Ireland within the realms of the EC’s first wave of enlargement

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Sincere thanks are due to Tapani Paavonen and Hans Otto Frøland, the organisers of this session, for their invitation to present this research paper at the XIV International Economic History Congress (IEHC) in Helsinki on 23 August 2006. This document builds upon a previous research paper – entitled “Ireland’s Experience of International Organisations in the 20th Century: European Integration from Marshall Aid to EEC Membership” – which was submitted as part of the session called *International integration and globalisation: governance strategies of small countries since the late XIXth century*, organised by Timo Myllyntaus, Hein Klemann, and Margrit Müller, at the XIII IEHC in Buenos Aires on 22 July 2002.

Indeed, this ongoing research into the history of Ireland’s European integration is part of a wider research project entitled *Breakthrough*, which is led by Fernando Guirao; other participants in this project include Alan S.Milward, N.Piers Ludlow, Hans Otto Frøland, and Morten Rasmussen. All comments and/or suggestions on this research paper are welcome.
Section 1 – Ireland within the realms of the EC's first wave of enlargement

1.1 – introduction

In 2005, former taoiseach (Irish prime minister) Garret FitzGerald went on record regarding the ties that link Ireland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the European Union (EU), by declaring that:

However paradoxical this may appear, future historians will, I believe, come to the view that the ultimate justification for Irish independence lay in Ireland's participation as a member state of the European Union … It was through accession in 1972 to what was then the European Community that the Irish State finally completed the process of separating itself from Britain, upon which it had remained almost totally economically dependent for half a century after the achievement of political independence … It was by freeing itself from extreme economic dependence upon its near neighbour and securing access to a much wider European market, that the Irish State, was for the first time in history empowered to take its place as an equal partner in economic terms and not just politically, with the rest of western Europe.¹

Typical of his views regarding Ireland's European integration, FitzGerald's words are, to a large extent, backed up by what the historical archives can now reveal, even if there are weaknesses in his arguments, such as the fact that Ireland's currency would remain strongly tied to sterling for some years to come after its entry into the European Communities (EC).²

In many respects, the Irish government's second and third attempts to attain EC membership are rather parochial tales because, as with the first application in 1961, both subsequent efforts took full account of the country's economic dependence on the UK. This is not to say that Ireland did not have its own reasons for joining, just that the European integration process had implications, and pressures, far beyond the confines of Irish borders. At the helm during Ireland's first attempt at entry in the first half of the 1960s, the decisive nature of Seán Lemass (taoiseach, 1959-66) and the arguments put forward by T.K. Whitaker (Department of Finance (D/F) secretary, 1956-69) informed the thinking behind subsequent policy development.³ Indeed, this decade was used to ready Irish agriculture and industry for the inevitable onset of freer trade, while also offering an opportunity for the social and political repercussions of this economic reorientation to be taken on board. At the same time, it is also possible to argue that there are parallels between Ireland's experiences and those of the other countries seeking EC entry in this period, indeed various threads tie all of the applicants together, not the least of which was their growing desire, or at least an acceptance of the need, for interdependence in an increasingly competitive, and perhaps even dangerous, world. Each country seeking EC accession had its own specific interests to protect. However, there was clearly safety in numbers, as well as space for individual economic development to take place, and this in particular is what attracted Ireland to the European integration project.

At its heart, this paper examines the processes involved prior to Ireland's full entry into the EC on 1 January 1973, particularly the lead up to, and execution of, as well as the responses to, substantive negotiations. It just so happens that accession was only secured at the third time of asking, previous attempts having failed in 1961-63, when actual negotiations never formally opened, and 1967, when even less substantive progress was made. Running parallel to these efforts were the various steps taken by the UK – as well as by Denmark and Norway – to join the EC, a process which at times complicated Dublin's position as the London government sought to help, bypass or even hinder Irish endeavours. Essentially, this text argues that Ireland gradually emerged from the UK's shadow, and increasingly saw full EC membership and interdependent relations with its continental European counterparts as a way to escape dependence on its nearest neighbour. Indeed, once EC entry was secured, it became clear that the Irish recognised the possibilities inherent in the EC, and were prepared to make accession work in their favour. Thus, from the outset, it is possible to argue that Ireland was not necessarily following in British footsteps, but that once the UK applied to join, and as it came closer to membership, the Irish government viewed accession as essential if not inevitable. In fact, once entry was secured, the Irish never seriously contemplated reversing their decision, unlike the London government which conducted a referendum in 1975 on whether to continue with its membership.
Thus, this paper essentially examines Ireland's European integration history in the period 1966 to 1973, and covers the first premiership of Jack Lynch, as well as other related developments in this period (such as the debates regarding equal pay for men and women, the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland, the introduction of Value Added Tax, et cetera). Particular attention is paid to the second unsuccessful application for membership of the European Communities (EC) in 1967, the departure of French president Charles de Gaulle from office in 1969, the EC accession negotiations of 1970-72, the subsequent ratification process (principally the Irish referendum), and ultimately Ireland's successful entry into the EC at the third attempt in 1973.

It places Ireland firmly within a comparative perspective, with special reference to the efforts of the UK, Denmark and Norway to secure the same result, and also examines Irish interaction with the governments of the then Member States (Belgium, France, (West) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Ultimately, this expansion of the EC from Six countries to Nine (ultimately Norway did not join) has become known as the first wave of enlargement, a process which remains relevant right up to the present day for the ongoing development of the EU. This paper builds upon previously published research regarding Ireland's first effort at entry, above all the monograph entitled Protectionism to liberalisation: Ireland and the EEC, 1957 to 1966, which paid specific attention to the unsuccessful 1961-63 negotiations. Indeed, this paper goes to the heart of ongoing research which will eventually form a monograph entitled Dependence to interdependence: Ireland and the EC, 1966 to 1973.

1.2 – methodological approach and brief literature survey

Various gaps in our knowledge regarding this period still remain, but these are slowly being filled in, and a clearer picture of this country’s European integration is emerging as a direct result, why and how certain decisions were taken, where Ireland stood in comparison to the other applicants, what it hoped to gain, and what it was prepared to lose. The materials necessary to write a history of Ireland’s European integration from 1966-1973 are now in the public domain, and continue to be worked through logically, if painstakingly. Informed by the research of historians such as Alan Milward,4 as well as political scientists like Andrew Moravcsik,5 this text makes full use of the primary source materials which have become available at the National Archives at Bishop Street in Dublin (NA), the Public Record Office at Kew in London (PRO), the Public Record Office Northern Ireland in Belfast (PRONI), and the National Archives at College Park in Washington (NARA), as well as the Historical Archives of the European Union at the European University Institute in Florence (ACE). There are still many holes to fill, but this text is a conscious effort to reassess the semi-official Irish government version of the country's European integration, written by D.J.Maher, via an in-depth re-examination rather than through revision.6 Indeed, in contrast to revisionism, this process is more akin to ‘vision’, that is the ability to see the full picture for the first time.

It is clear today that Irish historians, including Dermot Keogh,7 and political scientists, such as Brigid Laffan,8 have a wealth of knowledge and understanding to impart to us regarding Ireland’s European integration. In addition, significant contributions regarding this history have already been made, both on specific topics, for instance in relation to Ireland's second EC application by Jane Toomey,9 and also more substantial treatises, including the economic analysis put forward by Gary Murphy.10 However, this paper remains one of the first efforts to examine Ireland’s history of European integration before entry using the recently released archives.

1.3 – paper outline

First and foremost, this text considers the reactivated second application in 1967 by the new Dublin government of Jack Lynch (taoiseach, 1966-73 & 1977-79), before investigating the entry negotiations of 1970-72 conducted by Paddy Hillery (Irish foreign minister, 1969-73) in some detail, as well as the subsequent landslide referendum of 1972, and ultimately investigates the country’s preparations for EC membership as the year came to a close, as well as pointing towards its early experiences as a full member state. Across the 1960s and into the early 1970s, Ireland’s room for economic and political manoeuvre was severely limited, it
just did not have that many other options apart from EC membership, a fact which had been recognised for some years at the most senior levels of Irish government, business and society. Thus, while it is still possible to distinguish what was unique about Irish endeavours, there are also links with the efforts of the other applicants; these features, and the various developments which took place across this period, have been brought together under the four substantive sub-headings within this submission:

- Section 1 – Ireland within the realms of the EC’s first wave of enlargement;
- Section 2 – once bitten, twice shy? the 1967 attempt at membership;
- Section 3 – de Gaulle’s resignation and the 1970-72 negotiations; and
- Section 4 – Irish preparations for accession, from signature to entry.

Without doubt, any retrospective sense that Ireland was in some way better off entering the EC when it finally did does not tie in with the considerable efforts made by successive Dublin governments to effect entry throughout the 1960s. The transfer of power from Lemass to Lynch in late 1966 did not disrupt the integration process, in many ways it revitalised it and lent it consistency. There were, of course, both positive and negative developments across the second half of the 1960s. But, when Ireland did finally join, it is also subsequently clear that a whole new era in the country’s contemporary history dawned, a path which was paved by the Lemass government, and followed through by Lynch. Following accession, even with a change of administration only a matter of months later from a Fianna Fáil-led government to a Fine Gael-Labour coalition, Ireland’s economic liberalisation would continue apace, but would also have a profound impact in other quarters, such as Irish society and interaction by Irish politicians with their European counterparts. From 1973 onwards, Ireland became part of the western European mainstream and, even if there would be many growing pains, the economic interdependence which resulted was far more preferable than the economic dependence which had gone before. The periphery had indeed become a very uncomfortable place, and thus the core, for all its faults, held many more attractions.
Section 2 – once bitten, twice shy? the 1967 attempt at membership

2.1 – introduction

At the second time of asking, just under six years after its initial attempt at entry in July 1961, the Irish government’s renewed application to join the EC was virtually stillborn. Although its original effort to adhere was not vetoed in January 1963 – it had essentially been ignored – Ireland formally revived its request for the opening of accession negotiations in May 1967. There was no hesitation in doing so, indeed the opportunity was warmly welcomed by the Irish government. But, their bid only survived intact for some six months, that is until November 1967 and a second veto of the UK’s efforts by France. Once the second application from the UK failed, history was to repeat itself, with Dublin’s revitalised attempt to accede stumbling fatally, before this renewed effort rapidly descended into its previous state of limbo. Suddenly, the oft-repeated mantra by Irish government ministers, that is in response to questions regarding the status of Ireland’s bid, of EC entry by 1970 appeared to be rather optimistic.

This section examines Ireland’s 1967 effort to attain full EC membership under seven substantive headings, before proffering some intermediate concluding remarks linking this renewed – henceforth referred to as the second – application to its successful third attempt. It begins by looking at the foreign policy adjustments necessary for this second effort to proceed. It then examines Irish relations with the Commission and the other EC institutions, as well as with the most powerful Community partners, by exploring the main bilateral issues, in addition to an examination of Irish perceptions of how the EC institutions and partners were functioning. Thirdly, it looks at the other alternatives open to it apart from full EC membership. This involves the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area (AIFTA) agreement, as well as Irish links with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), relations with the members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the issue of associate EC membership.

Next, it presents a comparative of events in the 1960s as they pertained to Ireland; special attention is paid to the second application and an explanation for changes in the weights of issues is given. This leads to an assessment of who decided what in Dublin, identifying the decision-makers and how the decision-making process actually worked, before exploring the shift in power that took place at the heart of government. The subsequent sub-section compares the 1961-63 and 1967 negotiations, recounts what actually took place and explains how the application was modified between the two sets of negotiations. This is in order to determine which issues and standpoints were actually negotiable, and which were not; in both instances, the strategies and tactics the Irish followed are investigated in depth. At that stage, the most important issues are redefined, thereby explaining Dublin’s attitudes and policies so as to provide an explanation of where the main actors involved in the negotiations process actually stood. Finally, once policies, aims and means, as well as the bargaining process itself, have been examined, the impact of decisions at the various national and EC levels are introduced, with particular emphasis on Irish views.

Irish hopes of full EC entry, high at the beginning of 1967, were to be completely dashed by the end of the year. As Maher argues, it is true that the events surrounding the second application demonstrate a ‘striking resemblance’ to the first. It is readily apparent that negotiations were thwarted once more by the opposition of one member state in particular – France – and that the latter was only prepared to make the unsatisfactory offer of an ‘undefined link’ between the EC and the various applicants in the unspecified interim period before full membership.\textsuperscript{13} Indeed, it is undeniably the case that the actions taken by the French government destabilised the EC project. However, there were also subtle differences between the first two sets of negotiations. If nothing else, it was readily apparent that continued French opposition to enlargement was only a short – or at worst medium – term problem facing the other EC members and the applicants. In fact, the Irish continued to believe that accession was inevitable and that preparations for entry should remain both ongoing and necessary. At the same time, it is worth restating that Ireland was unsuccessful in its efforts to join the EC in 1967 ostensibly because of its own failings and inability to meet the entry criteria as much as it did for any other reason, a fact which too many previous commentators have chosen to gloss over. Clearly enough, the
opinions, chronology and detailed information put forward by Maher require some reflection in the light of the archival material now available, but so does the attitude that the fate of Ireland’s European integration was completely in the hands of others.

2.2 – foreign policy adjustments preceding/allowing Ireland’s application

Soon after the decision was taken in the summer of 1961 to apply for full membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), it became readily apparent that Ireland had embarked upon this course not only because it had been necessitated, but also because it was the right thing to do. The first application was concise, but both pointed and predictable. Once the UK government indicated that it was going to apply, the Irish felt that they had no real choice in the prevailing conditions but to do the same. After all, Ireland was economically dependent upon the UK. In terms of trade, for example, over 75% of Irish exports that year went directly to this one marketplace, while Ireland also sourced nearly 51% of its imports from there. Nevertheless, despite the groaning weight of this dependence, the EEC still offered an escape from an unhealthy bilateral reliance to a relationship of multilateral interdependence. In many ways, Ireland would remain a junior partner, but it would also have a voice and a forum. Thus, when it comes to the issue of adjusting foreign policy prior to, or allowing for, Ireland’s application, it should be noted that the most important decisions, in either economic or political terms, had already been taken long before the Taoiseach wrote to the EEC Council president in 1961.

Subsequent to the fallow period in Irish relations with the EEC during the mid-1960s, that is after its first application failed, the Dublin government had scratched around for an economic solution – at least in the intermediate period – to the onset of increasingly liberalised global trade before turning to its nearest neighbour just as it had so often in the past. The AIFTA agreement of December 1965 was meant to facilitate eventual entry into the European economic mainstream, but the creation of this free trade area between the UK and Ireland was also a solution in itself, even if was only envisaged as an interim answer. Temporary or not, the Irish government was prepared to become even more dependent on the UK in order to ready the economy for the realities of freer world trade. In truth, when it came to negotiating EC entry, full account had to be given not only to the fact that the AIFTA existed, but that it worked. Meanwhile, other pillars in Irish foreign policy were effectively abandoned in return for economic advancement. In political terms, for instance, it was obvious that certain realities had been faced, such as the existence of Northern Ireland and the partitioning of the island; indeed, Dublin was also readily prepared to sacrifice other policies when that was deemed necessary, such as military neutrality in return for a common European defence policy, that is if this was ever required. Virtually no policy was regarded as sacrosanct. Thus, little was needed in the realm of foreign policy adjustment to reactivate its application when the opportunity arose in the second half of the 1960s.

The fact that its first application had lapsed rather than collapsed meant that the new Taoiseach, Lynch, who had succeeded Lemass as prime minister in November 1966, was able “to propose to the Council of the Community the resumption of consideration of Ireland’s application” on 10 May 1967. This revitalised application went beyond the original application in both scope and detail. Although separate applications were made to the three Communities, they were essentially made in conjunction with one another. This is interesting in itself because, having applied for EEC membership in 1961, it was nearly eighteen months later before Ireland applied to join the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the first week of 1963; the ECSC application was never much more than an afterthought, and was in some ways deservedly ill-fated. The revived ECSC application did not develop or elaborate significantly upon the first effort, a clear indication of its relative importance. In fact, Ireland did not even manage to submit a membership application to the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) before the first French veto in January 1963; when it finally did come, the EURATOM application arrived some six years after the first EEC application, another sure sign of where Irish priorities lay. This time around, the three applications came together. It was a not inconsiderable departure from what had gone before, and at the very least signalled serious intent on the part of the Irish government.
The most obvious element to note about the 1967 EEC application is that it provided much more detail than the 1961 version, thereby giving more ‘hostages-to-fortune’ while simultaneously seeking to allay or pre-empt any Community fears regarding Ireland’s suitability for full membership. It also allowed Dublin the opportunity to make an opening gambit for the expected beginning of substantive negotiations. Nevertheless, the Irish government was certainly being careful. An earlier draft of the second application had contained a very revealing sentence:

In view, however, of the breakdown in January, 1963, of the British negotiations and the consequent economic implications for Ireland, the Irish Government did not seek to agree a date for negotiations and no further steps have since been taken in pursuance of the Council’s decision of October, 1962.

In contrast, the final version read: “The suspension in January, 1963, of the British negotiations created a situation in which it was not practicable to take further steps in pursuance of the Council’s decision of October, 1962”. Thus, all references to Irish inactivity and, perhaps more importantly, economic problems were removed. An important lesson had been learned from the first set of negotiations. Indeed, the second application did not just ask the Council to fix a date convenient to the Six in order to open negotiations. Lynch’s letter instead requested ‘an early date’ for this to happen. Furthermore, the AIFTA was given a prominent position and was also used as a justification for equitable treatment; it was, the Irish contended, “an added reason for urging the considerations in favour of concurrent negotiations”, that is at the same time as the EC negotiations were to take place with the UK.21

When the taoiseach entered Dáil Éireann (Irish lower house of parliament) on 11 May 1967, he was able to announce that his government had reactivated the application for EEC membership. Having previously debated the question of Irish entry in 1961 under the stewardship of Lemass, and having “received the support of the vast majority of Deputies” at that time, Lynch made it clear that, though there was room for “further discussion of the issues involved [in entry]”, the decision to apply had already been taken.22 Indeed, only the day before this statement, he had said:

... I regard the situation as being that we have a mandate from the Dáil to proceed with the application that has already been made. It will be my intention to move from where consideration of our application was left off in 1962. That was the point of decision by the Council ... to fix a date for the opening of negotiations with us.

The taoiseach categorically stated: “Our application is there. It never has been withdrawn. That is the situation”.23 Thus, it is possible to argue that little foreign policy adjustment was needed for Dublin to proceed with its second application; its desire for entry was well established, both on the record and public knowledge. In truth, it had been a regularly restated position by the government for a number of years by the second half of the 1960s.

2.3 – relations with the Commission and the main Community partners

Throughout the 1960s, the Irish case for full EC membership, particularly on its own merits but also in terms of presentation and substance, was relatively weak. Indeed, despite repeated protestations from Dublin to the contrary, it was clear that Ireland’s application was not standalone. In truth, it was always dependent upon the outcome of the UK bid. If its neighbour adhered to the EC, Ireland wanted to be able to do so with the same level of entitlement. And, even though relations with the EC institutions and potential future partners were particularly friendly, this did not mean that the Irish case for admission was without its own individual problems. In fact, a relative lack of enthusiasm for Irish membership sometimes emanated from the most unlikely of directions. For instance, in the process of garnering support for this second application, the taoiseach claimed: “We are now assured of the support of all Common Market nations, with the exception of France”.24 But, it was not only the French who were reluctant to accept Irish entry without further discussion. It is worth noting that, for example, “Luxembourg ... had been more reserved about Irish admission and perhaps more searching into possible Irish difficulties”.25 This was not just a case of the Luxembourg government backing up the French arguments regarding the UK; their reticence had merits going far beyond blind support for the positions being
adopted by a fellow EC member state, and had everything to do with the inherent weaknesses of Ireland's candidacy.

Nevertheless, Irish relations with the Commission and the main Community partners were on a reasonably sound basis, even if founded on reason and fact rather than heartfelt entreaties for consideration and understanding. Having met with senior Commission members in July 1967, the taoiseach said: “We laid our cards on the table, we bared our breasts. We told the members of the Commission to ask us any questions that they wanted and we gave them plain answers”. As these enquiries turned out to be of a technical nature, this meant that Lynch felt “we have a prima facie case for entry”. The Commission was due to submit a report to the Council in September 1967. And, when it did come, the Commission opinion was relatively positive. Once this emerged, the taoiseach wasted little time in noting that the Commission “unanimously recommended the opening of negotiations with the applicant States”. No definite date for the opening of negotiations was given, but Lynch was due to meet later that year with French president Charles de Gaulle in Paris on 3 November.

When it came to the other member states, Dublin clearly had the support of the Netherlands and Italy, for example. It was felt that there was every sign that the Italians were “as enthusiastic as the Dutch” about enlargement. When the Irish prime minister visited Rome that summer, he noted that he been there in 1950 for the Holy Year, but as he himself said: “I return again as a pilgrim … but this time it is as a pilgrim in the great cause of European unity”. Thus, his trip centred on a series of bilateral meetings between ministers regarding Ireland’s proposed EC membership; for once, Irish-Italian talks were not a secondary consideration to seeking an audience with the Pope. But, neither did they mask the reality of the position, despite Italian premier Aldo Moro’s confirmation that “the entry of Ireland into the E.E.C. is in accordance with the Italian desire to expand the Community to include those European countries which are prepared to accept its principles and objectives”.

Despite regular and public protestations to the contrary by senior government officials, Ireland was unable and unwilling to enter the EC as a full member without the UK doing so as well. If the latter entered, Dublin was not prepared to contemplate the proposal emerging from various quarters that associate, rather than full, membership was more appropriate in its case. It is worth restating that the major obstacle to Irish accession was not only de Gaulle’s objection to the UK, as the arguments regarding Irish membership had weaknesses that had their origins in Ireland as well. The Irish situation was summed up after Lynch’s trip to Paris in early November 1967. The French president stated: “We all stand now before an essential task: the construction of Europe … Everything indicates that Ireland can and must be closely associated with the achievement of this great work”. His choice of words was not accidental. The taoiseach’s response was equally revealing; he said:

> We did not study this question [of Ireland acceding without the UK] … I do not know what the chances are of Britain becoming a member of the Common Market, but I believe that this day is inevitable in the long or not so long run. We should prefer to become a member of the Common Market at the same time as the United Kingdom.

But, in Ireland’s case, associate EC membership was not necessarily an unacceptable interim step; however, it was not an alternative to full accession, especially if the UK was accorded the latter status and Ireland then had to wait outside. The Irish privately informed the British “that to shout a welcome to ‘interim’ would be to weaken momentum for full membership; nevertheless they would have to take a look at it”. Indeed, they felt that “there might be something to be said for an interim arrangement embodying a commitment to full membership after a stated period”, though this could not be envisaged for Ireland alone.

2.4 – alternative strategies to EEC membership

Once it had been decided in 1961 that full EEC membership was one of its primary foreign policy goals, it was clear that other alternatives would have to take a back seat. These options – such as associate membership or entry into EFTA – had already been considered in the context of the first application, and had either been dismissed by, or denied, to the Irish. When the 1961-63 negotiations broke down, and having considered the
limited choices subsequently available, Ireland had reverted to form. The AIFTA agreement was a logical step for them to take, even if it meant increased economic dependence upon the UK in the short term. EC entry remained the ultimate goal, though it too had its drawbacks. Indeed, in 1967, the UK ambassador to Ireland reported in some depth upon the “Common Market and its attraction for Ireland”. As he noted:

... there is a certain amount of wishful thinking about Ireland's proposed membership of the Common Market – all the dragons, it is thought, will be swept out of the way by this deus ex Europa. But some people are beginning to note that the Free Trade Agreement with Britain seems to have raised as many problems as it has solved; and they wonder if Common Market entry may have similar consequences. (It would also be true to say that pessimism about Britain's prospects of entry is increasing – and Ireland ... could not venture in alone.)

Thus, other strategies had to be contemplated because, if full EEC membership was denied to Ireland, other arrangements would have to be made instead.33

Denied EFTA membership in 1959, it is clear that this organisation did not offer a suitable alternative to full EC accession as far as the Irish were concerned; the principal attraction of the latter quickly became evident: its development of a Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). Without a meaningful agricultural dimension, EFTA was not that attractive an option, especially when Ireland already had more or less free access to its main export market. The real short-term danger was that this might ever be closed off. Dublin's main concern regarding EFTA was that its relative coherence might obscure Irish efforts to join the EC as the other applicants – that is, both Denmark and Norway – were, like the UK, members of the former. Ministerial pronouncements from the UK Foreign Office (FO) on the proposed expansion of the EC readily contemplated UK entry, as well as that of other EFTA members, but regularly omitted mention of Ireland or, when they did, accorded it a lesser status. It was bad enough the UK foreign minister George Brown proposing that the UK might enter the EC before the other applicants; after all, his suggestion ran completely counter to official Irish government policy.34

But, in addition, it was not that unusual for other FO statements to fly in the face of agreed Anglo-Irish interaction on European integration. For example, despite his mentioning Ireland at an early stage in a speech to the Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly, one FO junior minister ignored it completely when he went on to state:

We firmly believe that the best future for all of us in Europe lies in uniting our efforts, economically, politically and in the field of defence as well ... by enlarging the European Communities to embrace Britain and those of our E.F.T.A. partners who are ready to come in ... behind those governments whether in the Six or in Britain and our other partners in EFTA who are applying for membership with us, are our people.

There was, of course, no reference to Ireland in this connection. In many ways, this may just have been an oversight, that was the official version, but it was a worryingly regular one. Indeed, one Irish embassy official in London complained that this FO minister “referred positively to the applications for membership of other members of EFTA, but not to the application of the Irish Republic. He asked whether this had some special significance”.35 Dublin was very sensitive in such matters and wondered whether its omission was a sign that it would be seen as little more than a secondary consideration. Obviously, that was the true position, but the Irish did not particularly feel the need to have it reinforced publicly, or for that impression to become formalised in terms of the Six.

In the light of these Anglo-Irish difficulties, at least there was some evidence of other efforts to drag Ireland into the global economic mainstream being successful. For instance, having taken part in the Kennedy Round negotiations, the Irish government succeeded in persuading ⅔ of GATT members during the summer of 1967 to allow it to enter.36 Ireland signed and became a contracting party later that year. Beyond full EC membership, the only other viable route for the Irish to follow was an associate status, with all its inherent drawbacks. Nonetheless, this was never seriously contemplated as an alternative, only as an intermediate state, especially while the possibility of full membership remained open. Even when de Gaulle sounded the taoiseach out, the latter responded emphatically. Lynch said:
The President recalled the previous offers which had been made on associate membership and he wondered why Britain had not seemed willing to accept some form of association until full membership was possible. He then asked me if Ireland had ever contemplated associate membership. This was just in the form of a question. I told him that we had not contemplated such an arrangement that we had our application for full membership on the table on the basis of our readiness to undertake the full obligation of the Rome Treaty.

The *taoiseach* added that the French president referred “to the fact that some of the difficulties attached to the British application created difficulties for Ireland also. He then said in the event of British negotiations and ultimate membership being delayed for a considerable period we would have French support and goodwill for securing an interim arrangement which would eventually lead to full membership”. It was clear that Dublin was prepared to investigate the possibilities of ‘interim arrangements’. However, Lynch “took care to point out that any such arrangement of a working apprenticeship for Ireland on her own with the Common Market nations would require long and detailed negotiations within the context of the Treaty of Rome, the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement and the GATT countries”. Lynch was quoted as saying: “No study on this question will be undertaken until we know the outcome of the deliberations on our application now before the Council of Ministers in Brussels”. Full EC membership remained the number one desire, and all other alternatives were seen as problematic or unwelcome.

2.5 – changes in the weights of issues

Once the decision to apply to the EEC was finally taken, Dublin’s views on entry were to remain remarkably consistent. In very basic terms, the Irish government position boiled down to attaining full EC membership by 1970 and doing so simultaneously with the UK. Therefore, although its views on specific issues would be moulded by events and through negotiations, this basic attitude to EC entry and European integration followed a very similar pattern as the decade progressed. After the formal decision to apply for full EEC membership was taken in 1961, the government went about readying and convincing the Irish people of the benefits of membership. Obviously enough, the EEC had changed in the intervening period between the first and second applications, indeed the rate of integration had considerably quickened as the decade progressed. In Ireland’s case, there were many reasons why the time had arrived to come on board the European mainstream.

Further European integration has always presented both opportunities and threats, with the benefits and dangers inherent in membership often being only a question of perspective. For the Irish, the emergence of CAP meant that the agricultural sector was quickly convinced about its substance and potential; it was to be only very gradually though that industry would recognise the significance of freer trade, as well as the implications inherent in the creation of a common market. With the former in mind, the interim between Ireland’s first and renewed bids for membership had seen this common policy going from virtual non-existence to being almost fully fashioned. The adaptation of industry to the vagaries of international trade liberalisation was much more problematic. This rise in industrial capacity supported by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was not insignificant, but indigenous industry was having serious problems emerging from the umbrella of protectionism. At least exports were demonstrating greater diversity and expanding quickly into value added and manufactured goods. But, the problem of moving from protection to substantial liberalisation remained.

It is crucial to note that, although Ireland was prepared to allow its agricultural sector to enter the common market with little or no transitional period, its opening gambit regarding industry was that such a period was essential. Clearly, the Commission could not entertain such an idea easily. In fact, their view was that “it would be impossible to live with a situation in which there would be different periods for different sectors and for different applicants”. In this way, the progress made and mapped out within the AIFTA agreement, and the transition period that would last well in the mid-1970s, was to become Ireland’s opening negotiating position. And, though issues such as Irish restrictions on the sale of land and tax breaks encouraging FDI would have to be addressed, the Commission could report that it “did not see any serious issues arising on the Irish application”. After all, unlike the UK, it did not have balance of payments – or any other overly significant or outstanding – problems in economic terms.
It was not only in relation to the – on-balance – economic benefits of the EC that the general public needed convincing. Considerable effort was expended on the political level to demonstrate the essential nature of membership, while some attempt was also made to allay legitimate fears that those inside and outside the country held regarding Ireland’s propensity for membership. The Irish case for membership was summed up thus:

The first is the belief that with both Britain and Ireland inside Europe, the frontier between North and South will wither away and partition come automatically to some sort of end. The second is the feeling that Ireland can never be properly independent politically so long as she remains economically tied to a single foreign country, and that country Britain. The third is a vague and unformulated disenchantment with being a small country ... Ireland ... would like to be part of a larger entity and Europe is the obvious answer.42

It was not just a case of selling the economics of European integration to the Irish public, as the general population and other onlookers also needed to be convinced about its suitability in political terms. As a consequence of Irish endeavours during the 1961-63 process, any lasting Commission or existing member state fears about its military neutrality, once seen as a potential stumbling-block, or indeed the government’s views on the eventual creation of a European defence or military capacity, had gradually diminished. Ireland did not want to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but it was determined that the latter would not be misrepresented as being tied up any obligations in joining the EC. This was considerably aided by Dublin’s efforts to ignore any worries about a loss of sovereignty and its concentration on the economic gains.

2.6 – decision-makers and the decision-making process

The most important participants in the decision-making process in Ireland were consistently the same. The largest political party, Fianna Fáil, was elected to government in March 1957 and would remain in power for sixteen years, winning a series of elections throughout the 1960s. Having taken responsibility for Ireland’s relations with the EEC upon becoming tánaiste (Irish deputy prime minister), as well as industry and commerce minister, in March 1957, Lemass held onto that responsibility regarding European integration when he became taoiseach two years later in June 1959.43 A political realist, as well as a confirmed Atlanticist, Lemass viewed the economic developments in western Europe as an opportunity that had to be grasped. This pattern was replicated when Lynch replaced Lemass as industry & commerce minister upon the latter’s promotion, before himself becoming taoiseach at the end of 1966. In turn, Lynch held onto his post as prime minister until March 1973, before losing a general election some three months after Ireland entered the EC. It is worth noting that foreign minister Frank Aiken – who was to remain in office from March 1957 to July 1969, and who also served as tánaiste from April 1965 – played a very limited role in the development of Ireland’s European integration policy. Although Lynch’s relationship with his ministers was more collegiate, and perhaps in some respects weaker than that of his predecessor, the pattern of decision-making on European issues had already been set by the forceful and decisive approach Lemass favoured in cabinet.

It is vital to acknowledge that the most important civil servant in this era – himself a strong advocate of economic liberalisation and of the possibilities that European integration offered – was finance secretary Whitaker. He was to remain in situ from May 1956 until March 1969, while the other leading departmental secretaries were also vastly experienced and remained relatively constant.44 thus, it is very easy to understand why government policy towards the EC was marked more by continuity than by change throughout this time. Although industry and commerce secretary J.C.B.MacCarthy was more wary of the EC than his contemporaries, Whitaker had the considerable support of agriculture secretary J.C.Nagle and external affairs secretary C.C.Cremin.45 In truth, the departmental secretaries, taking their lead from Whitaker, were of fundamental importance to the government’s decision-making process, directly informing the taoiseach and the Irish cabinet of their considered views on EC issues. Indeed, the reports emanating from diplomats in the Department of External Affairs (D/FA) who were based in Brussels, as well as across the capitals of Europe and beyond, were forwarded to the Department of the Taoiseach (D/T) as common practice. It was to be the D/T, not the D/FA, which co-ordinated Ireland’s bid for membership under the direct tutelage of the prime minister. It was on this basis that co-ordinating decisions regarding Ireland’s European integration were taken,
and this clearly leant a sense of coherence to them. The capacity for accurate reporting on EC affairs, and the ability to influence support for Ireland’s case, was considerably assisted by the presence of a separate EC diplomatic mission in Brussels from September 1965. Even the senior Irish diplomats based across Europe, though their postings were intermittently swapped around, were consistently the same men.46 This could have meant some staleness in approach, but instead saw stability coupled with the odd flash of dynamism. Sound relations with the UK mission, as well as with the other applicants with representatives in Brussels, allied to open channels with Commission officials and member state diplomatic representatives, meant that the Irish government was rarely caught completely off guard on EC issues. In addition, Irish representatives were clearing keeping other players, notably the United States of America (US), very well informed about any significant developments.

The only other real shift in power at the heart of government was the emergence of a group of ‘young Turks’ headed by the likes of Charles Haughey, Brian Lenihan, and Donagh O’Malley. Although it was only gradually that this new cadre replaced the old guard, the introduction of these young politicians to high office meant that the drive for EC accession came to be seen as progressive. Antagonism towards membership was in many ways limited to a section within the – electorally relatively weak – Labour Party, while strong support for government policy on EC membership emanated from the main opposition party, Fine Gael. Indeed, their backing was epitomised in the role played by one of their leading figures, the aforementioned Garret FitzGerald, a keen advocate of European integration when he served in Seanad Éireann (Irish upper house of parliament) during the 1960s, who was to become foreign minister when Fianna Fáil were finally ousted from power in 1973. The only other significant sources of opposition came, it was argued by a succession of Irish government ministers, from people and parties such as Enoch Powell, Ian Paisley, and Sinn Féin.47 A relatively motley crew, the disaffected did not really reflect the prevailing view on European integration.

2.7 – the 1961-63 and 1967 negotiations compared

For Ireland, the most obvious similarity between the two sets of negotiations is that they both failed. However, even the term ‘negotiations’, when applied to Ireland’s dealings with the EC institutions and the member states in the periods 1961-63 and 1967, is misleading. The fact of the matter is that, in both instances, substantive talks regarding entry never actually got going. Indeed, EC entry negotiations with the Irish barely even reached the procedural level. In the eighteen months between Ireland’s initial application and the French president’s first veto, the nearest that the Irish got to arguing their case for entry were presentations delivered in Brussels by the taoiseach in January 1962 and by senior civil servants in May 1962. Although the EEC Council agreed in October 1962 that negotiations with the Irish should open, that was as far as the first set of negotiations got. When it came to the second set of discussions, there was little progress beyond the point reached five years previously; indeed, the renewed application only remained alive for six months before again finding itself consigned to the backburner.

From the Irish perspective, there are some other striking similarities between the first and second sets of negotiations. This can even be seen from the timing of the applications, for example, as the original Irish bid in 1961 was tabled ten days before that of the UK, but in the full knowledge that an application from the latter was coming. Meanwhile, Ireland’s fervour in renewing its application in 1967 meant that, as the UK ambassador left the EEC Council president’s office, the Irish ambassador entered.48 The reality of Anglo-Irish economic relations makes a complete nonsense of public claims and efforts by the Dublin government to differentiate or to extricate Ireland’s bid from dependence on the UK. Of course, that did not stop successive administrations maintaining that the Irish application was separate to any other country’s efforts. After all, Dublin insisted that its negotiations for entry should run in parallel with those of the other applicants and, when this did not happen, were prepared to settle for simultaneous accession. But, on the two occasions when London’s efforts to secure entry into the EC failed, the Irish were not prepared to negotiate sole entry by themselves. As Lynch had impressed upon de Gaulle, “the applications of both countries, although distinct, were closely linked, and that there was no question of Ireland wanting to go it alone”.49
The tactics employed by the Irish were also remarkably consistent. The most obvious examples of this were the tours of EC capitals that Lemass and Lynch undertook during the first and second applications. Obviously, these trips brought the Irish case right to the heart of the decision-making process. In the autumn of 1962, by which time the British, Danes and Norwegians all appeared to be making substantive progress in opening and conducting talks, the *taoiseach* embarked upon his series of whirlwind visits to various European capitals. During the first half of October, Lemass met with senior government ministers and officials in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands, as well as with EEC Commission president Walter Hallstein. Indeed, it was while he was in Germany that Lemass received the news he was waiting for, when the EEC Council finally acceded to the Irish entreaty to open negotiations. In turn, in order to avoid any unnecessary delays in opening bilateral talks during the 1967 effort, Lynch mirrored his predecessor's strategy, and went on a tour of European capital cities in order to facilitate the opening of Irish entry negotiations. Between June and July, Lynch visited The Hague and Bonn, before going on to Rome, Brussels – where he also took the opportunity to meet with EC Commission president Jean Rey – and Luxembourg. It was only later in the year that he was able to arrange the ‘crucial’ meeting in Paris. This was “the first direct contact between General de Gaulle and an Irish head of government since the Lemass visit to the French capital in 1962”. And, although the tour provided a welcome stimulus to Ireland’s European integration, and certainly raised its profile, ultimately the 1967 efforts only proved to be a stepping-stone to eventual entry, as the Lynch government found itself obliged to slip back into a waiting game.

As with the earlier negotiations, it is readily apparent that de Gaulle viewed Ireland’s bid in conjunction with that of the UK. If Ireland had been capable of entering the EEC alone in 1963, that is despite the French veto of the British bid, it would have been welcome to do so; indeed, overtures were made to the Irish at that time. This was exactly what happened again in 1967, the French president even going so far as to say that:

> France would in principle welcome Irish entry into the European Communities. Irish entry presented no problem to the French. They were aware, however, that because of the close links between the Irish and British economies, the fate of the British application might be regarded by the Irish government as relevant to their own application.

The Dublin government was not in a position to take such a step without the acquiescence of, or indeed the lead coming from, London. Even at this point in early November 1967, Lynch publicly declared that there was a 50-50 chance of entry by 1970. However, the French were clearly against early negotiations with the UK because of “the unhealthy state of the British economy, the reserve role of sterling, and the impact on the structure of the E.E.C. of admitting new members straight away” – in other words, France did not need a rival for its leadership role. The Irish succeeded “in getting an assurance of support for the eventual accession of Ireland to the E.E.C. as a full member” but, for the time being, it was clear that other links would require further attention. These included, for example, a visit by Irish government officials to France “to study the added value tax system which is to become the standard system in the Common Market”. It is interesting to note that the imposition of this new Value Added Tax (VAT) system on Irish people, a necessary prerequisite to ease Ireland’s accession, did not seem to be causing the Irish government very much distress.

2.8 – attitudes/policies in the negotiation process: the impact of decisions

As formal accession negotiations with Ireland never actually began in either 1961-63 or 1967, it is worth noting that, of all the issues in which the Irish government declared an interest, the impact of EC membership on relations with Northern Ireland was of some considerable significance. It was not just a question though of trying to end partition by stealth. This is just as well because, despite the deteriorating position in Northern Ireland, especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it is possible to argue that European integration remained – for the most part – a separate issue from the Dublin government’s other major foreign policy concern, and it was treated as such by significant foreign players like the US. For example, strong American support for Irish entry into the EC remained constant, even if there was a much more remarked reluctance for the US government to involve itself in the developing ‘Troubles’. Indeed, on the specific issue of Ireland and the EC, it was understood within the White House that it was “economically essential for the Irish to join the Common Market whenever Britain is admitted, since more than half of Ireland’s trade is with the UK”. This was the
situation when entry negotiations finally opened in mid-1970, and would remain the US position when they reached a successful conclusion some eighteen months later.

Other Northern Irish issues, such as Stormont’s proposals to construct a nuclear power station to generate electricity, were also bound to arouse concerns in Dublin, especially in the wake of the Windscale (subsequently renamed Sellafield) incident in 1957, and indeed any future role that EURATOM might feasibly play in the European integration project. However, it was the “free movement of labour across international boundaries” that particularly concerned Belfast and at the same time aroused a response from Dublin and London. Ostensibly, the Stormont government argued that:

The free movement of European nationals into the United Kingdom would have a damaging impact on the economy of Northern Ireland, but the [labour and national insurance] Minister’s main anxiety was to preserve the powers available under the Safeguarding of Employment Act in relation to Irish Republican nationals.\textsuperscript{58}

At the same time, of course, the benefits of freer trading arrangements between the two parts of the island would allow manufactured goods produced in Northern Ireland to find their way onto the market of their southern neighbour.\textsuperscript{59} There would therefore be the question of balancing the advantages and disadvantages of membership. Meanwhile, being part of a common market would greatly facilitate the attraction of FDI, while Northern Ireland’s considerable agriculture sector would also benefit from the CAP.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, it is interesting to observe that many of the hopes and doubts regarding integration were shared between the two parts of the island.

In fact, there was no doubt that EC membership would have significant and far-reaching influences. There were issues that both Irelands realised would impact, at least in the longer term, on how their economies and societies operated – for instance, the question of equal pay for men and women vexed both governments,\textsuperscript{61} and then there was the position of the Irish language, issues such as sovereignty, and even the negotiation of a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) for Dublin – but these difficulties did not necessarily make EC membership substantially less attractive.\textsuperscript{62} However, recognition and implementation of a policy such as equal pay were two different things, with one newspaper noting that “we can’t dally much longer, especially as we now formally aspire to Common Market membership”.\textsuperscript{63} The impact on Irish society did not stop there, because the “regulation in the Irish public service requiring a woman to resign on marriage” was also going to require serious attention.\textsuperscript{64} Therefore, the decision taken at the beginning of the 1960s to seek membership, and its eventual attainment, was going to have repercussions that would be felt long into the future; these were never going to be limited to economics or politics, even if there was more private rather than public recognition of this fact by government.

2.9 – intermediate conclusions

Throughout the 1960s and well beyond, Ireland’s approach to European issues demonstrated, as the current Irish president Mary McAleese has pointed out, “very substantial elements of continuity and consensus”.\textsuperscript{65} Although geographically located on the periphery of Europe, this did not stop successive Irish governments from attempting in 1961-63 and again in 1967 to join what had rapidly become the mainstream. Even if its first two attempts failed, it was also readily apparent that the ultimate goal remained EC accession as a full member. And, while ‘entry by 1970’ had clearly become unobtainable because of de Gaulle’s successive vetoes, there was no doubting that, having come relatively closer – certainly no further away – at the second attempt, Dublin was determined to make it a case of third time lucky. The inevitability of eventual accession should not have precluded an honest assessment of its advisability, but in truth this did not happen, and therefore the failure of this renewed attempt in 1967 only made the Irish government more determined to succeed and less likely to be circumspect.

At this juncture, it is perhaps worth reiterating where Ireland actually stood in relation to what has been termed by Andrew Moravcsik as the “Consolidation of the Common Market, 1958-1970: Preferences and outcomes", in other words with reference to where the larger EC Member State and institutional, as well as UK, priorities
lay; thus, **Table 1: Irish preferences according to Moravcsik’s model of Common Market consolidation** places Ireland’s relative positions within this sphere:66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>IRELAND’S POSITION</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>industrial tariff removal</td>
<td>reluctantly accepts the inevitability and necessity of tariff removal, while trying to work at ways around it, fears dumping and for the future of indigenous industry, but – even if it needs time to adapt – generally favours the free movement of goods and the elimination of duties and quantitative restrictions between member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>under pressure from farmers who are strongly in favour, the government would like to have an input in shaping the actual policy, even if it is fundamentally disposed to the idea anyway for a number of economic, political and social reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>external tariff policy</td>
<td>slow to respond to GATT, it wants high agricultural protection, but needs time so that it can gradually come into line with EC policy, certainly beyond the largely symbolic efforts of the early 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British membership</td>
<td>realises that if the UK is in the EC then it must be in as well because, while admission will require constitutional change, its main fear is being left out in the cold; happy to conclude the AIFTA agreement as a precursor to EC internal trade harmonisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transport</td>
<td>worries about the country’s peripheral nature, the government wants only gradual liberalisation, but is not going to look for derogations or any special arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign policy cooperation</td>
<td>weakly in favour of European cooperation, but wants to avoid making military neutrality an issue at home or in Brussels, though in practice – if not in theory – this means that it is opposed to NATO while supporting an eventual but as yet undefined European defence mechanism, at least in the rhetoric it employs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutions</td>
<td>not interested in the ECSC or EURATOM although it will join both, it is strongly in favour of the EEC by the end of this period, and wants an equal voice in decisions, thus tacitly supporting the Luxembourg compromise; realises early on that it will have to accept, and provide constitutionally for, the <em>acquis communautaire</em>, but is quite happy with other benefits associated with full entry, such as the European Investment Bank and the European Social Fund</td>
</tr>
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Why Ireland entered the EC, and how, are just two of the questions that need answering in the light of the second attempt failing. In truth, even if its own negotiations would prove to be relatively unproblematic, its reliance on their successful completion by the UK did not augur well. Ireland’s overall role in this first wave of EU enlargement negotiations, based upon its first and second attempts at entry, had been unremarkable. The third set of negotiations would go some way towards redeeming the Dublin government’s credibility, but it comes as no surprise that it would take a considerable investment in terms of time and energy for the Irish to succeed. Indeed, in the period between The Hague summit in December 1969 and the signing of the Treaty of Accession in January 1972, Irish ministers and parliamentary secretaries would make, according to Hillery, a total of 21 journeys to ‘continental countries’ in connection with Ireland’s entry into the EC.67 This figure appears to be a significant underestimate, as there were, perhaps, double this number of significant sets of meetings. Entry was never predestined, but it would not be for the want of trying if it was not secured.
Section 3 – de Gaulle’s resignation and the 1970-72 negotiations

3.1 - introduction

It is difficult to underestimate the importance for Ireland’s eventual accession of de Gaulle’s resignation as French president on 28 April 1969. It is worth noting that his objections to EC enlargement were not marked by some personal enmity towards the Irish cause. Indeed, reason and fact suggests otherwise, ranging from his declared ancestry to the fact that within a fortnight of his resignation he went to Ireland; indeed, he would remain there for six weeks, essentially for the duration of the French presidential elections, which surely demonstrates that his antipathy, or at least reluctance, had another government in mind apart from the one based in Dublin. But this is not to reduce this examination of Ireland’s entry to personality politics. Succeeded as head of state, following the resulting presidential election, by Georges Pompidou, previously de Gaulle’s prime minister, there was a noticeable shift in the French government’s attitude to EC enlargement. The appointment of Maurice Schumann as French foreign minister was a sign of this new orientation, as was the new French president’s declaration that:

... [they were] prepared, with regard to European integration, to go as quickly and as far as our partners themselves are prepared to go, quickly and far towards a Europe aware of her own destiny ... [even if] the enlargement of the Common Market to new members, and to Great Britain first and foremost, had to be discussed and agreed first of all with the Community partners.68

Although a clear sea-change in French attitudes towards enlargement was apparent, the next big step for Ireland would be to negotiate entry on its own merits.

The task facing it was huge, even with the appointment of other Europeanists to the new French cabinet, such as Valéry Giscard d’Estaing as finance and economy minister. Prior to de Gaulle’s departure, d’Estaing made remarks about the extension of the EC to a Community of Seven, thus including the UK but no other countries; such statements, their wider connotations and possible implications, were always likely to be picked up in the Irish capital, and this was the kind of utterance that habitually caused grave concern.69 Indeed, the Irish privately admitted that they “would prefer to see M. Pompidou being led into a positive line of thought by somebody other that M. Giscard d’Estaing”.70 It was not just from the UK that noises emanated regarding Ireland’s secondary status in the first wave of enlargement.

Nevertheless, de Gaulle’s resignation should still have set pulses racing in Dublin. Speaking in the Dáil on 22 April 1969, the taoiseach, when asked about the current position of Ireland’s application for admittance, and more specifically for a ‘reliable date’ for entry, was only able to say:

The present position is that Ireland’s application for membership of the European Economic Community, as well as those of the other applicants, continues to remain on the Agenda of the EEC Council but ... there is still disagreement among the member countries on the question of the opening of negotiations ... the date of Ireland’s accession to the EEC will depend in the first instance on how soon the member governments can agree among themselves on the opening of negotiations with the applicant countries.71

However, the French president’s departure did not make entry any easier either, certainly not in the short term. Press reports that Ireland was not necessarily any closer to joining quoted ‘official circles’ in Dublin who did not foresee any rapid, but more likely incremental, change in its chances of entering the EC. Apparently, the main obstacle to UK (and Irish) entry was France, and not de Gaulle, according to these Irish foreign ministry sources. Nonetheless, outside Irish government circles, it was felt that de Gaulle’s departure might well end up changing everything, certainly leading to less rigidity and a ‘loosening up’ of French attitudes to enlargement. Speculation regarding his successor, and the implications for Ireland, highlighted the fact that Pompidou was regarded as “even more right-wing on Europe than the General”, while d’Estaing, though “more liberal ... has spoken in support of the ‘Britain only’ move”. If that became official French policy, it was said that it would be regarded with ‘dismay in Dublin’. A meeting the next month to discuss a European system for granting patents
was seen as the first opportunity to see whether de Gaulle’s departure would lead to a change in the EC picture; this meeting was significant in itself as it was noted that Ireland would negotiate with the Six for the first time. But, it would only be at The Hague later in the year when real progress was made.

In the meantime, the Irish government endeavoured to help their situation. Thus, when asked in parliament about consultations with the new French administration, the Irish foreign minister was able to declare that:

We have been keeping in close touch with the French authorities on the question of this country's application for membership of the European Economic Community and this we shall, of course, continue to do with any new French administration.

He added that, with de Gaulle’s resignation, ‘no change’ was contemplated from Dublin with regard to attempted entry. One of the difficulties however would be in persuading not only France, as well as the other member states, but also the Commission, that EC enlargement should not just be about UK entry. Apparently, there was “no evidence of euphoria” in the EC institutions or in the diplomatic missions of Brussels as a result of de Gaulle’s resignation, even if, of course, it was felt that there were ‘more favourable prospects’, though only in the longer, and not necessarily in the immediate, term. In addition, it was felt that only with the emergence of a new French president and parliament, and really then only from October 1969 onwards, that a clearer picture would emerge. And, in the background, there was still a strong feeling in Dublin that certain voices in the Commission, including Sicco Mansholt (the EC agriculture commissioner), as well as in London, would want to see the UK enter without the other applicants in tow. The Irish ambassador in Brussels noted that the d'Estaing idea was still doing the rounds, while pointing out that an EC of Seven to include the UK, and to defer the entry of the other applicants, was being mentioned; and, although it was gaining support, it was felt that it had not yet become a ‘serious proposition’. These worries might have been more imaginary than substantial, but Irish fears were not wholly irrational or without precedent and experience.

The taoiseach sought some reassurances from the British, and was told that London “did not propose to ‘rush in’ now with any new initiative”, but would await developments in France and then in the EC as a whole. The Irish delegation in Brussels was able to add further caution to a pre-emptive move by stating that the UK mission felt that little would happen before the end of the year, and that their main advice was to ‘do nothing precipitate’. However, a window of opportunity was obviously developing. And, when the German foreign minister, Willy Brandt, declared in London that serious negotiations for UK entry would probably be under way relatively soon, he added: “I not only hope, but I think there is a good chance before we come to the end of this year we will have entered into a period of serious negotiations”. One media commentator felt that once the French presidency was secured, and even though he was under some pressure from d’Estaing, Pompidou would have a more favourable approach to EC enlargement. Whatever emerged, it was clear that the Irish would have to be ready. Considering that the first Irish application went ahead upon “a wave of euphoria and starry-eyed idealism of renewing ancient religious and cultural links with continental Europe”, it was undoubtedly the case that:

Since 1963 we have as a nation been drifting without positive goals while becoming more affluent ... We are wiser and more hard-headed now for the next assault on Europe and, hopefully, better prepared for the tough, even ruthless, negotiations which lie ahead.

In continuing to ready the country economically for entry, the Irish government also began to polish the arguments and strategy it would use once negotiations began. But it remained imperative for Ireland to be a consideration for the Six once the go-ahead for negotiations was given.

3.2 – the implications of The Hague summit

The change of government in France, as well as the relatively positive noises soon emanating from Paris regarding enlargement, meant that an opportunity for real progress had suddenly been created. The Council was not necessarily slow to take advantage, with its meeting on 22 July 1969 declaring that a conference of
Heads of State/Government would be held at The Hague later in the year, the Council communiqué announcing that it would take place:

... in order to examine the problems facing the Community, in particular in the fields of its completion, its consolidation and its enlargement ... The Council also instructed the Commission to bring up to date, in so far as appears necessary in the light of developments which have occurred since, the Opinions it presented in September 1967 and April 1968 on the requests for accession made by the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway.80

The Commission’s formal, albeit interim, opinion had been presented on 29 September 1967 to the Council and covered all four applicants though, according to D.J. Maher, there was the suggestion that Ireland was “unlikely to present any serious problems”, a sense reinforced by a further Commission opinion submitted on 5 April 1968.81 Subsequently, as the autumn of 1969 progressed, there was a strong sense that The Hague meeting would see substantial progress, the only serious stumbling block as far as Ireland was concerned being the continued speculation regarding the creation of an EC of Seven. On 5 August 1967, the Irish prime minister had been moved to declare that “such a move would be disastrous for the Irish economy”, but it was only when the Commission’s revised opinion reached the Council on 17 October 1969 that such rumours finally began to die out.82 Understandably given its past experiences, Dublin continued its vigilant watch over all statements regarding enlargement which even hinted at limited entry.

The Commission held that entry negotiations with the four applicants should open simultaneously and, despite fears that they would not be given the go-ahead, The Hague summit agreed that they should start. The interim between first applying for EC membership and the opening of substantive negotiations nearly a decade later has been retrospectively interpreted in Irish circles as offering an opportunity for the country to address its economic problems.83 In many respects this is a false argument, but mainly because Ireland had no say in the matter, it was a case of needs must. Throughout the Lemass and Lynch premierships though, there was an aspiration to swap dependency for interdependency. However, it was only now that external circumstances had changed that the Irish were both inclined and able to take full advantage. There were still obstacles to overcome, and significant players to convince, two arguments which also need to be mentioned before the actual negotiations can be examined. On the one hand, there was the worsening situation in Northern Ireland, which would be brought to the attention of the United Nations (UN), on the other there was the wider context of Cold War realities, such as the opening of Irish diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

3.3 – third time around: Ireland’s 1970-72 entry negotiations

Without wanting to devalue the day-to-day efforts that were to prove necessary in effecting full membership, the patient and labour-intensive discussions required for successful negotiations, or indeed to present an overly-detailed analysis of the public and private efforts required, it is possible to discern certain specific episodes in the early 1970s to explain how and why Ireland eventually became a full member of the EC. These developments, presented later in this section in the form of historical snapshots, included:

- the opening EC negotiating position adopted by Ireland (in the autumn of 1970);
- declarations/statements made at ministerial meetings (across the second half of 1970 and into 1971); and
- overcoming the final obstacles to the successful conclusion of negotiations (in late 1971 and early 1972).

Obviously, without the resignation of French president Charles de Gaulle in the summer of 1969, none of this might have been possible, certainly for as long as he remained in office. His departure set in train a series of events that led to the possibility of real progress being made. Once they began, substantive negotiations between the EC and Ireland ran from September 1970 through to January 1972. In effect, they were comprised of ten meetings at ministerial level, as well as a further seventeen made up of deputies, but such bald figures do little justice to the manoeuvres and compromises that fifteen months of negotiations entailed.84 They also ignore the fact that this was the first time in three attempts that Ireland actually embarked upon serious and substantive discussions with the EC institutions and its member states regarding Irish entry.
An analysis of the negotiations undertaken at the European level, on subjects such as fisheries policy for example, examined alongside the role played by ministers and officials, are a useful means through which to explain how and why Ireland’s EC accession eventually came about. But, any analysis of the impact European integration would have on the island of Ireland also has to include the costs and benefits of such membership, as epitomised, for instance, by the various manoeuvrings in Belfast, Dublin and London regarding the free movement of labour. Indeed, beyond such specific concerns, the bigger picture also needs to be taken into account. In effect, it was the EC entry negotiations with another state entirely – i.e. with the UK – that would ultimately determine whether Ireland joined or not. Although at times fraught across the late 1960s and early 1970s, the third set of EC accession negotiations were ultimately successful, but EC-UK talks emphatically remained the key. At the same time, other developments beyond the power of Dublin were to impact too; for instance, as has already been argued, in no small part was the successful opening of negotiations, never mind their conclusion, due to the departure from the European stage of one of its most famous statesmen – de Gaulle – after a decade in power. Nevertheless, it is worth asserting that Ireland also acceded on its own account, partly due to the strength of its case, partly because it was eventually prepared to adapt to the requirements of membership. When an end to the impasse in European integration and the EC’s enlargement finally came, it was relatively swift, and Ireland was ready to take advantage. No small credit for that must lie with the Irish, but then again so must much of the blame for not being ready, or necessarily willing, in the first place, when opportunities began to present themselves across the 1950s and into the early 1960s. Even if Ireland had not been party to creating the conditions necessary for this significant development to take place, it did, as has been noted, at least provide a place of refuge when de Gaulle left the world stage.

3.4 – the opening negotiating position adopted by Ireland

Between the end of 1969 and the summer of 1970, Dublin adopted a three pronged approach in seeking to accomplish its accession, respectively targeting Anglo-Irish relations, the Irish public, and the Six. Thus, it firstly aimed to shore up relations with its nearest neighbour, and was aided in this by the existence of the Anglo-Irish Economic Committee created as a result of the 1965 AIFTA; this offered a bilateral forum for both countries to examine the implications of entry upon their existing economic relationship, though the Irish were never fully assured regarding where UK loyalties lay, suspecting – probably rightly, and perfectly understandably given previous experiences – that they did not extend far beyond blatant self-interest. Secondly, the Irish government published a White Paper entitled *Membership of the European Communities – implications for Ireland* in April 1970, quite a break with past publications of this nature which were limited to factual accounts regarding the creation of the EC and its development; this paper dealt mainly with the economic impact of membership, but did not avoid raising various constitutional, legal, and political effects as well. Thirdly, in his new role as Irish foreign minister, Hillery paid a series of visits to the EC capitals, primarily to leave no room for doubt among the Six that Ireland wanted to join, but also to declare categorically that it entirely understood and unreservedly accepted the economic and political implications of membership. One of Dublin’s main concerns was that Anglo-Irish relations had to be fully taken into account during the course of negotiations, especially before EC-UK agreements on specific policy areas were concluded, but also when it came to facilitating the simultaneous opening and closing of negotiations, as well as the ultimate accession, of the UK and Ireland.

However, it was the meeting which took place in Luxembourg on 30 June 1970 that gave the Irish government their first real chance to elaborate upon their position within the formal setting of accession negotiations. Although this first meeting was in many respects rather ceremonial, with the Irish foreign minister acting as the Dublin government’s official representative, it offered the Irish an opportunity to elaborate on the issues raised by EC accession as Ireland saw them. Hillery did so at length, beginning his remarks by saying that:

... [the] meeting marks a further historic step towards political and economic unity in Europe, an objective to which the Governments of the member States of the European Communities and of the applicant countries have clearly demonstrated their commitment.
He therefore began by paying tribute to the achievements of the Six and the EC, even in pointing out that the ideal of European unity had yet to be fulfilled. Hillery added that the Irish government was:

... convinced that the fulfilment of this ideal can best be served by the full participation in an enlarged Community of those countries which are prepared to accept all the aims and obligations of membership and are ready to join with the present member States in creating a wider and stronger Europe.

Hillery said that The Hague meeting had given a ‘fresh impetus’ to European integration, as had the subsequent “successful completion of the transitional period and the entry upon the definitive stage”. It is worth examining this speech in detail, as it was to act as a marker for the negotiations which would follow across the next eighteen months and more.

The Irish foreign minister went on to declare that Ireland noted with ‘great interest’ the efforts being taken with regard to “political unification and economic and monetary union”, remarking that the opening of accession negotiations “has closely associated the question of enlargement with the completion and the strengthening of the Communities”, that is with regard to both its widening and deepening. He asserted that the 1961 application had:

... affirmed without qualification that they [the Irish government] shared the ideal which inspired the parties to the Treaty of Rome and accepted the aims of the Community ... as well as the action proposed to achieve those aims. This was reiterated by our present Prime Minister in 1967 when he formally requested the re-activation of Ireland’s application for membership.

He thus reaffirmed:

... on behalf of the Irish Government, our full acceptance of the Treaties of Rome and Paris, their political finality and economic objectives and the decisions taken to implement them ... to participating in the strengthening of the Communities and their further development.

Hillery also declared that the Irish government “accept that the political objectives, in the words of The Hague Communiqué, give the Community ‘its meaning and purport’”, and that, in following the deliberations of the Six on political unification, Ireland stood “ready to join as a member of the Community with our fellow member States in working towards the achievement of this goal”. He added that the Irish government welcomed the declaration at The Hague meeting regarding the readiness of the EC member states “to promote the development of the Community towards an economic and monetary union”, and that Ireland was prepared “to participate fully in this very important work, confident that it will be aimed at achieving a harmonious and steady economic growth in all parts of the enlarged Community”. He went on to say that Ireland accepted the economic obligations in the treaties and the EC’s efforts to implement them; indeed, Ireland had a “valuable contribution to make”, and was “anxious to join with the other countries of the Communities in concerted action for the economic and social advancement of the member States and their peoples”.

Ireland did of course have certain issues it wanted to address in the negotiations, especially “with the integration of the economies of the applicant countries into the Communities’ systems and the transitional arrangements necessary for this purpose”. It came as no surprise that, in Ireland’s case, “the most important aspects of these arrangements will be concerned with the agricultural and industrial sectors”. On agriculture, the Irish foreign minister said that his government “accept the objectives of the common agricultural policy as set out in the Treaty of Rome and fully support the action taken by the Community to implement that policy”. Having followed the evolution of the CAP very closely, he asserted that Ireland would “play a constructive and co-operative part in its further development”. Because it was such an important sector in the Irish economy, he asserted that “rational and orderly conditions of international trading in agricultural products are essential for Ireland’s economic well-being”, that Irish participation would “afford a secure basis for the balanced development of our agriculture”. It was not expected that the application of CAP would present Ireland with any major difficulty, but Dublin did want “to discuss ... certain specific aspects of the Community’s agricultural arrangements”, such as “regulations relating to animal and plant health”, as it was pointed out that Ireland was free “from certain major animal and plant diseases”. Brief mention was made of the fact that it “may ... be
necessary to raise particular points in regard to other agricultural matters, including future arrangements for fisheries, which may be the subject of Community decisions before the accession negotiations are completed. The development of a CFP would be a policy area to which the Irish government would end up paying particular attention during the negotiations proper, but for the moment it did not appear to attract undue attention.89

On industry, Hillery emphasised that, during the 1960s, the Irish economy as a whole had experienced ‘sustained growth’, which was mainly due to this sector. Industrial production in that period had grown by the equivalent of 7% per annum, with the volume of industrial exports increasing threefold so that by “1969 for the first time [industrial goods] accounted for over half our total merchandise exports”.90 It is perhaps worth noting that manufactured goods as a percentage of total Irish exports only superseded the total value of live animals as late as 1962.91 Thus, Hillery was able to add:

A major policy aim of the Irish Government has been to secure the most rapid expansion of the industrial sector consistent with maintenance of the internal equilibrium of the economy and of a reasonable balance in our international payments position. Throughout the 1960’s the emphasis has been on the preparation for conditions of freer trade and, specifically, for eventual membership of the European Economic Community. This policy was given a special impetus when our application for membership of the Community was originally made. The Government have continued to pursue this policy vigorously … As a result we are confident of the increasing capacity of Irish industry generally to meet the competitive challenges involved. Indeed, Irish industry looks forward to membership … recognising that, while there will be some problems in the shorter term, the structure and efficiency of Irish industry generally will be strengthened in the longer term. We see in the market of the enlarged Community the trading environment most likely to provide scope for the industrial advances necessary to achieve the economic and social goals which we have set ourselves as a nation.

Thus, on the ‘problems’ facing Ireland, the Irish foreign minister asserted that membership would require “some adjustments and adaptations in the Irish industrial and commercial sectors”, but expected that most of these could be met by “transitional arrangements and the safeguard provisions of the Rome Treaty”. He added that there was “a very small number of sensitive industries for which these arrangements may not be adequate”, but this was something Ireland wanted to discuss during the negotiations. Referring back to Irish industrial growth, he said that it had been a “policy in its programme for industrial development to encourage the rapid expansion of industry by means of financial and fiscal incentives”; as it was felt that continued economic growth was dependent upon these incentives, this was another issue that required discussion during the negotiations. Further to incentives for industry, he said that the “small size of the Irish market and of our industrial units leaves the Irish economy particularly vulnerable to dumping and we would hope that a satisfactory solution to this difficulty would also be found in the negotiations”. Apart from these matters, Hillery held that it was not expected that EC membership would create ‘exceptional problems’; the underlying assumption was that “appropriate transitional arrangements” would apply to Ireland’s implementation of treaty obligations, “not only in the agricultural and industrial sectors but also in other areas”.92

Moving onto Anglo-Irish economic relations, referred to as “Ireland’s special trading relationship with the United Kingdom”, it was asserted that this bilateral link was of “fundamental importance to the Irish economy”, with around 70% of exports and 50% of imports accounted for in that way. In the past, Ireland had “received preferential treatment in the British market for her products”, while the UK had “a special position in our market”; since 1965, the AIFTA agreement had been governing this trade, providing “for free trade between the two countries and for special arrangements for Irish agricultural exports to the United Kingdom”, with full implementation of this agreement due to be in place by 1975. It was asserted that this “progressive dismantlement of industrial protection has also served to prepare Irish industry for the more comprehensive obligations and challenges which membership of the Community will entail”. Because of its ‘essential’ nature, it was felt that Anglo-Irish agricultural and industrial trade:

... during the transitional period should continue with the least possible disturbance ... movement of the two countries to a wider European common market should advance from the present position which already involves some elements of a common market between them.
Apart from Anglo-Irish bilateral relations being taken into consideration, the question of favouritism towards any one applicant was a concern for the Irish, particularly with regard to the UK, and this was a logical issue to be raised.93

Hillery’s speech therefore referred “to the procedures to be adopted for the conduct of the negotiations”. Ireland felt that “these procedures should be settled before substantive negotiations took place”, and that all four applicants should take part in these initial discussions. He added that his government “also consider that the procedures should provide from a reasonable degree of parallelism in the negotiations with each applicant country”. He went on to say: “Simultaneous accession to the Communities by the applicants is of course essential”. Furthermore, the Irish government sought “at an early stage in the negotiations, procedures which would permit of the participation of each applicant country in negotiations on all matters affecting its interests”. Thus, in taking agriculture as an example, the Irish position was articulated as follows:

Matters will inevitably arise in one set of negotiations which will be of major interest to one or more other applicant countries ... It is important that decisions are not taken without reference at all stages to the other applicant countries directly involved.

But this concern was not just limited to any one area, but applied to “transitional measures relating to the movement of goods and the common agricultural policy, and also the institutional and financial arrangements to apply in the enlarged Communities”. Hillery noted to his satisfaction that this concern had already been taken on board.94

The Irish foreign minister noted the wider implications of enlargement when he said that, in embarking upon these enlargement negotiations, the EC and the applicants were:

... taking a step which is of great potential significance for the creation of a wider European Community pledged to unity and peace. The outcome of these negotiations will have a decisive influence on the future of this continent and its role in the world ... it will have a profound effect on the welfare of our peoples ... The Preamble to the Treaty of Rome wisely stressed not alone the resolve of its signatories ‘to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty’ but also their determination to pursue ‘the essential purpose of constantly improving the living and working conditions of their peoples’. This means all our peoples. We must not promote the interests of some at the expense of others.

He thus concluded by saying:

If Europe can promote an ever closer union of its peoples and work together for the steady improvement of their welfare then this greater Europe can be a vital force for peace in the world and make an ever-increasing contribution to the prosperity of the developing nations everywhere. We are encouraged by what has already been achieved. We are sure that the vision and determination shown by the member States are shared by the applicant countries. For the sake of Europe and its peoples, for the sake of peace and prosperity in the world, these negotiations must not fail. It is our responsibility that they should succeed.95

The Irish argument for entry was up and running, and the view in certain quarters was that “the issues which had been put forward by the Irish side for negotiation were not such as to occasion any serious difficulty”.96 Certain clarification was still required, and detail would have to be added to the framework for negotiations constructed by Hillery, but the way to entry now appeared clearer.

In general terms, it is worth keeping track of the negotiations across the period from The Hague summit at the end of 1970 and the formal opening meeting in the summer of 1970 to the signing of the treaty of accession at the beginning of 1972 and their ultimate conclusion with its eventual accession to commence at the start of 1973. It is evident that the various meetings which took place across the eighteen months of substantive discussions quickly narrowed to focus on what were, to all intents and purposes, relatively minor matters, especially when the wider context of the EC’s first wave of enlargement is considered. This did not mean that they were seen as insignificant to the Irish delegation – they clearly were important. However, Ireland’s negotiations have to be seen in the light of the progress made on agreeing UK entry. Thus, an overly detailed analysis of the toing-and-froing that took place is not necessarily going to prove as revealing as a direct
comparison of the opening positions adopted and the final negotiations that resulted, except perhaps for an
examination of one or two illustrative issues as cases in point. Clearly, for example, the CFP emerged as a
crucial issue, but other questions that need to be raised included, amongst many others, the rights of
establishment in agricultural land and the free movement of workers. It is worth noting that the next real
opportunity for the Irish to add substance to their summary of the position came in the autumn of 1970; indeed,
this first ministerial meeting marked the beginning of substantive negotiations in earnest.

3.5 – declarations/statements made at ministerial meetings

The Irish delegation at the first ministerial meeting in Brussels on 21 September 1970 was again led by Hillery
who detailed the negotiating issues from Dublin’s point of view. He opened his statement by again reaffirming,
as he had done on 30 June 1970, that “the Irish Government accept the Treaties of Rome and Paris, their
political objectives and the decisions taken in their implementation”; he added that Ireland was “also willing to
participate in the further development and strengthening of the Communities” as outlined by the EC Six at the
Luxembourg meeting earlier that year. At that meeting, Hillery said that he had “mention[ed] briefly the matters
of major concern to Ireland which would require to be discussed in the negotiations”; he now wanted “to set
out in some detail the matters which, from the Irish point of view, require to be discussed”, and also said that
there was a list of issues that the Irish delegation ‘shortly’ proposed to present in the form of more detailed
memoranda.

The headings and order under which the Irish foreign minister made his presentation to the Six were laid out in
some detail on 21 September 1970; indeed, ranging from a transitional period to Ireland’s trading
arrangements with the UK, from the free movement of workers to the financing of the Communities, there were
over twenty items on the Irish list. Striking for a number of reasons, not least the preponderance of economic
subjects, there was also evidence to suggest that the sequence chosen by the Irish signified both their relative
importance and some degree of tact. Nevertheless, this list clearly demonstrates where Dublin’s primary
interest lay – it was economic considerations that were being prioritised above any cultural, political or social
concerns. It is essential though to present a brief examination of the substance of Hillery’s speech, after all it
was to set the agenda for the next fifteen months of negotiations, but it is also crucial to follow up that
examination by a closer inspection of some – if not all twenty-one – of those issues in significantly more
detail.

(1) transitional period – as his opening gambit at the first ministerial meeting, Hillery said that the Irish
government was “in general agreement with the principles in regard to transitional measures”, before going on
to add:

In particular, they fully support the principle of adequate parallelism between the achievement of free movement of
industrial goods and the common market for agricultural products and they interpret this to mean that, in the
Community view, the transitional period should ... be the same duration for both these sectors. We support also the
view of the Communities that, in the field of trade, the transitional period should be of the same duration for all the
applicant countries.

So far so good, the Irish were not looking for preferential treatment here, but this was only the opening salvo in
a long encounter.

(2) Customs Union – regarding this particular issue, the Irish foreign minister said that arrangements “for the
elimination over the transitional period of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on intra-Community trade
and for the alignment of the tariffs of the applicant countries with the common external tariff” would have to be
agreed in the negotiations at the multilateral level, though Ireland was happy to examine them at the bilateral
level first. There were also matters that the Irish wished to explore at the bilateral level, specifically (i) tariff
quotas, (ii) the “waiver or refund of [certain] customs duties” [i.e. drawback], and (iii) “duties of a fiscal
character”. Thus firstly, in accepting the Common External Tariff (CET) as it would apply after the Kennedy
Round of the GATT negotiations, the Irish “want[ed] to discuss the grant of tariff quotas for some materials of
major importance to Irish industry”. Secondly, they wanted “to discuss the arrangements which would apply during the transitional period for the grant of ... [a] waiver or refund on materials imported from non-member countries and incorporated in goods exported to the member States of the Communities”. Finally, they wanted to examine “the arrangements to apply to the elimination of customs duties of a fiscal character and their replacement by internal changes”. Although it was restated that the “Irish Government fully accept the Treaty provisions in this matter ... [it would] involve substantial structural changes in the complex of Irish revenue customs duties and excise duties”, and thus it would be seeking the use of Article N°17.4EEC “for the purpose of dealing with any difficulties which might arise”.

(3) Common Agricultural Policy – the heading CAP was always going to be of central importance, and here the foreign minister addressed it under five headings: (i) ‘the phasing in of Ireland’s participation’; (ii) ‘fisheries’; (iii) ‘structural reform of agriculture’; (iv) ‘animal health’; and (v) ‘plant health’. The first of these issues, the phasing in of participation, was a pressing matter for Ireland, Hillery maintained. He said that Dublin would:

... be particularly concerned in this connection with the possible consequences for Ireland of the arrangements to be negotiated with the United Kingdom in regard to that country’s transition to full participation in the common agricultural policy, including any special arrangements for the import into the United Kingdom of agricultural products from third countries.

He also returned to this general subject when speaking about Anglo-Irish trade relations.

On the second question, the issue of fisheries, which was interestingly raised here under CAP, there was some indication in Hillery’s speech that it was foreseen as a subject requiring urgent attention, though little sign that it was necessarily a particularly complicated or fraught issue. He did say that Ireland wanted to discuss it in the light of the Council’s Resolution of 30 June 1970, due to be implemented by the Six by 1 November 1970, which set out the ‘broad lines’ of a CFP. In turn, the Irish foreign minister:

... [made] particular reference to the question of common access to fishing grounds within the exclusive fishery limits of member States. This question of access to fishing grounds is a matter of particular concern to Ireland because the Irish fishing industry is based on inshore fishing and Ireland has no deep-sea fishing fleet.

Of course, because the CFP was being developed at the same time as negotiations proceeded, this was a complicating factor, but alone that does not account for, what Maher terms, their “difficult and protracted” nature.

Still on the subject of agriculture, a third substantive topic was raised, one specifically concerned with regard to its structural reform – that is the Mansholt Plan. In noting that it had been “engaging the attention of the member States”, Hillery said that this was also “a matter of concern to my country and at the appropriate stage it will be necessary to discuss it with the Community in detail”.

Meanwhile, on a fourth issue directly linked with the CAP, it was pointed out regarding animal health that:

... [Ireland was] free of certain major animal diseases, such as foot and mouth disease, which occur from time to time in Western Europe. This freedom of disease is a vital feature of our livestock economy and ensures access for Irish livestock and meat to such markets as the United States and Japan ...

Thus, the Irish “want[ed] to maintain the animal health controls necessary to preserve the country’s freedom from these diseases”. As there was “considerable movement of animals to and from Northern Ireland”, this would effectively also put it into a different category to the rest of the EC, and the rest of the UK. Moreover, Ireland wanted “appropriate arrangements made to ensure that the existing relatively free movement of animals to the United Kingdom would continue without the introduction of new restrictions and that our existing livestock marketing system would not be disrupted”. Of course, this would go against EC “directives governing intra-Community trade in live cattle and pigs”, as freedom from disease in Ireland’s case would effectively mean one-way traffic. Additionally, it was pointed out that EC “requirements for the check-testing of animals for certain diseases within a prescribed period prior to export ... [and] the system of tuberculin testing prescribed
which differs from that in use in Ireland and the United Kingdom and certain other provisions relating to the marketing and movement of animals for export" all went against Irish practices. All of these were felt to be destabilising threats to Irish livestock and marketing systems.104

Finally under the CAP heading, and on the issue of plant health, the foreign minister held that, in effect, the same problems arose. He said that “Ireland is free of a number of plant diseases and pests which are commonly found in other European countries”. Thus, the Irish government wanted “to continue the health controls in regard to vegetables and plants necessary to preserve the country's continued freedom from these diseases and pests”.105 The EC's agriculture and fisheries policies, particularly the latter, would emerge as the most difficult issues confronted during the negotiations.

(4) Ireland’s trading arrangements with the United Kingdom during the transitional period – clearly, trading arrangements with the UK in the transitional period was considered by the Irish to be of paramount importance. Before moving on to give a concise assessment of the UK's significance to the Irish economy, the foreign minister summarised its provisions. Indeed, in stating that bilateral trade was governed by the 1965 AIFTA agreement, he explained its substantial impact on exports:

Under the Agreement, Irish exports to the United Kingdom are, with a few exceptions, guaranteed access free of duty and quantitative restriction. Imports into the United Kingdom of Irish butter, bacon, sugar and main-crop potatoes are subject to quantitative restriction and there is a minimum import price system in operation for cereals. There is also a temporary limitation on imports of Irish cheddar cheese. Irish exports of store or feeder animals and some Irish carcase beef and lamb are eligible for support under the British Fatstock Guarantee Scheme.

In basic terms, Ireland wanted guarantees regarding the continuance of this export market. When it came to imports, he added:

Under the Agreement, duties and quantitative restrictions on imports of British goods into Ireland are being eliminated over a nine-year period ending on 1 July 1975, with the exception of certain agricultural and agriculture-based products and jute products.

In addition, he said that the AIFTA agreement “provides for special arrangements relating to rules of origin, the grant of drawback, safeguard provisions and the exclusion of certain products from free trade”. Finally on this subject, Hillery stated:

Trade with the United Kingdom is of the greatest importance to the Irish economy. It is essential that the arrangements to apply to such trade during the transitional period should take account of the degree of free trade already existing between the two countries and should advance from the present position. It would be completely illogical to introduce temporary obstacles to trade as part of the arrangements for moving towards complete freedom of trade between the two countries as members of an enlarged Community.106

The Irish list was lengthening, but it was clearly felt that the best negotiating position to adopt was some degree of openness.

(5) safeguard measures for Irish industry – when it came to safeguard measures it was clear that, while most industries would be able to cope after a transitional period, certain industries would be very exposed by free trade and would need longer to adapt, that is if they were to survive at all. With regard to the former, Hillery said that a safeguard such as that provided by Article N°226EEC should “together with the arrangements for the elimination of protection on a gradual basis over the transitional period ... in general, be sufficient to meet any difficulties which Irish industry might encounter in the process of adaptation to participation in the enlarged customs union.” However, he added that:

... these measures will not be adequate to meet the difficulties likely to be experienced by a very small number of industries where there are exceptional circumstances. We would wish to secure for these industries arrangements extending beyond the standard transitional period for trade ... [emphasising] that we shall not be seeking any permanent derogation from the provisions of the Treaty of Rome.107
Apart from this defensive economic measure, there were of course others that the Irish thought were worth highlighting.

(6) **dumping** – with this issue mind, it was readily apparent that discussions were being sought regarding measures to counter any risks that the Irish economy might face. It was argued that, with “the progressive elimination by Ireland or protection against the other member States of the enlarged Community and the lowering of protection against non-member countries, dumping could become a serious threat to Irish industry”. Hillery said that, because of the small size of the Irish market and its industries, it was ‘particularly vulnerable’. Indeed, even one large dumping, “which could be absorbed in one of the larger member States with only temporary or local difficulties, could create a most serious situation in Ireland”. It was felt that Article N°91EEC did not appear strong enough for Ireland’s purposes during a transitional period, and that such a “situation would best be met by arrangements which would enable us to take remedial action ... subject to post-factum approval by the Commission”. Indeed, following a transitional period, it was noted that Article N°91EEC did not apply but, during the negotiations, it “wish[ed] to explore whether action against such practices could be taken by the Community institutions under other provisions of the Treaty”. Hillery summed up the Irish position as follows:

With regard to dumping from outside the Community, we shall be seeking the same right during the transitional period, as each of the present member States had up to 31 December 1969, to impose anti-dumping duties where the dumping caused or threatened injury to the industry of the member State. We wish to discuss the safeguards that would be available under Community regulations in this context after the end of the transitional period.108

Apart from this catalogue of defensive economic issues, it has to be said that there was also some concern regarding incentivisation.

(7) **industrial incentives** – in raising the industrial issue, it was pointed out that Ireland offered inducements, particularly in financial and fiscal form, to promote the growth of this sector of the economy, and that this was a fundamental part of Irish economic planning. Hillery presented a detailed account of their make-up and application, stating that:

The principal financial incentives are capital grants towards the cost of fixed assets for the development of new industry and for the modernisation of existing industry. These are available on a national basis with regional variations. My Government consider that they are in keeping with the objectives of the Treaty of Rome. We wish, however, to be assured that there are no objections from the Community standpoint to the retention of these incentives beyond the transitional period as any uncertainty about the position would be damaging to our programme of industrial development ... New manufacturing companies establishing in Ireland are relieved from income tax and corporation profits tax for fifteen consecutive years on profits arising from exports of goods manufactured in Ireland and have partial relief for a further five years. Under present legislation, these reliefs are to continue in operation until 1990. Similar tax concessions are granted in respect of increased exports by existing firms. Projects located at Shannon Free Airport are relieved from these taxes until 1990. We shall be seeking in the negotiations for the retention in operation of these tax reliefs for the remainder of their statutory life.109

Industrial concerns went to the heart of Irish worries regarding the economic impact of entry, and they clearly wanted to be sure that the EC understood Irish needs.

(8) **rights of establishment in agricultural land** – when it came to rights of establishment in agricultural land, the next subject that was raised, it was stated that, under Irish law, “non-nationals who have lived in Ireland for less than seven years must obtain the consent of the Irish authorities to acquire more than two hectares of rural land for non-industrial purposes”. It was said that this was to ensure the ‘equitable distribution of land’ and the creation of ‘viable agricultural holdings’. Hillery said:

The Irish Government are prepared to comply with the Community directives which have already been adopted on the question of right of establishment in respect of agricultural land. In relation to the possible extension of the right of establishment in this sector, we will raise in the negotiations our need to maintain sufficient control over the disposal of land in Ireland. This is to enable us to pursue policies to deal with such structural problems as exist.
Thus, in essence, the Irish government wanted land disposal to be controlled.¹¹⁰ Land for industrial or housing development does not appear to have caused such concerns, but agricultural land went to the heart of Irish concerns regarding the impact of European integration, at the same time betraying an historical attraction out of kilter with a more modern age.

(9) Common Commercial Policy – in relation to the development of a Common Commercial Policy (CCP), Hillery said that the Irish government accepted the policy as it then stood, adding: “It will, of course, be necessary to discuss the transitional arrangements for the implementation by Ireland of Community decisions in this sector ... in particular, Community trade agreements with non-member countries and the liberalisation of imports from these countries”.¹¹¹ But, this does not seem to have been an overwhelming worry.

(10) association agreements – on the subject of association agreements, the next issue that the Irish foreign minister raised, it was said that talks would be necessary:

... to discuss the arrangements to apply to Ireland's accession to the association agreements already concluded by the Community. No difficulties are foreseen in this respect. It is noted that the Community envisages the extension of the policy of association to include other countries and this is a matter which will also, no doubt, be discussed in the negotiations.

However, as Hillery said, the Irish government did not envisage difficulties here. But, only around half of Ireland's concerns at the opening of substantive negotiations had by this stage been raised.¹¹²

(11) non-applicant European Free Trade Association countries – with regard to the non-applicant EFTA countries, and specifically in relation to possible agreements between the EC and them, the Irish line was that arrangements should be discussed; Hillery said:

... we expect to have consultations with the Community during the negotiations in accordance with the Community view that it will be necessary to seek appropriate formulae to enable the applicants for membership to be associated in due course with the preparation and conclusion of such agreements ...

Again, this tack appears to have struck the Irish as being perfectly common sense rather than being in any way controversial.¹¹³

(12) free movement of workers – on the issue of the free movement of workers, Hillery said that Ireland, while “accept[ing] the principle of the free movement of workers within the enlarged Community", proposed that "the transitional period for the implementation by Ireland of the Community provisions in this regard should be of the same duration as that to be agreed for trade".¹¹⁴ There was a concern that non-nationals would enter Ireland at an increased rate, but the two main considerations were the free movement of Irish workers into Northern Ireland and the ‘brain-drain' which Irish governments in the 1960s had been seeking to plug.

(13) free movement of capital – meanwhile, with regard to the free movement of capital, the Irish foreign minister betrayed the country’s relative lack of economic independence when he declared that:

In view of Ireland’s membership of the sterling area and her close monetary links with the United Kingdom, it will be necessary to have the same transitional arrangements in respect of the free movement of capital as may be agreed in the case of the United Kingdom for the implementation of the Community directives in this sector.¹¹⁵

The issue of how Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) would develop was some way down this list of Irish priorities, and gives some indication of its relative importance to Dublin at this point in time. Obviously, when the opportunity arose to switch from dependence on the sterling area to interdependence within a single European currency, Ireland felt that its future lay with the latter. But this would only occur many years after EC entry had been secured.¹¹⁶
(14) tax provisions – regarding tax provisions, Hillery said that Ireland proposed to introduce VAT during the course of 1971, adding:

Only a short transitional period will be required to enable us to make any necessary adaptations in the Irish system to bring it into line with the present Community system. We would also wish to discuss in the negotiations Community proposals for the harmonisation of excise duties.117

Clearly, the question of raising taxes did not trouble the Irish government unduly, new revenue was always going to be welcome, especially when only a fraction of the VAT raised would ever be handed over to the EC.

(15) general aspect of the approximation of laws – under this heading, Ireland was basically seeking an appropriate adjustment period. Hillery said that there was only one general aspect to which he wanted to refer:

It has been noted that the existing Community established varying periods for the implementation of the relevant Community directives. Subject to agreement on an appropriate period for implementation in each case of the directives, we do not foresee any difficulties under this head[ing].118

Here there would be some difficulty however, and the Irish foreign minister was being very disingenuous to say otherwise. The absorption of the acquis communautaire and the impact of EC accession on Irish law – including an amendment to the Irish constitution – were more considerable matters than he seemed prepared to acknowledge during his presentation.

(16) equal pay – in truth, this was not the case with equal pay, even if Hillery said that Ireland was “prepared to accept the principle of equal pay for the same work as between men and women”. The Irish foreign minister was soon adding the caveat that “we wish to discuss in the course of the negotiations the question of suitable transitional measures for the application of this principle in Ireland”.119 Thus, transitional measures were needed, and there was no real sign that this development was very welcome; acceptance appears grudging at best, but it was of course necessary and central to more general concerns regarding fairness and the wider threats posed to society of discriminatory behaviour.

(17) European Coal and Steel Community – with regard to the first of the other two European Communities, the ECSC, Ireland was seeking “to discuss arrangements to apply to the elimination of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on coal and steel as between the member States and the applicant countries and to the adoption by the applicant countries of Community duties on imports of steel from non-member countries”.120 Apparently, Ireland was not treating the ECSC any more seriously in 1970 than it had done two decades earlier.

(18) European Atomic Energy Community – in turn, regarding EURATOM, it was said: “Accession to EURATOM will not necessitate any transitional period so far as Ireland is concerned”. While Ireland's peaceful use of nuclear energy was not going to cause any problems, as it had so little use for it, there were Irish concerns regarding proliferation. Hillery said: “As regards the conclusion of control agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency under the [UN’s] Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, we are prepared to discuss this matter when the Community is ready to do so”.121 But, as with the ECSC, Ireland was not really interested in this third European Community either; EURATOM, which had essentially been ignored with its first application, had not moved any higher up Ireland's list of priorities.

(19) financing of the Communities – on the issue of Ireland's own contributions to the running of the EC, Hillery went on to say:

The Irish Government are prepared to accept the decision on financing by means of the Communities’ 'own resources' which the Council of Ministers has recommended to the member States for adoption. We expect, of course, that any adaptations that may be proposed in these arrangements in the context of the enlargement of the Communities will be the subject of multilateral negotiations. The question of Ireland’s contribution to the financing of
Ireland was clearly more interested in highlighting what it would receive, relegating the question of what it would pay to a position much lower on its list of priorities.

(20) **institutions** – the penultimate heading was in relation to institutions, where he said: “The arrangements envisaged by the Council of Ministers in regard to the institutional adaptations to be made in the context of the enlargement of the Communities would be acceptable”. So, there was no problem here it seems either.

(21) **other matters** – finally, under the heading of other matters, the Irish foreign minister emphasised that the Dublin government was “willing to participate in the further development and strengthening of the Communities”. It had been indicated on 30 June 1970 that this would be directly related to (i) “the creation of an economic and monetary union”; (ii) “the co-ordination and promotion of industrial research and development; (iii) a ‘research programme’ for EURATOM; and (iv) “reform of the European Social Fund”. Hillery noted that “any guidelines or resolutions for action adopted by the Communities in respect of these matters will be presented to the applicant countries in the negotiations as Community positions”. Thus, for example, the government “assume[d] that the principles for the reform of the European Social Fund, which were agreed by the Council of Ministers on 27 July [1970], will be presented as the Community position in the matter”. He also said that Dublin:

> ... wish[ed] to participate in the study of any technical adaptations which might have to be made to Community regulations to take account of the enlargement of the Communities and also in the preparation of the English language texts of the Treaties and of Community legislation ...124

The Irish foreign minister’s list had almost been exhausted, but there were some follow-up remarks.

Hillery concluded his opening presentation by saying that he had “outlined the principal questions of concern to our negotiations”, and that one “of the main results that I would like to see achieved in this meeting to-day is the establishment of arrangements to get the negotiations effectively under way”. He also went on “to suggest the subjects which we feel could most usefully be taken up at this stage of the negotiations”, namely: (i) trade relations between Ireland and the UK during the transition period; (ii) the ‘proposed’ CFP; (iii) animal and plant ‘health controls’; (iv) ‘sensitive’ Irish industries; (v) dumping; (vi) industrial financial incentives; (vii) tax relief on export profits; (viii) tariff quotas; (ix) waiver or refund of customs duties; and (x) the translation of, and technical adaptations to, the EC treaties and *acquis communautaire* in the light of enlargement. He said that Ireland would submit memoranda on the first nine of these ten subjects ‘shortly’.125

The Irish had set the agenda as they saw it. Clearly, other issues would be raised across the following fifteen months, some of which would be easier to deal with than others, and indeed further elaboration was requested of the Irish at a subsequent, that is the second, ministerial meeting on 15 December 1970, as well as the first and second meetings at the level of deputies on 20 October 1970 and 27 November 1970 respectively.126 Meetings at ministerial and deputy level would continue across 1971 and even into 1972, but relatively rapid progress was made in finding workable solutions to most of the twenty-one topics in Hillery’s list. Effectively, some of the more important issues would turn out to be fisheries policy and the free movement of labour, which is why the final substantial subsection concentrates on those two questions rather than detailing the various moves undertaken by the main actors in the accession negotiations across all twenty-one of the policy areas mentioned in Hillery’s opening statement at the first ministerial meeting held on 21 September 1970.

### 3.6 – overcoming final obstacles to the successful conclusion of negotiations

During the course of the next eighteen months or so after the Irish government’s position was laid out, various obstacles were put in the way of successful negotiations being concluded, some of which were, in many
respects, entirely out of Ireland’s hands. Nevertheless, two issues that did need addressing were the development of the CFP and questions regarding the free movement of workers.

It is easy to explain why the fisheries issue arose, though more difficult to explain how it was resolved. While multilateral negotiations were the exception rather than the norm when it came to this set of enlargement negotiations, fisheries proved to be more ‘thorny’, and indeed were the last issue to be resolved in January 1972.127 Ireland’s opening position, as elucidated by Hillery in September 1970, came in response to the EC’s efforts of 30 June 1970 to propound a common policy on fisheries. As the year came to a close, the Irish government’s opposition began to firm up, with its major concern being “the adverse consequences for the Irish fishing industry of the application of the principle of common access to Irish fishery waters”;128 At the fourth ministerial meeting on 7 June 1971, with Robert Schuman in the chair, the Irish foreign minister noted that he had spoken about the fisheries question on every possible occasion granted to him and that he had “laid particular emphasis on the very grave problems which the application of the free accession provision of the Common Fisheries Policy would create for our fishing industry”; he added that it was an issue causing deep concern in Dublin, and was a reflection of the “very real and deeply-felt anxieties” of Irish fishermen who believed that “free access to Irish fisheries waters would jeopardise their livelihood and would also pose a serious threat to the maintenance of the fish stocks in our waters”. Schuman promised that the EC would study the Irish statement.129

Maher has argued that, gradually, the EC was persuaded by the combined efforts of the four applicants to reconsider “its original position, namely, a five years transitional period operative in favour of any local population which was dependent on coastal fishing and limited to a three-mile inner zone”.130 By the end of 1971, the Irish Times was speculating that “Ireland will have a 12-mile fishing limit for her entire northern and western coasts. The east coast will be protected for twelve miles as far as shell fish and crustaceans are concerned. The six-mile limit will apply along the south coast and for white fish only along the east coast”.131 In the end, therefore, the Irish found themselves in a position to agree to a protocol based on the EC-Norwegian negotiations on fishing rights.132 Indeed, in effect, Ireland eventually had a very limited six-mile limit for only part of its coastline, as two enormous stretches of Irish coastal waters were excepted. Firstly, there were twelve-mile limits for all species of fish on its northern, western and south western coasts running from Lough Foyle (marking the sea boundary with Northern Ireland near Derry) to Cork Harbour. Secondly, there were twelve-mile limits for shellfish from Carlingford Lough (marking the other sea boundary with Northern Ireland near Newry) to Carnsore Point (south of Wexford) on its eastern coast. The six-mile limit therefore only applied from Cork Harbour on the southern coast to Carnsore Point on the south eastern coast.133

Although this would clearly impact in certain areas, especially on harbours such as Dunmore East in County Waterford, the majority of Irish waters were therefore protected. Interestingly enough, the limits negotiated by the UK for Northern Irish fisheries waters were to be twelve miles from Carlingford Lough to the mouth of Belfast Harbour, and six miles for the remainder of the coastline from Belfast Harbour to Lough Foyle, in relative terms a less favourable outcome to the one negotiated by their counterparts in the southern half of the island.134 Effectively, of course, this meant that the only section of Irish coastal waters open to fishing of all types up to the six-mile limit ran across the southern coast from Cork Harbour to Carnsore Point. Ireland had secured a relatively good deal, certainly in contrast to the UK; indeed, even if the latter’s chief negotiator, Con O’Neill, saw the CFP as a mistake, there was no denying that, as far as the UK was concerned: “What mattered was to get into the Community and thereby restore our position at the centre of European affairs”.135 With the bigger picture in mind, the same applied to Ireland, even if it did not quite have the same leadership aspirations, and was also more hesitant to negotiate from a position of weakness.

Meanwhile, there was also the free movement of labour issue to be resolved, and this was negotiated in bilateral discussions between the EC and Ireland, while the latter kept a keen eye on how the EC negotiations on this issue progressed with the UK. The reason was simple enough, it was due to the restrictive practices under which employment operated in Northern Ireland. It was clear to the Dublin government that EC member states were “required by the Treaty of Rome to abolish any discrimination based on nationality between
workers of the member countries in so far as employment, remuneration and labour conditions are
concerned”. Ireland had its own problems in this regard. In his September 1970 speech during the first
ministerial session, Hillery had pointed out in relation to the free movement of workers that Ireland was
seeking a transitional period equal to that for trade, partly because it would effectively then be the same length
of time for all successful applicant countries. By the end of 1970, the Irish negotiating position therefore
anticipated a five-year transitional period, a situation that was confirmed by negotiations in the subsequent
twelve months, and reported in the *Irish Times* when it summarised the position as follows: “Entry of
Continental workers into Ireland will be restricted during the five-year transition period”. There would be no
restrictions on people born in the UK, but it did apply to the Six, as well as to Denmark and Norway. In the end,
the EC agreed to this five year transitional period in which existing controls operating on immigration into
Ireland for employment reasons could be maintained. But, the more interesting question is: how did this
translate when considering the free movement of workers in Northern Ireland?

During the early part of the 1960s, when the UK and Ireland were first negotiating entry into the EU, one of the
main issues which arose between them turned out not to be Irish restrictions, but a discriminatory piece of
legislation entitled the Safeguarding of Employment Act 1947. This prevented people from outside Northern
Ireland from taking jobs that could be filled by local labour; in fact, this piece of legislation was so
discriminatory that it even excluded workers from other parts of the UK from accepting jobs in Northern Ireland
if somebody from the local community could do the work instead, though its provisions did not include "Crown
servants, university professors, visiting actors and musicians, doctors, dentists and Consuls". The UK
authorities continued to sustain this position throughout their entry negotiations in the 1960s, but succeeded in
seeing its gradual elimination, despite the best efforts of obstructive elements in the Northern Ireland
government to thwart Edward Heath, formerly a junior FO minister who dealt with this subject during the first
set of negotiations and subsequently UK prime minister during the third. During this third set of negotiations
from 1970 to 1972, Ireland wished to see its workers excluded from this ban but was unsuccessful, that is until
this restriction was lifted after the transitional period for all EC workers.

In explaining the state of the negotiations on Ireland’s proposed EC entry, which had been ongoing for some
fourteen months by that stage, the media was continuing to inform the people about its implications. Reports in
the *Irish Times*, for instance, presented a relatively positive picture of the ‘package’ as it stood towards the end
of the negotiating period; *table 2: Ireland’s negotiations as viewed by the Irish Times, 13 December 1971*,
summarises the position as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Ireland’s negotiations as viewed by the Irish Times, 13 December 1971</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>transition period – “Ireland agreed in principle to accept one five-year period to cover the transition to free trade in industrial goods, full participation in the Common Agricultural Policy, and payment of full share of Community budget”</td>
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<tr>
<td>industrial transition – “Tariffs on trade between Ireland and the Community will go in five equal stages, beginning on April 1st, 1973, and ending on July 1st, 1977. Tariffs on trade outside the Community to be brought to Community level between January, 1974, and July, 1977”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agricultural transition – “This involves the raising of prices paid to Irish farmers for most of their products to Community price level. The difference between the prices will be cut in six stages between 1973 and the end of 1977. The first cut – that is the first price rise for Irish farmers – will be of 20% of the difference between current Irish and E.E.C. prices in 1973”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community budget – “The formula for assessing how much each nation should pay is based on its share of the total gross national product of the Community. Ireland will pay about £4m. in 1973, rising to £9m. at the end of the five-year transition period, with two further adjustments bringing this to £13m. in 1979. (This would rise under the Community’s ‘full own resources system’ to an eventual £16m.”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to EEC farm fund – “Under the Common Agricultural Policy the E.E.C. pays subsidies on farm exports, or intervenes to buy surplus production at Community prices. Ireland will have full access to this from the date of entry. In 1970 the Irish Exchequer paid £30m. to subsidise farm exports, mainly to Britain”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industrial development – “A protocol was negotiated recognising the special development problems faced by Ireland and promising full use of Community measures to help deal with these. An understanding was reached that the important export profit tax relief scheme would continue until it could be reviewed after membership, and that if replaced it should be</td>
</tr>
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done so with something equally attractive as an incentive to industrialists. There was clear agreement that tax-holiday agreements signed between now and the review would be binding for their negotiated life”

- special measures for sensitive industries – “An exceptional 12-year transition period was negotiated for the phasing out of the protective scheme for the Irish motor-vehicle assembly industry. Agreement was also reached on continued protection for the small steel industry in the form of a restriction on export of scrap metal, for the five-year transition period”

- dumping – “Government here will be able to use its existing powers to counteract dumping of cut-price products on Irish market, during the transition period. Thereafter Community arrangements will take over”

- fisheries – “Ireland will have a 12-mile fishing limit for her entire northern and western coasts. The east coast will be protected for twelve miles as far as shell fish and crustaceans are concerned. The six-mile limit will apply along the south coast and for white fish only along the east coast”

- animal health – “Ireland will retain its slaughter policy in the first five years of entry. The Six believe in a system of vaccination so before the end of five years there will be a report on the situation”

- Anglo-Irish agreement – “Free access for Irish farm products in Britain under the Anglo-Irish Free Trade agreement will continue, giving this country continued preference over other E.E.C. members during transition period”

- free movement of capital – “A five-year phase in period was agreed, as a safeguard against possible drain of capital out of Ireland”

- free movement of labour – “Entry of Continental workers into Ireland will be restricted during the five-year transition period”

- representation of EEC bodies – “Same for Ireland as for Norway and Denmark. One member of the new 14-man Commission will be Irish. Ireland will send 10 members to the European Parliament, nine to the Economic and Social Committee, one director to the Board of the European Bank. Irish Foreign Minister will sit on Council of Ministers with voting right equal to other nine on vital matters; he will command three votes out of 61 on the qualified majority voting system”

- other matters – “Irish, nominally at least, becomes an official language of the Community. Ireland will continue to import some products in duty-free quotas from outside the Community, women may have equal pay by 1978”

Given that the related archival materials are all now available under the 30-year rule, and that these materials confirm the process which facilitated Irish entry, it is now possible to draw some deeper and wider conclusions regarding the EC accession negotiations, not just as far as Ireland was concerned, but also with regard to its position relative to the UK.

3.7 – intermediate conclusions

Having in essence waited on the sidelines for over a decade, as UK relations with the EC shifted inexorably between progression and farce, Ireland finally became a full member in 1973. Entry meant that it had finally begun to escape economic dependence upon the UK for interdependence with its most important western European neighbours. The route from the AIFTA agreement that Irish prime minister Lynch inherited to the country’s Common Market entry had been as daunting and difficult as the process of economic vitalisation that marked the transition from protectionism to liberalisation for his predecessor, Lemass. At the same time, accession saw a continuation in Ireland’s economic transformation, from a contained and closed market to a freer and more open one. Ultimately, these changes also went way beyond economics, mirroring as they did the cultural, social and political developments that marked Ireland’s entrance into the last quarter of the twentieth century.

The conclusion of accession negotiations on 18 January 1972, fittingly concluded with a last-minute agreement on the fisheries issue, saw a favourable opinion emanating from the Commission the following day for the Council’s consideration. Within days, Gaston Thorn (EC Council President) wrote to congratulate the Dublin government.142 The Irish, in the guise of Lynch and Hillery, added their signatures to the EC Treaty of Accession in Brussels on 22 January 1972. Although critical of its slow economic growth in the early 1970s, as the OECD pointed out, the prospects for Ireland in the medium term were quite good considering the accession conditions that had been obtained:

Apart from agreements reached on various aspects of transition, certain problems specific to Ireland had to be solved, notably avoidance of interference with progress under the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement, special provisions relating to motor vehicle assembly activity in Ireland, special treatment concerning liberation of capital movements and fishery and veterinary legislation and, above all, special consideration of Irish development needs.
In the latter connection it was recognised that the country’s economic and social imbalances of a regional and structural nature would have to be overcome. To this effect, a special Protocol is annexed to the Treaty of Accession, noting the aims of Irish development policies and pledging community support of these aims.

It went on to say that the “outlook for agriculture is very favourable” in terms of higher prices and expanded markets leading to greater output and income, though the “outlook for industry is less straightforward”. Overall, it stated that, “if competitiveness is achieved”, considerable growth should follow, that “entry offers greatly improved prospects of removing structural imbalances and attaining full employment”. It noted that the constraints on agriculture would be “eased considerably”, while the apparatus promoting industrial development would be retained, before adding: “In a somewhat longer perspective, and assuming that Ireland is able to maintain price competitiveness, accession … could pave the way for higher, sustainable growth”.143 Although domestic preparations were still necessary, including parliamentary debates and a popular referendum to ratify the necessary amendment to Bunreacht na hÉireann (the Irish constitution), much of the external preparatory work had by this stage been completed.144 The Irish government now had to enter the final phase, and convince both itself and the Irish people that it had achieved its aims.
Section 4 – Irish preparations for accession: from signature to entry

4.1 – introduction

On 1 January 1973, almost a dozen years after its first attempt at entry in the summer of 1961, Ireland formally joined the EC. After all the waiting and persuading, false dawns and hidden pitfalls, sudden bursts of energy and periods of relative torpidity, the Dublin government succeeded at the third time of asking. Perhaps as a result of the fact that Ireland’s first application had been ignored so contemptuously in early 1963, and that its second effort had been passed over so gracelessly in late 1967, it came as a distinct relief to those most directly involved in the negotiations across the capitals of western Europe that accession finally took place. Ireland, along with Denmark and the UK, the Norwegians having faltered at the last moment, joined the ranks of the EC; the Six had, despite various hindrances and impediments, eventually become Nine.

As things turned out, Irish preparations for entry would go relatively smoothly, but work still needed to be done, both within political circles in Dublin and further afield, though perhaps even more importantly across the country as a whole. Some of the final arrangements were required for reasons outside the government’s control. For instance, last minute adjustments were necessitated by Norway’s non-accession, and then there was the multilateral heads of government/state meetings that took place in Paris at the end of the year, but there would also be interesting domestic developments before the Irish were in a position to deposit their instruments of ratification with the Italian government on 16 December 1972 and the French government on 1 January 1973.145 Once the goal of entry had been attained, as symbolised by the completion of entry negotiations in early 1972, the Irish found themselves adapting their practices and procedures so as to construct the final foundations necessary to becoming a fully-fledged member. As it turned out, most of these adaptations involved creating as a matter of some urgency the right conditions in Ireland, in terms of its economic, social and political life, in order to cope with the exigencies of membership. Therefore, this final section examines the principal domestic preparations, centring on the Irish referendum for EC membership, a vote the government had to win in order to amend the constitution, as well as examining other arrangements that were needed for entry to run smoothly, including the appointment of officials to the various institutions.

It is worth noting that Ireland’s Europeanisation had, by this stage, been ongoing for some years, epitomised, for example, by its triumph in the Eurovision Song Contest in 1970. This success necessitated the hosting of the event by the Irish television broadcaster, Radio Telefís Éireann (RTÉ), the following year, and would be the first event that it broadcast in colour. Inspired by Italy’s San Remo music festival, this competition has had a significant role to play in Europe’s cultural and social history, and indeed in European integration. First held in 1956, it has provided participating countries, their national broadcasters and a variety of composers and performers, with an opportunity to reflect upon their shared, as well as disparate, identities, tastes and cultures. Ireland did not enter the competition until a decade later, but, once they did take part – 1965 was also to be the first year that the competition was broadcast live to the USSR and its eastern European satellites – they became regular participants, and would take the contest increasingly seriously. When Ireland won the competition held on 21 March 1970 at the Rai Congrescentrum in Amsterdam, victory meant that it would host the subsequent event. Held at the Gaiety Theatre in Dublin, and with a total of eighteen entrants, the sixteenth edition of the Eurovision Song Contest was presented on 3 April 1971 by Bernadette Ní Ghallchoir, and beamed live to twenty-nine countries. Even the logo used to promote the competition gave Ireland the opportunity to project a positive and progressive image, one it was only too keen to utilise.146

4.2 – the Irish referendum

In the Irish case, the referendum to ratify membership was never treated as if it was going to be a formality, it was seen as giving the electorate “the opportunity of making up their minds about it in the most democratic way possible”.147 Nevertheless, there were still delays in making available an English version of the text in Ireland, and rueful complaints within Irish government circles that their neighbour’s version was “an extremely rushed job and inevitably contains its share of errors”.148 A strong indication of how seriously the Irish
government took the referendum can be seen in the decision to constitute a high-powered committee of senior civil servants – mostly at assistant secretary level – to help in conducting the campaign. Essentially, the role of this interdepartmental committee, which met for the first time on 8 March 1972 and again on 27 April 1972, evolved into one whereby they helped in the production and circulation of speaking notes for ministers.149

Each department contributed papers on subjects according to their specialism. Thus, the D/F made papers available ranging across topics from the effects of economic developments and regional policy to the impact of VAT on the cost of living, while the Department of Labour contributed notes on issues such as the free movement of workers and equal pay; at the same time, the Department of Lands circulated a paper on the rights of establishment in agricultural land, while the Department of Transport & Power (D/T&P) made a couple of documents available on transport policy, with one specifically centred on driving hours, while the Department of Social Welfare furnished one on the impact of membership on the Irish social security system.150 Other departments to contribute very directly included the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (D/A&F), Department of Industry and Commerce (D/I&C), and the D/FA, with the D/T playing a significant coordinating role.

Once the pro-membership campaign began in earnest, various publications extolling the virtues of membership were made available from sources as varied as the D/FA and the Irish Council of the European Movement (ICEM).151 Even the D/A&F produced a booklet entitled The Irish Farmer and the EEC.152 In a campaign dominated by those in favour of membership, one major consideration was the state of the economy as a whole, widely seen as considerably weaker compared to its counterparts.153 If nothing else, this clearly demonstrated Ireland’s relative economic poverty, its reliance on foreign trade, and its industrial underdevelopment. But the electorate had more important issues to consider, such as the price of tea! In one Fianna Fáil pamphlet, the Cork Examiner economics correspondent, Moore McDowell was quoted as saying: “To argue that entry to E.E.C. would mean a rise in the price of tea to £1.20 per pound is to be somewhat less than honest, in fact the price of tea will be totally unaffected.” In the same document, prices for food in Ireland were compared with those in the Netherlands; it concluded that prices were more or less the same, with tea, for instance, costing 40p in both countries.154

In the referendum campaign, led in particular on the government side by the taoiseach and foreign minister, due attention was therefore given to the benefits of entry, as well as the disadvantages of not joining. For instance, Hillery stated at one party meeting:

… if we did not join the Community, we would succeed only in losing what many people regard as the major benefit of membership, namely, agricultural prosperity, without avoiding in any way that is often regarded as the major problem, namely, industrial competition.155

Other examples of the stick being employed saw the D/T&P minister arguing:

If we stayed outside the EEC, there would be massive unemployment and massive emigration – particularly of our young men and women. Those left in Ireland – mainly the very young and the very old – would find themselves abandoned in an economic and social cul-de-sac, in a sad backwater of a country, left behind by the modern world. What right have those who oppose EEC membership to demand such a sacrifice of the Irish people?156

There was more subtlety demonstrated as well, with Lynch declaring:

By voting ‘Yes’ on Wednesday the Irish people will ensure that we will have the powerful impetus which E.E.C. membership can provide not only to accelerate the country’s economic and social advancement but to win for all our people a standard of living and a quality of life as good as that now enjoyed by the other peoples of Europe.157

Meanwhile, the attempts made by those opposed to membership on grounds such as, for instance, sovereignty or neutrality, were either belittled and ignored or addressed and nullified:

I deny emphatically that an agreement has been reached between the Irish and American Governments about landing rights [for military aircraft at Shannon Airport]. I am surprised that a daily newspaper appeared to present
this as a fact. I am not surprised that false statements on this matter were made by both wings of Sinn Fein and by the Common Market Defence Campaign. I hope we will not have further misrepresentation of this kind before referendum day.\textsuperscript{158}

At a press conference the day before polling, the \textit{taoiseach} promoted the message forcefully:

\begin{quote}
We are ... being offered this great opportunity and these major challenges. The question tomorrow is: are we prepared to grasp them. I am fully confident that the Irish people will wholeheartedly accept them by recording a massive vote -- a massive yes vote at the polls tomorrow.\textsuperscript{159}
\end{quote}

In the end, the referendum of 10 May 1972 passed handsomely, with an impressive overall turnout of nearly 71\% of the electorate, and more than four in every five subsequent Irish voters casting their ballot in favour, the economic aspects of the European integration project clearly appealing to the vast majority, and for the most part drowning out any significant political considerations.\textsuperscript{160} In truth, the detailed results of this national poll reveal overwhelming backing by the people for the arguments put forward by the ‘Yes’ campaign; as detailed in \textbf{table 3: referendum results regarding Irish entry into the EC}, the final outcome made excellent reading for the government:\textsuperscript{161}

\begin{table}[ht]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lll}
\hline
 & total electorate & 1,783,604 \\
 & total poll & 1,264,278 \\
 & percentage poll & 70.9\% \\
\hline
 & votes for the proposal & 1,041,890 \\
 & votes against the proposal & 211,891 \\
 & spoilt votes & 10,497 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{referendum results regarding Irish entry into the EC}
\end{table}

Thus, of the valid poll, nearly 83.1\% of the Irish electorate had voted in favour of full EC membership; with this ringing endorsement, the preparations for entry could go ahead.

There was only a short time to enjoy the result, but the \textit{taoiseach} made sure that his message was heard both at home and abroad. To the former audience he reiterated that it was a victory for the Irish people, but that it had been achieved by the not inconsiderable political cooperation and conviction of supporters and foes alike. Lynch was quoted as saying:

\begin{quote}
I am pleased that the people have so emphatically endorsed our entry to the European Economic Community. This is a great victory for the Irish nation. Such a massively favourable vote is a great tribute to our people’s innately sound judgment. The commitment of the Fine Gael Party, especially having regard to their difficulty in supporting the Government on any particular issue, of the farmers’ organisations and of other voluntary groups was of great significance in achieving the overall result. This emphatic vote of the Irish people establishes their firm desire to take their place in a united Europe and to contribute to its economic, social and cultural progress. I thank especially the members of the Fianna Fáil organisation who bore the burden of the campaign. They responded everywhere in city, town and country with their usual enthusiasm, dedication and efficiency.\textsuperscript{162}
\end{quote}

Of course, he also realised that there were wider implications, so a separate statement was issued to the international press, with the \textit{taoiseach} quoted this time as saying:

\begin{quote}
The result demonstrates the political realism of the Irish people. It shows that they were not influenced by the many irrational and irrelevant counter-views which were put forward. It also shows that, combined with the sense of political maturity and wisdom, there is the spirit of enterprise and idealism. I, personally, am pleased to have the honour of leading our people as they take a full and equal place in a Community of free democratic nations. I hope that we will be joined in that Community by our friends in Denmark and Norway, with whom we share many common interests and ideals. I look forward to working in friendly co-operation with representatives of the Northern Communities on the many common issues which will arise for both areas of our country, in the E.E.C.\textsuperscript{163}
\end{quote}

Before long, however, other practicalities needed to be addressed.
One of the first was to pass a law through parliament that would insert an appropriate article into the constitution. On 8 June 1972, the Third Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1972, received affirmation, inserting Article 29.4.3° into Bunreacht na hÉireann, thereby allowing Ireland to become an EC member state. It simply read:

The State may become a member of the European Coal and Steel Community (established by Treaty signed at Paris on the 18th day of April, 1951), the European Economic Community (established by Treaty signed at Rome on the 25th day of March, 1957) and the European Atomic Energy Community (established by Treaty signed at Rome on the 25th day of March, 1957). No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the Communities, or institutions thereof, from having the force of law in the State.

This modest statement gave the green light to Ireland’s EC entry, and also paved the way for it to function fully within it.

4.3 – final preparations for membership

Apart from the referendum, other decisions necessitated between the signing of the Treaty of Accession and Ireland’s actual entry, ranged from the appointment of an Irish judge to the European Court of Justice and an Irish commissioner to the European Commission, to making preparations for the education of the children of Irish bureaucrats who would be based in the various European institutions. With the former in mind, the name of Chief Justice Cearbhall Ó Dálaigh was suggested, and eventually put forward officially on 3 November 1972, as the person who would be offered the nomination. There was never any doubt that it would be a man, not only because the Irish justice minister suggested that the government should agree on a candidate, and then “approach him privately to discuss the various ramifications with him”, but also because no women occupied senior positions in the Irish judiciary at that time. The Irish foreign minister had already been nominated by the government as a member of the Commission on 26 September 1972. Thus, Ireland’s most senior judge and its foreign minister would take up important posts in Luxembourg and Brussels respectively, indicating how seriously these offices were considered by Dublin. At the other end of the scale, the government decided to send two primary school teachers as its commitment to the EC’s European School, one each to Brussels and Luxembourg, to be paid for by the Irish Department of Education; they were to be in place by 1 September 1972. The schools were for the benefit of EC member state children from kindergarten, through elementary school, and secondary school, ending in the European Baccalaureate, and would be able to provide Irish language instruction for the children of Irish workers in the European institutions.

Within weeks of the successful conclusion of negotiations, and despite attention being focussed on winning the referendum, the parliamentary opposition was expressing some concern regarding the role of the Dáil, and by extension the Seanad, in an enlarged EC. Indeed, the issue of national parliamentary scrutiny was “attracting increasing attention” from Irish members of parliament (TDs or Teachta Dála) and, in effect, many of the leading members of the opposition wanted a procedure put in place to deal with draft EC legislation, suggesting as one alternative a special parliamentary committee. There was also the role of Irish members of the EP to consider. In response, Lynch informed the Dáil that there were “many ways in which we could contemplate keeping the House informed of impending directives and regulations by the Community”, and that his government was looking into the matter. With regard to EP members, he suggest that “it ought to be done by agreement ... We have, I think, ten seats. They ought to be allocated proportionately between the parties. The parties themselves if they wish should select their members”. Despite repeated efforts to ensure high levels of parliamentary scrutiny of EC legislation, the only concessions made were to ensure firstly that, from the date of formal accession, all Commission documents would be placed in the Leinster House library and, secondly, that legislators were going to be informed of the titles of ministerial regulations made under the European Communities Act through the Iris Oifigiúil (the Irish stage gazette); it was suggested that secondary legislation listed in the EC’s Journal Officiel be brought to their attention in the same way, partly because this was noted as the procedure that was being adopted at Westminster. However, it was clear from the lack of
significant activity that the involvement of parliament was going to be minimal. Obviously, EC membership also meant that cabinet procedures would need to be addressed, but it was quickly ascertained that parliamentary secretaries could substitute for government ministers in the Council, though this had not stopped consideration as to whether or not "purchasing or leasing an executive jet to cope primarily with the problems of increased travel by Ministers and officials following membership of EEC" was a good idea.174

There were also external developments with regard to the EC’s future membership that impacted. Ultimately, for instance, the Norwegian decision not to join meant certain adjustments had to be made, though the D/FA noted: “None of the proposed adjustments represents any departure in substance from the terms negotiated for Ireland”. The changes were still significant. It was noted that, following the drawing of lots, the Irish judge would serve a ten month term until October 1973, renewable for a further six years; there would therefore only be nine judges in the Court of Justice as a result of the Norwegian referendum. Also, Ireland’s budgetary contribution would be raised from 0.60% to 0.61% of the total. Otherwise, for the most part, Norway’s involvement in the workings of the EC was essentially deleted.175 Lynch’s reaction to the Norwegian decision was diplomatic; he said: “Norway would have had a significant contribution to make as a member of the E.E.C. and Ireland had looked forward to her entry. The withdrawal of Norway’s application for membership would be a loss to the whole Community.”176 Obviously, this decision caused a ripple across the whole EC, but this was soon calmed by a positive Danish result. The Taoiseach wrote to the Danish prime minister:

I extend to you on behalf of my Government and on my own behalf warmest congratulations on the decisive and heartening result of the Danish Referendum on the European Communities. Our two peoples have now clearly demonstrated their firm belief in the valuable and progressive role which small countries such as Denmark and Ireland can have in the enlarged Communities in the building of a peaceful and prosperous Europe. We look forward to joining with Denmark in the building of this Europe.177

Of course, the reality was that Ireland had secured what it had set out to achieve, and both Norway and Denmark had clearly made decisions based upon their own interests.

More significantly perhaps from the Dublin government’s perspective, Ireland attended its first Heads of State/Government EC summit as a prospective member from 19-20 October 1972. Although earlier that summer there had been considerable uncertainty regarding whether this Paris summit would be held at all, it was expected from the foreign minister’s preparatory work that the agenda would cover:

- economic and monetary union, as well as social progress, in the EC;
- EC “relations and responsibilities vis-a-vis the rest of the world”, specifically relations with developed countries (such as the US), the countries of eastern Europe, and developing countries; and
- “strengthening ... the Community institutions and progress in the political field”.178

Not surprisingly, Lynch used the occasion to reinforce Ireland’s European credentials. In pressing for the summit to come up with ‘concrete decisions’, and “not merely general declarations of goodwill”, he gave his backing to measures which would ensure economic and social progress, especially with regard to living and working conditions, and which would promote a more equitable regional policy. In backing “balanced trade and fair competition and the progressive abolition of restrictions in world trade”, he also noted the “joint obligation to help the economic and social progress of the developing countries”. He declared:

There are formidable tasks and challenges ahead of us in the enlarged Community. We have here in Paris an historic opportunity to deal with these tasks and challenges. Our decisions at this Conference will be interpreted as a measure of how our Governments – the Governments of the countries which will constitute the enlarged Community – are prepared to meet the needs of our times, the challenges of the years ahead and the aspirations of our peoples.179

Widening and deepening of the EC would go hand in hand, and Ireland was finally contributing to the debate as an equal.
Apart from the clear economic and political implications of membership, Lynch went to some pains to explain that Ireland would feel the cultural benefits as well. He did not think EC membership would negatively affect its cultural heritage, stating:

... there are, I believe, good grounds for the view that in the plurality of cultures a small country like ours can confidently hope to preserve its national being and strengthen its own identity. If other small peoples, flanked by competing civilisations, can succeed, as indeed they have, in upholding their own distinctive national identities and characters sure the Irish, who are, in fact, among the very oldest identifiable peoples ... can do the same. I sincerely and firmly believe that we can and that we will. By sharing in a wider heritage we can, I believe, win a new pride in, and gain a new strength for, our own ... But it is a people themselves who must preserve their own culture and their own heritage. Nobody else can do it for them and, as far as we in Ireland are concerned, the responsibility for success or failure in that direction will be ours and ours alone ... I wholeheartedly share the view that membership of the European Economic Community offers us a cultural lifeline.180

There were also social issues, such as the role of women in society, and the fact that EC membership would see the question of equal pay for women resolved, as well as an end to the marriage-bar which meant that most women had to leave the civil service when they got married.181 Thus, on the eve of its accession, various efforts were made to publicise the fact of Ireland’s EC entry, both at home and abroad. In response, for example, to a request from the Daily Mail for ninety words explaining the benefits of EC entry for Ireland, which were to be used in a special supplement marking enlargement, the taoiseach’s message read:

Today Ireland joins with Denmark and the United Kingdom in membership of the European Communities. For Ireland this opens up the opportunity of building a prosperous and peaceful community; one in which the benefits of faster economic progress can produce a visible improvement in the quality of life for its people. The enlargement of the communities also represents an important step forward towards the goals of a stronger European economy and of closer political union among its people. The creation of this new outward-looking Europe would be a positive contribution towards international peace and progress, which we warmly welcome and support.182

Meanwhile, in conversation with the BBC’s John Simpson, Lynch was able to say: “Perhaps I could summarise the process of change which I envisage by saying that in the EEC we can, by becoming better Europeans, become better Irishmen”.183 Positive responses were also given to requests for copy from the Sunday Press, Irish Independent, Irish Press, amongst others, though a belated enquiry to provide an interview for RTÉ’s This Week radio programme was turned down because it was said that “time does not permit”.184 The period between the conclusion of entry negotiations and final accession had quickly elapsed; Ireland had become a full member of the EC.

4.4 – conclusions

Over a dozen years after it had first applied for membership, Ireland finally succeeded at the third attempt. In the years which followed Irish entry, it is interesting to note that a relatively small degree of anti-EC campaigning continued, culminating of course in the surprise defeat through a referendum of the Treaty of Nice at the first time of asking in 2001. These anti-EC activists, both prior to and after the referendum, were monitored by Irish army intelligence, partly because of their purported connections with Sinn Féin,185 but the truth is that they have never really gripped the Irish electorate in the way that euro scepticism has subsequently spread in other European countries. It is not that the extent or merits of European integration are not argued in Ireland, but the realities of its relative position in relation to its neighbours have been accepted for well over forty years. In fact, even with a change of government in the spring of 1973, no discernable differences in Ireland’s relations with the EC were expected,186 or in truth experienced. At the same time, the history of its participation in the EC, and the EU, are not within the ambit of this study, but will need to be addressed elsewhere in order to determine whether the aspirations preceding entry were realised within. This piece of research is content to concentrate on the second and third applications, while realising that this framework document only holds out a sketch of what transpired. In time, the numerous gaps in information will be filled, and the arguments regarding why and how enlargement took place will be considered in significantly more depth, and with more detachment.
endnotes


3. This is essentially the argument put forward when Ireland’s first application, and European integration under the premiership of Seán Lemass and stewardship of T.K. Whitaker, is examined in Maurice FitzGerald, Protectionism to liberalisation: Ireland and the EEC, 1957 to 1966 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), p. 171.


11. The efforts of successive taoisigh – that is both Lemass and his successor Jack Lynch – to move Irish foreign policy from the margins to the centre of Western European orthodoxy is one of the central claims proffered in Maurice FitzGerald, “The ‘mainstreaming’ of Irish foreign policy”, pp. 82-98, in Gary Murphy & Brian Girvin (eds.), The Lemassera: politics and society in the Ireland of Séan Lemass (Dublin: UCD Press, 2005).


14. Lemass to Ludwig Erhard (EEC Council president), 31 July 1961, National Archives, Dublin (NA), Department of the Taoiseach (D/T), S168770/61.


17. Lynch to Renaat Van Elslande (EEC Council president), 10 May 1967, National Archives, Dublin (NA), Department of the Taoiseach (D/T), S168770/61.

18. Lemass to J.W. de Pous (ECSC Special Council president), 7 January 1963, National Archives, Dublin (NA, D/T), S17246X/63 Appendix.

19. Lynch to Antoine Wehenkel (ECSC Special Council president), 10 May 1967, National Archives, Dublin (NA, D/T), 98/6/856.


25. UK embassy (Dublin) telegram to UK Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), 4 August 1967, PRO, FCO, 20/74.


31. UK embassy (Paris) telegram to UK Foreign Office (FO), 4 November 1967, PRO, FCO, 20/73.

32. UK embassy (Dublin) telegram to CRO, 6 November 1967, PRO, FCO, 20/74 (emphasis in original).

33. A.G. Gilchrist (UK ambassador, Dublin) to CRO secretary, 22 August 1967, PRO, FCO, 20/74 (emphasis in original).

35. C.J. Audland (FO official) to F.G.K. Gallagher (CRO official), 28 September 1967, PRO, FCO, 20/74. The UK junior minister in question was Lord Chalfont; the Irish embassy official was Mr. Brennan.


37. UK embassy (Dublin) telegram to CRO, 6 November 1967, PRO, FCO, 20/74.


40. Maher, The tortuous path, p. 221.

41. Maher, The tortuous path, pp. 222-3 & 228

42. Gilchrist to CRO secretary, 22 August 1967, PRO, FCO, 20/74.


45. FitzGerald, Protectionism to liberalisation, pp. 146-7.

46. FitzGerald, Protectionism to liberalisation, p. 321.


52. D/T memorandum, circa early February 1972, NA, D/T, S18523O.


55. UK embassy (Paris) telegram to FO, 7 November 1967, PRO, FCO, 20/74.


58. Cabinet meeting, 15 October 1957, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast (PRONI), Cabinet Conclusions Files (CAB), 4/1048.


64. David Neiligan (D/FA official) to Edwin FitzGibbon (Irish EC mission official, Brussels), 13 February 1968, NA, D/FA-99/3/168.


66. Adapted from FitzGerald, Ireland and the EEC, p. 424, and based on the model of preferences and outcomes presented in Moravcsik, Choice for Europe, pp. 162-3


68. Maher, The tortuous path, p. 244.

69. Seán Morrissey (Irish ambassador, Brussels) to the D/EA secretary, 10 April 1969, NA, D/T, S18081R.

70. D/EA report, circa May 1969, NA, D/T, S18081R.


73. Frank Aiken (Irish foreign minister) speaking in Dáil Éireann, Dáil debates, 1 May 1969, Volume 240 Columns 385-6, NA, D-T, S18081R.

74. Irish ambassador (Brussels) telegram to D.O’Sullivan (D/EA assistant secretary), 30 April 1969, NA, D-T, S18081R; Morrissey to D/EA secretary, 1 May 1969, NA, D-T, S18081R.

75. Morrissey to D/EA secretary, 1 May 1969, NA, D-T, S18081R.

76. Lynch note of a conversation with the UK ambassador (Dublin), 2 May 1969, NA, D-T, S18081R.

77. Irish ambassador (Brussels) telegram to O’Sullivan, 5 May 1969, NA, D-T, S18081R.

78. “Britain-EEC talks by end of year hint”, Irish Press, 6 May 1969, NA, D-T, S18081R.

80. Maher, The tortuous path, p.244.
86. Irish government publication, Membership of the European Communities – Implications for Ireland, Dublin, 1970.
87. P.J. Hillery (D/EA minister) speech at the “Conference between the European Communities and the States which have applied for membership of these Communities” held in Luxembourg, 30 June 1970, NA, D/T, S18523A.
88. Hillery speech, 30 June 1970, NA, D/T, S18523A.
89. Hillery speech, 30 June 1970, NA, D/T, S18523A.
90. Hillery speech, 30 June 1970, NA, D/T, S18523A.
91. FitzGerald, Ireland and the EEC, p.416.
92. Hillery speech, 30 June 1970, NA, D/T, S18523A.
93. Hillery speech, 30 June 1970, NA, D/T, S18523A.
94. Hillery speech, 30 June 1970, NA, D/T, S18523A.
95. Hillery speech, 30 June 1970, NA, D/T, S18523A.
97. Hillery speech at the “Conference between the European Communities and the States applying for membership of those Communities: first ministerial session between the Communities and Ireland” held in Brussels, 21 September 1970, NA, D/T, S18523B.
98. Hillery speech, 21 September 1970, NA, D/T, S18523B.
100. Hillery speech, 21 September 1970, NA, D/T, S18523B. As Maher points out, Article N°17.4EEC “empowers the Commission to authorise a member country to delay reductions in customs duties of a fiscal nature where difficulties are encountered”. Maher, The tortuous path, p.275. Indeed, Article N°17.4EEC states: “If the Commission finds that substitution for any customs duty of a fiscal nature meets with serious difficulties in a Member State, it shall authorise that State to retain the duty on condition that it shall abolish it not later than six years after the entry into force of this Treaty. Such authorisation must be applied for before the end of the first year after the entry into force of this Treaty”. Text of the Treaty of Rome, http://www.bmdf.co.uk/rometreaty.pdf [3 April 2006].
101. Hillery speech, 21 September 1970, NA, D/T, S18523B.
103. Hillery speech, 21 September 1970, NA, D/T, S18523B.
104. Hillery speech, 21 September 1970, NA, D/T, S18523B.
106. Hillery speech, 21 September 1970, NA, D/T, S18523B.
107. Hillery speech, 21 September 1970, NA, D/T, S18523B. Article N°226EEC states: “If, during the transitional period, difficulties arise which are serious and liable to persist in any sector of the economy or which could bring about serious deterioration in the economic situation of a given area, a Member State may apply for authorisation to take protective measures in order to rectify the situation and adjust the sector concerned to the economy of the common market”. It continues: “On application by the State concerned, the Commission shall, by emergency procedure, determine without delay the protective measures which it considers necessary, specifying the circumstances and the manner in which they are to be put into effect.” It concludes: “The measures authorised … may involve derogations from the rules of this Treaty, to such an extent and for such periods as are strictly necessary in order to attain the objectives referred to … Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning of the common market”. Text of the Treaty of Rome, http://www.bmdf.co.uk/rometreaty.pdf [31 March 2006].
108. Hillery speech, 21 September 1970, NA, D/T, S18523B. Article N°91EEC states: “If, during the transitional period, the Commission, on application by a Member State or by any other interested party, finds that dumping is being practised within the common market, it shall address recommendations to the person or persons with whom such practices originate for the purpose of putting an end to them. Should the practices continue, the Commission shall authorise the injured Member State to take protective measures, the conditions and details of which the Commission shall determine”. It concludes: “As soon as this Treaty enters into force, products which originate in or are in free circulation in one Member State shall, on reimporation, be admitted into the territory of the first-mentioned State free of all customs duties, quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect. The Commission shall lay down appropriate rules for the application of this”. Text of the Treaty of Rome, http://www.bmdf.co.uk/rometreaty.pdf [31 March 2006].
110. Hillery speech, 21 September 1970, NA, D/T, S18523B.
111. Hillery speech, 21 September 1970, NA, D/T, S18523B.
112. Hillery speech, 21 September 1970, NA, D/T, S18523B.

153. Albert Coppé (EC Commissioner) to Lynch, 6 February 1972, NA, D/T, S18523O.
154. Fianna Fáil (Cork North-East) pamphlet, Cost of Living!, Cork, 1972. The price of tea remains a major consideration to the present day, with the Guardian recently pointing out that “Ireland is a good place to buy … tea bags”; the same article pointed out that it is also the second most expensive place to live in the eurozone. Mark Milner, “Ireland to overtake Finland on prices”, Guardian, 23 May 2003.
156. Hillery speech at a Fianna Fáil dinner in Dunleer (Co.Louth), 24 February 1972, NA, D/T, S18523P.
157. Lenihan (D/T&P minister) speech to a Fianna Fáil meeting in Roscommon, 8 April 1972, NA, D/T, S18523P.
158. Lynch speeches at meetings in Counties Kildare, Carlow, Kilkenny, and Waterford, 4 May 1972, NA, D/T, S18523R.
159. GIB statement, 6 May 1972, NA, D/T, S18523R.
162. Symposium on Irish accession to the European Communities, 1972-73, Institute for International Integration Studies, Trinity College Dublin.
163. GIB statement, 11 May 1972, NA, D/T, S18523R.
168. DIB statement, 26 September 1972, NA, D/T, S18788.
170. D/FA note, 20 June 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S.
171. Hugh McCann (D/FA secretary) to N.S.Nolan (D/T secretary), 20 June 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S.
172. Lynch speaking in Dáil Éireann, Dáil debates, Volume 261 Number 11 Columns 1783-6, 20 June 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S.
173. Mr Burke (D/FA official) to H.J.O’Dowd (D/T official), 18 December 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S; O’Dowd to Burke, 20 December 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S; Mr Walsh (D/FA official) to D/T secretary, 29 December 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S.
174. C.H.Murray (D/F secretary) to Nolan, 14 July 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S; D/T note, 5 October 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S; R.Fogarty (D/FA official) to D.O’Sullivan (D/FA official), 6 October 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S.
175. D/FA memorandum, 18 December 1972, NA, D/T, S18523T.
176. D/T note, 26 September 1972, NA, D/T, S18523T.
177. Draft message from Lynch to Jens Otto Krag (Danish prime minister), circa early October 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S.
178. Seán Morrissey (D/FA official) to T.D.French (D/T secretary), 3 July 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S.
179. Lynch opening speech at the EC summit in Paris, 19-20 October 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S.
180. Lynch speaking at a book launch in Dublin, 3 July 1972, NA, D/T, S18523S.
181. D/F minister financial statement, 19 April 1972, NA, D/T, S7985C.
182. Lynch message for the *Daily Mail*, 22 December 1972, NA, D/T, S18523T.
183. Lynch interview with John Simpson (BBC overseas radio), 20 December 1972, NA, D/T, S18523T.
185. Deaglán de Bréadún, “Army intelligence monitored anti-EEC campaigners”, *Irish Times*, 5 January 2005. In noting that “political activity by campaigners against Irish participation in the [EEC] … was closely monitored by Army intelligence in 1974”, this report centred on Anthony Couglan’s efforts and stated that he was “a leading opponent of EEC entry”.