Protectionism to liberalisation: Ireland and the EEC, 1957 to 1966

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De Gaulle's refusal of the UK, 14 January 1963

France's rejection of UK membership: an introduction

Ireland failed to gain admission to the EEC at the first time of asking, following a relatively brief negotiations period between July 1961 and January 1963 in which it did not participate to any great degree; indeed, there was no real progress on its application until October 1962. This disappointing outcome was on the surface primarily due to the intransigence invariably exhibited towards the UK's application by the French president. Dublin's distinctive bid was still entirely contingent upon the success or otherwise of its neighbours negotiations, a factor over which it patently exercised no substantive control. Indeed, once France acted negatively and decisively towards this one applicant, it effectively did so for all the prospective members – Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the UK. History has shown, however, that Ireland's request for full membership was not refused per se; its application had, in point of fact, been almost entirely ignored. That is why the Irish bid for membership, essentially a reaction to London's decision to negotiate entry, failed in the early 1960s. The reasons why it was overlooked go way beyond its links to the UK or the latter's application; Ireland failed to join the EEC for reasons all of its own, essentially because it was economically unable to do so by itself.

It has proven possible to view Seán Lemass's European adventure – as William Nicoll and Trevor C.Salmon have done in Understanding the new European Community – as having been 'stillborn' basically because, following de Gaulle's veto, Ireland's attempt to join the EEC had no alternative but to fall into a limbo-like state or be withdrawn completely. For the time being, there was absolutely no prospect of Ireland's application making any progress. As a result, the taoiseach's vision of the EEC as an economic vehicle through which Ireland could break away from its suffocating commercial reliance upon the
Protectionism to liberalisation

UK had to be postponed, with the country once again facing an uncertain economic future. Ireland, which had already been relatively isolated economically during the late 1950s, especially in the context of the principal developments in European integration, had nowhere else to turn except back to the UK. The EEC had long been envisaged in bureaucratic and government circles as being the indispensable component needed to facilitate Ireland's escape from this economic quarantine. However, following the French president's decision, it was clear that the state's endeavours to attain 'economic independence' would have to be postponed for now. The collapse of the UK's negotiations for EEC membership may not – as Brian Girvin has suggested – have been unwelcome to the Dublin government; indeed, it may just have provided Lemass with the necessary motivation required to prepare Ireland for eventual accession. In the meantime there were more immediate concerns with which the Lemass government had to contend now that its chosen path had been cut off to it.

As has been indisputably pointed out by a series of historical commentators, the Irish were fully aware that the 'Treaty of Rome ... created an enticement to a journey into the blue and demanded an act of faith'. The irreversible decision that was made on 31 July 1961 to apply for full EEC membership was not lightly taken. Nevertheless, as Eoin O'Malley, the author of *Industry and economic development: the challenge for the latecomer*, has written, for all the economic policy influences on the Irish government of *Economic development* and the *Programme for economic expansion*, 'no steps had yet been taken to dismantle protection and to influence freer trade', even by the beginning of the 1960s. In addition, this writer has elsewhere declared that, although general incentives were introduced in the 1950s into Ireland in order to promote export industries and attract foreign investment, the removal of protectionism did not begin in earnest until the mid-1960s. It can still be said in reply that although the dismantlement of tariff barriers may not have begun until a relatively late stage, momentous decisions regarding freer trade had nonetheless already been taken well before then by the Dublin government. Ireland's foreign economic policy was indeed based on full EEC membership and it was in this regard that the disassembly of protectionist measures was being undertaken; political considerations were not necessarily a part of this equation.

At this point in time, another major aspect of development that was being highlighted by the government as the future for the economy was the adoption of a foreign-owned export-orientated investment policy. In fact, this concerted series of attempts to attract investment into the economy from outside sources was particularly concentrated in the manufacturing sector, with
most of this new investment being export-driven. This official government policy contributed to a rapid expansion in the sheer number of plants alone established in the country.\(^8\) Indeed, this exponential growth came far ahead of similar investment in Northern Ireland or in other UK ‘development areas’, never mind in the UK as a whole. In fact, as a direct result of this Irish economic policy, a total of sixty-two new foreign firms opened up in the country through the period 1960 to 1963; this figure was over six times the comparable aggregate for Northern Ireland, even if it was opening up to investment from foreign capital, and actually corresponded more than favourably with the total amount for the UK as a whole.\(^9\) Prior to the introduction of this innovative policy, the number of foreign firms opening up in Ireland was minuscule; indeed, the figure for the period between 1952 and 1959 was only eleven new foreign firms opening up. From that time onwards, however, this impulse burgeoned to such a tremendous degree that the establishment of foreign-owned businesses in Ireland quickly became a veritable explosion; for instance, 188 firms were established in the corresponding interval between 1964 and 1971. If numerical evidence of a changing orientation in the economy was needed, this data regarding the establishment of foreign-owned firms would be more than sufficient evidence to argue a strong case.

Tellingly, James Wickham has pointed out in his excellent article ‘Dependence and state structure’ that, while foreign-owned firms which initially emanated from the UK were the ‘single most important group in terms of national origin, many of these companies were in fact established before the end of protectionism as subsidiaries serving the domestic Irish market’. Indeed, this commentary serves as a rigorous policy critique because, in addition, the author has added that it was ‘astounding’ how little attention was devoted by successive Irish governments, through their economic policies, to the relative increase in foreign-owned manufacturing plants, despite the unremitting rise in their significance within the economy. In fact, he has discerned the various economic programmes enacted by the governments of this period to have only been ‘indicative plans’ rather than possessing the required hands-on approach.\(^10\)

In the taoiseach’s defence, it might be asserted that intensive intervention was no longer his intention with regard to the economy; indeed, Lemass’s economic thinking had undergone a major u-turn from his prewar period as Irish industry & commerce minister. In his opinion, post-war governments could only indicate what they wanted and then facilitate that development, but they could no longer try to control the industry sector *per se*. At the same time, however, it has to be said that this policy did not necessarily ameliorate the true economic situation in Ireland all by itself. Something more substantial
than pontification was needed from central government.

The economic trend towards the end and subsequent to the period of protectionism in Ireland was for US-owned, export-orientated firms to set up, taking advantage of a generous Irish government incentives package. This set of inducements included the granting of export profits tax relief, the creation of new infrastructural networks for specific projects, and access to capital grants for plants and machinery, as well as making full use of relatively low cost, available and educated labour. Therefore, during the period 1961 to 1966, it comes as no big surprise to learn that there were, on average, seventeen new foreign firms established in Ireland per annum. Although a detailed analysis and breakdown of the monetary incentives package that was made available to foreign firms is not necessary here, it has proven to be a rather rewarding way of tracking the development of initiatives enshrined in practice by the Irish government, especially in the context of their resulting economic, political and social effects. These consequences have been felt right up to the present day.

The export profits tax relief procedure, for example, was first introduced in 1956, but was initially limited because it was applied to only 50% of the profits earned on increases in export sales over and above the previous year's level. Ostensibly, this was not a crucial or even decisive government initiative except, of course, for the fact that it set a significant precedent. Indeed, the actual extent of export profits tax relief was substantially strengthened two years later, when this proportion of tax relief was raised to 100% with a similar proviso; in addition, the initial period for which full tax relief was to be extended to a new foreign firm setting up in Ireland was extended from five to ten years. This initial period for full tax relief was actually extended from ten to fifteen years in 1960, yet another fiscal enticement for foreign investors. Furthermore, while writing in an article entitled 'Industrial policy and economic development', Barry Moore adds his voice to the view that 'there is clear evidence that the policy package in the Republic was particularly successful in encouraging foreign-owned firms, and there must be a presumption that the export profits tax relief was effective in this respect'. Certainly, the government's practice of encouraging export profits tax relief as official policy was very 'effective' when considered in these terms, even if the implications of this strategy in later years may not have been so readily apparent.

Although the government's Industrial Development (Encouragement of External Investment) Act of 1958 had removed many of the restrictions on foreign ownership, it was not until the Control of Manufactures Act – which dated from the first Fianna Fáil government of 1932 and which restricted foreign ownership and board membership of Irish manufacturing industries to
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

a minority position – was fully revoked in 1964 that this process of reforming the issue of alien proprietorship was finally completed. Obviously, the development of the Industrial Development Authority (IDA), through the IDA Act of 1950, was an integral step in this effort to attract foreign investment; indeed, this initiative was in itself further supplemented by the Adaption and Re-equipment Programme that was introduced in 1963, a new initiative over which the IDA exercised its control. Accordingly, the fundamentally important economic developments of 1958 – the publication of T.K. Whitaker's *Economic development* and enactment of the Irish government's *Programme for economic expansion* – led directly, according to James Wickham, to the removal of 'many traditional aspects of dependency'. Certainly, while the increased role of foreign-owned manufacturing industry in Ireland obviously 'involved new forms of dependency', new economic growth and fewer economic ties with the UK came about as a immediate and welcome consequence.12

At the same time, of course, there were other important domestic economic initiatives being taken by the Irish government. The Committee on Industrial Organisation (CIO) was, for instance, set up in 1961 by the Irish Department of Industry & Commerce in a concerted attempt to effect two interlinked enterprises. These were:

- the CIO was going to facilitate the adaptation of existing Irish firms for the impending onslaught of free trade;
- it had to report to the government on their progress in that endeavour.

Meanwhile, there was also the National Industrial Economic Council (NIEC), initiated two years later. The NIEC was itself perceived as a broad forum for discussion – representing the government, employers and trade unions – through which future economic developments could be better coordinated.13 Obviously, this examination must still come back to asking the question: where did these economic innovations fit in the wider integration process?

Ireland's application to join the EEC may have remained the first absolute step in the country's journey towards freer trade, but it was not the only one. Indeed, this development was quickly followed by other initiatives, especially once the EEC Council agreed to open membership negotiations. On 13 October 1962, in anticipation of it having to fulfil EEC requirements, the Irish government formally announced that it was introducing a unilateral, if highly symbolic, 10% cut in its tariffs to come into effect from 1 January 1963. Indeed, at the same time, it also announced that it wanted to proceed thereafter on the basis of regular, if gradual, reductions in relation to
preferential arrangements and industrial tariffs. This move led one UK official to remark, somewhat condescendingly, that this Irish tariff cut created 'some sort of precedent (although not a very strong one). Notwithstanding such negative points of view, it was a step upon which the Irish government felt that it could build. However, its act of faith in the EEC was not reciprocated because, within a fortnight of the implementation of this tariff cut, it found itself peripheralised once again, this time by de Gaulle's decision. In the meantime, in the expectation of being a member of the EEC by 1 January 1964, Ireland had committed itself to observing an economic transitional period in which tariff reductions would finally be completed by the end of the decade. In themselves, unilateral tariff cuts were a worthwhile addition to an open economic policy. In spite of these efforts, Ireland was left down by circumstances that were outside of its control.

Ultimately, however, the economic developments of the Six and the Seven meant that the status quo enshrined by previous European trading arrangements had changed forever. Through necessity, the taoiseach had engendered an outward-looking economic orientation for Ireland, primarily in an effort to diversify its foreign markets and also to continue to attract foreign multinational investment into its economy. John Bradley et al have clearly shown that Ireland revolutionised, rather quickly at that, its manufacturing employment base, which from the 1920s had been one dependent upon 'traditional' industry – such as 'food, drink, tobacco, textiles, clothing, footwear, wood and paper' – to an economy that was soon attracting much more 'modern industry' – such as 'chemicals, minerals and metal products', before the subsequent advent of computer technology – as the 1960s progressed.

Protectionism – the progenitor of which had been Lemass himself – was no longer a viable economic policy alternative. Therefore, almost immediately after the French president vetoed the UK's application for full EEC membership, Ireland had to look elsewhere to safeguard its immediate agricultural and industrial future, while keeping an eye open as to when European integration would be a viable proposition. Indeed, Dublin's resulting bid for short-term economic preservation and the stability of its export markets quickly resulted in the seemingly incongruous move of signing The 1965 Anglo-Irish FTA agreement, subject of a subsequent chapter. Although launched in an effort to enhance future Irish economic competitiveness in what was rapidly becoming an ever-changing and highly unpredictable European economic environment, this apparently contradictory manoeuvre demonstrated that there sometimes is truth to the dictum that there exists 'the need to go one step backwards', in terms of economic dependence, 'before then going two
steps forward', towards economic diversification. Invariably, the ultimate goal remained the same. Although impeded for now, Ireland continued to prepare itself for full EEC entry and for its economic integration into a larger, more reliable, trading entity.

Expounding upon the Dublin government's presentation in Brussels in January 1962 of its case for full EEC membership, this fourth chapter – *De Gaulle's refusal of the UK, 14 January 1963* – winds its way through the positive reaction to the provisional opening of negotiations with the EEC in October 1962. It then traces the pivotal developments in the history of European integration that ran through the first months of 1963 before introducing the Anglo-Irish FTA agreement of December 1965, when Ireland secured even closer bilateral economic ties than it already had with the UK. Perhaps, it is Pierre Gerbet's belief, opined in *La construction de l'Europe* which best sums up the true economic situation facing Ireland, when he states that it found itself in an economic union with the UK from which it was not able to find a means of disengaging. This view not only gives added credence to the conventionally held impression of economic dependence that was the reality of Anglo-Irish relations, but it also suggests some of the implications for Ireland that were innate in the French government's rejection of the UK's membership application.16

The Irish government confronted what was, in effect, another 'crisis point' following de Gaulle's press conference of 14 January 1963. Ireland's plans for entry negotiations with the EEC were rendered nugatory as a result of this episode. However, before moving on to explore the main features of this press conference and to an investigation of its ramifications, it is important to trace the development of the Irish case for full EEC membership, how it was presented and viewed. Indeed, it is imperative to detail its preparations for entry negotiations, as well as describing its outlook towards membership of the other European Communities, the ECSC and Euratom. Therefore, the meeting that was scheduled for mid-January 1962 in Brussels presented the ideal opportunity in which the Irish government could explain, once and for all, its attitude to the process of European integration. Nevertheless, in spite of this genuine attempt to inform the Six and the institutions of the EEC regarding its capacity to undertake full membership, Lemass found that it would take the better part of a year to explain the position properly and facilitate the opening of the admission's procedure.

*The Dublin government presents its case in Brussels*17
Protectionism to liberalisation

In the previous chapter on Ireland's first EEC application, 31 July 1961, it was shown that, following a brief examination of its request for membership three months after the original bid had been made, the EEC Council had asked the Irish government to provide even more clarification regarding the reasoning behind its contemplated participation. An explanatory meeting to be held in Brussels was consequently set for a date which only came six months after Ireland's formal application had been delivered, arriving long after negotiations with the UK and the Danes had already begun. This delay did not auger well. Ireland would get an opportunity to plead its case in the heart of Europe; the danger was that its candidacy was not only being viewed as unimportant by the Six or the institutions, but that it was also seen as being intrinsically flawed.

Indeed, the enormity of the situation was not lost on those most intimately involved in the process in Dublin. As the Department of Finance secretary reminded his minister:

We have applied for membership of the EEC because it would be economic disaster for us to be outside the community if Britain is in it. We cannot afford to have our advantageous position in the British market turned into one of exclusion by a tariff wall, particularly as our chief competitors would be inside this wall.18

It was implicitly understood that the Irish delegation dispatched to Brussels and charged with this responsibility would have to use the opportunity to make an extremely good impression upon the Six and on the EEC, a factor emphasised by the Irish ambassador in Brussels. As Brian Girvin has explained, however, Biggar had warned his government against appearing 'lukewarm' on the issue of membership. In fact, this Irish diplomat said that Ireland would have to demonstrate convincingly that it was applying to the EEC without reservations if it was ever going to make its case both attractive and persuasive. He wrote:

... the EEC, despite its title, is first and foremost a political concept and not merely an economic organisation with a few political ideas added as an afterthought.19

At this stage, it appears that common sense – in the form of similar advice from Whitaker to the Irish finance minister, Jack Lynch, and from Biggar to his superiors at the Department of External Affairs in Iveagh House – began to prevail within Irish government circles. Indeed, it was eventually reflected in the taoiseach's address to the EEC Council on 18 January 1962. So, what was
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

Throughout the Irish government's development of a European integration policy, the Department of Finance played a pivotal role, directing and shaping its inexorable progress. As Brian Girvin has stated so unequivocally: 'Finance insisted that joining the Community was an imperative if Ireland was to survive economically'. Nothing should be allowed to get in the way of this, the departmental secretary felt; but, as Ireland had made a commitment to seek full membership of the EEC in good faith, it was equally not in a position 'to pick or choose the circumstances under which it would join'. Indeed, Whitaker personally considered that it would be 'extremely unfortunate' if Ireland's application was subsequently withdrawn on grounds such as the efficacy of its foreign policy; clearly, he had partition, neutrality and NATO membership in mind. He noted:

Nobody has yet told us that this is a condition of membership of the EEC. On the other hand, nobody so loves us as to want us in the EEC on our own terms. The Community have difficulties enough without adding those introduced by a 'contrary' new member who will bring the Community no particular benefits but will inflict on it additional problems including (as they might well view it) this tiresome 40-year old squabble with Britain.

Ireland's case for membership was in a precarious enough position already and would not be helped by any attempts to link partition to NATO membership or to full EEC accession; as far as Whitaker was concerned, it was more important for Ireland to play down the whole neutrality issue lest it be confused with the Irish government's attempt to negotiate full EEC entry. This eminently sensible piece of advice was duly taken by Lemass.

Obviously, although attention was thus being paid to the political aspects of full EEC membership, it was the economic aspects of Ireland's participation which were always going to dominate the taoiseach's thinking. Just as well really, because it was these aspects which most troubled the Six and the EEC. Of course, agriculture was a prime concern within these circumstances, but it was always going to be difficult to deal with this subject as long as it remained undefined in the context of European integration. However, it was becoming clear that Irish industry was ill-prepared for the onset of European integration and in reality the fear persisted that up to 100,000 industrial jobs were at risk from the dismantlement of protection. Therefore, what Lemass was invariably seeking for the future balanced development of both Irish agriculture and industry was the awareness and help of these prospective new economic partners. It is true to say that the main aim of the government's foreign economic policy at the beginning of 1962 was
Protectionism to liberalisation

To secure entry into the EEC on as favourable a set of terms as was possible. Thus, part of this process entailed meetings with various concerned groups in domestic agriculture and industry, representative organisations such as the NFA and ICTU. Nevertheless, it was clear from the outset that no single sector of the economy was going to be allowed to dictate or to mitigate against the perceived general economic good.

In the days which immediately preceded the presentation of Ireland's case to the EEC Council, Lemass delivered his address to the Árd-Fheis (party conference) of Fianna Fáil with a number of objectives securely in mind. Brian Girvin has listed these as follows:

- reassurance of the party faithful with regard to the propensity of a new economic policy, moving Ireland from a protectionist era to one of free trade and, in so doing, 'dismantling ... the entire economic nationalist superstructure which had been established over the previous 30 years';
- helping to develop the necessary momentum for adhesion;
- guaranteeing foreign observers that the Irish government was indeed totally committed to entry.

It was a difficult mélange of items over which to exercise control in a speech and at the same time to appear comfortable, but the taoiseach was in no doubt about the economic legitimacy of the direction in which Ireland was heading. Lemass declared that:

Membership of the Common Market is open to those nations which accept the political aims which inspired it. A movement to political confederation in some form ... is ... a natural and logical development of economic integration ... our national aims must conform to the emergence, in a political as well as in an economic sense, of a union of Western European States, not as a vague prospect of the distant future but as a living reality of our own times.

In economic and political terms, European integration was not just held to be the only real option available to Ireland, but it was now felt to be apt as well. Multilateral arrangements in the European context would replace bilateral agreements, especially with the UK; indeed, confederation would overtake partition as a government policy determinant. Finally, on 18 January 1962, the taoiseach went on record, proclaiming at length to the EEC Council that Ireland not only agreed with the ideals behind European integration and even the general aims of NATO, but that it was also prepared to fulfil the 'duties, obligations and responsibilities'
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

that full EEC membership would bring. It must be said that, although Lemass was fairly persuasive in his line of argument regarding the political considerations of membership, he found himself betraying the relative weakness of Ireland's position in relation to native agriculture and industry by having to expound upon the true needs of the economy. Obviously, it is worth going into the particulars of this speech, not only as it was the most precise affirmation regarding Ireland's relationship with the EEC delivered at this time, but also because, through this statement, the Six were made totally aware of the realities of the domestic economic and political situation, the Irish government's hopes and fears, its opinions and views, as well as a categoric understanding of the degree to which this prospective new member needed full membership.

The taoiseach's statement to the EEC Council can be divided into two main sections because, once he had introduced his government's application with the general assertion that 'Ireland belongs to Europe by history, tradition and sentiment no less than by geography', he primarily spoke upon the political and economic implications of membership. Specifically on the political aims of the EEC, Lemass stated that the Irish government and people were not only ready to subscribe to these goals, but that they were also eager to play an active part in achieving them for the benefit of all. Indeed, this had been a constituent facet in the reasoning behind Ireland's 'deliberate decision' to apply for membership. The country was, the taoiseach said, in full agreement with the general purposes of the EEC, as defined by the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Article 2), and sincerely wanted to work in harmony with the other six members in the 'accomplishment of these purposes by the methods prescribed' (Article 3); in addition, the government agreed that the various EEC institutions should ensure that the tasks of the EEC would in fact be achieved (Article 4). In truth, however, what were essentially mediocre assertions – statements to the effect that the Irish 'people have always tended to look to Europe for inspiration, guidance and encouragement', for example, or that the government's membership application of 31 July 1961 'declared that we share the ideals which inspired the parties to the Treaty and accept the aims of the Community ... as well as the action proposed to achieve those aims' – would clearly need more substantiation if they were to convince the EEC Council about the Irish propensity for full membership. Indeed, in concluding his presentation, Lemass said that:

... the Irish Government feel that the problems involved in accepting Ireland as a member ... will not prove to be greater and may, indeed, be less than
those which were originally overcome by the member States in accordance with the spirit expressed in the preamble to the Treaty ... As a country small in extent, population and production, Ireland would not represent, in terms of statistics, any considerable addition to the Community. We do feel, however, that we have a contribution to make to the accomplishment of the Community's design for a new European society and would wish to be given an opportunity of bringing our national qualities and potentialities to the service of this ideal in a spirit of loyal and constructive cooperation.

Nevertheless, it was in regard to the economic aspects of EEC membership that Ireland was undoubtedly most interested and, indeed, vulnerable. It was also the subject area it was felt with which the EEC Council was most unclear, even more so it should be said after the taoiseach had delivered his statement to them.

Speaking on economics, the second part of his address, Lemass further divided his remarks into two sections dealing expressly with Irish agriculture and industry, before moving on to make some general remarks about Ireland's position on European integration. There was, of course, no real point in the taoiseach understating the importance of agriculture, it was patently clear to the EEC Council how vital this sector really was to the economy. Therefore, he readily acknowledged that:

It generates about one-quarter of the national income, employs over one-third of the gainfully-occupied population, and is responsible, directly or indirectly, for three-quarters of our exports.

Obviously, there is no point in going into tremendous detail regarding the Irish agricultural situation, except to say that the government was undeniably interested in the proposals for a CAP and that Ireland's 'principal concern' in the sphere of agriculture and the EEC was in relation to the relative position of the UK and its trading arrangements within that context. Indeed, the taoiseach made specific reference to the relative implications of UK membership for Ireland and stated that his government hoped that the discussions for Irish admission to the EEC would be 'brought to completion at the same time as those for the United Kingdom', although, as Lemass pointed out, Ireland also had important bilateral trade agreements with individual members of the Six as well. Overall, however, in relation to agriculture, he made it readily apparent that the Dublin government would particularly 'look forward to active and constructive collaboration with the other members in their efforts to overcome the problems arising in putting into effect a common agricultural policy in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty'. It was clear where Ireland's chief
interest, indeed preoccupation, lay. Despite his best efforts, mistakes in presentation were being made.

The taoiseach then moved on to consider at length the position of industry within the general economic framework of full Irish adherence to the EEC. Speaking on progress made in the economy ever since the era of protectionism began to draw to a close and furthermore in the light of the \textit{Programme for economic expansion}, Lemass made direct reference to the role of the industrial sector in Ireland's economic renaissance. He declared:

The volume increase in gross national product, which averaged only 1 per cent per annum in the preceding decade, amounted to 4½ per cent in 1959, 5 per cent in 1960 and not less than 5 per cent, it is estimated, in 1961. The greater part of this expansion is attributable to the industrial sector. For manufacturing industry rates of growth of 6 per cent and 7 per cent were achieved in 1959 and 1960, respectively, and the estimate for 1961 is almost 9 per cent, a rate of expansion amongst the highest in Western Europe.

Indeed, the taoiseach continued his address in much the same upbeat vein, with special regard being paid to these positive economic indicators. He added that:

... results confirm not only the considerable scope for economic development in Ireland but the capacity of Irish initiative and effort, augmented by Western European enterprise, to exploit the existing potentialities. We have an economic and social infrastructure capable of supporting a much greater degree of industrial development. We also enjoy conditions of political and social stability conducive to maintenance of the higher rate of economic growth achieved in recent years. There is, therefore, good ground for the belief that a total increase in production of 50 per cent by 1970 is within the capacity of the Irish economy ...

However, obvious difficulties would also have to be faced by the Irish economy within a free trade environment and it was within this context that the Six had most worries about Ireland's capacity for full EEC membership. Indeed, very little of what the taoiseach actually said did much to allay these fears and the Irish government subsequently encountered an extremely difficult, though not impossible, task in persuading the EEC Council otherwise.

Of course, once Lemass began to explain the more precise implications of Ireland's economic situation to the EEC, \textit{vis-à-vis} its relations with the UK, no generalised entreaties about how the country had the ability to
accept the obligations of the Treaty of Rome in the industrial field were going
to suffice. This would especially be the case when Dublin began to look for
special economic treatment of its case under existing provisions (Article 226)
or, indeed, under any separate 'protocol dealing generally with the subject of
tariff reductions'. The taoiseach went into some detail regarding the subject of
tariffs – that is Ireland's need for an 'appropriate rhythm of tariff reductions' –
and specifically mentioned the fears that the government had in regard to
'dumping'. It was becoming rather an extensive list.

In addition, though, it should also be said that Lemass made reference
to the various sections of the Treaty of Rome with which Ireland was ready
and willing to comply forthwith. However, some aspects of his statement to
the EEC Council were bound to attract the wrong sort of attention. For
instance, the taoiseach said:

Detailed negotiations will provide an opportunity for discussing questions of
interpretation of particular Treaty provisions and of the implications of the
regulations, decisions, directives and recommendations issued by the Council
and the Commission.

Such a generalised statement about difficulties that the Irish government had
with the Treaty of Rome was never going to be regarded with anything other
than trepidation and derision. Obvious questions were begging to be asked: did
Ireland perhaps feel that it had views on the Treaty of Rome – the provisions
and realities of which it had conspicuously not actually been operating with
the six other states – upon which it felt accomplished and worthy to
extrapolate or, more pointedly, did it expect that the Treaty of Rome should be
interpreted or, indeed, revised on its account? It appears that Lemass did not
fully appreciate or even realise the precariously weak position of his
government's application for full membership. In reality, his statement of 18
January 1962, delivered to the EEC Council in Brussels, did little to assuage
the anxieties of the Six. Indeed, it probably exacerbated them.

D.J. Maher has subsequently written that, at this presentation, the
taoiseach set out the Irish 'Government's understanding of the political and
economic aims of the Treaty of Rome and declared the Government's
willingness to accept the obligations of membership of the Community under
both these heads'. However, the actual situation was not as simple as that,
because not only did this meeting present Ireland with its first major chance to
elucidate and explain its position on full EEC membership, but it also
introduced the Irish government into the complex political arena that
encompassed the whole issue of European integration. The fact that Maurice
Couve de Murville, the French foreign minister, who was chairing this
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

particular meeting, limited himself to saying that the Six needed more time in which to study the taoiseach's statement before responding to it, undoubtedly meant that the Irish application to begin accession negotiations had been delayed further still. Indeed, this limited response should have been evidence enough that Ireland would in fact be playing a fairly minor role within the whole membership negotiations process. This interpretation of events and their implications was reflected in a journal article, based on French government sources, which claimed that the Irish application had received a 'frigid reception'.25 The Irish government actually had rather a lot of work to do yet to convince the Six and the EEC of its suitability. Indeed, as was previously noted, the EEC Commission had already ascertained that the Irish government would have rather obvious special problems with respect to full EEC membership and, thus, had decided that those would have to be given very careful consideration prior to the opening of any formal and substantive accession negotiations. Ireland would have a long wait for its case to be heard with the attention and care that it felt was warranted.

Second time around26

At this point in time, there was no definitive immediate reaction from the Six in relation to the taoiseach's statement of 18 January 1962 that was delivered in Brussels, except to assert that Ireland's case would come under still further consideration at the EEC Council meeting that March. However, it was blatantly obvious that they were not particularly impressed and were not at all convinced that Ireland could fulfil the inherent obligations. In the meantime, there were other ongoing developments originating from the Irish side regarding its candidacy for full EEC membership. Indeed, Lemass continued to speak openly and publicly about the government's acceptance of the political implications inherent in Ireland's full participation, although he made sure to do so in strict accordance with a warning from Whitaker that any hint of dissent on the issue within the Irish domestic or international political arena would convey the wrong sort of message to Europe.27 Thus, for instance, the taoiseach frankly declared on 14 February 1962 that Ireland acknowledged and agreed 'that membership of EEC is open only to states which accept the Bonn Declaration'.28

Obviously, it was becoming as important to consider the political questions that were being raised by Ireland's membership application as it was to present an explanation of the economic direction in which Irish relations with the EEC were moving. Therefore, political and economic considerations
have to be appraised in conjunction with one another. This was not unlike the approach adopted by the Irish government, especially when soundings from the continent continued to stress that no state would be permitted into the EEC unless it accepted both economic and political integration. In fact, Lemass took every available opportunity to reiterate that Ireland had no political reservations about joining the EEC or to participating in it fully. As a result of the government's efforts to deal with political problems raised by its aspirant status, the foreign minister, Frank Aiken, stated in Dáil Éireann that it was not, for instance, in touch with other European neutrals about a common foreign policy approach to the EEC, but that Ireland's approach to the issue of neutrality was actually totally different. Dublin was not about to jeopardise the EEC's political orientation through its policies, he argued; equally, Aiken held that the EEC would not be forcing Ireland into compromising its international political outlook, because their views were in fact complementary.

There was some data to back up the foreign minister's claim. At the UN, for example, although regarded by the US as a 'maverick', Ireland was not particularly close to any of the members of the 'non-aligned' movement. In fact, even in the 'heyday' of Ireland's promotion of independence at the UN – circa 1957 to 1961 – its voting record on all Cold War issues showed that it was in accord with the US three times as often as against her. Thereafter, Ireland's voting pattern was 'solidly riveted' to that of the West except on issues such as arms control and self-determination. It generally agreed with US positions, but that is not a big surprise; thus, its policy can still be seen as 'independent' in such circumstances but it was also pragmatic, realistic and Western-orientated. This was not even unusual for the other European neutrals, it has to be said. Figures available on UN votes cast on Cold War issues in the period 1955 to 1959, show that, in a voting index ranking the degree of support for US positions ranging from -1 to +1, Ireland read +0.739; for the other European neutrals in the UN, this read: Austria +0.783; Finland +0.174; and Sweden +0.607. This shows that the degree of Irish support for US positions was therefore not 'remarkable' as Dennis Driscoll holds, but quite the opposite, that is completely expected. In relation to the EEC, the latter does make the fair point that its attempted – and ultimately successful – admission to an 'organisation which anticipates the ultimate political union of most of the European members of NATO seems somewhat incompatible with the independence suggested by the concept of "neutrality"/"non-alignment"'. Nevertheless, he is clearly mistaken in using such data to argue that as 'Ireland distances herself even from those European states which regard themselves as non-participants in either the Eastern or Western blocs ... it is clear that Ireland cannot be regarded as a "neutral"'. Indeed, this is exactly what the EEC held
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

in the early 1960s because that is what Ireland had been telling the world ever since the outbreak of the Second World War.

As time passed, however, although the EEC Council became more convinced about it on the political level, doubts still remained about its economic ability to accede fully to the EEC. Indeed, as D.J. Maher has said, from this point onwards there was an absence of any substantial indication of concern by the Six towards Ireland's political suitability for full EEC membership. However, it should be pointed out that Brian Girvin has been able to detail the main developments in the first half of 1962 regarding Ireland's relationship with the EEC in a much more systematic way, undermining this very argument. He contradicts D.J. Maher's view when he states that EEC unease about Ireland's political credentials for entry actually continued for some considerable time to come. The fact that the UK government had no such qualms about Ireland's candidacy suggests that they were much more in tune with the realities of the Irish political situation. Indeed, Heath was able to reassure the taoiseach on this very point by stating that NATO membership was not very important in the EEC context. Indeed, with regard to a meeting between them, it was reported by the Irish embassy in London that:

In an effort to combat the idea that Ireland joining NATO was a prerequisite for EEC membership, Lemass, of course, replied that the Irish government fully recognised the validity of the argument in favour of a common defence policy evolving.

In time, this attitude appears to have been accepted in the wider world as well; for instance, Washington obviously never looked upon Ireland's candidacy for full membership in the same negative way that it viewed the efforts of the other European neutrals, especially as they were seeking associate membership and thus were not prepared to pool allegiances in a Western European economic and political organisation. However, efforts by Ireland to convince the EEC regarding its political suitability for full membership were another issue altogether. Indeed, uneasiness was still being felt by the Six regarding the propriety of such a relationship with the Dublin government, particularly when the EEC itself had so many integral questions regarding European integration still left almost completely unanswered.

On 15 February 1962, the Irish ambassador in Brussels met with Walter Hallstein, the President of the EEC Commission, to discuss Ireland's position. Although favourably inclined towards their argument for membership, Hallstein raised the issue of their continued non-participation of NATO as a lingering factor. This opinion was reflected in a subsequent
meeting between Irish embassy officials in Brussels and Sicco Mansholt, the Vice-President of the EEC Commission, when the issue was brought up once more. Indeed, Mansholt held that France was against Ireland's entry into the EEC on these defence grounds, but also added that an indication from the Irish government that it would be prepared to join NATO would 'virtually assure our admission to the Community and would put us in a very strong position to negotiate favourable terms'. As Brian Girvin has since highlighted, the fact that the EEC Commission's president and the vice-president were prepared to raise the subject of defence and, in addition, to report upon French government opposition to Ireland's application must have created uncertainty, perhaps even a degree of worry, in Irish minds.38

It was soon noted that the Dublin government's application for full EEC membership was not going to be considered however at the next meeting of the EEC Council scheduled for March 1962. Nevertheless, Whitaker advised that only the most measured response of disappointment should be conveyed to the Six at this turn of events, coupled with inquiries for further clarification. Of the dangers inherent in pushing the Six into making a decision, he wisely cautioned:

... it is impolitic to rush them when they have other and more pressing preoccupations. If rushed, they may take up the position suggested by the most negatively minded member, this being the line of least resistance.39

Indeed, when it came to a meeting of departmental secretaries on 1 March 1962, he was even more insistent in stressing the political issues that were involved. The Department of Finance secretary was summarised as having said that:

... while membership of NATO may not be a *sine qua non* for entry into the EEC, we would be committed to participation in the common defence arrangements and foreign policy of the Community. While European Ministers would, no doubt, understand political difficulties presented by a name or by certain formalities, he thought there was considerable danger that our present attitude would be understood in community circles to mean that we could not join in any defence system with Britain.

Opinion was divided about how to proceed, with the Department of External Affairs secretary, Con Cremin, advocating a cautious approach; this was rather a propitious warning, it has been remarked, considering that the political debate in Europe was still scarcely evolving.40

In public, Lemass was much more assertive about his government's
commitment to all aspects of the EEC. In an RTÉ interview broadcast on 15 March 1962, he said that Ireland accepted its obligations and recognised where it was leading. He declared:

Economic integration is not regarded as an end in itself but as a step towards political union, and is, of course, in itself a political development of major significance.41

However, it was always going to be in private that the most realistic assessments of Ireland's relative position were being made. Cremin made it quite clear, for instance, that Ireland was in a situation at total polar opposites to that of the UK, which was after all a 'major European power, if at times a disinterested one'; the London government was much more advanced in the negotiations process than Ireland it was noted. In contrast, therefore, the Irish position appeared to be rather 'precarious'. The Department of External Affairs secretary wrote:

Our position is radically different. We have not been, except perhaps spasmodically, active protagonists of European political union, nor have we been actively associated with any of the major movements to this end, apart from such organisational instances as the Council of Europe ... we are not yet formally at the stage of negotiation for membership of the E.E.C. or, in other words, we are not yet a potential member of the Community in the same sense as Britain.42

Dublin was going to have to try harder to persuade the Six and the EEC institutions that Ireland merited attention in its own right. Heath's support was strong – in his statement to the WEU Council on 10 April 1962 he said that the UK recognised the political and economic objectives of the Treaties of Paris and Rome in the future context of an 'enlarged community including not only the United Kingdom, but also other European States who will be joining the European Economic Community' – but not sufficient for Irish purposes.43

Therefore, as if in a further effort still to convince the EEC about Ireland's suitability in political terms, Lemass made his clearest statement yet on the position of neutrality relative to Irish foreign policy in an interview given to the New York Times, subsequently published on 18 July 1962. Through this medium, the taoiseach said:

We recognise that a military commitment will be an inevitable consequence of our joining the Common Market and ultimately we would be prepared to yield even the technical label of neutrality. We are prepared to go into this integrated Europe without any reservations as to how far this will take us in
In truth, a portentous evolution in Irish foreign policy was taking place, a strategic rethink on security procedures that continued to develop throughout the whole application process. The Irish government was making it crystal clear to the EEC that it would not have balked at indicating its lack of attachment to neutrality – by dropping this defence stance altogether if it was to be replaced by an EEC sponsored military structure – if this was deemed contingent for membership. Indeed, Trevor Salmon has since written that:

Adherence to neutrality had become conditional and transient, depending upon how the Community developed; any lingering long-term aspiration to it was yielded in the commitment to the future development of the Community.45

If participation in NATO had been made a prerequisite to EEC membership, Lemass had left no lingering doubts regarding his government's readiness to accept such a repercussion, if not welcome it. In his opinion, the political price of membership was worth paying in return for the substantial economic benefits that Ireland would subsequently accrue.

The emphasis of its diplomacy turned from being dedicated to political action within the UN, that is 'active neutrality', to being focused economically on Europe, that is 'military neutrality'.46 Irish political strategy fell in behind new developments at the EEC rather than those at the UN as the consideration of EEC membership began to play a continuously larger role in the actual shaping of government policy.47 At the same time, neutrality was undergoing a process of dilution through the European integration policy it was pursuing. In the context of integration, the early 1960s thus marked a subtle shift in emphasis; Ireland's orientation towards the EEC was increasingly being viewed as an economic necessity with Lemass seeing membership as something that might be partly exchanged for its independent foreign policy, though obviously only if need be.

Despite the taoiseach's speech in Brussels at the beginning of 1962, the EEC Council stated that it needed still more clarification from the government, specifically regarding economic concerns appertaining to Ireland's candidacy. However, the EEC Council subsequently delayed forwarding the questions that it felt needed answering for no apparent reason other than to stall its application. In time, a list of fifteen questions was finally submitted by the EEC on aspects of Ireland's position over which it needed further elucidation. However, no commitment was made by the EEC regarding the opening of negotiations, nor was there any indication that the Dublin
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

government could directly influence any such decision by its actions.\(^{48}\) In most respects, Ireland's aspirant status was actually out of its own hands and dependent on much wider European integration considerations and developments.

Ireland's detailed reply to the questions posed by the EEC Council was delivered at a meeting held in Brussels on 11 May 1962 between senior Irish government officials and the permanent representatives of the Six. It is worth analysing this second major presentation of the Irish government's case for membership in a matter of months and examining the issues raised at this meeting. The questionnaire, although concerned with Irish agriculture, was most interested with the problem of indigenous Irish industry adapting to the rigours of full EEC membership; indeed, in this regard, it was actually the suggested timetable for the elimination of quotas and tariffs which troubled the Six most. Although the Irish attitude to this issue is dealt with in considerably more detail in a subsequent section centred on the government's preparations for negotiations to begin, at this early stage it is interesting to note the position of the EEC towards the Irish application bid because, rather suddenly, the political aspects of Ireland's candidacy were apparently being skipped over, thus legitimising the timeframe proposed by Brian Girvin rather than that put forward by D.J.Maher.\(^{49}\) Nonetheless, the fact of the matter is that the Irish government was still finding it difficult to make itself clearly heard and understood. The negotiations were not going too slowly; indeed, in any accepted sense, they were hardly happening at all.

In fact, it was the Taoiseach's pointed reference during his address to the EEC Council in Brussels regarding Ireland's desire that possible relief be administrated to 'basically sound industries', either under the Treaty of Rome (Article 226) or a new and quite separate protocol, which attracted particular attention. As D.J.Maher has stated, further information was sought on:

- specific details on the industries which would be affected;
- the Irish government's opinion as to whether the difficulties envisaged could not be solved through existing procedures;
- if this could not be done, a more detailed breakdown of the industrial products that would necessitate the insertion of a separate protocol.

At this meeting with the permanent representatives on 11 May 1962, questions such as these went unsatisfactorily answered as far as the EEC was concerned. For instance, when senior Irish civil servants present replied that, pending the results of industrial surveys being carried out and following an analysis of the actual effects of tariff reductions, it was not possible at that stage to identify
the industries that would be affected. However, the Irish government's 'double-barrelled' approach to the question of relief on tariffs was justified at this meeting, it felt, on the rather precarious grounds that it was 'not sufficiently familiar' with the EEC's own interpretation of the safeguards provided for in the Treaty of Rome.

Overall, it has to be said that the permanent representatives of the Six did not furnish much of a reaction to the Irish government's second presentation except to seek even further clarification on technical details such as the 'dumping' provision (Article 91).50 Indeed, as D.J.Maher has correctly stated, although Ireland's status as a prospective member of the EEC was not being examined any longer in direct regard to its political suitability for membership, the Six were evidently still very worried about its relative acceptability and viability on purely economic grounds.51 By the middle of 1962, it was economics, not so much politics, which was the vital consideration for the Irish government. It was finally being realised in Dublin that Ireland would have to assist more readily in promoting its own case for membership if it was going to be successful in its endeavours, as the EEC and the Six obviously remained rather unconvincing. So, how did the Lemass government decide to proceed and what impact did their policies have on Ireland's candidature?

Ireland finally forces the pace

Despite not receiving any real encouragement to do so, the Irish government began to make serious preparations for membership negotiations to begin. Efforts by the Irish delegation at the meeting with the Six permanent representatives in Brussels held on 11 May 1962 to fix a date to hold a ministerial-level meeting in the near future – the main item on such an agenda being to mark the official opening of Ireland's negotiations with the EEC – failed. Each of the major Irish government departments were, nevertheless, duly handed the responsibility of compiling and coordinating negotiating briefs. At the same time, preparations began for the publication of a follow-up White Paper to European Economic Community, which was primed with the main objective of summarising the latest developments in the EEC. As a result, this updated document subsequently appeared on 28 June 1962.52 At last, the government had decided to take the initiative, no matter how inconvenient that was for the EEC or for the Six. It was finally beginning to force the pace of events rather than reacting to them.

Most significantly, perhaps, the newly revised White Paper detailed
the advances made by the Six regarding the CAP, once again signalling one of the government's main concerns in relation to the EEC; this document dealt with other major developments by the Six in the previous twelve months as well. However, because there was no move from the EEC on the opening of membership negotiations throughout the summer of 1962 — in fact, it was felt that Ireland's candidacy was being postponed rather too easily and regularly — Dublin discerned the danger of falling even further behind the UK — as well as Denmark and Norway — in the negotiations stakes. The fact that this substantial delay was creating 'unease' in government circles and was not particularly remarked upon by the Six, led to further feelings of anguish and disquiet. Indeed, according to D.J. Maher, such emotions were felt despite the fact that:

Inquiries through diplomatic channels produced soothing assurances that little or no progress had been made with the Danish and Norwegian applications, which must necessarily wait on the processing of the British application, and that the Irish application presented so few problems that it could be dealt with very quickly.

As a result, the government decided to go on a propaganda offensive in an effort to quicken the tempo further still. Even though no assurances regarding its candidacy had been received by that stage — indeed, reports to the contrary suggest that relations between the Irish embassy in Brussels and the EEC Council were at an unusually low ebb — therefore, it could only be deduced that the 'status of our application is as yet undetermined'.

Consequently, Lemass decided upon a two pronged approach to be personally enacted throughout Europe, firstly, in a concerted bid to promote a more favourable view of the Irish government's application for full membership and, secondly, in an intensified effort to hasten a more promising decision from the EEC Council. His strategy combined two strands:

- the issuing of an invitation to prominent European and UK journalists, through the Irish Council of the European Movement, to visit Ireland in the first week of September 1962;
- a tour by the taoiseach of the main European capitals in October 1962.

The journalists involved were thus given wide-ranging access to leading Irish economic and political figures, as well as being given the chance to view Ireland for themselves. At the most important organised event, a press conference held on 5 September 1962, the taoiseach used the opportunity to
consider the main reservations of the Six regarding Irish membership. Indeed, he meticulously crafted even further placatory remarks regarding Ireland's political convictions and the appropriate nature of its candidacy. Ireland, he said, had no reservations regarding European defence and, indeed, 'accepted the political aims of the Community and their proposed method for realising them'. What the taoiseach was worried about throughout his presentation was perpetuating any myth or misunderstanding that NATO and the EEC were linked in some way, formally or otherwise. In concluding his analysis of the Irish political situation and in explicit reference to the Irish people, Lemass said that the EEC would still find:

... strong adherents of the principles of parliamentary democracy and strongly opposed to communism and everything that communism represents. We do not wish, in the conflict between the free democracies and the communist empires, to be thought of as neutral. We are not neutral and do not wish to be regarded as such, even though we have not got specific commitments of a military kind under any international agreements.

With regard to economics, the taoiseach was obviously not in as strong a position to advance his view of the situation as Ireland could not be so easily defined that it would comfortably fit into the existing European context.55 Nonetheless, Lemass boldly stated that Ireland was a 'European country, historically and geographically, and in our view fully qualified for membership'. Indeed, he said that Ireland must participate in the EEC 'not in any qualified way, not as a reluctant partner, not as a poor relation and not with any inferiority of status'. The government's acceptance of associate membership status was out of the question as it expected the country to be able to adapt fully economically to meet the requirements of the EEC, especially if it received the consideration and help of the Six. Therefore, Ireland only felt itself to be in a position to accept full membership status. Indeed, Lemass claimed that his government saw a net gain for the country on the industrial side through such membership, stating that it would 'assist and accelerate our economic development'. At the same time, it should be remarked that the taoiseach's press conference of 5 September 1962 marked a subtle departure from previous policy positions regarding Ireland's unstated, but understood, dependence on the success of the UK application for the effective conclusion of its own aspirant status. Lemass held that:

If the negotiations with Britain should fail, we would, nevertheless wish to pursue our application provided it was economically possible for us to do so.
In fact, he adamantly insisted that Ireland's status as a candidate existed in its own right and that – unlike the other aspirants Denmark or Norway – it was not conditional upon the success or otherwise of the UK's application. In truth, of course, Ireland was in no position to enter the EEC as a fully fledged member if the UK did not do so as well. However, the noises emanating from Dublin were beginning to sound better to European ears.

A report from the American ambassador in Dublin to his superiors in the US State Department provides adequate proof regarding the importance of this press conference as the 'most complete analysis of [Irish] Government policy toward the question of membership in the EEC that has yet appeared'. Additionally, Matthew McCloskey informed Washington that there was full cross-party support in the Dáil for the taoiseach's position from James Dillon and Brendan Corish, the leaders of Fine Gael and Labour respectively. In his summary of these frank views, this senior US diplomat reported that Lemass had been 'clear and forceful' in the answers which he had given. McCloskey then outlined the situation regarding Ireland's applicant status as follows:

- the attitude taken thus far by the EEC towards Ireland's application was seen as encouraging;
- Ireland would continue to seek Common Market membership – if it was economically possible to do so – even if the UK did not succeed in its own application;
- the Irish government was at that time considering the practicability of unilateral tariff dismantlement;
- associate EEC status was strongly rejected;
- the gains to Irish industry from full EEC membership would outweigh the losses, while indigenous agriculture should greatly benefit;
- Ireland had made known its agreement with the aims of NATO, despite the special circumstances which had resulted in its non-membership of the latter, while Lemass noted that it had not recently been invited to join nor had there been any discussion of such an invitation. Indeed, he then added: 'nor would we wish to receive and invitation at this time, because it would, I think, create misunderstanding in the mind of the Irish public as to the aims and purposes of the European Economic Community and be a further complication for us in the consideration of the problems which membership of the Community must necessarily involve for us'.

There was little room for any misreading of Irish incentives for membership or its intentions.
The press conference in Dublin was followed by a more meaningful tour of European capitals conducted by the taoiseach himself during October 1962. Lemass immediately set about convincing the leaders of the Six that Ireland wanted to participate fully in the process of European integration. Indeed, what he most definitely needed to hear was some news or even an indication regarding the opening of negotiations at some suitable, though unspecified, time. The Irish delegation duly met with senior elected representatives of the Belgian, Dutch, French, Italian and Luxembourg governments during the second week of October, as well as meeting with senior officials at the EEC, including Hallstein. It was, emphasised Lemass to his hosts, the uncertainty regarding the outcome of Ireland's application for full membership which was creating the most serious difficulties for his government, especially with regard to its rationalisation and reorganisation programme for the economy. What Ireland wanted most, the taoiseach stressed, was some concrete reassurance from the EEC Council regarding the continued validity of its candidature. In fact, the Irish government was quite prepared to consider announcing an early unilateral tariff cut if such encouragement was received.

As D.J. Maher has since stated, it was subsequently noted that: 'Without exception all the host Governments showed sympathy with, and understanding of, the Irish Government's position.' However, it was obvious from the deputation's meetings with representatives from the various member states and from the institutions of the EEC that not only had the UK government's negotiations reached a critical stage, but that they were also still concerned about certain economic and political aspects of Ireland's candidacy. Of course, Lemass could only respond by reconfirming in the strongest terms that his government was committed to the wider process of European integration, both economically and politically speaking. For the moment, however, Ireland did not yet appear to be doing enough to persuade its detractors and repudiators. The government's stated desire to play a full role in the EEC remained unrequited. Indeed, it did not appear to be in a position to do anything other than to wait for an undefined amount of time to come. Ireland was running out of ideas as to how to promote its candidacy any further and the frustration was beginning to show.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that the UK government was fully aware of what Lemass told the French president during their meeting of 13 October 1962. The taoiseach had said that, because of its strong ties to the UK, it would suit Ireland if the UK government negotiations with the EEC came to a successful conclusion. However, during this encounter he did not dismiss the possibility of Ireland continuing its candidacy for EEC.
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

...membership even if those negotiations failed, declaring that the Irish government would have to investigate the prevailing circumstances. Indeed, the taoiseach told de Gaulle that Ireland's application was not dependent upon, or subordinate to, that of the UK, a point of view which apparently appealed to the French president's sensibilities. In Lemass's view, the EEC was 'vital' to the future of the Irish economy. Therefore, he informed de Gaulle that Ireland wanted to join the EEC whether or not the UK itself ultimately adhered. This has led one historian to state that the Irish government's continued emphasis of this position was an integral part of the strategy it employed to unblock French opposition to its proposed candidacy. Another commentator has proffered the view that in the end the taoiseach 'gave de Gaulle all the assurances he was seeking about his commitment on both economic and political levels'. In fact, the prognosis from France might have been interpreted as very good at this point in time, with the French prime minister, Georges Pompidou, able to tell the taoiseach that: 'One could consider the entry of Great Britain as probable, even if the outcome is still uncertain'; however, this was not de Gaulle speaking of course, even if one might have expected the French prime minister to be able to echo his president. There was an additional footnote to Lemass's tour of the European capitals which cannot be ignored, but which throws light on the realities of French and European politics. The taoiseach actually had it on good authority – he had been made aware of this opinion by Amintore Fanfani, the Italian prime minister, amongst others – that the French government's fundamental strategy, which meant de Gaulle's policy, was to delay the UK's accession to the EEC for as long as possible, perhaps even until the end of 1965, a position which obviously had crucial implications for the future of the Dublin government's bid. Thus, the Irish application was doomed to failure right from the beginning.

Meanwhile, while the taoiseach was in Bonn, the Irish government received the news for which it had been waiting on 22 October 1962. Ireland was finally invited to participate in membership negotiations by the EEC Council at a mutually acceptable date to be agreed. At last, Dublin's concerted efforts to obtain a 'firm commitment' from the EEC Council on the opening of negotiations had borne fruit. Through this decision, the Six thus committed themselves to inaugurating membership negotiations with Ireland. Indeed, the very next day, 23 October 1962, an official communication followed from Emilio Colombo, the EEC Council president, to inform the taoiseach that, in responding to the call from the government for the EEC Council to open negotiations with Ireland, so that it might adhere to the Treaty of Rome, the Six had decided unanimously to accede to its entreaty. Having patiently waited in the wings for fifteen months, the Irish application was up and
running.

Understandably enough, on 9 November 1962, Lemass replied to the EEC Council by saying that this news had been received with 'much satisfaction' by his government. As a direct consequence, the closing months of 1962 thus saw the country propel itself into an upbeat pre-accession mode, as it enthusiastically prepared for the successful outcome of its talks, with specific attention being paid to those discussions which would be most intimately involved in considering the benefits and problems that faced Irish agriculture and industry. The prospect of a 'Europe of the Ten' – consisting of the Six, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the UK – was becoming a distinct and exciting reality; of course, this also made its failure to accede all the more disappointing. At the same time, the state of Irish negotiations meant that the UK's discussions were beginning to come to their conclusion before its own efforts had barely begun. The inherent dangers in such a situation were readily apparent.

In fact, the government's working assumption was that its membership negotiations would be completed by the middle of 1963 and that Ireland would be a member of the EEC by the beginning of the following year. Obviously enough, de Gaulle saw to it that this could not happen, even if there were more reasons to Ireland's ultimate failure to accede other than this decision taken by the French president. It should be reasserted that, all the while, Dublin was under no illusions about where it ultimately stood in relation to the Treaty of Rome or how it was viewed by the Six or the institutions. Indeed, according to the UK's negotiating team in Brussels, Ireland was always only going to be offered full membership of the EEC 'on a more or less take it or leave it basis'; in their opinion, Lemass was fully aware of this situation. Not unlike Denmark and Norway, Ireland would ultimately have had no choice but to sign up completely to the EEC if a 'Europe of the Ten' was to come about or else to stay outside; as one informed view put it, 'the alternative to taking the Treaty as it stood would be consignment to outer darkness'. The Dublin government was not about to lose out on the opportunity to accede now that it had become a distinct possibility.

Of course, in the interval between the EEC Council giving Ireland the 'green light' for negotiations to commence and de Gaulle 'pulling the plug', there were some interesting developments in the Irish government's position on various economic and political matters related to its aspirant status. At the end of October 1962, for instance, the taoiseach declared that Ireland had notified the Six that it was quite prepared to participate in whatever form of European political union developed and, in this regard, that it was not making any sort of reservation, including those matters which were directly related to
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

Lemass reiterated the fact that:

... 99 per cent. of the people agree with my view that this country is anti-Communist and will remain anti-Communist ... There is no doubt that this Christian country is and will remain to be completely antagonistic to the Communist concept ...

The EEC Council's promise to open negotiations may, as it turned out, have given the Irish government false hopes, but at least this decision had invigorated the country's preparations for membership, especially corrections in the economy that were much needed anyway. The inherent promise from Lemass to reform Ireland's status as a military neutral, if and when the need arose to do so, also exploded the quasi-mythical nature of Irish neutrality; it would be surrendered as soon as it could be bargained away at a profit.

On 22 November 1962 in Dáil Éireann, Lemass went so far as to pronounce that the application to accede to the Treaty of Rome would present no difficulty. In direct relation to Ireland's economic restructuring, his government also made a unilateral, if highly symbolic, 10% tariff cut as a sign of its faith in the whole integration process. This new position was to take effect from 1 January 1963. On the one hand, the Irish were creating the impression that they were prepared to pay any price in order to gain full accession to the EEC but, on the other, obviously realised the value of both independent negotiation and, indeed, the ability to put forward their own suggestions, positions that might not necessarily be in the UK's best interests.

A good illustration of this approach was the fact that the government was quite ready to submit an aide-mémoire to the EEC on the importance of mutton and lamb in the Irish agricultural sector, a move which did not please the UK government. However, as the departmental secretaries said: 'There was no good reason why we should not protect our own interests in an important matter such as this'. Nevertheless, speaking generally, Ireland and Norway never got much beyond the initial stages of beginning their negotiations with the EEC – limited to putting out 'feelers' – a crucial factor which distinguished their efforts from the proceedings engaged in by the Danish and UK governments. Ireland would not feel as reproachful towards the EEC or the Six, especially France, as the UK would; when it came to the next time to apply, the Irish government would fell chastened, but would also have to have learned a very valuable lesson if it was going to be successful.

The EEC Council's decision to open negotiations with Ireland was, of course, soon overtaken by events which are described in a series of sections later in this chapter that also analyse how and why Ireland's application had not failed, but that it had in fact been ignored. In the meantime, however, it has
proven necessary to investigate in some detail the substance of the Irish government's preparations for entry negotiations to begin with the EEC and to explore its relations with the other two European Communities, the ECSC and Euratom, up to the beginning of 1963. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the government was also committed to preparing a follow-up plan to the Programme for economic expansion at this time. However, notwithstanding this particular consideration, the Irish government concentrated its attention upon preparing for the forthcoming EEC negotiations to begin as it considered that all future developments depended on adhesion. Sadly, its faith in the good intentions of the French government was wholly misplaced.

**Lemass prepares for EEC entry negotiations to begin**

The EEC was, of course, generally well aware of the positions that Ireland would wish to take in its membership negotiations. Lemass's statement to the EEC Council on 18 January 1962 and the meeting on 11 May 1962 of senior Irish officials with the permanent representatives had actually left little of substance unsaid, even if clarification had been sought each time. There are no tangible grounds to go into immense detail regarding negotiation positions taken prior to Ireland's proposed accession. Nevertheless, some observations that come from a draft brief prepared by the Department of the Taoiseach with the onset of Irish-EEC negotiations in mind can be highlighted and, in turn, related to the relevant articles of the Treaty of Rome. This analysis by the most important government department in terms of European integration is of consequence mainly because it provides a priceless picture of positions being taken on the EEC membership question at the end of 1962, on the eve of negotiations beginning.

Ever since the inception of its application on 31 July 1961, the Irish government had gone out of its way to convince the EEC that Ireland accepted its vision of Europe, as set out in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome, without diminution. Additionally, it was well aware that there was no room for manoeuvre regarding the 'Principles' that continued to guide the foundation and further establishment of the EEC (Articles 1-8). Ireland was happy to signal its agreement with these principles. Indeed, as was outlined at the beginning of the part of the Treaty of Rome headed 'Foundations of the Community', there was a further aspiration which was clearly in favour of the free movement of goods (Articles 9-11); Ireland was also happily in favour of that. Certainly, another accepted assumption was the section of the treaty on the elimination of duties between member states within the customs union...
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

(Articles 12-17). So far, so good. The Irish government would be able to send all the right signals to the Six on the preamble and the initial articles of the Treaty of Rome.

However, regarding the section on the setting up of the common customs tariff within the customs union (Articles 18-29), the taoiseach had said that Ireland was prepared to accept such a tariff, but subject to negotiations for the revision of some items, 'mostly downwards'. Indeed, at the meeting with the permanent representatives of the Six, it had been added that the government was 'prepared to make an initial approximation towards the common external tariff on the date of Ireland's accession to the Community'. Regardless of this stance, a position of more fundamental importance to Ireland vis-à-vis its proposed membership of the EEC – regarding the free movement of goods – had already been demonstrated on both formal occasions in Brussels. As the Irish government had insisted at these meetings, it intended to 'replace industrial quantitative restrictions as soon as possible by tariffs of no greater and probably less restrictive effect'. Therefore, by the end of 1962, this standpoint had in fact become Ireland's official negotiating position in relation to the elimination of quantitative restrictions between member states (Articles 30-37). In the process, it also signalled what would have become a major issue of contention with its prospective new economic partners if negotiations had actually gone ahead as planned. The accession process would have started to become a little more awkward at that stage, explaining why the Six had been so reluctant to introduce Ireland into negotiations before the UK's adhesion had been solved.

In relation to the free movement of persons, services and capital, however, the Irish government's stance was relatively straightforward. Indeed, as regards the free movement of workers (Articles 48-51), 'no derogations or special arrangements' were being sought at the negotiations, as was the case with the right of establishment (Articles 52-58) and the freedom to provide services (Articles 59-66). Of course, the free movement of capital (Articles 67-73) was complicated by Ireland's strong ties to the UK, specifically to the 'Sterling Area', and to a neighbouring economy which had weak and fitful growth. The government's negotiating position therefore depended on arrangements that the UK would make through its own EEC accession negotiations. It is interesting, in this regard, to note T.K. Whitaker's remark on the 'Sterling Area' to the effect that 'when we were getting on well in the world, England was going backwards'. Ireland had its eyes elsewhere for markets.

In actual fact, it was West Germany and the US which were being foreseen by Ireland as two of its most important future economic partners, conclusions understandably discernible from the figures. As a potential market
Protectionism to liberalisation

for goods and services, Ireland's attitude towards West Germany transformed rather quickly from the relatively contemporary times of Heinrich Böll's travelogue *Irisches Tagesbuch*, only published in 1957, when Irish bankers had difficulty in recognising, never mind changing, a West German banknote. Indeed, by the early 1960s, the FRG was fast becoming the most important economy in Europe, as well as a very significant new trading partner for Ireland. In the period 1957 to 1966, its average export to import ratio with Germany was well under 3:1 – itself a very big improvement on the rest of the 1950s when it was well over 4:1 – but there was still some way to go. By 1962, over 6⅝% of its total imports came from the FRG, with most of these – 90% or more – being manufactured goods demanding high capital and technological input. Meanwhile, West Germany was also quickly becoming an important market for Irish goods, especially for agricultural products demanding less input, with over 3% of its total exports going there; regularly during the 1960s, live animals still accounted for around 30% of these goods however, even if Irish manufactured products were slowly becoming more significant. It was obviously growing in terms of trade for Ireland's rapidly developing economy, as was the rest of the European mainland, but there were clearly other alternatives to the UK as well.

It is a very interesting exercise therefore to put these German figures into the context of a comparable destination for Irish goods, as well as a source for its growing needs at home. Concurrently, over 7⅝% of its total imports came from the US, with 8¼% of its total exports going in the opposite direction. There was not much of a basis for getting too excited by these sets of figures however, as Ireland had a significant negative trade balance with both countries. In 1962, Ireland imported over 3½ times the value of goods from West Germany as it exported; with the US, it amounted to 1½ times as much. These statistics only provided evidence of serious, habitually negative trade deficits. Of course, the continued growth of foreign investment in Ireland from the end of the 1950s onwards also meant that both West Germany and the US had quickly developed into highly significant factors in the continued development of the Irish economy. However, a truthful assessment of the position meant that the country's definitive economic dependence upon the UK would not have given Ireland's negotiators with the EEC much room for instigating major new initiatives. Bilateral Anglo-Irish economic relations would remain of paramount importance to the Irish economy in the short and medium term, no matter how much Ireland searched for new markets.

The question mark that was surrounding the institution of a common transport policy in the EEC (Articles 74-84) was another area within the context of European integration in which the Irish government had decided
rather early on that it was not going to look for a 'derogation or any special arrangements' at the membership negotiations stage. Nonetheless, the Irish Department of Transport & Power hoped that, once in the EEC, Ireland would of course be able to influence the formulation of the as yet undefined common transport policy, thus enabling it to draw particular attention to the country's peripheral nature. At the same time, of much more specific interest to the Irish government was the wish that the 'removal of the existing restrictions on the licensing of the entry of road transport vehicles should be gradual'. Notwithstanding this consideration, the establishment of a common transport policy within the EEC was still a relatively long term goal at which to aim. Indeed, according to this draft brief for Ireland's talks with the EEC dating from December 1962, there were even more pressing matters in relation to the Treaty of Rome still to which the government would seriously have to attend at its forthcoming accession negotiations.

One of the areas that undoubtedly worried the Irish government was in relation to the part of the Treaty of Rome headed 'Policy of the Community', more specifically in relation to the rules that governed competition and, in particular, to those provisions that dealt with dumping (Article 91). Indeed, these fears had been explicitly acknowledged on both of the two previous occasions at which the government had presented its case for membership to the Six in Brussels, the taoiseach's statement to the EEC Council and the meeting of senior Irish officials with the permanent representatives. The provision against dumping stated:

If, during the transitional period, the Commission, on application by a Member State or by any other interested party, finds that dumping is being practised within the common market, it shall address recommendations to the person or persons with whom such practices originate for the purpose of putting an end to them. Should the practices continue, the Commission shall authorise the injured Member State to take protective measures, the conditions and details of which the Commission shall determine.

This provision was inadequate as far as the Irish were concerned because of a fundamental flaw. On 18 January 1962, Lemass had been moved to declare that:

Because of the small home market and the size of Irish industrial units, Irish industry is particularly vulnerable to dumping, and the Irish Government would hope that an arrangement could be made under which it would be possible for them to take effective counter measures against any dumping or threat of dumping in good time.
In addition, on 11 May 1962, the reply that was given to the permanent representatives of the Six further aired government fears about the effectiveness of this provision, because in reality they doubted its actual applicability. In the opinion of senior government officials, this provision 'would not provide sufficient protection against the dumping of goods'. Indeed, the government stated that the Treaty of Rome in fact only provided for remedial measures to be taken after dumping had taken place and also after it had then been investigated by the EEC Commission. It was pointed out by the Irish delegation that this retort might come too late for an Irish industry, because the saturation resulting from dumping could have caused 'serious disruption of production and employment' in the meantime. The government felt that Ireland was especially vulnerable to dumping because of factors such as the limited size of its market, and therefore suggested that it be allowed to take immediate, albeit temporary, action if there was evidence that dumping was actually already occurring or that it was about to occur. Of course, the government made it clear that the EEC Commission would then be called in to deal with the matter, but only post factum. This view on dumping was explicitly held in the draft brief for negotiations with the EEC and would obviously have been reflected in the Irish government's subsequent efforts at arbitration.

Another question related to the rules on competition which was dealt with at this time by the government in its preparations for full membership negotiations to begin was on the rules regarding aids granted by states (Articles 92-94) but, once again, it was felt that this subject did not arise at this early stage. The remaining aspects of the Treaty of Rome which were reviewed in this draft brief for Ireland's negotiations with the EEC were equally lacking in difficulty. In regard to economics, it was noted that the Dublin government accepted the objectives outlined in the section dealing with commercial policy (Articles 110-116) and that it would not be seeking any derogations here. Indeed, the provisions that were laid down in the area of social policy (Articles 117-122) were viewed similarly. Actually, Lemass had already specifically spoken in Brussels regarding the other area of social policy – that is the European Social Fund (Articles 123-128), and, in addition, on the European Investment Bank (Articles 129-130) – envisaging no genuine difficulties there either. Certainly, the taoiseach appeared not to feel that Ireland would need any 'special financial assistance', because he assumed that the country would have the same access to the European Social Fund and to the European Investment Bank as the other member states. So far so good.

There were some major lacunae in this draft Irish government brief for
negotiations with the EEC, noticeably with regard to the whole question of
debate of agriculture (Articles 38-47), an area which was at the heart of the part of the
Treaty of Rome which was labelled as the 'Foundations of the Community'.
Indeed, there were also large gaps with regard to the part denoted as the 'Policy
of the Community'; more precisely, these areas dealt with the rules on
competition, specifically in relation to the rules applying to undertakings
(Articles 85-90), as well as tax provisions (Articles 95-99) and with the
approximation of laws (Articles 100-102). Furthermore, in relation to
economics, there were also some significant gaps, expressly on conjunctural
policy (Article 103) and on the issue of balance of payments (Articles 104-
109). Nonetheless, this document remains extremely valuable as a snapshot of
what were in fact the vast majority of considered Irish government positions
regarding the Treaty of Rome at the end of 1962. Obviously, agriculture was
still the most important consideration for Ireland in any negotiations with the
EEC and, indeed, remained highly problematic. Notwithstanding the lack of
analysis of this integral component, amongst many other gaps, this Department
of the Taoiseach survey merited investigation here. Indeed, although this short
review of the negotiating positions that the Irish government was taking
regarding the Treaty of Rome may have gone into some detail, it does at least
give a strong indication of the extent to which the Irish were preparing
themselves for the accession process to start.

It is also worth pointing out that plans were made at this time for the
publication of a brochure containing the most important speeches that had
been delivered by the taoiseach in connection with Ireland's application,
because it adds a public dimension to the private Irish government
preparations that were being made for membership negotiations to begin.
Indeed, Lemass stated that the main intention behind such a brochure was that
it would prove to be primarily useful for 'Dáil Deputies and public
commentators, and ... representatives of other Governments and press
representatives from abroad'. In fact, totally ignoring the facts of the matter, he
also added, one suspects more in hope than with much conviction, that it
would demonstrate the 'consistency of our policy from the start' with regard to
the EEC. Of course, this claim was rightly castigated by the Irish
Independent, because, for example, there had undoubtedly been a complete
turn-about by the Lemass government in relation to defence, noticeably on
neutrality. Indeed, it quoted him as having said two years previously that: 'We
do not accept that it is only through a regional military alliance that this
country can make a useful contribution to the defence of these principles'. At
the end of 1962, the Irish government's position was that it was now willing, in
principle, to enter into a European defence alliance if compelled by the process
of integration. As the *Irish Independent* stated: 'Surely this is a clear change of emphasis and there is no point in cloaking it'.

In connection with this issue, it is thus also interesting to note that there was a debate between the departmental secretaries over whether or not to include in the proposed brochure the speech made by Lemass, dating from 1 December 1960, on Ireland's position relative to neutrality. It was only latterly, therefore, that he felt compelled to think the implications of its inclusion through. The taoiseach sought advice from his departmental secretary, explaining the two sides of the argument, as much to himself as to Nolan. Lemass wrote:

> While not related to our EEC application, its inclusion would help to emphasise that our position in this regard was taken before our EEC application was possible. On the other hand, its inclusion may over-emphasise the neutrality issue.

The editors of this brochure of speeches made in connection with Ireland's application were faced with a difficult conundrum. Interestingly, they decided in the end that this speech on neutrality should not be included, partially as a result of the newspaper's intervention it must be said, even if the evidence in surmising such a conclusion is at best circumstantial. However, it does appear that the taoiseach was prepared to dissemble the realities of his government's position on neutrality for the benefit of its endeavours in joining the EEC; the pamphlet itself was not in fact published anyway, events overtaking its usefulness.

Publicly, the taoiseach had been very upbeat ever since the EEC Council had made its historic decision to open negotiations in October 1962 and, although he now saw that the timetable for adhesion had been put back somewhat – even at a very optimistic estimate to the beginning of 1964 – he did not appear to be unduly worried at this point in time about the ultimate outcome. Indeed, although the Danish and Norwegian applications were themselves contingent upon the UK government's success, Lemass emphasised that Ireland's request was not. This assertion did, of course, carry a crucial proviso:

> ... a failure of the British negotiations would require us to reconsider our position in the light of the circumstances which may then prevail.

The worry foremost in Irish government minds was that there might be a substantial 'hiatus' between the UK's adhesion to the EEC and Ireland's accession. However, notwithstanding this critical consideration, the country
was still preparing itself for the full implementation of the Treaty of Rome by 31 December 1969. Therefore, the first unilateral tariff cut announced at the end of 1962 was part of this process. At the stage, Lemass actually declared that he found the 'prospect of intensive activity in preparing the national economy to meet the new circumstances not in the least distasteful'. Indeed, he added:

The sense of the historical significance of what is happening, together with the understanding that everything which we do in preparation is worth doing for its own sake and will give us an economic organisation which will be permanently stronger and sounder, helps to generate the enthusiasm which will make the work seem lighter.

It was clearly recognised that every national plan for economic and social advancement must henceforth be based in the belief that free trade in Europe would continue to develop.84

The Irish government's painful conversion from the economic policy of protectionism to one accepting the exigencies of European integration may in truth have been based on the premise that there was no other 'practical alternative' available. However, in a crucial speech that he delivered to the Fianna Fáil Árd-Fheis in Dublin on 20 November 1962, the taoiseach publicly maintained that Ireland was particularly excited at the prospect of participating in 'one of the greatest and most imaginative developments in the history of mankind'.85 This sudden conversion on European cooperation and integration still paled in comparison with that of London, but just like the latter, it was not 'merely due to a change of mind of the political leadership, but was the outcome of an agonising reappraisal involving policy-makers as well as the bureaucracy, the public as well as non-governmental élites'.86 Major uncertainties remained about the timing and form of adhesion, but the readjustment of native agriculture and industry continued apace nevertheless.87

These aspirations for Ireland to participate in the wider integration process came to mean little however on 14 January 1963 when the French president finally made his feelings known and, thereafter, as the implications of his pronouncement began to be more thoroughly evaluated. Before dealing directly with this specific subject, there were also some important developments in this period with regard to Ireland's relations with the other two European Communities that need to be considered, as the government finally set about joining the ECSC and Euratom, European institutions which it had heretofore deemed to be so relatively insignificant that it could virtually ignore them. Paradoxically, this evolution in Ireland's integration policy has to be fully explored in order to understand more fully the importance that it was
attaching to the EEC, proving that the latter was the only consideration.

**Ireland and the other two European Communities**

Membership of the other two European Communities – the ECSC or Euratom – were never important considerations for the Irish government, basically because, in terms of European integration, the question of full EEC membership thoroughly dominated Ireland's thinking. Indeed, it can be argued that the final opening of diplomatic relations with the ECSC and Euratom by Ireland – in fact, the resulting applications to join them – therefore signified nothing more than a kind of afterthought. In truth, Ireland had opened diplomatic relations with the EEC in December 1959, but it did not subsequently accredit a representative to the ECSC until January 1963 and to Euratom until April 1963. Indeed, these three postings, along with the jobs of Irish ambassador to Belgium and Irish minister to Luxembourg, were all held by one person until October 1966. Thus, Patrick Keatinge is mistaken when he states in *The formulation of Irish foreign policy* that Ireland actually had diplomatic relations with the European Communities from the earlier date mentioned. The general lack of available or relevant archive material strongly indicates that Dublin did not rally pay much attention to either the ECSC or to Euratom, although it has to be said that the question of steel was a relatively significant factor in the subsequent development of its strategy towards the ECSC. However, the importance of these other two European Communities paled in comparison with that of the EEC in the development of Ireland's foreign economic policy.

Overall, of course, the three European Communities were not at all averse to the idea of Ireland joining their organisations, but only so long as the Irish government was, in turn, prepared to accept and to fulfil the necessary economic and political conditions inherent in membership. In addition, there were obvious reasons for Ireland's slighting of the ECSC and Euratom at this time, with these grounds emerging as the relationship between Dublin and these two other European Communities, largely forgotten by historians and the general public alike, is chronicled. The purpose of this particular section is therefore to consider the Irish government's position in relation to nuclear power, coal and steel in this period, while also investigating how these concerns impacted on Ireland's general relationship with the Six. As these topics have not yet been dealt with in any great detail in these central chapters, the backgrounds to Ireland's relationship with both the ECSC and Euratom also have to be considered. Indeed, this section chronologically traces the various developments that were made in regard to both of these institutions,
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

especially in the early 1960s, before making some remarks that lead into the next section which centres on de Gaulle's famous press conference and veto of the UK.

On 18 January 1962, in the course of his statement to the EEC Council in Brussels regarding Ireland's case for EEC membership, Lemass stated that:

If Ireland's application for membership of the Community is accepted in principle, we shall apply for accession to the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom.90

As was previously stated, Ireland had applied to join the EEC at the end of July 1961 and, while it was understood by the Irish government that there was 'no formal requirement' for EEC members to be members of the ECSC and Euratom as well, towards the end of 1962 it was also 'recognised that the three Communities are complementary to each other and that membership of one entails membership of all.'91 Indeed, an Interdepartmental Committee report on Ireland's membership of the ECSC from that latter period had stated that:

Membership of the European Coal and Steel Community is dependent on whether or not our application for membership of the European Economic Community is successful. If this country's application for membership of the EEC is accepted we are committed to becoming a member of the ECSC.

Equally, the same case applied to Ireland's membership of Euratom. In addition, however, it was noted that association with the EEC – unlike full membership – would not necessarily involve accession to either of these other organisations.92 Thus, when the EEC Council agreed to open negotiations in October 1962, accepting in principle Ireland's application for EEC membership, the government was prompted for the first time into having to consider seriously opening membership negotiations with the ECSC and Euratom as well.

In point of fact, Ireland's continued anomalous position with regard to the ECSC and Euratom, having stated a desire to join both organisations at the beginning of 1962, had finally forced the UK to warn the Irish government that the continued absence of membership applications from both Ireland and Norway 'risked creating difficulties, especially in the matter of the timetable'; furthermore, it advised that Ireland's undefined position with regard to these two other European Communities also had much wider implications. Although the 'practical consequences' of joining either European Community would 'not for the moment be great', according to the Irish chef de mission to the EEC,
Francis Biggar, he still advised the Irish government to open formal diplomatic relations with the ECSC and Euratom as soon as was practicably possible. It was pointed out that such amended circumstances would enable Ireland to be in a similar position to that of the UK government when it would come to negotiating actual EEC entry. In fact, Dublin retained the expectation that any negotiations with the European Communities would operate in tandem with those of the UK, but it was, of course, to be extremely disappointed on this score. At any rate, the adhesion process was going to be a protracted one and would thus necessitate immediate action if Ireland's actual accreditation to these two other European Communities was to be fulfilled by January 1963. Biggar noted that the EEC Council's decision of October 1962 had realised Lemass's own acknowledged conditions for entry into the ECSC and Euratom. Thus, the Irish diplomat 'suggest[ed] that the sooner the matter is put in hands the better'; indeed, he also advised his superiors to take the unusual short-cut of presenting the agréments for diplomatic relations simultaneously with the documents for accreditation.93

In mid-November 1962, Lemass asked the authoritative Committee of Departmental Secretaries for its 'views on the desirability of applying now for membership of Euratom and the Coal & Steel Community'.94 The London government had already stated its desire to join the ECSC the previous July and thus was in a position to negotiate to join all three European Communities; indeed, Denmark had applied to join both organisations on 16 March 1962, but, at this point in time, Norway was still in a position similar to that of Ireland.95 As a direct consequence of this situation, the departmental secretaries 'agreed that the time had come to present formal applications for membership of the two Communities' at their meeting in mid-November 1962.96 Of course, this still leaves a very important question unanswered: what would the implications for Ireland be in joining these other two European Communities?

The ECSC – formed through the Treaty of Paris from 18 April 1951 – came into being on 1 July 1952 and had six participants – Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. It had been established in order to form a common market in coal and steel (although these categories were still restricted in some ways) to ensure easily accessible and regular supplies of these products for its partners, obviously at the lowest prices possible. This development consequently led to the abolition of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on the import and export of coal and steel products between the members of the Six. Indeed, this agreement catered for problems like 'dumping' as well and made provisions to deal with the iron and steel scrap market. In the end, however, the UK decided to remain 'aloof' from the ECSC process for two principal reasons. The London government felt that:
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

- it did not receive the full support of the ECSC member countries to participate, because they in turn were worried about the structures and power of the coal and steel industries in the UK;
- the UK was already in a very strong position to maintain its policies in regard to both industries.

Ireland thus followed the UK's lead, but did not seriously have to consider the implications of this decision for some years to come. Pointedly, this archetypal stance did not help to distinguish its application for EEC membership from that of the UK. In the meantime, the UK did of course sign an association agreement on 21 December 1954 with the ECSC; evidently Ireland was not interested.

As Dermot Keogh has subsequently written in his *Twentieth-century Ireland*: 'Nothing was done to borrow from the approach in Europe which led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. The idea of functional integration did not appeal to politicians on either side of the House [Dáil Éireann].' Notwithstanding this particular slant, in itself quite representative of the reality, it is worth noting that there is some evidence, albeit retrospective, to show that the Lemass government actually felt that:

... there were certain features which distinguished the ECSC from the other Communities ... The establishment of the ECSC was primarily a political development which arose in the context of German rearmament. The philosophy behind it was very different, therefore, from that of the EEC.

Therefore, once the country began to move more in favour of integration, the ECSC suddenly became an ardent consideration. After applying to join the EEC in the middle of 1961, it was still many months, however, before the taoiseach in fact noted that the ECSC agreement was 'being scanned with a view to our accession'. However, he was particularly concerned with the implications of initiating such a move for Irish Steel because, as he stated, the coal and steel 'agreement provides for something like a managed market for steel'. Thus, the government set about assessing the implications of ECSC membership.

Coal was not particularly important in this context because Ireland's production was minimal – peat, an important domestic source of fuel, was actually outside the scope of the Treaty of Paris – and the country depended on imports. The only significant consideration for the government in regard to coal was therefore limited to sourcing. The Interdepartmental Committee report presented in December 1962 had said, in reference to the implications of
ECSC membership for the Irish coal industry, such as it was, that: 'It is considered that the country's membership of the ECSC would not have any appreciable effect on the home industry'. This was, in fact, a belief to which the Department of Finance strongly concurred. Ireland was, after all, producing only 150,000 tons of anthracite *per annum* – most of which was said to be 'duff', that is poor quality – and 60,000 tons of semi-bituminous coal – the majority of which came in the form of 'slack' and which was used by the Electricity Supply Board (ESB) at its Arigna power plant. Irish production hardly rated more than a mention. On the other hand, it still proved necessary to import vast quantities of bituminous coal and 55,000 tons of anthracite for the home market. What did this imply?

As can be ascertained from this data, the UK remained the most important source of Irish bituminous coal imports and, for all practical purposes, accounted for all of Ireland's import needs with regard to anthracite as well. However, as the Department of Finance noted, the UK was losing its importance as a sourcing point for the Irish market, mainly due to the increased mechanisation of UK mines which did not in fact cater for Ireland's needs for large coal. Ireland had therefore begun to source elsewhere. Indeed, it began this change of tack by concentrating more on imports from countries within the ECSC, specifically from Belgium and West Germany. In addition, under ECSC regulations then in force, although of course always liable to change, Ireland was not required to impose a tariff on non-ECSC coal – that is coal which came to it from Poland or the US – and so was sourcing from further afield as well. At the same time, Ireland's coal industry was not protected, even though the various Anglo-Irish trade agreements put a tariff of 3 shillings per ton on non-UK coal, this sum had in fact been waived in relation to large coal for a number of years. Essentially, Ireland operated its own coal-mining industry under free trade conditions and, by that reckoning, had nothing to fear regarding any proposed membership of the ECSC. Steel was an entirely different matter altogether, however. Firstly, though, it is interesting to note what the ECSC itself was thinking before detailing Irish considerations.

Archival sources amply show that Ireland was not particularly interested in moving too quickly on the subject of tariff reductions. An illustrative example of this is a handwritten note from within the ECSC headed 'Irlande 1958', which gruffly states that Irish tariff #58/3 essentially meant that Ireland's imports of coal, culm, shale, slack and coke from the ECSC totalled 'néant'. As was previously stated, the duty on these goods stood at three shillings a ton, even if that did not amount to very much, but the ECSC was determined upon receiving an exemption from this tariff. Other items which
were dealt with in detail by this ECSC document included various iron and steel products covered by Irish tariffs #125/1 and #125/4. In this regard, the general demand of the ECSC countries was for a cut in the tariff rate down from 37½% to 25%. Indeed, the rest of the document, actually compiled in 1961, amounted to a detailed statement of Irish tariffs on all major related products, with a list of some of the concessions that the Six were demanding from Ireland. As all of these tariffs were within the parameters of ongoing negotiations with GATT, it was stated that the demands of the ECSC had not as yet been explicitly defined. Of course, Ireland was not a vitally important market but, nevertheless, the very fact that it was 'closed', that foreign produce was handicapped by duties upon entry into the Irish market, did not at this point in time predispose the Six to the government's case for membership. In turn, how did Dublin view the idea of the country actually becoming a fully-fledged member of the ECSC?

Irish Steel, a state-owned company based in Cork and the only domestic steel producer that would be affected by Ireland's ECSC membership, had only been in production since 1947 and remained highly protected. Indeed, as previously stated, the full customs duty rate was 37½% and there was a preferential rate of 25%, with a minimum duty respectively of IR£30 and IR£20 per ton on imported iron and steel products other than galvanised steel. As a result, the Interdepartmental Committee report of December 1962 subsequently stated that Irish entry into the ECSC in the near future would duly create a 'difficult situation' for that company, mainly due to the incurring of higher operational costs. In fact, these costs resulted from a redevelopment programme that was then being completed and which had been approved by the government in 1959 in an effort to reorganise fundamentally Irish Steel. It was also felt that ECSC membership would impact in a number of ways, including what was said to be a 'considerable increase' in imported steel prices, as steel from the Six was being imported at a price 'substantially lower' than prices operating within the ECSC. At that time, Ireland was importing its steel from the UK and the ECSC in more or less equal proportions. In addition, it was noted that this was all happening at a time when Irish Steel was meeting less than 25% of Irish domestic requirements, even if it was aiming to produce between 40% and 45% of the country's needs and was also aiming to employ around 700 people by some stage in 1964. The Irish market was consuming 130,000 to 140,000 tons of unfabricated steel a year, but Irish Steel was only producing 32,000 tons. It was also said that Irish Steel had a small, although not very significant, export trade averaging about 7,000 tons per annum. However, not only did home produced steel exceed the price of ECSC steel bought under export rules then in operation, but it was
also stated in Irish government documents that it would be 'somewhat higher' in price than the fixed internal market prices operating within the ECSC. What did this all mean in terms of Ireland and the ECSC?

While accepting the conditions of ECSC membership in principle, what Irish Steel in fact wanted were concessions, including continued protection for a specified amount of time, to help defend it from, as the company itself put it, the 'full rigours' of free trade. Indeed, Irish Steel had the departmental secretaries considerable support for 'special arrangements' to take this industry's recent reorganisation into account. After all, the company had initiated its development programme in the knowledge that the Irish steel industry would continue to be afforded protection and understandably felt that the government should not be allowed to renge on its agreement. It was further argued that Ireland would not be creating a precedent in regard to concessions, as Italy had already received 'substantial concessions' – essentially a transition period from the inauguration of the Treaty of Paris until February 1958 – through its membership negotiations. In this context, it was noted that the UK government was likely to seek 'some concessions' too. However, the departmental secretaries were not particularly optimistic about what concessions Irish Steel would receive in the end and therefore recommended a conservative and conciliatory line of argument in any ensuing ECSC membership negotiations, primarily so that any fall-back position then adopted would still be broadly acceptable in the circumstances. As a result of this investigation into the implications of ECSC membership, the departmental secretaries stated that they wanted a 'greater degree of consistency' to be exhibited in the government's approach to the EEC and demonstrated that they were very sensitive to the accusation emanating from other Irish industries that it was displaying signs of favouritism towards a state-owned operation.

At the same time, of course, Ireland was also considering entry into the second of the other two European Communities, Euratom, and it is with some background information on this development in mind that this section proceeds, before moving onto the actual events that unfolded in the course of Ireland's changing relations with both European organisations at the end of 1962. Euratom – established on 25 March 1957 through the second, less well-known, Treaty of Rome – came into being on 1 January 1958 and comprised the same six nations as the members of both the ECSC and EEC. Euratom had been formed with the central aim of creating the conditions that would be necessary for the expected rapid establishment and growth of nuclear powered industries in Europe. In preparation for this major evolution in European integration, the government quickly set up an Atomic Energy Committee in March 1956, which subsequently recommended in May 1958 that an Atomic
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

Energy Board be founded. This development did not in fact happen, however, mainly because de Valera's government rejected the Atomic Energy Committee's majority recommendation that Ireland should acquire a research reactor. It must be said from the outset that the whole question of nuclear energy was not very coordinated in Ireland's case, as it was dealt with by not one, but up to seven different government departments at this point in time. Ireland was therefore not in a particularly good position, not even a perfunctory one, to take any real advantage of Euratom's establishment and growth, certainly not without a nuclear reactor which it, rather evidently, was not particularly interested in acquiring, given the relative lack of government enthusiasm or organisation.109

One of Dublin's major concerns regarding membership of Euratom was related to the costs that it would obviously as a result incur for what it considered to be a minimal return. Indeed, it was calculated that Ireland would have to pay \textit{circa} IR£335,000 annually towards the two Euratom budgets for operational costs and expenses relating to both research and development. As a consequence, the Department of Finance felt that Ireland should try:

\begin{quote}
... to obtain agreement to a reduced rate of contribution ... on the grounds that, as we are unlikely to be concerned in the use of atomic power for some years to come, the research and investment programme will not benefit us to any great extent for some time. A further consideration in this regard would be that, as we would merely be buyers of nuclear plant, we would not benefit from the research projects to the same extent as the member countries manufacturing this plant.
\end{quote}

Of course, this really appears to have been a rather spurious argument for the Department of Finance to have put forward, because it undoubtedly realised that membership of Euratom offered Ireland many significant advantages as well, such as the use of its training facilities, access to its research and technical knowledge, the ensuing availability of the nuclear fuels themselves, and the utilisation of radioactive materials in agriculture, industry and medicine. At any rate, the ESB had informed the Irish government that it did not anticipate commissioning a nuclear power plant for ten years at least, as nuclear energy still remained commercially unviable.110 Thus, the whole issue of Ireland's financial position as it related to Euratom membership is, if nothing else, an interesting further illustration of the Dublin government's generally penurious attitude towards European integration.

In his opening speech to Euratom delivered on 3 July 1962, Edward Heath, the UK Lord Privy Seal, had actually advocated the expansion of UK research programmes in relation to nuclear energy, a stance which of course
proved to be anathema to the cash-conscious in Dublin. As a consequence of taking its contentious position by raising the idea of Ireland "seeking a reduced rate of contribution", at least the Irish government realised that:

... [it] may tend to strengthen any existing feeling that, generally, we are unwilling or unable to bear our share of the Community burdens ... [especially as Ireland was] not spending any appreciable amount of money ... on nuclear research and development.

At the same time, it was recognised that the advantage of Ireland actually joining Euratom was that it 'would be benefitting from advances in knowledge and techniques in the other countries of the Community'. Nonetheless, a strong suspicion remains that once the real goal of Ireland's relations with the European Communities had been achieved, EEC membership, other considerations, such as ECSC or Euratom membership, would essentially no longer be of any major interest. Therefore, in the eyes of the government, it was felt that it would not necessarily 'be good tactics to ask for a reduced contribution – unless, by the time such a request fell to be made, we were assured of membership of the EEC'. Thus, a more considered appreciation of the ramifications of this attitude is fundamental to understanding Ireland's genuine, but otherwise not deeply-held, attraction to certain aspects of European integration and, accordingly, what they then meant for the country. So, with this background in mind, the issues raised become: what were the steps regarding entry into the ECSC and Euratom being taken by Ireland towards the end of 1962 and how did these tie in with its central criterion, the idea of gaining full EEC membership?

It was felt that a decision regarding membership of both European organisations had finally become 'imminent'. Therefore, on 23 November 1962, at a crucial Irish cabinet meeting and on the advice of the Department of External Affairs, the Irish government decided to seek to establish diplomatic relations with the ECSC and Euratom. Meanwhile, it also sought to have Francis Biggar, the Irish chef de mission to the EEC, fully accredited to both of these European Communities, with the further view of entry negotiations to the two organisations beginning soon thereafter. In the process, a central promise made by the taoiseach during his tour of the EEC capitals in October 1962 would thus be fulfilled. On 13 December 1962, a meeting of the departmental secretaries dealt with the linked considerations of ECSC and Euratom membership. On the ECSC question, for instance, it was clearly recognised that coal was not a very significant factor, but it was still felt that there would be difficulties for the steel industry. Meanwhile, on the Euratom question it was felt that 'no urgency arose' for Ireland on this point because,
somewhat fortuitously, 'developments in the field of nuclear power were further away than was thought ... that it might be 1975 before a nuclear power station became a feasible proposition'. At the same time, however, pressure from the UK government for Ireland to apply to join both organisations was becoming particularly ardent, with the UK ambassador in Dublin, Ian Macleman, a leading proponent of such an initiative coming. The question remains: what did the Irish government decide to do?

A further meeting of the departmental secretaries on 10 January 1963 recognised that, even if Ireland formally submitted its application to join the ECSC at that stage, it would not be until some point in February before it could finally make its 'opening statement'. In the meantime, agreement for the government to open diplomatic relations had arrived from the ECSC Council. Thus, as the year drew to a close, the pressure started to build even further for the government to elucidate its position regarding the ECSC. Indeed, Ireland's ambassador in Brussels, due to present his diplomatic letters of credence for the ECSC post, requested more detailed information from his superiors at the Department of External Affairs regarding Ireland's exact relationship with this European Community; it does not appear that this diplomat was being furnished with the required materials. The department's response was to issue him with what they considered to be an appropriate memorandum, but there was no mention as yet of any 'special arrangements' that the Irish government might necessarily request in subsequent membership negotiations.

On the morning of 14 January 1963, Biggar duly presented his diplomatic credentials to the ECSC High Authority president, Piero Malvestiti, who expressed the ECSC's 'pleasure that Ireland had formally established relations with the Community'. That very same day, in fact, even though Ireland's accession was still expected to take some time, the new Irish representative took advantage of his journey to Luxembourg and also presented his country's application to join the ECSC; thus, through the appropriate provision in the Treaty of Paris, Christian Calmes, the ECSC Council secretary general, accepted the official Irish application to accede.

Article 98 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community deals specifically with a state's application for ECSC membership; the relevant section for adhesion reads:

Any European State may apply to accede to this Treaty. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the High Authority; the Council shall also determine the terms of accession, likewise acting unanimously. Accession shall take effect on the day when the instrument of accession is received by the Government acting
as depositary of this Treaty.\textsuperscript{121} In its application, the Irish government pointed out that, while it unreservedly accepted the aims of the Treaty of Paris and wanted them to be realised, it recognised that there existed the need to discuss 'problems'.\textsuperscript{122} Of course, later the same day, 14 January 1963, in a striking coincidence, the French president gave the press conference which effectively rejected the UK's first attempt at membership of the EEC and rendered similar negotiations involving Ireland, Denmark and Norway pointless, if not null and void. As a result of this particular announcement, the Irish ambassador noted afterwards that it left those working at the ECSC High Authority 'profoundly depressed'. Obviously, de Gaulle's decision also consigned an ambiguous status to the Irish applications for Euratom and ECSC membership.\textsuperscript{123}

Nonetheless, the ECSC membership process continued. Indeed, the Irish government was informed by a senior UK Commonwealth Relations Office official that, although the UK government was having to deal with a number of problems regarding the ECSC, it was felt that 'if they could do anything to hasten the admission of new applicants for membership such as Ireland, this might have the effect of making the obstacles to British membership a little less forbidding'. Indeed, Ireland's potential entry into the ECSC was interpreted as being of potential help to the UK in that context. Therefore, it was noted in Dublin that the UK government was prepared to 'put us in the picture' regarding its accession negotiations with the ECSC.\textsuperscript{124} However, when the accession negotiations were subsequently suspended, the official in question quickly rescinded this suggestion of giving greater help to the Irish cause, confining this short, albeit illuminating, episode to history.\textsuperscript{125}

As a direct result of the particular situation affecting the UK, the Irish government's own position regarding ECSC membership also fell into what was described as 'suspended animation'. Indeed, in addition to the UK's own peculiar circumstances, the taoiseach had to question profoundly if Ireland could be expected to continue with its application to join the ECSC when its, quite separate, EEC application had already been deferred. As it turned out, events quickly overtook such worries and Ireland's ECSC application fell into a limbo-like state anyway.\textsuperscript{126} What were the main implications of this affair therefore, if any, for Irish coal and steel?

Obviously, coal remained fairly unaffected as a result of the suspension of Ireland's ECSC candidature. At the same time, nevertheless, especially as other indigenous industries continued to remain unaffected by these events, it was felt that Irish Steel could hardly be expected to undergo the rigorous requirements that were necessitated by the dismantlement of protectionism all on its own. However, it was determined that the unilateral
reduction in Irish tariffs of 10% obviously had to apply to Irish Steel in the
same way as it applied to the rest of Irish industry.\textsuperscript{127} Basically, the outcome of
the French president's decision was that the Irish government thus determined
upon a rather different, albeit complementary, course of action for Irish Steel
when compared to the one originally envisaged if Ireland had taken up ECSC
membership. In comparison to the ECSC, however, there was even less
activity on the subject of Ireland's immediate future relationship with Euratom.
In fact, even the process of Ireland's accreditation to Euratom had
originally been delayed because under the Treaties of Rome, unlike the Treaty
of Paris, each of the member states had to agree separately to the opening of
diplomatic relations. Subsequently, because Ireland would not then have been
able to open accession negotiations simultaneously with the other applicants, it
was a matter of relative concern both for the European Communities and for
the UK, that is of course until de Gaulle's press conference.\textsuperscript{128} Indeed, as
Whitaker at the Department of Finance argued before this occurred, the
'important point' for Ireland in the wider context of European integration was
that:

... [the government had] to so arrange our programme as to ensure that we
will not be responsible for delaying any arrangements the Six may wish to
make for the opening of talks on the institutional questions. Rather than risk
that ... [it was suggested that it would have to] submit our applications even if
the necessary preliminary investigations had not been completed ...\textsuperscript{129}

Indeed, this is exactly what the Irish government set about to do and thus
prepared to submit its application to Euratom under the appropriate article of
the other Treaty of Rome. The \textit{Treaty establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community} (Article 205) deals specifically with the application of a
state for membership. The relevant section for accession reads:

Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It
shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after
obtaining the opinion of the Commission. The conditions of admission and
the adjustments to the Treaty necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an
agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This
agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the Contracting States in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.\textsuperscript{130}

However, as was the case with Ireland's aspirations towards joining the ECSC,
de Gaulle's veto of the UK government's application for membership of the
EEC similarly left Ireland's position as regards its proposed candidacy for
Euratom membership in a limbo-like state. Non-entry into the EEC meant non-entry into both Euratom and the ECSC.

Clearly, the successful nomination of the Irish ambassador to Belgium, Francis Biggar, as Ireland's Euratom chef de mission obviously did little to allay the disappointment that was being felt in failing to join the EEC; this newest appointment to the diplomatic corps was quickly and conclusively put into its proper perspective. Nonetheless, before his appointment, Biggar recommended that 'in present circumstances we may prefer to make no announcement in Dublin and to let the news come through to our newspapers from Brussels', apparently in an effort to placate public opinion over the Irish government's handling of its EEC accession. At least that way any disappointment might be tempered somewhat. This minor diplomatic triumph – in opening relations with Euratom – was duly set to be confirmed when Biggar presented his letters of credence. On 2 April 1963, the Euratom Commission president, Pierre Chatenet, received the Irish representative for the diplomatic exchange to take place. It was a very minor positive note for Dublin at the beginning of a year in which dreams of EEC membership had, for the time being, to be shelved. Subsequently, Biggar reported on the 'cordial nature' of the reception he had received. Ireland's official new representative to Euratom recounted that:

... [the Euratom official] spoke of the Community's satisfaction at the opening of diplomatic relations with Ireland and looked forward to the time when we would become members, stressing that the Commission fully appreciated the sincerity of our desire to join the European Communities. He concluded by an assurance that, in the meantime, the Euratom Commission would be very pleased to assist the Irish Government in every way we could.

As it happened, the Euratom Commission's offer of assistance to Ireland in the field of nuclear power included access to documentation and to training facilities. It was obviously welcomed by the government and, indeed, was viewed as a valuable additional resource. However, this section, which has concentrated on Ireland's true relationship in the early 1960s with these other two European Communities, still begs a basic question: what conclusions can be made about the ECSC and Euratom in relation to the much wider issue of Ireland and the concept of European integration?

It is, of course, possible to say that the ECSC and Euratom were not particularly predominant considerations for Ireland in this respect, mainly because the EEC remained of paramount importance. Indeed, in summarising the Irish government's considered views on these aforementioned organisations, the following can be stated with equanimity:
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

- in regard to the native Irish coal industry, it was considered that ECSC membership would not have had 'any appreciable effect' and that, as a result, the only significant factor for the government to consider was the 'sources of our coal imports';
- in relation to the indigenous Irish steel industry, the question of a steel capacity was the foremost consideration for Ireland with regard to the wider ECSC membership issue.\textsuperscript{133}

In fact, the Committee of Departmental Secretaries supported Lemass quite strongly on the position ultimately adopted by his government on ECSC membership. It was stated that:

... our view is that it would not be in our interest to seek to maintain this application while our EEC application remains in suspense. The difficulties of adjustment which adherence to the ECSC would entail for the Irish steel industry are of the same order as those which adherence to the EEC would involve for Irish industry generally; it would be hazardous to believe that Irish Steel could take a greater strain of adaption than other industries. In any case, there has been a doctrine that membership of the ECSC and Euratom depends on membership of the EEC. It is noteworthy that the Euratom have already taken the initiative in suspending further negotiations with Britain, following on the break down of Britain's negotiations for entry to the EEC.\textsuperscript{134}

Rather neatly, this leads to some remarks on the issue of nuclear energy.

As with the indigenous coal industry, the issue of an Irish nuclear power capacity was not a particularly serious consideration for the Dublin government in the context of European integration, as was made clear by the miserly manner in which Ireland considered the relative merits and value of Euratom membership. Indeed, it was noted that:

... membership would not appear to involve any immediate obligations ... [but, it] would enable us to participate in facilities for training of personnel in preparation for the time when we will have a nuclear power plant, and will give us access to the results of the Community's research programme and to its documentation service.

Notwithstanding the advantages of Euratom membership, when it came down to making a decision, the Irish government, which had a considerable amount to gain at a relatively low price, still prevaricated. Consequently, Ireland has never had a large-scale nuclear industry and has restricted its use of nuclear
Protectionism to liberalisation

power to research purposes only. Initially, the US was also particularly keen to facilitate the Irish government with supplies of fuels and information, but no real interest was ever shown in return. Ireland's indigenous power resources had been reaching their known limits at this time but, although the production of electricity by atomic energy was of 'great interest' to the Dublin government, it was still deemed to be a very long-term consideration. It has to be said, understandably, that membership of neither the ECSC nor Euratom ever came close to attaining the significance that full EEC membership had for Ireland.135

Evidently, the various institutions of the European Communities and the Six were completely aware of this. The opening of diplomatic relations with the ECSC and Euratom, coupled with the ensuing applications to join these two organisations, signified a distinct lack of interest from the Irish government in these particular aspects of European integration. This attitude did not lessen in the years that followed, clearly because EEC membership was all that mattered. Indeed, this phenomenon was further illustrated by the fact that it was only in October 1966 when Ireland established a mission to the European Communities that was completely separate from its diplomatic mission in Belgium and Luxembourg. Thus, if the ECSC and Euratom were not considerations for Ireland in the integration process, this leads to a basic question central to this investigation: what were the repercussions of the French president's decision for Ireland's EEC membership application?

14 January 1963: the UK is refused entry into the EEC

At his dramatic press conference held on 14 January 1963 at the Élysée Palace in Paris, the French president, Charles de Gaulle, announced that he felt that the UK was not a suitable candidate yet for full EEC membership. This was due, he declared, to a number of factors all of which were based around the central question of whether or not the UK was able and ready to integrate itself into the EEC. Famously, de Gaulle rhetorically asked if London was prepared to accept the following conditions of entry:

- the adoption of the Common Customs Tariff;
- the yielding up of the British Commonwealth preference system;
- the modification of its agricultural system;
- the cancellation of the agreements which bound it to EFTA.

The French president thought not, mainly because the UK's position relative to
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

the Six was very discordant. He maintained that the UK was both island-bound and maritime, insinuating that it had an enclosed mentality. Indeed, he argued that it was also tied to its markets and supply bases, sourcing in diverse countries which were often very far away. De Gaulle held that the UK employed predominantly commercial and industrial activities in its economy with very little emphasis on agriculture. Darnning the UK's circumstances with faint praise, he held that its work habits and traditions were both distinctive and 'original' in the European context. In brief, de Gaulle concluded that, by its very beliefs, nature and structure, the UK was profoundly dissimilar to countries on the European continent. The French president did not actually say 'no' to the UK's application for EEC membership. Instead, he pointed out the disparities between the UK and the Six. By definition, the UK was totally different, it was 'insular and unique', while the Six were entirely complementary because, as he said, they were 'continental and economically one'. Remarks such as these, coming from the mouth of the French president, were death by compliment.

It must be said that this attitude did not come as a shock to any observer. For quite some time, the signs in relation to the UK government's membership negotiations with the EEC had not been particularly good. Indeed, a few days before de Gaulle made his famous pronouncement upon the UK's candidature, the French information minister, Peyrefitte, had said that the French government was not pleased about the closeness of the ties that were operating between the UK and US governments. Meanwhile, the media and politicians in the UK had also appeared to be widely pessimistic about the prospects for a positive outcome to the talks. Of course, in Dublin, the government had already been seriously considering the possibility of such a scenario developing and, as a result, fully realised that no stronger links than some kind of bilateral trade agreement would probably be made with the EEC, chiefly due to the envisaged impact and repercussions of the various Anglo-Irish trade agreements. In these circumstances, it had been agreed within the government that, if the UK's accession talks with the EEC did not go according to plan, recourse would then have to be made as quickly as possible to its much maligned mainstay, Anglo-Irish trade relations, the perennial economic option in times of trouble.

It has already been remarked that the UK government's original decision to join the EEC 'exemplified the primacy of politics over economics in Britain's post-war policy vis-à-vis European integration'. Of course, this incentive was rather the opposite motivation to the one which propelled Ireland. In truth, the French president's main wish was to keep the EEC paralysed regarding any developments that did not fit in with his own designs
for a Europe of the nation states, his *Europe des états*. Certainly, de Gaulle did not want to see economic integration leading to some type of political integration, especially one in which the 'Atlanticist' UK played a leading role and, by extension, one over which France could no longer exercise full control. In March 1960, he specifically warned Harold Macmillan, the UK prime minister, that he would have to choose between the US on the one hand and Europe on the other. The fact that London was not prepared to make this choice was thus the rationale for France's veto of its application. The reasons themselves were not terribly important for the Irish government, especially as it was not in a position to influence them greatly. What was going to be very significant, however, were the immediate and projected effects for Ireland of this decision by the French president.

Obviously, de Gaulle's announcement sent shockwaves through the Irish government, although there was no direct reference to Ireland's case at the press conference itself, except to say that, once the UK entered the EEC as a member, other countries in the free trade zone would wish to follow suit. Extended membership of the EEC would have changed absolutely the intrinsic nature of the Six, primarily because, in bringing their own peculiar needs to bear, a refreshed common market would by necessity have to be created to facilitate their demands. Nonetheless, although the French president's 'ambiguous' attitude towards Ireland can in part be gleaned from this episode, it must be said that it was only consistent with the attitude to the Irish quest for full membership that the French generally displayed, even if the UK's own application usually tended to overshadow all other considerations. Indeed, France had made it very clear – in direct response to the EEC Council's reply of 23 October 1962 to the Irish initiative – that it did not consider the opening of negotiations as actual acknowledgement of Ireland's eligibility for membership.

Although the UK government negotiations with the EEC did not break down at this specific stage, it was clearly only a matter of time before they would do so. Indeed, it was not until four days after his president's press conference that Maurice Couve de Murville, the French foreign minister, asked that the UK government's accession negotiations be suspended. As the French agriculture minister so succinctly put it:

> It is very simple. Now, with the Six, there are five hens and one cock. If you join (along with the other countries), there would perhaps be seven or eight hens. But there would be *two* cocks.

By the end of the month, it was recognised that a deadlock in the negotiations process had been reached. Consequently, as with all the other applicants, those
striving for either full or associate status, the door to the EEC had effectively been slammed in Ireland's face; it would have to await any new developments.\textsuperscript{144}

The taoiseach's immediate public reaction was an interesting one and the significance of the platform that he used to deliver his response noticeably symbolic. Indeed, speaking on 16 January 1963 at the opening of a new foreign industrial plant in the west of Ireland, traditionally the country's most depressed region, Lemass declared that, while he felt that the immediate outcome of the UK government's negotiations with the EEC had now become 'doubtful' and that the ultimate form of trading arrangements in Europe was indeterminable, there was no doubting the continuing forward thrust of European states towards free trade. In his opinion, therefore, in the context of Ireland's economy, he could state that:

\begin{quote}
Nothing has happened or is likely to happen which will alter in the least degree the urgency and scope of our preparations.
\end{quote}

However, despite the promise of forthcoming government financial aid, the impetus was on old industries to adapt themselves to these new economic conditions, he said, as the country could not afford to carry 'passengers'. Meanwhile, new industries would have to be attracted at a rate which would continue to ensure industrial growth, both in terms of employment and output. The principal message that he was trying to deliver was centred on the fact that:

\begin{quote}
... whatever difficulties of adjustment we have now to resolve, the economic survival of our State would not be possible at all except within an arrangement which would facilitate the expansion of our exports. The great difference between the difficulties arising in the context of assumed E.E.C. membership, and those which we would face if we decided to remain outside, is that those we now face are capable of being removed if our efforts are adequate, while those we would face in the alternative circumstances – if we elected to remain cut-off from European markets – could not be solved at all by any means within our power.
\end{quote}

Indeed, he maintained that – explicitly in regard to the preparations that were being made by the government for full EEC entry – nothing had fundamentally changed.\textsuperscript{145}

In fact, perhaps as a result of the events that were unfolding in Paris, the taoiseach continued to instill a sense of optimism and urgency in Ireland. However, he also warned of the difficult period that lay ahead for Irish
industry in the new conditions of free trade, but was confident that, generally speaking, indigenous industry would be able to reorganise itself and that it was thoroughly capable of diversifying and expanding to meet these new economic conditions. Of course, the imposition of a universal 10% tariff cut on imports was meant to be part of this encouragement process, because it was realised that Irish industry would have to change in order for it to compete openly in this newly liberalised trading environment. Such a momentous development leads to a central consideration: what were the implications for Ireland of this new economic and political situation in Europe?

**The wider implications of the French president's rebuff**

On 24 January 1963, the taoiseach stressed that the 'tempo of events which has characterised the opening weeks of the year are merely a foretaste of what the coming months will bring'. Indeed, as far as he was concerned, Ireland was entering into 'a decisive period of human history in which the destiny of many nations will be determined for decades to come'. By way of a series of speeches delivered in an effort to calm the sense of frustration and fear that was being felt around the country about Ireland's future economic position, it has to be said that Lemass appeared to be rather philosophical about the whole situation. Thus, while Joseph T. Carroll's thesis that it was capitous to protest – he holds that the government, 'although deeply disappointed at the French veto, refrained from any public criticism of the French President' – can be accepted, it is true to remark as well that the taoiseach spoke rather cautiously, although fairly unambiguously, about the Irish government's true assessment and interpretation of its relative position within the wider context of European integration. More importantly again, its understanding of the specific type of relationship that it would now have to fashion with the EEC had also been clarified.

Some days later, in what can only be interpreted as a veiled censure of the position taken by the French government on the UK's bid for full EEC membership, Lemass said that:

> It may be that the original conception of the European Community, as a society of nations open to all the countries of Western Europe which accept the aims and obligations set out in the Rome Treaty, is now in question.

However, the taoiseach moderated that assertion when he went on to declare that:
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

For our part we applied for membership of the E.E.C. on the basis of the Treaty of Rome and the Bonn Declaration, which we read – and which were indeed so interpreted by the authors – as meaning that an invitation to membership of the Community was being held out, to us as to other democratic West European countries, subject only to unreserved acceptance of the political and economic aims of its founders and of the specific obligations involved.

Accordingly, while bemoaning the fact that Ireland was not in a position to 'shape or alter' the recent turn of events, Lemass also held that the 'complications' which had arisen in the negotiations process 'originated in stratospheric politics in which we play no part'. However, he continued to believe that the general atmosphere would, in all likelihood, be more positive sooner rather than later and, indeed, that progress on the EEC membership issue within the integration framework was still a strong motivating force for the Irish economy.149

Therefore, the taoiseach declared in a speech delivered on 29 January 1963 that it was in anticipation of this day arriving that the Irish government would continue with its policy of adjusting the economic direction of the nation away from protectionism towards freer trade. Of course, mindful of this, Ireland would have to take full account of what the UK now did as a result of its exclusion from the EEC, but at this early stage the situation remained so unclear that it was difficult for anyone to make any authoritative or clear-cut decisions as of yet. Indeed, there might have been seriously negative repercussions associated in doing so. Thus, Lemass was prepared to demonstrate that he remained upbeat about Ireland's economic future and felt that, despite the failure of the Irish government's membership negotiations with the EEC to open, the whole process had in itself been worthwhile, particularly as it was still ameliorating the redevelopment of the Irish economy. The taoiseach therefore stated that:

It is a matter of satisfaction that nothing which we proposed to do in preparation for Common Market membership, in relation to any sector of the country's organisation, was not worth doing for its own sake and for the advantages it would confer in our economic development in any international circumstances.150

Protectionism had been a product of its time but had long outlived its usefulness. As a direct consequence, the government decided, according to T.K. Whitaker writing in 'From protection to free trade: the Irish experience', that it would continue to prepare for the day when free trade finally came into
force and that it would endeavour to make 'the transition towards free trade in contemplation of EEC membership'. Notwithstanding this stated desire, it was also true that the realities of the new trading situation were slowly emerging.

Speaking in Dáil Éireann at the beginning of February 1963, Lemass was moved to mention his government's 'deep disappointment' at the breakdown of accession negotiations and stated that he hoped that the 'deadlock' in the talks would soon be broken. Significantly, the Irish prime minister also used this occasion to proclaim that the government would continue to 'prepare and plan' for Ireland's entry into an enlarged EEC and that it was 'taking every step which will further this objective and avoiding any that might make it more difficult to attain'. Obviously, full EEC membership remained the primary objective for the Dublin government but, until that was in fact achieved, it was also indisputable that Anglo-Irish trading relations would in the meantime have to be enhanced. Indeed, Lemass said that:

The concern of the Irish Government will be to explore the possibility of widening our export openings in Europe and elsewhere, while developing further our trade with Britain. We will be prepared to consider participating in any negotiations for collective arrangements for freer trade involving our principal trading partners. In any negotiation, whether multilateral or bilateral, it must be expected that better export opportunities for agricultural and industrial products will be obtainable only in consideration for continued reduction of protection.

Therefore, he took the opportunity to announce that, as and from 1 January 1964, there would be a further unilateral 10% tariff cut on imports and that his government's Second programme for economic expansion – a successor to the Programme for economic expansion – would have to be adapted to these changed circumstances. As a result of the French government's veto, Ireland was faced with many possible options, one more unappealing than the next, for its future foreign economic policy; entry into the EEC as a full member was no longer one of those. The remaining choices thus included associate EEC membership, participation in EFTA, and/or accession to the GATT. Ireland's actual room for manoeuvre was fairly limited however; as far as the Dublin government was concerned, upgraded bilateral trading relations with the UK remained the best – and perhaps also the only – available intermediate solution, especially until full EEC membership could be achieved, itself just a future possibility then. Thus, Lemass felt obliged to declare that:

While we would much prefer to see our future trading arrangements with
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

Britain as with other European countries conducted under the rules of an International Community such as EEC, if there is a need to re-negotiate our bilateral trading arrangements with Britain, either for a temporary period pending our common membership of EEC, or for an indefinite period, there is a possibility that it would take a different character to the present arrangement ... we must recognise that world trade is moving from the framework of bilateral agreements to that of multilateral arrangements and that the possibility of negotiating satisfactory arrangements on a purely bilateral basis with Britain or with the EEC, or any other country or any other group of countries is rapidly decreasing.

In the meantime, he stated that his government's preparations for entry into the EEC would of course continue and, indeed, that they would be intensified, primarily because it remained the principal long-term foreign economic and political option.152

Writing in Seán Lemass and the making of modern Ireland, the authors Paul Bew and Henry Patterson spoke of the 'reported ... deep pessimism in government circles' at that time. It has to be said though that Lemass was determined to continue upon this theme of tariff cuts as part of his government's wider economic strategy. Indeed, as early as one month after the infamous de Gaulle press conference, the taoiseach announced in Dáil Éireann that:

We intend to base our policy on the assumption that circumstances will emerge which will permit the admission of the present applicant countries to the EEC. In such an event we would be faced with the obligation to eliminate tariffs on imports from the community by 1970 ... There may be a tendency for some sections of industry to adopt a 'wait-and-see' or even a complacent attitude. Some compelling discipline – some additional pressures – will be necessary.

The unilateral tariff reductions would continue until 1965, he declared, and although it was clearly foreseen that some indigenous industries would suffer harshly as a consequence, the general thread of Lemass's thinking was that Irish industry, as a whole, would be better off. The policy of trade liberalisation would continue, therefore, as indeed would preparations for Ireland's accession to the EEC by the end of the decade.153 Meanwhile, what could Dublin do about the precarious economic situation that was facing the country?

An interesting footnote to France's exclusion of the UK as a candidate for full EEC membership was the fanciful, but briefly raised, possibility of adhesion being independently pursued by Ireland. In fact, at the beginning of
February 1963, the Irish government was still officially undecided about the possibilities of it seeking full EEC membership, even though it was anticipated that the UK was going to remain outside for the immediate future. Indeed, independent Irish membership of the EEC had been seriously suggested as an option during the taoiseach's meeting with de Gaulle some time previously. Of course, as David Arter has recorded in *The politics of European integration in the twentieth century*, de Gaulle personally offered EEC membership – 'full or associate' – to the Danish prime minister, Jens-Otto Krag, in the summer of 1963. This move backfired on the French when the Danes made a 'strong declaration of solidarity' with the UK position. Notwithstanding this affirmation, the French president's real agenda was questioned, but as David Arter has added:

> Whether de Gaulle's offer was genuine or not or simply an attempt to split EFTA was ultimately less important than the fact that the Danish government's strategy was based on concurrent entry with Britain ...  

154

Obviously, more or less exactly the same considerations applied in Ireland's case. There were some encouraging signs for the government from the Commission and from five of the Six that, once the UK's impasse to membership was unblocked, other states – specifically EFTA countries – could quickly join up with it, which by implication also meant Ireland.155

Of course, London quickly realised that it was 'doubtful' whether Ireland would be able to get as much out of the EEC without the UK as it would stand to lose in terms of the economic advantages innate in bilateral Anglo-Irish trade. This was especially true when the CAP, which was still in the early stages of its development, was considered and also when the dismantlement of industrial tariffs was continuing apace. Therefore, separate adhesion was never a very serious prospect for the government. In truth, the likelihood of the situation was that Ireland would soon have to turn back to trade with the UK as a fundamental part of its foreign economic policy. In reality, this is exactly what happened.156 At a meeting held between Hugh McCann, the ambassador in London, and his UK counterpart, it was pithily pointed out that although Ireland's application had not 'technically' been linked to that of the UK, it was plain to all the participants in the process that this was a 'technicality rather than any form of reality'. Therefore, despite some imprecise flirtations with the idea of associate EEC membership and even with the suggestion of Ireland joining EFTA, as well as various concrete advances that were made in relation to the question of its adhesion to the GATT, it must be said that the Irish government was much more eager to renew its bilateral discussions with its UK counterparts on their future relationship rather than
De Gaulle’s refusal of the UK

So, what were the tasks that faced the Lemass government? D.J. Maher has pointed out that the expression of economic realities took three distinct forms, which he listed as follows:

• concerns regarding the future implementation of the Second programme for economic expansion;
• problems in relation to Irish agriculture and industry;
• the forecasted difficulties involved in Ireland’s tariff policies.

Firstly, the planned Second programme for economic expansion was clearly still in the early stages of its development, but it was noticeable that Lemass was eager to launch a modified version of this plan as quickly as possible, so that there would be a formal framework within which the economy could continue to grow. Indeed, a basic assumption in this belief was that Ireland would be a member of the EEC by 1970; a rather weak basis, although one which was very difficult to disavow, on which to underpin economic policy.

Secondly, it was recognised that the adaption and reorganisation of Irish agriculture and industry would have to be reinforced. Once again, on the continued assumption that EEC membership could come at any time for Ireland, the Department of Agriculture had initiated its investigations into the future of this sector in August 1961, through the General Committee of Agricultural Producers mainly. In the meantime, operating on a similar basis to that of the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Industry & Commerce had been actively surveying industry in general and specific terms since the autumn of 1961, mainly through the Committee on Industrial Organisation. However, work on agricultural considerations in the context of European integration was significantly complicated by the fact that everything depended on the outcome of the CAP negotiations. Obviously, the Treaty of Rome had been much more specific in relation to the EEC’s plans for industry than it had been in relation to agriculture. Regardless of what had just happened in the first weeks of 1963, the taoiseach revealed in Dáil Éireann that the surveys into agriculture and industry would continue and that the results would be acted upon immediately.

Finally, there was the heated question of Ireland’s future tariff policy. At this point, tariff reductions had not begun to take effect in any serious manner. It was announced that unilateral reductions, as with the further 10% reduction effective from 1 January 1964, would continue to be imposed. However, the government was in fact finding it virtually impossible to keep pace with similar efforts being orchestrated by the EEC and EFTA. Clearly,
though, there was little alternative to this policy. As the taoiseach was quick to point out:

In a world committed to the progressive lowering of barriers to international trade, there was no choice but to move in the same direction.

Thus, as time passed and the immediate danger of the EEC imploding began to desist, the government's hopes were raised by the possibility that some interim arrangement could be worked out between Ireland and the EEC, with or without the UK's participation. It was with this in mind that an Anglo-Irish meeting was arranged for the middle of March 1963.

De Gaulle's 'no' not only ended the UK's short-term hopes of entering the EEC as a full member, but it also had a profound effect upon its domestic politics; Macmillan soon left Downing Street, to be replaced by the patrician, Alec Douglas-Home. Throughout, the UK was evidently uninterested in some type of provisional agreement being concocted which would bring in association. Both sides in these bilateral talks agreed that there was little likelihood of any permanent arrangement being made as long as the French presidential incumbent remained in power or, at the very least, for some undefined years to come. Thus, instead of some sort of accommodation being reached with the EEC, it started to become progressively clearer that the immediate economic future for both countries best lay in the further strengthening of already existing bilateral relations. Obviously, although it suited the UK to do so, this policy option was becoming especially necessary for Ireland.

The Irish application for full EEC membership was not suspended but it has to be said that, in the three and a half years between February 1963 and September 1966, the question went firmly onto the backburner. At one point, Lemass had to reply to the affirmative in Dáil Éireann that, indeed, Ireland still had an ambassador accredited to the EEC. In addition, it was repeated ad nauseam that the 'ultimate objective' of the Irish government remained full membership of the EEC. Of course, that left a problem which forms the centrepiece of the next chapter: what, other than encouraging further dependence upon the UK, was Ireland supposed to do in economic terms until adhesion to the EEC was finally achieved? Indeed, did Europe have any hope of offering Ireland an escape from dependence on the UK?

Intermediate conclusions
When the Irish government had applied to join the EEC at the end of July 1961, it did so in the knowledge that it basically had a free trade relationship with the UK. In any subsequent negotiations, Ireland's continued aim would clearly be to find a way to protect the immensely important Anglo-Irish economic link, especially until both countries gained full membership. However, once the French president had firmly announced that the UK was not yet a suitable candidate, Ireland was thrown back onto dependence upon its immutable trading relationship. It had, of course, been assessed by the Irish government that there were more disadvantages than advantages in it trying to gain EEC membership independent to that of the UK. It is also fair to say that separate membership would probably not have been possible for Ireland to achieve anyway. Thus, the government had no other economic choice at this point but to turn back to the UK for economic inspiration. Indeed, de Gaulle's gesture in refuting the UK government can be perceived as the necessary prompting for the Anglo-Irish FTA agreement of December 1965, a trading arrangement which provided for the complete phasing out of Anglo-Irish industrial tariffs over a ten year period effective from July 1966. This, in turn, created the conditions demanded for Ireland's ultimate accession to the EEC. In addition, this new agreement also widened Ireland's economic horizons even further still, climaxing in the country's accession to the GATT in 1968. Of course, at the same time, Ireland's dependence upon the UK also spiralled to what in any other circumstances could very well have been seen as totally unacceptable levels.

It is possible to add, however, that the 1960s marked an enormous departure from the 1950s. In terms of industrial production, for example, there was a huge increase of over 85% in the volume of Irish industrial production in the latter period, compared to a figure of only just over 27% in the former. It has since been remarked that this 'acceleration in the growth of output ... would not have occurred in the absence of policy', adding credence to the view that it was Lemass and Whitaker who were ultimately responsible for showing the vision and for changing the direction of the national economy. However, even though net industrial output in 1963 may have been 47% above its 1957 level, agriculture was still having major trouble in adapting to the new circumstances that it found were inherent in playing a full role in the process of European integration. F.S.L.Lyons, writing in *Ireland since the Famine*, has said that planning was 'evidently less effective' in relation to the former because, as he points out, net agricultural output was only 1% higher in 1963 in comparison to the corresponding figure given for 1957. Adverse market conditions might not have helped the situation, a problem which the farmers felt could only be resolved by Ireland's membership of the EEC, because
market size and stability would as a consequence increase.

Nevertheless, despite Ireland's growing reliance on footloose foreign-owned industries, Lemass was in a hurry to make the economy competitive in time for adhesion. As a result, although there is always a danger in looking at history in hindsight, it is also possible to say, as T.K. Whitaker has when assessing the implications of de Gaulle's veto of the UK, that this delay in Ireland's accession to the EEC was beneficial to the economy in the long run and, certainly, that it acted as a catalyst for later membership applications. He wrote:

In retrospect, one can scarcely doubt the economic advantage to Ireland of the time gained through the reluctance of France (at least) to see Great Britain in the EEC, of the surveys and adaption measures taken in the nineteen sixties, and of the experience provided by the tariff reductions of 1963 and 1964 and under the AIFTA.\textsuperscript{165}

The French president's decision was not a disaster for Ireland, certainly not in the respect that its exclusion and the UK's inclusion would have been. Efforts to change the economy were in the country's own best interests anyway; Ireland had moved from its position in the 1950s of 'restless discontent' to one where it was finally 'getting out of the desert'. EFTA, which did not appear to have tangible economic advantages for Ireland, was emphatically replaced by the EEC as its preferred economic option, the latter having the combined advantages of strong protective support for agriculture, a ready and challenging market for industry, and a greater feeling of exercising 'political independence'.\textsuperscript{166} In real terms, EFTA possessed none of these qualities, but the EEC certainly did. The Irish government's aim of achieving 'economic independence' from the UK was made achievable by remarkable developments in its foreign economic policy, such as its reorientation towards and preparation for full membership of the EEC.

Although this is a relatively contemporary view of the motivations behind seeking EEC membership, it is also an opinion which is significantly close to the basic reality given in any assessment that is made on the value of its integration policy. Ireland's economic dependence upon the UK stopped it from having any independent chance of admission to the EEC in 1963; indeed, the 'Catch-22' position in which it found itself economically gave it no other intermediate alternative except to turn back to the UK. As a US journalist, who was not necessarily atypical of informed commentators, was inspired to write:

Ireland has applied for membership in the Common Market but she is not pressing it. France's veto of England has complicated the Irish position. Great
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

trading problems would be raised for Ireland if she were in the Common Market while England was denied equal membership. Until the British relationship with the Common Market is settled, Ireland prefers to have her own application rest, without actually withdrawing it ... the government and people of Ireland are too acutely aware of their economic dependence on the British market to endanger this association by premature membership in the Common Market.\textsuperscript{167}

While the situation may not have been so dramatic and even if little concept of the actual repercussions of this situation were as yet evident in Irish government thinking, the basic foundations of the Anglo-Irish FTA agreement had been laid. At the same time, integration was evolving as well, in areas other than economics or politics – such as social policy, for instance – which would profoundly affect Ireland in the future, once it became a member; the EEC that Ireland tried to join in 1961 was changing just as the latter was trying to adapt itself to the new economic conditions.\textsuperscript{168}
Notes

1 As Richard Griffiths has written in summarising Ireland's experience of European integration in this period:
   Ireland's membership application was perhaps even more closely linked [than those of Denmark or Norway] with that of the United Kingdom. Ireland had not taken part in the EEC/EFTA split of the late 1950s, but had special trading arrangements with Britain dating back to the time when it formed part of the United Kingdom. [Appointed in July 1960 as Lord Privy Seal with special responsibility for Europe] Edward Heath specifically mentioned Ireland in his opening speech to the EEC governments in October 1961, expressing the hope that their trading relationship would be 'subsumed in the wider arrangements of the enlarged Community'. The EEC Council of Ministers signalled the start of negotiations with Ireland in October 1962 but, as in the case of Norway, substantial negotiations never actually opened.


4 Girvin, 'Economic development and the politics of EC entry', pp. 34-5.


8 These figures come from a chart originally used in B.Moore et al, 'Industrial policy and economic development: the experience of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland', pp. 99-114, in Cambridge journal of economics vol. 2 no. 1 1978, p. 108. The data for Ireland in the period 1945 to 1951 does not appear to be available; presumably, however, this figure was relatively low.


11 Moore et al, 'Industrial policy and economic development', passim.

12 Wickham, 'Dependence and state structure', p. 181.


14 G.Cunningham (CRO official) to P.A.R.Brown (B/T official), circa mid-November 1962, M6314/19, FO371/164771, PRO; G.L.Pearson (British Trade Commission official in Dublin) to Cunningham, 14 November 1962, M6314/19, FO371/164771, PRO.
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

15 Bradley et al, Stabilization and growth on the EC periphery, p. 10.
16 P.Gerbet, La construction de l'Europe (Paris: Imprimerie national, 1983), p. 294. In the original French, the author said: 'l'Irlande ... étant en union économique avec la Grande-Bretagne, elle ne pouvait s'en trouver séparée'.
17 Unless otherwise specified, this section – The Dublin government presents its case in Brussels – has been completed using the following two documents: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, passim; Lemass statement to the EEC Council, 18 January 1962. The full text of this speech given by the taoiseach is available in Maher, The tortuous path, pp. 375-85.
22 D/T memorandum on a meeting held on 9 January 1962 between Lemass, Haughey and representatives from various agricultural organisations, 9 January 1962, D/T-S16877Y/62, NA; D/T memorandum on a meeting held on 11 January 1962 between Lemass, Lynch and a delegation from the ICTU, 11 January 1962, D/T-S17120A/62, NA. Originally quoted in Girvin, 'Economic development and the politics of EC entry', pp. 22-5.
24 Maher, The tortuous path, p. 145.
26 Unless otherwise specified, this section – entitled Second time around – has been completed using the document: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, passim.
28 Lemass speech delivered in Dáil Éireann, 14 February 1962, Dáil debates vol. 193 col. 19.
Protectionism to liberalisation

31 Aiken speech delivered in Dáil Éireann, 14 February 1962, Dáil debates vol. 193 col. 75.
32 Keatinge, A place among the nations, p. 76.
33 O’Brien, ‘Ireland in international affairs’, passim.
43 Mally, Britain and European unity, pp. 83-91. The latter referred to a speech delivered to the Western European Union (WEU) Council, 10 April 1962, in which the UK Lord Privy Seal added: ‘unlike you, we have had to take account of the problems of countries which would be called upon to accept the political and the economic implications of this experiment at one and the same time’.
44 New York Times, 18 July 1962. Originally quoted in Maher, The tortuous path, p. 152. It is interesting to note that Harold Wilson, the UK Labour party leader and parliamentary opposition at Westminster, had only just said the previous month that he hoped de Gaulle would not look upon Irish neutrality as a block to full EEC membership, that European defence – and as he termed it the ‘cold war’ – was catered for by NATO. The UK Labour party, which was itself badly split over the future direction of the EEC, was not helping Ireland in its candidacy by raising such issues, even if at the same time it made the Macmillan government distinctly uncomfortable. Wilson speech delivered in the House of Commons, 7 June 1962, entitled ‘A no with nuances’, pp. 83-99, in U.Kitzinger, The second try: Labour and the EEC (Oxford: Pergamon, 1968), p. 98.
45 Salmon, ‘Ireland’, passim; Salmon, Unneutral Ireland, p. 239.
46 The term ‘active neutrality’ refers to Ireland’s independent foreign policy that included the initiation of a global non-proliferation treaty, a commitment to peacekeeping, and support for consideration of the position to be played by China in
global politics; in many respects, Ireland's views at the UN accorded with positions consistently taken by Sweden. The term 'military neutrality' essentially boiled down to considering how best could the Irish government further the state's improving, though inherently weak, economic performance while not making any unnecessary military alliance or defence commitment – joining NATO or WEU – although being prepared to do so if required. FitzGerald, 'Irish neutrality and European integration', p. 4.


48 Girvin, 'Economic development and the politics of EC entry', pp. 28 & 33.

49 Girvin, 'Economic development and the politics of EC entry', pp. 28-9; Maher, The tortuous path, p. 148.

50 Thus, an aspect of the statement delivered by Lemass on 18 January 1962 in Brussels which interested the EEC related to Dublin's interpretation of the 'dumping' provision (Article 91); this particular subject is dealt with in detail in a section entitled Lemass prepares for EEC entry negotiations to begin.

51 Maher, The tortuous path, pp. 146-8.

52 Irish government publication, European Economic Community Part II (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1962).


54 Biggar to Murphy, 25 July 1962, D/T-S17246L/62, NA; report on departmental secretaries meeting, 7 September 1962, D/T-S17246N/62, NA. Originally quoted in Girvin, 'Economic development and the politics of EC entry', p. 34.


57 Matthew McCloskey (US ambassador to Ireland) to Kennedy, 14 September 1962, 'National Security Files', Box #118, Kennedy Papers, JFK. Most of this material previously appeared in FitzGerald, Irish-American diplomatic relations, passim.

58 Maher, The tortuous path, p. 159.

59 Pierson Dixon (UK ambassador, Paris) telegram to the FO, 17 October 1962, M6314/21, FO371/164772, PRO; Dixon to the FO, 19 October 1962, M6314/21, FO371/164772, PRO.


62 Lintott note, 23 October 1962, M6314/24, FO371/164772, PRO.

63 Maher, The tortuous path, pp. 158-60.

64 Emilio Colombo (EEC Council president) to Lemass, 23 October 1962, D/T-S17339/62, NA. In the original Italian, this document read: 'mi prego comunicarLe che il Consiglio dei Ministri della Comunità Economica Europea ... si è pronunciato sulla domanda del Governo irlandese di aprire negoziati per aderire al Trattato di
Protectionism to liberalisation

Roma ... Sono lieto d'informarLa che il Consiglio dei Ministri ha dato all'unanimità il suo accordo a questa domanda di apertura di negoziati'.

65 Lemass to Colombo, 9 November 1962, D/T-S17339/62, NA.


69 Lemass speech delivered in Dáil Éireann, 30 October 1962, Dáil debates vol. 197 cols. 7-8.

70 Lemass speech delivered in Dáil Éireann, 22 November 1962, Dáil debates vol. 197 cols. 1688-9.

71 Barclay minute, 19 October 1962, M6314/25, FO371/164772, PRO.

72 Report of departmental secretaries meeting, 13 December 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.


74 These subjects respectively form the basis of the next two sections entitled Lemass prepares for entry negotiations with the EEC to begin and Ireland and the other two European Communities.

75 Unless otherwise specified, this section – entitled Lemass prepares for EEC entry negotiations to begin – has been completed using the following: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, passim; draft brief for negotiations with the EEC, circa December 1962, D/T-S17339/62Annex, NA.

76 T.K.Whitaker, 'An ceangal le sterling: ar cheart é a bhriseadh?’, pp. 82-90, in Annual report: Central Bank of Ireland, 1976, p. 86. In Irish, it read: 'nuair a bhí muide ag bisiú an tsaol bhí Sasana ag dul ar gcaile'.

77 H.Boîl, Irisches Tagesbuch (Köln: Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1957), pp. 36-8. The author recounts a story where, upon arriving in Westport, County Mayo, without anything except West German marks, his efforts to exchange some of his currency proves to be difficult. The bank manager there told the writer that he would have to send the notes on to Dublin for verification and, eventually, the transaction was conducted successfully in that way. Meanwhile, the author continued his travels in Ireland on credit. It is interesting to note that tourism was quickly recognised in Ireland as an important sectoral employer, as well as a foreign currency earner, and that such accounts soon became things of the past.

Lemass, the new industry & commerce minister, remarked upon the potential that tourism held soon after returning to office in 1957, noting that this type of trade was expected to grow at the rate of 10% per annum within Europe, in
addition to increased transatlantic trade. In turn, the foreign minister was able to report that over the next six years, Ireland's total income from tourism increased by IRE21 million, that is by 63%, and was very happy to add that 'tourism is becoming a rapidly increasing element in our external earnings'. Lemass speaking in Seanad Éireann, 11 December 1957, *Seanad debates* vol. 48 cols. 1152-3; Aiken speaking in Seanad Éireann, 18 November 1964, *Seanad debates* vol. 58 col. 45.

As Richard Vaughan subsequently wrote: 'In 1970, in Ireland, tourism was the largest single export and the greatest national industry, providing 15 per cent of employment and an income of £101 million'; it should be noted that Sean Barrett, a lecturer in economics at University College, Dublin, has noted that: 'Tourism into the Republic did not grow at all between 1966 and 1986'. However, in the period under review, there is no doubt but that tourism became both a very important source of employment and income, even if its full potential was not realised for another two decades. S. Barrett, 'Time to reap the benefits from open skies', *Irish Times*, 8 January 1999; Vaughan, *Twentieth-century Europe*, pp. 194-5.

Especially when looked at in retrospect, the figures do not mask the reality. Towards the end of 1964, Aiken tried his best to dress up the improvements in Irish export figures, but failed to hide the truth of the situation. He said:

In 1963 alone, our exports to every single country of the EEC increased and the over-all increase for the Common Market area was 40 per cent in value terms as compared with 1962. To the EFTA area, including Great Britain, our exports increased from £125 million to £140 million, an increase of 12 per cent in the same period. The same level of expansion, namely 12 per cent, is apparent in our export trade to the dollar area for 1963 as against 1962.

No matter how hard he tried to cover up the fact, the UK remained the first among unequals. Aiken speaking in Seanad Éireann, 18 November 1964, *Seanad debates* vol. 58 cols. 44-5.

The fears that Dublin held regarding dumping are easily explained, but one of the few effective tools that it previously had at its disposal was the right to introduce a customs duty. As the taoiseach had himself said on more than one occasion, duties such as these were 'increased and extended to protect the output of the Irish manufacturers against imports from the Continent which appeared to be of the character of dumping'. In accepting the Treaty of Rome, Ireland would have to operate by different rules that might not offer such security. Lemass speaking in Seanad Éireann, 27 March 1958, *Seanad debates* vol. 49 col. 328.

In the light of subsequent developments, this opinion is particularly interesting, especially in relation to Article 119. After its economic effects, it is arguable that the area in which Ireland has been affected most by European integration has been social policy, particularly with regard to the concept of men and women being treated equally, expressly with regard to equal pay for equal work, before the law. It is worth noting that Ireland's civil service bar on married women was revoked during the 1960s, but that societal attitudes were fairly slow to change; it should be mentioned that, of all the civil servants who dealt with the first application for full EEC membership, the only Irish government department that was headed by a woman was the newly formed Department of Transport & Power (D/T&P).
81 Lemass to Nolan, 25 September 1962, D/T-S17389/62, NA; Lemass speech delivered in Dáil Éireann, 13 December 1962, Dáil debates vol. 198 col. 1477, D/T-S17389/62, NA.
82 *Irish Independent*, 14 December 1962, D/T-S17389/62, NA.
83 Lemass to Nolan, 12 December 1962, D/T-S17389/62, NA; *Irish Independent*, 14 December 1962, D/T-S17389/62, NA; Cremin to Whitaker, 18 December 1962, D/T-S17389/62, NA; report of departmental secretaries meeting, 10 January 1963, D/T-S17337/63, NA.
84 Lemass speech delivered to the Cork Chamber of Commerce, 15 November 1962, D/T-S17389/62Annex, NA.
85 Lemass speech delivered to the Fianna Fáil Árd-Fheis in Dublin, 20 November 1962, D/T-S17389/62, NA.
86 Lee, 'Staying in the game?', p. 124.
87 Lemass speech delivered at the opening of a new factory in Ennis, County Clare, 3 December 1962, D/T-S17389/62, NA.
88 European Communities is a generic term for the three organisations that operated collectively at the forefront of European integration, that is the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom. However, as this particular section makes it perfectly clear, the Irish government was only really interested in membership of one of these.
91 D/F memorandum on Euratom, *circa* December 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.
92 Interdepartmental Committee report on Ireland's membership of the ECSC, *circa* December 1962, D/T-S17170/62, NA.
93 Francis Biggar (ambassador to Belgium, minister to Luxembourg and chef de mission to the EEC) to Cremin, 8 November 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA. It was Arthur Tandy, the UK chef de mission to the EEC, who had telephoned Biggar.
94 Lemass to Nolan, 13 November 1962, D/T-S17170/62, NA; Nolan to Whitaker, 13 November 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.
95 Heath speech to the ministers of the ECSC member states, 17 July 1962, D/T-S17170/62, NA; Biggar to Cremin, 8 November 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.
96 Whitaker to Nolan, 14 November 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.
98 Greenwood (ed.), *Britain and European integration since the Second World War*, pp. 70-1; Mally, *Britain and European unity*, p. 39. The latter refers to the association agreement signed between the ECSC and the UK in London on 21 December 1954.
100 Cremin's view as stated in the report from the departmental secretaries meeting, 13 December 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.
101 Lemass to Nolan, 19 October 1961, D/T-S17170/61, NA.
102 Lemass to Lynch, 1 November 1961, D/T-S17170/61, NA.
103 Interdepartmental Committee report on Ireland's membership of the ECSC, *circa* December 1962, D/T-S17170/62, NA; D/F note on the Irish coal and steel industries, early January 1963, D/T-S17170/63, NA.
De Gaulle's refusal of the UK

104 'Irlande/Relation/Pays tiers/CECA', 1961 CEAB 5/953 1-3, ACE; 'Irlande/Relation/Pays tiers/CECA', 1961 CEAB 5/954 1-35, ACE (author's emphasis). In the original French, the document read:

Dans le cas de l'IRLANDE, la Commission s'est abstenue de préciser les demandes de concessions étant donné qu'il ne s'agit que de pourparlers préalables en vue d'une adhésion de l'IRLANDE au GATT. La CECA ferait donc bien de renoncer, elle aussi, à une précision de ses demandes présentées dans la liste commune.

105 D/F note on the Irish coal and steel industries, early January 1963, D/T-S17170/63, NA.

106 Interdepartmental Committee report on Ireland's membership of the ECSC, circa December 1962, D/T-S17170/62, NA; D/F note on the Irish coal and steel industries, early January 1963, D/T-S17170/63, NA.


108 Seán Murray (D/F assistant secretary) to J.Connor (D/T&P assistant secretary), 19 December 1962, D/T-S17170/62, NA; report of departmental secretaries meeting, 13 December 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.

109 Whitaker memorandum on the implications of Euratom membership for Ireland, circa September 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA; T.J.Beere (D/T&P secretary) to Whitaker, 23 November 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA; D/F memorandum on Euratom, circa December 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.

110 Whitaker memorandum on the implications of Euratom membership for Ireland, circa September 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA; D/F memorandum on Euratom, circa December 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.

111 MacCarthy to Murray, 19 September 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.

112 Nagle to Murray, 20 September 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA; D/F memorandum on Euratom, circa December 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.

113 Beere to Whitaker, 23 November 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.


115 Report of departmental secretaries meeting, 13 December 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.

116 Report of departmental secretaries meeting, 10 January 1963, D/T-S17337/63, NA.

117 Cremin to Whitaker, 15 December 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.

118 Note of telephone conversation between the D/EA and Biggar, 20 December 1962, D/T-S17170/62, NA; Whitaker to MacCarthy, 2 January 1963, D/T-S17170/63, NA.

119 Murray to Beere, 21 December 1962, D/T-S17170/62, NA.

120 Biggar to Cremin, 22 January 1963, D/T-S17170/63, NA.

Protectionism to liberalisation

122 Lemass to J.W.de Pous (ECSC Council president), 7 January 1963, D/T-S17170/63, NA.
124 J.P.Slavin (embassy official, London) to Sheila Murphy (D/EA assistant secretary), 29 January 1963, D/T-S17170/63, NA. The senior official in question was J.R.A.Bottomley, assistant secretary at the CRO.
125 Slavin to Murphy, 31 January 1963, D/T-S17170/63, NA.
126 Lemass to Carroll, 4 February 1963, D/T-S17170/63, NA.
127 D/F note on the Irish coal and steel industries, early January 1963, D/T-S17170/63, NA.
128 Cremin to Whitaker, 15 December 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.
129 Whitaker to Cremin, 20 December 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA.
131 Biggar telephone call to D/EA, 28 February 1963, D/T-S17337/63, NA; Biggar to D/EA, 28 March 1963, D/T-S17337/63, NA.
132 Biggar to Cremin, 3 April 1963, D/T-S17337/63, NA.
133 D/F note on the Irish coal and steel industries, early January 1963, D/T-S17170/63, NA.
134 Whitaker to O'Carroll, 4 February 1963, D/T-S17337/63, NA.
135 D/F memorandum on Euratom, circa December 1962, D/T-S17337/62, NA; Biggar to Cremin, 3 April 1963, D/T-S17337/63, NA.

L’Angleterre ... est insulaire, maritime, liée par ses échanges, ses marchés, son ravitaillement, aux pays les plus divers et souvent les plus lointains. Elle exerce une activité essentiellement industrielle et commerciale et très peu agricole. Elle a, dans tout son travail, des habitudes et des traditions très marquées, très originales. Bref, la nature, la structure, la conjoncture, qui sont propres à l’Angleterre, diffèrent profondément de celles des Continentaux.

In addition, the French president had also been moved to ask whether the UK government was prepared to accept what he termed:

... un tarif qui soit véritablement commun, de renoncer à toute préférence à l'égard du Commonwealth, de cesser de prétendre que son agriculture soit privilégiée et encore de tenir pour caducs les engagements qu'elle a pris avec les pays qui font partie de sa zone de libre-échange.

137 Report of departmental secretaries meeting, 10 January 1963, D/T-S17337/63, NA.
138 W.Kaiser, 'To join, or not to join: the "appeasement" policy of Britain's first EEC application', pp. 144-56, in B.Brivati & H.Jones (eds), From reconstruction to
De Gaulle’s refusal of the UK


140 Kaiser, ‘To join, or not to join’, p. 151.

141 Carroll, ‘General de Gaulle and Ireland’s EEC application’, pp. 82 & 96.

142 CRO note, 31 January 1963, M10811/5, FO371/171401, PRO.

143 French agriculture minister in conversation with Christopher Soames in January 1963, quoted in Arter, The politics of European integration in the twentieth century, p. 145 (not my emphasis). Originally cited in Macmillan, At the end of the day, p. 365. In the original French, this statement read: ‘C’est très simple. Maintenant, avec les six, il y a cinq poules et un coq. Si vous joignez (avec des autres pays), il y aura peut-être sept ou huit poules. Mais, il y aura deux coqs’. Brown, In my way, p. 220.

144 R.T.Griffiths speaking at the conference entitled EFTA at its creation held at the University of Oslo from 14-15 May 1992.

145 Lemass speech delivered on 16 January 1963 at the opening of the new Potez Industries of Ireland, Ltd., plant in Galway, GIS1/217, NA.

146 Lemass speech delivered on 16 January 1963 at the opening of the new Potez Industries of Ireland, Ltd., plant in Galway, GIS1/217, NA.

147 Lemass speech delivered to a Fianna Fáil party Comhairle Dáil-Cheantair (constituency committee) in Dublin, 24 January 1963, GIS1/217, NA.


149 Lemass speech delivered at the Catholic Workers’ College in Dublin, 29 January 1963, GIS1/217, NA.

150 Lemass speech delivered at the Catholic Workers’ College in Dublin, 29 January 1963, GIS1/217, NA.


152 Lemass speech delivered in Dáil Éireann, 5 February 1963, Dáil debates vol. 199 cols. 932-8.


155 Mally, Britain and European unity, pp. 101-36. The latter quoted from statements delivered by the Belgian, German, Luxembourg, Dutch and UK foreign ministers, as well as the Italian industry minister, in Brussels, 29 January 1963, and from a speech delivered by Hallstein on 5 February 1963 to the European Parliament in Strasbourg.

156 CRO memorandum, 31 January 1963, M10811/5, FO371/171401, PRO; M.E.MacGlashan note, early February 1963, M10811/5, FO371/171401, PRO; F.G.K.Gallagher minute, 1 February 1963, M10811/5, FO371/171401, PRO; Gallagher minute, 4 February 1963, M10811/5, FO371/171401, PRO.

157 CRO memorandum, 31 January 1963, M10811/5, FO371/171401, PRO; MacGlashan note, early February 1963, M10811/5, FO371/171401, PRO; Gallagher minute, 1 February 1963, M10811/5, FO371/171401, PRO; Gallagher minute, 4 February 1963, M10811/5, FO371/171401, PRO.
Protectionism to liberalisation

162 Lemass reply to a question in Dáil Éireann, 10 June 1965, *Dáil debates* vol. 216 col. 722; Lemass reply to a question in Dáil Éireann, 3 March 1966, *Dáil debates* vol. 221 col. 922.
163 Moore *et al*, *Industrial policy and economic development*, p. 110.
164 Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine*, p. 630.
165 P.J. Hillery (former president and foreign minister) lecture (paper unavailable) entitled 'Ireland's accession to the European Community' presented on 5 March 1998 at the IUE; Whitaker, 'From protection to free trade', pp. 422-3. The latter was originally quoted in Baxter-Moore, 'The impact', pp. 45 & 71.
166 T.K. Whitaker speaking at the conference entitled *The first attempt to enlarge the European Community, 1961-63* held from 17-19 February 1994 at the IUE.
167 M. Freedman, 'Irish neutrality doesn't forsake the rule of law', *Chicago Daily News*, 16 May 1964, D/FA-96/40 Washington (formerly P150/1), NA.
168 Obviously, this particular text is not the place to go into questions such as the complexities of evolving social policy; still, Peter Sutherland has pointed out a couple of important developments regarding the 'doctrines of the supremacy of Community Law and Direct Effect' that deserve a mention, issues which apparently attracted little enough attention in Ireland. Indeed, he added: 'The former of these is of course centrally important to the sovereignty issue as it provides that Community law may override all national laws (including written Constitutions). The doctrine of Direct Effect, established in 1963, provided that under certain conditions the provisions of European law would have Direct Effect and might provide rights and remedies for individuals that are enforceable against Member States'. Sutherland, 'Ireland', p. 247.