Protectionism to liberalisation: Ireland and the EEC, 1957 to 1966

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Perspectives on the past

In retrospect, some of Ireland's brushes with the reality, rather than the concept, of European integration may well be viewed as somewhat disappointing, especially when considering the first two decades of post-war history. However, a judgment which perceives this process in such a sceptical light still has to allow for opinions to be tempered by the many subsequent positive developments. Of course, initially negative results should not have been unexpected because, after all, this particular country remains a small, historically-hindered, semiperipheral power lacking in any major natural resources or strategic importance. Indeed, when Ireland's application for full EEC membership is examined through any reflective political prism – partition or emigration, neutrality or nationalism – it only leads to a conclusion that the government consciously and deliberately changed its foreign policy emphasis away from political considerations to economic ones between the years 1957 to 1966. Ireland embarked upon this economic odyssey primarily in order to emerge from a lesser-developed status, not necessarily in itself a disagreeable transition. Certainly, the country which Lemass left behind after his resignation was a totally different one to that which he had inherited. It is evident that by the mid-1960s Ireland enjoyed an enhanced liberal democracy with an open economy emphasising industrial development ahead of agriculture; it possessed a regenerated political elite which underscored a shift away from civil war politics to more modern preoccupations and it was experiencing a social reawakening that was being encouraged by both Anglo-American and European influences. Although in many respects structurally weak, it had modernised radically.

Obviously, the situation Ireland found itself in was not altogether of its own making. As a former colony, successive governments had interminable
and understandable difficulties in developing an independent economy while trying to operate free of capitalist caprice in a hostile international environment. A Marxist analysis sees the recent past more in terms that the 'real turn' in 1958 was from 'British neo-colony to EEC/USA neo-colony'. According to Ronnie Munck, writing in *Ireland: nation, state, and class struggle*, the country was only a kind of 'small, subordinate cog' in an enormous capitalist wheel. Clearly, changes in the European economy during the late 1950s – the creation of EFTA and the EEC – had indeed led logically to the AIFTA's development in 1965 and to Ireland's EEC entry in 1973, but what other choice did policy-makers have? Indeed, is it fair to perceive a foreign economic policy which advocated openness and market diversification – away from historic dependence on the UK to future interdependence with the EEC – as an ignoble enterprise? The results of reforms in policy direction resonated loudly throughout Ireland's economy and society, as traditionally-held political convictions were sacrificed for economic gain. As far as Lemass himself was concerned, it was a price that was well worth paying.

The fact is that developments in Europe up to 1966, in their own right usually more positive than negative, appealed to the government because of their modernising effects. This is not just commentators looking back with hindsight at, for example, Ireland's rather painful experiences during the FTA negotiations of the late 1950s or its exclusion from the EEC in 1963 as being beneficial in the long-term. The 'heady growth' experienced by the Six, the advantages of lowering internal tariffs, the evolution of CAP, access to a much larger market, and the political benefits accruing from economic accord, these were all attractive as well, especially as they would lead to a loosening of ties with the UK. De Gaulle's refutation of the latter's bid for accession and intransigence over issues such as supranationality aside, the potential of a beneficial outcome for Ireland in the medium-term remained very much alive. Therefore, the Irish government continued to prepare for eventual accession; indeed, a bid would be mounted at relatively little notice if the chances of success merited it. The EEC had shown a willingness to adapt to changing circumstances when and if necessitated, the Luxembourg compromise of 1966 – 'which purported to preserve the right of veto if a country had very important interests at stake' – was incontestible evidence of that. It was clear that Lemass's policies would have to be continued by his successor, not just to attain accession, but for their own sake as well; yet, the UK remained the key.

Historically, Irish economic relations with the UK had been based on securing an outlet for agricultural produce. The various Anglo-Irish trade agreements provided for this. When the UK sought to join the EEC in 1961, it came as no surprise that Ireland reacted, even if it did so by promptly getting
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its application in first. In spite of this, as Brigid Laffan argues:

... the decision to apply for membership was not merely a passive reaction to a change in British policy but a decision that held out the beguiling prospect of placing Anglo-Irish relations in a wider multilateral setting.3

Paradoxically, in order for Ireland to extend its trading base outside of its existing restrictive economic reach, the AIFTA – an agreement which recognised economic realities, but which was diametrically opposed to Irish nationalist conventions – not only offered closer bilateral ties with the UK, but additionally gave it the chance to develop the range and quality of its products for expanded markets on a reasonably gradual basis. Of course, the AIFTA also had the benefit of preparing the country for the vigours of interaction with these other markets, particularly upon entry into the EEC. In turn, ameliorated economic relations with the UK enabled Ireland to face what might well have been a very uncertain future with some degree of self-confidence. Enhanced Anglo-Irish relations had political benefits as well.

It is quite apparent that Irish and UK ministers and officials meeting regularly in the context of both bilateral trade and European integration was 'immensely helpful' in developing an improved working relationship.4 Bilateral concessions were both received and given. The remains of Roger Casement were, for instance, restored to Ireland on 23 February 1965 for reburial.5 The return of a flag raised over the General Post Office during the Easter Rising followed one year later, just before the official commemorations.6 Such episodes cannot be underestimated in terms of identity or, in truth, with regard to the tangibility of Anglo-Irish cooperation. This was very much a two-way process. A UK cabinet report from that period stated that there existed 'growing evidence of the Republican Government's desire to take a firm stand against ... IRA lawlessness and to co-operate with the Northern Ireland authorities', for example.7 Thus, Dublin's interaction with London on economic matters extended into political collaboration as well, not only helping to reduce tensions, but also preparing Ireland for closer cooperation with the UK within the habitually envisioned context of the EEC.

In many respects, bilateral relations with the UK had never been better, but Ireland was looking further afield as well, even beyond the EEC. Additionally, domestic economic and political continuity, a material boom, and a more settled Western orientation, were considerable factors in the country's newly found self-assurance, allowing the Irish government to compare its achievements to those of Western Europe without embarrassment. All the same, nothing could be taken for granted, certainly not full EEC
membership. Endeavours towards participation thus remained one of the more consistent and substantial aspects of the economy, alongside a revitalisation of domestic circumstances, a dependence upon the inflow of external capital to fuel rapid industrialisation, and periodically strengthened Anglo-Irish relations. It is with the evidence of this economic realignment that this final chapter – entitled *Ireland’s European integration, 1957 to 1966* – proceeds, once evidence of change in the Irish political make-up has been revised and updated, prior to analyses of the roles that partition, emigration, neutrality and nationalism played in the Europeanisation of Irish affairs. Subsequently, this chapter explores the state of the Irish nation in 1966, before examining the substance of the Whitaker-Lemass dynamic. It concludes in two parts, surveying how Europe viewed Ireland, then exploring its future prospects as Lynch assumed control.

**The political landscape and how it pertained to Europe: Part II**

Ireland's domestic political make-up was remarkably consistent throughout this period. This meant that Fianna Fáil stayed in power, while the opposition remained relatively divided. One of the principal problems that the opposition faced, of course, was that the policies being pursued by Fianna Fáil were obviously working. The latter's policies were benefitting large swathes of the Irish population and the 'feel good' factor that their forward looking policies engendered reflected in their relatively consistent high standing. What of the opposition? Why were they so ineffective? Were they so divided among and between themselves in this period that their lack of coherence handed Fianna Fáil a golden opportunity to stay in power or was there more to it than that? By briefly analysing the experiences of the other political parties in this decade, much of the political consensus that existed is evidenced, the lethargy of the opposition exposed, and the fact that the government carried its policies out relatively unhindered at home emphasised.

Like Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael had no clear class base for its support, but traditionally drew its voters from large farmers, manufacturers, conservatives, and liberals; both political groupings can justifiably be described as 'catch-all' parties. The leader of Fine Gael between 1959 and 1966 was James Dillon, latterly described by his party as having been distinguished for his 'intellectual ability and oratorical pugnacity'. In political terms Dillon was in fact a moderate, but he was also seen as a maverick, a status earned through his belief that 'Ireland should build on its historic links with Britain rather than deny them'. Such beliefs were not politically advisable or pragmatic,
especially when a nationalist, republican government was looking for a third way to economic independence. Indeed, views such as these were usually not advertised, even if they reflected the reality and fitted in with Fine Gael's own view that as a party it espouses opinions which are capable of 'realising the diversity of opinion and identity on the island of Ireland'. Nevertheless, even in the 1960s, it was the political party which advocated moderation and a centrist approach to politics. Undoubtedly, there was a remodelling of the party with Dillon's retirement as leader in April 1965, but this only came after the economic, political and social landscape had been utterly transformed. As a recent briefing paper on the history of Fine Gael remarks:

In 1965 the publication of the 'Just Society' document signalled a new era for Fine Gael. It was to become a party of social reform complemented by its tradition of tolerance, openness and integrity. Younger, reformist minds ... [including Garret FitzGerald] came to dominate the party bringing innovation to the political arena.10

On the whole, Fine Gael was enthusiastic about European integration projects, but it was not in a position to influence the government unduly, even if it strengthened its position after the 1961 general election and reinforce its position as the major opposition party in Ireland. It was certainly not going to do so by espousing even greater dependence upon the UK.

A similar eagerness for all things European could not be said to have resided in the Labour party – Ireland's 'class-based' party which had rural and union support, as well as a more recent urban base – invariably Fine Gael's main coalition partner in any government when Fianna Fáil was voted out of office in 1948 and 1954. For nearly thirty years until he retired in March 1960, Norton was the leader of the Labour party, before being succeeded by Brendan Corish. Norton took an active part in the early days of the Council of Europe, but his party's attitude was generally ambivalent. In 1962, the Labour conference advocated that Ireland should basically do whatever the UK did.11 One year later, with the admission of former Irish health minister, Noel Browne, into the parliamentary party, there were signs that the Labour party might begin to move back to the left, while the possibility of associate EEC membership – advocated by the two National Progressive Democrat parliamentarians who merged their forces with the Labour party that year – was considered more seriously. Indeed, within three years the latter was promoting a 'coherent, socialist philosophy'.12 Although this development petered out, the question of EEC membership was hotly disputed internally as policy. By 1967, the Labour party had returned to a more traditional nationalist argument regarding Northern Ireland, in the process opposing Ireland's entry
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into the EEC partly, it was felt, because it would mean abandoning Dublin's right to demand unity. This bizarre logic increasingly tended to reflect Labour's opposition to European integration; this was especially apparent during the referendum campaign for EEC membership in 1972 and merely reflected the convictions of a minority within the general Irish populace.

However, it was the continuing inability of the Labour party to transcend Irish civil war politics, costing it dearly in terms of popular support and political representation. Unable to attract industrial workers in the same numbers as Fianna Fáil, Labour remained weak and divided. Socialist rhetoric has not been able to paper over changing opinions on the partition question, despite its attachment to popular policies such as social justice or military neutrality. Labour's parliamentary strength actually increased after the 1961 and 1965 general elections, but the divergence of views existing between the Labour party and Fine Gael on the European question did not aid the coherence of the opposition. As a consequence, the two parties were firmly out of power between 1957 and 1973; indeed, they were not even able to influence government policy unduly when it was in a minority position after 1961.

Additionally, there were also a number of smaller parties and independents represented in Dáil Éireann, including an innovative republican party, Clann na Poblachta, and what was effectively a small farmer's political pressure group, Clann na Talmhan. By the late 1950s, the influence of Clann na Poblachta as a political force had been on the wane for a decade, just as the other smaller parties and independents were doing. MacBride was its founder and most important member. According to Miriam Hederman, this Irish foreign minister had formulated a new foreign policy for the party, designed to reflect a radical, positive approach to external relations. Temperament and force of circumstances made him an "Irish European" in the context of his contemporaries. However, after the first Inter-Party government, this particular political party did not play an important role in the Europeanisation of Irish foreign policy. The other political party worth mentioning is Clann na Talmhan, who in many ways represented the interests of rural Ireland, but, having been successful in the mid-1940s, they were long declining by the end of the 1950s. The core support and policies of this party were by then represented by either Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil, before being slowly absorbed.

Fianna Fáil's 1957 election victory, although disappointingly followed by a reduction in seats four years later, proved to be a stabilising factor in economic and political terms. It campaigned in 1961 on a platform promoting its 'record of economic progress', while also advocating the prospect of further economic advancement once Ireland joined the EEC. Although short of a majority, Fianna Fáil formed a minority government which proved to be
surprisingly stable; partly due to divisions within the opposition, Lemass was able to govern with relative ease, while Ireland's proportional representation system – the single transferable vote – which slightly favours larger parties in terms of representation, helped to keep them in power. The electorate duly rewarded Fianna Fáil in 1965; in fact, in that general election, the incumbents won exactly half of the seats and enhanced its status as the 'natural' party of government. Working closely with trades unions and employers, farmers and workers, an era of revolutionary economic reform was advocated throughout, with preparations for entry into the EEC being a constituent part. In reviewing Fianna Fáil's position on Europe compared to that of Fine Gael, Martin Mansergh has written:

Fianna Fáil for a party attached to national sovereignty had few doubts about the desirability of Ireland being part of Europe as a real extension of sovereignty, through we would be less instinctively federalist and more pragmatic in our approach than Fine Gael ... 17

Once it had power, however, the most important point was that it was very difficult to shake Fianna Fáil off its chosen course, whether that was political, social or economic.

**Changes in orientation: the evidence of exports and imports**

It has already been intimated that the evidence of exports and imports backs up the assertion that Ireland had changed its economic and political orientation. Not only was it exporting a wider variety of products worth significantly more money to an ever more eclectic collection of countries, but it was also sourcing the goods that it imported from an array of different states, utilising the power that this gave for positive domestic progress and improved global relations. Ireland had entered the modern age twenty years after the rest of Western Europe, at first rather reluctantly, shaking off the stagnation of the previous decade, but quite quickly embracing such change. The numbers duly back up such assertions, because within the space of a decade the direction and make-up of the Irish economy was totally transformed, with industrialisation and agricultural reform at the heart of government planning, thus paving the way for political rebirth and social reformation.

In comparing where Irish goods went to in 1966 against where they went to in 1957, it is clear that the UK still dominated Irish economic thinking. The evidence is incontrovertible. Although Ireland's dependence upon the UK market decreased in real terms over the decade in which Lemass was a central
character, it still prefigured all other considerations. In 1966, nearly 70% of total Irish goods went to the UK. That may have been a substantial decrease of nine percentage points on the earlier date, but it was irrefutable evidence that the UK was still a dominant and overbearing force. Only the EEC made any pretence at being anything resembling an alternative destination having nearly doubled its significance in the space of a decade, thus establishing itself as a prospective market. Throughout the intervening period, EFTA had remained unimportant in any meaningful terms; of course, the same applied to the remaining OEEC countries. That really only left the US in a position to make an impression on these figures, regularly accounting for 7-8% of the remaining exports as Ireland constantly searched for fresh markets. The fact of the matter was that, although it had succeeded up to a point in finding new destinations for its produce, the second and third placed markets – the EEC and the US respectively – paled into insignificance when compared to the UK. The years in which Lemass exercised control saw fundamental changes, but it was not the cultivation of new marketplaces which was the most interesting development; it was the shifting composition of Irish exports which was garnering the most noteworthy attention and support.

Under Lemass, Ireland made the most of rather limited resources. Agriculture was the dominant sector in the economy, so the decision to change its orientation away from primary to processed products was an innovative move. The CAP incentive did not arrive until mid-1966, but then offered Ireland – once if acquired entry – an advantageous position of much increased agricultural subsidisation through central European funds. Meanwhile, within the space of ten years, the make-up of Irish exports was transformed, rather dramatically at that. From an unhealthy reliance on sales of live animals – accounting for nearly 43% of all exports in 1957, a figure which in a decade halved percentage-wise while remaining much the same in monetary terms – Ireland was rapidly able to discover new markets for its processed goods, steadily increasing the foreign sales of its food, drink and tobacco products from around 31½% to nearly 36% of total export figures. Unquestionably, the most dramatic dissimilarity between the two dates came regarding the importance of manufactured goods, nearly doubling the magnitude of this sector in ten years, so that it suddenly became Ireland's largest export category. The abandonment of protectionism as the 1960s progressed, coupled with the Irish government's strategy of promoting industrial growth – firstly through inward and then by means of foreign investment – accounted for this sharp rise in the sale of manufactured goods. By 1966, these came to symbolise the revolution that had taken place in the economy, even if an intrinsically unremunerative sector such as live animals was still a mainstay.
There was also the promise that, once Ireland had implemented the full provisions of the AIFTA, full EEC membership would provide an even greater impulse towards increased foreign direct investment.\textsuperscript{21} If these changes in Irish exports signalled a transformation in the orientation of the economy, upon what types of imports did Ireland stay dependent and from where did these products originate or had these figures dramatically altered as well?

On the face of it, the totals pertaining to the origin of Irish imports may not seem to be overly interesting at first glance. It is true that Ireland was sourcing many of its import needs from further afield than the UK but, as its nearest neighbour provided over half of its import requirements, this does suggest that this position of dependence was a mutually beneficial one. Indeed, the UK had an important market for its produce in these years, counterbalancing Ireland's need for access to the UK marketplace. Nevertheless, there is also clear evidence that the Irish government was also promoting a policy of using access to its internal market to enhance its relations with other countries. Both the EEC and the US benefitted from this policy, with the former regularly accounting for up to and over 15\% of Irish imports, while the US was often making up the best part of 10\% in total. During this time, the share for the rest of EFTA did not change in percentage terms, even if the volume did, while the remaining OEEC countries were a relatively trivial consideration once again. Overall, although it was proving to be a particularly slow process for Ireland to wean itself off the UK when sourcing its additional requisites and resources, the fact is that some progress was being made.

Of course, Ireland's major import needs were technological and concentrated on capital-intensive products and other highly valued manufactured goods. As industry and the general consumer had voracious appetites for durables of all kinds, disposable income and investment respectively came to be constituent parts of the economy. Obviously, a sector like live animals was well catered for by indigenous production, but it contrasts very well with the part this category played in total exports. The prevailing pattern over the ten year period showed no major changes, which not only goes to show that Ireland's dependence on certain goods endured, indeed that the country continued – with only the very slightest variations – to source them from essentially the same places, but that it further demonstrates that a plan had been made and followed. The only evident difference of note was that the importation of manufacturing goods went up by a significant 2½\% percentage points, representing more than a doubling in monetary terms.

Ireland was modernising fast. It could cater for its own basic needs, but to compete in a free market it would also have to adapt to changing styles
of trade, where the competition for newer export markets was far greater and dependent upon quality, price and innovation, where access to a huge free market made Ireland an attractive site for foreign investment, and where indigenous products would have to compete in the home market with imported goods. The economic present was a challenge and would become harder still, but it was not a threat unless inaction was mistaken for decisiveness. Lemass made several mistakes, but a lack of resolution or the fear to make decisions were not amongst them. This trait was again obvious in his attitude to Northern Ireland and the part that it played in Irish life, but it was evident in other conscious decisions that he took as well regarding such diverse issues as emigration, nationalism and neutrality. Interestingly, aside from his direct involvement in the country's reorientation away from the UK to Europe, it is in relation to Northern Ireland that he may well have had his most fundamental, if not necessarily wholly intentional, influence.

Northern Ireland's role in Irish-European affairs

In 1957, Ireland remained far behind its northern neighbour. Writing in *The dynamics of Irish politics*, Paul Bew *et al* have convincingly reinforced an argument regarding the importance of what they term the 'demonstration effect', which revealed, for instance, the considerably higher levels of social provision in the UK; this was accentuated by the decision to apply for EEC membership, only heightening an awareness in Ireland of the gap that had opened up between itself and other European countries. In comparative terms, there had been some degree of convergence by 1961, with the Irish economy catching up just as Northern Ireland's began to slow down. Belinda Probert, writing in *Beyond orange and green*, notes that:

... in the context of possible membership ... it was becoming apparent that the economic structure of Ireland had been transformed in such a way as to greatly reduce the significance of the barrier between North and South ...
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colonialism. It was intent on embracing ‘multinational capitalism and the great transnational corporations’ instead of rigidly sticking to protectionism as it had done in the first half of its decolonised existence.24 Ireland in the mid-1960s was a radically different place to the country that it had been in the mid-1950s and was beginning the process of catching up with its neighbour and erstwhile adversary.

Despite Fianna Fáil’s rhetoric, de Valera was at least partially responsible for the lack of urgency which became attached to solving the Northern Ireland question in his latter years as party leader and Irish premier. Indeed, upon victory in the 1957 general election, he called for "one great and combined effort", not to end partition, but to end the country's economic ills.25 Thus, in pursuing policies of what was basically economic rapprochement with the UK in the late 1950s and early 1960s – just as he had done in the late 1930s – Lemass in turn did his utmost to soothe bilateral Anglo-Irish relations, while simultaneously not generating any national dissent by ruffling republican feathers. A symbolic extension into the political field, thereby improving relations with the Northern Ireland government and also relaxing the 'sore thumb' policy, was the natural step for a radical economic realist and patient political pragmatist to take. This new policy was first evidenced by the efforts of the governments to defeat the IRA – which between December 1956 and February 1962 together they essentially did – but it was the meetings between the two prime ministers which had the most impact. At the same time, however, this delicate change in policy alignment legitimised partition by recognising its existence, if not de jure in the written word through treaties, at least de facto through symbolic actions and deeds.26 Of course, such interaction effectively ended a period of 'bitter hostility' marked not by conflict but by rhetoric; it could not have been achieved without similar thinking emanating from the corridors of power in Belfast.

The taoiseach maintained that more affable relations with Ireland’s northern neighbour, inexorably linked to economic progress within the context of Europe, would eventually allow the peaceful ending of a partition which saw the island divided into two distinct jurisdictions. Indeed, he supposed that a redeveloped and invigorated Ireland – economically, politically and socially – would through time become more attractive to Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, in publicly speaking this way about weakening partition, Lemass sometimes abjured the realities of the division; partition was very real, it could not be wished away and from that there was no escaping.27 It was more customary for him to be placatory and understanding, as he was in an interview given to the Belfast Telegraph on becoming taoiseach. Indeed, this particular contribution to a developing debate on the relationship between
Ireland and Northern Ireland was subsequently recognised as the 'most constructive attitude to the problem of partition that had yet emerged' from a politician of his standing. Gradually, increased cooperation followed between the Dublin and Belfast governments in matters of mutual interest such as electricity, tourism, and transport. It was undoubtedly true that Lemass's opinions were sometimes at variance with traditional anti-partitionist dogma, but he was able to employ such language when it suited him. On the whole, however, he was sensible and sensitive in his approach. Indeed, there was some striking evidence emerging that a new and more realistic dimension to north-south relations was dawning. In July 1963, Lemass went even further along the path of detente in a speech which basically represented a complete volte-face in government policy, thus opening the way for what amounted to a recognition of the status quo. The taoiseach was making all the right noises – explicitly dropping anti-partition as official policy – as he reached out to Ireland's northern neighbour. Dublin keenly hoped that moderate politicians in Belfast were listening with interest.

A new and relatively liberal Northern Ireland prime minister, Terence O'Neill, came to power on 25 March 1963, having previously served as a home affairs and finance minister during which time he successfully endeavoured to attract industries and foreign investment. From the outset, with confidence in the ability of the state low, he made it clear that he aimed to revitalise the country's ailing economy which was convulsing from the collapse of the linen and shipbuilding industries. In order for Northern Ireland to compete in an ever-changing international environment, technological improvements – in areas such as agriculture, industry, and transport – were undeniably the way forward economically. Coupled with the adoption of economic planning to deal with its mounting problems – pressures such as a rural economy, the rises in underemployment and unemployment, and the beginnings of social unrest – the next step, although possibly the hardest, could not be put off any longer.

On three separate occasions, Harold Macmillan asked the Northern Ireland premier to see whether relations with Dublin might not be improved. This policy was also favoured by his successor as Conservative prime minister, Alec Douglas-Home, who expressed a hope to O'Neill on 22 November 1963 that he should meet with Lemass; this pressure on O'Neill was sustained under a relatively unsympathetic Labour government at Westminster one year later. For the new administration in London, it was not so much a symbolic meeting which was urged, rather that Stormont had to start facing stark facts and expediting change, including facing the detrimental effects of the island's intransigently distinct economies. At the same time, conciliatory
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signals were emerging. Although it might be argued that rhetoric is cheap – with Lemass declaring his ready ‘willingness to meet the prime minister at any time to discuss practical problems of common interest and methods of cooperation to solve them’ – there had been real changes in outlook. It was surely only a matter of time before a thaw in north-south relations came about and an invitation for the taoiseach to visit Belfast was extended. Then the matter would be in Dublin’s hands.31

Planned with the utmost secrecy, the taoiseach’s visit to Belfast on 14 January 1965, criticised wildly by fundamental Protestant tendencies, adds to a positive historical assessment of both leaders. Such a profound and symbolic decision to invite his southern counterpart to discuss matters of bilateral interest showed some foresight and was in many respects brave. Perhaps mistakenly taken without prior consultation with most members of his cabinet, this move was condemned by hardliners as the abandonment of traditional unionism. Although it was of course bound to arouse controversy and was by definition ill-prepared, this softening in relations did have genuinely beneficial results, both economic and political. For instance, Lemass’s role in cajoling the National Party – a Northern nationalist political grouping seeking Irish unity – to act as the official opposition to those in Stormont favouring unionism was worthy of praise in the context of normalising northern politics. He was also the first major southern politician to make any effort to afford unionist traditions their rightful legitimacy. Indeed, even his entrance into the seat of power in Northern Ireland was an admission that the state itself existed at all. In relation to agriculture, for instance, it soon became apparent that there could be north-south cooperation on veterinary matters; for a variety of reasons, however, industrial development on a mutual basis was not included, so in many respects, the reality of cooperation did not quite match up with the symbolism.32

This successful invitation was reciprocated on 9 February 1965 when in turn O’Neill visited Ireland. The potential for cooperation was still tremendous. Nonetheless, it has to be admitted that the fact that these bilateral meetings attracted so much attention just goes to demonstrate the extent to which partitionist attitudes and actions had taken over the mind-set of politicians in both Dublin and Belfast in the four decades following the creation of the two states. The border was not just a political or physical barrier; it had become an economic and mental barrier as well.33 Thus, it was a significant psychological step to take for the two prime ministers to meet in the first place, even if the practical effects of their interaction were somewhat limited. Still, a start had been made and the opportunity for change was very real and, although it was in some ways unpalatable, the obvious solution to the
mounting and seemingly intractable problems facing both governments thus appeared to be cooperation.\textsuperscript{34} Up to this, the two parts of the island had been ignoring each other for well over forty years, much to their mutual detriment. Such a situation could not possibly be allowed to continue, certainly not \textit{ad infinitum}. Inertia in the Northern Ireland political system, however, which was partly engendered by nearly half a century of single partly rule, made it quite difficult to deal with the economic problems facing such a small and divided society. The launch in January 1965 of a programme entitled \textit{Economic development in Northern Ireland}, although a positive step in the right direction, mirrored similar initiatives taken in Dublin. Nonetheless, because O'Neill did not enjoy the intrinsic domestic support in Northern Ireland that his Irish counterpart did, he was in a considerably weaker position to force the pace of accommodation and adjustment. It must be said that Lemass's agenda was not necessarily the same obviously as the Northern Ireland premier's, but they were interested in some similar ends.\textsuperscript{35}

It was certainly clear that European integration was not going to be some kind of easy fix for partition. Alternatively cajoling or humouring Northern Ireland, the taoiseach helped to keep republicans satiated while creating the conditions necessary to break the impasse in north-south relations.\textsuperscript{36} Northern Ireland was still determined to confront its own problems without compromising upon its identity. In the end, it was the economy which was attracting most attention in Dublin of course, not what was happening north of the border. Essentially, partition's existence was accepted, as the focus was turned to an economy that required much strengthening.\textsuperscript{37} Ireland had its own problems, including the appeasement of wage demands and social deprivation; but, Lemass felt that there was not much that he could do in some respects other than to encourage responsible behaviour in workers and in employers.\textsuperscript{38} By the mid-1960s, growth rates were an admirable 4½% on average, while Northern Ireland, with growth in the shape of 3½%, was not particularly far behind.\textsuperscript{39} The two economies were performing well ahead of the UK norm. There was no reason necessarily to anticipate the political or social crises yet to come. In truth, Ireland's expected economic amelioration within the EEC was an altogether distinct project from any aspirations towards political unity that membership in time might encourage, even if a shift to an open and progressive economy brought the south more into line with the practices more common to the north. Such progress notwithstanding, there were political and social storm-clouds on the horizon.\textsuperscript{40}

On 8 March 1966, 'Nelson's Pillar' in Dublin city centre disappeared in an explosive cloud of debris and dust.\textsuperscript{41} Ireland's revolutionary republican \textit{élan} which, as Tom Garvin has written, had grown weak during the 1950s,
was still capable of destruction. As ever, the timing was supremely symbolic because, as Ireland was celebrating the golden anniversary of the Easter Rising, any 'triumphalist ceremonies' commemorating the occasion only served to sour the Lemass-O'Neill initiative. Writing in *Partition and the limits of Irish nationalism*, Clare O'Halloran therefore believes the meetings to have been 'significant only as a brief departure from the prevailing sterile political relationship between Belfast and Dublin'. Although he held them to be at least in part responsible, the northern premier felt the 1916 commemorations taking place in Ireland to have been a 'useful scapegoat' for opposition to an initiative which, along with various other factors, led to the rapid deterioration in cross-border cooperation. Although Lemass was himself careful not to antagonise unionists, de Valera had no such qualms it appears and spoke passionately of the country's reunification and the language's revival. Was it just the case that 'uncompromising irredentism' had been replaced by a 'softly softly' approach? Criticism of rapprochement though as some kind of 'cunning stratagem' appears rather cynical, if not disingenuous. The taoiseach supported a realistic reassessment of anti-partitionist dogma, even if it was his successor who would have to carry that policy out in the face of republican hawks within Fianna Fáil. There was a feeling that 1966 marked the end of a 'post-independence' period in Irish history, although it was not yet clear exactly where Ireland was going except in one chief respect. It would join the EEC when it was precipitate to do so, that is when the UK did and once it could then follow. What would that mean for north-south relations?

It is clear that all along there were serious unionist concerns regarding the implications of the UK and Ireland being members of the EEC simply because of the open border that this development would bring. Obviously, Northern Ireland would benefit from EEC membership because of the increases in economic activity. A price would have to be paid, however, as the discrimination enshrined in Northern Ireland's 'Safeguarding of Employment Act' dating from 1947 – which were expressly designed to restrict migration from the south to the north through a complex system of permits – would probably have to be discontinued by law. The fear among unionists was that this would lead to a marked increase in the flow of Irish labour into Northern Ireland, especially to towns like Derry and Newry, on a temporary and even permanent basis. One of the constraints which was considered was to 'restrict the franchise to ... [Northern Ireland] nationals'. The future of north-south relations was in the balance, even if other issues had already been decided in the context of EEC membership. Ireland had been undergoing fundamental change in the name of European integration, even if Lemass insisted that it was worth doing for its own sake.
A price worth paying?

With the objective of economic and political integration at the heart of its very being, it was little wonder that the EEC proved to be of enduring interest to the government. Undoubtedly, the country's prospective membership was seen as a means of escape from the twin evils of economic stagnation at home and dependency upon the UK market abroad. It has explicitly been pointed out that the two main political parties in Ireland had each reached a consensus regarding the EEC by the late 1950s. Both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael wanted the country to join and were quite willing to do all that was necessary for economic betterment; for instance, both parties were happy to see a policy such as neutrality diminished in importance or even in substance in return for an end to emigration. After 1963, it was Paris which proved to be the main obstacle to membership, not deficiencies in economic or political policies which the Irish were evidently becoming ever keener to iron out of existence. It was clear to all what the benefits the EEC would bring. The developing CAP would boost farming and slow down the rural to urban population shift by fixing higher prices for produce and by guaranteeing production subsidies. The diversification of markets would offer more opportunities for industry than it would pose problems, while allowing Irish agricultural produce free access to as many as ten countries instead of just one. Additionally, the various economic development and rehabilitation programmes for which the Treaty of Rome provided would help to finance the future, not mortgage it. In sum, although Ireland's application for EEC membership was linked to, indeed dictated by, its dependence upon the UK's economy, it was thought that the main effect of full participation would be to reduce such reliance. Having dealt with Northern Ireland in the previous section, an obvious question to be asked in the light of Miriam Hederman discerning four features – partition, emigration, neutrality and nationalism – which differentiated Ireland from its European neighbours, comes down to posing the following: what effects did the Lemass years have on these policies?

As a concept and as the reality reinforces, emigration has been an emotionally loaded phenomenon for Ireland. Indeed, for well over fifty years after the Great Famine of the late 1840s, it psychologically overshadowed Irish society and thinking, enduring as long as first-hand recollection existed and even for generations beyond. Although not alone in this period as a European country to experience emigration, abiding economic and social haemorrhaging
effects of this tragedy were still felt well into the early 1960s. Indeed, in the previous decade, emigration figures were greater than at any other period since the turn of the century; thus, by 1961, the Irish population stood at an all-time low of 2,818,341 people.\textsuperscript{48} Occupying the national psyche to an enormous extent, its solution understandably became a priority for the government, especially in the public sphere, even if emigration was privately welcomed as an economic escape valve which lessened the impact of unemployment. In return, of course, the value in financial terms of the diaspora was that it acted as a conduit for funding back into the economy – mainly in industry, but later in tourism, and in emigrants remittances – and as an example of possible attainment. Nevertheless, there was internal migration as well. Indeed, fundamental to the restructuring of agriculture was the consolidation of land holdings in number and size, as well as the utilisation of land. This led to rural depopulation and to increases in urbanisation and emigration. Thus, there is truth in the view that the effects of capitalist production – dating from the nineteenth century, away from labour intensive tillage to land extensive, but more profitable, cattle production – were being felt generations later.\textsuperscript{49} With an additional 62,000 inhabitants by 1966, a mini-census revealed one of Ireland's few increases in population since the Great Famine.\textsuperscript{50} The only way to reinforce the reverse of the emigration trend that was beginning to take hold in the mid-1960s, as the effects of the economic boom were being felt, was to mitigate against any sudden or long-term downturns. EEC membership offered such a hope, even if its fulfilment remained problematic.

Since the foundation of the Irish state in 1921, neutrality had been an intimate element – explicit or implicit – of foreign policy. Ostensibly, it reached its height during the Second World War when it became a watchword but, with partition enduring, it has lasted right up to the present day in one form or another. Non-belligerence, although benevolent towards the Allies in wartime, became military neutrality in the decades that followed, most prominently in regard to Ireland's rejection of NATO. When coupled with an ignominious departure from the British Commonwealth, it had the effect of sharply restricting diplomatic activity. This post-1945 international isolation did not ease for some considerable time to come because, even if it was positively pro-Western in its ideological orientation, the Irish government began to exercise both qualitative and quantitative independence in foreign policy – chiefly through ostentatious activism at the UN – which was especially bewildering to the US. Entwined with its abhorrence of partition – appropriately described as an 'introverted, brooding sense of grievance' which appeared to determine foreign policy – it was as yet no easier in the late 1950s for Western Europeans to understand Ireland's continued refusal to participate
in defence or military alliances, especially in the light of its subsequent peacekeeping activities. Referring to such contradictions as a 'Jekyll and Hyde' approach to security policy, Patrick Keatinge has written that the decision to join the EEC in 1961 'in effect made neutrality conditional on the extent of European integration'. By the mid-1960s, it was becoming more apparent that the government would not allow Ireland's neutral status to pose any great difficulties when it came to adhesion to an organisation such as the EEC. Although expressly economic, the EEC was also intrinsically political. 'Ireland's policy of neutrality has always been conditional upon the possibility of abandoning it for a political end', Bill McSweeney has declared. Under Lemass, Irish foreign policy was thus redirected away from military neutrality to full membership of an economic organisation which represented the Western European mainstream. As Dermot Keogh has written:

... [His] unambiguous response ... on neutrality finally convinced the Six that a non-member of NATO would not constitute a problem. Ireland ... was prepared to join any military defence arrangement organised by the member states of the EEC.

By 1966, neutrality was no longer perceived as a block on Ireland's entry into the EEC; even this problem of a European defence mechanism was neutralised in many ways once France was withdrawn from NATO's institutional structure. Nationalism has characterised itself in Ireland through various means including race, religion and territorial integrity, but was usually defined in the context of otherness through comparisons with the UK, that is through a distinct historical experience and separate cultural definition. With nationalism in mind, it is in fact possible to use the criteria advanced by Paul Bew and Henry Patterson when viewing its nineteenth century Irish antecedent; they examined nationalism in the context of agriculture and industry and put forward the following definitions, both of which echoed Ireland in the second half of the twentieth century as well:

- '... it meant the rejection of large scale cattle ranches in favour of smaller farms, more tillage and a larger agricultural workforce';
- '... it meant the project of an Irish industrial revolution probably assisted by the use of the weapon of tariff protection'.

What did this mean in the context of Lemass's tenure? Clearly, it can be said that although agrarian radicalism was high in the mid-1960s, virulently pushing for Ireland's inclusion in the EEC, it no longer played the same role in
the country's economy that it had done up to only a decade earlier. Certainly, grassland production now predominated and would not be threatened by uneconomic or backward practices associated with small farms and a large rural labour force. Thus, the role of agriculture in defining Irish nationalism had changed. Indeed, the same could be said for industry. Again, by the mid-1960s, foreign capital and economic liberalism were beginning to drive the economy. The era of subsidised, home-grown industry had come and gone. The transition from quota and tariff-based protectionism to liberalisation was well under way, with dreams of self-sufficiency going unrealised. Irish nationalism was as yet basically unaffected by conflict in Northern Ireland – it had not yet become equated with the violent interpretation of republicanism – but its definition was open to reinterpretation having undergone a tremendous inversion in the post-war decades. In summing up, Paul Bew and Henry Patterson have thus written that: 'It is very clear that one politician, Seán Lemass, played a decisive role in this process'. Although they do not deny that the latter continued to employ nationalism in his rhetoric to legitimise some decisions, they nevertheless argue that his 'gradualism and disingenuousness' disarmed detractors of the course he had chosen. As Lemass applied political reality to Whitaker's economic liberalism, Ireland was preparing itself for EEC entry. In the meantime, nationalism became a very secondary consideration; the collective Irish psyche was weighing up the advantages of 'Europeanism'.

Looking at the situation in Ireland through these various socio-economic, military and political prisms of emigration, neutrality and nationalism, it is possible to see something of what was sacrificed; but, what had been gained exactly? Where did Ireland stand in 1966 in comparison to a decade earlier back in 1957? The long-term effects of economic expansion were not as yet clear, but there had been many changes; domestic politics were not the same, indeed, the results of social innovations were evidently becoming more and more striking on a daily basis. What was the state of the nation some ten years after Economic development had been unveiled and the government's resulting Programme for economic expansion been launched? What did the future hold for a country that was so hindered geographically and historically that its impediments had become as much psychological as anything else, a state which had reluctantly realised that it was dependent upon external developments over which it exercised little control? What point had Ireland reached and where did it go to from here? Exactly where did the EEC fit into this equation and what could the government do to help itself in that context? These were the kind of questions that were being asked as Lemass's tenure came to a conclusion.
1966: the state of the nation

By 1966, certain choices had been made that had fundamental repercussions for the future of Ireland, especially in relation to its economy, politics and society. In turn, each of these areas of Irish life has to be examined to question the country's preparedness to exchange the UK's economic system for membership of an EEC in which Anglo-Irish economic relations would be subsumed. Thus, starting with the economy, the three main areas that are investigated are the agricultural, industrial and tertiary sectors. When it comes to politics, the situation that year in Ireland is clarified and then compared to its northern neighbour. Finally, in relation to Irish culture and society, a general outline is presented on the rapid changes in opinions and trends regarding religion, language and education as a representative sample of the wider reformation in opinions and views. At last, the government and the country was making an 'overdue rendezvous with the realities of the later twentieth-century', as Ireland began to feel both the benefits and the drawbacks of modernisation.58

Raymond Crotty, writing in *Irish agricultural production*, argued that the government's *Second programme for economic expansion*, while explicitly anticipating marked increases in agricultural production, did not appear to provide for the mechanisms which were necessary to accomplish this eventuality. Importantly, however, this document did at least explain the requirement upon which its plans for agriculture's future were based and depended; it cited:

... the assumption that, in the second half of the 1960's, international market arrangements for our agricultural products (which at present, due to reasons outside the control of the Government, are unsatisfactory) will be considerably improved, as a result, *inter alia*, of our being admitted to membership of the E.E.C.

A basic assumption was thus compromised as a repercussion of Ireland's exclusion in 1963. Nevertheless, it should be added that although the author argued that EEC membership would bring an increase to Irish farm product prices, this did not mean that by itself it would lead to any significant increase in terms of agricultural output. Indeed, even if the farming lobby was very consistent in seeking EEC entry and had considerable influence over government, he felt that the prices to be paid for agricultural produce would only see a 15% increase, on average, not the radical boost to the economy that they appeared to be predicting. Still, as Garret FitzGerald has written, it would
at least have access to a market where prices were not depressed by the inflow of 'dumped international farm produce' which contributed to the UK marketplace becoming increasingly unrewarding. All assumptions about entry were open to review in 1966, particularly as Raymond Crotty argues that, despite all the rhetoric about an expansion in the importance of agriculture, the reality remained very different. After all, the volume of net agricultural production was basically the same at the end of the Lemass period as it had been in the beginning. In truth, despite the Irish government's rhetoric about joining the EEC before the end of the decade, full membership was still not as yet guaranteed.\(^5\)

Nonetheless, the state of Irish industry in 1966 was very different again compared to agriculture, as was the situation regarding the services sector of the economy. Using similar criteria for industry to that used in assessing agriculture's readiness for Ireland's accession, Raymond Crotty convincingly demonstrated that the volume of net industrial production more than doubled in a decade; indeed, the respective figures for the third area of the economy were just as impressive.\(^6\) John Bradley \textit{et al} have written that while 'agricultural exports dominated trade up to the mid-1960s', manufactured goods soon became the preeminent part of Ireland's export total; additionally, the 'source of imports and, in particular, the destination of exports has broadened' since then.\(^6\) Clearly, it was manufacturing industry – much of its growth due to the government's policy of attracting foreign investment, especially that of export-oriented multinationals – which was starting to account for a larger employment share, total Irish exports, and the economy's output. The contrast to Northern Ireland, which only enjoyed a brief surge in the 1960s that contradicted a generally unremitting economic decline, was palpable and of much propaganda value. 'The process of industrialisation, including its social ramifications, is central to an understanding of historical change in modern Ireland', as Liam Kennedy has eloquently stated.\(^6\) This was the era that finally saw the modernisation and internationalisation of the Irish economy with employment, for instance, standing at around 4.8%; bare figures such as this demonstrated exactly where the country now stood in 1966 in relation to the previous position it had held back in 1957.\(^6\)

The differences between Ireland and Northern Ireland were also visible in the tertiary sector. While the former was, for example, able to develop an increasingly significant tourist industry – aided by the setting up of Bord Fáilte in 1955 and the inauguration of transatlantic air travel in the early 1960s, thus facilitating outside contacts and attracting lucrative business, which by 1967 had passed the IR£80m mark, as earnings in this burgeoning sector grew by around 5\% \textit{per annum} – the latter stagnated in comparison. The
mid-1960s saw an economic boom, reflected in societal changes, that in many ways Northern Ireland had already experienced. The former was planning for full employment, while the latter was combatting problems that had been suppressed or had not been experienced for a generation. Indeed, Ireland was only just beginning to open up to exciting new ideas, possible developments and experiencing freedom when its neighbour was entering into a period of brooding reflection, consolidation and hazardous introspection.

It is also possible to see a parallel in the politics of the two countries, as this period saw a progressive renewal and invigoration in the south that was only matched by a reversal in the fortunes of a Northern Irish state steadily moving from moderation to destructive radicalism and entrenched fundamentalism. Politics in de Valera's Ireland were localised, parochial and clientelistic; his successor made some attempts to change that practice with limited success. When Lemass abruptly decided to retire from politics in October 1966, an era in contemporary Irish history came to a sudden end. As Dermot Keogh has written, it seems that he felt the time had come for a younger political generation – most of whom, having been elected in March 1957, he had himself gradually appointed – to take the reins of power. As Lemass had no designated successor, it was left to the Fianna Fáil parliamentary party to determine its new leader so that he could be put forward for election as taoiseach in Dáil Éireann. As a result though of various, rather disparate, candidates representing different tendencies and traditions within the party not being in a position to attract enough party support, a compromise solution was reached. The Irish finance minister, Jack Lynch, was put forward for election and took over the running of the country the following month. Having achieved so much in office in such a limited space of time, it is true that not securing EEC membership was one of Lemass's few regrets and was also evidence that his radicalism did not realise all of his stated aims and ambitions. Assessed as a 'taker of risks' – vis-à-vis his relations with Belfast, focusing Ireland on Europe, domestic policy – he certainly won more political arguments and battles than he lost. Dermot Keogh maintains that, having transcended the past, Lemass reformed Ireland's present and radically outlined its future, both economically and structurally, before handing power over to a new generation. Although he was not necessarily presented with a poisoned chalice, the new taoiseach would have a lot of work to do to keep rival factions united, while trying to realise what was now deemed as the indispensable goal of economic and political policy, full EEC membership.

The political situation in Northern Ireland was much more complex, with the Belfast government at Stormont coming under a verbal siege. In making moves suggesting a thaw with Dublin, O'Neill's position as prime
Ireland's European integration

minister, although not necessarily under direct threat, was compromised. However, it was becoming more and more evident to the UK government that 'in the context of membership of the European Communities, Northern Ireland and the Republic will have certain common difficulties and opportunities which will differ in some respects from those which will face Great Britain'.

EEC membership would undoubtedly affect north-south relations rather markedly. Therefore, as much as Westminster needed the Northern Irish government to deal with the problems it faced effectively and justly, it was beginning to appear that Stormont might not be equal to the task. The differences between Ireland and Northern Ireland were defined in diametrically opposed ways; just as the former was becoming a little more liberal and out-going, the latter was becoming increasingly conservative and inflexible. Economic and political rejuvenation, tied up in the concept of EEC membership, was reflected in Ireland as a whole.

By the mid-1960s, culture and society in Ireland had radically altered, a phenomenon reflected in changes in attitudes to the Catholic Church, a continuation in the decline of the language, and a reformation in education. The period when the government in Dublin regarded the Vatican as the epicentre of world power had long since passed away. The zenith of the Catholic Church's influence in domestic affairs had been marked in the early 1950s by the 'Mother and Child' controversy. From that point onwards, a slow but steady decline in the importance of religion in Ireland ensued, even if political visits to Rome were always of propaganda value. Successive popes – Pius XII, John XXIII and Paul VI – correctly viewed Ireland as a bastion, one of the world's most Catholic countries. Indeed, in reference to the fifteenth centenary celebrations of Saint Patrick in 1961, one pope was moved to remark on 'the harmonious relations existing between Church and State in Ireland which enabled you [Uachtarán na hÉireann (the Irish president)] and the highest officials of the Government to participate so fully in the splendid commemoration of Ireland's national patron and great apostle'.

Nevertheless, the process begun by Lemass – 'somewhat cooler' in his attitude to the Catholic Church than de Valera, without being 'particularly anticlerical, or laic in political outlook' – was leading to a pluralist outlook and more tolerant society, one created in communion with a growing materialism and secularism, as a period of 'quiescence' descended on relations between Irish churchmen and statesmen. The Second Vatican Council tended to reinforce this new vision of the relationship between church and state. Ever so slowly, film and literary censorship was relaxed and the Catholic Church's role in education and medicine lessened. Changes did not mean that the church was accepting policy with equanimity – indeed, it championed Christian charity
and welfare reform in the shape of new housing – just that it no longer wielded
the power to influence new practices unduly if the state was determined to see
them enacted. Ireland's bucolic society was slowly contracting, with the nation
gradually being enlivened by a growing spirit of ecumenism and by the
modernisation of Irish attitudes.\(^\text{70}\) Indeed, Garret FitzGerald has specifically
written that the 'opening up [of] a much wider range of contacts between
Ireland and the Continent has modified to some degree the impact of Anglo-
American culture'.\(^\text{71}\)

Of course, one of the rudimentary definitions of Irish individuality –
its language – had also taken a battering. Constant exposure to English,
whether in normal daily interaction or through newspaper readership, radio or
television, meant that the days had died away when hopes of revitalising its
wide usage were strong. In speaking so regularly of the vital role it played in
realising and, indeed, in distinguishing nationality, de Valera frequently
lamented its decline as the embodiment of Irishness, fearing a future in which
the country would sink into 'amorphous cosmopolitanism'; it did not
necessarily hold the same appeal for Lemass.\(^\text{72}\) At the beginning of the
nineteenth century, the language spoken by the mass population had been
Irish. However, already within a couple of generations of the Great Famine,
that decline had become so inexorable that as the twentieth century began this
figure was 12% and falling. Well before the 1960s, despite a national
reawakening earlier in the century, the language was seen as an integral part of
the past, not as a symbol of what was to come. It was the UK, the US and the
British Commonwealth which had traditionally been the destinations of
emigrants, places where the Irish language had been of relatively little use.
Now that Irish people were returning home to a booming national economy, it
was Europe which was seen as the future. The traditional language –
accounting for only 2½% of the population – had a negligible role to play in
such a rapidly evolving environment.\(^\text{73}\) Indeed, even when it came to the
nation's name, it was apparent that the concept of progress would be
enshrined.\(^\text{74}\)

Interestingly, this was also reflected in changes in the structures and
attitudes towards education in Ireland. This policy was initiated by Lemass on
becoming taoiseach as funds were redirected towards an investment into one
of the country's richest natural resources, its inhabitants. In 1962, the Irish
section of the European Association of Teachers was founded as hopes of
joining the EEC became buoyant. That same year, Patrick Hillery, the
education minister, was able to write:

> Closer contact with the Continent should, as its first effect, redeem us from a
certain provincialism which hangs heavily over the Irish mind. It is bad for us to have our intellectual, educational, artistic and other horizons confined to these islands, with only a very occasional glance over the hedge at what is going on in the rest of Europe.

It has been said that the movement towards a united Europe was an 'aim which was closely in line with the traditions both of Catholicism and of Irish scholarship on the Continent'. Although only a small section of society, the fact that the impact of European integration was being debated among educationalists at all was indicative of Ireland's evolving orientation and its openness to EEC membership. The government was already involved in education at the European and global level through the OECD and in 1962 also joined the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. Symptomatic of the necessity to break away from 'introspective practices', a decision on the need for a reconsideration and reorientation of the role in Ireland of education quickly led, for instance, to a reform of the secondary school system. Changes such as this resulted from plans published in September 1966 under the suggestive heading *Investment in education* by Donogh O'Malley, himself described as the 'most dynamic and imaginative in a series of energetic Ministers of Education'. The OECD had initiated this report in 1962; even in education, Europe was quite clearly the future direction in which Ireland was heading.\(^75\)

It is quite obvious that the Ireland which Lemass left behind was rather a different country to the one which he had inherited. In all sectors of the economy, politics and society, there appeared to have been a fundamental revision, although it had not yet reached the stage that 'there is no longer any real poverty', as Richard Finnegan wrote.\(^76\) By 1966, there was still a long way to go; by no means had Ireland attained all of the goals that Lemass had set out to achieve. Nonetheless, major steps had been taken to rectify the ills that affected the country and that had negatively effected its chances of entering the EEC in the first place. Politicians were more aware of these needs; perhaps more importantly, there was evidence that society as a whole – farmers, industrialists and workers included – were also coming to realise the relevance of European integration to their daily lives. If any one element was to be considered integral to the realisation of this process, to the centrality of the EEC in foreign economic thinking, it would have to be the energy and intelligence that were brought to bear on this subject by the two people who have become synonymous with this age.

**The Whitaker-Lemass dynamic**

Within the space of ten years, an economic orthodoxy which had in truth
dominated Ireland’s orientation since the early 1930s was suddenly turned on its head and speedily reversed. The recognition of Irish economic frailty and European vitality helped to reverse completely what was heretofore accepted as irrefutable, perhaps near infallible, teaching. Back in 1932, the Fianna Fáil election manifesto contained the following declaration that it pledged to introduce on agricultural and industrial development, as well as foreign trade:

To organise systematically the establishment of the industries required to meet the needs of the community in manufactured goods ... to make ourselves as independent of foreign imports as possible and to provide for our people the employment that is at present denied them. Suitable fiscal laws would be passed to give the protection necessary against unfair foreign competition ... To preserve the home market for our farmers and to encourage the production by them of our food requirements to the greatest extent possible ... To negotiate trade agreements that would secure for our products preferences in foreign markets, always subject to the condition that the protection required for the maintenance and development of our own agricultural and manufacturing industries will not be lessened. The people of Britain and ourselves are each the other's best customer. Our geographical position and other factors make it unlikely that this close trade relationship will rapidly change. Machinery and other capital equipment for our industries will have to be purchased from abroad. We can in these purchases accord a preference to Britain in return for a preference in her markets for our agricultural produce.

A quarter of a century later, this policy had in effect still not changed very much. Fianna Fáil autarky and protectionist policies replaced the cautiously orthodox, but paradoxically open, economy favoured by the Cumann na nGaedheal governments of the 1920s. One of the last European states to introduce protectionism, the country was dominated by such thinking for thirty-five years, long after the rest of Europe had relinquished this practice.77

Between 1957 and 1966, two people in particular were responsible though for a radical remodelling of the government's economic policy and for spearheading reform. In the process, both ignorant provincialism and die-heart nationalism, two of the main obstacles to economic progress, were eroded from their positions of accepted conscious and subconscious orthodoxy.78 Following a decade of seemingly aimless 'drift', it was progressive leadership and confidence that the country lacked most; indeed, these would become central elements in taking advantage of the 'rising tide lifting all boats'. However, the government would also have to be aware of an ever-present danger, as F.Scott Fitzgerald wrote, of being one of those 'boats against the current carried back ceaselessly into the past'.79
Seán Lemass was a perceptive politician and a receptive man. Having served in every de Valera administration between 1932 and 1959, basically as the senior economic minister, he was the most adept candidate to take over as taoiseach. Despite having to restrain his own radicalism for many years and having been responsible for implementing a strict protectionist policy that became synonymous with Fianna Fáil inspired economic nationalism, he was open to new ideas regarding Ireland's future economic direction. That was where T.K. Whitaker came into the equation. A retiring albeit resolute individual, the latter convinced Lemass to adapt a different approach to economic affairs. Having served in the civil service for over two decades before he became the most senior civil servant in the finance ministry in 1956, he had his own ideas about how to run the economy and, by having recourse to the opinions of economists, intellectuals and other members of the civil service, he has become directly associated with the change in economic fortunes. Nevertheless, it was the fusion of these individuals' prescience which paved the way for real change. Although Lemass may not have been the economic 'superman' that adherents portrayed or Whitaker the financial equivalent of a soothsayer, it would be a grave mistake not to recognise fully the vibrant nature of their relationship or, fearing the creation of economic and political deities, not to give historical credit where it is due. It is true that, 'without the courage of his political masters, much of Whitaker's initiatives would have been stillborn'; running contrary to de Valera's notion of Ireland – who exercised some 'considerable influence', even if it quickly diminished, in his early years as Irish president – Lemass accepted most of this senior civil servant's advice and vision, seeing to it that these ideas were implemented as policy.

Ireland had already experienced economic cooperation in the European context with the enactment and distribution of Marshall Aid. D. George Boyce, writing in *Nationalism in Ireland*, presents his view of the changes during the late 1950s and early 1960s in the context of the Whitaker-Lemass dynamic. A dominant figure in cabinet, the taoiseach exercised full control over his administration, thus allowing him to give 'life and vigour' to the proposals of his finance secretary. In drawing attention to a quarter of a century of limited successes interspersed with the many continuing failures in policy, Whitaker cited a multifarious array of economic inhibitors, including the 'backwardness of agriculture, the stagnation of industry, the decline in population, emigration, the lack of public capital, and the lack of intelligent direction of public capital' as being particularly offensive. His exacting remedy was for the 'State to spend money on modernising agriculture and industry, to solicit for foreign capital by tax concessions and other facilities, and to
abandon the old ... policy of protection for its own sake. In all probability, Ireland would soon be participating in a European free trading environment in one form or another, but would have to be ready economically and politically in order to do so. There were great risks involved in economic expansion and civil servants, employers, politicians, and workers took some convincing. Nonetheless, political stability allowed for an extensive economic programme to be followed through to a logical and fruitful conclusion and thus did not constantly face ad hoc determinants.

Of course, the finance secretary's role in bringing Lemass and O'Neill together was integral to creating this climate. It was through his working relationship with Jim Malley, the northern prime minister's private secretary, that an invitation to visit Belfast was extended by O'Neill to the Irish prime minister, an entreaty which after some hesitation was consequently accepted. The fact of the matter was that Lemass and Whitaker complemented each other because they had the same basic goals in mind. Of course, it was the move to free trade and the concentration on economic considerations which distinguished this working relationship from most others. That is why the partnership worked and that is one of the reasons why Europe began to become more convinced of Ireland's eligibility for the creation of a stronger link; the actual form of such ties was still somewhat open to debate, but that was the purpose of the accession negotiations, whenever they transpired.

The maintenance of a momentum towards free trade, characterised by the primarily symbolic 10% unilateral tariff cuts of 1963 and 1964, was inspired by an unshakable belief in the future well-being of the Irish economy within the EEC. However, practical steps were more important than aspirations. Thus, the domestic reviews of the readiness of agriculture and industry were crucial to creating the necessary atmosphere for the onslaught of free trade. Indeed, the AIFTA worked in the same way. Writing in his account of the Irish Department of Finance, Ronan Fanning has distinguished three principal interlinking components in the economic strategy which the finance department and in time the Whitaker-Lemass dynamic had promoted, listing them as:

- a requisite for the rapid enactment economic planning;
- the need for more diversity in external trade policy;
- the imperative of accession to the EEC.

Arching over these considerations was Whitaker's firm belief that protectionism would have to be dismantled; otherwise Ireland faced economic impoverishment. Thus, in conjunction with the strength of the domestic
developments set in train from the late 1950s’ – Ireland's signing of the AIFTA, its participation in GATT, its eventual adhesion to the EEC – were all part of that process and evidence that the finance secretary won the argument. Free trade was coming anyway, so he contended that it was better to have limited control – or at least the semblance of it – over the gradual enactment of adjustment policies, rather than having them painfully forced upon the country at some later stage, possibly by decree.

Of all the elements that mattered, it was the EEC which remained of supreme import. In his efforts to convince the taoiseach of the legitimacy of his concept, the finance secretary argued from November 1960 that European developments would need to be watched closely and, once the UK began to make its position on EEC membership known from May 1961, Ireland had little choice but to follow the negotiations process wherever it led. Although the EEC was soon lost as a policy option in the near future, it was clear that a reorganisation of the economy for free trade was needed in its own right. Whitaker asserted that:

... [there] was a need to maintain a psychological impetus towards rapid adjustment to EEC conditions ... procrastination in making tariff reductions would merely result in a faster rate of reduction on joining the EEC ... [that unilateral reductions] would provide an earnest of our determination to adapt ourselves to EEC conditions ... [which] would be evidence not only of our realism but of our expectation that we would be admitted to membership.

These tariff reductions led onto negotiations for the AIFTA because the UK was the realistic extent of Irish economic ambition in the short-term, whether in the context of GATT or the EEC, as their trading relations needed to be formalised from Dublin's perspective. The fact that Whitaker was able to convince Lemass of the legitimacy of his views over an extended period of time is testimony to his persuasive abilities and to the openness, strength and trust inherent in their professional relationship. The existence of a Whitaker-Lemass dynamic does not need eulogising, but that does not mean that it should not in fact be acknowledged; indeed, as one commentator has written, it is surely better to moderate 'traditional adulation' than just to debunk 'heroes'.

Ireland viewed from Europe

It was becoming obvious to the Six and to the institutions in Brussels that Ireland no longer had rudimentary economic or political impediments to membership. The many dramatic improvements included an ever-expanding
manufacturing base and an all-encompassing tariff revision, reassurances that the country was neither politically nor ideologically neutral, and improved Anglo-Irish relations in all areas of life. Dublin felt that it was ready to participate in the process of European integration – indeed, it continued to expect to be able to do so by the end of the decade at the very least – but what in turn did Europe think?

It was clear to Europeans that, although Ireland was paying 'lip-service' to the notion of political union, there was 'little intuitive understanding of the original motivations that led the countries of continental Europe to opt for integration'. Ireland was clearly only interested in accruing the economic benefits of membership. That being said, as Brigid Laffan makes clear in her *Integration and co-operation in Europe* in relation to contemporary Ireland:

... as a small state with a limited ability to influence its external environment, Ireland has a keen sense that the pooling of sovereignty is preferable to the maintenance of formal sovereignty without the power to exercise it.91

Even in the mid-1960s, Ireland was more than prepared to work towards economic integration and the material well-being of both itself and its partners; if in the process political integration resulted, the Irish attitude was so be it, the Lemass government could live with that. The time and energy expended in the abortive negotiations for a European FTA or the poor impression created at that stage by Irish demands for special treatment was not, in the long-term, time and energy wasted.92 Ireland had worked at making a better impression in the intervening period, but it had also changed the actuality of its own position.

The second half of 1965 and the majority of 1966 had seen little interaction between Dublin and Brussels. Both had their own preoccupations, Ireland in securing the AIFTA, the EEC in surviving another de Gaulle inspired crisis. The question of enlargement receded into the background, but it was still there. Therefore, when the EEC found a formula through the Luxembourg compromise with which to proceed much as before and as London's interest in membership was rekindled, Ireland also began to pay close attention to events as they unfolded and prepared itself for any eventuality, including the resubmission of its candidature. As D.J.Maher has contended, the Irish government was not convinced of the perspicacity of resuming negotiations at that juncture, but it was not going to be caught unawares.93

Thus, Dublin set about making both major and minor adjustments to its relations with Europe, both inside and outside the Six. As an indication of its serious intent regarding full EEC membership, it decided to accredit a separate diplomatic mission to the three European Communities, while
maintaining an ambassador in Brussels accredited to Belgium and, on a non-residential basis, to Luxembourg, a posting which itself had only been raised to embassy status a year previously. In turn, on 13 September 1966, it was decided that Seán Morrissey would replace Francis Biggar as Head of the Mission of Ireland to the ECSC, EEC and Euratom; indeed, Biggar would be replaced by Gerard Woods as Irish ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg, signifying the increased workload of its various representatives in Brussels. Lemass's government also sought a meeting with the European Commission, the first such encounter at ministerial level for eighteen months; in addition, it decided to publish a further White Paper on the European Communities, due to come out in the early part of the following year. Its second round of negotiations to adhere to the EEC thus began in earnest, if not officially, one week later on 20 September 1966 when the finance minister, Jack Lynch, and Frank Aiken, the external affairs minister, met with various members of the European Commission in Brussels. The latter was represented by three commissioners: Sicco Mansholt at agriculture, Robert Marjolin at economic and financial affairs, and Jean Rey at external relations. For Dublin, this level of representation demonstrated overdue, if welcome, signs of the serious intent with which their case was now being viewed in Brussels.

The main purpose of the delegation's visit was to express Ireland's continuing interest in the EEC; D.J. Maher has pointed out others, so that the reasons for this meeting were:

- to record the Irish government's abiding interest in membership;
- to explore the possibility of resuming negotiations;
- to discuss setting up an interim trading relationship;
- to allow for subsequent meetings at ministerial and senior official level.

Lynch and Aiken made it quite clear that EEC membership was at the forefront of the Irish government's foreign economic policy thinking. Indeed, Ireland's efforts at creating the right environment for entry were emphasised by Aiken along with its recent history of unilateral tariff cuts, unsuccessful efforts to negotiate interim agreements, and AIFTA's creation. Lynch supplemented this contribution by presenting a comprehensive analysis of the economic situation, supplying a detailed explanation as to how the AIFTA complemented the EEC and how it was 'providing a valuable means of preparing the Irish economy for the conditions it would encounter on accession to the EEC. Further meetings were planned and the possibility of negotiations resuming towards the end of 1967, with accession coming two
years later, was envisaged as being a reasonably likely scenario.\textsuperscript{97}

This represented an innovation in the structure of Ireland’s European integration policy as there was a new emphasis on who took the responsibility for handling negotiations. It was an understandable departure from the government’s previous course, which had concentrated it in the hands of the taoiseach, demonstrating a new role for the external affairs and finance departments. Even if the Department of the Taoiseach still administered overall control, as Ronan Fanning explained, responsibility was apportioned so that the Department of Finance concerned itself with the internal aspects of the adhesion process, thus ‘coordinating the preparation of detailed material, chairing interdepartmental committees’ and so on, while the principal function of the Department of External Affairs was in its relation to the external features, that is ‘leading discussions in Brussels’.\textsuperscript{98} The structures for the negotiations were therefore back in place for when they would need to be reactivated. However, if the European Commission was thinking along the lines of such accession negotiations not being held for twelve months at least, what advice was coming from the Six?

Obviously, it was how the UK’s candidature was played which was really of crucial importance. It was clear that France in the shape of de Gaulle was still the stumbling block and that London was being informed of that unchanging position on a regular basis. The French government portrayed a position amounting to it having ‘no policy’ on a possible UK application, but that was not the reality of de Gaulle’s attitude filtering through from various sources.\textsuperscript{99} As Northern Ireland’s premier was told by Willi Brandt, West Germany’s foreign minister in early 1967, there was no point in ‘throwing oneself against a brick wall’ on the membership issue, a message relayed back to Con O’Neill, the former’s cousin, who himself felt that nothing had changed in relation to the French view on UK entry.\textsuperscript{100} Three choices faced the London government, it appears; it could:

\begin{itemize}
\item decide to reapply for full EEC membership immediately;
\item elect not to apply at all, certainly not while de Gaulle was in office;
\item delay its application until it received further clarification and perhaps even settle on another deal altogether, intermediate or long-term.\textsuperscript{101}
\end{itemize}

As 1966 came to a close and despite economic advantages existing in delaying a membership application, the outlook for Ireland was as yet only a matter of conjecture. Of course, it was desperately important that the country should not be perceived as a UK ‘clone’ or be seen as being too far away from the European heartland.\textsuperscript{102} Only by actively pursuing economic and political
policies favoured by the EEC and independent of the UK could Dublin secure a positive hearing from Brussels. Therein lay a contradiction; Ireland would not attempt any drastic economic change if the UK was not itself directly involved.

Prospects for the future

As things stood, Ireland's future prospects hinged on a lot of variables. The central unknown factor concerned economics – when would the country be able to join the EEC? – but there were many others. The country had a new leader, of course, but political stability down south was not reflected up north by anything approaching a similar situation, where a political and social precariousness pervaded. Socially, a period of changing attitudes in Ireland emerged towards previous constants such as the role of religion; it was also a time of reform in areas such as education; indeed, it was an era of technological development whether that concerned industry or the media. However, arching over all of these endeavours and hopes was one constant feature; this concerned future prosperity and that meant the EEC. There was another complication. It was assumed that both Ireland and the UK would be members by 1970, but of course there was an inherent risk in that dangerous assumption, as there was a very distinct threat that this particular eventuality would not necessarily pan out as planned.

On the same day, 10 November 1966, that Lemass formally announced his resignation as taoiseach, the UK prime minister reaffirmed London's wish to enter into 'exploratory talks' with the EEC. Indeed, significant moves such as visits to the six capitals to explain the UK's needs and ascertain the various positions of the member states were also announced at that point in time. Thus, well ahead of schedule, it appeared as if the UK was readying itself to reopen accession negotiations. Promptly, Lynch made it known that he wanted a meeting with Wilson and this duly took place on 19 December 1966. The main issue of concern to Ireland was clearly the EEC, although Northern Ireland was a significant consideration as well. A new era in Ireland's European integration was obviously dawning, but there were no guarantees that success would be forthcoming in the short-term, whatever about the benefits that enhanced Anglo-Irish relations were clearly going to bring in the meantime. It is particularly vital to examine this meeting in detail because, although it moves slightly outside of the stated timeframe, it does provide a useful subject with which to conclude; in providing a detailed analysis of this Wilson-Lynch summit, it also shows exactly where Ireland
stood in relation to Europe as the year came to an end.

Two subjects were of particular interest to the taoiseach as he arrived for his meeting at Downing Street, the EEC and Northern Ireland. When he arrived though, he was obviously surprised to be faced with a heavy-weight UK delegation, which not only comprised the prime minister, but also included George Brown, his foreign secretary, Douglas Jay, President of the Board of Trade, and Fred Peart, the agriculture minister, as well. What was billed as a tête-à-tête over lunch between the two prime ministers turned into a bilateral summit; indeed, it continued until 'all the business had been disposed of'. Both subjects deserve attention here, the EEC for obvious reasons, the situation in the north because of how it was impacting on Ireland's internal and external policies.

In preparation for his encounter with Wilson, the taoiseach was intensively briefed on what were clearly only tentative attempts by Ireland and the UK to reestablish a rapport with the EEC. Dublin knew that, when London began to renegotiate, its accession negotiations would proceed at a lesser pace. However, it was imperative that both enter at the same time. Ireland evidently did not have the same problems with accession that the UK would have, because even on the supranational effects of membership, lessened somewhat following the Luxembourg compromise, it had 'no reservations'. It was the government's view that the:

... degree to which the institutions of the EEC are endowed with supranational powers is strictly limited and these have been substantially watered down by the Luxembourg decision ... which more of less ensures that a majority decision cannot be used to override the vital interest of a member country.

Of course, it was at Lynch's request that this meeting was taking place, primarily because he wanted to glean information from the UK government regarding its position within the EEC context. The account that he received was not exactly what he was expecting to hear, but at least he now appreciated a little more precisely where the UK in fact stood and how they viewed their relative position.

The UK foreign minister gave an account of a recent meeting that he had conducted with his French counterpart, but he felt him to be 'aloof and uncommunicative'; he surmised that he was not talking to the person in charge. In a subsequent meeting with the French president, Brown got a better view of where the UK really stood, even if the former was not 'very helpful or oncoming'. The Irish external affairs secretary interpreted the Anglo-French meeting with these ominous words: 'Put crudely, the General's line was "What
do you want? What is your problem? I have no problem, I am not trying to get into the Common Market". The UK prime minister added that although five of the Six were in favour of UK entry, partly as a result of the British Commonwealth no longer being a predominant issue, partly because objections regarding the supranational aspects of membership had receded, even if other issues, such as the Anglo-American relationship and the position of sterling, had not. It was clear that the UK was going to continue with its probings on the possibilities of adhesion and Wilson guaranteed that Dublin would be kept informed because of overlapping interests in the question. In fact, Brown had stated that, in the context of the EEC, he saw the UK and Ireland 'as one'. At that stage, however, Lynch was still not able to ascertain what kind of timetable that the UK had in mind, but it was apparent that the UK felt that developments could advance quickly. Indeed, it was readily apparent that the London government was not averse to precipitating the matter of full EEC membership by taking the initiative.

Of course, Northern Ireland remained of particular concern to the Dublin government. The heady days back in the first couple of months 1965 were a part of the past, because it was obvious that tension was mounting. At their meeting in London, Lynch concentrated on the topical issue of institutionalised political and religious discrimination, especially in areas such as the equitable provision of educational, the flawed local electoral system, and housing allocations. Wilson agreed that Northern Ireland was of considerable and understandable concern, but that O'Neill had to proceed slowly with his reforms in order not to antagonise further his party or cabinet, as his position was seen as 'none too secure', or indeed the wider constituency, inflamed by the virulence of Ian Paisley. As with the EEC question, the Irish delegation felt that substantive progress had been made because Ireland had communicated its concerns. However, the Northern Ireland problem was still festering unsolved. Where the Irish government went from there was still open to question. In the context of full EEC membership, all that was clear was that it would be reacting to any new circumstances, not shaping them. Working out what the UK was going to decide to do next regarding the EEC was certainly not proving to be an easy task. Nevertheless, in the space of a decade, at least Ireland had gone from perennial economic underachiever to an increasingly prosperous nation. Throughout this process, it was hoped that the EEC would shortly provide the country with a 'constructive external framework' within which to pursue its national interests and own self-advancement within the setting of European economic and political integration. The future might have been bright, but it was also blindingly unknown.
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Notes


2 Unattributed article, 'Around Europe in 40 years', *Economist*, 31 May 1997. The Luxembourg compromise arose in the first place because de Gaulle viewed the growing influence and power of European institutions as a burgeoning supranational development to the detriment of national independence. In 1965, he had withdrawn his ministers from EEC meetings as a consequence, paralysing the processes of European integration.


5 Having been found guilty of inciting rebellion, a charge complicated by him being revealed a homosexual, Roger Casement was hanged as a traitor on 3 August 1916. Within a week of the reinstatement to Ireland of his remains, he was reinterred on 1 March 1965. The Irish president delivered an unpretentious oration at a funeral service accorded the status of a full state occasion; but, it had only been made possible by Wilson's acquiescence in releasing the body. In praising Casement, firstly as a native of Ulster, then as a humanitarian and also as a supporter of nationalism, the symbolism of the occasion was not lost on the domestic or international audience. De Valera speech delivered at Glasnevin Cemetery in Dublin, 1 March 1965, entitled 'At Casement's grave', pp. 603-5, in Moynihan (ed.), *Speeches and statements, passim*; A. J. P. Taylor, 'A patriot for one Ireland', pp. 253-9, in C. Wrigley (ed.), *From the Boer War to the Cold War: essays on twentieth-century Europe* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995), p. 253; P. Ziegler, *Wilson: the authorised life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), pp. 242-3.

6 Upon the flag's reinstatement, the taoiseach wrote to Wilson about the 'gratitude ... and deep appreciation of the Irish Government and people ... The return of the flag can be welcomed as yet another step towards the building of goodwill and the most friendly relations between our two countries'. Lemass concluded by thanking the UK prime minister for the 'speed and the generosity with which your government responded favourably to our representations for the return of the green flag bearing the words "Irish Republic"'. Symbolic gestures sometimes had tangible effects. R. Donnelly, '1916 flag return praised', *Irish Times*, 1/2 January 1997; B. Purcell, 'Lemass praised Wilson for return of 1916 flag', *Irish Independent*, 1/2 January 1997. Both newspaper articles cited a letter from Lemass to Wilson, dated *circa* mid-April 1966.


8 Much of the basic information in this section has been drawn from Gallagher, *Electoral support, passim*. It concentrates on the domestic positions of political parties and how that pertained to Europe, especially on how this situation evolved
once Fianna Fáil came back to power in 1957; an introduction to this area was presented in Chapter 1; it is headed *The political landscape and how it pertained to Europe: Part I*.


10 Fine Gael internet publication, 'Briefing paper on the history of Fine Gael 1933-1995, including comments on the place of Fine Gael in Irish political life', http://www.finegael.com/ist.htm (8 July 1997). It is also very interesting to note that this document concludes by stating that:

Fine Gael is a party of Europe. In taking our place in a united Europe we will broaden our national identity and partake in a new arrangement where national conflicts will lose their significance. Fine Gael is the only party consistent with the view that Ireland's future is safe within a prosperous and united Europe. Europe will open new possibilities for the advancement of Ireland, a future where every person has a place.


15 Hederman, *The road to Europe*, p. 22.


18 Bradley et al, *Stabilization and growth on the European periphery*, p. 10. It is clear that the destination of exports began to alter in the early 1950s, but it was only at the end of the decade that this process began to gather pace; by the mid-1960s, though there was still room for progress, especially in attracting new markets on a consistent and viable basis, it was readily apparent that very real changes were taking place.


20 Bradley et al, *Stabilization and growth on the EC periphery*, p. 10. Thus, this changing composition of Irish exports has been depicted before, although it was to be some years yet until goods other than animals and food were surpassed by non-agricultural goods as the largest percentage of total exports.


23 Munck, *Ireland*, p. 34. This view utilised B.Probert, *Beyond orange and green: the
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27 In 1959, Lemass related his view to a UK audience, subsequently published in a Fianna Fáil pamphlet, that:

> It is, indeed, the simple truth that Ireland is one nation, in its history, in its geography and in its people, entitled to have its essential unity expressed in its political institutions ... Ireland is, by every test, one nation. It is on that essential unity that we found our case for political integration.

However, he followed this assertion up, recognising that there was room for manoeuvre within his image of north-south relations when he asked: 'is it not plain common sense that the two existing political communities in our small island should seek every opportunity of working together in practical matters for their mutual and common good?' Wilson, *Ulster*, p. 4; Farrell, *Seán Lemass*, p. 115. Both quotations were originally taken from S. Lemass, *One nation* (Dublin: Fianna Fáil, 1959), pp. 4-14.


> I have no illusions about the strength of the barriers of prejudice and suspicion which now divide the people, but given good will nothing is impossible. Meanwhile better relations can be fostered by practical cooperation for mutual benefit in the economic sphere ... Even at present, and without reference to any wider issue, we would be prepared to consider and discuss proposals as to how policy might be directed so as to ensure that the economic progress of both parts of the country will be impaired as little as possible by the existing political division.

The previous year, when he ostensibly spoke in Belfast about Ireland's future in a European FTA, he had then advocated his beliefs regarding 'breaking down the barriers of suspicion, antagonism, prejudice and misunderstanding', adding that:

> Anything which tends to break or lower these barriers is good; anything
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which tends to raise or strengthen them is bad. I think it is as simple as that, and certainly that outlook will continue to settle our policy and determine our actions.

Farrell, Seán Lemass, p. 114. This speech was originally delivered by the tánaiste to the Irish Association for Cultural, Social and Economic Relations in Belfast on the subject of a European FTA, 10 February 1958.

Magee, Northern Ireland, p. 109. This view utilised a Lemass speech delivered in Tralee in July 1963. On this occasion, the taoiseach stated:

We recognise that the Government and Parliament there [Northern Ireland] exist with the support of the majority of the Six County area – artificial though that area is ... We believe that it is foolish in the extreme that in this island and amongst people of the same race there should persist a desire to avoid contacts, even in respect of matters where concerted action is seen to be beneficial. We would hope that from the extension of useful contacts at every level of activity, a new situation would develop which would permit of wider responsibilities in accord with our desires ...


31 Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland, p. 363: Farrell, Seán Lemass, p. 114; O'Neill, The autobiography, pp. 72-3; Phoenix, Irish Times, 3 January 1996; unattributed article, 'Files reveal IRA was stepping up plans for campaign in 1966', Irish Times, 1/2 January 1997. Symbolic change was relatively easy to achieve; more and more, for example, Lemass referred to the country as Northern Ireland rather than as the pejorative 'Six Counties'. Substance was a far more difficult task to accomplish.

32 In the previous chapter, the poor state of trade within the island was outlined. On only one occasion in these years did more than 5% of Irish imports come from Northern Ireland; simultaneously, trade figures in the other direction, while not as startling, still demonstrated that the economic barrier was very real.

33 P.Bew & G.Gillespie, Northern Ireland: a chronology of the troubles, 1968-1993 (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1993), pp. 1 & 4; Lawrence, Government of Northern Ireland, p. 102; Northern Ireland government publication, Economic development in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Northern Ireland Command Paper no. 479, 1965); Terence O'Neill (Northern Ireland prime minister) address to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association at Westminster, 4 November 1968. The latter quotation was taken from Magee, Northern Ireland, p. 113. Speaking in 1968 of the meetings held three years previously, O'Neill said:

... I decided to take the initiative of meeting ... Lemass. I knew he was a hard-headed realist, prepared to recognize the realities of the situation, and
I regarded our meeting as a *de facto*, if not *de jure* recognition of Northern Ireland. We agreed from the start to set political and constitutional issues on one side, and concentrate instead upon promoting economic and other forms of practical co-operation – in tourism, in power supply and so on. This was the basis – the sensible, realistic basis – of my two meetings with Mr Lemass ... What I must emphasize is that, from my point of view, the object of such talks was to promote a decent, sane neighbourly relationship ... But if such a relationship is to flourish, it demands sensible restraint and ... prudence ...

36 Lemass cajoled Northern Ireland's leaders by stating that there were much better ways of dealing with its problems than just by dispatching deputations to London to plead for help, that the 'bread of charity is never very filling', for example, or humoured them by declaring that 'unity means first that – bringing the people together', that it was not a matter of territorial acquisition. Farrell, *Seán Lemass*, p. 115; Bew & Patterson, *Lemass*, p. 11. The former comes from an interview with the *Scotsman* reported in the *Irish Press*, 13 February 1961; the latter quote comes from a retrospective interview with the *Irish Press*, 28 January 1969.


38 Lemass certainly did not agree with one industrialist, for example, who accused Irish trade unions of having 'communistic influence'. The taoiseach's views regarding the economic effects of European integration were regularly vocalised; the government could create a framework, but the attraction of foreign investment and the readaption of indigenous industry had to be effected by the investors, employers and workers. P.O'Morain, 'Lemass warned of union power', *Irish Times*, 1/2 January 1997. This newspaper article cited various communications between Lemass and the W & R Jacob chairman during 1966.


40 Somewhat presciently, Seamus Heaney wrote of the Northern Ireland situation at that point in time: 'Life goes on, yet people are reluctant to dismiss the possibility of an explosion'. Foster, *Modern Ireland*, p. 585. This Seamus Heaney quotation originally appeared in the *New Statesman*, 1 July 1966.


42 Garvin, 'Wealth, poverty and development', p. 320.

43 De Valera statement delivered on 1916's fiftieth anniversary, 10 April 1966, entitled 'Easter Rising', pp. 605-7, in Moynihan (ed.), *Speeches and statements*, pp. 605-6; O'Halloran, *Partition and the limits*, pp. 186-8. Clare O'Halloran has written that: 'The inflated rhetoric of de Valera and others sat uneasily with the previous year's pragmatism and showed how little Lemass's so-called realism had challenged received wisdom on partition. Uncompromising irredentism had not been officially rejected by Lemass, but merely laid aside in favour of a "softly softly" approach'.

44 Phoenix, *Irish Times*, 3 January 1996. In writing his article reviewing the archival releases on the O'Neill-Lemass meetings, Eamon Phoenix recorded the views of some Unionist MPs, including James Kilfedder. However, summing up the Northern Ireland prime minister's views, he wrote that: 'The main plank of the unionist platform would remain the maintenance of the constitutional position ... this did not mean that it was wrong to discuss matters of common interest with their nearest
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neighbours on the same island'. Clearly, Lemass was thinking on a different wave-length. John Bowman wrote that the taoiseach suggested to Aiken on 21 January 1966 that, in the future, an Irish unity policy pursued by the Northern nationalists might be better off to recognise the prevailing position, but to espouse its future achievement on a 'federal basis'. J.Bowman, 'Ahern warned Lemass about federal formula', Irish Times, 2 January 1998. This newspaper article was based on an exchange of memoranda between Lemass and Aiken, circa late January 1966.


Unattributed article, 'Open borders feared', Irish Times, 2 January 1998. This newspaper article cited a Northern Ireland cabinet memorandum, dated 8 June 1967.


A.Matthews, The common agricultural policy and the less developed countries (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1985), p. 198. This view originally utilised Crotty, Irish agricultural production, passim. The former writes of the 'consequences of capitalist production relations in nineteenth century Irish agriculture when labour made surplus by the move to land-extensive more profitable cattle production was forced to emigrate'; the latter gets straight to the heart of the matter, unequivocally stating that: 'Historically, the expansion of cattle production in Ireland has not been attended by happy results ... socially or economically'.

Foster, Modern Ireland, p. 579. 


B.McSweeney, 'Ireland and European integration', pp. 187-93, in Studies vol. 79 no. 314 1990, p. 191. He added his view that:

For most of our history, the principal end in view was reunification. Our neutrality was never absolute or permanent and we negotiated entry into the EC on that condition. Since our first application to join ... neutrality has been conditional upon our readiness to join an integrated defence in the future ... Our non-membership of a military alliance was a policy followed by successive governments because domestic public opinion seemed to favour it and, in the delicate balance of power in the Dail [sic], no party could afford to tamper with it. Neither could they afford to affirm it unconditionally, because it was clear to every government that such an affirmation would have serious consequences for our capacity to negotiate economic benefits in the EC.
Unattributed article, 'New order forces Irish "rethink" on security', *Irish Times*, 27 May 1996; P. Cullen, 'Congo recalled as Irish watch battle for Zaire', *Irish Times*, 19 April 1997; T. Farrell, 'An Irishman's diary', *Irish Times*, 5 June 1997; P. Keatinge, 'Visitors may marvel at "Jekyll and Hyde" approach to European security', *Irish Times*, 2 July 1996; N. MacQueen, 'Foreign policy', pp. 203-4, in Connolly (ed.), *The Oxford companion*, p. 204; N. MacQueen, 'Neutrality', pp. 385-6, in Connolly (ed.), *The Oxford companion*, p. 386. Patrick Keatinge was using this 'Jekyll and Hyde' analogy in a contemporary context, but it equally applies historically to Lemass's policy – reality versus the symbolic. Under the aegis of the UN, Ireland's neutrality was progressive throughout the late 1950s and immediately beyond. According to Norrie MacQueen, 'neutrality found a more comprehensible diplomatic expression' by that time, a 'reassertion of the international activism of the 1930s'. She added that the country:

... emerged as a considerable 'middle power' player in UN diplomacy. Positions were taken which were frequently at odds with 'western' interests on issues such as the representation of China ... and nuclear disengagement ... The question of neutrality featured prominently in the national debates over entry to Europe in the 1960s ...

Neutrality did not hinder Ireland's peace-keeping activities either, but appeared to encourage them; this was most apparent in the Congo during the early 1960s when Irish troops were sent there under the UN banner.


Greenwood (ed.), *Britain and European integration since the Second World War*, 147. This French government move occurred in March 1966.


Bew & Patterson, *Seán Lemass*, pp. 191-7; T. Garvin, *The evolution of Irish nationalist politics* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1981); J. Lee, 'Searching for lost European civilisation amid the free market', *Irish Times*, 2 July 1996. The latter argues that in the 1950s the 'founding fathers sought to transcend nationalism by Europeanism'; under Lemass, Ireland also made this transition, but he was certainly less convinced about it than he was about the possibilities of economic advancement within the context of European free trade and integration.


Crotty, *Irish agricultural production*, passim; Irish government publication, *Second programme for economic expansion*, p. 22. Raymond Crotty states, for example, that in 1963 the volume of net agricultural production was IR£143m as opposed to IR£130.7m in 1957. Even considering that inflation was relatively low, this performance does not suggest any radical economic advancement in terms of yield. Seamus Sheehy, an agricultural economics professor, wrote subsequently about the various attractions in EEC membership of the CAP, but did not neglect to mention the UK becoming increasingly self-sufficient because of the same reason. FitzGerald, *Irish Times*, 29 December 1997; S. Sheehy, 'CAP may finally ensure viable rural economy', *Irish Times*, 30 December 1997.

Crotty, *Irish agricultural production*, passim. Raymond Crotty states that the volume
of net industrial production in 1963 was IRE\text{211}m as opposed to IRE\text{124.2}m in 1957; for the tertiary sector these figures read IRE\text{284}m and IRE\text{182.7} respectively. In contrast to agriculture, this was the kind of achievement in terms of yield that does suggest radical economic advancement.

61 Bradley et al., Stabilization and growth on the EC periphery, p. 10.
62 Kennedy, Modern industrialisation, p. 5.
63 Foster, Modern Ireland, p. 569.
64 In 1957, unemployment in Ireland stood at 78,000 but, by 1966, with unemployment continuing to fall and confidence high, the National Industrial and Economic Council (NIEC) was outlining the possible choices that might credibly lead to full employment. In contrast, the employment rate that O'Neill faced upon taking office was 11.2\% for Northern Ireland; his country had not faced such serious economic problems since the Great Depression of the early 1930s. Obviously, the two countries sharing the island were going in totally different directions in economic terms. R. Deutsch & V. Magowan, Northern Ireland, 1968-73: a chronology of events, 1968-71, vol. 1 (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1973), p. 3; Kennedy, Economic development, pp. 71-2; Keogh, 'Diplomacy of "dignified calm"', p. 83.
65 Foster, Modern Ireland, p. 582.
69 Cardinal Agagianian to de Valera, 8 July 1961, 98/1/62, NA. Obviously, de Valera's main hope was that Ireland's celebrations of Saint Patrick would reflect well on the country in the Vatican's eyes; in this he was not disappointed. He was also keen that Ireland's renown as a Catholic country would be reinforced by such symbols as the number of cardinals present at the celebrations; in turn, of course, this occasion presented an excellent opportunity for the Irish people to show their spiritual devotion. D/ÚhÉ secretary to Cardinal John D'Alton's secretary, 24 December 1960, 98/1/62, NA.
70 Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican, passim; Whyte, Church and state, passim. Cooperation between Ireland and Northern Ireland was aided in many ways by Cardinal William Conway, the Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of All-Ireland between September 1963 and April 1977. Dermot Keogh has written:

Both Dublin and London had been quite happy with the firm leadership offered the nationalist community by the late cardinal. He had been unequivocal in his condemnation of physical force, nationalism and the murderous campaign of the ... IRA ...

In his article, John Bowman paid particular attention to the work of Brian Lenihan, Irish justice minister, who introduced some modest reforms in regard to the censorship of films and literary works. J. Bowman, 'Lenihan saw laws as an embarrassment', Irish Times, 2 January 1997. This article referred to a Lenihan memorandum for the cabinet, undated circa 1965.
72 De Valera, 'Easter Rising', p. 606.
Ireland – not Éire – remains the official name of the country in English, both in everyday language usage and in the context of international organisations. Article N°4 of Bunreacht na hÉireann provides for this specific naming; it reads: 'The name of the State is Éire, or in the English language, Ireland'. Of course, by Article N°25.4.6, the Irish language version of the constitution prevails in the case of conflict; but, as the name of the state in English is 'Ireland', it is listed alphabetically in agreements and treaties according to the formula furnished in the constitution and through international practice. This was not necessarily the case in Ireland's earliest dealings with Europe. For instance, in the statute which provided the basis for the Council of Europe, it was referred to as the 'Irish Republic', although in much the same way as France was termed the 'French Republic' and Italy as the 'Italian Republic'. However, this practice was to change. Indeed, the Irish foreign minister, David Andrews, reasserted that fact in a written reply to a question from Trevor Sargent (Green Party) in Dáil Éireann, remarking that it was 'longstanding practice to use the English-language version of the name of the State in international organisations. This practice was followed on entry to the European Communities in 1973 and Ireland is listed accordingly'. MacBride speaking in Dáil Éireann, 13 July 1949, Dáil debates vol. 117 col. 746; unattributed Irish Times article, 'Cá háit sin?'; http://www.irish-times.com/irish-times/paper/teangabeo/beo4.html (3 June 1998); J.M.Kelly, The Irish constitution (Dublin: Jurist Publishing, 1980), passim.

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Fianna Fáil party publication, 'Fianna Fáil manifesto 1932', reproduced in Dunphy, Class, power and the Fianna Fáil party, p. ii; Fianna Fáil party publication, Fianna Fáil manifesto, 9 February 1932, pp. 188-9, in A.O'Day & J.Stevenson, Irish historical documents since 1800 (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1992); P.Murtagh, 'He let down party and country, blame is his alone', Irish Times, 12 July 1997. Note that J.J.Lee used the word 'malaise' to describe the post-war decade, applying 'drift' to the 1970s and beyond. Lee, Ireland, passim.

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S.O'Faoláin, The Irish: a character study (Old Greenwich: Devin-Adair, 1949), pp. 173-80. Both characteristics were picked out as being responsible for holding Irish people – in this case, writers specifically – back in the past. Lemass and Whitaker were part of the process which broke this mould.

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This F.Scott Fitzgerald quotation comes from McAleese, 'Europe – the challenges of the new millennium', http://www.iue.it/general/jms.htm (10 February 1999).
Keogh, 'Diplomacy of "dignified calm"', p. 86. Dermot Keogh suggests that Lemass was actually 'not an easy or enthusiastic convert to a free trade policy' but, once convinced, that he became a devotee.

Foster, Modern Ireland, pp. 540 & 577-8.


Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland, pp. 356-7; J.Tratt, The Macmillan government and Europe: a study in the process of policy development (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 8. According to D.George Boyce, 'Lemass took up the Whitaker report, and used his power and skills to hurry along the civil servants, dispel gloom and defeatism, and convince workers and employers of the need for planning'. He subsequently added the opinion that he 'was helped by the general economic climate of the 1960s; and the return in 1965 of ... an adverse balance of payments, together with inflation and disappointing agricultural performance showed that the "economic miracle" was by no means accomplished for all time ... Lemass showed that he could not only replace de Valera in 1959, but keep the party in office in 1961 and then lead it to an impressive victory in 1965'.

Writing on the Macmillan cabinet and government, Jacqueline Tratt's views might equally apply to the Lemass-Whitaker axis; she has written:

The prime minister, although notionally first among equals, traditionally enjoys the facility of gathering about him ... like-minded ministers and advisers for the purpose first, of developing a policy, and secondly, of deciding how best to present that policy to the rest of the cabinet. Many of the prime minister's closest advisers are senior civil servants who have usually had many years' experience of government and often know, better than their political masters, what is and is not politically, socially and economically possible. Serving at the heart of the government, the work of senior officials in developing government policy, particularly in this case, should not be underestimated.

This does not take much adaption to see how the taoiseach and a senior finance civil servant could have worked so well together. Firstly, although the cabinet had to reflect the different views in Fianna Fáil, there is no doubt but that Lemass was in charge. By 1959, his leadership was no longer a questioned inheritance. With Lynch at the taoiseach's old post in industry & commerce and Aiken safely tucked away in New York, Lemass was able to develop Ireland's European policy and to win over or marginalise any detractors, such as his finance minister. Aided by the latter's secretary, Lemass was able to develop a credible policy which, if questioned because of a lack of progress or too rapid a development, was ignored or passed over.


Other examples existed. See, for instance, the relationship between de Valera and the pre-war and war-time Irish external affairs secretary, Joseph P.Walshe, in Keogh, Twentieth-century Ireland, passim; A.Nolan, Joseph Walshe and the management of Irish foreign policy, 1922-1946: a study in diplomatic and administrative history (Cork: unpublished UCC PhD, 1998), passim.
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89 Fanning, *Irish Department of Finance*, pp. 609-10; Keogh, ‘Diplomacy of “dignified calm”’, passim. Whitaker references come from a file of official and semi-official correspondence to which both Ronan Fanning and Dermot Keogh had access in compiling their separate analyses.
95 Gerard Woods took over from Biggar as ambassador to Luxembourg after a government decision on 4 October 1966. In the meantime, as part of a diplomatic reshuffle, Thomas Commins was moved from the Holy See to Paris, Denis McDonald from Paris to Rome (and Ankara), and Joseph Shields from Rome to the Holy See; in turn, Biggar took over as Ireland’s new ambassador to Austria and Switzerland. Irish government minute G11/75, 13 September 1966, 97/4/1, NA; Irish government minute G11/78, 4 October 1966, 97/4/1, NA.
96 Maher, *The tortuous path*, p. 199; P.Smyth, ‘Dublin seeks Euratom treaty amendments’, *Irish Times*, 1 October 1996. It is interesting to note in the context of the European Communities, which in 1966 were well on their way to being merged one year later, that the term EEC was used in Ireland for many years to come to mean this new expanded and inclusive entity.
98 Fanning, *Irish Department*, p. 611; Irish government publication, *The accession of Ireland to the European Communities* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1972). This view was based on a memorandum prepared in 1975 for Ronan Fanning by the Department of Finance entitled ‘Principal developments since 1960’.
103 P.Foot, *The politics of Harold Wilson* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), pp. 233-5. It is also interesting to note that, after Lemass’s resignation from office, the tanaiste and external affairs minister, Frank Aiken, was no longer listed as a member of the government at the front of the Dáil debates due to what might be generously termed as a ‘typographical error’, although he did make it into the index; perhaps the
compilers of these parliamentary reports mistook his absences from the chamber as
evidence of the fact that the more important aspects of Irish foreign relations –
bilateral relations with the UK and European integration – were mostly being dealt
with through the new taoiseach's office, as they had been with his predecessor.
General elections were held on 5 March 1957, 4 October 1961, and 7 April 1965
respectively. As a consequence, four governments were formed during the period
under review, the first led by Éamon de Valera, the others by Seán Lemass, who
took over as taoiseach on 23 June 1959 upon the former's resignation from office;
when the latter resigned, Jack Lynch took over to form a new government on 10
November 1966. Note that by Article 28.1° of Bunreacht na hÉireann, the
government should comprise of no more than fifteen members and, thus, the
amalgamation of ministries or the doubling up of departments under a minister was
one way of juggling these figures. Article 28.11.1° of the constitution declares that
all the other members of the government are also deemed to have resigned from
office upon the taoiseach's resignation, even if they still continue to carry out their
duties until their successors have been appointed; effectively, most of the ministers
held onto to their posts when Lynch became taoiseach, although there were some
changes.

104 J. Bowman, 'Lynch went to London to ascertain Britain's policy and progress on
EEC', Irish Times, 1/2 January 1997. This newspaper article cited a Hugh McCann
(Irish external affairs secretary) memorandum compiled after the summit, circa 19
December 1966.


107 According to the Irish government, these were the principal grievances of the
Catholic community and the nationalist population in Northern Ireland. Using the
example of the additional funding being provided on the basis of 'positive
discrimination' for the education of minority traditions in Ireland, as well as Ireland's
endeavours to promote assimilated schooling, the taoiseach urged the UK prime
minister to push O'Neill to introduce a similar programme. He stated that: 'Anything
that can be done to reduce political and religious discrimination in Northern Ireland
would considerably help to achieve a relaxation in tension'. However, the new
taoiseach acknowledged that the UK prime minister had taken various concrete steps
to help to improve north-south relations, as well as Anglo-Irish relations, and that he
favoured the policy of 'functional co-operation' established by his predecessor. It also
should be noted that one of his briefing documents for the bilateral meeting had
listed:

- the negotiation, conclusion and enactment of the AIFTA;
- the return of Casement's remains for reburial in Ireland;
- the reinstatement of the 1916 flag;
- 'the pressure, public and private, brought to bear on the Stormont regime'.

Information on this last item was hazy, so Lynch was advised not to cite this listing,
just to be aware of its significance. Bowman, 'Lynch went to London', Irish Times,
1/2 January 1997.

108 Bowman, 'Lynch went to London', Irish Times, 1/2 January 1997; E. Phoenix,
'O'Neill's policy begins to go badly wrong', Irish Times, 1/2 January 1997;


110 R. Burke, 'Treaty strengthens EU in important areas', *Irish Times*, 2 October 1997. During his tenure as foreign minister, Ray Burke wrote this article in favour of the Amsterdam Treaty.