Scotland’s future and 2014: political narratives of the Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the independence referendum

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‘Scotland’s Future’ and 2014 - political narratives of the Glasgow
Commonwealth Games and the independence referendum

by

Stuart Whigham

Doctoral Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the
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Abstract

This thesis critically examines the predominant narratives which emanated from political discourse in relation to two significant events in Scotland in 2014 – the Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the independence referendum. In particular, the thesis scrutinises the extent to which the staging of the Games in Scotland was exploited politically in relation to debates about Scotland’s constitutional future. Given the importance of the referendum and its proximity to the Games, it is unsurprising that the event became intertwined with political positioning from parties on both sides of the constitutional debate.

Utilising a novel methodological approach which synthesises analytical frameworks from the field of narrative analysis (Somers, 1994) and political discourse analysis (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2014), this thesis critically examines a range of political discourse sources produced by the five political parties represented in the Scottish Parliament, such as parliamentary speeches, press releases, manifestos and policy documents. Furthermore, the analysis of political discourse is complemented by analysis of nine interviews with MSPs from the respective political parties, namely the Scottish National Party, the Scottish Labour Party, the Scottish Conservatives, the Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Green Party. The findings of these complementary analyses are further interrogated through reference to existing academic literature on the relationship between nationalism, politics, sport and international sporting events such as the Commonwealth Games.

The thesis identifies a number of emergent findings which make an original contribution to the study of the interconnection between sport, political nationalism and the Commonwealth Games, demonstrating the nuanced and contrasting narratives of the respective pro-independence and pro-union parties with respect to Scotland’s constitutional future and the political ramifications of the Games for the independence referendum. These nuanced positions are demonstrated through consideration of: a) the contrasting narratives of the parties on the Games’ sporting and economic legacy; b) the political symbolism of the Games for Scotland’s constitutional status; c) discourse asserting that the Games should remain an apolitical event; d) the nature of cross-party consensus supporting the Games; and, e)
the role of the Games and sport in contemporary political communication. Given the emergence of numerous examples within this thesis whereby the Games became embroiled with political considerations, it is hoped that the prevailing political perceptions regarding the apolitical nature of sport can be challenged, thus allowing for a more diverse array of ideological approaches to the politics of sport.
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# Contents

Chapter 1 - Introduction 10

Chapter 2 - Literature Review 15

Introduction 15

Nationalism 16
- Modernism 16
- Perennialism 21
- Primordialism 23
- Ethnosymbolism 25
- Smith’s Typology of Nationalism Paradigms – Critical Reflections 26
- Banal and Everyday Nationalism 28

A History of Politics and Nationalism in Scotland 32
- Pre-Union History and Nationalism in Scotland 32
- Politics, Unionism and Nationalism in Scotland from 1707 to 1945 37
- Politics, Unionism and Nationalism in Scotland from 1945 to Present 41

Contemporary Scottish Nationalism 52
- Perennialism and Primordialism in the Scottish Context 52
- Modernism in the Scottish Context 54
- Ethnosymbolism in the Scottish Context 61
- Ethnic and Civic Nationalism in the Scottish Context 64
- Banal and Everyday Nationalism in the Scottish Context 67

Sport, Politics and Nationalism at International Sporting Events 69
- The Politics of Hosting International Sports Events 70
- The Politics of the Commonwealth Games 76

Sport, Scottish Nationalism and 2014 85
- Sport and Scottish Nationalism 85
- Sport and Politics in Contemporary Scotland 89
- Sport, Scottish Politics and the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games 93
- The 2014 Commonwealth Games and the Scottish Independence Referendum 97

Summary 101

Chapter 3 - Methodology 104

Introduction 104
- Theoretical, Ontological and Epistemological Considerations 105
- Narrative Analysis 110
- Critical Discourse Analysis 114
- Political Discourse Analysis 118
### Current Analytical Framework

#### Empirical Methods
- Empirical Methods – Political Discourse Analysis
- Empirical Methods – Political Stakeholder Interviews & Surveys

#### Reflexivity and Political Research

### Chapter 4 - Results and Discussion

#### Introduction

### Pro-Independence Narratives of the Scottish Constitution and the 2014 Commonwealth Games
- The SNP and the Constitution – ‘Scotland’s Future in Scotland’s Hands’?
- The SNP’s Games Narrative – Sporting Infrastructure and Economic Boosterism
- The SNP and the Politics of the Games – The ‘Feel-Good Factor’?
- The Scottish Green Party and the Constitution – A ‘Green Yes’?
- The Scottish Green Party’s Games Narrative – A Catalyst for Sports Participation and Equality
- The Scottish Green Party and the Politics of the Games – An Inclusive and Ethical Games

### Pro-Union Narratives of the Scottish Constitution and the 2014 Commonwealth Games
- The Scottish Labour Party and the Constitution – ‘The Best of Both Worlds’?
- The Scottish Labour Party’s Games Narrative – Prioritising Scotland’s Sporting Future
- The Scottish Labour Party and the Politics of the Games – Scrutinising the SNP and the Politicisation of the Games
- The Scottish Conservatives and the Constitution – The ‘Party of the Union’?
- The Scottish Conservatives’ Games Narrative – A Sporting & Health Legacy
- The Scottish Conservatives and the Politics of the Games – The Role of ‘Team GB’
- The Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Constitution – ‘Federalism: The Best Future for Scotland’?
- The Scottish Liberal Democrats’ Games Narrative – A ‘Trickle-Down Effect’?
- The Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Politics of the Games – Politicising the Apolitical Games?

### Exploring the Politicisation and Apoliticisation of the 2014 Commonwealth Games
- Glasgow 2014 – The Politics of Depoliticising a Sporting Event
- Swimming Against the Apolitical Tide? The Politicisation of the 2014 Games
- Glasgow’s Games or Scotland’s Games? Regional Politics at Play
List of Figures

Figure 1 – Elected MPs for UK Parliament by Party in Scotland from 1832 to 1944

Figure 2 – Elected MPs for UK Parliament by Party in Scotland from 1945 to 2010

Figure 3 – Elected MSPs for Scottish Parliament by Political Party from 1999 to 2011

Figure 4 – Diagrammatic representation of discourse as text, interaction and context (Fairclough, 2015: 58)

Figure 5 – Diagrammatic representation of the structure of practical reasoning (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 48)

Figure 6 – Diagrammatic representation of the structure of practical deliberation (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 51)

Figure 7 – Diagrammatic representation of SNP political discourse regarding Scotland’s constitutional status

Figure 8 – Proposals for Scottish citizenship rights in an independent Scotland (Scottish Government, 2013b: 273)

Figure 9 – Diagrammatic representation of SNP political discourse regarding 2014 Commonwealth Games vis-a-vis Scotland’s constitutional status

Figure 10 – Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Green Party political discourse regarding Scotland’s constitutional status

Figure 11 – Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Green Party political discourse regarding 2014 Commonwealth Games vis-a-vis Scotland’s constitutional status

Figure 12 – Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Labour Party political discourse regarding Scotland’s constitutional status

Figure 13 – Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Labour political discourse regarding 2014 Commonwealth Games vis-a-vis Scotland’s constitutional status

Figure 14 – Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Conservatives political discourse regarding Scotland’s constitutional status

Figure 15 – Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Conservatives political discourse regarding 2014 Commonwealth Games vis-a-vis Scotland’s constitutional status

Figure 16 – Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Liberal Democrats political discourse regarding Scotland’s constitutional status
Figure 17 – Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Liberal Democrats political discourse regarding 2014 Commonwealth Games vis-a-vis Scotland’s constitutional status
List of Appendices

Appendix 1 – Completed Ethical Clearance Checklist for Loughborough University Ethics Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee

Appendix 2 – Participant information sheet

Appendix 3 – Informed consent form

Appendix 4 – Semi-structured interview schedule

Appendix 5 – Survey questionnaire

Appendix 6 – Completed survey questionnaire exemplar – Liz Smith MSP

Appendix 7 – Interview transcript exemplar – Kenny MacAskill MSP

Appendix 8 – Summary of data analysis results for SNP Games-related political discourse sample

Appendix 9 – Summary of data analysis results for Scottish Greens’ Games-related political discourse sample

Appendix 10 – Summary of data analysis results for Scottish Labour Party Games-related political discourse sample

Appendix 11 – Summary of data analysis results for Scottish Conservatives’ Games-related political discourse sample

Appendix 12 – Summary of data analysis results for Scottish Liberal Democrats’ Games-related political discourse sample

Appendix 13 – List of interview and survey participants
Chapter 1 - Introduction

This thesis critically examines the predominant narratives which emanated from political discourse in relation to two significant events in Scotland in 2014 – the Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the independence referendum. In particular, the thesis scrutinises the extent to which the staging of the Games in Scotland was exploited politically in relation to debates about Scotland’s constitutional future. Given the importance of the referendum and its proximity to the Games, it is unsurprising that the event became intertwined with political positioning from parties on both sides of the constitutional debate.

The launch of official campaigns through the establishment of the pro-independence ‘Yes Scotland’ and pro-union ‘Better Together’ campaign groups ensured that the referendum remained a constant topic on the political agenda during the period leading up to the date of the referendum on 18th September 2014. Both groups made regular use of print and electronic press, television coverage, internet sites and social media to disseminate political messages and debate points, thus communicating their stances on Scotland’s constitutional future (Dekavalla, 2016; Jackson, 2014; Mullen, 2014; Sharp et al., 2014). The nature of these campaign groups is of particular interest due to the necessity for cross-party cooperation in order to demonstrate consensus within the respective campaigns, with the ‘Yes Scotland’ group supported by the Scottish National Party, the Scottish Greens, the Scottish Socialist Party and a small number of independent MSPs), and the ‘Better Together’ group (supported by Scottish Labour, the Scottish Conservatives, the Scottish Liberal Democrats (and their cognate Westminster-based parliamentary parties). Whilst each of these parties adopt contrasting stances regarding the constitutional future of Scotland, as evidenced in their contrasting policy documents and discourse during the referendum campaign which led to the eventual ‘No’ result, the relative success of these campaigns can be partly attributed to their ability to construct coherent narratives of their visions for Scotland after the referendum through effective political communication (Arnott and Ozga, 2010; Charteris-Black, 2014; McNair, 2011; Roberts and Crossley, 2004).

Developments such as the inclusion of sport in the Scottish Government’s White Paper on Scottish independence, the establishment of the ‘Working Group on
Scottish Sport’ and the establishment of the ‘Sport for Yes’ campaign group demonstrate the harnessing of sporting issues as an additional debating point in the referendum campaigns (Lafferty, 2014; Scottish Government, 2013a, 2013b, 2014). However, in light of Lord McConnell’s appeal for a political ‘truce’ in the form of a temporary halt to referendum campaigning during the 2014 Games (BBC News, 2014; McConnell, 2014), this thesis will also scrutinise the continued perpetuation of arguments supporting an apolitical approach to sport and the hosting of international sporting events. Although parties on both sides of the debate attempted to place emphasis on the apolitical approach in their official press releases and media interactions about the Games, political comments related to the Games from SNP politicians such as Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon drew opprobrium from politicians from the ‘Better Together’ campaign group (Boffey, 2014; Johnson, 2014; Wade, 2014), thus demonstrating the complex relationship between sporting events and political communication.

In light of this, this thesis will specifically examine the ways in which the hosting of the 2014 Games was used as a means of illustrating each party’s political position in relation to the independence referendum and Scotland’s constitutional status. Analysis centres on the nature of the political narratives and discourse relating to both the Games and the referendum, with specific emphasis on scrutinising the nature of the discourse emerging from “the formal operation of politics, its institutions and the sphere of government” in line with the arguments of Grix (2016: 3) regarding the traditional conceptualisation of elite politics in the academic study of political science. In order to scrutinise the nature of this discourse, the content of official party political communication sources is critically analysed by drawing upon the principles of narrative analysis (Somers, 1994) and critical discourse analysis (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012), as will the strategic thinking which underpinned its creation. Whilst the hosting of the Commonwealth Games should only be viewed as one issue amongst many in the constitutional debate and should therefore not be overstated in terms of its significance, the specific focus of its role in this important political debate facilitates the opportunity to complement the extensive array of academic literature on the political uses of sports event hosting (e.g. Holt and Ruta, 2015; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Roche, 2000; Tomlinson and Young, 2006; Zimbalist, 2015).
The following research questions summarise the central focus of this thesis:

- What narratives and discourses were generated by political parties in relation to the hosting of the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow in 2014?
- In what ways were the perceived benefits, drawbacks, successes and failures of the Games presented by political parties?
- In what ways did these narratives differ depending upon the contrasting ideological positions of political parties regarding Scotland’s constitutional status?
- To what extent were the Games used as a means to further or negate arguments relating to Scotland’s constitutional future following the 2014 independence referendum?
- What strategies and political considerations influenced the production of political communication which specifically focused upon the topic of the Commonwealth Games?

Given the nature of these aims, this thesis endeavours to make an original contribution to academic knowledge on the relationship between politics, sport and international sporting events in numerous ways. Firstly, the thesis builds upon the findings of past academic analyses of the political ramifications of hosting major sports events by evaluating the nature of political discourse on the 2014 Games in relation to existing knowledge. Given that the politics of the Commonwealth Games movement has been relatively neglected in past academic literature in comparison to that of other sporting mega-events such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup (Black, 2014; Carter, 2011; Dawson, 2006, 2011; Palmer, 2013; Polley, 2014), the thesis also helps to expand the corpus of literature on the Games themselves. Furthermore, despite the array of literature which discusses the political considerations of hosting international sporting events, many of these studies do not base their analyses on empirical evidence derived from interactions with politicians. However, this thesis facilitates the opportunity to engage directly with political actors to explore their personal beliefs with regards to the politicisation of events such as the 2014 Games.
In addition to these empirical contributions, the thesis also offers an original methodological contribution to the academic study of the relationship between politics, nationalism and sport. This original methodological contribution derives from the synthesis of narrative analysis, critical discourse analysis and political discourse analysis in the conceptual framework of the thesis’s methodology. The specific theorisations of these analytical approaches used in the thesis, namely the narrative analysis model of Somers (1994) and the political discourse analysis model of Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), marks the first simultaneous application of these complementary models in the academic study of sport, politics and nationalism. The application of these analytical models will be argued to offer a distinctive approach to understanding contemporary political discourse relating to Scotland’s constitutional status, and the discursive construction of the 2014 Games vis-à-vis the independence referendum campaigns. Finally, this thesis represents the first attempt to analyse the potential interconnection between the Games and the referendum using empirical data, given that the narrow range of existing academic literature on this interconnection fails to offer empirical evidence (Harris and Skillen, 2016; Jarvie, 2017; Mole, 2014; Ochman, 2013).
Chapter 2 - Literature Review

Introduction

The literature review commences with a detailed consideration of the predominant paradigms which have influenced the sociological study of nationalism. This is particularly pertinent given the emphasis of this study on scrutinising the contrasting narratives of Scotland’s past, present and future offered by parties across the political spectrum. Mapping alternative theorisations of nationalism, as both an academic concept and a political belief system, provides an opportunity to explore the boundaries of the potential narrative tropes available in contemporary political discourse. Consideration is also given to academic literature which examines historical and contemporary developments in Scottish politics, outlining the shifts in voting patterns, prevailing political ideologies and the constitutional arrangements relating to Scotland’s status within the United Kingdom (UK). The discussion is brought to a close with a reflection on the nature of contemporary Scottish nationalism.

Attention then shifts to a more focused consideration of the importance of sport for nationalist and political developments. Firstly, there is a consideration of literature on the relationship between sport and nationalism, before focusing on the political importance of hosting major sporting events. This provides a detailed contextualisation of the field in which the current study is situated, allowing for a comparison of the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games with past major sporting events. Literature scrutinising the relationship between sport, Scottish politics and Scottish nationalism will be critically examined to outline past developments in these fields, before concluding the chapter by discussing studies which scrutinise the importance of the 2014 Games for Scotland.
Nationalism

Attention will now turn to considering the four theoretical paradigms in the academic study of nationalism incorporated in Smith’s (2010) typology, namely ‘modernism’, ‘perennialism’, ‘primordialism’, and ‘ethnosymbolism’. This will be followed by a further consideration of other theoretical concepts which have potential analytical utility for understanding Scottish nationalism, such as Kohn’s (1944) distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nationalism, Billig’s (1995) concept of ‘banal nationalism’, and the ‘everyday nationalism’ approach (Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox and Grancea, 2006; Edensor, 2002).

Modernism

The modernist approach to nationalism has been widely argued to be the dominant theoretical paradigm (Malesevic, 2013; Smith, 2010), with a significant number of academics in fields such as sociology, politics, anthropology and history aligning with its fundamental postulates (e.g. Anderson, 1991; Breuilly, 1993; Gellner, 1983; Giddens, 1985; Hechter, 1975; Hobsbawm, 1983; Kedourie, 1960; Nairn, 1977). The central tenet of the modernist approach is its attribution of the historical foundations of nationalism to the growing forces of modernity, particularly in the 17th century, arguing that concepts such as the nation, nationalism and national identity only became prevalent in academic literature from that period onwards. Indeed, whilst the modernist paradigm incorporates a broad spectrum of differing theoretical perspectives, Smith (2010) argues that the common belief which underpins this paradigm is its ‘structural modernism’ which holds that “modernity necessarily took the form of nations and just as inevitably produced nationalist ideologies and movements” (ibid: 53). A modernist approach therefore tends to place an emphasis on the constructed nature of nations and nation-states, part of a strategic attempt to encourage social cohesion within a distinct territorial and political unit.

The nation is argued to owe its existence to a range of socioeconomic, sociocultural, political and ideological factors which emerged during the transition from the pre-modern to the modern era. However, Smith (2010) highlights that the relative emphasis placed on each of these factors as the catalyst for the emergence of the
nation can be used to differentiate between the different perspectives of scholars aligning with the modernist paradigm. He identifies five varieties of the modernist approach in this regard: ‘socioeconomic’ (e.g. Hechter, 1975; Nairn, 1977), ‘sociocultural’ (e.g. Gellner, 1964, 1983), ‘political’ (e.g. Breuilly, 1993; Giddens, 1985), ‘ideological’ (e.g. Kedourie, 1960, 1971), and ‘constructionist’ (e.g. Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1983).

The ‘socioeconomic’ strand of the modernist paradigm places emphasis on the importance of economic and social inequality within a given territory as the catalyst for the growth of nationalist movements. Its proponents argue that discontent with the status quo encourages economically disadvantaged groups and sympathetic ‘peripheral elites’ to use nationalist sentiment as a unifying medium for improving their socio-economic conditions, with a new state proposed to solve such inequality (Smith, 2010). For Nairn (1977), the roots of nationalist movements lie in discontent with historic ‘uneven development’ which occurred as a result of the spread of Western capitalist ideologies, following European imperial and colonial expansion. Discontent with this situation of ‘uneven development’ resulted in the political mobilisation of peripheral elites to challenge socioeconomic inequality. In order for the peripheral elites to gain the popular support needed to achieve this goal, Nairn (1977: 340-341) argues:

…one after another, these peripheric areas have been forced into a profoundly ambivalent reaction against this dominance, seeking at once to resist it and to somehow take over its vital forces for their own use. This could only be done by a kind of highly ‘idealistic’ political and ideological mobilization, by a painful forced march based on their own resources: that is, employing their ‘nationality’ as a basis.

According to Nairn, the ‘resources’ employed by peripheral elites had to be specific markers of nationalist difference (such as speech, folklore and skin colour) because peripheral regions lacked the “economic and political institutions of modernity” (1977: 340) which core areas utilise to mobilise popular consent, such as political, educational and religious organisations. Peripheral nationalist movements could therefore bypass the requirement for such institutions by drawing upon more fundamental markers of ethnic and cultural difference as a simpler means of
harnessing popular consent for challenging the status quo, thus addressing the problem of ‘uneven development’ by acquiring national sovereignty to accelerate socioeconomic development in the peripheral region.

Hechter’s (1975) stance shares many of the contentions of Nairn (1977) regarding the existence of ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ regions resulting from Western imperialist and capitalist expansion, and their importance for the growth of nationalist movements. Hechter (1975) argues for viewing such developments as a response to ‘internal colonialism’ within the historic Western imperial states, such as the UK, Spain, and France. Peripheral regions in these territories were assimilated into the political and economic system of the unified state, before becoming centrally involved in the next phase of imperialism on a global scale. Discontent with inequality leads to the growth of a collective movement in the peripheral population based on the solidarity offered by nationalist feelings (Hechter, 1975), differentiating between the ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ population with reference to cultural, ethnic and other social markers. The commensurability of the arguments of Hechter (1975) and Nairn (1977) are of particular pertinence for the current study, given that both authors were attempting to theorise the growth of nationalisms within the developed Western world, and specifically the growth of Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalist movements in the UK.

The next variety of the ‘modernist’ school of thought identified by Smith (2010) places a stronger emphasis on the ‘sociocultural’ antecedents of nationalist movements. For Gellner (1964, 1983), the requirement of a literate workforce to meet the demands of industrialisation resulted in the development of systems of mass public education, facilitating the transmission of an associated national culture within a given territory. He therefore argued that the modernisation process was responsible for the development of nationalist movements, on the grounds that industrialisation required a societal system with a shared language and culture to operate effectively. In order to develop a cohesive sociocultural system, mass education systems created a “self image of nationalism [which] involves the stress of folk, folklore and popular culture” (Gellner, 1964: 163-164). However, Gellner is keen to emphasise that the cultural and ethnic resources drawn upon to create this self-image are not old or authentic in nature:
[N]ationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state. It uses some of the pre-existent cultures, generally transforming them in the process, but it cannot possibly use them all. (Gellner, 1983: 48)

He therefore argues that the development of nationalist culture is a sociological necessity as a response to the forces of industrialisation and modernity, where societies are forced to forge a sense of nationhood through the means of mass linguistic and cultural education. However, in order to explain the development of later nationalist movements in established states with mass education systems, Gellner (1964, 1983) argued that the uneven nature of modernisation can result in ethnic antagonism in states where one particular ethnic, linguistic or cultural group were disadvantaged. These disadvantaged groups may then develop a separate nationalism based on their own specific cultural and ethnic resources, attempting to forge a nation which would satisfy their own demands for sovereignty.

Alternatively, the ‘political’ strand of modernist thought (Smith, 2010) places emphasis on the emergence of the sovereign state as the basis of global political organisation in the development of nationalism (e.g. Breuilly, 1993; Giddens, 1985). The central argument of this approach is that the sovereign state is a necessity for large-scale political organisation, and that nationalism is an instrumentalist process by which states are able to gain and maintain popular consent for a particular territorial, cultural and societal collective (Smith, 2010). Therefore, for a ‘nation’ to truly exist, it must find its expression through the establishment of a concurrent sovereign ‘nation-state’. For Breuilly (1993), the roots of nationalist ideology lie in the attempt to resolve this issue and the problems of the relationship between ‘society’ and ‘state’. Breuilly argues that the success of nationalism is due to its ability to act as a political solution to resolve the ambiguity regarding the possibilities of a ‘society’ achieving practical expression via a concurrent ‘state’. In this sense, nationalism is used for overt political purposes to unify and renew an existing state or to oppose a current state system by providing a new state for a submerged societal group (Smith, 2010). Giddens (1985) adopts a similar position to Breuilly with respect to the necessity of statehood for the political expression of the nation, arguing
“[a] nation… only exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed” (Giddens, 1985: 119). Nations therefore must express themselves via the establishment of a nation state, which is a ‘bordered power-container’ for political administration and control (Giddens, 1985).

In contrast to the emphasis of the ‘political’ theorisation of nationalism of Breuilly and Giddens, the ‘ideological’ strand of the modernist paradigm associated with the work of Kedourie (1960, 1971) instead focuses on the role of nationalism for providing the means by which societies can achieve self-determination, the central ideology of global societal organisation (Smith, 2010). Following Kedourie’s logic, it is therefore the development of nationalism as an ideological doctrine to achieve self-determination which leads to the development of nation-states, rather than nationalism emerging as the by-product of an existing state system as emphasised in the ‘political’ approach of Breuilly and Giddens. Kedourie (1960: 73) states that this nationalist doctrine “divides humanity into separate and distinct nations, claims that such nations must constitute sovereign states, and asserts that the members of a nation reach freedom and fulfilment by cultivating the peculiar identity of their own nation and by sinking their own persons in the greater whole of the nation”. The ideological power of nationalist doctrine therefore explains the hegemonic position of the nation-state as the unit of global political organisation given that it is the medium through which individuals can achieve self-determination for the social collective they align with emotionally (Kedourie, 1960).

The final strand of modernist thought delineated by Smith (2010) is the ‘constructionist’ approach associated with the work of Anderson (1991) and Hobsbawm (1983). This approach emphasises that the concept of the nation, and its associated ideological and cultural concomitants, are deliberate social constructions used by political elites to legitimise a particular nation-state (Smith, 2010). For Hobsbawm, the central process used to achieve the goal is the ‘invention of tradition’, whereby “the ‘nation’, with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories… rest on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative” (Hobsbawm, 1983: 13). He argues that reference to cultural and symbolic forms such as folk culture, dress and language allows for the creation of a coherent notion of ‘national’ traditions, offering
the opportunity for popular engagement with the nation through expression of these cultural and symbolic forms. Whilst these traditions are presented in a manner which gives the appearance of a strong historic precedent, Hobsbawm (1983) argues that they are actually the result of a covert process of formalisation and ritualization which seeks to artificially endow these practices with authenticity.

Anderson’s (1991) position revolves around his central theoretical concept of the nation as an ‘imagined community’, again emphasising the socially constructed nature of the nation. Anderson defined the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (1991: 6). This conceptualisation of the nation places particular emphasis on a sense of commonality across the population of a given nation which has clear geographic boundaries and political self-determination, with individual members of the nation linked together through common social, cultural and political bonds. For Anderson, it is these imagined bonds which explain the salience of nationalism and the nation. He argues that that the growth of nationalism began in the 18th century period of Enlightenment, wherein the nation took precedent as the primary form of global organisation, superseding the religious or dynastic forms which had prevailed historically (Anderson, 1991).

**Perennialism**

In stark contrast to the modernist paradigm and its constructionist approach to the development of the nation, the ‘perennialist’ approach (e.g. Hastings, 1997; Seton-Watson, 1977) instead argues that the distinct territorial units which we now refer to as ‘nations’ have existed throughout the documented history of human civilisation. Smith (2010: 54) argues that “[a]ll that is necessary for perennialism is a belief, founded on some empirical observation, that nations – or at least some nations – have existed for a long period of time, for whatever reason”. This stance opposes the modernist view regarding the historical origins of nations, citing examples of ‘old’ nations which precede the era of modernity in juxtaposition to the ‘new’ nations of the modern era (Hastings, 1997; Seton-Watson, 1977). Perennialists also contend that this conceptualisation of the nation is valid as this is the common-sense view of the origin of nations held by the general public (Smith, 2010); however, this could
equally be seen as evidence of the effectiveness of the nationalist inculcation proposed in the modernist approach.

The perennialist theorisation is further delineated between two different facets of this argument, ‘continuous perennialism’ and ‘recurrent perennialism’ (Ozkirimli, 2010; Smith, 2010). ‘Continuous perennialism’ is exemplified by contemporary nations with long and unbroken histories dating back to antiquity, with examples such as England, Scotland and France as ‘old’ nations being cited (Seton-Watson, 1977). Alternatively, the concept of ‘recurrent perennialism’ (e.g. Hastings, 1997) is offered to cater for historical examples throughout documented human history where territorial units which would now be distinguished as ‘nations’ have re-emerged, particularly in relation to nations, empires and territorial entities which have had a clear beginning and end. Seton-Watson argues that the differentiating factor between ‘old’ and ‘new’ nations lies in whether there is evidence of that nation preceding the growth of nationalism as an ideology:

The old are those which had acquired national identity or national consciousness before the formulation of the doctrine of nationalism. The new are those for whom two processes developed simultaneously: the formation of national consciousness and the creation of nationalist movements. (Seton-Watson, 1977: 6)

Whilst Seton-Watson accepts that the point at which these ‘old’ continuous nations came into existence is difficult to evidence precisely, it is clear that such examples undermine the arguments of modernist stances which dismiss the possibility of ‘nations’ before the onset of modernity. His position does not entirely refute the constructionist arguments of modernist scholars given his acknowledgement of the importance of the ‘doctrine of nationalism’ for the development of ‘new nations’. Nonetheless, he contends that examples of pre-modern nations, however few they may be, prove anomalous for stringent modernist arguments which completely dismiss the existence of these pre-modern nations.
**Primordialism**

The ‘primordialist’ paradigm also argues for the importance of long-term historical foundations in the development of nations (Geertz, 1973; Van den Berghe, 1995). However, the primordialist approach distinguishes itself from the perennialist by giving primacy to the naturalistic origins of nationalism, contending that socio-biological factors such as ethnicity and bloodline (Van den Berghe, 1995), ‘cultural givens’ such as language, kinship, and customs, and geographic factors such as 'home' territory, landscapes and 'soil' (Bairner, 2009; Lefebvre, 1991) all influence the cohesiveness and distinctiveness of territorial groups. These territorial groupings subsequently formed the basis for the modern formation of nations, the contention being that attempts to foster collective nationalist movements without the possession of shared ethnic and cultural foundations were unlikely to succeed. Primordialist theorisations also make use of the prevalence of ethnic and cultural factors in the discourses of contemporary nationalist movements as further evidence of the validity of this approach (Conversi, 2007; Smith, 2010).

Van den Berghe’s (1978) ‘sociobiological’ perspective on the primordial roots of nations emphasises that humans are instinctively social beings due to the mutual benefits of social cooperation. He argues that “human societies continue to be organized on the basis of all three principles of sociality: kin selection, reciprocity, and coercion” (Van den Berghe, 1978: 403). Such a stance suggests a central position for the role of ethnicity and race in the foundations of contemporary nation-states, claiming that such social groupings command primary importance for group loyalty. In contrast, Geertz’s (1973) position places less emphasis on the biological markers of ethnic groupings, and instead focuses on the importance of primordial ‘cultural givens’ as the basis for social group attachments (Smith, 2010). These ‘cultural givens’ include race, language, religion and tradition, with Geertz arguing that these markers often form the basis of nationalist movements:

By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’ – or, more precisely, as culture is inevitable involved in such matters, the assumed ‘givens’ – of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a
particular religious community, speaking a particular language, and following particular social practices. (Geertz, 1973: 259)

For Geertz, the fact that such markers are used as the primary means to differentiate between separate nationalist collectives, and are used frequently to harness support for nationalist movements, demonstrates that the foundations of nations hold a deeper historical grounding than the position held by the modernist school of thought would suggest (Smith, 2010).

The related distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ forms of nationalism has been argued to be one of the most important points of academic analysis in this field (Smith, 2010). This dichotomous approach to the nature of nationalist movements has been influenced by the work of Kohn (1944) who contrasted the more benign and ‘voluntarist’ forms of nationalism which prevailed in Western civilisations to the ‘organic’ and virulent movements which appeared in Eastern nationalisms, such as German, Russian and Indian nationalism. The former of these positions aligns with the concept of ‘civic nationalism’, whereby an individual is held to become a member of a nation through citizenship and residence. On the other hand, the latter position reflects that of ‘ethnic nationalism’, removing the element of free will in deciding individual national allegiance.

However, the distinction made between Kohn’s ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ forms of nationalism precludes the possibility of aligning his arguments with one particular paradigm of Smith’s (2010) typology, given that the ‘ethnic’ form arguably aligns with the arguments of ‘primordialist’ theorists such as Van den Berghe and Geertz whilst the ideals of ‘civic’ nationalism reflects the ‘modernist’ paradigm. Kohn’s arguments can therefore be viewed to straddle and traverse the categories outlined by Smith. Nonetheless, the distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nationalism has often been deployed in political discourse relating to issues of globalisation and immigration, despite the limitations of the simplistic nature of the model (Bairner, 1999, 2001; Brubaker, 1998; Smith, 2010).


**Ethnosymbolism**

The final theoretical approach to nationalism in Smith’s (2010) typology is the ‘ethnosymbolist’ paradigm (Armstrong, 1982; Hutchinson, 1994; Smith, 1986, 2002, 2010). This perspective is argued to draw upon ideas from the modernist, perennialist and primordialist theorisations, whilst placing particular emphasis on the importance of subjective elements of national identity in determining the success or demise of a given nation. Proponents of the ethnosymbolist approach to nationalism argue it avoids the theoretical challenges face by alternative paradigms in catering for the existence of both historic and recently-formed nations, stating that the synthesis of concepts from contrasting theorisations of nationalism offers the ability to accommodate problematic examples (Smith, 2010). For Smith (1986, 2010), the central feature of the ethnosymbolist conceptualisation is the primacy afforded to ‘ethnies’ as a foundational basis for contemporary nations. An ‘ethnie’ is defined as “a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites” (Smith, 2010: 13). Smith argues that the potential impact of the symbolic elements of nationalist cohesion are underpinned by the social, cultural, political and emotional attachment which emanates from identification with a particular ‘ethnie’.

The requirement to analyse the development of nations and nationalism over the ‘longue duree’ is therefore held to be crucial in appreciating the long-term developments of a particular nation (Armstrong, 1982, 2004; Leoussi and Grosby, 2007; Smith, 2010). Armstrong (1982) places emphasis on the importance of symbols, communication and myth for the gradual emergence of pre-modern nations. The existence of these three elements allows for a more cohesive sense of national consciousness, with Armstrong (1982: 7-8) contending that the “primary characteristic of ethnic boundaries is attitudinal… ethnic boundary mechanisms exist in the minds of their subjects rather than as lines on a map or norms in a rule book”. Therefore, this position contends that the successful establishment of a modern nation state depends on the strength of the national consciousness of its population (Leoussi and Grosby, 2007), providing motivational drive for securing self-determination for that particular collectivity.
The arguments of Hutchinson (1987; 1994) concerning the relationship between ‘political nationalism’ and ‘cultural nationalism’ can be used to further understand the interdependence between national consciousness and the success of political nationalist movements. He denounces the conflation of these two contrasting forms of nationalism, suggesting that they “articulate different, even competing conceptions of the nation, form their own distinctive organisations, and have sharply diverging political strategies” (Hutchinson, 1987: 12). Whilst ‘political nationalists’ adopt a pragmatic approach to achieve a sovereign state which allows for political expression by appealing to principles of self-determination, ‘cultural nationalists’ place greater emphasis on symbolic expression of the nation through its unique history and culture. Importantly, although these forms of nationalism differ in their end goal, Hutchinson’s thesis holds that within a particular nation’s historic movement towards statehood there is an oscillation between ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ nationalist movements across time, with one form often replacing the other at times of impasse (Hutchinson, 1987, 1994; Smith, 2010). However, other theorists have argued that the theoretical separation of political and cultural nationalism is a weakness of the ethnosymbolist paradigm, with Guibernau (2004: 140-141) arguing that:

In my view, the dissociation between the cultural and political aspects of nations and national identity casts some doubts over the ability of ethnosymbolism to capture the full meaning of nations and national identity in modern societies.

Smith’s Typology of Nationalism Paradigms – Critical Reflections

The utilisation of Smith’s (2010) typology of nationalism has facilitated a concise consideration of the distinguishing factors between these four contrasting paradigms. As a heuristic tool, Smith’s typology has the potential to effectively distinguish between these approaches, illustrating the axiomatic divergence of these paradigms with reference to the historical origins of the ‘nation’. Placing emphasis on the temporality of nations, it is possible to categorise the positions of various theorists depending upon whether they argue for the pre-modern existence of nations (i.e. perennialist and primordialists), refute their pre-modernity (i.e. modernists), or attempt to accommodate both arguments (i.e. ethnosymbolists). Although some
Theorists have argued that the ‘when’ of a nation’s origins is often indistinguishable (Connor, 1990, 2004; Ozkirimli, 2010), the historicity of the nation as a concept carries significant analytical utility for the applied study of a particular nation’s development, especially where ambiguity exists as regards its historic origins as is the case for Scotland.

However, this simplification of these complex theoretical positions poses issues for the validity of the distinctions made in Smith’s (2010) typology. By placing specific theorists in these categories, there exists a danger of conflating the individual particularities of their theoretical positions (Malesevic, 2013; Ozkirimli, 2010). Smith attempts to address this problem in his discussion of the ‘modernist’ paradigm in his further sub-categorisation of these authors into ‘socioeconomic’, ‘sociocultural’, ‘political’, ‘ideological’ and ‘constructionist’ variants. However, this further delineation is equally susceptible to the charge of oversimplifying the complexities and overlaps between these theorisations. Despite deploying broadly similar categories in his own overview of paradigms of nationalism, Ozkirimli (2010: 200) argues:

…the categories of the tripartite division and the labels used to describe each category are highly arbitrary. The classification of a particular theory or writer into existing categories depends to a large extent on who is doing the sorting...

For example, the distinction between the ‘sociocultural’ position attributed to Gellner (1964, 1983) and the ‘constructionist’ strand assigned to Anderson (1991) and Hobsbawm (1983) fails to acknowledge that the emphasis placed on the growth of mass education by Gellner has a clear synergy with the arguments of Anderson and Hobsbawm on the use of education for constructing a cohesive sense of national belonging. Both positions argue that the growth of nationalism is partially driven by the necessity for a literate workforce, and that the education of the mass population is organised through centralised state institutions; Smith’s separation of these theorists therefore runs the risk of riding roughshod over such shared arguments.

A similar concern can be offered regarding the distinction between ‘political’ modernists (i.e. Breuilly and Giddens) and the identification of Kedourie (1960,
1971) as an ‘ideological’ modernist. This distinction arguably fails to fully appreciate the tautological nature of separating the political and ideological elements of nationalism. It could be argued that the existence of nations as the predominant mode of societal organisation simultaneously depends upon and promulgates the ideology of nationalism. The cyclical argument that nations would not exist without nationalism, but that nationalism would not exist without the development of nations, demonstrates that separating the ‘political’ and ‘ideological’ positions fails to acknowledge the complex symbiotic relationship between these theoretical positions.

Finally, Smith’s recent acknowledgement of a “possible fifth ‘postmodern’ paradigm… as yet sketchy and fragmentary” (2010: 61) draws further attention to the problematic nature of his dependence on four concrete paradigms. The fact that recent developments in the study of nationalism do not lend themselves to the original four categories further highlights the typology’s analytical limitations, with concepts such as ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995) and ‘everyday nationalism’ (Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox and Grancea, 2006; Edensor, 2002) epitomising recent theoretical developments in this field. The fact that these concepts are argued by Smith to be “sketchy and fragmentary” demonstrates the limited possibilities of neatly pigeon-holing novel theorisations into the existing paradigms of his typology, given that these theorisations are in fact relatively well-developed and have significantly influenced numerous contemporary academic studies of nationalism. Attention will therefore now turn to considering these recent theoretical developments.

Banal and Everyday Nationalism

Billig’s (1995) concept of ‘banal nationalism’ possesses significant theoretical significance for understanding the nature of contemporary nationalism. He offers the concept as a means of analysing the process through which established nations reproduce and maintain a sense of national consciousness within its population, whilst emphasising that this process has become partially subconscious or unconscious in nature. In order to explicate the nature of this ‘banal nationalism’, he offers the analogy of the flag hanging limply from a mast, contrasting this with the fervent flag-waving of more overt, ‘hot’ forms of nationalism:
The ideological habits, by which our nations are reproduced as nations, are unnamed and therefore unnoticed. The national flag hanging outside a public building in the United States attracts no special attention. (Billig, 1995: 6)

Billig’s arguments place particular emphasis on the processes by which the wider population support nationalist movements, even where this support may be passive in nature. This focus on nationalism ‘from below’ can therefore help to build an appreciation of the role of the general public in securing popular consent for the nation as the legitimate mode of political organisation. In particular, Billig suggests that the ideological nature of national identity in contemporary Western nations is underlined through the routine, day-to-day flagging of the nation in modern society, whether through social institutions, politics or the mass media.

The arguments outlined in Billig’s ‘banal nationalism’ thesis have been expanded on through studies which scrutinise the nature of ‘everyday nationalism’ (Brubaker et al., 2006; Edensor, 2002; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a, 2008b). Mirroring the central foci of Billig’s work, such studies prioritise critical examination of “the actual practices through which ordinary people engage and enact (and ignore and deflect) nationhood and nationalism in the varied contexts of their everyday lives” (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a: 537). Studies of this ilk attempt to specifically attend to the processes which can engrain nationalist behaviours, attitudes and practices in the daily lives of the mass population. Importantly, this perspective equally considers whether such processes are indeed salient in the daily existence of the mass population, attempting to avoid the reification of national identity as a significant force for all citizens (Brubaker et al., 2006; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a, 2008b).

The work of Edensor (2002) specifically scrutinises the relationship between national identity, popular culture and the everyday life of the general population. Edensor (2002: vii) considers “national identity to be constituted out of a huge cultural matrix which provides innumerable points of connection… [c]ulture, according to this conception, is constantly in a process of becoming, of emerging out of dynamism of popular culture and everyday life”. His work also pays particular attention to the manner in which nationhood is ‘performed’, both through formalised traditions of a distinctly ‘national’ nature and also in the everyday, unconscious behaviours of the
general population. Edensor argues that this stance which prioritises nationalism ‘from below’ avoids the problems which are engrained in the predominant paradigms in the study of nationalism, which are “seriously distorted in their consideration of ‘high’, ‘official’ and ‘traditional’ culture to the exclusion of popular and everyday cultural expression” (2002: 2).

Brubaker et al.’s (2006) extensive study of ethnicity and nationhood in the Romanian city of Cluj adopts a similar theoretical perspective, again placing a strong emphasis on appreciating the expression of nationalism in the day-to-day existence of the city’s inhabitants:

They are embodied and expressed not only in political claims and nationalist rhetoric but in everyday encounters, practical categories, commonsense knowledge, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, mental maps, interactional cues, discursive frames, organisational routines, social networks, and institutional forms. (Brubaker et al., 2006: 6-7)

This position clearly outlines the embedded nature of nationalist practices in the lived experiences of inhabitants (Brubaker et al., 2006). Again, the importance of appreciating the dialectical relationship between nationalism from ‘above’ and ‘below’ is central, with a particular focus on whether nationalist rhetoric and political discourse influences the behaviours of the wider population.

The ‘banal nationalism’ and ‘everyday nationalism’ schools of thought have not been without their critics, as is evident in the critique and counter-critique played out in the debate between Skey (2009) and Billig (2009) regarding ‘banal nationalism’, and the dialogue regarding ‘everyday nationalism’ between Smith (2008) and Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008a, 2008b). Skey (2009) argues that Billig’s conceptualisation of the distinction between ‘hot’ and ‘banal’ nationalisms appears simplistic in its application, failing to appreciate the ability for nationalist sentiment in a particular context to oscillate between these positions, whilst also critiquing some of the methodological assumptions of Billig’s thesis. Similarly, whilst appreciative of the necessity to attend to the role of ‘non-elites’ and the emphasis placed on applied empirical study in the ‘everyday nationalism’ approach, Smith (2008) takes particular issue with the relatively ahistorical nature of the research agenda proposed by Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008a) and the lack of critical examination of the relationship
between ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ elements of nationalist processes. Whilst the response of Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008b) refutes the accusation of ahistoricity, their acceptance of the charge of a lack of dialectical scrutiny between nationalism from ‘above’ and ‘below’ is qualified through recourse to the contrasting nature of the research questions addressed through an ‘everyday’ approach to nationalism.
The case of Scotland provides a complex analytical challenge in relation to the theoretical conceptualisations of nationalism outlined above. Although the ‘nation-state’ acts as the fundamental starting point for ‘modernist’ theoretical analyses, Scotland is a prime example of a ‘submerged nation’ given its status within the wider state system of the UK. Inhabitants of ‘submerged nations’ such as Scotland can possess a tangible awareness of its existence as a distinct ‘nation’ on a social, cultural and political level, despite the nation's lack of parallel representation in terms of sovereign statehood (Guibernau, 1995; Smith, 1999). The lack of congruence between Scotland’s ‘nationhood’ and ‘statehood’ therefore presents an interesting dimension to any application of the major paradigmatic approaches of nationalism. Whilst the idea of a Scottish nation can be argued to have pre-modern historical foundations, thus providing support to adherents of a perennialist or primordialist perspective (Seton-Watson, 1977), contrasting arguments have been made concerning the constructed and romanticised nature of Scottish nationalism and identity (Hobsbawm, 1983; McCrone, 1992; Trevor-Roper, 1983, 2008), lending weight to the contentions of the modernist and ethnosymbolist paradigms.

The following discussion provides a critical overview of contrasting academic analyses which have scrutinised the complex nature on Scotland’s origins as a ‘nation’, outlining the stances adopted in seminal studies of Scotland’s history. Discussion will be ordered in a quasi-chronological fashion to facilitate a consideration of historical developments in the sphere of Scottish politics and nationalism since the 1707 Act of Union primarily, before reflecting on the merits of contrasting theoretical paradigms for critically exploring the nature of Scottish nationalism. Although the focus of the following discussion will predominantly concentrate upon developments in the post-Union period for reasons of brevity, the relevance of certain pre-Union historical developments will also be explored when considering the contrasting theoretical paradigms of nationalism in the Scottish context.
The fragmentary nature of Scotland’s early history presents significant foundational challenges to any attempts to identify the origins of the Scottish ‘nation’. Given that the earliest geographical records of the roots of the Scottish kingdom in the writings of Bede identify their location in Argyll, a small region of Scotland (Dickinson, 1961), it could be argued that the Scottish nation existed from the point at which the Scots settled in this location. Alternatively, it could be argued that the true origins of the Scottish nation stem from the delineation of territories through the construction of the Roman frontier walls, or through the joining of the Scottish and Pictish lands by Kenneth Mac Alpin in 843, or by the signing of the Treaty of York in 1237 which legally defined the border between Scotland and England (Davies, 1990; Dickinson, 1961; Mitchison, 1970).

Although the Treaty of York acted to establish the border between Scotland and England, the onset of the ‘Wars of Independence’ between the two countries at the end of the thirteenth century again represent a historical development which still carries resonance for contemporary reflections on the origins of the Scottish nation and Scottish nationalism. The power vacuum in the Scottish kingdom caused by the death of the Maid of Norway produced thirteen claimants, of various merits, to the Scottish throne (Dickinson; 1961); crucially, King Edward I of England was responsible for deciding on John Balliol as the rightful claimant to the Scottish throne in 1291, having been advised that Balliol would be most likely to submit to Edward’s demands for feudal overlordship (Dickinson, 1961; Maclean, 2000). However, Balliol’s refusal to submit to Edward’s demands for military service against the French in Gascony in 1294, and the subsequent conclusion of an alliance between Scotland and France in 1295, instigating Edward’s march on Scotland in 1296 (Dickinson, 1961; Maclean, 2000; Mitchison, 1970). The subsequent defeat of Balliol’s Scottish forces by Edward resulted in the loss of the Scottish kingdom’s independence, and “Edward treated Scotland as a conquered country” (Mitchison, 1970: 42).

The ensuing ‘Wars of Independence’ between Scottish and English forces included a number of historical events and characters which continue to influence discourse
surrounding Scottish nationalism in the present day. Indeed, for a number of writers, the Wars of Independence mark the first signs of a “common sense of nationhood” (Davies, 1990: 116) in Scottish society, with Scots armies fighting in the name of the country rather than in the name of their ruler (Davies, 1990; Dickinson, 1961; Mitchison, 1970; Webster, 1997). The first such example is the popular Scottish revolt led by William Wallace in 1297, culminating in the Scottish success over the English forces at Stirling Bridge in September of that year (Dickinson, 1961; Maclean, 2000). The re-establishment of Scottish independence under Wallace was short-lived, however, with Edward’s forces defeating Wallace and the Scottish army at Falkirk in July 1298. Nonetheless, the endeavours of Wallace and his army gained heroic and legendary status in popular Scottish history throughout the centuries since the defeat at Falkirk.

Following Wallace, the second major Scottish uprising against English forces was led by Robert Bruce, the Earl of Carrick (Maclean, 2000; Mitchison, 1970). Following the withdrawal of the English army under Edward II in the summer of 1307, Bruce was able to expand his control over Scottish territory to the extent to which he had drove the English garrisons from the territories to the north of the Forth-Clyde isthmus by 1309, and from Perth, Dundee, Dumfries, Roxburgh and Edinburgh by 1314 (Dickinson, 1961; Maclean, 2000; Mitchison, 1970). This prompted the return of a mass English army under Edward II, meeting Bruce’s forces at the battle of Bannockburn in June 1314. Despite being significantly outnumbered by the English forces, the battle ended with a resounding victory for Bruce’s forces and re-established the independence of the Scottish kingdom (Dickinson, 1961; Griffiths, 1984; Maclean, 2000). The prevailing period after Bannockburn also saw the creation of the ‘Declaration of Arbroath’ in 1320 to be sent to Pope John XXII, which Mitchison describes as “an announcement of independence and allegiance to Bruce ‘as being the person who hath restored the people’s safety in defence of their liberties’” (1970: 49). The Declaration of Arbroath is again a common point of reference in discussions of Scottish political and cultural nationalism to the present day. This was followed in 1328 by the Treaty of Northampton which was signed by between Scotland and England, recognising Scotland’s independence as a kingdom (Griffiths, 1984; Kidd, 1993; Maclean, 2000; Webster, 1997).
Furthermore, prior to the 1707 Act of Union, Scotland possessed an independent parliament stretching back to the late thirteenth century (Barrow, 1980; Dickinson, 1961; Mitchison, 1970). Whilst early parliaments were mere sittings of the monarch’s council of advisers and close gentry, the Scottish parliament soon developed to become the highest court of law in line with the development of Norman-era feudalism (Barrow, 1980; Dickinson, 1961). Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries representation in the Scottish parliament expanded slightly to include representatives from the royal burghs which had been established throughout the country, supplemented further by elected commissioners to represent smaller barons and freeholders at a later stage in the sixteenth century (Dickinson, 1961; Mitchison, 1970; Pryde, 1962). Although the constitution of the Parliament slowly expanded to include some representation of the lower landed classes, it is clear that this was limited, and there was no representation for Scots at the lower echelons of the social spectrum (Dickinson, 1961; Pryde, 1962). During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the parliament’s role shifted to giving final approval to numerous articles of law in a short space of time, with responsibility for drafting and revising the law resting with the Privy Council, again constituted by members of the Scottish elite and nobility (Devine, 1999; Dickinson, 1961; Maclean, 2000). Furthermore, following the Union of the Crowns in 1603 which led to the King controlling affairs from London, the role of the Privy Council expanded significantly to ensure the administration of law, order and taxation in Scotland in the absence of direct royal control (Devine, 1999; Dickinson, 1961; Maclean, 2000; Mitchison, 1970).

The succession of James VI to the throne in 1567 marked the start of crucial developments for the constitutional future of Scotland and England, due to his strong claim to the English throne in the event of the childless Elizabeth I’s death. Relationships between the two countries during the reign of James VI were therefore relatively stable, as James VI sought to convince Elizabeth I to name him as her rightful heir (Maclean, 2000; Mitchison, 1970; Wormald, 1981). James VI was indeed successful in achieving this aim, and was pronounced King James I of England in 1603 following Elizabeth I’s death, successfully uniting the thrones of both Scotland and England in this ‘Union of the Crowns’. Whilst this development united the thrones of both countries under one monarch, it is important to note that it
did not unite the countries together politically and constitutionally per se (Maclean, 2000; Mitchison, 1970; Pryde, 1962).

This distinction between the two separate countries remained throughout the seventeenth century, despite the failed attempts of James between 1604 and 1607 to encourage complete union between the Scottish and English parliaments (Mitchison, 1970; Pryde, 1962; Wormald, 1981). However, the succession of his son Charles I on his death in 1625 marked the start of another tumultuous period for the Stuart monarchy. Charles’ controversial attempts to align the Churches in Scotland and England invoked religious revolt in the form of the Covenanters movement in Scotland starting in 1638, before the outbreak of the Civil War in England in 1642 between Royalist and Parliamentarian forces, which ultimately led to the surrender of Charles in 1646 and his loss of control over both kingdoms (Donaldson, 1965; Maclean, 2000; Morrill, 1984; Pitttock, 1991). Power in England fell into the hands of Oliver Cromwell, leader of the Parliamentary forces and the eventual Lord Protector, who arranged for the execution of Charles I in 1649, before launching a successful invasion of Scotland in 1650 (Maclean, 2000).

The reign of William of Orange, or William III, also marked one final widely held precursor to the 1707 Act of Union between Scotland and England, namely the failure of the Scottish expedition to establish a trading colony in Darien between 1695 and 1700 (Devine, 1999; Ferguson, 1968; Maclean, 2000; Pryde, 1962). Whilst blame for the failure of the Darien scheme was apportioned to the English powers due to their lack of support and machinations against the expedition (Devine, 1999; Ferguson, 1968), the severe economic implications for the Scottish gentry, nobles and landowners who had lost their investments has been argued to have reduced resistance to William III’s plans to unite the two countries, finally completed under the reign of his daughter Anne after she had succeeded to the throne in 1702 (Mitchison, 1970; Maclean, 2000).

The Act of Union was finally sealed in 1707, legislating for the final incorporation of Scotland into union with England and Wales, and spelling the end of Scotland’s existence as an independent and sovereign nation. It is therefore apt to turn attention to literature which discusses the implications of this Act for the constitutional status
Politics, Unionism and Nationalism in Scotland 1707 to 1945

With the Act of Union in 1707, the separate Scottish and English Parliaments ceased to exist, and were replaced by a unified Parliament of the unified kingdom of Great Britain to sit at Westminster (Devine, 1999; Hanham, 1969; Maclean, 2000; Pryde, 1962). From an economic perspective, the Act ensured open trade and navigation for all British subjects (removing barriers which had hampered Scottish economic development), legislated for a common system of taxation and customs excise, and arranged for an ‘Equivalent’ to be paid to Scotland to compensate for sharing the English national debt as well as compensating investors who had lost money in the Darien scheme (Ferguson, 1968; Maclean, 2000; Pryde, 1962). Whilst these economic benefits outline numerous reasons for gaining the support of the Scottish Parliament to finally agree to the Act of Union, a great deal of animosity and reluctance to support Union was demonstrated prior to and following 1707 (Devine, 1999; Ferguson, 1968; Hanham, 1969; Harvie, 1998; Pittock, 1991). In particular, the provision in the Act to secure the succession of the Hanoverian line to the British throne generated significant conflict and disquiet amongst the Jacobite supporters of the Stuart claim to the throne (Devine, 1999; Maclean, 2000), and the proposed system of Scottish representation in the new Parliament on the basis of taxation revenues rather than population share led to fears of under-representation of Scottish interests (Devine, 1999; Ferguson, 1968; Pryde, 1962). Devine (1999) argues that this situation was further exacerbated by the abolition of the Privy Council in 1708:

The end of the Privy Council was a key development because it gravely weakened the ability of the government of Scotland to respond vigorously and decisively in crisis situations. The vacuum which it left could only give further comfort to the Jacobites. (ibid: 18)

Despite these significant losses for the governance of Scottish society in the Act, provisions were made to ensure that numerous elements of Scottish civil society were able to retain an element of autonomy and distinctiveness within the Union. The Act legislated for the maintenance of independent church, legal and educational systems of Scotland within the Union, and the nature of Scottish politics and nationalism in the post-Union era.
following the Union, ensuring that the Presbyterian and Episcopalian systems of worship would remain as the 'established' churches of Scotland and England, respectively (Larkin, 2011; Maclean, 2000; McCrone, 1992; Pryde, 1962; Webster, 1997). McCrone (1992) argues that these important concessions have had a significant long term impact in terms of maintaining the notion of Scotland as a distinct nation, due to the clear differences in relation to this ‘holy trinity’ of civil society which have existed between Scotland and England from 1707 to the present day. Furthermore, Pittock (2012) claims that this preservation of civic institutions, coupled with the fact that the Act of Union was a joining together of the Scottish and English Parliaments rather than an incorporation of the former into the latter, resulted in complex implications for Scottish sovereignty from 1707 onwards given that “from the beginning the union abolished and preserved Scottish sovereignty, and is to that degree a paradoxical as well as ambivalent document” (ibid: 14).

From the time of Union in 1707, a number of important developments occurred which impacted on the status of Scotland as a ‘submerged nation’, both in terms of political representation and Scotland’s constitutional status. Scholars of the period immediately after the Act of Union have identified discontent with the post-1707 settlement, highlighting narrowly unsuccessful attempts to repeal the Union in 1713 (Devine, 1999; Ferguson, 1968; Maclean, 2000; Pryde, 1962). However, this political discontent soon became superseded by the military agitations of the Jacobite uprisings in the first half of the eighteenth century. These movements had implications for the status of Scotland within the Union, given the strong support from numerous members of the Scottish nobility and the temporary declaration of Scotland as an independent kingdom in the 1745 uprising. It is important to note, however, that the main aim of these uprisings was to support the Stuart claim to the throne for Great Britain (Devine, 1999; Mitchison, 1970). Re-establishing Scotland’s independence was of secondary concern to the Jacobites, and acted only as a step along the way towards restoring the Stuart monarchy in the rest of Great Britain; indeed, the ramifications of the failed Jacobite rebellions are argued to have suppressed Scottish nationalism throughout the remainder of the eighteenth century (Harvie, 1998).
Devine (1999) and Mitchison (1970) argue that the stability of the Union was also secured due to the economic benefits which Scotland exploited during the eighteenth century, ensuring that the Scottish elite maintained their support for Scotland’s constitutional status. Furthermore, when popular radical movements to reform the nature of political representation inspired by the success of the French Revolution began to emerge in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the aims of these movements focused on reforming political representation within the Union (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998). Indeed, Devine argued that the “rebellion therefore shows a fusion of Scottish and English symbols of freedom but precious little evidence that Scottish independence was ever seriously on the agenda” (1999: 228).

The shifting voting patterns in the elections held throughout the period since the Act of Union illustrate the historical political context in Scotland. As 1832 marked the start of the process of enfranchising the wider population outside of Scotland’s elite following the 1832 Reform Act, Figure 1 outlines the results of each election from 1832 to 1945 in Scotland in terms of elected MPs. The dominance of the Liberal Party in Scotland throughout the majority of the nineteenth century demonstrates that political reforms had a high level of popular support with the expanding Scottish electorate; however, the constitution of the Union was rarely of political importance during this period (Hanham, 1969; Harvie, 1998). For Harvie, this was due to the continued existence of ‘semi-independence’ for Scotland within the Union, echoing the arguments of McCrone (1992) regarding the importance of the ‘holy trinity’ of independent Scottish civil society. However, the 1880s saw the issue of home rule for Scotland gaining prominence in political discussions. 1886 saw the establishment of the Scottish Home Rule Association which aimed to engender cross-party support for Scottish home rule and the establishment of a Scottish parliament (Devine, 1999), with some Liberals in Scotland beginning to endorse the policy (Harvie, 1998). James Keir Hardie, the founder of the Scottish Labour Party in 1888 and a co-founder of the UK-wide Labour Party, was also a keen supporter of Scottish home rule, ensuring that the cause began to receive cross-party support (Ferguson, 1968; Maclean, 2000; Mitchison, 1970).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Whig / Liberal / Liberal Democrat</th>
<th>Tory / Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal Unionist / National Liberal</th>
<th>Labour / ILP / Cooperative</th>
<th>SNP / NPS / Scottish Party</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1874</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1880</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1885</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1886</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>1892</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1895</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1900</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1931</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1935</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 – Elected MPs for UK Parliament by Political Party in Scotland from 1832 to 1944

However, although numerous motions were raised in Parliament concerning Scottish home rule in this period, only two of these won a majority and the motions were ultimately unsuccessful due a lack of parliamentary time and political impetus from the Liberal government (Devine, 1999; Hanham, 1969). Further home rule movements in the 1910s for both Ireland and Scotland proved more successful, and a Scottish Home Rule Bill had progressed to its second reading by the outbreak of the First World War in 1914; however the advent of war meant that this Bill failed to progress into law (Devine, 1999; Ferguson, 1968; Hanham, 1969; Harvie, 1998; Pittock, 1991). The home rule movement faltered somewhat after the First World War, given the integrative power of warfare and the growth of the Labour movement.
which favoured organisation across the UK rather than Scotland alone (Harvie, 1998).

Nonetheless, the inter-war period saw the establishment of other nationalist movements to replace the floundering home rule movement, with the establishment of the National Party of Scotland (NPS) in 1928 and the Scottish Self-Government Party (SSGP) in 1932 (Ferguson, 1968; Harvie, 1998; Lynch, 2009; Pittock, 1991). The original aim of the NPS was to promote the cause of Scottish home rule, although many members also advocated full Scottish independence (Devine, 1999; Ferguson, 1968; Harvie, 1998; Pittock, 1991). Whilst the NPS was predominantly left-wing in its ideological base, the SSGP was constituted of moderate right-wing supporters of home rule, demonstrating support for Scottish political nationalism across the political spectrum (Devine, 1999; Hanham, 1969; Harvie, 1998; Lynch, 2009).

In 1934, the NPS and the SSGP merged to form the Scottish National Party (SNP). The newly-merged SNP adopted “a programme which accentuated home rule and underplayed independence – although it never discarded it completely” (Harvie, 1998: 28). The SNP failed to make a significant impact in its first general election in 1935, with economic uncertainty following the Depression leaving the case for Scottish home rule open to attack as a risky enterprise. Agitation for further home rule was also partially pacified by the relocation of the Scottish Office from Whitehall to Edinburgh in 1937 (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998). Despite this, the SNP was able to successfully win its first seat in the Westminster parliament in the 1945 Motherwell by-election, with Dr Robert McIntyre exploiting a non-competition truce between the other major parties, triumphing as the only opposition to the Labour candidate (Ferguson, 1968; Mitchison, 1970; Pryde, 1962).

*Politics, Unionism and Nationalism in Scotland from 1945 to Present*

The post-war period marked the gradual consolidation of Labour as the dominant force in Scottish politics (Devine, 1999; Leith and Soule, 2011; Pryde, 1962). However, whilst the electoral results for the Westminster parliament outlined in
Figure 2 clearly demonstrate the growing dominance of Labour, the post-war politics of Scotland were significantly more nuanced than this suggests:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Liberal / Liberal Democrat / SDP</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal Unionist / National Liberal</th>
<th>Labour / ILP / Cooperative</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>Others</th>
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<td>1945</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>49</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conservatives and, secondly, the divergence between Scottish and British voting patterns. Although the 1959 general election saw the return of a Conservative government at Westminster, the Labour party achieved a majority in Scotland in terms of MPs (Devine, 1999; Leith and Soule, 2011; Pryde, 1962).

The subsequent elections of 1964 and 1966 saw the return to power of Harold Wilson’s Labour Party at Westminster, although the growing dominance of Labour in Scottish politics was not fully reflected at Westminster (Devine, 1999). Furthermore, the 1970 general election repeated the pattern of the 1959 election when a Conservative government was elected at Westminster despite a clear majority of Labour MPs elected in Scotland, reflecting an increasing ‘democratic deficit’ for the Scottish electorate (Leith and Soule, 2011; Pittock, 2008a). Both 1974 elections redressed the issue of this ‘deficit’ with the election of a minority Labour government in February 1974 and a majority Labour government in October 1974. Furthermore, the Labour government of 1974 also introduced the 1977 Scotland and Wales Bill which legislated for the 1979 devolution referendums in Scotland and Wales (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998; Leith and Soule, 2011).

Analysis of the post-war voting patterns demonstrates that the SNP failed to establish themselves as a significant force on the Scottish political scene until the 1970s (Leith and Soule, 2011; Lynch, 2009). The party was unable to build on their 1945 by-election success and failed to win any more Westminster seats until 1970. Devine (1999) and Harvie (1998) attribute this failure to the split within the SNP which began with their 1942 conference, leading to the loss of a number of moderate SNP members who advocated home rule, leaving behind a “narrow and exclusive nationalist organization, dominated by the pro-independence hardliners” (Devine, 1999: 565).

The remainder of the 1950s and the early 1960s saw little electoral success for the SNP (Harvie, 1998). However, the late 1960s saw the party re-establish itself through the election of Winnie Ewing at the 1967 Hamilton by-election (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998; Leith and Soule, 2011; Larkin, 2011). This success was followed by further gains at the local elections of 1968, and the growth of popular support for Scottish political nationalism led to the return of Scottish home rule to the
mainstream political agenda at Westminster (Devine, 1999). This is evidenced in the policies of the Conservative and Labour parties relating to Scotland, with Conservative leader Ted Heath announcing in his 1968 ‘Declaration of Perth’ that the party would support the establishment of a devolved Scottish Assembly, and the Labour government establishing a Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1969 (Devine, 1999; Leith and Soule, 2011; Larkin, 2011).

However, the failure of the SNP to build on their recent successes at the 1970 election led to the devolution movement losing momentum (Devine, 1999). Furthermore, the 1973 Kilbrandon Report which resulted from the Royal Commission on the Constitution did not lead to legislation for devolved assemblies in Scotland and Wales. Nonetheless, the resurgence of the SNP in the February 1974 and October 1974 elections (with 7 and 11 MPs elected, respectively) saw the issue of home rule regaining traction (Harvie, 1998; Hassan, 2011; Leith and Soule, 2011). For Harvie, a crucial factor in the 1974 resurgence of the SNP lay in the discovery of vast oil reserves in the North Sea and the SNP’s ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil!’ campaign of 1972:

The other parties might denounce the demand for Scottish control of oil revenues as selfish but, in a Scottish context, the oil issue was more complex than crude. To an extent not appreciated by politicians in the south, it presented the Scottish economy with as many problems as opportunities, problems which ultimately brought, as no other issue did, the whole concept of the Union into question. (Harvie, 1998: 185).

In light of the growing popular support for constitutional change, the Labour Party signified their support for Scottish devolution in their October 1974 manifesto (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998). However, the limited nature of the powers of this Assembly resulted in significant dissatisfaction, both within the Labour government and amongst its political opponents (Devine, 1999; Leith and Soule, 2011). The Bill was equally fraught with issues, disputes and amendments hindering its initial passage through Parliament. The defeat of the initial reading of the Bill required the concession of an advisory referendum and numerous other amendments in order for its revised version to make it through Parliament in 1978 (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998). One particular amendment had significant implications for the outcome of the
1979 referendum which followed the Bill – the addition of the stipulation that if less than 40% of the entire Scottish electorate voted in favour of the Assembly, then the Scotland Act would be repealed and no Assembly would be established (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998; Leith and Soule, 2011).

The 1979 referendum saw a ‘Yes’ vote of 51.6% against a ‘No’ vote of 48.4%, on a turnout of 63.8%; this meant only 32.85% of the electorate being in favour of a Scottish Assembly, with 30.78% against, and 36.37% who did not vote at all (Harvie, 1998; Ichijo, 2004; Leith and Soule, 2011). Given that this failed to reach the 40% threshold set by the Cunningham amendment, the Scotland Act was repealed despite achieving a majority in favour in the referendum. Devine (1999) identifies a number of factors which caused the failure of the 1979 referendum, including the decline of the SNP in 1978 by-elections, the low priority of devolution in comparison to industrial relations and unemployment due to the onset of the ‘Winter of Discontent’ in 1978-79, divisions within the ‘Yes’ campaign between the SNP and Labour, and the limited powers being proposed.

The voting patterns following the 1979 referendum demonstrated the effects of the ‘democratic deficit’ for the Scottish electorate to its full extent (Leith and Soule, 2011; Pittock, 2008a), with the 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992 general elections all returning Conservative governments to Westminster despite a growing majority of Labour MPs in Scotland. These four elections also saw the re-emergence of the Liberals in Scotland following the establishment of the SDP-Liberal Alliance in 1981, benefiting from the decline in the Conservative vote in Scotland during this period (Leith and Soule, 2011). In contrast, this period saw the SNP marginalised in comparison to their pre-1979 success, with the party hampered by internal conflicts and the implications of their 1979 vote of no confidence which led to the collapse of the Labour government. In particular, the suspension from the SNP of the prominent ‘‘79 Group’ which included party members such as Margo MacDonald, Jim Sillars and Alex Salmond, who wished to move the party’s ideology to the left, had a significantly disruptive effect on the solidarity of the SNP (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998; Lynch, 2009).
The period of the Conservative government from 1979 to 1992 saw the arrival of ‘Thatcherism’, ushering in economic and social policies which had considerable implications for Scottish society. For Devine (1999: 591), “Thatcherism came to mean monetary control, privatization, the liberalization of free markets, reduction in trade-union power and a concern to inspire a national revival of the virtues of self-help in a people perceived as too long wedded to state support and welfare subsidies”. Given its relatively high proportion of manufacturing and heavy industry, this led to the swift deindustrialisation of the Scottish economy, resulting in increasing unemployment, and a shift from employment in primary and secondary industry sectors to the tertiary service sector (Devine, 1999; Morgan, 1984; Tomlinson, 2014). A number of commentators have highlighted the lasting impact of Thatcherism in manifesting a sense of a political divide between Scotland and England (Hearn, 2014; Lecours, 2012; Leith and Soule, 2011; Newby, 2009; Pittock, 2008a; Sharp et al., 2014; Soule et al., 2012). McCrone (1992: 93) argued that it is “difficult to envisage a political ideology more at odds with Scottish sensibilities and identity than that which has emanated from the South during the 1980s”. Although the backlash against the ‘Poll Tax’ throughout the UK eventually led to Thatcher’s resignation in 1991, the Conservative government retained power at Westminster in 1992 under John Major, with the continuing majority of Labour MPs in Scotland further demonstrating the entrenchment of the Scottish ‘democratic deficit’ (Lecours, 2012; Leith and Soule, 2011; Newby, 2009; Pittock, 2008a).

The Scottish ‘democratic deficit’ remained until Labour’s success at the 1997 general election under Tony Blair, with the Conservatives failing to win any seats in Scotland. The election of the ‘New Labour’ government in 1997 was also significant for Scottish politics as it had committed to another devolution referendum (Devine, 1999; Leith and Soule, 2011; Maclean, 2000). Given this, the process by which home rule remained on the political agenda during this period merits further discussion. Following the 1979 referendum, a cross-party organisation named the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) was established to maintain momentum for devolution (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998; Leith and Soule, 2011). Citing Hroch’s (1985) three-stage model of European nationalism involving intellectual, institutional and popular mobilisation, Harvie underlines the importance of the formation of the CSA:
The CSA’s premise was that things had changed in the 1970s, and permanently. In this sense it resembled the second stage of Hroch’s intellectual nationalism, organising ideas into policies affecting culture and socialisation. (Harvie, 1998: 233)

Although the CSA made little impact on the mainstream political agenda in the early 1980s, the committee produced a document entitled ‘A Claim of Right for Scotland’ in 1988. The principles of cross-party support and civil society involvement in the ‘Claim of Right’ have been argued to underline the growth of ‘small ‘n’’ political nationalism in Scotland (Devine, 1999; Leith and Soule, 2011; Steven et al., 2012). Furthermore, the SNP’s withdrawal from the Scottish Constitutional Convention established in 1989 following the ‘Claim of Right’ evidenced the establishment of a home rule movement without the ‘large ‘N’’ ‘Nationalist’ parties who supported full independence (Leith and Soule, 2011). The 1989 Convention attracted participation from Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish Green Party, the Scottish Trades Union Congress and a number of other civic organisations. Despite the setback of the 1992 general election which saw another Conservative victory, the CSA produced the ‘Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right’ document which outlined the Convention’s vision for a devolved Scottish Parliament (Devine, 1999; Larkin, 2011; Leith and Soule, 2011; Linklater, 2000).

The 1997 Scotland Bill which legislated for the devolution referendum proposed a devolved Scottish Parliament with legislative powers over all areas except for ‘reserved powers’ which would remain under the Westminster Parliament. These ‘reserved powers’ were macro-economic policy, foreign policy, defence, social security, abortion, broadcasting, immigration and border controls (Devine, 1999; Linklater, 2000). The referendum was separated into two questions, with the first asking whether a Scottish Parliament should be established, and the second asking whether the Parliament should have limited tax-raising powers of up to 3p in the pound (Devine, 1999; Linklater, 2000; Leith and Soule, 2011). The results of the referendum returned a ‘Yes-Yes’ vote, with 74.3% voting in favour of the Parliament and 63.3% in favour of tax-raising powers. The resounding success of the ‘Yes-Yes’ campaign in comparison to the 1979 devolution referendum has been attributed to the cross-party cooperation of all of the major political parties in Scotland, except from
the Conservatives who pursued an anti-devolution campaign (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998; Linklater, 2000).

The first elections for the Scottish Parliament took place in May 1999. Figure 3 outlines the voting patterns in Scottish Parliament elections from 1999 to 2011:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Liberal Democrat</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>Others (Green, SSP, Independent)</th>
</tr>
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<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency:</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List:</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Figure 3 – Elected MSPs for Scottish Parliament by Political Party from 1999 to 2011

The 1999 election saw Labour dominating the constituency-based voting by taking 53 of the 73 seats available; however, the impact of the proportional Additional Member System (AMS) limited Labour to only 3 additional MSPs from the regional list system. In contrast, the SNP and the Conservatives, who fared poorly in the constituency-based voting, were able to gain a significant number of regional list MSPs given their significant proportion of the voting percentages (Leith and Soule, 2011). The use of the AMS prevented Labour from achieving an overall majority in the Scottish Parliament, and they therefore negotiated a coalition with the Liberal Democrats to form the first devolved Scottish Government.
The 2003 elections produced a similar result, with Labour continuing as the largest party with a reduced number of seats, and the Labour-Liberal coalition government remaining in place (Larkin, 2011; Leith and Soule, 2011). The 2003 election marked a growing number of minority party and independent MSPs, with 17 MSPs elected from non-mainstream parties, including 7 MSPs from the Scottish Green Party, 6 from the Scottish Socialist Party, 3 independent MSPs and 1 MSP from the Scottish Senior Citizens Unity Party. Although this minority party representation demonstrated the potential for a more consensual form of politics at Holyrood, Hassan (2011) and Larkin (2011) both argue that such hopes have not been fulfilled due to contrasting policy positions and personal differences between senior political figures. For Labour, 2003 marked the start of a decline at Scottish Parliament elections, with their vote slipping at the subsequent 2007 and 2010 elections (Hassan, 2011; Leith and Soule, 2011). The decline in Labour’s fortunes in Scottish elections was in stark contrast to their continued success in Westminster elections at this time, suggesting that the electorate varied their voting behaviour depending on context (Larkin, 2011; Leith and Soule, 2011).

In contrast, the SNP’s decline at the 2003 election marked a turning-point, with the party making sufficient gains at the 2007 election to become the largest party in the Scottish Parliament (Hassan, 2011; Leith and Soule, 2011). The growing success of the SNP was pre-empted by Linklater (2000), who argued that the SNP’s decision to embrace devolution was part of Salmond’s long-term strategy:

The party’s leader Alex Salmond… argued that it made better sense to work within the parliament, and to ensure it delivered policies which would benefit the new Scotland. Then, when Scots voters realised what it had managed to achieve, the SNP would be able to claim that, with independence, even more might be gained. (ibid: 227)

The SNP were forced to proceed as a minority government following the 2007 election as they were unable to agree a coalition with the Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Greens, primarily due to the SNP’s commitment to a referendum on Scottish independence (Larkin, 2011). Although this limited the ability of the SNP administration to implement its 2007 manifesto policies, including a proposed independence referendum, the formation of the first SNP government offered the
party the opportunity to demonstrate its ability to govern competently whilst providing a forum for emphasising the benefits of Scottish independence (Cairney, 2011; Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014; Johns et al., 2013; Larkin, 2011; Leith and Soule, 2011).

At the 2011 elections, the SNP was able to exploit dissatisfaction with the Labour government following the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, and the return of the Scottish ‘democratic deficit’ at Westminster with the establishment of the coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats following the 2010 general election (Mycock, 2012). The result of the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections placed the SNP in a position to hold an independence referendum, with its 69 MSPs providing the party with an overall majority. The SNP was able to form a majority government even though it only received 45.4% in the constituency vote and 44.0% in the list vote (SPICe, 2011), and despite the AMS electoral system which has been argued to have been designed to avoid such an eventuality (Harvie, 1998; Johns et al., 2013).

The SNP-led Scottish government entered into negotiations with the coalition Westminster government, resulting in the signing of the ‘Edinburgh Agreement’ in October 2012 which legislated for a single-question referendum before the end of 2014, in line with the SNP’s preference for a referendum date in autumn 2014. The preferred date for the referendum immediately sparked press speculation of the reasons for selecting autumn 2014, with various commentators highlighting the association with the 700th anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn in June 1314, and the hosting of a number of sporting and cultural events in the 2014 ‘Year of Homecoming’, including the Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the Ryder Cup (Carrell, 2013; The Economist, 2012).

The ‘Edinburgh Agreement’ ruled out the proposal for a second question in the referendum for further devolution powers, despite the popularity of such an option during the ‘National Conversation’ public consultation (Scottish Government, 2009). This appears to suggest a strategic move by the SNP to combine the possibilities of a ‘gradualist’ or ‘independence-lite’ form of political nationalism whilst retaining the ‘separatist’ position offered in their preference for independence for Scotland.
(Casanas Adam, 2014; Hearn, 2014; Keating, 2012; Lecours, 2012; Leith and Soule, 2011; Leith and Steven, 2010; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008). Analysis of this strategy suggest it had been prompted by the weight of opinion that ‘devolution max’ was the preferred option of the electorate and civil society (Casanas Adam, 2014; Dalle Mulle, 2016; Hearn, 2014; Ormston and Curtice, 2013a, 2013b; Sharp et al., 2014); however, the terms of the ‘Edinburgh Agreement’ ultimately negated such a possibility. The removal of the ‘devolution max’ option has been lamented by a number of public and academic commentators (Casanas Adam, 2014; Dalle Mulle, 2016; Hearn, 2014; Sharp et al., 2014). Ormston and Curtice's (2013a, 2013b) analyses of data from the 2012 Scottish Social Attitudes survey suggested that an option for enhanced devolution such as 'devo max' or 'devo plus' would “appear to be capable of securing the consent of a majority of people in Scotland” (2013a: 17) if offered as an option in the referendum. Nonetheless, the Scottish Government proceeded with its plans for a single-question referendum, and in March 2013 announced that the referendum would take place on 18th September 2014.
Contemporary Scottish Nationalism

Given the significance of the developments discussed above for Scotland’s constitutional future, it is important to consider their implications for the nature of contemporary political nationalism in Scotland. As Soule, Leith and Steven (2012: 6) argue:

...modernists, along with ethno-symbolists... and political theorists... have all indicated the importance of symbolism, or discourse, to an understanding of nationalism and national identity. What we think is key here is that, regardless of epistemology, accounting for stories of mythical and ancient persons and cultural symbols, drawn from whatever historical era, is an important part of accounting for national identity today.

The focus of the following discussion therefore turns to evaluating the various paradigmatic approaches in the study of nationalism for the case of Scotland. As discussed previously, the main differentiating factor which separates these contrasting theorisations is the historicity of the origins of a given nation; therefore, particular attention will be afforded to this issue.

Perennialism and Primordialism in the Scottish Context

The perennialist and primordialist approaches to nationalism which place emphasis on distant, pre-modern historical foundations of the nation will be considered first. One of the major proponents of the perennialist approach, Seton-Watson (1977), pays direct attention to the case of Scotland when differentiating between ‘old’ and ‘new’ nations. Seton-Watson’s distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ nations has particular significance for this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, it facilitates discussion of the case of Scotland as an example of an ‘old’ nation and, secondly, it potentially accommodates the central arguments of the modernist perspective vis-à-vis the origins of ‘new’ nations. He argues that the “old nations of Europe in 1789 were the English, Scots, French, Dutch, Castilians and Portuguese in the west; the Danes and Swedes in the north; and the Hungarians, Poles and Russians in the east” (Seton-Watson, 1977: 6). Scotland is therefore held as an exemplar of ‘continuous

The existence of documentary evidence referring to the Scots from scholars dating back to the Roman era, the later writings of Christian scholars, and in various treaties and manuscripts in the Middle Ages, provide evidence of the existence of Scotland as a nation to support Seton-Watson’s claims. According to Hanham, “Scotland has possessed all the characteristics of a distinct nation since the twelfth century” (1969:15), highlighting the existence of a distinct Scottish church, education, legal, banking and political system through to the modern day. Furthermore, other historians have cited the 1320 Declaration of Arbroath as evidence that not only did Scotland exist as a nation in a legal sense, but it also existed in the minds of members of the Scottish population as a nationalist cause (Harvie, 1998; Mitchison, 1970).

Seton-Watson differentiates between ‘old’ and ‘new’ nations through recourse to the possible existence of evidence that a given nation precedes the growth of nationalism as an ideology. His identification of Scotland as an ‘old’ nation demonstrates the flexibility of this position for accommodating ‘submerged nations’ within larger state formations, contrasting sharply with the arguments of Giddens (1985) and Breuilly (1993) that contend a nation must have a concurrent state for its political expression. Seton-Watson therefore uses the examples of ‘old’ nations such as Scotland to refute the arguments of stringent ‘modernists’ who refute the pre-modern existence of nations. He instead argues that Scotland’s preservation of independent civil society institutions following the 1707 Act of Union allowed its people to retain a separate national consciousness.

Although the case of Scotland provides evidence to support the claims of perennialists, it equally presents an empirical problem in identifying when the Scottish nation came into existence. Whilst Seton-Watson acknowledges this conundrum, the fragmentary nature of Scotland’s early history presents significant foundational challenges to his claims. Given that the earliest geographical records of the Scottish kingdom in the writings of Bede identify their location in Argyll, a small region of Scotland (Dickinson, 1961), it could be argued that the Scottish nation existed from the point at which the Scots settled here. Alternatively, it could be
argued that the true origins of the Scottish nation stem from its territorial delineation through the construction of Roman frontier walls, or through the joining of the Scottish and Pictish lands by Kenneth Mac Alpin in 843, or by the signing of the Treaty of York in 1237 which legally defined the border between Scotland and England (Davies, 1990; Dickinson, 1961; Mitchison, 1970; Smyth, 1984; Webster, 1997). The complexity of such foundational debates therefore destabilise the theoretical claims of the perennialist approach advocated by Seton-Watson.

The complexity of Scotland's historical origins also creates significant problems for adherents to a primordialist approach to nationalism (Geertz, 1973; Van den Berghe, 1978, 1995). By giving primacy to the naturalistic origins of nationalism, such as ethnicity, bloodline, language, kinship, and customs, primordialists place emphasis on the importance of shared ethnic and cultural foundations dating back to Scottish prehistory. The earliest archaeological and documentary evidence relating to Scotland identifies the existence of common Celtic origins for the earliest inhabitants of Scottish lands (Berresford Ellis, 1990; Duncan, 1975; Green, 1995; Powell, 1962). However, the existence of alternative archaeological evidence which suggests the simultaneous existence of contrasting human cultures in prehistoric Scotland renders the pursuit of a single foundational ethnic group problematic (Daniel, 1962; Hanham, 1969; Ichijo, 2004; Piggott, 1954, 1962). Such evidence provides a significant challenge to the ‘socio-biological’ perspective of Van den Berghe (1978; 1995) given the multi-ethnic and tribal nature of life in Scottish territory discussed in the earliest written records from the Roman era (Smyth, 1984).

Modernism in the Scottish Context

‘Modernist’ theorisations of nationalism have been predominant in literature in this academic field, as is reflected in the academic study of Scottish nationalism (Soule, Leith and Steven, 2012). Although modernist approaches to Scottish nationalism do not object to the argument that Scotland existed as an independent kingdom or territory in the pre-modern era, they argue that Scotland would not be referred to as a ‘nation’ until concepts such as the nation, nationalism and national identity became prevalent in the modern era. Considering that the 1707 Act of Union predates the modern era in which nationalism flourished as an ideological movement, such a
stance therefore presupposes that any idea of a Scottish ‘nation’ involves retrospectively constructing pre-Union Scotland as a nation given that it no longer existed as a sovereign state at the onset of the modern era (Smith, 2010).

Interestingly, two of the main adherents to the ‘socioeconomic’ variant of modernist thought, Nairn (1977) and Hechter (1975), paid particular attention to the case of Scotland to illustrate their arguments. Both authors cite economic and social inequality between Scotland and England as a catalyst for Scottish nationalist movements. For Nairn (1977), ‘uneven development’ in Britain after the Act of Union led to Scotland becoming a peripheral territory in comparison to the core territory of England. The divisive nature of this socioeconomic cleavage lies at the core of Nairn’s ‘Break Up of Britain’ thesis which predicted the ultimate secession of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland from the UK. Hechter’s (1975) conceptualisation of the inclusion of the ‘Celtic periphery’ within the UK as a form of ‘internal colonialism’ reflects a number of Nairn’s arguments about the status of Scotland as a socioeconomic ‘periphery’, although expressed in slightly different terms. Hechter places more emphasis on the ‘cultural division of labour’ as a stimulus for nationalist agitation, as the peripheral population begins to react to its under-representation in positions of influence in the Scottish economy and polity by pursing a sovereign state to redress this inequality.

Historical evidence, such as the relatively slow economic development of Scottish society in comparison to that of England, the lack of diversification in the Scottish economy, and the comparatively poor living standards in Scotland compared with England (Devine, 1999; Hearn, 2002; Jackson, 2014; Kidd, 1993; Maclean, 2000; Pryde, 1962), can all be used to support the arguments of Nairn and Hechter regarding the importance of socioeconomic precursors to Scottish nationalist movements. Furthermore, the historic lack of representation of Scots in pre-Reform Westminster government and the political economy of Scotland support the claims of the ‘cultural division of labour’ within the UK.

However, these approaches are somewhat undermined by their lack of acknowledgement of the economic and social benefits of Scotland’s status within the British Empire (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998; Jackson, 2014; Mitchison, 1970; Pryde, 1962; Tomlinson, 2014). Once political stability had been secured within the UK,
Scotland’s economic development was accelerated significantly, and the country’s role as the ‘World’s Workshop’ (Devine, 1999) was a direct result of its status in the British Empire. Although Hechter’s conceptualisation of ‘internal colonialism’ acknowledges that the Celtic periphery became centrally involved in the process of British imperial expansion, any acceptance of the mutually beneficial nature of the Union for Scotland and England undermines the strength of the ‘colonial’ representation of Scotland (Connell, 2004; Dalle Mulle, 2016; Evans, 1991; Mycock, 2012; Sharp et al., 2014).

The ‘sociocultural’ strand of modernist thought associated with the work of Gellner (1964, 1983) places emphasis on the development of a widely literate population for the growth of nationalist movements. This facilitates the development of a cohesive sociocultural system by creating a nationalist self-image based on notions of shared folklore and culture (Gellner, 1964, 1983). ‘Sociocultural’ modernism is arguably evidenced through the popularity of the Romantic movement in Scottish literature, associated with pre-eminent Scottish poets and authors such as Robert Burns, Sir Walter Scott and James Macpherson, amongst others (Gold and Gold, 1994; Maclean, 2000; Pittock, 2008b; Pryde, 1962). As Gellner (1983: 48; original emphasis) argues “nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself”; these sentiments reflect the raison d’être of the Scottish Romantic movement, imbuing Scottish popular history with a folklore and culture to be proud of. For Maclean (2000: 202), the success of Burns and Scott lay in the fact that they “helped to restore to the Scots themselves the self-confidence and self-respect which the events of the past century had done so much to destroy, to dispel the unhappy feeling of inferiority and lost identity which had followed the Union”.

Pittock’s (2008b) comprehensive work on Scottish romanticism discusses how the maintenance of Scottish language and a Scottish ‘public sphere’ for literature were crucial in generating a notion of Scotland as a nation within the UK. Pittock claims that this allowed Scots to develop an ‘altermentality’ which ensured they understood that their culture and society were distinctly Scottish rather than British, and that Scottish national literature drew upon a ‘taxonomy of glory’ by invoking historic events such as great victories, battles and leaders from Scottish history. However,
whilst the Scottish Romantic movement may have acted to generate a sense of Scottish nationhood, there was no strong contemporaneous political nationalism evident during the heyday of cultural nationalism evident in Scottish romantic literature in the early Victorian era (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998), with increasing support for Scottish home rule only gaining momentum in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Therefore, the movement appears to reflect a growth in cultural nationalism rather than political nationalism.

The contrasting political stances of the various authors associated with both the Scottish Enlightenment and Romantic movements also challenges the arguments of ‘sociocultural’ modernism. The contrast between the unionist position of Enlightenment writers such as Adam Smith, David Hume and William Robertson, or in the later Romantic work of Scott, who all demonstrated pro-British stances, with the ‘patriot historiography’ of individuals such as Robert Burns, Allan Ramsay, and William Hamilton with their pro-Scottish and/or Jacobite sympathies demonstrates that the Scottish public sphere was highly divided in a political sense (Kidd, 1993; Pittock, 1991, 2008b). This undermines any claims for a solely nationalist impetus in the development of mass literature and cultural movements in Scotland. Indeed, Kidd (1993: 268) argues that cultural elites’ attempts to produce a revisionist ‘Whig’ historiography often attempted to support pro-Union position, suggesting that:

The history of liberty had been rewritten by Scotland’s own intellectual elite in such a way as to subvert the intense pride which earlier generations of Scots had taken in their independence as a sovereign kingdom… [t]he Scottish conception of liberty had from the mid-eighteenth century become associated with the benefits of Union with England, including liberation from anachronistic feudal institutions.

The Scottish Romantic movement’s attempts to revitalise the self-image of the Scottish nation also resonates with the arguments of the ‘constructionist’ strand of modernist theorisations. Hobsbawm’s (1983) central arguments about the ‘invention of tradition’ with regards to folk culture, dress and language as a means of creating a coherent sense of national consciousness have been applied directly to the case of Scotland. Both Hobsbawm (1983) and Trevor-Roper (1983, 2008) are critical of the overt attempts of certain members of the Scottish Romantic movement to endow
‘invented traditions’ such as Highland dress, music and cultural forms with the character of authenticity. The formalisation and ritualization of these traditions were argued to be a covert process to establish a coherent sense of Scottish nationhood, thus legitimating the organisation of political and social institutions along Scottish rather than British lines.

Trevor-Roper (2008) argues that the historical symbolism associated with Scotland was developed long after the Act of Union in a retrospective manner, claiming that the existence of Highland dress, dance and customs was actually viewed as a sign of barbarism at the time. Furthermore, his work argues that this ‘sartorial myth’ related to Highland dress is an overt attempt to intertwine popular mythology and Scottish history, as found in the Romantic writing of the likes of Scott, supplementing the “political myth” of the “ancient constitution of Scotland” and the “literary myth” based on “the myth of ancient poetry of Scotland” (Trevor-Roper, 2008: xx). Such arguments are supported by those of numerous scholars of eighteenth century Scottish history, who have highlighted the suppression of Highland culture by Lowland Scots and British government forces alike (Devine, 1999; Kidd, 1993; Maclean, 2000; McCrone, 1992; Mitchison, 1970; Pryde, 1962). However, Trevor-Roper’s dismissal of their actual pre-Union existence in a significant form has also been strongly refuted (Jarvie, 1991, 1993; McCrone, 1992).

The ‘constructionist’ position of Anderson (1991) and his concept of the ‘imagined community’ has also been applied to the case of Scotland. Anderson (1991) discusses the failure of Scotland to establish a successful political nationalist movement, in comparison to the successful nationalist movements which prevailed elsewhere. Anderson argues that the impact of previous invasions by English forces, the resultant Anglicisation of Scottish society and the development of a shared language prevented such a development occurring in Scotland, a position echoed by Hanham (1969). Although the concept of the ‘imagined community’ has been deployed frequently in discussions of Scottish nationalism (Bairner, 2001; Kellas, 1998; McCrone, 1992), the status of Scotland as a ‘submerged nation’ challenges Anderson’s definition of this concept. Although the ‘imagined’ nature of the Scottish nation through shared cultural, ethnic and political bonds has been acknowledged above, and Scotland has a clearly ‘limited’ geographic boundary, Scotland’s lack of
full political self-determination does not coalesce with Anderson’s conceptualisation of the imagined community as ‘sovereign’. His definition is therefore tautological in the sense that ‘sovereignty’ is the ultimate goal of nascent political nationalism movements; if a nation must possess sovereignty to exist, then this excludes any submerged or embryonic nations seeking statehood.

It is also important to consider the claims of ‘political’ and ‘ideological’ modernists in relation to contemporary Scottish nationalism given the links between their arguments and recent developments in Scottish politics. For ‘political’ modernists such as Breuilly (1993) and Giddens (1985), Scotland’s status as a submerged nation is of central importance because of their contention that a ‘nation’ must seek to express itself by establishing a concurrent sovereign ‘nation-state’. Breuilly (1993) argues that nationalist movements are founded on the lack of contiguity between society and the state; in the case of Scotland, the existence of a distinct Scottish society, whether through the ‘holy trinity’ of civil society or the national consciousness of the Scottish population, clashes with the lack of a sovereign state. Giddens’ (1985) position aligns with that of Breuilly, suggesting that submerged nations such as Scotland must establish themselves as nation-states in order to be considered fully sovereign in the global political system.

The position adopted by Kedourie (1960, 1971) in his ‘ideological’ modernist approach shares some common ground with Breuilly and Giddens, given the agreement that the final goal of nationalist movements tends to be the establishment of sovereign statehood. However, for Kedourie, this is a means to an end rather than an end in itself, as contended in the ‘political’ modernist approach. In the case of Scotland, support for Kedourie’s arguments can be found in the shifting aims of Scottish political nationalist movements, given that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries these movements predominantly supported the cause of ‘home rule’ within the Union rather than full political independence (Dalle Mulle, 2016; Devine, 1999; Ferguson, 1968; Harvie, 1998). The goal of these movements was to increase Scotland’s political powers, rather than to achieve the full sovereign statehood deemed necessary by the ‘political’ modernist approach. This stance offers the possibility of redressing the ‘democratic deficit’ which has been argued to impact political representation for the Scottish electorate (Dalle Mulle, 2016; Ichijo, 2009;
Leith and Soule, 2011; Mycock, 2012; Newby, 2009), with devolution offering a potentially more accurate reflection of the popular vote in the Scottish Parliament than in the Westminster Parliament. The establishment of the devolved Scottish Parliament in 1999 has provided an added measure of political self-determination for Scotland in line with the priorities of Kedourie's theorisation.

The extensive work of Harvie (1998) on the historical development of Scottish nationalism lends support to Kedourie’s arguments, arguing that the central development in Scottish political nationalism has been a growing acceptance of the need for Scottish political representation. Harvie argues that “Scottish political identity had become real, and a devolutionist elite – left and right – had developed to cope with it” (1998: 199). He also states that the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly and the cross-party Constitutional Convention acted as evidence of political support for Scottish self-determination, rather than independence. However, given the simultaneous development of political movements for full Scottish independence in the post-war era (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998), support for both the ‘political’ and ‘ideological’ strands of modernist thought can be found in contemporary Scottish nationalism. Mycock (2012) also argues that the SNP's political strategy focuses on the ideals of Scottish political self-determination, aligning with the 'ideological' brand of modernism found in Kedourie's theorisations. Drawing upon the arguments of Hechter (1975), this is argued to link back to a 'post-colonial narrative' of Scottish independence which is subtly promoted by the SNP and within which the “idea that the UK remains a product of English 'internal colonialism' persists” (Mycock, 2012: 60).

However, the case of Scotland equally presents practical challenges to the theoretical perspectives espoused by Breuilly, Giddens and Kedourie. In particular, their emphasis on the importance of political nationalism fails to accommodate cases such as Scotland in which cultural nationalist movements are comparatively strong despite weak correlation with political nationalist movements. Nairn’s (1977) arguments on the existence of ‘Caledonian Antisyzygy’ suggests that many Scots have a cultural identification with a distinct Scottish nation, whilst rejecting claims of political nationalist movements seeking to achieve Scottish independence. A number of academics have equally argued that the relationship between Scottish cultural
nationalism and political nationalism is weak for many Scots (Bairner, 2001; Kellas, 1998). Furthermore, Kedourie’s modernist arguments that nationalism was “a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century” (Kedourie, 1960: 1; cited in Smith, 2010: 67) is problematic in the case of Scotland. A number of Scottish historians argue that events in pre-modern Scottish history, such as the Declaration of Arbroath, the numerous conflicts between Scotland and England, and the existence of a Scottish parliament prior to the Act of Union, were evidence of Scottish nationalist consciousness (Harvie, 1998; Mitchison, 1970).

*Ethnosymbolism in the Scottish Context*

The final major theoretical paradigm identified by Smith (2010), ‘ethnosymbolism’, has also been applied to the case of Scottish nationalism. The evidence cited above with respect to the historical development of the Scottish nation is beneficial to adherents to an ‘ethnosymbolist’ perspective, such as Armstrong (1982), Hutchinson (1994) and Smith (1986, 2002, 2010), who acknowledge the need to synthesise ideas from the modernist, perennialist and primordialist theorisations of nationalism. Such an approach is important in the case of ‘old’ nations such as Scotland (Seton-Watson, 1977), as it can help avoid the theoretical challenges facing these paradigms by accommodating the existence of both historic and recently formed nations.

For Smith (1981, 2010), Scottish nationalism is part of an ‘ethnic revival’ which bases its foundational claims on notions of a Scottish ‘ethnie’ which provides cultural, political and emotional solidarity for nationalist movements. Smith argues that the ‘ethnic revival’ in nationalist movements in industrialised Western societies such as Scotland involved:

…a largely middle-class revolt of ‘peripheral minorities’ against the dominant ethnic majorities of old-established states and against their centralized governments [which] appealed to some of the older symbols, myths and memories of classic European mass nationalisms, though with a more social and often socialist programme and more limited political goals – in most cases a desire for cultural and economic autonomy, rather than outright independence (Smith, 2010: 130)
This stance asserts that Scottish nationalism sought to undermine its absorption within the dominant British state, whilst catering for the varied demands of Scottish nationalist movements regarding the extent of cultural and political autonomy, whether devolutionist or separatist. Smith’s emphasis on the existence of a singular Scottish ‘ethnie’ is blighted by the same issues facing ‘perennialist’ and ‘primordialist’ paradigms in relation to the multi-ethnic ancient history of Scotland. However, he attempts to qualify such arguments by stating that the concept of an ‘ethnie’ exemplifies an ideal-type, and that the importance of ethnies lies in their ability to act as foundations for ethnic solidarity and myths of ancestry, acknowledging that their actual origins may not be as simplistic as popular beliefs suggest (Smith, 2010). Armstrong (1982) similarly argues that the “primary characteristic of ethnic boundaries is attitudinal… ethnic boundary mechanisms exist in the minds of their subjects rather than as lines on a map or norms in a rule book” (ibid: 7-8). It is therefore more important that an idea of singular Scottish ethnic origins exists as part of the Scottish national consciousness, even if the reality is more complex.

The case of Scottish nationalism also underlines the salience of the arguments of Hutchinson (1987; 1994) concerning the relationship between ‘political nationalism’ and ‘cultural nationalism’. Hutchinson’s contention that oscillation between the cultural and political forms of nationalism is common throughout the history of a given nationalist movement resonates with the case of Scotland, with the cultural nationalism evident in the Scottish Romantic movement situated in between the earlier political nationalist concerns which immediately follow the Act of Union, and the later development of home rule and independence movements (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998; Hutchinson, 2004). The status of Scottish sport as a form of cultural nationalism has been argued to demonstrate a similarly complex relationship with political nationalism (Kellas, 1998; Bairner, 1996, 2001).

The arguments of McCrone (1992) align with Hutchinson’s arguments here, and also lend some support to Hutchinson’s fellow ethnosymbolists. McCrone argues that although the foundations for ideas of Scotland as a nation have clear links with territory, landscape and ethnicity, he also identifies the forged nature of Scottish symbolism in the form of tartanry and ‘Kailyard’ romantic literature. This position
supports the attempts of ethnosymbolism to combine the deep historical foundations for ideas about the Scottish nation of the ‘perennialist’ and ‘primordialist’ schools with ‘modernist’ ideas relating to the construction of Scottish national symbolism. However, McCrone lends particular support to a number of ‘modernist’ propositions by highlighting the emphasis on the myth-history of the Scottish nation, citing a number of commonly held myths which have influenced Scottish nationalist movements. Despite Leith and Soule’s (2011) critique of his stance which firmly associates him with a modernist position, it appears difficult to pigeon-hole McCrone’s position in one particular theoretical paradigm given his acknowledgement of pre-modern and modern nationalist symbolism.

Leith and Soule are unequivocal about their own approach to the study of Scottish nationalism, explicitly identifying their adherence to an ethnosymbolist perspective. In particular, their work is “concerned with the contemporary political aspects and implications, an area that ethno-symbolism has not traditionally addressed and for which it has, rightly, been criticised” (2011: 9). By arguing against the modernist position that Scottish nationalist myths and symbols are simply modern social constructions, Leith and Soule claim instead that nationalist heroes such as William Wallace and Rob Roy are valid historical figures and cultural symbols, regardless of whether their associated mythology is embellished. Drawing upon the ideas of Billig and Anderson regarding the importance of symbolism, discourse and language in the study of Scottish nationalism, Leith and Soule place emphasis on synthesising their arguments with an ethnosymbolist ontological stance in order to overcome the audience homogenisation which they argue is implicit in the accounts of Billig and Anderson.

To this end, Leith and Soule note that the balanced view of pre-modern Scottish mythology advocated in their ethnosymbolist position facilitates an appreciation of the nuanced nature of nationalist discourse construction, arguing that “those wishing to employ particular narratives for political purposes must do so within a symbolic repertoire accessible to those they wish to persuade” (Leith and Soule, 2011: 10). Ichijo’s (2004) analysis of the political stance of the SNP towards Europe similarly adopts the ethnosymbolist theoretical approach of Leith and Soule (2011), providing a critical insight into the rhetorical position of the party with regards to the origin of
the Scottish nation and European integration. She argues that the SNP draws upon the notion that Scotland is a nation with a pre-modern and pre-Union history, stating that “[t]he fact that the Scottish National Party subscribes to the medieval origin of Scottish nationhood is not surprising since it strengthens their claim of the authenticity of the Scottish nationhood” (ibid: 32).

*Ethnic and Civic Nationalism in the Scottish Context*

It is also appropriate to reflect on Kohn’s (1944) distinction between ‘ethnic nationalism’ and ‘civic nationalism’ in the case of Scotland. Although the dichotomous nature of this distinction has been criticised elsewhere (Bairner, 1999, 2001; Brubaker, 1998; Smith, 2010; Zwet, 2015), political nationalist movements have often sought to clarify their stance on this spectrum in their appeal for popular support. Unsurprisingly, the position of the contemporary Scottish nationalist movement strongly aligns with the concept of ‘civic nationalism’, with an appeal to an idea of a Scottish nation constituted through citizenship and residence as well as ethnicity and birthplace (Harvie, 1998), a position which is not always replicated in contemporary nationalist movements in other locations (Jeram, 2014; Kaldor, 2004; Kaufmann and Zimmer, 2004).

Leith and Soule’s (2011) work provides an analysis of the discourse contained in the manifestos of mainstream Scottish political parties, allowing for a consideration of the emphasis placed on ‘civic’ and ‘non-civic’ (or ‘ethnic’ using Kohn’s (1944) terminology) nationalism. Their analysis identifies that the majority of discourse found in Scottish political manifestos stresses the civic nature of Scottish nationalism and society. Furthermore, these manifestos often make explicit reference to Scotland’s diversity and its welcoming of ethnic minorities (Leith and Soule, 2011). Nonetheless, certain elements of ‘non-civic’ nationalism are evident in Scottish political discourse, with emphasis often placed on the importance of landscape and language as a source of pride (Leith and Soule, 2011). However, Leith and Soule (2011) demonstrate the predominance of civic nationalism, claiming that “Unionist and Nationalist together eulogise the progressive and ‘welcoming’ nature of the nation; this is the dual voice of a modernist democratic nationalism expressing its
distinctive, unique character, but the nature of that character is an open, civic and inclusive plurality” (ibid: 73).

These arguments are echoed in Mycock’s (2012) analysis of the SNP’s attempts to project a ‘wholly civic’ form of contemporary Scottish political nationalism. He argues that their rhetorical position attempts to promote an inclusive form of Scottish nationalism, irrespective of birthplace, ethnicity and race. However, this is often undermined by certain policies and speeches which draw upon ideas of a distinctly Scottish culture, history and heritage which reflect a more ‘ethnic’ brand of nationalism. Furthermore, Mycock argues that the SNP attempts to denounce alternative conceptualisations of Scottish nationalism from other parties, deploying “a form of 'black sheep nationalism' that seeks to denigrate rival constructions of Scottish national identity whilst overlooking limitations in their own understanding of the Scottish nation and nationalism” (ibid: 54).

Leith and Soule (2011)’s analysis of the nature of contemporary political nationalism and political discourse in Scotland also identified a shift towards an acceptance of ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ by Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives in Scotland:

…all political parties in Scotland operate within a nationalist framework and all employ nationalist language to a greater or lesser degree; therefore, nationalist and nationalism with a small ‘n’ refers to the political behaviour of all major parties in Scotland, whilst Nationalists with a capital ‘N’ refers only to parties who seek a fully independent Scotland, i.e. the SNP… unionist arguments for Scotland’s continued incorporation within the UK state are made in the ‘interest’ of Scotland and as such are nationalist with a small ‘n’. (ibid: 13)

Ichijo (2009; 2012) suggests that this development marks the entrenchment of 'unionist nationalism' in post-devolution Scottish politics, with all three unionist parties presenting alternative visions of the role of devolution in securing the future status of the Union. She argues that the introduction of Scottish devolution has legitimised the expression of a unionist stance in the Scottish political sphere:
By presenting a discursive frame that connects three narrative strands, (a) the Union is where Scots can grow and prosper, (b) devolution is an embodiment of democratic principles and (c) devolution is the only way of maintaining the Union, the unionist politicians have bundled the Union, devolution and Scottish identity together and wrapped it with democratic legitimacy, the trump card in a modern liberal democracy (2012: 28)

Echoing the arguments of Leith and Soule (2011), Ichijo argues that the potentially exclusionary nature of Scottish nationalist discourse is tempered by espousing a stance that modern Scottish nationhood is of a civic and multicultural form. This increasingly outward-looking and open conceptualisation of Scottish nationalism is therefore also reflected in the recent pro-European discourse of the SNP towards the issue of European political integration (Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014; Sharp et al., 2014). Ichijo (2004) concludes that this stance is the result of three recurrent views relating to the status of Scotland within Europe:

First, Europe is seen as a means of achieving more autonomy or independence for Scotland, and for this, Europe is good for Scotland… Second, Europe is a space where a more just Scotland is possible… Third, Europe is seen as a substitute for the British Empire. (ibid: 148-149)

The above analyses of contemporary discourse do not indicate the complete lack of non-civic or exclusive nationalist discourse in Scottish politics or society, aligning with other studies of Scottish national identity which highlight the continued importance of ethnic markers of Scottish identity (Kiely, Bechhofer and McCrone, 2005; McCrone and Bechhofer, 2010; McCrone, Stewart, Kiely and Bechhofer, 1998). Furthermore, the civic brand of nationalist discourse used by Scottish political parties to describe contemporary Scottish society is also undermined by the issue of anti-English sentiment which constitutes an element of Scottish national identity for certain Scots (Hussain and Miller, 2005a, 2005b; McIntosh, Sim and Robertson 2004a; Watson, 2003). The extent of anti-English sentiment in Scottish society has been argued to range from comical remarks to more violent verbal and physical abuse, although McIntosh, Sim and Robertson (2004a: 44) argue that academic discussion of this phenomenon has tended to emphasise the “overwhelmingly benign nature of much anti-Englishness”. In his analysis of the complex relationship
between Scotland and England in the realpolitik of island union, Miller (2005) highlights imbalances in the size of the nations’ relative populations and the asymmetric migration patterns which result in a net flow of Scots to England as amongst the many of causes of tension between two nations.

*Banal and Everyday Nationalism in the Scottish Context*

The ideas espoused in the ‘post-modern’ approach to nationalism such as ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995) and ‘everyday nationalism’ (Brubaker et al., 2006; Edensor, 2002; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a, 2008b) are also relevant for the case of Scotland. Billig’s (1995) arguments regarding the routine, day-to-day flagging of the nation in all elements of modern society and culture hold true in the case of Scotland, given the existence of distinctly ‘Scottish’ forms of civic institutions, political parties and mass media forms. The importance of scrutinising the actual practices of ordinary Scots in engaging with their nation are equally reflected in the adherents to ‘everyday nationalism’, such as Brubaker et al. (2006), Edensor (2002), and Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008a, 2008b).

The work of Edensor (1997a, 1997b, 2002) specifically reflects on the relationship between popular culture and Scottish national identity in everyday life. By emphasising the importance of everyday cultural practices for generating a sense of national consciousness, Edensor (2002) argues that it is possible to avoid viewing cultural nationalism through the lens of ‘high’, ‘official’ and ‘traditional’ culture only. His earlier work (Edensor, 1997a, 1997b) specifically scrutinises the extent to which Scottish historical figures such as William Wallace and Robert the Bruce have been represented in contemporary Scottish popular culture and tourism. His analysis of the mythologizing of historical figures demonstrates the potential for the political commandeering of the popular sentiments regarding Scottish identity which emanate from such cultural productions, despite their questionable historicity (Edensor, 1997a, 1997b). The relationship between Scottish cultural and political nationalism is also argued to play out in the appropriation of the film ‘Braveheart’ by the SNP1:

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1 ‘Braveheart’ was released in 1995 by Paramount Pictures and 20th Century Fox, with the film directed by and starring Mel Gibson. The film dramatises the story of William Wallace and his exploits during the ‘Wars of Independence’ between Scotland and England in the 13th century. The
An analysis of responses to Braveheart also reveals the tension between political and cultural forms of nationalism. The SNP’s development of their ‘head and heart’ campaign testifies to the need to appeal to an emotional sense of attachment as well as the more ‘objective’ economic and political arguments. (1997b: 155) 

Furthermore, Edensor later highlighted that the potential political ramifications of the narratives emerging from various popular cultural representations of Scotland should not be discounted, given that the “global transmission of disembedded images and narratives may feed back into local discourses, even heightening their power over identity and imagination” (2002: 150). Nonetheless, he also argues that the juxtaposition of the narratives of films such as ‘Braveheart’ and ‘Rob Roy’ with other contemporary Scottish cinema productions such as ‘Trainspotting’ and ‘Shallow Grave’ demonstrates that contemporary Scottish popular culture is able to embrace critical self-representations (Edensor, 1997b, 2002).
Sport, Politics and Nationalism at International Sporting Events

Sport has frequently been identified as an important domain for the expression of ideas about the nation and national identity in the contemporary era, and has featured in some theorisations of nationalism such as the ‘postmodern’ schools of thought of Billig (1995) and Edensor (2002). Indeed, Edensor argues that “[p]robably the most currently powerful form of popular national performance is that found in sport… these everyday and spectacular contexts provide one of the most popular ways in which national identity is grounded” (ibid: 78). Notwithstanding these interventions of Billig and Edensor, as well as those of Hobsbawm, Smith and Porter (2004: 4) highlight that “[m]ost mainstream commentators on nationalism pay remarkably little attention to sport”. However, the interconnection between sport, nationalism and globalisation has been well-documented by an array of pre-eminent sport scholars (Allison, 2000; Bairner, 1996, 2001, 2009; Cronin, 1999; Gianianotti and Robertson, 2007; Hargreaves, 2000: Jarvie and Maguire, 1994; Maguire, 1999, 2005; Miller, Lawrence, McKay and Rowe, 2001; Silk, Andrews and Cole, 2005). Although it is outside the scope of the present study to fully examine the findings contained in this plethora of literature on the relationship between sport, nationalism and globalisation, it is important to acknowledge that the forthcoming discussion is situated in this wider field of literature.

Although sport is argued to play a central role in contemporary expressions of nationalist feelings, such feelings tend to be limited to the sporting domain and seldom correlate to expressions of political nationalism for most individuals (Kellas, 1998; Bairner, 1996, 2001). Furthermore, the contention that sport should not be politicised has been continuously perpetuated by some in both the public and academic domains, despite continued academic critique of such an argument (Allison, 1986, 1993; Maguire et al., 2002). Despite this, analysis of political manifestos has indicated that the salience of sport as a political issue has increased (Chaney, 2015a). The following discussion therefore commences by providing a critical overview of previous academic writing on the relationship between sport, politics, and international sporting events. In particular, consideration will be given to the implicit and explicit politicisation of sport by formal institutions of government such as governing parties, opposition political parties, governing departments,
political leaders and politicians, in line with a traditional approach to political science (Grix, 2016). Given the plethora of studies in this academic field, priority is given to studies which have emphasised the political motivations for hosting sporting ‘mega-events’ such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup, before focusing on the more limited range of sources which have scrutinised the Commonwealth Games specifically.

*The Politics of Hosting International Sports Events*

Given the emphasis of the current study on the political exploitation of sports events, it is important to delineate the relationship between sport and politics more clearly, particularly with regards to international sporting events. In his extensive study of the relationship between sport and international politics, Houlihan (1994) identifies a number of ways in which sport has been used by various nations and nation-states for political purposes. For Houlihan, “the most common use to which sport is put is as a vehicle for projecting an image of the state and its political and ideological priorities” (1994: 13), citing illustrative examples such as the 1936 Berlin Olympics held under the Nazi regime in Germany and the contrasting ideologies of the 1980 and 1984 Olympic Games held in Moscow and Los Angeles, respectively. The second use of sport identified by Houlihan lies in its potential utility for establishing international leadership for emerging powers, such as Indonesia’s role in the creation of the Games of the New Emerging Forces in 1962 and 1963 following their expulsion from the IOC. Furthermore, Houlihan identifies that sport can equally be used as a means of forging diplomatic ties between existing international powers where alternative measures have failed, as exemplified by the ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ between China and the USA in the mid-1970s (Cha, 2006; Kissoudi, 2011). Finally, and importantly for the current study, he argues that the proliferation of nation-state formation in the post-1945 era resulted in a growing role for sport as a tool of nation-building for new nation-states, with a growing number of post-imperial and post-colonial states imbuing sport with potential utility in this regard.

Hoberman’s (1984) work critically examines this relationship between sport and political ideology. His stance stresses that although there is a significant amount of anecdotal evidence that sport and political ideology are heavily linked, sport in itself
is not necessarily distinctive from other forms of culture in terms of its ideological potential, yet remains a potent form of advertisement for a state ideology. In particular, Hoberman’s thesis specifically scrutinises the framing of the sporting body from a contrasting range of ideological positions, including the conservative stances which dominated historically in the Western world and a range of alternative sporting ideologies such as those espoused from Nazi, fascist, Marxist, Soviet, Maoist and neo-Marxist positions. Hoberman’s (1993) later work outlines the growing relationship between sport and political ideology in the post-Cold-War era, supporting the arguments of Allison (1993) concerning the decline of the ‘myth of autonomy’ which had previously underpinned the relationship between sport and politics.

As noted above, there have been numerous academic studies which have focused on the impacts of hosting sporting ‘mega-events’, drawing scholars from a wide range of academic disciplines. Horne and Manzenreiter (2006) argue that the increased academic interest in sporting mega-events is mirrored in the increased coverage provided to these phenomena by the media, transnational corporations and governments from across the globe. They cite three main reasons for the growing attraction of sports mega-events: firstly, developments in mass communication technology which have maximised mediatised coverage and audiences for these events; secondly, the formation of a ‘sport-media-business’ alliance which has facilitated the successful commercialisation and commodification of sports mega-events; and thirdly, and most pertinently for the current study, the fact that sports mega-events “have become seen as valuable promotional opportunities for cities and regions” (ibid: 8).

Despite frequent attempts by governments and politicians from certain countries and time periods to stress their independence from political considerations (Jeffreys, 2012; Macfarlane, 1986), numerous case studies of international sports events have identified instances where political influences have ramifications for these events. Palmer (2013: 104) argues that the “social and economic impacts of sporting mega-events in terms of urban regeneration, tourism benefits or legacy outcomes for cities and countries who host them have all been recognized by governments, NGOs and cosmocrats alike”. Similarly, Grix (2014) cites a number of prominent reasons why
political actors have supported the hosting of sports mega-events, ranging “from increasing sport participation among the population, urban regeneration, producing a ‘feelgood factor’ among citizens, to showcasing a nation on the world stage and, of course, making a profit” (ibid: x). However, Horne and Manzenreiter (2006) note that such arguments have been subject to significant academic scrutiny, stating that the “tendency to overstate the potential economic, as well as social, benefits of stadium developments and hosting sports events has been detailed by several academic researchers” (ibid: 10).

An early example of the politicisation of a sporting event was the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games which was hosted by the Nazi German government (Brohm, 1978; Grix, 2013; Guttmann, 1998; Hargreaves, 2000; Houlihan, 1994; Houlihan and Giulianotti, 2012; Mandell, 1971). Guttmann (1998) discusses the controversy regarding the proposed US boycott of the 1936 Games given the international political tensions over the rearmament of the German nation and its prevalent fascist, anti-Semitic ideology. Controversy also centred on the use of the Games by the Nazi government for propaganda purposes in promoting its racial ideology of Aryan supremacy (Guttmann, 1998; Hargreaves, 2000; Houlihan, 1994). For Brohm (1978), writing from a neo-Marxist perspective, examples such as the 1936 Olympics particularly demonstrate the political exploitation of ceremonies by host nations, arguing that the “ceremonies at major sports competitions are just like big military parades or pre-fascist rallies, with their ‘traditional’ or military music, the flag rituals, rhythmic marches, nationals anthems and medal ceremonies” (ibid: 50).

Hill’s (1993) overview of the politics of the modern Olympic movement provides a number of later examples of political exploitation of the Olympic Games. In particular, Hill focuses on the various incidents in the Games in 1970s and 1980s, commencing with a discussion of the hostage-taking and killing of nine Israeli athletes by the Palestinian ‘Black September’ terrorist organisation at the 1972 Munich Olympics. The 1976 Olympics were also embroiled in political controversy, when the failure of the International Olympic Committee to suspend New Zealand from the Olympic movement led to 28 nations boycotting the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games in protest (Coghlan, 1990; Hill, 1993; Houlihan, 1994; Jeffreys, 2012). The 1980 Moscow and 1984 Los Angeles Olympics were similarly afflicted.
by political boycotts, on this occasion prompted by the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces in 1979 which resulted in a USA-led boycott of the 1980 Games and subsequent reciprocation from Soviet-aligned countries at the 1984 Games (Hargreaves, 2000; Hill, 1993; Houlihan, 1994; Houlihan and Giulianotti, 2012; Kissoudi, 2011).

Nonetheless, following the commercial success of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, there has been a growing acceptance and awareness of governments of the political and economic benefits of hosting major sporting events (Horne, 2007; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Jeffreys, 2012; Palmer, 2013). Palmer argues that:

…hosting major sports events has, for a number of countries, been an important element in tourism promotion (Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, South Africa’s 2010 World Cup, Rio Olympics, [sic] 2016) and in urban and social regeneration (Barcelona Olympic Games in 1992, Commonwealth Games in Delhi in 2010, London 2012 Olympic Games). (ibid: 104)

The 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games have often been held as the original example of effectively leveraging a major sporting-event for the purposes of economic and urban regeneration (Blain, Boyle and O’Donnell, 1993; Horne, 2007; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Munoz, 2006; Smith and Fox, 2007). Hargreaves’ (2000) in-depth analysis of the 1992 Games outlined the various motives of the central Spanish and Catalan regional governments regarding the use of the Games as a catalyst for private and public investment in Barcelona, whilst enhancing the image of Spain and Catalonia on the global stage. Numerous academics have considered the potential utility of sport for fostering nationalist sentiment in ‘submerged nations’ within existing state formations, such as the case of Catalonia and Scotland (Boyle, 2000; Boyle and Haynes, 1996; Duke and Crolley, 1996; Iorweth et al., 2014; Reid, 2010; Vaczi, 2015). Analysis of the importance of sport in the context of the Catalan and Basque regions of Spain have highlighted the pivotal role of FC Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao (respectively) for the expression of regional and ethnic identities for the population of these regions (Duke and Crolley, 1996; Maguire et al., 2002; Vaczi, 2015). Both regions have witnessed the development of political nationalism which seeks to increase the democratic power of their respective regional parliaments,
either in the form of increased autonomy within a federalised Spanish state or as an independent and sovereign nation-state (Castello, Leon-Solis and O’Donnell, 2016; Duke and Crolley, 1996; Hargreaves, 2000; Vaczi, 2015).

Therefore, for Hargreaves (2000), the 1992 Games possessed a further level of analytical interest with respect to the relationship between sport, politics and nationalism given its location in Catalonia. He argues that the Games represented a political threat for actors on different sides of the constitutional debate, with the main threat for the central government being that “Spain could lose prestige if something went wrong… from the Catalan point of view the main threat was that the Games would be used to tighten the political and cultural links to Spain” (ibid: 130). This led to competing visions of the political ramifications of the Games, as well as contrasting movements supporting the ‘Catalanisation’ or ‘Espanolisation’ of the Games in terms of its symbolism, organisation and the use of the Catalan language throughout the event (Hargreaves, 2000).

This echoes the earlier arguments of Blain, Boyle and O’Donnell (1993), whose analysis identified a ‘unitary discourse’ which emphasised the “unity of the Spanish nation” (ibid: 163), a ‘disjunctive discourse’ which emphasised the autonomy of Catalonia, and a middle-ground ‘differential discourse’ which possessed an ability to acknowledge the importance of peripheral regions such as Catalonia whilst still emphasising the role of central government. Hargreaves concludes his analysis by stating that an “inclusive nationalism… that was prepared to accommodate pragmatically to Spain and which, therefore, did not threaten the integrity of the state” (ibid: 161) was predominant during the Games due to the fact that the “majority of the population of Catalonia does not identify exclusively with Catalonia, nor want independence from Spain” (ibid: 161). However, political developments since the time of the 1992 Games and of Hargreaves’ writing, with Catalonia holding an independence referendum in November 2014 (although deemed illegal by the central Spanish state), demonstrate that the immediate political implications of such events need to be viewed within the longer-term development of nationalist movements. The potential for comparison between the case of Barcelona 1992 and the case of Glasgow 2014 is therefore abundant, although many nuanced differences emerge when comparing political nationalism in Scotland and Catalonia as well as
Another recent trend in the pattern of sporting mega-event hosting is the increased number of successful bids from ‘BRIC’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and other emerging non-Western economies (Cha, 2006; Cornelissen, 2010; Curi, Knijnik and Mascarenhas, 2011; Golubchikov and Slepukhina, 2014; Grix, 2014; Horne, 2015a; Horne et al., 2013; Zimbalist, 2015). Palmer (2013) notes that the success of the 2008 Beijing Olympic bid resembled a watershed in terms of the growth of non-Occidental states bidding for and winning the hosting rights of mega-events, with examples such as the South Africa 2010, Brazil 2014, Russia 2018 and Qatar 2022 FIFA World Cups, the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics in Russia, and the Rio 2016 Olympics in Brazil. In his analyses of the motivations for hosting the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, Xu (2006: 91) emphasised the use of the “mega-event for presenting China’s international image and promoting the harmonization of East-West civilizations”. Similarly, analyses of South Africa’s bid for hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup emphasise the country’s use of sports mega-events as social and political tools (Cornelissen, 2014; Cornelissen and Swart, 2006), whereby “on the one hand events are regarded as one mechanism to support the government’s nation-building project, while on the other, they are viewed as economic and development catalysts” (Cornelissen and Swart, 2006: 108-109). Furthermore, Grix (2014: xi) argues that “[a]t the time of writing, the next batch of economic powerhouses, the ‘MINT’ countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey) looked set to supersede the ‘BRICS’ states” in their use of sports mega-events as a vehicle for economic and social development.

Many recent academic analyses of contemporary sporting mega-events have therefore drawn upon Nye’s (2004) conceptualisation of ‘soft power’ and its growing importance in global politics (Almeida et al., 2014; Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014; Cornelissen, 2010: Grix, 2013; Grix and Houlihan, 2013; Manzenreiter, 2010; Mishra, 2012, 2013). Roche (2006) argues that the politics of sporting mega-events have been transformed by the processes of globalisation:
In earlier periods the social role of the Olympic Games events... needed to be understood in relation to, among other things, the sociology and politics of nations, particularly the nation-building of host nations, and the motivations of participant nations in terms of the presentation and recognition of national identities. Comparably in the contemporary period the social roles, and thus the potential social legacies, of the Olympics need to be seen – in addition to their national implications for nation states – in relation to the contemporary realities of globalization and global society-building. (ibid: 37)

It is therefore apt to bear these arguments in mind when focusing on the sporting event in question in the current study, the Commonwealth Games, given its interconnections with both national and transnational politics.

*The Politics of the Commonwealth Games*

In comparison to the two sporting ‘mega-events’, the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup, the Commonwealth Games is relatively neglected in terms of past academic consideration (Black, 2014; Carter, 2011; Dawson, 2006, 2011; Palmer, 2013; Polley, 2014). This is unsurprising due to the fact that the Commonwealth Games attract comparatively less attention outside of its participant Commonwealth countries in terms of media coverage given its status as a ‘second-order’ international sporting event (Black, 2014; Cashman et al., 2004). For example, Miller, Lawrence, McKay and Rowe (2001) highlight that the Commonwealth Games only attracted 500 million viewers (at the time of writing) in comparison with the 32 billion viewers of the 1994 FIFA World Cup and the 35 billion viewers of the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. Nonetheless, there are academic studies of the history and politics of the Commonwealth Games.

Houlihan (1994) dedicates a significant section of his work on sport and international politics to the political history of the Commonwealth Games. Firstly, he discusses the delay between their original proposal in 1891 and the inaugural event which took place in Hamilton, Canada in 1930, arguing that the successful establishment of the Olympic Games movement in this period ensured that the proposed Empire Games remained of secondary importance. This point is echoed by Holt (1989), who adds that at least part of the rationale behind the Empire Games’ introduction was linked to
the implementation of the Statute of Westminster in the late 1920s which would establish “full constitutional autonomy of the Dominions” and a “loosening of the formal bonds of Empire” (ibid: 224). Whilst Holt stresses that the Games were not “simply devised to hold together through the bonds of sport an institution which was under constitutional and economic strain” (ibid: 225), he equally identifies the motivations of economic ‘boosterism’ and the maintenance of cultural links within the Commonwealth as factors in their establishment. However, the concept of using major sporting events as part of a strategy of ‘boosterism’ has been argued by many academics to be based upon a flawed logic which ignores the lack of evidence of long-term benefits of hosting such events (Giulianotti, 2016; Horne, 2007; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Horne et al., 2013; Martin and Barth, 2013; Stewart and Rayner, 2016; Zimbalist, 2015).

Houlihan (1994) also highlights the changing title of the event, with the evolution of the name from the ‘British Empire Games’ at its inauguration in 1930, the subsequent 1950 amendment to the ‘British Empire and Commonwealth Games’, the short-lived revision to the ‘British Commonwealth Games’ from 1970 to 1974, and the final change in 1978 to its current title of the ‘Commonwealth Games’. This evolution is symbolic of the shifting power relations between the countries which constitute the Commonwealth, with the removal of the phrases ‘Empire’ then ‘British’ from the title reflecting the rapid decolonialisation within the British Empire in the post-1945 period (Barron, 2013; Black, 2007; Cashman et al., 2004; Dawson, 2006, 2014; Houlihan, 1994; Muda, 1998; Ochman, 2013; Phillips, 2000; Roche, 2000; Ryan, 2014; Stoddart, 1986; Whannel, 2008). However, Dheenshaw (1994) highlights that the process of decolonialisation has led some observers to question the continuing political significance of the Commonwealth:

Together, the countries of the Commonwealth serve no strategic military or geographic purpose, and little economic purpose. They try to serve a political purpose, although one wonders what the former colonies of a spend nineteenth century world power can do in the rapidly changing realpolitik of the late twentieth century. (ibid: 2)

This reconfiguration of the political dynamics in the Commonwealth are also reflected in Houlihan’s (1994) account of the implications of British policy in 1970s
and 1980s towards the South African political regime and its ‘apartheid’ system. He argues that this paid testimony to the intertwining of post-colonial intra-Commonwealth politics with the continuing fortunes of the Games:

...the Games provide a useful political resource both as an additional medium for policy communication, but more importantly as a safety valve for political positions that the CHOG [Commonwealth Heads of Government] meetings might not be able to accommodate. (ibid: 146)

The first such incidence of political controversy in the history of the Commonwealth Games movement occurred with the 1934 Games, which were moved from the original host location of Johannesburg to London due to opposition to the South African apartheid regime (Dheenshaw, 1994; Phillips, 2000, 2002). Although subsequent iterations of the Games following 1934 were largely free of political controversy, assisted by the barring of South Africa from the Commonwealth Games Federation in 1961 (Kidd, 1988), the issue of potential boycotts relating to the apartheid regime re-emerged in the build-up to the 1978 Edmonton Games (Coghlan, 1990; Dheenshaw, 1994; Downes, 2002; Houlihan, 1994; Jeffreys, 2012; Kidd, 1988; Macintosh et al., 1992; Nauright, 1997; Whannel, 2008).

Eager to avoid a repeat of the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games boycott at the forthcoming 1978 Edmonton Games, a meeting of select leaders from the Commonwealth nations was convened at the Gleneagles Hotel in Scotland in July 1977 and a formal agreement was reached regarding the withdrawal of sporting contact with South Africa by other Commonwealth countries (Coghlan, 1990; Downes, 2002; Jeffreys, 2012; Macfarlane, 1986; Majumdar and Mehta, 2010; Nauright, 1997; Whannel, 2008). This ‘Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport’ became commonly referred to as the ‘Gleneagles Agreement’, and proved sufficient to ensure that all African nations agreed to cancel the proposed boycott and participate in the 1978 Edmonton Games, with the obvious exception of South Africa (Macintosh et al., 1992). Given the political boycotts which dogged the Olympic Games held in Montreal in 1976, Moscow in 1980 and Los Angeles in 1984 (Houlihan, 1994; Macfarlane, 1986), the securing of the Gleneagles Agreement
therefore framed the Commonwealth Games as a comparative success in terms of political diplomacy (Coghlan, 1990; Jeffreys, 2012; Whannel, 2008).

However, this diplomatic success for the Commonwealth Games movement was short-lived, with the 1986 Edinburgh Games unable to stave off the renewed threat of boycotts by a number of Commonwealth nations, again resulting from the issue of sporting contacts with the South African regime (Coghlan, 1990; Dheenshaw, 1984; Downes, 2002; Holt, 1989; Macfarlane, 1986; McDowell and Skillen, 2015; Monnington, 1993; Phillips, 2000, 2002; Whannel, 2008). The 1986 Games were the second time the event was hosted in Edinburgh, and it had been hoped that the 1986 Games would emulate the relative success of Edinburgh’s previous hosting of ‘The Friendly Games’ in 1970 which had been argued to have left a positive impact on the city due to its resultant infrastructure and sporting facility improvements (Bateman and Douglas, 1986; Dheenshaw, 1994; Majumdar and Mehta, 2010; Skillen and McDowell, 2014; Thomson, 2000). Monnington (1993) identifies the perceived political support for the South African regime from the Conservative government in the UK as the catalyst for the boycott of the 1986 Games, with 32 Commonwealth nations from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean refusing to participate in the event in protest. Monnington also noted that the decision of Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Prime Minister, to attend the Games was widely regarded as a political embarrassment, and led to many commentators holding her personally responsible for the boycott.

The implications of the boycott were further compounded by the resultant financial difficulties faced by the 1986 Games organising committee (Dheenshaw, 1994; Macfarlane, 1986; McDowell and Skillen, 2015), with the reduced level of international participation and the underselling of the television rights to the British Broadcasting Corporation resulting in the necessity of a bail-out from businessman Robert Maxwell and a controversial right-wing Japanese benefactor (Bateman and Douglas, 1986). Bateman and Douglas’ account represents the most thorough analysis of the political and financial controversy surrounding the 1986 Edinburgh Games. Highlighting the increasing financial burden of hosting the Commonwealth Games in the 1980s and the shift towards the commercialisation of international sports events following the success of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, Bateman and
Douglas argue that “Edinburgh’s troubles began when they failed to win the backing of big businesses in the UK and Commonwealth but even more importantly when they agreed to take on the task of organisation without Government financial backing” (ibid: 10).

The growing interconnection between the 1986 Games, political actors and corporate interests therefore increased the potential for political and financial consequences from the boycott of the Games. Thatcher’s decision to attend the Games despite the political furore of her role in relation to the boycott resulted in further political embarrassment, with the presence of numerous protest groups and the high-profile questioning of Thatcher by the English rower Joanna Toch attracting significant media attention (Bateman and Douglas, 1986). Despite their sustained cataloguing of the political and organisational failures of the Games, Bateman and Douglas conclude their analysis by reflecting on the lessons learned from the challenges faced by the Edinburgh Games:

While few will look back at Edinburgh ’86 with thanks, they will nonetheless be forced to concede that it was a turning-point where the Games changed direction and entered the brash new world of big money sport. The determination not to repeat the mistakes will ensure that Edinburgh has hosted the Games for the last time and that the opportunities for developing nations to take up the task are enhanced. (ibid: 126).

The predictions of Bateman and Douglas that the 1986 Games would be the nadir of the Commonwealth Games movement proved correct, with the 1990 Auckland Games and 1994 Victoria Games proving successful in reaffirming support for and participation in the event from all Commonwealth members (Dheenshaw, 1994; Majumdar and Mehta, 2010; Phillips, 2000). Although the 1990 Auckland Games were again threatened by a risk of a sporting boycott due to a “proposed rebel English cricket tour of South Africa” (Majumdar and Mehta, 2010: 195), this threat was avoided by the condemnation of the tour by the British government, having learned its lesson from the 1986 Games. Furthermore, the success of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa resulted in the release of Nelson Mandela and the eventual reintegration of South Africa into international diplomatic relations, allowing for a
similar reintegration into the domain of international sporting competition (Cornelissen and Swart, 2006; Majumdar and Mehta, 2010). This development therefore negated the risks of boycotts related to apartheid at the 1994 Victoria Games, and all subsequent instances from that point onwards.

In the post-apartheid era, the focus of the internal politics of the Commonwealth Games movement turned to the dominance of ‘white dominion’ nations (namely Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, Scotland, and Wales) in terms of the hosting of the Games, given that the only past incidence of the Games taking place outside these countries was Kingston, Jamaica in 1966 (Black, 2007; Dawson, 2011, 2014; Dheenshaw, 1994; Majumdar and Mehta, 2010; Mishra, 2012, 2013; Osborne et al., 2016). Miller, Lawrence, McKay & Rowe (2001) argue that “the Games routinely see the handful of white-settler nations overwhelm the formerly British Third World in competition, highlighting old colonial inequalities… only the Kingston Games had been held outside the UK or its old dominions until Kuala Lumpur in 1998” (2001: 106). Majumdar and Metha (2010) support this position, stating that the decision to award the Games to Kingston was “looked upon as a serious step forward to democratize the Games in an era of decolonization” (ibid: 98).

Subsequently, however, non-white-dominion Commonwealth nations may have been dissuaded due to the significant financial costs faced by Jamaica in hosting the 1966 Games (Dawson, 2014; Majumdar and Mehta, 2010; Muda, 1998).

Nonetheless, following the commercial success of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, the 1990s saw increased interest in hosting the Games outside of the ‘white dominions’, evidenced in the successful bid by the Malaysian government to host the 1998 Kuala Lumpur Games. Whannel’s (2008) analysis of the motivations for hosting the 1998 Games concludes that:

In a period of recovery and reconstruction, the Malaysian government utilised the Commonwealth Games as a global media spectacle, both to gain international publicity and as an opportunity to celebrate its multicultural national identity and thus ‘market’ Malaysia as a model modern Muslim society. (ibid: 215-216)
Other academic analyses of the 1998 Games concur with Whannel’s position regarding its use as a tool for marketing a positive image of the modern Malaysian nation (Black, 2008, 2014; Black and Peacock, 2011; Black and van der Westhuizen, 2004; Grix, 2013; Muda, 1998; Phillips, 2000; Silk, 2001; van der Westhuizen, 2004). For Phillips (2000), a significant element of the Malaysian government strategy was to use the 1998 Games as a stepping-stone to future hosting of larger events such as the Olympics, arguing that Malaysia’s “political masters were working to another agenda entirely and had really built their monumentally breathtaking sporting complexes in the interests of the longer-term grandiose scheme of hosting an eventual Olympic Games into the 21st Century” (2000: 3). Black (2014) similarly contends that the Malaysian government’s strategy aligns with other ‘springboarder’ hosts of ‘second-order’ sports events who aim to host larger international sporting events in the future, with Muda (1998) emphasising the importance of this strategy in Malaysian foreign policy.

In the cases of the 2002 Manchester and 2006 Melbourne Games, the aforementioned shift to the use of sports mega-events as a tool for social and urban regeneration, tourism development and infrastructural projects was replicated in the Commonwealth Games movement (Cashman et al., 2004; Dawson, 2011; Jones and Stokes, 2003; Lockstone and Baum, 2008; Majumdar and Mehta, 2010; Palmer, 2013; Preuss et al., 2007; Smith and Fox, 2007; Stewart, 2014). Despite championing the oft-cited ‘legacy’ benefits of sports mega-events amid the questionable evidence of these claims (Majumdar and Mehta, 2010), Stewart (2014) argues that the 2006 Melbourne Games has provided little evidence of long-term benefits to the city following the event aside from the fact that the Games “consolidated its positions as a world leader in delivering major sports events” (ibid: 70). Furthermore, the 2006 Games also saw the establishment of various political protest groups, such as the ‘Stolenwealth Games’ and ‘Graffiti Games’ organisations who raised issues such as the recognition of mistreatment of the indigenous Australian population and the mass removal of graffiti street art from Melbourne, respectively (Stolenwealth Games, 2006).

Delhi’s hosting of the 2010 Commonwealth Games also demonstrated the high political stakes for host governments. The Indian city had previously bid to host the
1994 Games, losing out to the eventual hosts Victoria despite appeals to award the Games to an Asian country for the first time to avoid the continued domination of the ‘white dominion’ countries (Dheenshaw, 1994). The challenges faced for the organisers of the Delhi Games, as well as the Indian government, were arguably magnified given the emphasis placed on mimicking the Malaysian government by using the 2010 Games as a ‘springboard’ for future hosting of ‘first-order’ sports mega-events such as the Olympics or the FIFA World Cup (Black, 2007, 2008, 2014; Black and Peacock, 2011; Cashman et al., 2004; Cornelissen, 2010; Dawson, 2014; Horne et al., 2013; Majumdar, 2012). Baviskar (2014) argues that Delhi’s event-based strategy revolved around a central goal of developing Delhi into a ‘world-class’ city by forcing through rapid infrastructural, social and political developments, as the “Games legitimised social and spatial changes that would have been more difficult to achieve through political and administrative processes… by focusing on the importance of the Games for national prestige and, in particular, the Indian state’s ambition to be recognized as a global superpower” (ibid: 131).

The Delhi Games were plagued by concerns about severe budgetary miscalculations, with the costs of the Games sky-rocketing by over 1000% from the original estimate of US$1.3 billion to $15 billion, resulting in the most expensive Commonwealth Games in history (Majumdar, 2011; Majumdar and Mehta, 2010; Palmer, 2013; Stewart and Rayner, 2016). Curi et al. (2011) argue that stereotypes regarding the risk of disorganisation from non-Western hosts such as Delhi dominated media discourse in Western countries, reinforcing perceptions of the primacy of developed nation-states in terms of infrastructural preparation and political competence. Whilst acknowledging the “Orientalist assumptions” of the Western media, as highlighted by Curi et al. (2011), Black argues that negative media coverage of the organisation of the Delhi Games “decisively set back the prospect of an Indian Olympics” (ibid: 18).

Many academic analyses of the event highlighted the damage suffered to ‘brand India’ by issues of infrastructural failures and accidents, corruption, social injustices and inequalities, and financial mismanagement associated with the event (Barron, 2013; Baviskar, 2014; Grix, 2013; Majumdar, 2011, 2012; Majumdar and Mehta, 2010; Mishra, 2012, 2013; Osborne et al., 2016; Sengupta, 2015). Furthermore, the Delhi Games illustrated the potential political ramifications of a perceived failure in
hosting a sporting mega-event for future hosts, with Baviskar (2014: 138) concluding that:

The Games spectacularly failed to bind the citizens of Delhi to their city’s government. Instead, they confirmed the sense of a citizenry being ripped off by its political leaders, a realization that led to a resounding electoral defeat for the Congress in Delhi in 2013.
Sport, Scottish Nationalism and 2014

The forthcoming discussion will critically review literature which considers the relationship between sport, Scottish politics and Scottish nationalism. In this discussion, particular emphasis will be placed on the nuanced relationship between sporting nationalism, cultural nationalism and political nationalism in Scotland. The literature review is then brought to a close by offering a review of recent studies which have scrutinised the implications of hosting the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow, providing the opportunity to critically reflect on their findings later in this thesis.

Sport and Scottish Nationalism

Bairner's (1996) analysis of the link between sport and Scottish national identity suggests that sport represents the most popular means for the expression of national identity in Scotland. In particular, his claims are supported through reference to team sports such as football and rugby which constitute an additional form of distinct civil society in Scotland, acting in much the same way as the 'holy trinity' of independent civic institutions found in the Scottish educational, legal and Church systems (Hearn, 2002; Jarvie and Reid, 1999; McCrone, 1992, 2005; Pittock, 2012). The existence of independent Scottish representative teams in international football and rugby competition, for example, reinforces the idea of a distinct Scottish nation (Allison, 2000; Bairner, 1994, 1996, 2000; Blain, Boyle and O'Donnell, 1993; Boyle, 2000; Brand, 1978; Jarvie and Walker, 1994; Duke and Crolley, 1996; Moorhouse, 1987; Polley, 2004; Reid, 2010), given the fact that no nations outside of the UK are afforded this opportunity where they are not recognised as a sovereign state. Bairner (2001) later highlighted that this anomaly in the international sporting system means that notions of Scottish nationhood and a congruent distinct national identity are not in doubt for Scots, despite their acceptance that the Scottish nation does not possess political independence.

In terms of popular appeal and media coverage, football is prominent in Scotland and has therefore been argued to play a particularly important role in terms of fostering a distinctive sense of Scottish identity (Bairner, 1994). Blain and Boyle (1994)
demonstrate that 'national-symbolic' ideas, stories and narratives of Scotland and Scottish identity are prevalent in media coverage of Scottish sport, and this is significantly pronounced in the case of football. Amongst an array of narrative tropes deployed in Scottish sports media coverage, the authors identify certain narratives which are utilised frequently, such as representations of Scotland as the underdog, a tendency to flip between scepticism and optimism in a short space of time, and attempts to frame distinct styles of football associated with Scottish players such as skilful artistry (historically) and physicality (recently).

Another topic of academic interest in the study of Scottish sport and nationalism is the nature of the 'Tartan Army' which consists of supporters of the Scottish national football team, with particular attention being paid to the behaviour, attire and symbolism associated with this group when attending away fixtures held outside of Scotland. The 'Tartan Army' has often been presented as an example of national pride for Scots, with emphasis often placed on their reputation for lively but good-natured support for the Scottish team in media coverage of their exploits. A number of academics have argued that this positive coverage has resulted in a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts whereby the 'Tartan Army' attempts to maintain this reputation (Bairner, 1994; Blain, Boyle and O'Donnell, 1993; Boyle, 2000; Boyle and Haynes, 2009; Kowalski, 2004), with Blain and Boyle (1994) suggesting that this leads to elements of performance and self-caricature in relation to their actions, customs and attire.

Giulianotti's (1991) analysis of the 'Tartan Army' drew similar conclusions to the arguments of Bairner, Blain and Boyle, employing Goffman's (1975) dramaturgical theory to emphasise the manner in which Scottish football fans use stereotypes of themselves to perform the role of the 'Tartan Army foot-soldier'. Bairner (1994, 2000) reflects on the underlying motivations for maintaining the positive reputation of the 'Tartan Army', suggesting that one of the key motives for Scottish football fans is to distinguish themselves from English football fans, who had developed a significant reputation for violent behaviour and hooliganism in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, Bairner (1994, 1996) identifies the loss of the 'Home Internationals' and the lack of regular competition on the pitch in football as a driving force behind the attempts of the 'Tartan Army' to distinguish themselves from England, suggesting that
such a tactic is also a signifier of anti-English sentiment within Scottish national and sporting identity.

Although football has often been the central focus of academic discussion of the relationship between Scottish national identity and sport, other sports have also been argued to contribute towards a distinct sense of Scottishness. In terms of team sports, rugby union follows football in terms of popularity, and the representation of Scotland by a separate team on the international stage mirrors the status of the Scottish football team (Kowalski, 2004; Massie, 2000). Rugby union has therefore also received attention regarding its relationship to Scottish nationalism and national identity, with particular attention paid to the decision by the traditionally conservative Scottish Rugby Union to opt to play nationalist-associated 'Flower of Scotland' rather than 'God Save The Queen' as the Scottish national anthem before international matches (Bairner, 2000; Jarvie, 1993, 2017; Jarvie and Reid, 1999; Jarvie and Walker, 1994; Kowalski, 2004).

Maguire et al. (2000) highlight the symbolic importance of national anthems in the British sporting and political context, arguing that the choice of anthem is “informative about the state of respective senses of Englishness, Scottishness, Irishness and Welshness… the national anthem of Great Britain, ‘God Save the Queen’, is owned by none of the respective countries that play in these matches” (ibid: 151). Given Massie’s (2000) identification of rugby’s strong links with the middle classes of Scotland (apart from in the Borders area where class association is less pronounced), this decision is therefore an interesting development in the relationship between sport and Scottish cultural nationalism as such political stances were traditionally associated with the working-classes. However, the decision may have also been pragmatic in nature due to concerns about potential replication of the booing of ‘God Save The Queen’ which had been evident at Scottish international football matches (Jarvie and Reid, 1999).

Individual sports can also be demonstrated to have a role in the expression of Scottish nationalist sentiment, although to a lesser extent in comparison to team sports such as football and rugby union. Whilst team sports offer the opportunity to foster a sense of collective support of a Scottish team on a mass scale, whether in person or via
consumption of mediated sports coverage, the role of individual sports differs. Nationalist sentiment is instead demonstrated through the valorisation of individual Scottish performances over other British successes in the Scottish media and general public (Blain, Boyle and O’Donnell, 1993; Boyle and Haynes, 1996; Whigham, 2014). For example, Blain, Boyle and O’Donnell (1993) argue that:

…whereas the Scottish media traditionally display little sympathy with English football clubs and even less for the English national side, a tendency echoed in other sports like rugby union, it is notable that, in their coverage of the Olympics, they also appear to celebrate the victory of English/British athletes, and bemoan their failure, with no less commitment than the English papers. (ibid: 173).

The conditional nature of the support offered by the Scottish media and sports fans to athletes in individual sports is further complicated in the case of the Commonwealth Games, given that the home nations split off to compete against other in this event (Haynes and Boyle, 2008: Houlihan, 1997; Jarvie and Reid, 1999; Reid, 2010). Furthermore, given the lack of success for Scottish national representatives in team sports, the achievements of individual athletes offer the greatest opportunity for Scots to celebrate sporting success:

Often these successes are focused around individual sports stars such as Andy Murray in tennis, John Higgins in snooker, or Dario Franchitti, in Indy car racing. In some cases these individual athletes are partly defined by their 'Scottishness' (for example, Andy Murray with his saltire sweatbands or comments about his lack of support for England in the 2006 FIFA World Cup), at other times less so. (Haynes and Boyle, 2008: 265)

Although individual sports tend to carry weaker associations with nationalist sentiment (Whigham, 2014), the case of Andy Murray exemplifies the potential for the intertwining of individual athletes with political controversy. Firstly, his joke that he would not be supporting England in the 2006 FIFA World Cup resulted in a backlash, prompting media discussions that these comments, along with other perceptions about Murray’s personality and political stance, had resulted in a lack of support for Murray from English tennis fans (BBC News, 2006; Channel 4 News, 2012; Jones, 2012; Ochman, 2013). Secondly, Murray’s victories at the 2012
London Olympics, 2012 US Open and 2013 Wimbledon competitions led to accusations of political exploitation of his successes by politicians such as Alex Salmond, who emphasised Murray’s ‘Scottishness’ following his 2012 successes and controversially waved a Scottish saltire flag at the Wimbledon final, and David Cameron, who emphasised Murray’s ‘Britishness’ following his 2012 Olympic gold medal (Channel 4 News, 2012; Harris and Skillen, 2016; Sharp et al., 2014). Murray himself expressed his dissatisfaction at the political exploitation of his successes when question on his opinion on Alex Salmond, stating that Salmond “seemed perfectly nice to me, but I didn’t like it when he got the Scottish flag up at Wimbledon” (Shipman, 2014).

*Sport and Politics in Contemporary Scotland*

Despite examples such as these where Scottish sport and politics have mixed, and the importance of sport for fostering and maintaining Scottish national identity, most analyses of Scottish sport have argued that there is no direct correlation between sporting nationalism and political nationalism for the majority of Scots (Bairner, 1994, 1996, 2001; Jarvie, 1993; Jarvie and Walker, 1994; Kelly, 2007a). These arguments have often highlighted the relative fallacy of claims regarding the impact of sporting victory or defeat on political events, such as the suggestion that the failed campaign of the Scottish football team in the 1978 FIFA World Cup may have influenced the result of the 1979 referendum on Scottish devolution (Bairner, 1994; Boyle and Haynes, 2009; Jarvie, 1993; Jarvie and Reid, 1999; Jarvie and Walker, 1994; Kowalski, 2004).

The oft-quoted remark by the outgoing SNP MP for Govan Jim Sillars following his defeat in the 1992 general election in which he denounced his fellow Scots as ‘90-minute patriots’ has been used to symbolise the lack of synergy between sporting and political nationalism in Scotland (Bairner, 1996, 2015; Jarvie, 2017; Jarvie and Reid, 1999; Kowalski, 2004). However, in contrast to his predecessor, Alex Salmond argued that Scotland’s successful qualification for the 1998 FIFA World Cup helped to boost the ‘Yes’ vote in the 1999 referendum (Kowalski, 2004). For Jarvie and Walker (1994), the 'substitute thesis' adopted by Sillars which views sporting nationalism as a direct replacement for sporting nationalism is “at once too static and
too one-dimensional to help us explain the way sport has reflected Scottish life in its different political, social and cultural manifestations” (1994: 2). In contrast, Bairner (1994, 1996) lends some support to the '90-minute patriot’ thesis, contending that it may be safer for Scots to display sporting nationalism rather than political nationalism given the internal divisions in Scotland caused by religious and regional identity. For Bairner, these fissures prevent the possibility of achieving any semblance of a singular Scottish identity, whether in a cultural, political or sporting sense, thereby highlighting the complexity of analysing Scottish national identity.

These divisions in Scottish society have been discussed at length in academic studies of Scottish sport, with particular attention being paid to the existence of sectarian, ethnic and racial discrimination as a counter-argument against notions of a singular ‘Scottish’ identity (Bairner, 1994; Bradley, 1995, 2002, 2006; Boyle and Haynes, 2009; Dimeo and Finn, 2001; Finn, 1991a, 1991b; Horne, 1995; Kowalski, 2004), and the findings of such studies deserve consideration at this juncture. Kowalski (2004) emphasises the importance of acknowledging these divisions in Scottish society and sporting culture, outlining the continued existence of sectarianism in Scottish football, the relative lack of female interest in Scottish sport, and the existence of class and regional differences within Scotland.

The first of the issues highlighted by Kowalski (2004), sectarianism, has been a common topic in academic reflections on Scottish sport and society, with Kowalski stating that “[f]ootball, the so-called ‘national game’, still provides an important focus for the perpetuation of the sectarian divisions that have marred Scotland since the second half of the nineteenth century” (ibid: 73). Bairner (1994) highlights the significant influence of sectarianism on patterns of support for Scottish club teams, with this phenomenon explaining the hegemonic position of the Glaswegian ‘Old Firm’ clubs of Rangers and Celtic due to their association with Protestantism and Catholicism, respectively. Although similar arguments have been made relating to religious affiliations of other Scottish football clubs historically, such as in the case of Hibernian and Heart of Midlothian in Edinburgh, most academic analyses have conceded that the present influence of sectarianism on these clubs is not to the same extent as in the ‘Old Firm’ context (Holt, 1989; Kowalski, 2004; Kelly, 2007a, 2007b, 2013).
In the case of Celtic, Bradley (1995) suggests that the historic popularity of the club has been due to its position as a symbol for Irish Catholic immigrants in Scotland, a section of Scottish society which perceives itself as victim of racism, prejudice and sectarianism. This strategy of integration has been argued to be in stark contrast to the sporting culture found in the Republic of Ireland given the successful establishment of the GAA, with its strategy to promote a distinct Irish sporting culture separate from the ‘British’ sports of football and rugby (Bairner, 2002; Bradley, 1998, 2007; Houlihan, 1997; Jarvie, 1993; Jarvie and Walker, 1994; Sugden and Bairner, 1993). Other authors have outlined the association of Celtic with the ethnic and religious identities associated with Irishness and Catholicism, whilst also outlining potential examples of discrimination against this section of the population in Scottish football and Scottish society (Dimeo and Finn, 2001; Finn, 1991a, 1991b; Horne, 1995; Kelly, 2011). These examples of perceived discrimination with Irish Catholics and Celtic fans are often juxtaposed against the situation of Rangers supporters, who have frequently been associated with overt expressions of Protestantism, Orangeism, loyalism (in the context of the Irish question) and/or unionism (in relation to the question of Scottish independence) in past academic analyses (Bairner, 1994; Bradley, 2013; Flint and Kelly, 2013; Holt, 1989; Jarvie and Walker, 1994; Kowalski, 2004).

The issue of sectarianism in Scottish football and society has recently prompted legislative action by the SNP-led Scottish Government, resulting in the introduction of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 (Crawford, 2013; Davis, 2013; Flint and Kelly, 2013; May, 2015; Rosie, 2013; Waiton, 2013). On the premise that existing legislation to deal with offensive behaviour in football was inadequate, the Scottish Government proposed and passed this legislation thanks to the existence of a SNP majority (Crawford, 2013). However, both the content of the Bill and the process of its passing drew significant criticism from opposition political parties, sections of the Scottish media, the general public and academics (BBC News, 2011a, 2011b; Crawford, 2013; Flint and Powell, 2014; May, 2015; Waiton, 2013, 2014). For Waiton (2013, 2014) and Crawford (2013), this has led to the demonization of football fans who wish to express their cultural and ethnic identities freely, arguing that the Act has ironically led to intolerance of such individuals and restrictions on their freedom of speech. Although
other academics have adopted more cautious positions on the relative merits of the Act (Kelly and Flint, 2013; Rosie, 2013), the controversy demonstrates the difficulties faced by government policy-makers when intervening in the domain of sport.

In addition to the issue of sectarianism in Scottish football, the expression of anti-English sentiment has been discussed in a number of analyses of Scottish national identity and sport, and the sporting rivalry between Scotland and England. Anti-English sentiment is often held to be most prevalent during major sporting events such as the FIFA World Cup, the UEFA European Championships and the IRB Rugby World Cup (Abell, 2010; Blain and Boyle, 1994; Blain, Boyle and O’Donnell, 1993; Boyle and Haynes, 2009; Jarvie and Reid, 1999; Watson, 2003). It has therefore been argued that sport represents one particular domain in which anti-Englishness is openly expressed within Scottish society (Bairner, 1994, 1996; Kowalski, 2004; McIntosh, Sim and Robertson, 2004b), although the earlier discussion of the existence of such sentiment in wider Scottish society suggests that sport is not the sole domain for its expression (Hussain and Miller, 2005a, 2005b; McIntosh, Sim and Robertson 2004a; Watson, 2003).

The work of Moorhouse (1984, 1986, 1987, 1994, 1995) remains the most comprehensive analysis of the nature of anti-English sentiment in Scottish sport. Such sentiment is argued to manifest itself numerous ways, with Scots argued to suffer from a form of 'repressed nationalism' in sport (Moorhouse, 1986), ideas of English superiority and Scottish inferiority in both a sporting and wider sense (Moorhouse, 1987), and the development of asymmetric migration flows of Scottish footballers to England given the greater career opportunities available (Moorhouse, 1987, 1994, 1995). This latter issue is developed upon in Miller, Lawrence, McKay and Rowe’s (2001) discussion of the impact of globalisation in sport, wherein the authors present their arguments regarding the ‘NICL’ (New International Division of Cultural Labour) by drawing upon the case of Scottish football within the UK, partially echoing the ‘internal colonialism’ thesis of Hechter (1975).

A number of other academics have analysed the nature of anti-English sentiment in Scottish sport. Bairner (1994) claims that anti-English sentiment acts as a central
'ingredient' of Scottish sporting identity, and later argued that such sentiment has remained salient as it affords the opportunity to develop a sense of unity within Scottish identity whilst ignoring other religious, regional and class-based schisms with Scottish sport and society (Bairner, 2001). Furthermore, McIntosh, Sim and Robertson (2004b) found that sport remained a common domain for the expression of 'tribal' anti-Englishness in their study of the experiences of English migrants living in Scotland, whereas Whigham (2014) highlighted its links to an ‘underdog mentality’ narrative amongst Scots. Kelly's (2007a) extensive study of Scottish sporting identity generated mixed findings concerning the extent of anti-English sentiment. Kelly argues that Scottish devolution has rendered the historical political antagonism between Scotland and England obsolete due to perceptions of Scottish-Labour versus English-Conservative voting patterns, and his analysis also demonstrate that there was no clear correlation between anti-English sentiment and support for Scottish political nationalism. Kelly’s arguments align, therefore, with those of Giulianotti (1991) who asserted that Scotland is gradually abandoning its “cultural dislike” of England (ibid: 522).

*Sport, Scottish Politics and the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games*

The final sub-section of the literature review narrows its focus to the limited range of studies which have considered the case of the 2014 Commonwealth Games, and particularly their political, economic and societal ramifications. One example of the relationship between the Glasgow Games and Scottish politics lies in the original motives for bidding to host the 2014 Games. Following the re-establishment of a Scottish Parliament in 1999, Scottish politicians have had the opportunity to pursue distinct strategies to promote certain Scottish economic, social and political goals. One such strategy has seen Scotland, and particularly Glasgow, actively pursue a range of sporting events as part of an economic development strategy underpinned by tourism promotion, infrastructural improvements and urban regeneration (Chaney, 2015b; Christie and Gibb, 2015; Lockstone and Baum, 2008; Matheson, 2010; Mooney et al., 2015; Salisbury, 2013). The ‘Year of Homecoming 2014’ is of particular interest when considering the importance of sport for this strategy (EventScotland, 2008; VisitScotland, 2011), as Scotland hosted two major sporting
events in 2014 - the Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the Ryder Cup at Gleneagles.

As noted above, the growing financial costs of hosting major sports events has necessitated governmental support towards hosting costs, thus leading to increasing political scrutiny of the economic returns on the investment of public funds. Black (2014) argues that 'second-order' events such as the Glasgow Games are of great importance to “locales for whom second-order games at the only realistic means of pursuing event-centred development strategies” (ibid: 16), given that any attempts to 'springboard' to larger sporting events (as was the case of Kuala Lumpur 1998 or Delhi 2010) is not feasible for smaller host nations such as Scotland (Horne, 2015b). Haynes and Boyle (2008) argue that the strategic goals for Glasgow 2014 are therefore limited, claiming that the “aim of the organisers will be to offer a distinctively Scottish version of the relationship between sport and society” (ibid: 267-268). Indeed, image projection and tourism promotion have been widely contended to form a central tenet of the 2014 Games legacy strategy (Chaney, 2015b; Clark and Kearns, 2016; Horne, 2015b; Lockstone and Baum, 2008; Matheson, 2010; Owe, 2012; Rogerson, 2016).

Owe’s (2012) review of evidence of past event legacies was commissioned by the Scottish Government to investigate the likelihood of achieving a meaningful legacy from the 2014 Games. Whilst Owe praised the comprehensive nature of the Games’ legacy plans, her findings also mirrored the findings of others that legacy evaluations of past events lacked robust evidence or had mixed evidence of their positive impact (Clark and Kearns, 2015; Horne, 2007; Martin and Barth, 2013; McCartney et al., 2012; Mooney et al., 2015; Stewart and Rayner, 2016). Furthermore, analyses have cautioned against commonly-held perceptions about the possibility of a ‘trickle-down effect’ in terms of using funding for elite level sporting competitions to boost community sports and physical activity participation (Clark and Kearns, 2015, 2016), whilst others urge caution on the validity of claims regarding the ‘feel-good effect’ of hosting events such as the Games (Matheson, 2010; McCartney et al., 2012; Owe, 2012; Stewart and Rayner, 2016).
Indeed, the Scottish Government’s (2015) own analysis from the Scottish Health Survey on the impact of the Games on sports and physical activity participation demonstrated only minor positive impacts upon the aspirations of the Scottish population to increase participation; furthermore, these statistics only reviewed the opinions of the respondents on their willingness to participate, rather than measuring their actual participation. This is problematic for achieving the planned legacy of the Games, given the centrality of using the Games to boost sports and physical activity participation to improve health outcomes in the Glaswegian and Scottish population (McCartney et al., 2010; McCartney et al., 2012), or to overcome barriers relating to disability sports participation (McPherson et al., 2016; Misener et al., 2015). Rogerson (2016) elaborated further upon the legacy planning for the 2014 Games, highlighting the attempts by its organisers to achieve legacy outcome in additional areas outside of sports participation, including educational, transport, environmental, employment, housing and cultural benefits for Glasgow and Scotland. He highlights that these outcomes also formed part of a ‘pre-Games legacy’ strategy which sought to demonstrate measurable improvements in each of these areas in advance of the event, before achieving further improvements following the Games. Whilst Rogerson praises the positive impact of efforts in this area, he also raises concerns about the feasibility of sustaining short-term improvements over the long-term to achieve a tangible legacy.

Matheson’s (2010) analysis of the legacy planning for the 2014 Games drew similar conclusions to those of Owe and Rogerson, emphasising the mixed evidence of legacy at past events in light of the attempts of the Games’ planners to use the event as a catalyst for urban regeneration in Glasgow. However, Matheson also highlights that the organisers and government faced additional challenges in achieving these regeneration goals due to the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, citing the cancellation of the Glasgow Airport Rail Link as an example of the ramifications of the crisis. Christie and Gibb (2015) drew similar conclusions about the centrality of urban regeneration in the rationale for hosting the 2014 Games, highlighting the challenges faced in achieving such goals. Despite these challenges, they highlighted the relative strength of the partnership coordinated by the Glasgow Legacy Board responsible for the Games, claiming that the success of the collaborations between
the various organisations involved can act as a template for future attempts to achieve successful event-led regeneration strategies (Clark and Kearns, 2016).

Other academic reflections on the hosting of the 2014 Games have been more critical in tone. For example, Gray and Porter’s (2015) analysis of the use of Compulsory Purchase Orders (CPOs) to secure land for Games-related infrastructure and facilities highlight the exploitation of the ‘state of exception’ created by hosting major events by the Scottish Government and Glasgow City Council to forcibly remove residents from socially deprived areas such as Dalmarnock. In particular, Gray and Porter explore the case of the Jaconelli family who were forcibly removed from their privately-owned property to make way for the Games Athletes’ Village, highlighting the inconsistent treatment of cases such as that of the Jaconellis who were offered compensation significantly below market value through enforced CPOs in comparison to commercial landowners who received in excess of the market value without CPO enforcement. For Gray and Porter, CPOs have been used as “a classed tool mobilised to violently displace working class neighbourhoods... a fictionalised mantra of “necessity” combines neoliberal growth logics with their obscene underside - a stigmatisation logic that demonises poor urban neighbourhoods” (ibid: 380). They therefore contend that the spurious claims concerning the legacy of the Games is used as a discursive tool to justify the ‘necessity’ of the pursuit of economic regeneration of deprived areas, thus creating a ‘state of exception’ for the use of CPOs through legislation such as the Glasgow Commonwealth Games Act (2008).

Paton et al. (2012) are equally critical of the underpinning ideologies which inform the Scottish Government’s approach to regeneration through the Games. They argue that these assumptions draw upon neoliberal principles, and suggest that they result in market-led economic and social development strategies from states, whilst also contending that consumption acts as the central medium for social participation and citizenship for individuals in these areas. This therefore invokes the ‘trickle-down’ belief about the use of sporting events for development purposes, with Paton et al. (2012) aligning themselves with the arguments of others regarding the fallacy of such beliefs (Clark and Kearns, 2015, 2016; Matheson, 2010; Mooney et al., 2015; Owe, 2012; Stewart and Rayner, 2016). Indeed, for Paton et al., the market-led beliefs underpinning contemporary notions of urban regeneration are linked to prevalent
forms of class practice, whereby disadvantaged areas are treated as problems to be solved via market-led economic regeneration strategies. Gray and Mooney (2011: 7) suggest that this strategy manifests itself in narratives which position the 2014 Games as a solution to deprivation in the East End of Glasgow which “is viewed as a drag on economic growth and the continuing prosperity of both the city and Scotland as a whole. In much of the official narrative Glasgow East has come to symbolise a place of backwardness and decay”. Gray and Mooney therefore remain sceptical about this depiction of the Games, arguing that:

…the discourse of regeneration, the engineering of collective hyperbole around the Commonwealth Games and the advancement of the ‘Team Glasgow’ mantra, operate as both placebo for genuine participation models, and as alibis for property-led regeneration activity and punitive labour market policy. (ibid: 19)

These arguments are symptomatic of the central arguments of critics of the official narratives of the legacy of the 2014 Games, with a consensus emerging which questions the extent to which the economic and social benefits of the event will effectively prioritise the local population (Clark and Kearns, 2015, 2016; Gray and Mooney, 2011; Gray and Porter, 2015; Martin and Barth; 2013; Mooney et al., 2015; Paton et al., 2012).

The 2014 Commonwealth Games and the Scottish Independence Referendum

Attention now turns to the limited number of studies which have explicitly considered the interconnection between the 2014 Games and the independence referendum. Given that events such as the Commonwealth Games act as the pinnacle of an events-based strategy for the Scottish Government, the political importance of the Games is arguably magnified. Haynes and Boyle (2008) also remark that the opportunity for Scotland to compete as a separate Scottish team as a host nation will draw further attention to the relationship between sport and national identity. However, as their discussion was written before the formation of the SNP government in 2011, they did not have foresight of the forthcoming independence referendum which has added an additional layer of interest to their predictions about the symbolism of a separate Scottish team at the Games.
Jarvie’s (2017) chapter on the interconnection between the Games, Scottish sport and the independence referendum represents the most extensive articulation of the relationship between these events to date. His work identifies a number of issues which illustrate the potential political ramifications relating to Scottish independence, sport and the Games, such as the potential impact for elite sportspeople in Scotland regarding funding and training facilities, the publication of sports policy documents by the Scottish Government such as the Working Group on Scottish Sport Final Report (Scottish Government, 2013a, 2014) and the White Paper on Scottish independence (Scottish Government, 2013b), and the timing of the referendum in the post-Games period. These themes are also identified in Harris and Skillen’s (2016) reflection on the politicisation of sport vis-à-vis the referendum, placing particular emphasis on the role of the media in raising these potentially contentious issues in their comments on the Games. To this end, Harris and Skillen remark that:

The referendum debate was ever-present in much of the discussion around Scottish sport and offered opportune sites for political capital to be gained. The media… would also at times actively look for an angle whereby they could weave the issue of independence into narratives of sporting success. (2016: 92)

Reflecting upon the potential ramifications of the Games for the outcome of the referendum, Jarvie concluded that the event remained marginal in the referendum campaigns, highlighting that “the Yes and No camps strived for political advantage while not wanting to be seen to be overtly using the Games to deliver referendum messages” (2017: 216). Whilst acknowledging arguments that the Games could result in a ‘feel-good’ factor which could influence the outcome, Jarvie also cited the findings of opinion polling which highlighted the limited impact of the Games on referendum voting intentions (Survation, 2014). Jarvie therefore concludes that:

…during the Scottish Referendum campaign sport was neither a driver of cultural or political nationalism nor a hotly contested political issue. This is in the sense that it had no real political power in helping either the Yes or No campaign to achieve their political goals or influence Yes or No voters which way to vote. (2017: 219)
Ochman’s (2013) reflections on the political implications of the Games identifies similar issues to those noted by Jarvie (2017), again highlighting the concerns of elite athletes about the potential implications of Scottish independence and echoing Jarvie’s comments on the marginal impact of events such as the London 2012 Olympics on referendum voting intention. Nonetheless, in contrast to Jarvie, Ochman contends that:

…it is more than probable that the Games will be used by the Scottish government as a powerful tool in the battle for independence. For First Minister Alex Salmond and his Scottish National Party, sport events constitute a unique occasion to underline Scottish autonomy. (2013: 78)

Ochman bases this contention on her observations of the SNP’s responses to the symbolism of the London 2012 Olympics, highlighting Alex Salmond’s attempts to distinguish the success of Scottish athletes of those of ‘Scolympians’ rather than members of ‘Team GB’. Harris and Skillen’s (2016) reflection on the interconnection between sport and the referendum places similar emphasis on the nature of these political interventions regarding the Olympics, contending that “[w]ith the referendum looming ever closer, it was clear that competing claims for these medal winners was going to become an ever-present issue” (ibid: 84). This again highlights the potentially dualistic symbolism of major sporting events such as the Olympics and the Commonwealth Games, given their associations with both Britishness and Scottishness (Ewen. 2012; Iorwerth et al., 2014; Jarvie and Reid, 1999; MacRury and Poynter, 2010; Marks, 2010; McDowell and Skillen, 2015; Polley, 2014; Salisbury, 2013; Thomas and Antony, 2015). Chaney’s (2015a) analysis of the SNP’s election manifestos drew similar conclusions about the use of sport as a medium for emphasising their goals of independence, highlighting the ability to use sport for wider international recognition of Scottish nationhood. Furthermore, Jarvie and Reid (1999) highlight that similar strategies were used in the period immediately prior to the 1997 referendum on Scottish devolution, with sports personalities used to highlight support for devolution and the media invoking sport to mobilise nationalist sentiment. It therefore appears that similar beliefs about the interconnection between sport and Scottish nationalism were echoed in the climate leading up to the 2014 independence referendum, with both the pro-independence
and pro-union campaigns citing support from sporting personalities for their respective political goals (Harvie and Skillen, 2016; Jarvie, 2017; Ochman, 2013).

Mole’s (2014) brief editorial on the interconnection between the Games and the referendum drew similar conclusions to Jarvie (2017) and Ochman (2013) on the lack of political impact of the Games on the outcome of the vote, highlighting that “[c]oming towards the end of the Scottish referendum campaign, the Games avoided politics but allowed both the ‘Yes’ camp and the ‘Better Together’ campaign to draw comfort” (2014: 453), alluding to the campaign break which materialised during the Games period. However, Mole equally offers some speculation that the fact that Glasgow was one of the few areas which had a majority of ‘Yes’ votes could be partly attributed to the success of the Games. However, the dualistic nature of the symbolism of the Games is also highlighted by Mole, with his arguments about the potential to use the event to support both pro-independence and pro-union arguments undermining his speculative comments about the political interconnection between the Games and the referendum. Furthermore, the lack of empirical evidence in the account of Mole (2014), as also applies to Ochman (2013), Harris and Skillen (2016) and Jarvie (2017), means that the extent to which their claims regarding the interconnection between these two events require further empirical investigation.
Summary

This literature review has explored an array of academic sources and theoretical contributions which contextualise the current study. Having commenced this discussion with a review of the predominant academic theorisations of nationalism outlined in Smith’s (2010) typology, it was possible to outline the conceptual frameworks which can be drawn upon by political actors in their discursive framing and narration of Scotland’s constitutional status and future. The use of Smith’s typology of theories of nationalism facilitated the opportunity to delineate between contrasting conceptualisations of the nature of nations and nationalism, thus offering the possibility to examine which specific conceptualisations are invoked in the discourse of contemporary political actors. As will be discussed in the forthcoming section which outlines the methodological and conceptual framework adopted in this study, particular emphasis will be dedicated to the nature of discursive representations of the Scottish nation, both past and present. To this end, application of the contrasting theoretical approaches outlined in Smith’s typology will allow for the opportunity to identify the various ways in which contemporary political discourse with regards to Scotland’s constitutional future draws upon specific conceptual frameworks within the field of nationalism, whether intentionally or unintentionally.

The specific exploration of the nature of Scottish nationalism has also allowed for a consideration of the extent to which the predominant theorisations have been evident in studies of Scottish nationalism, offering an opportunity to chart the historical development of Scottish nationalism and Scottish politics. In particular, the above section which outlined academic literature on the history of Scottish nationalism acts as a basis for examining the historical roots upon which political and discursive claims regarding the historical development of the Scottish nation are founded. Given this, this discussion can be seen to provide a corpus of major developments in the history of Scotland, thus allowing the opportunity to explore the validity of the claims made by both pro-independence and pro-union politicians in the discourse on Scotland’s political past. These findings are utilised in the forthcoming results and discussion chapters to critically analyse the nature of political discourse on Scotland’s constitutional future emanating from the 2014 independence referendum campaigns,
with specific consideration being given to the alignment of Scottish political parties with contrasting conceptualisations of the Scottish nation. Furthermore, the extended discussion of historical developments in the specific domain of Scottish politics facilitates the opportunity to chart long-term trends in the voting patterns and prevalent political ideologies in Scotland. Given the arguments of academics such Armstrong (1982, 2004) and Smith (2010) about the importance of analysing the development of nations and nationalism over the ‘longue duree’, this discussion of the long-term development of Scottish political nationalism thus contextualises the rise of nationalist political parties such as the Scottish National Party, resulting in the eventual hosting of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum.

The later sections of the literature review focused attention upon the interconnection between sport, politics and nationalism, with particular attention being paid to the political ramifications of hosting sporting events such as the Commonwealth Games. Given the apparent disconnect between the frequent perpetuation of arguments by certain politicians regarding the ‘myth of autonomy’ (Allison, 1993), which suggests sporting events should not be mired in political debates, and the contrasting contentions of academics, which have frequently illustrated the continued politicisation of these events by elite political actors, it is possible to explore the extent to which these competing arguments are evident in the discourse of Scottish political actors in relation to the Glasgow 2014 Games. Furthermore, by drawing upon academic analyses of past iterations of events such as the Olympic Games, the FIFA World Cup, and the Commonwealth Games itself, it becomes possible to locate the discourses of the 2014 Commonwealth Games within the wider context of past case studies. Furthermore, the preponderance of mixed findings regarding the economic, social, sporting and political benefits of hosting past events can be used to critique the claims about the hosting of the Games made by contemporary political actors in the Scottish context. As the rhetoric regarding the ‘legacies’ of major international sporting events has now become ubiquitous within political, media and public discussions of events such as the Games, foregrounding the forthcoming analysis of political discourse relating to Glasgow 2014 allows for the possibility of exploring the nature and validity of the justifications given for hosting the Games in relation to past academic studies of similar events.
Finally, the discussion of the interconnection between sport and Scottish nationalism has facilitated the opportunity to explore the complex and nuanced relationship between the two phenomena historically. As outlined above, the existence of strong Scottish nationalist sentiment in both a sporting and wider cultural context has not necessarily led to a corollary with regards to political nationalism or support for Scottish independence. However, given the temporal proximity of the Games and the independence referendum, the forthcoming analysis will facilitate an opportunity to develop upon the past literature on this topic, whilst equally assessing the extent to which these past contentions hold true in a context of growing political nationalism in Scotland. These findings are applied in the forthcoming discussion to critically reflect upon the potential impact of the Games upon the outcome of the independence referendum, allowing for a critical discussion of the contrasting hypotheses and speculative comments about the validity of assertions concerning the interconnection between the two events. To this end, the aforementioned lack of empirical evidence in existing academic reflections on the relationship between the Games and the independence referendum will be addressed in the forthcoming analysis, facilitating the opportunity to complement the existing arguments of Mole (2014), Ochman (2013), Harris and Skillen (2016), and Jarvie (2017).
Chapter 3 - Methodology

Introduction

This chapter outlines the theoretical, conceptual and methodological principles which inform the data collection and analysis methods adopted for this study. With its central emphasis on the content and production of political discourse relating to the 2014 Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the Scottish independence referendum, the research methodology is primarily informed by academic studies in the fields of narrative analysis (NA) and critical discourse analysis (CDA). The emphasis placed in this study on identifying recurrent discursive forms from primary and secondary data sources requires a consideration of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of these methodological fields, as well as a reflexive critique of the relative merits of the chosen methodology, whilst acknowledging that no such discussion can provide a complete analysis of each analytical strand.

Since the approach adopted in this study uses a partial synthesis of distinct yet potentially complementary analytical frameworks, a thorough discussion of the paradigmatic assumptions of the methodology is provided initially. Discussion then focuses on the provision of a more detailed outline of the central concepts evident in the fields of NA and CDA. Finally, the discussion concludes with a detailed outline of the synthesis of the specific analytical frameworks adopted, a discussion of the specific empirical methods employed, and a consideration of the role of researcher reflexivity in politically-oriented research projects.
Theoretical, Ontological and Epistemological Considerations

In order to effectively foreground the theoretical, ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the current study, it is pertinent to provide a reflexive analysis of the paradigmatic assumptions which guide the methodological decisions employed throughout. For reasons of brevity, consideration will be restricted to the central ontological and epistemological debates which have underpinned paradigmatic differences in academic research. Broadly speaking, the two dominant paradigms adopted when conceptualising the term ‘science’ are positivism and interpretivism (Gratton and Jones, 2004; Silk, Andrews and Mason, 2005), although each paradigm contains a number of varied constituent methodologies with differing assumptions about the research process (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Guba and Lincoln, 2005). Comparing the paradigmatic assumptions of these two approaches facilitates concise analysis of this debate; however such a comparison has the limitation of polarising alternative approaches such as postpositivism and other interpretive variants in a simplistic, dichotomous manner.

Ontologically, the positivist paradigm argues for an ‘external-realist’ character of reality, where truth and reality are independent of and external to human beings, and can therefore be uncovered using the medium of scientific inquiry (Sparkes, 1994; Guba and Lincoln, 2005; Willig, 2008). In contrast, interpretivists argue that reality is ‘internal-idealist’ in character, suggesting that there are multiple realities which are constructed by the researcher depending on his/her specific interpretation of the information at hand, with different interpretations leading to different realities (Sparkes, 1994; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Sparkes and Smith, 2014). These ontological differences impact on the epistemological assumptions which, in turn, influence the manner in which research should be conducted in order to acquire or further ‘knowledge’. A positivist epistemology prioritises the use of objectivity and quantification in research, emphasising the importance of eliminating potential researcher bias in order to provide evidence and findings which accurately reflect the external reality and truth associated with the research subject (Sparkes and Smith, 2014; Guba and Lincoln, 2005). However, an interpretivist stance would argue that such a goal in itself is impossible to achieve since reality is interpreted differently by each individual, thereby ruling out the possibility of truly objective findings which
are finite and indisputable (Sparkes, 1994; Guba and Lincoln, 2005). Therefore, interpretivism prioritises ‘understanding’ of and insight into the complexity of the universe by attempting to provide rich qualitative data which can delve deeper into the subject at hand, whilst avoiding definitive claims about their research findings.

In terms of establishing the criteria used to determine what is ‘scientific’, the traditional positivist notion of science has been predominant by comparison with the interpretivist conceptualisation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). These positivist criteria emphasise the importance of adhering to certain common conventions in scientific endeavour, such as a search for a universal truth, the processes of theorisation and falsification, and the importance of validity, reliability and generalisability as markers of good scientific practice (Giddens, 1976; Sparkes, 1994; Silk, Andrews and Mason, 2005). The ontological and epistemological stance of traditional conceptualisations of science demands a rigorous and systematic approach in order to generate objective knowledge of the reality that exists externally to us as humans. Therefore, qualitative research is often rejected as unscientific because the paradigmatic assumptions of interpretivism challenge the possibility and plausibility of this ‘scientific’ approach (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).

All of this links strongly to procedural arguments against qualitative research, which claim that the interpretivist paradigm renders it impossible for qualitative research to achieve the common conventions of scientific inquiry, such as universal truth, validity, reliability, generalisability and probability (Flick, 2002; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Silk, Andrews and Mason, 2005; Sparkes and Smith, 2014). Further procedural criticism of qualitative research highlights the problems inherent in its idiographic character, which consequently undermines the authority, realism, objectivity and generalisability which are expected to underpin scientific endeavour (Silk, Andrews and Mason, 2005). Furthermore, qualitative research has been accused of being antimethodological and antifoundationalist by adopting an ‘anything goes’ approach to research methodology and styles of presentation which fail to produce hard evidence of cause and effect, resulting in low quality output which relies too heavily on common sense (Seale, Gobo, Gubrium and Silverman, 2004 [cited in Denzin and Lincoln, 2005]).
These philosophical and procedural arguments regarding the unscientific nature of qualitative research have been vigorously contested. A significant number of proponents of qualitative research have argued that the field does adhere to a number of the traditional conventions of science, albeit in a different methodological manner (Flick, 2002). Maxwell (2004) presents a robust defence of the scientific basis of qualitative research, contending that it can retain its core emphasis on interpretation and understanding, but must also prioritise the validity of its theoretical bases and research findings to re-emphasise its scientific character. Alternatively, some argue that the traditional positivist conventions of science should be replaced with different ‘scientific’ conventions which befit the qualitative model more effectively. Concepts such as credibility, transferability, and reciprocity, amongst others, are offered as criteria for establishing a scientific basis for interpretive qualitative research which overcomes the ‘crisis of legitimation’ (Harrison, MacGibbon and Morton, 2001 [cited in Silk, Andrews and Mason, 2005]). Indeed, many proponents of qualitative research methodologies argue that the traditional scientific conventions themselves are but a fallacy given the existence of multiple realities and the insurmountable subjectivity of researchers which undermines positivist claims of maintaining such conventions (Sparkes, 1994; Willig, 2008; Guba and Lincoln, 2005).

Given the contested nature of these paradigmatic debates, the first, and arguably defining, methodological position which influences the current study is support for an interpretivist stance which places emphasis on the exploration of the reasons for the patterns which emerge from empirical data, as opposed to a reductionist description of these patterns in isolation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Guba and Lincoln, 2005, Gratton and Jones, 2004; Silk, Andrews and Mason, 2005). This alignment with the interpretive paradigm and my adoption of qualitative research methods in this study are influenced by a pragmatic stance, in light of the benefits of such approaches for developing rich data sources and a nuanced understanding of the phenomena at hand. My strong alignment with the epistemological assumptions of the interpretivist paradigm which emphasise the constructed and provisional nature of knowledge precludes the adoption of a positivist or post-positivist ontological position, given the latter’s emphasis on objectivity.
However, at this point, a distinction should be made between qualitative research ‘methodologies’ and ‘methods’. Although an interpretivist qualitative ‘methodology’ requires that the entire research process is underpinned by interpretivist paradigmatic assumptions and the prioritisation of understanding the complexity of a research topic, quantitative ‘methods’ can be appropriated to complement an interpretivist methodology using predominantly qualitative methods to further inform this process by highlighting patterns of behaviour and social phenomena in a statistical manner (Flick, 2002; Guba and Lincoln, 2005). There is undoubtedly much to be gained from (post)positivist and hypothetico-deductivist methodological approaches of the natural sciences. However, the acceptance of subjectivity, multiple interpretations and realities, and the constructed nature of knowledge remains a crucial aspect of the research process in the social sciences (Lincoln, 2010). Therefore, the rich and complex data produced by qualitative research methods is of more utility in facilitating academic endeavours which seek to explain the data through hermeneutic understanding and inductive theoretical reasoning, given that the processes involved in shaping our social world are equally complex (Giddens, 1976; Maguire, 1991; Flick, 2002; Guba and Lincoln, 2005; Silk, Andrews and Mason, 2005).

My own assumptions are therefore clearly pragmatic, given my acceptance of the different paradigmatic alignments that are required depending on the academic field of study. As a social scientist, my alignment with the interpretive paradigm and qualitative research methods is clearly influenced by the utility of these approaches for my specific field of study. It is important to clarify this, given the debates relating to pragmatism and issues of (in)commensurability in the research process (Guba and Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln, 2010). My pragmatism extends as far as appreciating that different paradigmatic assumptions will predominate in different fields, and supporting the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods in a complementary fashion where appropriate. However, this position aligns with those of Flick (2002), Guba and Lincoln (2005), and Lincoln (2010) insofar as, at an ontological and epistemological level, it is impossible to adopt both a positivist and interpretivist stance given the different views on the nature of reality and the nature of knowledge; philosophically, it is inconsistent to believe in both single and multiple realities, just as it is impossible to believe that knowledge is both found and constructed.
Furthermore, this stance promotes a healthy element of self-doubt in relation to the robustness and validity of one’s own research findings which ultimately gives scope for healthy academic debate and scholarship. Rejection of traditional positivist ‘scientific’ criteria thus allows interpretivist qualitative research to free itself from potential methodological and paradigmatic constraints, facilitating the development of innovative methodologies which effectively align with the research question in hand (Sparkes and Smith, 2014). In particular, adopting an interpretivist stance addresses the contentious issue of objectivity head on, since such a goal is ultimately futile owing to the fact it is impossible for a researcher to eliminate all potential conscious and unconscious biases from his/her work. Instead, interpretivist qualitative research can embrace the subjectivity so feared in the positivist paradigm because, by adopting a reflexive approach to research, it is possible to effectively identify the subjective biases which may shape one’s own interpretation of a specific subject, given the constructed nature of knowledge (Bourdieu, 1990; Wacquant, 1992; Sparkes, 2002).
Narrative Analysis

Narrative analysis (NA) acts as one of the central theoretical influences on this study's methodological approach. NA has become an increasingly popular methodological approach in the social sciences following the widely-discussed 'narrative turn' in this academic field in the 1980s (Czarniaska, 2004; Smith and Sparkes, 2008; Somers, 1994). The fundamental epistemological belief which underpins NA lies in the emphasis placed on the importance of examining the content, nature and structure of the stories told by individuals and collectives within a given society as a means of understanding the lived experiences of that society's members (Bruner, 1986, 1990; Ricoeur, 1984; Somers, 1994; Smith and Sparkes, 2008; Smith and Weed, 2007).

Smith and Sparkes’ (2008) review of the predominant traditions in narrative inquiry identifies a diverse range of social theorists who have engaged with NA in various academic fields. They identify five contrasting perspectives which have prevailed, aligning a number of influential social theorists to each perspective, including the ‘psychosocial’ (e.g. Crossley, 2000; McAdams, 1985, 1993), ‘inter-subjective’ (e.g. Bruner, 1986, 1990; Ezzy, 1998; Ricoeur, 1984), 'storied resource' (e.g. Gubrium and Holstein, 1998; Riessman, 1993; Somers, 1994), 'dialogic' (e.g. Bakhtin, 1973, 1981; Frank, 2005; Hermans, 2001) and ‘performative’ approaches (e.g. Gergen, 1994, 1999, 2001) to NA. Although the diversity evident in this field leads to a plethora of contrasting methodological and ontological positions, the diverse perspectives retain the shared belief that narratives act as crucial phenomena in the shaping of our social world and our understanding of individual experiences within society.

Cortazzi (1993) outlines a variety of NA approaches, whilst Wood and Kroger’s (2000) review of the field also identifies an array of such approaches, ranging from:

…those in which the term narrative is used interchangeably with account; to those in which discourse is viewed as a narrative because it has at least some features of conventional narrative structure; to those in which discourse (or its production and comprehension) is analyzed using...
narrative principles, that is, principles derived from those used to analyze narrative literary forms. (ibid: 104; original emphasis)

Daiute and Lightfoot's (2004) introduction to their edited collection of NA research reflects upon the main benefits of this approach, highlighting: its preference for a holistic examination of social phenomena; the opportunity it provides to examine the contexts of wider social histories which influence an individual's identity; the insight the approach offers in terms of highlighting factors which shape relation between the self at the agency level and society at the structural level; and, finally, the acceptance (and encouragement) of subjectivity and value judgements from researchers in their analyses as a primary aim. Sparkes and Smith (2014) draw similar conclusions regarding the potential benefits of NA for the academic study of sport, exercise and health, placing particular emphasis on its prioritisation of the experiences of individuals and groups as social actors. However, despite their explication of the various benefits of NA in sport, exercise and health research, Sparkes and Smith offer relatively few examples of the narrative analyses conducted at a macro-analytical level which they term a ‘structural analysis of narrative types’. Therefore, the majority of the studies which they cite derive from the fields of psychology and social psychology in sport, rather than sociological and political analysis of sport as pursued in the current study.

In terms of specific theoretical frameworks used in this study's methodology, Margaret Somers’ (1994) theorisation of NA has been particularly influential. Somers’s conceptualisation of ‘narrative identity’ facilitates a reformulation of the roles played by narratives in social life, and argues that rather than viewing narratives as merely representational forms in the domain of literature, they should be understood as means by which social actors make sense of their individual life experiences. When viewed in this fashion, narratives act as medium for framing the fragmented experiences of each individual into a coherent narrative of the self, thus providing an individual with a sense of self-identity. Furthermore, Somers also argues that her theorisation of ‘narrative identity’ allows for an appreciation of the oft-analysed sociological duality of structure and agency, stating that her conceptualisation of identity allows for a relational and historical approach to identity formation which appreciates the dialectical relationship between the self and society.
Somers identifies four different ‘dimensions’ of narrative which operate at different levels of sociological abstraction and analysis: ‘metanarratives’, ‘public narratives’, ‘ontological narratives’ and ‘conceptual narratives’. At the macro-sociological level, the concept of ‘metanarratives’ is used to denote narratives “in which we are embedded as contemporary actors in history and as social scientists” (ibid: 619), such as ‘Progress’, ‘Enlightenment’ and ‘Capitalism v Communism’. At a meso-sociological level of analysis, Somers uses the term ‘public narratives’ to identify narrative forms which emanate from societal formations, including those presented by formal social institutions such as governments, political parties, religious institutions, educational establishments and the media, as well as an individual’s social network of family and friends. In addition to identifying the role of political parties in the creation of ‘public narratives’, Somers also identifies the prevalence of nation-centric narratives within this element of her framework; the potential utility of this model for the current study of political narratives is therefore underlined in these arguments.

Whilst the concepts of ‘metanarratives’ and ‘public narratives’ are used to denote narratives which operate at the structural level of sociological analysis, Somers contends that the influence of these external narratives on an individual’s sense of self can be analysed by considering the micro-sociological, agency-level ‘ontological narrative’ constructed by individual social actors. ‘Ontological narratives’ result from an individual synthesising his/her fragmentary life experiences, belief patterns and emotions into a coherent narrative of the self. It is argued therefore that this dialectical relationship between narratives at the macro-sociological (i.e. ‘metanarratives’), meso-sociological (i.e. ‘public narratives’) and micro-sociological (i.e. ‘ontological narratives’) levels can be used to theoretically negotiate the sociological duality that social agents are influenced by external social forces at a structural level, whilst equally constituting these social forces through the collective action of individuals. In order to achieve this complex theoretical goal, Somers (1994) argues for the need to develop ‘conceptual narratives’ in the social sciences in order to promote an analytical vocabulary which can accommodate the complex nature of narratives, and their temporal, spatial and historical nature.
The potential utility of NA for the study of nationalism is underlined in the work of Hall (1992) who contends that the expression of national identity by any individual involves participation in the narrative construction of the nation. Hall argues for viewing ‘national culture’ as a discursive device which develops, maintains and reinforces popular ideas of a given nation. Indeed, other scholars of nationalism (Hearn, 2002; Lecours, 2012; Ozkirimli, 2005) have argued that nationalism is in itself a “metanarrative or discourse” (Ozkirimli, 2005: 195), and that “the construction of national identity inevitably relies on the creation and use of narratives – part history, part myth – that imbue nations and nationalist projects with coherence and purpose” (Hearn, 2002: 745). Hearn (2002) actually draws upon Somers’ (1994) model in his own analysis of Scottish nationalism as advocated in the present study. Therefore, one of the central aims of the current study has been to identify the ‘metanarratives’ and ‘public narratives’ which are invoked by various political stakeholders in Scotland, with the eventual goal of contrasting the different narrative tropes from each party. In particular, narratives which are deployed as representations of Scotland’s past, present and future in political discourse relating to Scotland’s constitutional status will be scrutinised, alongside an analysis of the ‘public narratives’ relating to the Glasgow Commonwealth Games.
Critical Discourse Analysis

The second analytical element of this study is critical discourse analysis (CDA), a methodological approach which incorporates a varied range of conceptual and analytical approaches. It is important to note that, despite its diversity, CDA represents only one analytical approach in the academic study of discourse. For example, Titscher et al.’s (2000) guide to textual and discourse analysis identified eleven different methods of analysis within the field of discourse studies, of which CDA constituted one. Whilst all of these methods have a common interest in scrutinising texts as a means of understanding social realities, they are differentiated from each other by their relative emphases on the content, structure and contexts of a given text. For example, approaches such as conversation analysis, narrative semiotics and functional pragmatics place greater emphasis on the structural features of a given text, whereas others such as CDA place much greater emphasis on understanding the wider social and political context within which a given text is located, scrutinising the influence of external factors on the character of the text (Fairclough, 2015; Titscher et al., 2000).

The fundamental objective of explicitly defining what constitutes an example of ‘discourse’ in a CDA approach acts as an appropriate starting point for consideration. The work of Fairclough and Wodak remains the most influential example of the original theoretical foundations of the CDA approach, although their differing approaches to CDA involved a significant cleavage in their methodological direction (Blommaert, 2005; Titscher et al., 2000). Fairclough and Wodak’s (1997) collaborative work demonstrates their shared understanding of viewing discourse as a form of ‘social practice’:

Critical discourse analysis sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it. (ibid: 258)
Another leading scholar in the field of CDA, Van Dijk (1996: 84) similarly highlights the importance of scrutinising the dialectic between discourse and its context:

…one of the crucial tasks of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is to account for the relationships between discourse and social power. More specifically, such an analysis should describe and explain how power abuse is enacted, reproduced or legitimised by the text and talk of dominant groups or institutions.

CDA approaches have also been argued to share a number of theoretical influences which unite the various traditions situated within this field. Titscher et al.’s (2000) and Blommaert’s (2005) reviews of the field particularly identify the influence of neo-Marxist theoretical concepts on CDA, given its explicit goal of adopting a critical stance in relation to the character of contemporary capitalist societies and the discourse emanating from such societies. Examples of the neo-Marxist influences on the theoretical underpinnings of CDA have been argued to include Althusser’s conceptualisation of ‘ideological state apparatuses’, Bakhtin’s ‘genre theory’, and Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ (Blommaert, 2005; Fairclough, 2015; Titscher et al., 2000). Furthermore, Fairclough’s version of CDA has also been influenced by the work of Michael Halliday on systemic functional linguistics (SFL) which places a particular emphasis on considering the functions or goals of language use as a means to an end, rather than the structure and content of language as an end in itself (Fairclough, 2003, 2015; Titscher et al., 2000).

Fairclough’s position thus argues that the distinction between ‘textually-oriented discourse analysis’ and other forms which do not scrutinise texts should be transcended, recommending an oscillation between the content of specific texts and the ‘orders of discourse’ within which the texts are situated (Fairclough, 2015). Fairclough (1992a) also highlights the importance of appreciating the ‘intertextuality’ evident in a given form of discourse. He therefore argues that CDA is underpinned by an appreciation of the importance of an ‘intertextual analysis’ which demonstrates “how texts selectively draw upon orders of discourse – the particular configurations of conventionalized practices (genres, discourse, narratives, etc.) which are available to text producers and interpreters in particular social
circumstances” (ibid: 194; original emphasis). This position emphasises the common tendency for social actors to draw upon pre-existing narratives and textual representations when creating their own discursive forms, echoing the arguments of Somers (1994), with both the content and structure of texts being influenced by the ‘orders of discourse’ which are prevalent in a given social context. Fairclough (2015) elaborates on this point by drawing upon the work of Foucault, and arguing that “conventions and orders of discourse, moreover, embody particular ideologies” (ibid: 60; original emphasis).

Thus, Fairclough (2015) emphasises the importance of moving between contrasting levels of analysis when scrutinising specific texts, representing discourse as an outcome of the relationship between ‘text’, ‘interaction’ and ‘context’ (see Figure 4):

![Diagrammatic representation of discourse as text, interaction and context](image)

**Figure 4 – Diagrammatic representation of discourse as text, interaction and context (Fairclough, 2015: 58)**

For Fairclough, a common analytical goal of CDA should be to scrutinise the ideological aspects of texts and language:
Ideological representations can be identified in texts... but in saying that ideologies are representations which can be shown to contribute to social relations of power and domination, I am suggesting that textual analysis needs to be framed in this respect in social analysis... (ibid: 9)

Given the emphasis on ideological scrutiny and an explicitly critical stance, an important aspect of this approach lies in embracing subjectivity throughout the analytical process, with Fairclough refuting the possibility of truly objective analysis in a CDA approach (Fairclough, 2003). Instead, he argues that the primary goal of the social scientist should be to shed light on the strategies used to legitimate particular ideological positions within a given society.
Political Discourse Analysis

Although CDA as a methodological approach has been used in a vast array of contexts, its emphasis on scrutinising the power relations and social context within which a specific example of discourse is situated has led to frequent use in the field of politics. Indeed, the work of Fairclough has predominantly focused on discourse in the political domain, noting the importance of discourse for political actors to gain support:

In politics, each opposing party or political force tries to win general acceptance for its own discourse type as the preferred and ultimately the ‘natural’ one for talking and writing about the state, government, forms of political action, and all aspects of politics. (Fairclough, 2015: 112)

Another influential contributor to the field, Paul Chilton (2004: 8), similarly identifies the increasing importance of language in contemporary politics:

Political parties and government agencies employ publicists of various kinds, whose role is not merely to control the flow of, and access to information, but also to design and monitor wording and phrasings, and in this way to respond to challenges or potential challenges.

It is unsurprising that there is a degree of variation in the analytical methods proposed and adopted in studies of political discourse. With this in mind, the current study draws upon one specific analytical framework for political discourse, namely that proposed by Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough (2012). This framework represents the most recent substantive development of Norman Fairclough's previous work situated within the wider school of CDA. Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2012) analytical framework aims to build upon the authors’ earlier work in the fields of CDA and political discourse analysis (PDA), with a specific emphasis on the integration of argumentation theory. This is demonstrated in the authors' explication of their understanding of PDA as “the analysis of political discourse from a critical perspective, a perspective which focuses on the reproduction and contestation of political power through political discourse” (ibid: 17; original emphasis).
This framework’s distinction from past versions of CDA consists of the use of argumentation theory, with the authors contending that the proposed framework “views political discourse as primarily a form of argumentation, and as involving more specifically practical argumentation, argumentation for or against particular ways of acting, argumentation that can ground decision” (ibid: 1; original emphasis). This prioritisation of argumentation theory demands a particular analytical mind-set on the part of its adherents, with a specific goal of identifying and critiquing the character of the core ‘practical arguments’ proposed by political actors in relation to a specific set of circumstances. The explication of these practical arguments represent the fundamental purpose of any political speech, publication or other discursive form:

In our view, focusing on the structure of argumentation in a political speech is relevant... as the purpose of the speech, what it is designed to achieve, may be to convince an audience that a certain course of action is right or a certain point of view is true, and this is the intended perlocutionary effect that is intrinsically associated with the speech act of argumentation. (ibid: 18; original emphasis)

The framework also endeavours to explain how effective political discourse can motivate political action, thereby acting as a medium for consideration of the dialectical relationship between social structure and agency. For Fairclough and Fairclough, “discourses... provide arguers with premises in arguments, hence with reasons for action... discourses (and orders of discourse, as structures) provide agents with reasons for action” (ibid: 237; original emphasis); analytical emphasis on the nature of argumentation therefore facilitates a greater understanding of this dialectic in political discourse. For example, this conceptualisation of discourse is claimed to illustrate the potential impact of structural influences on political beliefs by highlighting the impact of external and institutional discourses which social agents draw upon in order to construct their political arguments, thereby shaping their individual political action at an agency level (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012).

Furthermore, the framework distinguishes between different constitutive elements of practical arguments found within forms of political discourse. The authors identify ‘narratives’, ‘mental conceptions’ and ‘imaginaries’ as important aspects of the arguments found in political discourse. They argue that ‘narratives’ and
‘imaginaries’ act as a way of realising ‘mental conceptions’ in a discursive form. This invocation of the term ‘narrative’ thus signposts the potential synthesis of principles of NA within this framework, as proposed in this study. These contrasting discursive representations differ in terms of their argumentative properties, with Fairclough and Fairclough claiming that these elements should be incorporated in different fashions in an analysis of political discourse:

…narratives of the crisis are incorporated within what we will call the ‘circumstantial premises’ of practical arguments (premises which represent the context of action); ‘imaginaries’ for possible and desirable states of affairs are incorporated in our account within the ‘goal premises’. (ibid: 4)

Greater emphasis is placed on the role of the ‘imaginary’ in the analytical framework, with Fairclough and Fairclough stating that only ‘imaginaries’ are a form of practical argumentation for future action given that ‘narratives’ simply act as representations of past or present circumstances. This argument is proposed as a counterpoint to that of Zizek (2009) who placed greater emphasis on the importance of narratives in determining the public response to the financial crisis. Fairclough and Fairclough instead contended that:

Although ‘imposing’ or winning acceptance of particular representations (descriptions, narratives, explanations) and thereby shaping perceptions are concerns in politics, we would argue that they subserve a greater concern of political agents and agencies to make their proposed lines of action, their strategies and policies, prevail over others. (ibid: 4)

They attribute this subservience to the fact that imaginaries “as future visions, capable of guiding action are assigned to the goal premises [of a practical argument], while semiotic representations of the actual world are assigned to the circumstantial premises” (ibid: 104; original emphasis). This means that the latter category of representations, such as 'narratives', simply describes the past and present state of affairs and are thus non-argumentative in nature; only 'imaginaries' have the power to motivate future political action (Fairclough, 2015; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). This 'performative power' of the imaginary is argued to lie in its emphasis on the 'goal
premise’ of an argument, with Fairclough and Fairclough claiming that to successfully achieve consensus for political action an arguer “represents the 'imaginary' as 'actual' and he attempts to get it collectively recognized as a factual representation.” (ibid: 108). The concept of the 'imaginary' is the central analytical development which underpins the originality of the Faircloughs' approach to PDA, given its ability to connect the present and future whilst acting as a lens for scrutinising the ideological values which shape a political actor's proposals.

Whilst the 'imaginary' is conceptualised as the central catalyst in political discourse and argumentation, the subservient positions of non-argumentative representations such as narratives in Fairclough and Fairclough's framework demand further discussion. Although narratives are explicitly held to be non-argumentative, they are still conceptualised as playing a role in the construction of effective practical argumentation due to their part in representing the 'circumstantial premises' of an argument. However, the authors caution that non-argumentative genres such as narratives should not be analysed in isolation. They contend that “[a]nalysis of non-argumentative genres (narratives, explanation) should also be view in relation to the arguments in which they are usually imbedded” (ibid: 1). The authors are therefore critical of other studies which scrutinise the framing and narration of political discourse as an end in itself.

This clear explication of the role of non-argumentative genres such as narratives within the framework therefore marks a clear break from previous forms of CDA, whilst also facilitating the possibility of synthesising methodological concepts from the traditions of CDA, PDA and NA. However, the framework's definitive categorisation of narratives as non-argumentative in character is arguably problematic. Despite the attempts to qualify this position by contending that non-argumentative genres should be analysed as part of a broader practical argument in political discourse, the view that representations of 'circumstantial premises' are purely non-argumentative, in contrast to the 'goal premises' associated with the argumentative 'imaginary', fails to appreciate that an argument for political change can be made implicitly as well as explicitly.
For example, political discourse relating to the 2008 global financial crisis (as analysed by Fairclough and Fairclough) consists of potentially contrasting representations of the causes of the crisis in narrative or other discursive forms without necessarily containing an explicit argument for a particular course of action. Although this discursive framing of the 'circumstantial premises' of a political problem may implicitly lend itself to a particular course of action or future 'imaginary', it is impossible to claim that this course of action will be clearly specified by a particular political actor. It is therefore questionable whether representations of circumstances in narrative form are entirely non-argumentative; it may instead be more appropriate to allow that narratives may be implicitly argumentative, rather than dismissing their argumentative potential out of hand.

As part of their analytical framework, Fairclough and Fairclough identify a number of structured features which emerge as part of effective political argumentation. Their framework is represented in a number of diagrammatic forms. The first of these diagrams is used to represent the foundations of their proposal for analysing the structure of practical arguments:
Within this conceptualisation of practical argumentation, a claim for a specific course of political 'action' is primarily driven by the normative political and ideological 'values' of an actor or group, with these 'values' in turn shaping the particular political 'goal' of the respective actor or group. These 'goal premises' are represented in discursive form as an 'imaginary' of a future state of affairs. The course of action argued for is therefore viewed as a 'means-goal', with the specific action representing a means to an end for achieving a political imaginary. Although secondary in terms of their importance in this framework, the 'circumstances' represented in a particular argument are still conceptualised as influential in justifying a course of action. The 'circumstantial' premises, however, are suggested to be non-argumentative in nature by Fairclough and Fairclough, with the narratives used by a political actor to simply contextualise the current state of affairs.
Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) acknowledge that this diagrammatic model acts a means of simplifying the complexities of a particular political argument. With this in mind, they expand upon the model by outlining an extended conceptualisation of deliberation within practical argumentation:

![Diagrammatic representation of the structure of practical deliberation (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 51)](image)

In their expanded model, they account for the explicit or implicit deliberations which are evident in some examples of political argumentation. To this end, the framework additionally accounts for the identification of representations of 'negative consequences' of a particular course of 'action', whereby a political actor argues against an action by highlighting its negative impact in terms of achieving his/her 'goal'. Representations of these negative consequences are used therefore to underpin a 'counter-claim' which explicitly denounces a suggested course of action. Further elaborations on the basic analytical framework are made throughout Fairclough and Fairclough's (2012) application of it in case studies of the 'Third Way' discourse of the 'New Labour' movement and discourse relating to the 2008 global financial crisis,
thus demonstrating the potential flexibility and fluidity of the framework. This flexibility allows scope to tailor the analytical focus to the specific content of the discursive form under scrutiny at a given time, thus allowing the analyst to align the framework with the chosen data sample. However, this flexibility arguably comes at the price of analytical clarity, given the ambiguity which emerges due to these required elaborations.

Bearing such caveats in mind, it is important to stress that the framework’s core analytical categories of ‘values’, 'goals', 'circumstances' and 'action' remain evident in all of these applications, thus ensuring that the fundamental principles of the framework remain consistent. However, the treatment of ‘narrative’ representations as non-argumentative forms of discourse remains problematic; attention will therefore now turn to considering the possibility of complementing this element of Fairclough and Fairclough’s framework by drawing upon theoretical principles derived from NA.

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2 For example, the additional analytical categories of 'alternative options' and 'addressing alternative options' are argued to be evident in a speech by Tony Blair outlining his vision for the 'Third Way', three more categories are identified in an analysis of the 2008 Pre-Budget Report ('anticipated objection', 'dealing with objection', and 'argument for authority'), and, finally, four more elaborate categories ('counter-argument and alternative proposal'; 'dealing with counter-argument and alternative: negative consequences of both'; 'emerging positive consequences of action already taken'; 'dealing with anticipated negative consequences of proposed action') are added in the analysis of the 2010 June Budget speech (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012).
Current Analytical Framework

The synthesis of Somers’ (1994) framework with Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2012) framework is used to redress a potential weakness concerning the supposed ‘non-argumentative’ nature of narratives of the current ‘circumstantial premises’ of Scotland’s political status. The synthesis of the contrasting analytical frameworks outlined above is illustrative of the position of a methodological ‘bricoleur’ as advocated by Denzin and Lincoln (2003), where an “interpretative bricoleur produces a bricolage – that is, a pieced-together set of representations that are fitted to the specifics of a complex situation” (ibid: 5). The crux of this methodological approach lies in its emphasis on analysing the content of political discourse relating to the Scottish independence referendum and the 2014 Commonwealth Games, as well as the identification of predominant narrative forms within the discourse of each political party. The importance of developing coherent narratives in order to sustain effective political campaigns has been acknowledged in recent studies of political communication (Arnott and Ozga, 2010; Charteris-Black, 204; Roberts and Crossley, 2004; McNair, 2011), with a number of arguments being made that such coherence is required to communicate effectively in a ‘post-modern / professional’ era of political communication (Negrine, 2008).

In order to scrutinise emergent patterns in political discourse relating to the Games and the independence referendum, Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2012) framework was selected as a means of identifying the ‘goals’ and ‘values’ of contrasting parties in the field of Scottish politics. Although the two frameworks derive from contrasting methodological schools, their synthesis derives from the synergy between Somers’ concept of the ‘public narrative’ and Fairclough and Fairclough’s notions of ‘circumstantial premises’, ‘goal premises’ and ‘imaginaries’. However, as outlined previously, in the eyes of Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), these political narratives constitute the ‘circumstantial premises’ of a specific example of political discourse. The ‘public narratives’ of a given political party are therefore harnessed to create a representation of a particular set of past or present circumstances; this representation is then used to contextualise a particular argument for future political action, taking the form of an ‘imaginary’ which represents an idealised representation of future circumstances or ‘goal premises’.
Applying this logic to the current study, the character of ‘public narratives’ relating to the past, present and future of Scotland’s constitutional status in the discourse of selected Scottish political parties is scrutinised. The past and present tense representations of these political ‘public narratives’ of Scotland’s constitutional status constitute the ‘circumstantial premises’ of Fairclough and Fairclough’s framework, whilst the future tense representations constitute the ‘imaginary’ and ‘goal premises’ elements of the framework. Given that Fairclough and Fairclough argue that ‘imaginaries’ acts as the catalyst for argumentation in political discourse, an analysis of the contrasting representations evident within discourse from across the Scottish political spectrum provides an opportunity to examine the values and ideologies of each respective party. Furthermore, it is also possible to ideologically contextualise discourse from the selected parties which specifically relate to the 2014 Commonwealth Games. This two-tiered analysis therefore facilitates a nuanced understanding of the political values which are evident in each party's stance on the political ramifications of the Games, as these issues are framed within each party’s wider political vision, or ‘imaginary’, concerning Scotland’s constitutional future (Arnott and Ozga, 2010). This analysis will therefore specifically consider the nature of elite political discourse on the topic of the Games, in line with the traditional, narrow approach to political science discussed by Grix (2016).

Despite the synergies outlined above, this synthesis of the frameworks of Somers (1994) and Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) creates certain theoretical contradictions and challenges. This is evident in the aforementioned stance of Fairclough and Fairclough regarding the identification of narrative as a ‘non-argumentative genre’, as this contradicts the central premises of NA as a methodological approach which emphasises the importance of narratives as both representations of and stimuli for human action in a social context. Resolving this contradiction demands one of two approaches: either dismissing the argumentative power of narrative forms entirely in alignment with the stance of Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), or refuting the arguments of the authors with respect to this particular issue. For this study, the latter approach is adopted, contending that narrative forms are not a 'non-argumentative genre' as argued by Fairclough and Fairclough but instead represent a form of 'soft' argumentation for political action. Although this stance accepts the authors’ position relating to the primacy of
‘imaginaries’ of future circumstances as the argumentative basis for a given course of political action, it equally contends that these future ‘imaginaries’ should be framed within a broader analysis of ‘public narratives’ of past and present circumstances. Such an approach allows for a fuller contextualisation of the historical, social, economic and cultural developments which have influenced the political ideologies of each political party, thus facilitating an analysis of the constitutional developments which led to the 2014 Scottish independence referendum.

Furthermore, this refutation of Fairclough and Fairclough’s position on the argumentative powers of narratives overcomes a problem regarding examples of political discourse which do not explicitly outline a future ‘imaginary’ in relation to a given political issue. For example, instances of political speeches and publications which only contain descriptions of past or present circumstances (i.e. ‘narratives’) with no explicit suggestions or recommendations for future political action (i.e. ‘imaginaries’) are entirely plausible. Such instances require an analyst to speculate about the argumentative stance of a political actor given the lack of explicit argumentation or ‘imaginary’; the alternative position adopted for this study with respect to the ‘soft’ argumentative qualities of narratives of past and/or present circumstances overcomes this problem. This contention regarding ‘soft’ argumentation suggests that political actors can represent circumstances in political discourse in a fashion which implicitly attempts to lead its audience to a particular course of action, without stating explicitly what this course of action is.
Empirical Methods – Political Discourse Analysis

The first stage of the data collection process involved scrutinising examples of political discourse which specifically discussed the 2014 Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the Scottish independence referendum. An important first step was to operationalise a vast and potentially unmanageable array of data sources by creating inclusion and exclusion criteria which would align with the current research questions. Titscher et al. (2000: 33-34) identified four methodological decisions required in order to achieve this aim as part of a discourse analysis approach:

- “From what material do I make the selection?”
- “What do I select from this?”
- “How much of this selection do I analyse?”
- “What are my units of analysis?”

It was decided therefore to firstly delineate sources which could be deemed reflective of ‘official’ political communication sources of a direct nature, rather than indirect mediated examples of political discourse. Therefore, the data sample was restricted to press releases, speech transcripts and policy publications which were produced directly by politicians and political parties, with these sources identified in Wood and Kroger’s (2000) extensive list of potential data sources for discourse analysis.

The first stage of narrowing the data sample involved specifically identifying forms of political communication which met the following inclusion criteria:

1. Takes the form of official press releases, party webpages, speech transcripts, parliamentary contributions, political manifestos and/or policy documents
2. Has been released into the public domain
3. Has a publication date between 23rd March 2011 (dissolution of 3rd Scottish Parliament) and 18th September 2014 (date of Scottish independence referendum)
4. Produced by political parties with electoral representation in the Scottish Parliament during the sample dates (i.e. Scottish Conservatives; Scottish Greens; Scottish Labour; Scottish Liberal Democrats; Scottish National Party)

These inclusion criteria were deemed necessary for a number of reasons. Firstly, the rationale for the decision to restrict the data sample to official press releases, webpages, speech transcripts, parliamentary contributions, political manifestos and policy documents was influenced by the emphasis of the current study on exploring the discursive strategies underpinning the creation of these communication sources. Political manifesto analysis has been demonstrated to be a fruitful method for understanding the relationship between sport and politics (Chaney, 2015a). By restricting the data sample to sources which have been produced and released from official party channels, it was possible to specifically scrutinise examples of communication which have been officially sanctioned by press officials and senior campaign staff. This facilitated a more precise examination of the nature of ‘approved’ and ‘official’ communications, and the particular discursive and narrative forms prevalent in them. Furthermore, sourcing the data sources directly from official governmental, party or campaign websites which are currently in the public domain avoided the possibility of any editing of these sources by third parties.

The decision to restrict the sample to sources with a publication date between 23rd March 2011 and 18th September 2014 allowed for reflection on the political discourse leading into the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary elections, whilst equally allowing for the inclusion of pre-referendum political discourse from the fourth sitting of the Scottish Parliament preceding the independence referendum. It is acknowledged that this decision precluded the opportunity to explore the shifting constitutional ‘imaginaries’ of the respective parties in the post-referendum period, given the need for parties to respond to the ‘No’ vote in the referendum. Furthermore, this also excluded analysis of political discourse which reflected upon the success of the Games with the hindsight of formal evaluations of their legacy. However, given the emphasis of the study on the potential political exploitation of the Games to support the contrasting views of the party on the referendum and the various interconnections made between the two events, it was decided that the removal of retrospective discourse would
ensure that the emergent patterns reflected the nature of the discourse during the actual period of the referendum more effectively.

The decision to include only political parties which had electoral representation in the Scottish Parliament during the sample period was founded on similarly pragmatic concerns, thus focusing on the most influential political parties in Scotland at the time of the Games and the referendum campaigns. Furthermore, the political parties excluded from the data sample did not have electoral representatives in the Scottish Parliament to allow for participation in the interview or survey processes. It is acknowledged that this decision excluded a number of relatively influential political parties within the Scottish political sphere, such as the Scottish Socialist Party and the UK Independence Party, as well as the three non-aligned independent MSPs in the Scottish Parliament, and therefore limited the extent to which the study fully represents the entirety of Scottish politics. Furthermore, the specific focus upon the nature of elite political discourse, to the exclusion of the broader “understanding of politics [which] highlights the power relations between individuals: be it state and subject, husband and wife, employer and employee” as advocated by Grix (2016: 3), means that political discussions on the Games outwith the domain of elite politics are excluded from the current analysis. However, given that the emphasis of the study was to provide an analytical representation of political discourse on specific topics rather than an exhaustive analysis of the positions of all possible actors in Scottish politics, the exclusion of independent representatives and unelected political parties was deemed to be an acceptable limitation for delineating an appropriate and manageable data sample.

Following the initial delineation of the data sample through the above inclusion criteria, it was then decided to focus attention upon election manifestos and policy documents which related specifically to the independence referendum to act as the data sample for specific analysis of each party’s discourse on Scotland’s constitutional status and future. The inclusion of data sources which focused on the issue of Scotland’s constitutional status facilitated the opportunity to analyse the contrasting semantics and narrative tropes used in the various representations of Scotland’s political past, present and future, as well as the conceptualisations of Scottish nationalism which resonate with the political discourse of each party. Given
the vast and unmanageable array of potential data sources from each party relating to the independence referendum deriving from the initial application of the inclusion criteria, the specific focus on political manifestos and constitutional policy documents allowed for a more precise analysis of the most detailed, rich sources of information on each party’s position on the Scottish constitutional debate. This also mirrored the methods used in other recent studies of Scottish political discourse, such as that of Leith and Soule (2011).

In contrast, the strategy used to identify data sources which explicitly discussed the 2014 Commonwealth Games involved the use of search terms to identify examples of political discourse referring to this specific event. The phrases ‘Commonwealth Games’, ‘Games’ and ‘Commonwealth’ were used to identify potential sources, prior to a manual review of the content of each source to validate that the source contained an explicit reference to the 2014 Commonwealth Games. The inclusion of data sources which specifically relate to the issue of the Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the politics of sport allowed for a critical analysis of the competing party-political visions of the importance of these issues to Scottish politics and the independence referendum campaigns, whilst allowing for a reflection on the political framing of the Games. The exclusion of political topics outside of those outlined above also offered a pragmatic solution to the problem of being overwhelmed by the diverse array of topics covered in the entirety of the independence referendum campaigns.

For press releases, webpages and speech transcripts from each respective party, the search terms were initially entered into search engines on each party’s website (where available) to identify potential sources, followed by an additional manual review of all press releases, webpages and speech transcripts during the sample period for the search terms. In addition, the Scottish Government and UK Government websites were also reviewed using the same search terms to identify further sources produced by the SNP-led Scottish Government and the Conservatives-Liberal Democrats coalition UK Government which referred to the Games. This process was completed at various points throughout the project from January 2013 to July 2015, with any appropriate sources saved as a HTML file for future reference in case of removal from the respective website at a future point. For parliamentary contributions, the search terms were again used to identify references to the Games in all Scottish
Parliament Official Reports during the sample period, with each report found to contain a valid reference saved as an Adobe Acrobat PDF file. Finally, the official election manifests and policy documents from each party were reviewed using the search terms, with relevant sources again saved as a PDF file.

As a result of the inclusion and exclusion criteria outlined above, the final data sample totalled 662 secondary data sources, consisting of 122 official press releases, 25 speech transcripts, 494 oral contributions from MSPs in official Scottish Parliamentary sessions, 7 policy documents, and 14 party manifestos. Each data source was uploaded into the NVivo qualitative data analysis software package which was used to manually code the content of each data source, with an open coding system used to identify emergent themes, followed by an axial coding process which sought to categorise these lower-level codes into higher-level discursive forms using the framework proposed by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012). The data analysis process drew upon the principles of both CDA and NA, with an emphasis on identifying narrative forms associated with each data item and the language being used to create particular narrative tropes by each party. The emergent themes and narrative tropes from political discourse sample were later reflected upon critically in light of the analysis of the interviews and surveys of the political stakeholders, as outlined below.

**Empirical Methods – MSP Interviews & Surveys**

One central goal of the data collection strategy was to provide an explanatory analysis of the strategies and processes which informed the character of official political communication sources on the topic of the Games. To this end, a criterion-based purposive sampling strategy was adopted to delineate potential participants for primary data collection (Sparkes and Smith, 2014), with the participation of politicians restricted to serving MSPs during the period of the data sample outlined above. This strategy again meant the exclusion of a number of political stakeholders and campaign groups which did not have official representation in the Scottish Parliament. However, considering that the aim of the primary data strategy was to complement the secondary analysis process, it was deemed that including
stakeholders already excluded from the original secondary data sample would have produced superfluous information.

Following identification of the sample, ethical approval documentation was submitted to the Loughborough University Ethics Approval (Human Participants) Sub-Committee in January 2014 (Appendix 1), receiving approval in February 2014. Initial contact was made with a range of potential participants in April 2014, through email invitations which outlined the study aims and provided copies of the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 2). All participants were required to read a Participant Information Sheet and complete an Informed Consent Form (Appendix 3) prior to participation in the study.

Participants were initially selected by identifying MSPs from all five political parties with cross-party or committee parliamentary responsibilities in relation to the Commonwealth Games and/or sport, given that these participants could provide more detailed insights into this specific event and policy area. The invitation process continued until a maximum of two MSPs from the respective parties had agreed to participate in the study. However, in order to achieve this goal, it was also necessary to approach MSPs with representative responsibilities for the Glasgow constituencies and region, and, finally, to extend invitations to other MSPs without specific responsibilities for sport or the Glasgow region. This strategy thus allowed for the inclusion of nine MSPs in the final sample of elected political representatives, with two MSPs from the SNP, Scottish Labour, the Scottish Conservatives and the Scottish Greens, respectively, and one MSP from the Scottish Liberal Democrats. The lack of a second MSP participant from the Liberal Democrats meant the party was relatively under-represented; however, the participation invitations were declined by the other four MSPs from the party, so this was unavoidable. Furthermore, such challenges in securing access to political elites for research studies have been documented elsewhere (Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff, 2015; McNabb, 2015).

All participants were informed of their right to confidentiality and anonymity in the research findings. However, all MSP interviewees were asked for consent to de-anonymise their contributions to the study to allow for their identity to be revealed, due to the small size of parties such as the Scottish Greens and the Scottish Liberal
Democrats in the Scottish Parliament which made it impossible to ensure anonymity once party affiliation had been identified. Consent to de-anonymise the contributions was granted by all nine MSP participants, and their names have been attributed to any quotes or opinions offered in the results and discussion section.

It was decided that interviews would be conducted during the period from April 2014 to March 2015 to overcome potential access difficulties, following responses from potential participants who expressed concerns about participation prior to the referendum due to time pressures and political sensitivities. Furthermore, following the request of one participant who was unable to participate in a face-to-face or telephone interview, participants were offered an alternative option to complete an open-ended survey incorporating the proposed questions from the semi-structured interview schedule (see Appendix 4 for interview schedule and Appendix 5 for survey). Although these alternative surveys produced comparatively limited data in comparison to the face-to-face semi-structured interviews, it was decided that this alternative would be preferable to non-participation in the study and was necessary to ensure the inclusion of all political parties.

The first tranche of interviews took place in July 2014 during the period of the Games and before the independence referendum, with three interviews with MSPs taking place (Patrick Harvie MSP, Kenny MacAskill MSP and Drew Smith MSP). Furthermore, a completed survey by Liz Smith MSP was submitted during the pre-Games period to complement these interviews (see Appendix 6 for exemplar), additionally providing past speech transcripts on the topic of the Games and sport to accompany their completed survey. This was followed by a second phase of interviewing in the post-referendum period, with four interviews with MSPs taking place in the final week of October (Patricia Ferguson MSP, Alison Johnstone MSP, John Mason MSP and Tavish Scott MSP). These were supplemented by the final interview with Murdo Fraser MSP which took place in March 2015. Chronologically, this therefore meant that each respective party had a participant in the study in both the pre-referendum and post-referendum periods (which the exception of the Liberal Democrats as highlighted previously), allowing each party the opportunity to reflect upon the referendum retrospectively. To this end, the
respective timing of each MSP’s contribution will be indicated in the quotations used in the following results and discussion section.

The interviews were recorded using electronic dictaphone technology, with the audio files stored securely on a password-protected computer. The interviews ranged from between 18 and 49 minutes in duration, and were transcribed verbatim at the initial stage of the data analysis process to preserve the data and retain the authentic features of the interviews (Wood and Kroger, 2000) (see Appendix 7 for exemplar interview transcript). The completed transcripts were uploaded and analysed using the NVivo software package. However, in the case of the primary data, the NVivo software was used only to manually code the content of each data source, with an open coding system being used to identify key themes emerging from the interviews. A particular emphasis was placed on the strategic thinking and ideological values which underpinned the creation of political communication relating to the Games and the independence referendum.

The analysis of the interviews was then cross-referenced with the results of the secondary data analysis, thereby identifying where similarities and discrepancies emerged from the political narratives in the interviews in comparison to the political discourse associated with their respective parties. Furthermore, the interviews were also used to further reflect upon the nature of the ‘values’, ‘goals’ and ‘means-goal’ positions of each party in line with the analytical framework of Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), with the interview data providing an opportunity to explicitly discuss the nuances of each party’s approach to the Games and to sport as a general policy area in greater depth. This aspect of the study’s multi-method approach allowed for a degree of triangulation and elaboration upon the secondary data sample consisting of political discourse samples, as advocated by Denzin and Lincoln (2003).
In the final section of this chapter, attention turns to a reflexive discussion of the potential impact of my personal political beliefs on the nature and outcome of the study. This study’s alignment with the axiological position of CDA which permits and encourages the incursion of personal political values in the research process (Fairclough, 2003, 2015) is an important consideration, given the undoubted influence that my personal political beliefs had throughout the analysis and presentation of the study’s findings. Following the arguments of Bourdieu (1990) and Wacquant (1992) regarding the importance of ‘reflexive sociology’, it is appropriate to explicitly outline these personal beliefs and their possible ramifications for the discussion which follows.

An appropriate starting point is a consideration of my own position on the central political proposition scrutinised in the present study – the question of Scotland’s constitutional status. Firstly, my status as a Scot by birthplace who has resided in England since 2005 rendered me an actively interested outsider throughout the Scottish independence referendum campaign, given that my residence outside of Scotland meant that I could not vote in the referendum. Nonetheless, my hypothetical answer to the official referendum question of “Should Scotland be an independent country?” has been a consistent, but qualified ‘yes’. I would have voted for Scottish independence because I believe it would have provided Scotland with the opportunity to follow a political approach which would differ from the centre-right political orthodoxy which has prevailed in the UK as a whole. However, I qualified this stance by arguing that I did not believe that independence would necessarily lead to Scotland improving its economic prospects or becoming a wealthier country; instead, I argued that independence could lead to a fairer, more redistributive society which possessed the sovereign powers to control its own economic, political and social path.

However, had the mooted option of a second referendum question including the option of ‘devo-max’ (maximum devolution of all powers bar defence and foreign affairs to the Scottish Parliament, whilst remaining within the UK) been offered, my personal stance would have been less certain. Whilst the idealistic side of my
political beliefs would opt for full independence, the pragmatist in me believes that ‘devo-max’ would provide the fiscal and policy levers to create the fairer and more redistributive society I would wish for Scotland. Furthermore, I would argue that the option of ‘devo-max’ would probably have gained the greatest consensus amongst the Scottish electorate as a compromise position between full independence and the various forms of devolution proposed in the referendum campaign.

As regards my personal political beliefs in a wider sense, my previous allusions to a preference for a fairer, more redistributive approach within society reflect my collectivist political ideology. I would self-identify as a socialist or social democrat, given my belief in the value of the welfare state, public services, wealth distribution and progressive taxation. Although I can partially sympathise with those who vociferously argue for the benefits of a communist or socialist state system over the current late-capitalist, neo-liberal political orthodoxy, pragmatically I believe that the broad acceptance of the rights to private property in capitalist societies renders the abolition of private property and the equal distribution of wealth unforeseeable. I therefore align myself with a more libertarian rather than totalitarian form of collectivist political ideology, whereby my (naïve) beliefs revolve around generating popular acceptance of the redistribution of wealth in a capitalist system through progressive fiscal, taxation and welfare policies.

Given these political beliefs, I would identify myself as a Green voter as this party arguably aligns most closely with my own personal ideology, despite the low status of environmental issues in my political views. However, the persistence of the first-past-the-post electoral system at Westminster parliamentary elections encourages me to vote pragmatically for candidates from parties which have a realistic chance of winning my constituency (currently Oxford East). This predicament normally leads me to vote for the Labour Party in Westminster elections as it represents the potentially government-forming party which is closest to the ‘left’ of the political spectrum – however, I regretfully believe that the Labour Party has become a centrist party in both ideology and policy.

Attention now turns to the potential ramifications of these political beliefs in the process of completing this research study. Here I am conscious of the arguments of
Berling and Beuger (2013) concerning the importance of ‘practical reflexivity’ in political science. Firstly, my beliefs have undoubtedly acted as the kernel at the centre of this research project. My desire for a change to the political orthodoxy rendered the prospect of Scottish independence an alluring case study for the expression of contrasting visions from across the political spectrum. My active interest in this campaign has undoubtedly benefited the research process, as it has allowed for me to draw upon my own knowledge of Scottish politics and society, whilst facilitating a healthy engagement with coverage of the referendum.

However, my subjective biases required significant consideration in order to provide a balanced approach to the data collection, analysis and presentation stages (Mauthner and Doucet, 2003). Firstly, the process of conducting interviews with representatives from the various political parties was undoubtedly influenced, consciously or subconsciously, by my political beliefs, as the tone and line of my questioning, body language and responses to participants may have indicated my personal stances. Although I actively sought to avoid this in my communication with participants, I am doubtful that my attempts would have been fully successful. Nonetheless, I do not believe that the incursion of my subjective beliefs into the data collection process had a significant impact upon the responses I received, as my use of a semi-structured interview schedule ensured the topics discussed remained broadly consistent.

Within the data analysis and forthcoming presentation of my findings, I have attempted to detach myself from my personal political beliefs to present the analysis in a manner which reflects the words evident in the data sources, thus endeavouring to represent the values and ideologies of each party or participant as accurately as possible. Nonetheless, my own subjective biases have undoubtedly shaped the conclusions I have drawn regarding the validity and value of each party’s ideological stance in the final discussion. In line with the arguments of Bourdieu (1990), Wacquant (1992) and Fairclough (2003; 2015), I have therefore attempted to embrace this subjectivity throughout my analysis, having taken the above steps to share these potential sources of potential bias with the reader.
Chapter 4 - Results and Discussion

Introduction

The following three chapters discuss the central findings of the study, outlining the emergent themes and narrative tropes evident in political discourse relating to the 2014 Commonwealth Games and the Scottish independence referendum. The first chapter is dedicated to the pro-independence parties in order of parliamentary representation size in the Scottish Parliament, with the first section focusing on the SNP (and the SNP-led Scottish Government) and the second focusing on the Scottish Green Party. The second chapter provide an analysis of pro-union party political discourse, with the first section dedicated to the Scottish Labour Party, the official parliamentary opposition, followed by a further two sections dedicated to the Scottish Conservatives and the Scottish Liberal Democrats, respectively.

The analysis of each party’s discourse aims to firstly identify the ideological position of each party with regards to the independence referendum and Scotland’s constitutional position through scrutiny of party manifestos and policy documents, applying the Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) analytical framework to heuristically analyse the predominant narrative tropes of each party. Having provided the context in which political discourse relating to the Commonwealth Games is situated for each party, attention then turns to analysis of political discourse from that party which explicitly discusses the Games. This discussion also integrates the findings from the interviews and surveys to explore the rationale behind the specific discursive patterns of each party with regards to the Games, thus exploring the strategic thinking (or lack thereof) which led to the emergent themes from each party. Relevant theoretical, empirical and academic literature sources will be integrated at appropriate junctures to facilitate a critical reflection on the emergent findings.

The third and final chapter provides a critical discussion of findings of a broader nature which cut across the political discourse of the individual parties. This section thus allows for a reflective discussion of phenomena relating to the political construction of sporting events such as the Games and the relationship between sport
and politics, facilitating a critical discussion of broader patterns which are informed by and contribute to existing literature in relevant academic fields.
Pro-Independence Narratives of the Scottish Constitution and the 2014 Commonwealth Games

The SNP and the Constitution – ‘Scotland’s Future in Scotland’s Hands’?

Discussion commences with a consideration of the emergent discursive patterns within the SNP’s publications and manifestos specifically relating to Scotland’s constitutional status: namely, the SNP’s recent official election manifestos from the pre-Games period (i.e. 2011 Scottish Parliament; 2012 local/council elections; 2014 European Parliament) and the Scottish Government’s White Paper on Scottish independence entitled ‘Scotland’s Future’. Figure 7 provides a diagrammatic representation of the SNP’s political discourse on Scotland’s constitutional status, applying the Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) framework’s core analytical categories of ‘values’, ‘goal’, ‘circumstances’, ‘means-goal’ and ‘claim for action’ to analyse the central themes which emerged from this data sample:

Figure 7 - Diagrammatic representation of SNP political discourse regarding Scotland’s constitutional status

An appropriate starting point is to examine the SNP’s discursive construction of the past and present ‘circumstances’ of Scotland’s constitutional status. Analysis of the
emergent ‘public narratives’ (Somers, 1994) constructed by the SNP on this issue provides an opportunity to explore the party’s ideological stance and its rationale for supporting Scottish independence. The first emergent narrative is an overt attempt to refer to Scotland as an ancient, outward-looking, wealthy and compassionate nation:

Scotland is an ancient nation, renowned for the ingenuity and creativity of our people, the breathtaking beauty of our land and the brilliance of our scholars. Our national story has been shaped down the generations by values of compassion, equality, an unrivalled commitment to the empowerment of education, and a passion and curiosity for invention that has helped to shape the world around us. Scots have been at the forefront of the great moral, political and economic debates of our times as humanity has searched for progress in the modern age. (Scottish Government, 2013b: ix)

If we vote for independence, the eyes of the world will be on Scotland as our ancient nation emerges – again – as an independent country. (Scottish Government, 2013b: 3)

This narrative appears to be part of a strategy to construct Scotland as a nation with a deep-rooted historical foundation, with phrases referring to the nation as ‘ancient’ and the ‘beauty of our land’ resonating with ethnosymbolist (Armstrong, 1982; Hutchinson, 1994; Smith, 1986, 2002, 2010) and perennialist conceptualisations of the Scottish nation (Hastings, 1997; Seton-Watson, 1977). These narrative tropes of a historic Scottish nation with abundant physical resources and human potential are then juxtaposed with the circumstances which followed the 1707 Act of Union, with Scotland constrained by a Westminster parliament which fails to prioritise Scottish interests sufficiently:

Under the Westminster system Scotland is treated as a regional economy within the UK. Our ability to meet future challenges and seize opportunities is constrained and many major decisions are taken by Westminster. (Scottish Government, 2013b: 7)

Furthermore, the ‘circumstances’ of Scotland’s status within the Union are frequently argued by the SNP to be afflicted by an unequal economic model which prioritises a ‘core’ of the economy in the form of London and south-east England. This narrative therefore problematises the status quo, resonating with some of the arguments
presented in Hechter’s (1975) ‘internal colonialism’ thesis regarding the asymmetry between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ regions within the UK, yet avoiding the extremism of Hechter’s terminology by omitting terms such as ‘colony’ to describe Scotland. This narrative of Scotland’s constraints within the unequal UK economic model is also frequently juxtaposed with one of the SNP’s central circumstantial justifications for Scottish independence – a core narrative highlighting the historic over-contribution of Scottish taxation per capita due to North Sea oil revenues (Harvie, 1998; Hassan, 2011; Hearn, 2002; Leith and Steven, 2010; Newby, 2009). Given that this ‘public narrative’ is central to the SNP’s economic case for Scottish independence, it is unsurprising that it is repeatedly emphasised to illustrate the potential of an independent Scotland and to refute arguments regarding the economic risks of independence.

The final central narrative in the SNP’s discursive construction of Scotland’s ‘circumstances’ is the frequent emphasis on the Scottish ‘democratic deficit’, with Scotland portrayed as a submerged nation which lacks the political and fiscal powers to flourish. This narrative evokes the arguments of Kedourie (1960, 1971) and his conceptualisation of the ‘ideological’ form of nationalism which emphasises political self-determination, and provides further justification for arguments regarding the centrality of such arguments in the SNP’s political strategy (Casanas Adam, 2014; Dalle Mulle, 2016; Keating, 2012; Mycock, 2012). This argument concerning Scotland’s democratic deficit is elaborated upon through an emphasis in the SNP’s political discourse on its success as a party of government in the Scottish Parliament since 2007, claiming credit for positive developments in Scottish society and the Scottish economy.

In contrast, emphasis is placed on the negative impact on Scotland of a ‘Tory’ government at Westminster, elected without the consent of the Scottish electorate (given the lack of Conservative MPs in Scotland), with the risks of ‘Tory austerity’, past and future, blamed for hampering Scottish economic growth and leading to greater inequality. These circumstantial premises are thus forwarded as justification for eradicating the central problem of the Scottish ‘democratic deficit’ through the achievement of political independence, thereby providing the ‘successful’ SNP government with the additional legislative, fiscal and economic levers to ensure that
Scotland can flourish as an independent nation. Despite the promise of additional powers for the Scottish Parliament delivered through the 2012 Scotland Act and the pre-referendum devolution proposals from pro-union parties, their potential to act as a sufficient solution for the Scottish ‘democratic deficit’ is disputed by the SNP through an emphasis on a ‘betrayal narrative’ in relation to past devolution proposals (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998).

The discursive construction of Scotland’s ‘circumstances’ can be directly linked to the SNP’s ideological ‘values’ in relation to Scotland’s constitutional status, with a core narrative being the SNP’s belief in the importance of ‘Scotland’s future in Scotland’s hands’:

We believe it is fundamentally better for our nation if decisions about Scotland’s future and Scotland’s successes are taken by the people who care most about Scotland – that is by the people of Scotland. (SNP Local Election Manifesto, 2012: 6)

Independence means that Scotland’s future will be in our own hands. Decisions currently taken for Scotland at Westminster will instead be taken by the people of Scotland. (Scottish Government, 2013b: 3)

The primacy of this message demonstrates an overt attempt to equate the party’s belief in Scottish independence with a core desire for the principle of Scottish political sovereignty. This discursive strategy demonstrates clear synergies in the work of adherents of ‘ideological’ modernist theorisations of nationalism (Smith 2010). For example, Kedourie (1960, 1971) highlights the ideological power of nationalist doctrine which emphasises that the nation-state is the medium through which individuals can achieve sovereignty and self-determination for the social collective with which they align (Ichijo, 2009).

Furthermore, the emphasis in the White Paper’s preface on the identification of “the people who live and work here” (Scottish Government 2013b: ix) as the people of Scotland signposts the importance of ‘civic nationalism’ (Kohn 1944) in contemporary Scottish political discourse. This emphasis on ‘civic nationalism’ is
particularly evident in the section of the White Paper on Scottish citizenship rights in an independent Scotland:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CURRENT STATUS</th>
<th>SCOTTISH CITIZENSHIP?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT THE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British citizen habitually resident in Scotland on day one of independence</td>
<td>Yes, automatically a Scottish citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British citizens born in Scotland but living outside of Scotland on day one of independence</td>
<td>Yes, automatically a Scottish citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTER THE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child born in Scotland to at least one parent who has Scottish citizenship or indefinite leave to remain at the time of their birth</td>
<td>Yes, automatically a Scottish citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child born outside Scotland to at least one parent who has Scottish citizenship</td>
<td>Yes, automatically a Scottish citizen (the birth must be registered in Scotland to take effect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British national living outside Scotland with at least one parent who qualifies for Scottish citizenship</td>
<td>Can register as a Scottish citizen (will need to provide evidence to substantiate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens of any country, who have a parent or grandparent who qualifies for Scottish citizenship</td>
<td>Can register as a Scottish citizen (will need to provide evidence to substantiate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants in Scotland legally</td>
<td>May apply for naturalisation as a Scottish citizen (subject to meeting good character, residency and any other requirements set out under Scottish immigration law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens of any country who have spent at least ten years living in Scotland at any time and have an ongoing connection with Scotland</td>
<td>May apply for naturalisation as a Scottish citizen (subject to meeting good character and other requirements set out under Scottish immigration law)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 - Proposals for Scottish citizenship rights in an independent Scotland (Scottish Government 2013b: 273)

Leith and Soule’s (2011) analysis of discourse in manifestos of mainstream Scottish political parties drew similar conclusions on the afore-mentioned emphasis on the civic nature of Scottish nationalism and Scottish society. This emphasis on ‘civic nationalism’ is unsurprising given the political ramifications of any association with xenophobic feeling in the Scottish nationalist movement. Nonetheless, certain elements of ‘non-civic’ nationalism remain evident within Scottish political
discourse, with emphasis often placed on the importance of landscape and language as a source of pride for the Scottish nation (Leith and Soule 2011, Mycock 2012).

The emphasis on civic nationalism in the SNP’s political discourse is also linked to other emergent ideological values, located in a core message portraying the party’s position as centre-left, social democratic and pro-EU. In particular, the SNP frequently stresses the party’s ‘progressive’, anti-austerity credentials, often juxtaposing this with the policies of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government at Westminster outlined in the ‘circumstances’ of Scotland’s political situation. The White Paper and the SNP’s election manifestos place significant emphasis on the party’s support for Scotland’s ongoing membership of the EU, with large sections of the White Paper attempting to reassure the electorate regarding the continuity of Scotland’s membership (Scottish Government, 2013b), and election manifestos explicitly opposing the EU membership referendum supported by the Conservatives, Labour and UKIP. This stance in relation to European integration serves to underline the SNP’s pro-European position, echoing the arguments of Ichijo (2004) and Dardanelli and Mitchell (2014). It also acts a further device to reinforce the notion of the Scottish ‘democratic deficit’ through its portrayal of the risk of EU withdrawal taking place against the wishes of the Scottish electorate:

If we remain in the UK, the Conservative Party’s promise of an in/out referendum on EU membership raises the serious possibility that Scotland will be forced to leave the EU against the wishes of the people of Scotland. (Scottish Government, 2013b: 60)

The final emergent ideological ‘value’ in the SNP’s political discourse is an emphasis on a ‘gradualist’ form of political nationalism, supporting the arguments of previous analyses (Casanas Adam, 2014; Dalle Mulle, 2016; Hearn, 2014; Keating, 2012; Leith and Soule, 2011; Leith and Steven, 2010; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008). For example, whilst the White Paper undoubtedly advocates the creation of an independent, sovereign Scottish state, significant emphasis is placed on portraying a ‘Yes’ vote as the severing only of the ‘political’ union with the UK, with other non-political unions being maintained:
This change in the political and governmental arrangements for Scotland will not affect the many other ties that bind Scotland to the other nations of the UK. We will continue to be linked to other nations of the UK by five continuing unions: the EU; an ongoing Union of the Crowns; a Sterling Area; and as members of the NATO defence union. And the social union, made up of connections of family, history, culture and language, will have every opportunity to flourish and strengthen. (Scottish Government, 2013b: 215)

This conceptualisation of Scottish independence therefore accepts that a ‘Yes’ vote would not result in a fully sovereign Scottish state. Instead the party accepts that a significant degree of political and economic sovereignty would be ceded to other political institutions such as the EU, NATO and the Bank of England as partners in these continuing ‘unions’ (Casanas Adam, 2014; Jackson, 2014; Keating, 2012; Sharp et al., 2014).

Given that the raison d’être of the SNP is the achievement of the party’s ‘imaginary’ of Scottish independence, it is unsurprising that the party’s ‘goal’ is the establishment of an independent, sovereign Scottish state. However, although Scottish independence may represent an end in itself for numerous SNP supporters, the party’s discourse places greater emphasis on Scottish independence as a means to an end. For example, the most commonly-cited reason for independence in the sample considered here is the achievement of political sovereignty for Scotland, with the emphasis on the ‘Scotland’s future in Scotland’s hands’ narrative frequently perpetuated as the central rationale for Scottish independence and resolving the ‘democratic deficit’ (Dalle Mulle, 2016; Ichijo, 2009; Leith and Soule, 2011; Mycock, 2012; Newby, 2009; Pittock, 2008a). This is closely followed by a secondary emphasis on using these newly-gained levers of Scottish independence to achieve economic growth for Scotland, with considerable emphasis in the White Paper on proposed economic and fiscal interventions in an independent Scotland (Sharp et al., 2014). The ‘claim for action’ to achieve this ‘goal’ proposed in the SNP’s political discourse therefore involves encouraging the Scottish electorate to vote ‘Yes’ in the referendum, portraying this as an endorsement of the SNP’s proposals for Scottish independence in the White Paper.
In practice, however, the historic lack of majority support for Scottish independence meant that the obligation lay with the SNP and other pro-independence parties to convince the Scottish electorate to vote for Scottish independence. Therefore, the central thrust of the party’s political discourse, and its dominant discursive ‘means-goal’, was to highlight the benefits of Scottish independence. In line with earlier comments concerning the centrality of political self-determination in the SNP’s ideological ‘values’, democratic benefits were the most frequently cited positive result of Scottish independence in the White Paper and the party’s manifestos, with particular emphasis being placed on political self-determination and prioritising Scottish political interests through a modernised Scottish democracy, mirroring the analysis of Ichijo (2009) and Keating (2012). Economic improvement constituted the second most frequently cited independence benefit; in particular, emphasis was placed on factors such as economic growth, employment rates, fair taxation and the provision of a more balanced economic model (Tomlinson, 2014). Although the SNP forwarded other categories of benefits, such as welfare benefits, environmental benefits, anti-nuclear defence benefits and improved foreign affairs, their relatively low occurrence compared with democratic and economic benefits underlines the party’s central ‘means-goal’ strategy of advancing its belief in using the enhanced political powers of Scottish independence as a means towards the goal of economic growth as part of an argument for a ‘Yes’ vote.

Although the SNP’s discursive strategy primarily emphasised the benefits of independence, the ‘means-goal’ argument of the party also problematised the status quo by highlighting the risks for Scotland of continued union with the UK (Johns et al., 2013; Sharp et al., 2014). In comparison to the regular explicit discussion of the benefits of independence, explicit references to the risks of a ‘No’ vote were comparatively rare. These referred to the lack of power over important decisions which influence Scotland, with specific reference to the risks of ongoing fiscal austerity, Trident renewal, EU withdrawal and reductions to the Barnett formula. Furthermore, the SNP highlighted the lack of credibility of the pro-Union parties’ promises of additional devolved powers for the Scottish Parliament, thereby suggesting that a ‘No’ vote would lead to a repeat of the broken promises of past referendums on Scottish devolution. Such arguments thus evoked the ‘betrayal narrative’ outlined in the earlier analysis of the ‘circumstances’ of Scotland’s
constitutional status (Devine, 1999; Harvie, 1998), with the negative portrayal of the status quo acting as an implicit form of argumentation for a ‘Yes’ vote. However, the party’s attempt to problematise the status quo in its discursive strategy required a degree of compromise, especially in light of the need to convince a significant proportion of undecided voters to opt for a ‘Yes’ vote despite their relative satisfaction with the status quo. Again, this ‘means-goal’ strategy required an emphasis on the party’s gradualist approach to Scottish independence (Dalle Mulle, 2016; Hearn, 2014; Leith and Soule, 2011; Leith and Steven, 2010; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008), given the portrayal of a ‘Yes’ vote as an end only to the political union between Scotland and the UK, while the maintenance of the non-political unions of a shared currency, monarchy, cultural and social union would reduce the potential risks of Scottish independence (Mycock, 2012).

The SNP’s Games Narrative – Sporting Infrastructure and Economic Boosterism

Attention now turns to the SNP’s discursive stance in relation to the 2014 Commonwealth Games. Appendix 8 provides an overview of the data analysis findings on the emergent themes within the sample of the SNP’s parliamentary speech contributions (299 sources), press releases (139 sources) and manifestos (3 sources) which make explicit reference to the Games. The results of the data analysis process generated a number of emergent patterns in the party’s Games-related discourse and narratives; however, for reasons of brevity, prioritisation is given to phenomena which directly relate to the use of the Games to support the SNP’s ideological values and the party’s constitutional stance. To this end, Figure 9 provides a diagrammatic representation of the SNP’s political discourse vis-à-vis the Games, again applying the Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) framework’s core analytical categories of ‘values’, ‘goals’, ‘circumstances’ and ‘claim for action’. Whilst the ‘values’, ‘goal’ and ‘claim for action’ in Figure 9 remain unchanged for the SNP from the previous iteration of the framework’s application (since the party’s constitutional stance also remains unchanged), the ‘circumstances’ and the ‘means-goal’ aspects of the party’s discourse regarding the Games demonstrates the emergent narratives and discursive strategies which specifically relate to the event:
An appropriate starting point for this analysis is an assessment of the party’s ‘public narrative’ of the benefits of hosting the Games for Scotland. Analysis of the SNP’s discourse sample identified sporting benefits and legacy as the most common category. The party argued for a range of sports-related benefits and legacy aspects deriving from the Games, with a primary focus on using the event as a catalyst for boosting sports and physical activity participation rates in Scotland (Clark and Kearns, 2015, 2016; McCartney et al., 2010; McCartney et al., 2012; Rogerson, 2016). Frequent reference was made to the impact of the Games on the development of sporting facilities in Scotland:

…I am delighted to announce that there are now 72 hubs in the pipeline, with 41 community sports hubs up and running throughout Scotland… They cater to the local needs of each community and support participation in physical activity across the country. They demonstrate our commitment to ensuring that all Scotland’s people and communities can benefit from becoming more active… Following the Commonwealth Games, Scotland will be a stronger sporting nation… (Shona Robison MSP, SP OR 21 December 2011, col. 4869)
Furthermore, enhanced support for youth sport provision and improvements to the elite sport performance system in Scotland were also forwarded as further considerations on the impact of the Games.

Despite the centrality of these arguments in the SNP’s discourse, the interviews revealed a more restrained perspective. John Mason highlighted a number of positive developments with regards to the sporting legacy of the Games, citing both hockey and swimming as examples, but equally cautioned about the delivery of a sporting legacy on two separate occasions:

There's quite a lot that's happening, but how big an impact it has on subjects like health I think remains to be seen, and I think every other city with Commonwealth or Olympic Games has struggled to do the legacy thing... (John Mason MSP, interview, post-referendum)

…sport's the obvious one... that more people would take part in sport because the facilities are actually there... but that doesn't happen automatically. (John Mason MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Furthermore, Kenny MacAskill MSP made no direct reference to the sporting legacy of hosting the Games, despite listing numerous other benefits. This demonstrates that the centrality of the sporting legacy of the Games was not necessarily shared by all in the SNP, whether this was due to contrasting policy responsibilities or an unwillingness to emphasise sporting legacy due to historic failures elsewhere. Given that analyses of sports participation data in Scotland in the period following the Games showed little improvement (Clark and Kearns, 2016; Rogerson, 2016; Scottish Government, 2015), the continued lack of concrete evidence suggests that politicians may be sensible to continue to act with caution.

Although sporting benefits were the most common theme in the SNP’s Games-related discourse, the party also placed a significant emphasis on the benefits of the Games for the Scottish economy. Indeed, references to the economic benefits of the Games were almost as frequent as the references to the sporting legacy in the political discourse sample of the SNP (see Appendix 8). Within this category, particular emphasis was placed on the use of the Games to encourage regeneration
and infrastructural developments in Glasgow’s ‘East End’, while the benefits of the event for the Scottish tourism industry also featured prominently:

This Government is absolutely clear about the contribution that regeneration makes to growing our economy and improving the life chances of Scotland’s people. All these projects are central to the regeneration of the area and will contribute to the legacy of the Commonwealth Games. (Alex Salmond MSP, ‘Multi-million pound regeneration boost’, Scottish Government press release, 2014)

Other frequently-cited economic benefits from the event included enhanced employability and training, increased exports of Scottish produce, a significant proportion of Games-related contracts for Scottish businesses, and inward investment (Christie and Gibb, 2015; Clark and Kearns, 2016; Mooney et al., 2015). The centrality of economic justifications in the SNP’s ‘public narrative’ resonates with the work of academics who have identified the use of sporting mega-events as a means of ‘economic boosterism’ for the host city and nation (Holt, 1989; Horne, 2007; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Horne et al., 2013; Zimbalist, 2015). Furthermore, this emphasis on economic considerations aligns with the party’s ideological ‘values’, especially their attempts to project a position which is pro-business and focused on Scottish economic growth (Lynch, 2009; Tomlinson, 2014). It appears therefore that the Games acted as an opportunity to illustrate the party’s beliefs about using major events and capital investment more broadly as a stimulus for the Scottish economy.

Discussion in the political stakeholder interviews also demonstrated the centrality of economic considerations when justifying the government’s investment in the Games:

It’s first of all a chance to regenerate the East End of Glasgow which probably statistically is the poorest area of the country. The infrastructure and investment is phenomenal in the area over the years. (Kenny MacAskill MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

However, despite the overwhelmingly positive messages in the SNP’s discourse concerning the economic benefits of hosting the Games, the interviews revealed a
disjuncture between rhetoric and reality. For example, despite being one of the most frequent contributors to the Scottish Parliament in terms of emphasising the economic and infrastructural benefits of the Games for his constituency, Mason questioned the validity of such claims in practice:

…there have been questions about… even in the construction phase, were there local jobs? Well, I think there were some but… I don't know, I think some people expected jobs maybe to just fall into their lap, or something, and that's not gonna happen. And somebody did say to me: “Right, that's the Games over… where's the legacy? Where's the regeneration of things?” (John Mason MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Nonetheless, despite these partial reservations about the extent of the economic benefits, mirroring the responses of local residents in Mooney et al.’s (2015) research both Mason and MacAskill expressed a generally supportive stance with regards to the Games’ positive impact on the local and national economy in a broader sense, echoing the centrality of this message in the party’s ‘public narrative’.

In contrast, agreement on the positive impact of the Games on Scotland’s international profile and reputation was more evident in the SNP’s political discourse and the interviewees’ opinions. Statements highlighting the positive impact of the event on Scotland’s profile were made frequently, with particular emphasis placed on the opportunity to use the Games to showcase Glasgow and Scotland, plus the positive impact on Scotland’s international diplomatic relationships:

SNP Conference has today hailed 2014 as a year of sporting opportunity for Scotland, which will see Scotland showcased on the world stage through the Commonwealth Games and Ryder Cup. A resolution praising the thousands of volunteers from across Scotland and beyond who have come forward to help with the Commonwealth Games and the Ryder Cup and welcoming the international attention that Scotland will have in 2014. (‘Conference: 2014 a year of opportunity for sport’, SNP press release, 2014)

The importance of Scotland’s international profile and reputation in the SNP’s discourse on the Games resonates with the party’s wider message regarding the promotion of Scottish interests through the Scottish Government’s operations, with
emphasis being placed on forging international and diplomatic ties following the election of a SNP-led government. For MacAskill and Mason, the enhanced profile of Scotland was deemed pivotal for leveraging the future benefits of the Games (Clark and Kearns, 2016), thus maximising tourism benefits and future event hosting opportunities:

Well, I think it puts Glasgow and Scotland on the map. I think it gives us opportunities for further events. I mean, I was speaking anecdotally to someone from Glasgow Life or whatever yesterday, and I think they see opportunities… I just think it’s the profile that’s enhanced incredibly. (Kenny MacAskill MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

I hope so. I mean, I think Glasgow's image has been changing over the years, and long before the Commonwealth Games came and they were surprised and positive about Glasgow. (John Mason MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Furthermore, emphasis was also placed on the wider social benefits of hosting events such as the Games, including the promotion of social equality, community cohesion and national pride. The SNP’s political discourse on the Games and sporting events more generally was therefore overwhelmingly positive in its tone, perhaps unsurprisingly given the level of public funding offered to support such events (Horne, 2007; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Jeffreys, 2012; Zimbalist, 2015).

*The SNP and the Politics of the Games – The ‘Feel-Good Factor’?*

For the SNP, the Games also acted as an opportunity to illustrate wider political debates in Scotland. One such discursive strategy deployed by the SNP involved the use of the Games as an analogy or example either to illustrate a wider political issue, to justify a particular course of action, or to defend the party against criticism from opposition parties. This tactic was used to illustrate various issues, with the investment in the Games acting as an analogy for the SNP’s general economic growth strategy, an example of the SNP’s success in government, and an example of the success of the SNP’s tourism strategy, amongst others:

That’s why when my Government came into office in 2007, we focussed government activity on one purpose, ‘to create opportunities for all of
Scotland to flourish by raising the rate of sustainable economic growth’. It’s not about growth alone, it’s about sustainable growth for a purpose: the wellbeing and happiness of individuals and communities in every part of the country. The Commonwealth Games demonstrate our approach to growth. The very word “Commonwealth” used to mean public benefit or public good – you still hear the phrase “common weal” in Scotland. The Commonwealth Games won’t just be the biggest cultural and sporting celebration Scotland has ever seen - they’re a catalyst for improving wellbeing. (‘Scotland’s international profile has never been higher’, Scottish Government press release, 2014)

On what the SNP has ever done for Glasgow, there is the new south Glasgow hospital, the Commonwealth Games investment, Clyde Fastlink, the City of Glasgow College, further rail improvements and the M8, M73 and M74 work. There has been massive investment in Glasgow, which I am sure the people of that city will continue to welcome. (Derek Mackay MSP, SP OR 9 February 2012, col. 6282)

As demonstrated above, the SNP-led Scottish Government’s ongoing investment in the Games was often used to counter opposition arguments about a lack of investment in Glasgow’s infrastructure and transport system, thus countering the frequently-cited claim from Labour about ‘Scotland being on pause’ during the referendum due to the SNP’s focus upon securing a ‘Yes’ vote.

One strategy of particular interest for the current study was the SNP’s use of the Games to illustrate problems with the constitutional status quo, aligning with the party’s ‘means-goal’ discursive strategy of highlighting the risks of continued Union due to a ‘No’ vote. A number of illustrative examples of the Games being used as a justification for independence became evident, particularly in the party’s press releases. A prime example of this strategy was the use of the Games to argue for gaining control over Air Passenger Duty, suggesting the event would have its potential tourism benefits for Scotland currently hampered by a prohibitory rate of APD:

The series of events and sporting occasions and the associated tourism opportunities that go with them in 2014 are a fantastic opportunity for developing and growing the tourism industry in Scotland. The Commonwealth Games in Glasgow - the Ryder Cup and of course Scotland’s Year of Homecoming 2014 are going to be potentially huge boosts. However there is still a blight over air travel to and from
Scotland in the shape of the Air Passenger Duty… which Westminster not only continues to levy on Scotland but has astonishingly increased it in the Autumn Statement… If Scotland had powers to set our own APD rates we could give our aviation industry and travellers a better and fairer deal, cheaper holiday costs and businesses a competitive tax regime which is more in line with mainland European nations. It is clear that this can only be delivered with a Yes vote next September. (‘2014 Tourism-hit by Westminster’s Air Travel Tax’, SNP press release, 2014)

The report entitled “The economic impact of Air Passenger Duty”, which was published in February this year, underlined the damage that APD is doing to our airports, our tourism industry and the economy. Scotland will welcome the world in 2014, courtesy of homecoming, the Commonwealth games and the Ryder cup, but we are in the absolutely absurd situation of increasing costs for people who want to visit Scotland. We believe that the devolution of air passenger duty would enable the development of a regime that supports more direct international air routes, reduces the costs of flights for passengers, and encourages more visitors. That is a good example of why we need powers in the hands of the Scottish Parliament to do what is right for Scotland. (Nicola Sturgeon MSP, SP OR 9 May 2013, col. 19605)

Similar arguments were made in relation to the allocation of Value Added Tax revenues in the UK, with the assertion that the additional VAT revenues from Games-related tourist expenditure would go to the UK Treasury despite the Scottish Government’s investment in the Games:

Some of this is complicated by the current devolution settlement because we don’t get the money back in VAT to spend, or anything such as that. Y’know, post-independence it really takes off… We’re not able to invest on the basis of getting a return. We only get the allocated spend, so we put all that money in but we don’t get the benefit back. Y’know, the benefit of the tourist spend in Glasgow is going in to George Osbourne’s coffers, yet who’s funding the infrastructure and investment? (Kenny MacAskill MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

The examples concerning APD and VAT were therefore used to reinforce the SNP’s ‘public narrative’ of the constrained economic circumstances of the status quo, with the need for additional fiscal powers ‘in Scottish hands’ to eradicate the ‘democratic deficit’ (Lecours, 2012; Leith and Soule, 2011; Newby, 2009; Pittock, 2008a), thus maximising Scottish economic growth in the SNP’s ‘imaginary’ of independence. Other examples of the SNP using the Games to highlight problems with Scotland’s
constitutional status included emphasis on the non-allocation of Barnett formula spending consequentials to Scotland deriving from the additional Government spending and Lottery funding relating to the London 2012 Olympics, thereby highlighting the lack of a British and/or Scottish constitution in comparison to other independent Commonwealth countries, and emphasising the expanded opportunities for Scottish athletes as part of ‘Team Scotland’ at the Commonwealth Games in contrast to their restricted opportunities as part of ‘Team GB’ at the Olympic Games (Jarvie and Reid, 1999). These examples thus constituted a core discursive strategy for the SNP regarding the Commonwealth Games, utilising their potential illustrative utility for political messaging within the constitutional debate.

Despite this emergent pattern, both SNP interviewees expressed only qualified support for the logic that the Games had the potential to impact on support for a ‘Yes’ vote, rightly arguing that the impact of the Games was likely to be minimal in comparison to other substantive policy areas and political debates. Nonetheless, a number of factors were identified by both Mason and MacAskill when considering the possible impact of the Games on the referendum. First and foremost, there was a shared belief that the success of the Games would result in a ‘feel-good factor’ in Glasgow and Scotland as a whole, echoing the arguments of Grix (2014) and Jarvie (2017) on the use of such events for feel-good purposes, with MacAskill in particular claiming that this positivity would boost the ‘Yes’ vote:

I think that anything that makes Scots feel confident because I think the majority of people in Scotland have always wanted to vote Yes. Of course there’s some people that would want to vote No and that’s fair, but the majority of people would like to see an independent Scotland but they have concerns or a variety of issues. Some of it’s just… we don’t know, can’t conceptualise or worry about being too wee, too difficult… so anything that raises the profile, raises self-confidence, shows that we can do it, can compete… we can run the best ever Commonwealth Games, why can’t we run our own country? (Kenny MacAskill MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

Elaborating further, MacAskill articulated his belief that this ‘feel-good’ factor encapsulated the contrasts between the pro-independence and pro-union campaigns more broadly:
…if this creates a mood swing of hope, optimism, then that’s going to play in because the whole basis of the Yes campaign has been to run on hope, aspiration, the ‘yes we can’ as opposed to the doom and gloom, and whatever Better Together’s said about the positive case for the Union, I ain’t seen it... I tend to think ‘Yes’ people might say that the Commonwealth Games, it allowed the country to feel good about itself. And if Scotland feels good about itself, then it’ll vote for independence. (Kenny MacAskill MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

Although adopting a more sceptical stance, Mason still echoed the view that the Games’ success had resulted in greater self-confidence amongst the Scottish population, boosting the pro-independence campaign:

I don’t really think they were a major factor. I mean I think there was a kind of feel-good thing. I think there was... this process of building up our self-confidence that we can do these things. So that was probably helpful, but some of that’s a long term trend and I’m not sure how much of it really affected the actual Games... and I feel that it’s been quite a crucial part of the referendum, but the Games is definitely part of that process of our self-confidence. (John Mason MSP, interview, post-referendum)

These arguments therefore emphasised the positive impact of hosting the Games for Scottish self-confidence, often argued to have been a constraining factor for Scottish political nationalism in line with the ‘Caledonian Antiszygy’ thesis (Nairn, 1977). For the SNP, the successful organisation of the Games acted as an illustration of Scotland’s capacity for political self-governance, contributing to a longer-term trend of growing confidence due to the perceived success of the devolved Scottish Parliament as part of the ‘gradualist’ movement towards political independence (Dalle Mulle, 2016; Hearn, 2014; Leith and Soule, 2011; Leith and Steven, 2010; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008).

However, Mason also argued that the fact that the Games linked to a sense of friendly competition between the Home Nations may have alternatively provided succour to the arguments of pro-union campaigners and parties:
I suppose the attitudes of the parties are a wee bit different, especially to having a separate Scottish team… For me, the fact that it is a Scottish team, I am immediately more engaged and more interested. I've got somebody that I can really feel enthusiastic about. Now whether your average Labour politician would feel the same… to be fair, some of them would also probably be a bit more enthusiastic about a Scottish team than a British team, or whatever. I mean, people kind of fell over backwards to welcome the English and all the rest of it, but clearly people were thinking and talking about the referendum, and there's an argument probably to say that the fact that the English seemed to be welcomed quite well, and there was quite a lot of interaction between English… there was a lot of English supporters obviously in Scotland, y'know, maybe that actually helped the Better Together side and the 'No' side. (John Mason MSP, interview, post-referendum)

These arguments demonstrated two interpretations of the potential impact of the Games in terms of undermining the success of the pro-independence campaign. Firstly, the concerns raised about the possibility of negativity towards English athletes and visitors underlined the centrality of ‘civic nationalism’ in the contemporary rhetoric of the SNP (Leith and Soule 2011, Mycock, 2012), with Mason expressing an element of relief that negative or xenophobic incidents towards England were largely absent. Secondly, the complex symbolism of the Games with its celebration of the Commonwealth and the historical vestiges of the British Empire, combined with the temporary separation between Scotland and the other Home Nations within the Commonwealth (Haynes and Boyle, 2008; Harris and Skillen, 2016; Jarvie, 2017; McDowell and Skillen, 2015; Ochman, 2015), demonstrated the futility of drawing any naive conclusions with respect to the potential impact of the Games on Scottish national pride or self-confidence.

The Scottish Green Party and the Constitution – A ‘Green Yes’?

Attention now transfers to the other pro-independence party represented in the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Green Party (abbreviated as the Greens henceforth). Figure 10 provides a diagrammatic representation of the Greens’ political discourse regarding Scotland’s constitutional status using the Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) framework, based on analysis of the party’s recent election manifestos from the pre-Games period (i.e. 2011 Scottish Parliament; 2012 local/council elections; 2014
European Parliament) and the party’s policy document on the topic of Scottish independence entitled ‘A Green Yes’:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CLAIM FOR ACTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Scottish electorate should vote ‘Yes’ in independence referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Accept recommendations of Scotland’s Future White Paper for transition in case of ‘Yes’ vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Vote for alternative policies for independent Scotland in first parliamentary election by voting Green</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOAL: Scotland as an independent, sovereign state; primary emphasis on political sovereignty; additional emphasis on overhaul of Scottish economic model to tackle inequality &amp; environmental neglect</th>
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<tr>
<td>CIRCUMSTANCES: lack of fiscal powers constraining Scottish economic growth; unequal economic model in UK with emphasis on London &amp; SE; environmental neglect by Westminster &amp; Holyrood governments; global economic model creating inequality, human exploitation &amp; destroying natural environment; living in uncertain world due to self-inflicted problems; UK politics moving to right-wing individualism on economy &amp; immigration; power centralised in Scotland under SNP</td>
</tr>
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A comparative analysis of the Greens’ ‘public narratives’ of the present ‘circumstances’ of Scottish society to those of the SNP demonstrates the contrasting ideological stances evident within the pro-independence campaigns. For example, the Greens’ stance on the nature of Scottish politics echoes the arguments of the SNP in relation to the Scottish ‘democratic deficit’, thus also aligning with the ‘ideological’ form of modernist nationalism espoused by Kedourie (1960, 1971). However, for the Greens this deficit is specifically argued to manifest itself in an inability to tackle inequality and poverty due to the lack of fiscal powers:

Devolution has given Scotland a Parliament which can fire-fight the worst manifestations of poverty, but is incapable of the action needed to truly close the gap between rich and poor; or even between the rich and the rest. (A Green Yes, 2014: 3)

Although a similar emphasis on highlighting inequality was emerged from the analysis of the SNP’s discursive strategy, this acted as but one circumstantial factor.

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Figure 10 - Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Green Party political discourse regarding Scotland’s constitutional status
amongst many; in contrast, for the Greens it constituted the crux of their narratives regarding Scotland’s circumstances. The majority of references from the Greens emphasised the failing economic model in the UK and globally, arguing that this model has led to numerous problems within the Scottish economy and Scottish society:

Our current economic model is failing to meet needs or provide jobs. Money is drained from our local economies. Small businesses make up the majority of all Scottish businesses and over half of Scottish jobs, yet vast sums are spent on enticing multinational companies or footloose individuals to locate here. (Scottish Greens Local Election Manifesto, 2012: 4)

For most people, the economic crisis is far from over. Wages have fallen and jobs are less secure than ever. Food costs, house prices and energy bills have gone up. Young people are locked out of decent homes and locked into unemployment. For the first time in a generation, there are families in Scotland being forced to suffer the pangs of hunger. (Scottish Greens European Manifesto, 2014: 2)

Echoing the SNP, the Greens highlight the growth of inequality in the UK as a contributory factor to these circumstances for Scotland; however, the Greens’ position also suggests that a similar economic model is evident in Scotland under the SNP. This narrative therefore avoids solely pinning the blame on inequality on the Conservative UK Government, instead emphasising the adherence to a neo-liberal economic model as the primary cause of damage to Scotland’s economy, society and environment. The Greens’ ‘public narrative’ thus appears to align more strongly with the ‘socioeconomic’ variant of nationalist thought in comparison to the SNP’s discourse, with an observable resonance between the Greens’ presentation of Scotland’s circumstances and the arguments of Nairn’s (1977) ‘Break Up of Britain’ thesis which identified uneven economic development as the core stimulus for nationalist movements in Scotland (Hearn, 2002).

The Greens’ discourse on the issue of the environment also acts as an interesting barometer for the party’s particular political stance. For example, the party differentiates itself from others by highlighting the responsibilities of other political
parties for environmental neglect, given their adherence to the prevalent neo-liberal global economic model:

Governments of all colours in London and Edinburgh have neglected our environment, let inequality widen, and narrowed our politics. Only Greens are offering an alternative to this failed agenda. (Scottish Greens Scottish Parliament Manifesto, 2011: 1)

However, the emphasis on the global economic model as the causative factor in the ‘circumstances’ of environmental neglect is indicative of the party’s shift from a single-issue party concentrating on environmental issues to one which embraces the full range of policy issues, presenting itself is an ideologically radical, left-wing alternative (Anderson, 2016; Carter, 2008; Hearn, 2014; Wheatley et al., 2014). This positioning of the Greens is thus used to differentiate the party from others within the political ‘circumstances’ of, firstly, a UK-wide political context which has moved to towards right-wing individualism on issues related to the economy and immigration, and, secondly, the growing centralisation of power in Scottish politics under the SNP:

Swapping a centralised UK Government for a centralised Scottish Government isn’t the radical change that many wanted. Local community empowerment is an agenda Holyrood must embrace instead of seeing it as a threat. (Scottish Greens Scottish Parliament Manifesto, 2011: 24)

This attempt to differentiate the Greens from the other political parties is also evident in the analysis of the ideological ‘values’ of the party’s discourse. This is exemplified in the ‘A Green Yes’ document, with allusions to the contrasts between the Greens and the SNP within the pro-independence movement:

For many Greens, this debate has little to do with identity or feelings of patriotism. In the face of unprecedented social, ecological and economic challenges, Greens are committed to the transformational change our society needs; a fairer more equal society, an economy which respects environmental limits. Westminster could hardly be less likely to deliver this change. Its MPs are elected with no element of fair voting; its Peers sit without the consent of the people. Dominated by politicians who prove themselves time and time again beholden to big business and the
City of London, its political culture looks after the interests of those served well by the status quo. (A Green Yes, 2014: 3)

Although the language used here clearly echoes the SNP’s rhetoric with regards to the centrality of political self-determination as a justification for Scottish independence, the explicit denunciation of those who evoke “identity or feelings of patriotism” appears to be an attempt to distance the Greens from those within the SNP or the broader pro-independence movement who would draw upon such arguments as a rationale for Scottish independence. This strategy therefore demonstrates that the arguments of Kedourie (1960, 1971) regarding ideological modernist nationalism have not only gained prominence within pro-independence debate – they have also acted as a point of contention between the two main pro-independence parties, with the Greens claiming to be the true exponents of political self-determination whilst implicitly questioning the credentials of the SNP in this regard.

Indeed, the Greens’ qualified support for the White Paper proposals of the SNP-led Scottish Government during the hypothetical transition to Scottish independence further illustrates their emphasis on political self-determination, with its emphasis on the importance of future policy changes in the first election to take place in an independent Scotland:

[The Scottish Green Party] therefore accepts that the SNP Government’s white paper on independence will be the starting point for that transition... Similarly, they must recognise that as yet they have no mandate for their policies in reserved areas. From NATO membership to the level of Corporation Tax, they should not lock Scotland in to their preferred policies, unless the Scottish people give them a mandate to do so in 2016. (A Green Yes, 2014: 4)

This position therefore allows the Greens to further differentiate the party’s ideological ‘values’ from those of the SNP, with the remainder of the ‘A Green Yes’ policy document subsequently outlining the party’s pro-immigration and pro-EU stance, and values such as political decentralisation, environmentalism, communitarianism, economic redistribution and the nationalisation of public services
The Greens’ strategy also offers the opportunity to demonstrate the potential for both radical and conservative policy options in an independent Scotland, highlighting that a ‘Yes’ vote would retain the existing array of contrasting ideological positions within Scottish politics on non-constitutional matters. The party’s articulation of a vision for a self-proclaimed ‘radical independence’, resonating with the ‘socioeconomic’ variants of nationalist thought associated with the work of Nairn (1977) and Hechter (1975) in its emphasis on economic redistribution in light of growing social inequality, thus allows for the discursive creation of a vision of an independent Scotland with a pluralist political system.

The Greens’ discursive strategy with reference to the party’s ‘goal’ of achieving an independent Scottish state also demonstrates a distinctive approach from that of the SNP, despite the shared ‘goal’ of achieving Scottish independence. For example, although the primary emphasis of the Greens’ on the ‘goal’ of independence echoed the arguments of the SNP concerning the importance of Scottish political sovereignty, the secondary emphasis of the Greens on the possibility of using this sovereignty to overhaul the economic model of Scotland to tackle inequality and environmental neglect differs from the position of the SNP:

…most politicians can’t see beyond the simplistic mantra of getting back to business-as-usual... We’ve been leading the 21st century case for transformational change in our economy, our society, and our politics. What’s different now is the opportunity Scotland has to take control of our future and build a political culture that’s capable of that transformation. (A Green Yes, 2014: 2)

Greens don’t want independence for its own sake. We have the chance to build a different political culture – one capable of transforming Scotland. (A Green Yes (abridged version), 2014: 1)

This difference exemplifies the central ideological cleavage between the Greens and the SNP. Whilst the SNP’s discourse emphasises the potential for Scotland to use the additional policy levers available in the existing economic model to tackle economic inequality, the Greens instead argue that the core problem lies in the nature of the existing economic model itself, thus by implication demanding the transition to a
new, radical economic model in an independent Scotland to successfully tackle economic inequality. It follows, therefore, that Greens’ ‘claim for action’ is that the Scottish electorate should vote ‘Yes’ in the independence referendum, whilst recognising alternative policy options and economic strategies for an independent Scotland to those espoused in the White Paper.

The Greens’ contrasting vision for an independent Scotland to the one envisaged in the White Paper is also evident in the ‘means-goal’ aspect of the party’s discourse. Firstly, the relative emphasis on the predicted benefits of Scottish independence differs in comparison with the SNP, with the Greens demonstrating a more equal distribution of references across the different categories of benefits whereas the SNP’s discourse demonstrated a skew towards ‘democratic benefits’ and ‘economic benefits’. Although this indicates a similar pattern to the SNP in terms of the prioritisation of democratic and economic benefits in the Greens’ discourse as part of the ‘means-goal’ of convincing the electorate to vote ‘Yes’ in the referendum, it is clear that the Greens also attempted to promote contrasting benefit categories to a greater extent proportionally by comparison with the SNP.

Secondly, the ‘means-goal’ category of the Greens’ discourse on the independence referendum also sought to explicitly identify contrasting policies to those of the SNP’s White Paper, whilst refuting some of the claims made and positions adopted in the White Paper. This strategy can be argued to have a dual purpose in terms of convincing voters to opt for a ‘Yes’ vote. Firstly, the explicit differentiation of the Greens’ vision allowed the party to promote their own left-wing, environmentalist ideology and policies (Anderson, 2016; Carter, 2008; Hearn, 2014; Wheatley et al., 2014), and, secondly, it simultaneously provided an opportunity to demonstrate the scope for contrasting political approaches in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote. Given the need to appeal to non-SNP voters to secure an overall majority in the referendum, the Greens’ contestation of certain proposals in the White Paper thus illustrated the opportunity for contrasting ideological stances in the ‘imaginary’ of an independent Scotland. In particular, the Greens adopted a contradictory position on the issue of the currency proposals for an independent Scotland, countering the White Paper proposals for a Sterling currency union with the remainder of the UK by arguing for the importance of a separate Scottish currency:
We recognise the current Scottish Government’s right to argue for a sterling currency union, especially as a transitional measure, but, over time, we believe that conditions placed on it would limit Scotland’s options. That is why the Scottish Green Party supports a Scottish currency. (Greens European Parliament Manifesto, 2014: 6)

In addition to this contradictory stance on currency, the Greens also presented significantly contrasting policies on energy and taxation, arguing for a switch from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources whilst countering the SNP’s proposals for a cut in corporation tax. Such contradictory comments thus demonstrated a degree of implicit criticism of the SNP’s proposals for their ‘imaginary’ of a future SNP government in an independent Scotland.

Despite these contrasts with the SNP in the Greens’ ‘means-goal’ discourse, the final emergent pattern evident in the party’s discourse replicated the SNP’s approach of highlighting the risk of the continued union with the UK for Scotland in the event of a ‘No’ vote. For the Greens, this strategy centred on the risk of fiscal austerity and growing economic inequality in Scotland due to the policies of the coalition government at Westminster. Furthermore, the Greens also highlighted the shift towards right-wing politics and policies within the UK as a whole, thus representing a ‘Yes’ vote as an opportunity to allow Scotland to follow a different political path which would avoid austerity and protect public services. However, despite this negative portrayal of Westminster politics with regards to fiscal austerity and public sector cuts, the Greens’ discursive strategy avoided evoking the ‘betrayal narrative’ of the SNP with regards to both the treatment of Scotland within the UK and the potential promises of additional devolution in the event of a ‘No’ vote.

**The Scottish Green Party’s Games Narrative – A Catalyst for Sports Participation and Equality**

Comparative analysis of the Greens’ discourse regarding the benefits of hosting the 2014 Games for Scotland to the SNP’s discourse also allows for an exploration of the contrasting ‘public narratives’ of these pro-independence parties. Appendix 9 provides an overview of the findings of the data analysis of the Greens’
parliamentary speech contributions (13 sources), press releases (8 sources) and
manifestos (1 source) which make explicit reference to the Games. Analysis of the
emergent patterns in the Greens’ political discourse using the Fairclough and
Fairclough (2012) framework also provides further evidence of the nuanced
ideological and political positions of the party on the topic of the Games, as indicated
in Figure 11:

Figure 11 - Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Green Party political discourse regarding 2014
Commonwealth Games vis-a-vis Scotland’s constitutional status

Analysis of the Greens’ parliamentary contributions and press released referring to
the benefits and/or legacy of the Games found that the vast majority of references
related directly to sporting benefits. This overwhelming singular emphasis on the
sporting benefits of the Games for Scotland lies in contrast with the two dominant
themes in the SNP’s discourse highlighting both the sporting and economic legacies
of the Games, with the SNP placing greater emphasis on the event’s economic
benefits as a form of ‘economic boosterism’ (Holt, 1989; Horne, 2007; Horne et al.,
2013; Zimbalist, 2015), whereas economic considerations were absent from the
Greens’ ‘public narrative’ of the Games. Notwithstanding this significant omission
of economic considerations, the patterns in the Greens’ discourse on the sporting
benefits of the Games mirrored those of the SNP in the primacy given to an emphasis
on the opportunity to use the event to improve participation in sport and physical activity:

I am sure that we will see some of our excellent young Scottish athletes... They will have a chance to develop and become household names before we all have an opportunity to see them in Glasgow next year. That will have an impact. Positive role models are part of the picture of encouraging more people to take part in sport. (Alison Johnstone MSP, SP OR, 11 June 2013, col. 20956)

The 2012 Olympics in London and the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow are major opportunities to transform attitudes to participation in sport. But they also pose a huge risk of presenting sport as being for elite athletes, with a consequent drain of money away from community facilities. Greens want to see active leisure for all – for all areas, ages and abilities. That is how we should measure success, not simply through gold medals. (Scottish Greens Local Elections Manifesto, 2012: 12)

This emphasis on increasing physical activity was also developed with specific reference to the use of the Games to encourage active travel, an unsurprising emphasis given the environmentalist ideology of the party. However, the Greens’ also emphasised using the Games to address inequality in sport, with particular reference made to gender inequality and LGBT human rights issues, positioning the party as a champion of progressive political values with regards to the Games. This particular stance was elaborated upon in the interviews, with the party’s sports spokesperson Alison Johnstone MSP explaining the emphasis on tackling inequality in sport:

I think it's really important that the people, the less affluent people, the people who live too far away to do much organised, participative sport... that's where it's really got to make a difference if it is to be considered a success... if you want to have really prestigious, elite squad of cyclists or athletes, or whatever, you're gonna have a much better chance if you've got a broader participation base at the bottom. (Alison Johnstone MSP, interview, post-referendum)

A similar explanation of this position was offered by the party’s co-convenor Patrick Harvie MSP, emphasising the analogies which can be drawn between equality in the context of the Games legacy and the modern economy more broadly:
I probably would have some concerns that in terms of promoting sport there is a danger of focusing too much on elite sport and not enough on physically active communities, physically active lifestyles generally… as well as it being sport at the community level, there is still I think a danger in focusing on the elite side. It doesn’t just apply to this sort of argument, it applies in economics. We focus on what high earners are getting rather than what a typical experience is. (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

Although supportive of the potential for a sporting legacy from the Games on the whole, this was qualified with reference to the challenges of delivering a long-lasting legacy. These concerns were articulated specifically in relation to the future use of sporting facilities and the promised legacy for active travel:

I think one of the long-standing concerns that I’ve had is the transport element where we could have had a very transformational approach to seeing sustainable transport as a part of the physical legacy of the Games, and that hasn’t really materialised. There are some positives, but not nearly as much as I would have hoped for. (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview)

As noted earlier, the Greens were also circumspect about the potential economic benefits of the Games, with no direct discussion of the economic impact of the Games in their discourse dataset. This appeared to reflect the party’s stated preferences to move away from a neo-liberal economic model which viewed events such as the Games as a means to economic ends, emphasising instead the importance of viewing such events as ends in themselves in line with the party’s redistributive and communitarian ‘values’ (Anderson, 2016; Carter, 2008; Hearn, 2014; Wheatley et al., 2014). Indeed, the only emergent pattern in the Greens’ discourse regarding the economic benefits of the Games was restricted to a recurrent phrase that ‘investing in sport is money well spent’. This phrase thus emphasised the party’s belief that encouraging sports and physical activity has long-term health benefits, providing indirect economic benefits:

The challenge now, if we’re to deliver a meaningful legacy, is to make sure the facilities and coaches are in place for this to become a reality, and that no one is priced out of a more active lifestyle. Investing in sport
is money well spent. (‘Glasgow 2014: an inspirational Games’, Scottish Greens press release, 2014)

Despite the lack of emphasis on the economic benefits of the Games in the Greens’ discourse sample, there was a greater acknowledgement of the potential economic benefits of the Games in the interviews:

I’ve no doubt that there will be businesses in Glasgow that will be getting a huge immediate short-term benefit… em… all of the activity, not just tourists but Glaswegians as well as other Scots from outside Glasgow are here to experience it and be part of it. (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

Furthermore, the party’s discourse also emphasised the benefits of the Games for boosting the profile of Glasgow and Scotland, as was also acknowledged in the interviews:

It certainly showcased Scotland and Glasgow to the world in an incredibly positive light… a lot of visitors will have left having a really… not only a brilliant sporting experience, but a really warm and cultural experience too. So… I would imagine that in terms of tourism and stuff it can only be to the good. (Alison Johnstone MSP, interview, post-referendum)

However, the economic boosts via Games-related tourism expenditure championed by the SNP were viewed with caution by the Greens given the potential environmental damage caused by the SNP-led Government’s emphasis on boosting the number of international tourists visiting Scotland:

…my preference would be that we try and focus that on domestic tourism, that we try to focus it on visits from the rest of the UK, from other parts of Europe. And I believe if we’re gonna have a sustainable, viable tourism industry, that’s gonna have to be done with increasing surface travel rather than air travel for obvious peak oil and climate change reasons. (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview, pre-referendum)
The Greens’ concerns about the lack of environmental consideration in the planning of the Games legacy was similarly emphasised in the party’s press release on the official opening of the M74 extension in June 2011. Given that the M74 extension was explicitly named as one of the Games-related infrastructure developments in the original bid document, the Games acted as a tool for highlighting the party’s opposition to investment in road transport over public transportation:

The new road is completely at odds with Scottish Government commitment and targets for cutting carbon emissions, and will make it more difficult for Glasgow to tackle its considerable air pollution problems in the run-up to the 2014 Commonwealth Games. (‘Environmental movement: M74 opening “a dark day”’, Scottish Greens press release, 2011)

…probably the biggest piece of infrastructure that was cited in the bid was the M74 extension, so 5 miles of urban motorway is not a project that we were fans of. I’ve raised those kind of issues with the Games organisers and also with the likes of public transport providers and SPT pretty consistently over the last couple of years. (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

It appeared therefore that the Games were used as a form of leverage for highlighting specific policy concerns for the Greens, with the party opting for a mostly supportive stance regarding the Games overall whilst concentrating their Games-related political interventions on select areas of concern such as transportation and community sports facilities.

This strategy is also evident in the higher proportion of references made by the Greens to the social benefits of the Games. Both Harvie and Johnstone separately identified that the party’s specific line on the Games was to emphasise the potential to tackle issues relating to human rights for LGBT communities throughout the Commonwealth, achieving equality for para-sports participants, and raising issues concerning social inequality:
...I’ve consciously tried not to give voice to the little cynical devil which hovers on my shoulder. I’ve wanted our engagement to be positive where it can be, and to find ways to add other issues like the LGBT human rights on to the agenda. (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

Y’know, we were hoping for a very successful Games, an inclusive Games. We really welcomed the sort of work around human rights, and Pride House... but I do think the kind of line I take with sport is that you've got to make it accessible, you've got to make it affordable. (Alison Johnstone MSP, interview, post-referendum)

This strategy was evident in the party’s parliamentary contributions on the Games, with emphasis being placed on raising the party’s concerns in a relatively constructive manner, given the perceived risks of portraying negativity about the event (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Horne, 2007):

Members will no doubt be aware of the controversy surrounding the London Olympic committee’s decision to appoint Dow Chemical as sponsor of the Olympic stadium wrap... It is hard to think of a less appropriate sponsor for a life-affirming, health-promoting, global sports event... We have an opportunity to do things differently in Scotland. I am sure that the minister will agree that ethical considerations should be part of the sponsor selection process. (Alison Johnstone MSP, SP OR, 21 December 2011, col. 4895)

In contrast, the tone of the party’s press releases on the topic adopted a more critical and provocative tone:

The Commonwealth Games should be an opportunity for Scotland to be seen at its best in the world, and so we must be very careful not to tarnish ourselves by associating the Games with irresponsible, anti-social companies.... Dow Chemicals has left a legacy of decades of pollution and human suffering in India, and it would be totally unacceptable for the Commonwealth Games to play a role in any PR campaign by this company. (‘Minister challenged on sponsorship of Commonwealth Games’, Scottish Greens press release, 2011)

Despite this example of more strident criticism of unethical Games sponsorship, the party’s discourse predominantly adopted a positive tone to make a constructive
contribution to the Games-related debates. The politicisation of the Games by the Greens was therefore restricted to the use of the Games to illustrate wider policy concerns of the party. This particular perspective of the Games to illustrate the particular ideological stances of the Greens was further explored in the interview with Harvie:

…I think from our point of view because we don’t want to see GDP growth as the kind of standalone metric of success, the kind of statistic which is put on a pedestal it doesn’t belong on… that would lead us to be a bit more focused on not projected economic benefit but thinking about the cultural or community side of it a wee bit more. (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

Despite this acknowledgement of the potential to use the Games to exemplify elements of the Greens’ ideological stance, the party’s representatives were more circumspect about the ability to use the Games to forward arguments for their pro-independence stance, which supports previous academic analyses (Jarvie, 2017; Mole, 2014; Ochman, 2015). It is therefore unsurprising that the Greens’ political discourse dataset contained no examples of linking the Games to the independence referendum debate, in contrast to the strategy of the SNP which occasionally used the Games to illustrate wider constitutional debates. The reasons behind this contrast were elaborated upon in the responses from both of the party’s representatives, concurring on the lack of impact of the Games on the independence referendum campaign:

I think it would be completely stupid for people to start creating the false impression that there’s a direct impact on something like the referendum and trying to milk that, and it’s hard to resist the temptation sometimes for politicians because we’re, y’know, committed to one side or the other of the debate, but it’s… it’s a temptation that we should resist if… and it… I don’t think it does anybody any good… The Commonwealth Games does not directly connect at the political level to the question of Scottish independence. (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

Although Johnstone’s stance on the impact of the Games was less strident than that of her colleagues, she later elaborated upon some of the reasons why the Games lacked
traction as an issue in the campaign, a position that echoes the arguments put forward by Jarvie (2017):

It's still a marginal thing, it definitely is... I think the timing of the Commonwealth Games enabled them to be part of that whole amazing few months that we've just had with the Ryder Cup and so on. But... I'm just thinking about all the debates... I took part in so many debates I can't even think about it, and probably the only thing that would come up would be will Scotland be able to have its own Olympics team (Alison Johnstone MSP, interview, post-referendum)

However, this did not necessarily mean that the event was not considered to have any potential relevance for the referendum campaigns whatsoever, with both Harvie and Johnstone acknowledging that there were possible marginal implications for the referendum linked to the Games. Their arguments mirrored those suggested by Kenny MacAskill and John Mason of the SNP, highlighting the potential benefits of both the ‘feel-good’ factor of the Games and the opportunity to demonstrate Scotland’s self-governing capacity through a successful Games:

I don’t think there’s a direct impact. There could be a kind of indirect emotional impact that would... is just around confidence. If we have a good Games, y’know, does that have an emotional impact on how people feel about the country when they go to vote? But I don’t think it’s a direct impact that’s necessarily gonna direct people to change their vote. (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

...certainly, I don't think it will have down the Yes campaign any harm the fact that we put on a very credible... y’know, it's one of the... it's obviously not the Olympics but it's a major global games, and we did a very, very good, competent job. (Alison Johnstone MSP, interview, post-referendum)

However, both interviewees were quick to qualify these arguments by stating that any implications of the success or hypothetical failures of the Games would be marginal, and relatively unimportant in the grand scheme of the referendum campaign debates:

I doubt there’ll be a huge impact on which undecided voters go on. Y’know, as I say, if... if Glasgow had ended up, or Scotland had ended
up, mismanaging and bodging the organisation, that feeling of a lack of competence might have impacted negatively on the Government… but perhaps, only marginally compared with the wider arguments that people are getting their heads around. I mean, Scotland’s electorate is far more engaged with politics than it’s been for a long, long time now. (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

This relative reluctance to emphasise the potential impact of the Games on the referendum by the Greens when compared with the views of the SNP’s representatives aptly summarises the respective stances of these two pro-independence parties. Whilst both parties understandably acknowledged the limited impact of the Games when compared with wider campaign issues such as the economy, currency, pensions and welfare, the SNP position was more willing to use the Games to illustrate arguments in relation to the constitutional debate than the Greens. In light of this, it is appropriate to now turn to the contrasting discursive strategies adopted by the pro-union parties on the topic of the Games.
The Scottish Labour Party and the Constitution – ‘The Best of Both Worlds’?

This chapter analyses the discourse of the pro-union parties, commencing with the Scottish Labour Party (referred to as Labour henceforth), the largest pro-union party in terms of MSPs at the time of the discourse sample. Figure 12 provides a diagrammatic representation of Labour’s political discourse regarding Scotland’s constitutional status using Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2012) framework, based on analysis of election manifestos from the pre-Games period (i.e. 2011 Scottish Parliament; 2012 local/council elections; 2014 European Parliament) and the party’s two main policy documents on the topic of the Scottish constitution, ‘Together We Can’ and ‘Powers for a Purpose’, with the latter document derived from the work of the Scottish Labour Devolution Commission.

Unsurprisingly, the emergent ‘public narratives’ in Labour’s discourse with respect to the past and present ‘circumstances’ of Scotland and the UK contrast starkly with those of the pro-independence parties, with Labour describing the UK and the status
of Scotland within the UK in almost entirely positive terms. The predominant recurring theme in Labour’s discourse is the description of the UK as a ‘sharing union’:

The UK is a “sharing union”, with economic, social, and political aspects, in which risks and rewards are collectively pooled. These three aspects are interconnected: political union means we can have an integrated economy and a single currency. It also means we can share resources to permit social solidarity. (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission, 2014: 11)

It is important to understand what the sharing union means for Scotland, both historically and going forward, as this enables us to properly grasp how devolution can be further developed in a way that is mutually beneficial to the whole United Kingdom. For us, the sharing union in the twenty-first century accepts and recognises difference, but it is also founded upon the solidarity, partnership and cooperation between the nations of the UK. (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission, 2014: 35)

The sharply contrasting descriptions of the UK in the discourse of Labour and the SNP can be argued to represent a semantic battle over connotations of the word ‘union’. For example, Labour imbue the phrase ‘union’ with a range of economic, social and political benefits for Scotland, while the SNP’s discursive strategy attempts to portray the ‘union’ as a restrictive state of affairs for Scotland politically and economically, despite accepting the desirability of other ‘unions’ relating to currency, socio-cultural relations and the monarchy for an independent Scotland. Indeed, Labour explicitly criticise the SNP’s independence proposals in light of this semantic contest:

This sharing union is incompatible with the SNP’s vision of independence. The SNP has attempted to adopt the language of social union, but their conception of what this entails is so shallow as to be all but meaningless. (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission, 2014: 11)

Labour’s strategy of emphasising the benefits of the union for Scotland is illustrated through reference to current and historical narratives of Scotland’s status within the UK. A recurrent theme in the party’s discourse is the frequent reference to the ‘pooling and sharing of resources’ within the UK:
WE BELIEVE IN AN IDEA BIGGER THAN INDEPENDENCE: THE POOLING AND SHARING OF RESOURCES AND THE SHARING OF POWER FOR THE BENEFIT OF PEOPLE ACROSS THE UK. We have a redistributive union, a wealth-sharing union, where a contribution from all to the common pot means those most in need should benefit from the common weal. (‘Together We Can’, Scottish Labour, 2014: 13; original emphasis)

This narrative of the ‘pooling and sharing of resources’ appears to have a dual purpose. Firstly, it again emphasises the positives of the union for Scotland by stressing the economic security gained from the UK (Sharp et al., 2014), while, secondly, the ‘pooling and sharing of resources’ trope underlines a vision of the UK which aligns with Labour’s ideological values of ‘unionist nationalism’ (Ichijo, 2012).

Labour’s discursive construction of the historical development of Scotland also demonstrates the party’s pro-union stance. In stark contrast to the SNP’s ethnosymbolist and perennialist conceptualisation of Scotland as an ancient, outward-looking, wealthy and compassionate nation which pre-dates the modern era, Labour’s references to the historical development of Scotland are restricted to the post-union era from 1707 onwards. Labour’s narratives of the historical ‘circumstances’ of Scotland therefore emphasise that the country’s achievements are intertwined with those of the UK as a whole:

The UK is a union of equals and partnership. We have over 300 years of shared experience, history and joint endeavour. The UK family of nations – Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland – have achieved so much together. There have been so many great economic, social, political, scientific and cultural advances by working together as part of the union. (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission, 2014: 32)

The absence of references to Scottish history which predate the Act of Union is symptomatic of an alignment with ‘modernist’ conceptualisations of nationalism, with Scotland solely referred to as a constituent nation within the nation-state of the UK. This discursive strategy resonates with the arguments of ‘political’ modernists such as Breuilly (1993) and Giddens (1985) given the emphasis on the 1707 Act of
Union and the emergence of the sovereign state of the UK as the medium for political organisation and success for Scotland, whilst facilitating an independent Scottish civil society in line with arguments of McCrone (1992) and Pittock (2012). In contrast, the emphasis on the ‘union of equals and partnership’ counters the arguments of ‘socioeconomic’ modernist interpretations of Scottish nationalism such as those of Nairn (1977 and Hechter (1975), given the dismissal of arguments regarding economic and political asymmetry between the nations constituting the UK. However, Labour’s discourse also attempts to strike a balance by expressing pride in the historic achievements and values of Scotland as a distinct nation within the UK, while reiterating the benefits of union. This attempt to portray Labour politicians and supporters as both patriotic Scots in cultural terms and internationalist in ideological terms provides further support for Leith and Soule’s (2011) analysis of the embracing of ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ by the pro-union Scottish parties.

Labour’s embracing of ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’, or ‘unionist nationalism’ to use Ichijo’s (2012) description, is also illustrated in the party’s core strategy entailing an emphasis on the potential for further powers for Scotland within the ‘circumstances’ of the union. This is also evident in the party’s self-descriptive narrative which portrays Labour as ‘the party of devolution’:

Scottish Labour is a party of both devolution and the union. For over 100 years, Labour has led the argument for Scottish devolution within the union, and it is a cause we have advanced out of deep-seated conviction. That is why it was a Labour Government which set up the Scottish Parliament, delivering on what John Smith memorably called “unfinished business”. (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission, 2014: 2)

In addition to citing Labour’s central role in the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 as evidence of its status as ‘the party of devolution’, the discourse also repeatedly cites other examples of its historic contribution to devolution in Scotland. Given the centrality of these references in the party’s discourse, it is clear that the narrative of Labour as the ‘party of devolution’ demonstrates an all-encompassing embrace of the ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ rhetoric identified by Leith and Soule (2011). This position is also argued by Labour to align with the
‘circumstances’ of current electoral support for devolution in Scotland, citing the lack of popular support for independence in comparison to the status quo.

Despite this contrast between the narratives of the pro-independence parties and those of Labour, an element of consensus unsurprisingly emerges with regards to the negative impact of the Conservative-led Westminster Government in Scotland. However, Labour again frame the arguments on this matter in such a way as to challenge the arguments of the SNP and the Greens:

We oppose the Conservative-led Government’s welfare reform agenda, but this does not lead us to the conclusion that the solution is either to end the Welfare State or United Kingdom. We believe, instead, that it is an argument for progressive Labour Governments at both the Scottish Parliament and the UK Parliament. (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission, 2014: 186)

Indeed, Labour’s criticisms of the Conservative-led UK Government are extended to criticism of the SNP-led Scottish Government, constructing a narrative of present ‘circumstances’ which aims to undermine the SNP’s attempts to illustrate its competence to govern an independent Scotland (Cairney, 2011; Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014; Johns et al., 2013; Larkin, 2011; Leith and Soule, 2011). In particular, Labour’s discourse repeatedly highlights the SNP’s policy failures in further education, higher education and the housing market, and criticises both the Conservatives and the SNP for the centralisation of power in Scotland (echoing the arguments of the Greens). This strategy portrays Labour as the opposition-in-waiting to resolve the problems evident in Scotland’s current ‘circumstances’.

In line with the arguments of Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), Labour’s discourse concerning the ‘circumstances’ of Scottish politics helps to elicit the emergent ideological ‘values’ of the party. The main finding of the analysis of Labour’s discourse is the entrenchment of what has been termed ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ (Leith and Soule, 2011) or ‘unionist nationalism’ (Ichijo, 2012) within the party’s ideological ‘values’ in relation to the Scottish constitution. The party’s embrace of devolution is evident in both the aforementioned self-proclaimed narrative of Labour
as the ‘party of devolution’ and the core theme of the union offering the ‘best of both worlds’ to Scotland:

By having a Scottish Parliament with the powers to make decisions that affect our day-to-day lives here in Scotland, such as health and education, we can have the best of both worlds. A strong Scotland within a safe and secure United Kingdom - we know there is nowhere better, but we are also part of something bigger. As part of the United Kingdom, Scotland stands taller, speaks louder and has more influence. (‘Together We Can’, Scottish Labour, 2014: 53)

The ‘best of both worlds’ narrative in Labour’s discourse also offered an opportunity for the party to reiterate its core belief in the redistribution of wealth and progressive, social-democratic policies (Leith and Soule, 2011; Wheatley et al., 2014). The prevalence of the ‘sharing union’ characterisation was used to advance Labour’s arguments regarding the ‘sharing and pooling of resources’, thus couching the party’s stance on the Scottish constitution within a wider ideological value set of social justice, solidarity with disadvantaged communities elsewhere in the UK, and broader internationalist ideals:

As we write the next chapter of Scotland’s story, we do so considering not borders and identity, but values and ideas. Internationalism is a fundamental Labour value. Our pursuit of equality, fairness and social justice goes well beyond the borders of Scotland and the United Kingdom. (‘Together We Can’, Scottish Labour, 2014: 52)

Labour’s emphasis on the party’s outward-looking, internationalist ‘values’ therefore suggests an alignment with the principles of a civic form of nationalism, echoing both the findings of Leith and Soule (2011) as well as the discourse of the SNP and the Greens. However, Labour’s discourse explicitly refutes the attempts of the pro-independence parties to commandeer the language of civic nationalism, claiming that the strategy of nationalists is to foster an exclusive (although not necessarily ethnic) sense of Scottishness:

Welfare States send a powerful signal about belonging. As a result, it should not come as a shock that nationalists want to devolve welfare:
they want to create a more exclusively Scottish sense of national identity, in an attempt to substitute the allegiances which already unite British people together. (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission, 2014: 212)

In addition to this criticism, Labour also develop their narrative of growing centralisation in the ‘circumstances’ of contemporary Scottish politics under the SNP government in order to demonstrate an adherence to ‘values’ of decentralisation, localisation and the abolition of the unelected House of Lords at Westminster.

The aforementioned ideological ‘values’ of Labour’s discourse unsurprisingly led to an over-arching ‘goal’ of ensuring that Scotland remains within the UK. In order to achieve this ‘goal’, the party’s discourse appears to again embrace the importance of devolution in its ‘imaginary’ for the long-term stability of the union, with significant emphasis being placed on Labour’s arguments for the maintenance of a model of asymmetric devolution in the UK. Labour’s embracing of ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ (Leith and Soule, 2011) in its discourse is particularly evidenced by the party’s frequent expression of a goal of ‘home rule all round’:

> It is our belief that the union has to retain the combination of economic integration and social solidarity that creates both the domestic market and a well-functioning social market. Subject to this, we take the view that the preference should be for home rule all round and the Scottish Parliament ought to be funded by an appropriate balance of UK taxes, which give effect to social solidarity, and its own tax resources. (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission, 2014: 65)

Labour therefore placed emphasis on the need for an enhanced Scottish devolution settlement beyond that which was agreed by the Calman Commission and the resultant Scotland Act 2012. Labour’s Devolution Commission (2014) highlighted the party’s future intention to devolve additional powers for revenue raising to reach 40% of the Parliament’s budget, while also offering additional devolved powers in other policy areas. The party therefore used its pre-referendum discourse to highlight a willingness to revisit the Scottish constitutional settlement through further devolution, accompanied by reforming the UK-wide constitutional arrangements through the abolition of the House of Lords.
Aiming to convince the electorate of the value of Labour’s proposed ‘imaginary’ for the Scottish constitution, the party’s ‘means-goal’ strategy predominantly focused on highlighting the benefits of continuing union for Scotland (Sharp et al., 2014). The party’s ‘means-goal’ discourse therefore reiterated the benefits of the ‘sharing union’, with frequent references to the ‘pooling and sharing’ of resources and risks throughout the UK, the economic stability offered by the union, the achievement of social justice and solidarity through the preservation and protection of a UK-wide welfare system, and the maintenance of the Barnett formula for the calculation of Scotland’s block grant. However, it would be wrong to argue that Labour’s discourse did not challenge the proposals for Scottish independence at all, even if such arguments were secondary in their ‘means-goal’ discursive strategy. Indeed, Labour explicitly highlighted the potential risks of independence, while also outlining the party’s opposition to the devolution of full fiscal powers to the Scottish Parliament, frequently referred to as ‘devo-max’ or ‘full fiscal autonomy’:

We believe that independence would make us less secure in an increasingly uncertain world. By pooling resources and expertise from across the UK, we are safer and better prepared to meet potential threats. (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission, 2014: 110)

We also concluded that scope existed for greater devolution of taxation powers than is currently planned, while stating our objection to full fiscal autonomy, which, in our view, is no more than a thinly disguised version of independence. (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission, 2014: 146)

In addition to the above risks relating to defence and economic stability, Labour also highlighted the potential dangers of a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of corporation tax and employment rights as an independent Scotland sought a competitive advantage over the UK, the risk of over-dependence on oil revenues given the potential instability of oil prices, and the broader risks to public services and welfare as a result of the predicted economic instability in an independent Scotland.

The final tenet of Labour’s ‘means-goal’ strategy was an emphasis on the benefits of further post-referendum devolution, re-emphasising the core ‘public narrative’ presenting Scottish devolution as the ‘best of both worlds’. In particular, Labour’s
discourse placed repeated emphasis on the opportunity for enhanced democratic accountability and responsibility for the Scottish Parliament:

In making the case for devolution, Labour has brought enhanced democratic accountability for decisions affecting the people of Scotland. Our desire has always been a simple one: meeting the Scottish people’s legitimate desire for more powers and enhanced accountability within a strengthened union. (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission, 2014: 2)

Interestingly, this discursive strategy mimics the arguments of the pro-independence parties about the need for enhanced political sovereignty, resonating with ‘ideological’ modernist theories of nationalism such as those of Kedourie (1960; 1971). This narrative trope therefore appears to fuse the concepts of political sovereignty with the idea of ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ (Leith and Soule, 2011) or ‘unionist nationalism’ (Ichijo, 2012), thus legitimating Labour’s position on Scottish devolution through the reference to the “legitimate desire for more powers”.

This position on enhanced devolution is then used for party political purposes in both the Scottish and UK-wide context to illustrate the potential to protect Scotland from ‘Tory cuts’. Although this portrayal of ‘Tory cuts’ echoes the language of the SNP and the Greens, Labour used this argument to boost its specific ‘claim for action’: that the Scottish electorate should vote ‘No’ in the independence referendum, then vote for Labour in the 2015 Westminster and the 2016 Holyrood elections in order to protect Scotland from ‘Tory austerity’. Labour’s discourse therefore attempts to re-establish the party as the ‘true’ bulwark to the right-wing economic and social policies of the Tory government, thereby discursively jostling with the SNP as the ‘natural’, left-of-centre opposition to the Conservatives.

The Scottish Labour Party’s Games Narrative – Prioritising Scotland’s Sporting Future

Attention now turns to the emergent narratives on the 2014 Games in Labour’s political discourse. Appendix 10 provides an overview of the findings of the data analysis of Labour’s parliamentary speech contributions (120 sources), press releases
(17 sources) and manifestos (3 sources) which make explicit reference to the Games. The relative size of the political discourse sample for Labour is reflective of comparatively high levels of engagement in the issue of the Games, resulting from the party’s position as the official parliamentary opposition and its past role in securing the hosting rights for the event whilst in government prior to 2007. Figure 13 displays the emergent patterns in Labour’s political discourse on the topic of the Games using the Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) framework:

When contrasting the emergent ‘public narratives’ of Labour and the SNP, the most significant phenomenon is the additional emphasis placed on the sporting legacy of the Games by Labour, distinguishing the party from the SNP’s discursive strategy which prioritised the economic aspects of the event to the same degree as the sporting aspects. For example, analysis of Labour’s discourse sample identified that the majority of the references to the Games’ benefits and/or legacy were sport-related, significantly outstripping the ‘economic’, ‘profile and reputation’ and ‘other’ categories. Within the ‘sporting’ category, particular emphasis was placed on the importance of using the Games as a catalyst for both improving youth sport in Scotland and sports or physical activity participation for the general public:
The 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow in particular present Scotland with a great opportunity to unleash a revolution in sporting involvement. In preparing for a successful Games, we must ensure our athletes enjoy the benefits of competing at home and we must build towards a lasting legacy for Scotland’s citizens. The run-up to the Games should be used both to highlight the country’s poor record on physical activity and associated ill-health, and as a springboard for a vast improvement in our nation’s wellbeing. (Scottish Labour Sports Manifesto, 2011: 1)

Labour also highlighted other aspects of the sporting benefits and legacy of the Games, additionally citing the health benefits of sports participation, the benefits for Scotland’s elite sports performance system, sports volunteering opportunities and sports facility development, despite the questionable evidence upon which such claims are founded (Clark and Kearns, 2015, 2016; Matheson, 2010; McCartney et al., 2012; Owe, 2012; Stewart and Rayner, 2016). The party’s strategy of focusing predominantly on the sporting benefits of the Games was also reflected in the opinions of both interviewees:

I would hope, overall, there's an increase in the take-up of sport... and also in the number of volunteers that come forward to be involved in sport, and I think that will happen. (Patricia Ferguson MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Despite the clear emphasis on a sporting legacy in Labour’s discourse, the party did partially echo the arguments of the SNP regarding the economic considerations for hosting the Games, even though this constituted a smaller proportion of the party’s discourse. As was the case with the SNP, the main arguments forwarded by Labour related to the benefits of the Games for Scottish tourism and the regeneration of Glasgow’s ‘East End’ (Christie and Gibb, 2015; Matheson, 2010; Rogerson, 2016). Indeed, a narrative which became apparent in Labour’s discourse on the economic impact of the Games was the framing of the event as a solution to the failures of the SNP’s economic strategy. This narrative highlighted the benefits of the Games as an economic stimulus, juxtaposing this with the lack of action from the Scottish Government:
Spending on construction and refurbishment of Games venues and the Athletes’ village now supports around 1000 jobs including more than 600 new jobs and 700 new houses including support specifically designed to get people who are long-term unemployed back into work. The regeneration of the East End of our city is exactly the type of project that will help get our economy growing again and help stop the tragedy of young people leaving school and being forced to join the long queue of unemployed. (‘Dalarnock regeneration is example of how government can boost the economy and our communities without obsessing over the constitution’, Scottish Labour press release, 2013)

The use of the Games as a catalyst for economic development was also reflected in Labour’s third main narrative regarding the Games’ benefits and legacy, namely the profile and reputational benefits of the Games. As was the case with SNP’s discourse in this regard, Labour’s press releases and parliamentary speeches struck a balance between emphasising the benefits for the profile and reputation of Glasgow and Scotland:

In a little over 200 days, the great city of Glasgow will host the 20th Commonwealth Games. The eyes of the sporting world will turn our way… Come July Glasgow and Scotland will showcase itself to the world by hosting one of the great sporting occasions. (‘Huge year ahead for Glasgow and Scotland’, Scottish Labour press release, 2014)

However, in contrast, the interviews with Ferguson and Smith highlighted a greater emphasis on the benefits of the Games for Glasgow. This is perhaps unsurprising due to the fact that both interviewees represented Glasgow constituencies and regions at the time of the study, combined with the relative strength of Labour in Glasgow at the time of the Games in terms of MSPs, MPs and the Labour-led Glasgow City Council (Leith and Soule, 2011; Scottish Parliament Information Centre, 2011):

Over a long period of time, the City Council has been hugely involved in trying to change the image of the city internationally. I think Glasgow’s image has changed within the UK, and to an extent within Europe… it’s a chance to do that on a bigger scale, which is not just about a sense of civic pride… it’s directly about encouraging people to think that Glasgow’s a place where they want to invest, a place they want to come to do business, a place where they want to come to visit… (Drew Smith MSP, interview, pre-referendum)
This partial skewing towards the reputational benefits of the Games for Glasgow over Scotland in the party’s discourse therefore appears to be pragmatic in nature, grounded in both the realisation that the Games impact would ultimately be centred on the Glasgow context for visitors whilst also reflecting the political considerations of the Labour party in Glasgow (Leith and Soule, 2011; Mooney et al., 2015).

*The Scottish Labour Party and the Politics of the Games – Scrutinising the SNP and the Politicisation of the Games*

Analysis of Labour’s discourse also identified numerous instances where the event was used as an analogy or example to illustrate wider political issues. In particular, the Games were frequently used as a justification for criticism of the SNP government:

…Glasgow City Council has done a fantastic job preparing our city for the events... The achievement is even more impressive when you consider the massive financial constraints that have been put on our city, year after year. Despite the Scottish Government taking more than £150million from our city’s finances, Glasgow has used the Games to create real, sustainable jobs, from Govan to Garrowhill, through the Glasgow Guarantee. (‘Glasgow is using the Commonwealth Games’, Scottish Labour press release, 2014)

As we see the final preparations for the Commonwealth Games come into place it’s clear that the lack of an integrated transport solution to Glasgow airport is a vital missing link in the overall improvements across the city ahead of the Games. Every other major European city has a rail link to the airport and the SNP’s stubborn reluctance to use alternative finance mechanisms is hampering Glasgow’s ability to truly compete on the world stage and they need to rethink their strategy now to stop Scotland’s economic prosperity suffering further. (‘Transport Minister must make sure Glasgow Airport study is published now’, Scottish Labour press release, 2013)

In addition to these criticisms related to council funding (Mooney et al., 2015) and the cancellation of the Glasgow Airport Rail Link, Labour also used the Games to raise transport investment issues, Police Scotland control rooms, the National Planning Framework, teacher numbers, NHS budgeting debates, and the future of the BBC in Scotland. Furthermore, the issue of ‘phantom accommodation’ at the Games
was raised by Drew Smith in Parliament, with the rationale for utilising the event to raise this issue explored in his interview:

… I’ll be quite honest about it, there was also a separate issue which I was pursuing through the Housing Bill which was going through in that period as well which was about the regulation of private accommodation and short-term letting… So it was another way of shining a light on the whole issue that I hoped might get a result for them, and it got a result in the Housing Bill… (Drew Smith MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

Interestingly, the majority of the issues raised by Labour concerned wider political issues rather than specifically focusing upon sport as a policy area, despite the centrality of sport in the party’s narratives on the benefits of the Games, suggesting a lack of congruent strategic planning in this regard.

Labour’s discourse contained a number of contrasting positions and comments on the implications of the event for Scotland’s constitutional status. In particular, the party considered the potential symbolism of the Games, with a number of references alluding to the benefits of the union for the Games and Scottish sport:

Many sports are supported at a UK level, with UK-wide facilities. There is also tremendous UK co-operation and camaraderie in all sports. The Olympics provided the template and the platform for the games and both were utilised in the planning of Glasgow 2014; it also encouraged the growth of public interest in a wide range of sports… We now have to take the combined achievements of the UK and its nations, competing together and in friendly rivalry, and build on that to take Scottish and UK sport to the next level. (John Pentland MSP, SP OR 7 August 2014, col. 33201-33202)

The symbolism of the event for the maintenance of British identity was emphasised by Labour, echoing the arguments of the wider pro-union campaign that supporting the union can be viewed as a patriotic act:

Manchester has also hosted a fantastically successful Commonwealth Games. Glasgow, I’m sure, will host an equally, if not even more spectacular games in just a couple of weeks. Glasgow, Manchester, and London: three great cities we welcome into our homes every week with
River City, Coronation Street and EastEnders… The Nationalists would have you believe that these characters, represented in television drama, are so different as to demand separation; a new border and a new psychological wound opened between Scotland's communities and those of our neighbours in Manchester and London… the nationalists want this referendum debate to be Scotland v Britain. But the true choice is between two Scottish visions of Scotland's future: a nationalist vision that severs all political links with Britain, and a patriotic vision of a Scottish Parliament that is part of a system of pooling and sharing risks and resources across the UK. (‘What EastEnders and River City can teach the Nats’, Scottish Labour press release, 2014)

The complex nature of Scottish identity was also referred to in Smith’s interview, with reference made to the distinctive nature of the Games given the existence of a separate Scottish team:

I think it’s important that we do compete as a home nation in Games like the Commonwealth… I think it’s an important thing that it allows people to feel that we can have both of those. We can compete as Team GB at the Olympics but we can also have the benefit of competing as Scotland as well at different times, and I think that that balance and that mixture is what makes the Commonwealth Games for the home nations … it agrees my view on the constitution where you don’t have to make that choice, you can have both. (Drew Smith MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

This position therefore illustrates that the Labour’s constitutional narrative regarding the union as the ‘best of both worlds’ is replicated symbolically at events such as the Games (Harris and Skillen, 2016; Jarvie, 2017; MacRury and Poynter, 2010; Marks, 2010; McDowell and Skillen, 2015; Ochman, 2013; Thomas and Antony, 2015). Indeed, it can be argued that this also replicates the dualistic discourses of Catalanisation’ or ‘Espanolisation’ found in Hargreaves’ (2000) analysis of the 1992 Barcelona Games. Such arguments are representative of the party’s political position on the Games, with an emphasis being placed on refuting the attempts of the SNP to exploit the Games for political purposes whilst acknowledging the potential implications, if limited, of the Games for the referendum campaign.
Attention now turns to analysis of the discourse of the Scottish Conservatives (referred to as the Conservatives henceforth) on the matter of the Scottish constitution. Figure 14 provides a diagrammatic representation of the Conservatives’ political discourse relating to Scotland’s constitutional status using the Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) framework, based on analysis of election manifestos from the pre-Games period (i.e. 2011 Scottish Parliament; 2012 local/council elections; 2014 European Parliament) and the party’s main policy document on the Scottish constitution entitled the ‘Commission on the Future Governance of Scotland’ (more commonly referred to as the ‘Strathclyde Commission’).

Given the strong degree of cooperation between the pro-union parties within the Better Together campaign, it is perhaps unsurprising that analysis of the Conservatives’ ‘public narrative’ on the Scottish constitution contained numerous similarities with patterns found in Labour’s discourse. However, analysis of the Conservatives’ discourse also illustrates that the pro-union parties perpetuated nuanced positions on central issues within the constitutional debate.
Analysis of the Conservatives’ discursive construction of Scotland’s past and present ‘circumstances’ begins to elicit some of these nuances. For example, on the topic of the union, the Conservatives clearly mirror the strategy of Labour in terms of consistently highlighting its benefits for Scotland (Sharp et al., 2014; Wheatley et al., 2014). However, in contrast to Labour’s portrayal of a ‘sharing union’ underpinned by the ‘pooling and sharing of resources’ and values of social justice and solidarity, the Conservatives’ description of the union places greater emphasis on economic and security considerations:

The two fundamental purposes of the Union are creating a **large, single and fully integrated economic market** for jobs and enterprise and **assuring the common security** of everyone within the state. (Strathclyde Commission, 2014: 5; original emphasis)

The Conservatives’ historic narration of the benefits of union for Scotland are also linked to the party’s staunch pro-union constitutional stance:

The Conservative Party is and always has been the party of the Union. As Alan Trench has recently written for the IPPR, “The union is a Tory accomplishment – first under Queen Anne in 1707, then under Pitt the Younger (with Ireland) in 1801”... The genius at the heart of the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707 is that it allows both nations to blossom within a shared state. The Union was not and never has been an incorporating Union, requiring Scotland to assimilate as if she were nothing more than a northern region of England – or even an English colony. On the contrary, the Union is founded on the principle that Scottish institutions maintain their distinctive identity. (Strathclyde Commission, 2014: 3; original emphasis)

This narrative of the ‘circumstances’ of the union demonstrates the Conservatives’ position on the Scottish constitution in numerous ways. Firstly, the party’s proclamation of the union as a ‘Tory accomplishment’ highlights a discursive contest with Labour for the status of the ‘party of the union’, with the Conservatives’ reference to the historic foundations of the union being used to claim credit for these pre-suffrage developments. Secondly, the Conservatives’ explicit refutation of arguments which contend that the union was ‘incorporating’ and resulted in the colonisation of Scotland by England demonstrates a willingness to directly challenge
some of the foundational positions of Scottish nationalists on the union (Connell, 2004; Dalle Mulle, 2016; Evans, 1991; Mycock, 2012; Sharp et al., 2014).

On a theoretical level, this suggests that the party’s discourse not only explicitly challenges the positions of ‘socioeconomic’ modernist theories of nationalism such as Hechter’s (1975) ‘internal colonialism’ thesis, but also implicitly refutes other ‘modernist’ conceptualisations of the origins of the Scottish nation as a post-union development. Given that the Conservatives suggest that Scotland as a nation pre-dated the Act of Union, it would appear that the party’s discursive conceptualisation of the nation’s origins align more closely with those of ‘ethnosymbolist’ (e.g. Armstrong, 1982; Hutchinson, 1994; Smith, 1986, 2002, 2010) or ‘perennialist’ (e.g. Hastings, 1997; Seton-Watson, 1977) theories of nationalism, ironically echoing the position of the SNP.

Analysis of the Conservatives’ narratives of more recent political ‘circumstances’ in Scotland is also instructive in understanding the party’s stance. For example, despite their discursive battle with Labour for the status of the ‘party of the union’, the Conservatives’ discourse explicitly acknowledges that the Conservatives had historically been opponents of Scottish devolution. However, it is contended that the party has made some historic contributions to improving political representation for Scotland:

The Conservative Party is and always has been flexible about how the Union should be encouraged to evolve. It was Lord Salisbury’s Conservative Government that established the Scottish Office in 1885, and it was a Conservative Prime Minister (Baldwin) who appointed the first Secretary of State for Scotland to the Cabinet in 1926... The Scottish Parliament was created under Tony Blair’s Labour Government but its powers and responsibilities have been considerably extended under David Cameron’s Conservative-led Government... (Strathclyde Commission, 2014: 3)

This emphasis on the Conservatives’ historic contribution, in conjunction with the additional devolution of powers proposed by the party in the Strathclyde Commission, lends support to the arguments of Leith and Soule (2011) concerning the Conservatives’ recent conversion to support for Scottish devolution. Given the
party’s opposition to the introduction of the Scottish Parliament in the 1997 referendum, this stark contrast in its discourse demonstrates that there has been a move towards ‘unionist nationalism’ in the party’s narratives on constitutional policy (Convery, 2014; Ichijo, 2012; Steven et al., 2012). This is also evident in the party’s description of the nature of contemporary Scottish politics, with the Conservatives arguing that the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK is ill-at-ease (Strathclyde Commission, 2014), and that there is a desire for change in Scotland (Scottish Conservatives Local Election Manifesto, 2012).

Despite this evolving stance on Scottish devolution, the party’s discourse also emphasised that the root causes of the desire for change in Scottish politics do not solely lie in the need for more powers for the Scottish Parliament. The Conservatives repeatedly highlight the failure to use existing taxation powers by various post-devolution governments at Holyrood, blaming previous governments and, particularly, the SNP-led Scottish Government for failing to communicate these powers’ existence in the current devolution settlement. Furthermore, the Conservatives’ discourse also echoes the arguments of both the Greens and Labour regarding the growing centralisation of power to Holyrood under the SNP administrations since 2007.

Although analysis of the discourse of Labour and the Conservatives has demonstrated a degree of overlap, such as the espousal of ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ (Leith and Soule, 2011) by both parties, it is also true that each party’s discourse demonstrates both nuanced and stark differences in their respective ideological ‘values’. For example, the phrase ‘best of both worlds’ is used by both parties to emphasise the benefits of the union and devolution as compared with independence for Scotland; however, compared with Labour’s linking of this phrase to the ‘pooling and sharing of resources’, this idea is imbued with different political significance by the Conservatives:

Our plan gives us the best of both worlds: a Scottish voice that is loud and clear, a place at the top table and British heft in securing Scotland’s vital interests in Europe. Crucially, it will give us the chance to fix our relationship with Europe and make sure it works. (Scottish Conservatives European Election Manifesto, 2014: 3)
This illustrates that the referendum campaign remained an opportunity for the articulation of contrasting political arguments by parties which were otherwise cooperating on constitutional matters, with the Conservatives’ discourse articulating the party’s Euro-sceptic and Euro-reformer ‘values’ in order to differentiate it from both the SNP and Labour (Anderson, 2016; Convery, 2014).

For the Conservatives, this use of referendum campaign discourse to promote the party’s ideological ‘values’ was most clearly demonstrated through the publication of the Strathclyde Commission. The report explicitly links the party’s stance on the Scottish constitution to principles of ‘responsible, transparency’ and ‘accountability’, using these principles repeatedly throughout:

In our deliberations, we examined the political, fiscal, social and institutional elements of the Union, offering considered proposals for improving each. Throughout our report, we have based our recommendations on strong Conservative principles of responsibility, transparency and accountability, which we believe are required for a sustained relationship of all four parts of the UK. (Strathclyde Commission, 2014: 4; original emphasis)

These ‘Conservative principles’ are cited in support of the main recommendations of the Strathclyde Commission, such as the closure of the ‘fiscal gap’ in the Scottish Parliament by devolving additional fiscal powers to “create a more responsible Scottish politics” (Strathclyde Commission, 2014: 8). This added responsibility is linked to the removal of the ‘grievance culture’ which blames Westminster for budgetary cuts (Lecours, 2012; Leith and Soule, 2011; Newby, 2009; Pittock, 2008a). The strategy of linking the Strathclyde Commission proposals to the Conservatives’ ideological ‘values’ allows the party’s referendum campaign discourse to serve a dual purpose, using the proposals to both counter the arguments of the pro-independence parties while also promoting the Conservatives’ policy positions.

The Commission also allowed the party to illustrate its embrace of the popular demand for further devolution to the Scottish Parliament. Indeed, analysis of the details of the Commission’s proposals demonstrated a greater willingness to devolve
fiscal and budgetary powers to Holyrood than Labour’s Devolution Commission proposals (Thomson, Mawdsley and Payne, 2014), illustrating a swing in the party’s adherence to ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ (Leith and Soule, 2011) which outstrips that of Labour. Furthermore, leading figures in the Scottish Conservatives such as Murdo Fraser voiced support for additional powers for the Scottish Parliament beyond the Strathclyde Commission recommendations (Reform Scotland, 2015), voicing support for a federalist settlement throughout the UK:

The West Lothian Question, in particular, looms large at Westminster: what should be the role of Scottish MPs in debates and votes on matters which, in Scotland, are the responsibility of Holyrood?... In our view, it is important that any sense be resisted that MPs for Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish constituencies somehow perform any lesser a function than MPs representing seats in England. The establishment of stable constitutional arrangements for the future of the UK must address this. (Strathclyde Commission, 2014: 18)

This illustrates that the Conservatives’ stance on the Scottish constitutional debate has rapidly evolved during the period since the Scottish Parliament was re-established in 1999, with the 2014 referendum campaign being used as an opportunity to rebrand the party to the Scottish electorate. Furthermore, the expression of support for additional devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament cleared the ground for the Conservatives’ post-referendum campaigns to introduce ‘English Votes for English Laws’, or ‘EVEL’, to areas of English-only policy controlled by the Westminster Parliament.

The final element of the Conservatives’ ‘values’ evident in the party’s discourse is an emphasis on localism and decentralisation as a central tenet of Conservative policy, with the party’s discourse concurring with the arguments of the Greens and Labour on the growing centralisation of power in Scotland under the SNP. This repeated emphasis on the centrality of localism to Conservative values demonstrates that the party was keen to engage in a discursive battle with other parties such as the Greens and Labour to claim localism as a Conservative ‘value’, in stark opposition to the self-proclaimed title of the ‘party of devolution’ espoused by Labour which remained uncontested. Nonetheless, the extent of the afore-mentioned devolution proposals by
the Conservatives in the Strathclyde Commission (which outstrips those of Labour) arguably demonstrate that both localism and devolution have been embraced in the contemporary discourse of the party (Convery, 2014).

As outlined above, the Conservatives’ ideological ‘values’ demonstrate the party’s embracing of ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ (Leith and Soule, 2011) and ‘unionist nationalism’ (Ichijo, 2012). These ‘values’ therefore manifest themselves in a future ‘imaginary’ in which Scotland remains within the UK, with the proposals of the Strathclyde Commission suggested as a means for achieving the party’s ‘goal’ of maintaining constitutional stability through a model of asymmetric devolution within the UK and a resolution of the ‘West Lothian Question’ through the introduction of ‘EVEL’ (Mullen, 2014). The party’s discourse therefore stresses the need to vote for the Conservatives in order to achieve both an enhanced Scottish devolution settlement beyond the powers granted in the Scotland Act 2012 and a reformed EU through the proposals for a referendum on EU membership, with the Conservatives’ ‘claim for action’ encouraging a ‘No’ vote in the referendum and votes for the party in the forthcoming Westminster and Holyrood elections.

The Conservatives’ ‘means-goal’ strategy to persuade voters to follow their ‘claim for action’ centred on highlighting the benefits of the party’s own proposed constitutional settlement whilst underlining the potential risks of others’ proposals, in this case the prospect of Scottish independence. However, in comparison to Labour who focused the majority of their discussion on highlighting the benefits of continuing union, analysis of the Conservatives’ discourse identifies a greater emphasis on outlining the benefits of further Scottish devolution in comparison to either the benefits of the union for Scotland or the risks of Scottish independence. The Conservatives’ emphasis on the benefits of Scottish devolution in their discursive ‘means-goal’ strategy focused on portraying Scottish devolution within the union as the ‘best of both worlds’, emphasising the delivery of extended powers to the Scottish Parliament whilst retaining the security and stability of being in the UK:

…it is clear that empowering the Scottish people to shape their own nation within the security of a United Kingdom is not just something we are willing only grudgingly to accept, it is something that sits at the very
**heart of what it means to be a modern Scottish Conservative.**
(Strathclyde Commission, 2014: 3-4; original emphasis)

As part of this strategy, particular emphasis was placed on the opportunity to use new fiscal and borrowing powers to both boost economic growth and to lower the tax burden for the Scottish electorate. This demonstrates that the party’s ‘imaginary’ for post-referendum Scotland is one in which further devolution would facilitate an opportunity to pursue neoliberal economic and taxation policies in line with Conservative ideological values, with the repeated emphasis on ‘accountability, transparency and responsibility’ for the Scottish Parliament resonating with a vision of a smaller role for central government in Scottish society.

Identification of the continuing benefits of union constituted an important contributory element of the party’s ‘means-goal’ strategy for encouraging a ‘No’ vote. As highlighted previously, the party’s framing of the union focused on the economic stability and security achieved for Scotland as part of UK. Unsurprisingly, the risks of Scottish independence were juxtaposed with this narrative of an economically stable and secure UK:

> The Scottish Conservatives will say no to independence so that we keep the UK pound, protect pensions and keep the strength and stability of the UK. (Scottish Conservatives European Elections Manifesto, 2014: 12)

In particular, the Conservatives’ discourse identified risks to the pensions, public services and the welfare state in an independent Scotland, contending that the economic instability caused by over-dependency on fluctuating oil revenues and the loss of sterling as a currency would undermine the fiscal position of an independent Scotland (Tomlinson, 2014). Ironically, the Conservatives also highlighted the danger of losing membership of the EU as another risk factor for an independent Scotland, despite the party’s own Euro-sceptic or Euro-reformer ideological ‘values’ (Anderson, 2016; Convery, 2014). However, given the arguments of Ichijo (2004) about the comparatively favourable views on EU membership held by the Scottish electorate, it can again be argued that the mention of this issue by the Conservatives
resembles a pragmatic political calculation to achieve the party’s ultimate ‘goal’ of a ‘No’ vote.

*The Scottish Conservatives’ Games Narrative – A Sporting & Health Legacy*

Shifting attention to the Conservatives’ Games-related discourse, Appendix 11 provides an overview of the findings of the data analysis of the Conservatives’ parliamentary speech contributions (49 sources), press releases (31 sources) and manifestos (1 source) which make explicit reference to the Games. The party’s political discourse sample is comparably small in size compared to that of Labour given the lesser number of Conservative MSPs in the Scottish Parliament. Nonetheless, a number of patterns are evident in the party’s narratives regarding the Games represented in Figure 15, demonstrating the Conservatives’ nuanced positions on the event:

![Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Conservatives political discourse regarding 2014 Commonwealth Games vis-a-vis Scotland’s constitutional status](image)

As was the case with the emergent patterns in the discourse of the other parties, the primary emphasis of the Conservatives’ narratives of the Games focused upon the sporting benefits and legacy of the event. Indeed, over two-thirds of the party’s references to the Games legacy and benefits linked to the topic of sport. Within the
‘sporting’ category, the most frequently occurring theme related to the potential boost from the Games for sports and physical activity participation rates, with a particular emphasis on using Games-related facility development as a catalyst for this:

We want to make the Glasgow Commonwealth Games a great success. We will use the Games to encourage greater participation in sport across all age groups, and focus on leaving a lasting legacy of sporting facilities for after 2014. (Scottish Conservatives Scottish Parliament Elections Manifesto, 2010: 27)

However, interestingly, the Conservatives placed a greater degree of emphasis on the potential to leverage the Games to encourage health improvements in Scotland than the other parties, despite the questionable evidence of such claims (Clark and Kearns, 2015; Martin and Barth, 2013; McCartney et al., 2012; Mooney et al., 2015; Owe, 2012; Stewart and Rayner, 2016):

As someone with a health background, I naturally hope that the most important legacy that will come from Glasgow 2014 will be the improved physical health of our people—and that must start with our young people. (Nanette Milne MSP, SP OR 11 June 2013, col. 20967)

Furthermore, the party also emphasised the potential to use the Games as a platform to secure future events for Glasgow and Scotland, whilst promoting its PE and school sport policy centring on competitive sports. These distinct emphases appeared to mirror the discursive strategies of the other minority parties such as the Greens and the Liberal Democrats, with the Conservatives appearing to focus their attentions upon specific narrow issues, a pattern found in past academic analyses of minority party discourse (Lynch et al., 2012). This created a nuanced and contrasting position for the party, as was the case with the Greens’ distinct focus on ethical and environmental issues relating to the Games.

Outside of the sporting domain, the Conservatives’ discourse contained a relatively low number of references to other aspects of the Games’ benefits and legacy, such as economic, social and reputational impacts. This contrasted significantly with the
discussion in the interviews, where more emphasis was placed on a range of non-sporting benefits and legacy aspects:

The Commonwealth Games are a prestige international event and they will bring substantial economic and social benefits to Glasgow and to Scotland especially in those non-Glasgow communities which will be hosting events. There will be some benefits to the UK in terms of visitors coming to Scotland but also wishing to spend time in other part of the UK, in terms of economic gains to the companies assisting with the construction of games venue, the production of retail products and the provision of additional employment. (Liz Smith MSP, survey, pre-referendum)

This therefore suggests a disjuncture between the party’s conceptualisation of the Games legacy in strategic terms and the discursive narratives espoused in Holyrood or in press releases.

*The Scottish Conservatives and the Politics of the Games – The Role of ‘Team GB’*

In contrast, the relationship between the Conservatives’ discourse on the political aspects of the Games and the responses of the interviewees on this issue demonstrated a greater degree of alignment. Indeed, it can be argued that the party’s discourse contained the highest degree of pro-union symbolism regarding the Games of all the unionist parties, with frequent references to ‘Team GB’ and the UK sporting system, the positive impact of London 2012 as a UK-wide event (Ewen, 2012; Jarvie, 2017; MacRury and Poynter, 2010; Marks, 2010), and support for the Games from the UK Government. These frequent symbolic connections between the success of London 2012 and Glasgow 2014 were used to reiterate the benefits of the constitutional status quo for Scottish sport and society:

The brilliance of our BBC, the fantastic institution of our NHS, the fact that we have a welfare state… Those are all things we’ve achieved as a United Kingdom and we should be proud of that. But it’s not just our past – it’s our current, and our future. Think of when Britain is called on to host these great events like the Olympics in 2012, or the Commonwealth Games this year. We do so as a United Kingdom, and we make them such special occasions for the whole world to see. (David Cameron MP, ‘Prime Minister’s speech at Rally for the Union event’, Scottish Conservatives press release, 2014)
This discursive strategy emphasised both the devolved nature of sport as a policy area whilst also illustrating the benefits of the support from the UK Government for the Games, thus redolent of the ‘best of both worlds’ narrative which formed a central element of the pro-union discourse regarding the referendum. This provides further evidence of the existence of ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ (Leith and Soule, 2011) in the Conservatives’ discourse on the Games.

This strategy is also evident in the aforementioned frequent references to London 2012 and the support for the 2014 Games from the UK government. These narratives particularly emphasised the achievements of the UK as a nation at London 2012, the benefit of UK-wide support for Scottish sport, the unifying nature of London 2012 for the UK through a ‘feel-good factor’, and the support from the rest of the UK for Glasgow 2014 for Games volunteers and for the Baton Relay as a demonstration of the UK being part of a family:

I am delighted to be given the opportunity to speak about an exciting event that can bring the nation together in a positive way, behind a common purpose, in 2014. It is an event that will give Scots across the nation an opportunity to express what is great about this country, and the opportunity to promote our national identity while celebrating competition with and respect for our friends in the home nations… At the recent Commonwealth games reception, which has been referred to several times, I was struck by how appreciative the Glasgow 2014 organisers were of the access, the support and the co-working with the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games that has been on-going. (Ruth Davidson MSP, SP OR 8 November 2012, col. 13241-13242)

So while some Nationalists may claim sole rights to national pride, I beg to differ. I’m voting ‘No’ as a patriotic Scot conscious of the practical case before us – a currency we all trust, Armed Forces we rely on, a pension when we retire, the knowledge we’ll be cared for in hospital without the need to flash a credit card... And let’s not take for granted the social and family ties that bond us together across the UK as well – symbolised in a small way for me by the fact that fully a quarter of the people who asked to volunteer in this summer’s Glasgow Commonwealth games were from elsewhere in the UK. Simply put, the thing works. (Ruth Davidson MSP, ‘Separating the country I love? No thanks’, Scottish Conservatives press release, 2014)
These examples illustrate a pattern of allusion to the benefits of the union vis-à-vis the Games and the referendum, demonstrating that the Conservatives appreciated that events such as the Games could have both a unifying and dividing effect as regards Scottish and British identities, echoing the arguments of past academic analyses of the event (Harris and Skillen, 2016; Haynes and Boyle, 2008; Jarvie, 2017; McDowell and Skillen, 2015; Mole, 2014; Ochman, 2013; Salisbury, 2013) and the conflicted nature of the ‘Caledonian Antisyzygy’ in Scottish identity (Nairn, 1977). These patterns were also explored in the interview with Murdo Fraser MSP:

…one of the very interesting aspects of the Commonwealth Games was how enthusiastically the audiences of the Commonwealth Games cheered not just the Scots athletes, but all the athletes from the home countries… which suggests that while people were very happy to go along and cheer on the Scottish team, there’s no question that they were doing that in any kind of exclusive sense… Many of the Scots Commonwealth Games team were based in England because the training facilities in England were better. So there was certainly no tension or animosity of any kind between the competitors from the Home Nations, and I think that kind of over-spilled a bit into the crowd reactions. (Murdo Fraser MSP, interview, post-referendum)

This explanation therefore reiterated the potential for the Games to have a mixed impact in terms of the symbolism of Scottishness and Britishness, with the existence of an independent Scottish team in the Games countered by the event’s association with Britishness and the Commonwealth (Jarvie, 2017; McDowell and Skillen, 2015; Ochman, 2013). This suggests that the Conservatives’ conceptualisation of the Games aligned with the ‘best of both worlds’ narrative which was frequently promoted by all of the pro-union parties, resonating with the ‘unionist nationalism’ thesis of Ichijo (2012).

The double-edged nature of the Games in a political sense was also discussed by the interviewees when considering the potential impact of the event on the referendum. Similar to the other parties, the Conservatives’ representatives were generally circumspect about the possibility of the Games influencing the referendum:
Do you think the hosting of the 2014 Games has any implications for the independence referendum? Why/why not?

Not particularly. I think it would influence votes both ways but not in significant numbers. (Liz Smith MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

I certainly don’t think it’s seen as being a top priority, and if you think of the government the key issues are finance, economy, health, justice, education, the environment. I mean, sport comes pretty far down the list, yeah… I don’t remember a great deal of discussion around sport at all during the independence referendum. I mean, you did get various sporting personalities coming out for different sides, but it wasn’t a big feature in any of the debates at the time. (Murdo Fraser MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Although these responses clearly demonstrated a significant degree of scepticism about the significance of the Games, there was a partial acceptance or acknowledgement of the logic behind the proposition that the Games may influence voters to a small extent. This was further elaborated on in Fraser’s comments on the SNP’s strategy of using the Games to justify the devolution of APD:

…there were large numbers of people coming into Scotland who would be paying Air Passenger Duty, and I think the SNP saw that as an opportunity to really illustrate why this tax on the air passengers was going to be an issue for people. And that was potentially one of the benefits of independence… it would have been that they could have got rid or have reduced APD. I think the point we might have made is, despite all the chat around Air Passenger Duty from SNP politicians, there’s very little evidence that passenger numbers through Scottish airports were adversely affected. In fact, quite the opposite. (Murdo Fraser MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Although Fraser’s parliamentary intervention regarding the issue of APD took place in the post-referendum period and is therefore excluded from the discourse sample considered here, his interview comments on the matter remain pertinent to understanding the strategic positioning of the Conservatives during the referendum campaign, particularly so given his personal advocacy of a federalist settlement for Scotland which went beyond his party’s recommendations in the Strathclyde Commission. Interestingly, this advocacy for federalism and additional devolved
powers was supported by his colleagues in the party, and actually formed part of the Conservatives’ strategic approach to the referendum campaign:

...obviously in the run up to the referendum, y’know, everybody was very cautious about saying anything that might, y’know, be off message or to cause the campaign difficulties, y’know. So when I floated the federalist idea that was done in full discussion with political colleagues and with our media team, and they were very relaxed about it because what we were clear to do was to say that in the event that there was a no vote in the referendum, it didn’t mean the constitutional status quo would remain, and that there were other possibilities for additional devolution of power or indeed moving towards a federal structure. (Murdo Fraser MSP, interview)

It can therefore be argued that the Conservatives shift towards ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ (Leith and Soule, 2011) is at least in part related to an acceptance of the need to embrace the public popularity of devolution in Scotland, with the party’s shifting stance on the constitution a central tenet of the party’s political communication and campaigning. Although the Games were not considered to play a prominent role in the party’s strategy in the referendum campaign, their potential illustrative utility did not go unnoticed. It can therefore be argued, in sum, that the Conservatives’ political strategy for the Games focused on emphasising the symbolism of the event in relation to Britishness and the union, whilst simultaneously undermining the attempts of pro-independence campaigners to utilise the event’s success for their own constitutional ends.

The Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Constitution – ‘Federalism: The Best Future for Scotland’?

This section focuses upon the discourse of the Scottish Liberal Democrats (referred to as the Liberal Democrats henceforth). Figure 16 provides a diagrammatic representation of the Liberal Democrats’ political discourse regarding Scotland’s constitutional status using the Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) framework, based on analysis of election manifestos from the pre-Games period (i.e. 2011 Scottish Parliament; 2012 local/council elections; 2014 European Parliament) and the party’s main policy document on the topic of the Scottish constitution entitled ‘Federalism:
The Best Future for Scotland’, the result of the party’s 2012 ‘Home Rule and Community Rule Commission’ (HRCRC henceforth) led by Sir Menzies Campbell MP.

Figure 16 - Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Liberal Democrats political discourse regarding Scotland’s constitutional status

The Liberal Democrats’ ‘public narrative’ on the Scottish constitution demonstrates a qualified support for the current union between Scotland and the rest of the UK, with the party’s stance on this topic illustrated in its discursive construction of the past and present ‘circumstances’ of Scottish politics and economic development. Echoing the other pro-union parties, the Liberal Democrats emphasise the historic and current benefits of the union for Scotland:

For over 300 years, the United Kingdom has brought people together in a successful multi-national state. The United Kingdom is one of the biggest economies in the world and our combined strength has helped us to weather the recent economic turmoil. As part of the United Kingdom, Scotland itself is better protected from economic shocks. (Liberal Democrats HRCRC, 2012: 13)

However, despite the party’s explicit support for continuing union, this is qualified through reference to the party’s historic support for Scottish Home Rule and a federalist constitutional settlement within the UK:
We have a long commitment to federalism across the UK. The Scotland Bill is part of this. It establishes shared approach and accountability on taxation. (Liberal Democrats Scottish Parliament Elections Manifesto, 2011: 76)

The Liberal Democrats’ position therefore problematises the nature of the union for Scotland and the UK, arguing that the status quo fails to successfully address demands for powers and democratic representation in the contemporary political era. The Liberal Democrats’ discourse therefore echoes the strategies of the other pro-union parties by explicitly identifying the party’s support for further devolution to the Scottish Parliament, both historically and in the post-referendum period. This again illustrates the conversion of all of the major pro-union parties in Scottish politics to a position of ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ (Leith and Soule, 2011).

To this end, the Liberal Democrats’ discourse of the present ‘circumstances’ also endeavours to highlight the existing powers of Holyrood:

Most of the domestic powers are already allocated to the Scottish Parliament. Indeed, in legislative terms, the Scottish Parliament is one of the most powerful in the world and already has substantial powers to improve the lives of its citizens. (Liberal Democrats HRCRC, 2012: 39-40)

However, the Liberal Democrats’ narrative of the circumstances which led to growing support for Scottish devolution is instructive for understanding the party’s stance on the Scottish constitution. In particular, the narrative illustrates that the Liberal Democrats view the establishment of the Scottish Parliament as part of a process towards addressing the nature of contemporary identity in Scotland:

Since the early 1970s there has been a growing sense that our political institutions were no longer up to the job, that the changing sense of personal and national identity in Scotland required a modern political framework in which to flourish…. Liberal Democrats always recognised that devolution would only ever be a halfway house to a more permanent modern constitutional framework. (Liberal Democrats HRCRC, 2012: 12-13)
This position suggests that the Liberal Democrats’ willingness to embrace federalism as a solution for the nature of modern Scottish identity aligns with elements of the theoretical position of the ‘ideological’ modernist conceptualisations of nationalism of Kedourie (1960, 1971), with a federal settlement proposed as a resolution to the legitimate demands of the Scottish electorate to exercise a greater degree of political sovereignty. As this claim is explicitly grounded in relation to the concepts of national identity in Scotland, it would appear that the Liberal Democrats’ support for federalism represents a pragmatic acceptance of the need to accommodate the growth of a distinctly Scottish identity in contemporary Scottish politics (Harvie, 1998; Ichijo, 2012). Furthermore, the party’s discursive construction of the ‘circumstances’ of contemporary Scottish politics replicates the arguments of the other parties about the growing centralisation of power under the SNP. These circumstantial premises are therefore offered as further evidence of the need for a federal settlement for Scotland to tackle both the constitutional and policy-related issues facing Scottish society.

This strategy therefore acts as a clear demonstration of the arguments of Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) with regard to the deliberate use of ‘circumstantial premises’ to forward a particular set of ideological ‘values’, in this case the concept of federalism. The Liberal Democrats’ thus used their referendum campaign discourse as an opportunity to fully articulate their vision for a federal UK. It is unsurprising therefore that the party explicitly identifies federalism as a core ‘value’ of its ideological position on the constitution:

Home rule for Scotland within a reformed, federal United Kingdom has long been the constitutional aim of Liberals and Liberal Democrats. (Liberal Democrats HRCRC, 2012: 5)

This core value statement is expanded upon in the party’s discourse through reference to a number of benefits of a federalism the party’s core ‘means-goal’ strategy. Indeed, the Liberal Democrats’ proposals for additional powers outlined in the 2012 HRCRC were found to significantly outstrip those of the other pro-union parties (Thomson, Mawdsley and Payne, 2014), thus demonstrating once more that the
party’s policy proposals mirror the embracing of ‘small ‘n’ nationalism’ (Leith and Soule, 2011) in the discourse used in its manifestos.

The Liberal Democrats’ ideological ‘values’ on the Scottish constitution were also found to align with the ‘best of both worlds’ mantra which became a common discursive feature for all of the pro-union parties. However, the framing of the Liberal Democrats’ version of the ‘best of both worlds’ narrative through reference to the benefits of federalism demonstrates a contrasting stance to those of Labour and the Conservatives:

Scotland can and should get the best of both worlds: strong domestic powers, working in partnership with the other parts of the UK, yet punching above its weight on the world stage. In 2006 the Steel Commission set out how a federal solution could accommodate the multiple identities of people who live in the United Kingdom – simultaneously Scottish and British, never forced to choose between them. It allows all people in the United Kingdom to share the risks and rewards in an uncertain world. (Liberal Democrats HRCRC, 2012: 15)

Whilst this position shows similarities to the phraseology of the other pro-union parties regarding the sharing of ‘risks and rewards’ across the UK, the explicit reference to accommodating ‘multiple identities’ demonstrates the direct link between the Liberal Democrats’ federalist values and a pragmatic approach to the nature of contemporary national identity. This approach appears to demonstrate a willingness to embrace a position whereby Scottish political sovereignty is similarly shared across multiple layers of governance, given the separation of powers proposed by the party for the Scottish Parliament, the Westminster Parliament and the European Parliament, as was accepted in the SNP’s ‘gradualist’ or ‘independence-lite’ conceptualisation of Scottish independence (Casanas Adam, 2014; Jackson, 2014; Keating, 2012; Sharp et al., 2014).

The Liberal Democrats’ discourse also highlights other ideological ‘values’ which portray the party as a modernising political entity which embraces the need for democratic and electoral reform. These arguments about the need for such reforms are extended from the Scottish context to local democracy, the English constitutional
arrangements (Liberal Democrats HRCRC, 2012), the nature of the UK-wide House of Commons and House of Lords (Liberal Democrats HRCRC, 2012), and the need to reform the European Union (Liberal Democrats European Elections Manifesto, 2014). Furthermore, the Liberal Democrats’ discourse frequently endeavours to explicitly outline their pro-EU, internationalist position, thus juxtaposing the party’s ‘values’ against the more Euro-sceptic Conservative party whom the Liberal Democrats joined in the Westminster coalition government in 2010.

Given the Liberal Democrats’ repeated message about their belief in federalism as a mechanism for a permanent Scottish and UK-wide constitutional settlement, it follows that the ultimate ‘goal’ of the party’s discourse on this issue is that Scotland would remain within the UK following a ‘No’ vote in the independence referendum. In comparison to Labour and the Conservatives, however, the Liberal Democrats’ federalist ‘imaginary’ for the future of the constitutional relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK is bolder in terms of the extent of the reforms proposed (Thomson, Mawdsley and Payne, 2014). This ‘goal’ is therefore linked to the party’s overarching ‘claim for action’ for the Scottish electorate, with the party urging a ‘No’ vote in the referendum, followed by votes for the Liberal Democrats in the 2015 Westminster and 2016 Holyrood elections to secure an enhanced Scottish devolution settlement beyond the additional powers of the Scotland Act 2012.

It is unsurprising that the party’s discourse elaborated on the benefits of federalism for Scotland as the primary objectives of their ‘means-goal’ strategy to convince the Scottish electorate to vote ‘No’ in the referendum. To this end, the party’s discourse on the Scottish constitution cited numerous potential benefits of a federal settlement, with most of these framed in the ‘best of both worlds’ narrative which emphasised the opportunity for enhanced powers, accountability and responsibility for the Scottish Parliament while retaining the stability and security gained from remaining in the UK. In particular, the Liberal Democrats emphasised the potential to use the additional borrowing and fiscal powers for Scotland to meet the specific demands of the Scottish economy:

The report sets out radical tax plans that would give the Scottish Parliament the powers to raise the greater part of the money it spends
while confirming the advantages of social and fiscal equity across the United Kingdom. The proposals for control of taxes on income and wealth give powerful tools to address inequality in Scotland. (Liberal Democrats HRCRC, 2012: 3).

In addition to the economic benefits of federalism, the long-term benefits for the remainder of the UK are also discussed at length, emphasising the opportunity to deliver a sustainable constitutional settlement across the UK. The argued benefits of federalism for the UK are qualified through reference to the flexibility to express multiple identities through the new dynamics of a federal UK, whilst simultaneously resolving the ‘EVEL’ debate which had risen up the political agenda for the English electorate (Mullen, 2014). It can therefore be argued that the Liberal Democrats’ conceptualisation of the benefits of federalism resonate with the arguments of ‘postmodern’ theorisations of nationalism (e.g. Billig, 1995; Brubaker et al., 2006; Edensor, 2002; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a, 2008b) which embrace the existence of multiple identities whilst simultaneously appreciating the ongoing salience of national identity in contemporary politics.

In addition to this emphasis on the benefits of federalism for Scotland and the UK, a secondary strand of the Liberal Democrats’ ‘means-goal’ strategy involved reaffirmation of the benefits of the union for Scotland. The positive impact of the Barnett formula for calculating the Scottish Parliament’s block grant was commonly referred to, with emphasis being placed on the higher ‘per capita’ funding provided to Scotland in comparison with England. Whilst the Liberal Democrats explicitly supported the replacement of the Barnett formula with a new needs-based formula if the party’s ‘imaginary’ of a federal settlement came to fruition, it was presupposed that this new formula would remain beneficial to Scotland. This emphasis on the benefits of the Barnett formula links to the party’s wider ‘values’ concerning the ‘sharing of risks and rewards’ within the UK. The final central feature of the Liberal Democrats’ discussion of the benefits of remaining part of the UK focused on the opportunities provided for international representation of Scottish interests, highlighting the key roles played by the UK in global political organisations such as the EU, the G8, the UN, NATO and the IMF. This argument clearly aligns with the party’s self-proclaimed ‘internationalist’ values, whilst simultaneously countering the
arguments of the pro-independence parties about the opportunity to represent Scotland’s interests more effectively as an independent, sovereign state.

Similar denunciation of the pro-independence parties’ claims regarding the benefits of a ‘Yes’ vote were made elsewhere by the Liberal Democrats, with the final aspect of the ‘means-goal’ in the party’s discourse concentrating on highlighting the potential risks of independence. However, it should be noted that this discussion was significantly less frequent than the emphasis on the benefits of federalism and ongoing union, with the party’s discourse placing emphasis on a positive message. Indeed, most of the explicit references to the risks of independence remained couched within a wider discussion of the benefits of federalism:

One of the strengths of federalism over independence is that it gives the people of Scotland an equal and continuing voice in UK decisions, whereas independence removes the Scottish voice from the UK and from influence over these key decisions. A separate Scotland would have no say over the Bank of England or the financial services authorities and no ability to help shape the fiscal arrangements supporting Sterling. An independent Scotland would also have to accept immigration rules laid down for the rest of the United Kingdom if it wished to retain a common travel area with England, Wales, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. (Liberal Democrats HRCRC, 2012: 16)

In addition to the potential loss of influence on policy issues which would have a direct impact on an independent Scotland, the party also echoed the other pro-union parties by emphasising the risks of an independent Scotland becoming over-dependent on oil revenues (Tomlinson, 2014). The Liberal Democrats’ discourse thus reiterated the ‘uncertain world’ found in the contemporary globalised era, with the Scottish economy and welfare system at risk of over-exposure to fluctuating oil prices. This final aspect of the party’s ‘means-goal’ strategy therefore attempts to reiterate the benefits of remaining within the UK to balance the ‘risks and rewards’ across a larger canvas, thus encouraging the Scottish electorate to opt for a ‘No’ vote to maintain the economic security of the union.
The Scottish Liberal Democrats’ Games Narrative – A ‘Trickle-Down Effect’?

Attention now turns to the Liberal Democrats’ discourse on the 2014 Games. Appendix 12 provides an overview of the findings of the data analysis of the Liberal Democrats’ parliamentary speech contributions (13 sources), press releases (12 sources) and manifestos (1 source) which make explicit reference to the Games. As was the case with the Greens, the relatively limited number of sources referring to the Games by the party is again explained by the respective sizes of the parties. Nonetheless, a number of distinct political positions regarding the Games emerged in the Liberal Democrats’ discourse on the event, as outlined in Figure 17:

Figure 17 - Diagrammatic representation of Scottish Liberal Democrats political discourse regarding 2014 Commonwealth Games vis-a-vis Scotland’s constitutional status

Analysis of the Liberal Democrats’ discourse on the benefits of the legacy and benefits of the Games highlights a similar central emphasis on the sporting benefits of hosting the event. However, compared with the other parties, the relative proportion of references devoted to the Games legacy in the party’s discourse was significantly lower, with the Liberal Democrats being the only party to make more references to the political aspects of the Games than either the Games’ legacy or the organisation
and evaluation of the Games. It can therefore be argued that the party’s new status as a minority party following the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections, having dropped from 16 MSPs in 2007 to 5 MSPs in 2011, negated the ability of the Liberal Democrats to contribute to discussions on the Games legacy, given their loss of influence in terms of cross-party committee responsibilities and the time offered to the party in parliamentary debates on the event.

Nonetheless, analysis of the Liberal Democrats’ narratives of the Games legacy remains fruitful for appreciating the party’s conceptualisation of the event and their political approach to sport. For example, the party mirrored the patterns of their political opponents in terms of prioritising the Games’ sporting legacy, with sport and physical activity participation rates, elite performance and health benefits particularly emphasised:

"With tickets now on sale I know that there is real excitement building over the Commonwealth Games across Scotland. It promises to be a great sporting occasion that will give Glasgow a real boost and inspire the next generation of Scottish athletes in the same way that the performance of Team GB did in London last year.” (Sir Menzies Campbell MP, ‘Campbell: Glasgow Games will help inspire next generation of Scottish athletes’, Scottish Liberal Democrats press release, 2013)

If we are to work constructively for the future and ensure that there are behavioural changes, we must ensure that the Commonwealth games add to the overall encouragement to future generations to take up athletics or indeed just a healthier lifestyle than people might currently have. (Tavish Scott MSP, SP OR 21 December 2011, col. 4884)

However, despite the presence of these supportive comments from the party, the relative lack of reference to the legacy of the Games can be explained by the sceptical stance of the Liberal Democrats’ sports spokesperson, Tavish Scott, who expressed opinions which aligned with the common findings of academic research on legacies (Clark and Kearns, 2015, 2016; Horne, 2007; Matheson, 2010; McCartney et al., 2012; Owe, 2012; Stewart and Rayner, 2016):

I think this legacy stuff’s a whole lot of hot air, I really do. If in 15 years' time the next generation of Scots coming through have lead more healthy
lifestyles, don't smoke as much, drink less alcohol and healthy lives... eh... healthier lives and therefore the statistics on our health, particularly in West Central Scotland which are appalling at the moment, start to improve, then there's been a legacy... I was always in those kind of discussions saying, y'know... including to Government ministers... “Don’t over-do this” because in many ways having it in itself is worth doing. There's a perfectly good argument for the economic boost it creates at the time just in having a major sporting event. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)

This position echoes the arguments of the SNP on the use of the event as a form of ‘economic boosterism’ (Holt, 1989). Nonetheless, it also appears that the party possessed an inherent belief in the ‘trickle-down effect’ thesis regarding the potential to boost sports participation amongst the general population by focusing funding on the hosting of major sports events and support for elite sports performance:

I think it matters to have elite sportsmen and women winning... I think you probably do more to inspire the next generation by having... the Michael Jamiesons and the Hannah Mileys who then do all the stuff going round pools in Scotland saying “come and swim”, or go to schools and “come and swim”... I think that achieves a lot more than more money going into participation in PE and all this... if you were gonna ask me if I was Sports Minister and I was under huge pressure from a Finance Minister saying “you can't have it all”, I'd push it down the elite route. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)

This emphasis on the use of the event to stimulate sports participation is therefore based on the core assumption that the hosting of the event itself can act as a central catalyst for development at community level (Clark and Kearns, 2015, 2016; Matheson, 2010; Owe, 2012). A similar conceptualisation of the Games’ effects was also evident in the Liberal Democrats’ discourse on non-sporting aspects of the event’s legacy, particularly in comments on the positive impact the Games would have on the profile and reputation of Scotland and/or Glasgow and the associated economic benefits:

And the Commonwealth Games can be great for Glasgow and Scotland. Not just the winning of medals, but also in building Scotland's ties to other countries, helping trade, relationships and therefore Scottish jobs. (Liberal Democrats Scottish Parliament Elections Manifesto, 2011: 5)
The above example highlights the party’s conscious decision to remain supportive of the Games, despite Scott’s admitted scepticism. This was borne out in the party’s parliamentary speeches and press releases, where a significant degree of attention was paid to praising sporting successes, the Games’ cultural programme, the Games’ organisers and the event in general.

*The Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Politics of the Games – Politicising the Apolitical Games?*

Nonetheless, this did not necessarily mean that the party did not hold the SNP government accountable for the Games, with analysis of the Liberal Democrats’ discourse identifying elements of explicit and implicit politicisation of the event. One such example of this politicisation was evident in the party’s use of the event as a justification for criticism of the SNP-led government. In particular, the party used the Games as leverage to critique the failures of the SNP to deliver upon their manifesto commitments on PE and school sport:

> Six years on from the SNP’s manifesto pledge to deliver more PE in schools we know that there remains significant variations in provision across the country. The previous ambition shown by the SNP appears to have been watered down in this strategy, with Ministers having scrubbed the requirement for specialists to deliver PE classes to pupils. If we are to tackle obesity amongst young people effectively and create a Commonwealth Games legacy we can be proud of, the Scottish Government must show ambition towards meeting their own targets in full and as quickly as possible. (Liam McArthur MSP, ‘McArthur welcomes overdue increase in school PE funding’, Scottish Liberal Democrats press release, 2013)

In addition to this concerted campaign to highlight the SNP’s failures on PE targets, the interview with Scott also identified another veiled criticism, this time of the cancellation of the Glasgow Airport Rail Link project by the minority SNP government between 2007 and 2011:

> ...one of the projects we had was the Glasgow Airport Rail Link and that project was partly designed and sold on the basis of providing that kind of facility for the Commonwealth Games, and for visitors to Glasgow.
Obviously the current government chose to cancel it, and you can ask them for their reasons for that, but that happened. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Turning attention to constitutional matters, the Liberal Democrats appeared keen to emphasise the potential links between the Games and the benefits of the constitutional status quo. This was illustrated in the party’s references to the support given to the Games from the UK government (echoing the arguments of their coalition partners, the Conservatives) and the fact that the current devolution settlement gives Holyrood legislative power of the Games:

“While athletes for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will compete with one another at the Commonwealth Games, the whole of the United Kingdom wants Glasgow 2014 to be a great success. By offering this additional tax break, we hope to ensure that the best athletes will come to Glasgow this summer for both this event and the Games itself.”
(Danny Alexander MP, ‘Commonwealth Games to get extra boost’, HM Treasury press release, 2014)

The other entirely negative argument that the nationalists in Government use is that they are powerless because this Parliament does not have full economic and legislative powers. Let me say in passing that I do not remember that being said when Glasgow won the right to host next year’s Commonwealth Games. (Tavish Scott MSP, SP OR 18 September 2013, col. 22607)

It therefore appeared that the party’s position regarding the politicisation of the Games was somewhat inconsistent, with the Liberal Democrats willing to use the Games to illustrate the shortcomings of the SNP-led government and the benefits of the constitutional status quo, whilst simultaneously claiming that the SNP should avoid politicising the event with regard to the referendum. This contradiction is particularly demonstrated in the comments of Scott, both in parliament and in the interview:

**Tavish Scott:** I also hope that politicians will recognise that not everyone is engrossed in the referendum campaign. Just the other day, David Grevemberg—the admirable chief executive of Glasgow 2014—said that we could do without any politics in the Commonwealth Games next
year... I hope that there is a lesson there for politicians not to use such events in a way in which—

**Shona Robison:** The member will, of course, be aware that the Deputy Prime Minister is visiting Glasgow to look at the facilities for the Commonwealth Games next week. I hope that the member is not making any assertions in relation to Nick Clegg’s intentions in that regard.

**Tavish Scott:** I do not understand that remark. Ms Robison might want to reflect on David Grevemberg’s piece that was published today. I hope that she agrees with it, because I certainly do, and I do not understand her observation. (SP OR 18 September 2013, col. 22430-22431)

Well, I think there was very, very strongly a cross-party group, but we all said repeatedly “don't politicise it”. And we told Shona that privately. We had a perfectly amicable private conversation which said “don't politicise it otherwise we're gonna come for... we'll go for you”. I mean that in a much more diplomatic sense. And I said the same to Alex Salmond a couple of times too. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview)

Scott’s comments provide a unique insight into some of the behind-the-scenes political discussions relating to the Games, thus demonstrating that the act of promoting an apolitical Games is itself a political act.

Despite these political skirmishes over the politicisation of the Games in relation to the referendum, overall Scott demonstrated a relatively circumspect attitude towards the potential impact of the Games on the vote’s outcome, in line with arguments put forward by Jarvie (2017). Concurring with the views of the majority of the other parties’ respondents, this was particularly attributed to the relative lack of importance of the event in comparison to economic concerns:

…ultimately people did not vote either yes or no... well, maybe on the yes side, but certainly the two million plus who voted no enjoyed the Commonwealth Games in Scotland every bit as much as the folk who voted yes, the 1.6 million who voted yes, but were not... sorry, were much more influenced by ultimately hard-headed economic arguments around currency or pensions or embassies in Santiago or wherever than they are or were by Hannah Miley winning a gold medal. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Furthermore, it was similarly contended that the symbolic nature of the event could act as a double-edged sword in terms of any marginal impact on attitudes towards
Scottish independence, highlighting that the Games could easily be used to illustrate the benefits of continuing union as well as independence (Jarvie, 2017; Jarvie and Reid, 1999; McDowell and Skillen, 2015; Polley, 2014; Salisbury, 2013).

You just have to look at the Olympic Games. I mean, the downside for Salmond and the Yes campaign was how successful the Scots were, particularly Chris Hoy in London. I mean everyone knew who wanted to think about it that Chris Hoy built his career by training in Manchester... And they only get that sports Lottery funding because they're being part of the elite programme across the UK. Certainly I saw a couple of SNP people having very uncomfortable times on telly or in hustings when you pointed out all of that wouldn't be available. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)

These arguments appear to add credence to the claims of others highlighting the nature of ‘confirmation bias’ in political communication, illustrating a common pattern of using particular events or information to simply reinforce a pre-existing disposition to vote in a particular manner, rather than changing a voter’s position per se (Morisi, 2016). In the case of the Games, it can be contended that the event’s symbolism in relation to the dualism of Scottishness and Britishness would only serve to magnify a voter’s original intentions, with the ‘feel-good factor’ of the event identified by various parties simply acting to reinforce a pre-disposition to a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ vote, leaving little impact on the crucial undecided voter (Jarvie, 2017; Ochman, 2013).

The Janus-faced quality of the event was reiterated in the Liberal Democrats’ parliamentary speeches and press releases. In particular, the party made reference to the integrative nature of the Games for the Home Nations:

Scotland has a shop window to the world with the Ryder Cup, Commonwealth Games and decision on our constitutional future. Rarely will we get such an opportunity to show who we are and how we carry ourselves... I think we will show the world we are an outward looking, confident, compassionate and economically thriving nation. That we are proud Scots who want to share in good times and in bad with our friends in Liverpool, Manchester and people right across the UK. (‘New Year message from Willie Rennie MSP’, Scottish Liberal Democrats press release, 2013)
It therefore appeared that the Liberal Democrats were alert to the fact that the Games’ symbolism could be used to counter-attack any attempts by the pro-independence parties to use the event for political ends, with Scott explicitly identifying the concerns that the SNP had about the dualistic nature of the Games (Ochman, 2013):

I tell you, the cheers that the Scots got were something but the cheers when a Welsh swimmer won or an English swimmer won, it really came home to me. This is the Commonwealth Games, this is not just little Scotland, it's much wider than that. And I think if I'd been a nationalist politician, I'd have been a bit taken aback by that, and it's what it really showed is that lots of Scots care about sport, and care about seeing great sporting achievements, and they're less worried about the bloody Saltire. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)

It is apparent therefore that whilst the Liberal Democrats did not necessarily believe that the Games would have a significant impact on the referendum, there was a tacit acceptance that there was some logic in connecting the two events politically:

...the SNP made a political calculation when they looked at the diary from two years back that the Commonwealth Games would be a great springboard into the campaign, and I think that was just slightly a miscalculation for the reasons we've already discussed. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)

This conclusion which focuses on the ‘miscalculation’ of using the Games to provide a springboard for a ‘Yes vote’ therefore adds a new perspective on the use of the event for political reasons, adding to the arguments of Black (2008, 2014) on previous attempts by Games hosts to ‘springboard’ for different purposes such as future events hosting or international investment. The reasons for this perceived miscalculation will be explored in more depth in the forthcoming chapter, with attention now turning to an analysis of the cross-party themes and phenomena relating to the politicisation of Games.
Exploring the Politicisation and Apoliticisation of the 2014 Commonwealth Games

This chapter represents the final analysis of the results and discussion of the thesis, providing an extended discussion of phenomena relating to the politics of the 2014 Commonwealth Games which cuts across all of the respective parties’ narratives, discourse and interview responses. It can therefore be viewed as an opportunity to critically reflect upon a range of issues relating to the politicisation of the Games within the context of the Scottish independence referendum, allowing for a comparative discussion of the contrasting stances of the parties. This facilitates the possibility of synthesising the comparatively isolated discussions of each respective party in the preceding results and discussion chapters.

To this end, the forthcoming discussion considers five emergent themes from this comparative analysis: 1) the publically-avowed acceptance that the Games should remain apolitical in relation to the independence referendum campaigns; 2) the manner in which the Games were factored in to the referendum campaigns despite these aforementioned statements to the contrary; 3) debates regarding political credit for the success of the Games; 4) the existence of public cross-party consensus supporting the Games, despite public and private concerns to the contrary; and, 5) the use of the Games as a tool for political communication.

Throughout the discussion of these five trends, the political actions and processes which propagated the notion that the Games should remain apolitical are discussed, whilst simultaneously critiquing the validity of this stance on the basis that attempting to de-politicise the Games is in itself a political act. This allows for a critical analysis of the peculiar nature of international sporting events in terms of consistently securing political support whilst propagating questionable claims about the benefits of hosting such events. This also allows for a critical reflection on the wider lessons for academics and politicians considering the political implications of hosting international sports events.
One of the most striking features of the political discourse on the 2014 Games was the frequent espousal of opinions that the Games should be treated as an apolitical event, both in relation to the independence referendum campaigns and as a means for building political capital for individual parties. Despite the dissenting voices of a small minority of politicians and campaigners who argued that the Games should not be treated differently to the multifarious issues and events which became embroiled in the referendum campaigns, the majority attitude across the political spectrum publicly subscribed to the view that the Games should be treated as an apolitical event. Therefore, the Games remained comparatively politics-free at a superficial level, despite 1) the potential for pro-independence and pro-union campaigners to use the event to promote their political arguments regarding Scotland's constitutional future; 2) the proximity of the Games to the referendum; 3) the significant public investment in the Games’ preparations; and, 4) the high-profile implications of the event for the Scottish economy. However, scratching beneath the surface of the Games’ apolitical façade, it is apparent that the actions which led to the establishment of this apolitical consensus were in themselves political acts. Indeed, the process by which this consensus was manufactured ironically demonstrates that a significant degree of political manoeuvring to render this major event apolitical.

The first such example was the public intervention of Lord McConnell, the former First Minister of the Scottish Parliament from 2001-2007 during the Labour-led coalition governments, who appealed for a political ‘truce’ in the Scottish independence referendum campaign during the Games due to:

\[\ldots\text{genuine concerns that the Games, and the image of Scotland, could be\}\]
damaged by attempts by either side – for and against – to use the Games to promote their cause, or to use the venues for campaigning. There is a real possibility that worries over politicisation will distract organisers, athletes and performers in their preparation. (McConnell, 2014)

This pre-emptive action from a senior Labour politician appeared to be a response to concerns from strategists within the pro-union 'Better Together' campaign that the
pro-independence 'Yes Scotland' campaign would seek to exploit the Games. However, given the fact that McConnell himself had been highly influential in the successful bid for 2014 Commonwealth Games during his time as First Minister, thus generating significant personal political capital, his appeal for a truce arguably demonstrates at least a degree of hypocrisy (Whigham, 2017). Therefore, the extent to which McConnell's appeal was altruistic in motivation in preventing ‘damage’ to the Games rather than a political manoeuvre designed primarily to benefit the pro-union campaign is debatable.

Unsurprisingly, McConnell’s proposals received contrasting appraisals from the interviewees. For example, the pro-union respondents from Labour and the Liberal Democrats welcomed the intervention:

…we did certainly look into, looking back now… whether or not we should put in a campaigning pause… and the problems with that. And we decided that all that did… it would probably highlight the issues of politicisation. If we enter debate about whether or not we should pause during the Games, would it become another Scottish referendum process story which wouldn’t have really helped the Games? And then… so we were pleased then when Jack came out and said something… I don’t think it would have worked for us to argue that case in Parliament… (Drew Smith MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

These remarks shed light on the nature of the strategic discussions with respect to the potential politicisation of the Games, and the precarious positions of politicians who wished to discuss the event. Indeed, it was suggested that the degree of detachment from party politics offered by McConnell’s position in the House of Lords was a crucial factor in facilitating his intervention. This suggests therefore that sporting events such as the Games still represent hazardous territory for active politicians wishing to avoid alienating their electorate (Horne, 2007; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006).

In contrast, the pro-independence parties were cynical about the rationale behind McConnell’s intervention:
…I just thought that it was seeking publicity on his part. Y’know, this suggestion that you can keep them entirely separate is not true… Equally, we were never going to have big ‘Vote Yes’ banners outside at Hampden. So I thought that his suggestion was frankly crass and nonsensical. Equally, I think the real benefit for us politically is the growth of self-confidence, the feel-good factor… that’s why Jack McConnell’s pissed off because that… when, y’know, you see the tears welling in Ross Murdoch’s eyes, Scots’ hearts are bursting with pride. (Kenny MacAskill MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

He was obviously concerned that the Scottish National Party were going to use it as a, y’know, pre-referendum boost. “Oh look, aren't we doing well? We've won all these medals at home... clearly we can stand on our own two feet”. (Alison Johnstone MSP, interview, post-referendum)

In the eyes of the pro-independence campaigners, McConnell’s intervention was primarily motivated by a desire to neuter the potential exploitation of the Games’ success by the ‘Yes’ campaign, thus implicitly suggesting that the event’s success would boost the pro-independence vote. Nonetheless, the pre-emptive appeal of Lord McConnell proved to be an effective intervention for those who wished the 2014 Glasgow Games to be an apolitical event, with the figurehead of the pro-independence campaign, First Minister Alex Salmond, publicly announcing a ‘self-denying ordinance’ to avoid discussing the independence referendum in relation to the Games (Johnson, 2014; Wade, 2014). For Salmond’s colleagues in the SNP, such as MacAskill, the pressure to avoid politicisation of the Games placed the First Minister in an unfair position:

I think the other side worries about anything which raises the profile of ourselves, and somehow or other we’re not to mention… the First Minister isn’t allowed to speak… since when has the elected head of state not said anything at… so there’s this nervousness on the other side that we will do well out of this because they know as well as I do that there’s a reflected glory that will look good on the government or on our administration. (Kenny MacAskill MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

However, in contrast, other pro-independence interviewees highlighted the fact that Salmond’s ‘self-denying ordinance’ with respect to the Games was breached soon after the ordinance was declared:
…the First Minister’s been a wee bit silly in all of this kind of ‘Freedom City’ stuff which…

The day after his ‘self-denying ordnance’?

Yeah… yeah… (laughs). You can read that how you want. It’s… there are probably worse examples of how it could have been mishandled. But I think for the most part people have steered clear of milking it in a kind of deliberate way. (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

Harvie’s comments illustrate the reluctant approach to the politicisation of the Games adopted by the Greens, whilst also illustrating some of the tensions evident within the cross-party alliances formed for the referendum campaigns. Harvie’s observations about the ‘silly’ nature of Salmond’s were further elaborated upon by Tavish Scott:

...they on the whole behaved themselves. And actually there was some nervousness amongst Scottish Government ministers of exploiting it, not least because of what happened in London where memorably... George Osborne got booed by the crowd at that medal ceremony... I don't know Alex Salmond personally was petrified, but I know they, the SNP, were petrified about Salmond being booed at the opening ceremony... So I think they knew fine that there was a line they should not step over and they, I think, on the whole obeyed that ordnance. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)

These comments aptly illustrate one of the widely-held perceptions amongst interviewees regarding the politicisation of the Games, namely that it ran a significant risk of alienating the electorate. The emergent consensus demonstrates that the continued perpetuation of arguments that the ‘myth of autonomy’ (Allison, 1993) which suggests sporting events should not be mired in political debates has influenced both the personal opinions of politicians and the strategic approaches of political parties. This near-paradigmatic conceptualisation of the relationship between sport and politics resulted in implicit criticism of any politicisation of the Games:

…trying to make a false projection to links between the two… I think people see through it and get a bit pissed off by it. (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview, pre-referendum)
I mean I think you can over-do it as you can with other things… eh… and you just kind of make yourself look silly if you go around all the time. (John Mason MSP, interview, post-referendum)

I think there was a feeling that politicians should be hands-off, that there was something a bit seedy about trying to capitalise on very talented athletes who spent a long time training. So I think people were kind of respectful of that because it’s often seen as a bit, I dunno, fake and fawning. (Alison Johnstone MSP, interview, post-referendum)

These comments suggest a perceived risk of politicians stretching the boundaries of acceptable domains for political debate by trespassing into the apolitical sphere of sport, illustrated in the language outlining the risks of making the electorate ‘pissed off’ due to politicians appearing ‘silly’, ‘seedy’, ‘fake’, and ‘fawning’. These perceptions were further elaborated upon by the interviewees from pro-union parties:

I think the government made a big mistake in trying to politicise the Olympic Games… the Scottish Government with Scotland House and the 'Scolympians', and all of that, then Alex Salmond's flag, and whatever… and then when the Olympians came back to Glasgow, Mr Salmond was roundly booed which shocked me I have to say… I think it did mark his card, if you want, a wee bit, and it suggested that maybe they had to take a bit of a back seat in this as far as the Games were concerned. (Patricia Ferguson MSP, interview, post-referendum)

These frequent preconceptions of the electorate’s likely reaction to the explicit politicisation of the Games were also apparent in the campaign and communications strategies of the respective parties, with the pro-union parties in particular citing concerns about the potential backlash:

I think you can imagine if Alex Salmond had made a speech about, y’know, independence or. y’know, Gordon Matheson from Glasgow City Council had made a speech about the UK that would have just jarred. It would have been inappropriate. I don’t think people would have reacted at all well to that, so I think that the politicians were quite right to stay off that during the time of the Games… (Murdo Fraser MSP, interview, post-referendum)
The commonality on the perceived electoral risks of politicising the Games demonstrates that any such interventions involved a relatively high political risk. Furthermore, given the consensus across the parties about the relatively minor potential impact of the event on the referendum outcome in comparison to other issues (Jarvie, 2017; Mole, 2014; Ochman, 2013), it appears that the perceived risks of political interventions were deemed to significantly outweigh the potential rewards.

The interviews also identified a number of other considerations which further negated the politicisation of the Games. Firstly, a common theme emerged regarding respecting the wishes of athletes and supporters, with the apoliticisation of the Games portrayed as a form of protection:

I think that people just do feel that sport's a bit different sometimes, and they don't like it being messed about with… Cultural people maybe are a bit more politicised but sportspeople tend not to like that. Their focus is on their performance and delivering, and therefore they don't want that distraction either. (Patricia Ferguson MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Aside from the mildly patronising belief that professional athletes would not be able to concentrate due to political campaigning, the tone of these comments again perpetuate the clichéd adage that ‘sport and politics’ should not mix, in line with ‘myth of autonomy’ discussed by Allison (1993). However, in contrast, Scott highlighted a different explanation for the widespread acceptance of arguments for an apolitical Games:

I think the commercial side of it was quite interesting in terms of how they got big companies to commit to the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow given that they all knew the referendum was going on at the same time. And there’s some interesting questions that I’ve had privately expressed to me about the commitments that, for example, BP got out of the Government not to do politics otherwise we're going nowhere near it… I think it's a noticeable sign when you had BP who were clearly against Scottish independence… BP were a major investor in the Commonwealth Games and were… I know got commitments that it wasn't going to be politicised… (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)
These insights into the realpolitik of the behind-the-scenes discussions about the potential commercial ramifications of political interventions raise questions about the impact of the growing reliance on private sector funding sources for sporting events (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). Whilst the claims of Scott lacked further triangulation to prove their validity, the suggestion that major sponsors such as BP, who arguably had a vested commercial interest in maintaining the constitutional status quo, could influence the political activities of the pro-independence campaign adds a layer of analytical interest when examining the apolitical nature of the Games.

The alleged pressures from Games’ sponsors did not appear to constitute the only behind-the-scenes political manoeuvring related to the apoliticisation of the Games, with representatives on the cross-party parliamentary group on the Games stating that they had made similar private comments:

…we all said repeatedly “don't politicise it”. And we told Shona that privately. We had a perfectly amicable private conversation which said, y'know, “don't politicise it otherwise we're gonna come for... we'll go for you”. I mean that in a much more diplomatic sense. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)

…from day one when we were involved in it as part of the government we didn't want it to be a party political play thing. We knew that if it was gonna work, it needed everybody. (Patricia Ferguson MSP, interview, post-referendum)

These comments illustrate that a degree of informal ‘back-channelling’ played a part in the political discussions surrounding the Games. The remarks from Scott in particular demonstrate the role of private political discussions in securing the consensus for an apolitical Games, with the explicit threat to attack the SNP government in the public domain if they transgressed illustrating the political nature of the apoliticisation process.

Despite the fact that the consensus that the Games should remain apolitical was supported by the vast majority of the interviewees, this did not mean that this support was always given in an unquestioning manner. For example, when prompted to
consider why any public investment on the scale of the Games should not be a political consideration, a variety of reflections emerged:

...given that there's obviously a massive, half a billion pounds investment in the Commonwealth Games... I mean, as we discussed there, it does seem a little bit seedy or a little bit off to politicise or make political capital from that. Why do you think that is?

I know. I mean, as I'm saying this I'm thinking that is what I feel about it, but why is that the case? (Alison Johnstone MSP, interview, post-referendum)

The above responses are indicative of a broader pattern observed across the interviews, with most interviewees unable to clearly articulate the exact reasons why they believed that sport and politics should not mix, instead expressing gut feelings about potential negative reactions to Games’ politicisation without fully explaining why this would occur.

Nonetheless, the assertion that the Games should remain apolitical ultimately gained sufficient traction to ensure that the event would represent a temporary break in the lengthy referendum campaigns. The ‘campaign break’ narrative, echoing the arguments of Mole (2014), was particularly propagated in the political discourse of the Labour Party:

The Commonwealth Games will hopefully be some light relief (for politicians and the public!) from the referendum debate, and the vote that will happen on 18 September. We all know how sharp that debate has become in recent months, but the next two weeks offers an opportunity for us all to come together as a country behind Team Scotland. (‘Let's hope the Glasgow Commonwealth Games give London 2012 a run for its money’, Scottish Labour press release, 2014)

I think the great thing about the Games from my point of view… the point of view of political people is that we’ve had the longest political campaign ever in Scotland and Britain’s history… and that’s quite exhausting. Em… and the Games are the number one thing going on in Scotland just now. (Drew Smith MSP, interview, pre-referendum)
Despite the centrality of Labour politicians in supporting the campaign break, it would be remiss to argue that other parties did not support the suggestion:

I think in practice it was a break because it so dominated the media that it did just give us a break from the referendum which was good I think because May and June was pretty, y'know, full on. (John Mason MSP, interview, post-referendum)

They provided a very genuinely and pleasant break from politics… It was two weeks off bloody politics for most people… (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Although the interventions by McConnell and his supporters concerning the necessity for a Games campaign break therefore appeared to influence the communication strategies of mainstream political parties, the decentralised nature of the campaign still precluded absolute control over political campaigning during the event.

Swimming Against the Apolitical Tide? The Politicisation of the 2014 Games

In light of the prevailing consensus supporting an apolitical Games, it is unsurprising that the extent to which the Games were explicitly politicised in the public domain was relatively low (Jarvie, 2017). However, this consensus did not entirely preclude examples of the event being drawn into the political sphere; this section will therefore explore examples which illustrate explicit and implicit politicisation of the Games.

An appropriate starting point is consideration of responses which explicitly acknowledged that the Games were factored into the referendum campaigns. For example, despite acceptance of the marginal status of the Games, both SNP interviewees acknowledged that the proximity of the event to the date of the referendum ultimately led to a degree of strategic planning:

It’s just there. We’ve had to build around it. I mean, what you’ve found is that we’ve put our shoulder to the wheel, heart and soul…we’ve
factored it in as we would… as we have factored in, y’know, the Ryder Cup. (Kenny MacAskill MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

In contrast, Mason acknowledged the arguments of opposition parties about the strategic timing of the referendum, underlining his belief that there may have been an attempt to capitalise on the success of the Games:

…you can clearly argue that 2014 was chosen for both events because it was felt that it would benefit the referendum… But my gut feeling is a bit of an input but not huge probably. (John Mason MSP, interview, post-referendum)

In contrast to the SNP interviewees, the responses of the Greens highlighted earlier demonstrated a more cautious stance on the extent to which the event was factored into the referendum campaign. This discrepancy could have been due to the contrasting ideological approaches of the respective parties, with the Greens opting for a primary focus on using independence to tackle social inequality and a failed macroeconomic model, with less emphasis on the wider implications of independence on marginal issues such as sport in comparison to the more populist campaigning of the SNP (Chaney, 2015a; Ochman, 2013). Alternatively, the fact that the timing of the referendum was decided by the SNP government meant that the Greens may not have been party to the internal conversations to which MacAskill would have been privy.

The responses of the pro-union interviewees regarding the referendum timing equally illustrate a range of perspectives on this alleged covert politicisation of the Games. The first such perspective was of a dismissive nature:

…we were all quite worried about it in terms of the Better Together side because the thought of the Saltire being waved every night on the telly, and all the rest of it… but that didn’t knock on into opinion polls or anything like that… I think us and the Yes campaign spent far too much time trying to guess what would happen… (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)
In contrast, the Labour Party appeared to be more concerned about the proximity of the two events, expressing dissatisfaction at the implicit politicisation of the event:

Great sporting events have the power to break down barriers and to bring people together so isn’t it a shame that Alex Salmond simply wants to use them to promote his separation agenda. It is increasingly clear that Alex Salmond sees the Commonwealth Games and the Ryder Cup as nothing more than a backdrop for his plans for a separate Scotland. Scottish Labour will not allow these great sporting events to be used as props for separation... (‘Patricia Ferguson Speech to Conference’, Scottish Labour press release, 2011)

I would be very surprised if it wasn’t a factor when the Scottish Government were deciding when to hold this… I think there’s no doubt people assume there’s an expectation in the Yes campaign that a good Games and a feel-good factor from the Games will… would help them more than hinder them. (Drew Smith MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

This line of argument again echoes the emergent consensus adopted in relation to the potential ‘feel-good factor’ effect of the Games on the referendum (Harris and Skillen, 2016; Jarvie, 2017; Mole, 2014; Ochman, 2013), with the pro-independence representatives emphasising the benefits of this phenomenon and pro-union parties refuting or seeking to neuter such claims. However, given the lack of empirical evidence that sporting events such as the Games have a material impact upon political voting (Jarvie, 2017), it would appear that the disputes about the referendum timing over-emphasised the importance of this issue.

There were a number of other accusations made by pro-union politicians with respect to the politicisation of the Games by the SNP. Alex Salmond’s comments on Glasgow’s status as the ‘Freedom City’ in the run-up to the Games attracted particular ire:

…we’ve had some interesting discussions last week in terms of our press office as to… y’know, Alex Salmond has credited Glasgow last week as ‘Freedom City’ and whether or not that is something we respond to. And on that one, we decided that we ultimately did need to because we found it quite insulting and it reflected something that he said about the city before the local government elections as well. But at the same time, we were very conscious that making that argument that we shouldn’t be seeking to exploit the Games you have to hold yourself back quite a lot
from getting in to this ‘I’m not politicising the Games, but you are’ and then… (laughs). (Drew Smith MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

The Conservatives’ representatives were also keen to highlight the frequency of the SNP’s attempts to politicise the Games, despite their avowed adherence to the ‘campaign break’ consensus. Again, this politicisation was attributed to the SNP’s desire to capitalise on the Games ‘feel-good’ factor:

…it clearly in terms of the context of the independence referendum I think the SNP government were anxious to do anything they could to try and capitalise on that sense of national pride. Y’know, with the referendum coming up just a few weeks after the Commonwealth Games took place undoubtedly I think the SNP government saw the Commonwealth Games as an opportunity to demonstrate to people how successful the Scottish Government could be. If we could run a successful world event like the Commonwealth Games, then that helps suggest that we could, y’know, we could run an independent country successfully. And I think they also thought that because in the Commonwealth Games, unlike the Olympics, Scotland is competing as a separate nation within the UK, that gave an opportunity for a sense of national pride around the Scottish team and the symbols of Scottishness, the Saltire and so on. That would give a boost to national self-confidence, which they felt was important to the prospects of winning a Yes vote. (Murdo Fraser MSP, interview, post-referendum)

The comments of Fraser encapsulate the various emergent strands forwarded by others regarding the politicisation of the Games, invoking the ‘feel-good factor’ thesis (Grix, 2014; Jarvie, 2017), the arguments about the timing of the referendum to ‘springboard’ to a Yes vote, and the Janus-face symbolism of the Games given the independent Scottish team (Harris and Skillen, 2016; Haynes and Boyle, 2008; Jarvie, 2017; McDowell and Skillen, 2015; Ochman, 2015). However, whilst acknowledging the rationale for the SNP’s thinking, Fraser remained at pains to emphasise the lack of impact of the event on the eventual outcome.

The dual-edged nature of the political symbolism of the Games was equally highlighted by pro-independence campaigners, resulting in counter-accusations of pro-union politicisation of the event:
...in terms of the general ‘Better Together’, there’s lots of negativity involved in that... whether it’s red, white and blue on the fly-past jets or whatever, it’s entirely disingenuous. David Cameron, who hardly ever comes to Scotland... y’know, the amount of English UK ministers all over Scotland at the moment like a rash who frankly don’t know the place, don’t really care about the place, and have been here hardly ever, y’know, they’re the ones that’s doing it. (Kenny MacAskill MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

These comments also illustrate the ‘Scotland’s future in Scotland’s hands’ narrative invoking political sovereignty as a central tenet of the party’s discursive claims for a ‘Yes’ vote. In particular, the comments about the appearances of ‘English’ ministers who do not care about Scotland at the Games are used to demonstrate the ‘democratic deficit’ of the status quo (Leith and Soule, 2011; Mycock, 2012; Newby, 2009; Pittock, 2008a), whilst highlighting the hypocrisy of accusations of politicisation aimed at the SNP. Therefore, it is clear that despite the overt attempts of certain politicians to render the Games an apolitical event, accusations and counter-accusations of politicisation were made on both sides of the constitutional debate.

Glasgow’s Games or Scotland’s Games? Regional Politics at Play

The Games were also used for political leverage in debates on the regional and national benefits of the Games. The contrasting viewpoints in this debate can be linked to the wider political strategies of the parties involved, with Labour primarily emphasising the benefits of the event for Glasgow:

...I think certainly as a Glasgow Labour Party and a Scottish Labour Party, we always saw the bid as also being about, not to the exclusion of anything else, but a significant part of our drive was about how we brought investment into the city and how we could use the Games in a way that allowed us to present the city on an international stage. And we hoped to draw benefits from that, but also to make a particular regeneration impact in the East End. (Drew Smith MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

In contrast, the SNP’s discourse appeared to include a coordinated attempt to flag the benefits of the Games for various areas outside of Glasgow. This was particularly
evident in the party’s parliamentary contributions, with numerous examples of backbench SNP MSPs asking questions about the specific Games legacy or benefits for their own constituency. The prevalence of these questions suggest that a degree of party whipping or strategic planning took place in order to emphasise the nationwide benefits of the Games, thus appealing to the SNP’s electoral support outside of the Glaswegian domain. This contrasts with the discursive strategy of the Labour Party discussed earlier, which instead placed a greater emphasis on the benefits of the Games for Glasgow specifically as per the interviews with Ferguson and Smith.

This pattern was also evident in the nature of the party’s discourse regarding the organisational successes of the Games, representing a discursive battle to reap political credit for the success of the event. Labour frequently highlighted the importance of partnership working and the contributions of the Labour-led Glasgow City Council in the delivery of the event, in line with the arguments of Christie and Gibb (2015). Whilst this did not necessarily differ from the position of the SNP in terms of acknowledging the importance of partnership working per se, Labour’s discourse on the Games was often at pains to explicitly emphasise the role of Labour politicians:

And, of course, there is the Commonwealth Games – delivered by a Labour council and a proud city. (‘Speech to Scottish Labour Conference by Johann Lamont MSP’, Scottish Labour press release, 2014)

Another important aspect was the role that was played by Glasgow City Council and, indeed, by councillors, officials and businesspeople—not only in Glasgow, but across Scotland and in other parts of the UK, as well as by the previous First Minister, Jack McConnell... (Hanzala Malik MSP, SP OR 7 August 2014, col. 33224)

In contrast, given the central role of the Games Organising Committee in the delivery of the Games, an emergent theme in the SNP’s discourse was a strong emphasis on the success of the partnership between the Games Organising Committee, the Scottish Government, Glasgow City Council and the other numerous organisations involved in the delivery of the Games (Christie and Gibb, 2015), rather than
attempting to capitalise politically by claiming credit for the SNP-led Scottish Government, as was assumed would be the case by their political opponents.

Moving from the two main protagonists in the political credit debate, contrasting opinions on this issue emerge. Firstly, the Conservatives sought to highlight that the SNP had failed to acknowledge the support given to the Games by the Conservative-led Westminster government:

The cabinet secretary did not add her congratulations to the two Governments—the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government—which worked extraordinarily hard and proved just how successful things can be when the two Governments come together. (Liz Smith MSP, SP OR 5 August 2014, col. 32967-32968)

The Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, sought to reduce the emphasis placed on the contributions of the various political parties, with Scott in particular highlighting the contribution of David Grevemberg and Lord Smith of Kelvin:

…Lord Smith of Kelvin, a very impressive and single-minded direct UK businessman... very effective at doing that, and frankly a minister... sorry, a leader who doesn't take any nonsense from politicians, whether they be First Ministers or anyone else. And then David Grevemberg who became the Chief Executive who’s... who I got on very well with... became a good personal friend, and I have a high regard for David Grevemberg. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Expanding upon this argument, Scott stated that the long-term nature of the bidding process and organisational responsibilities of international sporting events should preclude the possibility of one particular party claiming political credit, given that governing parties can change during this period. This position was reinforced in the interview with Drew Smith, who highlighted the opportunity afforded to the SNP to take advantage of the Labour government’s support during the Games bid:

I think they reaped the benefits of the fact that they won an election! (laughs) There was cross-party support for the bid at the time… it’s the nature of democracy that they reap the benefits of lots of great things that we did in government! (laughs) (Drew Smith MSP, interview, pre-referendum)
Although many of these debates over the political credit for the Games remained relatively sedate, at points this aspect of the event’s politicisation became more heated, particularly in parliamentary debates:

**Hanzala Malik:** The Games are for Glasgow, in particular, but I am a little fearful that they might be hijacked by others. There is a huge temptation for other cities, and for people who have perhaps not been fully involved, to try to hijack the Games. We need to recognise that, in the main, it is Glasgow that has done all the running for the Games.

**Shona Robison:** I would certainly pay tribute to the role that has been played by Glasgow City Council—it has been an important partnership—but surely Hanzala Malik will recognise that the Scottish Government’s contribution to the public cost of the Games is 80 per cent, amounting to £381.6 million. Surely we can all agree that, yes, they are Glasgow’s games, but they are also Scotland’s Games. We need to agree on that and then just get on to celebrate and enjoy the Games.

**Hanzala Malik:** Although I have no difficulty with accepting the fact that the Government is putting in 80 per cent of the cost, and I have no problem with other parts of Scotland celebrating the Games, I will have a problem when other people take the credit for it… (SP OR 30 January 2014, col. 27246-27247)

This extended exchange further demonstrates the contention that the debates around the Games did not adhere to the wider consensus on their apolitical nature. Their interconnection with the perceived competence of the leading pro-independence and pro-union parties clearly demonstrated an indirect link to the arguments forwarded in the campaigns about the ability of the SNP to successfully govern an independent Scotland, thereby indicating that all parties imbued the Games with at least a modicum of political importance despite arguments to the contrary.

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**Glasgow 2014 - A Curious Case of Cross-Party Consensus?**

Attention in this section turns to a consideration of a contrasting emergent theme concerning the existence of cross-party consensus and support for the Games. Whilst it has often been argued that such cross-party support for international sporting events and elite sport funding is a recurrent phenomenon (Giulianotti et al., 2015; Green and Houlihan, 2005), in the realms of political debate relating to non-sporting topics the
consensual approach is relatively unusual. This section explores the possible explanations for the existence of this consensus concerning the 2014 Games. This consensus is particularly surprising given the scale of the investment in the Games, and the ongoing questions over the validity of legacy claims and returns on this investment (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Horne, 2007).

One explanation harks back to the nature of the bidding process for international sporting events such as the Games, with a number of respondents highlighting that cross-party support is in fact a prerequisite for submitting a bid document to host the Games:

… part of the bid process, if I recall, you had to have a letter from each of the parties in the Parliament stating that they backed the bid, so we were able to deliver that without any trouble at all. And if you're asking for support from people for something as major as this and something as expensive as this, then the least you can do is discuss it with them. (Patricia Ferguson MSP, interview, post-referendum)

This prerequisite of the bidding process demonstrates the growing influence of international sporting organisations on the political activities of their prospective host nations (Horne, 2007, 2015; Jennings, 2013; Zimbalist, 2015), with such demands not only securing cross-party political support at the time of the bid but equally precluding any future changes in policy or stance in relation to the hosting of the event. Such measures therefore negate the capacity of political parties or actors to raise specific political or ideological issues relating to the hosting of events such as the Games, arguably preventing legitimate issues or arguments being raised during the delivery of the event.

As outlined in the above comments from Ferguson, the requirement for cross-party support for the Games bid led to a willingness from all parties to engage with the Games’ delivery. The comments regarding the opportunity to scrutinise the Government’s delivery of the Games illustrate the second major reason for maintaining cross-party consensus, with acceptance across all parties of the necessity for cross-party scrutiny. This scrutiny was evident from parties on both sides of the constitutional debate, with the majority of issues raised in a relatively constructive
manner in parliamentary debates, press releases and reflections on the cross-party meetings.

For MacAskill, his position as the Cabinet Secretary for Justice during the period before and during the Games resulted in a consultative role in relation to policing and security at the Games:

...the Games Committee and the bid was all dealt with by different departments. My involvement’s been, y’know, through security. But even then, the police tend to report directly in to the Games Committee and they’re represented on that, so it’s been very much peripheral... (Kenny MacAskill MSP, interview)

Both SNP interviewees acknowledged that despite agreement on the relative success of the Games’ organisation and delivery, a number of issues impacting upon the budgeting resulted in the need to learn lessons:

There’s lessons to be learned. I mean, security and how much we spent on it... The 90 million on security seemed an awful lot of money, and some of it did seem a bit over the top having been involved as a volunteer and seeing it. But, y’know, there was a political risk there because if some big name from Africa or Asia had got shot or blown up or something, y’know, that would not have been good! And that would certainly have brought politics in to it… If something does go wrong then very clearly politics and sport does get tied together. (John Mason MSP, interview)

Such comments once more illustrate that despite the attempts of some commentators to keep the Games free of politics, the profile of such events render significant scrutiny and organisational efficacy an inevitable aspect of the process.

The Games’ organisation and delivery also received scrutiny from within the pro-independence campaign from the Greens. However, given the concerns raised by Harvie about adopting a cynical approach to the Games in terms of how this might be received by other politicians and the public, it is clear that there was a risk of straying on to the wrong side of the line in terms of critical comments. This is reflected in the
tone of the party’s reflections on the successes of the Games in the parliamentary debates on the event:

I am grateful to the Scottish Government, Glasgow City Council and Glasgow 2014 for the support that they have given to Pride House. It has reminded the LGBTI community in Glasgow of the importance of a non-commercial community space in the city—it is years since we had one. (Patrick Harvie MSP, SP OR 6 August 2014, col. 33064)

The relative proportion of references regarding Games scrutiny was significantly higher for Labour, unsurprisingly given their status as the official opposition in the Scottish Parliament. The party particularly highlighted issues related to the delivery of the Games’ legacy, sports-related issues, human trafficking concerns and concerns about the distribution of Games-related benefits throughout Scotland. The prevalence of Labour’s interventions of this type was explained in more depth in the interviews with party’s representatives, with both Smith and Ferguson arguing that scrutiny of the Games’ delivery acted as the main feature of the party’s political comments on the event:

…we certainly saw our role as a committee to… not to second-guess the decisions of the organising committee, or indeed the Scottish Government or the City Council, but to where it was useful draw things out to the public domain to ensure that things went as well as they could do… (Drew Smith MSP, interview)

Therefore, it appeared to be the case that Labour’s willingness to intervene politically on the topic of the Games was largely restricted to constructive criticism of the Games’ organisation, with the party retaining a predominantly positive tone with regards to the event. The Conservatives also raised a number of issues in their discourse when scrutinising the delivery and organisation of the Games, such as the challenges of delivering legacy goals, issues relating to the Games ticketing process and budgetary issues. These interventions therefore appear to have been planned and discussed strategically, given the synergy between these comments and the positions of the party’s interviewees:
…there are definitely some issues which have attracted concern:
1. The mistake made over the “Red Road Flats” demolition being included in the proposed Opening Ceremony plans, most especially the lack of consultation with those affected. There have been serious questions raised over who was responsible for the decision.
2. The fact that one of the two Contingency funds has been more or less spent without full transparency over why and again, on whose authority.
3. The concerns within the business community about the lateness of the information regarding changes to the transport infrastructure. (Liz Smith MSP, survey, pre-referendum)

“It was increasingly clear that the proposal to include the demolition of the Red Road Flats was not only deeply unpopular but that it was sending out all the wrong messages about Glasgow and the Commonwealth Games.” (‘Demolition U-turn a victory for common sense, Scottish Conservatives press release, 2014)

…it's hard work has been undermined this week by the shambolic ticketing fiasco that has seen tens of thousands of families spend hours on hold, and still they have no prospect of tickets. Does the First Minister agree that it is outrageous that a hired-in company, paid handsomely for its work, is now damaging the reputation of our Games, and what does he plan to do about it? (Ruth Davidson MSP, SP OR 15 May 2014, col. 31065-31066)

Last week, it was reported that the Commonwealth Games organisers were preparing to access the special reserve fund to finance alterations to the opening and closing ceremonies. (John Lamont MSP, SP OR 5 June 2014, col. 31883)

By contrast, the Liberal Democrats raised concerns in Parliament about the challenges of delivering a sporting legacy (reflecting Scott’s personal opinion on this issue) and on the issue of human trafficking during the Games period:

Ultimately, you had to be pretty cynical as a politician to try to take advantage of something like that. The Scottish Government put everything and the kitchen sink to make sure nothing did go wrong… And in that sense I don't think there was anything to attack… you need to be very sure of your ground to do that. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview)

Interestingly, the respondents from both parties separated their beliefs about the importance of scrutinising the event from political considerations for the party. It
appears therefore that the apolitical nature of the Games only applied in the circumstances where their organisation proved a success, and political scrutiny of any problems relating to the Games was still deemed appropriate. Although the significant investment of public funds in the region of £0.5bn in the Games renders such scrutiny necessary and appropriate, the contradictions evident in such actions are evident to those who may be critical of McConnell's suggested 'truce'.

A further explanation for the cross-party consensus and support for the Games that emerged links back to the relationship between sport and political ideology, specifically the lack of ideological differences between the parties’ approaches to sport as a policy area (Chaney, 2015a). The apparent alignment of the parties’ political positions on the topics of sport and the Games was a recurrent theme for the interviewees when pressed upon whether a particular ‘party line’ on these issues existed:

...there’s cross-party support for the Games, so I think that any differences that exist are nuanced rather than any major differences...
There were people who were more interested in elite sport, people more interested in physical activity, but they’re not hugely partisan differences.
(Drew Smith MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

These comments are instructive in various ways with regards to the status of the Games and sport in the political strategies of the parties. Firstly, they illustrate that the political and ideological differences on these issues were comparatively minor, with only nuanced differences between the parties, attributed to the personal opinion of individual politicians rather than a centrally-planned strategic approach. Secondly, they illustrate the relative unimportance of sporting issues in political campaigning. This suggests that little consideration has been given to the potential of sport to illustrate a particular ideological stance. Indeed, the few comments which suggested any such ideological framing for sport or the Games did not differ dramatically from traditional political approaches to sport:

I think from our point of view because we don’t want to see GDP growth as the kind of standalone metric of success… that would lead us to be a bit more focused on not projected economic benefit but thinking about the cultural or community side of it a wee bit more…. But… no, I think for the most part the political spectrum’s been… I don’t think I’ve heard
Given that the Greens’ ideological positions are arguably the most radical in comparison to the overcrowded centre-ground of the Scottish political spectrum (Leith and Soule, 2011), the fact that their ideological approach was only a slight departure from the status quo suggests that sport remains peripheral to the political considerations of modern political parties in Scotland.

The lack of political difference on the issue of the Games was illustrated in one final phenomenon related to cross-party agreement on the challenges of delivering a tangible Games legacy. Interestingly, there was a broad acceptance across all the parties that achieving this goal would be difficult, despite the overwhelming positivity evident from all parties in their parliamentary speeches, press releases and manifestos. This clearly suggested a disconnect between the private concerns or beliefs of political actors and the messages presented in their public discourse on the Games.

For example, the somewhat contradictory comments made by Ferguson highlighting her concerns about the possibility of delivering a successful, tangible Games legacy illustrate the more cautious private beliefs of a politician who was a key proponent of the Games bid:

…we had the report drawn up on whether or not we should bid weighing it all up. And one of the things we asked at that point was ‘can you look particularly at whether or not a legacy is possible?’… And the report came back saying yes. Now, legacy is something that has rarely been done well in big sporting events, but we took the view right at the beginning that we had to start planning then for legacy if we were ever going to be able to deliver anything. (Patricia Ferguson MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Despite acknowledging the lack of evidence from previous event hosts regarding the successful delivery of legacy goals and claims (Horne, 2007; Owe, 2012; Stewart and Rayner, 2016), the positivity about the bid expressed in public and private belie these
concerns. This suggests that the need to harness public support for hosting international sporting events leads to a degree of self-censorship from politicians with regard to airing legitimate concerns about legacy claims, particularly from those involved in the government leading the bid and delivery of the event. This position echoes the earlier arguments of Patrick Harvie about the need to avoid giving voice to the “cynical devil which hovers on my shoulder” about the Games.

These comments arguably demonstrate the broader pattern which emerged in relation to the cross-party support for the Games, in the sense that the consensual approach was simultaneously both enabling and restrictive for the politics of the Games. In one sense, the opportunity for cross-party cooperation on the organisation and scrutiny of the Games enabled the engagement of politicians from across the political spectrum, thus allowing for all parties to constructively air their views. However, at the same time, the consensual approach restricted the opportunity to air significant concerns freely in the public domain, given the risks of undermining cross-party working on the event or alienating supporters of the Games. The evident self-censorship of such views demonstrates that the frequent existence or prerequisites for cross-party support for sports event hosting demand further investigation by academics interested in the political economy of events such as the Games (Horne, 2007, 2015; Jennings, 2013; Zimbalist, 2015).

_Glasgow 2014, Sport and Political Communication_

In this final section of the results and discussion, attention turns to a consideration of the role of sport in modern political communication, and the associated strategic thinking around the politicisation of sport. An appropriate starting point for this discussion is an exploration of the interviewees’ opinions on the relationship between sport and politics. Interestingly, despite the widespread acceptance of the claims that the Games should remain apolitical, there was an overwhelming acknowledgement that the ‘myth of autonomy’ (Allison, 1993) stating ‘sport and politics shouldn’t mix’ was an unrealistic and naïve proposition:

…sport and politics do mix. Sometimes that can be done in a crass way and in an unnecessary way. Other times it is very, very necessary. So
the human rights context, for example, of the Commonwealth… (Patrick Harvie MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

I think it’s naïve to say that suddenly sport and politics should never mix because they always have, and they always well. And we’ve seen that with the issues that have been raised around LGBT rights… At the end of the day, bidding for these international events are political decisions so there’ll always be an element of politics in that. (Drew Smith MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

Whilst these comments illustrate the broader interconnection between sport and politics on an international scale, the same was equally argued to be true at a domestic level given the positioning of sport within wider policy goals:

…for me there's few things that are more important, because I just think that it's got so much validity in terms of talking about health, and talking about mental health as well... certainly I think we took it very seriously because we felt that it linked in to every other portfolio… I can only speak for myself but I would certainly rank them very highly, and I know that when Jack McConnell was First Minister he took them very highly indeed, and that's why he was so committed to things like the Commonwealth Games… (Patricia Ferguson MSP, interview, post-referendum)

Attention therefore now turns to considering the contrasting views on the relative importance of sport as a policy area within the Scottish political domain. It is interesting to note that Ferguson’s argument was qualified by the insistence that this was due to its interconnections with other policy areas. This suggests that sport was not necessarily treated with the same degree of importance as a stand-alone policy area, reinforcing the arguments of those who highlight the importance of cross-departmental policymaking in the domain of sport (Collins, 2008; Houlihan and Lindsey, 2008). Similar comments were offered elsewhere amongst the respondents who reiterated that sport is often viewed as a means of achieving policy aims in more politically important domains:

No, I think sports pretty high up the pecking order because it's important for Scotland both economically... for all the reasons, economically, socially and culturally. We're a pretty sport-loving nation in that sense.
So I think it is important. (Tavish Scott MSP, interview, post-referendum)

I think we just link the environment and the economy in a way that the other parties don't... and I guess it's the same thing if you can make biking and walking easier. You're not gonna do it every day but even if it's an option 60 to 70 per cent of the time then people want to... you transform your cities... And I think that the Fans First thing it... we're just seeing so many clubs one by one facing difficulties. I just think it would be really nice if, y'know, at such traumatic times the fans have first refusal... I think a bit like the economy, it's a model which doesn't seem to be working for many, many people. (Alison Johnstone MSP, interview, post-referendum)

The same phenomenon was evident when consideration was given to the use of sport to illustrate wider political issues, or an individual party’s specific ideological approach to sports policy:

There’s a less traditional understanding that sport is social, it’s wellbeing, it keeps people out of mischief, in the youngsters it reduces alcohol consumption, it improves people’s diet. So it’s part of this factor of early intervention... all of these things are, I think, a change from sport’s just something you can take to if you want to a working mission that actually the community. It’s a bit like the referendum campaign... do you go down the Anglo-American model of the Premier League... you pay into it as a spectator sport, it’s up to you to join the David Lloyd if you can afford it? Or do you go down the Scandinavian model... actually it’s from the bottom up, we have community clubs, we invest in this? (Kenny MacAskill MSP, interview, pre-referendum)

MacAskill’s comments demonstrate the potential to link sport as a policy domain with wider ideological beliefs about the nature of social policy or macroeconomic models, illustrating his beliefs that sport was analogous to the SNP’s ‘imaginary’ for an independent Scotland which drew upon a Scandinavian model of social democracy (Newby, 2009). However, aside from these rare examples, sport largely remained a peripheral aspect within the sample of political discourse examined, with a lack of reference to sport in an ideological sense in election manifestos. This suggests that sport remains an underutilised policy area for the strategic communication of ideological and political goals in contemporary society, contrasting with the explicit ideological exploitation of sport historically (Hoberman, 1983, 1994).
However, other interviewees such as Liz Smith were content with the peripheral status of sport in comparison with other policy areas:

> It is probably a slightly more important political brief than it used to be but much less important than others such as Education, Health and Justice – rightly so. (Liz Smith MSP, survey, pre-referendum)

Smith’s colleague in the Conservatives, Murdo Fraser, expressed a similar belief on the issue:

> I certainly don’t think it’s seen as being a top priority, and if you think of the government the key issues are finance, economy… eh… health, justice, education, the environment. I mean, sport comes pretty far down the list, yeah. (Murdo Fraser MSP, interview, post-referendum)

It is interesting to note that the Conservatives appeared to strike a contrasting tone regarding the importance of sport as a policy area, emphasising a belief in a more liberal, arms-length approach to sport in comparison to the other parties who expressed a greater willingness to adopt an interventionist approach. This suggests that the Conservatives’ long-standing preference for reducing the size and influence of central government is illustrated in the preference to avoid the politicisation of sport (Collins, 2008; Jeffreys, 2012), perhaps reflecting a belief that the state should only intervene in core policy areas such as the economy, health, justice and education.

In summary, despite the widespread acceptance of the peripheral role of sport in politics, it was still argued that sport acted as a potentially useful tool with political communication and campaigning. This position illustrates that sport constitutes a potentially fruitful method for political communication given the popular interest in sporting matters, yet remains an inherently risky domain given the continuation of perceptions that sport should not be politicised. Interestingly, this suggests that the extent to which sport is used as a medium for political campaigning is limited due to calculated decisions about the relative trade-off between these benefits and risks, illustrating the complex interrelationship between sport and politics. These
comments also highlight one of the overarching findings of this study regarding the limitations of contemporary political communication involving sport: sport is often viewed only as a tool for grabbing the public’s attention before linking to a more ‘serious’ political message outside of the sporting domain. In order for sport to be viewed more seriously as a political issue in its own right, political communication about sport needs to shift towards expressing contrasting ideological approaches to sport as a bespoke policy area. To achieve this, politicians will need to move beyond a superficial and populist use of sport as a convenient photo opportunity to a deeper engagement with policy issues within the domain of sport. It appears that the willingness to engage with sport in this manner is absent in the Scottish political sphere at the present time.
Chapter 5 - Conclusion

Summary of Main Findings

In light of the emergent findings outlined in the results and discussion chapters, it is now possible to summarise the central findings of this thesis in relation to the original research questions, whilst emphasising its original contribution to knowledge in the sociology and politics of sport.

With regards to the first and second research questions which highlighted the thesis’ intention to scrutinise a) the narratives and discourses generated by political parties in relation to the 2014 Games, and b) the perceived benefits, drawbacks, successes and failures of the Games in the discourse of each party, the analysis of the respective parties’ political discourse on the 2014 Commonwealth Games illustrated nuanced positions on the event, with contrasting ‘public narratives’ on the benefits of hosting the Games. For the SNP-led Scottish Government, emphasis was on both the sporting and economic legacies of hosting the Games, demonstrating an adherence to the ‘boosterism’ logic which has often been argued to underpin political justifications for hosting major sporting events (Holt, 1989; Horne, 2007; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Horne et al., 2013; Zimbalist, 2015). However, this emphasis on the numerous benefits of the Games for the Scottish economy which emerged from the analysis of the official narratives and discourse contained in the SNP’s publications and parliamentary speeches was not necessarily fully shared by the interviewees when discussing these issues informally. Indeed, both SNP interviewees expressed a degree of hesitancy to over-emphasise the positive impact of the Games despite being broadly supportive of the Games, suggesting that both politicians held slightly more circumspect personal opinions on the event.

In contrast to the governing SNP, the opposition parties – Labour, the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and Greens – placed greater emphasis on the sporting legacy of the Games, with less emphasis on the economic benefits of the event. However, each party had a particular nuanced stance on the sporting legacy, with Labour emphasising the health and physical activity legacy, the Conservatives highlighting the importance of competition in school sport, the Liberal Democrats espousing a
‘trickle-down’ narrative, and the Greens raising issues of human rights and equality in sport. Interestingly, despite the abundance of evidence which suggest such legacy claims often fail to come to fruition (Giulianotti, 2016; Horne, 2007; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Horne et al., 2013; Martin and Barth, 2013; Stewart and Rayner, 2016; Zimbalist, 2015), none of the parties adopted a critical or oppositional stance in the public domain towards the hosting of the Games. However, interviewees did express some reservations in private on the validity of the espoused benefits of the event, suggesting that a degree of self-censorship was exercised to avoid alienating the public given the popular consensus supporting the Games. It therefore appeared that politicians across all five parties remained cautious in expressing their personal opinions on the Games, instead opting to emphasise the positives of hosting the event in the public domain. It can therefore be argued that such self-censorship is at least partially responsible for the continued perpetuation of political discourse which is overwhelmingly supportive of bids to host international sporting events, despite the plethora of academic evidence which highlights the mixed or non-existent evidence of their benefits for host nations and/or regions.

Switching attention to the fourth research question highlighted in the introduction to this thesis regarding the extent to which the Games were to further or negate arguments relating to Scotland’s constitutional future, the findings discussed above demonstrate that the explicit politicisation of sporting events such as the Games remains a controversial topic. With regards to the interconnection between the Games and the independence referendum, it is evident that the interventions of those who argued for a campaign break during the period of the event led to a lack of explicit public politicisation of the event (Mole, 2014). Given the extended nature of the Scottish independence referendum campaign and the exhaustive list of issues which became politicised by both sides of the debate (ranging from central issues of economics, currency, defence, and social justice to relatively marginal issues such as broadcasting rights of BBC programming, the future of the ‘Union Jack’ flag and Scottish representation at the Olympic Games), it is striking that the 2014 Games remained one of the few issues mutually declared as apolitical. Furthermore, sporting policy issues more broadly were deemed to be of only marginal importance to arguments regarding the benefits or risks of Scottish independence by parties on both sides of the constitutional debate. This therefore suggests that sporting matters,
such as the hosting of major international sporting events, remain a low priority for politicians who wish to express a particular political or ideological position, despite the fact that sport has frequently been argued to play a central role in contemporary expressions of nationalist sentiment (Kellas, 1998; Bairner, 1996, 2001).

Nonetheless, it is equally important to state that the processes which led to the cross-party consensus that the Games should remain apolitical were ironically political in nature. For example, the public pronouncements of politicians such as Lord McConnell combined with the private pressures placed on the Scottish Government by opposition politicians, cross-party parliamentary groups and Games sponsors demonstrate that political interventions were required to negate the possibility of pro-independence campaigners capitalising on the perceived ‘feel-good factor’ of a successful Games (Grix, 2014; Harris and Skillen, 2016; Jarvie, 2017; Mole, 2014; Ochman, 2013). Indeed, it can be argued that the fact that interviewees from both sides of the constitutional debate acknowledged the potential impact of the Games ‘feel-good’ factor on the independence referendum undermines the claims of political actors who argued that the Games had no political implications whatsoever, regardless of whether there is indeed any validity in causally linking these two events. Instead, the fact that respondents from across the spectrum highlighted that the impact of the Games was considered as part of the campaigning strategy from both sides demonstrates that the event did entail some political considerations, even if the eventual outcome of these deliberations was to avoid politicisation of the Games. Regardless of these political manoeuvres and deliberations, the extent to which any political exploitation of the 2014 Games would have had any impact on the final result of the referendum remains highly speculative, with the result of a 55.3% ‘No’ vote and a 44.7% ‘Yes’ vote surely proving too significant a margin for the successful hosting of the Commonwealth Games to have had any sort of impact on the final outcome of this important decision for Scotland’s constitutional future.

However, despite the predominantly apolitical nature of the Games, there were some instances when the event was used by the respective parties to illustrate a particular ideological or political position within Scotland-wide or regional politics, in line with specific focus outlined in the third research question addressed in this thesis. For example, the Games were often used as an analogy to illustrate a wider political
issue, with topics such as the negative impact of Air Passenger Duty for the SNP, human rights and inequality for the Greens, the impact of council funding cuts for Labour, the support for the Games offered by the UK Government for the Conservatives, or the failure of SNP policy in physical education for the Liberal Democrats. It can therefore be argued that the Games offered an opportunity for each respective party to advance their own specific ideological and political agenda, given that the event could be potentially linked to a wide range of contrasting policy areas and considerations. In this respect, the emphasis in contemporary political discourse on international sporting events on promoting the multi-faceted nature of ‘legacies’ of a sporting, economic, environmental and social nature facilitates the opportunity for political parties to use events such as the Games to link to broader ideological positions in these domains.

Furthermore, the Games were also explicitly linked to the wider constitutional debates in contrasting ways by the pro-independence and pro-union parties, with the former using the success of the Games as an example of the potential and competence of an ‘imaginary’ of an independent Scotland, and the latter using the Games to illustrate the ‘best of both worlds’ public narrative of the constitutional status quo given the support of the UK Government for the Games and the dualistic symbolism of the event for expressions of Britishness and Scottishness (Harris and Skillen, 2016; Jarvie, 2017; Ochman, 2013). Although the dualistic nature of the Games’ symbolism could be argued to have rendered any politicisation of the event as a ‘zero-sum game’ which would offer neither side a specific opportunity to gain a political advantage, this did not necessarily entirely preclude any political interventions regarding the political implications of the Games, with some public and private expressions of the potential impact of the event on the referendum.

Despite this potential utility of the Games for illustrating political arguments, a consensus emerged about the limitations using the Games (and, more broadly, sport) as a medium for political communication, as was explored in relation to the fifth and final research question of this thesis. However, the politicisation of sport in this manner was perceived to be a risky endeavour with potentially limited rewards, with the respondents continuing to perpetuate the ‘myth of autonomy’ (Allison, 1993) that suggests that sport and politics should not mix, whilst arguing that events such as the
Games and sporting issues have limited sway in comparison to more substantive political issues. Furthermore, it would be fair to surmise that the relative unimportance of the Games in comparison to other issues in the constitutional debate (such as the economy, currency, defence and foreign affairs, for example) negated the extent to which the Games were explicitly linked to the independence referendum in the public domain, despite a small number of examples which contravened the ‘campaign break’ during the Games as discussed above. This arguably results in a lack of serious consideration of the potential utility of sport to illustrate contrasting political ideologies, leading to a considerable degree of convergence within sport as a policy area which fails to reflect the full political spectrum ideologically. It is therefore argued that the status of sport as a political issue needs to improve to facilitate a richer debate on contrasting ideological approaches to the importance of sports policy in contemporary Scotland.

Limitations of Thesis

As is the case with all research projects, it goes without saying that the methodological approach adopted in this thesis contained certain limitations which impacted upon the findings of the study. As acknowledged in the methodology section, one of the major challenges faced during the data collection process was recruiting MSPs as participants for the interviews, given the difficulties of securing access to political elites for research studies (Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff, 2015; McNabb, 2015). Although numerous steps were taken to recruit additional participants to no avail, such as the use of surveys as an alternative to interviews, the depth of the responses for the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats was slightly limited in comparison to the other three parties. Nonetheless, given the fact that the first stage of the data analysis which focused upon the emergent themes within the political discourse of these parties was extensive in terms of its scope, it can be argued that the inability to recruit additional participants for these parties only resulted in a marginal impact in terms of the depth of the findings. Whilst the input of additional participants may well have allowed for a contrasting interpretation of the rationale behind the emergent themes in the discourse of these respective parties, it would not necessarily have influenced the conclusions drawn on the emergent
narratives and discursive patterns in each party’s publications, manifestos, press releases and parliamentary speeches.

Furthermore, the strategy used to delineate the sample of political discourse analysed in this thesis also created some potential limitations for the above findings. Firstly, the exclusion of independent representatives and unelected political parties precluded the opportunity to explore more radical ideological positions on the Scottish constitution and the politics of the Games. Furthermore, the sole emphasis on elite political discourse, rather than a broader conceptualisation of politics which acknowledges the political nature of power relations outside of the domain of the formal institutions of government, excluded political discourse on the Games from non-elite political actors. However, the diverse range of political parties and actors in Scottish politics (and the resultant issues of access for inclusion of these parties and actors) meant that their exclusion was deemed both acceptable and pragmatic, as the specific research questions of this project could be achieved despite their exclusion. The decision to exclude political discourse from the post-referendum period also resulted in the inability to assess the shifting constitutional ‘imaginaries’ of the respective parties in the post-referendum period, precluding the opportunity to critically analyses the current positions of each party following the ‘No’ vote. Nonetheless, the removal of post-referendum discourse ensured that the nature of the discourse during the actual period of the referendum could be analysed in greater depth and with additional clarity, given the removal of the complications of the shifting constitutional stances of each party. Indeed, this methodological decision in turn creates an opportunity for future research which explores the nuanced shifts in each party’s discourse on the matter of the Scottish constitution, as the implications of the ‘No’ vote led to a revised focus from all parties on the prospect of additional devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament via the Smith Commission process.

It is therefore suggested that future analysis of the nature of these discursive shifts would complement the findings of this thesis, with additional analytical interest deriving from the impact of the ‘No’ vote in the Scottish independence referendum and the ‘Leave’ vote in the UK-wide referendum on EU membership. The prospect of Scottish independence has remained a salient issue within the domain of Scottish and British politics, despite the ‘No’ vote in the 2014 Scottish independence
referendum. Indeed, further succour for advocates of Scottish independence has emerged due to the outcome of the UK-wide referendum on EU membership which resulted in a victory for anti-EU ‘Leave’ campaign, despite strong electoral support in Scotland to ‘Remain’ in the EU as evident in the referendum results. The EU referendum result has therefore been portrayed as further evidence of the Scottish ‘democratic deficit’ which has been argued to impact political representation for the Scottish electorate within the UK (Dalle Mulle, 2016; Ichijo, 2009; Leith and Soule, 2011; Mycock, 2012), with the SNP citing the EU referendum outcome as a potential catalyst for a second Scottish independence referendum in the coming years.

**Original Contribution of Thesis**

Despite these limitations, it can be argued that the methodological and conceptual approach of this thesis also makes an original contribution to the academic study of the relationship between politics, nationalism and sport. The application of the conceptual frameworks of Somers (1994) and Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) have demonstrated the potential benefits of the ‘methodological bricolage’ advocated by Denzin and Lincoln (2003), with the complementarity of the two frameworks deriving from the shared emphasis on the roles of narrative in contemporary political discourse. The synthesis of these frameworks has facilitated the opportunity to explore the nature of the ‘public narratives’ of each party on the Scottish constitution and the 2014 Games, whilst simultaneously providing an opportunity to present the findings of the data analysis through the heuristic application of the Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) framework. Whilst the application of these complementary theoretical frameworks was specifically focused upon the 2014 Games as a relatively isolated political event, it is contended that the same (or similar) methodological approach could be replicated on a range of contrasting events or developments, whether in a sporting or wider domain of political consideration. It is therefore hoped that the original methodological approach utilised in the current thesis can be used to inspire or influence other academics to conduct academic research using similar methodological approaches in a variety of contrasting contexts.

As acknowledged previously, the framework's definitive categorisation of narratives as non-argumentative in character created some minor analytical challenges given the
contention that narratives of past and present ‘circumstances’ can implicitly or explicitly make a specific political argument. This thesis therefore contends that narrative forms are not a 'non-argumentative genre' as argued by Fairclough and Fairclough but instead represent a form of 'soft' argumentation for political action. Although this stance accepts the authors’ position relating to the primacy of ‘imaginaries’ of future circumstances as the argumentative basis for a given course of political action, it equally contends that these future ‘imaginaries’ should be framed within a broader analysis of ‘public narratives’ of past and present circumstances. Furthermore, this refutation of Fairclough and Fairclough’s position on the argumentative powers of narratives overcomes a problem regarding examples of political discourse which do not explicitly outline a future ‘imaginary’ in relation to a given political issue. This original contention regarding ‘soft’ argumentation suggests that political actors can represent circumstances in political discourse in a fashion which implicitly attempts to lead its audience to a particular course of action, without stating explicitly what this course of action is. The synthesis of these two contrasting frameworks also represents an original contribution to future empirical applications of the Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) model, with the current thesis revealing that it is more appropriate to state that narratives may be implicitly argumentative, rather than dismissing their argumentative potential out of hand.

The findings derived from this methodological approach make an original contribution to furthering academic understanding in a number of other ways. Firstly, the specific examination of the 2014 Commonwealth Games has helped to fill a comparative gap in academic literature due to the lack of discussion of the Commonwealth Games (Black, 2014; Carter, 2011; Dawson, 2006, 2011; Palmer, 2013; Polley, 2014). In particular, the findings illustrate the contrasting motives of hosts of ‘second-order’ international events such as the Games (Black, 2008, 2014), with Scotland’s hosting of the Games used as a catalyst for investment in sporting infrastructure and economic growth rather than as a ‘springboard’ to hosting larger events in the future. Furthermore, the direct engagement with politicians via the interviews and surveys has facilitated the opportunity to critically evaluate the claims of past academic literature on the politics of international sporting events in light of the responses of these political actors. To this end, it has been possible to illustrate that many of the widely held beliefs about these events, such as those revolving
around the ‘myth of autonomy’ (Allison, 1993) and the ‘boosterism’ logic of hosting benefits (Holt, 1989; Horne, 2007; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Horne et al., 2013; Zimbalist, 2015), have also become manifest in the beliefs and strategic thinking of political actors in the Scottish context. Future academic research studies which scrutinise the politics of international sporting events (and sporting issues, more broadly) should therefore continue to engage with politicians directly, given that this provides an opportunity to gain a fuller understanding of the reasons behind their political position regarding sport. Furthermore, such interaction also facilitates an opportunity to directly question and/or challenge some of the unexamined assumptions about the politics of sport perpetuated by political actors, thus offering the possibility of encouraging further personal reflections of these actors on their personal ideological positions and inconsistencies, as was found to have been the case in the dialogues with the participants in this thesis.

Finally, this thesis represents the first example of engaging with original empirical data to analyse the potential interconnection between the 2014 Games and the independence referendum. This has allowed the opportunity to explore the validity of the findings of the limited range of academic literature on the relationship between the Games and the referendum, thus lending empirical support to the arguments of Harris and Skillen (2016), Jarvie (2017) and Ochman (2013) who offered insightful preliminary analyses on these topics. Given that the findings of this thesis have provided analytical insights into both the nature of political discourse on both events, and also the strategic thinking of the political actors involved in creating this discourse, it is hoped that future studies of the relationship between sport and politics can further develop our understanding of these phenomena. The original methodological approach of the thesis can also be replicated to explore the nature of political discourses of future sporting events such as the Commonwealth Games or other sporting ‘mega-events’. Indeed, it will be interesting to explore the nature of political discourse in the forthcoming iterations of the 2018 Commonwealth Games in Gold Coast, Australia and the 2022 Games in Durban, South Africa through future research projects of a similar nature, given the starkly contrasting political contexts and considerations of these respective host nations in comparison to the Scottish context.
Furthermore, future research studies on the interconnection between sport and politics in the Scottish and British contexts will undoubtedly be of great academic interest, given the significant constitutional debates which are likely to continue over the coming years as Britain leaves the EU. Although there are no specific major international sporting events to be hosted in the UK in the near future, sport as a wider policy area will remain a political consideration as the implications of future governmental decisions shape the funding landscape for sport at an international, national and local level. Whilst this would preclude a direct methodological replication of the processes followed in this thesis per se, the fundamental methodological principles of this thesis which underline the importance of critically examining the nature of political discourse have numerous political applications within political and sociological study of sport. Indeed, as the UK government grapples with the contrasting and competing forces of British, English, Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish and Irish nationalism during the forthcoming period of constitutional instability, there is a great deal of scope for further investigation of the role sport plays within nationalist political discourse during this period. Furthermore, the interconnection between sport and political discourse in contrasting international contexts clearly demands further academic interrogation, with continuing nationalist and separatist movements in regions such as Catalonia and the Basque region, for example, often closely connected to the domain of sport. Sport therefore remains a ripe field for the exploration of the nature of contemporary political nationalism in the European context, and beyond, as demonstrated in this thesis.

Given this, the continued perpetuation of the ‘myth of autonomy’ (Allison, 1993) that ‘sport and politics should not mix’ in contemporary political discourse highlights the necessity of further academic analysis of these spurious claims. Although it can be argued that academics operating in the fields of the politics and sociology of sport have a vested interest in tackling these myths as part of ongoing attempts to raise the status of sport in both political and academic circles, it is also important to critique the impact of commonly held beliefs about the benefits of investing vast sums of public money in hosting sporting events such as the Commonwealth Games, or indeed investing in sport more generally. It is hoped therefore that challenges to the prevailing political perceptions on the nature of sport will allow for a more diverse array of ideological approaches to the politics of sport, thus addressing the limitations
of the ideological lacuna which arguably prevails in contemporary political thought and discourse on sport.
References

Literature Sources


Political Discourse Sample Primary Sources


Conservative Friends of the Union (2012) *Stronger together, better together, safer together – speech by Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP*. Speech transcript, 9th October 2012.


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Scottish Labour Party (2014) *Did politics come into the Commonwealth Games and what effect will the event have on your campaign? Patricia Ferguson MSP.* Press release, 8th August 2014.


Scottish Liberal Democrats (2011) *Olympics can benefit Scotland if we want it to.* Press release, 22nd November 2011.

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312

Scottish National Party (2012) *First Minister’s address to SNP Spring Conference*. Speech transcript, 10th March 2012.


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Scottish Parliament (2011) SP OR 8 June 2011 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2011) SP OR 8 September 2011 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2011) SP OR 14 September 2011 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2011) SP OR 21 September 2011 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2011) SP OR 29 September 2011 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2011) SP OR 6 October 2011 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2011) SP OR 27 October 2011 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2011) SP OR 16 November 2011 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2011) SP OR 1 December 2011 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2011) SP OR 21 December 2011 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2011) SP OR 22 December 2011 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2012) SP OR 1 February 2012 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2012) SP OR 2 February 2012 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2012) SP OR 4 February 2012 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2012) SP OR 23 February 2012 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2012) SP OR 29 February 2012 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2012) SP OR 1 March 2012 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2012) SP OR 14 June 2012 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2012) SP OR 8 November 2012 [Electronic version].
Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 5 February 2013 [Electronic version].
Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 7 February 2013 [Electronic version].
Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 20 February 2013 [Electronic version].
Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 7 March 2013 [Electronic version].
Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 12 March 2013 [Electronic version].
Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 15 March 2013 [Electronic version].
Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 20 March 2013 [Electronic version].
Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 27 March 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 23 April 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 30 April 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 6 May 2013 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 30 May 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 11 June 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 19 June 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 27 June 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 4 September 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 5 September 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 10 September 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 11 September 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 12 September 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 18 September 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 25 September 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 26 September 2013 [Electronic version].

320
Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 1 October 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 2 October 2013 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 31 October 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 6 November 2013 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 7 November 2013 [Electronic version].


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Scottish Parliament (2013) SP OR 18 December 2013 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 5 February 2014 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 20 February 2014 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 26 February 2014 [Electronic version].

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Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 3 April 2014 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 30 April 2014 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 1 May 2014 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 8 May 2014 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 13 May 2014 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 14 May 2014 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 21 May 2014 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 27 May 2014 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 3 June 2014 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 5 June 2014 [Electronic version].

Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 11 June 2014 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 26 June 2014 [Electronic version].


Scottish Parliament (2014) SP OR 14 August 2014 [Electronic version].


Appendices

Appendix 1 – Completed Ethical Clearance Checklist for Loughborough University Ethics Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethics Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee</th>
<th>Loughborough University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethical Clearance Checklist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Has the Investigator read the 'Guidance for completion of Ethical Clearance Checklist' before starting this form?  Yes

Project Details

1. Project Title: Scotland’s future and 2014 - political narratives of the Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the Scottish independence referendum

Applicant(s) Details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Name of Applicant 1: Stuart Whigham</th>
<th>10. Name of Applicant 2: Professor Alan Bairner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Programme (if applicable): MPhil/PhD</td>
<td>13. Programme (if applicable): MPhil/PhD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Email address: <a href="mailto:s.whigham@lboro.ac.uk">s.whigham@lboro.ac.uk</a></td>
<td>14. Email address: <a href="mailto:a.e.s.bairner@lboro.ac.uk">a.e.s.bairner@lboro.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7a. Contact address: 14 Church Way, Ifley, Oxford, Oxfordshire, OX4 4DY  
7b. Telephone number: 07736048385  
8. Supervisor: No  
9. Responsible Investigator: No  

Participants

Positions of Authority

18. Are researchers in a position of direct authority with regard to participants (e.g. academic staff using student participants, sports coaches using his/her athletes in training)? No
Vulnerable groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19. Will participants be knowingly recruited from one or more of the following vulnerable groups?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 18 years of age</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons incapable of making an informed decision for themselves</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pregnant women</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners/Detained persons</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other vulnerable group</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you have selected No to all of Question 19, please go to Question 23.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Choose an item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20. Will participants be chaperoned by more than one investigator at all times?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Will at least one investigator of the same sex as the participant(s) be present throughout the investigation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Will participants be visited at home?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Researcher Safety

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Choose an item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23. Will the researcher be alone with participants at any time?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If Yes, please answer the following questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Choose an item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23a. Will the researcher inform anyone else of when they will be alone with participants?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23b. Has the researcher read the ‘guidelines for lone working’ and will abide by the recommendations within?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Methodology and Procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24. Please indicate whether the proposed study:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involves taking bodily samples (please refer to published guidelines)</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involves using samples previously collected with consent for further research</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involves procedures which are likely to cause physical, psychological, social or emotional distress to participants</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is designed to be challenging physically or psychologically in any way (includes any study involving physical exercise)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposes participants to risks or distress greater than those encountered in their normal lifestyle</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involves collection of body secretions by invasive methods</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescribes intake of compounds additional to daily diet or other dietary manipulation-supplementation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involves pharmaceutical drugs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involves use of radiation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involves use of hazardous materials</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Answer</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assists/alters the process of conception in any way</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involves methods of contraception</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involves genetic engineering</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involves testing new equipment</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observation/Recording</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25a. Does the study involve observation and/or recording of participants?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Yes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25b. Will those being observed and/or recorded be informed that the observation and/or recording will take place?</td>
<td>Choose an Item</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consent and Deception</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Will participants give informed consent freely?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informed consent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Will participants be fully informed of the objectives of the study and all details disclosed (preferably at the start of the study but, where this would interfere with the study, at the end)?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Will participants be fully informed of the use of the data collected (including, where applicable, any intellectual property arising from the research)?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. For children under the age of 18 or participants who are incapable of making an informed decision for themselves:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Will consent be obtained (either in writing or by some other means)?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Will consent be obtained from parents or other suitable person?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Will they be informed that they have the right to withdraw regardless of parental/guardian consent?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. For studies conducted in schools, will approval be gained in advance from the Head-teacher and/or the Director of Education of the appropriate Local Education Authority?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. For detained persons, members of the armed forces, employees, students and other persons judged to be under duress, will care be taken over gaining freely informed consent?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deception</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Does the study involve deception of participants (i.e. withholding of information or the misleading of participants) which could potentially harm or exploit participants?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Yes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethical Clearance Checklist January 2013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31. Is deception an unavoidable part of the study?</td>
<td>Choose an item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Will participants be de-briefed and the true object of the research revealed at the earliest stage upon completion of the study?</td>
<td>Choose an item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Has consideration been given on the way that participants will react to the withholding of information or deliberate deception?</td>
<td>Choose an item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Withdrawal</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Will participants be informed of their right to withdraw from the investigation at any time and to require their own data to be destroyed?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Storage of Data and Confidentiality</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Will all information on participants be treated as confidential and not identifiable unless agreed otherwise in advance, and subject to the requirements of law?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Will storage of data comply with the Data Protection Act 1998?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Will any video/audio recording of participants be kept in a secure place and not released for any use by third parties?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Will video/audio recordings be destroyed within ten years of the completion of the investigation?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Will full details regarding the storage and disposal of any human tissue samples be communicated to the participants?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Will research involve the sharing of data or confidential information beyond the initial consent given?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Will the research involve administrative or secure data that requires permission from the appropriate authorities before use?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incentives</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Will incentives be offered to the investigator to conduct the study?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Will incentives by offered to potential participants as an inducement to participate in the study?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work Outside of the United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Is your research being conducted outside of the United Kingdom?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Yes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Has a risk assessment been carried out to ensure the safety of the researcher whilst working outside of the United Kingdom?</td>
<td>Choose an item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Have you considered the appropriateness of your research in the country?</td>
<td>Choose an item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you are travelling to?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. is there an increased risk to yourself or the participants in your research study?</td>
<td>Choose an item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Have you obtained any necessary ethical permission needed in the country you are travelling to?</td>
<td>Choose an item</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Information and Declarations**

*Checklist Application Only:*  
If you have completed the checklist to the best of your knowledge, and not selected any answers marked with an * or †, your investigation is deemed to conform with the ethical checkpoints. Please sign the declaration and lodge the completed checklist with your Head of Department/School or his/her nominee.

*Checklist with Additional Information to the Secretary:*  
If you have completed the checklist and have only selected answers which require additional information to be submitted with the checklist (indicated by a †), please ensure that all the information is provided in detail below and send this signed checklist to the Secretary of the Sub-Committee.

*Checklist with Generic Protocols Included:*  
If you have completed the checklist and you have selected one or more answers in which you wish to use a Generic Protocol (indicated by #), please include the Generic Protocol reference number in the space below, along with a brief summary of how it will be used. Please ensure you are on the list of approved investigators for the Generic Protocol before including it on the checklist. The completed checklist should be lodged with your Head of Department/School or his/her nominee.

*Full Application needed:*  
If on completion of the checklist you have selected one or more answers which require the submission of a full proposal (indicated by †), please download the relevant form from the Sub-Committee’s web page. A signed copy of this Checklist should accompany the full submission to the Sub-Committee.

**Space for Information on Generic Proposals and/or Additional Information as requested:**  
Click here to enter text.

**For completion by Supervisor**
Please tick the appropriate boxes. The study should not begin until all boxes are ticked.

☐ The student has read the University’s Code of Practice on investigations involving human participants

☐ The topic merits further research

☐ The student has the skills to carry out the research or are being trained in the requires skills by the Supervisor

☐ The participant information sheet or leaflet is appropriate

☐ The procedures for recruitment and obtaining informed consent are appropriate

Comments from supervisor:

Click here to enter text.

Signature of Applicant: Stuart Whigham

Signature of Supervisor (if applicable): Click here to enter text.

Signature of Head of School/Department or his/her nominee: Click here to enter text.

Date: 2/1/2014
Scotland’s future and 2014 - political narratives of the Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the Scottish independence referendum

Adult Participant Information Sheet

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What is the purpose of the study?

This study aims to critically examine predominant narratives which will emanate from political discourse in relation to two significant events in Scotland in 2014 – the Glasgow Commonwealth Games held and the independence referendum. In particular, the extent to which the staging of the Commonwealth Games in Scotland is linked to debates about Scotland’s constitutional future will be scrutinised. The project will examine the content and structure of official press releases, speeches and other publications from a range of political parties and campaign groups, whilst simultaneously exploring the nature of the strategic discussions and processes which inform the production of such material.

Who is doing this research and why?

This research is being completed by the main investigator alone in order to fulfil the requirements of a MPhil/PhD doctoral research programme at Loughborough University. The study is being completed under the supervision of Professor Alan Bairner from the School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences at Loughborough University.

Are there any exclusion criteria?

There are no specific exclusion criteria for participation in this research study. However, participants will be invited to participate in the study based upon their specific ability to provide an insight into the processes which inform the production of political publications and speeches.
Once I take part, can I change my mind?

Yes. After you have read this information and asked any questions you may have we will ask you to complete an Informed Consent Form, however if at any time, before, during or after the sessions you wish to withdraw from the study please just contact the main investigator. You can withdraw at any time, for any reason and you will not be asked to explain your reasons for withdrawing.

Will I be required to attend any sessions and where will these be?

You will be required to participate in one interview session, to be held at a suitable location as negotiated between the researcher and yourself. Where appropriate, you may be asked to participate in an additional follow-up interview at a later date in the research process.

What will I be asked to do?

You will be asked to participate in a tape-recorded interview. Discussion will be led by the researcher on specific questions relating to production of political publications and speeches, but discussion may branch out to other topics of interest which may arise. You will be asked for your honest thoughts and opinions on selected topics, and your responses will be recorded for analysis and discussion as part of the project.

How long will it take?

The interview should last between 30 and 60 minutes, although this will depend upon the length and depth of the discussion which takes place.

What personal information will be required from me?

Background information relating to your past and present employment will be discussed as part of the study. However all questions are entirely optional, and any questions you do not wish to answer can and will be excluded from discussion as desired.

Are there any risks in participating?

The risks of participation are relatively low in the study, with areas of risk limited to the potential disclosure of sensitive organisational information by the participant due to the focus of this research. However, there is no obligation to answer any questions which may draw upon sensitive information, and any information shared will be strictly confidential.

Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?

All information provided will be kept fully confidential. Data recordings such as audio tapes and interview transcripts will be stored for no longer than 6 years in line with the Data Protection Act. Data will not be shared with any other individuals other than those named above without explicit prior consent. Data will be stored in a secure location. Data will be used as part of the current study, and may be used in
future studies on related topics by the current researcher alone. If you wish to remain
anonymous, your anonymity will be protected by the use of pseudonyms in the final
research report and publications relating to the data. Any identifying features and
factors will be removed from published data at your request.

What will happen to the results of the study?

Interviews will be transcribed and will be analysed for common themes in relation to
the central research topics. The results will then be used for discussion and analysis,
and will be submitted as part of the final project submission.

I have some more questions; who should I contact?

If you have any further questions regarding your participation in this study, you
should contact Stuart Whigham (Lead Investigator) in the first instance using the
contact details at the top of this information sheet. You can also contact Professor
Alan Bairner (Project Supervisor) on the provided contact details if you have any
other enquiries regarding this project.

What if I am not happy with how the research was conducted?

If you are not happy with how the research was conducted, please contact Mrs Zoe
Stockdale, the Secretary for the University’s Ethics Approvals (Human Participants)
Sub-Committee:

Mrs Z Stockdale, Research Office, Rutland Building, Loughborough University,
Epinal Way, Loughborough, LE11 3TU. Tel: 01509 222423. Email:
Z.C.Stockdale@lboro.ac.uk

The University also has a policy relating to Research Misconduct and Whistle
Blowing which is available online at
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/Whistleblowing(2).htm.
Appendix 3 – Informed consent form

Scotland’s future and 2014 - political narratives of the Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the Scottish independence referendum

INFORMED CONSENT FORM
(to be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read)

The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me. I understand that this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have been approved by the Loughborough University Ethics Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee.

I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form.

I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation.

I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study.

I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any reason, and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing.

I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence and will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers unless (under the statutory obligations of the agencies which the researchers are working with), it is judged that confidentiality will have to be breached for the safety of the participant or others.

I agree to participate in this study.

Your name

Your signature

Signature of investigator

Date
Appendix 4 – Semi-structured interview schedule

Generic:

- What involvement have you had in relation to the 2014 Commonwealth Games?
- In your opinion, what are the benefits of hosting the 2014 Commonwealth Games for Glasgow? For Scotland? For the United Kingdom?
- Do/did you have any concerns about hosting the 2014 Games?
- Thinking back to the period when a potential bid for hosting the Games was being deliberated, what were opinions on the feasibility and success of the bid? Any fears?
- What benefits are derived from hosting sporting and cultural events in Scotland?
- What impact does the 2014 Year of Homecoming have for Scotland?
- How would you respond to those who say sport and politics should not mix?
- Do you think the hosting of the 2014 Games has any implications for the independence referendum? Why/why not?
- Do you think that the 2014 Games has played an active part in the strategy of the Yes Scotland or Better Together campaigns?
- Would you say that there are differences in opinions between the main political parties on the hosting of the Commonwealth Games? Why do you think this is the case?
- Have you been involved in any strategic discussions within your party about the Commonwealth Games? Is there a ‘party line’ on the Games?
- Does your party have a strategy in terms of linking the Games to the independence? If so, what are your thoughts on this?
- How important is the Commonwealth Games in comparison to other events, issues and debates in the independence referendum campaign?
- How important is sport in political terms in comparison to other ministerial briefs?
Appendix 5 – Survey questionnaire

Scotland’s future and 2014 - political narratives of the Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the Scottish independence referendum

Interview Questions

1. What involvement (if any) have you had in relation to the 2014 Commonwealth Games?

2. In your opinion, what are the benefits of hosting the 2014 Commonwealth Games for Glasgow? For Scotland? For the United Kingdom?

3. Do you have any concerns about hosting the 2014 Games?

4. Thinking back to the period when a potential bid for hosting the Games was being deliberated, what were your opinions on the feasibility and success of the bid? Did you have any fears?

5. What benefits are derived from hosting sporting and cultural events in Scotland?

6. What impact does the 2014 Year of Homecoming have for Scotland?

7. How would you respond to those who say sport and politics should not mix?

8. Do you think the hosting of the 2014 Games has any implications for the independence referendum? Why/why not?

9. Do you think that the 2014 Games has played an active part in the strategy of the Yes Scotland or Better Together campaigns?
10. Would you say that there are in differences in opinions between the main political parties on the hosting of the Commonwealth Games? Why do you think this is the case?

11. Have you been involved in any strategic discussions within your party about the Commonwealth Games? Is there a ‘party line’ on the Games?

12. Does your party have a strategy in terms of linking the Games to the independence? If so, what are your thoughts on this?

13. How important is the Commonwealth Games in comparison to other events, issues and debates in the independence referendum campaign?

14. How important is sport in political terms in comparison to other ministerial briefs?

15. Are there any other comments you would like to make which you feel are relevant to this research study?
Appendix 6 – Completed survey questionnaire exemplar – Liz Smith MSP

Scotland’s future and 2014 - political narratives of the Glasgow Commonwealth Games and the Scottish independence referendum

Interview Questions

1. What involvement (if any) have you had in relation to the 2014 Commonwealth Games?

I am Scottish Conservative Spokesman on Sport so have been regularly involved in briefings by Shona Robison, the Minister for Sport, and David Grevenberg, Chief Executive of Glasgow 2014. These have taken place on a monthly basis. I am also Deputy Convenor of the Cross Party Group on Sport. I also applied for tickets on a private basis and will be watching some hockey matches.

2. In your opinion, what are the benefits of hosting the 2014 Commonwealth Games for Glasgow? For Scotland? For the United Kingdom?

The Commonwealth Games are a prestige international event and they will bring substantial economic and social benefits to Glasgow and to Scotland especially in those non-Glasgow communities which will be hosting events. There will be some benefits to the UK in terms of visitors coming to Scotland but also wishing to spend time in other part of the UK, in terms of economic gains to the companies assisting with the construction of games venue, the production of retail products and the provision of additional employment.

3. Do you have any concerns about hosting the 2014 Games?

Broadly speaking no, but there are definitely some issues which have attracted concern:

1. The mistake made over the “Red Road Flats” demolition being included in the proposed Opening Ceremony plans, most especially the lack of consultation with those affected. There have been serious questions raised over who was responsible for the decision.

2. The fact that one of the two Contingency funds has been more or less spent without full transparency over why and again, on whose authority.

3. The concerns within the business community about the lateness of the information regarding changes to the transport infrastructure.
4. Thinking back to the period when a potential bid for hosting the Games was being deliberated, what were your opinions on the feasibility and success of the bid? Did you have any fears?

   No, I was comfortable with the Glasgow bid.

5. What benefits are derived from hosting sporting and cultural events in Scotland?

   Scotland has a poor record of health when compared to many European nations and there has been a great deal of focus on health policy which will boost physical activity especially amongst young people. The Commonwealth Games helps this process but there is, I believe, an important issue as to what constitutes an appropriate legacy. I am attaching a speech I made on this issue on 4 February 2014 this year plus a speech on Youth Sport Policy.

6. What impact does the 2014 Year of Homecoming have for Scotland?

   In my view, very little outwith some modest economic gains from tourism.

7. How would you respond to those who say sport and politics should not mix?

   There has to be some political leadership when it comes to sport since there are some important policy–making aspects, but I do not think politicians should meddle in the day to day running of sport.

8. Do you think the hosting of the 2014 Games has any implications for the independence referendum? Why/why not?

   Not particularly. I think it would influence votes both ways but not in significant numbers.

9. Do you think that the 2014 Games has played an active part in the strategy of the Yes Scotland or Better Together campaigns?

   No.

10. Would you say that there are in differences in opinions between the main political parties on the hosting of the Commonwealth Games? Why do you think this is the case?

    No, and I have had first-hand experience of hearing each party's Sport Spokesman speak about the Games.
11. Have you been involved in any strategic discussions within your party about the Commonwealth Games? Is there a ‘party line’ on the Games?

   Our party is very supportive of the Games but we have, from time to time, raised issues about the scrutiny of key aspects (see answer 3).

12. Does your party have a strategy in terms of linking the Games to the independence? If so, what are your thoughts on this?

   No.

13. How important is the Commonwealth Games in comparison to other events, issues and debates in the independence referendum campaign?

   It’s a very important event but, to date, it has been little mentioned in the referendum debates.

14. How important is sport in political terms in comparison to other ministerial briefs?

   It is probably a slightly more important political brief than it used to be but much less important than others such as Education, Health and Justice – rightly so.

15. Are there any other comments you would like to make which you feel are relevant to this research study?

   No.
Appendix 7 – Interview transcript exemplar – Kenny MacAskill MSP

*Thank you for giving up your time.*

Aye.

*I guess the first question is for yourself personally... em... what involvement have you had with the 2014 Commonwealth Games as in pre-bid, bid, during the organisation, at the moment?*

Very little, I mean the... the... y’know, the Games Committee and the bid was all dealt with by different departments. My involvement’s been, y’know, eh... eh... through security. But even then, the police tend to report directly in to the Games Committee and they’re represented on that, so it’s been very much peripheral.

*Okay. And have there been any times where, say for example the security are feeding in to the Games that they’ve asked you to intervene at all or has it been quite smooth?*

It’s... it’s been quite smooth, there’s never been... there’s been challenges over, y’know, whether it’s G4S finance thing, but y’know it’s got through... it’s all come together remarkably well.

*Okay, good. And I guess... em... at the time of the bid you were in... em... you were in opposition. At that time, what was your thoughts about the bid for hosting the Games? Did you think it was a good idea?*

Yeah, I think these things are a good idea. I think it’s good for raising the profile. I think certainly, y’know... we were delighted with the success of the bid which we obviously... you know... it came about during our administration. It’s first of all a chance to get... regenerate the East End of Glasgow which probably statistically is the poorest area of the country. The infrastructure and investment is phenomenal in the area, y’know, over the years. And it’s the growth in confidence amongst the city, the community and the country.

*And you mentioned the kind of profile and the regeneration... do you think those are the two main things? Is there anything else which you think either Glasgow or Scotland or the UK generates from hosting the Games?*

Well, I think it puts Glasgow and Scotland on the map. I think it gives us opportunities for further events. I mean, I was speaking anecdotally to someone from Glasgow Life or whatever yesterday, and I think they see opportunities. There’s always been this... and you’ll probably know better from your experience than me, that you’ve got to have a population of between 5 and 10 million... actually, Scotland’s not that far off if you think of its Central Belt. So this gives you an opportunity to come forward. We’re not gonna get a Champions League final staged there, but there are other opportunities there. I just think it’s the profile that’s enhanced incredibly.
Okay, good. And... and... kind of, currently or in the past, have you had any concerns about the hosting the Games at all? Has there been anything you've thought “that unnerves me” or...?

No... I think these things... y'know, Edinburgh’s had it twice. The first was remarkably successful; the second was a debacle, but there was... there were good reasons for that. I think given the organisation here... the fact that from the early stages it’s gone far better than we would ever had anticipated, but I never though it would be anything other than good. But, probably with the weather, everybody... the feel-good factor in the city is palpable and tangible.

Yeah... yeah, I was through there a couple of weeks ago and... even when it’s two weeks before you can kind of... I might come back to what you said about 1986 a little bit later on... em... and in terms of hosting it as... you kind of mentioned as part of an events package. I spoke to a couple of people from the Glasgow bid team, and they said it was part of a bigger events strategy. Em, again, why do you think, not just sports events but these cultural events are good for Scotland to host?

Well, y’know, in some instances it allows you to invest in the infrastructure to regenerate Glasgow as a classic example. But I think that they bring in people as well in terms of visitors’ spend. We see that in Edinburgh with the Festival. We see that in Glasgow with other events. We see it with the Wickerman in south-west Scotland. So there’s the... and I think that from a Scottish perspective it’s self-confidence and feel-good. So I... I think there’s a financial benefit, there’s a well-being benefit, there’s a profile benefit that...y’know... an audience of a billion, you couldn’t buy that publicity.

Yeah, naw... it's... it's putting it on the map type thing. Em... yeah it’s all kind of fitted in with the Year of Homecoming. We’ve had Bannockburn Live, the Armed Forces Day on the same weekend... em... we’ve got the Games, Ryder Cup, things like that. Em... what impact do you think... you have these Years of Homecoming and their different themes... what benefit do you think they’ve had for Scotland?

I think it’s all part of, y’know, the same strategy. To raise the profile, generate income, and... eh... y’know create a feel-good feeling of confidence which has been a problem in Scotland sometimes. The ‘too wee, too poor, too stupid, we can’t do these things’... yes we can. It puts us on an international stage and anything that puts us up there I think is good the country, and it’s good financially as well as profile and well-being.

And would you say that, for yourself, you would put profile first or the finance and economics side of it first as a... as a politician?

I think it’s both, y’know. We’re... y’know... em... the Games has cost money to run but I think it was the right thing to do for the city. Other events are smaller but you generate income. Some of this is complicated by the current devolution... y’know... settlement because we don’t get the money back in VAT to spend, or anything such as that. Y’know, post-independence it really takes off. But... eh... I think these things you take them in the round. The odd... the initial one that’s more about profile, that one's more about money, but the general thing is across the board is that
people feel better, the country’s profiles raised. I mean, you do generate income spent and the return visits because you’ve got these people who’ll come to Glasgow and the majority will tell their friends. People… y’know… Glasgow, they always get the shopping visit. But y’know it’s like Liverpool which I’ve visited myself, a fantastic place to visit, but if you’d asked me 20 years ago would I go to Liverpool? No. Equally now I would recommend it highly to anyone.

Yeah… with Glasgow… I mean, I live down south and a lot of my friends are like ‘oh Glasgow, I’m not sure about that’ but… we’ll see after this it could be totally different. Em… just one point you made there about the current constitutional settlement and the frustrations you’ve got with that. Em… the economic side of things, do you feel that sometimes some of the benefits that Scotland gets are diluted by the fact that, kind of, there’s not full fiscal control for Scotland?

Well, absolutely. We’re not able to invest on the basis of getting a return. We only get the allocated spend, so we put all that money in but we don’t get the benefit back. Y’know, the benefit of the tourist spend in Glasgow is going in to George Osbourne’s coffers, yet who’s funding the infrastructure and investment? So that is a frustration. It limits what you can do.

And I guess, to an extent, the events that have gone past and present…it’s a bit speculative to accumulate because you’re putting the money in to raise the profile but you’re maybe not maximising as best you could with a different kind of settlement?

Aye, exactly.

Okay… em… kind of delving into a bit of the way sport and politics mix then… obviously, Jack McConnell came out in January about a campaigning truce and… what do you think about the idea that sport and politics shouldn’t mix? Do you agree with that personally, politically? Where do you sit on that?

Politics is life, y’know. Eh… you cannot get away from that so some of these suggestions, and the suggestion from Jack McConnell was frankly… I just thought that it was seeking publicity on his part. Y’know, this suggestion that you can keep them entirely separate is not true. I mean, on that basis, if you took that logic, you would argue that we should never have boycotted South Africa because it was their cricket team, y’know… eh… and it’s just sport and you don’t have the two so… eh… you can’t do that. Are you going to play Israel? No we’re not. Why? Because their behaviour in Gaza is, y’know, reprehensible. So you can’t differentiate there. Equally, no-one’s talking about a re-run of Nuremberg or the Berlin Olympics, or whatever it is, back in 1936. So politics is part of this… y’know, this idea … y’know, you can separate the two, no you can’t. Equally, we were never going to have big ‘Vote Yes’ banners outside at Hampden. So I thought that his suggestion was frankly crass and nonsensical. Equally, I think the real benefit for us politically is the growth of self-confidence, the feel-good factor… Ross Murdoch winning gold, these things… we couldn’t buy that. Equally… probably, y’know, that’s why Jack McConnell’s pissed off because that when… y’know, you see the tears welling in Ross Murdoch’s eyes… so Scots’ hearts are bursting with pride.
Yeah, and I think the Commonwealth Games are an interesting one because we do split off into our constituent parts and ‘Flower of Scotland’ comes on... em... it’s interesting you mentioned the Jack McConnell thing because... em... do you think... do you think that’s him trying to possibly personally raise his profile or make a statement? Do you think there’s a kind of party politic line towards that in terms of the ‘Better Together’, ‘Yes’ campaigns?

No, I don’t think there’s kind of a party political line... well, maybe in terms of the general ‘Better Together’, there’s lots of negativity involved in that. Part of that I think was just Jack McConnell looking for profile because most people are now like ‘Jack who?’. Y’know, I passed him yesterday in the... at the Games, and frankly if he hadn’t shouted me I would have walked past him. And I think that’s the general view of most of the public. Y’know, once you’re out of the political limelight, you’re out... ah... y’know, but whether it’s red, white and blue on the fly-past jets or whatever, it’s entirely disingenuous. David Cameron, who hardly ever comes to Scotland, y’know... the amount of English UK ministers all over Scotland at the moment like a rash who frankly don’t know the place, don’t really care about the place, and have been here hardly ever, y’know, they’re the ones that’s doing it. We’re just doing our job as the host country.

Okay... em... moving on, well we’ve touched on this a little bit. Do you think that the 2014 Games has any implications for the independence referendum? Do you think it would boost the Yes vote? Do you think there’s a risk it could boost the No vote?

No... I think that anything that makes Scots feel confident because... y’know... I think the majority of people in Scotland have always wanted to vote Yes. Of course there’s some people that would want to vote No and that’s fair, but the majority of people would like to see an independent Scotland but they have concerns or a variety of issues. Some of it’s just we don’t know, can’t conceptualise or worry about being too wee, too difficult... so anything that raises the profile, raises self-confidence, shows that we can do it, can compete... we can run the best ever Commonwealth Games, why can’t we run our own country?

Okay, so it’s about actually showing willing and showing the ability to actually organise things on a large scale. What do you think about if something went wrong? Say there was a major incident of any variety... whether it be terrorist, whether it be a...

Well, then we’d deal with it. We’ve already had terrorist incidents at the airport, and again if we rise to the challenge, we meet the challenge, then we’re capable of doing it. So some of this is just about Scotland floating free, doing its own thing, showing that it can do it. And, as I say, these things as a political party, as part of the Yes campaign, we can’t buy this because it’s...it just inculcates in the atmosphere. People feel good. They feel good about their country, they feel good about the city. And if they feel good about their country and feel good about their city, they’re more likely to have the positive Yes vote aspiration, because the other side are saying no, doom, gloom and all that stuff. So, y’know, this is better than we could ever have imagined.
Yeah, and it’s one of those things that was, I guess, it was started under the previous government and it’s now come in there... do you think because of that kind of stroke of luck, do you think it’s played an active part of the strategy of the Yes campaign or do you think it’s just been one where... it’s there, we will... it’s just...

It’s just there. We’ve had to build around it. I mean, what you’ve found is that we’ve put our shoulder to the wheel, heart and soul... more than others who are perhaps more concerned over, y’know, dampening down the... ehhhhh... dampening down the hopes and aspirations. So all governments are going to deliver on, y’know, all the commitments the nation had but I think that what we’ve been blessed with is the ability to build upon it. We’ve factored it in as we would... as we have factored in, y’know, the Ryder Cup. So they’re just... there... ah... we just have to go with the flow.

Em... okay... do you think other parties have a different view about the Games than the SNP, either within the Yes Scotland campaign or on the kind of pro-Union side at all? Or do you think there’s been a cross-party consensus which has been sort of bandied about a little bit?

Well, I think the other side worries about anything which raises the profile of ourselves, and somehow or other we’re not to mention... the First Minister isn’t allowed to speak... since when has the elected head of state not said anything at... so there’s this nervousness on the other side that we will do well out of this because they know as well as I do that there’s a reflected glory that will look good on the government or on our administration but it’s the... if we can run the Games, we can run our country. And that’s why they worried about the Saltire, but it’s fine for the Red Arrows to have the red, white and blue. And they worry about Flower of Scotland, but it’s fine to have the national anthem... so there’s gross hypocrisy, but it all stems, it manifests from fear.

Yeah, and it’s interesting because obviously the inverse case happened for London 2012 so, yeah, there’s not much said about it at that point there as well. Em... I just trying to figure out what we’ve covered there... em... in comparison, in the grand scheme of things of the referendum campaign, the other issues and debates, how important do you think the Games are to the referendum campaign? Would you say it’s a minor side of things...?

I don’t think we’ll know that until people look back historically. I tend to think it could be significant in terms of, y’know... I mean, the campaign has started but we’ve not really hit the final yet, but this gives the kind of lull before the storm. But with the weather, the mood... if this creates a mood swing of hope, optimism, and that’s going to play in, y’know, because the whole basis of the Yes campaign has been to run on hope, aspiration, the ‘yes we can’ as opposed to the doom and gloom, and whatever Better Together’s said about the positive case for the Union, I ain’t seen it. Y’know, eh... so... I... y’know, I think people will look back but I tend to think yes people might say that, y’know, the Commonwealth Games, y’know, it allowed... it allowed the country to feel good about itself. And if Scotland feels good about itself, then it’ll vote for independence.
Okay, so if you think they’re going to swing... it just helps swing the barometer towards that way?

Yeah, I’m trying to think of a historical…

The only antithesis would be the ’78 Ally McLeod... the... the kind of clichéd one that we had failure in Argentina and then 1979...

Well, I think that a better analogy sometimes used would be the growth of self-confidence in Ireland and the growth of the 'Celtic Tiger’. I mean, was it Mary Robinson or was it Jack Charlton and the football team? Was it stuff in England that... eh... y’know, Euro whatever it was in... eh... eh... Germany... y’know, with Ray Houghton’s goal. All of these things actually boosted Irish self-confidence. They moved on from being worried about being West British and what had been done to them in to ‘we’re Ireland... actually, our economy’s winning, we’re beating you on the football park’. So I think, y’know, a bit like the success that they had in the... eh... in Euro ’92 or whatever, or something like that... I think it was probably significant for them.

And... em... in... in political terms, I mean obviously in light of the ministerial brief you have, how important is it seen, sport broadly and the sport brief, and that kind of area there? I mean, as a politician is one which is a fairly minor role, or is it a stepping stone for people? Em... just... just to get...

Well I think there’s been a change in mindset that, y’know, from sport, y’know, was a private enterprise carried out by individuals who were paid or contracted with their sports club or whatever has lead us to disaster. There’s a less traditional understanding that sport is social, it’s wellbeing, it keeps people out of mischief, in the youngsters it reduces alcohol consumption, it improves people’s diet. So it’s part of this factor of early intervention. It’s about... y’know... and that’s why the emphasis, y’know, on putting money into women’s football because we know that they become the soccer mums and they then get their kids to play so you see the benefit in 20 years. Street football, street rugby – interaction there keeps the kids of the street until night goes down. So all of these things are, I think, a change from sport’s just something you can take to if you want to a working mission that actually the community. It’s a bit like the referendum campaign... do you go down the Anglo-American model of the Premier League... you pay into it as a spectator sport, it’s up to you to join the David Lloyd if you can afford it? Or do you go down the Scandinavian model... actually it’s from the bottom up, we have community clubs, we invest in this? And as you can see... with all the financial challenges we have faced, we have put a lot of money into sport through Cashback for Communities.

I was gonna ask about that... yeah...

Actually, it works... y’know, sport is tangible... the initial 5-a-sides keeps the lads off the streets. Equally, there’s something there for everybody and that’s why... y’know, whether it’s Ocean Youth Trust and sailing... it’s about finding something that... that resonates. And that then creates, y’know... having been out with Ocean Youth Trust recently, the feel-good... the feeling of... the sense of self-worth that, y’know, some of the visually-impaired youngsters are needing. All of that challenges
them. So I think with that change-over, sport has actually... it’s not sport per se in terms of just the big events, it’s sport as part of a wider health, well-being, employability, leadership...

*The kind of communitarian aspect of it?*

Yeah.

Yeah, because I guess if ultimately you’re gonna invest public purse into it, you want to see tangible benefits, and that could be profile and success at elite level but if you can get people, kids more active then there’s a benefit there. I mean... I was going to ask you there about the Cashback for... from the crime scheme... em... why particularly sport for that? Why did you... with that fund that you’ve reclaimed, why did you pick sport to kind of redistribute that?

Well, because it’s bang for bucks. I mean, if you wanna get kinds off the street on a Friday or Saturday night, the easiest thing to do is sport. Football is the game and a winner... so we do that, but equally rugby, basketball, there’s a sport there for everyone. It’s not simply sport. We’ve got... we’ve put a lot into the creative, into employability. But football resonates. It brings... y’know, it does a lot... it keeps kids out of trouble... to work with kids who are in trouble, y’know... this is across all sports. It, y’know, allows us to have racial mixing with members from ethnic minorities, whether it’s with football, basketball, rugby, all that. So it’s a way of... a way of bonding, camaraderie, a community thing, a way of... y’know... I work quite closely to tangential to the Cashback... the glory and dismay type route, where they take kids and people with learning difficulties that do it through football. Y’know, I’ve seen it with Alzheimer’s where people who are suffering from Alzheimer’s are again reminiscing... so, actually it’s a conduit from discussion from engagement and, y’know, putting... we actually just put Cashback from the Community into the Celtic Foundation because we do know that men of my age or above who are drinking too much, smoking too much, are not gonna go to the doctor, be lectured by a politician or policeman, but they will go to a football club, they will listen to somebody, they will put a tracksuit on and say ‘I’m getting fat, aye’. They will... y’know... so it’s those things... it’s that ability for football to reach audiences where we can’t...

*It’s the kind of hook to grasp people on?*

Absolutely.

It’s similar to that one they’re doing down at Hibs which has been quite successful as well.

Aye, aye.

*The last question is probably again on... em... on football, and obviously for yourself the Offensive Behaviour at Football and the Offensive Communications Act, and what not. Em... what was the rationale for having a football-specific piece of legislation? So actually thinking ‘right, we’re gonna target football specifically. Was it because of... was it a reaction to some of the problems there? Was it just the fact that the current laws were inadequate? What was... was the...*
Well, of course the current laws were inadequate… this idea you could deal with it through ‘breach of the peace’, no you couldn’t because when you had a flare-up… eh… big crowd… when you had, y’know, breach of the peace it was being defined as, y’know, fear and alarm to the lieges, what lieges were being alarmed when Rangers were at home to Hamilton and everybody was singing ‘The Sash’? Y’know, so the law was not adequate. Equally, we faced a specific problem in sectarianism in Scotland and I think a bit like the Church faced up to racism in the ‘80s and… y’know… ‘til death us do part, and all these things were no longer funny or acceptable. Phraseology that I refer to calling coons and Pakis and not… y’know… 30 years ago it was fine, but not now… so why should someone be a Fenian, a Taig, a Proddy? And, y’know, this idea that it’s a bit of banter… it crossed the line. The modern Scotland… we just decided, y’know, we needed to change the law with ongoing issues, because with sectarianism it isn’t restricted to just the two clubs. And, y’know, organised football violence has reappeared… a generation that had retired are coming back in, so… y’know… it… it ticked the boxes across the board of tackling a social ill that was unacceptable and dealing with an inadequacy in the law, not just in terms of the breach of the peace aspect but also what people were doing on the internet, which were y’know, just entirely unacceptable.

And… there was opposition from the opposition parties for that… eh… what do you think the reasons were for that? Do you think they… em… had… saw tangible problems? Do you think it was political point-scoring? What’s your thoughts on…?

It’s political point-scoring. We live in an atmosphere in the run-in to the 18th of September that if I say black they will say white, whatever we say. So as soon as we… y’know… so legitimate criticisms can be made, and points and challenges, yes. But in the main, where did their position come from? It came because it’s us. Y’know… that applies to corroboration, it applies to policing, it applies to… whatever we’re for, they’re against. If we were to invest in, y’know, teddy bears for Africa they would find some reason to be opposed to it so… eh… y’know, some of their behaviour was quite reprehensible, y’know, particularly with certain individuals putting forward, y’know, one side of the allegiance and not the other, so… I just think it shows some of the worst aspects of Scottish society where politics has also displayed those prejudices… eh… that are long-standing but thankfully reducing.

Okay, grand… eh… is there anything else that I’ve not asked you about that you think might be relevant to my…

No, no… just that I think the Commonwealth Games will be good for Scotland. I think it will be looked back in history as a proper juncture where the country says ‘aye, actually, nice one, we’re not that bad really’.

And we can do these things?

Aye.

Well, Mr MacAskill, thank you so much for your time, I really appreciate that, it’s been absolutely superb. Em… just on a kind of practical level… em… this can all stay anonymous, but if you would… if everyone else who takes part in the study wants to and is happy to, would you be happy to have your name put to it or would you
prefer it stays anonymous? I mean, it won’t come out until 2 or 3 years down the line or anything like that?

I don’t see a problem with it coming out.

Okay, well, my default position is that it would be anonymous... it would just be identified as your party as such but with some of the questioning they might...

Aye, I don’t have a problem with it.

Okay, excellent, well thank you so much for your time. I know that you’re busy and it’s been absolutely priceless for me.
### Appendix 8 - Summary of data analysis results for SNP Games-related political discourse sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Games Benefits &amp; Legacy – 983 references</th>
<th>Games Organisation &amp; Evaluation – 603 references</th>
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Appendix 9 - Summary of data analysis results for Scottish Greens’ Games-related political discourse sample

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<th>Games Benefits &amp; Legacy – 33 references</th>
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### Appendix 10 - Summary of data analysis results for Scottish Labour Party Games-related political discourse sample

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### Appendix 11 - Summary of data analysis results for Scottish Conservatives’ Games-related political discourse sample

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<th><strong>Games Organisation &amp; Evaluation</strong></th>
<th><strong>Politicisation of Games</strong></th>
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- **Games as analogy or example** 23 references
- **Links to sport & PE policy** 12 references
- **Justification for criticism** 6 references
- **Example of wider political issue** 5 references
- **Gender & referendum debate** 12 references
- **Team GB & UK references** 8 references
- **Referendum timing** 2 references
- **Separate Scottish team** 1 reference
- **Impact of Games on referendum** 1 reference
- **Other Games politicisation** 37 references
- **London 2012 & UK references** 14 references
- **Diamond League tax exemption** 11 references
- **Cross-party consensus** 6 references
- **Games’ historical significance** 6 references
Appendix 12 - Summary of data analysis results for Scottish Liberal Democrats’ Games-related political discourse sample

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<th>Games Benefits &amp; Legacy – 27 references</th>
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Appendix 13 – List of interview and survey participants

Liz Smith MSP, Mid Scotland and Fife region MSP, Scottish Conservatives, April 2014

Murdo Fraser MSP, Mid Scotland and Fife region MSP, Scottish Conservatives, March 2015

Patrick Harvie MSP, Glasgow region MSP, Scottish Greens, July 2014

Alison Johnstone MSP, Lothian region MSP, Scottish Greens, October 2014

Drew Smith MSP, Glasgow region MSP, Scottish Labour, July 2014

Patricia Ferguson MSP, Glasgow Maryhill and Springburn constituency MSP, Scottish Labour, October 2014

Tavish Scott MSP, Shetland constituency MSP, Scottish Liberal Democrats, October 2014

Kenny MacAskill MSP, Edinburgh Eastern constituency, Scottish National Party, July 2014

John Mason MSP, Glasgow Shettleston constituency MSP, Scottish National Party, October 2014