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I-challenges: Influencing Others’ Perspectives by Mentioning Personal Experiences in Therapeutic-Community Group Meetings

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Abstract
In this paper I examine the communicative practice of mentioning a personal experience as a vehicle for challenging a peer’s perspective. I study this in the context of Therapeutic Community (TC) group meetings for clients recovering from drug misuse. Using conversation analysis, I demonstrate that TC clients use this practice, which I call an I-challenge, to influence how their peers make sense of their own experiences, and to do so without commenting on those peers’ experiences and perspectives.

This study highlights the power of talking in the first person as a means of influencing others—a notion previously made popular by Thomas Gordon’s work on ‘I-messages’. Additionally, this study illustrates a novel way of studying social influence. Whereas previous research in social psychology has focused on the cognitive constraints behind phenomena of social influence and persuasion, here I contribute towards understandings of the interactional norms underlying the organisation of influence as a structured and coordinated domain of social action.

Keywords
conversation analysis, addiction, experience, group, social influence
In this article, I examine a communication practice used to influence others’ perspectives by mentioning one’s own personal experience. Through this practice, which I call an *I-challenge*, people can influence others without directly commenting on their experiences and perspectives. I examine this phenomenon in the context of group meetings within therapeutic community (TC) programs for clients undergoing treatment for drug misuse.

The practice of influencing others by mentioning a personal experience has been previously described in Thomas Gordon’s popular theory of I-messages, originally formulated with reference to parenting (Gordon 1970) and teaching (Gordon [1974] 2003). Gordon proposed that I-messages (statements about the speaker) should be preferred over you-messages (statements about the recipient) for influencing others’ behaviors. Examples of you-messages in teaching are orders (“*You* stop that!”) and criticism (“*You’re* not thinking maturely”; Gordon [1974] 2003:132–33). I-messages are statements that “reveal something about the teacher,” for example “*I’m* frustrated by the noise” (Gordon [1974] 2003:132–33). These would allow one to influence others’ behaviors without commenting on their conduct.

Gordon’s theory is somewhat silent to how exactly you- and I-messages work. He posited that recipients can detect hidden messages embedded in you-messages, such as “I am the boss, the authority” or “You’re too dumb to figure out how to help me” (Gordon [1974] 2003:132–33); on this basis, recipients would treat you-messages as unauthentic, damaging, and manipulative. By contrast, recipients would react positively to I-messages because these would convey authentic information about the speaker. One problem with these arguments is that they are not grounded on observational evidence on how people construct and recognize you-/I-messages in their naturally occurring interpersonal interactions. Additionally, Gordon’s notion of “message” does not indicate what action would constitute the unit of analysis (Schegloff 1988). It reflects the dominance of an information-transmission model of communication prevalent at the time and therefore does not take into consideration what we know now about the role of sequences of actions in the organization of interpersonal interactions (Heritage 2012; Schegloff 1990). Gordon’s notion that recipients would find hidden messages in their interlocutors’ talk also presents difficulties. People monitor others’ talk in real time to recognize the actions that it implements (e.g., requests, invitations, challenges, etc.); they base these determinations on observable features of utterances—features that are therefore not “hidden” (Heritage forthcoming).

Additionally, Gordon suggested that you-/I-messages promote different types of social relationship, with you-messages promoting more authoritarian relationships and I-messages more democratic ones (Oryan and Gastil 2013). This was a significant intuition, proposing that
people use different ways of talking—alternative types of utterance—to promote different types of social relationships in the moment-by-moment unfolding of their interpersonal interactions. However, Gordon’s theory does not explain how people construct and recognize you-/I-messages as reflecting or promoting different types of social relationships.

In this article, I examine how TC clients use utterances referencing the self—what Gordon called I-messages—to challenge their peers. Compared to Gordon’s prescriptive approach to recommending the use of I-messages, I take a descriptive/naturalistic approach by asking how people use I-messages in their naturally occurring interactions and what they accomplish through them. I concentrate on one particular action that TC clients implement through utterances referencing the self: challenging their peers’ perspectives.1 Adapting Gordon’s locution, I call this practice an I-challenge.

Using conversation analysis (Sidnell and Stivers 2013), I describe the procedures that TC clients use to construct and recognize utterances referencing the self as actions that challenge their peers’ perspectives. Subsequently, I ask what motivates clients’ use of I-challenges and propose that through this practice, clients can handle a problem of experience that they regularly face when they challenge their peers. Finally, I discuss implications for social psychological notions of social influence. I propose that conversation analytic understandings of how people attempt to influence others can expand current views of social influence, which are mainly based on theories of how recipients cognitively process others’ messages. My study findings cast new light on influence by identifying constraints informing the ways in which speakers design their actions; such constraints appear to be associated in primis with the very nature of the social activity in which speakers engage—challenging a peer’s perspective—and the practical problems that it raises.

**Therapeutic Communities**

Therapeutic communities (TCs) are residential programs for drug addiction, within which staff-led group meetings are a core component. A common activity is for clients to report on their recent experiences to the group (Pino 2016b). Through that process, they share their perspectives on a range of issues. Other group members—staff and clients—monitor clients’ individual reports for signs of adherence to therapeutic principles, and they challenge clients’ perspectives that contradict them. The TC approach encapsulates this process in the notion of “reality confrontation” (Campling 2001). In Rapoport’s (1959:63) classic rendition,
Reality-Confrontation refers to the Unit’s [i.e., the TC’s] belief that patients should be continuously presented with interpretations of their behavior as it is seen by most others. This is meant to counteract patients’ tendencies to use massive denial, distortion, withdrawal, or other mechanisms that interfere with their capacity to relate to others in the normal world.

In more recent versions, emphasis is less on interpretations and more on members’ reciprocal feedback on perspectives that might be dysfunctional or unhelpful for the therapeutic process (Shah and Paget 2006). According to the TC principle of “community as method” (Campling 2001), every member is expected to help with others’ recovery; one way of doing this is for clients to challenge their peers’ perspectives. I examine a practice—the I-challenge—that TC clients employ to implement the process of reality confrontation.

Earlier Studies on Mentions of Personal Experiences

In this article, I examine how TC clients challenge their peers through the practice of mentioning a personal experience. Relevant to the understanding of this phenomenon is prior research in conversation analysis, examining the use of stories and personal experiences. Sacks (1992) examined sequences of talk where a speaker tells a story and the next speaker tells a “second story” designed to display similarities to the first. Speakers design second stories to exhibit “experiential matching” (Heritage and Lindström 1998), for example, by reporting an experience in which they played a similar role to the first speaker in their own experience. Kendrick (2013) proposed that reciprocity is a fundamental organizational principle in social interaction. According to this principle, when someone reports a personal experience, they systematically provide interlocutors with an opportunity to reciprocate by reporting a similar experience. The idea of reciprocity offers a framework for considering the sequences examined in this article; it suggests that when a TC client shares an experience, other clients have an opportunity to share their own experience in ways that are relevant to the matter under discussion (Wootton 1977). Sharing experiences would be an available resource that clients can use for different interactional purposes.

Other research has examined actions that people implement by sharing their experiences. Second speakers report matching experiences to affiliate with first speakers
(Ruusuvuori 2005) or convey a sense of solidarity and support, such as in Alcoholics Anonymous (Arminen 2004). People also use personal experiences to depart from the perspective of a prior speaker. For instance, speakers can report an experience to indirectly offer a new understanding of the other’s experience (Arminen 2004) or normalize the other’s experience (Heritage and Lindström 1998; Leudar, Antaki, and Barnes 2006). In this study, I focus on how mentioning a personal experience can be used to depart from an interlocutor’s perspective; through this practice, TC clients challenge—rather than share—their peers’ perspectives.

**Methods**

Data was collected between 2009 and 2014 in three TCs in Italy; these were a residential TC for drug addiction, a residential TC for drug addiction and mental health issues, and a semi-residential TC for young adults with drug addiction. The TCs delivered intensive residential or semi-residential rehabilitation involving work, educational, and leisure activities. Meetings involving the clients and a number of staff members happened in each TC on a weekly basis. The staff members had a background in education, social work, or psychology. The clients had diagnoses of drug and/or alcohol addiction and sometimes mental health issues. The number of staff per meeting varied from 1 to 4; the number of clients from 3 to 16. Data consisted of 24 audio- or video-recorded meetings lasting 26 hours in total; the instances used in this article are from video-recorded meetings, with the exception of extracts 1 and 3.

My interest in I-challenges emerged within a broader examination of actions that TC clients implement by mentioning their experiences. Using conversation analysis (Sidnell and Stivers 2013), I collected and analyzed sequences in which clients mentioned personal experiences in response to another group member. I found 12 cases where clients mentioned their experiences in affiliative ways (supporting a peer’s perspective), 21 cases where clients mentioned their experiences to challenge a generalizing statement, and 23 cases where clients mentioned their experiences to challenge a peer’s perspective. Therefore, my approach was to collect instances of a practice and examine the actions it implements.

In this article, I examine the third set of practices, and I hope to examine the others in future reports. The target practice is not frequent. It occurs in nine recorded meetings, one to eight times per single meeting. Although it is difficult to explain the nonoccurrence of a practice, one possible reason for the relatively rare use of I-challenges is that the staff members mainly provide feedback on the clients’ experiences and perspectives in the meetings—not the
other clients. This may suggest that the TC members in my recordings do not employ, to its full potential, an interactional resource that is available to clients—the I-challenge.

The extracts in this article contain an idiomatic English translation of the original language (Italian). The full transcripts—including original Italian, interlinear gloss, and idiomatic translation—are reproduced in Online Appendix A. Participants gave written informed consent for publishing the transcripts. Names in this article are pseudonyms. I refer to client A (Ca) as the client who conveys a perspective—subsequently challenged—and to client B (Cb) as the client who mentions a personal experience to challenge client A’s perspective.

Results

I-challenge is the interactional practice (Schegloff, 1997) of mentioning a personal experience to convey the action of challenging someone’s perspective. Before introducing the distinctive features of I-challenges, I observe that clients also use the practice of mentioning their experience to share—rather than challenge—a peer’s perspective. In extract 1, Lidia (client A) is recounting the time she disclosed her condition as a drug user to her parents (lines 1–5). Enrico (client B) issues an appreciative assessment (line 6), whose valence Lidia matches in a subsequent assessment (lines 7–8). In this context of established concordance, Enrico mentions he had an equivalent experience (“anche per me,” literally translatable as “also for me,” and translated as “for me too” in idiomatic English; line 11). He does not introduce his experience contrastively but in a way that conveys experiential matching (Heritage and Lindström 1998), specifically through the turn-initial “anche”/“also” (see Online Appendix A). I will show that clients implement I-challenges by commenting on their experience in a way that contrasts with how the other client has commented on their own experience. Also, they often mention that experience in the context of established nonconcordance between the clients’ perspectives.4

(1) IntV4 15:07 ‘They have found out’

Ca = client A (Lidia)
Cb = client B (Enrico)

**Staff = Marta**

01 Ca-Lid: dopo: dieci minuti ho chiamato il Paolo, e ho detto after ten minutes have-1S call-PSTP the NAME and have-1S say-PSTP after ten minutes I called Paolo, and I said

02 "Paolo, guarda io glielo dico perché ↑qua: NAME look-IMP.2S 1S.N 3P.D=3S.A say-1S because here "Look Paolo, I’m telling them because

03 mi stanno facendo: heh <pressione,> e mi- c’han 1S.D stay-3P do-GER pressure and 1S.A 1P.A=have-3P they are putting heh <pressure> on me here, and they

04 >cioè< ci han scope:rto, e non è che .h=.h=.h” (. I.mean 1P.A have-3P discover-PSTP and not be-3S that >I mean< they have found out about us, and it’s not that .h=.h=.h” (.)

05 e gliel’ho detto, .hh (0.3) e:::m (0.7) and 3P.D=3S.A=have1S say-PSTP and I told them, .hh (0.3) u::m (0.7)

06 Cb-Enr: tk Che situazione dimme:r[da. tk What a shitty situation.

07 Ca-Lid: [È stato be-3S be-PSTP It was

08 treme:n[do. terrible horrible.

09 Cb-Enr: [Vacca di’. cow god Holy shit.

10 S-Mar: M[m. PTC Mn.

11 Cb-Enr: -> [Anche per me. also for me For me too.

12 (0.4)

13 Ca-Lid: .h È stato brutissimo=.h ma più che altro . . be-3S be-PSTP awful but more than other .h It was awful=.h but more than anything else . .
TC clients also implement challenges through practices other than mentioning their experience. In extract 2, the group members are discussing a phase in the therapeutic community (TC) program, which they call “the Test.” The Test involves allowing a client to go home for a few days and then reviewing their experience when they come back to the TC—for example, whether they have relapsed into drug use. Some clients have reported they felt no desire to use drugs during their Test. Others—including Gianni—have treated this as evidence of those clients’ overconfidence and underestimation of their risk of relapsing (data not shown).

At lines 1–5, Gianni challenges the other clients’ conveyed sense of security by proposing that they did not do “anything stupid”—that is, use drugs—during their Test only because their family members were closely monitoring them. With this, he implies that those clients are at risk of relapse. In contrast to I-challenges, Gianni does not implement his challenge by referring to his personal experience; he references a generic “you” (line 1) and thereby grounds his challenge on a general claim that applies to all the clients in the meeting. Other clients reject the applicability of that claim to their cases (lines 6–8). They exploit one feature of Gianni’s challenge (lines 1–4): a claim about states of affairs in the other clients’ lives, that is, matters over which they have more authoritative knowledge (Raymond and Heritage 2006). Later, Gianni switches to a different practice for implementing his challenge; he mentions that he had trouble during the Test (lines 28–32). This is an I-challenge. Crucially, by mentioning his difficulties, Gianni more cautiously grounds his challenge on a claim that is restricted to his experience, an area in which he has more authoritative knowledge.

(2) IntL4 1:25:19 ‘Monitored’

Clients: Gianni and a number of unidentified clients

Staff = Arianna

01 C-Gia:cioè è normale che le cavolate non le fai:
I mean it’s normal that you don’t do anything stupid

02 la prima volta. Né la seconda, (.) perché sei
the first time. Or the second time, (.) because you are

03 guardato a vista, perché ti mettono alla
being watched, because they are putting you to the

04 pro[va. Lo]  ↑sai
       test  3S.A know-2S
       test. You ↑know that

05 Client:     [(    )]

06 Client:     ( non ero)  guardato a vista da
       not be-IPF.3S  watch-PSTP at sight from
       ( I was not)  being watched by

07 ne[ssuno   
       nobody

08 Client:     [Ma non è vero. Io non mi senti- (. ) io mi  
       but not be-3S true  1S.N not 1S.RFL feel-IPV.1S  1S.N 1S.RFL
       But that’s not true. I didn’t feel- (. ) the first time

      son sentito [la prima
      be-1S feel-PSTP the first
      I felt

09 C-Gia:     [L’avete detto voi ragazzi prima?  
       3S.A=have-2P say-PSTP 2P.N guys earlier
       Guys that’s what you said?

10 (    )

11 Client:     No la prima [( )
       no the first
       No the first (   )

12 C-Gia:     [Guardati a vista nel modo di- (. )
       watch-PSTP at sight in the way of
       Watched in the way that- (. )

13 cioè cioè nel senso che lo ↑sai
       I mean I mean in the sense that 3S.A know-2S
       I mean I mean in the sense that you ↑know

14 [che
       that

15 S-Ari:     [Controllati. Insomma un po’
       controlled-P namely a bit
       Monitored. In other words a bit

16 più [protetto (    )
       more protected-S
       more protected (    )

17 Client:     [Sai che sei più con[trollato.
       know-2S that be-2S more controlled-S
       You know that you are being monitored.

18 Client:  

Ma io ( )  

but 1S.N  

But I ( )

19 la prima mi  son sentito così. La seconda::  

the first 1S.RFL be-1S feel-PSTP so the second  

the first time I felt that way. The second time

20 mi  son sentito a mio agio. Cioè da una parte.  

1S.RFL be-1S feel-PSTP at my ease namely from one part  

I felt comfortable. I mean in part.

21 C-Gia:  

Si però eh-  

yes but PTC  

Yes but uh-

22 Client:  

Io  ero [lì ( ) a mangiare da mia madre.=  

1S.N be-IPF.1S there to eat at my mother  

I was there ( ) to have lunch at my mother’s.=

23 C-Gia:  

[Non lo so.  

not 3S.A know-1S  

I don’t know.

24 Client:  

=E basta.  

and enough  

=And that’s it.

25 (.)

26 C-Gia:  

Ma un qualcosa vi susciterà la Verifica.  

but a something 2P.D raise-FUT.3S the Test  

But the Test must do something to you.

27 Client:  

[Si si si  

yes yes yes  

Yes yes yes

28 C-Gia:  

[Che ne so. Io andavo a casa e lo  

what DEM know-1S 1S.N go-IPF.1S to home and the  

I don’t know. I used to go home and

29 stare in famiglia con i miei mi veniva  

stay=INF in family with the mine-P 1S.D come-IPF.3S  

staying with my family with my folks I used to get

30 l’ansia. Certe dinamiche mi veniva l’ansia.  

the=anxiety certain dynamics 1S.D come-IPF.3S the=anxiety  

anxious. Some dynamics I used to get anxious.

31 Andare in centro in  

go-INF in centre in

32 ci[tà non ci andavo.
In what follows, I examine how clients construct and recognize I-challenges. Subsequently, I ask what drives clients’ use of I-challenges and propose that this practice enables them to manage a fundamental problem of experience raised by the activity of challenging others.

I-challenge as a Contrastive Perspective on a Shared Experience

I examine sequences of talk where client A makes available their perspective on a personal event and subsequently client B mentions a personal experience. My goal in this section is to show how B constructs this turn to convey a challenge of A’s perspective. Client B does so through two operations: (1) proposing that their own experience is relevantly similar to client A’s experience—hence shared—and (2) conveying a perspective on that experience that radically differs from client A’s perspective on their own experience. The first operation inferentially extends the applicability of B’s perspective to A’s case. Importantly, B does not make the link between the two experiences explicit; rather, they make it inferable through a syllogistic procedure (Gill and Maynard 1995; Pino 2016a). By establishing that their experience is relevantly similar to A’s, B conveys that both clients’ cases are instances of the same type of experience. When B comments on their own experience, A can infer that the same perspective applies to their own case. Since B’s perspective radically differs from A’s previously conveyed perspective, it effectively challenges it. B conveys the sense of an alternative and competitive perspective through the positioning of the turn within the unfolding activity and through its construction. In what follows, I provide two illustrative examples.

In extract 3, Lidia (client B) mentions her experience to challenge the self-serving character of Enrico’s (client A) perspective about his own experience. Enrico is recounting that he used to hide his use of illegal drugs from his parents, the feelings associated with it, and that he decided to seek help at a support service. Enrico’s claim that he wanted to stop using drugs is the target of Lidia’s I-challenge (lines 17–21). Features of the context preceding Lidia’s utterance support its understanding as a challenge. Lidia produces a “M:m” token (line 10)
whose emphatic delivery makes it hearable as a negative reaction to Enrico’s claim. She realizes it as a stretched “m”-sound with rise-fall intonation, which is perceptually distinct from the more punctual and high-pitched “↑Mm” at line 5, hearable as a continuer. Enrico treats Lidia’s “M:m” as a negative reaction to his claim by promptly amending it; he now claims that he did not want to quit using drugs “at first” (lines 13–14). By adjusting his earlier claim, Enrico displays an understanding that Lidia’s reaction targets that part of his talk (lines 8–9). Therefore, Lidia subsequently mentions her experience (from line 17) in the context of already established nonconcordance with Enrico.

Other elements preceding Lidia’s mention of her experience contribute to its understanding as a challenge. Lidia starts a turn with “guarda che”/“look” (line 15), a practice previously found to alert recipients to an upcoming redirection of the talk (Sidnell 2007). Here, it marks a departure from Enrico’s perspective by introducing a competing view. Lidia then starts and abandons what looks like an incipient challenge; she is arguably on her way to claim that “most people”—that is, drug users—do not seek help because they want to stop using drugs. This foreshadows a departure from Enrico’s claim that we wanted to quit using drugs; all the more so because it occurs after a troubles-telling, a place where affiliation is relevant (Jefferson 1988).5

(3) IntV4:550 28:25 ‘Quitting’

Ca = client A (Enrico)
Cb = client B (Lidia)
S = staff (Marta)

01 Ca-Enr: cioè: dopo un po’ di testa vai ↑via eh. .h .h=
I mean after a bit of head go-2S away PTC
I mean after a while it drives you crazy you know. .h .h=

02 S-Mar: =M[m.
PTC
=MMm.

03 Ca-Enr: [Proprio psicologicamente non
really psychologically not
Psychologically you really can’t

04 ce la fai più? E poi è [state=
EX 3S.A make-2S anymore and then be-3S be-PSTP
gocope anymore? And this was=


Two operations embodied in Lidia’s utterance at lines 17–18 and 20–21 make it recognizable as challenging Enrico’s perspective. First, Lidia claims that her experience was relevantly similar to Enrico’s (Arminen 2004; Wootton 1977); she “also” went to the local support center (lines 17–18). Second, in contrast to extract 1, Lidia comments on her experience in radically different terms than Enrico has done with his own. Her motivation for seeking help was “not” to quit (lines 20–21). Unlike extract 2, lines 1–4, where a client bases a challenge on a general claim, Lidia only comments on her own experience (lines 20–21) after establishing it is similar to Enrico’s (lines 17–18). This operation extends the applicability of her perspective to Enrico’s case, and since her perspective radically differs from his, it challenges it.

Enrico’s admission that he also did not intend to quit (line 22) supports this analysis. He treats Lidia’s mention of her experience as making relevant a revision of the way in which he has described his own experience. Additionally, his post-completion laughter particles (Schegloff 1996) convey a sense of admission, possibly displaying his understanding that Lidia has exposed the self-serving character of his self-description. I examine more evidence of recipients’ displayed understandings of I-challenges in the next section.

In extract 4, Cristina (client B) mentions her experience to promote a more realistic or balanced representation of Mauro’s (client A’s) experience. Mauro has complained about withdrawal symptoms—he was a heroin user—and other clients have expressed doubts that his current physical problems are actually indicative of withdrawal (data not shown). At lines 1–3, Mauro complains about—and emphatically demonstrates by kicking the table—one of his alleged withdrawal symptoms: an involuntary movement of his leg. Describing nonordinary events, which disrupt the flow of the speaker’s life, is a practice for constructing complaints (Drew 1998), which makes affiliation relevant (Drew and Walker 2009). At this sequential place, Cristina’s articulation of a competitive perspective for the same type of experience conveys a challenge (line 7).

(4) IntV8:1864 32:10 ‘Twitches’

Ca = client A (Mauro)
Cb = client (Cristina)
C = other client (Carlotta)
S = staff (Annamaria)

01 Ca-Mau: Cioè eravamo lì a guardare il fi:lm
I mean we were there watching the fi:lm

02 vero l’altro gio:rn:o:, (0.2) così: cioè una ga:m:ba
right the-other day so I mean a leg
weren’t we the other day, (0.2) so I mean at a certain point

03 a un certo punto <pà:h> (0.3)/((kicks the table))
at a certain point ITJ
a leg <pà:h> (0.3)/((kicks the table))

04 è partita da ↑so:la.
be-3S leave-PSTP by alone
((idiomatic = the leg moved involuntarily))

05 Ca-Mau: Cioè (0.8) (b-d) (.)
I mean
I mean (0.8) (b-d) (.)

06 [te (disi una parò-)]
SCL (say-2S a word)
you (say a wo-)

07 Cb-Cri: -> [A me capi]tava normalmente
to 1S.D happen-IPF-3S normally
To me it happened normally

08 °( [ ] °

09 S-Ann: [Comunque è
anyway be-3S
Anyway it’s

10 imp:ortante dire sem)pre come ti=
important say-INF always how RPL-2S
important that you always say how you=

11 Ca-Mau: [tch Ma quando eri in asti↑nenza.]
but when be-IPF-2S in withdrawal
 tch But ((was it)) when you were in with↑drawal.

12 S-Ann: =se:nti realme:[nte.
feel-2S really

**=really feel.**

13 S-Mar:  
[|Mm.  
PTC  
|Mm.  |
14 Cb-Cri:  
[|↑N↓o.  
no  
↑N↓o.  |

15 (1.1)

16 Ca-Mau:  
Bo:h?  
PTC  
((idiomatic = I don’t know))

17 (0.2)

18 Ca-Cri:  
[:catti:ni.]  
twitches-DIM  
Little twitches.

19 C-Car:  
[(Quelli son) scatti an]che  
those be-3P twitches also  
(Those can be) muscle

20 ner[vo:si. Cioè (.)( ).]  
nervous I mean  
twitches. I mean (.)( ).

21 Cb-Cri:  
[Scatti:ni. O no:].  
(gaze towards C-Car))  
twitches-DIM or no  
Little twitches. Aren’t they.

Cristina’s turn (line 7) implements the two operations found in extract 3, although she realizes them concurrently—in the same turn-constructional unit (Schegloff 1996). First, although Cristina does not use adverbs such as “anche”/“also,” it is clear from the context of her turn—after Mauro’s report of his leg problem—that she is proposing her experience was relevantly similar to Mauro’s experience (Arminen 2004; Wootton 1977). Second, she comments on her experience in radically different terms than Mauro has done with his own; it happened “normally,” suggesting that her leg spasms were not indicative of an underlying problem. The left dislocated “a me”/“to me” conveys that Cristina is offering her experience as a contrastive model against which Mauro can reconsider the meaning of his own. Since Cristina presents her experience as relevantly similar to his, her perspective on that experience inferentially extends to Mauro’s case. By normalizing her own experience, Cristina can challenge Mauro’s claim that his spasms constitute an abnormal event and thus that they are indicative of withdrawal. She challenges his perspective without explicitly contesting it.
I-challenges as Attempts at Influencing Recipient Perspectives

In this section, I demonstrate that client A (recipient of the I-challenge) observably treats client B’s mention of their own experience as implementing a challenge. Client A—the recipient of the I-challenge—orient to the two constituent operations whereby client B (1) proposes their experience is relevantly similar to A’s and (2) conveys a perspective on that experience that radically differs from A’s perspective on their own experience. The evidence suggests that I-challenges are sequence-initiating actions which make it relevant for recipients to modify the challenged perspective or alternatively, to further support it.

In what follows, I examine two classes of client responses. First, I examine responses whereby client A orients to both constituent operations of I-challenges: conveyed relevant similarity and competing perspective. These are further divided into responses whereby A modifies the challenged perspective, therefore embracing the alternative perspective conveyed with the I-challenge, and responses whereby A rejects the perspective conveyed through the I-challenge, thereby maintaining the challenged perspective. Subsequently, I examine cases where A orients to the first constituent operation but not the second one. In these cases, A’s orientation to the challenge-import of B’s turn is less transparent. However, I propose that these responses still suggest that orientation based on a common feature they display; with these responses, A tests the relevant similarity of B’s experience and their own.

Modifying the challenged perspective. This is the first type of response displaying an orientation to both constituent operations of I-challenges. In extract 3, Enrico’s responses are sensitive to both operations that Lidia performs. First, after Lidia proposes her experience was relevantly similar to Enrico’s (lines 17–18), Enrico confirms that his experience was indeed similar to hers (“Well yes indeed”). Second, after Lidia introduces her competing perspective (her intention was not to quit drugs; lines 20–21), Enrico admits that he did not intend to quit using drugs either (“Yes well neither was mine,” line 22), thereby amending his earlier claim (lines 8–9). Enrico thereby treats Lidia’s mention of a personal experience as challenging his perspective on his own experience and as giving him an opportunity to correct it, if not even as encouraging him to do so.
Rejecting the conveyed perspective. This is the second type of response displaying an orientation to both constituent operations of I-challenges. At the start of extract 5, Carlotta (client A) is recounting her weekend at home—this TC is a day center, open Monday to Friday. A friend offered to visit her, but she discouraged him from doing so (data not shown). The context preceding Carlotta’s mention of her experience (lines 30–32) helps recognize its challenge import. After Carlotta gives reasons for not meeting her friend (lines 4–11), a staff member invites her to elaborate on her mood in the weekend (translated as “grumpy,” mentioned by Carlotta at line 2), thereby establishing it as worthy of attention. Carlotta resists elaborating and establishes her mood as not requiring further scrutiny (lines 14 and 18–19). Another client, Grazia, supports this position (line 20). Cristina’s intervention (lines 25–28) departs from Carlotta’s perspective, as signaled with the turn-initial “Ma”/“But.” Cristina proposes that there is a reason for Carlotta’s bad mood, this being methadone reduction—methadone being a drug prescribed to help with detoxification in people with opioid dependence. Therefore, Cristina subsequently mentions her experience (lines 30–32) in the context of already established nonconcordance with Carlotta’s perspective.

(5) IntV6 23:33 ‘Depression’

Ca = client A (Carlotta)
Cb = client B (Cristina)
C = other client (Grazia)
S = staff (Roberto, Marta)

feel like talking, I didn’t want to make him

venire:: (. ) a casa:\, mentre mangiavamo:\,
come-INF to home while eat-IPF
come over (. ) to my house, while we were eating,

come over (. ) to my house, while we were eating,

co::n mia madre, e io e lui, che io
with my mother and 1.S.A and 3.S.A
wi::th my mother, and me and him, while I

non avevo voglia di: .hhhh
not have-IPF.1S desire to
didn’t feel like .hhhh

socializzare::hre.
socialize-INF
sociali::zing.

(0.2)

Therefore (0.4) (I said)° (. )
°Therefore (0.4) (I said)° (. )

ti conviene evitare questa scenetta: che: (1.4)
be.convenient-3S avoid-INF this scene-DIM REL
it’ll best for you to avoid this little scene that (1.4)

Ma non ho capito come mai avevi
but not have-1S understand-PSTP how never have-IPF.2S
But I didn’t understand why you were

i coglioni girati?
the bollocks turned
((idiom = grumpy))?

No non c’era un motivo.
not EX=be-IPV.3S a reason
No there wasn’t a reason.

I wanted to stay

((per i cazzo miei)
(for the dicks my)
((idiom = alone))

20 C-Gra:  
£Perché non sai il perché.£  
because not know-2S the why  
£Because you don’t know why.£  
(0.5)

22 Ca-Car:  
£ESA:(h)TTOE >heh heh heh heh heh.<  
exact  
£EXA:(h)CTLY£ >heh heh heh heh heh.<  
(0.6)

24 Ca-Car:  
[No::: ]  
no  
No:::

25 Cb-Cri:  
[Ma infatti] ne: stavamo parlando  
but indeed stay-IPV.1P talk-GER  
But indeed we were talking about this

26 prima che secondo:_=n=me è: il .hhh  
before CMP according.to 1S.A be-3S the  
before that I think it’s the .hhh

27 >il fatto< che sta scalando il metadone  
the fact CMP stay-3S reduce-GER the NAME  
>the fact< that she is reducing the methadone

28 che ormai è a sei milligrammi.  
CMP by.now be-3S at six milligrams  
that she is already down to six milligrams.

29  
(0.4)

30 Cb-Cri: -> Io mi ricordo che (. ) quando incominciavo  
1S.N RFL remember-1S CMP when start-IPV.1S  
I remember that (. ) when I was starting

31 -> ad arrivare verso i quattro così: .hh  
to arrive-INF towards the four so  
to get towards four or so: .hh

enter-IPF-1S in a state of depression  
I was getting into ‘a state of’ depression?

33 Ca-Car:  
[Ma sono a sei?]  
but be-1S at six  
But I am at six?

34 Ca-Car: .hh ↑↑No ↑↑non èera depressione.=  
no not be-IPF-3S depression  
.hh ↑↑No ↑↑it ↑was not depression.=

35 ={Sai quan}do non ha[i voglia di ] (0.6)  
know-2S when not have-2S desire to  
=You know when you don’t feel like (0.6)
Cristina’s mention of her experience (lines 30–32) implements an I-challenge through the two operations found in extracts 3 and 4. She proposes her experience was relevantly similar to Carlotta’s—she also went through methadone reduction (lines 30–31). Then she expresses a perspective that radically differs from Carlotta’s “no-problem” perspective on her own experience. As a result of methadone reduction, Cristina was in a “state of depression” (line 32). Carlotta’s responses are visibly sensitive to these operations. First, Carlotta treats Cristina’s turn as proposing that Cristina’s experience is relevantly similar to Carlotta’s by contesting that relevant similarity (line 33); Carlotta is taking six milligrams of Methadone, whereas Cristina was taking a lower dose (line 31). Second, Carlotta treats Cristina’s turn as expressing an alternative perspective on the experience of methadone reduction and as
extending its applicability to Carlotta’s case; Carlotta displays this understanding by rejecting the idea that she has depression (line 34).

Extracts 6 and 7 further illustrate recipients’ orientations to both constituent operations of I-challenges through rejections. In extract 6, Carlotta (client A) conveys that it is desirable to smoke in her bedroom—although her mother does not allow her to do so (lines 1–18). Cristina (client B) challenges this by mentioning her experience (“I can’t stand sleeping in the same room where I smoke,” lines 21–23). As in extract 5, Carlotta treats this as proposing that Cristina’s perspective—that is, finding the smell of smoke unpleasant—could or should apply to her case by rejecting that applicability (“No no I really don’t feel it,” line 25) and thereby maintaining her earlier position. Additionally, Carlotta orients to the conveyed relevant similarity of Cristina’s experience by proposing that it is actually not relevantly similar; Cristina might find smoke distasteful because she is pregnant (line 31).

(6) IntV7 14:20 ‘Smoking’

Ca = client A (Carlotta)
Cb = client B (Cristina)
S = staff (Annamaria, Roberto)

01 Ca-Car: Ho fatto questo patto e adesso- (0.4) have-1S make-PSTP this pact and now
I’ve made this agreement and now- (0.4)

02 (mi) posso tenere il computer 1S.RFL can-1S keep-INF the computer
I can keep the computer

03 in [camera, (.) se non fumo. in bedroom if not smoke-1S
in my bedroom, (.) if I don’t smoke.

04 S-Ann: ↑Mm. ((nods)) PTC
↑Mm.

05 S-Ann: ↑Mm. ((nods)) PTC
↑Mm.

06 (0.7)

07 S-Ann: Riesci a mantenere,
Do you manage to maintain,

(.)

Ca-Car: .h [Si]::.
yes
.h Ye]::s.

S-Ann: [l’accordo.

the agreement.

(0.7)

Ca-Car: Più o meno si.

more or less yes

More or less yes.

Ca-Car: Va be:h l’importante è fumare la

Well the important thing ((for me)) is to smoke

mattina appena [sveglia e la sera?
in the morning when I wake up and in the evening?

S-Ann: [Mm

PTC

Mm

(1.7)

Ca-Car: #Per il resto# (0.6) c’è caldo posso uʃscire

for the rest EX=be-INF warm can-INF go-INF

#As for the rest# (0.6) it’s warm I can go out

non è più inve[rno che:

not be-INF anymore winter that

it’s not winter anymore where

S-Ann: [Mm.

PTC

Mm.

Infatti, pesa meno ade[sso.

indeed be-heavy-INF less now

Indeed, it’s less of a problem now

Cb-Cri: -> [Io non posso

1S.N not can-INF

I can’t

-> sopportare di dormire: nella stessa

stand of sleep-INF in the same

stand sleeping in the same

23 -> camera dove fumo. 
room where smoke-1S  
room where I smoke.

24 (0.6)

25 Ca-Car: No no io non lo #sento proprio.#
no no 1S.N not 3S.A feel really  
No no I really don’t #feel it.#

26 (0.2)

27 Cb-Cri: Io sto male?
1S.N stay-1S badly  
I feel bad?

28 (1.7)

29 Ca-Car: “Io non lo sento”=  
1S.N not 3S.A feel-1S  
“I don’t feel it”=

30 Cb-Cri: =Cioè mi [sveglio con <l’affanno.>]  
I.mean 1S.RFL wake up-1S with the=shortness.of.breath  
=I mean I wake up and I’m <short of breath.>

31 Ca-Car: [Ma adesso che sei in]↑cinta.  
but now that be-2S pregnant  
But now that you are ↑pregnant.

32 S-Rob: Non- quindi non ↑fu[mi in camera?]  
not- so not smoke in bedroom  
You don’t- so you don’t ↑smoke in your bedroom?

33 Cb-Cri: [No: ] se:mpre?
no always  
No: always?

34 (1.9)

35 Cb-Cri: Dove do:rmo, [nella camera dove do:rmo,  
where sleep-1S in=the room where sleep-1S  
Where I sleep, in the bedroom where I sleep,

36 S-Rob: [Eh.  
PTC  
Right.

37 Cb-Cri: cioè nelle altre stanze no perché  
I.mean in=the other rooms no because  
I mean not in the other rooms because

38 tranqui.hh anche a casa mia fumavo  
relaxed also at house my smoke-IPF.1S
I’m relaxed ((about it)). .hh I also used to smoke <everywhere> at my place but no:t I mean .hh I may have everywhere but not I.mean in bedroom

avrò fumato un paio di volte e stavo have-FUT.1S smoke-PSTP a couple of times and stay-IPF.1S smoked in my bedroom a couple of times and I nearly everywhere but not I.mean .hh in bedroom

mandando a fuoco t(h)utto(h), send-GER on fire everything set everything on f(h)ire(h),

Ma anche per [quello] non fumi in camera. But ↑that’s also why you don’t smoke in your bedroom. but also for that not smoke-2S in bedroom

Perché rischi di dargli fuoco. because risk-2S of give-INF=3S.A fire

Because you risk setting it on ↑fire.

No: no proprio perché ti giuro no no really because 2S.D swear-1S
No: no I swear ((it’s)) really because

non riesco a dormire? not manage-1S to sleep I can’t sleep?

It bothers you ((when)) the air ((is))

No ma [non- [#voglio dire#<] no but not want-1S say-INF
No but (I don’t-) >#I mean#<

I I can’t.=

=vi ziata. foul =foul.
Extract 7 contains another part of the debate on the Test from which extract 2 was taken. Ilario (client A) has dismissed the importance of the Test by reporting that when he went home for his Test, he did not feel he was at risk of relapsing (data not shown). He further conveys this perspective at lines 1–6 by dismissing the significance of meeting “the same people” in his neighborhood, that is, drug addicts and drug dealers (the group members have been discussing risks associated with those encounters as occasions/triggers for relapse). Two staff members challenge this perspective (lines 9–44); they take Ilario’s claim as indication that he does not recognize having a “problem,” that is, addiction. In this context of emerged nonconcordance, Luigi (client B) mentions a personal experience (from line 47). His perspective contrasts with Ilario’s perspective; not only did Luigi feel bad during his first Test, but he also relapsed (lines 55–56 and 64). A staff member treats Luigi’s experience as challenging Ilario’s perspective by conveying that Ilario should also be worried about the risk of relapsing (lines 50, 54, and 66). Crucially, Ilario treats Luigi’s mention of his own experience as proposing that the same perspective should apply to him, which he rejects (“No I didn’t feel like that,” line 57; a very similar response to extract 6, line 25).

(7) IntL4 1:26:19 ‘Test’

Ca = client A (Ilario)
Cb = client B (Luigi)
C = other clients (Gianni, Matteo, Flavio)
S = staff (Beatrice, Arianna)

02 sempre la solita gente nel mio quartiere. 
always the same people in the my neighbourhood
always the same people in my neighbourhood.

03 
(0.4)

04 Ca-Ila: Che mi devo stupire. 
what RFL-1S must-1S surprise-INF
Why should I be surprised.

05 
(0.3)

06 Ca-Ila: Son sempre li eh. 
be-3P always there PTC
They are always there you see.

07 C-Gia: Sì ho capito. 
yes have-1S understand-PSTP
Yes I get that.

08 
(.)

09 S-Bea: Okay. Sentiamo quello che ha detto Arianna. 
okay hear-IMP.1P that which have-3S say-PSTP NAME
Okay. Let’s listen to what Arianna has said.

10 
(0.4)

11 S-Bea: Prima di tutto, devo sapere di avere 
first of all must-1S know of have-INF
First of all, I need to know that I have

12 un problema. 
a problem

13 
(0.9)

14 S-Bea: Punto. 
full.stop
Full stop.

15 
(0.6)

16 C-Mat: Chiaro. Se no:, (0.2) niente. 
clear if no nothing
Of course. Otherwise, (0.2) nothing.

17 S-Bea: [Che non è solo 
which not be-3S only
Which is not only

18 il: “posso avere voglia” o meno. 
the can-1S have-INF desire or less
the: “I can have desire” or not.

19 (0.6)

because that be-3S the=last maybe of=the problems  
Because that is perhaps the last of the problems.

21 C-Gia: [No: no. ] 
no

22 (0.8)

23 C-Gia: Quello ti viene dopo. Dopo- 
that 2S.D come-3S afterwards then-  
You get that later. Then-

24 cioè[:]>::=m::#]  
I.mean  
I mea::=n=m::#

25 S-Ari: [Se la Verifica diventa un momento  
if the Test become-3S a moment  
If the Test becomes a time  

di <vacanz:,> (0.4) allora certe cose che  
of holiday then certain things that  
of <vacation,> (0.4) then some of the things that  

tu dici:, (. ) non le sentono.  
2S.N say-2S not 3P.A feel-3P  
you are talking about, (. ) they do not feel them.  
(0.5)

29 S-Ari: Perché è il momento in cui hai nel piatto  
because be-3S the moment in which have-2S in=the plate  
Because it’s the time where you have in your plate  

quello che non hai mangiato negli ultimi  
that which not have-2S eat-PSTP in=the last  
what you’ve not eaten in the last  

31 sei mesi,  
six months  
six months,

32 S-Bea: Mm mm mm.  
PTC PTC PTC  
Mm mm mm.  

33 S-Ari: ti danno il contentino per[ché hai] la=  
2S.D give-3P the sweetener because have-2S the  
they try to make you happy because you have the=  

34 Ca-Ila: [Si::: ]  
yes

Ye:s.

35 S-Ari: =felpa [nuova:, hai mangiato::::::]  
sweater new have-2S eat-PSTP  
=new sweater, you’ve ate::::::

36 Ca-Ila: [Tua madre che ti fa i tortellini di Giovanni Rana.  
your mother who 2S.D make-3S the tortellini of BRAND-NAMEx  
Your mother makes Giovanni Rana tortellini for you.

37 S-Ari: Quello [che vuoi te:::] (0.4) però: (.l) lì è una vacan:za.  
that which want-2S 2S.N however there be-3S a holiday  
Whatever, (0.4) but (.l) then it’s a holiday.

38 C-Fia: [Mffg heh heh! ]  
Mffg heh heh!

39 Cb-Lui: Beh [va bene anche quel:lo però ci sta di {[meno]}  
well go-3S well also that however EX stay-3S of (less)  
Well that’s also fine but ((idiom = it’s not great))

40 Cli: [( ]

41 S-Ari: [(Li è come-)  
(there be-3S as-)  
(There it’s like-)

42 S-Ari: [VA BENE ANCHE QUELLO, MA DEVE ARRIVAR[E- ]  
go-3S well also that but must-3S arrive-INF  
THAT’S ALSO FINE, BUT IT MUST COME-

43 [((several indistinct voices))]

44 S-Bea: [Ci: sta]:::.  
EX stay-3S  
That’s fine.

45 ????: Fa parte anche  
make-3S part also  
It’s also part

46 [della Verifica. ]  
of=the Test  
of the Test.

47 Cb-Lui: -> [{ stavo male}] quando sono uscito le [prime=  
(stay-IPF.1S badly) when be-1S go.out-PSTP the first  
{ felt bad) when I went out the first=

48 S-Ari: [Eh.  
PTC  
Right.

times not stay-IPF.1S well

=times. I did not feel well.

50 S-Ari: [Eh. [Vedi?]
PTC see-2S
Right. You see?

51 Cb-Lui: [Assolutamente. =
absolutely
Absolutely. =

52 =Non volevo nemmeno uscire.
not want-IPF.1S even go.out
=I didn’t even want to go out.

53 (.)

54 S-Ari: Ve[di?]
PTC see-2S
[Tutti (dovevamo)]
all (have-IPF.1P)
You see? We all (had to)

55 Cb-Lui: [Visto che la pri[ma uscita mi ]
seen that the first time.out 1S.RFL
Given that the first time ((I went)) out I

56 son ( [ ]
be-1S ( )
was ( )

57 Ca-Ila: [No io non mi sen[to così io.
no 1S.N not 1S.RFL feel-1S so 1S.N
No I don’t feel like that.

58 (0.2)

59 Cb-Lui: Eh [(no)
PTC (no)
Right (no)

60 Ca-Ila: [Quando vado a casa [in Verifica. ]
when go-IS to home in Test
When I go home for a Test.

61 Cb-Lui: [Io non ho nessuno
1S.N not have-1S nobody
I don’t have anyone

62 che mi controlla. Come Guido.
who 1S.A control-3S like NAME

to control me. Like Guido.

63 (1.1) ((indistinct talk in the background))

64 Cb-Lui: E difatti la prima uscita pa:n. (0.2) Heh.
and in.fact the first time out 1S.TJ
And indeed at the first time out ba:m. (0.2) Heh.

65 (0.5)

66 S-Ari: Vedi?
   see-2S
   You see?

67 (0.4)

68 Cb-Lui: Eh. E:::::: le uscite dopo::: han dovuto
   PCT and the times.out then have-3P need-PSTP
   Right. A:::::::nd then the next times they had to

69 spingermi fuori perché
   push-INF=1S.A out because
   to push me out because

70 S-Ari: [Mh n(h)on v(h)olevi andarci.]
   not want-IPP-2S go-INF=LOC
   Mh you d(h)idn’t w(h)ant to go.

71 (0.6)

72 Cb-Lui: Eh perché al mio paese: c’è
   PTC because at.the my village EX=be-3S
   Eh because in my village there’s

73 (ge:n)
   (people)
   (peo)

74 S-?: ( [ ] )

75 Cb-Lui: [cioè]
   I.mean
   I mean

76 (.)

77 Cb-Lui: e:h non è semplice. Non ho nessuno
   PTC not be-3S simple not have-1S nobody
   e:h it isn’t easy. I’ve got no-one

78 che mi cont(ro)- .hh cioè se decido::: lo
   who IS.A control .hh I mean if decide-1S 3S.A
to control me .hh I mean if I decide I

79 fa[ccio. Non è che:
   do-1S not be-3S that
   do it. It’s not that

80 Ca-Ila?: [Si ( )]
   yes ( )
   Yes ( )

81 ma è (a)

but be-3S (at)

but it’s ( )

82 Cb-Lui: devo rendere conto alla

must-1S give-INF account to the

I have to give explanations to

83 ma[imma o al papà o]

mum or the dad or

84 Ca-Ila: [Ma penso chiunque di noi può] farlo.

but think-1S anyone of is can-3S do-INF=3S.A

But I think that any of us can do that.

85 (0.2)

86 Ca-Ila: An[ch’io (volevo farlo )]

also=1S,N want-IPV.1S do-INF=3S.A

I also (wanted to do it )

87 Cb-Lui: [Sì però (sei) uno che ha almeno la famiglia dove

yes but (be-2S) one REL have-3S at least the family where

Yes but (you are) someone who at least has a

family where

88 andare. Io mio figlio adesso] è grande?

go-INF 1S.N my son now be-3S big
to go. My son is a grown-up now?

Testing and contesting similarity. I turn now to cases where client A orients to the first constituent operation of I-challenges (relevant similarity) but not the second (competitive perspective).

In extract 4, Cristina challenges Mauro’s perspective on the meaning of his legs spasm. Mauro orients to Cristina’s conveyed proposal that her experience was relevantly similar to his; he tests its relevant similarity by asking whether she experienced spasms when she was in withdrawal (line 11). Cristina defends her position by suggesting (through the emphatically delivered “↑N↓o” at line 14) that although she was not in withdrawal, her experience is nevertheless relevantly similar to Mauro’s precisely because he is not in withdrawal either. This aspect connects to the second operation of Cristina’s turn, that is, the normalizing account—and challenge—it conveys. Mauro’s response (“Boh”/“I don’t know,” line 16) may display his understanding that Cristina has offered her experience as a resource he can use to reevaluate his own experience; that is, “I don’t know” may acknowledge that he should do something with her experience but that he “does not know” how. However, unlike the clients in the previous examples, Mauro’s response does not display a clear orientation to a conveyed
challenge. For instance, he does not revise his perspective (as Enrico does in extract 3), nor does he reject the applicability of client B’s alternative perspective to his own case (as the clients in extracts 2, 5, 6, and 7 do). Nevertheless, Cristina pursues Mauro’s acceptance of an alternative perspective on his symptoms. She proposes that his symptoms are “little twitches” and therefore benign (lines 18 and 21; another client does the same at lines 19–20). This retrospectively suggests that Cristina may have mentioned her experience as a first attempt at proposing an alternative perspective on Mauro’s symptoms.

One possible explanation for client A’s response in extract 4 is that with I-challenges, B does not directly criticize A’s perspective. Rather, B comments on their own experience in contrastive terms, and they exploit the syllogistic procedure examined in the previous section to convey the applicability of that competitive perspective to A’s case. The challenge import of B’s turn is available for A to infer and act on, with the implication that A may fail to do so. However, there is another possibility; A’s practice of testing the relevant similarity of B’s experience (seen in extract 4, line 11) is present in other cases. This suggests that this response may be, in itself, a recurrent practice for responding to I-challenges and that its presence may reflect A’s orientation to the challenge import of B’s mention of a personal experience.

In extract 6, Carlotta tests the relevant similarity of Cristina’s experience (line 31) by suggesting that Cristina’s experience of disliking the smell of smoke is caused by her pregnancy—Carlotta is not pregnant. Carlotta does so after rejecting the applicability of Cristina’s perspective to her case (lines 25 and 29) and after Cristina has reissued her I-challenge (lines 27 and 30). In this context, the practice of testing the relevant similarity of Cristina’s experience is a way of undermining the challenge conveyed by mentioning that experience. Extract 5 further supports this possibility; Carlotta challenges the relevant similarity of Cristina’s experience (line 33) and subsequently rejects the applicability of the perspective conveyed by mentioning that experience (line 34).

These cases show client A challenging the relevant similarity of their own and B’s experiences in cases where they also reject the applicability of B’s conveyed perspective to their own case. This raises the possibility that A may be doing the same in cases where they do not overtly contest the applicability of the competing perspective, but they test or contest the relevant similarity of their own and B’s experiences. Mauro does so in extract 4 (line 11). Extract 8 presents a similar pattern. Manolo (client A) has relapsed into heroin use a few days before the group meeting (Cristina raises this at lines 25–26); he provides a generic explanation for why this has happened (he was “out of his mind,” lines 38–40). Cristina (client B) challenges this by proposing that Manolo relapsed because he is not satisfied with his life (lines
41–45). After an objection by Manolo (lines 46–48), Cristina challenges his perspective by mentioning her own experience (lines 54–58). She refers to the fact—discussed earlier in that meeting—that he is doing several free time activities. By reporting that she does not do as many activities, she implies that her life does not offer many sources of satisfaction and that despite this, she is not using drugs. In response, Manolo contests the relevant similarity of the two experiences (“But you are stronger,” line 62). By doing so he can undermine the I-challenge; specifically, if Cristina is “stronger,” her experience cannot be used as a model against which to assess Manolo’s propensity to relapse into drug use.

(8) IntV6 1:03:38 ‘Relapse’

Ca = client A (Manolo)
Cb = client B (Cristina)
C = other client (Grazia)
S = staff (Marta)

01 S-Mar: Vuoi dirci qualcos’altro Manu?
Do you want to tell us something else Manu?

03 S-Man: No,
No,

04 S-Mar?: Hmmh=
Hmmh=

06 Ca-Man: non ho fatto altro.
I haven’t done anything else.

07 Cb-Cri: Ma tu sei soddisfatto della vita
But are you satisfied with the life

08 che stai facendo adesso.
that you are doing now.

10 Ca-Man: Vorrei andare via da qua sinceramente.
I would like to leave this place frankly.

*Però:* °hh=e:hh°
but
*But* °hh=e:hh° (= breathy “eh”, not a laugh)

(0.6)

Ca-Man: Hheh.
Hheh. (= laugh)

(0.2)

S-Mar: Andar via da [qua la comunità?]
go-INF away from here the community
Leave this place ((you mean)) the community?

Ca-Man: [£Non è così facile]
not be-3S so easy
£It’s not that easy

(dalla) comunità
(from the) community

Cb-Cri: [A parte] quello sei soddisfatto
Aside that be-2S satisfied
Aside from that are you satisfied

Cb-Cri: [come stai vivendo.]
the.way stay-2S live-GER
((with)) the way you are living.

(0.5)

Ca-Man: °Sì beh°
yes PTC
"Yes well"

(0.5)

Cb-Cri: E allora che cazzo di bisogno avevi
and so what dick of need have-IPF.2S
And so why the fuck did you need

Cb-Cri: di andarti a prender la roba?
of go-INF=RFL.2S to take the thing
to go and take the gear? ("roba"/"gear" = heroin))

27  (0.8)

28 Ca-Man:  Ah bo:h.
            (PTC PTC)
            Ah I don’t know.

29  (0.5)

30 C-Gra:  Quando.
           when
           Wh'en. ((turns towards Cb-Cri))

31  (0.6)

32 Ca-Man:  La settimana scorsa.
            the last week
            Last week.

33  (1.0)

34 C-Gra:  (Vedi) io non so niente?
           (see-2S) I.S.N not know nothing
           (You see) I don’t know anything? ((looking at Ca-Man))

35  (0.5)

36 S-Mar:  tk (0.3) (Cioè)?
          (INTERJ)
          tk (0.3) (There you go)? ((looking at C-Gra))

37  (0.8)

38 Ca-Man:  Mah bo:h pe:rché:# (. ) m::h=ogni ta:n to
            PTC PTC because PTC every while
            Well I don’t know #because# (. ) m::h=every once in while

39  (0.8)

40  ( [ ]

41 Cb-Cri:  [Si ma secondo [me (.]
           yes but according IS.A
           Yes but I think (.)

42 C-Gra:  [{(Come me)/(Come mai)=
           (like me) / (like never)
           (Like me)/(Why)=

43 Cb-Cri:  =non è che sei proprio <soddisfatto.>
           =you’re not really <satisfied.>
> Ciòè non (1.0) > secondo me< ti manca
I.mean not according 1S.D 2S.D lack-3S
> I mean< (1.0) > I think< you’re still missing out

ancora < qualcosa::> (un:) boh?
still something a PTC on < something> (a:) I don’t know?

Ca-Man: ° (Beh non so:) °
( well not know-1S)
° (Well I don’t know:) °

(0.4)

Ca-Man: A tutti manca qualcosa (. ) ( ciòè)
to everybody lack-3S something (. ) I.mean
Everyone misses out on something (. ) ( I mean)

(2.0)

Ca-Man: ° E::h °
PTC
° U::h °

Cb-Cri: ° Sì (0.5) [ce: rto. Ovviamente.
yes certain obviously
° Yes (0.5) certainly. Obviously.

(0.5)

Cb-Cri: Però (1.1) m::h io::=no-non è che s- (0.4)
but PTC 1S.N not be-3S that
But (1.1) m::h I::=I’m not really (0.4)

sto facendo chissà co::sa.=Anzi non (.hh)
stay-1S do-GER who knows what on.the.contrary not
doing anything special.=On the contrary I’m not (.hh)

sto facendo < nie::nte> in confronto a te.
stay-1S do-GER nothing in comparison to you
doing < anything> compared to you.

(0.2)

Cb-Cri: Ciòè vengo solo qua e poi vado a casa.
I.mean come-1S only here and then go-1S to home
I mean I only come here and then I go home.

Ca-Man: [Mm.
PTC
Mm.
I-Challenges and the Problem of Experience

Previous research in conversation analysis has found that speakers treat each other’s subjective experiences as areas where everyone has special “entitlements” (Peräkylä and Silverman 1991; Sacks 1984). This means that everyone can usually claim that they are more knowledgeable than others about their own experiences and therefore more entitled to make claims about them. The activity of challenging a peer’s perspective raises a “problem of experience” (Heritage, 2011); TC clients are vulnerable to be heard as making unjustified claims on matters of which they do not have first-hand knowledge. Recipients can always object that they know more about their own experience.

Navigating the problem of experience. I-challenges seem especially fitted for navigating the problem of experience. With them, clients only make claims about their own case. To appreciate this, it is useful to consider instances where clients start with a different practice and then switch to an I-challenge.

In extract 3, Lidia (client B) starts a possible challenge by referring to what “most people” do (line 15). She abandons this utterance in progress and switches to mentioning her experience (line 17). The claim about “most people” may already be designed to navigate the problem of experience; “most people” is not “everyone,” and therefore this reference form already allows for the possibility that Enrico belongs to the few people to whom the claim does not apply. However, by switching to mentioning her own experience, Lidia avoids any claim that might be heard as being “about” Enrico’s experience. She makes a claim about her own experience and leaves it to Enrico to extract implications for himself.

In extract 2, Gianni (client B) challenges his peers’ perspectives with a general claim (lines 1–4). Another client treats this precisely as a general claim applicable to the clients, which he does by rejecting its validity (“But that’s not true,” line 8) based on his personal experience—that is, an area of knowledge over which he can claim higher entitlement (“I didn’t feel […],” line 8). Here, Gianni’s general claim has raised a problem of experience and has
been rejected on that basis. Later, Gianni switches to his own experience as a basis for his challenge (lines 28–32). Another client rejects Gianni’s challenge but in a different way than the previous client (at line 8). By saying, “Well for me it was the same as before” (lines 33–34), this client does not treat Gianni’s turn as making a claim about the other clients’ experiences but rather—and consistently with the analyses reported in the previous section—as offering Gianni’s experience as a model for others to reconsider the meaning of their own experiences.

I-challenges are particularly advantageous because with them TC clients avoid making claims about their peers’ circumstances, therefore navigating the problem of experience that this activity raises. In doing this, TC clients also achieve two important and closely related outcomes: they give a basis for the challenge, and they promote relational affiliation (Figure 1).

Figure 1 – I-challenges and the problem of experience

Giving a basis. In a study on how people describe the bases for their knowledge, Pomerantz (1984:609) observed that “when people are concerned with being accountable for what they say, they may mitigate their accountability by presenting sources or bases for believing particular states of affairs, without accountably asserting the states of affairs that are suggested [emphasis added]” (see also Bolden and Mandelbaum 2017). Similarly, mentioning a personal experience enables TC clients to implement a challenge and provide a basis for it concurrently
(through the same action). This allows clients to challenge their peers without commenting on their experiences and support the challenge with the weight of experiential knowledge.

Minimizing relational attrition. Challenging someone’s perspective has disaffiliative relational implications. It has the potential of undermining the sense of solidarity that can stem from belonging to the same group. With I-challenges, clients compensate for this by displaying belongingness to the same social group (Arminen 2004).

The I-challenge is based on client B’s proposal that they have an experience in common with client A. This operation reflexively characterizes the clients as members of a social group sharing the same relevant experiences, including a history of drug use and undergoing treatment. Unlike alternative practices for challenging others (e.g., criticizing; Pino 2016a), I-challenges convey that modifying one’s own perspective can be beneficial for both the recipient and the speaker. There is a conveyed sense of “being in the same boat.” With I-challenges, clients make relevant an aspect of their social relationship in their talk (Raymond and Heritage 2006).

At the same time, a claim of shared experience helps clients add force to the challenge. Although with I-challenges clients only comment on their own experience, the applicability of that claim extends beyond their own individual case. This is because clients construct their case as representative of a class of experiences, of which the recipient’s experience is also an instance. For example, in extract 4, line 7, Cristina conveys that her experience does not tally with Mauro’s conveyed perspective on his leg spasms. She conveys that there exists at least one case in the world—her own—where things did not quite work in the way that Mauro has described (Drew 1992). On this basis, Cristina’s experience has implications for anyone who made the sorts of claims that Mauro has made and who were in a similar situation. This is evidenced by another client joining in and supporting the alternative perspective (line 19) and by Cristina seeking further confirmation from that client (line 21).

In summary, I-challenges enable clients to navigate the problem of experience by way of avoiding claims about their peers’ circumstances. By mentioning their experience, clients concurrently provide a basis for the challenge and claim belongingness to the same social group, thereby reducing the disaffiliative implications of their challenges.

Discussion
Social influence has been a central topic in social psychology from its inception. It is encapsulated in Allport’s (1985:3) definition of the field as “the attempt to understand and explain how the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of other human beings.” Typically, social psychologists have explained social influence with reference to how recipients cognitively process message-based persuasion and other forms of influence (Petty and Briñol 2008; Wood 2010). This line of inquiry has been somewhat silent to how people practically realize influence through social actions at the ground level of their conversational interactions.

The study reported here shows how it is possible to explore social influence from a different perspective, using conversation analysis. Rather than trying to infer the cognitive processes of message recipients, I focused on the structure and function of communicative practices that speakers use to exert social influence. I examined TC group meetings for people recovering from drug misuse—a setting where influencing people’s perspectives is an especially consequential activity—and focused on how clients challenge their peers’ perspectives on their own experiences. Through close examination of when, within their interactions, TC clients use specific communicative practices and how they design them, I identified situated choices they make by selecting a practice—an utterance referencing the self or I-challenge—over other available practices to implement the social action of challenging a peer. Rather than explaining these choices with reference to how TC clients might orient to (e.g., anticipate) their peers’ cognitive responses, I proposed that TC clients design their actions by taking into consideration constraints associated with the very nature of the social activity in which they engage—challenging a peer’s perspective—and the practical problems that it raises. This perspective augments existing social psychological notions of influence with insights on the social organization of influence as a practical activity in which people engage in their interpersonal interactions.

The findings suggest that there are at least two broad approaches to influencing other people’s perspectives: direct versus indirect. TC clients implement a direct approach to influence when they claim to know about aspects of their peers’ experiences and associated meanings and feelings (see extract 2). With the indirect approach—embodied in the I-challenge—clients make claims about a different matter (i.e., not about their recipients’ experiences) in a way that carries implications for how recipients can make sense of their own experiences (cf. Pino 2016a).

The demarcation between direct and indirect approaches to influence does not only apply to challenges but to other social actions as well. For example, in the case of requests for
assistance, people can directly nominate a recipient to perform a particular action; alternatively, they can report a need or a desire and leave it to recipients to volunteer assistance (Kendrick and Drew 2016; Pino 2016c). With these approaches, speakers establish different social expectations for recipient responses, and they also propose different kinds of social relationships in the moment-by-moment unfolding of speaker-recipient interactions.

The two approaches to influence have received some attention within interventionist approaches to social influence—a popular example being nudge theory (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). Within that framework, the direct approach to influence translates into promoting behavioral changes through injunctions or restrictions of people’s options for action. The indirect approach translates into designing physical spaces and social environments in ways that maximize the probability of desired behavioral outcomes. In this article, I have shown that speakers orient to the availability of these two approaches, their interactional consequences, and their relational implications at the ground level of their conversational exchanges. With I-challenges, TC clients make available a resource—their own experience—that recipients can use to modify their own perspectives without inviting them to do so. TC clients thereby “design” conversational environments that can be conducive to a certain behavioral outcome without formally soliciting it. These findings also support and substantiate Thomas Gordon’s early intuition about the different affordances and implications of I-messages as opposed to you-messages.

The findings resonate with the social psychological notion that ensuring satisfactory relations with others is a powerful motive driving how people respond to social influence (Wood, 2000). Social psychologists have mainly used this notion to explain how recipients respond to social influence. By contrast, my results suggest that a concern with maintaining affiliative relationships is already observably embodied in the ways in which speakers design their actions for their recipients. With I-challenges, TC clients claim belongingness to the same social group as their peers (Arminen 2004), thereby reducing the disaffiliative relational implications associated with challenging a peer’s perspective. Additionally, I have shown that speakers’ situated choice to employ I-challenges is a way of addressing a problem of experience (Heritage 2011) raised by the activity of challenging others; this had not been previously described in the social psychological literature on influence. In the context examined here, speakers have a particular way of maintaining positive relations with others; they avoid making claims about matters over which their recipients may justifiably claim superior knowledge (cf. Pino 2016a).
This study has some limitations that invite caution when interpreting its findings. It is confined to one particular institutional setting; therefore, future research should explore the extent to which the findings extend to other institutional and mundane settings. Since the study did not elicit participants’ thoughts after recording their interactions, there is no way of knowing whether their perspectives shifted as a result of being exposed to I-challenges. Despite these limitations, the study findings point to the power of first-person talk in conveying social influence. It also exemplifies how conversation analysis can be used to address a central topic in social psychology by examining people’s practices for managing real problems in real time as well as the situated understandings that they make available to each other in the course of their naturally occurring interactions.

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Notes

1. In this study, influence is broadly defined as an activity whereby a speaker aims to bring about some change in a recipient’s behaviors. Perspective is defined as a way of assessing or
making sense of a state of affairs and is preferred in this study over attitude despite its common use in social psychology. **Attitude** can be taken to refer to a more stable configuration of evaluations, whereas the term **perspective** can accommodate transient views that group members voice with no assumption about whether they represent underlying stable cognitive patterns.

2. See Online Appendix at spq.sagepub.com/supplemental.

4. In most cases, client B challenges client A in a context of already established nonconcordance between their perspectives. I highlight this aspect in the analyses because it helps grasp the interactional function of I-challenges. However, this does not appear to be an essential feature for the action recognition of I-challenges. Extract 6 (“Smoking”) is a case where an I-challenge is not delivered in the context of already established nonconcordance.

5. This tacitly relies on shared understandings about how addicts behave. Lidia alludes to the fact that addicts usually seek a prescription of methadone when they run out of money and cannot buy the heroin they need to relieve their withdrawal symptoms (as supported by Lidia’s reference to running out of money at line 18).

6. Enrico’s responses at lines 14, 19, and 22 are “Beh” and “Sì beh” prefaced (see Online Appendix A), translated as “Well” and “Yes well,” respectively (Heritage 2015). With these, Enrico pushes back against Lidia’s challenge; that is, he does not frame his revision of his own earlier perspective as a whole-hearted perspectival shift but as a concession, partially preserving the validity of that previous perspective. With “at first” (lines 14 and 16), he concedes that he did not intend to quit using drugs when he initially approached the support service and conveys that the decision to quit came later. This feature does not change the main point of my analysis: Enrico treats Lidia’s mention of her experience as making relevant a revision of his perspective on his own experience.

7. Alluding to desire for illegal drugs.

8. He alludes to a relapse into drug or alcohol use. This is confirmed by what he says later in the recorded meeting (data not shown).

References


