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Dual Antenna Selection in Secure Cognitive Radio Networks

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Abstract

This paper investigates data transmission and physical layer secrecy in cognitive radio network. We propose to apply full duplex transmission and dual antenna selection at secondary destination node. With the full duplex transmission, the secondary destination node can simultaneously apply the receiving and jamming antenna selection to improve the secondary data transmission and primary secrecy performance respectively. This describes an attractive scheme in practice: unlike that in most existing approaches, the secrecy performance improvement in the CR network is no longer at the price of the data transmission loss. The outage probabilities for both the data transmission and physical layer secrecy are analyzed. Numerical simulations are also included to verify the performance of the proposed scheme.

Index Terms

Physical layer secrecy, cognitive radio network, antenna selection, full duplex

I. INTRODUCTION

Cognitive radio (CR) improves spectrum utilization by sharing resources between primary and cognitive radio (secondary) users. Among various spectrum sharing schemes including underlay, overlay and interweave, the underlay scheme is often of interest in practical implementation [1]. In the underlay approach, the secondary user is allowed to access the spectrum of the primary user if its interference to
the primary user is below a certain level. It is known that the antenna selection provides an attractive approach in the underlay CR network [2]–[4]. In the CR antenna selection schemes, the ‘best’ antenna with the least interference to the primary users and strongest link for the secondary data transmission is often selected among a number of available antennas equipped at the secondary users.

An important issue that has attracted much attention recently is the physical layer network security in the CR system. Unlike the traditional cryptographic security system [5], the physical network security is based on Shannon theory using channel coding to achieve secure transmission [6]–[11]. The physical layer security has been investigated in various systems including direct point-to-point transmission (e.g. [12]), distributed beamforming in cooperative networks (e.g. [13], [14]), cooperative jamming (e.g. [15]–[17]), relay and jammer selection (e.g. [18]–[20]) and buffer aided relay network [21].

The physical layer secrecy is of particularly interest in the CR network. This is because that the primary users are designed to share the spectrum with secondary users, making it also ‘convenient’ for eavesdroppers to intercept the informative data. In [22], the secondary source is used as a jammer to improve the secrecy performance of the primary network. This is not a typical CR network as the secondary user does not transmit its own data. In [23], a CR network with multiple secondary users is considered, where the secondary user which maximizes the secrecy performance of the secondary network is selected for data transmission. In [24], transmission powers are carefully allocated between the primary and secondary users to balance the primary and secondary secrecy rates. Similarly in [25], powers are optimally allocated to maximize the secrecy rate in a MIMO cognitive network, which is achieved with distributed beamforming at the source or the relay. All of these approaches mainly focus on the physical layer secrecy in the CR network. This motes us to investigate approaches which can improve the physical layer secrecy and data transmission at the same time.

In this paper, we propose a dual antenna selection to improve data transmission in the secondary network and secrecy performance in the primary network simultaneously. This is achieved by equipping full duplex multiple antennas at the secondary destination. Full duplex transmission, which was previously considered difficult to implement due to the associated self interference, is now an attractive alternative in many applications because of the recent advances in the fields of antenna technology and signal processing [26]–[28]. In this paper, the receiving antenna selection at the secondary destination node is used to maximize the data transmission capacity in the secondary network. On the other hand, because of the full duplex transmission, the transmission antenna selection is also used at the secondary destination to transmit
jamming signals to the eavesdropper so that the secrecy capacity of the primary network is improved. With the full-duplex dual antenna selection at the secondary destination, unlike existing approaches, the secrecy and data transmission performance no longer have to compromise for each other but can be improved simultaneously. This describes a new way in applying full-duplex (beside its capability in increasing data rate), which is of particular interest in 5G applications including CR network, D2D transmission and small cell systems.

The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:

- Proposing the full duplex dual antenna selection scheme to improve the data transmission for the secondary network and secrecy performance for the primary network simultaneously. Both cases with and without the knowledge of the jamming channel gains are considered. As far as the authors are aware, this is the first attempt to simultaneously improve the secrecy and data transmission in the CR network.
- Deriving the closed-form expressions the outage probability for the secondary data transmission. The analysis shows that the receiving antenna selection provides diversity gain in the secondary data transmission.
- Deriving the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy outage probability for the primary network. The analysis shows that, even without the knowledge of the jamming channel gains, the jamming antenna selection can still improve the secrecy performance of the primary network.
- Analyzing the secrecy diversity order and coding gain for the primary network, and concluding that the secrecy performance improvement from the jamming antenna selection comes from the coding gain rather than the diversity gain. This is very different from the traditional antenna selection schemes for data transmission, where the performance gain is mainly from the diversity gain. The results provide very useful insight in designing practical secrecy systems.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the dual antenna selection schemes; Section III analyzes the outage probability for the secondary data transmission; Section IV derives the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy outage probability for the primary network; Section V analyzes the secrecy diversity order and coding gain for the primary network; Section VI verifies the proposed antenna selection scheme with numerical simulations; finally Section VII summarizes the paper.
II. DUAL ANTENNA SELECTION AT THE SECONDARY DESTINATION

The system model of the secure cognitive network is shown in Fig. 1, which consists of the primary network (including one primary source node $PS$ and one primary destination $PD$), the secondary network (including one secondary source node $SS$ and one secondary destination node $SD$), and one eavesdropper $E$. The secondary destination $SD$ performs in the full duplex mode, and is equipped with multiple antennas, where there are $K_1$ antennas for receiving data from the secondary source and $K_2$ antennas for transmitting jamming signals to the eavesdropper. All other nodes are equipped with a single antenna and perform in the half duplex mode.

![Fig. 1. Dual antenna selection in the secure CR network.](image)

We denote $SD_i$ and $SD_j$ as the $i$th and $j$th receiving and jamming antennas at node $SD$, where $i = 1, \cdots, K_1$ and $j = 1, \cdots, K_2$, respectively. As is illustrated in Fig. 1, the channel coefficients for $SS \rightarrow SD_i$, $SS \rightarrow E$, $SS \rightarrow PD$, $SD_j \rightarrow PD$, $SD_j \rightarrow E$, $PS \rightarrow SD_i$, $PS \rightarrow PD$, $PS \rightarrow E$ and $SD_j \rightarrow SD_i$ are denoted as $h_{sd_i}$, $h_{se}$, $h_{sp}$, $h_{dj,p}$, $h_{dj,e}$, $h_{pd_i}$, $h_{pp}$, $h_{pe}$ and $h_{dj,di}$, respectively.

The channel gains are denoted as $\gamma_{ab} = |h_{ab}|^2$ correspondingly, which are independently exponentially distributed with mean of $\lambda_{ab} = E[|h_{ab}|^2]$, where $ab \in \{sd_i, se, sp, dj,p, dj,e, pd_i, pp, pe, dj,di\}$. We assume that $\lambda_{sd_i} = \lambda_{sd}$, $\lambda_{pd_i} = \lambda_{pd}$, $\lambda_{dj,p} = \lambda_{dp}$ and $\lambda_{dj,e} = \lambda_{de}$, for all $i = 1, \cdots, K_1$ and $j = 1, \cdots, K_2$.

Without losing generality, we assume the transmission power at $PS$ and noise variances are all normalized to unity, and the channels are quasi-static so that the channel coefficients remain unchanged.
during one packet duration but independently vary from one packet time to another. We also assume the secondary users have knowledge of the channel-state-information (CSI) between the secondary and primary users. This can be achieved by feeding back CSI from the primary user to the secondary transmitter directly or indirectly by, for example, a band manager between the two parties [29], or sensing pilot signals from primary users [30].

A. Receiving antenna selection

The receiving antenna is selected with the best data transmission performance in the secondary network. Because the secondary destination \( S_D \) operates in full-duplex mode, it receives data from the secondary source \( S_S \) and transmit jamming signals to the eavesdropper \( E \) at the same time. If the \( j \)th jamming antenna \( S_{D_j} \) is selected, the received signal at the \( i \)th receiving antenna \( S_{D_i} \) is given by

\[
y_{sd_i} = \sqrt{P_{ss}} h_{sd_i} s_s + h_{pd_i} s_p + \sqrt{P_{sd}} h_{dj_i} s_t + n_{sd_i},
\]

where \( s_s, s_p \) and \( s_t \) are the transmission signals from nodes \( S_S, P_S \) and the \( S_{D_j} \) respectively, \( P_{ss} \) and \( P_{sd} \) are the transmission powers at \( S_S \) and \( S_D \) respectively. It is clear that third term at the right hand side of (1) is the residual self-interference from the \( S_{D_j} \) to \( S_{D_i} \).

Then the capacity for data receiving at \( S_{D_i} \) is given by

\[
C_{sd;i} = \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{P_{ss} \gamma_{sd_i}}{\gamma_{pd_i} + P_{sd} \gamma_{dj_i} + 1} \right),
\]

(2)

Considering that current technology can significantly suppress the self interference to the noise level (e.g [31], [32]), we assume that residual self-interference term \( P_{sd} \gamma_{dj_i} \) has little effect on \( C_{sd;i} \). Further assuming the channel SNR is high enough, we approximately have

\[
C_{sd;i} \approx \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{P_{ss} \gamma_{sd_i}}{\gamma_{pd_i}} \right).
\]

(3)

In the underlay CR system, the interfering power from the secondary network to the primary destination must be below a certain level. Similar to those in [23], [33], the transmission powers of \( S_S \) and \( S_D \) can be constrained as \( P_{ss} \gamma_{sp} \leq I_{th} \) and \( P_{sd} \gamma_{dj,p} \leq I_{th} \) respectively. Then replacing \( P_{ss} \) in (3) with \( I_{th}/\gamma_{sp} \) gives

\[
C_{sd;i} \approx \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{I_{th}}{\gamma_{sp} \gamma_{sd_i}/\gamma_{pd_i}} \right).
\]

(4)
Thus we propose that the receiving antenna at the secondary destination SD is selected maximizing (4) such that

\[ i_r = \arg \max_{i=1, \ldots, K_1} \left\{ \frac{\gamma_{sd_i}}{\gamma_{pd_i}} \right\}. \tag{5} \]

### B. Jamming antenna selection

The jamming antenna is selected with the best secrecy performance in the primary network. Below we first derive the secrecy capacity for the primary network, from which the jamming selection rules are proposed.

1) **Data transmission capacity at PD:** Because the secondary destination SD performs in the full duplex mode, the secondary source SS transmits data and SD transmits jamming signals at the same time. Thus both SS and SD impose interference to the primary destination PD. If the \( j \)th antenna \( SD_j \) is selected, the received signal at PD is given by

\[ y_{pd,j} = h_{pp}s_p + \sqrt{P_{ss}}h_{sp}s_s + \sqrt{P_{sd}}h_{dp}t + n_{pd}, \tag{6} \]

where \( n_{pd} \) is the noise at node PD. Then the capacity for data transmission at PD is obtained as

\[ C_{d,j} = \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma_{pp}}{P_{ss}\gamma_{sp} + P_{sd}\gamma_{d,p} + 1} \right). \tag{7} \]

Using the CR power constraints in (7), we have

\[ C_d = \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma_{pp}}{2I_{th} + 1} \right) \approx \log_2 \left( \frac{\gamma_{pp}}{2I_{th} + 1} \right), \tag{8} \]

where the approximation holds at high SNR, and the jamming antenna index \( j \) is ignored because (8) holds for every \( SD_j \). We note that it is common to assume high SNR in the physical layer secrecy systems to focus on the secrecy performance (e.g. [18], [21]).

2) **Eavesdropping capacity at E:** Due to the full-duplex transmission at SD, the eavesdropper receives signals from PS, SS and SD simultaneously. If \( j \)th jamming antenna \( SD_j \) is selected, the received signal at the eavesdropper \( E \) is given by

\[ y_{e,j} = h_{pe}s_p + \sqrt{P_{ss}}h_{se}s_s + \sqrt{P_{sd}}h_{de}t + n_e, \tag{9} \]

where \( n_e \) is the noise at the eavesdropper \( E \).

While the jamming signal \( s_t \) imposes interference on the eavesdropper \( E \), the transmission from PS
and SS forms an multiple-access channel at E. But unlike the typical multiple-access channel, for the secrecy performance of the primary network, the eavesdropper intends to ‘intercept’ the data from the primary source PS (and not that from the secondary source SS). Therefore, the eavesdropping capacity for the primary data \(s_p\), detection is a piece-wise function of the \(SS \rightarrow E\) channel gain \(\gamma_{se}\) as is shown in the following. We suppose the data rate of the secondary source SS is \(R_{data}\).

- If \(\log_2(1 + \frac{P_{ss}\gamma_{se}}{P_{sd\gamma_{dj,e} + 1}}) < R_{data}\), the \(SS \rightarrow E\) channel is too weak for the eavesdropper to decode the secondary data \(s_s\), so that \(s_s\) can only be treated as interference. Then the eavesdropping capacity for the primary network is obtained as

\[
C_{e,j} = \log_2 \left(1 + \frac{\gamma_{pe}}{P_{ss}\gamma_{se} + P_{sd}\gamma_{dj,e} + 1}\right), \quad \text{if} \quad P_{ss}\gamma_{se} < (2^{R_{data}} - 1)(P_{sd}\gamma_{dj,e} + 1). \tag{10}
\]

- If \(\log_2(1 + \frac{P_{ss}\gamma_{se}}{\gamma_{pe} + P_{sd}\gamma_{dj,e} + 1}) < R_{data} < \log_2(1 + \frac{P_{ss}\gamma_{se}}{P_{sd}\gamma_{dj,e} + 1})\), the eavesdropper can jointly decode the data from PS and SS. Considering that SS transmits at rate \(R_{data}\), the eavesdropping capacity for the primary network is obtained as

\[
C_{e,j} = \log_2 \left(1 + \frac{\gamma_{pe} + P_{ss}\gamma_{se}}{P_{sd}\gamma_{dj,e} + 1}\right) - R_{data},
\]

\[
\text{if} \quad (2^{R_{data}} - 1)(P_{sd}\gamma_{dj,e} + 1) < P_{ss}\gamma_{se} < (2^{R_{data}} - 1)(\gamma_{pe} + P_{sd}\gamma_{dj,e} + 1). \tag{11}
\]

where the first term at the right-hand-of (11) is the ‘overall’ capacity for the \(s_p\) and \(s_s\) detection.

- If \(\log_2(1 + \frac{P_{ss}\gamma_{se}}{\gamma_{pe} + P_{sd}\gamma_{dj,e} + 1}}) > R_{data}\), the \(SS \rightarrow E\) channel is strong enough for the eavesdropper to decode \(s_s\) first (by treating \(s_p\) as interference). The eavesdropper then subtracts the \(s_s\) term from its received signal (which is given by (9)), and decodes \(s_p\). Then the eavesdropping capacity for the primary network is obtained as if there is no SS transmission as

\[
C_{e,j} = \log_2 \left(1 + \frac{\gamma_{pe}}{P_{sd}\gamma_{dj,e} + 1}\right), \quad \text{if} \quad P_{ss}\gamma_{se} > (2^{R_{data}} - 1)(\gamma_{pe} + P_{sd}\gamma_{dj,e} + 1). \tag{12}
\]

3) Secrecy capacity: If the \(j\) jamming antenna \(SD_j\) is selected, the secrecy capacity ([8]) in the primary network is obtained as

\[
C_{s,j} = [C_d - C_{e,j}]^+, \tag{13}
\]

where \([a]^+ = \max(a, 0)\).

It is clear from (13) that, in order to have large secrecy capacity, the jamming antenna at the secondary destination need to be selected corresponding to large data transmission capacity \(C_d\) at PD and small
eavesdropping capacity $C_{e,j}$ at $E$. Or the selected antenna has high ‘jamming’ to $E$ and low ‘interference’ to $PD$. This again requires large $|h_{d,e}|^2$ and small $|h_{d,p}|^2$, as is shown in (7) and (10-12), respectively. Thus we propose to select the jamming antenna with the largest ratio of $\gamma_{d,e}/\gamma_{d,p}$. In fact, as will be shown later in (25) and (26), this jamming antenna selection scheme maximizes the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy capacity.

4) Jamming antenna selection rules: We assume that the secondary destination $SD$ is aware of the $SD_j \to PD$ channel gains $\gamma_{d,p}$. Then depending on the knowledge of the $SD_j \to E$ jamming channel gains, we propose two jamming antenna selection rules:

Case 1 - If the knowledge of the $SD_j \to E$ jamming channel gains is available, the jamming antenna is selected to satisfy

$$j_{case\ 1} = \arg \max_{j=1,\ldots,K_2} \left\{ \frac{\gamma_{d,e}}{\gamma_{d,p}} \right\}.$$ (14)

Case 2 - If the knowledge of the $SD_j \to E$ jamming channel gains is not available (which is often the case in practice), the jamming antenna is selected to satisfy

$$j_{case\ 2} = \arg \max_{j=1,\ldots,K_2} \left\{ \frac{1}{\gamma_{d,p}} \right\}.$$ (15)

Below, we drive the outage probabilities for the data transmission in the secondary network and secrecy performance in the primary network.

III. OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE SECONDARY DATA TRANSMISSION

This section analyzes the outage probability of the data transmission in the secondary network. If the $i$th receiving antenna $SD_i$ is selected at the secondary destination, the data transmission capacity in the secondary network is given by (4) when the channel SNR is high enough. Because the receiving antenna is selected from $K_1$ antennas, and from (5), the capacity for the data transmission is approximately given by

$$C_{sd} \approx \log_2 \left( 1 + I_{th} \cdot \max_{i=1,\ldots,K_1} \left( \frac{\gamma_{sd_i}}{\gamma_{sp}} \right) \right).$$ (16)

The outage probability for data transmission in the secondary network is then given by

$$P_{d,\text{out}} = P(C_{sd} < R_{data}),$$ (17)
where $R_{\text{data}}$ is the data rate at the secondary source $SS$.

Substituting (16) into (17) and letting $X_1 = \max_{i=1, \ldots, K_1} \left( \frac{\gamma_{sd}}{\gamma_{pd}} \right)$, $Y_1 = \gamma_{sp}$, $Z_1 = X_1/Y_1$ and $z_1 = \frac{2R_{\text{data}} - 1}{I_{\text{th}}}$, we have

$$P_{d,\text{out}} = F_{Z_1}(z_1) = P\left( X_1/Y_1 < z_1 \right) = \int_{0}^{\infty} F_{X_1}(z_1y_1)f_{Y_1}(y_1)dy_1,$$

where $F(.)$ is the cumulative density function (CDF).

The CDF of $X_1$ and probability density function (PDF) of $Y_1$ can be obtained as

$$F_{X_1}(x_1) = \left[ \frac{x_1}{N + x_1} \right]^{K_1} \text{ and } f_{Y_1}(y_1) = \frac{1}{\lambda_{sp}} e^{-\frac{y_1}{\lambda_{sp}}},$$

respectively, where $N = \lambda_{sd}/\lambda_{pd}$.

Finally, substituting (19) into (18) gives

$$P_{d,\text{out}} = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{N}{\lambda_{sp} z_1} e^{-\frac{N}{\lambda_{sp} z_1}} \text{Ei}(1, \frac{N}{\lambda_{sp} z_1}), & \text{if } K_1 = 1, \\ \left( \frac{\lambda_{sp} z_1}{N} \right)^{K_1-1} \frac{\text{MG}\left(\left[0, [1, K_1 - 1, 1, 1]\right], \left[1 \right], \frac{N}{\lambda_{sp} z_1} \right)}{\Gamma(K_1)}, & \text{if } K_1 \geq 2, \end{cases}$$

(20)

where $\text{Ei}(1, a) = \int_{1}^{\infty} \frac{\exp(-ta)}{a} dt$, $a > 0$, $\Gamma(\bullet)$ is the gamma function, and $\text{MG}\left(\left[0, [1, K_1 - 1, 1, 1]\right], \left[1 \right], \frac{N}{\lambda_{sp} z_1} \right)$, $\bullet$ is the Meijer G function [34].

It is clear from (20) that the outage probability $P_{s,\text{out}}$ well depends on $N$, or a larger $N$ leads to smaller outage probability. It is thus of interest to show the diversity order for the data transmission in the secondary network which is defined as

$$d_d = - \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{\log_{10} P_{d,\text{out}}}{\log_{10} N}.$$ 

(21)

We note that the definition in (21) is similar to that of the conventional diversity order except now the SNR is replaced with the parameter $N$. The diversity order defined in (21) reflects the decreasing rate of $P_{s,\text{out}}$ with respect to the receiving antenna number $K_1$.

Unfortunately, because (20) contains the Meijer G function $\text{MG}(\bullet)$, it is very hard to derive the diversity order. On the other hand, numerical results show that $\text{MG}(\bullet)$ has little effect on the diversity order. Then ignoring the $\text{MG}(\bullet)$ term in (20), we approximately have

$$d_d \approx - \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{\log_{10} (\lambda_{sp} z_1/N)^{K_1-1}}{\log_{10} N} = K_1 - 1, \quad K_1 \geq 2.$$ 

(22)
This shows that the receiving antenna selection introduces diversity gain in the data transmission, which is similar to that in the traditional antenna selection schemes [4]. This result will be verified in the simulation later.

IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE PRIMARY NETWORK

This section analyzes the secrecy outage probability of the primary networks. Both Case 1 and 2, with and without the knowledge of the jamming channel gains respectively, are considered. Because the eavesdropping capacity is a complicated piece-wise function as is shown in (10-12), it is hard (if not impossible) to obtain the closed form expression of secrecy outage probability for the primary network. Instead, the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy outage probability are derived.

First, the maximum eavesdropping capacity for the primary source $C_{e,j}$ is obtained when the signals from SS has no effect on the eavesdropper to detect the data from PS. This happens when $\gamma_{se} = 0$, or $P_{ss} \gamma_{se} > (2^{R_{data}} - 1)(\gamma_{pe} + P_{sd} \gamma_{d,e} + 1)$ so that the SS $\rightarrow$ E link is strong enough for the eavesdropper to successfully decode $ss$ and subtract it from the received signal. Thus when $j$th jamming antenna is selected, the upper bound of the eavesdropping capacity is given by

$$C_{e,j}^{(up)} = \log_2 \left(1 + \frac{\gamma_{pe}}{P_{sd} \gamma_{d,e} + 1}\right).$$  \hspace{1cm} (23)

On the other hand, we notice that when $\log(1 + \frac{P_{ss} \gamma_{se}}{P_{sd} \gamma_{d,e} + 1}) < R_{data}$, or $P_{ss} \gamma_{se} < (2^{R_{data}} - 1)(P_{sd} \gamma_{d,e} + 1)$, the eavesdropper cannot decode $s_s$ so that the signals from SS is treated as interference. When $P_{ss} \gamma_{se} > (2^{R_{data}} - 1)(P_{sd} \gamma_{d,e} + 1)$, $s_s$ and $s_p$ (from SS and PS respectively) can be jointly decoded. Therefore, the minimum eavesdropping capacity $C_{e,j}$ is reached when $P_{ss} \gamma_{se} = (2^{R_{data}} - 1)(P_{sd} \gamma_{d,e} + 1)$. Substituting $P_{ss} \gamma_{se} = (2^{R_{data}} - 1)(P_{sd} \gamma_{d,e} + 1)$ into (10) then gives the lower bound of $C_{e,j}$ as

$$C_{e,j}^{(low)} = \log_2 \left(1 + \frac{\gamma_{pe}}{\Delta \cdot (P_{sd} \gamma_{d,e} + 1)}\right),$$  \hspace{1cm} (24)

where $\Delta = 2^{R_{data}} - 1$.

Recall that the capacity for data transmission at the primary destination $PD$ is given by (8). Then substituting (8), (23) and (24) into (13), and with the CR power constraints, we obtain the lower and upper bounds of the secrecy capacity for the primary network (corresponding to the $j$th jamming antenna)
as

\[ C_{s,j}^{(low)} = \left[ C_d - C_{e,j}^{(up)} \right]^+ \approx \log_2 \left( \frac{I_{th} \gamma_{pp} \gamma_{d,j,e}}{(2I_{th} + 1) \gamma_{pe} \gamma_{d,j,p}} \right)^+, \]  
\[ C_{s,j}^{(up)} = \left[ C_d - C_{e,j}^{(low)} \right]^+ \approx \log_2 \left( \frac{\Delta I_{th} \gamma_{pp} \gamma_{d,j,e}}{(2I_{th} + 1) \gamma_{pe} \gamma_{d,j,p}} \right)^+, \]  

respectively, where the approximation holds at the high SNR which is often of interests in secrecy performance [18]. In the following two subsections, we drive the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy outage probability for Case 1 and 2 respectively.

A. Case 1 - with the knowledge of the SD \( j \to E \) jamming channel

The jamming antenna selection rule in Case 1 is shown in (14).

1) Upper bound - Case 1: Noting that the jamming antenna is selected among \( K_2 \) antennas, and from (25), the lower bound of the secrecy capacity in Case 1 is obtained as

\[ C_s^{(low, case 1)} = \left[ \log_2 \left( \frac{I_{th} \gamma_{pp}}{(2I_{th} + 1) \gamma_{pe} \max_{j=1\cdots K_2} \left( \frac{\gamma_{d,j,e}}{\gamma_{d,j,p}} \right)} \right) \right]^+. \]  

Then the upper bound of the secrecy outage probability in Case 1 is given by

\[ P_{s, out}^{(up, case 1)} = P(C_s^{(low, case 1)} < R_{secrecy}), \]  

where \( R_{secrecy} \) is the target secrecy rate.

We let \( X = \max_{j=1\cdots K_2} \left( \frac{\gamma_{d,j,e}}{\gamma_{d,j,p}} \right) \), \( Y = \frac{\gamma_{pe}}{\gamma_{pp}} \) and \( Z = X/Y \). Further noting that the CDF of the division of two random variables is given by (18), the CDF of \( X \) and PDF of \( Y \) can be obtained as

\[ F_X(x) = \left[ \frac{x}{M + x} \right]^{K_2} \text{ and } f_Y(y) = \frac{L}{(L + y)^2}, \]  

respectively, where \( M = \lambda_{de}/\lambda_{dp} \) and \( L = \lambda_{pe}/\lambda_{pp} \).

The CDF of \( Z \) is then given by

\[ F_Z(z) = \int_0^\infty F_X(zy) f_Y(y) dy. \]
Substituting (29) into (30) gives

\[
F_Z(z) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{Lz[Lz-M-M\ln(z)]}{(Lz-M)^2}, & \text{if } K_2 = 1, \\
\frac{Lz[-L^2z^2+M^2-2LMz\ln(z)]}{(Lz-M)^3}, & \text{if } K_2 = 2, \\
\frac{Lz[2L^3z^3+3L^2Mz^2-6LM^2z^2+M^3-2L^2Mz^2\ln(z)]}{2(Lz-M)^4}, & \text{if } K_2 = 3, \\
\frac{Lz[12L^5z^5+65Mz^4L^4-120z^3L^3M^2+60z^2L^2M^3-20zLM^4+3M^5-6L^4Mz^4\ln(z)]}{12(Lz-M)^6}, & \text{if } K_2 = 5, \\
\cdots, & \text{if } K_2 \geq 6.
\end{cases}
\] (31)

We note that there is no uniform format of \( F_Z(z) \) with respect to the number of jamming antennas \( K_2 \). But the closed form expression can be obtained for any given \( K_2 \), some of which are shown in (31).

Finally from (28), the upper bound of the secrecy outage probability of primary network is given by

\[
P_{s, out}^{(up, case 1)} = F_Z(u),
\] (32)

where \( u = \frac{2R_{secrecy}}{L_{th}} (2I_{th} + 1) \).

2) Lower bound - Case 1: On the other hand, from (14) and (26), the upper bound of the secrecy capacity in Case 1 is obtained as

\[
C_{s}^{(up, case 1)} = \left[ \log_2 \left( \frac{\Delta \cdot I_{th} \gamma_{pp}}{(2I_{th} + 1) \gamma_{pe}} \cdot \max_{j=1,\ldots,K_2} \gamma_{d_{j},p} \right) \right]^+.
\] (33)

Then the lower bound of the secrecy outage probability in Case 1 is given by

\[
P_{s, out}^{(low, case 1)} = P(C_{s}^{(up, case 1)} < R_{secrecy}).
\] (34)

Following the same procedures as those in obtaining (32), we have

\[
P_{s, out}^{(low, case 1)} = F_Z(v),
\] (35)

where \( v = \frac{2R_{secrecy} (2I_{th} + 1)}{\Delta L_{th}} \), and \( F_Z(.) \) is given by (32).

B. Case 2 - without the knowledge of the SDj → E jamming channel

The jamming antenna selection rule in Case 2 is given by (15).

1) Upper bound - Case 2: From (15) and (25), the lower bound of the secrecy capacity is obtained as

\[
C_{s}^{(low, case 2)} = \left[ \log_2 \left( \frac{I_{th} \gamma_{pp} \gamma_{d_{j},e}}{(2I_{th} + 1) \gamma_{pe}} \cdot \max_{j=1,\ldots,K_2} \left( \frac{1}{\gamma_{d_{j},p}} \right) \right) \right]^+.
\] (36)
The upper bound of the secrecy outage probability in Case 2 is then given by

\[ P_{s,\text{out}}^{(\text{up, case 2})} = P(C_s^{(\text{low, case 2})} < R_{\text{secrecy}}). \]  

(37)

We let \( X_2 = \max_{j=1,\ldots,K_2} \left( \frac{1}{\gamma_{d,p}} \right) \), \( Y_2 = \frac{\gamma_{pp}}{\gamma_{pe}} \) and \( W_1 = \gamma_{d,e} \). Using the order statistics, the CDF of \( X_2 \) is obtained as

\[ F_{X_2}(x_2) = e^{-\frac{x_2^{K_2}}{\lambda_{dp}^{x_2}}} . \]  

(38)

The PDF-s of \( W_1 \) and \( Y_2 \) are given by

\[ f_{Y_2}(y_2) = \frac{1/L}{(1/L + y_2)^2} \quad \text{and} \quad f_{W_1}(w_1) = \frac{1}{\lambda_{de}} e^{-\frac{w_1}{\lambda_{de}}} . \]  

(39)

respectively.

Further letting \( T_1 = X_2W_1 \), the CDF of \( T_1 \) is given by

\[ F_{T_1}(t_1) = \int_0^\infty F_{X_2}(t_1/w_1)f_{W_1}(w_1)dw_1 = \frac{\lambda_{dp}t_1}{\lambda_{de}K_2 + \lambda_{dp}t_1} . \]  

(40)

Finally we let \( Q = T_1Y_2 \), and obtain the CDF of \( Q \) as

\[ F_{Q}(q) = \int_0^\infty F_{T_1}(q/y_2)f_{Y_2}(y_2)dy_2 = \frac{L\lambda_{dp}qL - K_2\lambda_{de} - K_2\lambda_{de}\ln\left(\frac{\lambda_{dp}qL}{K_2\lambda_{de}}\right)}{(K_2\lambda_{de} - \lambda_{dp}qL)^2} . \]  

(41)

Comparing (37) and (41), we then have

\[ P_{s,\text{out}}^{(\text{up, case 2})} = F_{Q}(u) = \frac{Lu\left[-MK_2 + ul - MK_2\ln\left(\frac{uL}{MK_2}\right)\right]}{(MK_2 - ul)^2}, \]  

(42)

where \( u = \frac{2R_{\text{secrecy}}(2I_{th} + 1)}{I_{th}} \), \( M \) and \( L \) are defined in (29).

2) Lower bound - Case 2: From (26) and (15), the upper bound of the secrecy capacity in Case 2 is obtained as

\[ C_s^{(\text{up, case 2})} = \left[ \log_2 \left( \frac{\Delta \cdot I_{th} \gamma_{pp} \gamma_{d,e}}{(2I_{th} + 1)\gamma_{pe}} \cdot \max_{j=1,\ldots,K_2} \left( \frac{1}{\gamma_{d,p}} \right) \right) \right]^+. \]  

(43)

Then following the similar procedures as those in obtaining (42), we obtain the lower bound of the secrecy outage probability in Case 2 as

\[ P_{s,\text{out}}^{(\text{low, case 2})} = P(C_s^{(\text{up, case 2})} < R_{\text{secrecy}}) = F_{Q}(v), \]  

(44)
where \( v = \frac{2^{R_{\text{secrecy}}} (2 I_{th} + 1)}{\Delta I_{th}} \).

V. ASYMPTOTICAL SECRECY PERFORMANCE

It is shown above that, in both Case 1 and 2, the secrecy performance of the primary network depends on the ratio of \( M = \frac{\lambda_L}{\lambda_J} \), or a larger \( M \) results in better secrecy performance. In fact, \( M \) to the secrecy outage probability is similar as the SNR to the data transmission outage probability. Thus it is of great interest to analyze the asymptotical secrecy performance that is, when \( M \to \infty \), how the secrecy performance varies with the number of jamming antenna \( K_2 \). Similar to the conventional data transmission, the asymptotical secrecy performance includes the secrecy diversity order and coding gain.

When \( M \to \infty \), the secondary source \( SS \) transmission has little effect on the eavesdropping capacity so that the secrecy outage probability is close to the upper bound. Thus the secrecy diversity order and coding gain can be defined based on the upper bound of the secrecy outage probability. To be specific, the secrecy diversity order is defined as

\[
 d_s = \lim_{M \to \infty} \log_{10} \frac{P_{s; out}^{(up)}(K = K_b)}{M}. \tag{45}
\]

Similar to the classic diversity order, the secrecy diversity order reflects the decreasing rate of the secrecy outage probability with respect to the antenna number \( K_2 \).

On the other hand, the secrecy coding gain can be defined as

\[
 c_s = \lim_{M \to \infty} 10 \log_{10} P_{s; out}^{(up)}(K = K_b) - \lim_{M \to \infty} 10 \log_{10} P_{s; out}^{(up)}(K = K_2). \tag{46}
\]

where \( P_{s; out}^{(up)}(K) \) is the secrecy outage probability if there are \( K \) antenna available for jamming antennas selection, \( K_2 \) is the number of available jamming antennas, \( K_b \) is the number of jamming antennas in the baseline system for comparison. As will be shown below, we let \( K_b = 2 \) and \( K_b = 1 \) in Case 1 and Case 2 respectively. It is clear from (46) that the secrecy coding gain reflects the ‘shift’ of the secrecy outage probability with respect to the antenna number \( K_2 \).

A. Case 1 - with the knowledge of the \( SD_j \to E \) jamming channel

From (31), and ignoring lower orders of \( M \) terms, we have

\[
 \lim_{M \to \infty} P_{s; out}^{(up, \text{ case 1})} = \begin{cases} 
 L_z \cdot \ln(M) M^{-1}, & \text{if } K_2 = 1, \\
 \frac{L_z}{K_2 - 1} M^{-1}, & \text{if } K_2 \geq 2.
\end{cases} \tag{47}
\]
Substituting (47) into (45) gives the secrecy diversity order in Case 1. To be specific, if \( K_2 = 1 \), the secrecy diversity order is obtained as

\[
d_s^{\text{(case 1)}}(K_2 = 1) = - \lim_{M \to \infty} \frac{\log_{10}(Lz \cdot \ln(M)M^{-1})}{\log_{10} M} \\
= - \lim_{M \to \infty} \frac{\log_{10}(Lz)}{\log_{10} M} - \lim_{M \to \infty} \frac{\log_{10}(\ln(M))}{\log_{10} M} - \lim_{M \to \infty} \frac{\log_{10}(M^{-1})}{\log_{10} M}
\]

(48)

And if \( K_2 \geq 2 \), the secrecy diversity order is given by

\[
d_s^{\text{(case 1)}}(K_2 \geq 2) = - \lim_{M \to \infty} \frac{\log_{10}(Lz \cdot (K_2 - 1)M^{-1})}{\log_{10} M} = 1
\]

(49)

Combining (48) and (49), we obtain the secrecy diversity order in Case 1 as

\[
d_s^{\text{(case 1)}} = 1.
\]

(50)

On the other hand, as is shown in (47), \( \lim_{M \to \infty} P_{\text{up, case 1}}^{(up, case 1)} \) has a uniform expression for \( K_2 \geq 2 \). Thus we let \( K_b = 2 \) in (46) as a baseline to define the secrecy coding gain in Case 1 as

\[
c_s^{\text{(case 1)}} = \lim_{M \to \infty} 10 \log_{10} P_{\text{up, case 1}}^{(up, case 1)}(K = 2) - \lim_{M \to \infty} 10 \log_{10} P_{\text{up, case 1}}^{(up, case 1)}(K = K_2).
\]

(51)

Substituting (47) into (51) gives the secrecy coding gain in Case 1 as

\[
c_s^{\text{(case 1)}} = 10 \log_{10}(K_2 - 1), \quad \text{for } K_2 \geq 2.
\]

(52)

B. Case 2 - without the knowledge of the SD_{j} → E jamming channel

From (42), and ignoring lower orders of \( M \) terms, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability for Case 2 is given by

\[
\lim_{M \to \infty} P_{\text{s, out}}^{(up, case 2)} = \frac{Lz}{K_2} \cdot \ln(M)M^{-1}.
\]

(53)

Substituting (53) into (45) gives the secrecy diversity order in Case 2 as

\[
d_s^{\text{(case 2)}} = - \lim_{M \to \infty} \frac{\log_{10}(Lz/K_2 \cdot \ln(M)M^{-1})}{\log_{10} M} = 1.
\]

(54)

On the other hand, because (53) holds for any \( K_2 \), we let \( K_b = 1 \) in (46) as a baseline to define the
secrecy coding gain in Case 2 as

\[ c_s^{(\text{case 2})} = \lim_{M \to \infty} 10 \log_{10} P_{s, \text{out}}^{(\text{up, case 2})}(K = 1) - \lim_{M \to \infty} 10 \log_{10} P_{s, \text{out}}^{(\text{up, case 2})}(K = K_2). \]  

Substituting (53) into (55) gives secrecy coding gain in Case 2 as

\[ c_s^{(\text{case 2})} = 10 \log_{10}(K_2). \]  

C. Discussion

It is clear from (50) and (54) that, in both Case 1 and 2, the secrecy diversity order is 1. Or the decreasing rate of the secrecy outage probability with respect to \( M \) is always 1, no matter how many transmission jamming antennas are used at the secondary destination.

On the other hand, it is shown in (52) and (56) that, with more transmission jamming antenna for selection at the secondary destination, the secrecy outage performance still improves due to the coding gain. It is interesting to note that (52) and (56) are consistent, because they are defined based on \( K_b = 2 \) and \( K_b = 1 \) as the baselines respectively.

Therefore, in both Case 1 and 2, the jamming antenna selection at the secondary destination leads to the secrecy coding gain, but not the diversity gain. This contrasts sharply with the traditional antenna selection approaches for data transmission, where the diversity order usually goes up with the antenna number. The analysis also shows that, even without the knowledge of the \( \text{SD} \to \text{E} \) jamming channel gains, the secrecy performance still improves with the jamming antenna selection.

VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS

In this section, we provide theoretical and simulation results to verify the proposed dual antenna selection scheme in the CR network. In the simulation, the CR network consists of one pair of primary source \( PS \) and destination \( PD \), and one pair of secondary source \( SS \) and destination \( SD \). Except for \( SD \), all nodes are equipped with a single antenna. While there are multiple antennas at \( SD \), the antenna numbers are respectively set for different simulations. All channels are Rayleigh flat fading and channel coefficients remains unchanged during one time slot but vary independently from one time slot to another. The average channel gains for different channel groups, \( PS \to SD_i, SS \to SD_i, SD_i \to E \) and \( SD_j \to PD \) respectively, can be different but the channels within each of the above groups are i.i.d. For example, the average channel gains for \( PS \to SD_1, \ldots, PS \to SD_M \) are the same, but the average channel gains for
PS \rightarrow SD_1 \text{ and } SS \rightarrow SD_1 \text{ may be different. This describes a typical CR network, and the different average channel gains for each group represent different path-loss for every node at various locations within the network. All simulation results are obtained by averaging over 1,000,000 independent runs. Other parameters including the data transmission rate and target secrecy rate are set individually for every simulation.}

Fig. 2. The secrecy outage probabilities vs target secrecy rate with $K_2 = 5$.

Fig. 2 (a) and (b) show the secrecy outage probability of the primary network vs target secrecy rate in Case 1 and 2 respectively, where we set the number of jamming antenna as $K_2 = 5$, the average channel gains as $\lambda_{pp} = 55 \text{ dB}$, $\lambda_{sp} = \lambda_{pd} = 20 \text{ dB}$, $\lambda_{se} = 10 \text{ dB}$, $\lambda_{pe} = 40 \text{ dB}$, $\lambda_{de} = 30 \text{ dB}$, $\lambda_{dp} = 20 \text{ dB}$ and $\lambda_{dd} = 1 \text{ dB}$, the interference constraint level at the primary destination as $I_{th} = 3$ and the data transmission rate at the secondary source $SS$ as $R_{data} = 2 \text{ bps/Hz}$. Both the simulation results and theoretical upper and lower bounds are shown. It is clear that, in both cases, the simulation results lie between the lower and upper bounds, which well verifies the secrecy outage analysis for the primary network in Section IV. Specifically, when the average $SS \rightarrow E$ channel is small ($\lambda_{se} = 5 \text{ dB}$) or large ($\lambda_{se} = 70 \text{ dB}$), the simulation results are close to the upper bounds. This is because that, at the eavesdropper, the signals from $SS$ can be ignored when $\lambda_{se}$ is small, or successfully decoded and subtracted from the received signal when $\lambda_{se}$ is large. For other $SS \rightarrow E$ channel gains, the simulation results lie between the upper and lower bounds. Comparing Fig. 2 (a) and (b) also reveals that Case 1 has better secrecy performance than Case 2. This is as expected because Case 1 has the knowledge of the $SD \rightarrow E$ jamming channel.
and Case 2 does not.

![Graph](image)

Fig. 3. The secrecy outage probabilities for two cases vs $M = \lambda_{de}/\lambda_{dp}$ (dB).

Fig. 3 shows the secrecy outage probabilities vs $M = \lambda_{de}/\lambda_{dp}$, where we set $I_{th} = 1$, the secrecy target rate as $R_{st} = 4$ bps/Hz and the average gain ratio $L = \lambda_{pe}/\lambda_{pp} = -5$ dB. Fig. 3 verifies the following analysis.

- In both Case 1 and 2, the secrecy performance of the primary network improves with more jamming antennas.
- In both Case 1 and 2, the secrecy diversity orders for all jamming antenna numbers $K_2$ are always 1, as are given by (50) and (54) respectively. For example, for $K_2 = 5$ in Case 1, when $M$ increases from 40 to 50 dB, the secrecy outage probability approximately drops from -37 to -47dB.
- In Case 1, the secrecy coding gain is $10 \log_{10}(K_2 - 1)$, as is given by (52). For example, for $M = 50$ dB, the secrecy outage difference between $K_2 = 2$ and $K_2 = 5$ is about 6 dB, which well matches the theoretical coding gain for $K_2 = 5$ as $10 \log_2(5 - 1) \approx 6$ dB. Note that in Case 1, the baseline system for coding gain definition is based on $K_2 = 2$.
- In Case 2, the secrecy coding gain is $10 \log_{10}(K_2)$, as is given by (56). For example, for $M = 50$ dB, the secrecy outage difference between $K_2 = 5$ and $K_2 = 1$ is about 7 dB, which well matches the theoretical coding gain for $K_2 = 5$ as $10 \log_{10}(5) \approx 7$ dB. Note that in Case 1, the baseline system for coding gain definition is based on $K_2 = 1$.

Thus Fig. 3 clearly shows that, in both Case 1 and 2, the jamming antenna selection at the secondary destination leads to coding gain rather than the diversity gain in the secrecy outage probability.
Fig. 4. The outage probability vs $N = \lambda_{sd}/\lambda_{pd}$ of the data transmission in the secondary network.

Fig. 4 shows the outage probability for data transmission in the secondary network vs $N = \lambda_{sd}/\lambda_{pd}$, where we set the target data rate in the secondary network as $R_t = 4$ bps/Hz, $\lambda_{sp} = \lambda_{pd} = 20$ dB, the power constraint level as $I_{th} = 1$ or 3. Both the simulation and theoretical results are presented, which are shown perfectly match. It is clearly shown in Fig. 4 that, for both $I_{th} = 1$ and 3, the outage probability decreases with more receiving antennas and the improvement is clearly from the diversity gain. This well verifies the analysis in Section III that the antenna selection leads to the diversity gain for the data transmission in the secondary network.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

This paper proposed the dual antenna selection scheme in the secure CR network. This was achieved by applying full duplex transmission at the secondary user. The outage probability for both the data transmission in the secondary network and secrecy performance in the primary network were analyzed, where the analysis showed that the antenna selection leads to diversity gain for the secondary data transmission and coding gain for the primary secrecy performance respectively. Numerical simulation results were also shown to well verify the analysis in this paper. Both the analysis and simulations showed that the proposed scheme describes an attractive scheme in the secure CR network.

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