The impact of low and middle level policing on the social organisation of the drug scene

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THE IMPACT OF LOW AND MIDDLE LEVEL POLICING ON THE SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF THE DRUG SCENE

1997

Submitted by:
John Neville

LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY
PH.D.
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INTRODUCTION

The trade in illegal drugs in the last decade has developed at an alarming rate and now is the world's fastest growing criminal activity. Any estimation of its scale and profits can only be very loose but present estimates of profits in excess of £150 billion per year are not unrealistic. The world drug picture is one of growth. The producing countries within South America, Asia, and elsewhere have increased their production while within the United Kingdom drug abuse and the related problems which are connected with it are reported to be on the increase. The number of people who use drugs and how much they spend on their habit is not known. For example, the Marquess of Bristol is said to have spent £7.5 million on drugs. Although this may be an isolated example, we do know that large amounts of personal income are being diverted into illicit drug consumption. The number of young people who have tried drugs in Britain has been estimated to be a quarter to a third of all youth. In 1993 the number of drug addicts increased by 19 per cent to a record 24,700; world wide this number has been estimated at 125 million (The Times October 15, 1993).

Drug seizures have risen by 182 per cent between 1987 and 1992 (The Guardian, Wednesday June 1, 1994.) and increased arrests seem to have had little effect on controlling the problem. Libertarians would argue that much of the reason for the lack of success in the "war against drugs" is rooted in the ideas and legislation that originated in the 1960s, a decade which was filled with fear due to an increase of drug use and social unrest among many of the young. Drug policies were then formulated based on a reaction to these factors and with a limited knowledge or understanding of the true nature of the problem. Conservatives, on the other hand would argue that these increasing seizures and convictions of traffickers have proved that policing has been effective in the interdiction of illicit drugs entering the country. They would also argue that strong legislation and penalties have deterred many would be users from starting to experiment with drugs.
Government policies over the last two decades have seen the solution to the increasing drug problem in terms of stronger law enforcement and drug legislation. However present day thinking among some judges, politicians, and senior police officers is beginning to question the wisdom of this approach. They see the drug problem much less as a police problem but more as a social, health, and welfare problem. Others in similar positions argue that law enforcement still has an important role to play in reducing the drug problem. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) during their conference in June 1994 was firmly of the view that the police service must lead in the fight against the drug problem and there can be no compromise on the stance against drug trafficking at all levels. It is their view that society needs to express its disapproval of experimentation with drugs by not relaxing present legislation in favour of a more libertarian position that would see some drugs becoming decriminalised. Sir Paul Condon, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, has argued that changing the law (decriminalisation of some drugs) would have no effect at all on decreasing the drug problem. "Drug dealing is big business with powerful forces behind it, cutting the supply is the job of the police. We have to find ways of stopping drugs entering Britain, seizing them when they do, and ensuring tough penalties for dealers when caught" (Sunday Express, September 11, 1994). The question of how successful present day policies and law enforcement efforts are at influencing the drug market is still open to debate and requires much more research.

Purpose Of The Research

The purpose of this research is to determine the impact of low and middle level policing on the social organization of drug dealing and drug using and the outcome these activities have on the community. This study will investigate the impact the Nottinghamshire police service have on the social organization of the local drug scene within a geographically defined area of the City of Nottingham.
The general aim of the study is to provide an analysis of the activities of low and middle drug dealers and their customers in the context of their street environment and the impact that local policing has on the illicit drug market and community.

The first chapter describes the role of the police in the drug market and the troubled environment in which they are expected to enforce present drug legislation. This chapter also addresses the increased pressure on policing by the press, public, and all levels of government to become more accountable for the enforcement of these laws.

The second chapter looks at how the "drug problem" has been defined and offers an historical explanation of how the "drug problem" has been constructed as a policing issue and how the government has attempted to respond to it. This chapter also examines the evolution of government drug policies from the 1920s to the present. Within this period of time there has been an evolution in policy definition which has seen the government define the drug problem in terms of personal choice, to a social problem, to a medical problem, and now to a crime control problem. This change of definitions regarding drug policies are discussed by examining the three key issues which are believed to be the cause:

The rise in national crime rates with a vague awareness of a close relationship between drug use and crime.

The Vietnam War gave rise to student protests. The youth question was a matter of high public profile, and a concern with drug misuse was a constant accompaniment to this preoccupation that amounted to a sustained moral panic (Pearson, 1991)
The expansion of drug use was beginning to spread out of London and other deprived inner-city areas and into other areas throughout England.

The third chapter discusses the aims and objectives on which the project is based and the methods used in the data collection process. This chapter also explores some of the methodological and ethical issues encountered in the implementation of the field study.

Chapter four discusses some methodological issues confronted by the researcher while conducting the project. This chapter focuses on some of the problems encountered while attempting to undertake the research.

Chapter five explores the ethnographic process which was undertaken and the problems of "getting in" and being accepted within the drug culture in order to conduct the research.

Chapter six suggests that the illicit drug markets in the United Kingdom is more than heroin, cocaine and marijuana. It encompasses a complete line of designer drugs and prescription drugs which end up on the street. These markets vary a great deal across drugs and over time and have been widely growing since the 1960s. Where do the drugs come from? How do these drugs enter the market place? How does the market place work? Who are the customers? How are drugs distributed? These are central questions in determining the impact the police have on the drug scene. This chapter not only examines these issues but also discusses the economics of the illicit drug market and the effect it has on the economy as a whole.
The seventh chapter defines the drug taking and drug dealing populations within Nottingham. It also describes the demographic characteristics of the drug dealing population of Nottingham. In addition, it discusses the different trafficking groups and the economics of street-level drug dealing in the city.

The eighth chapter discusses the development and structure of drug enforcement policies from the 1985 Broom Report to 1993. It also reviews the present day assumptions which are held by the police regarding the manner in which the drug market operates. It is these assumptions of the structure and working of the drug market that define present day enforcement strategies by the police.

Chapter nine provides an insight into both supply-side, demand-side, and harm minimization methods which are presently being used by the police to combat the drug problem. Within this chapter the use of informants is discussed as one of the tactics commonly used by all drug squads. This chapter sets the stage for chapter eight which explores in detail the drug enforcement methods at a local level in Nottingham.

Chapter ten discusses present indicators such as price and purity of drugs seized, and seizure and arrest rates which are used to judge policing effectiveness. Within this chapter suggestions are made as to why these present indicators may in fact be inappropriate and why alternative methods should be used.

Chapters eleven and twelve use empirical data collected during 18 months of field research to determine policing effectiveness. In determining effectiveness, indicators discussed in chapter nine were used. These indicators measured not only traditional variables such as price and purity, seizures, and arrests, but also measured variables such as the perception and attitudes of
shopkeepers, residents, and drug dealers on policing impact on the drug market.

Chapter thirteen suggests that, unlike other forms of crime, the taking and selling of drugs involves a large number of individuals from all walks of life. The involvement of such a diverse population creates certain enforcement problems which are not common in other forms of crime. It is these problems which influence policing impact and effectiveness.

The final chapter offers a summary of what lessons we have learned over the past decade and presents a more pragmatic and radical way forward for policing the drug market. This way forward in part argues that for policing to be effective they must regard the drug problem as a priority. This would require ACPO to call on the government to commit to a partnership with other community agencies in tackling the harm which is caused by drug dealing and by drugs. The role of the police in drug enforcement should take on a more radical role. Rather than attempting to eliminate drug dealing which may be far beyond their control, the police should work in partnership with the community so that their role becomes one of reducing drug related harm within that community.
CHAPTER ONE
POLICING THE PUBLIC

After a century of quiet evolution, within the last two decades the role of the police and their methods of dealing with the public have come under considerable scrutiny and criticism. This increased pressure on policing to become more accountable has come from three fronts; government, who have started questioning the cost and effectiveness of present policing methods, the public who have become fearful of increased crime rates and what seems to be the inability of the police to deal effectively with these increased crime rates and the newspapers and other forms of media. This demand for more accountability has come about for four reasons.

First, soaring crime rates and the public's perception of the inability of the justice system to adequately protect the community and at the same time punish and deter individuals from committing crimes have produced widespread disillusionment with policing. Reported crime over the period from 1979 to 1989 has increased from 2,607 crimes per 100,000 population to 3,900, an increase of over 66 per cent and violent crimes such as homicide have increased from 352 homicides in 1971 to over 600 in 1989. However, the primary clear-up rate has fallen from 45 per cent in 1971 to 34 per cent in 1987 and in London for the year 1982 the clear up rate was 17 per cent. (Criminal Statistics England and Wales, 1989, Home Office). For the year 1993 the overall primary clear-up rate of all offences for England and Wales was only 15 per cent (Notifiable Offences, 1994, Home Office Statistical Bulletin).

Second, law enforcement is expensive. The actual cost of law enforcement is difficult to calculate but if one bases costs on personnel which accounts for 70 per cent of the overall budget the increase over time is apparent. From the years 1950 to 1984 police personnel which includes civilians in Great Britain have increased from 76,379 to 141,800 (White and Brown, 1986). At an average cost of £17,000 per person per year the
personnel budget for 1984 would be £2,712,792,000 yet crime increases and the clean-up rate decreases. The Government's Financial Management Initiative (HMSO, 1982) has demanded tighter fiscal policies and has sought to foster tighter management control and has encouraged the more precise measurement of the outputs. Within this environment of fiscal accountability the police have been called upon, especially in larger urban areas to increase their efforts against the growing problems associated with the illicit drug market.

Third, for the police to be effective they must have the support of the larger society in which they function. This support is based on the image of the police as being honest and above corruption, yet there is evidence that police officers have failed to honour the conditions upon which public consent depends. This public acceptance and approval started to diminish with the anti Vietnam War demonstrations in the 1960s, student movement in Great Britain, and a growing middle-class who were highly articulate and were starting to question policing methods.

Starting in the 1960s and continuing to the present day, police institutions have been beset by a number of publicised scandals, controversy and charges of corruption that have rocked public confidence in the police (Reiner, 1985). The first scandal was prior to the passage of the 1964 Police Act which was followed by the Scotland Yard corruption scandal of 1969, to the corruption scandals involving the Metropolitan Drug Squad in the mid 1970s', to the Brixton riots in 1981, and more recently the Birmingham Six, Guildford Four, The Tottenham Three, The Maguire seven, and the disbandment of the West Midlands Crime Squad due to charges of corruption and tampering with evidence. These cases paint the police as dishonest, corrupt and not above breaking the law as a means to their own ends. These views are supported by Lord McCluskey a senior judge, when he told law students in Aberdeen in 1993 (The Times, October 5, 1993) that police do manufacture false confessions, perjure and plant evidence to obtain a conviction. He continued to say he was sceptical when juries were told of confessions made to only one police officer.
It is because of reports such as these that in many communities throughout Great Britain the police are sometimes seen not as a resource worth paying for but rather as corrupt, racist, and brutal individuals. This image must affect their ability to maintain law and order within most communities and rather than seen as an ally in the fight against crime they appear as the enemy.

Fourth, law and order themes are a basic staple of news reporting; 25 per cent of all copy in newspapers comprise law and order themes (Reiner, 1986). Robert Mark complained in 1974 that the police were the most abused, the most unfairly criticised and the most silent minority in this country (Uglow, 1988). But for the most part the media have portrayed the police in a favourable light. Yet this trend is quickly turning. Reporters are beginning to see themselves as the public's watchdog and lately their reporting of crime is anything but favourable towards the police.

The Sun, an English newspaper, reporting of the beating of Rodney King and the violence which followed in Los Angeles is only one example (The Sun May 1 1992). Cover story: **Five grim-faced cops stand guard amid blazing buildings during riots in Los Angeles yesterday which left at least 13 people dead.** "Mobs ran amok after four white cops filmed beating a black driver were cleared in court. Tanks set to roll in as cops lose control of the city". While in the Sunday Times 24th of May 1992, the report reads **Police in southeast give poor value.** Newman, an English playwright whose latest play, **Black and Blue** portrays the message that "coppers", if they are not lying, stealing or inflicting grievous bodily harm are probably plotting to do so. Newman backs up this statement as true as unnamed policemen told him of their crimes. He asks: "why do we assume that British policemen don't commit murders when policemen in South Africa or America do?" The underlying theme to the television play is in essence about the ultimately corrupting nature of police work, rather than about the individual bad apple (Sunday Times, 20th September 1992). Peter Winship assistant commissioner of The Metropolitan Police said about the media that; "they have greatly misunderstood us over the
last four years and have treated us unkind. The media have encouraged the public to see us as Leviathan... out of touch, out of control, profligate and spectacularly unsuccessful" (Sunday Times, 20 Sept. 1992).

The media's ability to create undo panic in regards to some forms of crime and their reporting of those who represents the "dangerous classes" in most cases little resemblance to official statistics. Their reporting is usually misleading and creates a picture of criminal chaos which is beyond the control of the police. Stuart Hall's analysis of the press coverage of the "mugging panic of 1973-4" is an example of how the press manufactured moral panic about crime which was based on flimsy statistical evidence of the image of the unsafe streets (Uglow, 1988). This type of reporting is even more prominent in the area of the drug/crime connection. As early as 1972 the "People" newspaper revealed the dubious practices of the Metropolitan police Drug Squad and the rake-offs from Soho pornographers.

This type of reporting continued when Robert Stutman, then a US drug enforcement agent, was invited by the Association of Chief Police Officers to speak at their conference in Wales in April of 1989. He told the conference how crack had entered the United States and how an epidemic had followed. He painted a picture of crack cocaine being out of control in Great Britain within two years. His comments were picked up by the press as they were meant to be. For example, The Sun, 25th May 1989: "Terrifying statistics show that 75% of crack users who are usually aged between 16 and 35 become hopelessly addicted by inhaling the cocaine derivative just three times". By the late summer of 1989 and into 1990 The Independent and the Times had run similar stories (Uglow, 1988).

The reporting of the drug epidemic and the stories which have followed have as their primary focus the increase in crime and violence as a direct result of drug use. Customs Cut Sparks Fears Of Drugs Flood... "Customs officers cuts at East Midlands International Airport will mean a huge increase
in drugs entering the country.... It will mean more lives lost to addiction and more crime committed by those desperately seeking any means to fund their habit" (Herald & Post, September 18, 1992). The Sunday Times, November 14, 1992. **Crack takes grip on Britain's shires** ... "Crack, the highly addictive cocaine derivative, is spreading to Britain's shires. The drug, normally associated with crime and violence within the deprived inner cities, is now regularly being found in county towns and commuter areas." The Times on the same day also ran **The seeds of Misery** ... "In the United States it has generated a wave of violence, human suffering and social disruption unprecedented in the nation's history. Now the crack curse may be about to burst with similar vengeance on the British drug scene and bring with it the crime and violence which has accompanied it in the U.S.A."

The fear which has been associated with illicit drugs and the violence connected with it has been presented by the Conservative Government as a lack of respect for law and order and a major legal problem. By presenting the drug problem in this manner it then justifies an increase in law enforcement resources in an attempt to correct a situation that at best may only be a reflection of a greater social problem. The solution, rather than confronting the larger social problem is seen in terms of greater law enforcement rather than addressing larger social issues. Stronger policing, longer prison sentences, more power given to judges, the legislation of new laws and the development of new policing strategies (Uglow, 1988). Yet, much of the fear which has been associated with the drug problem and the role of policing the illicit drug scene is based on vague and misleading information.
CHAPTER TWO
THE DRUG PROBLEM: A PROBLEM OF DEFINITIONS

Once behaviour has been defined as a social problem it follows that a solution will be proposed. The very way the problem is defined and perceived will set the framework for the solution to be found (MacGregor, 1989: 18).

To understand how the "the drug problem" has been constructed as a policing issue it is important to review the factors related to the evolution of government policy. This shift in definitions has seen drug use evolve from a personal choice, to a social problem, to a medical problem, and to the present crime control problem. MacGregor (1989) discusses this transition and places the shift into four phases.

Prior to 1920 much drug taking was viewed as a matter of personal choice. This first phase ended with the implementation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in 1920. Hitherto drugs were seen by many as a bad habit and a minor form of moral failing on the part of the user. While public opinion did not approve of drug addiction, Victorian society was not in the habit of exposing social vices which did not intrude and could therefore be ignored. The addict may have been regarded as an individual of weak character but not as a criminal. Well into the nineteenth century opium was freely available and moderate habitual use of opium was not considered an addiction; it was felt by many that opium use was less destructive than was alcoholism.

It was not until society started to view drug use and addiction as a disease, which was in need of treatment, that this opinion changed. It was this
concern, along with the struggle between physicians who were attempting to
gain control from pharmacists for the prescribing of opiates, was the impetus
for the government setting up the Rolleston Committee. The basic premise of
the Rolleston Committee was that drug addiction should be regarded as an
expression of mental disorder rather than a form of criminal behaviour
(Pearson, 1991: 174). It was this premise along with the committee's
recommendations that firmly placed the control of opiates in the hands of the
physicians and provided the basis for the treatment of drug problems in the
United Kingdom and what has become known as the "British System.

It was not until the late 1960s that the break-down of the "British System"
started to occur. In part the breakdown was a result of a different type of drug-
taking which involved an increasing number of young people who were
becoming involved in an alternative lifestyle (MacGregor, 170: 1989). This
alternative lifestyle involved an increase in drug use and other pleasure seeking
activities for many young people who otherwise did not fit the previous drug
using profile. This new form of drug-takers prompted the Ministry of Health in
1958 to review existing drug policy. The committee was chaired by Sir Russell
Brain. The major conclusion of his report was that drug addiction had not
increased to any major degree and reaffirmed the principles of the Rolleston
Committee (Pearson, 1991: 175).

In 1964 the second Brain Committee was convened as a result of an
increase in the number of heroin addicts, of which the large majority lived in
London. These new addicts were characterized by a significant lower age.
The Brain Committee claimed that this mini epidemic was due to six London
doctors who had prescribed large amounts of dangerous drugs for individual
patients and that these doctors were well known to London addicts. In 1962
one doctor alone prescribed almost 600,000 tablets of heroin (Leech, 1991: 35).
The Times (13 March 1970) said that over-prescription on drugs by a small
number of "rogue doctors" operating mainly in London was responsible for
much of the development of the British drugs problem. The government at the
time felt that, these *'rogue doctors'* were small in numbers but presented a threat not only to the patients they treated but also a danger to the partnership that existed between the medical and pharmaceutical professions (Ministry of Health, 1965; 6). One solution, therefore, was to control and regulate the prescribing of these drugs. The controlling and regulation of these drugs was the beginning of what many saw as the demise of the *'British System'* and set the stage for the third phase.

The third phase according to MacGregor was known as the Clinic System and involved limiting the prescribing of heroin and cocaine to doctors holding a special licence rather than allowing all physicians to prescribe. This phase saw the addict as an individual in need of rehabilitation and treatment. Methadone programmes were developed as the first stage of treating heroin addicts with the goal of total detoxification. Although this phase reflected a growing concern for treatment the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act marked a shift away from treatment to more of a control orientation system.

The fourth phase was characterized by a shift from a medical model, which had largely focused on treatment and rehabilitation, to that of a crime control model with its focus on legal and penal sanctions. This shift in drug policy was not only a reflection of the social and economic conditions of the time but was also a response to American dominated international drug policy.

As early as 1968, President Nixon had declared a *"War on Drugs"* and was using his influence to control international drug policy. The United States was able to take this role in creating and influencing international policy not only because it was one of the super powers but in most other countries drug abuse was of peripheral concern while in the U.S.A. it was viewed as a serious problem (Kusevic, 1977). This was most apparent during the 1971 U.N. Conference on Drug Abuse. From the very beginning of the Conference it was obvious that its primary goal was more related to domestic American policy than to drug issues. During the convention the American delegation made it
very clear that American international aid and intra-government co-operation was dependent on foreign governments' response to the drug crisis.

In addition to pressure placed on Great Britain from the United States the new direction which drug policies were taking was a reflection of the social and economic conditions of the time. Drug policies of the late 1970s and 1980s therefore, can be seen as a reflection of a larger social and political polarization. There was recognition, by the then Conservative government in the United Kingdom, that political stability would be hard to maintain due primarily to high unemployment. The state of unemployment was causing social unrest in many parts of the country (Benyon and Solomos, 1987). Britain was in the process of undergoing change. High rates of unemployment and mobility among the disenfranchised coupled with the highest level of prosperity within certain sectors of the population created tension and instability within many areas of Britain. In 1981 the national unemployment rate was 12 per cent but in some areas it reached as high as 35 per cent (Pearson, 1991). Given these conditions, the Brixton riot of 1981 and the riots which followed came as no shock. Lord Scarman reported that the disorder occurred in the context of political, social and economic disadvantage which had included high levels of unemployment, poor housing, and widespread racial discrimination (Benyon and Solomos, 1987: 27).

The government and the police, on the other hand, saw this social unrest as a result of a few "riff-raffs" and condemned the disorders as sheer criminality. Those rioters who were involved were seen as people indulging in criminal activities whose sole purpose was to loot and rob. Douglas Hurd, then the Home Secretary said after the Handsworth riots that; "This time there is to be no Scarman. The predominant response now is not that you can do something about the conditions which give rise to these riots; it is all a case of human wickedness" (Benyon and Solomos, 1987: 119-120). Mr. Tebbit said that the Tottenham riots were a result of wickedness and grew out of the moral degeneration of the 1960s, (Benyon and Solomos, 1987: 32). The
government's primary response was based on the theme of law and order. The Conservative Government dictated policing policies to change from a relatively passive non-intervention role to that of a pro-active role of today. The police were to deal firmly and harshly with the individual rioters involved. To assist in this matter the police were given more money, manpower, and equipment. To support this shift new legislative powers for law enforcement such as the Criminal Justice Act of 1982 and the Public Order Act of 1986 were introduced. In addition to this new legislation the powers to stop and search which were granted to the police in the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act were increasingly used.

Accordingly the police came under increased pressure to maintain law and order. In many areas the powers of stop and search were used to target young people and more specifically black youths. These tactics resulted in frequent allegations made by minority groups against the police of harassment and discrimination. After the Handsworth riot it was suggested that a cause for the riot might well have been that of high-profile methods used by the police against the black youth within that district. This was rejected by Chief Constable Dear. Instead he declared: "The rioting was orchestrated by local drug dealers who had become fearful for the demise of their livelihoods and it was fuelled and organised by persons who required a supply of drugs to continue their normal lifestyle" (Benyon and Solomos, 1987: 65).

Based on the political environment of the 1970s and 1980s, the following three factors led to the police taking a more proactive role in the drugs field.

1. The rise in national crime rates in the 1980s with a presumed relationship between drug use and crime.

2. The break-down in what has become known as the "British System" of drug control and the Implementation of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, and

3. The Heroin Epidemic of the 1980s

Within the last three decades the field of crime/drug linkage has been a primary concern of politicians and the public at large. President Nixon started the "war on drugs" in the early 1970s and first launched a strong offensive against drug abuse as part of his law and order platform in 1971. In his message to Congress on June 17, 1971 President Nixon stated that the drug abuse problem and resulting crime had reached a national epidemic (McBride and McCoy, 1981). The dope menace became a national neurosis and the addict came to be regarded as a criminal degenerate who would stop at nothing to indulge his vice. In Canada due to the increasing drug problem of the 1960s, the Canadian Government set up the LeDain Commission to enquire into the non-medical use of drugs. In Great Britain this same concern was reflected. The Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, referred to the "flood of hard drugs", and described it as the most serious peace-time threat to our national well-being (Stimson, 1987). He went on to state further:

Western society is faced by a warlike threat from the hard drug industry.... The traffickers in hard drugs amass princely income from the exploitation of human weakness, boredom and misery. The war has never been openly declared and the drug traffic infiltrates insidiously into Western countries.... the ruthlessness of the big drug dealers must be met by equally ruthless penalties once they are caught, tried and convicted... The American practice, which we unhesitatingly support, is to give the courts Draconian powers in both civil and criminal law to strip drug dealers of all their assets acquired from their dealings in drugs. Drug dealers must be made to lose everything, their homes, their money and all that they possess which can be attributed to their profits from selling drugs (Home Affairs Committee, Session 1984-85: iv-v).
Although in Great Britain the crime and drug causal nexus, which was first linked in the 1970s, (Mott, 1991: 77) was one of the primary reason for this country's own "War on Drugs" and the draconian legislation which followed. Nevertheless, there is considerable disagreement throughout the western world concerning the nature of the drug/crime relationship. The link between drugs and crime and the debate which it created has raised three questions. The first is to what extent does drug use lead to criminal behaviour? The second question is to what extent is drug use an extension of a deviant and criminal life style? The third question is what is the possibility that there is a set of common causes or circumstances from which both criminal behaviour and drug use emerge?

Drug-Crime Connection
Nurco, et al. (1985) suggest that drug abuse can be directly and indirectly correlated with certain types of crime. They argue that by definition the buying and selling of certain drugs is an illegal act but that a large proportion of the crimes committed does not consist merely of drug sales or possession, but involves other criminal behaviours including serious crime (Nurco, et al., 1985: 94). They say that, "Their involvement in crime is frequent, persistent, and widespread in scope. It may be said that narcotic addiction is an integral part of the national crime problem". Jarvis and Parker (1989) also conclude that: "... young heroin takers clearly commit a massive amount of acquisitive crime".

Miller, et al. (1990) also suggests that alcohol, alcoholism and drug abuse is one of the main causes of family violence. In addition, Kuttner and Lorinz (1967) indicated that drug abuse was involved in 95 per cent of all family violence and in 85 per cent of all serious crimes such as rape, homicide and suicide. Regardless of the kind of crime, it has been well documented that the vast majority of all Indian crime is drug related. This position was stated even more emphatically by Paul Tappan (1960: 25-26) when he said, "The addict of lower socioeconomic class is a criminal primarily because illicit narcotics are
costly and because he can secure his daily requirement only by committing crimes that will pay for them*.

Within Great Britain, although there was a concern about the link between drugs and crime which dated to the Victorian era, it was not until the 1970s that drug misuse was seen as a major cause of criminal behaviour (Mott, 1991: 77). It has been suggested there was no economic necessity to do so as doctors could prescribe drugs such as heroin and cocaine (Mott, 1993). From the 1980s the research which has been undertaken has attempted to support the drug/crime connection. One of the first was a study conducted by D'Orban and Bewley (1970). This study is unique in that it deals exclusively with women. It was found that of the total number of addicts (N=66) admitted in 1967 to Holloway Prison 60 per cent had a history of court appearances after the onset of drug use. Jarvis and Parker (1989) in their ethnographic study of 61 known male and female users stated that 68 per cent reported no criminal activity prior to heroin use. They estimated that of the 32 per cent of heroin users who committed burglaries during their study, 24 per cent committed theft from the person and 41 per cent committed shoplifting. They continued to say that "Common-sense" notions about drug takers have long supposed that so-called addicts commit crime in order to finance their habits. Recent empirical research has borne out the truth of this assertion*. ... [furthermore] The dramatic rise in the number of heroin users in Britain during the early 1980s has elevated the possible drug-crime connection to a matter of major political and policy concern (Jarvis and Parker, 1989: 167).

Yet Mott states that many assumptions have had to be made about the number of users and about the frequency with which they committed offences. "These estimates therefore should be regarded as nothing more than informed speculation or guess-stimates* (Mott, 1993: 221). Moore (1977: 91) also suggests that property offences finance a much smaller proportion of the addicts' total heroin consumption than is usually assumed.
It must be remembered that, within this model, individuals become criminals because of their addiction; they do not become addicts because they are criminals (Grab and Crim, 1966). Another interpretation, but one which still maintains a causal nexus between crime and drugs reverses the cause and effect. This interpretation is usually derived from the fact that illegal income is often spent to purchase illegal drugs.

Crime-Drug Connection
Hammersley (1989) suggest that the argument related to the drug/crime relationship can exist in the opposite direction and that one of the best indicators in predicting crime is drug use. He concludes that rather than drug use or addiction being a root cause it is more likely to be a symptom of a criminal lifestyle.

Eldridge (1952) argued that because heroin use is illegal, and the source and distribution of heroin was a part of a criminal underworld, few non-criminal innocents were seduced into the initiation of heroin use. Other authors such as Faupel and Klockars (1987), Inciardi (1981), and Collins (1981) also express similar positions. It has been recognised that there is a link between drug abuse and criminal behaviour but what that link is, is still unclear. Collins adds:

Although there is abundant evidence to indicate that drug abuse and criminal behaviour are linked the exact nature of the relationship remains ambiguous. It is by no means clear whether the often demonstrated relationship is causal or only statistical; whether drug abuse is a cause of crime or merely a correlate (Collins, 1981: 12).

In most analysis, drug use is not usually viewed as the initiating motive for criminal behaviour, but rather as a reason for maintaining or increasing involvement in criminal behaviour, (McBride and McCoy, 1982). For, example, earlier studies showed that a large proportion of illicit drug users have engaged
in criminal activities prior to the initiation of drug use and much of their crime did not appear to be directly related to illicit drug use.

Two studies conducted by Drapkin and Landau (1966 and 1970) of Israeli hashish users indicate that drug use followed criminality in temporal order. Both studies concluded that hashish use began as a result of socialization into the criminal subculture (Drapkin and Landau, cited in Greenberg and Alder, 1974). Ball (1976), using a population of heroin addicts at the Lexinton Narcotics Hospital, found that the mean age of first arrest for his sample of 2,213 was two years prior to the initiation of narcotics use. Voss and Stephen (1973) found that 57 per cent of a sample of hospitalized addicts had been arrested before they first used narcotics, and Nurco (1976) found that opiate addicts were arrested more often when "off" opiates than when on. Dai (1970) reported that out of 1,047 cases in which both the year of addiction and the number of previous criminal records were known, it was reported that 846 (80.8 per cent) had no criminal records before addiction. The results of the above studies suggest that the increase in criminal activity after first addiction can be explained on the basis of an age-related increase in criminal tendencies rather than due to the onset of addiction (Speckart and Anglin, 1986).

Finally, there are several studies in the volume by Greenberg and Alder (1974) which deals with drugs other than heroin or hashish, that examine the relationship between addiction and crime. Two of these studies were conducted in the mid 1960s by Scott and Buckell (1971). Their first study dealt with amphetamine use among juveniles admitted to London remand homes. They found that nearly 1 out of 5, \( n = 600 \) showed positive results of urine tests for amphetamines and that of those who had used the drug the majority had used it after the onset of delinquency. On this basis, Scott and Buckell (1971) concluded that amphetamine use in the mid 60s' was an expression of a delinquent life style.
In their second study, five years later using the same methodology and target population the same authors found that amphetamines use had dropped to only 1 in 20. This led them to suggest that amphetamine use and perhaps drug use in general was not the causal factor in producing delinquency but rather was simply another expression of criminal behaviour which can pass in and out of fashion. This supposition is supported by the study conducted by Chien et al. (1966) where they concluded that drug use was a versatile part of a delinquent subculture as was crime and other forms of delinquent behaviour. It may well be that illicit drug abusers and criminals are drawn from the same neighbourhood and population, rather than one derived from the other.

**Societal Connection**

The great majority of the drugs and crime research has been conducted in an attempt to show a causal relationship between the two. Rather than attempting to show a causal relationship the issues of crime and drug abuse must be seen as parallel problems which are affected by common variables. This point is reinforced by McBride and Mcoy.

Data implies that intervention into the individual crime - drug relationship by treating narcotics abuse and thereby hoping to reduce criminal behaviour may be fallacious. If property crime and narcotics use are a product of the same neighbourhood context, then breaking the individual relationship without affecting the context in which both types of behaviour emerged would have little long-term influence on the occurrence of criminal behaviour, drug-using behaviour, or the existence of drug-using criminals (McBride and Mcoy, 1981: 298).

Such studies have attempted to attribute crime to individual pathologies and in doing so have focused on psychological traits with a biological origin which assume the addict is functioning with free will. These individuals
calculate the costs and benefit and then act on the basis of their perceived consequences. By doing so, they fail to acknowledge the social context within which individuals function.

This approach does not consider sociological variables such as social class, peer influence, labour markets, community structure, education, individual mobility, and political economy (Cohen and Scull, 1985). Chien et al. (1966), for example, argued that for sociological variables to be relevant they do not have to impinge directly on the individual but rather they could generate social climates which are more or less hospitable to a particular form of aberrant behaviour. This ecological perspective is well accepted in relationship to physical environment and the influence on behaviour that buildings, space and layout of housing projects have on criminal behaviour (Stark, 1987).

The ecological theory of crime was first presented by Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) and later made popular by Shaw and Mckay (1942) where they identified a clear and obvious difference in the rate of delinquency over a wide range of neighbourhoods. The most significant observation was the zonal arrangements of many variables such as high population densities and physical deterioration in the centre, low density and better conditions on the periphery. Thus, high rates of delinquency were found in inner-city areas characterised by deteriorated rented property, by high population density, by large migrant populations and by the relative scarcity of social amenities.

Rodney Stark (1987) takes this theory one stage farther when he discusses "Deviant Places". Stark asked the question:

How is it that neighbourhoods can remain the site of high crime and deviance rates despite a complete turnover in their populations? If the Garfield district was tough because Italians lived there, why did it stay tough once they moved out? Questions such as these force the perception that the composition of neighbourhoods, in
terms of characteristics of their populations cannot provide an adequate explanation of variations in deviance rates. Instead, there must be something about places as such that sustains crime (Stark, 1987: 893).

The social ecological perspective which views drugs and crime as being the result of the same set of variables, implies that the drug/crime relationship is not due to any causal connection, but rather to the fact that both criminal and drug-use behaviour are the manifestation of the same organism. This would suggest that the statistical association is spurious and that both criminal behaviour and drug using behaviour are the result of the same variables. This view is supported in the article by Wish (1991: 393).

Illicit drug use and crime are both part of a person's general disposition towards deviant behaviour. Drug use may be seen as an outgrowth of a pattern of deviance that began in childhood with dropout from school and early problems with parents and police. The drug use is one manifestation of the proneness to deviance.

The social ecological perspective stems from social disorganisation theory and is reflected in the works of Shaw and McCay, and the Chicago School. The theory of social disorganization states that there is a positive correlation between increasing social complexity of industrial society and higher rates of deviance especially in the larger urban centres were there is an inequality of resources. This theory is based on the assumption that social order and organizations exist when there is a high degree of internal cohesion binding people and their institutions together (Rich, 1979) and that delinquent behaviour is a result of the disintegration of these institutions.
It is well accepted that crime diminishes with age and thus reflects the Hobbesian assumption that human behaviour is not inherently conforming and that the problem of social order facing any society is a recurring one. Where there is an inability of communities to supervise and control teenage peer groups there is a general rise in rates of offending among teenagers. The peaking of offending rates of young adults reflects the criminogenic reinforcement experienced by young people. Whereas, the decline in rates of older persons' offending reflects the powerful institutional pressures for conformity that accompany adulthood. Where there is an absence of institutional pressures to conform, the criminogenic behaviour which is reflected in the involvement of low-yield crime or exploratory behaviour such as drug and alcohol offenses, will continue. This behaviour will be supported within a milieu that finds such activities as crime, drug use, unemployment, and lack of social mobility as part of a functional social network.

The above view is supported by a study of opiate users in Chicago, in which Dia (1970) pointed out that the rate of opiate use was highest in the same areas that Shaw and McKay had found highest in delinquency. Dai did not view opiate use as the cause or effect of criminal behaviour, but rather as a function of the same environmental milieu. Again this concept is supported through the works of Hunt, Lypton, and Spunt (1984) where they found that 61 per cent of methadone clients reported no illicit drug use in the prior week but reported involvement in criminal activities. They reported that the reasons given for their criminal activities were unemployment, "keeping their hand in", and having a good "hustle". These rationalizations were no different from criminals who did not use illicit drugs. Gandossy et al., (1980) suggest that the point which is central to the drug-crime issue is the question of temporal sequencing. Is criminality an antecedent to drug addiction or is criminality a result of addiction? Thay suggests that within the street subculture the sole purpose in life is to experience the "kick and the hustle"; any act that is tabooed by "squares" intensifies the enjoyment of the act and heroin usage is the ultimate kick, while stealing is the ultimate hustle. These acts are part of the
street subculture and are not seen as sequential. Johnston et al., concluded the following:

Nonaddictive use of illicit drugs does not seem to play much of a role in leading users to become the more delinquent people we know them to be on the average. There is a reverse kind of causation which seems considerably more plausible, that is, that delinquency leads to drug use. For example, we think it quite possible that delinquents who, because of their delinquency, become part of a deviant peer group are more likely to become drug users. Drug use is likely to be an approved behaviour in such a peer group. We also think that the correlation between delinquency and drug use stems not only from such environmental factors but also from individual differences in personality. Both delinquency and drug use are deviant behaviours, and therefore, both are more likely to be adopted by individuals who are deviance prone. (Johnston et al., 1978: 155-6).

The question that arises from this theoretical position then is: "Are narcotic addicts drawn from population groups highly susceptible to both crime and addiction and whether this population group would have been arrested if they had not become addicts?" A secondary question which flows from the above is: "Is the simple process of population groups and "places" being labelled deviant likely to increase the probability of being arrested?"

A major problem that has impeded the majority of the crime-drug causal relationship is the use of a unitary model which attempts to define the relationship in terms of a single factor. This unitary model assumes that addicts engage in criminal activities primarily because they need money to support their drug habit. This assumption then produces a causal relationship between drugs/crime and sees the cause of criminality in the characteristics of the individual. The assumption that there is a linkage between drug abuse and crime played a major role in the passage of the Harrison Act of 1914 in the
U.S.A. and has been the impetus for the present United Kingdom government’s strategy on "Tackling Drug Misuse". This assumption then becomes the justification for legal sanctions and other legislation which has similar goals (McBride and McCoy, 1981). An example of this, is the criminalization of the possession of certain drugs. If, in fact, a causal relationship can be shown between drugs and crime the legitimization of legal sanctions becomes justified.

Given the ambiguity regarding the direction of the relationship and the present state of the literature the only definitive statements that can be made regarding the drug/crime nexus are the following:

(1) A large proportion of criminals have engaged in drug use and a large proportion of drug users have engaged in criminal behaviour (Voss and Stephens, 1973);

(2) Part of the relationship between crime and drugs is the result of a legal system that makes the possession of certain drugs illegal in itself (Gandossy, et al, 1980);

(3) Some forms of treatment reduce the use of illicit drugs and reduce crime for some individuals; and

(4) A change in one (crime or drug abuse) is closely related with a change in the other.

The Breakdown of What Has Become Known as the "British System" of Drug Control and the Implementation of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act.

Not only has the drug/crime nexus been a reason in Great Britain to criminalise certain drugs but in addition some have argued that drug use is inherently immoral, while others are motivated by fear and ignorance of the drugs and their effect. Also, in most societies, there is a reluctance to accept the notion of people seeking the altered states of consciousness which these drugs facilitate. Finally there is the idea that drug use is harmful so that society has a responsibility to its weaker members of that society to protect them from themselves. (Nadelmann, 1987). Nadelmann suggests that:
It is the assumption that if the market were legal, the numbers of people who are harmed by their use of these drugs would be far greater than it is today. In a legal market, there would be much easier availability, probably lower prices and no legal sanctions for using the drug so long as no harm resulted to others. Under such conditions, it is feared, the use of these drugs would approximate the numbers associated with use of alcohol and tobacco (Nadelmann, 1987: 22).

Yet others have viewed drug use as a personal choice and that the state should have no authority over morality. Walter Lippmann, who wrote A Preface To Morals in 1942, argues that the state has little authority over an individual's morality and provides a thought-provoking introduction to the subject when he argues:

Nothing in the modern world is more chaotic - not its politics, its business or its sexual relations - than the mind of orthodox moralists who suppose that the problem of morals is somehow to find a way of reinforcing the sanctions which are dissolving. How can we, they say in effect, find formulas and rhetoric potent enough to make men behave?

They have misconceived the moral problem, and therefore they misconceive the function of the moralist. An authoritative code of morals has force and effect when it expresses that settled customs of a stable society, the pharisee can impose upon the minority only such conventions as the majority find appropriate and necessary. But when customs are unsettled, as they are in the modern world, by continual change in the circumstances of life, the pharisee is helpless (Lippmann, 1942: 317).
Other libertarians would also argue that the state has no right to interfere in the individual's choice of consumption irrespective of the nature of the commodity (Graham 1991). This view is supported by the writings of Jeremy Bentham when he said.

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subject will in words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognizes the subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light (Bentham, 1789: 61 in Jacoby, 1978. Classics of Criminology).

In the early 1960s, when a new form of drug-taking appeared, the debate focus on the drug scene and the new drug users. The face of the British drug scene started to change. The Vietnam War gave rise to student protests and the youth question was a matter of high public profile. A concern with drug misuse among the youth was a constant accompaniment to this preoccupation that amounted to a sustained moral panic (Pearson, 1991). In 1962 the media appeared to be painting a picture of a new epidemic of recreational drug use, particularly cannabis and amphetamines, amongst the young. The vast media coverage of illegal drug-taking by young people was due in part to the fact that such behaviour was combined with new lifestyles which were seen as immoral and anti-social. Mr. James Callaghan then the
Secretary of State for the Home Office, in the House of Commons on 25 March 1970 stated:

Drug-taking is a scourge. Compared with even three years ago, the pattern of misuse of drugs is much more complicated and more serious. Then, the main problem was a sharply increasing growth of heroin addiction coupled with a widened use of pep pills, cannabis and L.S.D.. Drug-users, even that short while ago, tended to go for a single drug of their choice. Today, the increase appears to be in all drugs.

Along with this use of cannabis and amphetamines, there also appeared to be a significant shift in the age range of the heroin users. In 1959 only 11 per cent of users were below the age of 35 while in 1964 this figure rose to 40 per cent (Home Office, 1964). The new addicts were largely young men living in and around London.

Not only was the age of the addict changing but so was his legal status. In 1959 there were 454 therapeutic addicts compared with 122 non-therapeutic. By 1965 therapeutic addicts had reached 709 and non therapeutics had reached the same number (Home Office, 1974).

The shift from what had been seen as minor drug taking problem or at the most a contained social problem to that of a drug epidemic among the youth of London demanded a full account of the government's response to the new youth drug problem. The Brain Committee which was set up in 1960 to review the illicit drug situation and had reaffirmed the Rollston report of 1920 that addiction was a medical rather than a criminal matter, was reconvened in 1964. The second Brain Committee acknowledged drug use to be a social as well as an individual problem and recommended the tightening of controls on prescriptions and the development of a system of notification of diagnosed
addicts to the central authorities. It also recommended that treatment centres should have the power to detain addicts for compulsory treatment. These recommendations produced a government resource shift to counteract this new problem and witnessed the establishment of specialist clinics designed to address the needs of problem drug users. They also produced greater co-ordination and co-operation among government agencies in the area of social policy making and implementation. These tendencies of greater co-operation were particularly notable in relation to crime and drug problems (Dorn and South, 1986) and were reflected in paragraph 2 section (a) and (c) of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act.

The primary focus of this Act was mainly the protection of young persons and its concern was to protect young people against drug abuse. The government was conscious that there was a group of young people who were on the way to becoming established drug addicts, often living in socially insecure situations, leaving school early and participating in criminal activities accompanied by abuse of alcohol and drugs. To achieve the aim of protection, new legislation was introduced for strict controls over the legal trade in controlled drugs. Manufactures and wholesalers were required to be licensed by the Secretary of State to carry on their business, and specific licences were required for imports and exports. The Act also laid down procedures for withdrawing from practitioners the right to prescribe controlled drugs if they have been found to have prescribed irresponsibly.

In addition there were three new offences aimed at the trafficker. Clause 4, subsections (2) and (3), created a new offence of being in any way concerned in unlawful supply or production of a controlled drug. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of clause 8 for the first time made it an offence for occupiers or persons concerned in management of premises knowingly to permit unlawful production or supply to take place on their premises. Clause 5(3) created a new offence of possession with intent unlawfully to supply.
Along with increase penalties for trafficking, clause, 23 sections (a), (b) and (c) gave the police powers of search and seizure. These powers allowed the police to stop and search on the basis of reasonable suspicion. This clause also allowed the police to enter the premises of a person carrying on business and to inspect any books or documents related to individuals who have authority to deal in drugs.

In conjunction with this new legislation the development of specialised drugs units were starting to appear throughout Great Britain and regional crime squads were increasingly engaged in investigating drug trafficking. In 1972 the Central Drugs Intelligence Unit was set up to co-ordinate activities between customs and the police and to gather intelligence on drug traffickers. With this new legislation and increased resources the police were given the scope to focus their activities on the drug scene, but it was not until the early 1980s that these powers were truly unleashed.

The Heroin Epidemic of the Eighties
It is clear that the themes that dominated public concern about drugs in the 1980s centred on the question of social and public order (MacGregor, 1989). This discussion was fuelled by the fear of social disintegration and conflict between the legitimate authorities and other sources of power, especially criminal gangs and international organized crime. Drugs and drug users were beginning to be linked with serious crime and violence regardless of the conflicting research reports.

During the 1980s heroin use spread out of London and into other towns throughout England and Scotland where there were high rates of unemployment and other forms of social deprivation. Heroin misuse had started becoming a serious problem in many towns where prior to the 1980s it had been almost unknown (Pearson, 1991). As early as 1970 Mr Fowler's maiden speech on 16 July 1970 was devoted to the problem caused by drugs in a debate on the second reading of the Misuse of Drugs Bill. In his speech
he noted that even then the drug problem was not confined to London but was affecting his constituency of Nottingham South.

During 1983, 247 Kilograms of heroin were seized by HM Customs and the police; the then highest ever annual total. In addition the number of actual heroin seizures doubled over the previous year, with a sixfold increase compared to the annual average for 1973-78. There was a 42 percent increase in the number of addicts notified to the Home Office, with a 50 percent increase in the number of new addicts notified in 1983 as against 1982. This trend was to continue, so that by 1984 the number of addicts known to the Home Office had reached 12,489 (Stimson, 1987: 480). This represented a 20 to 30 percent increase in the figure recorded in 1980. In addition, there was a four fold increase in persons found guilty of drug offenses. These new heroin users were also quite different from the older generation of vaguely bohemian junkies in that they were more likely to be recruited from conventional working class neighbourhoods (Pearson, 1991). The changed pattern of drug users had led some researchers to hypothesize that drug use was becoming normalized. This thesis proposed that heroin use was now a common place activity and no longer an expression of a youth sub-culture (Stimson, 1987).

Alarmed by this upsurge in heroin misuse and the extent to which the heroin epidemic was connected with increased levels of crime, the call for more punitive measures to deal with drug trafficking was heard. Tom Sackville, Conservative M.P. called for the death sentence and stricter law enforcement measures (Bolton Evening News, 28 June 1983). Baroness Jeger, (Monday 22 March) speaking in the House of Lords commented "the pity is that if this continues to be an epidemic among unemployed, young working-class people, they quickly become unemployed and they quickly become involved, not only with related health disease but with crime and blackmail" (Macgregor, 1989).

A marked feature of this new crisis was the extent to which the government took an interest in the drug problem. By 1984 the government
came to the realization that the drug problem cut across governmental departments. Thus, for the first time it set up an inter-Ministerial collaborative committee. In 1985 an investigation into the Misuse of Hard Drugs was carried out by this committee. In its first report the committee's primary recommendations called for:

1. Continued and intensive enforcement of the law;
2. The stationing in overseas countries of additional customs and police intelligence liaison officers;
3. Harsher penalties for trafficking offences;
4. Further help for crop eradication and substitution schemes;
5. Legislation to attack and seize the profits of traffickers; and

These recommendations were to be incorporated into the Drug Trafficking Offence' Act of 1986 (MacGregor, 1989).

In 1985 the interdepartmental Ministerial Group on the Misuse of Hard Drugs developed the government's five prong strategy on "Tackling Drug Misuse". An important shift of emphasis within this document was that enforcement and penal measures were given a much higher priority than they had formerly assumed in British drug control policies (Pearson, 1991). This shift in the focus of law enforcement as the key prong within the government strategy on tackling drug abuse was strongly reflected in the Fifth Report of the Home Office Affairs Committee, Misuse of Hard Drugs Session 1984/5, May 15, 1985.
The war has never been openly declared and the drug traffic infiltrates insidiously into western countries. We make no apology for reverting repeatedly to the American experience, because it is in the U.S.A. that the real battle is being waged. The Americans are now making a vast effort in terms of manpower and money which involves every law enforcement agency and the armed forces. To this end we support increasing the number of police officers (Home Office Affairs Committee, Misuse of Hard Drugs Session 1984/5, May 15, 1985: iv).

To combat this threat the Committee came up with four recommendations; all of which were focused on enforcement.

Stopping as far as possible the importation of drugs;

Attacking the profits of the traffickers;

Stopping the disposal of drug related profits and;

She penalties for systematic dealing in hard drugs should be no less than the penalty for premeditated murder (Home Office Affairs Committee, Misuse of Hard Drugs Session 1984/5, May 15, 1985: v -vii).

To enforce these recommendations the committee suggested that the Royal Navy and Air Force be conscripted to aid the customs. The committee also requested stronger law enforcement efforts, laws dealing with sequestration of assets and reforming of banking laws so that assets from drugs could easier be traced. This new approach to the drug problem was endorsed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and was reflected in the 1987 Conservative Party manifesto.
We have taken the battle against drugs into every corner of the globe where production or trafficking flourishes... we have strengthened the effectiveness of the police in the fight against drug abuse ... the battle against drugs can and must be won. We will continue to make the defeat of the drug trade a key priority (Conservative Party manifesto 1987: 14).

Since *Tackling Drug Misuse* was first published in 1985 five further initiatives have been added to the Conservative manifesto. Of the five, three focus on law enforcement. They are:

Further contributions by the UK to help combat drug production and trafficking;

The development of a six-point Customs enforcement plan involving the deployment of extra specialist staff and new technology against drug smuggling; and

Replacement of the Central Drugs Intelligence Unit by the new National Drugs Intelligence Unit (Tackling Drug Misuse: A Summary of the Government's Strategy, 1988).

With the evolution of British drug policy law enforcement has achieved a new significance. Yet this present government strategy and the role played by the police is seen by many, including Lord Woolf and Commander John Grieve, then head of criminal intelligence at Scotland Yard, as nothing more than reflecting the failure of government to solve the drug problem (Grieves, 1993).

The present solution of increased powers and resources given to law enforcement agencies in many cases is erroneous as it is based on improper
definitions of the problem. The drug problem is more than a definition of legal status. It finds its root cause not within the criminal law but within the structure of society. Nevertheless, the present solution has been "framed" in terms of legal sanctions and enforcement. It is believed that with more resources and better laws the solution will be found. Is it then any wonder that the solution to combat the drug problem looks as bleak as its past? Nor am I alone in this view. On July 5, 1985 John C. Lawn, who had just been appointed by President Reagan as Chief of the Drug Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.) said:

I have approached law enforcement with the view that if you put sufficient resources into a case, eventually you are going to solve it. I feel that in the case of drug enforcement I can no longer support this view (Cited in Brecher, 1986: 24).
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the impact of low and middle level policing on the social organization of the drug scene in Hyson Green/Radford Ward. To accomplish this purpose it will be necessary to determine if shopkeepers, drug dealers, and the community at large perceive the police as having made any impact in reducing the drug market or affecting the social organization of the drug market. It is their perception of policing impact which is central to this thesis. The behaviour and attitudes of each group are shaped by different sets of suppositions, beliefs, or theories regarding how effective the police are in influencing the drug scene.

Drug Dealers
Cloward and Ohlin (1960) suggest that drug dealers are double failures who are constantly in search of "kicks"; alcohol, pot, heroin, unusual music and sexual experiences. They are always "cool"; detached from relationships with the conventional world. To feed this habit of "kicks" retreatists develop a "hustle"; pimping, conning, or selling drugs. Personal status is derived from the respect retreatists get from the society of which they are members. This theory along with Merton's theory of Anomie postulates that legitimate means to acquire wealth and status are blocked so that drug dealing allows the dealers to achieve wealth, status and mobility within his/her social order. These factors rather than the fear of police intervention will be the contributing variables in choosing if one enters into the drug market.

Drug Users
It has often been said that drug use is an escape for the user from his/her problems. It has also been suggested that one of the main reasons that drugs are outlawed is the strong positive association believed to exist between drug
abuse and crime. Rather than accepting these beliefs I would suggest that drug users as defined within this study see drug taking as part of every day life which reflects the social ecological perspective.

The social ecological approach to deviant behaviour is reflected in the works of Shaw, McKay and the Chicago School. The theory is based on the assumption that deviant behaviour, which drug taking is only one example of, is a product of transitional neighbourhoods that manifest social disorganization and value conflict. Within this type of neighbourhood the drug user sees himself as simply "taken care of biz" or "ripping and running... it is a quest for a meaningful life, not an escape from life" (Preble and Casey, 1969: 3). For those that live this life style the fear of the police is no more or less important than the many other fears that are part of the drug users life.

Police
Low level drug enforcement activities rarely appear to have been seen in terms of strategic planning. The fact that these types of police operations are given a low priority is partly a consequence of the moral logic of the victim/villain distinction, and that the occupational culture of the police gives a privilege status to the "good class villain" (Pearson, 1991). This lack of any well defined strategy tackling low level dealers combined with the lack of respect most constables and drug squad members have for low level drug dealers and users produces a sporadic hit and miss method of policing the drug scene.

Secondly, it is well accepted that police will let things pass in those neighbourhoods which have been defined as slums or those that have a high ethnic population that they would act on in better neighbourhoods (Knapp Commission, 1972 plus a personal interview with a Detective Inspector of the Nottinghamshire Police Constabulary). There are two possible reasons for this. First, police tend to respond to complaints rather than seek out villains. There is some research data to support the belief that minorities and the poor seem to complain to the police less often (Farrell, 1992). Secondly, police tend to
"look the other way" and therefore condone the drug market in neighbourhoods which they do not receive pressures to act against. The exception to complicity is when pressure is placed on the police from community power group demanding solutions to the problem. In many cases this pressure is reflected in political terms for the police to address the problem. In the cases when there is no action to overt drug dealing activities the possibility of being arrested decreases so the incidents of these types of crimes will be increased. Thus, these neighbourhoods become known to dealers and buyers alike as "safe areas" to conduct business.

**Shopkeepers**

The role of shopkeepers within any given location is to supply a service and a product which is required by enough individuals so that a profit can be realized. Any form of external activity which disrupts this is not welcomed. The drug market brings to the area a perceived criminal element which is bad for most types of business. This criminal element also impede potential customers from shopping in the neighbourhood. While this is true for most businesses, other businesses such as the "grocery fences", second hand stores, and pubs flourish. For most shopkeepers the perceived impact that the police have on the social organization of the drug scene is directly related to their ability to do business.

**Residents**

Drug dealing and using within a neighbourhood affect community members in quite different ways. The impact of the drug market placed on individuals is determined by the position the individual has in relationship to either the user or the seller. As stated previously, within the community there will be a percentage of individuals who are connected with the business of selling or using drugs. This connection will take one of numerous forms. Firstly, they will be connected through the purchasing of discounted goods. Secondly, they will be connected by means of a family member or friend who is involved in the distribution or consumption of drugs. Thirdly, there will be individuals, family,
and friends who have been impacted negatively by the use of drugs. Finally, there will be a group of individuals who fear for the safety and security of themselves or their family due to the degree of drug selling and the associated levels of crime and violence which accompanies the drug scene. Therefore, it is argued that the impact of policing on the drug scene will affect each group in different ways.

The major aims of this research are:

1. To determine the impact that policing has on the street level of illicit drugs;

2. To determine the impact of policing on community attitudes towards the police;

3. To determine the impact policing has on the economics of the drug market place;

4. To determine the impact of policing as a general deterrent on drug distribution and consumption of illicit drugs;

5. To determine the relationship between levels of enforcement activities and the drug scene;

6. To determine the role of demand reduction theory in low level policing;

7. To determine the role of supply reduction in low level policing; and

8. To determine shopkeepers' perceptions of policing as it affects their ability to do business.
These aims were achieved by the following methods:

To determine aim one the size and scope of the social organization of the drug scene was defined along with developing measurements to determine policing impact.

For aim two a questionnaire was used to identify residents attitudes toward policing methods and the polices' ability to control the buying and selling of drugs.

For aim three, to determine if policing impact affects either the price or purity of drugs. This was accomplished by comparing the actual price of drugs pre and post study and then by comparing these prices to the level of police activity pre and post study.

Aim four, to determine if the fear of apprehension or conviction affects either the buying or selling of drugs individuals were interviewed. By means of a semi-structured interview and the use of a questionnaire subjects were asked if the fear of apprehension or conviction affects their drug activities. Subjects who were no longer either using or selling were asked to what degree policing activities deterred their selling or using.

Aim five, to determine what effect the levels of policing activities had on the buying and selling of drugs policing strategies were reviewed. In addition drug sellers were asked what type of police activities most affected their selling activities.

Aim six, and seven were met by means of reviewing the research regarding the theory of both supply reduction and demand reduction. This knowledge was then incorporated into the body of the thesis.
Aim eight, was accomplished by means of a semi-structured questionnaire. Shopkeepers within Hyson Green were requested to put forward their opinions and attitudes towards the police and their ability to manage the drug problem.

METHOD
This study used an ethnographic strategy to address the projects stated aims. Malinowski was the first to articulate clearly the importance of ethnographic field work. He called for anthropologists to get out of their armchairs and into the field, to go into the villages and study the people as they actually lived (Malinowski, 1922). He identified what he felt were the principles of ethnographic research and grouped his principles of method under three headings:

1. The ethnographer must possess "real scientific aims";
2. He must live among the people; and
3. The goals of ethnography must apply a number of special methods of collecting, manipulating and fixing his evidence.

The goal of ethnography is to grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world (Spradley, 1979). This type of methodology focuses heavily on the use of the participant observer and is derived from the notion of analytical objectivity in anthropology (Ellin, 1984). This method of data collection has been well documented (Carey, 1971; Feldman, 1974; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983; Hindmarch, 1972; Manheimer and Mellinger, 1972; and Plant and Reeves, 1975).
Informants' statements...should be treated as the historian treats his sources: they are, that is to say, value judgements and should, therefore, be considered as falling within the category of data referred to...as observed behaviour. In other words, such statements should not be used as if they were objective, analytical observations by outsiders. The sociological evaluation of actions and other behaviour is the anthropologist's job, and the sociological evaluation of the same action, etc., may well be very different from their social evaluation by local informants. After all, one cannot accept untrained informants, be they Bemba headman or white-collar workers in London, to present the anthropologist with sociological analyses of behaviour observed in their respective communities. To do so would be to assume, as many laymen do, that to be a member of a community is to understand it sociologically (Van Velsen, cited in Ellen 1984: 43).

Participant observation methodology therefore, can be seen as a useful tool as long as it adheres to certain principles (Plant, 1975: 10):

1. It serves a formulated research purpose;
2. It is planned systematically;
3. It is recorded systematically and related to more general propositions, rather than being presented as a set of interesting curios;
4. Observations to be of value must lead to insight; and
5. It is subject to checks and controls upon its validity and reliability.
Although the project used a combination of qualitative and quantitative measures, the primary focus was on qualitative information obtained through field study. The field study took 18 months and consisted of participant observation, structured interviews and semi-structured interviews. The quantitative data consisted of police records, Home Office statistics, and census tracts data. The official statistics were used in part, to verify information given to me by the research subjects and to develop a profile of the area which was be researched.

**Target Population**

The population to be studied in this project consisted of four groups:

A. Police officers working in the drug squad of the Nottingham Constabulary and who have responsibility for the Radford Road district of Nottingham and constables who were working within this defined area.

B. Drug sellers and drug users in the Radford Road area- It was decided to use a non-random sample to represent this group. To conduct a random sample it becomes important to have a general idea of the size and scope of the population from which the sample will be taken. Given the nature of the illegal activities of this population the actual size and scope of this group cannot be pre-determined. Therefore, it would be impossible to construct a list to determine the actual population size. Thus a non-random sampling method using snowballing, interviews of individual drug dealers who were identified by the police and other dealers would give enough of a cross section of the population to be representative.

Fifty-two drug dealers were interviewed. All were selling drugs at the time of the interviews.
Target Area

The area chosen for this study is Greater Nottingham and more specifically the Radford Road electoral ward. There were three primary reasons for basing this study in Greater Nottingham and more specifically the Radford and connecting electoral wards. Firstly, Nottingham has gained a certain notoriety as a high crime city and is disadvantaged relative to the country. Yet, it has one of the lowest per capita rates of seizure for controlled drugs within England.

The city of Nottingham is a socially deprived area with a trend of rising unemployment. The unemployment rate for 1991 of 35.1 per cent is almost three times the national average. The Radford Road electoral ward is part of the city to which many immigrants had come to settle and in which a high rate of unskilled natives live. It presently has one of the highest ethnic populations within the city. It has been described by members of the police force as a high drug and crime area. A recent regional mapping (1991) puts Nottingham among the six English police authorities with the highest overall rates of crime. Melville, et al., (1990) suggest that the residents of Bestwood, Radford Road, and Meadows were more worried about being insulted or bothered by drug users than in other areas. Based on "Jarman ratings", levels of social deprivation in Nottingham City are greater relative to the county and Radford Road Electoral Ward ranked the highest within the city. This area is
acknowledged locally to have many housing problems and is most likely the worst slum area of Nottingham.

The second reason for choosing Nottingham City was one of opportunity. Chief Inspector Mike Ward of the Radford Ward Constabulary had identified this area as one he felt was more problematic than others within his area of authority. In discussing his concerns with a colleague at the university it was suggested that possibly a research project could be undertaken to determine the best possible method of allocating police resources within this area. After some discussion, it was agreed that a project to determine the effects of policing on the drug scene would be most beneficial to both the Nottinghamshire Constabulary and the University of Loughborough.

And thirdly, based on previous drug studies completed by Dr. Bean, a resource pool of individuals that are connected to the drug scene had been cultivated. It was felt that this study could draw upon this pool of individuals and using snowball sampling techniques, this population could be expanded upon. The advantage of using the snowballing device will ensure that all persons to be interviewed will either be drug users or dealers.

**Data Collection**
The data collection methods consisted of:

1. Unstructured participant observation of drug dealers who were interviewed was overt and included interactive observations using a semi-structured checklist to record behaviours;

2. Life history interviews with drug dealers were conducted on a selective sample. The selection was primarily determined by who was prepared to be interviewed;
3. A semi-structured questionnaire was used. These questionnaires were administered to all drug dealers and drug users who were willing to complete them. Questionnaires were also administered to police, shopkeepers and residents. The purpose of the questionnaires was to augment information collected in the other data collection methods;

4. Information was collected from official sources such as, police, courts and the Home Office. In part, this was done to increase the validity and reliability of the ethnographic process; and

5. Snowballing was used as a method of data collecting with drug dealers and drug users. This method of sampling was chosen for this research as it took into account the social organization of the drug population that was being researched.

**Participant Observation**

It is well accepted that official crime statistics do not represent the actual amount of crime committed. Thus, participant observation is an important research method in studying and collecting data on a group in their natural setting especially if that group is involved in illegal activities. These observations of the drug dealers who took part in the research were recorded through the use of an observational check list and included not only objective data such as time, dates, temperature, police activities and street drug dealing etc. but also subjective thoughts.

**Life History Interviews**

Along with the participant observer method the researcher included a modified use of research techniques developed by Prebie and Casey (1969) in this study
of lower class heroin users in New York City. The focus of the methodology was the life history interview. The main characteristics of a formal life history are:

(1) The sheer quantity of raw data presented in the informant's own words; and

(2) the emphasis on long-term continuities in individual experience, rather than on broadly based thematic and comparative topics (Wallman and Dhooge, 1985).

The purpose for using life history interviews for this research was to get a better understanding of the subjects who were to be interviewed. It was believed by the researcher that "fitting in" had more to do with knowing about the process of becoming a drug dealer than it did with the actual present day act of selling drugs. The data collected by using this approach was useful in gaining a greater realization of the motives which drove their activities.

**Official Data**

The purpose for the use of official data is two fold. First, the use of police, courts, and crime statistics were used to verify or support life history and self reported data collected from subjects. Secondly, data collected from census tracts and the Home Office were used to compare general populations within the Radford Ward.

**Structured Questionnaires**

In addition, four sets of questionnaires were utilized. Each questionnaire targeted an individual population; drug users, drug dealers, shopkeepers, and the general community. Due to the sensitivity and potential danger of this study each questionnaire had to be developed in such a way that they did not present
a threat or interfere with drug dealers,\' buyers,\' or shopkeeper\'s routines. Questionnaires therefore, had to be succinct. The purpose of these questionnaire was to gain an understanding of each group\'s attitudes and beliefs regarding the impact the police have on the drug market. It is the combination of these two conditions which will determine how individuals perceive the policing impact on the drug market.

**Shopkeepers Questionnaire**

The manner in which shopkeepers were chosen to answer a questionnaire was non-random. Approximately 60 hours (both evening and daytime) were spent walking from shop to shop requesting an interview. All but ten shops were approached within the area. Each person who was approached was told the purpose of the questionnaire and that their anonymity would be protected. The questionnaire which they were asked to answer consisted of 42 questions (see appendix three). Each question was designed in such a way that the respondents had the opportunity of commenting on their answer. These open ended questions were divided into four sections, each designed to elicit different attitudes towards drugs and policing. The first section consisted of demographic information such as age, sex, race, the length of time working in the area, etc.

The second set of questions was designed to determine if the respondents believed there was a drug problem nationally and or locally and to what degree the problem affected their business. Shopkeepers were asked to rate on a seven point scale how much they agreed or disagreed with the statements which were read to them. Using the same scale, with open ended questions the shopkeepers rated each question on the following scale; disagree very much, disagree generally, disagree a little, neutral, agree a little, agree generally, or agree very much.
The third set of questions attempted to determine who the shopkeepers thought was to blame for the drug problem in their area and what was required to help solve the problem. In part, the questions attempted to determine if any of the shopkeepers believed that the drug problem was the fault of a specific minority group and the last set of questions was designed to determine the shopkeepers attitudes towards the police in general and more specifically, how effective they believed the police were in policing the drug market.

**Resident's Questionnaire**

One hundred and twenty residents who lived in the Radford Ward were chosen to be interviewed. The two enumeration districts which encompass Hyson Green were chosen. Sixty residents were chosen from each district. The survey was conducted by choosing every third house on three streets. The main body of the questionnaire was the same for both residents and shopkeepers. The major difference was that residents were asked a set of questions regarding how they saw the typical police officer. Ten questions were asked, each with a five point scale, covering people's attitudes to the police; such as: ambitious to lazy, brave to cowardly, tough to soft, strong to weak, friendly to unfriendly, smart to dumb, kind to cruel, good to bad, fair to unfair, and honest to dishonest. The purpose, of asking these questions was to determine the respondents attitudes to the police in general and to compare these findings to their attitude to policing and drugs. Shopkeepers were not asked this set of questions as it was believed to be too time consuming. In retrospect, it would have been useful to have done so, in order that the two groups could have been compared.

**Drug Dealers/Users**

The snowballing method of data collection was used to gather data on the drug distributors and their customers. Through the use of the method of snowballing it was possible to gain access to the social organization of the drug market which provided an avenue to develop the research population. The individuals
who were introduced to the researcher, were asked if they, in the presence of
an interviewer, would answer a questionnaire. The questionnaire was divided
into five sections. The first section was to gather demographic information.
The second section was designed to elicit information on; length of drug use,
preferred drug, age when drugs were first used, type of drugs used, and what
drugs had been used in the last 30 days and the last seven days. The next
section was to determine drug selling activities. Respondents were asked;
when they first started selling drugs, what drugs they ever sold, what drugs
they had sold in the last 30 and seven days, the largest amount ever
purchased, the largest amount ever sold, their drug and non-drug income over
the last year, where they purchased their drugs, how easy it was to purchase
drugs for resale, and if they worked alone or with others. The fourth section
dealt with respondents' criminal history. They were asked if they had a criminal
record, when were they first arrested, convicted, how many times they were
convicted, were the charges drug or non-drug related, and had they ever been
sent to prison for drug or non-drug offences. The last section attempted to gain
an understanding regarding drug dealer's perceptions of the police. They were
asked: what type of police activities (if any) affected their selling, where they
sold, how many hours per week did they sell, if they thought the police were
effective in policing the drug market, if they were worried about being caught,
did they fear going to jail, or did they fear other dealers or customers more.

The snowballing process of data collection, using the capture-recapture
method was used to provid an estimate of the number of dealers within the
targeted area. This method looks at how many of the dealers previously
named in the first layer turn up in subsequent layers. For this method to be
accurate in reflecting the total population it is important that the first layer
network structure reflects the social organization of the population which is
being studied. By using a large population of Afro-Caribbeans at the first layer
rather than capturing a broad representative population, the sample within this
study may reflect, to a large degree, the social organization of the Afro-Caribbean drug community which may or may not be representative of the area at large.
CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Problems in Implementing the Field Study

The first and most obvious question which arises in doing a study of this nature using the participating observer as the primary method of data collection is that of role definition. Is the researcher a participant in the activities he is observing or is he simply an observer? In the context of criminal activity this issue is particularly important. How far does the researcher go to "fit in?" Platt and Reeves (1976) define participant observation as:

A method of studying the structure and functioning of groups in their natural setting in which the observer lives intimately with the members of the group, participates in their various activities, and makes a continuing record of the content and pattern of group interaction (Platt and Reeves, 1976: 156).

The ethical problem which Platt and Reeves (1976) ask is: does the researcher studying criminals drive the getaway car to "fit in" and to be part of the group he is studying? Or in the case of the drug scene, does the researcher when left in a public place with a bag of drugs get up and leave or does he "hold"? Polsky (1969) suggests:

You must draw the line, to yourself and to the criminal. Precisely where to draw it is a moral decision that each researcher must make for himself in each research situation. You need to decide beforehand, as much as possible, where you wish to draw the line, because it is wise to make your position on this known to informants rather early in the game (Polsky, 1969: 132).
He continued to say that: not;

If one is effectively to study adult criminals in their natural setting he must make the moral decision that in some ways, he will break the law himself. He need not be a "participant" observer and commit the criminal acts being studied, yet he has to witness such acts or be taken into confidence about them and not blow the whistle (Polsky, 1969: 138).

Other anthropologists (Holy, 1985) suggest that in many situations the researcher can take advantage of the differences between the two cultures. Rather than attempting to accomplish the impossible task of becoming a member of a foreign culture, rather by systematically exploiting the fact that he is not a member and acting on the basis of his own cultural rules without "putting down" or in anyway discrediting their culture. With the exception of individuals and institutional codes of ethics, there are no set rules of conduct to determine the extent to which a researcher will attempt to "fit in". It therefore, becomes important not to lose sight of any given situation simply to achieve the goal of "fitting in" so that the research will be completed.

There are other problems in doing a participant observation study on illicit drugs. The first, is the nature of data to be collected. Most information to be collected is either highly confidential; i.e., information pertaining to undercover assignments, data about informants, and police tactics or involves collecting information on illegal activities. The second, concern lies in the area of legal risks. The third area of difficulty is gaining access to people who have the information; i.e., police, drug users, and drug sellers. And the fourth problem is one of attempting to extract the proper data once contact has been made.
Legal Risks

English law, like most laws of countries within the Western World, makes the withholding of information pertaining to criminal activity an offence. There is no relationship of confidentiality between the researcher and his subject as there is with a doctor or a lawyer. This may have the possibility of placing the researcher in two areas of danger. First, simply being aware of illegal drug transactions makes the researcher liable to prosecution if he withholds information. Secondly, if the researcher is called as a witness he is not protected under client-patient privilege. If he refuses to testify he will be committing a criminal offence and likewise if he lies he will also be committing an offence. Worst of all, if he does testify, he could be facing personal danger.

Access

There is always the problem of gaining access to individuals who hold the answers to the questions which must be asked and this is particularly true when the observer is neither a member nor associate of the groups being researched. Also illicit drug use is largely a clandestine activity and one of the necessary functions of an illegal drug-using group is to prevent access or knowledge to non-users (Powers, 1989). On this occasion, two important contacts were made. The first, being a senior police officer, who approached this researcher's advisor to conduct a project regarding the better utilization of human resources as it pertains to policing in general but more specifically to drug enforcement. This invitation opened the door. However, the bulk of the fieldwork and data collection was controlled by other operational officers.

Research and my previous experience of police work demonstrated the power of the lower ranks, not least their resistance to external control of their work. Any effective research strategy would have to pierce their protective shield if it was to be successful (Holdaway, cited in Jupp, 1989: 46).
Drug Dealing and User Access

As the majority of the field work was done on the streets, access to the drug dealers and their customers had to be made in a manner that was not only non-threatening but would help in arranging a proper introduction to the street community.

They (good contact persons) tend to have contact across time in the given area. Most street dealers are middle men. They will continue to work together and routinely rely on each other. Introduction by one dealer who vouches to other dealers that someone is "right" and "not a cop" is a vital part of street life and everyday dealing hustling. If an ethnographer gets a positive reference from a dealer, another dealer will still be a little suspicious. They study how you handle yourself in the field and then decide whether to talk more (Williams et al., 1992: 352)

Contact was made with two prominent prostitutes who have connections with the street scene and know most of the major drug dealers in the area. They were both seen as being "good contact people" who if they approved of you would make "proper introductions". Their support in gaining access to that population was of primary importance.

The degree of acceptance of the researcher both by the police and the street sellers and buyers will determine the quantity and quality of the data collected. The degree of acceptance is determined by three factors: Firstly, informants such as the police, drug dealers, and individual members of the community have their own ideas about research and what the researcher is doing even before the formal process begins. In part, the acceptance of the researcher will be affected by the host's perception of his status among them and the role they believe he/she is to play. Secondly, the quality of the
research will depend on the amount of trust that can be generated between informants and the researcher. The colour of his/her skin or his or her perceived social status may be enough to invoke mistrust. Thirdly, informants have their own reasons for providing the information they do and may use the researcher for their own ends. These reasons may be inter-departmental rivalry or they may want certain information passed on which could be damaging to other parties. Once a degree of acceptance has been achieved the use of structured and unstructured interviews will be very important. A prepared check-list was used to focus the researcher's observations and discussion.

**Police Access**

Entry into the closed system of the police sub-culture presents major problems for any researcher who is not part of that system. This closed system is reflected by the degree of internal solidarity. As a consequence, police officers see most research and researchers who are not part of the police force as intruders. A final problem of access is the very pragmatic, concrete, down-to-earth, anti-theoretical perspective which is characterized by the rank and file (Reiner, 1985). This makes them reluctant to complete questionnaires or become involved with any form of research. The question which had to be answered prior to the research was to what degree would the gatekeepers be co-operative or would they informally block access to data required? Clearly the degree of obstruction or co-operation has to be taken into account.

The process of obtaining information from members of the drug squad proved to be much more difficult than it did with either drug dealers or drug users. As stated earlier, even though the research project was sanctioned by both the Chief Superintendent of the Radford Road and Division and the Detective Inspector of the drug squad the majority of the squad members viewed the research with scepticism and a waste of their time. Their co-operation was at best minimal and superficial. Those that fully cooperated did so as a means to tell "their stories".
I've worked in surveillance for more than eight years. In my opinion this is most likely the key element in determining the quality of a raid. If the surveillance is not done properly the team never knows what to expect. I can remember spending day after day in a dumpster across the street from this flat that was to be raided. I had to keep track of everyone who entered, the times that they arrived, and then to determine when the gear was to be dropped off. Without this type of surveillance the raid would not be successful (Interview with member of the drug squad).

A major problem which was first encountered was reluctance in completing the two questionnaires which were to be administered. Each member was given one to complete then returned. Of the eighteen questionnaires handed out only five were completed and returned. Members of the drug squad were interviewed and were asked to complete two questionnaires (see appendix four).

The first questionnaire (Production and Craftsmanship) consisted of eleven questions. Five of the questions were to determine if individuals were more concerned with the quality of their work (doing a good job) while the remaining six questions focused on if the priority was quantity (getting as many busts as possible). This questionnaire was adapted from the article Production and Craftsmanship in Police Narcotics Enforcement by Julius Wachtel. In this article Wachtel suggests that over the last decade demands for increased productivity have spilled into the government sector and has created a tension between quantity and quality. Productivity within policing have usually been measured in terms of counting the number of arrests.
The only way we presently have of measuring our performance is by the amount of dealers we nick and the cost of making these arrests. As I said earlier it may be to our benefit to arrest allot of low level deals at little cost than spending four days planning a raid which cost allot in terms of main hours which may end up with few arrests and little gear to show for it (Personal interview with drug squad inspector).

Quality policing, on the other hand, has more to with simply making arrests.

Quality policing can mean rendering valuable, non-crime related public service, maintaining peace and order, solving serious crime, apprehending habitual offenders, and so on (Wachtel, 1985: p. 264).

It can be argued that if performance is only measured by arrests and drug seizures the factors such as community harm reduction, drug education, and community awareness programme are factors which are key to successful drug reduction will be lost. Therefore the purpose of this questionnaire was to gain an understanding of how individual drug squad officers viewed what was important in policing the drug scene.

The second questionnaire (see appendix five) was developed by a lecturer at the Loughborough University of Technology. This questionnaire was not part of the original study but was incorporated into the research to assist the lecturer in piloting his questionnaire. The purpose of this questionnaire was to determine the attitudes of individuals towards drug use and drug users. It was believed by this researcher that police attitudes towards drugs and drug users would have a influence on the way they saw their job and their method of policing the drug market.
Given that only five questionnaires were returned the majority of information obtained from members of the drug square was through personal interviews and informal conversations. These conversations took place while I was at the police station and on the few occasions when I accompanied them with their actual investigations.

Community Access
Open drug dealing is bad for legitimate business and for individuals living in a community who are not part of the drug scene. Drug dealers pose two threats; that some neighbourhood residents, particularly children, may become users; and that the behaviour of buyers and sellers will be disruptive or worse; that their activities will contribute to a rise in crime and a decline in the standard of their community. Given these realities anyone who is perceived to be of assistance in reducing the amount of drug transactions is seen as helping their cause. The researcher simply through his presence adds support to their cause and, therefore, the relationship can be seen as a reciprocal one.

Survey
The purpose of general surveys is to represent a specific population which is to be studied. This may be an approach which is useful for studying "normal" social behaviour, in particular the making of large-scale social surveys. It is generally less so for investigating illegal or deviant behaviour. This type of behaviour is likely to be concealed and not open to normal methods of data collection (Plant, 1975). It is for this reason it was decided not to use a survey.

Nature of Data
Most businesses and entrepreneurs do not like the idea of sharing trade secrets. There is always a fear that information given out can somehow negatively effect your sales and method of doing business. This is also true in the drug market. Police are very hesitant in giving out any information about assignments, the use of informants or drug raids. Likewise, individuals involved
in the illegal act of buying or selling drugs do not want the exposure that comes with filling out questionnaires or discussing activities which are illegal. The comment of "Trust me anything you tell me is confidential" does not seem to "cut it" with them and besides, there is nothing in it for them. In fact any information which they do share can be very detrimental to their well being. No pay off! In business when there is no pay off you do not do business.

Once these problems have been solved or avoided, Irwin (1972) suggests that we are still faced with the most important research problem, that is deciding exactly what it is we are looking for and how will you know if you have found it. He also argues against approaching any area with the intention of verifying an existing theory. Rather one should go in with a clear slate and experience the situation.

**Validity And Reliability**
The use of participant observation seems particularly appropriate due to the delicate nature of investigating an illegal environment and goes a long way to understanding the nature of the population which is being researched. Bilton, et al., (1981) suggest that the hallmark of the ethnographic approach to research is that of the participant observer. This approach goes far beyond simply documenting accounts offered by the individuals involved but also incorporates these accounts into an analytical framework.

Care must be taken to insure that information collected is reliable and reflects the true situation. The snowballing effect, in part guarantees, that some of the information will be confirmed about the potential interviewee prior to the first meeting. Information given about him can be cross-validated through questions asked. In addition, many of the responses can be checked against criminal records and other official sources.
Ethical Considerations

A critical issue facing researchers involves the recognition of the ethics of field research. All too often researchers forget the social responsibility they bear to the subjects they study. Researchers working with populations whose activities are illegal have a greater than normal responsibility to insure that information collected is and remains confidential. Once the researcher is trusted he becomes party to potentially damaging information which if allowed to fall into the wrong hands can become legally damaging and physically dangerous (Powers, 1989). Therefore, the storage and safety of these documents must be safeguarded. More damaging than data falling into the wrong hands is the behaviour of the researcher. Researchers, like most individuals, love talking to anyone who will listen to them. The expression "loose lips sink ships" is as true doing research as it was during the war. It must never be forgotten by the researcher that working with illicit drug dealers carries a heavy responsibility.
CHAPTER FIVE
GETTING IN AND CARRYING ON (The Ethnographic Process)
Research on policing and drugs has usually fallen into three areas: The first area is the connection between drugs and crime, Nurco (1985), Ball (1983), and Faupel (1987) have suggest that drug abuse can be directly and indirectly correlated with certain types of crime. They argue that the selling and buying of illicit drugs is an illegal act and that a large proportion of the crimes committed does not consist merely of drug sales or possession, but involves other criminal behaviours including serious crime.

The second area is an attempt to understand drug markets and the effects that different law enforcement strategies have on them. Dorn and South (1987); Dorn and South (1990); Dorn and Murji (1992); Dorn, Murji, and South (1992); Rudolph (1992); Dom, Murji, and South (1993); Murji (1993); Moore and Kleiman (1989); and Kleiman (1986), have all discussed the different types of law enforcement strategies such as going for "Mr. Big", the use of informants and "Buy Bust" operations. They have attempted to describe the effect these strategies have on both drug dealers and users. They, however, do not extrapolate their findings on what the implications of these strategies might be for the community.

The third area covers the effects of policing on the economic organization of drug dealing. White and Luketich (1983); Reuter (1983); Wagstaff and Maynard (1988); and Reuter et. al. (1986); Reuter and Haaga (1989); MacCoun and Reuter (1992); and Kotch and Grupp (1973), all discuss the economic considerations of policing but again do not extend their findings to the effects on the larger community. Other authors such as Plant (1975); Kerr (1958); Preble (1969); Blum and Associates (1973); and Fish and Bruhnsen (1978); Adler and Adler (1983); Adler (1985); Lieb and Olson (1987) have explored the subculture of the addict, the making of a dealer, and their relationship to the broader community. But, there has been very little research
which has addressed the interrelationship between the individuals working and living in the community, the drug subculture, and the impact of policing on the broader community. The one exception to this is the work done by Kleiman et al., (1988) where they looked at illicit drug use and the impact of open drug markets on the neighbourhoods in which they operated. Their study examined the impact of low level enforcement on retail heroin dealing in Washington D.C.

The majority of the research on policing and drugs in Great Britain and North America has usually attempted to determine the effectiveness of enforcement on drug selling by concentrating on the connection between opiates such as heroin and cocaine and non-opiates such as marijuana and enforcement impact (Goldstein 1981; Pearson 1991; Kleiman 1986; Rudolph 1992; Reuter 1989; Deininger, 1976). These studies do not attempt to explain the role that designer or synthetic drugs play within the market place, nor do they attempt to address the interrelationship between the individuals working and living in the community and their relationship with the drug subculture and the impact of policing on the broader community.

The question to what degree does policing impact on the social organization of the drug community has not yet been asked. The reason for this is not due to the unimportance of the question but rather in the difficulty of "getting in" in order to obtain the data necessary to address the question.
From June to August of 1992 a semi-structured pilot field study was undertaken. The primary purpose was to determine how difficult it would be to "get in" to the drug scene in the proposed research area. The second purpose was to develop some knowledge of the area in relationship to population and environment and to sort out and focus on those items that make up the local status system within the area. And thirdly, the researcher met with key police personnel to develop a co-operative relationship, as their support would eventually be essential.
The process of obtaining knowledge of the social organization of the drug market and the impact police have on it began at the home of a well known prostitute (Betty') within the area. This contact was made at the University of Loughborough where she had been assisting on a research project on prostitution in Nottingham. This first contact was important as she is not only aware of the local drug market but is part of the social organization of the drug environment. Our first meeting took place at Betty's home and was informal. The primary purpose was not to discuss my research but rather for her to determine if I could be trusted. The majority of the day was spent touring the area where I would be doing my data collecting and talking about the risks not only to me but to her if I was not honest and trustworthy. I believe, one of the reasons for the tour, was to determine my reactions and attitudes to the area and to the individuals who she introduced me to. Once the tour was completed and we had finished talking she agreed to assist in the research. She informed me that her boyfriend (Mark), who was in jail for grievous bodily harm would soon be getting out and he would act as my minder during the research.

Betty's home and a pub on Radford Road became the base from which most of my contacts were made. The process by which I collected the majority of the data was very much an informal one. As Betty is seen by many as an informal social worker, psychologist, legal advice counsellor, and friend, her home is the focal point for many of the drug dealers\users within the area. All are welcomed as long as the rules are not violated. The two rules are no drugs in the house and her home is not be used as a place to conduct business from.

The task of obtaining information then became one of being introduced as a friend from Canada who could be trusted and was doing research on the drug scene and policing. "Would you please answer some questions for him?" This introduction was the beginning of "getting in" but it was an introduction that

1 All names used within this chapter are not the actual names of the individuals referred to.
also placed my contact in potential danger. If at any time I was suspected of being an informant or undercover policeman she would be held ultimately responsible. All but one individual who were introduced in this manner freely answered my questions. With these individuals my credibility was ascribed due to my relationship to the prostitute who acted as the go-between.

The majority of the users/dealers during the pilot study interviewed consisted of individuals from the Jamaican community who were either unemployed or working in low paying jobs where the risk of lay-offs is great. It has been suggested that drug dealing and other forms of crime have served as an elusive symbol of success and upward mobility for many ethnic minorities who find that legitimate means of achieving success are blocked and therefore revert to illegitimate means to achieve that success (Merton, 1968). This theory, although not as eloquently stated, was supported by many who were interviewed.

I have been arrested over a hundred times for things like stealing, fighting, getting drunk in pubs and fighting nothing big you know. I've been on the dole or get money from social services, never really had a good job. I started to sell drugs about three years ago when I was twenty six. I thought it would be safer and I could make more money than stealing. I didn't think the chances of getting caught was as good as when I was stealing. I've never been arrested for selling, (Personal interview, June 1992).

Many of the dealers/users I talked with during this stage reported that the early process of becoming a drug dealer or drug user was more a process of "drift" the theory of drift was first put forth by Matza in his book Delinquency and Drift.
Most of my mates used some drugs so after a while you just start. After a while you may stop and then start up again. This time when I started up again was the first time I tried "crack", (Personal interview in June 1992).

The majority of these individuals said that they were selling out of necessity to support their own habit and a means to subsidize their lifestyle. They began to sell drugs as this type of criminal activity was more profitable, easier, and there was less risk of being caught by the police than other forms of crime. "You were less likely to get caught as you only sold to people you knew like people you meet when you're working or friends of friends".

The drug market is open; it formed part of the community and seems on the surface not to be disturbed by either police or local residents. Of the time spent on Radford Road during the pilot study, I rarely saw any police on foot patrol nor were there many panda cars patrolling the area. Jamaican user talked about his "tea" (name used when discussing marijuana) and the dealers who are simply supplying a product that everyone wanted, but yet the stores would not sell it. They do not see the low level dealers as villains. "If anyone is a villain it is the big importers who have the lorries or planes, they are the ones who makes all the money. The little guy doesn't make a penny". The perception of the Jamaican users/dealers I talked with was that the police used drugs as an excuse to harass them. It had nothing to do with drugs just an excuse to keep them off the streets.

Getting in and Personal Risk

The process of "getting in" not only involved being accepted and trusted by individuals in and around Radford Road (Hyson Green), it also involved learning how to spot and avoid situations which might present the possibility of personal harm to the researcher. In most situations researchers usually assume that they are not at risk and in most circumstances this is true. In the case of
researching the drug market there are personal risks which confront the researcher's safety. There are three potential situations which at any one time could seriously turn what is a relatively safe environment into a potentially dangerous one.

The first is if one of the drug contacts, for whatever reason, is either arrested or "taken out" by the competition, the blame may be attributed to the researcher. Secondly, Bean and Pearson (1992), in their Home Office report on the crack scene in Nottingham, have suggested that more and more guns are being purchased and used by drug dealers in Nottingham. This was not only reported to this researcher but in fact was experienced first hand. That realization alone increases everyday risk while doing research. Thirdly, what seems to be a normal situation if read wrong can turn into a situation which is out of control and the researcher may find himself the target of hostility.

The realization of potential danger is the first step in protecting yourself while in the field. But what is more important is to develop both physical and social safety zones. Williams et al., suggest that for a safety zone to be effective it has to incorporate three components:

First, researchers must have a feeling of "psychological safety"; that is, they must not feel endangered, they must experience some degree of acceptance by others, and they must be willing to stay in the location.

Second, other persons in this zone should accept the ethnographers' presence, trusting that they are "right" and he is not a cop.

Third, the physical environment must not be hazardous (e.g., the floors should not be likely to collapse; the ceiling should not be likely to fall (Williams et al., 1992: 356-357)).
The first point is likely the most important. If the researcher at any time is not prepared to accept the culture or mannerisms of those being researched or tries to be superior or patronising any attempt to be accepted will be lost. If the researcher comes across as a "phoney" and is perceived as not interested or concerned with his subjects but only with his own needs, the possibility of either collecting poor data or being in personal danger increases. It therefore becomes important for the researcher to offer the respondents something in return for their time and co-operation. This may be friendship or simply an understanding of their situation rather than condemnation.

Although Williams et al., 1992 suggest that extensive ethnographic experience shows that physical violence against ethnographers has rarely occurred during the period of their research. Over this research process three incidents occurred which presented a possible threat to this research. The first incident occurred early on while I was conducting my pilot study. It had been arranged that I was to be introduced to a dealer who was a major importer. This individual was to be at the home of one of my contacts. I was told to be there at one o'clock as he was passing through Nottingham on his way to London then to Jamaica and would only be stopping over for a very brief visit. I arrived well before the allotted time. As it turned out the individual never showed up so rather than going down to the pub it was suggested that we go to the home of two individuals who were known dealers. In fact their home had somewhat of a reputation for being a "crack house. Phone calls were made and we were invited over. When we arrived there were six individuals present two males in their late twenties and four females. The females were all in their mid and late teens. All of the females were involved to some extent in prostitution. One of the younger girls, most likely not older than fifteen said that she only turned tricks when she needed money for either drugs or drink. One of the other girls seemed to belong to the individual who had rented the flat while the other two had just come down from Newcastle and were passing through. It soon became apparent that all were high either on alcohol and/or drugs.
The flat was dark, dirty, with empty liquor and beer bottles throughout. Shortly after we arrived we were both offered a drink (a drink that we never got drank). The first hour of our visit consisted of making introductions and discussing my research. The plan was that once every one felt comfortable I would then interview each person individually. The first interview, with one of the younger females went well. During the second interview one of the males sitting on the couch started to become very loud, in his hand he had a needle which he was pointing in my direction and swearing. You fucking ...... you think were all shit don't you? I'll give it to you. I've got AIDs. At that moment he got up and started to stager towards me waving his needle. The person I was interviewing jumped up and moved away from the table and the person with the needle. As he came closer I insured that I kept the table where I was conducting the interviews between us. As he came closer Betty and the other male were trying to convince him to sit down. This situation lasted for a few minutes until be slumped down in a chair. By this time I had moved closer to the door and along with Betty took a speedy exit.

The second incident took place shortly after the raid on the cafe (this raid will be discussed in chapter the following chapter). I had just returned from a trip to North America and was informed by one of my contacts that the owner of the cafe was out to get me. I was told that the owner believed I had informed the police that he was dealing in drugs. It was suggested that I should stay way from the area until a meeting between the owner of the cafe, Betty and myself could be arranged. The meeting took place yet the owner was not convinced that I did not have a role in the raid. He was convinced that there was a conspiracy involving the Guardian, the BBC, and myself to close him down. He believed that this conspiracy was not only against him but included all other Jamaicans. He was convinced that everyone were trying to portray all Jamaicans as crack dealers. All the talking in the world would not convince him that I was not involved. By definition, being caucasian involved me in the conspiracy. He warned me that if I returned to the area he would insure I would be sorry. Nevertheless I left the meeting determined to carry on my
research. This decision was supported by both Mark and Betty. In their opinion the cafe owner would do nothing and in fact he was more talk than action.

Over the next two weeks while I was in the area nothing changed, individuals would still talk with me and I continued using the pub as a meeting point. It wasn't until one evening when I went to the pub alone that I became concerned. While having a pint with one of the locals, the owner of the cafe came in with three friends, they sat down with two other individuals. They made sure that I was aware that their conversation was about me. As the evening continued their crowd increased and so did their tone. Towards the end of the evening Mark and a few of his friends had joined me it was then when a individual from another table joined us. He began by accusing me of being a police informer and anti Jamaican. Before I could respond my minder took it upon himself to deal with the situation. He informed the individual that I was his friend and could be trusted, he suggested that the owner of the cafe was most likely, rather than selling his gear, was using too much of it.

The man is crazy, you know what I mean man, he don't know reality man, you spend too much time with him you start acting crazy too. Now go back man leave us in peace, all we want to do is drink a pint.

The individual who had joined us returned to his own table without saying a word. I saw the owner once again a few days later. Our conversation was brief. He said he no longer believed that I was behind the raid but the conversation was guarded and far from friendly.
The third situation was more of an ethical dilemma than one of personal danger. It happened one afternoon when I was invited to the flat of a local dealer. The plan was to hang out for a while as he had business to take care of before we met up with some of his mates at his local pub. Before long the individual he was waiting for showed up. Along with the drugs he was selling he also had for sale two or three hand guns along with a number of what looked like semi-automatic rifles.

That evening when I returned home I became extremely concerned regarding my responsibility not only as a researcher but as an individual. As a researcher one of my primary concerns was to protect the anonymity of anyone who agreed to take part in the research. The question of ethics regarding the fact if I had not been doing research I would not have known about the firearms therefore the knowledge should be maintained within the parameters of the research. On the other hand there is a moral argument suggests that the greater good and overall safety of all members of the community should supersede the commitment to confidentiality.

The following day I made contact with a staff member of the National Criminal Intelligent Unit who I had been working with. I informed him of the situation but stated that I was uncomfortable in revealing the specific location or the individual involved. Due to our relationship he did not press me for more information. He informed me that he would pass the information on to the Nottingham Constabulary and then get back to me. It wasn't until a month later that I heard anything. I was told that the information was passed on but that the person who took the information treated it with scepticism. It was the belief of the Nottingham Constabulary that the use of firearms within the drug world in Nottingham was not an issue. Ironically, shortly after this event four Jamaicans who were allegedly connected to drug trafficking entered a social club in St. Anne's (a district of Nottingham) and shot someone.
Carrying On

The process of collecting the data for this project took approximately twenty-four months (August 1992 to August 1994). Within this time frame depending on the weather, time of day or night, and the time of year the drug scene changed. The summer when the days were hot saw the most street activity. From early morning to late in the evening Radford Road was very active. In the morning was the time that most of the shopping took place. The majority of the shoppers were female either Jamaican or Asian and their shopping patterns were regimented and focused. Little interaction took place among these shoppers. Very little browsing or social interaction took place. If friends were to meet they would exchange politeness and then carry on with their allotted tasks.

Early afternoon was the time when the top end of Radford Road began to become occupied by mostly Jamaicans "hanging out" in front of the shops interacting with occupants of passing cars and passers by. At times there could be as many as ten individuals in front of a local store. The problem with this is that the men block the street for passers-by and create a nuisance for customers who may want to shop within the stores. When this occurred within a short time period, on a few rare occasion the shopkeeper would come out and move the crowd on, calling them shiftless, lazy and accusing them of being all a bunch of drug dealers. Generally this was not the case, rather, what usually happened was nothing. Not because the shopkeepers did not mind this activity but rather they were concerned for their own personal safety and the safety of their shop.

I'll tell you why I don't do anything about them. It's bad for business for one thing as a lot of people will not shop around here because of these Jamaicans carrying on and selling drugs. If I had my way I would have the police here right away and move them on. But if I do call the police they'll know who
As the afternoon turned into evening you would find more and more individuals on the street. The majority of the individuals were busy chatting either in English or patois, moving from the road where they would hold up traffic and then back to the pavement. Horns would be honking in an attempt to keep the traffic moving. As a result the level of conversation would increase to overcome the noise of the traffic. Walking from the top end of the road where the cafe was located it was easy to spot the dealers. Some would be talking on mobile phones arranging what appeared to be drug transactions. While others would simply show you what they had for sale. Others would be asking what you wanted "Crack man, the best hit around what about tea".

For an outsider the street action, with all that it offered seemed hostile, aggressive, and unsafe. After being around the neighbourhood for a while and getting to know the custom of the Jamaican street scene the outsider can begin to see that there is a social order to this world. In many ways, once I had identified this social order the experience reminded me of a carnival. While there was some tension surrounding those individuals waiting to do (drug) business, most individuals were in a party mood, mingling with each other, carrying on conversations which changed as new members would enter or leave the group. The conversations were always loud and animated, yet, there was no violence within these groups or with individuals that passed by.

The street scene, in the cold winter months was a far cry from the activities of the summer months. With the exception of the shoppers and motorist the street was relatively empty. The majority of the individuals that you saw on the street were the ones that had a destination in mind. For example they were generally moving from store to store gathering groceries and other items which were required. At this time of the year all the action was in doors.
The three pubs that were in the area and the cafe were usual always busy. Each season had a different impact on the area and thus affecting the data collected. The summer months were when the majority of the data was collected as there were more individuals out and about. In addition it seemed that more individuals were prepared to spend the time with me. It was my impression that during the colder winter months individuals were more interested in just getting by, doing what had to be done and nothing more.

In the beginning the method of collecting data involved Betty talking with her friends and contacts then pre-arranging interviews. Once the interviews were arranged I would drive into Nottingham and meet the individual at Betty's home. This method of gathering data did present some difficulties. In some cases individuals who had agreed to be interviewed never showed up. Although this proved to be frustrating the information gathered while I was at the house proved to be invaluable. The house was always full of interesting people who were simply "hanging out". The majority of these individuals had either used or sold illicit drugs at one time or another. Therefore by being present and directing the conversation information about the drug scene flowed freely. This information in many ways was more valuable than was the structured questionnaire. The information collected in this manner was more personal and related to the reasons behind becoming a user or dealer.

Other times, when contact was not made, Mark and I would end up going down to the pub to "hang out". At these times there was no real agenda it simply was a time to get to know each other, to have a few pints, to meet the pub crowd, and to feel comfortable just "hanging out".

Mark is Jamaican, 6 feet 4 inches tall and weights about 185 pounds. He was a good contact person as he was well respected in Hyson Green. Brada had been well connected to the local underworld as a petty thief and drug dealer. If anyone wanted something Brade had the reputation as the person to see. His relationship to Betty was always on-again-off-again.
depending on if Mark was cheating on her or if Betty had just had enough of Mark’s behaviour. When I first meet Brada he wanted to be on Betty’s good side so he willingly agreed to help me with my research. His conditions were quite simple. You help me to please Betty. You stay close to my side. You don’t cause me any misery. The first time we had arranged to meet at the pub I arrived wearing blue jeans and a blue jean shirt on my feet I wore a trainers. When I arrived at the pub Mark was somewhat cold towards me. He was with his mates and were speaking in patois and english as I joined the group he took me aside and suggested I had broken one of the rules.

All ready you have brought down misery on me. Do you want to be an embarrassment to me? My reputation is important! Do you not have anything better to wear? Maybe a few gold chains or some rings.

That was the last time I "dressed down" in an attempt to fit in. When ever I was with Mark I was accepted within the group and in Hyson Green. Over the next six months Brada would invite me to "hang out" with him and to meet individuals who would be useful in my research.

When your with me at the beginning just listen. Don’t ask a lot of questions show respect, always show respect man. If you show respect they will talk with you and tell you what you want to know. If your a mate of mine you will get respect back. (Advice which I received from Brada early on in the research).
It was this advice and Marks's reputation that allowed me to move as freely as I did and allowed me to meet people that I otherwise would not have had the opportunity to talk with. By the end of my research Brada had become a good friend.

The process of "hanging out" not only gave me the opportunity to meet friends of Mark on their own turf but it helped me become more accepted by the regulars in the pub and also within the Jamaican community. It was these contacts which later turned out to be invaluable.

Unlike the cafe, which had a reputation as a drug hang-out the pub, although it was a good place to meet drug dealers it did not have the same reputation as did the cafe. Rather, the pub served as an important gathering place for people to meet and socialize. In this sense it served as an informal social club for the community where individuals could meet. The pub is owned and managed by individuals from Jamaica and the clientele is mostly Jamaican both young and old. The pub is situated at a corner of Radford Road, across the road from a large food store and down a block from the cafe. The pub has two entrances, one leading from the side street which lead to the formal section and the other leading from Radford Road to where the pool table is situated. Each room has its own distinctive social character. The formal section is well maintained and usually quiet. This is the section where individuals come to read the paper, be alone, or where older couples would come for a drink and socialize. When you enter the pub from the Radford Road entrance the appearance is quite different. It is not as clean as the other side and there is a sign on the wall that warns all who entered that there is to be no selling or using of illicit drugs. Although there is a sign warning against the selling and using of drugs this did not deter drug deals from occurring. In addition, there was an other sign that said no dreadlocks allowed. The sign regarding the selling and using of drugs was self explanatory but I had to be informed about what dreadlocks were and why they were not allowed. The explanation which
was given to me from the owner of the pub was that dreadlocks were worn by Rastafarian and that Rastafarian were not welcome in his pub as Rastafarian were drug users and dealers.

In the summer months, afternoon or evening, the pub was always crowded. Usually there were four separate groups; the domino players, the pool players, the drug crowd, and the audience. The domino players usually sat against the side wall and were older. They would arrive early afternoon take their usual spot and start their game. As the game progressed they became louder and louder yelling demands to the other players, criticizing how they played, the speed they took on making the next move, and why that move was inappropriate. An outsider viewing this behaviour would assume that at any moment a fight was to break-out. But it never happened and the game would continue on with each person yelling at each other.

The pool players were much younger than the domino players. They were also much better dressed, wore a lot of gold, and seemed very much impressed with themselves. Individuals within this group would mingle with the drug group but would have little to do with the domino players. The closest to any form of interaction was for one of the pool players to the domino players to "close your mouth man how can a body concentrate". The pool players were very flashy and attempted to be the centre of attention. When one made a good shot the game came to a stand still with the shooter expanding on his ability and the talent it took to make such a shot.

The third group, the audience, was made up of both young and old. They would mingle between the pool players and the domino players suggesting the next move, how to make the shot and then either congratulating them or commiserating with them on the error that they made. This group would act as waiters to both the pool and the domino players and in return would usually receive a pint for their effort. On occasion they would interact with the drug sellers but only if they were buying and the contact would be
brief. Once contact was made the dealer would go to the toilet, shortly after the purchaser would follow. Soon after they would reappear and return to their own group.

The fourth group were the drug dealers and users. This group would always sit close to the toilet which was located at the back of the pub. Within this group there was a well defined hierarchy which was defined by the level of dealing among the individuals present. Low level and user/dealers were made to take a back seat when middle level dealers were present. When middle level dealers were talking about their women or how much they had spent on their clothes it was expected that all would listen and then reinforce the style of the middle level dealer. This group was somewhat similar to the pool players in that they were very concerned with their appearance and the amount of gold they wore. The wearing of gold was a symbol of personal success for both groups. For the drug dealers the wearing of gold presented themselves as living good without having to work at a regular job. Yet around the pub the majority of the dealers were low-level. Their activities included selling small amounts of crack or marijuana. Some worked whenever they got an opportunity at a regular job while others either obtained public aid of some form or lived off family, friends or their women.

Once I had made what I believed was enough contacts through Betty and Mark I started to go to the pub to "hang out" and arrange my own interviews. Being accepted was no longer a problem. When I arrived there would usually be at least one person whom I knew so it was usually easy to simply join that group. On the occasion when my presence was challenged by someone that was not known to me, one of the individuals I knew would say "the man is a mate of Brada he's from Canada be tolerant man and don't give him any misery". In many cases he would continue and explain why I was in England. It was this explanation which allowed me to discuss my research and if appropriate to arrange a future interview.
One such individual I met this way was Billy. He was 41 years old but when you first say him you would have thought he was much older. Around the pub he had a reputation, in his younger days of being one the best "cutters" in England. Now he was burnt-out on crack and was believed to be a police informant so very few people trusted him but would tolerate his presence. According to Billy he had been in drug treatment two or three times but the programs did not work. In addition to the treatment programs he had spent time in jail for selling drugs. His latest notoriety was an appearance on the television show Panorama when Panorama investigated the drug scene in Nottingham. In this appearance Billy showed how easy it was to obtain crack and then went on to use it. While he was under the influence he named individuals and places where crack could be obtained. Once the show was aired it was reported by some that there was a contract on him and he deserved what ever happened, while others felt sorry for him and suggested that no one would have taken him seriously.

You know the man is fryed, his brain doesn't work properly. You have to fell sorry for such a person. You got to show some sympathy for the man.

As it happened Billy was soon ostracized by the people from the pub so his appearances became less and less frequent. Betty later informed me that he left Nottingham with his daughter and granddaughter and had moved north.
By using an ethnographic perspective to study the nature of the issues that emerge during social interaction provided for a greater understanding of the actions of the drug dealers which I had the opportunity to meet and talk with. This process gave me a much broader and more meaningful understanding of the social interaction between the drug dealers and the community. As the ethnographic process took into account the social and cultural context of what it was like to be a dealer in illicit drugs in Hyson Green it provided me with in-depth knowledge of the drug scene from the perspective of the drug dealers.
CHAPTER SIX
THE NATURE OF THE ILLICIT DRUG MARKET IN NOTTINGHAM.

The illicit drug market in Nottingham in keeping with the rest of the United Kingdom is more than heroin, cocaine and marijuana. It encompasses a complete line of designer and prescription drugs which all end up on the street. These drug markets vary a great deal across drugs and over time and most of what are now classified as controlled drugs have been widely growing and produced since the 18th century. Who controls the trafficking of the drugs? Where do the drugs come from? How do these drugs enter the market place? How do these market places work? These and other questions such as who the customers are and how the drugs are distributed are central in determining the impact the police have on the drug scene.

The theory of Anomie presented a general argument to the effect that in areas of high social deprivation when the goals individuals seek have no relationship to the means society prescribes for attaining these goals, life, in effect, becomes unlivable. Within this state, drug taking and other forms of deviant behaviour become the norm. Drug taking becomes an attempt to enhance a person's status within a social system where the highest prize goes to those who demonstrate attributes of toughness and adventure (Feldman, 1968). Moreover, Pearson (1987: 64) also suggests that the use of opiates and the incidence of social deprivation are strongly linked in Great Britain. He argues that drug abuse has become a serious problem in those neighbourhoods where there is a presence of poor housing, low income, high density of single-parent families, and high unemployment. It is these neighbourhoods that are often least able to combat the threat of drugs once the problem has become established.
Moore (1977: 58) also argues that socially disorganized areas provide environments that are attractive to heroin dealers. These areas, according to Moore, provide the following five advantages:

1. A supply of customers and employees that have internalized norms against cooperation with the police;

2. A background level of activity into which many illegal activities can be blended;

3. An inability of honest citizens to demand a fair share of police services;

4. The likelihood that other criminals in the area have born some of the very expensive initial costs of corrupting the local police; and

5. The fact that the enormous supply of criminals in the area will allow local police to reach satisfactory levels of achievement long before they arrest a large fraction of the criminals operating (Moore, 1977: 58-9).

Nottingham City, based on 15 social indicators (no car, free school meals, lone parent families, dependent population, adults unemployed, youth unemployed, over one person per room, no central heating, long term illness, low weight babies, youth in care, youth offenders, school leavers, semi-skilled workers, and unskilled workers) is disadvantaged relative to the country as a whole. It suffers higher rates of unemployment, greater extremes of poverty, some of the highest rates of crime and has a very large rate of children in care (Melville et al., 1990). Seventy per cent of the population lives in areas which the Nottinghamshire County Council has defined as being in social need. The largest concentrations of social need are found in the inner area of the city.
The population of Nottinghamshire in the 1991 census was estimated at just over a million while the population for Nottingham City was estimated at 263,522. This estimate reflects a continuing overall population decline which started in 1981. At 3,680 persons per square kilometre, Nottingham City has a considerably higher population density than other districts (Unell, 1990). Lone parent households make up 13.7 per cent of all council rented accommodations compared to the national average of 3.7 per cent and 15.7 per cent of all housing association rentals compared to the national average of 6.4 per cent.

Presently (1993), within the city there is a rising trend of unemployment estimated at 55,636 (13%), four per cent higher than the United Kingdom as a whole. White male unemployment is still higher at 18 per cent. While unemployment is higher again for Black groups. Black unemployment for all groups is 31.9 per cent while for men between the ages of 16 to 24 unemployment is estimated at 44.5 per cent.

The 1991 census indicates the ethnic background for the city of Nottingham as follows.
Table 6.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nottingham (%)</th>
<th>England &amp; Wales (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>235,184</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>8,516</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Other</td>
<td>3,042</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>4,747</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>6,867</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2,624</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to high levels of unemployment Nottingham has an increasing crime problem. In 1993 the Home Office Criminal Statistic Bulletin put Nottingham among the top ten cities with the highest overall rate of crime per 100,000 population. The level of violent crime such as sexual assaults for the year 1993 was up 19 per cent and robbery was up 13 per cent over the figures for 1992.

For the year 1983 levels of social deprivation in each of the city's 27 electoral wards were calculated by Nottingham Health Authority and Nottinghamshire County Council Planning and Economic Development Department. The highest ranked of these was Radford Ward. In 1993 the study was undertaken again. At this time Radford Ward was ranked third overall. This improvement in Radford's overall rating does not reflect an
improvement in relation to the social indicators but rather a decrease in conditions in other areas of the city.

Actual drug related statistics in Nottingham over a period from 1988 to 1992 show increased activity in both police and health services and reflects what many believe is a growing problem. Table 6.2 shows both an increase in arrests and convictions for Nottinghamshire for the period between 1988 and 1992. These figures indicate more than a doubling of arrests over the period between 1988 to 1992, with cautioning increasing from 64 to 236 for the same period.
Table 6.2

Arrests and Disposition for Drug Related Offenses in Nottinghamshire (Source: Nottinghamshire Constabulary Drug Squad).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrests All Officers</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Drug Squad)</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found guilty</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cautioned</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3

Persons Found Guilty or Cautioned for Drug Offenses in Nottinghamshire (Source: Statistics of the Misuse of Drugs, United Kingdom, 1992, Area tables).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All drug offenses</th>
<th>Trafficking</th>
<th>Production of cannabis</th>
<th>Possession of all drugs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3 presents the number of arrests for drug offences in Nottinghamshire from 1986 to 1992, during this time arrests more than doubled. More important though is the actual amount of charges for "trafficking". Although arrests more than doubled the largest amount of trafficking offenses was reached in 1987 with a total of 60 which fell to only 25 in 1992.
### Table 6.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All drugs</th>
<th>Cocaine</th>
<th>Heroin</th>
<th>LSD</th>
<th>Cannabis</th>
<th>Amphetamines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the doubling of arrests for the same period drug seizures rose from 207 in 1986 to 516 in 1992 a increase of 236 per cent. Yet, the overall figure for those found guilty or cautioned for cocaine or heroin remains rather low with only six convictions for 1992.

### Table 6.5

Seizures of Controlled Drugs in Nottinghamshire, (Source: Statistics of the Misuse of Drugs, United Kingdom, 1992, Area tables).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All drugs</th>
<th>Cocaine</th>
<th>Heroin</th>
<th>LSD</th>
<th>Cannabis</th>
<th>Amphetamines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.6
Seizures of Controlled Drugs for England, (Source: Statistics of the misuse of drugs, United Kingdom, 1992, Area tables).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All Drugs</th>
<th>Cocaine</th>
<th>Heroin</th>
<th>LSD</th>
<th>Cannabis</th>
<th>Amphetamines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>45,190</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>2,178</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>39,102</td>
<td>3,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>51,862</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>2,324</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>43,812</td>
<td>5,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>37,857</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>2,196</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>32,309</td>
<td>2,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>27,877</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>1,724</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>24,248</td>
<td>2,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>51,862</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>2,324</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>43,812</td>
<td>5,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>53,042</td>
<td>1,916</td>
<td>2,569</td>
<td>1,978</td>
<td>41,552</td>
<td>8,611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of seizures within Nottinghamshire of controlled drugs for the year 1992 rose by ten per cent, which, for the first time was far greater than the national average of three per cent (Home Office Statistical Bulletin, October, 1993). Given the relative deprivation and the high crime rate in Nottingham, drug related arrests and drug seizures compared to the rest of the country over the period from 1986 to 1992 are rather low. Of the 38 police authorities which provided data on drug seizures per 1,000,000 population to the Home Office Nottingham rated as follows:

Table 6.7
Ranking of Drug Seizures Per. 1,000,000 Population (Source: Statistics of the Misuse of Drugs, United Kingdom, 1992, Area tables).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nottinghamshire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The absolute number of seizures in Nottingham for the year 1992 of 516, placed Nottingham in 36th place just above Hampshire and Lancashire neither of which contain large urban centres with a population which exceeding 150,000 (Home Office Statistical Bulletin, October, 1993).

Of the 516 drug seizures for the year 1992, 432 (83.7 per cent) were related to cannabis, while class A drugs made up 48 (11 per cent) of all seizures. These percentages compare very closely to the national figures of 80 per cent for cannabis and 13 per cent for class A drugs. In addition to the 516 seizures, 687 individuals were detained for drug related offences of which 251 were found guilty while 236 were cautioned. Of the 487 found guilty or cautioned 25 were for trafficking offences while seven were for unlawful production of cannabis and 452 were for unlawful possession.

The Illicit Drug Market Place in Radford and Nottingham

Drug markets vary a great deal across drugs and over time. As early as 1970 Mr. Fowler, M.P. for Nottingham South in his maiden speech to the House of Commons, identified illicit drug use as a problem in Nottingham. In the period from 1970 to the mid 1980s the two drugs which generated the most concern were heroin and marijuana. Information obtained from the Home Office Addicts index for the year 1978 suggested that no more than 20 drug addicts were known to the Home Office. The majority of this population was male and came from a working class background. Marijuana was used by many more people and from a wider socio-economic background. Other synthetic drugs such as LSD, MDA, and Ecstasy were used over the years but have not received the same concern as did the other drugs such as heroin or cannabis. Although cocaine was used during the mid 1970s it wasn't until the mid to late 1980s that cocaine came into identifiable use within Nottingham. By 1988 there were still only 29 drug addicts within Nottinghamshire known to the Home Office while in England the reported figure of drug addicts was 12,644. However, many more users than this figure were known to treatment services.
Table 6.8
Addicts Notified to The Home Office, England and Nottinghamshire
(Source: Statistics of the Misuse of Drugs, United Kingdom, 1992, Area tables).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nottinghamshire</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>11,533</td>
<td>13,700</td>
<td>16,163</td>
<td>18,761</td>
<td>22,240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.9
All Addicts per 1,000,000 Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nottinghamshire</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1982 D.H.S.S. Treatment and Rehabilitation: Report of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs stated that figures derived from the Addicts Index were seriously underestimated by at least five fold. In addition to the addicts reported to the Home Office in 1992, Griffin (1992) estimated that there were more than 150,000 regular opiate users in the UK. In a report entitled "Drugs: A Review of the Government Strategy, "Tackling Drug Misuse From a Police Perspective (1985) the government suggests that the number of registered opiate addicts can only represent the trends in addiction and that official data may only represent ten per cent of the total population. The report continued to say that the ten per cent figure is a very loose estimate, the truth being that no-one really knows the extent of addiction. The scale of addiction to non-opiates, e.g. cocaine, is completely unknown.
Other than heroin there is no information on the total prevalence of other drugs (Sutton and Maynard, 1992). Cannabis prevalence could be measured in terms of millions not thousands while the use of other drugs is only estimated from the numbers seeking treatment. The present indicators are: The number of registered addicts, the number of arrests for possession and trafficking, the number and size of seizures, the price of drugs, and the number of persons seeking counselling and advice. There are also inadequate as bases for determining the prevalence of problem drug takers. Yet it is on the basis of these indicators that government expects police and other agencies to allocate limited resources.

The collection of data to determine the size and scope of the use of illicit drugs is the responsibility of many different agencies. The problem with the majority of the information collected is that it reflects the need of enforcement and health policy makers rather than the needs of data gathering to identify underlying trends in drug markets (Sutton and Maynard, 1992).

A number of studies have attempted to estimate the size and scope of the drug problem in Nottingham by determining the prevalence rate of drug misuse. (Bradbury et al., 1985; Bean and Wilkinson, 1987; Melville et al., 1985, 1987, and 1990). These studies have started by first collecting information on drug users known to treatment agencies and the Addicts Index, then have undertaken fieldwork to identify the unknown population.

Bradbury et al., (1985) identified 77 known addicts from the Home Office Index and 122 problem drug takers were identified from the Nottingham Addiction Unit while only 39 were identified during their field work. They concluded that none of the indicators used in their study showed a large prevalence of drug use in Nottingham.
Bean and Wilkinson (1987) identified 177 users in total, of which 86 users were known to the Home Office Index, 65 were known to treatment services, and 26 were identified during their fieldwork. Their conclusion was that there was a flourishing illicit drugs system but in some respects things were not as bad as expected.

In 1990 The Nottingham Alcohol and Drug Team also attempted to determine the prevalence rate of problem drug users in Nottingham. Figures taken from the mental illness unit case register which showed that 222 admissions had been made to the in-patient unit of the Drug and Alcohol Team and that 723 patients attended the out-patient unit (Meville, et al., 1990). They concluded that the prevalence of problem drug use in Nottingham was low in absolute terms; 40 per 100,000 of the population.

The British Crime Survey (1992) also suggested that the overall use of drugs within Nottingham was in line with that of the British population. This study also stated that past Nottingham prevalence studies which indicated that the drug problem in Nottingham was particularly severe were either based on the method of data collection (snowballing) or based on "at risk groups". The study continued to say that given the nature of the city and its population, it is no greater than one would expect.

Based on the actual studies conducted and national statistics between 1988 to 1993, it would seem that the drug problem in Nottingham in relationship to the rest of the country is no worse. Yet there is the perception among residents, some academics, and the media of a problem which is epidemic in proportion. The drug problem often assumes a high profile in areas which are characterized by urban deprivation, high unemployment, poverty and a high percentage of minority groups.
It has been argued, largely due to the role played by the popular press, that drugs issues came to the top of the social concern agenda in 1984-5. This preoccupation with the "drug problem" for many communities has been counter productive. Not only does it perpetuate the perception of a problem, it creates the problem. Fewer businesses are prepared to invest in an area that has been negatively labelled, in turn reducing the number of shoppers. In addition, this type of notoriety can depict a lucrative area for selling and buying drugs, thus creating a drugs tourism which brings drug users and dealers from other regions (Pearson, 1992).

**Trafficking Groups (The Structure of the Illicit Market in Nottingham)**

The structure of the illicit drug distribution network throughout both North America and Great Britain has previously been outlined by Preble and Casey (1969), Hunt (1987), and Dom, *et al.*, (1992) and many others. Although for this research some of the terms and definitions have changed much of their description of the distribution network holds true for Nottingham. The drug market structure in Nottingham composes of mainly small, isolated units at many different levels. At the top of the distribution chain are the importers. A top level importer that took part in this research claimed that he has the capability to import cocaine into Liverpool from Africa and Spain. He has a relatively large network of trust (lower level dealers who operated independently, but purchased their drugs from him and then in turn after cutting the drug sold them to smaller dealers). He reported that his annual profits were in the region of £200,000 to £250,000 per year. He believed that one of the secrets of making a lot of money and not being caught was to sell at a very competitive price, with a rapid turnover. It was his belief that this rapid turnover decreased the possibility of detection and investigation by the police.

The second level of traffickers identified was the classical "Posse Style Syndicate". This type of syndicate controlled the whole range of trafficking operations from importation to street sale. Generally, they are middle level dealers who buy from the importer, cut the product and hire "runners" to do the...
selling. Individuals at this level usually try to expand their operations by recruiting new dealers, who operate at a lower level than themselves by giving credit (usually an ounce or less). If the arrangement is successful the credit line can be increased. If the arrangement in some case is not successful their losses are offset by their increase in sales from the more successful operations. This use of credit would suggest that profits are large enough that middle level dealers can take the chance of being ripped-off without being financially affected. It may also suggest that there is a large amount of drugs available for distribution. It was reported by the Nottingham Drug Squad that more and more small-time criminals with no apparent drug connection are being arrested for trafficking in drugs. In two cases the individuals involved reported that they received their supply on credit.

A third group of traffickers identified in this research were the independent dealers. These individuals are private entrepreneurs working their area as a private business usually supplying amounts of up to 1/4 of an ounce. These individuals at times may work in pairs or may occasionally join together to fund major purchases for subsequent resale. The dealers know each other personally and may work in close proximity of each other. One of the group will act as a buyer and will travel to London, Birmingham, or Liverpool to make a bulk purchase which is then split amongst the purchasing group. If the dealers can combine to purchase four to five ounces the volume purchase will allow them in many cases to triple their usual profits. The drawback to this type of bulk purchasing is the individual dealer increases his/her chance of being "ripped-off" by other dealers within the syndicate. At this level these dealers are most at risk from both other dealers and the police as they are highly visible and are more likely to be arrested due to the number of transactions they have to make while plying their trade. The profits which are realized, rather than being reinvested, are usually spent in supporting a fast lifestyle. Because they lack both funds or major connections it is difficult for them to move up the chain and become major dealers.
The bottom level dealer identified was the user dealer. This individual sells to support his/her own drug habit, sometimes working as a "runner" for other dealers, or they purchase a small amount, "cut" what they do not use and then sell the remainder to support their own habit. This group is also highly visible and easily detected by the police; if arrested they are easily replaced. At this level there is very little stability and many dealers if not arrested will take early retirement, some to return at a later date.

The Drug Selling Population

The amount of people selling illegal drugs at any given time is unknown and similar in attempting to determine drug prevalence is difficult. Sutton and Maynard (1992) in their analysis of the research on sellers to users in Great Britain suggest that nationwide there are probably eight users for each retailer. Moore (1977) suggests that for the heroin market ten to one is a better estimate and this figure would not include "jugglers" or addicts who sell to support their habit. Cocaine markets are estimated at 25 to one and cannabis is closer to 40 to one (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986). These figures are, as suggested by Reuter and Kleiman arbitrary and unreliable as they cannot take into account the static nature of the market.

The structure of the illicit drug market like most legitimate markets is affected by a number of factors, some of which include the economics of part time dealers, the extent to which policing is effective in relation to their ability to affect the quantity, quality and pricing of the drugs on the street, and the type of drugs which is in demand. These factors not only influence the drug taking population but also will affect the size and scope of the drug selling population.

Sample Characteristics

Of the 50 drug dealers interviewed, 33 (64 per cent) were male between the ages of 19 and 53. Seventeen respondents were female between the age of 17 and 43. For both males and females the mean age was 32. For the male population the ethnic make up was 22 Afro-Caribbean, seven were white, and
four were of mixed race. Of the female population their ethnic background consisted of four Afro-Caribbean, 10 were white, and three were of mixed race (see Table 4.10). The disproportionately high numbers of Afro-Caribbeans within this study may reflect the method in which the data was collected (snowballing, using Afro-Caribbeans as the starting point) rather than the degree to which they actually are involved in the distribution of drugs. In respect to age distribution the population interviewed seem to generally correspond to the mean age of the drug taking population who have entered into treatment in Nottingham.

Table 6.10

Drug Dealers: Sample Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N = 50</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>19-53</td>
<td>17-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Caribbean</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents' Household Characteristics

Respondents' household characteristics appear in Table 6.11 Of all the respondents 21 had never been married. Although 21 reported they were single only 11 reported that they were living alone. Eight reported living with more than three people. The majority, 27 of the respondents had lived in their present residence for over five years. Only four had lived in their residence for one year or less with the average length of residence being over five years and a mode of over 7 years. This would suggest somewhat of a stable population. Twenty-four of the respondents lived within the Radford Ward. Forty-seven of the respondents lived in inner city wards. This would be expected based on the snowballing method of data collection which was used.
### Table 6.11  
Household Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17-29</td>
<td>30-53</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Sample (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=22</td>
<td>N=28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common law</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohabitants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living alone</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One cohabitant</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 cohabitants</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 cohabitants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radford</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Annes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlton</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Length of stay</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than one year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Criminal History

Of the 50 dealers, 36 had a criminal record. Of these 36 individuals, 11 dealers had criminal records due to non-drug related offences. The remaining 25 had been convicted of drug offences, four had convictions for possession only and 9 respondents were convicted both of possession and trafficking.

The 36 people with criminal records reported a total of 61 convictions which included drug and non-drug offences. Sixteen of these convictions were for possession and nine convictions were for trafficking. The remaining 36 convictions were non-drug related.
It is important to note that the age group 17-29 had the largest number of people with non-drug convictions. The older population had the greatest overall number of convictions, 37 in total of which 22 were drug related (see Table 6.12).

Of the 24 individuals in the older group only one person had non drug related charges while 14 were found guilty for trafficking. Of the total 37 who had criminal charges only two were first charged with a criminal offence prior to their reporting of drug use. In both cases their first charge was a drug related charge. For the remaining 35 their criminal careers preceded drug use and drug selling.

Table 6.12
Characteristics of residents charged with drug and other offences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Possession</th>
<th>Trafficking</th>
<th>Non-drug</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age 17-29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 30-53</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Car</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.12 indicates that of the 50 respondents 25 or 50 per cent have had at least one conviction of either possession or trafficking. For the vast majority of these individuals convictions came later on in their drug selling career. This would suggest that the length of time involved in drug selling activities is positively associated with the risk of arrest and conviction for a drug related offence.
(A) Total drugs seized in the United Kingdom in 1992.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>49,173 kgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>2,266 kgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>601 kgs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(B) Estimated amount of drugs available

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>491,732 kgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>5,134 kgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>22,668 kgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>6,017 kgs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) Distributor prices per Kilogramme

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>£2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>£27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>£25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>£2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(D) Estimated value of drugs available at distributor prices

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>£983,465,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>£142,843,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>£566,709,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>£12,035,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distributor value</td>
<td>£1,705,054,370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this point, the relative purity of the drugs on the street must be considered. Using the purity at import level and the purity at street level an estimate of the amount of drugs available on the street can be determined.

(E) Average purity at import

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(F) Average street purity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Purity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(G) Estimated quantity of drugs on the street after cutting, taking into account the purity at import and street level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>491,732 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>5,905 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>30,720 Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>10,825 kg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(H) Average street price per kilo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Price per Kilo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>£2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>£90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>£85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>£12,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(I) Total street price

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Total Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>£1,376,849,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>£531,450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>£2,611,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>£135,312,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated total of drugs for 1992 on the street £4,645,812,100

Accepting that the calculations described are based on wide ranging assumptions, it is nevertheless possible to demonstrate the extent of the drug based black economy without further qualifications. The obvious question which arises from these calculations is what happens to this sum of money per annum and what effect does it have on the economy? It is acknowledged that there are many varied groups and individuals involved in trafficking and supplying at various tiered levels, and operations ranging from small to large scale. At each level and for each individual, this gross profit is accounted for in terms of operating expenses, reinvestment capital and personal gain.
Accepting that one cannot determine the proportion of the drug-based economy which is invested in the local economy it must nevertheless be recognised that at each level of the drug trade investments along with every day living expenses occur. The effects of these investments and expenses on many communities can be potentially significant. The adverse effect of such money is that it can be used to buy up legitimate enterprises and are able to defeat competition. These business which are funded with drug money and essentially acting as a vehicle for money laundering do not need to achieve even marginal profits.

Yet there is another side to the economic argument. It must be granted that the Drug Barons and major traffickers reap the majority of the money from illicit drugs but are there spin-offs from this money? When Pablo Escobar was killed on the 3rd of December 1993 hundreds of people, mostly from poor neighbourhoods flocked to the cemetery to pay their last respects. He will be remembered by many as a generous benefactor of many social projects. To many poor Colombians he was a Robin Hood who poisoned the rich with his drugs and distributed at least part of his vast wealth to the slum poor for taking on a state apparatus that had failed to provide for their basic needs. Many Colombians including local football teams and the occupants of 460 homes that he financed for slum dwellers (The Times, Saturday Dec. 4th.). Pearson (1987), Johnson et al (1985), and Preble (1969) would also suggest that there are financial spin offs for individuals and deprived communities within the drug consuming nations. This comes about in the way stolen merchandise is fenced at a much reduced cost to the consumer.

Moreover, our heroin abuser’s theft had indirect effects on society by increasing monetary wealth in the licit economy. Victims bought replacements for the stolen goods, stores transferred shoplifting losses to consumers, and the government gained added sales-tax revenue. The licit economic system indirectly gained about $6,000 in additional
economic values that would not have been realised had the heroin abuser not stolen merchandise (Johnson et al., 1985: 13).

Preble (1969) also presents an argument that the heroin user is an important figure in the economic life of neighbourhoods which are characterized by high drug dealing.

One economic institution that has resulted directly from the increased criminal activity among heroin users is the grocery fence. He is a small, local businessmen, such as a candy store owner, bar owner, or beauty parlour owner, who has enough cash to buy stolen goods and property on a small scale and has a place to store them. He then sells the items to his regular customers, both for goodwill and a profit. He provides a service for the user in providing him with a fast outlet for his goods. ... In order to support a $20 a day habit, he has to steal goods and property worth from $50 to $100. Usually he steals outside his neighbourhood, not out of community loyalty but because the opportunities are better in the wealthier neighbourhoods, and he brings his merchandise back to the neighbourhood for sale at high discounts. This results, to some extent, in a redistribution of real income from the richer to the poorer neighbourhoods. Although non-addict residents in the neighbourhood may deplore the presence of heroin users, they appreciate and compete for their services as discount salesmen. The users, in turn, experiences satisfaction in being able to make this contribution to the neighbourhood (Preble, 1969: 19).

Other parts of the community are also interested in not disrupting the drug trade. They would include individuals who make accommodation available to drug dealers to sell drugs and run "shooting galleries, and landlords who
increase rents knowing full well that the money will be paid and in turn will not be concerned with the activities taking place within the property. Given the social and political conditions for many individuals who live in deprived communities they may deplore the presence of the drug dealers, but are prepared to accept their place within the community, since this type of redistribution of income may well determine their standard of living.

The Economic Life of Street-Level Drug Dealers in Radford
MacCoun and Reuter (1992) suggest that crack dealing has become the new "sweatshop" for minorities in some cities with street level dealers barely earning minimum wage and what is usually earned is spent on their own habit. This view is in contrast to the popular view presented by newspapers and the television who regularly report high earnings and extravagant lifestyles of drug dealers. Some of these stories of high earnings are based on facts but how true is it for the majority of drug sellers? For the purpose of this research drug dealers were asked a variety of questions, for example; income earned from drug dealing and other crimes and money earned from other legitimate work activities.

Of the 50 dealers interviewed who sold (30 or more hours per week 68 per cent of the population) reported that their earnings were much higher than alternative earnings (legal or criminal). The major finding is that drug dealing is indeed a well paid activity for a group of the population who have poor legitimate means for goal attainment.

For the 35 individuals who reported selling drugs on an average of 30 hours per week their mean earnings were £3,733 per week. Table 6.13 would indicate that there is a positive correlation between hours per week spent selling and yearly gross income. This correlation holds true till £80,000 plus.
Table 6.13

Income From Drug Sales (£)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income From Drug Sales (£)</th>
<th>Dealers</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-10,000</td>
<td>18 (36%)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,001-30,000</td>
<td>16 (32%)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,001-50,000</td>
<td>9 (18%)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,001-100,000</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;100,000</td>
<td>5 (10%)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drug Selling Activity

Although, over a twelve month period, while marijuana made up 60 per cent of the drug sellers crack and cocaine were the most lucrative source of income (Table 6.14). Nineteen of the respondents earned the majority of their money primarily from selling crack, nine earned their primary income from selling cocaine, and nine primarily sold heroin. The mean number of different drugs any one drug dealer sold was 1.66. Thirty (60 per cent) of the respondents reported only selling one drug. Fourteen only sold cannabis, five only sold heroin, and eight only sold crack.

Table 6.14

Income for Respondents, for the Past Twelve Months.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Non Drug Income (£)</th>
<th>Amount of Drug Income (£)</th>
<th>Mean Monthly Income (£)</th>
<th>Per Cent of non-drug to total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>48,541</td>
<td>4,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>98,000</td>
<td>8,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marijuana</td>
<td>6,855</td>
<td>21,458</td>
<td>2,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>15,444</td>
<td>44,700</td>
<td>5,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamines</td>
<td>2,950</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>2,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>2,683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(These figures are not mutually exclusive as some dealers sold more than one drug).
Respondents were also asked how much income was earned from drug and non-drug activities. The mean estimates of gross earnings and the percentage which that made of their total income is shown in Table 6.14. Of the 50 respondents, two reported working full time while another two reported being self-employed. Sixteen reported working part time while 38 (76%) reported being unemployed. Of the 38 who reported being unemployed 10 or 26 percent had been out of work for more than a year. Of the 38 respondents who were unemployed they reported receiving some form of legitimate income either from government payment or friends and family. In addition to this income 30 per cent reported receiving income from the grey economy. The mean yearly income for non-drug activities was £5,682 compared to a mean of £33,500 for money earned from selling drugs.

Of the 50 respondents, 15 individuals reported drug selling income above the mean and 29 of those individuals who reported non-drug income were above the mean. In addition, there seems to be a positive association with non-drug income and drug income. Those who reported high drug income also reported high non-drug income. This may occur for two reasons; first it may be fair to speculate that those who hustle at selling drugs also place the same amount of energy into non-drug activities. Secondly those that reported a high non-drug income may be using legitimate channels of employment to launder money earned from drugs. With two respondents this was the case.

Table 6.15 shows the number of individuals by drug and non-drug income and the percentiles where they fall. Of the 50 respondents for non-drug income 29 ranged above the 50th percentile while 26 respondents drug income was above the 50th percentile.
Table 6.15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard Source Deviation</th>
<th>0-25th</th>
<th>26-50th</th>
<th>51-75th</th>
<th>76-100</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Drug Income (£11,358)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Income (£45,571)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were asked how many hours per week they spent selling drugs. Many of the respondents reported that all their free time, over 40 hours were spent in selling drugs but no actual figure was given. For the purpose of data analysis these responses were put at forty hours per week. Those who reported selling for approximately 40 hours per week formed the largest per cent of all respondents, 34 per cent or 17 in total. These figures would suggest that there is a close association between the amount of income generated and the amount of time spent in selling drugs. Twenty-four (48 per cent) reported that they spent 35 or more hours per week selling drugs. This would suggest that for these respondents drug selling is seen as full time employment.

Drug selling, for these respondents generated large incomes, more than twice what could possibly be made from legitimate employment. One would assume if they earned these incomes over a sustained period of time their opportunity for greater social mobility would improve. Unfortunately this is not the case. In all but a few examples the money which was earned did not translate into legitimate activities or accumulation of assets which was otherwise unavailable to them. To a great extent this is due to the instability...
of the drug market place and the conspicuous consumption which makes up the lifestyle of many drug sellers. In addition, their heavy personal use of drugs acts against their possibility for economic mobility.

Drug Use History of Street-Level Drug Dealers

Of the 50 respondents who reported selling drugs in the 12 months during this research, all reported using drugs at one time or the other (see Table 6.17). The most used drug was cannabis followed by crack and ecstasy. The drug of choice for 41 per cent of the sample was cannabis followed by crack (25 per cent). Of those who used crack at any given time 90 per cent said it was their preferred drug.

The age for first time drug use such as cannabis, cocaine, amphetamines and LSD approximates drug initiation as reported by Reuter, et al., (1990) and for Nottingham Alcohol and Drug Team (1992). Cannabis was used by more respondents than any other drug including alcohol and at an earlier age. The age for first time alcohol use was also asked and it was interesting to find that the age for first time use was 17.2, almost two years after the mean age of cannabis use. In addition, fewer respondents reported ever using alcohol than cannabis. The mean age for first time use for crack is the highest at 27 years old. This may be due to the fact that crack did not become widely available in Nottingham until the late 1980s.

During the last 30 days prior to being interviewed all respondents reported use of an illicit drug and 66 per cent reported use of a drug other than cannabis. The mean number of drugs used for this period was 2.06 (see Table 6.17).
Table 6.17

I illicit Drug Consumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Ever used (%)</th>
<th>Mean Age at 1st Use</th>
<th>Used in last 30 Days (%)</th>
<th>Drug of Choice (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamines</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbiturates</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tranquillizer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Drug</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Except Cannabis</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>92*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Alcohol was identified by 7.8% as their drug of choice and 2% had no preference.

From the onset of illicit drug use to the present, 61 per cent of the respondents have used more than three drugs with the mean being 3.7. This is contrasted to monthly use where 77 per cent of the population using only one or two drugs with a mean of 1.8. It is interesting that those respondents who reported using five to six drugs on a monthly basis continued the same use throughout a seven day period. (see Table 6.18).

Table 6.18

Frequency of Illicit Drug Consumption (Per Cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drugs used (N=49)</th>
<th>Ever (N=50)</th>
<th>Last Month (N=49)</th>
<th>Last Week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to respondents in Table 6.19 the most commonly used drugs in a week are cannabis and crack. However when heroin is used, it is used most frequently on a daily basis. Drugs such as ecstasy and LSD seem to be used as a recreational drug and therefore are only used on week-ends.

Table 6.19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>2/3 Weekly</th>
<th>Week-ends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbiturates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tranquillize</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It would appear that within this population drug selling and drug use go hand in hand and that the respondents drug of choice was easily available. Barriers to entering the drug market at the low and middle level were minimal at best. Most respondents attained their position through a process of "drift"; they did not go through a process of training or had large amounts of capital to front their operations. It was simply a matter of "hanging out", meeting other dealers and gaining low level contacts. For this group, in the majority of cases, successful drug dealing did not require a large organization but rather time and energy. Their drug selling area was usually confined to a specific geographical location but they were prepared to sell outside of that area so long as the
customers were credible. This meant that they would have to be introduced by someone who was a customer in good standing. During the interviews the respondents made it very clear that policing had very little effect on the availability of purchasing or selling of drugs within this area. The subjects of policing strategies and their impact on drug dealing will be discussed in the forthcoming chapters.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE STRUCTURE OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN BRITAIN

In Britain the responsibility for the enforcement of drug related laws falls primarily on the police and HM Customs and Excise. HM Customs and Excise has the prime responsibility for preventing the importation of illicit drugs into the United Kingdom, while the police are responsible for dealing with offences of manufacture, supply, and possession. As the police service and HM Customs have overlapping powers and responsibilities in drug law enforcement, it is essential for both services to co-operate fully in their respective responsibilities. How this co-operation was to be defined and the development of the present operational structure of illicit drug enforcement emerged in 1985.

In 1985 the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) convened a Working Party on Drug Related Crime chaired by Mr. Broome, then the Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset. Their terms of reference were as follows;

To evaluate the nature and extent of the drug problem in this country;

To review the efficacy of police action; and

To make recommendations.

The working party concluded that the drug problem had increased in size and nature and that decisive action had to be forthcoming. In their report they recommended that firm, effective and coordinated action be taken on what had become a widespread drug problem, which had confronted both government, law enforcement, and the public.
One of the recommendations put forth by the Broome Report was that British drug enforcement be organized on a three tiered system. This system would be designed to meet the drugs threat at all levels of the market. The report reflected the assumption that the drug market had a static structure, characterised by a series of hierarchial levels, which encompassed global production and distribution at its peak, and consumer demand at its base (Pearson, 1990). Within this structure all participants have a role according to the type and quantity of drug they trafficked in. Therefore for policing to be effective each tier had to mirror the different levels of production, importation and, distribution. In their report they suggested it was possible to formulate such a mirroring strategy which would act as a series of checks and balances against drug misuse.

The first tier is composed of HM Customs and Excise and Regional Crime Squads. Their role is to prevent importation and distribution by focusing their attention on high level drug enforcement and by aiming at major manufacturers and importers. The second level, the County or Constabulary Drug Squads have the responsibility to tackle drug distribution where it has evaded the first level of control. Their primary efforts are to be aimed at the wholesale distributors and other middle traffickers. The third level is a divisional responsibility which includes divisional uniform and plain-clothes officers. Their role is to target small time dealers and user-dealers. In addition to the three tier system the National Criminal Intelligence Service was organized for the purpose of gathering and disseminating intelligence.

**HM Customs and Excise and Regional Crime Squads**

The 1980s saw the United Kingdom become a partner in the "war on drugs". This involvement saw an increase in high level policing activities with the purpose of targeting the major importers. Within Britain HM Customs along with the drugs wing of the Regional Crime Squads are seen as the first line of defence against the trafficking of illicit drugs. HM Customs and Excise is the most effective agency in the work of preventing illegal drugs entering the
country and have been responsible for seizing more drugs than the combined police forces within Britain (Drugs Arena, National Drugs Intelligence unit, New Scotland Yard, N.DiU. Publication, London).

Table 7.1
Drug Seizure Statistics - Police and Customs and Excise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>601</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>4,616</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,647</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>478</td>
<td></td>
<td>165</td>
<td></td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD Doses</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
<td>79,748</td>
<td></td>
<td>232,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2
Total Kg. Seizure by HMCE and the Police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>5,711</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,930</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMCE</td>
<td>46,930</td>
<td></td>
<td>28,505</td>
<td></td>
<td>26,806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following a recommendation from the 1984 National Drugs Conference, a working party under the Chairmanship of Mr. R. F. Broome was set up to consider drug related crime. One of the recommendations which was made to the Home Office was the creation of a drugs wing which would be attached to each of nine Regional Crime Squads. During July 1985 the Rt. Hon. Leon Brittan then the Home Secretary, said in the House of Commons the following in respect of the report.
As a measure of the importance which I attach to effective policing and Customs enforcement I am acting immediately on the report's key recommendations. First Regional Crime Squads in England and Wales will be strengthened by the addition of dedicated "drugs wings". I have in mind an increase of more than two hundred officers (National Drug Intelligence Unit (NDIU), Drugs Issue 1986: 3).

In 1986 at the A.C.P.O. national conference, Secretary Mr. Colin Hewett, then the National Drugs Intelligence Co-ordinator said the following:

I am delighted that at last the first of these "wings" are operating. Seventeen "wings" comprising 13 detective officers-a total of 221 staff with the necessary logistical support for operations (NDIU, Drugs Issue 1986: 3).

The Regional Crime/Drugs Wing in co-operation with HM Customs and Excise have the responsibility for targeting "major distributors" who are often importers.

They provide an integrated, mobile network of experienced detective officers who are able to investigate drug trafficking networks, often involving elements of international organized crime and which might stretch across the country (Home Office, 1988: 16).

**Divisional Responsibilities which include County Drug Squads, Uniformed and Plain-Clothes Officers.**

The primary responsibility of the county drug squad which forms the second tier is to target "middle level dealers" within their force area and to provide assistance at the divisional level when required. The county drug squad also
liaise with the regional drugs wing and maintain contact with teams which are responsible for financial investigation.

The third tier is divisional uniform and detectives. Their responsibility is centred on simple possession offences and small scale dealers. All officers are indirectly or directly involved at this level. The responsibility of county and local drug enforcement is that of the chief constable of each shire. How the drug problem is defined and the degree of resources that goes into the problem is determined at this level.

**National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS)**

In the late 1950s it was realised that to successfully combat organised crime and to achieve the apprehension and conviction of high level criminals effort would have to be made to accumulate as much intelligence on these individuals as possible (Dom, *et al.*, 1992). It was this realization that prompted the Home Office in May 1990 to write to the Association of Chief Police Officers and local authority associations about the possibility of drawing together various national intelligence units into one national intelligence office. Later the same year the Home Secretary approved the proposal in principle of such a unit. Yet, it was not until the 1st April 1992 that such a service was actually set up.

The evolution of NCIS was a long and drawn out process. The idea of having one agency which had the responsibility for the co-ordination of intelligence for all of Britain was quite foreign to the majority of the country's chief constables. The actual impetus which contributed to the development of the National Criminal Intelligence Service and their role in drug enforcement was the result of three factors.

First, in 1973, following revelations of corruption in the Metropolitan Police drug squad, the Home Office transferred the files of that squad to the new Central Drug and Illegal Immigration Intelligence Unit. This unit was later split into Immigration and Drugs Intelligence Units. Second, the chief
constables outside the Greater London area favoured integration of drugs intelligence into a broader system rather than the present system which was controlled by the Metropolitan Police. Third, The involvement of organised criminals in the lucrative area of trafficking in drugs meant that there was a greater sophistication in the importation and distribution process. Because the rewards were great the drugs market attracted many professional criminals who formerly were involved in other forms of organized crime. In 1985 a Metropolitan Police study revealed that 25 per cent of all targeted criminals were involved in drug activity of some kind (ACPO's Broome Report, 1985: P. 5).

The NCIS is made up of five units with the Drugs Division being the largest component. This unit has extended the mandate of the former National Drugs Intelligence Unit by exploring the link between major drugs offences and other serious crime. The Drugs Division has two branches, drugs and money laundering. Their primary responsibility is to target international smuggling and to liaise with other international police departments. It is their responsibility to gather and disseminate drugs intelligence, whether emanating from within the United Kingdom or abroad and to provide the link between the police and customs. They gather intelligence only and do no operational police work or other work that may result in them giving evidence in court.

The present three tiered method of Policing of illicit drugs within the United Kingdom is designed to reflect the prevailing assumptions of how the illicit drug market operates. The prevailing thought, as stated earlier, is that the market is one of a monopolistic organization acting as a closed system and is dominated by "Mr. Bigs" who control these systems. It is suggested that this system operates at 5 distinctive levels and is pyramidal in shape (Fig.7.1)
The top level consists of major exporters such as the Columbian drug barons and financiers. The second level, larger than the first level consists of major dealers. These are the individuals or groups who import directly from the drug barons. The third level is the wholesalers. These are the individuals who are buying in smaller quantity and provide a service to a much more localized market. The next level is that of the street peddler. This individual is usually a user and is selling in part to support his or her own habit. This and the next level make up the majority of the pyramid. Lastly at the bottom is the consumer.

This model assumes that drug markets are static, hierarchial structures which are increasingly organized at the international and national levels and for policing to be effective it must mirror the structure of the drug market. This model of a static well-structured market is beginning to be challenged. Although law enforcement is tiered at three levels to meet the drugs threat it does not mean that the drug market is structured in a corresponding way. Dom et al., (1992) offer another possible picture of the drug market. They suggest that this type of stratification does not exist; instead markets are flexible, unstructured, and far from hierarchical. Reuter (1983) implies that the market place is characterized by its disorganized nature and lacks the pyramid structure. The competitive nature of these markets make them open and unstable in nature, they are populated by individuals and small organizations rather than by large closed systems. Within this model participants may come and go; they may move up and down the market varying their mode of operation. Unlike other forms of crime where they have to go through some form of apprenticeship, there are few if any barriers stopping individuals entering the drug market. This type of system often has a high turnover of participants. Vacancies may occur for different reasons but there is always a reserve of individuals waiting to take their place.
I used to sell drugs. Only cannabis. I stopped about six months ago. I usually made about 300 to 400 pounds per month. The money was just to help me live as I couldn’t survive on benefits that I received. I never sold or bought that much. The biggest buy I ever made was 2 ounces. It was offered to me at a good price so I borrowed most of the money from friends. That was about two years ago. The reason I stopped selling was the competition. There are so many dealers these days that it’s hard to make any money unless you can buy real cheap. To do that you have to buy in quantity. There is just too much competition these days (Personal interview with a drug dealer in Radford, September, 1992).

With the present policing structure, if drug markets do not conform in any coherent sense the problem then is to determine a realistic cut-off point in policing the chain from importation to internal distribution. It is suggested that there is no such realistic point as these different levels are not equally applicable to different kinds of drugs. For example this tiering of enforcement overlooks those drugs which are grown or produced locally (Pearson, 1990). In addition, the role of drug enforcement at the lower tier appears not to be thought out in terms of strategic planning (Gilman and Pearson, 1992). As one moves down the tiers less and less priority is given to the low class drug dealer. Importance in policing terms tends to give priority to operations against bulk seizures and operations which produce arrests against major dealers (Moore, 1977).
CHAPTER EIGHT
DRUG ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

A major difficulty for governments in tackling the drug problem is that there is no consensus as to what the problem is or who should have the primary responsibility for controlling it. In the last decade Great Britain like the majority of the Western World have defined the drug problem in terms of drug related crime. In defining the problem in such a way it has placed drug enforcement at the centre of law enforcement.

The focus in tackling the problem has been two dimensional; the need to reduce the supply of drugs to the user; and the need to reduce the demand for drugs within the country by means of education, treatment, prevention activities and legal sanctions. Within the last few years due to the HIV and AIDS crisis a third dimension has been added and that is one of harm minimization.

Supply-Side Reduction Strategies
Drug enforcement strategies aimed at the supply-side can be classified by targets which are commonly divided into three levels and categorized by the methods used:

High level enforcement, aimed at major manufacturers and importers;

Middle level drug enforcement, aimed at the wholesale "distributors" and other middling traffickers; and

Low level drug enforcement, which aims to break the link between the "retailer" of drugs and the customer (Dom and Murji, 1992: 160).
The purpose of supply-reduction efforts, at all three levels is the same. The objective then is to:

- Limit the amount of drugs available to the consumer;
- To increase the price, time, and risk of obtaining drugs;
- To decrease the amount of users by means of strong deterrence; and
- To force those already using into treatment.

It is believed that if the supply-side objectives were achieved many people would be discouraged from experimenting with drugs, many people already using drugs in experimental patterns would be discouraged from advancing their level of use, and many chronic users would be motivated to seek treatment.

At the top of the market the first approach is to limit the amount of drugs available by attacking the source of the problem by means of crop substitution and eradication programmes. The second approach is one of interdiction; closing the borders so that it makes the importation of drugs into the country very difficult. Both approaches have inherent problems. With crop substitution and eradication the source can be seen in a number of ways. For drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and cannabis the source may be identified as third world countries while for synthetic drugs the source may be internal. The source can be seen as the point of production or the point from where the drugs are shipped, to where they enter the country. In addition, source can be identified as either the individual who is involved with the exportation or the individual who is importing (Murji, 1993).
The problem cannot be solved by identifying the source of production since the source, once identified and eliminated, can easily be replaced by new entrepreneurs growing crops in new locations. It is impossible to deny the existence of a "push down-pop up dynamic" in the market. Accordingly, where eradication or crop substitution is successful in one area there are new entrepreneurs in other countries ready to take their place (Nadelmann, 1987: 40).

Drug crops are so plentiful, so cheap and so little restricted by geography that it is hard to see how any plausible set of crop-eradication efforts abroad could make any difference to the availability of drugs at home (Wilkinson, 1994: 28).

In the case of cannabis production both Jamaica and Belize have undergone successful eradication programmes. Some Jamaican and Belizean government officials have estimated that up to 75 per cent of cannabis crops have been eradicated. In 1984 marijuana production in Belize was estimated at approximately 660 metric tons. The present production is estimated to be less than 60 metric tons. Between 1988 and 1991 Jamaica received 225,000 ECUs from the European Community Development Fund for the purpose of implementing a crop substitution programme. This programme targeted 1,200 farmers and offered $800 Jamaican dollars per half acre per farmer. Yet total cannabis production within the Caribbean has increased. Islands such as St. Lucia and St. Vincent, which reportedly never had large production of cannabis, have lately been identified as major production areas. In 1992 over 3 million acres of cannabis were identified in St. Lucia and St. Vincent, more than Jamaica ever produced. In addition to cannabis production in 1993, 27,000 pounds of cocaine were seized along with 400,000 U.S. dollars (Personal interview with a British Customs officer in Jamaica). This "push-down pop-up" theory also holds true for domestic production of synthetic drugs; as one laboratory is found and closed another pops-up to replace it.
A final reason for believing that crop control measures are unlikely to work is that, unless law enforcement is uniform across international borders, action which is taken will be ineffectual. In 1960s action against opium growers in Turkey was more than offset by increased output in Pakistan and Southeast Asia (Stevenson, 1991: 205).

Interdiction aimed at intercepting drug shipments is the second most common means of limiting the amount of drugs available to the consumer. The theory is that successful interdiction should raise the cost of trafficking drugs from the producing countries to the importing countries by limiting the amount of drugs entering the country. Thus, the cost to the traffickers is increased due to having to ship more drugs, to spend more on bribes and legal fees, and replacement of seized assets. These increased costs are then passed on to the consumer. However, it appears that interdiction has little hope of affecting either the retail price or purity of illicit drugs over the long haul. Nadelmann (1987) presents one of the arguments for the failure of interdiction to increase the cost to the consumer. He argues that:

Given the foreign price of cannabis is only four per cent of its wholesale price and heroin only four to seven per cent in both cases the foreign price is less than one per cent of the retail price payed by the consumer. Drug production is estimated at 20 per cent of available land which could be under production and yet production still exceeds consumption. If interdiction efforts reached their goal of 50 per cent it is unlikely to have much impact on the price of drugs (Nadelmann (1987: 42-3).

Polich et al., estimate that U.S. drug enforcement agencies intercept between 14 to 20 per cent of all cocaine shipped to U.S. markets. If the interdiction rate reached 40 per cent they estimate this would only increase the
street cost by 3.4 per cent (Wagstaff, 1989: 1179). Drugs are easy to produce and the replacement cost of drugs seized either at the point of production or at the point where they enter the country is relatively small compared to the cost of drugs seized further down the chain.

In discussions of drug enforcement, there exists a parallel concept of "quantity illusion". A belief that the quantity of drugs seized is a useful means of measuring the efficacy of enforcement efforts. In this case, the source of the problem is the lack of reference to price. The result of this illusion is an overemphasis on the value of enforcement efforts in the early stages of the distribution system (interdiction). An illegal drug's price increases as it moves away from the source of production. It cost only about $5,000 to replace a kilogram of cocaine seized in Bolivia, at the point where it is about to be sent to Colombia for shipment to the United States. By the time that same kilogram is available for sale in Chicago, its replacement cost has risen to almost $45,000. It is as easy to replace ten kilograms in Bolivia as to replace one kilogram on the streets. While drug production is cheap, its distribution is risky and expensive. Seizing vast quantities of drugs before the enormous cost of distribution have been incurred inflicts little injury on the drug trade (Reuter, 1989: 16-17).

Mark Kleiman has also noted that the total amount of cocaine shipped from source countries to the United States will tend to rise along with the success of the interdiction effort, as source country suppliers sell enough to meet the (largely unaffected) final retail demand plus the demand represented by seizure (Wilkinson, 1994: 28).
As long as high level police strategies focus on interdiction as a method of controlling the price of drugs on the street, middle and low level police strategies must not expect that large seizures will dramatically affect either price or purity of street drugs (Kleiman 1986). Thus, if local police forces attempt to use either of these as a indicator of effectiveness the results may be very disappointing. Rather than concentrating resources on interdiction strategies local forces must focus on increasing the risks to dealers and the amount of time involved in completing a transaction.

Moore (1990: 121) suggests that the single most important bit of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of supply-reduction efforts is on the price and purity of drugs on the street. Yet the price of illicit drugs can have two different meanings. There is the price the trafficker, importer and distributor pay to bring the commodity to the consumer and there is the price on the street that an individual must pay for the commodity. The price of doing business usually has to do with cost incurred in the buying, transporting, bribes, distributing and risk taking of any given transaction. As the economics of doing business goes up so does the retail price of the commodity.

Therefore, supply reduction effectiveness as an enforcement strategy will depend on:

1. The price elasticity of demand of the drug at which the enforcement measure is aimed; and
2. The impact the enforcement measure has on the supply curve (Home office Research Study 95, 1992: 23).

The first point is reinforced by Reuter and Kleimen.
The major objective of drug law enforcement and source control programmes is reduced drug consumption. The retail price of drugs can be used as a measure of effectiveness, for these programmes can reduce use only by making dealing so risky that dealers will require higher compensation for continued participation (Reuter and Kleimen 1986: 296).

But it is argued that the police, have very little impact on the supply reduction with the exception of heroin (Fraser and George, 1992).

There are numerous qualifications associated with use of price as an indicator of the effectiveness of drug enforcement strategies. First price is determined by both demand and supply. A decline in price may occur either because the demand curve falls or because the supply curve rises. It is clear that there have been shifts in both supply and demand and that we lack a well-specified model of the drug market. However, to consider the effect of hypothetical changes in drug enforcement efforts, the major tool of this analysis, we need only consider the impact these have on price through shifts of the supply curve; we assume the direct demand effects of law enforcement to be negligible (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986: 298).
This concept of using price and purity as indicators of a successful supply reduction programme was a result of the heroin panic in New York City in the 1970s. This was the first time that a real shortage of heroin appeared in the United States of America since the Second World War. In early 1972, a variety of heroin seizures occurred. Several French laboratories were destroyed along with a record amount of heroin which was being sent to the United States market.

Ingersoll (1973) has stated that the shortage had the effect of increasing the price of heroin, reducing the purity of street heroin, and increasing the number of addicts seeking treatment (Smart, 1976). Using these indicators to determine the impact of policing may in fact be the wrong measurement of supply- reduction. First, the change in price may be the result of shifts in demand rather than supply. Secondly, using price and purity as indicators does not take into account multi-drug use. There is strong evidence to suggest that if a drug user's drug of choice is not available, he/she will substitute it for other drugs. Thirdly, this thinking assumes that all drugs are inelastic in price and therefore, will reflect higher prices if a shortage of a certain drug occurs in the market. It assumes drug abusers are all addicts and will pay any price to support their habit of choice.

**Elasticity of Illicit Drugs**

Although criminologists, sociologists and addiction workers tend to disagree on the nature and cause of addiction, there is one point that they agree on and that is the willingness of problem drug users to divert a significant portion of their income towards satisfying their drug needs. The theory of inelasticity argues that drugs like heroin and cocaine have little or low elasticity so the problem drug user will spend as much as is required to support this habit. Inelastic demand is characterized by the problem drug user's willingness to buy about the same amount of a drug whether its price is high or low. Proponents of this theory base their arguments on the assumption that drug users are overwhelmingly addicted to drugs and therefore will do anything to maintain
their habit. If the user, for whatever reason, does not maintain his/her level of consumption he or she is then faced with withdrawal symptoms which are significantly agonizing to force the user to return to former levels of consumption (Moore, 1977).

The second assumption would like us to believe that they are "personality types" whose behaviour although not addicted represents a form of escapism and who have chosen to use drugs and will not be swayed by either legal or social sanctions. The belief that all problem drug users are addicts has recently been challenged and it has been suggested that the demand for drugs may not be so insensitive to price changes as was previously thought (Wagstaff, 1989). Trends have shown that users of addictive drugs such as heroin and cocaine tend to substitute one drug for another as the price of their primary drug increases. There is, therefore, a positive cross elasticity of demand (Boyum, 1989). Moreover, it has been noted that the typical addict does not consume heroin every day (Moore, 1977; Nurco et al., 1985).

Because only a portion of all heroin users are "junkies" - that is, those who use it at least daily-the economic need of all users is much less than is sometimes supposed by persons who believe that all users are junkies obligated to steal. Also, there is great variability in the daily heroin consumption patterns even among the "junkies" (Wilson et al., 1985: 366).

In addition, Roumasset and Hadreas (1977) argue that there is a range of unitary elasticity rather than an elastic range. The range would result from the addicts' complete unwillingness to further reduce their consumption of leisure time or goods other than heroin as the price of heroin increases.

The goal of enforcement strategy based on the concept of price inelasticity is to reduce the amount of any given drug on the street, thus,
pushing the market price up and forcing the casual user out of the market place. If the price of drugs is inelastic, supply-side policing strategies are confronted with three problems. First, if the assumption holds true that there is a correlation between illicit drug use and crime, enforcement efforts may be counter-productive. If the demand for illicit drugs is indeed inelastic, as the price of drugs goes up addicts and drug users who stay in the market place must increase their personal expenditure to support their habit. This would necessitate the user's obtaining more money to acquire the same level of consumption, thus increasing criminal activities to pay the higher price. If, in fact the addict is willing to pay the increased market prices illicit drug profits will remain as high, if not higher, despite a decrease in supply.

Second, as stated earlier, the problem of interdiction programmes is simply, they do not work. Effective drug interdiction requires a combination of factors to produce seizures and arrests and at best the amount of the total market that could be expected to be intercepted would be between nine to 19 per cent. The National Criminal Intelligence Service believe that ten per cent are presently being intercepted. Wagstaff and Maynard (1988) suggest that if the interception rate increased to 30 per cent this would only increase the cost of heroin by 2.1 per cent.

Third, assuming that the illicit market place is characterized by the inelasticity of drugs, policing has the potential of creating small monopolies within the drug market. As enforcement strategies become more effective and reduce the amount of drugs available to the consumer, small dealers who cannot afford the cost of doing business leave the market place to larger dealers; thus again creating an increase in the cost of drugs and profits to a smaller group of traffickers and importers.

If, on the other hand, the price of illicit drugs is elastic the effect of increased pressure on drug dealers may also produce a monopoly. However, assuming the monopoly prefers more profits, it would increase the price of
heroin until the inelastic range was reached. In this case, increased seller harassment would result in a decrease in the total amount spent on heroin, and thereby a decrease in the sellers' total revenue (White et al., 1983). Moreover, if the market place is elastic, then a strategy of disrupting seller/buyer transactions would produce a greater reduction in the rate of new addicts and would have a more positive effect on the community in that drug related crime would decrease due to the increased visibility of the police. An increase in police presence where property criminals and drug dealers and consumers hang out may convince some of them to cut back on their activity by giving them the impression that the risk of arrest has gone up. Enforcement in these terms is seen as a tax in that it imposes additional costs on the illicit drug market (Kleiman, 1986).

**Time And Risk**

In completing any given transaction both time and risk are variables that are required in the purchasing of all illicit drugs. Mark Kleiman's (1986) central hypothesis asserts that crackdowns on street level dealing and buyers increase the non-monetary cost of drugs use and reduce consumption. He argues that the combination of increased risk and time drives some users to leave the market place. Within this model there is a realization that drugs like any other commodity are traded in the market place and are affected by price and quantity. A factor that influences both of these considerations is the ease at which transactions take place. Moore (1977) suggests that the monetary cost of drugs may be the wrong measure in the cost of buying and selling drugs. He suggests that buyers are discouraged from buying by many reasons other than cash expense.

The "effective price" is defined as an index of all things that make drugs difficult, expensive or dangerous to consume; dollar cost, amount of time required to secure the drugs, the toxicity of adulterants, uncertainty about the actual dose, risk
of arrest, and the risk of being defrauded or mugged in the transaction (Moore, 1977: 293).

As the "effective price" is increased, the casual user, in many cases, finds the effort of obtaining drugs outweighs the reward of using them.

This concept of disrupting the market by separating buyer and seller is a strategy which is not new. The strategy of inconvenience policing is the primary method employed by low level enforcement. The greatest fear of this type of enforcement is that dealers within the area rather than going out of business will simply move to another area with the risk of spreading the geographical availability of drugs. Kleiman and Smith (1990) argue this is not necessarily the case.

"The obvious problem with focused enforcement activity is the displacement of illicit transactions from one neighbourhood to another. It is sometimes asserted that this displacement is automatic and complete: as if dope deals, like mass and energy, were subject to a conservation law and incapable of being increased or decreased in total. There is no evidence to believe this is true. ... Some neighbourhoods are more convenient than others as places for drug buyers and sellers to meet, owing to convenient transportation, relative safety from street crime, and the presence of natural or man made cover in the form of parks, courtyards, and abandoned buildings" (Kleiman and Smith 1990: 89).

Caulkins (1992) also argues that in areas where drug markets are well defined, dealers might not be able to switch markets as easily as their customers. It has also been argued that some forms of displacement may in fact be positive. If drug dealing is moved from the more visible (street dealing) to the less visible (indoors) there may be positive spin-offs for both residents
and shopkeepers as low visibility dealing only impacts buyers and sellers. Outsiders and casual users find it difficult to buy and the resulting diminished competition for new customers reduces the overall size of the market place.

There is strong evidence that enforcement aimed at street-level markets has a major impact on drug buying and selling (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986; Kleiman and Young, 1991; and Boyum, 1989). In addition, this type of policing has a positive spin-off effect on the community in general by reducing the level of social harm which is associated with the drug trade. It gives the community a perception of action being taken against drug dealing. Thus the actual outcome, based on arrests and convictions, is secondary to the community's belief that something is being done about the problem.

On the other hand, covert action by definition is secret and away from the view of the community and usually results in an increase in fear of crime and the perception that drug dealing is running amuck, out of control of the police. This mismatch of perception to what is or is not being done about the drug problem, in deprived ethnic communities where the police may be seen as racist and where their integrity is in doubt, covert activities do very little to enhance positive police-community relations.

Within local police forces, where resources of all types are limited and where policing the drug market is seen in terms of community accountability, in order to have a major contribution policing must be seen in terms of disrupting the market place. This can only be done by creating uncertainty among both buyers and sellers.

The Use Of Informants

One method of creating uncertainty within the drug market is the use of informants. The use of informants in policing has always been an accepted practice: without informers, paid or otherwise, detection of crime and the apprehension of criminals would be more difficult. In the drug field the use of
informers is widespread. It is suggested that drug informers may be different; not the least because they will have no value to the police unless they are active users and suppliers, and because the drug scene is itself qualitatively different from other types of criminal activity. Moreover, to what extent do drug informers affect the overall use of drugs?

It has been suggested that traditional models of informants may not apply in the drugs trade: dealers and users are not like traditional offenders where the police can expect to contain a group in a small geographical area. To do so with drugs, at least from the data which has been collected, would encourage me to believe that other dealers attach themselves to these informers and so paradoxically increase levels of dealing. This practice of using active players leaves the police open to criticism and produces anger and resentment by users and non-using residents alike who see this as granting a licence to deal (Bean, et al., 1992).

Without police informants the task of gaining more intelligence to combat crime would become much harder. It has been suggested that if a perpetrator is not arrested or identified within hours of the incident the police have little prospect of solving the case (Greenwood et al., 1975). In most cases their most effective source of information is obtained from informants. In addition, Mount (1990) suggests that informants expose crimes that otherwise may go undetected. Therefore, the use of informants has become a common and widely accepted policing practice. Furthermore, how to handle, develop, and manage informant programmes is part of present day police training. Presently, there are Home Office guidelines pertaining to the treatment and payment of informants. The Home Affairs Committee (1989) recommended that half the cost of payments should be met from the Home Office general fund, but as the use and handling of informants is an operational matter it is up to the local forces to decide to what extent and in what manner informants will be used.
It is widely accepted in policing circles that the motivation of good informants is far more complicated than financial greed. Many informants seek revenge for professional or personal affronts, and to exercise power over a competitor or an old enemy. While others trade information in the expectation that the police department will help them out the next time they get into trouble or for some other type of police favours (Dorn et al., 1992).

The police attempt to appear efficient has led them to seek the "good pinch", the arrest that will stand up in court. With victimless crimes, such as those involving drugs the police control the situation since they alone decide whether an offense has been committed and whether they have a legal case against the offender. To control the success rate in these cases, the police create a gaggle of informants, many of whom are compelled to give the police evidence in order to stay free of a potential charge against themselves (Manning, 1978: 27).

Noziglia asks us to consider the following American example:

In a small mid-western city, a rumour developed among street people that a federal agency with a local office was paying an informant $1,200.00 a month. This office was deluged with inquiries from individuals volunteering information in hopes of being taken into the programme. The rumour was unfounded but the reaction to it was real. This event suggests that the criminals are widely aware of the use of informants (Noziglia, 1985: 185).

The idea that an informer might be motivated by considerations other than helping to establish law and order is not new. It has been well established that drug dealers will use informants to influence the outcome of criminal turf
wars (Tonry and Morris, 1992). Moore (1980) reported that drug dealers will use their status as an informant to carry on business and that he may be informing to the police to reduce his competition. But no matter what the reason all criminal informants' motivation is based on the pleasure pain principle, to avoid the unpleasant experience of police harassment or to gain the protection of law enforcement agencies.

Generally, the regional drug squad obtains its' information from three types of informants. They are: the professional informer (otherwise known as police property); the public-spirited individual who has seen something suspicious and reports it, and, other police officers either in uniform or CID. The professional informant is usually an individual who has a good knowledge of the criminal element. This knowledge is obtained as a result of being a past participant or as a result of his life style and they are providing information in exchange for a reduced charge. Another type of professional informant is one who enjoys a life style which brings him into association with members of the criminal underworld. These informants usually are no longer involved with criminal activities.

Professional informants usually serve three functions for the police. The first, is simply as a lead to suspects or a lead to merchandise. The second, is to act as a go-between or as a sponsor so that police can gain access to the criminal element. And the third, is to act as a witness in court against criminal accomplices (Wilson, 1978).

The public-spirited kind of informants are not connected to the criminal underworld. Many hold responsible positions within society and are usually motivated by personal antipathy to criminal conduct that they see around them and a few cooperate because they enjoy the cops-and-robbers excitement that goes along with solving crimes and are the types who would love to be doing the job themselves (Mount, 1990).
information provided by cooperating individuals, the use of informants can be abused. To guard against this abuse the criminal law is very clear regarding discretionary authority of law enforcement departments using informants. Statutes of most western countries make no provision for police to decide which laws are worthy of action and which should be ignored. These statutes will not allow those individuals to commit crimes. Once an officer determines that an informant has committed a crime it is policy that the officer will report the relevant facts to his supervisors. They should by law act against all criminal infractions. In addition, law enforcement officers are not authorized to offer immunity to informants or to enter into any other improper agreement in return for an informant's cooperation (Brown 1985). The Home Office (1990) has a similar belief regarding the criminal activities of informants: "The Government considers that police and H.M.Customs should not in any circumstances counsel, incite or procure the commission of a crime in the carrying out of their duties". Even more strongly than that in the decision laid in Humphries v. Connor, the English Court said that no police officer had the authority to commit an offence in order to obtain evidence, and still less was such authority given to an unofficial "stooge or decoy" used by the police.

The Nature Of Drug Informants
Within the drug scene it is suggested that drug informers and the policies governing their activities may be at odds; not the least because the informers have no value to the police unless they are active users and/or suppliers. The more valuable the information that can be supplied to the police, the more likely it is that the provider of the information is active within the drug trade. Manning (1980) observed that, informants were expected to continue drug use otherwise they would not be able to provide information about drug dealers. To gain more intelligence about the drug scene the police have started to rely more and more on the use of informants.
It has been established that the best informants are not those who work for money but rather those who are "working off" charges (Reuter, 1983). This point was reinforced during an interview with the Nottingham Drug Squad. During the interview it was stated that the best informant was one who perceived the threat of going to jail but if he would cooperate charges may be reduced or an officer would speak on his behalf. It is believed that this type of inducement is a better motivator than a promise of a small sum of money, usually around £70.

Whenever possible an officer will charge a drug suspect with as many offences as possible. In doing so it is his hope of being able to use the weight of these charges for information leading to bigger arrests. One goal of the bargaining process is to convince him to become an on going informant. Because of this, it is strongly believed by many users/dealers that the police bait them into becoming informers or what has become known as "police property". Once the police have information which can lead to a charge against the individual this information will give the police even more leverage over him or her.

The "buy-bust-flip" is a well documented method used by drug squads for baiting and grooming informants (Reuter, 1983). This use of informants in its most simple form involves hand-to-hand purchases of drugs which result in an immediate arrest. The arrestee is then given the choice of either going to jail or becoming an informant (Brown, 1985). This type of informant is preferred by police officers.

"They are the best informants in the world, because they can literally go into a dealer's address, come out and run their fingers though their hair and that is the signal that he is sitting there with a mountain of the stuff (Dorn et al., 1992: 129)."
This type of sting operation which uses informants is believed by many senior command officers as the area which has the greatest potential for increased effectiveness. The increased use of sting operations formed one of the recommendations put forward by a police review of the government strategy on tackling drug misuse.

"Procedures and practices in the use of informants, agents and controlled purchases be reviewed with a view to significantly increasing the use of these tactics (Police Review of the Government Strategy on Tackling Drug Misuse, unpublished document, 1985: 9).

In addition, the Audit Commission (November, 1993) recommended an increased use of paid informants as their use was more cost-effective in jailing criminals and recovering stolen property. Yet Marx (1988) offers strong arguments that although this type of controlled purchase operation is widely used, there is no evidence that it reduces the amount of drug activity but rather may increase the demand. Also Skolnick (1966) reported that the use of informants to make buys can (by using public money) actually create dope rings.

By its very nature, the use of informants is a problem but within the drug scene this problem is amplified. Take the case of the one ounce dealer who is allowed to carry on his trade as long as he is actively working as an informant. The one ounce dealer grows larger as he supplies more information to the police. As his competition decreases, his competitors are eliminated and he thereby grows larger, thus supplying more information to the police. This upwardly mobile spiral continues to the point were he becomes untouchable. This scenario was reported by a senior member of the Metropolitan Police Drug Squad during an interview (June, 1992).
Manning (1980) observed that drug dealers while working with the police were using their position as informants to carry on business and that they may be informing to the police to reduce their competition. This type of informant sees himself as having a licence to carry on business and to grow as long as he is supplying information regarding bigger dealers to his police handlers and as long as he does not embarrass his handler.

You know, you can say I'm a licensed drug dealer! Because your CID [Criminal Investigation Department] officer knows that you've learnt to do these little things [and says] as long as you don't have a disorderly house and you don't have any category A drugs in your house, you carry on doing that and we'll make sure you're all right. (Dorn, et al., 1992: 144).

The extent of this license is directly related to the quality of information he can supply and is a function of the level of the market that the police are aiming at.

The use of controlled purchases, and informants significantly increases the danger of corruption both in its incidence and in allegations that it exists. This point has been well documented within the Knapp Commission report (1975). The use of informants and controlled purchases if not handled carefully can be used as a defence of "agent provocateur". The defence of entrapment has been created in North America and is raised when the defendant maintains that law enforcement officers induced him to commit the offence. The defendant would not have committed the offence if it wasn't for the fact that enforcement officials induced him into the act. This situation is different from that in which an officer simply provides an opportunity for the crime to be committed but the defendant is willing. Although English courts reject this defence judges have sometimes spoken strongly against the police using "agents provocateurs", in the sense of people who cause an offence to be committed. One principle that has been distinctly laid down is that where an informant has been employed in such a way as to affect the "quality of the
offence" this fact must be disclosed at the trial. However, when a police officer gives evidence that he acted on information received, the defendant cannot cross-examine him to ascertain the identity of his informant. The buy-bust method of drug enforcement if not handled very carefully may be seen as entrapment and may form a defence (Williams, 1983).

Finally, by using informers in the drug scene police must be aware that the use of working informers is often a two way street. It has been known that drug sellers have fed the police informers who are gathering information on drug squad tactics. Reuter (1983) has suggested that more is learned about the police by feeding them information than the police have ever learned about drug dealers and that many informants use their position to manipulate the police.

Within the drug scene in the last decade there has been greater effort placed by law enforcement agencies on the cultivation of the average person to act as an informant. Drug hotline Programmes in America such as TIP (turn in a pusher), and in Great Britain the Community Action Trust which was announced in 1990 as an extension of its activities through Drug Command to assist the Police to solve drug related crime (Dorn, et al., 1992). In these programmes information is exchanged for money, and informants, depending on the quality of information, can earn large rewards. Yet, this idea of the private individual acting as an informant has not achieved much success.

A second problem which may be created is that as rewards become larger the number of fraudulent leads passed to the police may well be increased with no guarantee that more convictions will be achieved (Brown, 1985). In the case of Nottingham, a "turn in a Pusher" programme was implemented in the spring of 1994. The hot line which was set up received over 200 calls a week for the first four months of operation. The detective inspector in charge of the programme reported that he did not have the
manpower to follow-up most of the calls. By not following up on complaints of informants the department came under a lot of criticism.

Reactive Response To The Drug Market
Reactive policing drug strategies are almost always a response to a perceived problem which has been initiated by external forces. These external forces usually comprise community pressure groups demanding action within their housing estate or community. Fear of the availability of drugs to young people and the violence and crime which accompanies it, can band the community together to place pressure on the police to take action. Pressure can also come from politicians who believe that the war on drugs is a war on crime and politically correct. Pressure may also come from the media who exploit the fear of drugs and the violence associated with drug dealing. For the community the drug problem is realized in very simplistic and personal terms.

The drug problem is defined in terms of its effect on day to day life. So, on a local level, drug enforcement must be seen to respond to the problem as identified by the community. By doing so, policing can target specific zones and document the nature of the drug problem within these communities, thus focusing on specific problems and concerns rather than attempting to deal with the undefinable "drug problem". Past experience would suggest that police officers who are permanently assigned to specific areas, working with the community are in the best position to identify problems from the bottom and to determine the best possible solutions.

Operation Pressure Point in New York and Operation Kingfisher in England are but two examples of reactive policing. Operation Pressure Point was launched in 1984 as a reaction to media and citizen groups demand that action should be taken to counteract the problem. This pressure demanded political action to what many had described, in an area of the Lower East Side of New York, as "the drug supermarket of the metropolitan area" (Carroll,
Pressure was then placed on the new police commissioner to take action. According to Carroll:

This occurred because of certain conditions which contributed to flourishing and highly profitable drug transactions. These conditions were a combination of socioeconomic and demographic factors which attracted an inordinate number of drug dealers and users to the area (Carroll, 1989: 1).

Phase one of the enforcement strategy focused on low level policing of three precincts where illicit drug trafficking was obvious. Seventy-four drug locations were then identified and a large task force of uniformed officers began patrolling the area. Their strategy was one of inconvenience and selective policing. Their aim was to seal off the area and only allow vehicle and pedestrian traffic into the area who had a legitimate reason for being there. Through this type of policing their goal was not only to target the drug dealers but also novice and experienced users.

From January 1984 to December 1984 Operation Pressure Point personnel made 11,041 arrests and issued 45,000 summons. The press compared Operation Pressure Point to a person with bulimia, gorging itself on masses of arrests only to vomit them back up in plea negotiation and overloading the courts so that the value of the mass-arrests was largely neutralized (Carroll, 1989).

Shortly after the riots and the death of PC Blakelock at the Broadwater Farm estate under the supervision of the invited media Operation Kingfisher was mounted on Friday 29th of September 1989. The operation involved 400 officers whose main purpose was not to make arrests or seize large amounts of drugs; these were seen as secondary aims. The raid was a reaction to the concerns of some community members and politicians that illicit drug use was
out of control in the area. Its primary aim therefore was to demonstrate that the police had control of the problem in the area (Dorn *et al.*, 1992).

Reactive policing in the short term may be seen as very successful in some areas, it gives the impression that the problem has been taken seriously but in fact it is a "fire brigade" approach to the problem. As the fire is successfully put out resources are then rapidly removed and sent to the next fire. This approach is costly in terms of manpower and other resources and in the long haul other than a respite to the problem it accomplishes very little. Once the resources are pulled out the situation returns to its former state. For this type of policing to have long term effects and to ensure that resources which have been spent to put out the fire are maximized, policing must anticipate the needs of the community once the fire is out. For this to be accomplished and so that these gains can be sustained there must be cooperation between enforcement efforts and local community agencies. This cooperative strategy emphasizes flexible or selective enforcement that takes into consideration the particular circumstances of individual communities.

**Proactive Response To The Drug Market (Demand-Side)**

While traditionally, through-out the majority of the western world, law enforcement has been widely regarded as the principal strategy against drug abuse, importance is increasingly being placed on demand reduction programmes as drug use is seen as being spreading to younger and younger age groups. Demand reduction is seen as an alternative to supply reduction, it focuses on the individual rather than the supply of drugs. Demand reduction programmes can either be enforcement centred or community centred but to be successful they must be based on a model of police and community integration.

The major area of demand reduction with which the police are involved is that of education. Each police force in the country is involved in school education and prevention programmes to some extent. In most policing areas
there exists a comprehensive school programme which will include some element on drug education. In some areas the involvement is highly localized and individual, often depending on the commitment of a specific individual. However, nationally, it is likely that a significant amount of police time is taken up with school involvement in general and with the drug element in particular (Drugs: A Review of the Government Strategy "Tackling Drug Misuse" From A Police Perspective, 1985).

The second type of demand reduction which is enforcement centred are "zero tolerance programmes". These programmes advocate strict punishment for any infringement against drug laws and are meant to discourage the casual user or discourage non-users from experimenting with drugs. A strong advocate of this type of policy is William Bennett who advocates targeting the middle class or "yuppie" who has a major monetary investment in society.

Casual use is not just a matter of personal preference. It has a cost - wide, horrible social cost. The suburban man who drives his BMW downtown to buy cocaine is killing himself, of course. But he is killing the city at the same time. And his "casual" use is best deterred not by empty threats of long, hard punishment, but by certain punishment. Compel him, as authorities are doing in Phoenix, to pay a steep fine and spend a weekend in jail. Seize his BMW right after he has bought some dope, and when he is convicted, take the car away from him for good. That is what they do in Philadelphia (Bennett², cited in Dorn and Murji, 1992: 111).

² Will Bennett was appointed head of the Office of National Drug control Policy within the Reagan administration.
The third type of demand reduction programme recognises that drug usage is not exclusively a legal concern. The effects of treatment and rehabilitation are central to the demand reduction strategy. They are built on the assumption that a reduction in drug use will lead to a reduction in criminality and, perhaps, to increases in productive activities. The increased rise in drug use has taxed resources to the breaking point. This pressure has put demands on the basic assumptions of how to deal with the problem of policing the drug scene. The orientation towards more resources going into law enforcement to punish offenders is shifting towards the finding of solutions to the problem of addiction and the treatment of drug abuse. This movement towards the treatment of drug offenders rather than incarcerating them has been expressed in the reform of many national criminal codes, the United States, Canada, Germany, and Great Britain, to name a few.

The increase of resources to a treatment/rehabilitation model has primarily been based on two assumptions; the first being that incarceration has not shown positive results and by all accounts is costly in terms of direct and indirect resources. This point is emphasized by Stitzer and McCaul (1987) where they conclude:

> A punishment approach to crime reduction among substance abusers seems unlikely to succeed primarily because of the low detection rate of criminal behaviour among drug abusers and alcoholics. Furthermore, incarceration by itself does not appear to have any effect on the future likelihood of returning to substance abuse and related crime (Stitzer and McCaul, 1987: 37).

The second reason finds its logic in terms of not ideology but practicality. Limited resources within the criminal justice system have placed pressure on correctional facilities to the point of over crowding. These same pressures have forced politicians to look towards other possibilities. The concept of treatment
then becomes a viable alternative to the pressures placed on resources and the public's demands for action.

**Harm Reduction**

Given the realisation that supply reduction strategies have had little impact on either reducing the amount of drugs available or decreasing the number of addicts, and that demand reduction programmes will only have limited success, a greater emphasises is now being placed on harm reduction. Harm reduction is a concept that has been widely used in both health and treatment programmes and has served to emphasize a form of policing strategy, which has until recently been over looked. Harm reduction in relationship to policing illegal drug use recognizes that the supply of drugs can never be eliminated therefore, some people will continue to use and misuse drugs. The purpose of harm reduction strategies, therefore, is to seek to minimise the harm which their misuse causes to the individual and to others. In the policing context, harm reduction implies a recognition that enforcement of the laws against drug misuse cannot wholly eliminate misuse but can have an effect on the level of harm to individuals and to society caused by misuse. Pearson organises harm reduction into four broad principles:

1. The containment of the number of not-yet-users recruited into the system through effective and focused low-level policing in conjunction with other prevention strategies;

2. The encouragement of existing users to make contact with helping agencies at an earlier point in their drug using careers than they might otherwise do;

3. The minimisation of counter-productive aspects of enforcement strategies through community-based diversion programmes; and
4. The minimisation of harm to the wider community, such as crime committed by users in order to sustain their habits, general nuisance, and fear of crime (Pearson. 1992: 17).

Given that no one department or agency has either the resources or knowledge to work independently, the responsibility for meeting these objectives must be a shared commitment between law enforcement, local community, and government agencies. Community policing is more likely to have its most significant impact on the drug market where the police, working with the community make a conscious attempt to shift the locus of responsibility to the community. A multi-agency approach in terms of drug referrals to treatment programmes, diversion programmes, and media campaigns can raise public and user awareness and thus reduce the spread of drug related harm to the individual and community.

Police departments throughout North America have begun to move towards various forms of community policing programs in which they attempt to redefine their own role in the community, to establish new and more helpful relationships with the community, and to act as catalysts to involve other professionals and citizens in sharing responsibility for things which have been seen as problems for the police alone... We are going to see growing acceptance by communities that social and economic ills are indeed community problems and to hold the police accountable for the level of crime is totally illogical (Steenhuis, 1980: 142)
Within the Nottinghamshire Constabulary there are a total of 2,344 police officers who are supported by 846 civilian staff. The drug squad consists of eighteen individuals and is headed by a detective inspector. These officers usually work in teams of two and have designated responsibilities for defined areas within Nottinghamshire. The priorities and terms of reference of the drug squad each year are determined by the detective inspector. These priorities are described in his yearly action plan. For the year 1993-4 the terms of reference and priorities were defined as:

1. Identify and target level two (middle level) dealers;
2. Develop the use of informants;
3. Maintain a drug intelligence network for the drug unit;
4. Promote a two way flow of information between divisional officers and drug squad officer;
5. Increase divisional officers awareness regarding drug matters; and
6. Establish liaison and an information flow with other agencies concerned with the drug problem.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Broome Report the drug squad's primary responsibility were to target the activities of "middle level dealers". Throughout the year local drug enforcement strategies and primary objectives have become somewhat fluid. This fluidity is a result not only of internal and external pressures but also of the nature of the drug market. In many cases this has created the need for re-active rather than pro-active
enforcement. As explained by the detective inspector in charge of the Nottinghamshire drug squad, due to the fluctuation in the drug market, targeting middle level dealers is not always easy. It is very possible for dealers to move from low-level dealing to middle level and then back to low-level dealing in a period of weeks or months.

An informant supplies you with good information that let's say Bill is a large dealer of cocaine. Let us also say that along with this information and other forms of intelligence we are on to Bill. We do all the bits, a surveillance team gathers the information, undercover people are in place and so forth. We know he is dealing in cocaine but we not sure of the quantity. As it turns out we do the raid and only end up with a few grams of cannabis and not enough cocaine to charge him with trafficking. It is obvious given the amount of gear he had with him at the time of the raid did not make him a middle level dealer. A few months or even days from now he may be. As it turns out we make the arrest but rather than charging him with trafficking we only lay a charge of possession (personal interview with drug squad inspector, August 12, 1994).

In 1993 the Nottingham drug squad was involved in 40 operations, of these 24 involved covert or undercover work. Moreover, 12 of the total 40 operations involved the Regional Drug Squad. During the same period 81 warrants for drug related issues were requested from the courts. Of the 81 warrants which were granted 73 resulted in positive arrests. The total number of arrests for the year was 154. Of the 40 operations undertaken by the drug squad, only three operations were not informant-led.

Informant-led-operations for the Nottinghamshire Drug Squad are favoured over other strategies such as "Sting" and "Buy Bust" operations.
Informant-led operations are seen as possibly the most cost effective and usually the most effective in terms of arrests and drug seizures.

These type of operations [informant-led] are sound, cheap and require very little intelligence gathering. Informants usually always know when and where the gear is to change place and who will be holding what gear. In all cases last year using informants we have not been disappointed. In a few cases we didn't seize as much gear as we had hoped but on the other hand we didn't have to put that much time or effort into the operation (Personal interview, September 12, 1994).

Although these types of operations are preferred, according to the detective inspector there can be major problems with informant-led-operations. The main problem, as he sees it, is if drug officers are not careful they can end up working where the informant wants them to work rather than being where they should be. In other words, the size and scope of the drug market becomes nothing more than a mirror image of the informants which are being used. This point is reinforced when actual data on arrests and seizures in Nottingham for "crack" are reviewed. In 1993 within Nottinghamshire less than five individuals have been charged with dealing in "crack". "Crack" in Nottingham, as with the majority of the country, is identified as a Afro-Caribbean drug of choice. Presently Nottinghamshire drug squad have very few if any reliable black drug informants. The difficulty is that if all cases are informant-led that particular market remains unknown to the police. Therefore, the true nature and extent of the "crack" market place in Nottingham will remain unclear. Similarly, the amount of arrests and convictions for "crack" will not accurately reflect the number of individuals either using or dealing in that drug.

The use of "Sting" and "Buy Bust" type operations, which are commonly used throughout Great Britain, are not favoured by the Nottinghamshire Drug Squad although they have used them on two exceptions.
Although in both cases when "Sting" operations were used the judge ruled in favour of the Crown, D.I. Bradshaw believes there are more problems than benefits. The Drug Squad has found that the evidence collected has not only been difficult to produce in court as the defendants have used agent provocateur as a defence but it also opens the door to the possibility of abuse by the police. A case of two officers supplying an informant with drugs with the instructions that the informant was to resell these drugs so that the police could then arrest the purchaser provides an example of abuse which may occur. Moreover, the success of "Buy Bust" operations is directly related to the amount of "buy money" available. The larger the budget, the larger the seizures but also the larger the budget, the larger the opportunity for police corruption.

One raid which was not a typical informant-led operation occurred in the summer of 1993 as a reaction to a full page report the Guardian newspaper on the drug problem on Radford Road. Once the article appeared in the paper senior officers within the Nottinhamshire Constabulary requested that action should be taken so that they could not be accused of complacency. The article written by Melanie Phillips described Radford Road as the drug super market of Nottingham.

It is 10 pm in the Radford Road, a sleazy street in the centre of Nottingham. At the top end of the road is the police station, headquarters of the Nottingham Drug Squad. About a quarter of a mile down the road, a certain amount of trade is going on inside a cafe but there is no sign of any food. The cafe is crowded with men and boys, all black. Several are carrying mobile phones. They are standing waiting. They are waiting to do business in crack.

The atmosphere is tense. There are five dealers in the cafe. At a table, a dealer is passing the drugs over to a customer... This is a normal day on the road (The Guardian, June 1994).
Shortly after this article appeared the drug squad organized a raid on the "cafe" which was reported to be the centre of the drug market within this area. The raid involved 35 uniformed and CID officers and took four days to plan. The raid took place at 7.30 in the evening and resulted in two individuals being arrested. Later the charges were dropped on both due to lack of evidence and a small quantity of crack and marijuana was seized. According to detective inspector Peter Bradshaw the raid was launched due to the article in the Guardian. This article had placed pressure on the drug squad by senior police officers to react to what many shopkeepers and residents believed to be an open drug market which was allowed to flourish at the expense of those who lived and worked in the area. The raid according to the detective inspector had three objectives.

The first objective was to seize all drugs on the premises and to make arrests. The second objective was to improve the quality of life of those individuals working or living within the surrounding area by disrupting the present market. The third objective was to show that the police were aware of the drug problem within the area and were in fact in control.

In the opinion of the detective inspector the raid was not effective in terms of arrests nor seizure of drugs but it was effective with regard to increasing the quality of life for those living and working within the area. The raid had, in fact, disrupted the drug market within that area. For a six week period, in the opinion of the majority of those interviewed who were living or working in the area, there was a visible difference. In the opinion of the shopkeepers interviewed within the vicinity of the cafe the raid was very successful. This success was denoted by the lack of overt drug dealing on Radford Road and within the pubs. There was also a decrease in the amount of "mingling" or "hanging out" within the area.

Following this raid, a community police officer was assigned to the area in July 1993. The purpose, in part, was to consolidate the gains made by the
drug squad and to assure the residents and shopkeepers in the area that the drug problem was being taken seriously by the police and that the police were prepared to put a priority on drug enforcement. The community beat officer remained for a period of six months and then was removed due to a reallocation of policing priorities. The officer was reassigned to the Broxtowe Estate shortly after the riots that took place in that area.

Although, during the six months between July and December 1993 that the community police officer was present major crimes did not decrease nor was there an increase in drug related arrests (see table 9.1 Reported Crime for Policing District of Radford Road). In the opinion of those shopkeepers and residents who were interviewed drug dealing and "hanging out" had decreased. In addition, both groups admitted during the interviews that they felt safer walking the streets and believed that the quality of life within the area had improved.

In that in 1993, many of the street crimes, street drug trading and other regular nuisances which occurred on the southern part of the Radford Road were reduced when compared with previous years. Local Traders and residents alike have told us that they feel the same. There are a number of reasons for this, but much of the reduction can be attributed to the professional and dedicated work of PC Ian Crawley. His task was to make his presence felt on this part of the road. He became a familiar figure, his presence was reassuring and appreciated by all law-abiding people (Policing Radford Road Division, Annual Report For 1993: 4).
In terms of how successful community policing is, there is a growing expectation by the public that policing effectiveness and accountability must go beyond crime rates, clearance rates, and response times. In a review prepared by Dr. Andre Normandeau (1991) entitled "the Future of Policing and Crime prevention in Canada," he reports that American and British studies have concluded that with community policing, "on the whole, the rates of crime have not changed significantly although the feeling of insecurity has; the more complete and operational the community policing model is, the more the feeling of insecurity diminishes for the citizens as a whole (or for certain groups) in a city or neighbourhood."
In discussing the role of a community policing officer with senior officers within the district they openly admitted that enforcement was a secondary role. They reported that his primary role was one of "occupying the street" and moving undesirables indoors or to other areas. This strategy was to encourage a better working arrangement between the police and shopkeepers. It was the hope of senior officers that with the new visibility of the community police officer shopkeepers would be more willing to take ownership of day to day problems rather than seeing these problems as a policing issue.

This type of strategy in some communities has been a mixed blessing. It has been argued that closer community/police relations result in an increase in reported crime. For example, the move by the police in providing services to victims of sexual assaults has been seen as being partly responsible for the increase in the reporting of these offences. In communities where community policing has resulted in greater public awareness of the law and a reduction in the reluctance of citizens to report crimes, this has led to increased crime reporting (Ministry of Attorney General, Province of British Columbia, 1993).

The personal interviews with local shopkeepers tend to support these previous beliefs. Many of the shopkeepers saw the community policeman as their personal advocate, an individual to whom they could report their concerns and who was expected to act on their behalf and implement change within the area. When these demands were not met shopkeepers became upset and resentful. One shopkeeper informed me that he was always ticketed when he parked his van on a double yellow line and that the community policing officer should get this stopped.

There is no place to park so that I can unload my stock so I have to park here. When ever I do there is always someone who gives me a ticket. Drug dealers have more rights than I do. Everyone knows they're selling drugs in the open but instead of arresting them they spend all their time giving
parking tickets to us shopkeepers. It doesn't seem right (personal interview, June 1994).

Other shopkeepers became upset when they started to report drug deals being made outside their shop but the police would not react to these complaints. In many cases the police would not even return phone calls.

In addition to the priorities outlined within the Broome Report, Detective Inspector Bradshaw also suggests that priorities must encompass quality of life issues as part of an overall drug enforcement strategy and in many cases this may take the form of low level inconvenience policing. Inconvenience policing means targeting those dealers who may not be "middle level dealers" but who nevertheless affect the lives of those who live in the area.

For example if my mother or anybody else lives on a road, if there is someone dealing next door on a Friday or Saturday night and have 30 or 40 individuals driving or showing up on foot we need to look at the quality of life of those people living on that street and how the drugs market affects their quality of life. That is something we are not presently addressing. That type of issue is presently not being reflected when it comes to determining performance (Personal interview September 14, 1994).

For drug policies at any level to be effective they must be integrated into an overall policing strategy. In addition, drug enforcement strategies must be linked with demand reduction and crime prevention programmes within the community. This latter point has been overlooked by the present Conservative government. Both the Labour and Liberal Democratic parties have called on the government to recognize that only by a partnership between police and the community can the problem of crime be tackled effectively (The Times,
Wednesday 14, 1994). As an example of this policy in Labour controlled areas, the local authorities are responsible for crime prevention programmes in collaboration with the police.

The Constabulary in Loughborough are presently using the multi-agency approach. The police have formed a partnership with local authorities and other key agencies to tackle the drug problem. A sergeant responsible for the project responded that a combined agency approach to the problem is being used and was open to suggestions from anyone who would like to help with the problem. This multi-agency approach has proven successful in London in the area of King's Cross.

King's Cross was an area with about 40 key drug dealers. The police busted them and for about three days the problem dropped dramatically.

The next day it was back to the same level with new people replacing the old, so it was obvious that the problem could not be solved by simply busting the dealers.

When the police worked in partnership with the local authority, it was a different picture. The local authority had far more power. They could close a certain hotel and pull down a bus shelter used by lookouts and dealers (Echo Extra. Wednesday, 14th September, 1994: 9).

Accordingly, the multi-agency approach is the only sensible way to tackle the drug problem. It has become clear that criminal justice sanctions in themselves are not the answer. In the city of Nottingham and more specifically the policing district of Radford Road, the police see their role in demand-reduction in a comprehensive manner. The police are presently working with community agencies to develop a partnership programme that
involves joint ownership of a community drug demand reduction programme. Koch (1971) agrees that demand restriction enforcement activities such as education and community mobilization are preferable from an a priori standpoint because they will decrease both the quantity consumed and the drug price and result in a decreasing amount of crime. Gilman and Pearson (1991) agree that law enforcement has a crucial role to play as part of a community multi-agency strategy.

Current policing strategies have not produced the success which warrants the amount of resources that presently are allocated to confront the problem. What may be more effective is a partnership approach which includes overall community effort to provide a context in which the use of drugs is seen as a symptom of an underlying cause. Within this context demand reduction may mean a multi-agency approach to cleaning up the streets and parks, increasing street lighting, and developing a community policing strategy. It is only through this type of co-operation that the use and distribution of drugs will be reduced.
CHAPTER TEN
MEASURING POLICE IMPACT

In most cases successful drug enforcement judges its impact by the price of illegal drugs and their purity. High price and low purity means less drugs on the street, which means suppression has been fairly effective (Yeager, 1975: 153). In addition, successful enforcement is measured in terms of large amounts of arrests and conviction of drug dealers.

Wagstaff and Maynard (1989: 8) suggest that in order to determine the impact of policing on the supply-side, performance indicators must take into account the following six factors:

1. The number of convictions for drug offenses;
2. The length of prison sentence awarded for the offence;
3. The quantity of drugs seized;
4. The number of seizures;
5. The police seizure rate; and
6. The risks facing drug dealers.

Dom and South (1986) suggest that drug taking and selling are simply part of a larger black economy and that this economy provides multiple conduits for the distribution and exchange of drugs alongside a variety of other goods and services. They suggest two possible methods of control:
Reduction of the total size and scope of the black economy of which drug distribution is a part; and

Reduction of the extent of drug distribution within the black economy by displacing drug distribution by other activities that currently form a part of the black economy (Dorn and South, 1986: 528).

Both Wagstaff and Maynard and Dorn and South see successful drug enforcement in terms of Clark and Hough's (1980) Rational Deterrent Model which suggests that the effectiveness of policing can be measured based on the following indicators:

1. The police are the primary agents of social control;

2. Social control can be equated with the control of crime, which thus constitutes the primary objective of the police;

3. The content of police work is primarily crime orientated;

4. Crime is committed by a small number of individuals whose selfishly motivated behaviour threatens society;

5. The main strategies available to the police are those of deterrence; and

6. The police are organized as a rational bureaucracy: police administrators assess the best crime fighting strategies, and implement these through a paramilitary chain of command (Clarke, R. and Hough, J., 1980: 2).
A model which has a primary focus on criminal procedures such as the detection of crime and apprehension rates is inadequate as an attempt to describe the effectiveness of police work. In the drugs field using drug seizures and clear up rates are even more problematic. Unlike other crimes which are usually reported, drug crimes involve proactive policing with little known about the actual amount of crime committed. Therefore, base number of cases is unknown (Pearson, 1990). In addition, policing comprises a multiplicity of tasks, the majority of which are unrelated to crime.

Based on past research, a great deal of the policing activities are of a service nature such as prevention activities and other non-criminal activities. Bennett and Lupton (1992), in their survey of the distribution of time spent on various tasks among a sample of over 1,600 police, found that general duty officers spent just over two-fifths of their time inside the station and that an average of two hours and 51 minutes were spent on non-criminal activities such as community contact and preventative work per 8 hour tour of duty. The results of the survey confirmed what had already been suggested that patrol officers spend a large proportion of their duty time inside the station on general administrative duties and when outside the station the major proportion of the time is spent on non-criminal activities.

If policing effectiveness is only measured on matters related to crime control, the police will inevitably attach priority to this function. This would indicate that the majority of their present and future resources should be allocated to target drug trafficking and the enforcement of drug related laws.

This strategy of allocating greater and greater resources to the detection and conviction of drug trafficking would achieve at best marginal impact on the drug market. Hough argues that the police have limited scope for either catching or deterring people from crimes:
Research implies that the police have a more limited capability for crime control than is generally assumed, and raises the possibility that they are being held responsible for objectives beyond their control (Hough, 1987: 70).

The present method of measuring policing impact by means of clearing up crime has little relevance to drug operations (Pearson, 1990). An alternative approach for policing the drug market would see the police as having limited capability for crime control and would realize that a very large proportion of police time is devoted to other matters than crime. Therefore, the police should see their role in relation to drug crime not as that of law enforcement but primarily as one of serving the criminal justice machinery. This alternative approach views crime as a product of structural inequalities and that the sort of social intervention needed to achieve an impact on crime lies outside of the remit of police administration. The requirements of the police in pursuing this approach would be that they are responsive to citizen demands. According to this approach, police effectiveness is assessed by the perceived quality of police response to demands made by the public (Clarke and Hough, 1980: 10).

Pearson agreed with this alternative approach to measuring policing impact when he stated that in reality looking at policing impact by only using demand-side indicators such as quantities of drugs seized may be the wrong method.

For example, there has been a sharp increase in recent years in seizures of a range of restricted drugs. Yet how could this evidence be used to argue for an improvement in effectiveness when these increased seizures have coincided with a
rapidly escalating drug problem in many localities? If the reduction of drug misuse is the overall policy objective, then clearly seizures in themselves are not an effective way of achieving that objective (Pearson, 1990: 152).

Measuring policing impact on the illicit drug market has too often been judged by criteria which are one-dimensional, such as clear-up rates. Polland (1982) argues that policing has more to do with the detection of crime and clear-up rates and that ultimate responsibility of the police is not just the detection of crime but the prevention, the maintenance of public tranquillity, the meeting of the public demand in response to crime and non-crime related matters, the maintenance of a sense of personal security and the faith in the police. The president of the Association of Chief Police Officers stated that:

The purpose of the police service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly; to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queen's Peace; to protect, help and reassure the community; and to be seen to do all this with integrity, common sense and sound judgement (Association of Chief Police Officers 23rd of October 1990).

For the most part, drug enforcement impact measurements must involve intermediate measures of specific kinds of activity (Morgan and Smith, 1989) such as the maintaining of order, improving relations with the community, suppressing the harm created from drug consumption and the reduction of drug related crime. These indicators, along with the perceptions of the community can, in fact, be used to measure the overall reduction of some problems.
To determine fully the impact the police have on the social organization of the drug scene the questions which must be asked are: who are affected, how are they affected, what is the social cost to the community, and what is the impact this effect has on the greater community? Once these questions are asked the following questions must be addressed: a) What are the goals which might reasonably be set for drug enforcement to offset the negative effects of those who are impacted by the drug market and b) what role can citizens and community groups usefully play in coping with the problem? (Moore and Kleiman, 1989: 1). The answer to these questions must involve more than looking at simple performance indicators such as seizures and arrests (supply-side). Such strategies presently account for less than 30 per cent of policing activities. It is equally important to consider performance indicators which measure the satisfaction of those individuals, families, and communities which are directly or indirectly impacted by the problem.

This position would argue that community social control plays a greater role in determining effectiveness. Therefore, police strategies must also consider that their largest asset in the fight against drugs is not money or police manpower but rather the community. Demand-side enforcement strategies which include citizen-oriented policing and problem-oriented policing will produce greater results since these strategies address larger community issues and in many ways provide more relevant performance indicators.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
POLICING IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY

DIVISIONAL MAP
CHAPTER ELEVEN
POLICING IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY

In determining the impact of policing on the community the starting point is to define policing impact specific to each group within the community. For each group, positive and negative definitions of policing were defined in different terms.

For the police, positive impact is measured in terms of how successful they are in meeting the goals of their yearly action plan. This includes the number of operations carried out, how many arrests were made, and the amount of illicit drugs seized. For shopkeepers, policing impact had more to do with less disruption of business, an increase in the number of customers who come to the area, and policing impact was measured in terms of visibility. The mere presence of a constable was regarded as an important check on crime and disorder caused by the illicit drug market. The visibility of police on the street for the period between July 1993 to December of the same year was seen as a large measure of successful impact as far as some shopkeepers were concerned. For residents, police impact was measured in terms of perceived safety, walking the streets without the worry of being accosted by drug dealers or mugged by drug users. Within this concept not only does the relationship between consumption and distribution of illicit drugs have to be considered but drug enforcement impact must also be viewed at a community level. Outcome measurements must reflect more than simple enforcement of the law, they must also consider intangible measurements based on the needs of the community.

For the purpose of this chapter impact measurements will look at three areas: indicators which focus on the impact police have on the buying and selling of drugs; indicators which focus on shopkeepers and their perception of police impact on the drug scene; and residents' attitudes towards the impact that the police have on the drug scene within the Electoral Ward of Radford.
Within Radford Road Electoral Ward unemployment is the highest for the city of Nottingham at 44 per cent compared to the city average of 13 per cent. Single parent homes make up 20.5 per cent of individuals living in council rented accommodation compared to the city average of 13.7 per cent, and 22.2 per cent of housing associated rental property compared to a city average of 15.7 per cent. Of all the city wards Radford Ward has the second highest rate for; households with no car, dependent population, adult unemployed, and youths taken into care (Profile for Nottingham City, 1991 census profile England and Wales).

The 1991 census indicates the ethnic population for the Ward of Radford was 32.9 per cent compared to 10.8 per cent for the city. Table 11.1 indicates how the ethnic population is broken down.
Table 11.1
1991 Census Population Figures for Nottingham and Radford Ward

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City</th>
<th></th>
<th>Radford</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>235,184</td>
<td>(89.2)</td>
<td>6,657</td>
<td>(77.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>8,516</td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>(5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>(0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Other</td>
<td>3,042</td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>(2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>4,747</td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>(3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>6,867</td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>(7.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2,624</td>
<td>(1.0)</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>(2.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The district of Hyson Green, the setting for the research, comprises the area along Radford Road from Bentick Road at the north to Beaconsfield Street at the south. The centre of this area contains 280 shops of which 112 (40 per cent) are closed. Within this area many of the roads and pavements are in poor repair, buildings are boarded-up and dilapidated. The streets and pavements are unkept, covered with litter and the front of the boarded up buildings are covered with unsightly out-of-date advertising, which suggests long term dilapidation.

This area has a growing number of second-hand shops and pawn shops with a decreasing amount of variety and specialty shops. A household survey conducted by the Hyson Green Trades Association revealed that only 27 per cent of households in the area used Hyson Green for their purchasing of food. Due to high levels of crime, insurance is difficult to obtain. Thus many potential businesses are discouraged from coming into the area; 44 per cent of all traders report that they had been burgled at least once since 1990 (Burke and Gregson, 1993).
A report which was completed in 1983 by the Nottinghamshire County Council, City Planning Office for the City of Nottingham stated that the Hyson Green District Shopping Centre had shown a dramatic decline in the last 20 years. The area contains a number of low investment enterprises which are particularly vulnerable to downturns in trading cycle. From 1983 to the present this overall downward trend in trading and investment has continued.

The social need studies conducted by the Nottingham County Council in 1983 identified Hyson Green as the area with the greatest social need within Nottingham. In 1993 the area was ranked third overall and scored highest for two indicators, youth unemployed and adult unemployment. It ranked second highest in lone parent households.

This area has the largest concentration of black unemployed people in the city, it is not uncommon to see groups of black individuals "hanging around" the street or in the pubs. This area has acquired something of a reputation as a "shooting gallery" where drugs are easily attained with little interference from the police. Both The Guardian newspaper and BBC's Panorama have featured the drug problem in this area. In the Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire' Annual Report for 1990 street drug trading was identified as "a problem that continued to persist and it was a cause of concern, not only for the police but for the general community at large".

In 1989 a survey was conducted by Nottingham Safer Cities Project which explored residents fear of crime in five specific areas, of which Radford Road/Hyson Green was one. The researchers concluded that more people were worried about being assaulted or bothered by drug users than any other form of anti-social behaviour. Wilson and Kelling (1982) have suggested that levels of disorderly behaviour can trigger a spiral of neighbourhood decline with an increased fear of crime and a ultimate increase in serious crime.
The signs of deterioration in a neighbourhood, whether physical or in the form of disorder, if uncorrected, lead ordinary citizens to reduce their own efforts to maintain their homes and to control unruly conduct (Goldstein, 1990: 23).

The "Broken Window" thesis links physical deterioration with the breakdown in public order and crime. It argues that signs of deterioration in a neighbourhood if not repaired, lead the citizens to reduce their own efforts to maintain their property and will ignore damage caused to structures around them. This decline in the physical environment allows for "safe places" for criminal activity to take place. It therefore should come as no surprise that a large proportion of the shopkeepers and residents in the area are fearful about "undesirable" filling the streets and the possibility that they may be responsible for an increase in crime. Shopkeepers believe that this undesirable element, and the fear of crime which it brings, is driving away customers as the residents are afraid of being harassed or threatened.

Community and Shopkeeper Perceptions of Policing Impact on the Drug Market

To determine the community's perceptions of policing impact on the drug market both shopkeepers and residents were interviewed. Of the 168 shops that were doing business at the time of this research, 80 (47.6 per cent) shop owners or employees were interviewed. Of those interviewed 70 per cent were owners while the remaining 30 per cent were employees. It is of some interest that only 15 per cent of the population interviewed were female.

The ethnic make up was: Afro-Caribbean ten per cent, Asian 30 per cent, White 57.5 per cent, and others 2.5 per cent. Of the total population 40 percent lived within the Radford Ward. Fifty-two percent of those interviewed had worked in the area for five years or more and the mean was 8.6 years. Of the interviewed population 77.5 per cent were married and only 30 per cent had
children living with them. The mean age was 38.9 years old with a standard deviation of 12.38.

One hundred and twenty residents were interviewed. Of this group 30.4 percent were Afro-Caribbean, 20.6 percent were Asian, 36.3 were white, while 12.7 percent were of mixed race or other. Of this population the mean age was 32.2; 17 percent were below the age of 19 while only nine percent were over the age of 50. There was no one over the age of 59. Fifty-two percent of the respondents were female, while 48 percent were male. Table 11.2 gives a comparison between the demographic figures for both shopkeepers and residence who were interviewed.

Table 11.2
Demographic Comparison Between Shopkeepers and Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shopkeepers (Percentage)</th>
<th>Residents (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic make-up</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Caribbean</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Length of residence</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean length of employment</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children living at home</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both shopkeepers and residents were asked a number of questions regarding their perceptions of the drug problem in general and more specifically to what extent there was a drug problem in Hyson Green. The respondents
were also asked to comment on how the drug problem affected their business and how well the police were reacting to the problem within Hyson Green.

The first set of questions respondents were asked to comment on had to do with their beliefs concerning the legalization of drugs and their perceptions of the "drug problem". On a seven point scale they were first asked if they believed that all drugs should be legalized and secondly if they believed marijuana should be legalized.

Both groups were in agreement that all drugs should not be legalized (shopkeepers, 89% and residents 76%), yet on the question of the legalization of marijuana there was a major difference. Only 38 per cent of the shopkeepers and 19 per cent of the residents believed that marijuana should not be legalized. This latter belief regarding the legalization or decriminalization of marijuana is now being supported by many senior officials within the police service yet runs counter to the attitudes of the general public. Commander John Grieve head of criminal intelligence at Scotland Yard urged the government "to think the unthinkable" and examine whether the supply and use of illegal drugs should be licensed (The Times, October 14, 1993).

The second set of questions focused on drugs as a major problem in England and more specifically in Nottingham and the area of the city where they worked or lived. The first question regarding drugs as a problem throughout England, 78 per cent of the shopkeepers either agreed or agreed strongly that there was a major problem. The mean was 5.65 with a standard deviation of 2.03. The second question asked if there was a drug problem in Nottingham? Seventy per cent believed this to be a major problem but 17 per cent were neutral compared to two per cent who responded neutrally for the first question and seven per cent for the third question. The mean was 5.42 with a standard deviation of 1.69. When asked the same question regarding where they worked (Hyson Green) 78 per cent believed drugs are a major problem. In this case the mean was 5.7 with a standard deviation of 1.64. On
the surface this would suggest that there was a general agreement among shopkeepers that drugs do present a problem and that the problem was believed to be greater in Hyson Green than in Nottingham and the rest of the England and Wales. (Table 11.3).

Table 11.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drugs as a Problem (Shopkeepers)</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Percentage)

Do you believe drugs are a major problem?

| 5 13 2 0 3 20 55 |

There is a drug problem in Notts.

| 0 12 0 17 8 28 35 |

The area where I work has a greater drug problem than the rest of the city.

| 2 3 10 7 5 30 43 |

Drug dealing in this area of the city is out of control.

| 3 8 10 21 26 16 16 |

The residents response to the same questions were somewhat similar, the biggest difference was their perception of the extent of the problem in Nottingham. Eighty-eight percent of the survey group believed that nationally there was a drug problem compared to ninety-three percent who felt that the problem in Nottingham was worse. Eighty-one per cent felt the problem was worse in the area where they lived (Table 11.4).

These findings in some ways reflect the "Drug Usage and Drugs Prevention Report" published by HMSO in December 1993. In this report respondents in Nottingham believed that the "drug problem" was more evident nationally than locally. Eighty-eight percent of the respondents in the main report (Drug Usage and Drugs Prevention) believed that drugs presented a
national problem, while 93 per cent of the booster sample believed that drugs presented a national problem. (The booster sample consisted of 250 individuals thought to be at risk of drug taking in Nottingham). This may indicate that in areas of high deprivation where there is high drug usage the residents have a greater awareness and are more likely to be concerned about the problem than the public at large.

Although the vast majority of both groups in Hyson Green reported drugs as a major problem, neither group felt it was the most serious problem for the country or for Nottingham. For the shopkeepers 36 per cent felt that poor education and unemployment (31 per cent) were more serious problems than was the drug problem. While 41 per cent of the residents felt that unemployment and poor education (26 per cent) were bigger problems. For shopkeepers the drug problem was rated third while for residents drugs as a problem was rated fourth.

**Table 11.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drugs as a Problem (Residence)</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5  6  7 (Percentage)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe drugs are a major problem?</td>
<td>6  0  6  0 12 19 57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a drug problem in Notts.</td>
<td>3  0  0  4  9 25 59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The area where I live has a bigger drug problem than the rest of the city</td>
<td>6  0  4  9 11 24 46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug dealing in this area of the city is out of control</td>
<td>5 12 4 21 19 17 22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the responses of the shopkeepers and residents are compared (Table 11.5) the major difference is not so much as to how bad the drug problem is but rather how the problem is reflected within the area. The residents reported that they did not believe that the problem locally was as bad as the city as a whole, while the shopkeepers believed that Hyson Green had
a much greater problem than did the rest of the city. This difference could in part be explained as an attempt by the shopkeepers to rationalize a down turn in business which they see as a direct result of the open drug market.

Shopkeepers were asked if they believed that the "drug problem" negatively affected their business and 72 per cent agreed with the statement while 64 per cent believed that if the police did a better job policing the drug market their business would improve. It was of some interest that four shopkeepers felt that drug dealing in the area had a positive effect. These four individuals traded in second-hand goods and believed that the drug users and dealers would sell goods at a knock-down-price to raise money to buy drugs either for their own use or for resale.

For many traders the "drug problem" has become a focal point in an attempt to justify a cleaning up of the area so that the area becomes more appealing to shoppers.

Table 11.5
Comparison Between Shopkeepers and Residents Regarding Drugs as a Problem.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug-related Statement</th>
<th>Shopkeepers (percentage)</th>
<th>Residents (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Mean</td>
<td>Standard Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe drugs are a major problem?</td>
<td>5.7  2.03</td>
<td>6  1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a drug problem in Nottingham</td>
<td>5.4  1.69</td>
<td>6.28  1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The area where I live has a bigger drug problem than the rest of the city</td>
<td>5.7  1.64</td>
<td>5.7  1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug dealing in this area is out of control</td>
<td>4.7  1.59</td>
<td>4.7  1.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Drug Dealing In Hyson Green

One of the questions which precipitated this study was to what degree ethnic minorities were responsible for selling drugs within Hyson Green. It was believed by some police officers responsible for the area that shopkeepers were using the drug issue to control minorities within Hyson Green. The belief was held by senior police officers that rather than the existence of a drug problem there was a racial problem.

In an attempt to address this question shopkeepers were asked what type of people in their opinion sold drugs. The single largest group identified were Afro-Caribbeans of all ages (49.6 per cent). Of those who identified this group as responsible for the drug problem, the majority of the respondents comments identified the Afro-Caribbeans as lazy, shiftless individuals who did nothing but hang around the streets and were responsible for frightening away customers. This group was seen as not interested in honest employment but was only interested in making easy money. When asked if they actually saw this group selling drugs only nine per cent of shopkeepers responded positively. For the remainder, they reported that their perception was based on media reports, what they were told, and personal biases.

The second largest group (18.2 per cent) identified as drug dealers were young white unemployed males. Respondents reported that this group, unlike the Jamacain dealers who sold drugs for profit and were shiftless, this group became dealers for different reasons. For this group there seemed to be more of an understanding from the respondents for their drug dealing activities than was given to the Jamaicans. For this group the blame was placed more on the government for its inability to manage the economy and create jobs for the youth.

The third largest group (15.6 per cent) were identified as "any and all types". Again with this group, little blame was attributed to the individual but
rather they were seen as victims rather than the villains; the problem was perceived not as a drug problem but as a societal problem.

The results of the study would suggest that the largest single group perceived to be responsible for the selling of drugs in Hyson Green are Afro-Caribbeans. Research conducted by Bean and Pearson (1992) also identified a large Afro-Caribbean drug dealing and using population within this area. However, it is important to note that in their research snowballing was used as their method of data collection. In their study, similar to this research, the original contacts were made with Afro-Caribbeans so it is logical to assume that the snowballing process would involve more Afro-Caribbeans than others. To what degree the Afro-Caribbean community are actually involved in the drug market is unknown. It is the opinion of this researcher, based on observations, conversations, and data collected that prejudice among shopkeepers towards the male Afro-Caribbean "street corner" way of life may play a greater role in the identification of this group as the prime drug dealers than does quantifiable data.

Following this theme of prejudice, both shopkeepers and residents were asked if they believed that prejudice played a role in policing the drug market. Based on four questions (see table 9.6) 66 per cent of all resident respondents felt that the police treated black dealers and users harsher than non-black dealers, while only 36 per cent of shopkeepers felt that the police were biased. These findings did not come as a great surprise when one looks at the populations involved.

White who responded to the residents survey only made up 30 per cent of the total population, while white shopkeepers, who believe that blacks are responsible for the drug problem, made up 58 per cent of the sample of shopkeepers. Of the residents, it was those who reported their ethnicity as mixed (84 per cent of residents) that believed prejudice played the greatest factor in policing the drug market.
TABLE 11.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shopkeepers</th>
<th>Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police response time is slower</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Black areas of the city</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police are harder on black</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drug dealers than white dealers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe the police are</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prejudiced against black dealers?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police use drugs as an</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excuse to pick on minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shopkeepers were more in favour of police targeting suppliers than were residents. Of the sample, 55 percent of shopkeepers believed the best way to tackle the drug problem was to get tougher with suppliers, while 74 per cent of the residents believed targeting drug producing countries would be more effective. Only 24 per cent of shopkeepers and 14 per cent of residents believed that the police were effective in dealing with the problem within the target area and that much more had to be done.

Both groups (82 per cent of the residents and 62 per cent of shopkeepers) believed that the police, if they chose to, could do much more to solve the problem than they were presently doing. Yet some shopkeepers and residents believed that the lack of action against drug dealers was not the fault of the police. They believed that due to the courts response of light sentencing the police had become frustrated and apathetic about policing drug dealers.

I don't blame the police. What is the purpose of arresting these drug dealers when all that happens is either they never go to court or if they do they’re let off. The police pick them up and within the hour they’re back standing in front of my shop. I blame the government and the courts. What we need is to teach them they cant get away with it (Personal interview, September, 1993).
Of the two groups, the shopkeepers (73 per cent) were more likely to be sympathetic towards the police than were the residents (53 per cent). Both groups felt that if the police had more resources and were freed up from doing unimportant tasks (administration) they would have a greater impact on the drug scene. What both groups wanted to see were more police on foot patrol (table 11.7). It was their belief that this would act as a deterrent not only against open drug dealing but it would also deter other forms of criminal behaviour such as "curb crawling", drunkenness, and theft from homes.

Table 11.7
Policing Methods as a Deterrent to Drug Dealing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shopkeepers Yes (%)</th>
<th>Residents Yes (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe the city would be</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>better off with more police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe the police spend</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>too much time on unimportant tasks?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police should spend more time</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on foot patrol in this area?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drug dealing that persists in a community for a long period of time can cause significant harm to the community's relationship with the police. This is even truer in poorer communities where this lack of action on the part of the police can produce suspicion or outright hostility towards the police. If this type of antagonism persists between the police and residents, the drug problem may be increased and in turn the community may become more hostile towards the police.

To counteract this danger a potential strategy may be for the police to address the harms caused to the community by drug activities rather than focusing on the actual drug dealers. This would mean working with the community to identified those drug related harms which effect specific
communities and then in cooperation with each community develop policing strategies which focus on the ways in which drug activity harms those community rather than focusing their resources on drug sellers and drug users.
CHAPTER TWELVE
POLICING IMPACT ON DRUG DEALERS

Presently, there are six methods which are commonly employed in determining the impact that policing has on the drug scene. The most commonly used indicators are:

1. price and purity;
2. The amount and weight of seizures;
3. The ease with which drugs can be purchased including time involved in making a purchase;
4. The ease of finding sellers, risks involved for both buyer and seller;
5. The geographical location; and
6. The impact which legal deterrence have on the seller or purchaser of any drug.

Drug Pricing as an Indicator of Police Effectiveness

The increase of the street price of illicit drugs is normally used as one indicator of successful law enforcement since rising prices usually indicate a shortage in supply (Moore, 1977). This shortage is seen as a result of increased enforcement pressure placed at all levels of the drug distribution chain. If the demand for drugs is perfectly inelastic consumption will remain static while prices increase.

Based on controlled purchases by the Nottingham police the purchase price for cocaine for 1992-93 in Nottingham was between £90 to £100 per gram but the price of £80 per gram was quoted if you knew the right source. This
price, as with all drugs, fluctuated depending on both amount purchased and
the quality of the drug.

In Nottingham for the year 1992-3 crack was selling for an average of
£25 per rock and as low as £15 depending on who the seller was, how well the
buyer was connected to the seller, and on the amount of business that was
personal, transacted or referred to the seller. Heroin was selling for as low as
£80 to £100 per gram. The price of cannabis was between £60 to £80 per
ounce, while amphetamines were selling for £10 to £15 per gram. Purchases
were also transacted in "kind". There is an increasing bartering system that
has developed over the last two years (1992-3). Many dealers are now taking
in merchandise in part or full payment of drugs. In part, this can be attributed
to the downturn in the economy which, in turn will increase the price and
purchasing of second-hand goods. For the period 1989 to 1993, with the
exception of cannabis, which has increased by about £20 per ounce and
cocaine which has a range between £65 to £100 per gram, drug prices in
Nottingham have been very stable (Table 12.1).

Table 12.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Price (£) per gram of Drugs in Nottingham</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis (ounce)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amph.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data collected from Nottinghamshire Constabulary and NCIS)
Drug Purity as an Indicator of Police Effectiveness

A second factor which has been used to determine the effects of policing on the drug market is the purity of street drugs. If a drug shortage occurs prices can be maintained at a constant level by decreasing the purity of the drug (cutting). By "cutting" dealers' profits can be maintained and at the same time they can also ensure that they have sufficient volume to overcome periods of drought that may occur.

For the period 1989-93 the purity of cocaine has dropped by nine per cent while heroin has increased by 35 per cent, and amphetamines have stayed relatively the same (table 12.2).

Table 12.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amph</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data supplied by the National Criminal Intelligence Service)

Based on the period 1989-93 if price and purity are to be used as an indicator of police effectiveness for Nottingham the data would suggest that their impact is minimal. Yet it must be recognized that using indicators such as price and purity to determine policing impact can be very misleading.

The most obvious and misleading problem with using indicators such as price and purity is that the use of these indicators is based on the theory of elasticity of demand for illicit drugs. It is now accepted that with the exception
of crack, drug inelasticity is low. Even heroin, which many assumed was perfectly inelastic, has proven to be elastic. The belief that drugs are perfectly inelastic is based on the supposition of an overwhelming addiction which occurs after using drugs. This addiction results in the user diverting as many resources as required to maintain this addiction. This addiction model assumes that all users are addicts yet in fact only a few drug users are addicts. The majority of all individuals who use illicit drugs are casual users or users of non-addictive drugs such as marijuana.

**Drug Seizures as an Indicator of Policing Impact**

A third indicator in determining policing impact is related to the success of illicit drug seizures either entering the country or seizures on the streets. In Nottingham and throughout the country drug seizures of all drugs have gone up but these increased seizures have had little impact on price, and the purity of most drugs has stayed constant. In Nottinghamshire seizures of all drugs have increased from 228 seizures in 1989 to 516 seizures in 1992 an increase of over 270 per cent. Yet, the increase in seizures has had little impact on either the price or purity of most drugs (Tables 12.3).

**Table 12.3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All drugs</th>
<th>Cocaine</th>
<th>Heroin</th>
<th>LSD</th>
<th>Cannabis</th>
<th>Amphetamines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nationally, for the same period of time (1989-1992) drug seizures have increased from 8,026 (55,674 kilos and 185,916 doses respectively of LSD and MDMA) to 19,044 seizures (569,783 and 626,425 doses of LSD and MDMA) (tables 12.4 & 12.5). Cocaine seizures more than doubled from 1,086 kilograms in 1991 to 2,266 kilograms in 1992. This increase was due to two large amounts discovered by HMS Customs and Excise (900 kilos and 800 kilos). Seizures of Ecstasy rose by 38 per cent from 1,700 doses in 1991 to 2,400 doses in 1992, while seizures of LSD almost tripled.

**TABLE 12.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drugs Seized by Kg.</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>2,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>54,687</td>
<td>30,933</td>
<td>49,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD Doses</td>
<td>146,855</td>
<td>167,451</td>
<td>312,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDMA Doses</td>
<td>39,061</td>
<td>252,043</td>
<td>314,312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data supplied by the National Criminal Intelligence Service)

**Table 12.5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Seizures</th>
<th>All Drugs</th>
<th>Cocaine</th>
<th>Heroin</th>
<th>LSD</th>
<th>Cannabis</th>
<th>Amphet-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>37,857</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>2,196</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>32,309</td>
<td>2,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>27,877</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>1,724</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>24,248</td>
<td>2,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>51,862</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>2,324</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>43,812</td>
<td>5,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>53,042</td>
<td>1,916</td>
<td>2,569</td>
<td>1,978</td>
<td>41,552</td>
<td>8,611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data supplied by the National Criminal Intelligence Service)
The trend of increased seizures has continued into 1993 and 1994. On Thursday November 19th, 1993 Customs seized Britain's largest single shipment of 200kg. of heroin worth £30 million. This compares with a total seizure of 513kg. for the year 1992 (The Times, November 20, 1993). On Monday November 17 1994 Customs and police seized 250kg. of cocaine worth £50 million, again the single largest recorded seizure of cocaine. Given the ever increasing amount of illicit drugs being seized by both Customs and the police, if they are succeeding in reducing the amount of illicit drugs reaching the consumer, it would be logical to assume that the prevalence of drug use and misuse would be on the decline.

The problem with attempting to determine the estimated size of the drug taking population is that there is virtually no information on the total prevalence of the use of drugs other than heroin (Sutton and Maynard, 1992: 75). Rather than attempting to determine the actual extent of all drug use, for the purpose of this chapter I will simply use heroin to extrapolate the increase of drug misuse within the United Kingdom.

Using a multiplier between four and ten to one Wagstaff and Maynard (1988) suggested that there were between 41,000 and 100,000 users of heroin in the United Kingdom in 1985. This estimate was based on the Home Office Addict Index which reported 9,843 Heroin addicts. Sutton and Maynard (1992: 81) suggested that nationally a multiplier of seven would be more accurate to determine the total population who are addicted to heroin.

In 1992 the number of heroin addicts notified to the Home Office increased from 13,700 in 1989 to 22,240 (Addicts Notified to The Home Office, Statistics of the misuse of drugs, United Kingdom, 1992, Area tables). In real terms, applying the multiplier of seven this would suggest that individuals addicted to heroin increased from 92,400 to 155,680. Per million population, the rise from 304 addicts per million in 1989 to 494 per million in 1992. This increase occurred while Customs and the police were reporting larger and
These findings are again supported by an undercover officer in the Nottinghamshire drugs squad.

Hard drugs are available in all parts of Nottingham. Buying cannabis is easier than getting a loaf of bread. Actually it's easier because you won't even need to get out of your car (Interview February 18th, 1994).

Drug Dealers' Response to Police Activities
Drug dealers were asked to what degree did policing activities affect their drug dealing. Fifty-five per cent reported they felt that the police had little or no effect on their selling activities, while only seven per cent said that they were very worried about the police. For the former group the police were seen as nothing more than an inconvenience which came with the job.

You have to be careful when you're selling, anyone that tells you different is a prat. I mean that you're out there selling and you know the Bill is around so you just keep your eyes open and make sure you're not holding a lot of gear. If the coppers are around you just shut down and move to another spot and carry on. We're out there they're out there and we all carry on (Personal interview, April, 1993).

Yet the most serious consequence for any drug dealer is the fear of police intervention which could result in arrest and imprisonment. Lost income and freedom of movement are two of the risks which all drug dealers must face. The possibility of being caught by the police did not seem to be regarded as an important factor. Only 29 per cent of all respondents reported that they were worried about being apprehended while they were involved in selling drugs. Of the 29 per cent who were very worried about being caught, 49
percent had been charged and convicted of a drug offence. Of the 35 percent who had reported having no fear of being caught again, 49 per cent reported that they had been also been charged and convicted of a drug related offence. For both groups (afraid and not afraid) approximately 50 percent had prior convictions. Based on these findings it would appear that the fear of conviction does not act as a deterrent.

Eighteen per cent of the respondents felt that the police were effective at policing the drug market. The majority (61 per cent) suggested that if you were careful and only sold to friends or known contacts there was little chance of being caught. The fear of either being "ripped off" or assaulted by other dealers or customers was reported as a greater fear than being caught by the police. Eighty per cent of respondents reported that there was a greater possibility of being "done in" by customers or other dealers than being caught dealing by the police.

Although 29 per cent of all respondents reported that they were worried about being apprehended while they were involved in selling drugs, when asked what types of policing strategies affected them the most, over 80 percent of respondents felt that the use of informants was the most effective method that the police could use. This finding is interesting for two reasons. First, even though 71 percent of all respondents suggested that policing activities did not affect their drug dealing, when asked the secondary question regarding policing strategies over 80 percent of all drug dealers believed that informants were a threat to their activities. This may indicate that drug dealers do not recognize the use of informants as an official policing method. Secondly, these results would appear to support the present drug squad use of informant-led activities.
Even though 71 percent of the respondents reported that they were not worried about the police, all but a few invested in some form of strategy to reduce the threat of arrest to themselves. The first line of defence in reducing the possibility of detection and possible arrest is to conceal all visible connections with the drug market (Moore, 1977: 15). According to Moore (1977), the best way of achieving this is to avoid becoming known as a dealer to all but those you are doing business with. This requires dealers to limit the number of individuals with whom they do business. It also requires dealers to develop a select clientele which can be closely monitored to reduce the possibility of informant-led police operations (Moore, 1977: 17).

Of the 51 dealers who were interviewed only eight per cent (four individuals) sold to individuals who had not been screened, while an additional 17 per cent reported that on occasion they would sell to customers who had not been screened and were not known to them. Seventy-three per cent said that under no circumstance would they ever sell to anyone who had not been screened (Table 12.7).

The screening process used by the majority of the deals was not overly sophisticated. It simply involved having the new customer being introduced by someone the dealer had dealt with in the past. For other dealers screening new customers was more involved. For large purchases the new customer had to have past dealings with an individual who was well known and trusted to him. If the new customer could show that he was "connected" to the drug
culture he would be supplied. If there was any doubt in the mind of the seller that he could not be trusted there would not be relationship formed.

Heroin dealers were the most likely to be selective in who they sold to. Of the nine dealers who dealt primarily in heroin none of these dealers would sell to anyone who was not first introduced by a known associate or customer. It was believed by these dealers that this screening process did help in lowering the possibility of doing business with informants and drug squad officers but they admitted that this strategy had some major liabilities. The most significant liability reported was the inability for the individual dealer to generate an increase in his or her profits other than by present customers increasing their consumption level. This screening process decrease the opportunity of increased sales and greatly limits their possibility for expanding their market share.

Although the retail heroin dealers who took part in this survey admitted the loss of new customers as the greatest liability they did not seem to be concerned with the negative side effects of screening new customers. They were not aggressive in their marketing nor were they overly concerned in increasing their market share. These dealers reported that they were less interested in attempting to expand their market share but rather more interested in reducing the danger to themselves by means of selective selling. It was their belief that selective selling reduced the risk of police detection and eliminated the danger from other dealers who would not have to fear that they were attempting to steal their customers. Also, it was reported by many of the dealers who were selling at a retail level that within a smaller market the trust between seller and buyer is greater; therefore a symbiotic relationship between the dealer and customer is more likely to develop. This relationship then protects the dealers from the possibility of their customers informing on them. The customers come to depend as much on the dealer as the dealer depends on the customers (Moore, 1977).
Table 12.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who do you sell drugs to</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Some Times</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strangers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends of friends</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business associates</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The wholesale dealers who took part in this survey seemed much more aggressive than did the retail level dealers. Their aim was to move as much gear in the shortest possible time. To accomplish this they had a select network of retail dealers to whom they sold. In turn these retail dealers were encouraged to hire as many runners as possible. This type of organization minimized the risk to the wholesaler as he was only doing business with a limited amount of retailers who knew his identity, yet it maximized profits as the retailers increased the amount of runners who were working for the retailers.

Within this model it is the retailers and the runners who face the greatest risk and receive the least rewards. It is for these reasons that the more energetic runners and retailers will attempt to establish a more personal connection with the higher level dealer (supplier) within the chain in the hope that they may move up the distribution network to capture the profits of the higher level dealer. Moving up the distribution chain for the vast majority of those who attempted to improve their position usually ended in failure. To move up the distribution chain and maintain that position required much more than forming a personal connection with a wholesaler. To become a high level dealer requires resources. First, a large investment of capital is needed. For the majority of the respondents within this study even though they generated a large amount of revenue that revenue went to support their lifestyle leaving them with just enough money to reinvest for their next purchase for resale. To overcome this barrier some of the independent dealers would form buying
syndicates. Usually, this meant four or five individual dealers would pool their capital either on a regular or a one time basis to purchase in bulk. One member of the syndicate would then purchase the drugs either from a wholesaler in London, Birmingham or travel to either Holland, Spain, or Africa. Travelling to Europe and Africa would lower their purchase cost but would increase the possibility of detection. For example, one such syndicate sent one of its members twice a year to the toy fair which took place in Hamburg (Germany). The toy fair which takes place in Germany has become well known by many drug traffickers as the place to buy in bulk and make international drug connections.

The majority of the drugs enter Hamburg via Africa and the Eastern Block countries. These drugs enter concealed in cartons of toys. Once in the country they are quickly dispersed to near by locations. Purchases are then made with dealers at the toy fair and pick-up is prearranged.

Syndicate buying greatly increases profits but requires a high level of trust among all members. The possibility of being "ripped-off is greatly increased for each member. The designated purchaser is in the position either to take the money and invest for himself or simply report that he was robbed and the money or drugs were stolen. The problems for the purchaser are even greater. The purchaser places himself in the position of being detected either purchasing the drugs or transporting them. In addition, if he or she is truly robbed or must dispose of his purchase as he thinks he has been detected, he does not know if the rest of the syndicate will believe him.

Secondly, even if it is possible to raise the required capital, there must be the ability for a distribution network to dispose of the drugs that have been purchased quickly. This not only requires obtaining new dealers that can be trusted, it also requires a large customer base. This customer base can either come from new addicts entering the market place or existing users. The latter means of forming a consumer base would require poaching clients from other
dealers. If the method of poaching clients is used it becomes very important that there is significant enforcement power within the organization to support this venture and overcome the violence which is most likely to follow. The crack drug market is the best example of how violence has occurred among rival drug gangs competing for territorial supremacy.

Thirdly, if the first two obstacles can be overcome there still exists the threat of drug market instability. This instability may take many forms, such as lack of customer loyalty. Of the 62 drug users interviewed only 51 per cent bought their drugs from the same source. The reasons given for this lack of customer loyalty were price fluctuation, access to their supplier and quality of product. In addition, the police have a tendency to target the greedier and new upwardly mobile drug organizations who are threatening to expand the market. These organizations have a greater possibility of informant-led detection by law enforcement agencies. Informant-led operations can be initiated by either drug dealers who are being squeezed out of the market place or by low level dealers who are attempting to increase their market share.

Of the fifty dealers interviewed, four dealers reported that they had started at what they called low level dealing and had moved to middle level dealing and remained at that level. Another fourteen reported dealing at a middle level at one point in their drug dealing history but could not maintain that level and returned to low level dealing.

Respondents were also asked if they worked alone or with a partner or if they were hired by someone or in turn if they hired others to help distribute drugs. There was considerable variation across drugs and income but the results in some areas were what would be expected. For instance, 82 per cent of those who reported working alone earned the least income.

Just less than half, (44.9 per cent), of all respondents reported that they worked alone. As expected this was most common with cannabis dealers.
Sixty-three per cent said that they worked alone while 30 cent reported working with a partner. For those respondents who reported working with a partner 82 per cent said that their partner was a family member. Usually that family member turned out to be a spouse. Seventeen per cent reported that they were part of an organization. Given the amount sold, limited capital to enter into business, and the small profits realized from this venture, this would be expected. Heroin and crack dealers were more likely to work as part of an organization, either hiring or being hired. Of the heroin dealers only 11 per cent said they worked alone while 33 per cent of crack dealers reported working alone. The reminder reported either working as part of an organization or with a partner (see table 12.8).

Table 12.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>1 - 10</th>
<th>1 - 20</th>
<th>30 - 39</th>
<th>40 - 55</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of hr. Sold</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>15 (30%)</td>
<td>10 (20%)</td>
<td>24 (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Hours Spent Selling</td>
<td>34 hrs. per week</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked by</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Criminal Sanctions as a Deterrent to Drug Dealing

The degree to which criminal sanctions affect both drug buyers and sellers involves the perception of the risk of apprehension and the toughness of criminal sanctions. If criminal sanctions are to be effective three conditions must be present (Fish and Bruhnsen, 1978: 257):

1. Sanctions must follow the undesirable behaviour closely in time;
2. The sanctions must be intense; and
3. The sanctions must have a high probability of occurring.

These conditions are central to the theory of low level policing. Within the present legal structure simple possession charges do not usually result in serious penalties. For the year 1992 of the 43,492 individuals in the United Kingdom who were found guilty or cautioned for unlawful possession only 2,826 received custodial orders (6.5 per cent). Whereas, for the 5,392 individuals charged for supplying or possession with the intent to supply a 1,427 result in immediate custody (26 per cent). Table 10.8 presents drug arrests, broken down by drug type and disposition of sanctions for individuals within the United Kingdom for the year 1992.
Table 12.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug Arrests and Disposition</th>
<th>Cautioned</th>
<th>Non-prison</th>
<th>Prison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manufacture</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amph</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Possession</strong></td>
<td>43,492</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amph</td>
<td>4,923</td>
<td>4,923</td>
<td>1,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>34,429</td>
<td>34,429</td>
<td>22,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supplying</strong></td>
<td>2,189</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methadone</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Possession with intent</strong></td>
<td>3,203</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methadone</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total arrests 48,927

(Source: Drug seizures for the United Kingdom, 1992 Supplementary tables).

Table 12.10 presents data on the estimated total number of users and dealers in Nottinghamshire. User estimates are based on the report, Drug Usage and Drugs Prevention: The Views and Habits of the General Public published by HMSO which was carried out in 1992 and which indicates that two
per cent of the population used drugs at least once a month. The percentage of population and drug use within this table has been calculated by the authors of the 1992 British Crime Survey. Sellers estimates are based on Moore's (1977) estimates of the ratio of sellers to buyers.

Table 12.10

Estimated Number of Users and Suppliers of Illicit Drugs in Nottinghamshire (1992).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Users</th>
<th>Sellers</th>
<th>Arrests</th>
<th>Guilty</th>
<th>Cautioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All drug users</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17% cannabis</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>401</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4% amph.</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3% LSD</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2% ecstasy</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2% cocaine</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1% crack</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1% heroin</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(These figures are not mutually exclusive as most dealers sell more than one drug).

(Percentages referes to those drug deals who only sold that one drug).

Of the 487 who were arrested for a drug related offence only 251 individuals were found guilty; 25 were for possession with the intent to supply, while 219 were for possession of an illegal drug. Of those who received prison sentences for possession with intent to supply in 1992 the average sentence was 19.6 months while those convicted and who received prison sentences for unlawful possession the average sentence was 5.4 years. For sellers, the risk of apprehension and possible incarceration seems less than five per cent per year. The longer the person sells the chances of being detected and charged become greater.
Deterrence theory is commonly operationalized as a statistical relationship between properties of legal punishment and measures of disapproved conduct, (Meier et al., 1984). This theory of deterrence stems from the perceived threat or fear of the inherent elements of punishment and is about the behavioural implications of the individual's beliefs of being caught (Williams and Hawkins, 1986).

For the purpose of this study drug dealers were asked if while selling drugs they were afraid of being detected and charged with a drug related charge. Of the fifty one respondents 15 (29.4 per cent) reported that they feared the possibility of detection and another seven (13.7 per cent) respondents reported minimal concern. Of the 29 (56.8 per cent) respondents who reported not being worried, the majority 74 per cent had been charged for drug offences in the past yet continued to sell illicit drugs. In the opinion of those who were interviewed and charged they believed that the lack of criminal sanctions were outweighed by the monetary rewards for continuing their drug dealing.

In the case of drug dealers, we are dealing with a group of individuals who have entered into a deviant lifestyle whereas the taking and selling of drugs are a natural part of that lifestyle. Consequently, the central issue is whether they would disengage from such a lifestyle as a result of legal threats. The question arises, "Do past criminal justice sanctions and the threat of future sanctions reduce the probability of continuing drug taking?" The logical answer to this question has to be no for the simple reason that a great deal of profit is to be realized from dealing in drugs. Severity of penalties and maximum sentencing do not seem to deter those who are in drug distribution for profit (Piliavin, et al., 1986: 16).
Fagan (1991) suggests that for a legal sanction to be effective it depends on the probability that offenders view their behaviours as likely to be detected and punished. In addition, the offender must perceive some degree of pain and that pain must outweigh the benefits gained from the illegal act. Based on the theory of pleasure and pain, for many of the respondents in Nottingham, criminal deterrence has failed to deter drug dealing activities. It would appear for many drug dealers the risk of being caught is outweighed by the prospect of monetary returns.

Respondents were then asked if the fear of being caught did not act as a deterrent what would it take for them to stop dealing in illicit drugs. Of those who earned less than £14,000 (40 per cent) from drug dealing, rather than being seen as a full time activity drug dealing was only a means of subsidizing their income. For this group a good job which allowed them to support themselves and their family would be a greater motivation to stop their drug dealing rather than the threat of criminal sanction. For the majority of those individuals who were making more than £20,000, drug dealing represented more of a commitment to the theory of pleasure and pain. For this group the potential monetary rewards for drug dealing outweighed the limited risk of apprehension and the lack of criminal sanction if convicted.

This lack of perceived risk of arrest and punishment is seen as a major factor by many drug dealers in the continuance of their activities. But it is only one of many problems which makes policing the drug market difficult. This problem along with other issues will be discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
PROBLEMS WITH POLICING THE DRUG MARKET

Unlike other crimes the taking of drugs and therefore the breaking of the law involves not a small minority but a large number of individuals from all walks of life. This diverse population makes enforcement of drug laws a monumental task.

The benefits of arresting drug dealers are not as obvious as arresting other criminals. Drug markets, and legitimate markets, share several common features. Both involve willing buyers and sellers and both are demand-led. As long as there is a strong demand there will be drug deals taking place. Unlike other forms of crime, such as robbery or fraud, when drug dealers are displaced either by early retirement or through police efforts an opening is created within the market for other dealers who are eager to take their place.

In addition, drug related crimes, like prostitution feature certain factors which are not common in most other forms of criminal behaviour. These types of crimes require limited resources and no particular expertise to commit and have no complaining victims who are likely to report their behaviour to the police. Therefore the collection of evidence becomes difficult to obtain. The drug trade is an entirely consensus activity involving a voluntary exchange of a desired commodity between willing buyers and willing sellers.

I don't like the term "pusher", I've never sold drugs to anyone who first didn't approach me first. I've never held anyone down on the ground and made him buy my drugs. Hey there are enough punters out there that search me out. Why would I force someone to buy if they didn't want them" (Personal interview, 12th June 1992).
It is the willingness of both supply and demand (buyers and sellers) to become involved in the drug market and the lack of a complaining victim which renders drug legislation largely unenforceable.

Enforcement of the marijuana laws suffers from the same difficulties encountered in the enforcement of laws concerning other consensual crimes. There is no victim to complain and there is little social pressure to conform to the law within the various subcultures involved (Blum, 1973: 89).

Since there are no complaining victims police work must be organized in a different manner as the discovery and clear-up rates rely on proactive policing. In other words policing the drug market in a sense means "making crime happen" or constructing circumstances in which evidence can be obtained (Pearson, 1990: 150). Given these conditions in drugs cases there is a tendency for the police to use questionable tactics which usually involve entrapment and the use of paid informants.

Moore and Kleiman (1989) suggest that for the police to be successful in drug enforcement it is important to mobilise the community. It stands to reason that the police have a better chance of success if they can count on the assistance of concerned residents. But along with this conspiracy of silence among sellers and users this conspiracy extends to immediate and extended family members. Drug selling and buying normally involves individuals who could typically be identified as victims. However drug use is said to be a family affair; it not only affects the individual using the drug but also family members become either willing or unwilling partners who are drawn into the activities of both users and sellers.
Family members usually see the user-dealer as either a victim of "Mr. Big" who stands for the evil entrepreneur. It is "Mr. Big" who is reaping the large fortunes and is responsible for the drug related violence which is so commonly reported by the media. Or the drug users are seen as a victim of the political structure. It is this structure which has allowed the drug problem to occur and at the same time has closed off the opportunities afforded to others. In both cases the user/dealer is seen as victim only engaging in activities in order to supply his/her own habit. Because of these perceptions family members are reluctant to co-operate with the police or other authority figures.

Communities which have a flourishing drug trade are usually identified by high levels of social deprivation and have large ethnic populations. Within these communities the policing of the drug market has developed as one of the most sensitive issues. Many of these communities which have been targeted by the police see the issue not as a drug issue but rather as a manipulation by the police to control the grey economy and to intimate minority communities (Uglow, 1988).

Farrell (1992) has suggested that drug laws are extensively used against Blacks in Britain as liquor laws in the colonial days were used against the North American Indians and against the Irish. He argues that popular fears of hard drugs have been used to justify attacks on Black people, even though the majority of the sellers and users are white. He presents the following example to support this belief.

Black meeting places are continually raided. For example, in October 1975, 100 police with dogs and riot shields raided a black youth club, 12 were arrested, all were acquitted. In 1975 police raided the Four Acres West Indian club with dogs searching for a youth who had allegedly stolen a purse (Farrell, 1992: 121).
In 1985 riots occurred in Handsworth, Brixton, and Tottenham. All of these riots occurred in the run-down inner-city, crime ridden areas, and the majority of the participants were black, under 25, and unemployed (Benyon and Solomos, 1987: 61). Following the Handsworth riot a local panel was set up to investigate the cause. The Chief Constable of the West Midlands concluded that the riot was triggered by a small criminal group of drug dealers, whose activities had recently been attacked by the police and whose livelihood was suffering at the hands of the drug squad (West Midlands Police 1986: 70). Bhavnani et al., (1986: 68) suggested that drugs were not the real issue:

Drugs were not the real issue; soft drugs are widely available all over the place. Drugs were used as an excuse for police activity to throw a wide net around black people in the area and to harass black youth.

The issue of policing drug markets in ethnic communities is not that simple. If the police take a hands off approach to soft drug use they may well be setting themselves up to be accused of having "no go areas" and therefore sanctioning, by non enforcement, the use of drugs and possibly other forms of illegal behaviour. Yet the average citizen within these communities often holds extremely bitter views about drug use and selling in the community. In the case of Handsworth, for example, the police were subjected to a double attack. On the one hand, they were accused of discrimination and harassing black youth and, on the other hand, they were accused by the Asians and older blacks for not taking stronger action, thus allowing the situation to get out of control (Benyon and Solomos, 1987: 108). There are clear problems associated with policing the drug market within some communities and how these difficulties are to be resolved remains unclear.
In communities where there is an active drug scene there are fiscal considerations for community members which help them to condone drug markets. Drug dealing can be seen as a means of status achievement in communities where people are deprived of the traditional means of earning an income through legitimate means of employment (Pearson, 1987). The money earned from drug selling contributes to the local economy in a similar manner to money earned by high level dealers. The money that has been earned from drugs and drug related activities is put back into the community either by drug dealers' profits being spent to maintain their life style or by users selling in stolen merchandise at cut rate prices to maintain their drug habit.

Preble and Casey argue that the heroin user is an important figure in the economic life of neighbourhoods that are characterized by high drug dealing.

The distribution and sales of goods and property stolen by heroin users has become a major economic institution in low income neighbourhoods. Most of the consumers are otherwise ordinary, legitimate members of the community. Housewives will wait on the stoop for specialists in stealing meat to come by, so that they can get a ham or roast at a 60% discount. Owners of small grocery stores buy cartons of cigarettes stolen from the neighbourhood super-market. The owners of an automobile places an order with a heroin user for tires, and the next day he has the tires-with the wheels. At the Easter holidays there is a great demand for clothes, with slum streets looking like the streets of the Garment District (Preeble and Casey, 1969: 19).

Sequestration has been suggested as a powerful tool for law enforcement in the war on drugs. Unfortunately this strategy may create more problems for enforcement agencies than it solves. Stimson (1986) presents the argument that sequestration may increase the cost of drugs to low and middle
level dealers but it will not effect high level dealers. He suggests that the task of tracing drug money is so complex that some police commentators believe that it is almost impossible to bring a successful prosecution against major drug dealers. The amount of police time and effort that will have to be given to the tracing of the money trail is not cost effective.

Most confiscation orders are against low and middle level dealers who have few resources for covering and defending themselves so they become the primary targets. In 1987 in England and Wales the court applied 200 confiscation orders which was only six per cent of the total 3,560 sentenced offenders which were eligible for confiscation orders. Of the 200 cases 135 cases involved sums of less than 1,000 pounds (Pearson, 1991: 201). This has placed the police in the position of targeting minority and disenfranchised communities which thrive on an irregular economy.

Policing a market characterized by consumer demand has additional problems. First, becoming a low level drug dealer is quite simple. People who begin dealing at the bottom follow traditional paths. They usually are drug users themselves who turn to dealing to support their own habit and to make a little cash. There usually is no apprenticeship as in becoming a "good class villain": "Good class villains" are professionals or at least experienced criminals who play by the rules and are worthy of pursuit (Reiner, 1985). Most low level drug dealers are somewhat unpredictable and therefore potentially dangerous. Secondly, law enforcement agencies suddenly possess a highly marketable service, the sale of non-enforcement of the law (Yeager, 1975). Corruption by police officers includes a wide variety of illegal behaviours that range from misuse of authority to illegal acts which produce personal gain.

The Knapp Commission (1972) and the Mollen Commission (1993) identified drug related corruption as a significant problem within the New York Police Department. The Mollen Commission reported that the police force was riddled with dishonesty and corruption. The Commission reported that some
police officers working in the poorest areas of the city were involved with the selling of drugs and stealing money from suspected drug dealers. Michael Dowd, an officer from the 75th precinct (central Harlem), gave evidence that he and his gang of crooked cops treated their beat as a personal fiefdom dealing in cocaine and stealing from drug dealers (The Times, July 9, 1994).

The case of "India One" in England reported by Panorama, 27th October 1993 seems to support the findings of the Knapp Commission. "India One" was the code name for an undercover operation against a corrupt regional drugs squad policeman who was selling secret information to suspected drug dealers in exchange for money. In addition to the selling of information, the police officer, Detective Constable John Donald, also counselled suspected criminals on how to avoid conviction and how to obtain bail. For example Cressey, a known drug dealer, was arrested late in September, 1993 with fifty-five kilos of cannabis. Cressey was later charged with conspiracy to traffic in a controlled drug. After he was taken into custody he was told by Detective Constable John Donald to "say nothing - you can be out of it". Within twenty-four hours of being arrested for drug trafficking and possession of a gun he was free on bail (BBC, Panorama 27.9.93).

Moore (1977) reported that drug dealers invest heavily in bribes as a strategy to avoid imprisonment. Carter defines this as Type 1 drug corruption in that the officer relies on his position to receive benefits which are inconsistent with the legitimate police mandate of apprehension.

Accepting bribes from drug dealers in exchange for "tips", information regarding drug investigations, undercover officers, drug strategies, names of informants, planning raids, and related tactical information. Accepting bribes from drug dealers in exchange for interference in the justice process such as a failure to arrest, evidence tampering, perjury, failure to interview or include witnesses, or contamination of other physical or testimonial evidence (Carter, 1990: 88).
Albrecht, et al., (1989) state that as the grey economy increases and becomes a larger part of the legal economy and when officials are aware of that involvement there is by definition a case of corruption. When the criminal volume increases, corruption will increase out of all proportion. Public officials, especially police and customs officers, are the target of that corruption.

The case of "India One" reveals the new temptation that exists for detectives fighting the drugs traffickers. They confront a breed of cash rich criminals whose wealth they can now examine for themselves. It's a world where criminals are only too willing to deal and trade to protect their fortunes (BBC, Panorama 27.9.93).

To gain a better understanding of the level of temptation that confronts drug squad officers, Carter in a interview with an undercover narcotics investigator stated:

When you're looking at ongoing drug deals of even medium to small size quantities, $100,000 is a small score for a bribe in drug trafficking today. In another case, ten officers from one police department made two robberies of cocaine from drug traffickers. In just these two robberies, the officers made over $16 million among them. The amount of money is staggering and tempting (Carter, 1990: 90).

Corruption within large and small police forces has become a major problem and the greatest potential for corruption to occur exists for drug enforcement officers. They receive less supervision than does the average officer, are less accountable to a chain of authority, and are exposed to the drug culture which has the greatest potential for ongoing corruption. In addition the use of on
going covert drug enforcement strategies have created greater opportunity for large scale corruption than ever before.

The major problem for policing the drug market within Great Britain lies within the present government strategy which sees the drug problem predominantly as a matter of crime and violence rather than one of drug use. Rather than seeing addiction as a disease it is viewed as a crime. Thus, the present response, to what was seen as a medical and social responsibility, has been placed within a legal framework.

If the present Conservative government wanted to maximise crime levels, encourage burglary, mugging, and a proliferation of violent gangs, it could not have achieved its goal more effectively than with its long-standing policies on drugs. The criminalization of drug use has created a vast illicit economy, in which cash comes from the theft and violence that is destroying many of Britain's neighbourhoods (The Independent, 3 March, 1994: 19).

Drug addiction, like prostitution, and liquor, is not a police problem; it never has been, and never can be solved by policemen. It is first and last a medical problem, and if there is a solution, it will be discovered not by policemen, but by scientific and competent trained medical experts whose sole objective will be the reduction and possible eradication of this devastating appetite (August Vollmer, cited in Grieve, 1986: 194).

This shift from a medical to a crime control model culminated in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the Drug Trafficking Act 1986. Evidence which has led to this change in thinking is to be found in the report by the Home Affairs Committee (1985) which suggested that the Royal Navy and Air Force be enlisted to help the police and HM Customs in the "war on drugs". Sir Edward Gardner called for intensified law enforcement efforts, sequestration of
the assets of drug traffickers, extradition of suppliers, more efforts for crop substitution and eradication, and an increase in the penalty for systematic dealing in drugs to no less than the penalty for premeditated murder (Stimson, 1987: 43).

The state has always been seen as having an interest in the preservation of public morality. Thus the response to what many see as more of a social-educational solution has been placed within a legal framework. The consequence of this shift is an appeal to the law to safeguard the values and norms of society, with enforcement viewed as the optimal solution to the illegal use of drugs. This then places the burden of responsibility on law enforcement agencies to control a problem which they are poorly equipped to deal with. Most enforcement officials admit that the task of significantly curbing the smuggling of narcotics into the country and eliminating the use of illicit drug use is pretty hopeless.

It was first suggested in 1966 by the Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police that it was doubtful whether law enforcement alone could solve the problem of drug misuse (Mott, 1981: 222). This view was reinforced by the U.S. Commissioner of Narcotics in 1991 who agreed that the combined efforts of the army, the navy, the Narcotics Bureau and the FBI could not eliminate drug smuggling.

Law enforcement cannot, did not and will not solve the appetite for drugs in this country. Congress now is talking in terms of interdiction, of putting all of this money to blockade the borders. No. 1 that is impossible. And No. 2, if we miraculously could put military people arm to arm to surround the United States to keep out cocaine and heroin, we would continue to have a substantial drug problem, (Nadelmann, 1987: 54).
This view is also supported by Commander Penrose of the Metropolitan Police and the Society of Civil and Public Servants.

The heroin and cocaine seized by HM Customs and Excise have had no effect on price and purity. This indicates a plentiful supply and we have had no effect on street price and purity levels, and the Addicts index. We are not doing at all well in fact we are doing badly. Street price of heroin and cocaine have come down and at best remain steady and purity levels have gone up (Society of Civil and Public Servants, cited in Simson 1987: 55).

Criminalization has achieved very little that is positive. It has stigmatized users and forces them into a situation were the simple act of purchasing drugs forces the user to interact with the criminal underworld. If anything, these laws have only helped to create more crime and criminals.

In the present situation the police have been given responsibility to enforce laws against behaviour which a great percentage of individuals either take part in or condone. Policing as a solution to the drugs problem cannot, therefore, be effective until a consensus has developed across all levels of society that these activities are morally wrong.

Social control through the criminal law predominates in a society only when other means of control have failed. When it does predominate, it no longer reflects the mores of the society. It more accurately reflects the interests of shifting power groups within the society. As a result, the police, as the designated enforcers of a system of criminal laws, are undercut by circumstances that accentuate the growing differences between the moral order and the legal order (Manning, 1978: 14).
The arguments for the involvement of the criminal law to enforce drug prohibition have been lost. Current public policy must be viewed as dysfunctional and non-utilitarian in controlling drug use. Clearly there is no single solution to the problem but just as clearly we as a society must start to look at options which are not enforcement-led.

Problems of Policing the Drug Market At a Local Level
At a local level the problems of policing the drug market are much more pragmatic. According to the detective inspector in charge of the drug squad, drug policies within Nottinghamshire are not incorporated into an overall policing strategy but rather they are pragmatic and isolated. This pragmatic approach does not allow the drug squad to co-ordinate over all police resources in the target of specific drugs and drug traffickers. Rather they must rely, for the most part, partially on the resources of the unit. Given that the majority of drug related arrests occur by non-drug squad personnel, this lack of an integrated strategy is materialized in a "hit and miss" approach to drug enforcement throughout Nottingham.

This pragmatic approach to drug enforcement extends to the constable on the beat. The formal policy for policing the drug market at the street level is one of zero tolerance. If, during normal policing activities individuals were in possession of limited amounts of cannabis the expectation was that they were to be charged. In reality this policy was never enforced. All constables who were interviewed stated that arresting individuals who were in possession of a limited amount of cannabis was never seen as a priority. In fact it was suggested that charging these individuals was more of a bother as it took up more time than it was worth.

On a normal shift I could walk from the station and by the time I got to the top of the street I could have nicked enough people to fill the station. What is the purpose? The majority would not even go to court and of those that went nothing would happen.
Once they returned I would really look the prat wouldn't I.

The primary exception to this was if the dealing or use was conspicuous or if they were responding to a complaint regarding a transaction which was taking place.

If I'm walking my beat and I come across a couple of blokes smoking and their too daft to get rid of their gear, I'll nick them. No one will make me look the fool.

The charging of these individuals seemed to be more for personal pride or respect than it did for enforcing the law.

The majority of all charges involving cannabis are secondary charges. In other words, if an individual was charged for a crime such as car theft, burglary, or other types of crimes and cannabis was present they then would be charged with both offences. In addition, if during an investigation of a non drug related crime cannabis was uncovered a charge would be laid.

According to D.I. Bradshaw one exception to this pragmatic "hit and miss" approach involves drug sweeps. When the drug squad in conjunction with local police divisions, target an area for a "sweep", the local police divisions will supply the backup manpower in a supportive role to maintain order. However, the cost of this additional manpower is budgeted against the budget of the drug squad. With the present Conservative government policy which now ties police budgets to performance indicators, the Detective Inspector is questioning the cost- benefit of such operations. This policy, according to the detective inspector, has left the drug squad at the local level
with the goal of having to increase arrests and seizures, rather than focusing on middle level traffickers and targeting specific drug related dealers.

Low-level dealers are easy to round up and are good for my month end statistics. It takes very few man hours and little money to run a job. With large jobs, what costs the money is the surveillance and intelligence gathering. They always involve a lot of overtime which costs money and that comes out of my budget. When you run jobs targeting low level deals the time involved is much less and in many cases the numbers (arrests and convictions) are greater. So there is a good incentive to do what is easy and still meet your targeted goal for the year. The quality in terms of drug type and level of dealing is less important than the numbers (personal interview September 12th 1993).

This view is supported by most members of the drug squad but at the same time it frustrates them. Of the fourteen individuals interviewed, focusing on high level dealers was identified as their primary goal. In their opinion the most successful way to tackle the drug problem is to reduce the amount of high and middle level dealers, which in turn would eliminate most of the low level dealers and drastically reduce the amount of drugs on the street.

Picking up small time dealers is a waste of time. For everyone you pick up they are replaced by their brother or wife or someone else. I could walk outside this door and by the end of my shift I could have nicked more people for selling "pot" than we nicked all last year. But what would I have accomplished? Damn little! (personal interview with a member of the Nottinghamshire drug squad, September 12th 1993).
According to officers within the drug squad the drug market in Nottingham is made up of possibly fifteen middle level dealers and as many as six hundred part time low level dealers. It was emphasized that these figures were simply a guess based on their own personal experience. With the addition of new dealers and the removal of others the market place changes daily. In addition, individuals within the market change position. They move from gram dealers to ounce dealers to kilo dealers back down to gram dealers.

In the opinion of most members of the drug squad, with the exception of a few well organized syndicates, the market place is characterised by independent dealers rather than a top down hierarchy consisting of one or two "Mr. Bigs".

If I was to characterise the drug market in Nottingham I would have to say that is more disorganized than organized. This holds true for trafficking in all types of drugs and it especially holds true for crack. The Jamaicans are mostly the crack dealers in Nottingham as they are in London. If you know anything about Jamaicans you know it has to be disorganised (personal interview April 14th 1993).

The problem of policing this type of drug market is the displacement effect. The removal of one or two dealers within an area may produce a period of inactivity but in the long run it simply makes an opening for other independent dealers to take their place. This type of market limits the possibility of working up the chain to the major dealers as the structure is fluid and is lacking any formal structure. It is for this reason that it makes it difficult for policing to have a major overall impact on the market place.
There is an acceptance among the members of the Nottinghamshire drug squad that they are barely scratching the surface of the drug market and in reality they have little effect on the market as a whole. Part of the reason why the drug squad has little effect is that crimes involving either the buying or selling of illicit drugs vary from crimes such as fraud or white collar. The undertaking of these latter types of crimes, for the most part, take a high degree of sophistication, planning, and ability. The individuals who perpetrate these types of criminal activity usually come from a well defined and limited population. It is for these reasons that specialized police squads were developed. The purpose of these squads is to focus their attention on targeting a specific population of criminals. On the other hand, crimes involving the selling and purchasing of illicit drugs cross all cultural and economic boundaries and involve a greater number of the population. Furthermore, it takes little experience, limited resources, and very little knowledge to become involved with this type of criminal activity. Because of this, an attempt to target individuals by means of specialized policing has in the past not succeeded in controlling the drug market. Rather than attempting to focus on reducing the illegal supply and use of drugs a more successful strategy might be to identify the harms which are created by illicit drugs to both the individual and the community.

Policing methods are more likely to be successful when they are designed to reflect local communities and take a coordinated approach using schools, parents, civic organizations, newspapers, radio, television. The police could have a much greater impact working within a integrated framework than presenting programme that occur only in the school and are isolated within the rest of the community. As patterns of crime vary greatly from area to area with this type of policing, drug strategies would also vary depending on how each community defined the harms which were created through the buying and selling of illicit drugs. Within this model policing the drug market would then be community lead rather than police lead. The focus would be on reducing community harm which is a creation of illicit drugs rather than reducing the overall size and scope of the drug market. In the final chapter I will expand on
the theme of community lead policing and outline some recommendations, which if implemented, might have a positive effect on the role of policing the drug market.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF POLICING THE DRUG MARKET

There is a common public perception that the drug problem in Great Britain is a law enforcement problem. This is quite natural, for the public is of the view that discouraging the rise of drug use can be achieved by means of interdiction and tougher criminal sanctions against dealers and users alike. The solution, therefore, to solving the problem can be achieved through enforcement, punishment and fear. However, the failure of this approach is equally apparent.

Attempts to control drug use and abuse have produced an inventory of failures. Efforts, based primarily in moral righteousness, to regulate drug traffic and eliminate addiction have resulted in drug laws that are among the most repressive in the free world and involve a phenomenal array of enforcement authorities at the Federal, state, and local levels of government. This vast bureaucracy carefully nurtures the illusion that only through relentless enforcement can a drug-free society be achieved (Goode, 1981: 227).

Pearson (1989) observed that the "war" against drugs pollutes the legal atmosphere, threatens the liberties of individuals and contaminates the banking system. Not only is the war unwinnable in terms of law enforcement but some present policing techniques may also present certain problems that pose a potential threat to civil liberties. A society, if it is to maintain any form of social order, cannot afford to have its laws widely and openly broken. Attempting to legislate illicit drug use out of existence can only lead to granting governments the kind of power they should not have in a free society. As an example of this power, early in 1990 the Governor of Maryland, in responding to criticism from
those who questioned the constitutionality of some of the provisions of his anti-drug abuse package, stated: "I can first say the constitution won't allow many of these things. I can say my rights as an individual are being violated but that citizens should be willing to give up a few of their freedoms in order to reduce the amount of illegal drug use" (Christina, 1992: 89).

The drug problem in Nottingham, similar to that of Great Britain as a whole, is real and very serious and the solutions are far from simplistic. The data collected during this research project suggest that minorities living in deprived areas within Nottingham are affected the worse. The recession has deprived many low-income minorities of better-paying employment. Thirty-one per cent of all Blacks within Hyson Green are unemployed compared to the national average of less than 12 per cent (Source: 1991 Census Profile, England and Wales). Within areas like Hyson Green increased numbers of the minority poor have turned to hanging out, hustling and selling in order to purchase illicit drugs. Within this study of the 51 drug dealers interviewed 64 per cent belonged to a minority group.

The major complaint of the shopkeepers interviewed was that Jamaicans were hanging-out around their shops and this behaviour negatively affected their trade. The issue was one of lifestyle rather than the actual selling of drugs which concerned the shopkeepers. Yet, they expected the police to deal with the problem as they saw it as an enforcement issue. However, many of the senior police officers saw it not as a policing issue but rather as a racist response to declining business. It is no wonder that less than 30 per cent of the shopkeepers interviewed believed that the police were effective in dealing with the drug problem. This perception that the police are ineffective in dealing with the drug problem was supported by both residents and drug dealers alike.
The lack of effectiveness may, in part, be due to the fact that overall policing objectives for Nottinghamshire do not include drug enforcement. This has created a great deal of frustration within the drug enforcement unit with the lack of clear objectives, support, equipment, and manpower. As a result present drug enforcement strategies focus on drug trafficking and use. Success is measured in arrests and seizures rather than protecting the community from drug related harm. Yet the issues behind the illicit drug problem in Hyson Green are more than an issue of enforcement of drug legislation. They encompass human behaviour, human failings, social issues, and political issues.

It is for these reasons that present policing strategies have done little to impact the negative effects that illicit drugs have on the individual drug users, their families, or community. Any government strategy, if it is to achieve a positive outcome, must concede that the “drug problem” is not so much an enforcement issue as an issue that covers a wide spectrum of behaviour. Rather than concentrating on the actual selling and buying of drugs a more successful approach would involve a comprehensive strategy which would not ignore the deep-rooted social problems which encourages the selling and using of drugs.

The problems created by illicit drugs stretch well beyond the legal system and effect the delivery of health, social services and other social programmes. The problem of HIV within the drug community has spread to the general community. The spread of HIV is directly related to the illegality of drug use and the consequent oppression of drug users (Release, 1994: 10). Money spent by the addict deprives family members of limited financial resources which could be put to better use. The loss of income results in the individual and other family members being hounded for unpaid bills. Occasionally, and with growing frequency, they are involved in robberies and other crimes. If the cycle of poverty continues the likelihood of the children being taken into care by child protection agencies increases.
The money that the government spends on the enforcement of drug laws could be better used by the communities where the drug problem is hardest felt. This new money could be utilized by all community agencies to increase the quality of life for all by focusing on the individual and community harms created by the illicit drug market. This new approach would involve greater inter-agency co-operation and exchange of information in co-ordinating community resources.

The concept of harm reduction is not new and has usually been associated with health education and health care (Pearson, 1992). In the late 1980s there was a growing suspicion that current drug strategies were exacerbating the problem, rather than ameliorating it. As a result harm reduction or risk reduction was introduced as a strategy to include drug related issues (O'Hare et al., 1992: X111). These strategies have as their primary focus to decrease the harm to society arising from the effects of drug use, distribution and from drug related crime and related health problems associated with HIV.

Policing strategies, as part of an overall harm reduction strategy, rather than focusing on the drug dealers must first consider the harms which result from an active community drug market in relationship to the greater social problems of that community. The attack must be co-ordinated and multi-faceted. There must be some reality of a partnership between the police and the community in dealing with the drug issues.

On a micro level policing strategies must be seen in the context of Britain’s deprived neighbourhoods which are characterized by high unemployment, poor housing and lack of social and recreational facilities.

[This area] had long been notorious because of structural and design problems which had led to damp in bedrooms and mould on the interior walls.
of the flats, as well as excessive heating bills for residents. Waste-disposal facilities had long since failed to operate properly and the area had entered that well-known spiral of decline whereby the majority of the families were anxious to leave and only those with the most urgent and desperate housing needs were prepared to consider moving into the flats. It had become a hard to let area which placed pressure on residents. Also, significantly, the heroin problem began to take root...... Heroin misuse is therefore at least in part a consequence of the effects of the housing market and housing policies on poor and disadvantaged people (Pearson, 1987: 73).

In times when the economy is hit the hardest those who live in deprived areas usually feel the effect the worst. Therefore, the expansion of an illicit drug market within these areas is hardest felt. The increasing size of the "underclass" living within these areas are more vulnerable to the effects of an ever increasing drug market and presents a problem that cannot be overlooked. Within these inner cities the drug problem is increasing at an alarming rate. The disintegration of the family structure, inadequate education, and the limited possibility of employment have created communities where the drug trade flourishes.

In fact the drug problem, in part, has been responsible for creating a permanent "underclass". Many of these individuals who make up the "underclass" have realized that there is little future, or hope for a better life so have given in to the present social system. Rather than competing they turn their efforts to a day to day search for physical relief. Although drugs in of themselves may not be the worst hazard within these areas, the impact of drug misuse effects the bottom third of our society the hardest. They produce harsher consequences as this group has fewer economic and social resources to cope with the additional strain (MacGregor, 1992).
It may be true that the drug market within deprived areas offers a few individuals the possibility to earn more money than they would otherwise. Yet, through drug dealing this increased earning power usually does not improve their economic position within society nor does it contribute to their economic well-being. Within this context economic well-being is defined by Johnson et al. (1987) as having both tangible and intangible properties. It is the ability to achieve and maintain housing, food, and the ability to accumulate tangible assets. It also pertains to the ability to form good relationships and to gain self-esteem.

In the short term, we must accept the realization that we cannot totally prevent illegal drug markets, therefore policing strategy must be based on the reduction of individual and community harm. The first phase of a comprehensive drug strategy, in addressing the drug problem has to be to minimize the social, legal, and medical harms that may be associated with drug consumption. This could be accomplished by introducing a comprehensive harm minimization strategy using people oriented and environmental policing strategies. These strategies would target primary, secondary and tertiary drug populations within the community. The first step of a comprehensive strategy would be to identify and focus on the assists available within the community. This first step is important as the community in of itself can either support or discourage drug dealing gaining a foothold is a resource.

Primary harm reduction would target the community at large. The police in conjunction with community groups would have the responsibility to identify "soft targets" where the effects of illicit drug use is hardest felt. The objective of this phase would be to reduce the number of individuals who may start using drugs by means of decreasing the opportunity to purchase and use drugs in public places. Low level policing would focus on disrupting the market place by means of inconvenience policing (Moore, 1977). This type of policing has the potential to discourage the non-user from starting by raising the opportunity cost of purchasing drugs.
Policing is not merely confined to enforcement as it also has a role in the sponsoring of public awareness campaigns. This role could provide information on drugs and their effects on the individual, the family, and the wider society. The media would have a crucial role in supporting the police in determining attitudes and behaviours. To date, unfortunately, the media has been the prime promoter of illicit drugs and the hysteria which accompanies it. Therefore, the information disseminated would have to deal with the subject honestly and fairly. For the campaign to be effective it should not only reduce the number of new drug users but also reduce the harm to those who start to experiment with drugs.

Secondary harm reduction would target experimental and moderate users with a goal of reducing not only the number of users but also the harm for those who continue to involve themselves with drug use. For example police stations, as those in Amsterdam, could become centres for addicts to obtain new needles. This would not only reduce the harm to police officers but would also reduce the harm of drug related HIV to the greater community (Zaal, 1992). The police, rather than arresting and referring users and low level dealers to court, would divert offenders into diversion programmes and other community-based treatment and activity program where the possibility of rehabilitation is greatly increased (Pearson, 1992: 17).

The chances of dealing effectively with a drug problem are much greater if the offender can remain in the community and undertake to cooperate in a sensibly planned programme to help him or her come off drugs. Such a programme would aim, in the first instance, to secure a transition from illegal consumption to a medically supervised regime designed to reduce the harm caused to the individual by drug taking and would be based on a realistic plan for tackling the
addiction in the context of his or her other problems (Home Office, 1988: 13 in Policing and Prescribing, ed. by Whynes and Bean, 1991: 116-7).

The possibility of rehabilitation for the user and user-dealers not only reduces the harm to the individual but also reduces the harm to the greater community. Harm reduction to the community comes in the form of less drug-related crime and other social harms such as safer streets, increased use of common areas, and increased business to local shopkeepers.

Tertiary harm reduction would target persons who are at the stage of misusing drugs. The primary goal of this phase would be to reduce the overall extent of disability by minimizing drug-related harm to the individual and community. Policing strategies, rather than arresting drug dealers in mass, would focus their attention on the most dangerous offenders. By removing this group from the streets they would be addressing the primary reason that citizens worry about drugs, namely drug-related crime (Moore and Kleimam, 1989: 11). Those arrested would be processed through the courts and those found guilty would either receive a period of incarceration or would receive mandatory treatment.

The next phase of an overall drug strategy is for the government to realize that the drug problem has not been created in a vacuum. This would require the government to confront the social problems that contribute to the misuse of drugs. Removing an individual from their community, either by means of incarceration or hospitalization (treatment) and maintaining the same social structure within that community will only serve to produce more drug abusing individuals. Given this realization the government must shift its emphasis from seeing the problem as one of enforcement to a social ecological perspective. This shift in emphasis would see the solutions to the problem within a broader social context and would focus on the individual, family, and community.
Such a shift would involve the developing of a drug policy which would go beyond the debate between prohibition versusers legalization. Moore suggests that this debate has created a false dichotomy as any change regarding the restrictions which govern the supply of illicit drugs would only result in a different status being given to the drug user and would not necessarily eliminate the problem (Moore, 1977: xxi). Yet there must be an element of decriminalization in the development of any new policy.

Decriminalization will not end all the drug problems but it would ameliorate many negative personal, family, and social consequences arising from the punitive criminal model, in so far as the user is concerned and affected. This process of decriminalization would also be the first step in accepting the fact that the drug problem is not an enforcement problem but rather a health problem.

The first step in a decriminalization model would be to make possession of small amounts of any drug for personal use legal. This libertarian approach is based on the view that drug problems stem not so much from the drugs but rather the problems stem from the controls placed on them. This approach recognizes that many people presently use drugs while only a small percentage actually misuse them.

Secondly, governments rather than attempting to enforce antiquated drug laws must empower individuals to make their own decisions regarding drug use while at the same time supplying a safety net for those who make damaging personal decisions (Nadelmann and Wenner, 1993). Thirdly, there must be a means of quality assurance and outlets where these drugs can be purchased. The cost for the development of this safety net would easily be recovered from the savings in law enforcement. The remainder of the savings could then be channelled back into those inner city neighbourhoods where the problem is worst felt.
This more liberal approach to the drug problem may in the short term result in higher drug use and abuse as it did in Holland, but as in Holland levels of addiction did decrease. There is nothing to suggest that the same trend would not be true for Great Britain. Even if, as some have suggested, drug addiction did increase, social costs and other related harm associated with drug abuse would still be reduced.

On a macro level there must be a realization that conditions within drug producing countries are usually directly related to their economic position within the world. Those countries which are the highest drug producers are usually the same countries which rank lowest in the economic order. The livelihood for many within these countries are directly related to the economics of the drug market.

Some of the conditions for drug production are engendered by the poor positions of producer countries in the world economic order. In the long run, drug production is related to development issues, which are in turn related to a restructuring of that economic order so that some countries are not kept rich at the expense of the poor. The history of former drug producing countries, such as China and Yugoslavia, suggests that drug production diminishes when there are major economic, political and social changes (Stimson, 1987: 58).

It must be realized by the countries which are experiencing the effects of illicit drugs that the solution will not be achievable until the poorer drug producing nations no longer have to rely on drug production.

The failure of the present approach to the drug problem is that it has not reduced the harm to the community and user alike. Perhaps this is because the goal of present day drug policies focuses on punishment, not harm.
reduction. The time has surely come to re-examine and clarify the balance between public safety and harm reduction. What is now required is a shift to some other model which will deal with the underlying causes that produce a vast number of individuals who are involved in the drug market.

No one has found the answer to the drug problem but there are better alternatives than we are presently exploring. We can do no worse than we have done in the past. Hopefully, the future holds better promise (Cohn, 1984: 23). If present conditions in society remain broadly the same there seems to be little hope in resolving the drug problem.
POSTSCRIPT

In May of 1996 when I returned to England I had an opportunity to return to Radford Road. The area seemed to be worse off than it was two years ago. Many more shops had been closed and the general appearance of the area was more dilapidated and unsightly than it had been during the period in which my research took place. The "Cafe" which many had believed to be the centre of the drug trade within the Radford area had burned down almost 11 months ago, and there were fewer convenient stores such as green grocers, butcher shops, and bakers. In addition to these changes D.I. Bradshaw was transferred along with many of the members of the drug squad.

The cause of the fire at the cafe was never determined. Some believed that fire started in the kitchen due to an electrical malfunctioning. Others believed that competing drug dealers or unhappy customers were behind the fire. While a few individuals said that they would not be surprised if some individuals who worked or lived within the area may have taken the law into their own hands. Although the cafe was boarded up and added to the wretchedness of the area the individuals which I talked with that day seemed not to be upset.

I would rather have it the way you see it now than when it was opened. When it was opened it wasn't safe to walk at that end of the street. The area was full of drug dealers and their customers. All of us had to pay for that. I'm glad it's closed up I just wish it would have happened well before it did. The fire did what the police didn't.

I was informed that after the fire the owner had moved to New York and had just returned to England. No one I talked with new what he was doing or exactly where he was.
The pub where I conducted some of my interviews had not changed. Both the owner and the manageress were still there but their business had decreased. While I was present there were only three customers, two were playing pool while the third watched. In the past there was always a group of men sitting around playing cards, having a few drinks, and instructing the other players on how the game should be played. Along with the card players there was usually a dominos game in progress where four or five players were enjoying the bantering which always took place among the players.

Policing strategies as they pertained to drug enforcement had also changed over the last two years. According to the 1995/6 Nottinghamshire Police Authority Policing Plan policing the drug market has become more proactive. Although the aim of the Authority and Constabulary is to reduce the illegal supply the Constabulary is now committed to a programme of education and preventative initiatives in partnership with other agencies. The new plan realizes that it is only by playing a full and active role in these areas that real progress can be made to combat drug related crime (Nottinghamshire Policing Authority Policing Plan 1996/97, Nottinghamshire Authority: P.13).


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Government, Harvard University: Cambridge, Mass..

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APPENDIX ONE

THE EFFECTS OF POLICING ON THE DRUG SCENE
Drug Dealer Questionnaire
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is your ethnic background</td>
<td>Afro-Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical area where you live</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal code number</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How long have you lived there</td>
<td>Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you employed</td>
<td>Full time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you presently</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Common Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Separated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have any children living at home</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If yes how many</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you living with your spouse</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DRUGS

Which of the following drugs have you ever taken?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbiturates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tranquilliser</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Drug Taking Pattern over last 30 days

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Heroin</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tranquilliser</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Drug Taking Pattern over last 7 days

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tranquilliser</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How regularly were the drugs taken within the last 30 days?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Weekends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
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<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbiturates</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tranquilliser</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How regularly were drugs taken within the last 7 days?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Weekends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
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<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbiturates</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tranquilliser</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is your preferred drug?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbiturates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tranquilliser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Drug Supply

Do you get all your drugs in Nottingham?  

All  □  Some  □  None  □  
If none or some are specify ........................................

Do you get your drugs from the same source?  

Yes  □  no  □

If you could no longer use your regular source could another supplier be found?  

Very easily  □  Easily  □  With a little effort  □  wouldn't try  □  

VeryEasy-4  Easy-3  Hard-2  VeryHard-1

If you wanted to buy any of the following drugs how easy would it be?  

Cannabis  □  Cocaine  □  Heroin  □  Crack  □  LSD  □  Amphetamine  □  Barbiturates  □  Tranquilliser  □  Ecstasy  □

How many of your friends use drugs other than cannabis?  

All  □  Most  □  About half  □  Less than half  □  A few  □

How many of your friends use cannabis?  

All  □  Most  □  About half  □  Less than half  □  A few  □
### Drug selling history

**Have you ever sold drugs**

**What drugs have you ever sold**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>Age first sold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbiturates</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tranquilliser</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**What drugs have you sold in the last 30 days**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>Age first sold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbiturates</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tranquilliser</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**When do you sell drugs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drugs</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>WeekEnds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>!1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>!1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
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<td>!1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barbiturates</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tranquilliser</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>!1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>!1</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**What was the largest amount of drugs you ever bought?**

**What was the largest amount of drugs you ever sold?**

**How much money would you make in a year selling drugs?**
How many hours a week do you spend selling drugs?

Do you believe there are more people selling drugs now than a year ago

more than a year ago □
less than a year ago □
about the same

How much money did you make last year from non-drug activities.

Is drug selling less risky now than a year ago

Less risky □
More Risky □
About the same □

Do you sell drugs

Alone □
With a partner □
As part of an organization

Are drugs overall easier to get now than a year ago

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Easier</th>
<th>Harder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>□</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>□</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What area of the city do you sell in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Notts</th>
<th>Other Specify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
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<td>□</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>□</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When you buy your drugs for resale where do you by them

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Notts</th>
<th>Other Specify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>□</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbiturates</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tranquilliser</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Police activities

When you are selling drugs are you afraid of being caught

Yes 1 2 3 4 5 No

Do you feel the police are good at policing the drug field

Yes 1 2 3 4 5 No

Do you believe you have to be careful not to be caught by the police

Very careful □
Careful □
Normal □
Not careful at all □

Is drug selling less risky now than it was a year ago

Yes □
No □
About the same □

Who do you sell drugs to

Always Some Never
Times

Friends □ □ □
Strangers □ □ □
Friends of friends □ □ □
Business associates □ □ □

Do police activities effect your selling

Specify

A little 1 2 3 4 5 A lot

Little 1 2 3 4 5 lot

What type of police activities effect you the most

Street patrols □ □ □ □ □
Car Patrols □ □ □ □ □
Drug squad □ □ □ □ □
Police informer □ □ □ □ □
Others □ □ □ □ □
**Criminal Activity**

**Have you ever been arrested?**
- Yes □
- No □
If yes, how many times

**Have you ever been found guilty?**
- Yes □
- No □
If yes, how many times

**How old were you when you were first convicted?**

**Have you ever been charged with possession of a drug?**
- Yes □
- No □
If yes, how many times

**Have you ever been convicted of possession of a drug?**
- Yes □
- No □
If yes, how many times

**Have you ever been charged with supplying?**
- Yes □
- No □
If yes, how many times

**Have you ever been convicted of supplying?**
- Yes □
- No □
If yes, how old were you?

**Have you ever been sent to prison for a drug related charge?**
- Yes □
- No □
If yes, how many times

**Do you know who are working in the drug squad?**
- None of them
- Some of them
- About half of them
- Most of them

**How many times have you ever talked with someone on the drug squad?**
- In the 6 last month
- In the last month
- In the last week

**What type of police activities would most frustrate your selling activities?**
Where do you sell most of your drugs

- On the street
- In a house
- At a Rave
- In a pub or night club
- Other

Who are you more frightened of:

- Most
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- Not at all

- Police
- Other dealers
- Customers
- Informants
- Passersby
- Others

Have you ever been ripped off

- Yes
- No

If yes was it by the

- Police
- Other dealers
- Customers
- Others

Do you believe informers are a threat to you

- No
- a little
- a lot

Do you believe that informers have a licence to sell drugs

- Yes
- No

Do you believe there are safe houses for informers to carry on selling

- Yes
- No

Do you know who the informers are

- No
- a few
- about half
- most of them

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Do you think that the informer system with crack differs from other drugs

No
Yes (explain)

What would it take for you to stop selling drugs

Worried about police
Worried about going to jail
Other please specify
APPENDIX TWO

THE EFFECTS OF POLICING ON THE DRUG SCENE
Resedents Questionair
Date of interview

What is your ethnic background

Gender

Geographical area where you live

Postal code number

How long have you lived there

Are you employed

Are you presently

Do you have any children living at home

If yes how many

Are you living with your spouse

Age

Afro-Caribbean

Asian

White

Other

Female

Male

Years

Months

Full time

Part Time

Not employed

Married

Single

Common Law

Separated

Yes

No
Typical Policeman

Ambitious  --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Brave      --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Tough      --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Strong     --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Friendly   --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Smart      --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Kind       --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Good       --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Fair       --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Honest     --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Lazy       --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Cowardly   --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Soft       --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Weak       --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Unfriendly --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Dumb       --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Cruel      --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Bad        --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Unfair     --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Dishonest  --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

1. Police response time is slower in black neighbourhoods than white neighbourhoods?
   
   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

2. Police do a good job policing drug users?
   
   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

3. Police do a good job policing drug dealing?
   
   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much
Date of interview ........................................

What is your ethnic background

- Afro-Caribbean
- Asian
- White
- Other

Gender

- Female □
- Male □

Geographical area where you live

Postal code number

How long have you lived there

Age ......................................................

- Years ..............
- Months ..............

Are you employed

- Full time □
- Part Time □
- Not employed □

Are you presently

- Married □
- Single □
- Common Law □
- Separated □

Do you have any children living at home

If yes how many

Are you living with your spouse

- Yes □
- No □

- Yes □
- No □
4. All drugs should be legalized?

   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

5. Marijuana should be legalized?

   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

6. Police are often dishonest?

   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

7. The police spend too much time and energy on too many unimportant things?

   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much
8. The likelihood of people being abused by the police in my neighbourhood is high?

  Disagree very much
  Disagree generally
  Disagree a little
  Neutral
  Agree a little
  Agree generally
  Agree very much

9. The police use drugs as an excuse to pick on minorities?

  Disagree very much
  Disagree generally
  Disagree a little
  Neutral
  Agree a little
  Agree generally
  Agree very much

10. The police should spend more time arresting drug dealers?

  Disagree very much
  Disagree generally
  Disagree a little
  Neutral
  Agree a little
  Agree generally
  Agree very much

11. The police do not arrest some people even though they know that they are selling drugs?

  Disagree very much
  Disagree generally
  Disagree a little
  Neutral
  Agree a little
  Agree generally
  Agree very much
12. The police will allow some people to sell drugs because they are police informants?

- Disagree very much
- Disagree generally
- Disagree a little
- Neutral
- Agree a little
- Agree generally
- Agree very much

13. The police generally do a good job?

- Disagree very much
- Disagree generally
- Disagree a little
- Neutral
- Agree a little
- Agree generally
- Agree very much

14. The city would be better off if there were more police?

- Disagree very much
- Disagree generally
- Disagree a little
- Neutral
- Agree a little
- Agree generally
- Agree very much

15. The police treat the rich and poor drug users the same.

- Disagree very much
- Disagree generally
- Disagree a little
- Neutral
- Agree a little
- Agree generally
- Agree very much
16. Drugs are a major problem.

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much

17. There is a drug problem in Nottingham?

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much

18. The area where I live has a bigger drug problem than the rest of the city?

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much

19. The police could do much more to solve the drug problem than they are presently doing?

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much
20. Drug dealing in this area of the city is out of control and the police are to blame.

   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

21. The drug problem in this area effects my life and the things I do?

   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

22. Do you think the police are prejudice when it comes to policing the drug scene?

   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

23. The police do not care if people sell drugs in this area of the city?

   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much
24. The police have no control over drug selling in this area of the city?

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much

25. I think more should be done about the drug problem.

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much

26. I think the best way to get rid of the drug problem is to.

get tougher with drug dealers
get tougher with drug users
get tougher with drug producers
Hire more police
all about the same

27. Which one of the following factors will have the most negative effect on children growing up now?

poor education
violence on television
illegal drugs
Unemployment
Rock music
Single parent homes
working mothers
APPENDIX THREE

THE EFFECTS OF POLICING ON THE DRUG SCENE
SHOPKEEPERS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of interview</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is your ethnic background</td>
<td>Afro-Caribean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical area where you live</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal code number</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How long have you worked here</td>
<td>Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you presently</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Common Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Separated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have any children living at home</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If yes how many</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Business</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of shop</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Do you believe Drugs are a major problem?
   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

2. There is a drug problem in Nottingham?
   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

3. The area where I work has a bigger drug problem than the rest of the city.
   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

4. Drug dealing is common place in this area of the city?
   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

5. What kind of people do you believe sell drugs

6. Can you tell me more about this group
7. Do you believe all drugs should be legalized?
   - Disagree very much
   - Disagree generally
   - Disagree a little
   - Neutral
   - Agree a little
   - Agree generally
   - Agree very much

8. Do you believe marijuana should be legalized?
   - Disagree very much
   - Disagree generally
   - Disagree a little
   - Neutral
   - Agree a little
   - Agree generally
   - Agree very much

9. The drug problem in this area affects my business?
   - Disagree very much
   - Disagree generally
   - Disagree a little
   - Neutral
   - Agree a little
   - Agree generally
   - Agree very much

10. If you agree with this statement can you explain how it affects your business.
    - Minority groups hanging out causing trouble?
    - How do they cause trouble?
    - Involved with drugs?
    - Have you actually seen them sell/buy drugs?
    - What did you do about it?
11. Police do not react to complaints about drug dealers in this area?

- Disagree very much
- Disagree generally
- Disagree a little
- Neutral
- Agree a little
- Agree generally
- Agree very much

12. If the police did a better job policing drug dealers my business would improve?

- Disagree very much
- Disagree generally
- Disagree a little
- Neutral
- Agree a little
- Agree generally
- Agree very much

13. I think the best way to get rid of the drug problem is to.

- Get tougher with drug dealers
- Get tougher with drug users
- Get tougher with drug producers
- Hire more police
- All about the same
- Other

14. Which one of the following factors will have the most negative effect on children growing up now?

- Poor education
- Violence on television
- Illegal drugs
- Unemployment
- Rock music
- Single parent homes
- Working mothers
15. Police response time is slower in this neighbourhoods than other neighbourhoods?

   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

16. Police do a good job policing drug users.

   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

17. Police do a good job policing drug dealing in this area?

   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much

18. The police are often dishonest?

   Disagree very much
   Disagree generally
   Disagree a little
   Neutral
   Agree a little
   Agree generally
   Agree very much
19. The police spend too much time and energy on too many unimportant things?

- Disagree very much
- Disagree generally
- Disagree a little
- Neutral
- Agree a little
- Agree generally
- Agree very much

20. This area of the city would be better off if the police spent more time arresting drug dealers?

- Disagree very much
- Disagree generally
- Disagree a little
- Neutral
- Agree a little
- Agree generally
- Agree very much

21. The police do not arrest some people even though they know that they are selling drugs?

- Disagree very much
- Disagree generally
- Disagree a little
- Neutral
- Agree a little
- Agree generally
- Agree very much

22. The police will allow some people to sell drugs because they are police informants?

- Disagree very much
- Disagree generally
- Disagree a little
- Neutral
- Agree a little
- Agree generally
- Agree very much
23. The police generally do a good job?

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much

24. The city would be better off if there were more police.

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much

25. The police could do much more to solve the drug problem than they are presently doing?

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much

26. Drug dealing in this area of the city is out of control.

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much

(If answer agree ask who they think are to blame)
27. The police should spend more time on foot patrol to police drug dealing?

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much

28. The police do not care if people sell drugs in this area of the city.

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much

29. The police have no control over drug selling in this area of the city?

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much

30. I think the police have a responsibility to do more about the drug problem in the area of the city where I work.

Disagree very much
Disagree generally
Disagree a little
Neutral
Agree a little
Agree generally
Agree very much
31. Have you ever called the police about drug dealers or drug buyers outside your shop.

  Yes
  No

  If yes were you happy with their response time
  Were you happy with the outcome?

  Yes  no

  If no why not/If yes why?

  Tell me more about the people you called the police about.

  Do you think most of these people sell/use drugs?

  What do you think should be done about this problem?
APPENDIX FOUR AND FIVE

THE EFFECTS OF POLICING ON THE DRUG SCENE
Production and Craftsmanship in Police Narcotics Enforcement

Age

How many years have you been a police office

How long have you worked on the drug squad

From one to eleven (one being the most important) please prioritize the importance of the following duties.

( ) Taking users/dealers off the street.
( ) Making cases.
( ) Keeping things simple.
( ) Quickly closing with an arrest.
( ) Taking junkies off the street.
( ) Getting at the bigger dealers.
( ) Working up the ladder to the source.
( ) Identifying everyone involved.
( ) Following through on all leads.
( ) Seizing Assets.
( ) Making a lot of small arrests.
Police Attitudes to Illegal Drugs

Circle the number which best reflects your own view of the following statements

1 = Agree very strongly  
5 = Strongly disagree

1. Many people use drugs in a controlled way. 
   1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5

2. Drug misusers can be pleasant and enterprising people. 
   1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5

3. The legal prescribing of methadone is a catastrophe. 
   1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5

4. The use of cocaine is always harmful. 
   1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5

5. The legalisation of drugs would lead to a considerable increase in misuse. 
   1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5

6. One must have respect for the integrity of drug misusers. 
   1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5

7. Total abstinence should be the main aim of drug policy. 
   1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5

8. Harm reduction should be the main aim of drug policy. 
   1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5

9. Drug misusers are violent and dangerous people. 
   1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5

10. All adults have a duty to intervene to prevent a young person from using drugs. 
    1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5

11. We must strive for a drug-free society. 
    1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5

12. The occasional use of heroin is O.K. 
    1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5

13. HIV is a greater threat to public health than drug misuse. 
    1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5
14. All drug use is misuse.  
15. It is important to intervene early to stop young people's drug misuse.  
16. Adults should have the right to choose which drugs they use.  
17. Compulsory care for drug misusers is inhuman.  
18. Doctors must be allowed to prescribe methadone to those dependent on heroin.  
19. Prohibition of a drug creates more problems than it solves.  
20. It is dangerous to smoke cannabis.  
21. Cannabis should be legalised.  
22. Clean syringes must be distributed to intravenous drug misusers to prevent the spread of HIV.  
23. The use of cannabis leads to mental disorder.  
24. We have to accept that drug use is an established part of society.  
25. Possession of drugs should be decriminalised.  
26. All heroin use leads to dependence.  
27. Addicts cannot be helped unless they want help.  
28. Drugs control those who use them.  
29. The cost of enforcing drug laws is too high.  
30. The use of "soft drugs" leads to the use of "hard drugs".
31. Drug misusers cannot be trusted. 1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5
32. Drug misuse spreads like an epidemic. 1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5
33. Drug use can be beneficial. 1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5
34. The global drug war is a serious threat to the stability of society. 1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5
35. Compulsory care is necessary to protect drug misusers. 1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5
36. The drug problem is a threat to the stability of society. 1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5
37. To seek care and treatment must be a voluntary decision on the part of the drug misuser. 1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5
38. Handing out free syringes to prevent HIV infection will increase drug misuse. 1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5
39. People who use drugs have social and emotional problems. 1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5
40. Drug misuse is a relatively small social problem. 1..... 2..... 3..... 4..... 5