The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the eighties

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The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
in the Eighties

by

Paul Byrne

A Doctoral Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the award of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy of the Loughborough University
of Technology.

January 1988

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ABSTRACT

The subject of this thesis is the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament during the period 1979 to 1987. It focuses specifically upon national CND, and seeks to fulfill three objectives: to provide an analysis of the internal workings of the Campaign, a discussion of its impact upon the British political system, and to relate these to recent and contemporary theories about social movements.

The internal dynamics of national CND are discussed by way of an examination of its membership, organisation, goals and tactics. The thesis includes the results of a sample survey of national CND's membership undertaken in 1985, which reveals the structural location of the Campaign's support in British society, the attitudes and preferences of its membership in relation to the stated aims of CND, and their participation in other forms of political activity. Patterns of decision-making and the distribution of power within national CND are studied by an investigation of its Annual Conference, National Council and national committees. CND's professed aims are described, utilising the Campaign's own publications and the resolutions emanating from its policy-making bodies. The varied tactics the Campaign has employed (both conventional and unconventional) are outlined, drawing upon internal documents and interviews with leading members of organisation.

The impact of the Campaign on Britain's political system is assessed by an examination of the stances adopted by political parties, trade unions, churches and other institutions on the
issue of unilateral nuclear disarmament, and a discussion of changes in public opinion and the coverage CND has received in the media. The thesis seeks to set the internal workings and external impact of the Campaign in a wider context by including an account of CND's experiences in the late fifties and early sixties, and a resume of the main principles underlying British defence policy in the post-war period.

The thesis includes an overview of theories relating to social movements (in Britain and abroad) which attempts to identify the most important concepts, and comment upon their potential utility. It concludes by relating these concepts to the empirical material derived from this study, and argues that social movement theory needs further refinement. Specifically, it contends that the resource mobilisation perspective is much better suited than conventional pressure group theory for the study of moral campaigns which attract significant support from the middle class yet fail to change public policy, but that this perspective gives inadequate attention to the effect of the nature of the issue engaged by a social movement upon its organisation and tactics.
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The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was formed in 1958, and has spent almost thirty years trying to persuade British governments, parties and voters to support the idea of the United Kingdom unilaterally renouncing nuclear weapons. Throughout that period, its arguments and actions have never convinced a British government. Of Britain's major political parties, only the Labour Party has adopted a non-nuclear defence policy. Moreover, apart from a brief period at the beginning of the sixties, unilateral nuclear disarmament has been official Labour Party policy only since 1982, and Labour has performed badly in both the general elections since then. Public opinion polls between elections have indicated fluctuating levels of support for unilateral nuclear disarmament among the electorate, but never a majority.

Despite this apparent lack of success, CND has survived and resisted the temptation to enhance its popularity by moderating its aims. Although between 1963 and 1979 the Campaign was virtually moribund, numbering only a few thousand supporters, in its early years and then again in the eighties it has been by any standards a mass movement. Even when at its lowest ebb it has been one of the best known groups in British politics. Since 1980, it has seen its national membership rise to a peak of around 100,000 and at the time of writing (1987) numbers over 80,000. Including those who belong only to local CND and other peace groups, its total number of supporters is estimated to be in the region of some 200,000 people. Although it has
never attracted many members outside of the particular social stratum of the educated middle class, it has been able to motivate its adherents to participate in public demonstrations of a magnitude very rarely seen in post-war Britain, and innovatory tactics such as peace camps established around military bases have received wide publicity both within Britain and abroad.

CND may not have been able to inspire changes in governmental policy, but it can take some comfort from the way in which the issue of nuclear disarmament has been brought back onto the political agenda. After the short-lived conversion of the Labour Party at the beginning of the sixties, the nuclear dimension of Britain's defence policy went virtually unquestioned for almost two decades. In successive general elections from 1964 to 1979, none of the main parties chose to dissent from the consensus view that Britain should retain nuclear weapons, and that it was a policy area on which discussion was best kept within the executive branch of government. After 1979, however, the issue gained in salience to such an extent that commentators are generally agreed that it was second only to unemployment as a determinant of voting choice in the 1983 general election, and continued to play an important part in the 1987 general election. Admittedly, opinion poll evidence suggests that a majority of those voters who did consider the issue to be of great importance were opposed to the idea of unilateral nuclear disarmament, but at least alternatives were being discussed and politicians who rejected unilateralism had to argue their case.
Of course, CND was not the only causal factor in this transition. International developments were important, as increased hostility between America and the Soviet Union in the eighties marked an end to the era of detente which had characterized much of the previous decade. Technical innovations were also a very significant factor, as new weapons (and especially new delivery systems) were introduced. Nevertheless, the size of the Campaign and the media coverage it received has been such that it would be nonsensical to argue that CND, and its counterparts in much of Western Europe, have had no role to play in the eruption of the nuclear issue onto the political agenda.

This thesis examines the Campaign from its renaissance in 1979 through to the general election of 1987. It is not an account of the peace movement as a whole, which incorporates national CND, local CND and peace groups, and autonomous bodies such as the Greenham women and Cruisewatch. Its focus is national CND, which — although many activists in the peace movement might disagree — is arguably the single most important element in the movement, if only because it is perceived by political parties and the national media as the authoritative voice and organisational nucleus of the whole movement. What follows does not pretend to offer a definitive account of the peace movement; what it does attempt to provide is an analysis of national CND, on the grounds that it can be conceptualised as the 'peak' organisation of the peace movement. It is based partly upon secondary source material, but mainly upon documents kept at national CND's headquarters, to which the author was given access, interviews with members of CND, national CND officials and staff.
members, observation of CND's Annual Conferences and meetings of its National Council, and a sample survey of the national membership (see appendix).

A complementary aim of this thesis is to relate empirical material about the Campaign, and particularly National CND, to the theoretical arguments which have been constructed around the concept of social movements. There has been a resurgence of interest in this area since the sixties, as political scientists have come to realise that conventional pressure group theory could not incorporate the variety of organisational and tactical forms exhibited by new movements and groupings over the last few decades. As a consequence, new concepts have been developed, the most influential of which are amalgamated under the heading of 'resource mobilisation'. This thesis will seek to test the applicability to CND of these new insights. It will also attempt to explore the hypothesis that, although it is considerably more useful than conventional pressure group theory for understanding a movement such as CND, present thinking on social movement theory needs to be refined in such a way as to pay more attention to the implications of the nature of the issue which is engaged by any particular social movement.

The starting point is an overview of recent theoretical insights into the phenomenon of social movements which are broadly similar to CND. This is followed by an outline of developments in British defence policy since the fifties, and an account of CND's formation, campaigning and decline between the late fifties and early sixties. Having established the general context, the results of the national membership survey are analysed in an attempt to determine who is motivated to join the
Campaign, their political affiliations outside of CND, and their opinions on a number of issues which have been discussed within the Campaign in recent years. The analysis then moves on to the organisational structure of national CND, and the way in which decisions are taken on matters concerning policy and tactics. This is followed by a discussion of the Campaign's ideology as it has developed during the eighties, and the various strategies of both persuasion and protest which have been employed in an attempt to realise these goals. Finally, the stances adopted by Britain's political parties and other social institutions on the issue of nuclear weapons are examined, with a view to determining how much progress the Campaign has made, and conclusions are drawn as to its strengths and weaknesses and the political opportunities which are open to it in the contemporary British political system.
In the account of CND in the eighties which follows, we shall be looking at how the Campaign operates and what it has achieved. Although not without its problems, such an exercise does not present insurmountable difficulties. Far more problematic, however, is any attempt to derive a satisfactory explanation of why CND revived in such a dramatic fashion after some fifteen years in the political doldrums. Establishing causal relationships between ideas, events and behaviour is a notoriously difficult undertaking in political science, when there are so many variables which cannot be controlled. A logical first step would seem to be to determine the nature of the Campaign - that is, whether it should be seen as a quasi-party, an interest group, a movement or whatever - and then draw upon the insights offered by analysis of similar groups or movements. In the case of CND, this will involve setting the Campaign within the context of the Peace Movement as a whole, but even the Peace Movement has qualities which set it apart from other movements in liberal democratic societies.
Clearly the Peace Movement is something other than a pressure group as defined in conventional pluralistic politics. It is not a protective group: its adherents are not limited to one section of society, it offers no services to its supporters (unless one counts information under this heading), it is not primarily interested in the detail of governmental administration, and — whilst it numbers amongst its ranks some with an impressive level of knowledge about nuclear weapons policy — its expert knowledge is not sought after by British government. More of an argument could be made for classifying it as a promotional pressure group. Although its aims are more radical than most other promotional groups in Britain, and, if ever realised, would have a fundamental effect upon defence, foreign and economic policy, there are other promotional groups seeking far-reaching changes — the anti-poverty lobby is one example. The sheer size of the Peace Movement, however, the way in which it is organised and, above all, some (though not all) of the tactics that it employs clearly distinguish it from other promotional groups. The Peace Movement uses 'insider' tactics such as lobbying decision-makers and seeking to persuade and educate public opinion; what differentiates it from other promotional groups is its persistent use over time of 'outsider' tactics — especially mass demonstrations and non-violent direct action. These are an integral part of the Peace Movement's tactical armoury, and this in itself is sufficient to justify classifying the Peace Movement as something other than a conventional promotional group.
Social Movements

The Peace Movement is not the only societal grouping whose aims and tactics place it outside the ambit of conventional pressure group typologies. The post-war period, especially from the sixties on, has seen the rise of such phenomena as the student movement, the civil rights movement (especially in America) and second-wave feminism. This has prompted a resurgence of interest in the concept of 'social movements'. Like pressure groups, social movements involve purposive collective action but it is action of a specific kind, falling in between the spontaneity of mob or crowd behaviour on the one hand and the formalised structure of participation in political parties or conventional pressure groups on the other. Unfortunately, there does not as yet exist any one widely accepted and precise definition of what constitutes a social movement. Writing in the 1968 International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Rudolf Herberle notes that the term 'denotes a wide variety of collective attempts to bring about a change in certain social institutions or to create an entirely new order' (1), a description which is symptomatic of the difficulties analysts have found in establishing a precise and tight definition. Nevertheless, drawing upon the literature that has been produced in response to the resurgence of political activity outside of normal institutional channels since the early sixties (2), it is possible to isolate certain defining features of the concept.

It is generally agreed that for a social movement to exist, there must be a group consciousness among its supporters, in the sense that they
must experience some sense of belonging and of solidarity. As Freeman has argued:

of utmost importance is the consciousness that one is part of a group with whom one shares awareness of a particular concern. Individuals acting in response to common social forces with no particular identification with one another may be setting a trend, but they are not part of a movement.(3)

There must then be agreement within the movement on what is the problem, on what is wrong, and a desire to communicate this vision of society to others, to spread the message. This entails the development of an ideology, that is some kind of vision of how things could be made better in the future — although, as Gerlach and Hine have noted(4), such a vision may only ever be expressed in very general terms. All of this, of course, applies equally well to political parties, but there are further defining characteristics which set social movements apart from other forms of concerted political action. Firstly, social movements aim to bring about change by non-institutionalised means.(5) This is not to say that a social movement will shun any kind of participation in institutionalised channels of access; however, it will not restrict itself to these but will seek to develop and exploit means of exercising pressure that fall outside those channels. Secondly, social movements employ a looser and usually more decentralised form of organisation than do political parties or pressure groups, and concomitantly place more reliance on the commitment and activism of their members. Social movements often avoid any kind of
formal institutional structure, many not having any membership per se, only supporters and activists - the women's movement is a good example of this. Thirdly, and following on from these two points, social movements experience a much greater degree of exclusion from governmental decision-making processes than their more conventional counterparts in the pressure group and party universe. Fourthly, social movements normally aim to bring about radical and fundamental changes in society which, whilst this is also true of some political parties, distinguishes them from most pressure groups. Finally, most social movements are characterised by the emphasis they place upon combining social change with personal change. Attitudinal and behavioural change on a personal level is often seen by social movement activists as being at least as important as applying overt pressure on political authorities - as James Q. Wilson puts it, 'showing by one's conduct a model for a new social order'.(6)

This last point, however, raises the question of whether the concept of social movements pays sufficient attention to the nature of the issue involved. Where the issue does have a personal dimension - as in, for example, the feminist contention that 'the personal is political' - the utility of the social movement concept is clear. Its emphasis upon group consciousness and networking, and the importance of this rather than highly structured organisation as a means of mobilising and retaining support, is particularly valuable. It is able to incorporate, for example, the way in which a feminist may attempt to 'live out' equality by renouncing subservient behaviour in both the public and the private domains, even in the absence
of structured group activity. However, where the issue is one on which any substantive change is dependent upon action in the public sphere (i.e. by the state), and behavioural change on the personal level is inappropriate or irrelevant, the concept of social movements does not appear to give sufficient attention to the effect this has upon the character of any movement taking up such an issue.

The Peace Movement in Britain is a case in point. Its characteristics are such that it is clearly appropriate to define it as a social movement, in the light of the defining features listed above. Its adherents are united in their abhorrence of nuclear weapons, and have a shared belief that such weapons do not constitute an effective or acceptable means of national defence. There is a clear collective desire to convince others of this viewpoint, using both institutionalised channels and less conventional tactics. Although it contains formal organisations, of which CND is by far the most important, CND does not and cannot claim to represent the whole movement. The Peace Movement as a whole is loosely organised, based to a large extent on localised groups, and has no overall membership structure. Much of its internal communication is effected informally, via networks of adherents with cross-cutting membership of localised and sectoral groups.

However, the peace movement is concerned with an issue on which change can only be effected at the public level. Peace campaigners cannot exclude themselves from public policy on nuclear weapons or pursue an anti-nuclear personal lifestyle in the way that feminists or environmentalists are able to. Were it the case that all those involved in
the peace movement espoused 'total' pacifism, then
the stress laid by the social movement concept upon
the personal as well as the public would be
unproblematic. As it is, however, 'total' paciﬁ-
cism may well be a sufficient condition for
adherence to the peace movement, but it is not a
necessary condition. There are many in the
movement whose only commitment is to 'nuclear'
pacifism, and who reject the viability or wisdom of
outright pacifism.

There is one sense in which the peace movement
may be thought of as combining the personal with
the political. This is the rejection of hierarchi-
cal and bureaucratic attitudes which runs through-
out the movement - from, at one extreme, the
emphasis placed upon internal democracy within the
most formal organisation in the movement (national
CND) to, at the other extreme, the complete
rejection of any practice remotely resembling
hierarchy among the Greenham women. It is only
amongst the Greenham women, however, that this has
been elevated into a principle of almost as much
importance as the anti-nuclear stance itself. Among
the rest of the peace movement, there is a distinct
preference for informality and egalitarianism, but
it is seen as being tangential to the basic issue
of opposition to nuclear weapons.

The 'Rationality' of Participation

This emphasis upon personal equality within
the movement also offers some insight into why
people participate in the Peace Movement. On first
analysis, such a question may seem redundant -
people may have different reasons for their
opposition to nuclear weapons (for example, moral or political), but these reasons could all be subsumed under a general heading of shared attitudes. As Olson has argued, however(7), there is nothing inevitable about people with common attitudes or interests joining a group to pursue them. On the contrary, if a sufficiently large group already exists - such that the individual contribution of any one person will not have a significant effect on the success of that group - then Olson argues it would be more 'rational' for that individual to devote their energies to their own specific interests, because they will receive any benefits secured by the group anyway - the 'free rider' phenomenon. Therefore, group participation is something to be investigated and explained, it cannot be treated as unproblematic. Olson's own explanation, which is based largely on groups which seek material goods or services, centres around ideas about selective rewards or sanctions for group membership as incentives to participate. Olson argues that his theory is not very useful for the study of what he terms 'philanthropic lobbies' - that is, groups which voice concern about some group or sector of society other than the group that supports the lobby, a definition which obviously encompasses the Peace Movement - because of the absence of selective rewards for those who participate.

Gamson(8), however, takes issue with Olson over this disclaimer. Gamson argues that one of the central points about Olson's theory is that it offers a new insight, which is that all groups (whether they are basically self-interested or philanthropic) face the same problem - how to get members to work for something that they will
receive or not receive independently of their individual efforts. Disputing Olson's distinction between groups which are seeking material benefits for their own members, and those which are seeking non-exclusive or collective changes, Gamson argues convincingly that:

For the older group theorists whom (Olson) criticises, the distinction is relevant. They see it as entirely reasonable that individuals with common interests usually attempt to further their common interests while it requires an explanation that individuals should attempt to further someone else's interest or the interests of everybody. But in rejecting the 'naturalness' of pursuing one's common interests, Olson shows the distinction to be irrelevant. It is no more in one's personal interest to make sacrifices to achieve the goal of his particular group than it is for him to make sacrifices to achieve the good of the whole or of some disadvantaged group to which he does not belong. All require an explanation.(9)

This is to some extent irrelevant to the present discussion, given that both 'old' and 'new' group theorists agree that participation in 'philanthropic' groups is a phenomenon which requires explanation. It is relevant, however, in that it makes the point that differential motives of participants in the Peace Movement do not remove the necessity to explain their participation. Whether people are participating because of apparently 'philanthropic' motives (e.g. a desire for world peace) or apparently more 'self-inter-
ested' motives (e.g. to protect their own children from the threat of nuclear war, or to in some way advance the prospects of their favoured political party), their participation is still - in Olson's terminology - 'irrational', and thus requires explanation.

One possible explanation is the dichotomy developed by Parkin between 'instrumental' and 'expressive' politics. He defines 'instrumental' politics as activity directly geared to the attainment of concrete (usually material) goals, whilst 'expressive' political behaviour is more concerned with the benefits and satisfactions which the activity in itself affords. In his analysis of CND's supporters in the sixties, Parkin argues that they showed a distinct preference for expressive politics, which was related to their adherence to deviant values - deviant in the sense of alienation from the dominant values in British society at the time (such as support for the monarchy, capitalism, the established church and nationalism). Parkin's thesis is that participation in CND was not simply a result of an individual's opposition to nuclear weapons, but also a 'capsule statement' of the individual's attitudes on a variety of other issues - CND membership was symbolic of a generally 'progressive' value orientation which was at odds with the more established and conventional values in society at the time. Thus, Parkin argues:

Those who subscribe to deviant values, particularly of a religious or political kind, will have to seek outlets for their expression and re-affirmation since they are not firmly institutionalised in the social system in the
way that dominant values are. Expressive political activity could therefore be regarded as functionally necessary for the maintenance of deviant values. The marches, demonstrations, vigils and so forth which characterise expressive politics provide a means of re-enforcing values which are not securely integrated in the social structure in the sense that they lack the support and the legitimating effect of major institutions. (11)

This raises two points. Firstly, the incentive for participation in group activity is that it offers the individual a specific if intangible reward - the personal satisfaction to be derived from participating with others who are like-minded. As Wilson (12) has put it, such participation involves both collective solidarity and purposive incentives; the former involves:

- the fun and conviviality of coming together,
- the sense of group membership or exclusiveness, and such collective status or esteem as the group as a whole may enjoy

whilst the latter 'derive from the sense of satisfaction of having contributed to the attainment of a worthwhile cause'. By including in their tactical armory an emphasis upon collective public events, social movements such as the Peace Movement can integrate movement and individual needs; only by actually participating, and not remaining a 'free rider', can the individual experience the sense of satisfaction that group activity can offer. Secondly, Parkin's analysis draws our attention to the oppositional character of most
social movements, and certainly the Peace Movement. Participation can alleviate the feeling of alienation and powerlessness that individuals can experience when their values run counter to those in political authority; group solidarity becomes a meaningful incentive when operating in a hostile environment.

This may offer some clue as to why CND rather than other 'oppositional' groupings expanded so rapidly at the beginning of the eighties. The seventies had seen a Labour government degenerate into immobilism, and the trade union movement castigated for the pursuit of 'selfish' sectional interest. For people holding left-wing views and wishing to register their opposition to the return to power of right-wing governments in the West, CND offered a relatively trouble-free opportunity to make a statement of opposition. Whilst support for environmental causes might involve difficulties with the established left over economic growth, and whilst 'moral' causes such as the anti-apartheid campaign, Amnesty or the various Third World groups might be seen as worthy but to some extent irrelevant to domestic politics, nuclear disarmament was both relevant (especially so, given the 'independent' deterrent) and did not involve any head-on confrontation or questioning of traditional socialist beliefs. Membership of or support for CND did not entail renouncing membership of any other groups or parties, was not open to the accusation of pursuit of self-interest, and did not involve any adjustment of personal life-style. Moreover, by virtue of its earlier activities, CND was well established in the political culture as a 'protesting' group, but one which was generally accepted as being sincere (if misguided, in the
opinion of many outside the left) and thus respectable rather than revolutionary. When talking with younger supporters of the Campaign in the eighties, it is remarkable how often one finds that they are under the impression that the Campaign enjoyed its zenith in the late sixties and early seventies - in other words, it is seen as synonymous with the wave of student protest at that time, and part of an unbroken strand of radical dissent throughout the sixties and seventies. For these supporters, adherence to the Campaign was an obvious first step in establishing their credentials as part of the opposition to the right of British politics, and the emphasis laid upon collective action made it even more attractive.

Social Movement Organisations

Prior to the sixties, a common assumption among social scientists was that social movements were a product of social stress. The argument was that a perceived deterioration in social conditions led individuals to experience a sense of relative deprivation, that this led to the formation of a collective view among the aggrieved on possible remedies for the discontent, and that social movements grew on this base. Consequently, much of the work done on social movements concentrated upon a social psychological perspective, investigating the attitudes and perceived grievances of participants in social movements. Over the last twenty years, however, a considerable shift in perspective has occurred. Working from the basic premise that there is usually sufficient stress and perceived grievance in society to generate social
movement activity, scholars have sought to explain the rise and fall of social movements by looking outside the social psychology of the individuals involved, to the question of how social movements mobilise resources. In other words, the new perspective discounts the idea that feelings of relative deprivation and grievance are a sufficient cause for social movement activity, and argues that such activity can only be understood by the study of organisations which mobilise resources for social movements (the social movement organisation: SMO), and the relationships between SMO's and other institutions and processes in society as a whole.

To oversimplify: the new approach moves away from a concentration upon the individual participant in a social movement, and directs our attention towards the organisational and structural factors which are involved. The social psychology of the individual is not ignored in this new perspective — commonly termed the Resource Mobilisation approach — but it is relegated to a position of secondary importance.

The traditional relative deprivation approach assumed that movements grew on a basis of individual grievance. Whilst this may have had obvious relevance for such movements as the early Labour movement or the Black Power movement in America, its applicability to an essentially 'philanthropic' group such as the Peace movement is less clear. The resource mobilisation approach, however, argues that social movements are not necessarily based upon individual grievances. As McCarthy and Zald have argued(13), 'conscience constituents' — supporters who do not stand to benefit directly or exclusively from a social movement attaining its goals — are often major sources of support for social movements. Moving the analysis away from
just those with perceived grievances and who are direct beneficiaries of social movement activity also directs our attention to the varied strategic tasks faced by SMO's. They not only have to organise any direct beneficiaries. They also have to mobilise conscience constituents; seek to turn those who are not supporters of the movement but are also not opposed to it (commonly termed 'bystander publics') into supporters; and deal with those who are opponents. All of this activity has to be studied in the context of the attitudes of the political authorities in society, because these attitudes will affect the readiness of people to alter their own status and commitment, their readiness to become bystanders rather than opponents, or supporters rather than bystanders.

In seeking to effect these changes, SMO's are not just competing with opponents. The resource mobilisation perspective draws our attention to the phenomenon of competition between SMO's. The argument is that any social movement will typically have more than one SMO operating within its boundaries. Thus, even in the case of the British peace movement (which is unusual because it has one predominant SMO, CND) other SMO's exist - the Freeze movement and END, for example. Although these different SMO's may pursue similar goals and use similar tactics, the resource mobilisation approach makes the point that they are competing for limited resources (e.g. time and money) from those segments of the population who agree with the overall goals of the movement in question. McCarthy and Zald term a cluster of SMO's that are working towards broadly similar goals a Social Movement Industry (SMI) - 'the organisational analogue of a social movement'(14). The importance of this
concept in the present context is that it draws our attention to the interplay not just between CND and its closest SMO's (e.g. the Freeze movement), but also to the relationship between CND and allied but more distinct SMOs - for example, those in the environmental sector. Resource mobilisation theorists would make the point that, although friendly and cooperative relations may well exist between, for example, CND and Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, they are all effectively in competition for scarce resources - the time, money, knowledge and commitment of those in British society who agree with the broad preferences espoused by these kind of SMOs. Indeed, in this context, the boundaries of this SMI are unclear. One could easily justify the inclusion of the Labour Party, other left parties and the Green party under the general heading of an anti-nuclear SMI. Where the boundaries are drawn is dependent upon the particular characteristics and structure of a society at any one time. The point remains, however, that by directing our attention away from the social psychology of individuals and towards the broader organisational perspective, the resource mobilisation approach offers the potential for a considerably better understanding of social movement activity.

The essence of the resource mobilisation approach, then, is the interplay between SMOs and society as a whole. As is the case in this thesis, most empirical studies which take the resource mobilisation approach as their starting point tend to concentrate attention on the level of individual SMOs. Before doing this, however, it is worth noting some of the insights that the resource mobilisation perspective offers about the societal
context of SMO activity. McCarthy and Zald offer the concept of the Social Movement Sector (SMS) — which consists, quite simply, of all the SMIs in a society, regardless of which social movement they are championing. This concept is used to make the point that the size of an SMS in a society at any one time is largely dependent on the amount of discretionary wealth and time available in that society. The more time and money that individuals have uncommitted and at their disposal, the greater the likelihood that SMIs and SMOs will develop to compete for these resources. Of course, this is not a straightforward causal relationship. Other variables are involved, such as the extent of political freedoms in a society, the means of communication available, the extent of repression by political authorities, and so on — all of which will have effect upon the growth of the SMS in a society. Nevertheless, the basic hypothesis remains: the more wealth that is available in society, the more time that is available (and education is important in this context, as the more highly educated are more likely to give time), then the more likely it is that SMIs and SMOs will develop.

There is a clear link to be made here with the work of Inglehart and his concept of 'post-materialism'. Using a nine-nation European survey in 1973, Inglehart has developed the thesis that the post-war generation in Europe has a different set of value preferences from the preceding generation. Drawing on the work of Maslow, he argues that the relative prosperity of Europe after 1945 has meant that people are less concerned about basic material needs (food, shelter, etc.) and consequently more concerned with 'higher order
needs' (such as preserving freedom of speech in society, or giving people more say in decision-making). Although Inglehart acknowledges that such 'post-materialists' are still in a minority in Europe, he predicted in the seventies that the rise of post-materialism would lead to changes in political behaviour - a post-materialist/materialist cleavage developing to co-exist with (but not replace) the traditional class cleavage in politics, and an increase in the number of 'new left' parties. It is a similar argument to that advanced by Habermas, who draws our attention to the way in which 'old' conflicts over the allocation of material resources in society, mediated via established parties and interest groups, now co-exist with 'new' conflicts caused by individuals seeking greater participation and more opportunities for realising their own potential in society.(18) This is not the context in which to embark on any lengthy assessment of such arguments(19), although in general terms the rise of the Peace Movement and Green parties in certain parts of Europe would seem to substantiate these arguments.

The Political Opportunity Structure.

The point remains, however, that the political expression of post-materialist values is uneven throughout Europe; this draws our attention to other, potentially constraining factors. Whilst both McCarthy and Zald and Inglehart are presenting general arguments about the potential for social movement activity to occur, the extent to which this potential is realised will of course depend
upon the particular political configurations in a society. Useful in this respect is the concept of a 'political opportunity structure' - the institutional arrangements (e.g. electoral and party systems) and cultural attitudes which form the political context within which social movements have to operate. These will have a significant impact on the strategies employed by social movements and their impact on society. Thus, for example, Kitschelt (20) has argued that political systems which are both 'open' in input terms (multi-party, influential legislature, good access for pressure groups), and 'weak' in output terms (decentralised state apparatus, the judiciary as independent political arbiters), will encourage social movements to adopt 'assimilative' strategies (lobbying, petitioning, participating in public inquiries and possibly elections); whereas those which are 'closed' in input terms and 'strong' in output terms will lead social movements to adopt 'confrontational' strategies (demonstrations, varieties of direct action). Such a framework may be lacking in precision - the British political system, for example, does not seem to fit neatly into the strong/weak, open/closed dichotomies, and the Peace Movement utilises both assimilative and confrontational strategies - but it does remind us of the necessity to examine the tactics of social movements within the context of the political opportunities open to them. The point has been made on a more general level by Tilley (21), who argues that the key to success for a social movement lies in it being able to form alliances with established groups in the political system.

The particular relevance of the idea of a political opportunity structure to a discussion of
CND is that it highlights the differences between the Campaign and other social movements. Our argument is that the peace movement is faced with a different political opportunity structure from that which obtains for other social movements, and that this has a significant impact upon the structure, tactics and survival chances of the movement. Feminists and environmentalists are, of course, concerned to make issue-specific impacts, but they are also engaged upon developing and propagating wider philosophies concerned with fundamental cultural and institutional change in society, and can look to changes in personal lifestyle to contribute towards achieving this. This is a significant influence upon these movements' organisation and tactics. Although the peace movement is concerned with an issue which has many ramifications for thinking on defence and foreign policy generally, its whole orientation is much more issue-specific. It is not the case that it chooses to seek alliances with established members of the polity because this will enhance its chances of success, but that the nature of the issue it is concerned with is such that it has no alternative but to do this. This is one of the reasons why the peace movement has an organised nucleus in the form of CND (although, as we shall see, there are also historical reasons), and why CND itself is so concerned to elicit support among established members of the polity as well as among the general public. The dilemma CND has to face is to what extent it can build such alliances without compromising what many of its supporters see as non-negotiable principles. This has been a particular problem for CND during the eighties, as the British
political system has undergone some substantial changes.

The Structure of Social Movement Organisations

As social movements, and their concomitant social movement organisations grow, so the structure of SMOs evolves. Organisational development has been a focus of interest for sociologists and political scientists for many years now, and a traditional view has evolved, typified by the arguments of Weber and Michels. This view argues that an organisation will, over time, become oligarchic and bureaucratic. An elite group will emerge within the organisation who, in order to ensure the survival of the organisation and thus their own position, will moderate the original goals of the organisation, so as to minimise opposition from outside the organisation. Bureaucratisation will develop, initially in an effort to make the organisation's work more effective (by taking advantage of specialisation, division of labour and clear internal hierarchy), but this will eventually result in rules and procedures being observed for their own sake rather than their relevance to the overall goals of the organisation. Despite these apparent drawbacks, bureaucratisation is seen as inevitable as it is the most rational form of organisation.

This traditional view of organisational structure is well known in social science, and is reflected in the work of social movement theorists. Perhaps the best known is the work of Gamson(22), who argues that centralisation and bureaucratisa-
tion in an SMO increase its chances of success. Based on a study of 53 'challenging groups' in America, Gamson identifies two broad dimensions of success: the extent to which a challenging group is accepted by its antagonists as being a valid spokesman for a legitimate set of interests, and the extent to which the group wins new advantages for its beneficiaries. He goes on to argue that bureaucratisation helps a group with the problem of 'pattern maintenance' (i.e. the routine performance of necessary tasks, which makes the group more ready for action), and that this will enhance the group's chances of being accepted. Centralisation also increases combat readiness by reducing internal conflict in the group, and this tends to increase the group's chances of winning new advantages.(23)

This is a superficial account of a complex argument which Gamson himself qualifies in many respects, and which has been subject to detailed criticism by other authors.(24) However, it will suffice to note in this context the broad thrust of Gamson's argument - that organisations which are both centralised and bureaucratic are most likely to succeed. An alternative argument has been developed by Gerlach and Hine(25), who dispute the idea that centralisation and bureaucratisation are the most efficient organisational form for SMOs to adopt. On the contrary, they argue, movements that utilised a decentralised and essentially informal organisational structure are likely to be more effective. Gerlach and Hine offer a model, originally designated SPIN (segmented, polycephalous, interaction networks) and then reformulated as SPR (segmentary, polycephalous and reticulate). Segmentary denotes a structure in which a movement
is composed of a range of diverse groups or cells - for example, the local groups in the British peace movement. Polycephalous means that the organisation is many-headed - in other words, it is decentralised, with no one central command or decision-making structure, and no single authoritative leader - so a leader in one group may have no influence in other groups. Reticulate means that these groups are not an amorphous collection, but are organised into a network - partly through formalised links, and partly through cross-cutting memberships, the work of 'travelling evangelists' (i.e. spokesmen) who go from group to group making speeches and so on, and partly through informal personal links and friendships among the movement's supporters.

The advantages of this SPR structure are held to be that it makes for a highly adaptive movement, which is able to experiment with different tactics and which is less vulnerable than a centralised organisation to suppression by authorities. Because the movement consists of many groups or cells, each can 'do its own thing' - which facilitates penetration into a variety of other groups and institutions in society. It is also argued that, precisely because there is no central authority imposing specialisation and division of labour, there will occur duplication of effort and overlap between groups - but that this actually contributes to 'system reliability' in the movement because it makes it more likely that if one group fails or contracts, another group can quickly take its place. Moreover, the relative autonomy of the multiple groups means that some may experiment with radical or innovative tactics; if these work, others are encouraged to follow - but if they fail
and attract adverse comment, then the failure will only affect the groups most directly concerned, and the whole movement will not be dragged down by the failure of a few groups. Finally, multiplicity of leadership and lack of centralised control means that the authorities in society cannot easily predict what will happen next in the movement, and cannot easily suppress it or seek to coopt it into the establishment because there is no single, centralised leadership to target.

It should be noted that the arguments of Gamson and Gerlach and Hine are not strictly comparable, in that Gerlach and Hine are drawing on work concerned with social movements which emphasise personal change as well as social change in their ideology. This entails a concept of personal power being emphasised by such movement adherents, and it is the expression of this which gives rise to many of the distinctive features of the SPR organisational form. One may question the relevance of the model to the British peace movement on this basis. It might also be argued that the assumption that multiple local groups enjoy a large degree of effective autonomy is problematic, given the tendency of the media to treat them as a collectivity, and visit the perceived sins of one upon all (the relationship between the Greenham women and the Peace Movement is a case in point here). Nevertheless, as with Gamson, it will suffice to take the broad outline of Gerlach and Hine's argument, which suggests that decentralisation and informal organisation may well have concrete advantages to offer to social movements.

Obviously, these two arguments have not been the only contributions to the debate on social movement organisation in recent years, but they do
represent the two opposing poles in the discussion. Others have offered more intermediate arguments. Zald and Ash\(^{26}\) have made the point that a social movement will have more than one SMO within it, and that these different SMOs can adopt differing organisational forms to 'fit' their varying strategic aims. Similarly, drawing upon a study of the anti-nuclear movement in America, Dwyer\(^{27}\) makes the point that a movement with a varied structure enjoys a great strategic flexibility — local groups having the ability to act spontaneously and encourage participation, larger and more formal groups being able to mobilise more resources in the form of money, staff and expertise.

It would be easy to assume from this discussion that it was open to any SMO to decide upon its strategic objectives — for example, a centralised, hierarchical structure if the objective was specific policy changes, or a decentralised structure if personal change was thought more important. In the real world, of course, things are not that simple; social movements attract adherents who come to the movement with already existing values and past experiences which will obviously affect the kind of organisational structure which develops. Freeman\(^{28}\) explains this well in her work based upon the women's movement in America. She starts from the premise that virtually every social movement must have both tangible resources (e.g. money, office space, a means of publicising the movement's ideas) and intangible resources (primarily people — either their expertise or, more importantly, their time and commitment). She makes the point that social movements are typically very dependent on intangible resources — people who are prepared to make an effort.
on behalf of the movement. However, as she argues, the way in which people will be prepared to give expression to their commitment will be influenced by those people's values, past experiences, expectations for the future, and reference groups (i.e. others against whom people measure their own behaviour and attitudes). Thus, in the context of the women's movement, Freeman identifies two broad groups - the younger and older branches. The younger branch had past experience in radical politics, had developed radical values and hence were only prepared to work within an organisational context that stressed decentralisation and equal participation, and rejected any kind of hierarchical structure. The older branch had experience in party politics and more traditional interest groups, saw formalised organisational structure as a help not a hindrance and argued that "getting equality was more important than living it". So the younger branch developed its organisation very much along the decentralised lines outlined in Gerlach and Hine's SPR model, while the older branch established more formalised, centralised national organisations.

Conclusions

Neither of the broad approaches to the study of social movements that are outlined above - relative deprivation and resource mobilisation - offer a completely satisfactory solution to the problem of structuring research on the Peace Movement in Britain. The relative deprivation approach may suggest some guidance on the level of individual's feelings of discontent leading to participation.
This would require an interpretation of relative deprivation terminology which saw individuals as feeling that they had a legitimate right to live in a society free from weapons of mass destruction, and that this right was being withheld from them. There may be some validity in this, but it does not allow for the possibility that such feelings will arise as a consequence of participation in the Peace Movement or similar organisations, rather than being a cause of it. Political experience prior to participation in the Peace Movement may be just as much of a spur to involvement as any perceived feeling of deprivation. The resource mobilisation perspective is more attractive, because it has a much wider scope - it is founded on the idea that one must look beyond the individual, to the societal context in which movements arise and operate, and the ways in which movements and 'their' groups can and do interact.

It is precisely because the resource mobilisation perspective offers this greater breadth that it must be treated with caution. Many of the concepts employed - not least, the central concept of 'resources' - are open to a variety of interpretations. It is not clear, for example, to what extent the parameters of what is seen as 'legitimate' protest activity within a specific political culture can be accommodated within the resource mobilisation perspective. If, however, we are content to work with the broad thrust of such approaches, then the resource mobilisation perspective does offer significant advantages. It directs our attention towards the processes involved in the creation, strategy, tactics and interactions of social movement organisations within social movements. In the case of the British peace
movement - unusual among social movements in that it is dominated by just one such SMO - these are clearly central questions which have to be addressed.

In what follows, we shall be looking at the organisation, membership, tactics and impact of the Campaign. We shall be asking why people participate in what is apparently a 'philanthropic' group. We shall be examining how CND seeks to maintain the commitment and enthusiasm of its supporters (especially in the face of competition from related groups) via a variety of campaigning tactics whilst not letting these tactics alienate potential supporters and 'bystander' publics. We shall be questioning whether it is possible for the Campaign's leadership to run the organisation on democratic and decentralised lines whilst also retaining enough of an authority structure to deter infiltration from outside and give a sense of coherence to the Campaign as a whole. Not least, given the nature of the issue involved, we shall be analysing how CND has reacted to changes in the political opportunity structure during the eighties, and to what extent the Campaign can change its priorities and build alliances with established parties and institutions in the light of what many of its supporters see as non-negotiable principles. Firstly, however, we shall set the general context of Britain's defence policy, and relate this to the Campaign's first wave of activity in the fifties and sixties.

NOTES

1. R. Herberle, 'Social Movements', International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,


9. Ibid., pp. 61-62.


11. Ibid., p. 38.


15. Ibid., p. 1225.


Britain's first atomic weapon was tested in Australia in 1952. The decision to manufacture a British atomic device dated back to 1947, when Attlee's Labour government decided to commence work on a nuclear weapons programme. Then, as since, the decision was taken by only a small group of Ministers (1); it was not a matter for discussion by the full Cabinet, let alone Parliament, the media or the public. This desire for secrecy was partly motivated by a desire to keep the United States unaware that Britain was developing its own atomic weapons. Britain and the United States had cooperated fully on the 'Manhattan Project' during the war, spurred by a common fear that Germany might win the race to develop a nuclear capability. The British, however, had been a junior rather than full partner in the project, and in any case the United States had withdrawn its cooperation shortly after the war ended. The Attlee government and its civil service and military advisers were concerned not to allow the United States to acquire a monopoly over this new development in weaponry (the Soviet Union did not produce an atomic device until 1949), not least because it would signify Britain
conceding that it was no longer a world power. It must be remembered that in the immediate post-war period it was far from clear to the British government whether the United States would adopt an isolationist foreign policy, which would effectively mean that Britain would have to rely on its own resources to defend itself.

The Formation of NATO

Cooperation between Britain and America did not resume until the fifties, when Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe and the Korean War convinced the two Western powers of the desirability of a more coordinated approach to defence. The development of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe prompted the formation of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) in 1949. Originally this was no more than an agreement between the Western powers that an attack on one would be treated as an attack on all - in effect, that American involvement in any future hostilities would be more immediate than it had been in the two World Wars, and could entail use of America's nuclear capability. The experience of the Korean War, however, which demonstrated that conventional war need not necessarily escalate onto the nuclear level, prompted the development of NATO into an organisation rather than just an agreement. Military thinking in the aftermath of the Second World War tended to the viewpoint that the development of nuclear weapons made it very unlikely that global conflict would re-occur on a conventional level.
The Korean experience suggested that, on the contrary, this was indeed a possibility. The NATO countries responded by constructing a military organisation in which most of the conventional forces of the European members of NATO, and a substantial number of American forces, were committed to NATO and placed under a NATO command structure.

The cost of conventional re-armament in the early fifties, however, together with the knowledge that the Soviet Union now had a nuclear armoury, quickly convinced NATO of the economic and military benefits of a strategy which rested on both conventional and nuclear weapons. From 1953 on, NATO strategy rested not on matching Soviet conventional forces, but rather upon relying on American nuclear superiority to deter attack. This strategy was enthusiastically endorsed by Britain's Conservative government at the time, not least because it enabled the government to argue that the nuclear deterrent removed the need to maintain large conventional forces, so conscription (national service) could be brought to an end. American possession of a nuclear deterrent was not considered to be a sufficient guarantee of Britain's security, however. The Suez affair in 1956, which harmed Anglo-American relations and offered a graphic reminder of Britain's declining world-power status, increased the determination of the Conservative government to maintain an 'independent' nuclear deterrent. From 1958 on, the V-Bomber force (designed and built in Britain) was deployed to fulfil this role. Doubts about the capability of the V-Bombers to penetrate Soviet defence
systems led Britain to attempt to develop its own ballistic missile as an eventual replacement for the Bomber force - the 'Blue Streak' - but this programme was cancelled when it became clear that it would prove too costly and (given the rate of technical advance in America and the Soviet Union) probably ineffective by the time it came into service. The British government's solution was to turn to America: between 1958 and 1962, the two government's concluded a number of agreements which resulted in uniquely close links over nuclear matters. American intermediate-range nuclear missiles were based in Britain from 1958 on, and America was given permission to base its new Polaris submarines at Holy Loch in Scotland in 1960. In return, America agreed to sell its 'Skybolt' air-launched ballistic missile system to Britain as a replacement for the ill-fated 'Blue Streak'. The British government received a nasty shock when the new Kennedy administration cancelled the 'Skybolt' programme, but the problem was resolved in 1962 when Macmillan and Kennedy concluded the Nassau agreement, whereby America was to supply Britain with Polaris missiles which would be fitted with British warheads and deployed in British-built submarines.

MAD and Flexible Response

Britain thus maintained its 'independent' deterrent, thought this independence was qualified by a dependence upon American technology and had the political cost of causing the French government
to become even more inimical to the idea of British membership of the European Community. However, Britain remained convinced of the need to commit the bulk of its defence resources to NATO, the 'independent' deterrent being seen as very much a weapon of last resort. It also represented something of an insurance should the NATO Alliance ever develop problems. There was some indication that this might happen in the early sixties, when the Soviet expansion of its nuclear arsenal - to the point where it developed the capability to retaliate in kind to any nuclear attack - caused some doubts within NATO about the extent of the American commitment. Superpower nuclear parity meant the development of the MAD (mutual assured destruction) and 'counter-value' strategies - deterrence resting on the ability of either side to wreak immense destruction on their opponent's cities and industrial base. American military thinkers became concerned that a defence strategy which rested upon the willingness of an American President to risk nuclear annihilation of American cities in order to defend Europe from a conventional Soviet attack would not be seen as credible by the Soviet Union. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations began to argue the desirability of expanding NATO's conventional forces. This worried the European partners in NATO, partly because of the cost involved and more importantly because they thought that the new American approach signalled a greater reluctance to act as nuclear guarantor of Europe's security. Discussion within NATO about these concerns led in 1967 to its adoption by NATO of the doctrine of 'flexible response' - whereby
NATO was to maintain strategic nuclear forces, build up its conventional forces, and — most importantly — introduce a new element, American intermediate and short-range nuclear weapons based in Europe. For the Americans, flexible response meant it was less likely that they might have to respond to a conventional Soviet offensive in Europe by intercontinental nuclear war. For the Europeans, the crucially important feature of flexible response was that it strengthened the link between European and American security. The introduction of intermediate and short-range ('tactical' or 'theatre') nuclear weapons gave NATO a "ladder of escalation" — from conventional to 'limited' nuclear exchanges to all-out nuclear war. This quelled doubts among Europeans that America was becoming more sanguine about the possibility of conventional war in Europe. Then, as in the late seventies and again in 1986/7, it was European rather than American official opinion which stressed the desirability of deploying American nuclear weapons on European soil.

As we shall see, NATO has remained committed to a strategy of flexible response for the last twenty years. The concept of flexible response rests upon not just maintaining certain capabilities and resources, but also upon making clear certain intentions. In NATO's view, its mix of conventional and strategic and intermediate nuclear weapons can only fulfil its purpose of deterring Soviet aggression (and NATO consistently sees itself as a defensive alliance) if NATO retains the option of being the first actually to use nuclear weapons in the event of war. NATO's reasoning is
that if it were to enter into any commitment to 'no first use' of nuclear weapons, this would open the way to the Soviet Union using its apparently superior conventional forces to launch a conventional attack on Western Europe secure in the knowledge that if they refrained from employing nuclear weapons, so would NATO. Thus, while NATO has made it clear that it would be likely to meet any conventional attack with conventional defence, it has made it equally clear that this is not certain and, more importantly, that such restraint may be short-lived. NATO has spelt this out in unambiguous language; the purpose of the flexible response strategy is:

- to permit a flexible range of responses combining two main capabilities: to meet any aggression by direct defence at a level judged to be appropriate to defeat the attack, and to be prepared to escalate the level deliberately, maintaining firm political control, if defence at the level first selected is not effective. An aggressor must be convinced of NATO's readiness to use nuclear weapons if necessary, but he must be uncertain regarding the timing or the circumstances in which they would be used. (2)

Whether or not the strategy of flexible response has been responsible for preserving the peace in Europe since the sixties is impossible to determine. What is certain is that it has enabled NATO governments to avoid the need to match the Soviet Union in terms of conventional weaponry and forces,
with all the economic and political consequences such a policy might involve. In terms of their relative destructive power, nuclear weapons are much less costly than an equivalent conventional force — as the Americans put it, nuclear weapons offer 'more bangs per buck'. Similarly, it is argued by advocates of the flexible response doctrine that any move towards conventional-only defence would have substantial political implications, as it might well entail a return to some form of conscription or national service — much more of a political problem for Western governments than their Communist counterparts. Flexible response, with its combination of nuclear and conventional weaponry and the refusal to enter into any preconditions as to the use of all or any of that weaponry, has relieved NATO governments of the need to divert resources in order to obtain a position of parity with the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces. There can be little doubt that this has been of considerable economic and political benefit to the West European governments in NATO.

The other perceived benefit of flexible response as far as the European members of NATO have been concerned was that it provided 'linkage' between Europe and the United States. The presence of American intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe meant that NATO had an escalatory option which was short of all-out intercontinental nuclear war, and this was felt to enhance the credibility of NATO's deterrent strategy. During the seventies, however, many in NATO (and particularly the European partners) became concerned that a gap was appearing in Nato's capabilities. NATO had short-range
'battlefield') nuclear weapons in place - although there was concern that by their very proximity to Warsaw Pact forces they were vulnerable to surprise attack, which might place NATO commanders in a 'use or lose' situation. NATO also had intermediate nuclear weapons, but these were based on airborne delivery systems (e.g. F11 aircraft) which were ranged against improving air defence systems in the Warsaw Pact. These apparent deficiencies were in themselves enough to prompt a debate within NATO about the need to modernise its intermediate nuclear capability, a debate which became even more pressing when the Soviet Union started to deploy a new generation of intermediate weapons - notably the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 missile, which was both more accurate and more destructive than its predecessor.

The Twin-Track Decision of 1979

The Europeans were worried not only by these new technical developments on the Soviet side, but also by the apparent trend towards some political accommodation between the superpowers (via the SALT II disarmament talks) on intercontinental weapons, which might have the effect of reducing the American commitment to Europe. As Williams has commented

Until the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 the primary concern in Europe was how to prevent superpower collusion. And the SALT II treaty, far from alleviating these worries,
may have intensified them. The omission from SALT II of Soviet missiles aimed only at Western Europe, together with the agreement on limiting the range of the Backfire bombers (which effectively meant that they would only threaten Western Europe and not the United States homeland) seemed to offer further evidence of American unreliability.\(^{(3)}\)

These concerns culminated in the 1979 decision to modernise NATO's intermediate forces by the introduction of Cruise and Pershing II missiles to NATO's armoury. They offered significant tactical advantages over the existing airborne systems. Although Cruise was relatively slow and thus had a flight time of several hours to reach its targets in the East, its ability to fly very low and the accuracy promised by its TERCOM navigation system, made NATO planners confident that any attack based on a wave of Cruise missiles would be certain of enough missiles evading the Warsaw Pact's air defence systems. Pershing II had a more conventional flight pattern, but was extremely fast and accurate; provided it could be based near to its targets, its sheer speed was thought to be sufficient to pose severe problems for any air defence system.

The decision in 1979 to modernise was not only intended to redress a perceived military imbalance between East and West in Europe, but also to signify that NATO could agree on major innovations. This was something which the protracted debate over the deployment of the 'neutron bomb' in Europe between 1977 and 1979 had cast into doubt. The
neutron bomb, designed primarily as an anti-tank weapon, was distinguished by its enhanced radiation capability - that is to say, compared with other nuclear weapons which emit a similar amount of radiation, the neutron bomb's lower levels of blast and fallout mean that it has a relatively less destructive effect on buildings.\((4)\) Because of this, it quickly became dubbed the 'capitalist' bomb, a weapon which killed people while leaving property intact. As Freedman has argued, this was something of an exaggeration, there being no question of buildings being left intact after a neutron bomb attack\((5)\). Nevertheless, it proved a sufficiently powerful political argument such that neither the United States nor the major European allies in NATO were prepared to take a lead in arguing for its deployment in Europe. President Carter decided against deployment in 1978, but the Reagan administration started production of the weapon in 1981, stockpiling it in the United States.

At the same time as deciding to deploy Cruise and Pershing II, NATO indicated that it would be willing to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union to remove all such weapons from Europe - hence the term 'twin-track' which was coined to describe the 1979 decision. The United States did offer its European allies the option of a 'dual-key' (i.e. joint) control over the new weapons, but this was declined by the Europeans - partly because it would have entailed a significant financial contribution to the costs of the new systems, and partly because one of the main concerns of the Europeans was to
reinforce the American commitment to Europe. As Freedman has argued

The whole point about the Cruise and Pershing missiles was that they were designed to increase the nuclear risk to the United States of a land war in Europe.\(^{(6)}\)

The West German government was particularly concerned to maintain this linkage, and agreed to the siting of the Pershing II missiles in Germany, which would maximise the tactical advantage offered by the missile's speed. When it came to the decision on where Cruise was to be based, however, the German government was insistent that Germany should not be the only recipient in NATO. There was apprehension in the German government that were both new systems to be based solely on their territory, they would be singled out for undue pressure from the Soviet Union. Consequently, Britain, Belgium, Holland and Italy were designated as recipients for the 464 Cruise missiles which were to be deployed.

Cruise and Pershing are part of the new generation of nuclear missiles which emerged during the seventies. Together with the American MX system and the Soviet SS-18 and SS-20 systems, they are distinguished from their predecessors primarily by their delivery systems, which are much more accurate and better able to penetrate defensive systems. This was the focus for much of the criticism levelled against Cruise and Pershing II. Their apparent ability to strike at the opposition's missile sites rather than civilian or
industrial targets has led some to label them as 'first-strike' weapons, and to argue that their deployment has opened the way for NATO to adopt a war-fighting strategy. Pershing II was also seen as destabilising because its speed necessitates defensive systems which are based on a 'launch-on-warning' capability - with all the possibilities of human and technical error that this involves. These technical innovations might not have been sufficient in themselves to prompt the wave of protest which has erupted in Europe following the 1979 twin-track decision, but the changing international climate at the end of the seventies put these technological developments in a new light. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the arrival in office of the Thatcher government and the Reagan administration, signalled the end of the era of detente which had characterised much of the seventies. Relations between the superpowers deteriorated amidst talk of 'evil empires', and it came as no surprise that the U.S./Soviet negotiations over intermediate nuclear weapons (which started in 1981 as a result of the twin-track decision) finally ground to a halt in 1983 with no agreement being reached. The failure of these talks meant that in December of 1983 NATO went ahead with its plans to begin the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II in Europe.

Not the least of the problems encountered in these talks was that whilst the Americans conceptu-alised Cruise and Pershing II as intermediate weapons, the Soviet Union argued that they were no different from America's strategic weapons - as they had the ability to strike at the Soviet
homeland. Consequently, the Soviet Union made it clear that it would regard any European-based strike by Cruise or Pershing II as tantamount to direct aggression by the United States, and thus liable to result in a retaliatory strike against both Europe and the United States itself. This was, of course, precisely the kind of linkage between America and European security which the major European partners in NATO had wanted to achieve by modernising the intermediate forces.

Developments and Divisions in the eighties

No sooner had the Europeans established this new dimension of linkage, however, than concern over the reliability of the American nuclear guarantee arose once again, when the Reagan administration outlined its intention to pursue a Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI - 'Star Wars'). In announcing SDI, Reagan conjured up a vision of a defensive system which would erect an impenetrable umbrella over the US as a whole, and thus open the way to the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons throughout the world. Since the President's announcement in 1983, the claims for SDI from members of the Reagan administration have become more muted; they have tended to concentrate on the prospect of SDI protecting America's home-based missile sites rather than American cities, although the President himself appears to retain faith in his original vision of the project. As the project is in its infancy, it is impossible to judge whether or not protection of missile sites is the
real rationale behind the initiative, or whether it is in any case feasible. (At the time of writing, there seems to be a consensus among most European commentators that, even if the concept of defensive systems in space was realised, it would be unlikely to offer much protection against submarine-based attacks, given the ability to mount these from relatively close to the target). Whatever the technical merits or defects of SDI, it has assumed a major political significance in the East-West relationship. The United States has remained firmly committed to the idea, despite scepticism being publicly voiced by West European leaders, and has required its NATO partners to support the proposal by effectively making it an issue of loyalty to the NATO Alliance. The Soviet Union is sufficiently concerned by the prospect of a system which might offer its potential adversary the ability to shield its weapons from attack (and almost certainly involve the Soviet Union in an expensive SDI programme of its own) that Gorbachev was moved to offer the prospect not only of deep cuts in the superpower intercontinental arsenal but also of the removal of all intermediate missiles from Europe, East and West — but initially this offer was made dependent upon the United States agreeing to confine research on SDI to the laboratory phase, and preferably to abandon the project completely.

As with the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II, the Americans can argue with some justification that it took an initiative on their part to bring the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. At both the superpower meetings in 1986, however — at
Geneva and Reykjavik - negotiations broke down because of Soviet insistence on an effective abandonment of SDI as a precondition of other arms control measures, and Reagan's insistence on continuing with a project which he sees as capable of leading to a world free of nuclear weapons. In 1987, the USSR amended its offer, removing the preconditions on SDI; before this happened, however, it was interesting to note the reactions of NATO's European partners to the superpower negotiations in 1986.

Although far from enthusiastic about the concept of SDI, the Europeans voiced serious concerns and reservations about any deal which might involve the removal of all intermediate nuclear weapons from Europe. Almost as soon as the possibility was mentioned by Reagan and Gorbachev, the West German and (to a lesser extent) British and French governments argued that no such move should be contemplated whilst the Soviet Union retained a substantial numerical advantage in short-range nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and, most importantly, conventional forces in Europe. (The French were also worried that Reagan's initiative could lead to the Soviet Union developing its own version of SDI, which could well mean that the French independent nuclear deterrent could no longer penetrate Soviet defences. The British government, anticipating the arrival of the submarine-based Trident system, were much more confident that it could breach virtually any defensive system. As far as they were concerned, the furore over SDI only served to demonstrate the sagacity of opting for the most sophisticated
deterrent available, because it is difficult to predict future technological and political change). Nor was European concern limited to the question of intermediate nuclear weapons. The prospect raised in the superpower meetings during 1986 of deep cuts in intercontinental nuclear weapons met with a firm insistence from European governments that any such reductions should only be undertaken in conjunction with similar cuts in conventional weaponry. Mrs Thatcher was echoing the concern of other European NATO allies (especially West Germany) when she argued that

We can never forget that the frontier of freedom cuts right across our continent, and renders Western Europe vulnerable to attack by conventional forces and chemical weapons in a way which the United States is not.\(^7\)

and she made it clear that whatever the superpowers might speculate about a non-nuclear future, Europeans would continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their defence unless there was a dramatic reduction in the Soviet Union's other offensive capabilities.

The Gorbachev Initiatives

The initiative passed from European hands in 1987, however, when Gorbachev announced that an agreement to remove intermediate nuclear weapons from Europe was no longer dependent upon agreement over SDI. European governments welcomed the revival of the 'zero-zero' option, but also
immediately voiced scepticism and concern over the apparent Soviet superiority in short-range nuclear weapons, the imbalance in conventional forces, and the problems of verification which would be involved in any INF agreement. Gorbachev's response to Western concern over short-range nuclear weapons was to offer to negotiate over the removal of these from Europe as well.

In Britain, the initiatives were welcomed by all the major parties, but with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Mrs. Thatcher, for example, seized the opportunity to argue that it was NATO's 'strength and resolve' in deploying Cruise and Pershing in the first place which had brought about this response from the Soviet Union, but was equally insistent that any agreement on intermediate weapons in isolation from one on short-range weapons (which might pose severe problems when it came to verification procedures) would reduce rather than enhance Britain's security. Despite American pressure on Britain to argue within Europe the case for reductions in both medium and short-range missiles (the Reagan administration being mindful of Mrs. Thatcher's standing in Western Europe as one of the few senior politicians to have been in power throughout the period since NATO's 1979 modernisation), the Thatcher government continued to insist that substantial concessions would have to be secured over the balance of conventional forces before this could be considered a realistic possibility. Even if the Thatcher government was to lend its support to Reagan's desire to reach an agreement on both intermediate and short-range weapons, it was made very clear
that this should not threaten the status of Britain's 'independent' deterrent. It was noteworthy that the White Paper on the Defence Estimates published just before the 1987 general election went to unusual lengths to spell out what appeared to the government to be the advantages of retaining a nuclear deterrent.

The Labour Party hastily (and with little evidence of intra-party consultation) announced that it was prepared to shelve its commitment to remove Cruise from Britain whilst negotiations took place between America and the Soviet Union, albeit with the proviso that, if the negotiations were not successfully concluded within a reasonable time, a Labour government would go ahead with the removal of Cruise anyway. This apparent reversal of party policy was given a guarded approval by CND, which wanted to see a firm time limit set on how long the negotiations would be given to reach a successful conclusion, but was more concerned to see that the INF negotiations did not founder on any insistence that they be linked to a parallel agreement on short-range weapons. The SDP/Liberal Alliance (and particularly David Owen) interpreted the initiative as yet further evidence that, while Britain should remain committed to NATO, there was a growing need for more European cooperation in defence, and a more assertive European attitude towards the United States within the NATO framework.

For the Europeans it is an old dilemma. On the one hand, they wish to preserve the linkage which exists between American and West European security. Moreover, so long as the Soviet Union
maintains strong conventional forces in Eastern Europe - which, given the Soviet Union's relationship with its Warsaw Pact allies, is unlikely to change in the near future - and the Europeans find it politically and economically difficult to match those forces, the major European partners in NATO would prefer that linkage to have an explicit nuclear dimension in the form of American nuclear weapons based in Europe. On the other hand, all the European partners in the Western Alliance have found it necessary, to varying degrees, to distance themselves from at least some aspects of American foreign policy in recent years. European reluctance to follow the American lead in boycotting participation in the Soviet gas pipeline project and the Moscow Olympics are both cases in point, although the most serious rift came over the American raid on Libya in 1986, when only Britain was prepared to give the sort of cooperation the Americans wanted. Of all the major European governments in NATO, the Thatcher administration has been the most reluctant to criticise the United States, but even Britain has tended to side with its European partners over the basic issue of maintaining the U.S./West European nuclear linkage.

Conclusions

Despite the ideological affinity between the Thatcher and Reagan administrations, Britain has clearly continued to conceptualise its defence strategy in terms of NATO membership rather than any exclusive Anglo-American arrangement. Britain's
main NATO commitments - the British Army forces in West Germany and Britain's key role in securing the Eastern Atlantic (Britain providing some two-thirds of NATO's naval and air-maritime capability) - have remained a central part of overall defence strategy. Although protection of Britain's 'independent' interests has also been part of that strategy, this has been accorded less importance than the NATO commitment. It was significant that the most graphic demonstration in recent years that such interests still existed - the deployment of the Falklands task-force in 1982 - could only be undertaken by dint of an agreement among NATO allies that Britain be allowed temporarily to suspend its NATO deployments. There is a clear consensus among Britain's political elite that this commitment to NATO is fundamental and effectively non-negotiable; even the Labour Party makes a point of stressing its commitment to NATO, albeit from a non-nuclear perspective.

Britain's commitment to NATO is such that successive governments have argued that even the 'independent' deterrent should be seen as part of our contribution to the Western Alliance. This is qualified, however, by the proviso that Britain reserves the right to use its deterrent unilaterally, should the situation demand it. As such, Britain is in a unique position among the European allies in NATO; participating fully in NATO, unlike the French, but also possessing its own intercontinental nuclear capability. Unless the Labour Party is returned to power in the next decade - with a clear majority and the resolve to implement its defence policy - this situation is likely to
persist. Despite some unilateralist leanings among Liberal activists, the SDP/Liberal Alliance leadership has made quite clear its commitment to maintaining the 'independent' deterrent, unless there is a fundamental change in the balance of forces between East and West. David Owen's virulent repudiation during the 1987 election campaign of the Conservative charge that the SDP/Liberal Alliance should be seen as unilateralists leaves this in no doubt - although, of course, this may be open to question should the parties merge. The Thatcher government's commitment to Trident has never been seriously in doubt, at least among those closest to the Prime Minister. It was amply demonstrated by Thatcher's visit to Reagan after the Geneva and Reykjavik summits, which she undertook in order to obtain an explicit undertaking from the Americans that their negotiations with the Soviet Union would not result in Trident no longer being available to Britain. Maintaining and modernising one's own nuclear arsenal might well be an effective method of bringing one's opponents to the negotiating table, but in the case of Britain the events of 1986/87 make it clear that most British politicians view superpower accommodation as a potential threat to British security. In this sense, the essentials of Britain's defence policy have remained unchanged over the last twenty five years; a commitment to NATO, certainly, but one which is underpinned by the ability, in the last resort, to deploy nuclear weapons independently of any allies. Thus while protest in other European NATO countries has centred on the issue of American weapons in Europe,
protest in Britain has also been directed towards 'British' nuclear weapons. It is this which gives the British peace movement a distinctive character, as there has always been more potential for unilateralist decisions. Although Britain's peace movement in the eighties has expended at least as much (if not more) effort on opposing American weapons in Britain and Europe as it has on Britain's 'own' nuclear weapons, the futility of an 'independent' nuclear deterrent is a central plank in CND's platform, and was a crucial argument during the movement's first wave of popularity in the fifties and sixties. It is to this first wave that we now turn.

NOTES

5. Ibid., p.97.
6. Ibid., p.98.
7. Speech to the Lord Mayor's Banquet, The Guardian, 11.11.86.
The birth and growth of CND can only be appreciated in the context of the world balance of nuclear weapons at the time. During the late fifties, Britain was still indisputably a force to be reckoned with in nuclear terms. It was one of only three nuclear powers, and whilst the other two had nuclear arsenals which were superior to Britain's both in size and the technical capabilities of their delivery systems, Britain was not nearly so far behind them as it is today. The leaders of the newly formed anti-nuclear movement in the fifties could argue with some credibility that unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain would constitute an influential example which might open the way for America and the Soviet Union to follow suit. This gave the campaign a motivation which, whilst not lacking from the movement in the eighties, no longer has quite the same force because of the proliferation of nuclear-armed states.

Anti-nuclear protest on any significant scale did not emerge in Britain until the mid-fifties. Presumably to some extent this was the result of a legacy of patriotic feeling after the war, and a belief that the American nuclear attacks on Japan
had shortened the course of the conflict. Domestically, of course, there was little public awareness of Britain's developing nuclear capability, as successive governments kept their policy shrouded from Parliamentary and public scrutiny. The Labour governments of 1945-51 may have pursued a comparatively radical strategy with regard to the domestic economy and society, but their foreign and defence policy was much more conventional. Under the guidance of a leading member of the right-wing in the Labour party - Ernest Bevin, noted for his pragmatism and anti-communism - Labour implemented a foreign and defence policy which centred upon the development of British nuclear weapons and a determination to forge close links between British, American and European security. Although there was some disquiet among the left of the party at this apparent lack of a 'socialist' dimension to Labour's defence and foreign policy, this never developed into any cohesive or significant opposition.

As was the case with the second wave of protest, the first wave was prompted by a combination of political and technical developments. On the technical front, Britain was developing its hydrogen-bomb capability during the fifties, and this necessitated a series of atomic tests. These attracted more public attention than the on-going development of weapon delivery systems, not least because the RAF did not obtain a viable delivery system until 1956. On the political front, the virtually simultaneous events of the Suez debacle and the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising prompted a resurgence of interest on the left in a radical reappraisal of Britain's role in the world, the nature of Communist society and the
impact of nuclear weaponry on international relations. Disillusioned British communists found common cause with those in the Labour party who saw Suez as irrefutable proof that Britain needed to make radical changes in its foreign and defence policy.

The Birth of CND

When protest did develop, it centred around the issue of nuclear tests. In 1957, the National Committee for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapon Tests (NCANWT) was formed to coordinate local groups which had started to campaign on the issue. In the same year the Emergency Committee for Direct Action against Nuclear War (DAC) was also formed, with the aim of coordinating and encouraging non-violent direct action (NVDA) against nuclear tests. Although neither organisation attracted much public support in numerical terms, they did ensure that the issue became part of the agenda for discussion in British politics, at least among the left. Concern over testing was not reflected in the major parties, however. 1957 saw the Conservative government give explicit support in its Defence White Paper to the concept of British nuclear weapons. It was also the year in which the Labour Party Conference defeated by a 7-1 majority a resolution rejecting the testing, manufacture or use of nuclear weapons. It was during this Conference that Aneurin Bevan - the leading figure on the left of the party, and shadow Foreign Secretary - caused surprise and dismay among unilateralists by arguing against them, on the grounds that unilateral nuclear disarmament by
Britain would severely weaken its influence in any international arms talks. As he put it, Labour should not adopt a policy which would mean a British Foreign Secretary 'going naked into the international conference chamber'.

Such an attitude on the part of Labour's leadership meant that anti-nuclear protest developed in the extra-Parliamentary sphere. It became a phenomenon on the national political scene when some notable intellectual figures gave their support. In 1957, the *New Statesman* published an article by J.B. Priestley which argued the unilateralist case. The response to this article was such that meetings were convened between interested members of Britain's intelligentsia (notably Bertrand Russell, Sir Julian Huxley, Priestley and the *New Statesman*'s editor, Kingsley Martin) and leading members of the NCANWT, which led to the formation in January 1958 of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the NCANWT merging with the new organisation. Bertrand Russell became President, Canon Collins the Chairman, and Peggy Duff (from NCANWT) the organising secretary. As Taylor and Pritchard have observed

> there is no doubt that the CND leadership constituted a glittering array of the nation's progressive intelligentsia. Elitist and unrepresentative of the Movement's rank and file it may have been, but nobody could deny its immense and charismatic impact.(1)

It seems debatable whether the founding members of the new Campaign actually expected to attract a considerable rank and file following, but the response to their first public meeting was such
that from that moment on it was clear that CND was to be something other than a conventional elite pressure group. As Rose has noted, most of the newly appointed executive approached this first meeting with the expectation that the campaign would be calling for general nuclear disarmament by all the nuclear powers. (2) In the event, however, enthusiasm for a campaign based on unilateral disarmament by Britain was such that this became adopted as the new movement's principal aim. Although the statement of policy aims included a call to other nuclear powers to renounce their weapons, clear priority was given to the demand that Britain should renounce unconditionally the use or production of nuclear weapons, and refuse to allow their use by others in its defence. This latter aspect was given additional weight by the Campaign's Annual Conference in 1960, which backed a resolution calling for British withdrawal from any alliance based on the use of nuclear weapons (i.e. NATO).

The Committee of 100

One of the first tactical decisions the new Campaign had to take was what stance it would adopt towards the type of protest activities being mounted by the DAC. As Taylor and Pritchard have argued, CND's executive was reluctant to become involved in what it saw as "street politics". (3) The DAC organised a march from London to Aldermaston, which CND endorsed but stressed should not be seen as a CND demonstration. This first
Aldermaston march was such a success, however, (attracting up to 10,000 participants) that CND took over the organisation of subsequent annual marches; during the early sixties, these attracted between 50,000 and 150,000 supporters, although there was a sharp decline after 1963. The tension between those who preferred advancing the unilateralist argument via the conventional channels of access to decision-makers (which were relatively open, given the social position of the intelligentsia at the head of CND(4)), and those who were convinced of the necessity to adopt NVDA tactics to make their case, did not disappear. In 1960, it erupted into public conflict. Persuaded by the arguments of primarily the younger supporters of CND, Bertrand Russell resigned his Presidency of the Campaign and formed the Committee of 100 for the specific purpose of organising NVDA on a national scale. The manner in which Russell resigned led to public acrimony between himself and Canon Collins, which was given considerable exposure by the media. Many of the DAC's leading activists switched their support to the Committee of 100 immediately, and the DAC effectively merged with Russell's organisation within a year of its formation. The Committee of 100 mounted a number of actions during 1960-61, which attracted thousands of supporters willing to participate in NVDA (normally taking the form of 'sit-down' protests in public places) and resulted in hundreds of arrests.

Taylor and Pritchard have argued convincingly that the Committee of 100 incorporated a number of different ideological perspectives, ranging from those like Russell who took the essentially pragmatic view the NVDA was a good way of demonstrating the urgency of the nuclear issue, to those
like the young and influential American, Ralph Schoenman, who conceptualised NVDA as leading to the eventual paralysis of the political system.(5) Whatever their internal divisions, the Committee of 100 was united in its rejection of the strategy adopted by those who remained in CND. The Committee of 100 was a pacifist organisation, and many of its supporters saw nuclear weapons as a direct consequence of a particular form of social structure - one which legitimised violence. They were anarcho-pacifists, who saw little point in pursuing their argument through the conventional channels and placed their faith in persuasion at the grass-roots level(6); propagation of NVDA could eventually bring about the creation of a non-violent society.

Under the leadership of Canon Collins, CND was distinguished from the Committee of 100 not only by its insistence that it was not an exclusively pacifist grouping, but also by its view that unilateral nuclear disarmament was a single and distinct issue best pursued within the existing political system. On the basis of extensive interview evidence, Taylor and Pritchard offer a persuasive argument that most of the leadership of CND not only failed to anticipate the transformation from an elite pressure group into a mass-based campaign, but actually viewed this development with some trepidation and considerable unease(7). Nuclear disarmament was seen as primarily a moral issue, and to the extent that CND's leaders had a political strategy, it was to convince - by reasoned argument - leading members of the Labour party (and, if possible, of the 'Establishment') of
the moral rectitude of unilateralism. Even if they had wanted to, CND's leaders would have found it very difficult to organise any systematic effort to recruit support within the Labour Party. The movement had no formal membership (this was not introduced until 1966), and little in the way of organisational resources. Arguably, this lack of bureaucratisation and formalised structure was attractive to many of the movement's adherents, who welcomed the opportunity to make a public demonstration of their personal beliefs in a way which was not so possible in conventional party politics. It did mean, however, that CND's leadership had little alternative but to pursue their preferred strategy of seeking to win over Labour's leadership rather than mount a campaign throughout all levels of the party. In the event, this strategy was soon rendered largely irrelevant, as the issue of unilateral disarmament was taken up at all levels of the Labour Party as part of the on-going struggle between different factions of the party during the late fifties and early sixties.

Labour and Unilateralism

The disagreements between the 'fundamentalists' (in favour of retaining Labour's explicit commitment to large-scale nationalisation) and the 'revisionists' (who argued the electoral advantages of a more moderate approach) have been too well documented elsewhere to bear repetition in this context. As is common in the Labour Party, a debate which was ostensibly about ideological issues also incorporated disagreements about the relative authority within the party of its leader.
(Hugh Gaitskell), the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Party Conference, Gaitskell angered those on the left of the party when, after the Conservatives' third election victory in a row in 1959, he attempted but failed to persuade the party to tone down Clause Four of the party constitution (committing the party to large-scale nationalisation). This caused those on the left to question Gaitskell's suitability as a leader of a socialist party, and many of those in the centre to become apprehensive about the effect of Gaitskell's style of leadership on party unity. Unilateralism was taken up by the left in the party not least because it was known that Gaitskell was anti-unilateralist. Although many left-wingers within the party were disposed to favour unilateralism anyway, the issue was only pursued with any enthusiasm once it assumed symbolic importance in the more general intra-party conflict. As Parkin notes

The case for unilateralism henceforth became not merely the case for ridding the country of the Bomb, but for ridding the Party of Gaitskell and the revisionist and anti-Conference tendencies with which he was identified. It was mainly for this reason that the unilateralist conflict was conducted with such venom and bitterness throughout the early nineteen-sixties in comparison with the period before Labour's election defeat . . . The party unilateralists' attitude towards Gaitskell contrasted markedly with their attitude towards Bevan when he had opposed them in the previous confrontation in 1957.
Although Bevan's defence of the Bomb certainly created a sense of shock and disappointment among the Left, it did not engender the kind of hostility which was loosed upon Gaitskell. It was only when the anti-Bomb movement inside the Party became linked with the defence of traditional socialism and Party democracy (the threat to which was symbolised in the person of Gaitskell) that it became powerful enough to mount a definite challenge to the leadership.(8)

Unilateralism became the focus of this discontent in the party during 1960-61. In the summer of 1960, four of the six largest unions affiliated to the Labour Party voted at their national conferences to support the unilateralist line - the Transport and General Workers, the engineers, the shopworkers and the railwaymen. This prompted the British Communist Party to reverse its previous policy of endorsing the Soviet Union's campaign for a moratorium on testing rather than unilateralism, and to encourage its supporters within the trade union movement to throw their weight behind the unilateralist cause. As Parkin argues, the Communist Party saw the possibility of mobilising enough support around the unilateralism issue to force the defeat and resignation of Gaitskell, which was their primary motive, and their conversion to unilateralism ended their isolation as the only significant organisation on the left in British politics not to have adopted the twin stances of pro-unilateralism and anti-Gaitskellism.(9)

A combination of those who accepted the moral arguments of CND and those whose support was more tactically motivated (with a considerable degree of
overlap between the two) was sufficient to see the 1960 Trades Union Congress pass a unilateralist motion, followed by the famous victory for the unilateralists at Labour's 1960 Conference, when a multilateralist policy was rejected and a unilateralist resolution from the Transport and General Workers' Union approved. Gaitskell's reaction was to make a stand on the issue, not least because it had become a test of where effective authority over party policy rested - with the Conference or with the parliamentary party and its leader. There was little enthusiasm for unilateralism within the parliamentary party; Rose notes that there was a hard core of only some 50 unilateralists in the PLP. Gaitskell openly rejected the Conference's endorsement of unilateralism, pledging himself to 'fight and fight and fight again' against the decision, and finding support among the right in the party who saw unilateralism as a good issue on which to take a stand asserting the qualified independence of the PLP from the Conference.

The debate which ensued in the party did not rest solely upon the merits or otherwise of unilateral nuclear disarmament; the tactic of those seeking to reverse the 1960 Conference decision was to put more emphasis upon what they perceived as the over-riding need to re-establish party unity. Ordinary members of the party found themselves faced with two conflicting claims upon their sense of values; the moral absolutism of unilateralism as against the traditional importance of unity within the Labour movement. In the event, unity proved to have a stronger claim, and Gaitskell was successful
in persuading enough delegates to the 1961 Labour Conference such that the unilateral decision was overturned. The crucial constituency in this struggle was the trade union movement, with its predominantly working class membership - a movement with a socio-economic profile very different from that of CND. The moral emphasis of CND's arguments may well have served to unite otherwise disparate elements among the radical middle class, but there was little evidence to suggest that it commended itself to a working class that was enjoying the benefits of economic recovery and a welfare state. Moreover, Gaitskell resisted any attempt to compromise on the issue, and turned the whole debate into an issue of confidence in his leadership - and so the union leaders were left in no doubt that an endorsement of the 1960 decision would serve only to prolong Labour's internal divisions. In Parkin's view, it was not surprising that union leaders abandoned unilateralism as readily as they had endorsed it the previous year - whereas in 1960 a vote against the Bomb entailed a salutary rap on the leader's knuckles for his revisionist flirtations, a similar vote in 1961 would have entailed the complete disruption of the Labour Party.\(^{11}\)

Whilst there had been some effort made to argue the multilateralist case purely on its merits within the party during 1961, there seems little doubt that those arguing this case (primarily the Campaign for Democratic Socialism) were in effect fighting on the wider ground of establishing who ran the party rather than just the specifics of nuclear disarmament. Parkin offers the convincing
argument that events within the party following Gaitskell's death and Wilson's accession to the leadership in 1963 confirm this thesis that unilateralism was little more than a peg on which much wider intra-party disagreements rested. Although Labour's defence policy did not change significantly once Wilson became leader, enthusiasm for unilateralism was substantially diminished under a new Party leader whose political record and attitudes were far more attractive to the Left, the latter with surprising haste dropped their militant posture on the Bomb and became apologists for the same defence policy they had opposed under Gaitskell. The anti-Bomb crusade in the Labour Party died with Hugh Gaitskell and the open challenge to traditional socialist concepts with which he was identified.(12)

The very small majority of the first Wilson Government from 1964-66 would have appeared to offer the opportunity for unilateralists within the Parliamentary party to bring pressure to bear on that Government. In the event, however, Wilson's only gesture towards unilateralism (reducing the number of Polaris submarines to be deployed from five to four) was met with acquiescence within the party.

The Decline of CND

Not surprisingly, Labour's downgrading of the
importance of unilateralism in the year preceding its electoral victory, its subsequent espousal in office of multilateralism and Atlanticism, and its maintenance of Britain's nuclear deterrent, all served to confirm the suspicions of those committed to Direct Action that the Parliamentary avenue was inherently flawed. In the Campaign itself, the level of energy and commitment declined sharply after 1962, with much lower levels of attendance on demonstrations and actions. Although it is difficult to establish a firm causal relationship, changes in the international climate in the mid- to late sixties would seem to have had some impact. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 dramatically highlighted the potential dangers of the nuclear age, but its resolution also seemed to suggest that super-power leaders could ultimately be relied upon to avert disaster. The conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 (banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere) lent credence to the idea that multilateral agreements on significant matters were attainable - an argument further strengthened by the Non-Proliferation treaty of 1968 (as part of which the existing nuclear powers pledged themselves to seek an end to the nuclear arms race via multilateral negotiation) and the SALT-1 agreement of 1972 which committed the United States and the Soviet Union to limiting their deployments of Anti-Ballistic missile systems. Closer to home, the escalation of protest over the Vietnam war meant that many of Britain's middle class youth devoted their energies to this issue rather than nuclear disarmament - as with the Labour party, it was not that they came to reject the unilateralist message, but that they were no longer prepared to prioritise it. Media coverage of Vietnam (espe-
cially on television) demonstrated the horrors of modern conventional warfare. The 'new Left' became preoccupied with imperialism and the Third World, and Che Guevara seemed a more relevant figure than Canon Collins or Bertrand Russell. Active support for the Campaign shrank to a few thousand by the mid-sixties, and stayed at this level throughout the seventies. Among political and social institutions, only the Communist party and the Quakers continued unabated their efforts within and on behalf of the movement - neither institution being noted for attracting much support or sympathy among those who spawned the 'student revolution' of the late sixties.

Opinions vary as to the underlying causes of the Campaign's decline during the sixties and seventies. Writing in the mid-sixties, before the real nature of the Campaign's demise was clear, Parkin argued that the largely middle class composition of the Campaign's supporters led it to adopt an 'expressive' rather than 'instrumental' style of politics - that is, one in which adherence to principle was more important than concrete achievements. He acknowledged that this could well have been functional to the survival of the movement in the face of a lack of specific achievements, but went on to stress the 'symbolic' nature of the Campaign's protest. He argued that Labour Party activists were not alone in seizing upon the unilateralist issue as a symbol for wider discontents - for example, Marxists employed the Bomb as a symbol of all the worst ills of capitalist society and activists within the Churches could use the moral force of the unilateralist message to
prompt their leaders into public pronouncements upon national rather than purely personal issues of morality. The clear implication of his argument was that the issue of the Bomb was one that was always susceptible to being replaced by newer and more potent symbols of alienation and protest. Writing at the end of the seventies, Taylor and Pritchard argued that the Campaign's failure (and, indeed, disinclination) to develop a mass base of support among the working class, particularly the trade unions, was a crucial debility; they concluded that

the lesson that is evident ... is that moral action and motivation alone and divorced from a political strategy are always ineffective in achieving political change.(13)

Conclusions

Expressive politics, a middle class membership and an insistence upon a moral dimension may all have contributed to the Campaign's failure to promote radical change in Britain's defence policy, but equally they ensured that unilateral nuclear disarmament never completely lost its attraction as a rallying point and symbol for those who espoused radical causes in British politics. CND's impact on the political culture from the late fifties onwards far outweighed its impact on the policy agenda, and its symbolic importance was such that, despite its shrinking support, it remained a widely known reference point in British political life. When technological and political developments occurred in the late seventies which once again brought the nuclear issue to the forefront in
British politics, CND was the obvious repository for protest on the issue, and it is on this 'second wave' in the movement's existence that we now focus our attention.

NOTES

4. Taylor & Pritchard note that 'Lord Home readily confirmed that the eminence of the Movement's leadership would have guaranteed them access to any Prime Minister.' Ibid., p.56.
5. Ibid., p. 79-83.
6. See the comments by Pat Arrowsmith, a prominent NVDA activist during both waves of CND, in Taylor and Pritchard, Ibid., pp.75-6.
7. Ibid., pp.53-8.
8. F. Parkin, Middle Class Radicalism, p.116-7.
9. Ibid., pp.82-3.
Chapter Four

CND'S MEMBERS: THE 1985 NATIONAL MEMBERSHIP SURVEY

It is generally agreed that any social movement has to rely heavily upon its membership as its main 'resource'. It may have other resources - money or offices, for example - but in the final analysis a social movement depends upon converting nonadherents into supporters, and looks to those supporters to use their time, energy, contacts and status in other organisations to impress the movement's case upon political authorities. Some movements are fortunate enough to include among their membership recognised experts in their field; this expertise not only enhances the status of the movement, but may prompt the political authorities into granting recognition or concessions to the movement in order to benefit from such expertise. This is not the case with CND. It does include among its membership some with an impressive technical knowledge of the whole field of nuclear weapons and indeed nuclear energy as a whole. The best example is SANA (Scientists Against Nuclear Arms), an independent organisation of scientists formed in 1981 which works closely with CND, and which is highly influential in CND's campaigning to persuade Local Authorities to pursue a Nuclear Free Zone policy.
and not participate in national civil defence planning. Its members also provide the technical material for much of CND's publicity work. Its expertise is not sought after by the government, however, which considers itself to be the sole source of authoritative information in this area.

Aside from subjective impressions gained through contact with local groups and individual members, national CND has very little information on its own membership. It does not attempt to impose any conditions upon joining, and its records are limited to names, addresses and certain basic subscription payment categories. Even these are regarded as confidential, and such information is never disclosed if it would enable individuals to be identified. All that can be said about the total membership of national CND at the end of 1986 is that it numbered around 85,000, was based very largely in England rather than the rest of the U.K., and contained a sizeable number of young people. According to CND's own records, 89 per cent of its national members lived in England, 6 per cent in Scotland, 5 per cent in Wales and less than 1 per cent in Ireland. A third of the total membership lived in London and the South-East. Just under 20 per cent fell into the Student/Youth category, and a further 12 per cent were unwaged. More information than this is simply not available.

In order to obtain more information, a sample survey was undertaken at the end of 1985. This comprised a postal questionnaire (see appendix) sent to a randomly generated 1 per cent of the national membership, which produced a response rate of around 65 per cent. CND's membership has, of course, been surveyed before. Parkin has provided an impressive account of the movement in the
sixties (1); Taylor and Pritchard have surveyed the subsequent experience of the sixties' membership (2); more recently, CND itself commissioned a survey of its current membership in 1982 (3). CND's rapid growth in the eighties, however, meant that even between 1982 and 1985 the membership had grown by almost 200 per cent, so clearly there was the possibility that the nature and character of the group had changed as it had grown.

In general terms, all three of previous surveys produced very similar findings. As in the sixties, CND's members in 1982 were overwhelmingly middle class and predominantly potential labour voters. Data are not available for the sixties, but in the early eighties members were also fairly evenly balanced between the sexes, and concentrated in the 25-40 age-group. Most national members were active in other movements or groups - for example, about one-third belonged to a trade union, about one-quarter to a political party (mainly Labour), and about one-fifth to a church - and overall, nearly two-thirds were also members of at least one other organisation. Educational work and big public events were considered by members to be of more importance than non-violent direct action. In short, Parkin's portrayal of CND membership in the sixties as being comprised largely of the educated middle class clustered in a comparatively narrow range of occupations (especially the welfare, education and creative sectors) still held true some twenty years later.

The first point to note about the 1985 results is that the massive influx of new members between 1982 and 1985 has had little or no impact on the character and nature of the movement. In short, CND has attracted many more people, but they have
come from the same social strata as before — middle-aged, middle-class and well-educated. CND has indubitably been successful in tapping an already rich vein of recruitment, but has had little return on its efforts to attract more support outside the educated middle class. Having said that, one should not be left with the impression that CND's membership is an entirely homogeneous group; it does attract some working class support, it does have substantial representation from both the young and the elderly, it does contain Alliance and Green supporters as well as Labour voters, levels of activism and commitment to the cause of unilateralism do vary among the membership, and so on. These differences are examined in more detail below, but the second striking point to emerge from the 1985 survey is just how little variation in attitudes arises from these different components in the movement. Most of CND's members are involved with movements and groups other than CND, and thus may be subject to cross-pressures, yet relatively little evidence emerges to suggest that this is the cause of any serious internal divisions within CND.

Demographic Data

Just under half of the 1985 respondents were in the 25-40 age band, as was the case in 1982. Participation by this age group in other protest or social movements is common, both in the U.K. and throughout Western Europe. Analysts have termed them the 'protest generation', referring to the wave of protest activity among (largely middle-class) youth in the sixties, the assumption being
that this experience paved the way for the growth of new social movements in the seventies and eighties. As we shall see, this generation is now well integrated into the social and economic structure. CND also attracts many young people, who have yet to attain the economic security enjoyed by their older counterparts. Despite this, however, younger members (those under 25) do not appear to be alienated from mainstream politics, only 3 per cent of them indicating that they would abstain in a general election, and a majority (61 per cent) opting for Labour. Only 4 per cent identified their parents as their main reason for joining CND, whilst 13 per cent cited moral reasons and 12 per cent friends' influence. Amongst the older members (those over 40), although 20 per cent were members before 1980, only 11 per cent of them (a mere 2 per cent of all respondents) had joined during CND's first wave of activity in the fifties and sixties.

The sex balance has also remained unchanged since the early eighties, there being an almost perfect 50/50 split between men and women. This high proportion of women is a distinctive feature of CND, and, unlike some other similar movements in other countries, is also reflected in the distribution of offices in national CND. Table 4.1 illustrates the breakdown by age and sex of the 1985 respondents:
As can be seen, the parity between the sexes remains virtually constant throughout the age range. Reflecting the growth in membership, 58 percent of the respondents had joined since the
beginning of 1983. A third of this new membership came from the under 25 age group, but otherwise there are no significant differences in terms of age or sex between this group and the whole sample population.

Education and Occupation

In his study of the membership in the sixties, Parkin discovered clear evidence to support his hypothesis that the main basis of support for CND was located in the educated middle classes. The growth in the membership since then has not altered this. In 1985, 57 per cent of respondents held either a degree or diploma; only 15 per cent completed their education at or before the age of 16. Sex is not a significant area of difference – 56 per cent of women held diplomas or degrees and 14 per cent completed their education at or before 16. Compared with Taylor and Pritchard's data relating to the 1958-1965 membership, not only has the proportion of women in the contemporary CND risen from a third to a half, they are also now as well educated as their male counterparts – whereas in the sixties "women did significantly less well in educational terms".(4)

As might be expected with this kind of educational profile, CND's members are predominantly middle class. 85 per cent of respondents provided information on their present or previous occupation. Of these, 74 per cent (63 per cent of all respondents) were classified as having middle class occupations – either at present or at some point in the past. A further 22 per cent had skilled manual or manual occupations (skilled
manual outnumbering manual in a ratio of four to one), and 5 per cent were unemployed or retired. In terms of the broad middle class/working class divide, there was no significant difference between men and women - the latter have apparently been able to translate their improved educational performance into similar work experience to their male equivalents. Of all those respondents holding a degree and/or a diploma, only 6 per cent fell into the skilled manual/manual category; for the non-graduates, the corresponding figure was 51 per cent. Excluding those under 25 (almost half of whom did not give a response on this question), age had little impact on the occupational distribution. 73 per cent of those aged between 25 and 40 held or used to hold middle class occupations, and 72 per cent of those aged over 40.

In the light of both Parkin's findings and more recent research on voting behaviour generally in Britain it was hypothesised that public sector occupations would be a significant feature of the sample, and that moreover occupations in what Parkin termed the "welfare and creative" sectors would predominate. The 1985 data illustrates that there has been relatively little change since the sixties. Asked which sector they were employed in, 37 per cent responded by indicating the public sector, 26 per cent the private sector, with a further 37 per cent not responding to this question. Women were more likely than men to be employed in the public sector. Excluding non-responses to this question (35 per cent of men, 39 per cent of women), then 67 per cent of women indicated the public sector as compared with 52 per cent of men. Those lower down the occupational scale were more likely to have worked or be working
in the private sector. Excluding the 31 per cent who did not respond to this question, 64 per cent of the skilled manual/manual category were employed in the private sector - the equivalent percentage for those in the middle-class occupational group being 35 per cent.

Given this clustering of (past or present) middle-class occupations in the public sector, it was decided to sub-divide the occupational data into four categories - education (teachers, lecturers, etc.) caring (social workers, the medical profession, etc.), scientific and other professional. This produces a breakdown as shown in Table 4.2. There is a clear concentration of membership in non-commercial occupations. The high number of respondents employed in education is striking. Women outnumbered men in this category (57 per cent to 41 per cent), and perhaps surprisingly 12 per cent of this group were employed in the private educational sector. Less surprising was the result that 75 per cent favoured Labour as their electoral choice, 29 per cent being members of the Labour Party and a further 12 per cent past members. Taking just the two most obvious non-commercial categories - education and caring - then (excluding the 15 per cent non-respondents) no less than 44 per cent of all respondents fall under this heading. Given that at least some respondents in other occupational categories are likely to be involved in non-commercial work, then it seems reasonable to hypothesise that about half of the respondents are or were involved in non-commercial work.

In short then, the data analysed so far suggests a preponderence of CND members who are well educated and middle class, and more likely
than not to be employed in non-commercial work in

TABLE 4.2

CND Members: Past or Present Occupation (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professional</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Middle Class</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed/Retired</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the public sector. This offers further confirmation of the observations made by both Parkin and Taylor and Pritchard that support for CND should not be equated with alienation or exclusion from 'respectable' positions in the economic and social structure. On the contrary, CND's members are concentrated in occupations which may not be among
the most highly remunerated in society, but which are generally held to involve considerable responsibility and commensurate social status.

Political Affiliations

In terms of current thinking on voting behaviour, it is hard to know what party preference to expect from such a group - different methodological approaches could all lead to different hypotheses. In the case of CND members, however, any lengthy discussion of these competing approaches would have little point; most students of electoral behaviour would agree that, at least for some voters, issue salience is likely to be the main determinant of voting choice - and it seems reasonable to hypothesise that those who have expressed their commitment to a single cause group like CND are likely to figure among such voters. Nuclear disarmament is an issue on which there are important divisions among the parties, at least to the extent of it producing a clear cleavage between the Conservative party and the other major parties. The cleavage between Labour and the Alliance parties on this issue is less clear-cut, but there can be little doubt that Labour is perceived, both inside and outside CND, as the party most clearly identified with the aims of CND. The Green party may have a manifesto and ideology which is in fact a closer match to CND's position than the Labour party's, but Labour is still seen as the party most likely to deliver the desired outcome on nuclear disarmament. The breakdown of voting preference among the 1985 sample, therefore, contains few surprises - see Table 4.3.
TABLE 4.3

CND Membership - Voting Preferences (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th>Working Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (e.g. Nat.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wouldn't Vote</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 620 310 306 386 118

The first point to note is the very small number of respondents who are unsure of their voting intention or who would abstain. As we shall see in more detail subsequently, CND members participate avidly in what might be termed 'conventional' political activity. The clear majority preference for Labour is unaffected by class or sex; similarly, age makes little difference, support for Labour staying within the 60-70% band across all the age groups. Neither is education a significant differentiator; graduates and non-graduates proffer virtually identical support for
Labour (68 per cent and 69 per cent respectively). Support for the Alliance and Green parties shows a little more variation. Alliance support tends to be found amongst the older, male, middle-class group, whereas Green supporters tend to be found in the younger age groups. Even these variations are relatively slight, as Table 4.4 demonstrates, and in any case the variations are in accordance with the pattern of national support for these parties.

**TABLE 4.4**

Alliance, Green and Labour Voters in CND (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Green</th>
<th>Labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 and under</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 91, 61, 415

88
Support for the Conservative Party is minimal, as expected. Perhaps more noteworthy, in view of the claims sometimes made about left-wing influence in CND, is the equally low level of support for the Communist Party - although, of course, data on voting preference does not provide an indication of the strength of left-wing commitment among Labour supporters.

Party membership, as distinct from support, reveals a similar pattern. Labour again predominates, with 25 per cent of the 1985 respondents being Labour party members; membership of other parties is insignificant (e.g. Green Party - 3 per cent, Alliance parties - 2 per cent). Most Labour party members (71 per cent) held middle-class occupations, with only 17 per cent being skilled manual or manual workers. Very few seemed to have taken their party membership as a cue for joining CND - only 3 per cent cited the Labour party as their main reason for joining the Campaign; moreover, only 39 per cent claimed to work on behalf of CND within the party. Just under 10 per cent of the respondents had been members of the Labour Party, but had relinquished their membership. Only one had joined another party (the Greens), and most (63 per cent) still gave Labour as their voting choice. Amongst those who had deserted Labour completely (only some 3 per cent of all respondents), the Green party attracted twice as many as the Alliance. More interesting than the distribution between parties is the result that two-thirds of the respondents did not belong to any political party. Given the decline in party membership across the major parties in national terms over the last twenty years, this is perhaps understandable. Nevertheless, it raises the
question of to what extent CND members are motivated to join or support organisations other than CND.

Membership of other groups and campaigns

Respondents were asked about their membership of institutionalised groups and more loosely organised campaigns. 37 per cent of respondents belonged to a trade union, and a further 24 per cent to a professional association. Union membership was actually slightly higher among those with middle class occupations than among those with skilled manual or manual employment, as (predictably) is membership of a professional association. Given the growth in middle class trade unionism in Britain from the seventies on, this is not an unexpected result. 65 per cent of trade unionists had obtained a degree or diplomas, and 50 per cent were employed in education or the caring professions. 78 per cent were Labour voters, and 40 per cent members of the party. Only two respondents were members of the Communist party. 30 per cent of the respondents belonged to a voluntary organisation of some kind, and 9 per cent (17 per cent of women) to a women's group. Asked whether they utilised membership of these organisations to work within them for the cause of nuclear disarmament, the majority of respondents offered no answer. Only 8 per cent claimed any such activity within trade unions, 7 per cent within voluntary organisations, and less than 5 per cent within women's groups or professional associations. This contrasts with the 1982 survey, when Nias found that a third of his sample claimed to work actively for CND in the
It is impossible to derive from the data available any satisfactory causal explanation for this apparent lack of proselytising enthusiasm among CND members. One contributory factor may be the nature of the organisations themselves, trade unions and professional associations in particular choosing to operate in a more formalised and bureaucratised manner than CND members are used to in the peace movement. CND members certainly display a marked enthusiasm for campaigning activity similar to that mounted by CND. 60 per cent of respondents had supported public campaigns other than those mounted by CND in recent years, with gender, occupation and class making little difference to this participation rate. The most popular campaigns were those associated with protection of the environment (for example, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth) and what might loosely be termed moral campaigns (for example, Anti-Apartheid and Third World groups) - the former attracted 22 per cent of those responding to the question and the latter some 29 per cent. Left-wing political campaigns (for example, against cuts in the education or welfare services) and trade union campaigns (especially the miners' strike) attracted significant levels of support - 16 per cent and 11 per cent of those responding respectively - but these figures do not bear out the popular image of CND members as the agit-prop element of the left, in Britain. Very few CND members who did support other campaigns were prepared to prioritise them over the cause of nuclear disarmament; 9 per cent of respondents were engaged in other campaigns more important to them than CND, whereas 34 per cent considered their work for CND to be more important
than any other campaigning, and 13 per cent gave all their campaigning activity an equal priority.

Religious Belief

One social institution for which one might expect to find a significant level of support among CND members is the church. Surveys in the sixties found that around 40 per cent of their respondents in CND professed active religious beliefs. Nias, however, found only 21 per cent of his respondents in 1982 to be church members, and only 23 per cent of the 1985 respondents were practising members of any church or religious denomination. Of these, 37 per cent were members of the Church of England, 25 per cent Roman Catholics and 10 per cent Quakers. The Methodist Church might rank among its numbers the present chair of CND, but they only account for 6 per cent of the actively religious in CND. The religious element in CND, however, do demonstrate some willingness to work for nuclear disarmament within their Churches - 30 per cent indicated that they were active in this way, and Christian CND is certainly one of the more active sections within CND. There was relatively less enthusiasm for the Labour Party, 53 per cent being Labour voters and 16 per cent party members, a further 11 per cent being ex-members of the party. Although 41 per cent of this group were aged over 40, only 9 per cent were long-standing members of the Campaign, with the vast majority (89 per cent) joining during the eighties.
Pacifism

Pacifism is another attribute which one might expect to find among CND's membership, although it must be remembered that complete pacifism is not a part of CND's ideological aims, which are concerned only with weapons of mass destruction. Almost half of the 1985 respondents pronounced themselves to be pacifists, without any qualifications. There was a slight bias towards women within this sub-group (58 per cent female, 42 per cent male), but otherwise no significant variations in terms of age, class, education or voting preference when compared with the total sample. One might expect to find a correlation between pacifism and religious belief, but only 28 per cent of those espousing pacifism were also practising church members.

Participation in 'Conventional' politics

Whatever their beliefs, CND's members are generally active in what might be termed 'conventional' politics. There has been a tendency in the past to assume that people who became involved in protest politics were, almost by definition, alienated from more conventional avenues of political participation. More recent research, however - in particular, the work of Barnes and Kaase(5) - has argued the opposite. Their thesis is that 'conventional' and 'unconventional' political activity is, at least to some extent, cumulative rather than mutually exclusive. The data from the 1985 survey support this argument. Around 97 per cent read about and discussed politics generally (either 'often' or 'sometimes'). On the same
criteria, 61 per cent attempted to convince others to vote as they did, around 57 per cent attended political meetings and contacted officials or politicians, and 39 per cent campaigned for candidates in national or local elections. This is a far greater frequency of participation in 'conventional' politics than Marsh discovered in his survey of the electorate at large in the seventies(6). CND's national membership are not uncritical of the mainstream political system; asked to what extent, in general terms, they trusted a British government to do what was right, 68 per cent replied 'sometimes' and 23 per cent indicated 'never' although many of this latter group indicated that this distrust only applied to Conservative governments. Such dissatisfaction, however, does not lead most of national CND's membership into turning their backs upon participation in national and local politics. Overall, only about one-third of the 1985 respondents restricted their involvement in political activism to work on behalf of the Campaign.

Reasons for Joining

In an attempt to ascertain what prompted their membership of national CND, respondents were asked an open-ended question about who or what most influenced their decision to join. This produced a wide variety of responses, with 91 per cent of respondents offering an answer. Of those, 18 per cent cited moral grounds, particularly moral revulsion at the whole concept of waging war with weapons of mass destruction, and a further 2 per cent cited their own personal experience of
warfare, usually adding some comment upon the futility of war itself. Just over half of these respondents classified themselves as pacifists, and a third of them were actively religious, indicating that moral concern was by no means limited to these groups. More men than women emphasised moral reasons for joining (60 per cent male); overall, however, there were virtually no significant differences between the motivations noted by men and those by women.

Given the emphasis laid upon the moral dimension by the Campaign and the apparent enthusiasm of respondents for other moral issues, it might appear surprising that only one in five respondents cited a moral motivation, but this would appear to be because many respondents took the question to refer to some specific event which tipped the balance in favour of taking out a membership subscription. Thus 8 per cent indicated that they had been persuaded by friends, and another 7 per cent by seeing a film (usually the War Game) or hearing a talk organised by a local peace group, or simply through being inspired by the personal example of leading figures in the Campaign (Bruce Kent being the most frequently mentioned). Relatively few respondents cited specific issues which the Campaign itself has sought to publicise; 6 per cent gave Cruise as their main motivation (rising to 8 per cent if one includes those who mentioned Greenham Common or Molesworth) and only 1 per cent singled out Trident. However, 5 per cent said that Mrs. Thatcher and the experience of her administration had persuaded them to join; indeed, Thatcher and Reagan were relatively frequent one-word answers, with 10 per cent of those responding to this question offering just this response (normally
accompanied by a number of exclamation marks). Reagan himself was singled out by 4 per cent of respondents, and a further 7 per cent cited the arms race and the apparent increase in international tension.

Few respondents gave reasons which might be thought of as relating only to themselves or those close to them; 6 per cent said that fear for the future safety of their children was their main motivating factor (4 per cent of male respondents and 7 per cent of female respondents), and a further 7 per cent simply cited fear as their reason. Only 1 per cent mentioned economic grounds, and this is clearly a matter of secondary importance. Similarly, very few respondents had been prompted into joining by the attitudes of groups outside the Campaign; 2 per cent cited the influence of their Church, and only 1 per cent that of the Labour Party. The vast majority of respondents seemed to have made the decision to join without reference to others; for example, only 2 per cent indicated that they had been influenced by their parents. However, 7 per cent said that they had joined specifically because it would offer them the opportunity to translate their beliefs into action, and that membership of the Campaign was the best avenue for this.

One might expect reasons for joining to differ according to the year in which respondents joined and their length of membership of the Campaign. The survey results do not bear this out, however, the only significant difference between those with a long-standing membership and those who joined in the mid-eighties being that more longer-standing members cited moral reasons. Those who joined between 1980 and 1983 did so for a wide variety of
reasons; very few of them were primarily motivated by specific issues like Cruise and Trident; despite these being the main issues on which CND campaigned during this period, and the same holds for those who joined after 1983. Whatever the year of entry, however, more respondents cited moral grounds as prompting their decision than any other single reason.

Activism within the Campaign

As one might expect, not all individual national members of CND are prepared or able to participate in the Campaign's activities to the same degree. Crucial to any discussion of differential rates of activism are the local CND and other peace groups. One must remember that national CND does not mount any kind of activity that is restricted to the national membership. On the contrary, national CND relies upon the network of local groups to mobilise members. Even in the context of 'national' events, such as large demonstrations, most of national CND's organisational effort is directed towards local groups rather than establishing contact with individual members. When mounting longer-lasting campaigns, national CND pursues a strategy of exhorting local groups to mobilise their members into participation rather than making direct appeals to their national members. The local groups are the organisational nucleus of the Campaign, which is why CND's leadership continually encourage all national members to participate at the local level as well.

Unfortunately for the Campaign, such appeals are not always effective. Whilst there are many
paid-up members of national CND who are also active at the local level, the 1985 survey suggests that there are just as many who are not. Questioned on whether they were members of a local CND, anti-nuclear weapons or similar peace group, only 44 per cent said that they were. A further 8 per cent said that no such group existed in their locality, and they are consequently excluded from the following discussion. No less than 48 per cent, however, indicated that, although such groups did exist in their locality, they were not members. It is, of course, impossible to establish with certainty from the survey evidence why this is. It may be that some respondents were physically incapable of any participation other than subscribing to the national organisation - although, given the age profile of the national membership, this seems unlikely. It may be that domestic commitments preclude participation - but given the class background of respondents, and the high proportion of both men and women in employment, it again seems improbable that this would be a major causal factor. It may be that some respondents used to be active at the local level, but were no longer motivated to take part. Unfortunately, the survey only investigated current (i.e. 1985) activity in local groups; as we shall see in Chapter 7, there is subjective evidence to suggest that many in the Campaign experienced a decline in commitment after the deployment of Cruise in 1983, so it is probable that at least some of the 48 per cent who were not in local groups had been involved some years earlier. The boundaries between activists and non-activists are not clear-cut, therefore, and the following discussion should be read with this proviso in mind.
Whatever the reasons, however, the evidence remains that in 1985 almost half of CND's national membership were not involved at the local level. It does not seem unreasonable to hypothesise that many of these are individuals who wish to register their agreement with CND's broad unilateralist message, but are reluctant to express their agreement in any more demanding fashion. This group will be termed 'sympathisers', on the assumption that their membership of national CND is largely a symbolic act.

Among those who are members of a local group, a further distinction is necessary, as membership does not necessarily equate with participation. Respondents who belonged to a local group were asked how often they participated in the group's meetings or events. Again, this data related only to the 1984/85 period, but it does reveal that 21 per cent had participated in no local activities at all, a further 51 per cent had participated in six or less such meetings or events, and only 26 per cent had participated in more than this. Given that it is the practice of local groups to hold monthly meetings (at least) in addition to campaigning activities, then only this latter 26 per cent could be considered to be particularly active at the local level. This group will be termed 'activists'. Those who were members of local groups, but participated on six or less occasions (including those who had not participated at all, on the assumption that they may have participated before mid-1984, and had at least maintained their membership of a local group) will be termed 'participants'.

Table 4.5 shows the differential participation rates of these sub-groups and the whole sample. As
might be expected, activities which involve direct communication with the general public are distinctly less popular than group or mass actions which do not usually entail any dialogue with the unconvinced. Face-to-face contact with members of the public, on the streets or on the doorstep, not only requires an ability to present the unilateralist argument to what may well be a hostile audience, it also means being deprived of the security of solidarity that is experienced on mass actions. As can be seen from the table, only the activists pursue canvassing and lobbying to any marked degree. If the proportion who engage in some of these activities seems small, it should be remembered that we are discussing a large movement.

### TABLE 4.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities Undertaken on behalf of CND (%)</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Sympathisers</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wearing Badges</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leafletting</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvassing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying politicians</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting local press</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending peace camps</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public speaking</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n =</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although not all CND members are prepared to take the unilateralist argument onto their neighbour's doorsteps, the proportions above suggest that in the Campaign as a whole there are some 5,000 (perhaps even 10,000) people who are active in this way - an achievement which can only be matched in the political arena by the major parties.

In socio-economic terms, the survey reveals few differences between the more and less active in the Campaign. Men and women were found in all three sub-groups in almost exactly equal proportions. Activists tend to be more concentrated in the older age bands, middle-class rather than working class occupations and to have been involved in the Campaign for longer, but in all cases the differences are relatively slight, as shown in Table 4.6.

**TABLE 4.6**

Demographic and Social Factors (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Sympathisers</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Sympathisers</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Sympathisers</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joined CND</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Sympathisers</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1980</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-83</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[n = 620\] 295 209 70
In short, whilst one may discern certain defining socio-economic characteristics of national CND members in general, such factors do not appear to underly differential rates of activism within the Campaign.

The survey does suggest that those who are more active in CND are also likely to be more active in conventional politics and other campaigns. 39 per cent of activists and 41 per cent of participants belonged to a political party, compared with 25 per cent of sympathisers - most belonging to the Labour Party in all three groups. Membership of a trade union or professional association was more evenly spread - 62 per cent of sympathisers, 59 per cent of participants and 65 per cent of activists. However, support for other public campaigns is clearly more marked among the more active; 53 per cent of sympathisers supported other campaigns, rising to 63 per cent of participants and 79 per cent of activists. Moreover, activists placed a higher priority on CND than their other campaigning commitments - whilst only 25 per cent of sympathisers considered other public campaigns which they supported to be definitely less important to them than CND, the proportion among activists was 61 per cent. Activists were also more likely to be involved in voluntary organisations - 36 per cent, compared with 34 per cent of participants and 25 per cent of sympathisers.

This trend towards activism in CND being a reflection of political and campaigning activism in general is also apparent in the responses to the question on conventional political activism. We have already noted the generally high participation of CND members in such activities, compared with
the general public, but Table 4.7 demonstrates that activists in Campaign provide yet more support for the thesis of cumulative participation. As is the case for respondents as a whole, most of this participation is directed towards work on behalf of the Labour Party. Table 4.8 on voting preferences demonstrates some variation in support for the Alliance and Green parties (support for the Communist party being minimal in all three groups), but Labour is still the choice of most.

The more active do show some tendency to think differently from their less active colleagues when questioned about their attitudes on various issues relevant to the Campaign. Activists are more inclined to conceptualise America rather than the Soviet Union as a potentially destabilising influence on world affairs (and this was before the American bombing of Libyan targets in 1986). Asked who they considered to bear the main responsibility for the arms race in recent years, none of the respondents in any of the three groups identified the Soviet Union. Among sympathisers, 50 per cent attached blame to the United States and 46 per cent to the USA and USSR equally. 54 per cent of participants identified the USA as the main culprit, and 41 per cent indicated the USA and USSR as being jointly responsible. Among activists, however, opinion was more sharply divided; 63 per cent considered the USA to be mainly responsible whilst the proportion allocating blame equally among the super-powers fell to 33 per cent. A
TABLE 4.7
Participation in 'Conventional Politics' (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Sympathisers</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Read about politics</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss politics</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convince others to vote</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend political meetings</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact politicians</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for candidates</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 620 295 209 70

TABLE 4.8
Voting Preference (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Sympathisers</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 620 295 209 70

similar trend was apparent when respondents were asked whether they thought the Soviet Union represented a real military threat to the UK. 26
per cent of sympathisers thought that it did, compared with 19 per cent of participants and only 13 per cent of activists. 55 per cent of sympathisers thought that it did not, rising to 64 per cent of participants and 79 per cent of activists. One cannot infer from this data that activists are in some way 'pro-Soviet'; the questionnaire referred only to the potential military threat from the Soviet Union, and did not investigate attitudes about the Soviet economic and political system. Nor can one assume that activists (or indeed the less active) were more interested in campaigning against American rather than Soviet nuclear weapons policy; the overwhelming majority in all three groups thought that CND should campaign more actively against the nuclear strategy of both super-powers, with hardly any respondents making a distinction between the two. Nevertheless, a desire to reduce Britain's defence and foreign policy links with the United States was indicated by over 90 per cent of respondents in all three groups. One alternative which was offered to respondents was that Britain should pursue a strictly non-aligned defence and foreign policy. This did not receive such an enthusiastic endorsement, but still attracted a majority of positive responses. Among sympathisers, 64 per cent agreed and 15 per cent disagreed; among participants, 59 per cent agreed and 24 per cent disagreed, while among activists 67 per cent agreed and 14 per cent disagreed.

The question of British withdrawal from the NATO alliance prompted clearer cut differences among the sub-groups. Sympathisers were fairly evenly split on the issue, 37 per cent agreeing that Britain should withdraw and 31 per cent disagreeing. Opinion hardened among the partici-
pants, 45 per cent endorsing withdrawal and 25 per cent disagreeing. Among activists, 56 per cent supported the idea of withdrawal, with only 14 per cent disagreeing. The fact that only among the latter group does one find a majority in favour of withdrawal may seem surprising, given that CND has a clear policy commitment to arguing the case for Britain leaving NATO; as we shall see in subsequent chapters, however, this has been a highly contentious issue both inside and outside the campaign during the eighties.

Activists are also more inclined to emphasise the moral dimension of the Campaign's ideology. This can be observed both obliquely and directly. Thus, for example, when asked whether money saved by nuclear disarmament should go primarily on overseas aid, 35 per cent of sympathisers agreed whilst 27 per cent disagreed. Among participants, opinion was more evenly balanced, with 41 per cent agreeing and 39 per cent disagreeing. Activists' opinions were almost a mirror image of the sympathisers' position; 47 per cent of activists agreed, and 31 per cent disagreed. In an attempt to secure more direct evidence on this aspect of the Campaign, a question used by Parkin in his 1965 survey was replicated with slightly different wording(7). Respondents were given two economic reasons and two moral reasons for opposition to British possession of nuclear weapons, and asked to indicate which one of the four carried the greatest weight with them personally. Table 4.9 shows the comparison between the 1965 and 1985 results. Parkin, in interpreting his results by way of a breakdown of respondents' social class, comments that this shows that:
Whilst CND may certainly be regarded as a radical movement, the radicalism of its followers is centred primarily upon broad moral concerns of a basically non-class kind, rather than on the more traditional left-wing preoccupation with economic change and class conflict. (8)

In general terms, the same is largely true of CND in the eighties, as Table 4.9 suggests, and the trend for activists to incline towards the moral dimension can also be observed, although it is slight in this case.

There are limits on the emphasis placed upon the moral basis for unilateralism by activists, however, in the sense that it does not lead most activists into espousing complete disarmament or pacifism. There is a solid minority in all groups which favours an increase in conventional armaments should Britain dispose of its nuclear capability, and pacifist sentiments actually decline when one compares the active with the less active. Asked whether Britain should increase its conventional weaponry in the event of unilateral nuclear disarmament, 25 per cent of sympathisers agreed and 59 per cent disagreed; similarly, 25 per cent of participants agreed and 58 per cent disagreed, whilst
### TABLE 4.9

Most Important Argument against British nuclear weapons (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>Parkin 1966</th>
<th>Byrne 1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inefficient means of defence</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste of economic resources</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morally unacceptable/evil</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain able to give moral lead</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know/No response</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n= 341)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the activists produced almost identical responses, with 27 per cent agreeing and 54 per cent disagreeing. Asked to react to the statement 'I am a pacifist', 53 per cent of sympathisers agreed and 34 per cent disagreed; 43 per cent of participants agreed and 42 per cent disagreed, whilst among activists opinions swung the other way, with 39 per cent agreeing and 46 per cent disagreeing. Acti-
vists are also less inclined to be actively religious: 16 per cent of them classified themselves as such, compared with 21 per cent of sympathisers and 28 per cent of participants.

Conclusions

It is inevitable that any analysis based upon a sample survey and a postal questionnaire must be approached with caution. Nevertheless, there is very strong evidence from the 1985 survey that the main socio-economic characteristics of the Campaign's membership have not changed significantly over the last thirty years. The bulk of CND's members are still to be found in a quite specific class location, which in itself suggests at least a degree of structural determinism. It is still the educated middle-class, and particularly those within that class who are employed in non-commercial occupations and/or the public-sector, who are motivated to join the Campaign. It remains debatable whether this is because, as Parkin has argued, such people have a predisposition towards radical values, and this lies behind both their support for the Campaign and their choice of occupation, although there is certainly little evidence in the 1985 survey to refute such an argument. Like Inglehart's thesis on post-materialism, Parkin's argument has an intuitive validity; both conceptualise membership of social movements as a manifestation of fundamental values which are at variance with the 'dominant' or 'old' value order based upon materialism and support for capitalism. Both are, however, very hard to prove given the difficulties of ascertaining individuals' values on the basis of survey evidence.
We are not only interested in what motivates people to join CND, however, but also in how they behave and the attitudes they espouse once they have become members. The striking impression obtained from the survey results is the degree of unanimity among members and their loyalty to the Campaign. CND's members are not alienated from conventional political life or other social movements; yet there is little evidence to suggest that their involvement in causes and campaigns outside of CND leads to divisions and ideological schisms within the Campaign. Among those who responded to the questionnaire, there was a very high level of agreement about both the tactics and the aims of the Campaign, with factors such as age, gender, class and even political affiliation causing little or no variation. It is only when one draws a distinction between active and passive members of the Campaign that differences start to appear, and even then the correlation between activism and support for more militant aims and tactics seems considerably weaker than it commonly is in political parties. The Campaign is highly cohesive; the question remains as to whether this cohesion is dependent upon the Campaign refusing to compromise its moral integrity, and whether this inhibits its impact on parties, public opinion and public policy.

NOTES

7. Parkin, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
Chapter Five

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE: DECISION-MAKING AND DEMOCRACY

CND's membership is overwhelmingly middle-aged, middle-class, well-educated and presumably articulate. Given this, and the fact that they have taken the step of joining a group which is not dedicated to the pursuit of their exclusive self-interest, it is unlikely that those of the Campaign's paid-up members who do take an active interest in its running will do so in a subservient manner. Having taken a stand on what most of them see as an issue of moral principle, CND's members are unlikely to give blind and unquestioning obedience to their leaders; their sense of personal responsibility is too great for that. It poses a challenging problem for those entrusted with the overall direction of the Campaign. On the one hand, they have to devise a decision-making structure which is sufficiently egalitarian to attract and maintain the support of their membership; on the other hand, some demarcation of responsibility and some degree of legitimised authority is desirable to facilitate coordination of the Campaign's activities and prevent it being used by outside groups for their own purposes. The problem is compounded if the impact of the Campaign
on parties and public opinion reaches a plateau (as is arguably the case since 1982/3), and leaders and members have to decide upon new directions and initiatives in an attempt to make another break-through. Organising a Campaign during a period of explosive growth is one thing; keeping it together once it has become a mass organisation is quite another.

CND: a half-way house

A variety of organisational forms are to be found within the contemporary British peace movement, reflecting the different ideological outlooks, tactics and objectives of those involved. Some participants in the movement adhere to formal democratic structures; this is most notable among the organised political left. More common, however, are groups which emphasise decentralisation and profess an abhorrence of any kind of hierarchy or bureaucracy. These groups see themselves as operating in a hostile political environment, and argue that adopting a highly decentralised, polycephalous organisational structure means that they present no easily identifiable target group of key decision-makers and information-holders to those who might wish to infiltrate, coerce or control a group. This kind of tactical thinking is most often found in those groups who are primarily committed to non-violent direct action. For example, both the Greenham women and the Cruisewatch network (neither of which are integral parts of CND) stress the tactical advantages of a network, non-bureaucratic form of organisation when faced with what is seen as virtually constant harassment by the political
authorities. Tactical decisions are not the only determinants of organisation structure for these groups. Decentralisation and non-hierarchical structures are also adopted for ideological reasons, as a concrete expression of the groups conception of meaningful democracy. They argue that nuclear weapons policy is a classic instance of the lack of real democracy in British politics, crucial decisions being taken by Governments without consultation with Parliament, let alone the electorate. Some go further: the Greenham women argue that the possession of nuclear weapons epitomises the structural violence endemic in British society, which is being perpetuated by a small elite of decision-makers. For them, the struggle against Cruise has widened out into an advocacy of the values of cooperation and tolerance in society as a whole.(1) For such groups as the Greenham women, an emphasis upon decentralised, non-hierarchical organisation has developed from a tactic into an important principle, and has become an integral and essential component of their ideological thinking.

In its choice of organisational structure, CND falls somewhere between conventional democracy (as practiced by established political parties) and the more direct democracy of some peace-activist groups. Tactically and ideologically, it shares much common ground with the latter, endorsing and participating in direct action, and criticising government for the lack of democratic input into nuclear weapons policy. Simultaneously, however, it pursues more conventional tactics, and numbers many in its ranks who are accustomed to working within hierarchical party and group structures. On the one hand, CND wishes to be seen as a democratic
grouping and one that is open to participation by all. This not only facilitates recruitment, it also serves to reinforce CND's argument that it is an autonomous entity (a "broad church") and should not be associated exclusively with the radical left. On the other hand, CND has to maintain a constant vigilance against take-over attempts from smaller but more cohesively organised groups, and needs enough of an authority structure to prevent this. As a voluntary group, however, there are distinct limits on the degree of hierarchical control which could be imposed even if this was thought desirable. Most of CND's campaigning work is undertaken by local groups; national CND may advise, guide and exhort local activists but it does not have the rewards and sanctions necessary to instruct them. The result of this mix of tactical and ideological factors is that CND has adopted an organisation structure which, in outline, resembles the formal representative structure of the Labour party but which in its day-to-day operation lays the same kind of emphasis upon personal contact and informality which is found among the more unconventional peace activists.

MEMBERSHIP

CND has two types of membership: national members who pay an annual subscription to national CND, and local members who subscribe to their local group. The dramatic growth in both categories of membership after 1980 prompted several attempts within CND to introduce a unified membership scheme, but this has always been resisted by the financial planners within CND because of complications over
VAT. The basic unit of organisation is the local group, but these (together with individual members not in local groups) are coordinated in a structure of national, regional and area organisations. Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales have their own organisations; the English membership is subdivided into some twelve regional and area organisations. National, regional and area organisations may all hold their own Annual General Meetings and elect their own executive committees, but their role is seen as promoting and facilitating local group activity, and acting as a feedback channel from the groups to the national level.

In addition to individual national and local members, CND also has some specialist sections. These are groups of members within particular areas in society, which have been established as CND's membership grew. There were five such specialist sections by the end of 1985; Labour CND, Green CND, Liberal CND, Trade Union CND and Christian CND. Their theoretical function is to further the work of CND within their own particular party, group or church. In practice, however, especially between 1980 and 1983 when the sections were being established in an ad hoc fashion they posed some problems for CND. Both Labour and Green CND were considered by some within national CND to be more concerned with importing political disagreements and stances into CND rather than exporting the unilateralist message. These difficulties are discussed in more detail below; the point to note in this context is that these difficulties led national CND to clarify the status and responsibilities of specialist sections from 1983 onwards. National CND decided then that it should formalise its right to create or disband specialist sections,
to make rules governing their activities, and to require them to submit regular reports and forward plans. Specialist sections are required by CND's constitution to further the aims of CND within their own area of interest, and national CND reinforced this in 1983 when it passed a motion that any specialist section "must not promote political, social or religious aims of its own". (2)

In constitutional terms, therefore, specialist sections are a fully integrated part of CND's national organisation; in practical terms, however, they still enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy in choosing how they will work on behalf of CND. They hold their own annual general meetings and elect their own executive committees, in the same way as regional and area organisations, but as their campaigning is more specialised, they demonstrate more independence in their choice of issues and activities to prioritise.

Similar, but distinct from the specialist sections is Youth CND. This enjoys a unique organisational status in CND, having its own annual conference and regional group structure. It also caused problems for CND in 1983, when it was subject to entryism from far-left political groupings. The result of this was the same kind of reminder about responsibilities from national CND that the specialist sections received at that time. A motion was passed to the effect that Youth CND could not make changes in policy or its own organisational structure without approval from national CND, and reaffirming that Youth CND should reflect the broad based nature of CND and should not be dominated by any particular political or religious group. (3)
Finally, and to a much greater extent outside the formal organisational framework of CND, there are a large number of affiliated bodies. Many of these are trade unions, reflecting the marked success CND has had in recruiting support in this area during the eighties. Another area in which CND has attracted support is among the professions. Included among the affiliated organisations are such bodies as SANA (Scientists Against Nuclear Armaments), JANE (Journalists Against Nuclear Extermination), Lawyers for Nuclear Disarmament and the Medical Campaign against Nuclear Weapons. Affiliated organisations enjoy virtually complete autonomy from national CND, although they do have a small input into the decision-making process.

It can be seen from this that membership of CND is essentially reticulate. Over-lapping membership is relatively common, especially amongst the more active members. Even allowing for a degree of double-counting, however, the totals of membership remain impressive.

Decision-Making

Whatever avenue of participation is employed, members of CND are bound to follow the general policy directions of the Campaign as a whole. In constitutional terms, the ultimate authority for overall policy rests with the Annual Conference. This forum consists of delegates from the national, regional and area organisations, the local groups, specialist sections and Youth CND, and affiliated organisations; unusually, there is also provision for individual members of national CND not only to attend, but also enjoy voting rights. National,
regional and area organisations are entitled to five votes each as, in practice, are most local groups. Specialist sections are entitled to five votes, affiliated organisations to two votes each. This means that two individual members (representing no-one but themselves) have equal voting power in the Annual Conference to the two delegates that an affiliated organisation like the Transport and General Workers Union (representing around a million affiliated members) may send to the Conference. It has been suggested to the Conference that individual's voting rights be removed, but Conference delegates have consistently rejected this. It is seen by many in the Campaign as an important matter of principle to maintain this stress on individualism and internal democracy, and an important distinguishing feature from the more formally political groupings in British politics.

In practice, very few of the national membership actually attend Conference in an individual capacity - normally, some two or three hundred. More disconcerting for CND is the fact that less than half of the local groups send delegates to the Conference - in recent years, local group representation has averaged around 35 per cent. National CND surveyed its local groups about their reasons for non-attendance in 1983 and 1984; on both occasions, the response indicated lack of time and money and a perceived lack of relevance of the Annual Conference to local campaigning to be the main causes of non-participation. Even so, delegates from local groups still enjoy an overwhelming majority of the available voting power in the Conference.
Although it would be unfair, it is tempting to characterise the proceedings of the Annual Conference as schizophrenic. Strenuous efforts are made by the Chairperson to encourage participation from all; Conference delegates have come to expect the Chair to try to distribute time on a roughly equal basis between male and female, old and young, and so on, and will make a point of voicing their discontent if this doesn't happen. Whilst this enhances the image of the Campaign as a fully democratised organisation, it is by no means uncommon for Annual Conferences to become enmeshed in procedural objections and manoeuvres, which many delegates find to be a frustrating and alienating experience. Despite this, the two-day Conference normally manages to discuss some 10 to 12 major resolutions each year, proceedings usually being marked by their informality and friendliness rather than sectarianism. Nevertheless, there have been persistent criticisms from some activists that the Annual Conference spends too much time on procedural motions, and not enough on actual campaigning work. CND has responded to this, and, from 1986 on, half of the Conference's time will be spent on workshops organised around specific campaigns, with the time spent on resolutions cut accordingly.

The relative harmony of the Annual Conference is not surprising, given that many of the resolutions presented to Conference are uncontentious, as they reaffirm the Campaign's opposition to particular nuclear weapons systems or support for such causes as arms conversion, nuclear-free zones or protection of civil liberties. This is not to imply that the Conference is no more than a stage-managed rally. As will be seen below, the
national leadership has some control over the choice of resolutions to be debated, but by no means complete control. Moreover, the distribution of voting rights is such that there are no large bloc votes which the leadership can influence or predict in advance. It is because of this that Conference proceedings can never be predicted with complete confidence. A good example was the 1985 election of Paul Johns as Chairperson (succeeding Joan Ruddock). It was known quite widely within the Campaign before the Conference that many of the more influential figures in the campaign favoured another candidate; yet (at least in this observer's opinion) the outcome of the election was determined to a large extent by the candidates' performance on the floor of the Conference on the day.

When contentious issues do arise, the distribution of voting power, the fact that many delegates have long experience of committee and public meetings and are skilled in the creative use of points of order, the allegiances that some delegates have to other campaigns or parties, and the concern for individual rights which is part of CND's ideology - all these combine to produce a situation in which the leadership of CND would find it very difficult to persuade the Conference not to engage in potentially embarrassing disagreement. A good example of this was the debate at the 1984 Conference on a resolution calling for CND 'to campaign vigorously against Soviet nuclear weapons and policies'. In the long and at times acrimonious debate which followed, it was argued by delegates sympathetic to some Soviet disarmament initiatives (e.g. no first use, a nuclear weapons freeze) that this would amount to campaigning against policies which were similar to some of
those espoused by the Campaign itself. Other delegates argued that to reject the resolution would be tantamount to limiting the Campaign to the Western hemisphere, and would be seen by those outside the campaign (especially the media) as evidence of a pro-Soviet bias in CND. The debate, almost wholly monopolised by past and present supporters of the CPGB, degenerated into an involved procedural wrangle which was only resolved by not taking a vote on the resolution at all. Despite a reminder from the Chair that CND remained firmly opposed to nuclear weapons of both East and West, media reports on the Conference presented the debate as a sign of CND 'going soft' on the Soviet Union - something the leadership knew would almost certainly happen, but were powerless to prevent.

The National Council and Committees

Conference may well be difficult to keep in order at times, not least because of a spirit of independence among delegates, but the concomitant of this is that there is little evidence of Conference being able to exercise concerted and consistent scrutiny and control over executive action in the Campaign. Conference may be constitutionally supreme in terms of policy formulation, but responsibility for implementation lies outside the Conference with CND's National Council. This body, which meets four times a year, offers guidance and advice to the Conference over policy - which is normally accepted by Conference - and oversees the general running of the Campaign. National Council is composed of around 100 people: the chairperson, four vice-chairpersons, the
treasurer and twenty ordinary members (all 26 directly elected by Conference), five delegates each from the national, regional and area organisations, one from each of the specialist sections, and six from Youth CND. One marked feature of the Council's composition is the number of women, the balance between the sexes being virtually even. This is a phenomenon that runs throughout all levels of the campaign, including Conference, Council, Committees, elected officers, staff and the membership at large.

Although turnover of membership on Council is high, there is a core group of around fifteen to twenty people who tend to appear on National Council year after year - whether as directly elected officers or representatives, or representing a region or specialist section. By virtue of their experience, such people tend to speak the most often in Council meetings - something which has prompted the Council to experiment with its procedure in an attempt to encourage more diverse participation. The real problem in terms of effective participation, however, lies in the way in which most proposals coming before Council emanate from CND's system of national committees. In a situation analogous to the relationship between the full cabinet and cabinet committees in national politics, proposals from committees tend to be put forward for Council's approval rather than discussion and further input. Discussion is not enhanced by the tendency for committee proposals to be circulated only a relatively short time before Council meetings - allowing little time for delegates to digest the proposals, let alone discuss them with their colleagues in the regions or sections. In this sense, National Council is
similar to the Annual Conference - both tend to be largely reactive bodies, passing judgement on proposals coming from more specialised sub-sections of the movement.

The most significant input to Council deliberations comes from the national committees. Most of these have been created in an ad hoc manner as the campaign has grown; by 1985, there were eight in existence. The most important is the National Executive Committee, which meets monthly and is responsible for coordinating the day-to-day operations of the Campaign. It consists of some 25-30 members; some are directly elected by Council, but most are present as representatives from other national committees, the national organisations or as national office-holders. The other national committees are as follows, together with their main areas of responsibility. Finance and General Purposes (financial planning and control, budgeting, fund-raising, funding of regions and areas); Projects (planning national events, developing on-going campaigns, liaising with other peace groups and autonomous activist groupings involved in campaigning initiatives e.g. the Greenham Women and the Cruisewatch network) - International (developing international contacts, raising international issues at national level, stimulating internationalism within the Campaign); Publications (overseeing all printed material produced for sale by CND - works closely with CND Publications Ltd, which, for financial reasons is organised separately from national CND); Sanity Editorial Board (overseeing production of CND's monthly magazine); Parliamentary and Elections (information service for M.P.s and Parliamentary candidates, constituency monitoring of M.P.s,
organising CND's input into national and local elections and, from 1986 on, coordinating their work of the political party specialist sections); Conference Arrangements (organising Annual Conference, compositing resolutions). All of these committees are elected by Council, although only places on Projects and International committees are normally contested. There are also a Press and Public Relations Committee and a Staffing Committee, the responsibilities of which are self-evident, but these are sub-committees of the National Executive.

The National Executive Committee

The work undertaken by these committees is discussed in more detail elsewhere, in the context of CND's campaigning activities in the eighties. As far as the organisational context of CND is concerned, the National Executive is the key committee. Much of its time is spent on sorting out problems and disputes which occur between the other committees, and the regions, areas and specialist sections. This is a significant task, given the tendency for Conference, and indeed National Council, to endorse new campaigning initiatives without thinking through the subsequent organisational problems. The decentralised nature of much of CND's campaigning only compounds the coordination problems faced by the National Executive. It is not uncommon for criticism to be voiced internally about a lack of communication between committees (and the full-time staff servicing them). To date, national CND has been unable to devise an institutional means of resolv-
ing these problems (which is not surprising, given the scale of their activities when compared to other voluntary associations), other than repeatedly extolling the virtues of good communication. At the time of writing, plans are afoot to strengthen the position of the National Executive by streamlining the number of committees, and having them report to the National Executive rather than the National Council. Even without this, however, when faced with serious problems the National Executive has not hesitated to act in a firm and authoritative manner, most notably when some of the specialist sections have attempted to impose their own political orientations onto CND.

We have already noted the problems which arose with Youth CND in 1983, and the corrective action undertaken by the Campaign's leadership. Youth CND was not the only section in which there was disagreement resulting from members having commitments and loyalties outside the Campaign. For example, Labour CND was beset by sectarian argument in 1983 to such an extent that the National Executive Committee of Labour CND became virtually unworkable during the latter half of 1983. The Committee was split between those allied to the left of the Labour Party, who saw the election defeat as no reason to soften CND or the Labour Party's line on such issues as NATO, and those allied to the centre of the party and its new leader, who were concerned to consolidate recent success in committing the party to unilateralism rather than seeking to push it any further in the short term. The split culminated in threats of resignation from the more moderate element, which prompted CND's National Executive (four of whose members were among the moderate faction) to step
in, effectively suspend temporarily the activities of Labour CND and appoint an interim committee to run the section until new elections could be held. Less dramatically, Green CND was censured for seeking to affiliate with Solidarity in Poland without consulting the National Executive - (and, indeed, there has been dissatisfaction expressed on a number of occasions since 1983 that Green CND is more concerned to work for Green policies within CND rather than for CND's policies in the Green Movement, although the National Executive has not acted on this).

Whilst the National Executive may be in a position to resolve internal disputes of a political nature, it has found it much more difficult to coordinate the expanding range of campaigning activities which CND has spawned as the Campaign has grown. As one senior staff member argued in 1984, the tendency was for Council's campaigning initiatives to be passed straight to the national committees, who each decided on their input with minimal consultation. The result was a lack of synchronisation in the planning of campaigns. One response to this is that from 1986 onwards, the agenda for National Executive meetings is arranged so as to ensure that there is a specific slot for discussion of on-going and future campaigns. Coordination problems have not been helped by the growth of a second-tier of Working Groups, again established in an ad hoc fashion to concentrate on specific aspects of the Campaign. Groups have been created on such topics as Non-violent direct action, Molesworth, Nuclear-Free Zones, Fundraising, Forward Planning, and the campaign's Regions and Areas - in all, there were over twenty working groups in operation by the end of 1984. In
theory, each working group is responsible to one of the national committees, though the relationship between committees and working groups has been ambiguous at times. As CND's General Secretary commented in 1984, working groups had shown a tendency to proliferate and to create for themselves an on-going function; the National Executive agreed that it had become necessary to review the growth and functioning of working groups.\(^{6}\) By 1987, there appeared to be widespread agreement that a streamlining of the committee and working group structure was desirable but little in the way of concrete changes had been implemented.

CND's Staff

An increasingly important element in this attempt to coordinate campaigning work has been the full-time staff who work for national CND. Between 1979 and 1985, the number of staff employed by the Campaign grew from only three to forty; although all are paid the same (rather low) salary, staff costs by 1985 were accounting for around 25 per cent of national CND's income. Staff are allocated among five separate departments: Projects, Publications, Press and Public Relations, Groups and Organisation, and Finance and Membership. The Projects department works on events, campaigns, nuclear-free zones, international contacts and generally services the activities of Youth CND, Christian CND and Trade Union CND. The Groups and Organisation department is a recent creation (1986), merging the old Administration department (which works on the Annual Conference and general administration at the national headquarters) with
new staff appointments to oversee and stimulate local groups in the regions and areas. The responsibilities of the other departments are self-evident. In most areas, staff are assisted by a fluctuating population of volunteer workers, some of whom have been working on this basis for a number of years. Each department has a head, who is responsible to the General Secretary. Prior to 1985, this post was occupied by Bruce Kent, who combined his administrative duties with a hectic schedule of public speaking and public relations work. The increase in staff and administrative work led CND to appoint Meg Beresford as the new General Secretary in 1985, with a new job description which emphasised that the role of General Secretary was now to be primarily internal administrative work.

The influence that full-time staff exert on decision-making in national CND is impossible to determine without participant research. The National Executive acknowledged in 1985 that it was difficult even for them to see how and by whom decisions were being made. One may only observe that having a number of full-time staff to service part-time elected officers and committees must facilitate internal communication, but inevitably creates the potential for staff to exert a significant influence on the options presented to committees and their subsequent decisions. What is clear is that the relationship between Council members serving on national committees and the full-time staff has not always been good. The major problem seems to be one of deciding on the right degree of delegation from Council members to staff. It is acknowledged that in the more 'technical' areas of CND's work - for example, finance, publications,
administration - elected members and staff work well together. It is in the more 'political' areas (i.e. campaigning work) that difficulties have arisen, as elected members have struggled to hit the right balance between exercising democratic control over staff without seeming to interfere in the details of their work. One response has been to create a system of linkpersons among the elected members (one for each national committee), whose function is to represent their committee between meetings and cooperate with Heads of Department to monitor progress, but even this does not seem to have fully resolved the ambiguities and confusions which exist over the distribution of responsibilities in the national headquarters. It should be stated quite clearly in this context that many of these problems arise from the very real commitment and enthusiasm of both elected members and staff; it is an abundance of zeal, not a lack of it, that contributes to these coordination problems. One consequence of these difficulties is that the elected national officers of the campaign play a vital role as arbitrators of last resort. Whilst the Treasurer is fully occupied with financial planning and control, both the Chairperson and the four Vice-Chairpersons have to combine general public relations work with a lot of internal administration.

Centralised Control?

There is not just disquiet about the internal functioning of CND's organisation, but also about the relationship between the national headquarters as a whole and the other elements within the
Campaign. Complaints about growing centralisation and a neglect of local and regional initiatives outside London and the South East have been a recurring feature of Conference and Council meetings since 1983. It was noticeable in the Conference hustings for the elections of Chairperson in 1985 that all five candidates made at least passing reference to the desirability of more decentralisation in the Campaign, the importance of local groups' work, and the need to avoid becoming a bureaucratic organisation. Most criticism within the Campaign is directed towards the proportion of resources devoted to the regions and areas. National Council decided in 1983 to give a greater priority in new spending to the regions, and decided in principle that the regions and areas should henceforth have up to 9 per cent of the total budget devoted to them. In practice, the take-up of funds has fallen below this. National CND has made some effort to stimulate contact between the central office and the regions. A Regions and Areas Working Group was established in 1983, to recommend to Council ways in which central committees and staff could promote regional campaigning and membership; and to fund regional initiatives. From 1986, this working group was elevated to the status of a full national committee. National CND also produces a regular newsheet ("Campaign") which has the specific aim of keeping regions and local groups informed on activities and forward plans at all levels of the Campaign. The fact remains, however, that in terms of staffing resources CND remains a centralised organisation; in 1985, the ratio of staff based centrally to those based in the regions was 7.5 to 1. One of the more active local groups commented in 1985,
'the fact that national meetings are in London, and that workers spend most of their time in London, not only reflects a London chauvinism, but threatens the democracy of the organisation.'(8) CND has responded by appointing two new staff to service the Regions and Areas Working Group (only one of whom is to be based outside London), but the issue of over-centralisation is one that is likely to remain on the agenda for some time yet.

Criticisms from within the Campaign of a perceived trend towards centralisation and bureaucratisation have been fuelled by the way in which CND has spent its not inconsiderable income. Table 5.1 has been compiled from CND's annual Accounts, which have been professionally audited since 1983.(9) The presentation of these Accounts under such headings as 'Organisation' and 'Policy and Decision-Making' does not give an accurate guide to the distribution of resources between centre and periphery. For example, between a third and a half of the spending on 'Policy and Decision-making' goes towards the Annual Conference where, as we have seen, local groups predominate. Similarly, 'Organisation' includes the costs of recruiting and servicing the national membership. However, the Accounts do indicate the general split between administrative and campaigning expenditure. Money spent on campaigning activities - demonstrations, press and public relations work, Parliamentary lobbying, and so on - has settled at around a third of total spending. Money spent on organisation, policy and decision-making has consistently accounted for at least half of total spending. As can be seen from the table, money spent specifically on the Regions has always been a minor element in CND's overall expenditure pattern.
Not surprisingly, this distribution of resources has angered some activists within the Campaign, who have become increasingly frustrated with what they see as too much time and money being spent on meetings at the expense of 'real' campaigning activities. The fear is expressed that

TABLE 5.1
CND: Expenditure and Income (in £ and %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Organisation</td>
<td>57,361</td>
<td>196,568</td>
<td>387,169</td>
<td>282,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(46%)</td>
<td>(45%)</td>
<td>(52%)</td>
<td>(40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Policy and Decision-making</td>
<td>4,956</td>
<td>32,825</td>
<td>48,596</td>
<td>68,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4%)</td>
<td>(7%)</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
<td>(10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Campaigning</td>
<td>49,213</td>
<td>135,130</td>
<td>217,759</td>
<td>222,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(39%)</td>
<td>(31%)</td>
<td>(29%)</td>
<td>(32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regions</td>
<td>8,411</td>
<td>40,609</td>
<td>23,535</td>
<td>34,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7%)</td>
<td>(9%)</td>
<td>(3%)</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Specialist Sections</td>
<td>4,090</td>
<td>18,397</td>
<td>35,989</td>
<td>42,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3%)</td>
<td>(4%)</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Youth CND</td>
<td>1,917</td>
<td>9,563</td>
<td>21,204</td>
<td>28,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1%)</td>
<td>(2%)</td>
<td>(3%)</td>
<td>(4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Donations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,338</td>
<td>14,882</td>
<td>22,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2%)</td>
<td>(2%)</td>
<td>(3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>126,307</td>
<td>440,430</td>
<td>749,134</td>
<td>702,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Income</td>
<td>125,307</td>
<td>461,255</td>
<td>721,259</td>
<td>782,260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CND is becoming less of a campaign and more of a quasipolitical party - centralised, bureaucratic, cautious and more inflexible. Such criticisms have brought a dual reaction from CND's leadership. On the one hand, it is accepted that administrative overheads should be kept to a minimum, but that much of the responsibility for rising costs lies with the national committees - as the Treasurer observed in 1985:

The budget requests received by the Finance General Purposes Committee show a tendency towards incremental budgeting. There seems to be a lack of questioning of Committee activities... and an automatic assumption that it will be necessary for all Committees to spend more in 1985.(10)

On the other hand, the argument is made repeatedly that a professional central administrative structure is an asset to the Campaign as a whole, and that expertise developed within the Central office is a resource to be utilised at all levels and areas of the movement. This argument, presented to National Council by CND's Treasurer, is typical:

The Campaign must be careful to ensure that expertise and knowledge at the national level is retained and shared with local groups, areas and regions. Criticisms about the over concentration of resources on the national office are mistaken in their particular focus that highlight the need for attention to be paid to ensure the Campaign is able to respond effectively at all levels. The head needs a
fit and able body and a body needs a head that can give a common voice, direction and purpose to the activities of the body.

There are few within the Campaign who would dispute the need for CND to have an effective head office; what concerns the critics is that this is diverting energy and resources away from campaigning at the local level. The fear is expressed that the Campaign will become dominated by officers and staff who are more concerned with the smooth running of the central administrative machinery than they are with encouraging and becoming involved in grass-roots activity - although it must be said that there is little evidence of this, both officers and staff making a point of maintaining their participation in national and local events. Even if the evidence to substantiate this fear is not apparent, however, these apprehensions among those primarily committed to direct action are present, and voiced at both Council and Conference.

Of course, it is always open to activists in the regions and areas to use the Annual Conference as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the central administrative machinery. In practice, however, Conference is too blunt and unwieldy an instrument for such control. Conference may be utilised to establish broad policy guidelines, but it is too remote a body to oversee implementation of those policies.

It is not unusual to find this kind of distinction between control over policy formulation and control over policy implementation in any large organisation. The frustrations expressed by critics within the Campaign are, in particular, very reminiscent of those which recur in the Labour
Party. Leading figures in the Campaign are only too well aware of this, and some of the most bitter criticism has come from them rather than grassroots activists. Bruce Kent, when he was General Secretary, commented in 1984 that:

CND for all sorts of historical reasons seems to have lumbered itself with a decision-making machinery which reproduces some of the worst features of the processes created by political parties.(12)

Meg Beresford, in a paper submitted to the National Executive in 1984 (before she succeeded Msg. Kent), was more trenchant in her criticisms.(13) Describing the organisation at the time as bureaucratic and inflexible, she argued that the decision-making structure was not properly democratic, and that it tended to frustrate initiatives from the grassroots. Moreover, the stress laid on consensus decision-making was tending to modify and moderate those initiatives that were pursued. This analysis was supported by the National Executive, which commented that it had become evident that many bright ideas were being 'watered-down or sanitised'.(14)

It is important to put these criticisms of CND's decision-making structure in their proper perspective. Most of the argument has taken place at the national level, among those most directly concerned and involved with the structure in question. In the Campaign as a whole, the issue has not provoked widespread discussion or disagreement. Results from the 1985 Membership Survey indicate some unease but also considerable apathy. For example, when asked about the influence of
full-time staff within CND, only 3 per cent of respondents thought it was excessive. However, when asked about their own influence in the running of CND, over 40 per cent thought it was insufficient. The full response to the question of 'How much influence would you say the following have within CND' is given in Table 5.2. As can be seen, many respondents did not offer an opinion. Of those that did, there is little evidence of serious dissatisfaction. It is noticeable that almost none of the respondents thought the full-time staff to have too little influence. It might be thought that this was more a reflection of all the other groups having their supporters among the survey sample, and answering on a basis of self-interest. There is some truth in this, as each sub-group was likely

Table 5.2
Influence within CND (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CND Staff</th>
<th>Labour Party</th>
<th>Trade Unions</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Christian CND</th>
<th>Youth CND</th>
<th>Green CND</th>
<th>Yourself</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too much</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About Right</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too Little</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41</td>
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(n = 620)
to consider their own tendency to have less influence than it should, but only young people and Green voters appear to be particularly dissatisfied.

Analysis of those respondents who considered themselves to have too little influence in CND - 41 per cent of respondents - shows that they tend to fall outside the general category of middle-aged and middle class, perhaps reflecting some dissatisfaction with the predominance of this group within the Campaign. 54 per cent of the under-24 age-group, and 50 per cent of those over 60 thought their influence insufficient, compared with only 35 per cent of the 25-59 age group. 34 per cent of graduates were dissatisfied, compared with 50 per cent of nongraduates, and 38 per cent of those in middle-class occupations compared with 47 per cent of those in skilled manual or manual occupations. Other variables, such as sex, length of CND membership, voting choice and membership of a political party, church or trade union, did not show any significant variation from the pattern of overall responses.

In general terms, therefore, although there has been considerable debate among those actively involved in national decision-making about the appropriate structures and processes the Campaign should adopt, the membership as a whole has remained largely indifferent. Although there is a significant level of dissatisfaction about their personal influence in CND, few respondents seem to attach blame for this to any particular element in the Campaign. In other words, the Campaign seems to have convinced its own members at least that it is a broad-based movement, demonstrating mutual
tolerance and understanding between its various elements rather than sectarianism.

CONCLUSIONS

CND is clearly distinguished from 'pure' social movements, like the peace movement as a whole or the women's movement, by its formalised and institutional structure for participation by the membership and for decision-making. Although this structure is overt, it is difficult to categorise. It is a hybrid form of organisation - one which stresses the validity of individualism whilst simultaneously giving expression to a federal incorporation of sub-groups. Ambiguities abound, whether in the form of overlapping membership categories, division of power between decision-making bodies or coordination between representative committees. These ambiguities are due to a number of factors. Hostility towards centralised, bureaucratic decision-making, as practised by successive British governments over nuclear weapons policy, may attract and maintain membership for the Campaign, but it militates against the delineation of clear lines of authority within CND's own organisation. Creating the facility for sub-groups to develop their own organisational form within the Campaign may well assist the dissemination of the unilateralist message into groups and parties outside the Campaign, but it also creates the opportunity for internal dissent and factionalism. Stressing the moral validity of the Campaign is not only a powerful tool for recruitment, it is also vital for the Campaign's survival in the absence of any concrete progress towards its objectives; yet
it can also encourage independent attitudes among the membership rather than solidarity and compromise. Employing both 'insider' tactics (lobbying, educational work) and 'outsider' tactics (varieties of direct action) gives the Campaign considerable strategic flexibility and makes it attractive to a range of different recruits, but it leads to inevitable confusion over distribution of resources between the two.

Having said that, the overall conclusion must be that CND has coped relatively well with the organisational stresses it has faced. Despite unprecedented growth, despite heavy reliance on volunteer staff and part-time officers (with a consequent high turnover rate in decision-making and administrative positions), despite lack of progress on its objectives and the disappointment of the 1983 and 1987 elections, despite its membership mix of veterans from the school of Labour and Union organisation politics, those committed to more direct forms of democracy and action, and those with no prior political experience but an overwhelming belief in the moral worth of their arguments, and despite incorporating all these into a structure which emphasises consultation and consensus-building rather than hierarchy, the Campaign has largely avoided sectarianism, internal dispute or serious disillusionment among the mass membership.

It is a fragmented organisation, in that there is no single source of authoritative decisions which determines everything that happens in the Campaign. It's best known leaders - for example, Joan Ruddock and Bruce Kent during the first half of the eighties - have enjoyed considerable loyalty and support from all sections of the Campaign; yet
their role has been largely one of the 'travelling evangelist' (15) rather than making decisions which are in any sense binding upon the Campaign's supporters. It is true that, at any one time, members of CND will be pursuing many different activities, and that the national officials and administrators may often have only a vague idea of what all these activities are, but there is a strong argument to be made that this is beneficial rather than disadvantageous to the Campaign. Success in terms of changing public policy may have been conspicuous by its absence, but no-one could deny the vitality of the Campaign in the early eighties. In the mid-eighties, CND has had to face the paradox of growth. In its desire to be seen as democratic, it has seen a system of committees and working groups proliferate – yet this is perceived by some in the Campaign as a trend towards bureaucratisation and away from the cutting edge of campaigning. Even leading figures in CND share this fear, but as yet have been unable to devise a solution which does not emphasise hierarchy at the expense of democracy.

NOTES


3. Ibid., pp.8-9.

4. Local groups are entitled to one vote for every five members of the group who are also
members of national CND, subject to a maximum of five votes. See CND Constitution, section D.


11. Ibid.


Discussion of the aims of CND should be a simple exercise. It purports to be a single issue organisation - that issue being the abandonment by all countries of any weapons of mass destruction. On the face of it, the targets of its efforts may not be visible, but they are easily delineated - unlike, for example, the targets of anti-poverty or anti-discrimination organisations. The issue is of such fundamental importance in both domestic and international politics, however, that the apparently straightforward aims of the Campaign in fact incorporate many ambiguities and differences of opinion. It is these, and their impact on the Campaign, that we will attempt to analyse in this chapter.

Unlike most other social movement organisations, CND has a formal constitution which includes a statement of the Campaign's aims. The opening paragraph of this constitution states

The aim of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is the unilateral abandonment by Britain of Nuclear weapons, nuclear bases and nuclear alliances as a prerequisite for a British
foreign policy which has the worldwide abolition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons leading to general and complete disarmament as its prime objective.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is opposed to the manufacture, stockpiling, testing, use or threatened use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by any country, and the policies of any country or group of countries which make nuclear war more likely, or which hinder progress towards a world without weapons of mass destruction.

It can be seen from this that nuclear weaponry is not the only concern of CND; any weapons of mass destruction, especially chemical or biological weapons, are viewed as equally reprehensible. In practice, however, virtually all of CND's campaigning is directed against nuclear weaponry. This is partly because it is in this area that the most obvious and visible escalation has taken place in the post-war period. CND will react to any apparent escalation in the sphere of chemical and biological warfare with a forthright condemnation (as in, for example, the proposed up-dating of NATO's chemical weapon stock in 1986), but rarely takes any initiative to put these areas in the forefront of its campaigning. The 1985 survey evidence indicates substantial concern over this kind of weaponry - 76 per cent of respondents agreeing that the Campaign should give a high priority to campaigning against chemical and biological weapons, with only 14 per cent saying it should have a low priority and 4 per cent no place in campaigning at all. Nevertheless, there is no
evidence in the form of conference resolutions or internal debates in National Council or Executive to suggest that there is any serious disagreement within the Campaign over the strategy of giving a clear priority to nuclear weapons, bases and alliances.

Pacifism

It is important to note that CND is not committed to opposing the possession or use of all weapons, just those of mass destruction. In other words, CND is not a pacifist organisation. Obviously, all those who subscribe to or support the Campaign might be dubbed 'nuclear pacifists', but 'total pacifism' is not as widespread as popular conceptions of the Campaign might suggest. This was highlighted by the Campaign's reaction to the Falklands War in 1982. There was some debate within the movement as to whether the Falklands was "CND's issue", given that nuclear weapons were apparently not involved. It was easy enough for the Campaign to decide to point out the potential nuclear implications - the presence of a Polaris submarine in the South Atlantic, the possibility that Task Force vessels were carrying nuclear weapons, and the possibility that if defeat seemed likely Britain might threaten the use of nuclear weapons - and this the Campaign did during the whole Falklands episode. A much more difficult decision, however, was whether national CND should take a, if not the leading role in protesting and campaigning against the war in all its aspects. Pacifist opinion within the movement argued that CND could not claim to be a 'peace movement' without taking
some stand against the war, a public position which went beyond a concern with just the nuclear dimension. There were others in the movement, however, who - whilst certainly not condoning the war - did not consider themselves to be pacifists. They argued that CND should not adopt an official policy of opposition to the war, given the apparent unpopularity of such a position with the general public, but should concentrate solely upon the nuclear issue. Faced with the dilemma of feeling some obligation to campaign upon an issue, but knowing in advance that public opinion was very likely to be unreceptive, if not hostile, national CND adopted much the same tactic as it has over the thorny question of NATO membership - it left it to local groups to decide for themselves whether they wanted to campaign on the war, and many of them did in fact take the lead in anti-Falklands war campaigning in their area. National CND did not take a formal lead, however; underlining the point that 'total pacifism' is an influential strand within the Campaign, but it is far from being a dominant force.

As noted in Chapter 4, the 1985 survey suggested that about half of the membership could be classified as 'total' pacifists; however, they tend to be somewhat less active in CND's own activities. Perhaps as a reflection of this, pacifists were also more unhappy about their influence within CND; 48 per cent indicated that they thought they personally had too little influence within the Campaign, whereas only 36 per cent of non-pacifists expressed similar dissatisfaction. Be that as it may, pacifists are certainly not without influence in CND. They may be unable to persuade others within the Campaign to
join them in renouncing conventional as well as nuclear weapons (and, indeed, rarely try to do so), but they do constitute an important enough strand of opinion to stop the Campaign moving in certain directions.

The best example of this is the recurring debate over whether the Campaign should not only oppose current defence strategy but also endorse a particular alternative defence policy for Britain. Some non-pacifists in the Campaign argue that if CND were to support a specific non-nuclear defence policy, this would enhance CND's appeal, particularly to those in the middle of the electoral spectrum who might feel CND's current policy to be unrealistic. This argument has been conducted since 1980, but became more important after the 1983 General Election, when it appeared that many voters equated nuclear disarmament with leaving Britain defenceless. Pacifists strongly resist this argument, however, not wishing to lend their support to any specific policy which would entail the maintenance or escalation of present levels of conventional armaments. They have been successful in advancing this viewpoint in so far as whereas the Annual Conference in 1980 voted in favour of the movement formulating an alternative defence policy, the 1983 Conference called only for education of both membership and the general public about various forms of non-nuclear defence policies. They have been helped by the fact that leading figures in the Campaign, although they would not describe themselves as 'total pacifists', have not wished to take up the idea of endorsing a specific alternative defence policy, precisely because of the risk of alienating a substantial proportion of the membership.
This was an important factor in the short-lived history of a proposed 'Defence Charter'; an idea which surfaced in 1985. Proposed largely on the initiative of James Hinton (then chairperson of the national Projects Committee), Meg Beresford, Dan Smith and others among the national leadership who take an internationalist perspective on CND's strategy, the idea behind the Defence Charter was to counter the 'defenceless' argument which proved so damaging in the 1983 Election. The strategy was to devise a package of recommendations which would shift the argument on non-nuclear defence away from a concentration on abolishing nuclear weaponry and onto a consideration of how non-nuclear defence could be presented as part of a credible new foreign policy. For such credibility to be obtained, it was considered essential by Hinton to secure the support of politicians, trade unionists, church leaders and others who were not members of or associated with CND - as he put it,

The basic problem was to address defencelessness in an authoritative way. To do that, it was necessary to get support from political and non-political figures who were not identified as CND supporters. (1)

This meant that the Charter could not simply restate CND's own position in its entirety; given that the aim was to attract support from outside the unilateralist, anti-NATO school of thought (Dennis Healey, for example, was a key target figure), then the package had to stop short of making specific commitments on the immediate scrapping of Britain's existing deterrent and membership of NATO. Hence the only specific demand
in the Charter was for the cancellation of Trident and the removal of Cruise; otherwise the Charter was couched in generalities about the need for a foreign policy which would reduce tension between East and West and lead to a more equitable sharing of resources between North and South. Although the Charter argued that Britain should 'move towards' a non-nuclear defence policy, no timetable was envisaged, and there was no suggestion as to what form this new system of defence might take. Having formulated this package, the intention was to secure its endorsement by leading national figures, and then conduct a mass petition throughout the country.

The initiative failed, partly because there was not sufficient support from outside CND, but also because it was not received favourably by many within the campaign. The instigators of the Charter were well aware in advance that it would incur the displeasure of those in CND who put a high priority on British withdrawal from NATO (primarily Labour CND and their sympathisers). They attempted to circumvent this opposition by arguing that as this initiative was independent of CND, the Campaign did not need to decide on whether or not it formally supported it. They had some success with this tactic, in that, despite vehement objections from Labour CND, the idea continued to be discussed in national CND throughout 1985. Any chance of the movement actually endorsing the idea, however, disappeared when it became clear that pacifist opinion was hostile. The 'total pacifists' in the Campaign could not bring themselves to support an initiative which did not make a specific commitment to decommission Polaris, let alone make clear what kind of conventional armaments would be employed as
part of a non-nuclear defence strategy. The national leadership was careful to keep the topic off the agenda at National Conference, precisely because it did not wish to expose a split between 'total' and 'nuclear' pacifists. It is in this sense that pacifist opinion is influential in CND; the 'total pacifists' are not sufficiently powerful to direct national policy in a positive way, but they do have a negative influence in the sense that they can set parameters beyond which the movement cannot go. More often than not, they do not have to argue their case; the national leadership is sufficiently sensitive to pacifist opinion that it will not commit itself to any course of action which it is anticipated will be unacceptable to the many pacifists within the movement.

Conventional weapons

Consequently, while CND is happy to publicise various alternative strategies of non-nuclear defence, it refuses to endorse (even by implication) any particular strategy. The Campaign's literature outlines the main alternatives - 'defensive' conventional weaponry (Anti-tank missiles, fighter aircraft) rather than the 'aggressive' counterparts (tanks, bombers); 'in depth' defence which rests on mobilising reservists to exact a 'high admission price' on any invading force; sabotage; civilian-based non-violent resistance; and guerrilla resistance - but apart from noting reservations about guerrilla resistance (even if only as a fall-back strategy), CND is scrupulous not to indicate any preference. To justify this, the leadership argues that the nature of CND as a
protest movement is such that it does not need to endorse any particular strategy, merely to make the case against nuclear weapons and publicise all the possible alternatives. The choice of one particular alternative is left to political parties - the following argument from Dan Smith is typical of the line taken by CND's leadership since the early eighties:—

One question faced by all CND activists at one time or another is, 'What defence policy do you advocate to replace our reliance on nuclear weapons?' Arising from this widely shared experience, there is a growing interest in CND developing an alternative defence policy. I believe it would be a fundamental strategic error for CND to take this course ... The fact that CND is not a political party means it cannot aspire to hold governmental power. Political parties which aspire to form a government need to have defence policies, and CND's role is to do everything it can to form a climate of opinion in which the defence policies developed by parties are non-nuclear, and in which the electorate opts for a party or parties with non-nuclear defence policies. In other words, CND's basic role is to close the door against certain options in defence policy - nuclear options. Since it will never have to implement a defence policy it is needless and inappropriate for it to develop one. (2)

Among the national membership as a whole, the 1985 survey reveals a substantial minority who take a positive stand on the issue of conventional
weaponry. Asked whether Britain should have more conventional weapons if nuclear weapons were abandoned, 25 per cent agreed while 58 per cent rejected the idea. There were few significant differences between these groups, except that those opposed to increasing conventional weaponry tended to be slightly younger. The 1986 Annual Conference, however, did vote in favour of a resolution which called for all money at present spent on nuclear weapons to be diverted away from defence, and not into spending on conventional weapons. This remains a significant difference between the Campaign's programme and that of the Labour Party, Labour having made clear by the time of the 1987 Election that it intended to devote money saved by nuclear disarmament to increased spending on conventional weapons.

Rather than becoming involved in the specifics of non-nuclear defence CND prefers to concentrate upon more general arguments about just what does constitute effective 'defence'. The Campaign argues that nuclear weapons do not provide such a defence, but on the contrary make Britain more of a likely target. Moreover, use of nuclear weapons against another nuclear-armed state would only provoke retaliation, and thus destruction on both sides. Use or threatened use of nuclear weapons by Britain or any other nuclear power against a non-nuclear state is seen as politically unacceptable - so, for example,

Nuclear weapons are so dangerous that they are not very useful. Britain's nuclear weapons did not deter the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands. A non-nuclear state, Vietnam,
fought a long successful war against nuclear America. (3)

Similarly, the prospect of a nuclear-armed state threatening to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear Britain - the 'nuclear blackmail' scenario which has been persistently stressed by the Conservatives - is discounted as very unlikely on political grounds, and, even if it did occur, it would be better to come to terms with such a threat rather than indulge in mutual destruction - hence,

It is very difficult to imagine a nuclear power threatening to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country unless they were already at war. Indeed the history of the last 30 years shows that even in war this threat is unlikely; it would be very difficult for any state to justify to its own people, let alone the rest of the world, a nuclear attack on a country which was not threatening it . . . If, however, this threat was made and was not a bluff, and we were actually faced with a choice between nuclear obliteration and giving way, then most people would probably prefer to keep on living. Our best course of action then would be a determined campaign of civil resistance. (4)

In addition to these pragmatic arguments, CND also advances a powerful moral argument against nuclear weapons. Reduced to its essentials, this states that it is immoral to subscribe to a defence policy which is based on the threat of killing millions of people (mostly civilians) in other countries and, through inevitable retaliation, millions of British
people - 'in the final analysis, nuclear deterrence is the moral equivalent of holding a pistol to the heads of our own children, wives, husbands and friends.'(5)

Defence and Foreign Affairs

Increasingly in recent years, CND has not rested its case entirely upon the moral or practical shortcomings of nuclear weapons, but has placed its arguments for nuclear disarmament in the context of the need for a whole new defence and foreign policy perspective for Britain. The argument is that any defence policy is futile (though a nuclear defence policy is particularly so) unless it is devised in the context of a foreign policy which signals to the rest of the world that Britain is concerned to promote international peace and understanding. As with non-nuclear defence policy, CND does not see it as its proper function to devise a fully-fledged alternative foreign policy, but rather to highlight what is wrong with existing policy and to encourage discussion about possible alternatives. The 1985 survey shows that there is considerable support among the national membership for radical change. 63 per cent agreed that Britain should pursue a strictly non-aligned defence and foreign policy, with only 17 per cent indicating disagreement. Despite this being a policy stance which is considerably at variance with that advocated by Labour, support for the Labour Party and trade union membership was somewhat higher among those favouring non-alignment, whereas the group rejecting the idea tended to be younger, male rather than
female (this being one of the few issues which revealed a significant difference according to gender) and more disposed to support the SDP/Liberal Alliance.

As might be expected, most of the discussion within the Campaign about foreign policy centres around the super-power conflict, and particularly on the implications of this for Europe in the form of the NATO/Warsaw Pact divide. Before examining this, however, it is worth noting a more general trend which has become apparent since 1983, which is a growing interest in the linkages to be made between disarmament and development. Since its re-birth, CND's literature has detailed specific instances of the undesirable effects of nuclear weapons on non-nuclear states. Examples of this are the impact of uranium mining on the people of Namibia and the Aboriginal population in Australia, and the after effects of nuclear weapons testing on the Navaho Indians in New Mexico and the population of the South Pacific Atolls. The recent trend, no doubt partly inspired by the massive publicity given to the problems of famine and under-development in the Third World during 1984 and 1985, has been to place these particular instances in the more general context of the Arms Race and super-power hostility being a direct cause of poverty and repression in the Third World. The argument is not without difficulties for CND: a move towards conventional weaponry by nuclear states could mean that more resources would be required (as nuclear weapons are relatively cheap), leaving less available for overseas aid and even more interest in selling such conventional weaponry to Third World countries. CND confronts this problem by arguing that it is the possession of nuclear
weapons which in itself reinforces the spending pattern on conventional arms, because it maintains the atmosphere of international tension. In other words, the relevance of nuclear disarmament to the Third World is not just to bring to an end exploitation of the raw materials necessary for the production of nuclear weapons, but also because it would mark the first stage of a process of lessening international tension and conflict generally. As the present chairperson argued shortly after his election,

Bread not bombs is an important moral statement about priorities which a lot of people readily understand, and we must keep on saying it because it connects the arms race with popular awareness of world poverty. But we mustn't oversimplify things. The reasons why millions are starving today are complex, and the nuclear arms race is only one of them. Non-nuclear defence would cost money, though whether it costs more or less than nuclear deterrence depends on how you assess external threats and what kind of defence policy you opt for. All that's open to debate. But apart from asserting right priorities, one of the most important things we must say about disarmament and development is this: what we need is an independent foreign policy, not a so-called 'independent' nuclear deterrent. As long as we have a British government devoted to the nuclear deterrent, and which allows the military confrontation between the superpowers to dominate its relations with the rest of the world, we have no independent foreign
policy which can give Third World countries the help they urgently need.(6)

Such an approach has been accepted by the Campaign nationally; the 1985 Conference approved a resolution which stated that

The continuing massive escalation of the arms race diverts enormous resources from peaceful development throughout the world. It is a cause of poverty and deprivation and perpetuates injustice and inequality between North and South.

and went on to instruct National CND to campaign on this issue. Among the membership, however, there are signs of caution. Asked in the 1985 survey whether money saved by nuclear disarmament should go primarily on overseas aid, 39 per cent agreed - reflecting the real commitment among many in the Campaign to prioritise the issue. 42 per cent disagreed, however, many of whom indicated (without being asked to do so) that any such savings would be better spent on improving health and social services in Britain. In other words, the difference of opinion within the Campaign is over priorities not principles: there is widespread agreement that Britain's foreign policy should reflect greater concern for the Third World, but less unanimity over how important this should be.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact

Any such move towards a more equitable relationship with the Third World rests, however,
upon disengagement from the super-powers. Again, there is widespread agreement on the principle of disengagement, but very real and much more serious disagreements over the priority to be given to this and the tactics to be employed. More than any other issue, it is the position CND should adopt vis-a-vis NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the super-powers which has caused internal division and sometimes bitter argument. The different opinions on this within the Campaign are many and tend to overlap; at the risk of over-simplification, however, three broad schools of thought may be identified as influential.

One coalesces around those in the leadership who are committed to an internationalist perspective. Most have past or present links with END, the campaign for European Nuclear Disarmament. This organisation, in which British campaigners play the leading role, does not have members as such, but rather supporters who subscribe to the END journal. END rejects a nationalist approach to disarmament (although it advocates unilateral steps by individual nations), and lays great stress upon peace campaigners from both Western and Eastern Europe working together. They argue that although CND should continue withdrawal from NATO as long as it remains a nuclear alliance it should only do so in conjunction with campaigning as far as possible for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact nuclear alliance as well. Their ideological perspective is one which sees a need for people in both Western and Eastern Europe to be liberated from super-power domination. Generally speaking, they are less ready than some others in the Campaign to see the USSR's role in the Arms Race as reacting to American escalation; whilst they accept that the
USA is more to blame for such escalation, and that the USSR has a more impressive record on disarmament proposals, they argue that neither super-power has taken concrete unilateral action and thus it is important to maintain the pressure on both. Tactically, this means that they advocate a strategy of 'detente from below', which entails pursuing a dialogue not only with the government-approved 'official' peace groups in the USSR and Eastern Europe, but also with 'unofficial' groups and individuals. It also means that they resist attempts to commit CND to a strategy of campaigning for British withdrawal from NATO immediately and as a first priority; they argue rather that the Campaign should 'educate' people about the implications of NATO membership, putting this firmly in the context of the need for the dissolution of all nuclear alliances.

Another broad school of thought, which centres around Labour CND, but includes adherents from outside the Labour party is convinced of the necessity to prioritise withdrawal from NATO. They lay a greater stress on America's role in escalating the Arms Race, and argue the need to question the assumption that the Soviet Union is necessarily an enemy of Britain (They should not be confused with the numerically very small element of long-serving members of the British Communist Party in CND, who attempt to advance the view that the Soviet Union is virtually blameless; although active, especially at the local level, and vocal at Conference, their views rarely attract majority support within the Campaign.) Their ideological orientation is not so much pro-Soviet as anti-American, and as such they are deeply suspicious of the internationalist argument about giving equal
priority to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The possibility of Britain undertaking unilateral nuclear disarmament, yet remaining a member of NATO, is dismissed on the grounds that it could lead to American bases remaining in Britain which could be put on a nuclear footing in times of crisis. Moreover, membership of NATO has implications for other aspects of governmental policy as well as defence – for example

Since NATO was set up in 1949, it has been an organ of the cold war. It is a military alliance dominated by America and created not in response to Soviet aggression but to guarantee US nuclear supremacy over the USSR and to establish America as the world's most powerful state. It is not an alliance of equals – the interests of other member states are totally subordinate to US interests. Whilst Britain remains a member, we lack overall control of our economic, industrial and social policies and independence in our foreign and international policies. Membership of NATO means not only that our military budget squeezes other budgets and threatens a socialist programme of a Labour government, but it also means that we are in an alliance that threatens any other country trying to liberate itself from imperialism. There is no distinction between US foreign policy and the policy of NATO. (NATO) does not defend our freedom, our democracy, or our liberty. In reality, it threatens all of these things, and jeopardises peace throughout the world.
These differences of opinion emerge most clearly at CND's Annual Conference. The question of prioritising campaigning on NATO withdrawal has been raised several times. In 1981, Conference reaffirmed CND's commitment to Britain's unilateral withdrawal from NATO. In 1982, Conference passed a resolution which noted with regret that the previous decision to carry out educational work had not been fully implemented, and reiterated the instruction to do so to National Council. In 1983, Conference again called for educational material to be prepared which would present the case for leaving NATO; significantly, however, a further resolution instructing National Council to include withdrawal from NATO as a fundamental element in all future campaigns was referred to National Council as a delaying tactic. The Campaign's policy on NATO withdrawal was also an influential factor in the election of a new Chairperson at the 1985 Conference. Among the candidates, Dan Smith was identified with the internationalist school of thought, whilst Joy Hurcombe and Vic Allen were firm in their insistence on prioritising the NATO issue. Although empirical evidence is impossible to obtain, there was a clear impression among delegates that most of Hurcombe and Allen's second preference votes went to Paul Johns rather than Dan Smith precisely because Johns was viewed as more likely to prioritise the issue. In the event, Johns has stuck to the line developed by the leadership during the early eighties - that is, to affirm CND's commitment to campaigning for British withdrawal, but to advocate an educational strategy rather than anything more radical - for example
It would be quite wrong to put 'Britain out of NATO' on its own up at the top of our agenda, and go round mindlessly shouting 'No, No, Nato'. But the time has come where we need to mount a well-constructed public information campaign about Nato, about how its political and military decisions are taken, and how, in consequence, democratic control over defence issues in this country is eroded. What priority we give to this and how we fit it into our other political campaigning we've got to think through together.(8)

Despite some vocal opposition, particularly from Labour CND, this position is broadly acceptable within the Campaign, although the 1986 Annual Conference did pass by a clear majority a motion emphasising CND's commitment to campaigning for British withdrawal from NATO.

An important third element in the internal discussions over NATO were those who were leading figures during the first half of the eighties and who had strong ties with the Labour Party - for example, Joan Ruddock, Roger Spiller and Mick Elliott. These were inevitably subject to cross pressures - their colleagues in Labour CND pressing them to prioritise NATO withdrawal, whilst Labour and most unions' policy was to remain in the Alliance. Their response was to make clear their commitment to the Campaign, by continuing to argue the case for withdrawal both within the Campaign and in Labour and union circles, but they appeared more mindful of the electoral unpopularity of withdrawal than their counterparts in Labour CND, and correspondingly more pragmatic and disposed to
see the issue remain as just one of a number of campaigning priorities.

The Campaign's strategy towards the Soviet Union has only received extensive debate at one Annual Conference, in 1984. Then, however, it was the occasion of prolonged and fierce debate. The resolution called on Conference to step up its campaigning against Soviet deployment of new nuclear weapons and to campaign against Soviet nuclear weapons and policies. This led to passionate arguments that CND should not attack the Soviet system as a whole, countered by equally passionate arguments that CND had, if it was to keep any credibility, to be seen to be even-handed in its campaigning against all nuclear weapons powers. Since then, however, the issue has become less contentious, and guidelines on contacting both official and unofficial peace groups in Eastern Europe have been agreed, and opposition to both nuclear alliances reaffirmed.

Among the national membership, the 1985 survey produced results which reflect the differences of opinion which exist where Britain's relationship with the super-powers is concerned. Asked whether Britain should leave NATO, less than half (43 per cent) agreed and 26 per cent disagreed (26 per cent don't know; 6 per cent no response) a surprising result, given the Campaign's clear policy commitment to withdrawal. Labour and Green supporters were predominant in the group favouring withdrawal; this group also tended to be more active than the sample as a whole, both within CND and in political parties, trade unions and other public campaigns. Among the group opposing British withdrawal from NATO, there were more SDP/Liberal Alliance supporters than in the sample as a whole, a higher
incidence of religious belief, and a tendency to be sympathisers rather than activists. Asked whether Britain should substantially reduce its present defence and foreign policy links with America, an overwhelming majority of respondents - 91 per cent - agreed. Asked who bore the main responsibility for the Arms Race in recent years, 53 per cent singled out America, 42 per cent laid equal blame on America and the Soviet Union, while only one respondent laid responsibility on the Soviet Union alone. Those who considered America to be primarily responsible did not differ from the sample as a whole in any significant way, except they tended to come from the older age bracket. Those who thought America and the Soviet Union to be equally responsible tended to be younger, more disposed to support the SDP/Liberal Alliance, and less involved in both CND's activities and political parties. Asked whether they considered the Soviet Union to pose a military threat to Britain, there was an unusual age profile, with no less than 43 per cent of those who thought it did being 25 or under; they also tended to be less active in CND's activities and less likely to belong to a political party or trade union.

Anti-Americanism

In addition to these attitudinal questions, respondents were also given a list of six possible campaigning areas, and asked to indicate which three they thought CND should pursue. The areas given were the nuclear civil defence program, Trident, British unilateral nuclear disarmament, British withdrawal from NATO, Cruise, and the
removal of all American bases from Britain. The last alternative - removal of U.S. bases - was chosen by 73 per cent of respondents, and there were no significant differences between this group and the whole sample. British withdrawal from NATO was prioritised by only 18 per cent of respondents; compared with the whole sample, they tended to be younger, and more involved in other public campaigns. They were also more likely to lay sole blame on America for the Arms Race, to oppose replacing nuclear weapons by more conventional weaponry and to favour a non-aligned defence and foreign policy for Britain.

There is clearly a substantial element within the national membership who are firmly opposed to American defence and foreign policy, at least in so far as it impinges on Britain's policies in this area. If one takes those respondents who indicated that CND should prioritise the removal of American bases as a campaigning issue, who favoured reducing Britain's defence and foreign policy links with America, and who identified America as primarily responsible for the Arms Race, then this group accounts for 39 per cent of all respondents. The survey evidence suggests, however, that they are not concentrated in any one area or group among the membership as a whole. They tend to be slightly older (39 per cent over 40, compared with 30 per cent of all respondents), to support the Labour Party (73 per cent, compared with 67 per cent of all respondents), to be less likely to be practising members of a church, more likely to favour withdrawal from NATO (52 per cent, compared with 43 per cent of all respondents), and to advocate a position of non-alignment for Britain (74 per cent, compared with 63 per cent of all respondents).
Otherwise, however, there are no significant differences between this group and all respondents and, as can be appreciated from the above, the differences that do exist are not great. In other words, although there are clear divisions amongst the leadership over the most suitable strategy for CND to adopt vis-a-vis the super-powers, the survey does not suggest that these differences are reflected in any clear factional form among the national membership.

Unilateralism

The debate over the Campaign's policies towards the super-powers has also called into question CND's commitment to the principle of unilateralism, although this has never developed into a serious dispute. There was an attempt at the 1985 Conference to have the Constitution amended so as to replace the call for unilateral British nuclear disarmament with a call for the adoption of a non-nuclear defence policy - in other words, omitting the term 'unilateral'. This was supported by Bruce Kent, who for some years had been arguing that 'multilateralism' and 'unilateralism' were by no means mutually exclusive, but in fact complementary. He claimed at the Conference that the present wording of the Constitution was 'negative and unhelpful'. Despite this, Conference responded to the arguments of other delegates that it was essential to keep the explicit commitment to unilateralism if the Campaign was to retain the support of pacifists and keep its moral integrity intact, and the motion was clearly lost. However, CND has consistently argued that unilateralism
should go hand-in-hand with multi-lateralism; the argument is that unilateralist measures can inspire subsequent multi-lateralist measures. Thus, while CND acknowledges that it is unrealistic to expect either super-power to abolish all its nuclear weapons unilaterally, the Campaign argues that British unilateralism could help to break the deadlock in arms control negotiations. The contention is that an important first step in any multi-lateral disarmament is to confine possession of nuclear weapons to the super-powers, and whilst unilateral action by Britain would not have much effect on the global armoury of nuclear weapons, it would at least prompt the super-powers into a reassessment of their position. This is somewhat ironical in the light of Gorbachev's initiatives in 1986/87, which have prompted the European powers into a hasty reassessment of their own positions.

In an attempt to discover attitudes towards unilateralism among the national membership, the 1985 survey asked respondents to indicate whether they supported unilateral nuclear disarmament a) as soon as they became seriously interested or involved in CND ('immediately'); b) intuitively, but having taken some time work out why ('intuitively'); c) after much consideration of pro and counter arguments ('eventually'); or d) whether they were still considering the issue ('undecided'). Among the whole sample, 37 per cent indicated 'immediately', 35 per cent 'intuitively', 16 per cent 'eventually and 11 per cent 'undecided'. As might be expected, given that they constitute 72 per cent of the whole sample, the 'immediate' and 'intuitive' sub-groups taken together do not differ significantly in any other respect from the whole sample. There is a slight
tendency for respondents in these two sub-groups to be older; to favour Labour rather than the SDP/Lib­
eral Alliance, to be more active in CND's affairs, to favour withdrawal from NATO, to reject the notion of the Soviet threat and to favour non-
alignment when compared with the total sample, but in all cases the difference is only a few per cent. Comparing the 'eventual' sub-group with the total sample reveals men to be over-represented, more support for the Alliance, more recent members and less enthusiasm for withdrawal from NATO and non-alignment.

Perhaps the most interesting results come from the 'undecided' sub-group. They tend to be younger (32 per cent under 25, compared with 24 per cent of the total sample), much more evenly divided between Alliance and Labour (32 per cent Alliance voters, 43 per cent Labour voters, compared with 15 per cent and 67 per cent respectively among the total sample) and less active (2 per cent activists, 29 per cent participants and 65 per cent sympathisers, compared with 11 per cent, 34 per cent and 48 per cent respectively among the total sample). They are also less active outside CND - 15 per cent belonging to a political party (32 per cent in the total sample), 25 per cent to a trade union and 50 per cent supporting other campaigns (compared with 37 per cent and 60 per cent respectively among the total sample). Only 38 per cent laid the main responsibility for the Arms Race on America alone (compared with 58 per cent of the 'immediate/intuitive' sub-group and 53 per cent of the total sample), whilst 52 per cent laid equal blame on America and the Soviet Union. Similarly, only 15 per cent favoured British withdrawal from NATO (compared with 50 per cent of the 'immediate/intui-
tive' sub-group and 43 per cent of the total sample); with almost half (47 per cent) definitely rejecting the idea. Whilst in the 'immediate/intuitive' sub-group 72 per cent thought that the Soviet Union did not pose a serious military threat to Britain, and 15 per cent thought that it did, among the 'undecided' sub-group opinion was much more evenly divided - 37 per cent rejecting the notion of a Soviet threat, and 35 per cent arguing that such a threat does exist. Similarly, only 35 per cent of the 'undecided' sub-group supported the idea of non-alignment for Britain, compared with 69 per cent of the 'immediate/intuitive' sub-group. Despite these marked differences, it must be remembered that the 'undecided' sub-group only accounts for some 11 per cent of the total sample, so in overall terms there is clearly widespread support for unilateralism within the Campaign. Indeed, it might be argued that - given CND's explicit commitment to unilateralism - it is surprising to find any of the national membership in the undecided category. However, given that much of the publicity given to CND during the eighties has concerned its opposition to Cruise and Trident, rather than its more extensive commitment to unilateralism, it is surprising to find so few among the national membership who express no doubts about expanding their opposition to Cruise and Trident into unqualified support for unilateral nuclear disarmament. Among respondents as a whole, 68 per cent of respondents thought that CND should prioritise British unilateral disarmament as one of its campaigning options.

Respondents were also asked which arguments against unilateralism (if any) they found hardest to refute, either in their own minds or in discus-
sion with others. Two-thirds of respondents gave an answer to this, and of these almost 20 per cent cited the charge of 'defencelessness'—presumably with memories of the 1983 election campaign in mind. A further 10 per cent found it difficult to dismiss the argument that unilateralism might upset the balance of deterrence in international relations, and just under 10 per cent noted that distrust of the Soviet Union made it difficult to persuade people into supporting unilateralism. Just over 10 per cent of respondents indicated that they did not find any arguments against unilateralism hard to refute; perhaps surprisingly, however, this group were no more active within the Campaign than their less self-confident counterparts.

The Question of Nuclear Energy

A potentially more serious dispute has occurred over the stance CND should adopt on the question of nuclear energy. This has been the subject of numerous resolutions at Annual Conference throughout the seventies and eighties. At the 1978 Conference, for example, a resolution was passed to the effect that 'so-called peaceful development of nuclear power be opposed (by CND) as a matter of policy'. The main concern has always been that the proliferation of nuclear technology would lead to a proliferation of nuclear-weapon states. CND has repeatedly drawn attention to the linkage between the production of plutonium by the nuclear power industry, and its use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This argument was highlighted by the efforts of a CND working group which gave evidence to the Sizewell B Public
Enquiry that, despite government assurances to the contrary, plutonium from British nuclear power stations had been exported to America, and used for weapons production. Apart from making this connection, however, CND has been reluctant to add formal opposition to nuclear energy to its statement of policy aims.

This reluctance is partly due to the belief of many in the movement, from various shades of opinion, that CND is and should remain a single-issue organisation, and that concern over nuclear energy, although shared by most in CND, is best expressed through environmental groups such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. A more important factor, however, has been the opposition of trade unions affiliated to CND. Until recently, trade unionists have been apprehensive about the effect on their members' jobs of a drive against nuclear power. Within the Campaign, this has brought them into conflict with the relatively small but active and voluble contingent of Green Party supporters, who have persistently argued that CND should formally commit itself to opposition to nuclear energy. This disagreement between Greens and trade unionists reached its height at the 1984 Annual Conference, when Green CND sought to amend the Constitution to incorporate opposition to the total nuclear energy cycle. This was firmly opposed by trade unionists, particularly the Transport and General Workers delegates, and, on a card vote, the motion was narrowly defeated. By the 1985 Conference, however, the Transport and General (along with other unions) had already changed its own policy on nuclear energy and trade unionists and greens were able to agree on a resolution calling on Trade Union CND to pursue an
educational campaign on the problems associated with the nuclear power industry; and the need to develop alternative plans which would safeguard employment in the context of a non-nuclear energy policy. This was carried unanimously and, as this rapprochement occurred before the Chernobyl disaster, there is every reason to believe that CND will adopt an even stronger opposition to nuclear energy in the future as shown by the decision to mount a national demonstration in 1987 in partnership with Friends of the Earth. The 1985 survey revealed considerable potential for this to occur; 55 per cent thought that CND should give a high priority to campaigning against nuclear energy, a further 29 per cent that it should form part of the Campaign's programme but with a low priority, and only 8 per cent indicating that the issue should not be given any priority at all.

Employment and Conversion

The employment consequences of a move away from nuclear power is not the only problem faced by trade unionists in CND; there is also the more pressing problem of their members who are directly employed in nuclear weapons production. A classic example of the problems facing CND in this context is the Vickers shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness, chosen to build the new Trident submarines and employing about half of the town's working population. CND faced up to this dilemma by making Barrow the site of its annual demonstration in 1984, and thus confronting the problem head-on. CND has a dual strategy. Firstly, to emphasise the capital-intensive nature of nuclear weapons
production; the argument is that a move to non-nuclear defence would create more jobs. This is an argument that is heard more in the Trade Union CND than in the movement as a whole, as many pacifists would be very reluctant to endorse a policy which rested on increasing the output of conventional arms. The second strategy, referred to more often at Conference, is to advocate 'conversion' — that is, utilising the skills and resources at present employed in nuclear weapons production for new, socially useful production. Much inspiration is drawn from the experience of Lucas Aerospace, where shop stewards pursued such a course(9), though it is admitted that special circumstances (not least the support of Tony Benn, then Minister of Industry) were important in this case. CND's thinking on the problems of conversion has not advanced much beyond establishing the need for considerable public investment, at least in the short-term, but it is an issue which Trade Union CND pursues with some vigour; the Transport and General Workers Union, in particular, is involved in studying the problem, and CND has sponsored a full-time worker attached to Barrow to develop ideas on the ground. A number of major trade unions have formed a Defence Conversion committee to explore alternatives and publicise them within the trade union movement. (10)

Legality

If the search for viable conversion projects is still in a formative stage, so too is CND's attempt to explore the legality of nuclear weapons. To some extent as a response to the Conservative
government's stress on law and order, CND has sought to argue that it is governments rather than protestors who are guilty of a serious crime. Drawing on a number of international conventions and agreements(11), CND argues that nuclear weapons defy these because they are indiscriminate weapons which, if used, must inevitably affect the civilian population and neutral countries. Any attempt to present a case on these lines has been rejected by British courts on the grounds that defence policy is a Crown prerogative, and therefore outside their competence. Nevertheless, CND continues to campaign on this issue, and the 1984 Annual Conference endorsed a motion which committed the Campaign to put a greater emphasis on the legality question in the future. Some individuals in CND (notably the Quakers) have attempted to withhold a proportion of their taxes, on the grounds that the money would be used to finance defence. To date, this has met with a singular lack of success in the British courts.

Non-Violent Direct Action

Legality is of course important for CND in another respect - the legitimacy or otherwise of non-violent direct action (NVDA), and the alleged curtailment of protestors' civil liberties in general. NVDA has been a core belief among CND activists since the movement's inception, and the ideological justification for it has remained largely unchanged. Briefly, CND argues that NVDA and civil disobedience is justified when the protest is motivated by a regard for higher or more fundamental laws; thus, for example, international
law is cited as one ground, and Christian CND asserts that civil disobedience is entirely consistent with Christian beliefs. Frequent references are made to the precedents set by the suffragist movement, the Chartists, Ghandi, the civil rights movement in America, and the long tradition in Britain of protest activity. It is freely acknowledged by all but the most ardent NVDA enthusiasts in the Campaign that such action rarely produces concrete results (although it is argued that the actions of the Greenham women have caused real disruption to the operations of that base). It is thought to be worthwhile, however, partly because of the media exposure it brings and partly because of the consciousness-raising effect it has on those who participate. (12) Successive Conference resolutions have endorsed the principle of NVDA, always stressing that it should be peaceful - the 1983 Conference decided that local groups should have the right to withdraw membership from any person advocating violence against others in any form. In practice, there is a historic suspicion among activists that the leadership is in practice somewhat ambivalent on the question of direct action, partly because of the negative treatment it can (and usually does) receive in the media, and partly because it represents a tactic over which they can exercise little direct control. This suspicion is discussed in more detail in the next chapter, but it is certainly true that there are some in the movement who have doubts about the political efficacy, if not the moral principle, of NVDA.

The 1985 survey sought to investigate those doubts. Some 30 per cent of all respondents indicated that they were not prepared to partici-
pate in NVDA, although many respondents gave personal reasons (fear of arrest, family or work responsibilities) for their reluctance. Respondents were also asked to give their opinion on whether, in general terms, NVDA strengthened or weakened the Campaign. 56 per cent thought that it strengthened the Campaign; apart from a slight tendency to be more active in CND's affairs, this sub-group did not differ greatly from the whole sample. 22 per cent thought that NVDA weakened the Campaign; a quarter of these were SDP/Liberal Alliance supporters, and they tended to be less active both inside and outside the Campaign.

Civil Liberties

Civil liberties is an area in which CND has developed policy in response to events. These can be divided into two types: judicial and police action in response to NVDA, and the harassment of CND activists generally. Many of those involved in NVDA activities have been arrested, charged with obstruction or breach of the peace, and usually convicted. More disturbing, in CND's eyes, has been the use of conspiracy charges against those in peace camps (notably Alconbury). It is alleged (and certainly believed by the leadership) that even members of CND who limit their protest to demonstrating are subject to scrutiny and investigation by the Special Branch and M.I.5, such activities including interference with mail and phone-tapping. CND's tactical response to this is discussed later; in this context, the point to note is that this apparent harassment has revived a debate within the movement about the relationship
between the nuclear state and civil liberties. Nuclear weapons policy is a uniquely secretive area, even within the generally very secretive system of British government. CND highlights the almost complete lack of democratic and Parliamentary input into the decision-making process about nuclear weapons, and argues that 'national security' is used as an excuse to restrict information which might damage the government's case for the possession of nuclear weapons. In this sense, civil liberties are seen as an inevitable casualty of the nuclear state. At both the 1984 and 1985 Annual Conferences, resolutions were overwhelmingly approved which criticised the curtailment of traditional rights of free speech, freedom of assembly and of peaceful protest, and which called on CND to work with the National Council for Civil Liberties in a campaign against the Public Order Act (which gives the police powers to impose wide-ranging conditions on demonstrations, meetings and marches of all kinds). Christian CND and Green CND are particularly keen advocates of prioritising the civil liberties issue.

Conclusions

At the start of its re-birth at the end of the seventies, CND was a small, single-issue group working within a two-party system in which many thought of Labour as the 'natural' party of government. Less than ten years later, the Campaign had grown at least twenty-fold, had lived through the rise and (given the 1987 election) apparent demise of three-party politics and, above all, had come through an era in which Thatcherism
and Conservative governments had been the norm. Given a combination of freshly recruited supporters, changes in the party system and implacably hostile governments, it would not have been surprising if the Campaign had changed the nature or extent of its demands. In the event, it has remained largely true to its original vision; although its campaigning has not achieved any concrete changes in public policy, it has not sought to replace its principal goal with something which might be easier to achieve. It has entered into working alliances with the anti-nuclear energy lobby, but has not allowed itself to become submerged into the diffuse 'green counter-culture'. It has resisted the temptation to restrict its campaigning to apparently popular issues like Cruise and Trident, remaining committed to the much less popular stances of complete British nuclear disarmament and withdrawal from NATO.

Part of the reason for this may lie in the relatively steady turnover of leading figures in the Campaign. No individual or small group of individuals has been able - or indeed sought - to monopolise the leadership throughout the eighties. Of the leading figures in the Campaign, only Bruce Kent has remained in a prominent position from 1979 to 1987, and even he has played less of a role in decision-making since the mid-eighties. The Campaign has thus avoided the danger of an established leadership seeking to maintain its own position by re-defining goals into more manageable proportions.

Another reason lies in the nature of the membership, and the various sub-groups into which it may be divided. There are few clear boundaries between these sub-groups, and much over-lapping
membership, but some distinct elements may be identified— for example, pacifists; Labour Party supporters, Greens, SDP/Liberal Alliance supporters, trade unionists and internationalists. We have already noted in our discussion of the 1985 survey results that membership of other groups does not appear to diminish loyalty to the Campaign. What it does mean, however, is that each sub-group is loyal, but in its own way in that each group holds some of the principles embodied in the Campaign to be effectively non-negotiable. Thus, the pacifists will not countenance the Campaign adopting a policy which appears to endorse increased spending on conventional weapons; the Greens insist upon raising the issue of nuclear energy and vociferously resist any trend towards the Campaign becoming more centralised and using only 'conventional' pressure group tactics; trade unionists insist upon the employment consequences of nuclear disarmament being taken into account, and internationalists refuse to allow the Campaign to become purely anti-American in its outlook.

This is not to say that everything in the Campaign's programme is negotiable. At the time of writing, its stances on the specifics of the foreign policy and general defence policy that it feels Britain should follow are deliberately vague, to allow the Campaign some flexibility and to avert opposition from sub-groups within the movement. On other issues, however, the commitment is firm and non-negotiable; in particular, the commitment to unilateralism and to working for that using both conventional and unconventional (NVDA) tactics appear to be seen by the bulk of the membership as defining features of the Campaign, and thus immutable.
The only issue to cause a persistent problem has been the Campaign's policy on withdrawal from NATO. Apart from a residual suspicion among activists about the leadership's real commitment to NVDA, it is the only issue on which the leadership has been repeatedly criticised. This is likely to remain something of a problem for those charged with guiding the Campaign. Successive opinion polls and general elections during the eighties have confirmed that the idea of withdrawal from NATO is unpopular with the electorate, and the 1985 survey suggests that these doubts are shared by many of the Campaign's own members. Any attempt to moderate the Campaign's policy on NATO withdrawal, however, would not only meet with stiff resistance from Labour CND and Green CND (numerically small elements in the Campaign, but active and vocal within it), but might well inspire complaints from those without partisan commitments that CND was becoming too closely identified with the Labour Party and its policies in this area. As with its attitude towards NVDA, the Campaign has a commitment to withdrawal from NATO which may well lessen its impact upon public opinion and established members of the polity, but which many of its supporters insist upon retaining. We shall now examine how this apparent tension between respectability and radicalism has affected the Campaign's choice of tactics during the eighties.

NOTES

1. Interview with James Hinton, ex-chairperson, Projects Committee.
2. Dan Smith, 'Alternative Defence Strate-

3. Questions and Answers about CND, qu. 8.
4. Questions and Answers about Non-Nuclear Defence, Qu. 6.

5. Questions and Answers about CND, Qu. 6.


10. The National Trade Union Defence Conversion Committee: trade unions involved are the Transport and General Workers, General and Municipal, Institute of Professional and Civil Servants, Society of Civil and Public Servants, Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs, Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers - TASS and Engineering sections, and Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians. The Committee has been in operation since 1984.

11. The most important of these are: the Hague Conventions, 1899, 1907, (war must be confined to military engagements and targets); The Geneva Gas Protocol, 1925 (outlawing poisoned weapons); Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, 1945 (forbidding the threat or use of force to solve international problems); the Genocide Convention, 1948 (forbidding the killing of national, ethnic, racial or religious groups) - ratified by the British Parliament in 1969; and the Nuremberg Principles, 1950, adopted by the United Nations (no person, regardless of rank or status, can evade
responsibility for upholding international law).

12. See, for example, Pete Strauss, 'The Politics of Non-Violent Direct Action', Sanity, Feb. 1986: Strauss is one of the leading organisers of NVDA at the Molesworth cruise missile site.
Chapter Seven

TACTICS: PROTEST AND PERSUASION

It can be seen from our discussion of CND's membership and aims that the Campaign incorporates diverse elements. Politically they range from those on the organised left, for whom nuclear weapons are just one of a number of undesirable features associated with capitalist liberal democracy, to those who are committed to more mainstream political parties and activities but who are impelled by what they see as the special importance of this issue to make a particular effort, and to those whose interest in conventional politics is minimal and whose motivation to support the Campaign is almost entirely on moral grounds. Socially, the predominance of the middle-aged and middle-class should not mask the fact that not all supporters fall into these categories. Moreover, there is the high incidence of cross-cutting membership of other groups and campaigns by CND supporters, all of which have their own tactical strategies and methods. All of this means that the Campaign brings together people with very different ideas on the most suitable way to communicate and present the case for unilateral nuclear disarmament.
An Inaccessible Policy Area?

This variety of experience and attitude among its supporters is one of the reasons that CND chooses to employ a range of tactics, rather than seeking to impose just one strategy on the Campaign. Another reason, of course, is that the opportunity for CND to act as other (more conventional) pressure groups do is simply not available. As far as the Thatcher governments have been concerned, CND has nothing to offer; its expertise is not sought after by British governments and, even if the government were to accede to at least some of CND's demands, its supporters are unlikely to transfer their allegiance to the Conservative cause. The nature of the issue is also unique in British politics, in that no other policy area is so inaccessible. Defence policy, and particularly its nuclear dimension, is an area which has consistently been kept within the executive rather than parliamentary sphere since 1945. Parliamentary debates on even the generalities of nuclear weapons policy are few and far between. The details of such policy are hardly ever discussed outside the closed doors of the Whitehall and defence establishment. (The decision to modernise the Polaris force during the seventies was kept secret even from most of the Cabinet, let alone Parliament and the public.) Hence, whilst environmental groups can utilise such avenues as Public Inquiries and Royal Commissions to advance their case, this option is not open to CND(1). Compared to most other liberal democracies, the British system is a closed and secretive system and never more so than when it comes to
nuclear policy. (Indicative of this is the way in which CND has despatched researchers to the United States where, taking advantage of the Freedom of Information provisions, they have been able to discover far more about British policy than they ever have by working within their own country.) It is within this context that one must assess CND's choice of strategies and tactics. Even if it were to be the unanimous wish of its members, there is little opportunity for CND to pursue a conventional "insider" strategy which rests upon the government accepting the Campaign as a legitimate and worthwhile participant in the policy-formulation process.

Protest and Persuasion

Even if the political opportunity structure were such as to offer CND the possibility of using only conventional tactics, there is a substantial body of opinion among the membership who would view this as inadequate. Impelled by the belief that decision-making on nuclear weapons is conducted in an undemocratic manner, and that the moral case for unilateral nuclear disarmament is so strong, there are many involved in the Campaign who believe that protest activities are a necessary and desirable part of CND's tactics. There is also a small minority who take this argument a stage further, advocating that the Campaign should be organised as a movement of mass resistance (physical, but non-violent) against the more visible manifestations of the nuclear state, but there is little evidence of much enthusiasm for this strategy among the membership as a whole. Those who disagree with
such a strategy tend to register their disapproval by non-participation in events, rather than arguing the case against at Conference or Council. Nevertheless, there is still a widespread belief that protest and resistance tactics should continue to be employed by CND. Indicative of this are the responses in the 1985 survey to the question about the effect of NVDA on the Campaign, with over half of all respondents of the opinion that NVDA strengthened the Campaign as a whole. The ecstatic reception which is usually accorded to those who relate their experiences of direct action to Conference is a further indication that, among activists at least, protest and resistance are seen as an essential element in CND's campaigning.

Such feelings cannot be ignored or discounted by the decision-makers in national CND, not least because frustration among activists could prompt a transfer of energy and commitment away from CND and into one of the related organisations in CND's 'social movement industry'. CND's supporters are 'conscience constituents', in the sense that they do not derive any direct material benefit in return for their commitment; they also have little in the way of concrete success to show for their effort since 1979. In such circumstances, variety and spontaneity in campaigning activities can become important motivating forces. Constant repetition of a few simple arguments whilst eschewing any unconventional protest, might be seen by some in national CND as the most effective way of influencing the uncommitted among the electorate, but if it were the only strategy to be employed by the Campaign, it would require considerable patience among activists. In other words, were CND's leadership actively to discourage unconventional
protest, they would risk alienating many of their most energetic supporters. In any case, the structure of CND is such that, even if it were thought desirable, the national leadership could not impose a ban on unconventional protest. There is little national CND can do if a local group pursues its own tactics, and any unconventional activity against nuclear weapons is likely to be presented by the media as at least linked to CND, regardless of the national leadership's formal position. (The classic example in this instance is the NVDA undertaken by the Greenham Women's Peace Camp; despite the fact that the Greenham Women have consistently maintained their autonomy from CND, their activities are usually treated by the media as being strongly associated, if not synonymous, with CND).

It is not surprising, therefore, that CND's leadership in the eighties has given guarded approval to the use of protest and resistance tactics. It has been their firm conviction, however, that it would be misguided for the Campaign to concentrate exclusively upon such tactics, mainly because it would make it too easy for CND's opponents to brand the Campaign as anti-social, eccentric and above all unrealistic. Again, the nature of the issue at stake has tactical implications. CND is seeking to mobilise opinion around a fundamental issue that has ramifications for other important policy areas. Clearly, a decision by a British government to adopt the unilateralist option would involve at least a review of foreign policy generally (and most probably significant changes), which in turn might well have significant implications for economic policy - one may only speculate what
effect unilateralism and possible withdrawal from NATO might have upon the very significant level of American investment in the British economy. The point to make in this context is that, as the 1983 and 1987 elections demonstrated, it is relatively easy for those opposed to unilateralism to raise the spectres of destabilisation and irresponsibility, and reinforce the British electorate's apparent preference for incremental rather than radical change. A Campaign which became known only for its fence-cutting and paint-daubing would run the risk of having its arguments dismissed without consideration by those committed to more conventional forms of political participation.

This analysis of the dangers inherent in a Campaign devoted exclusively to protest and resistance is not found only among the leadership, but at all levels of the Campaign, as Table 7.1 from the 1985 Survey shows. Respondents were given a list of six possible types of activity that CND could pursue, and asked to indicate which three they thought to be the most important. As can be seen, the more conventional activities - educational work, lobbying and developing international
TABLE 7.1

Activities CND should undertake (in %)

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(n = 620 620 70 209 295)

contacts - received a considerable degree of support from both activists and the less active. Given this, it would be mistaken to assume that the debate within CND on the choice between conventional and unconventional tactics resolves itself into a dispute between leadership and followers; the belief that the Campaign should utilise both kinds of tactics is apparent at all levels of the membership.

Another major factor which influences CND's choice of tactics is that much of their campaigning is inevitably reactive, in that they are operating in a changing environment as successive governments (both British and foreign) make decisions which cause CND to change its tactics. Thus, for example, the 1979 decision to accept Cruise and Trident prompted CND to adopt a strategy which concentrated on these particular weapons systems and was largely
based on protest tactics. In 1983, however, the combined effect of the Election and the subsequent deployment of the first Cruise missiles was to prompt CND into rethinking its strategy, such that by 1985 the emphasis had moved from weapons systems to the broader fundamentals of unilateralism. After 1983, much more emphasis was being placed upon more conventional methods of persuasion as well as protest tactics. This transition is discussed in more detail below; the general point in this context is that CND's choice of tactics is inevitably both varied and dynamic over time. The Campaign has attempted to pursue both conventional tactics of education and persuasion and unconventional tactics of protest and resistance. It has attempted to maintain the enthusiasm of its activists without alienating the uncommitted and unconvinced among the electorate. It has, in short, attempted to capitalise upon the variety of perspectives found among its membership, rather than seeking to impose uniformity.

Campaigning to Educate

In the realm of education and persuasion, CND devotes considerable effort to producing published material which sets out the Campaign's position on the main issues involved. This material takes the form of leaflets, pamphlets and books, as well as a vast range of badges and stickers. The Campaign also publishes a monthly magazine - 'Sanity' - which has a circulation of around 40,000. It is a glossy magazine, produced to a high standard. Although it does cover internal debates and developments within the Campaign, most of its material concerns the
wider issues of nuclear disarmament, and it is aimed as much at the uncommitted as it is at the active membership. CND also produces a newsletter - 'Campaign' - which is much more concerned with keeping the membership informed about campaigning initiatives, and is primarily aimed at local groups. Whilst Campaign is concerned with movement communication, Sanity offers news coverage and factual articles about nuclear weaponry and strategy, together with CND's arguments, in a conscious effort to attract interest from outside the movement. Thus, for example, Trident is described in terms of its technical capabilities, it is compared with previous and contemporary weapon systems, its construction and those contributing to it are analysed - all at an impressive level of knowledge. Alongside this are presented CND's arguments, stressing the expense, that it represents an escalation in the arms race - which in turn leads into discussions of the concepts of escalation, deterrence and defence. Although it would appear that efforts are made to present such information and discussion in an accessible style, much of the content is clearly written with an educated readership in mind. Hence discussions in Sanity about Cruise, for example, tend to concentrate on its role as a first-strike weapon and its technical capabilities (and deficiencies) rather than using Cruise to indulge in populist anti-Americanism. America is certainly criticised for its defence policy, but usually in terms of reasoned argument; the influence of internationalists on Sanity's editorial board is sufficient to ensure that the Soviet Union does not escape similar criticism.
In addition to these periodicals, CND Publications (which, for business reasons, is a separate entity from national CND) also publishes a number of books and pamphlets, most of which are concerned with describing and analysing nuclear strategy and its implications for Britain. Some are addressed specifically to activists, a good example being Dan Plesch's comprehensive guide to organising and running a local group(2), which offers advice on everything from conducting public meetings to using the media and influencing political parties and trade unions.

National CND also has a Research section, which offers journalists and researchers information on both nuclear weapons and CND's policies, together with access to a press cuttings service. As might be expected, the Research section keeps a full collection of the material issued by the organisations of scientists, doctors, teachers, lawyers and so on who ally themselves with the Campaign's cause. SANA is a particularly important source of information, as it produces material on the probable effects of nuclear warfare which is unobtainable from official governmental sources. The Medical Campaign against Nuclear Weapons (MCANW) is a similar source of authoritative information, and both groups are cited frequently in CND literature. Their material is also used extensively by Teachers for Peace, a relatively small organisation of teachers and lecturers which is affiliated to CND, and which seeks to promote the teaching of peace studies in schools and colleges. This is an area which has attracted more publicity than action; a survey in 1983 suggested that only 23 per cent of local authorities taught peace studies as a formal subject(3). Given the
high proportion of CND's membership who came from the educational sector (25 per cent of respondents in the 1985 survey), one might expect more activity in this area. However, advocacy of peace studies has led to such an outcry over possible bias in the classroom(4) that there seems to be little overt enthusiasm in national CND for prioritising this area, although CND remains committed to the idea in principle.

The Work of Specialist Sections

The specialist sections are expected and encouraged to pursue educational work within their own areas. Christian CND (CCND) is the most active of the specialist sections, with some 150 local CCND groups and about 6000 subscribers to its newsletter 'Ploughshares'. As we shall see, CCND and the other specialist sections are also involved in the realm of protest and resistance tactics - CCND is particularly notable for the way in which it has resisted becoming a 'moderate' element in the movement - but much of their time and energy is devoted to persuasion. CCND has put a lot of effort into lobbying church organisations at a national level, the General Synod of the Church of England being its prime target. After some success in 1983, when the Synod rejected the 'first use' policy of NATO as immoral but refused to adopt the report of its working party on the implications of nuclear weapons (which argued for a progressive disengagement from nuclear weapons by the U.K., whilst still remaining in NATO)(5), CCND has become impatient at the lack of concrete proposals from such bodies, and now concentrates more upon
campaigning at a local level. As with the teachers, CCND is frequently criticised for attempting to import 'politics' into what should be a non-political area, but a recent attempt by some of those members of Synod opposed to CCND to introduce a resolution condemning civil disobedience never even reached the agenda, as CCND is skilled in pointing out the connections between acts of conscience over nuclear weapons and similar acts directed against such issues as apartheid.

Trade Union CND (TUCND) has also given much attention to education and persuasion in the trade union movement. Emphasis is placed upon establishing a CND presence in the workplace, and members are urged to propose resolutions against nuclear weapons at all levels of their union's democratic structure (TUCND providing model resolutions for guidance). TUCND has a particular interest in the idea of conversion (i.e. viable alternatives to jobs in the nuclear weapons industry), and has produced a video on the subject. They are also heavily involved in the Barrow project, where a full-time worker funded by CND is spearheading a local initiative to persuade the Trident workforce that there is an alternative to their current work. At a national level, TUCND works closely with the National Trade Union Defence Conversion Committee, and campaigns to link arms expenditure with cuts in the social and health services. Labour, Liberal and Green CND work in a similar fashion, although they have different priorities. Liberal CND places a lot of emphasis on regional and local work (especially with Liberal Councillors); at a national level, they are active at the annual Party Conference, but have had little success in attracting support from their allies in the SDP. Green
CND does undertake educational work within the Green Movement, but is much more concerned with varieties of protest and resistance tactics. Labour CND is also active at a national and constituency level, but is often castigated by those in the Campaign who are uncommitted to a party for being more interested in proposing and passing resolutions rather than becoming involved in actual campaigning.

Parliamentary Lobbying and General Elections

An area in which new initiatives have been mounted is that of Parliamentary lobbying and persuasion. Indeed, the importance of this area has grown such that, from 1985, the work of the political specialist sections has been increasingly subject to direction and coordination by the Parliamentary and Elections Committee(6), and two full-time staff who have been appointed to service the Committee. This up-grading was largely inspired by the unhappy experience of the 1983 General Election. This was a salutary experience for national CND, not just in terms of the election result, but also because it exposed serious shortcomings in CND's organisation.

CND's efforts in 1983 were organised by a specially constituted General Election Unit, established just days before the election was announced. This unit sought to coordinate the various activities which were thought appropriate and which did not contravene the Representation of the People Act (RPA). These included the production of leaflets, posters and stickers; the preparation of briefings for CND's own speakers and
sympathetic Parliamentary candidates; advertising in the national press; and the organisation of meetings and rallies to be addressed by leading figures in the movement. Many problems were encountered, not least of which were concerned with the provisions of the RPA — thus, for example, CND's legal advisers pointed out that if CND were to call on people to vote for no Cruise and no Trident, this could be construed as either encouraging people to vote Labour or discouraging them from voting Conservative, and in both cases would have been contravening the RPA. This kind of problem had not been properly considered prior to the election, and led to some confusion and frustration both within national CND and in some local groups. Similarly, although almost four million leaflets and some 80,000 posters were produced, the intention to concentrate the distribution of these on marginal constituencies was frustrated by the lack of an established system for regional distribution. In the event, distribution went smoothly where a strong regional organisation already existed, but was much more haphazard elsewhere. National newspaper advertising was another disappointment. It was originally intended to be the area in which CND would make its most forceful intervention. Again, however, lack of preparation meant that much of the intended copy was withdrawn at the last moment, mainly because it had been agreed that all such copy would be vetted by national officers who, in the run-up to the election, were too busy or unavailable to perform this function. Even fund-raising posed unexpected (though not unwelcome) problems. A special appeal for money was sent out once the election was announced, setting a target of £50,000. The actual
budget for the election period was £30,000, but the appeal raised almost £75,000 - leaving CND unsure whether it would be morally correct to spend any surplus on activities unconnected with the election campaign.

In short, the 1983 election caught national CND unprepared, and revealed serious shortcomings in organisation and internal decision-making procedures. Once the dust had settled after what was a disastrous result for unilateralists, discussions began on how to improve matters before the next election, with considerable time and attention being devoted to the matter during 1985/86. One move was the upgrading of the authority of the Parliamentary and Elections Committee over the specialist sections. Another was to create a database of constituency profiles, holding records on incumbent MPs and Parliamentary Candidates and principally concerned with their position on the nuclear issue - first priority in compiling this information has been given to constituencies which contain nuclear bases or defence industry installations. Similarly, marginal constituencies were identified by 1986, and the intention was that public speaking engagements by the Campaign's better known personalities were to be concentrated in these areas.

The real problem the Campaign had found in 1983, however, was in propagating its message without falling foul of the Representation of the People Act. The solution that the Campaign's leadership came up with was to try to undertake the bulk of campaigning before the next election was officially announced. Consequently, during February to April 1987, when speculation about a general election was growing, CND organised a speak-
ers' tour (in the 'CND Express') of some 44 marginal constituencies. During the actual 1987 election campaign in June, CND kept a relatively low profile. Some advertising was undertaken in the national press, but not much. If CND's leading figures had any comments to make during the campaign, they were not reported in the national media. The only advice CND offered to guide its supporters was to vote for whichever candidate had the best record and most appropriate views on unilateralism. To what extent, if any, this low profile was motivated by the desire to give the Labour Party a clear run on the issue is debatable. Certainly no-one holding office in national CND would be prepared to argue that this was the case, not least because many in the Campaign would not support Labour's policy on conventional defence spending. Whatever the real reason, CND played much less of a part in the 1987 election, although some £40,000, was devoted to electoral campaigning in the first half of 1987. There is no doubt that a high profile could well have resulted in CND being prosecuted under the Representation of the People Act, especially if the Conservatives had lost the election — indeed, the feeling within national CND is that they only escaped prosecution in 1983 because the Conservatives were so successful. It seems equally likely that there was an implicit agreement among the Campaign's leadership that it was best to allow Labour to concentrate on what it saw as its strengths during the 1987 election (for example, health and education), and that strident campaigning by CND could well prove counter-productive to Labour's chances of success.

Campaigning during national elections is only a part of the new approach to Parliamentary work,
as the main aim of the P.&E. Committee has been to develop new methods of persuasion which can be routinised and employed between as well as during the general elections. In this way, the P.&E. Committee hopes to preclude both the disorganisation which characterised the 1983 campaign, and the disappointment of the 1984 elections to the European Parliament - when the P.&E. staff wanted to mount a high-profile campaign (and were encouraged to do so by the Labour Party, who were worried about a low turn-out), but were instructed by the leadership to keep a low-profile in order to avoid a repetition of the 1983 experience.

The new machinery which is being developed focuses both on Westminster and on the constituencies. Inside Parliament, the concern is almost exclusively with the Commons, as there is thought to be little scope for attracting new converts among the Lords. In the Commons, lobbying takes the form of providing briefings for MPs, holding meetings which are addressed by sympathetic experts (SANA and the MCANW being important in this context) and making information packs generally available. By 1985, for example, when the Defence Estimates were debated in the Commons, the P.&E. Committee had previously sent out both technical and general briefings, held meetings and press conferences at the House, and subsequently analysed contributions to the debate for further use -whereas, two years earlier, the Defence Estimates went through with virtually no input from CND. It is not just the overall level of effort which has improved, however; the P.&E. Committee's new approach is to be much more systematic in its lobbying, and a lot of work has been put into
identifying different target groups among MPs, and tailoring the information on offer accordingly. Initially, this differentiation is made in party terms. For Conservative MPs, the idea is to push information which might lead them to question their support for all existing defence policies - thus, for example, they are sent material highlighting the economic cost of Trident or arguing the need for a restoration of British control over its own defence strategy. Where Labour MPs are concerned, the aim is not so much to press them to expand their commitment to non-nuclear defence (for example, by advocating withdrawal from NATO), as to encourage them to actually campaign on the commitments that have been made. One might expect CND's efforts to be concentrated on Parliamentary Labour CND (PLCND), a group of some 130 Labour MPs in the 1983/87 Parliament who supported unilateralism, but PLCND's meetings tend to be poorly attended and liaison with CND seems less than perfect. As the P.&E. Committee noted in 1986, in a general overview of the state of opinion in Parliament on the nuclear disarmament issue:

As yet there is no substantial campaigning on the issue in the Labour Party. Specifically, neither the front bench nor any PLCND member employs a single full-time researcher on defence. Other than the isolated efforts of a few very good MPs, there is no effective organisation on the issue by either PLCND, Tribune, Campaign, Back Bench defence committee, Whips Office or Front Bench team in the PLP, and outside the Commons neither the Labour Disarmament Liaison Committee, the NEC or more significantly any of the left organi-
sations have organised any effective campaigning. Labour CND has produced a useful campaigning pack but still tends to be associated with a section within the party rather than with CND itself.(7)

Given this, CND's strategy before the 1987 election was to encourage PLCND MPs to move away from discussion and into actual campaigning, and to persuade the 80 or so Labour MPs who still had some reservations on the issue to enter into a full commitment to nuclear disarmament.

The minor parties may not have many MPs, but they are important to CND. The Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties both have anti-nuclear policies, as does the Green Party. The P.&E. Committee is careful to nurture its connections with these minor parties, partly because of this, and partly because it is aware that in a hung Parliament they could exercise an influence out of all proportion to their numerical representation. Similar thinking applies to the SDP/Liberal Alliance. Prior to the possibility of a merger between the SDP and the Liberals, the P.&E. Committee has been foremost among those in CND who argue that, whatever the frustrations of lobbying the SDP, whose leaders are highly unsympathetic to the unilateralist argument, the Alliance will be crucial in any Parliament other than one with a clear Conservative majority. The importance of Alliance MPs in a hung Parliament is obvious. In the event of a Labour majority, it is argued that a significant commitment to nuclear disarmament by Alliance MPs would leave those on the right of the Labour Party with nowhere to go if they wanted to soft-pedal on their commitment to unilateralism.
Although virtually no progress has been made with the SDP (who removed from their list of candidates the only prominent CND member in the party), close contact was enjoyed with some five of the eighteen Liberal MPs in the 1983/87 Parliament. Such sympathetic MPs outside of the Labour Party are particularly important in that they can help with organising meetings or putting parliamentary questions, which goes some way to avoiding CND being exclusively identified with Labour Party.

It is hard to assess the impact of such lobbying of MPs, as the Commons does not have many opportunities to express an opinion on matters of nuclear policy. As the central issue is only infrequently debated, CND briefs MPs when related issues arise - for example, civil liberties or nuclear power. The P.&E. Committee has had some success in suggesting parliamentary questions to sympathetic MPs, particularly the twenty or so who (according to the P.&E. workers) make nuclear disarmament the issue they prioritise above all others, and early day motions are another device which CND encourages MPs to use. As yet, the P.&E. staff have not been able to utilise select committee hearings as an arena in which to demonstrate CND's expert knowledge, although they intend to develop this kind of work.

National Canvassing

It is outside Westminster that the most significant innovation has been made. Drawing on American experience, the P.&E. staff have set out to establish a network of parliamentary monitors. The idea is to have a monitor in each constituency: by mid-1986, there were just under 520 in place,
with about 65 per cent of these considered to be active. The Monitors are asked to scrutinise their local press for any statements by MPs or candidates which might be relevant. National CND scrutinises Hansard, and sends Monitors information on what their MP has been saying or doing on the nuclear issue. Monitors also receive copies of the information briefings which are normally sent to MPs. The intention is to develop a network of informed monitors who can not only exercise direct pressure on their MP, but also ensure that the MPs' stance on nuclear disarmament is made known throughout the local CND groups and the constituency as a whole. It is a tactic which has concerned some MPs, who feel that they are being kept under surveillance, but national CND argues that it is doing no more than exercising legitimate rights of democratic accountability. Whilst it is an unconventional tactic in the British context - as one P.&E. staff member put it, 'it's much more conventional in Britain to lie down in the road' (8) - it is one which has attracted interest from other pressure groups (9) and is considered to be a success by CND's leadership. A related development which has yet to get under way is the attempt to establish Contact Persons in each Labour and Liberal constituency party. If such contacts can be recruited, their function will be to organise meetings and invite speakers, to lobby their MPs and candidates, and to ensure that the issue of nuclear disarmament is raised whenever possible in meetings and discussions within the constituency organisation.

This kind of work in parliament and the constituencies does not require much input from the bulk of the national membership; apart from the
less than one per cent of the membership who volunteer for constituency work, most of the lobbying is undertaken by staff and committee members at national CND, and runs smoothly. Attempts to involve the rest of the Campaign's membership in the task of public persuasion have not always been so successful. Thus, for example, two national ballots of public opinion have been undertaken in the eighties, and neither has lived up to expectations. A 'Peace Canvass' was undertaken in 1983, with the aim of communicating the Campaign's message on a door-by-door basis across the nation. In the event, not all local groups took up the idea, and its originator admitted somewhat ruefully that it was not easy to motivate members to talk to people on the doorstep, rather than campaigning in ways that did not involve face-to-face contact(10). The main impact of the Peace Canvass seems to have been on CND itself; although it confirmed that many people agreed with CND on the specific issues of Cruise and Trident it also revealed that unilateral nuclear disarmament was equally unpopular, and served as a reminder to CND that there was a long way to go on the road to unilateralism. A similar exercise was mounted in 1985, when local groups were encouraged to spend a week carrying out a ballot of opinion on Trident in town centres throughout Britain. Although the ballot produced gratifying results for CND (84 per cent against Trident, 12 per cent in favour, only 4 per cent don't knows), this was on the basis of a mere 100,000 returns - that is to say, even less than the total number of members of national CND at the time. This was because many local groups simply decided not to participate in the exercise, preferring to take up other campaigning initiatives.
which were emanating from other parts of national CND at the same time, with little effective coordination. Many of these did not necessitate face-to-face contact; for example, Operation Christmas Card (first mounted in 1984) centred around members sending messages calling for peace and more open dialogue to official bodies, public organisations and private citizens in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the G.D.R., and proved very popular with the membership.

The Move to the 'Basic Case'

Such innovative ideas, however, could not mask the disappointments and set-backs of 1983. Not only had the General Election exposed the apparent unpopularity of unilateralism, but the first deployment of cruise missiles at Greenham in late 1983 dealt a severe blow to the morale of activists. During the 1979-83 period, when most of CND's campaigning was directed against the specific weapons systems of Cruise and Trident rather than the more general arguments about unilateral disarmament, Cruise had always preoccupied the English membership of CND, while Trident was seen as the most important issue by activists in Scotland. The deployment of Cruise meant that the Campaign, at least in England, had to develop a new perspective, not least because it became clear to national CND during 1984 that deployment had contributed to an atmosphere of fatigue among the local groups. Faced with up to five years of campaigning before there was even a chance of reversing the British commitment to both Cruise and Trident, and the alternative attractions of the
Labour Party under a new leader and the higher profile enjoyed by Greenpeace and the famine relief campaigns, there was some concern in national CND that the membership's commitment would begin to flag or be transferred elsewhere.

CND's response emerged in 1985, with the decision to maintain most of its existing campaigning arguments, but to make a conscious effort to integrate them in a much more consistent manner than had ever been tried before. Dubbed the 'Basic Case' strategy, the intention was not so much to move away from campaigning against specific weapons systems as to present these and other arguments in a framework which sought to convince public opinion on the fundamentals of nuclear disarmament. Before 1985, committees and staff at national CND (and some of the more active local groups) were initiating campaigns on such issues as Trident, Cruise and NATO, Civil Defence, and so on seemingly as the mood took them. There was little systematic effort made to coordinate these campaigns (a situation not helped by rapid expansion and staff turnover at national CND), with the result that there was an uneven take-up of these initiatives by local groups, who were sometimes faced with a bewildering multiplicity of campaigning suggestions. The new strategy envisaged amalgamating these different campaigning arguments in such a way that they would meld together. As Joan Ruddock, then Chairperson, argued early in 1985

We have to be much more considered about the mass mobilisation we attempt to coordinate. We ought not to be rushing into actions or print or whatever on a continuous basis because that's what we've always done. We are very
action-orientated and this year we are going
to be again, but a lot of people believe that
we ought to be thinking what is the fundamen-
tal position to which we are trying to win
people and do you best achieve that by a whole
series of actions. So I would want some
priorities which are about getting across the
basic issues to people at a local level.
Helping local groups to communicate on the
doorstep about the immorality and uselessness
of nuclear weapons and the case for unilatera-
lism.(12)

The tactic to be employed was the Extended
Public Information Campaign (EPIC), whereby
campaigns would be mounted - each lasting up to six
months - concentrating on different aspects of the
fundamental case for nuclear disarmament. Thus,
for example, the first EPIC in 1986 centred on the
perceived positive results of British nuclear
disarmament, rather than criticising particular
weapons systems, EPIC 1 was to present broad
arguments about how unilateralism could enhance
Britain's security and international standing.
Despite considerable planning during 1985, it is
generally agreed in CND that EPIC 1 did not run as
smoothly as expected. This was mainly because the
Basic Case strategy does not just involve an
unprecedented attempt at coordinated campaigning -
which caused predictable teething problems - but
also because new methods of communication were
adopted. In particular, it was the first time that
CND had made a systematic effort to use national
advertising. Previously, such advertising had been
limited to recruitment advertisements, but central
to the EPIC strategy was the use of press, cinema
and billboard outlets to put over 'message advertising'. Administrative mishaps and an unfamiliarity with the world of professional advertising meant that many of the plans for EPIC 1 never materialised(13); EPIC 2, however, mounted in late 1986 and centred around the theme that Britain could neither afford nuclear weapons or ever use them, did benefit from professional advertising expertise, and is held by national CND to have had a particular interest on the party conferences that year - especially the Liberal Assembly.

In theory, future EPICS will not be directed at the public in general, but at selected groups. In particular, little effort will be made to convert those who most strongly disagree with CND's aims. The intention, rather, is to aim the message at the 'middle ground' of opinion on the nuclear issue - for example, those who are opposed to Cruise and Trident but still accept a policy of nuclear deterrence, or those who oppose American weapons in Britain but support 'British' weapons. The hope is that clear and repetitive 'message advertising' will imbue nascent supporters with a feeling of effectiveness - as the group responsible for planning the Basic Case strategy argued,

Public awareness of the dangers of nuclear war is high; our problem is the feelings of hopelessness and helplessness that go along with this - the inability to see any way out of the mess, the belief that British nuclear disarmament would make no difference, that the actions of an individual make no difference... We think that the crucial issue to get across is that something can be done and that CND knows what.(14)
Although such an argument might appear innocuous, there was the potential for internal disagreement over the new Basic Case strategy. Its emphasis on targeting the 'middle ground' and using professional communicators raised the suspicion on the part of some that the more controversial aspects of CND's ideology and tactics (eg. NATO withdrawal: NVDA) would not be included in the forthcoming EPICs. When the strategy was debated at the 1985 Conference, one of the (hard left) contenders for the post of Chairperson argued against it on these grounds -

The Basic Case is part of the process of transforming CND into an educational pressure group and away from being a protest movement. (15)

Moreover, the emphasis on integration of new and existing campaigns meant that each element in national CND (the national committees, working groups and specialist sections) had to agree to devote at least a part of their resources to the EPIC campaigns and, where possible, to modify their campaigning material so that it tied in with the current EPIC theme. This caused some unease within both national CND and the local groups that the new strategy would entail a much higher degree of centralisation in CND's decision-making, at a time when many were pressing for greater decentralisation.

The national leadership was able to mollify potential discontents such that the strategy received an overwhelming endorsement by the national Conference. They argued that there was no
reason for any particular policy or tactic to be excluded from the new approach, that it didn't mark a move away from protest to persuasion but merely a better way of doing what was already being done. The only casualty of the new strategy appears to have been the Trident campaign, on the somewhat ingenuous grounds that

The Trident Campaign will be the Basic Case campaign, since it has become clear that Trident must be defeated on the basis that it is 'Britain's Bomb' and not because of the particular characteristics of the Trident weapon. (16)

It is hard to see how the same argument could not be applied to Polaris, Civil Defence, etc., but any suggestion from within CND that the Basic Case concept was so vague as to make it meaningless was firmly countered with a strong pragmatic argument - that in the aftermath of the election and Cruise deployment, something had to be done to motivate the membership or they might drift away. The point was made quite explicitly in National Council debates; as the planning group argued, the objective of Basic Case was not only to undermine public support for the idea of nuclear deterrence, but also to re-energise our members, our local groups and those who are with us but currently not active. There is some weariness in the local groups and, we think, some consensus that re-appraisal of our strategy and methods is needed. (17)
The point was reiterated in the Conference debate on the new strategy, and seems to have been a sufficiently powerful argument to quell any serious dissent. It remains to be seen whether the proposed integration of campaigning initiatives takes place, or whether bureaucratic inertia at the national level will ensure the continuation of segmented and compartmentalised campaigning supplemented by new forms of advertising. Certainly, there are some at the highest level in national CND who see the only point of the new strategy being to give an impetus to the membership between General Elections, although such views are not expressed openly. Whatever the outcome, the adoption of the Basic Case approach does mark a formal commitment by CND to dissociate itself from its public image as a campaign primarily concerned with protest, and to propagate a new image of a movement that is just as interested in dialogue and persuasion as it is in unconventional protest.

The Commitment to Protest

This is not to say that protest will cease to be a tactic employed by national CND. Whilst there is a small minority in national CND who do express fears that the Campaign will abandon its commitment to protest action, the leadership has consistently denied this. Thus, for example, Paul Johns has argued that although the campaign should become more concerned to enter into a dialogue with the uncommitted, non-violent resistance to the state should remain an important element; (18) the General Secretary has confirmed that there is no possibility of CND renouncing protest activities (19). As
we have argued earlier, protest is important to
the Campaign on both an ideological and tactical
level. Ideologically, protest is justified by
reference to the 'undemocratic' way in which
governments take decisions on nuclear policy and to
the moral obligation to resist what are seen as
fundamentally immoral policies. Tactically, some
protest activity is important because it provides
supporters with the opportunity to participate in
actions which do not involve face-to-face contact
on an individual or small group basis. Relatively
anonymous participation in mass actions has all the
attendant benefits of experiencing group solidarity.
The classic example of this is the annual
demonstration, which has taken place every year
between 1980 and 1985. The turnout for these
demonstrations is hard to determine, as CND's
estimates and those of the police invariably
differ, the police figure being considerably lower.
The following figures represent CND's estimates;
if, as the police suggest, actual turnout was
somewhat lower, it does not invalidate the general
point that these were genuine mass demonstrations.
The 1980 demonstration was held in Trafalgar
Square, and attracted some 80,000 participants. The
demonstrations in 1981, 1982 and 1983 were all held
in the more spacious surroundings of Hyde Park, and
attracted 250,000, 400,000 and 300,000 participants
respectively. In 1984, the annual demonstration
was held outside London, at Barrow (where the
Trident submarines are to be built): turnout
dropped to some 25,000. There was another demonstra-
tion in London in 1984, to mark President Reagan's visit, which attracted some 80,000. In
1985, a demonstration early in the year at the
Molesworth site attracted just over 30,000; a later

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demonstration in Hyde Park produced a turnout of around 100,000. The crucial factor in determining turnout would certainly seem to be location. Any mass demonstration held outside London is, on past experience, unlikely to attract more than 30,000 people; against this, however, there has been considerable agitation by activists (particularly in the North and Scotland) to mount more events outside of London and the South-East. As the ex-Chairperson of the Projects Committee remarked, decisions on where to hold demonstrations are usually highly emotive and controversial. Wherever the demonstrations have been held in the early eighties, however, they have on the whole run smoothly. National CND claims to have a good working relationship with the Metropolitan Police over London demonstrations partly because there have been few problems in the past and partly because the organisation of these events has become routinised by CND staff. Even outside London, apprehensions about the impact of mass demonstrations have been largely unfounded. For example, the farming community around the Molesworth base were sufficiently fearful about damage to their property prior to the mass demonstration in 1985 that they commissioned aerial photographs of the area before the event; after the demonstration, the National Farmers' Union acknowledged that actual damage had been minimal and that the whole event had been very well organised.

The primary purpose of such mass demonstrations is to achieve some impact on public opinion, and in this CND are aided by the media coverage that the demonstrations receive. Perhaps inevitably, the demonstrations are reported as news events, with comment being made on the size of the
turnout and any disruption rather than on the issues underlying the demonstration. This is one of the reasons why CND decided against organising a mass demonstration in 1986. The alternative adopted was to mount an 'action' at the warhead storage site at Coulport instead - the difference between a demonstration and an action being that whilst the former requires only attendance, the latter (at least in theory) rests on participants being willing to participate in or support some form of NVDA, and thus be at much greater risk of arrest. The official reasoning behind the Coulport action decision was that this was in response to calls from local groups in the north of England and Scotland for activity in their area and that a national demonstration might prove too expensive. Unofficially, however, there was concern within national CND that a mass demonstration in 1986 (particularly if it were to be held outside London) could see a continuation of the downward trend in turnout, and that it would be this rather than the Campaign's message which would be publicised by the media.

There was similar apprehension in 1987, but this was resolved by mounting a joint demonstration with Friends of the Earth on a general anti-nuclear theme, which attracted some 100,000 participants. CND has no plans to repeat such an exercise, and it seems likely that, in the same way that before 1980 the Campaign undertook marches rather than demonstrations, in the latter half of the eighties smaller-scale actions at specific bases will become the norm, unless there is a significant upsurge in enthusiasm. That, in turn, will be determined by events outside of CND's control; the American action against Libya and the Chernobyl disaster in
the Soviet Union (both in early 1986) produced a dramatic upswing in membership enquiries, but the impact seemed relatively short-lived.

'Actions' as distinct from demonstrations, are unlikely to attract a turnout which bears any comparison with the numbers prepared to attend a demonstration. A nationally coordinated action at Molesworth in early 1986 produced a turnout of some 7,000, compared with the 30,000 who attended the Molesworth demonstration in 1985. Given the real possibility of arrest - and it must be remembered that literally thousands of activists have been arrested in connection with NVDA actions since 1979 - and the disruption this can cause in peoples' lives, it is hardly surprising that turnout is numbered in thousands rather than tens or hundreds of thousands. Despite the personal costs involved, there are a substantial number of activists within the campaign who are not only prepared to participate in such actions but persistently pressurise CND's leadership to mount and endorse more of them.

The 1985 survey sought to investigate the spread of opinion within the national membership over the tactical choices the Campaign should adopt. Respondents were given six possible activities that the Campaign should adopt, and were asked to indicate which three they thought to be the most important. As can be seen from Table 7.1, a quarter of respondents prioritised NVDA as one of their choices; as one might expect, enthusiasm for NVDA was somewhat higher among the more active members, although even among this group only a third listed NVDA among their choices. Apart from a slight over-representation of Green votes, and under-representation of Alliance voters, there is little in demographic or attitudinal terms to
distinguish this sub-group from the whole sample; support for NVDA is to be found in all the component areas of the campaign.

There are those within the Campaign who argue that it should employ tactics of NVDA and resistance to the state with a much greater frequency and enthusiasm. Unlike their predecessors in the sixties, however, who coalesced around the Direct Action Committee and the Committee of 100, they have not organised into a distinct group within the movement. There is considerable support for NVDA in both Christian and Green CND, but there are also many advocates of NVDA who have no connection with either of these groups. Although the viewpoint has not been institutionalised, it has nevertheless always been present in the movement since its rebirth in 1979. It has been expressed not only in terms of calls for mass resistance actions, but also in demands for less centralisation in Campaign decision-making, and more autonomy for local groups. Advocates of NVDA have never enjoyed a trouble-free relationship with the Campaign's leadership, even though the people involved in both groups have changed over the years. Advocates of NVDA are suspicious of the leadership's commitment to resistance actions; there is a belief that the leadership is prone to being guided by public opinion rather than seeking to change it, and that this motivates the leadership to moderate both the demands and the tactics of the Campaign. The solution, according to advocates of NVDA, is to decentralise in the long-term, and to organise local groups to pressurise the leadership into more support for resistance tactics in the short-term. The leadership rarely if ever counters such arguments head-on, answering charges of undue
centralisation by pointing to the Campaign's democratic structure. Their argument is that if there was widespread enthusiasm for a particular tactic, then this would inevitably take place within local groups and the leadership would have no option but to follow. This does not address the point which the NVDA advocates are making, which is that the leadership should give a lead on co-ordinated mass resistance rather than waiting to see if it occurs spontaneously. The leadership, whilst reaffirming its commitment to the principle of NVDA and resistance, is sceptical about both the practicality of organising a mass campaign based mainly on resistance, and the possible impact of such a tactic on many in the movement, let alone on public opinion.

Protest and Internal Divisions

These differences of opinion have threatened to become divisive only once since the Campaign's rebirth, during 1984/85. Perhaps ironically, the cause of the potential split was not a disagreement between advocates of NVDA and the Campaign's leadership, but one between NVDA enthusiasts within the Campaign and the best-known practitioners of resistance tactics in the Peace Movement as a whole, the Greenham Women. The Greenham Peace Camp was established in 1981, when some forty women, men and children marched from Cardiff to Greenham to publicise the planned deployment of Cruise missiles at the base. Disappointed at the lack of media coverage given to their march, they decided to set up a camp outside the base. The small number of men involved in the action were excluded by a unanimous
vote among the women, who then started to develop the women-only camp along strictly non-hierarchical lines — in their terms, 'making a new kind of politics', one which emphasised individualism and rejected structure(22). For the next three years, the Camp flourished as more women (from both the U.K. and abroad) participated. During 1982 and 1983, the numbers fluctuated between hundreds and thousands in attendance, many of the women living in the Camp under extremely difficult circumstances. As neither the original march or the Peace Camp were CND initiatives, this is not the context in which to give an account of the Greenham Camp.

It is worth remembering, however, that — although the Camp had shrunk in size dramatically by 1987 — during the 1982-84 period it was highly successful in attracting public attention. A combination of mass actions (30,000 women 'embracing the base' in 1982; 40,000 in 1983) and smaller-scale initiatives (the numerous invasions of the base) drew at least as much media coverage as anything CND was doing at the time. It was one of these mass actions which, indirectly, gave rise to a threatened split in the Campaign during 1984.

The problem arose over the deployment of the first Cruise missiles in the U.K., at Greenham in 1983. For many advocates of NVDA, the physical arrival of Cruise was an event of unique importance, one which demanded a show of resistance. They argued within the Campaign the necessity of mounting NVDA at Greenham as and when the missiles arrived. CND's National Council had already heard arguments for and against the separatist stand taken by the Greenham Women, and had decided in April of 1983 that the Campaign would support the women's action at Greenham whilst providing an
opportunity for men and women to join together in backing the demonstration there. The hollowness of this resolution was revealed later in 1983; in response to calls from within the Campaign for some action, CND proposed to the Greenham Women that a joint action be mounted in December 1983 - the women to mount their own action around the perimeter fence, while a mixed demonstration of support would be held near the base. This proposal was rejected by the women, who vehemently opposed the idea of any mixed action either at or near the base. After heated discussion, national CND gave way. In a letter to all local groups, the national officers said

We believe that confrontation within the peace movement is to the disadvantage of all and therefore accept reluctantly the women's veto on our proposals. We understand that the Campaign has given us no mandate to endorse separatist action, but equally we are aware that most people in CND hold the women's actions at Greenham in very high regard.(23)

It was certainly true that there was little or no overt expression of misogyny in the debate within CND, and equally true that there existed (and still does exist) considerable support for the commitment shown by the women. Among the decision-makers on the National Council and its Committees, however, there were still some who felt a very real frustration at not being able to use tactics of mass resistance at Greenham. This frustration was contained in the short-term by the mounting of a demonstration at Burghfield nuclear weapons factory to coincide with the Greenham action, but feelings
of resentment at the Greenham Women's veto and suspicions that the leadership were not wholly enthusiastic about mass resistance actions continued unabated.

The first deployment of Cruise missiles did not, therefore, cause a split in the movement, and CND's leadership had succeeded in their prime objective of holding the Campaign together through the twin disappointments of the general election result and deployment. The respite was short-lived, however, as advocates of mass resistance in local groups based in Essex and East Anglia almost immediately announced the formation of Action '84. Although strenuously denying that Action '84 was any kind of break-away group, its instigators left little doubt that their intention was to encourage and mobilise support for mass resistance among local groups, and to use this to force national CND into adopting such a tactic. Their arguments were given a focus by CND Council's decision in January 1984 not to mount an action to mark President Reagan's visit to London in June 1984 to attend the Economic Summit - which was Action '84's preferred strategy - but instead to participate in European-wide demonstrations against Cruise, which were being organised to coincide with the June elections to the European Parliament. Having failed to convince the Council to support a London action against Reagan, Action '84 decided to take their case direct to the membership. In a mailing sent to all local groups in England and Wales,(24) Action '84 argued that mass actions would not only complement and revitalise existing localised NVDA, but would also have a much greater impact on the political authorities. They also argued that, whatever CND National Council decided, it was

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inevitable that at least some in CND would feel impelled to express their opposition to Reagan; and that, unless this protest was coordinated, this would result in the sort of 'ragged, small-scale actions' which (in Action '84's opinion) had marked the deployment protest. Action '84 made it plain that if there was support among local groups for the principle of nationally organised mass NVDA, then they would assume the responsibility of organising such action if national CND would not.

The National Executive's reaction to this was to consider the idea of a mass action in London against Reagan, but to remain unconvinced. Presumably the National Executive was waiting to assess the response by local groups to Action '84's mailing. Action '84 held a meeting for interested groups in February 1984, and there was a sufficient turnout for national CND to realise that evidently there was a significant level of support for Action '84's ideas. As a result of this meeting, Action '84 proposed both a mass action (encirclement of the Summit meeting at Lancaster House) and a mass demonstration (to be organised by London Region CND, and not involving NVDA). The National Executive reacted quickly, seeking to incorporate this emerging 'wing' of the movement before a formal rift could develop. Jimmy Johns, Action '84's leading spokesperson and well-known in the Campaign for his commitment to NVDA tactics, was coopted onto Projects Committee; the National Executive and Projects issued a statement to the whole campaign which offered Action '84 the compromise solution of national endorsement of the proposal for a 'conventional' demonstration in London, and consultations over the question of accompanying NVDA.
Four months of negotiations ensued, as the National Executive remained sceptical of the advisability of mounting mass NVDA in the centre of London, at a time when the leaders of the Western world were gathered together. Action '84 continued to argue the case for mass NVDA directed against the actual Summit meeting, but the National Executive and Projects were concerned that this NVDA and the proposed 'conventional' demonstration could not be kept separate, and that demonstrators who had not intended to participate in NVDA could become involved - as Projects Committee argued,

such people will have given little previous thought to NVDA, have had no training, be members of no affinity group. If the police decide to make arrests, the presence of such raw recruits will increase the possibility of things getting out of hand.(25)

When it became clear that Action '84's supporters (now amounting to some 150 local groups) were insistent on some kind of mass action being mounted, Projects devised another compromise. Rather than mass NVDA directed at the Summit on the same day as the demonstration, they suggested an action to be held the day before and for it to be targeted at the American Embassy instead of the Summit meeting at Lancaster House. The issue was not resolved until the National Council meeting in April 1984, when a third compromise was agreed upon - mass NVDA (in the form of a blockade) to be mounted on the same day as the conventional demonstration, but directed towards the American Embassy rather than the Summit meeting. This was accepted by Action '84, and once again a potential
split had been averted. The demonstration and action which took place on June 9th was adjudged a success: some 80,000 participated in the conventional demonstration, and around 2,000 people blockaded the American Embassy. A protest was still mounted at Lancaster House, but this involved a London-based group of peace activists who were not associated with CND.

In the aftermath of these six months of negotiations, the eventual compromise was hailed by both national CND and Action '84 as a demonstration of the movement's ability to accommodate and cooperate. Nevertheless, the prolonged reluctance of the National Executive to endorse mass NVDA was not forgotten by some activists, who attempted later in 1984 to revive the spirit of Action '84 but in a wider context. Dubbing themselves Direction '85, this grouping (which included many who had been associated with Action '84) called for not only more mass actions, but also decentralisation of decision-making in CND, and stronger campaigning on basic issues like withdrawal from NATO and unilateralism - whether they were popular with the electorate or not. Despite vigorous lobbying at the 1984 Annual Conference, this grouping never attracted a significant level of support from among local groups. One may speculate that one of the reasons for this was that Direction '85 did not have a specific issue around which to organise their campaign. Not only was there no equivalent to Reagan's visit forthcoming, but CND during 1985 was also showing signs of a greater readiness to organise nationally-coordinated NVDA - not least because of the incorporation of Action '84 members into the decision-making process.
The target for this NVDA was to be the second Cruise missile site at Molesworth. This was seen as a unique opportunity by NVDA activists. It was still a 'green field' site. Whilst Greenham had been an established (and thus relatively secure) base prior to the Cruise decision, Molesworth's facilities comprised only a few minor buildings with no personnel stationed there. This meant that there would have to be a lengthy period of building and construction work which could offer considerable scope for disruption and passive resistance. There were two peace camps established at Molesworth; the People's Peace Camp - a small group of Christians, who set up their camp in 1982 - and the Rainbow Village - a collection of about a hundred travellers and Green activists who had stayed on after a Green gathering at the base in mid-1984. Few people were involved, however, and there was no question of a Greenham-type exclusion of men being applied.

The strategy devised by NVDA activists, and subsequently endorsed by National Council without prevarication, was the Molesworth Pledge/Rota scheme. The idea was to organise a continuous protest at the site by firstly calling on individuals in the movement to pledge their willingness to participate in either NVDA or in a support role when construction work started, and secondly to organise these volunteers via a regional rota (regions being allotted specific days of the week when their members should attend) in order to spread the load. In this way, it was hoped that construction work could be severely impeded, if not halted completely; and that this would be a symbol of continuing resistance to Cruise - an important point, given that only 16 of the planned 160
missiles were actually deployed in the U.K. at that time. The scheme got underway towards the end of 1984, and by early 1985 enough volunteers had come forward to enable CND to announce that the Rota would be launched on February 11. On 6 February, however, several thousand men from the Army and the Police were drafted in to erect a seven-mile security fence around the base, and to evict the Rainbow Village campers. Mr. Heseltine's appearance on the scene dressed in an Army flak-jacket led the media to dub the exercise an 'invasion'. Overnight, the Pledge/Rota strategy was crippled; rather than giving volunteers the chance to disrupt construction work, the Pledge now involved vigils outside a base which remained undeveloped for a further six months. CND persisted with the Pledge until mid-1985, but most local groups outside of those closest to Molesworth (primarily East Anglia and the East Midlands) either did not take up the initiative or could not generate much enthusiasm among their members. There was some confusion within national CND as to what to do about the Pledge, apart from claiming that it had forced the Ministry of Defence into its 'pre-emptive strike'. Although small numbers of demonstrators were fulfilling their Pledge obligations, the action was clearly falling far short of its target; yet if it was continued, it might stifle other campaigning initiatives at Molesworth. Looking back, the then chairperson of Projects commented

Nobody in national CND could come up with a clear explanation of what the Pledge was about once the fence had gone up - it didn't have a clear rationale.(26)
Any attempt to discontinue the Pledge immediately after February 6, however, would have risked another potential split between NVDA advocates and the leadership. The instigators of the Pledge were already unhappy about the apparent reluctance of leading figures in the Campaign (particularly Joan Ruddock and Bruce Kent) enthusiastically to endorse the Pledge in public, although the Campaign remained committed to it officially. In the event, those who thought the Pledge to be misjudged or rendered ineffective by the erection of the fence did not argue for its abandonment until mid-1985, and even then offered an alternative in the form of a nationally-organised mass NVDA action at the camp in 1986, to mark the anniversary of the 'invasion'. This alternative was accepted by the instigators of the Pledge who, although still convinced that it was a worthwhile initiative, were attracted by the idea of a national mass action - the very tactic they had been arguing for via Action '84.

This is not to suggest that there was complete satisfaction with CND's actions on Cruise. In an exercise reminiscent of Action '84, a group of activists called a national conference in March of 1985 in Manchester; the aim of the conference was to organise opposition to Cruise which would be independent of CND. Some 450 delegates from the U.K. and abroad attended, and were critical of CND's campaigning on Cruise, particularly the apparent reluctance to endorse NVDA on the issue with any great enthusiasm. One issue of contention was CND's backing of Cruisewatch - a group of activists based in the south which includes members of CND, but also people from other peace campaigns. Their objective is to monitor Cruise missile convoys when they are deployed on exercise, in
order to demonstrate that their movement cannot be kept secret - thus refuting Michael Heseltine's claim that Cruise can 'melt into the countryside'. Cruisewatch is autonomous from CND, but receives funding via the Projects Committee, and delegates at the Manchester Conference were dissatisfied with the priority this was receiving. This dissatisfaction also surfaced at CND's Annual Conference in 1985, when a resolution was passed which instructed the National Council to give a much higher level of direct tactical support for autonomous anti-Cruise activities such as Cruisewatch and the Greenham camp. Projects Committee (and particularly its Chairperson) usually had to endure the brunt of these criticisms, but pursued a strategy of containing the dissent and making concessions where necessary rather than allowing the disagreements to lead to any kind of split between the NVDA activists and CND. This strategy was shown to be successful by the mass action at Molesworth in 1986, in which the NVDA activists worked within CND's guidelines without dissent. In the view of Projects Chairperson, their 'loyalty' over this action was proof that the spectre of a split in the movement over NVDA had been averted (27).

Deployment of Cruise at Greenham and the security fence at Molesworth may have diminished the opportunities for effective NVDA, but sections of the Campaign remain committed to the idea. Green CND has consistently argued the necessity for NVDA, seeing it as an important element in the Green philosophy - 'direct action is a fundamental part of reclaiming personal responsibility for our communities and environment' (28). Although Green CND has always taken a particular interest in Molesworth, however, it has become increasingly
preoccupied with the policing of travellers and their festivals since the demise of the Pledge campaign. Christian CND is another section which has always emphasised protest as well as persuasion. It has developed its own Affinity Group network - small groups which train and mobilise for NVDA - and its national organiser has pointed out that members are often put in prominent positions during demonstrations and actions because of their experience and good reputation for maintaining non-violence in difficult situations(29). It also mounts its own actions, usually coinciding with significant dates in the religious calendar, which have resulted in many CCND members being arrested. Alone among CND's activists, they are often able to persuade Magistrates' Courts to at least listen to a defence which is couched in terms of civil disobedience being justified by reference to a 'higher' moral authority. The courts have also been the arena in which CCND has achieved the most media attention. For some two years, CCND fought against a proposal by the Church of England to sell some land that it owned at the Molesworth site to the Ministry of Defence. CCND's offers to buy the land were refused, but taking the matter through to the High Court finally resulted in an in-court settlement to the effect that the land could not be sold to the Ministry of Defence without the Church of England taking into account other offers and its own policy on nuclear weapons - a judgement hailed by CCND as 'giving us in effect what we had been asking for'(30).
Protest and the Missing Working Class

CCND's organiser has argued that many who become involved in the section's work have no prior political experience, and that this means they bring a fresh and enthusiastic approach to their campaigning(31). Whilst there may be similar enthusiasm, there is unlikely to be a lack of political experience among Trade Union CND members. TUCND is more concerned to influence its constituency through education and persuasion than through participation in NVDA. Attempts have been made in the past (though not by TUCND) to mobilise the Campaign's sympathisers in trade unions into direct action. The Annual Conference passed a resolution in 1980 calling on CND members in trade unions to organise industrial action as a way of campaigning against nuclear weapons policy. The 1982 Conference (which attracted an unusually high number of delegates from 'hard left' political groups) passed a similar resolution, calling on CND members to educate, agitate and organise in trade unions and workplaces for a campaign of action, including industrial action such as the boycott of the nuclear arms industry, the non-handling of or refusal to transport weapons and components, and industrial disruption around old and new nuclear weapons bases.(31)

Both resolutions failed to find any significant support among trade unionists within the Campaign, and even less among trade unionists in the country as a whole. The fact that they were passed at all is more indicative of the efforts made by Trotsky-
ist activists to influence the Campaign's direction in the early eighties, than it is of any real possibility of the Campaign inspiring industrial action. Given the economic climate in the eighties, it is not surprising that NVDA which could result in arrests and job losses does not appeal to many trade unionists. It is one thing for a union to adopt anti-nuclear resolutions at a national level, but quite another to translate this into action at a branch level. As the Transport and General Workers Union has found when attempting to persuade its members to boycott delivery and construction work at Molesworth, getting workers to prioritise the issue when it might risk their livelihood is problematic, to say the least.

Nuclear-Free Zones

One area in which trade unionists have been active is that of Nuclear-Free Zones (NFZ's). Many local authorities have adopted this concept, originally devised in Australia in the seventies, which entails declaring a community to be nuclear-free - that is, opposed to nuclear weapons, nuclear waste dumping and transportation of nuclear materials through the area. The idea was first taken up by Manchester City Council in 1980, when it passed a resolution calling on the Government to refrain from the manufacture or positioning of any nuclear weapons within the boundary of the city. Six months later, over sixty other local authorities had passed similar resolutions. By the end of 1981, this number had grown to some 120 authorities, and a National Steering Committee was
established to coordinate future activities. At the time of writing, there are some 170 local authorities participating in the NFZ campaign.

CND did not become fully involved with the NFZ campaign until 1982. The issue which prompted closer liaison between the two campaigns was Civil Defence; the NFZ campaign was concerned with other issues which also engaged CND (e.g. peace education), but it was on Civil Defence that the two campaigns found a commonality of interest. CND had always opposed the concept of Civil Defence on the grounds that it was impractical and ineffective in the face of a nuclear onslaught, and that to persist with Civil Defence planning would only propagate the idea that nuclear war could be survived which could make people complacent about the dangers of the arms race. It also argued that the Government's Civil Defence plans entailed unacceptable curtailments on civil liberties, highlighting the emergency powers that would be granted to the military and the police in the event of a nuclear attack. Many local authorities shared this view (predominantly, of course, Labour controlled authorities), but were obliged by central government to participate in Civil Defence planning. Under regulations issued by the Home Office in 1974, local authorities had a duty to make plans for Civil Defence in their area. These plans were incorporated into a number of national exercises held every two or three years since the mid-seventies. The planned exercise for 1982, however - termed 'Hard Rock' by the government - had to be cancelled when it became clear that twenty NFZ county councils were refusing to participate in the exercise. (County Councils are much more important than District Councils in this context, as the main
planning powers and responsibilities reside with them). CND decided to capitalise on this set-back for the government by mounting its own exercise ('Hard Luck'); which drew on the expertise of SANA to offer NFZ councils an estimation of the effects of a 'limited' nuclear attack on their area. SANA argued that official estimates from the Home Office seriously underestimated the extent of casualties and damage, an argument which was reiterated by the British Medical Association in 1983.(32) This dispute over the validity of official information was to become the lynch-pin of the ensuing conflict between central government and the NFZ's. Following its cancellation of the Hard Rock exercise. The Home office introduced a new set of Civil Defence regulations in 1983. These imposed on all councils the duty to participate in Civil Defence exercises; they also required councils to provide emergency control centres, to train staff in Civil Defence duties and to recruit and train volunteers for Civil Defence - the latter despite fears expressed by trade unionists that a volunteer force could be employed for strike-breaking purposes. Although the NFZ's dubbed the new regulations as 'ill-drafted, contradictory, impractical to implement and designed deliberately to further mislead the public about the effects of nuclear war'(33), they could not question their legality. Failure to comply could result in Commissioners being drafted in by central government to implement regulations, with the cost being charged to the Council and the possibility of individual councillors being surcharged. Consequently, the NFZ response has not been an outright refusal to implement the regulations. They have argued, however, that they cannot draw up proper
plans unless and until the Home Office provides them with full information about the likely nature and the scale of any attack—what are termed the government's 'planning assumptions'. Specifically, the NFZ's have demanded, as a prerequisite of drawing up Civil Defence plans, that the Home Office should tell them what are the likely targets in their area, what would be the effect of an attack on them, and what problems could be caused outside the authority's area. The Home Office is extremely reluctant to provide such detailed information on its planning assumptions, as it is well aware that the information would be seized upon by the NFZ's and CND and used to conduct local campaigns which would highlight the vulnerability of communities under nuclear attack. The Home Office claims that it is impossible to predict with any accuracy the targets or magnitude of a nuclear attack, and hence that Civil Defence planning should be flexible enough to cover a range of possibilities. The NFZ's intend to go ahead and mount their own planning assumption studies; if they cannot obtain the information they need from the Home Office, they will use groups such as SANA. Only one such study has been completed, by the GLC in 1986(34); this concluded that much smaller nuclear attacks than were previously assumed would effectively destroy London, and condemned the Home Office policy of flexible planning for all types of attack as unworkable. Other studies are underway in a few NFZ's, but there have been some difficulties in persuading officials in local authorities to rely on information which does not emanate from the government.

CND, liaising with the NFZs through the national steering committee, has been active in
encouraging the NFZs to continue with this policy of delay and resistance. CND has argued that the NFZs future strategy should be to comply with the new regulations, but to do so 'creatively' - that is to say, to publicise the effects of nuclear war and the enormity of seeking to draw up realistic Civil Defence plans in the face of these. The NFZs have yet to endorse this strategy (arguing that they do not need to choose a strategy until local Planning Assumptions Studies have been conducted), but they are maintaining a close relationship with CND. To date, the government has done little to bring the NFZs into line. Deadlines have been set for all councils to complete their Civil Defence plans, but when the NFZ councils have either failed to submit plans or submitted out-dated plans, the deadlines have generally been extended rather than enforced. A few authorities have been financially penalised, but others in the NFZ campaign adopting the same tactics have not attracted action. Civil Defence exercises have been held since the new regulations came into force, but they have been of a much smaller scale than envisaged in 'Hard Rock'. When the 'Brave Defender' military manoeuvres were held in 1985 (the biggest such exercise since 1945), nuclear attack did not form part of the scenario(35). In the wider political context, the government's abolition of the GLC and metropolitan counties dealt a blow to the NFZ campaign, but the intention is to increase recruiting efforts at the borough level.

CND will certainly participate in this, as it has identified the twin issues of NFZs and Civil Defence as very worthwhile campaigning areas. A motion to the 1984 Annual Conference stipulating that resources be allocated to continue the
high-powered campaign on these issues was overwhelmingly carried. For CND, the issues lend themselves to a campaigning style which emphasises the relevance of the nuclear threat to the individual in his or her own community, and NFZ councils are encouraged to develop initiatives which publicise this. The NFZ campaign has the additional benefit that CND are seen to be working in cooperation with democratically elected public bodies, and to be providing those bodies with specialised information that is sufficiently credible to cast doubt on the government's own circulars - both factors which are held to enhance the public legitimacy of the Campaign. Not least, NFZ authorities can and do provide practical support and facilities for peace campaigning in general in their area.

Conclusions

We have already noted that CND is a relatively homogeneous group. Its membership and support is predominantly drawn from a specific class location, the educated middle-class, who are more likely than not to be employed in the public sector. Its members display a high level of consensus over the aims and goals of the Campaign. We have to remember, however, that CND is far from being a completely homogeneous organisation. It does, after all, bring together young anarchists and senior citizens, the unemployed and those with positions of responsibility in society; there are not many groups in Britain which have working together people who look as if they have just stepped out of the House of Commons and others who
have the appearance of having arrived from the Glastonbury festival (and, indeed, have done just that in both cases). These people, with their variety of backgrounds and peer groups, may well be in accord over the aims of CND, but they are likely to want to express their commitment and take action in rather different ways.

For those directing the Campaign, the problem lies in maintaining the enthusiasm of its supporters, and their willingness to take various forms of public action, whilst simultaneously convincing politicians and the public to consider the idea of unilateralism and treat it as a serious alternative to existing thinking on national defence, rather than just dismissing it as unrealistic or solely the preserve of an unworldly minority. During the eighties, the quest for respectability has pushed the Campaign more and more into the realm of persuasion and reasoned argument as distinct from protest and resistance. The focus of the Campaign has widened from a preoccupation with Cruise and Trident (issues which lent themselves to targeted protest actions) to the basic issue of unilateral disarmament. The perceived necessity to enter into dialogue over this - seeking to persuade others of the positive virtues of this policy rather than just rejecting the existing system - has grown, and is reflected in the new initiatives on lobbying and the Basic Case, and new appointments to the national staff.

Persuasion, however, has not replaced protest; protest actions have been rather muted since 1984 in comparison with the early eighties, but this is more a reflection of a general (and probably temporary) downturn in activity than any switch to tactics of persuasion. Protest remains an integral
part of the Campaign, and is likely to continue to do so, because of two factors. These are the ways in which British governments exclude the Campaign from any dialogue and reinforce its 'outsider' status, and the commitment on an ideological level of at least some of the Campaign's supporters to the practice as well as the principle of peaceful resistance and NVDA. There are those within the Campaign who would like to see it concentrate exclusively upon protest and resistance, just as there are those who consider this self-defeating and would prefer to see the Campaign become a purely educational and conventional lobbying group. The leadership of the Campaign, however, with the support of the majority of the membership, have sought to keep both dimensions of activity as part of the Campaign's tactical armoury. This has led to stresses and disagreements, and it has meant an uneven take-up of national initiatives by local groups. It has not split the Campaign, however, which must be seen as a substantial achievement. Whether or not this unity in the face of tactical diversity has enhanced the impact of the Campaign on British society is the question to which we now turn.

NOTES


2. D. Plesch What do we do after we've shown 'The War Game'?, CND Publications.

3. Survey by the Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research, Lancaster University: 237
the survey showed that Peace studies are taught in 64 per cent of Labour Authorities and 59 per cent of Conservative Authorities, but was based on 69 replies out of 125 questionnaires sent out. See *The Economist*, 9 June 1984, p.27.

4. For example, Sir Keith Joseph (then Secretary of State for Education) made a speech at the Conservative Party Conference in 1984, calling on parents to contact him if they were worried that their children were being indoctrinated. A back-bench Conservative M.P., Edward Leigh, attempted to introduce a Private Members Bill in 1984 which was designed to restrict the teaching of peace studies in schools, but the Bill did not complete its passage through the legislative process. On the other hand, the H.M. Schools Inspector responsible for History and Politics curriculae said in 1983 that, where peace studies was being taught, he was satisfied that it was taught in a 'fair and proper' manner - see *Sanity*, July 1984, pp.14-17.


6. Indicative of this was the decision in 1985 to cut the budget allocations to the specialist sections, as part of the process of seeking to integrate their work with that of the Parliamentary and Elections Committee.

7. 'CND Election Strategy' - paper by P. and E. Committee and Staff to National Executive Committee, April 1986.

8. Interview with Majorie Thompson, staff member, P. and E. Committee, June 1986.

9. On the joint initiative of CND and Greenpeace, regular meetings are now held bringing together lobbyists and researchers who have an
interest in the nuclear issue, and who seek to exert pressure on Parliament. The meetings are designed to enable participants to share their ideas and experiences.

10. Interview with James Hinton, April 1986.
11. A viewpoint confirmed by James Hinton, on the basis of his experience as Chairperson of Projects Committee.
13. According to CND's General Secretary, EPIC 1 was rather unsuccessful primarily because the theme chosen was very abstract and thus hard to communicate in simple terms. Interview with Meg Beresford, May 1986.
17. Forward Planning Group, op.cit.
19. Interview with Meg Beresford, op.cit.
20. Interview with James Hinton, op.cit.

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23. Letter to all CND groups, Council Members and Staff from the National Officers; 14.11.83.
25. 'Return to Sender', paper from Projects Committee to National Council, April 1984.
26. Interview with James Hinton, op. cit.
27. Ibid.
29. Interview with Barbara Egglestone, June 1986.
35. General Sir John Alcehurst, responsible for setting up the exercise, was reported as saying that the planners did not want 'to stir up the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament', The Guardian, 9.8.85.
Chapter Eight

THE IMPACT OF THE CAMPAIGN

Whatever the tactics employed by the Campaign, its ultimate aim remains the same - to influence the government, whether directly or indirectly, to adopt and implement a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament. This, of course, it has singly failed to do since 1979, the Thatcher administrations remaining totally committed to a policy of maintaining an 'effective' nuclear deterrent which will only be dispensed with as a result of multilateral negotiation. This is not to say that the Thatcher governments have ignored CND. The peace movement may not have changed the government's policies, but it has persuaded them of the need to publicise and defend those policies - which is in marked contrast to the situation in the fifties and sixties, when the government did not feel it necessary to publicly refute the Campaign's arguments. As we shall see, during the 1982-83 period, the government went to some lengths to diminish the growing popularity of CND and its message among the electorate. Since 1983 (and the twin 'victories' for the government of the general election and Cruise deployment), the government has been less concerned to wage a propaganda war against CND, but
has stepped up its use of coercive powers against peace movement activists, which itself represents some kind of impact by the movement.

The Conservative Governments

Neither the efforts of CND nor the unforeseen demands and costs of the Falklands conflict in 1982 have caused the Conservatives to alter their stance on Britain's possession of nuclear weaponry. Government statements since 1979 have become more detailed, but the essence remains the same. Defence is conceptualised as consisting of four basic commitments: direct defence of the U.K., the maintenance of a strategic nuclear deterrent, the stationing of major land and air forces as part of the NATO dispositions in West Germany, and a similar naval contribution to NATO forces in the North Atlantic(1). Whilst it is accepted that defence of the U.K. itself has to remain primarily the responsibility of a British government, and that this entails independent control of the nuclear deterrent in the final analysis, Britain's defence policy is formulated almost entirely in terms of membership of NATO, and the main potential threat is conceptualised as coming from the USSR and Warsaw Pact. The Conservatives' commitment to NATO has never come under question since 1979; this is particularly important in terms of nuclear weapons, as it not only gives rise to the deployment of American Cruise missiles in the U.K., but it is also advanced as a powerful reason for maintaining a modern British deterrent. The argument advanced by the government is that the deterrence capability of NATO is strongly enhanced by the presence of two independent nuclear powers
within it, and that moreover only Britain is in a position to be that second power. Their reasoning is that having two nuclear powers fully incorporated in the NATO framework (France not being prepared to commit its nuclear forces to NATO) represents an extra insurance. Whilst the British government is fully convinced of America's commitment to defend Western Europe by any means, it argues that the Soviet Union might doubt this commitment, but would be deterred from seeking to capitalise upon any perceived American uncertainties by the knowledge that Britain could trigger off a nuclear exchange. As Francis Pym argued in 1980, when discussing the possibility of the Soviet Union being tempted to gamble on American hesitation,

The nuclear decision, whether as a matter of retaliatory response or in any other circumstance, would, of course, be no less agonising for the United Kingdom than for the United States. But it would be a decision of a separate and independent Power, and a Power whose survival in Freedom might be more directly and closely threatened by aggression in Europe than that of the United States. This is where the fact of having to face two decision-makers instead of one is of such significance. Soviet leaders would have to assess that there was a greater chance of one of them using its nuclear capability than if there were a single decision-maker across the Atlantic. The risk to the Soviet Union would be inescapably higher and less calculable. That is just another way of saying that the deterrence of the Alliance as a whole would be
the stronger, the more credible and therefore the more effective. (2)

As France is not willing to assume the status of the 'second centre of decision' within NATO, and as West Germany is bound by treaty (and international pressure) not to assume nuclear status, the government argues that only Britain can fulfill this role - and it is proudly presented as a 'distinctive, central and unique component of our contribution to the Alliance' (3).

These basic principles of Britain's defence policy - countering a perceived Soviet threat through a contribution to NATO which includes a strategic nuclear deterrent - then underpin the government's case for Trident. The starting point is, of course, the Soviet threat. Its existence tends to be assumed rather than proven in government statements, but it is the Soviet threat which leads the government to argue that Britain must deploy a 'super-power' weapon if it is to have any credibility. As John Nott retorted to the suggestion that Trident was a somewhat grandiose weapon system for a country that was no longer a world super power,

the threat that we face comes from a super power, our submarines must be capable of surviving against super power technology, and the defences that we have to penetrate are those of a super power (4).

and this theme of Trident being essential because of improvements in Soviet defence systems was reiterated in the 1987 Conservative election manifesto. In the government's view, only Trident
is an adequate and cost-effective solution to the problem of the encroaching obsolescence of the present deterrent (Polaris is assumed to become too costly and difficult to maintain after the early 1990s). The possibility of a deterrent force based on British-owned Cruise missiles is firmly dismissed. Cruise missiles may in themselves be cheaper than ballistic missiles, but many more of them are needed to constitute an effective deterrent. Moreover, of the various launch platforms available (i.e. surface ships, submarines, airborne and land-based), the government considers submarines to be the most invulnerable - but a deterrent based on submarine-launched Cruise missiles would require more extremely expensive submarines to be built. Cost is not the only drawback to Cruise; the government argues that the long-term development of Soviet defences against Cruise missiles is very hard to predict(5). Trident, however, is presented as a formidable and proven system, which enables Britain to maintain cooperation with the United States established by the Polaris decision(6).

The government accepts that Trident will cost a lot of money in absolute terms; the Commons Defence Committee has noted that the original cost estimate for Trident in 1980 was some 5.2 thousand million, and had risen to 9.3 thousand million by 1985(7). However, the government points out that in the context of the total defence budget, such an expenditure (which they estimate will be spread out over a fifteen-year period, peaking in the late eighties) is relatively small - absorbing about 3 per cent of the defence budget on average between 1980 and 1995, and about 5 per cent in the peak years(9). However, as critics of the Trident programme (even within the Conservative Party) have
argued; only a part of the defence budget is available for the procurement of new equipment, and acquiring Trident will mean that there is considerably less money available for other (conventional) equipment; several prominent Conservative back-benchers have voiced very real apprehension about the impact of Trident on the Royal Navy in this respect. The government, however, argues that its impact on the acquisition of other equipment will be minimal and is, in any case, unavoidable – as the Defence Minister argued in 1982,

Our planned expenditure on the strategic nuclear deterrent, if it were instead to be spread over many conventional capabilities, would not represent more than a marginal increment in those conventional forces which will, anyhow obtain, 97 per cent of defence expenditure over that period (up to 1975). Of course, I and all my defence advisers would like more frigates. As Secretary of State for Defence, I should like more tanks and aircraft. However, all of us, including the Chiefs of Staff, are unanimous in the view that a strategic nuclear capability takes precedence over an increase in such forces. Even a massive conventional force has no ultimate value in a nuclear environment unless the possessor of those conventional forces can resist strategic nuclear blackmail by the other side. (9)

Neither escalating costs of Trident nor the additional costs entailed by the Falklands campaign and subsequent defence have caused the government to change its mind on this. In its review of
defence spending in 1985, the Government was still insistent that the acquisition of Trident would have a minimal effect on the defence budget as a whole; in the 1987 election manifesto, alternatives to Trident were dismissed out of hand on the grounds that none could provide an equivalent level of security.

Another criticism of Trident, advanced by both the peace movement and others more sympathetic to the government, is that Trident represents an escalation in the arms race because it is a 'first-strike' weapon - that is, one which can incapacitate an enemy's offensive weapons before they can be used. This criticism has been voiced particularly since the government's decision in 1982 to acquire the up-dated (D5) version of Trident rather than the original (C4) system. The government has dismissed this criticism as a fallacy - partly on the grounds that the Soviet Union has too many targets for even the full British force of four Trident submarines to destroy, and partly because neither the British government nor NATO have any interest in developing a first-strike capability. Repeated accusations that the United States does have a strategy of achieving a first-strike capability have been met with blank denials that such a capability could ever be used; for example, in 1983 -

NATO is a defensive alliance and had made it clear that none of its weapons, nuclear or conventional, will be used except in response to attack. Moreover, both the United Kingdom and the United States have undertaken not to use nuclear weapons save in the case of
an attack by another nuclear power or a state allied to a nuclear power.(13)

However, as is apparent from the concluding part of this statement, the government is firm in its resistance to any idea of NATO entering into a commitment to make no first use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has declared that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons; but the government argues that, given the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional weaponry (at least in numerical terms), NATO could not be confident of resisting a conventional attack by conventional forces alone — and, moreover, that NATO's commitment to use none of its weapons except in response to an attack is a far more fundamental and comprehensive commitment than that offered by the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons(14). In other words, the government draws a firm distinction between capability and intent: NATO needs the weapon systems which would enable it to pursue a strategy of 'flexible response', but does not necessarily intend to use them —

It strengthens deterrence that the Warsaw Pact is not allowed to believe that a limited conventional war could be fought in Europe without involving a risk of nuclear conflict. This does not, of course, meant that the Alliance is committing itself in advance to the use of nuclear weapons in response to attack; it is simply keeping its options open, to increase the uncertainty in the mind of the potential aggressor and hence increase deterrence.(15)
It is precisely that uncertainty that CND and the peace movement claim fuels the arms race, but the government is convinced that a combination of a second centre of decision in NATO, and an insistence on retaining a nuclear option, combine to maximise the deterrent effect on the Soviet Union.

Given this perception of the potential Soviet threat, it is not surprising that the government rejects any idea of a unilateral move towards a non-nuclear defence strategy. Reliance on conventional weaponry alone is ruled out because of the costs involved and, more importantly, because it would open the way to nuclear blackmail. The government quote with approval the argument advanced by Lord Carrington (now Secretary General of NATO) -

No amount of conventional improvement would protect the West from nuclear blackmail. The advocates of non-nuclear defence have to explain why a Soviet Union with a nuclear monopoly would launch a conventional attack against a conventionally well-defended position, when it could threaten a devastating nuclear strike without fear of effective retaliation. And they must explain also what answer they would give if such a threat were made. To say of the Soviet leaders 'Oh, but they wouldn't' is not an answer. It is wishful thinking.(16)

The government also argues that any such move would result in Britain effectively sheltering under the American nuclear umbrella. Not only would this be an abrogation of the government's responsibility for national defence, it would also be morally
unacceptable and politically unwise (as it would leave France as the only European nuclear pow-er)(17).

The case for a move towards more 'defensive' weapons systems is dismissed in similarly robust terms. The government asserts that, in practice, there is no clear distinction to be drawn between 'offensive' and 'defensive' systems, although it does not substantiate this with detailed argument. It also makes the broader argument that 'defensive' systems do not constitute an effective deterrent -

there is little or no historical evidence to show that non-offensive defence alone has ever deterred aggression. Such a strategy would reduce the risk for a potential aggressor by making his territory, in effect, a sanctuary. The enemy may well be willing to take the risk, and pay the potential cost, of losing his military forces in the field if he knows that his own homeland could not be attacked in return. But if he is faced with a threat of retaliation he is likely to be far more reluctant to embark on aggression.(18)

This view of deterrence - resting on the capability to penetrate Soviet and Warsaw Pact defences - also underpins the government's support for the deployment of Cruise in Britain (and Cruise and Pershing within NATO). The government argues that the Soviet Union's combination of improving defence systems and deploying new missile systems (especially the SS20) has made it inevitable that NATO should respond by modernising its own systems; if NATO had done nothing, it would have seriously damaged the Alliance's ability to deter the Soviet Union from
thinking that it could fight and win a nuclear war confined to Europe(19). However, the government also supports the United States' efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union over the deployment of the SS20, Cruise and Pershing. This does not extend to the government supporting any notion of a nuclear 'freeze', however. Such a policy would only result in perpetuating and legitimising existing Soviet superiority, because the Soviet Union has modernised or replaced many of its nuclear weapons while NATO has adopted a policy of self-imposed restraint; verification would also be difficult(20).

Another idea emanating from the peace movement which receives short shrift from the government is that of Nuclear-Free Zones, particularly across Europe. This is seen as an idea which, if implemented, would not only imperil the linkage with American nuclear weapons that provides 'the ultimate guarantee of NATO security'(21), but would also create a false impression of enhanced security. This is because the concept is simply impractical, on three main grounds:

First, the territory of the zone would remain under threat from long-range weapons located outside it . . . Secondly, the mobility of modern missile systems means that they could be rapidly redeployed in a period of tension; this could be easier for the Soviet Union than for the West. Thirdly, the Soviet Union could bring its conventional superiority to bear in such zones with less risk of provoking an escalation in the conflict: deterrence against the outbreak of hostilities would be weakened. Geographical redistributions of nuclear
weapons are no substitute for their overall reduction and ultimate elimination through balanced arms control agreements - an aim to which NATO remains fully committed.(22)

More fundamental proposals for reform in defence policy, such as passive resistance and civil disobedience, are dismissed as lacking credibility in deterrence terms. Although it is something of a tribute to CND and the peace movement that the government has come to even address these possibilities, they are seen by the Conservatives as highly unrealistic. A defence policy based on some variation of 'social defence' or guerilla warfare is condemned on a number of grounds:

It could only take effect after occupation by the aggressor. It is, therefore, essentially a national policy that would allow the West European nations to be picked off individually. It would provide no defence against, for example, a blockade of the UK designed to starve the country into submission. Moreover, resistance of this nature depends on the occupying powers being inhibited by the attitudes of its own people and other nations from adopting oppressive measures: there are no grounds for believing that such restraint would be felt by the Soviet Union. Perhaps more important, it is wholly unrealistic to suppose that the counter measures envisaged in social defence would be viewed by the Soviet Union as any demonstration of the UK's or NATO's will or capability to resist attack, and it would be irresponsible of the Government to rely on such measures.(23)
When Neil Kinnock, during the 1987 election campaign, appeared to offer a qualified endorsement of some variety of civil resistance, he was immediately vilified by the Conservatives for advocating defeatism and surrender.

In short, the Conservative government's defence policy has remained largely unchanged since 1979, as has its view of the potential Soviet threat and what constitutes a 'realistic' deterrent against that threat. As is clear from the above, the government rejects CND's analysis and prescription on every count, save that both subscribe to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. The government has remained insistent that unilateral acts are too risky to be worthwhile; there is no confidence that the Soviet Union would respond in kind to what the government terms 'one-sided' measures—

history shows that by one-sidedly reducing our defence capabilities we increase the risk of war. Disarmament must be equitable and multilateral if it is to enhance rather than decrease our security.(24)

Moreover, although the government maintains a clear official commitment to the process of multilateral negotiation on nuclear disarmament (from a position of strength), it is also prepared to defend the record of Britain and NATO's nuclear weapons policy since the war. In 1981, it argued that whilst it could not be proven that deterrence based on nuclear weapons had played a key part in persevering the East-West peace for 35 years, commonsense suggested that it must have done(25). In 1983, it claimed that NATO's twin policies of deterrence and
multilateral disarmament 'have preserved the peace in Europe for over 30 years and will continue to do so provided the West remains resolute in its approach' (26), and the 1987 election manifesto argued that the nuclear deterrent had prevented both nuclear and conventional warfare in Europe since 1945. In terms of current defence policy, therefore, CND's impact has been non-existent. The only shift in official statements since 1979 is that they have paid the peace movement the compliment of seeking to refute its arguments rather than, as in the sixties and seventies, simply ignoring them. Apart from some doubts about the cost of Trident and its implications for the rest of the defence budget, the government has been able to rely on the Conservative party inside and outside Parliament to fully endorse and support its defence policy.

Although CND has failed to have an impact on Conservative policies, it has not been ignored by the Thatcher governments. Considerable resources, in terms of money and manpower, have been devoted to the policing of demonstrations and direct action, particularly at Greenham and Molesworth. Legal powers have been employed, including the creation of new bye-laws to limit protest activity around major bases. Although inspired more by mass picketing and industrial disputes than CND activities, the government has also introduced new Public Order provisions which give the police greater powers to restrict or ban demonstrations and marches. Arguably, the use of such coercive power by the state has led to a victory over the peace movement, in that no major base in the U.K. has a flourishing peace camp or similar activity established around it any longer (although there is a
small hard core of protestors at Greenham who have resisted all the authorities' efforts to date). Although the protestors may no longer be physically present in large numbers, however, their success in publicising the issue cannot be denied, and at one stage provoked the government into adopting a high-profile propaganda campaign against the peace movement, and particularly against CND.

As we shall see, the government's counter-campaign to CND has attracted considerable media attention. This has not centred on the content of the government's arguments so much as on the methods employed, particularly the alleged use of the security services to 'infiltrate' the Campaign. Before discussing this, it is worth noting that these allegations relate only to a relatively short period around the 1983 election. Both before and after 1983, the government has tended to adopt the same strategy as its predecessors towards the peace movement; to ignore it where possible, and, if pressed, to dismiss its arguments as unrealistic (without seeking to counter any of CND's specific arguments) and to concentrate on presenting the case for replacing Polaris with Trident. As the movement grew in strength, however - and particularly as it started to convince the Labour Party and major trade unions to subscribe to the unilateralist cause - the Conservatives decided that a more overt strategy was necessary. During 1981 and 1982, the then Minister of Defence (John Nott) attempted to 'freeze out' the Campaign by refusing to enter into any public debate. Simultaneously, it was made clear to television and radio producers that any programmes which covered the nuclear issue, and included a contribution from CND without a corresponding contribution from the
government, would be considered one-sided and 'unbalanced'. Given the concern felt by most decision-makers in the British electronic media to maintain political 'balance' in their output, this tactic was relatively successful in keeping the Campaign's spokespersons out of discussion programmes, especially on television. It did not, however, prevent rapidly increasing coverage of the Campaign's activities as news events, culminating with extensive publicity being given to the Labour party's decision at its 1982 Conference to adopt a unilateralist policy by a two-thirds majority.

The growing size and influence of the Campaign, the forthcoming deployment of Cruise missiles and, of course, the apparent popularity of the Falklands 'victory' and an imminent general election, all combined to convince the government at the beginning of 1983 that it was no longer sufficient to simply ignore CND. On the one hand, the Campaign was growing stronger; membership was increasing, more people were prepared to participate in demonstrations and actions, and major parties, unions and some churches were giving their support to the Campaign. On the other hand, the Falklands campaign boosted popular support for 'strong' government, and Labour adopting unilateralism as one of its official policies laid the way open for the government to argue that this proved CND to be merely a 'stalking horse' for the left in British politics, and to label both the Campaign and the Labour Party as left-wing extremists who would strip the country of its defences and leave it unable to perform such feats as the Falklands campaign. Although it has not been officially acknowledged, it seems clear that a decision was taken in late 1982 to go onto the offensive against
CND, and it seems very probable that this was one of the reasons underlying the replacement in January 1983 of John Nott at the Ministry of Defence with one of the government's best communicators, Michael Heseltine.

Heseltine's first initiative in the campaign against CND was to take up the idea of mounting a national advertising campaign, to be prepared by professional advertising agencies rather than the Defence Ministry's own public relations staff. Estimating an expenditure of several million pounds of public money on such a campaign, Heseltine argued that it was legitimate for the government to incur such a cost as it had a duty to communicate to the electorate its policy on nuclear weapons and deterrence (28). Predictably, however, the idea was strongly criticised as an instance of a government using public funding to mount a party political campaign (a charge the Conservative government did not wish to face, given its own strong criticisms of advertising campaigns mounted by Labour-controlled local authorities at the time). In the light of this, Heseltine dropped the idea, but replaced it with another. This was the appointment of a small team within the Ministry of Defence, known as D.S.19 and consisting of career civil servants, whose job it was to assist Heseltine in his campaign against the unilateralists. The six-member team (compared with the hundred or so public relations staff employed within the Ministry of Defence) were charged with assisting in the preparation of speeches for Heseltine, the preparation of films and pamphlets explaining the government's policies (none of which seem to have materialised) and dealing with enquiries from the media about the nuclear weapons issue. Although
little is known about how D.S.19 actually operated, it appears to have spent its time advising Ministers rather than dealing directly with the media or public. It reputedly held weekly meetings during the first six months of 1983, attended by Heseltine, Ministers from the Foreign and Home Offices, senior officials and Mrs Thatcher's press secretary; the team was disbanded after the general election.

Although the input from D.S.19 remains unclear, it is certainly true that shortly after its inception Heseltine moved onto the offensive against CND. He made a number of speeches in which CND was presented as indistinguishable from the Labour Party, and both were castigated as left-wing extremists who were prepared to gamble with the nation's security. In a more controversial move in the two months before the 1983 election, Heseltine issued two letters which claimed to show that CND had been taken over by left-wing activists. In April, Heseltine wrote to all Conservative MPs and all Conservative candidates in marginal seats. In this letter, he argued that of the 26 individuals directly elected to CND's National Council by Conference, 14 were 'of the left or extreme left'; 5 of these were said to have links with the Community Party (although the letter omitted to mention that 3 of them left the Communist Party some twenty five years earlier). Of the remaining 9, one was said to be linked with the International Socialists (the person concerned had in fact been a member of the Labour Party since he was 16, and denied having ever belonged to I.S.), and the rest were members of and active in the Labour Party. CND ridiculed this letter as an unfounded smear, but this did not dissuade Heseltine from issuing
another letter (in May 1983). In this; circulated to all Conservative candidates, Heseltine turned his attention to the National Executive Committee of CND, claiming that 'a clear majority of the Executive, which is the body which meets monthly to run CND, is also of the left (whether Labour, socialist or Communist)' and that CND was instructing its activists to attack the Conservative Party, and especially the Prime Minister, during the general election campaign(30).

Although these letters, and CND's vehement denials, attracted some interest in the media; they were not seen as particularly exceptional in the rough and tumble of British politics during an election campaign. Some time after the election, however, allegations were made that put these attacks from the government in a new and altogether more serious perspective. The allegations concerned the government's use of the police and security services to gain information on CND which was then used for party political campaigning. The first serious allegations occurred in 1984; CND had for some time been receiving complaints from a sizeable number of its activists that mail to and from CND was being delayed and arriving having been opened and resealed, and that telephone conversations were being mysteriously interrupted. CND built up a dossier of these allegations which prompted Labour's Shadow Home Affairs spokesman (Gerald Kaufman) to question the Home Secretary about them. On the allegation of interference with mail, the Home Secretary agreed that clearly something was wrong (the Post Office had already agreed to pay compensation) but inferred that this might be due to normal wear and tear. He followed normal governmental practice in refusing to confirm
or deny whether any specific phone-tapping had been authorised, but gave the general assurance that any such authorisation was only given when on tightly defined criteria 'subversion' was suspected, and that CND itself was not considered a subversive organisation as such -

I welcome the opportunity to make it perfectly clear that peaceful political campaigning to change the mind of the government and the people generally about nuclear disarmament is a legitimate activity and does not fall within the strict criteria. (31)

The important qualification to be noted here is the use of the term 'peaceful'; the Home Secretary did not expand on this point, but it seems possible that the government has drawn a distinction between activists who attend marches and demonstrations, and those who participate in more direct actions, especially around the two Cruise bases. The latter, by seeking to monitor and disrupt Cruise deployment, could be considered a direct threat to national security, and thus not covered by the above assurance. It was certainly the case that many of the complaints received by CND were from members based in the areas around Greenham Common and Molesworth.

CND continued to press for a full inquiry into their allegations (a demand rejected by the Home Secretary), but the issue became subsumed during 1984 and 1985 by new developments. Clive Ponting, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, was accused of breaching the Official Secrets Act by leaking information on the conduct of the Falklands campaign to a Labour MP; he was subse-
quently acquitted at his trial, but his case gave rise to concern that the Ministry of Defence was being over-secretive. In a previous trial in 1984, another civil servant, Ms. Sarah Tisdall, was convicted on a charge of contravening the catch-all section two of the Official Secrets Act by leaking information to the *The Guardian* concerning the government's public relations strategy over the arrival of Cruise missiles in the UK. Neither of these cases had any direct bearing on CND's relationship with the government, but they did create a climate in which the revelations of yet another civil servant - Ms. Cathy Massiter, who worked for M.I.5 (Britain's internal security agency) - received massive publicity in early 1985, and centred on the government's alleged surveillance of CND activists.

Ms. Massiter, who resigned from M.I.5 in 1985, had joined the agency in 1970. According to her own account, in 1981 she was chosen to take over responsibility for M.I.5's investigation of left-wing subversive influence within CND. She felt this to be a legitimate exercise, but became concerned during 1982 and 1983 that she was under political pressure to study all activists, not just known Communists in CND, and that this led to the Security Service breaking its own rules(32). She made four specific allegations relating to the investigation of CND. Firstly, that M.I.5 in conjunction with the Special Branch 'stretched' the concept of subversive to include anyone who had contact with known Communists, and used this to justify the preparation of lengthy files on hundreds of CND activists including the leadership(33). Secondly, that the telephone of John Cox (then a Vice-President of CND) was tapped in 1983,
officially because he was a known member of the Communist Party, but in spite of the fact that (according to Ms. Massiter) 'we knew from our coverage of the Communist Party that he was not getting up to anything in CND'; in other words, Cox was chosen as a means of monitoring conversations among CND's leadership rather than from any genuine suspicion of subversive activities on his part. Thirdly, that during 1982 and 1983, M.I.5 introduced an agent into CND's headquarters who reported back on what was going on in the CND office - one Harry Newton, a long-time activist in left-wing politics whom Ms. Massiter claimed had been recruited by M.I.5 during the fifties. Fourthly, that unclassified information on the political affiliations and inclinations of leading members of CND, which had been in part gathered by the above techniques, was passed from M.I.5 to the D.S. 19 team in the Ministry of Defence, and subsequently used in Heseltine's campaigning during the run-up to the 1983 election.

These allegations, and the initial banning of a television programme based on them, received extensive discussion in the media and Parliament, such that the government felt obliged to react to them. The allegation concerning the infiltration of Harry Newton did not receive much attention, partly because Newton died in 1983 and partly because many of those who had known him during and prior to his involvement with CND publicly voiced their disbelief that he was such an agent. The allegation that information had been passed to D.S. 19 was taken up by the Opposition, but largely ignored by the government. Massiter's first two allegations were addressed by the Home Secretary, however, whose initial move was to establish an
inquiry (headed by Lord Bridge, Chairman of the Security Commission) to determine whether govern­ment ministers since 1970 had operated under established guidelines whenever they authorised telephone tapping. Less than a week later, Lord Bridge reported back to the Home Secretary that no warrant for interception had been issued in contravention of the appropriate criteria. This inquiry was dismissed by both Labour and Alliance leaders as seriously inadequate, however, because its terms of reference precluded any investigation into any unauthorised interceptions which may have been made by the security services or any improper use of information. The Home Secretary attempted to counter this criticism in a subsequent debate in the Commons, when he claimed that he had conducted his own enquiries in this area; he concluded that

the security service has carried out no operation, investigation, surveillance or action against any individual otherwise than for the purposes laid down in its directive and with the propriety which successive Governments have rightly demanded of it, and which this Government will continue to demand.(34)

He went on to offer a qualified assurance that CND membership did not, in itself, constitute grounds for regarding an individual as subversive:

No member of CND, no members of a trade union — nor for that matter any individual — need fear that he is the object of surveillance by the security authorities unless his own actions and intentions bring him within the
strict criteria set out in the definition of subversion ... It is not sufficient for the safety or well being of the state to be threatened. In addition, there must be an intention to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy. That definition governs the work of both the security service and the special branches in relation to subversion.(35)

Neither of these assurances counter the allegation that information obtained by the security services and special branches was subsequently used for party political campaigning. Nor do they have anything to say on the allegation of a phone-tap on John Cox, as the Home Secretary followed precedent by refusing to confirm or deny allegations relating to specific individuals. These points were pursued by CND, who took a case to the High Court in 1986 on the grounds that Cox's phone had been tapped and that the motive for the interception was party political rather than any danger to national security. The government asked the court not to review the case at all, on the grounds that governments never confirmed or denied tapping in the interests of national security, and the courts should not become involved for the same reason. The Higher Court rejected this application, however, arguing that it would be unacceptable for Ministers to evade complaints against them simply by citing national security. The Court also accepted evidence from Ms. Massiter that Cox's telephone had been intercepted. The Court pointed to two serious flaws in CND's case, however. Firstly, although Ms. Massiter claimed that Cox was being monitored because he was a committed member
of CND rather than working in the Campaign to further the interests of the Communist party, the Court argued that other evidence unknown to Ms. Massiter could have motivated the interception; given the government's refusal to disclose any information, Ms. Massiter's evidence was inadequate rather than unacceptable. Therefore, the Court declared the interception to have been lawful. Secondly, Massiter claimed that the possibility of tapping Cox's phone had first been discussed early in 1983 (between February and April), but the Home Secretary had not approved the interception until August - that is, after the general election. In the Court's opinion, this delay was crucial because it cast serious doubt on the allegation that the interception was politically motivated; Mr. Justice Taylor argued that

'if the issue of this warrant was for party political purposes, it is hard to credit that four months would be allowed to pass between application and warrant, thereby losing any advantage the tap might have afforded at the general election.'(36)

CND drew some comfort from the Court's insistence on its right to review such cases, but could do little about the problem of obtaining adequate evidence in the face of the government's determination to offer no guidance one way or the other.

The Bridge enquiry and the High Court case both centred upon alleged interceptions at the national level of CND, but the Campaign is also concerned about surveillance of activists at a local level, presumably by special branch officers. CND has compiled a dossier of complaints from
members about mail and phone intercepts, particularly those involved in the Cruisewatch network, and intends to present a case based on these to the European Court on Human Rights. The whole question of special branch operations was examined in 1985 by the Commons' Home Affairs Committee. As the government refused to disclose much information, however, (on the grounds that it might compromise national security), the Committee had to conduct their investigation within narrow limits. Indeed, the Labour members of the Committee argued that the government's attitude defeated the whole purpose of the enquiry, and they submitted a minority report rather than (as is normal) agreeing a unanimous report with their Conservative colleagues. Conservative members professed themselves broadly satisfied that special branch operations were being conducted in line with established guidelines, but the Labour minority report argued that the government's working definition of 'subversion' gave too much discretion to the special branch, and called for an independent inquiry to be conducted (37).

Clearly, as both the courts and Parliament have discovered, it is impossible to obtain enough reliable information to assess whether all these various allegations concerning surveillance are correct in every detail and, if so, what exactly motivated such actions. There does seem to be enough circumstantial evidence to make it a reasonable assumption that the Conservative government was sufficiently concerned about CND's impact on parties, institutions and electoral opinion to take steps to inform themselves of the general direction the Campaign was taking, and of the leading personalities involved. This was particularly so during the 1982/83 period, and it seems
probable that this continues to be the case where activity around major bases is concerned.

Tactically, the Conservatives have persisted with a strategy of encouraging the electorate to identify CND as a left-wing organisation. Although Conservatives acknowledge that many involved in the Campaign are motivated by reasons other than principles of revolutionary socialism or communism, the Campaign is still labelled as being directed by left-wingers who allow ideological convictions to lead them into advocating 'irresponsible' policies. As far as the government's own defence policies are concerned, they continue to reflect a rejection of CND's arguments, albeit a reasoned rejection rather than the cursory outright dismissal which unilateralist arguments received from governments in the seventies. Overall, the Conservative governments' attitudes have not changed, but no effort has been spared to combat the Campaign and its unilateralist message. Although the government appears less concerned in the mid-eighties than it was in the year preceding the 1983 election and Cruise deployment, it is still the case that the government identifies the Campaign as an organisation capable of effecting a significant influence of public opinion. In the mid-eighties, the government appears to have reverted to its earlier strategy of seeking to ignore the Campaign's existence where possible, but the overt attacks made on CND in recent years are a testimony to its perceived ability to attract public attention and support.
The Labour Party

Among the established members and institutions of Britain's political system, it is the labour movement which has most evidently responded to the Campaign's persuasion. The trade unions and the Labour Party have shifted their position over the last decade from majority support (or, at least, acquiescence) for an orthodox, Atlanticist defence policy to an unequivocal commitment to unilaterality and non-nuclear defence. It should be noted that many decision-makers in CND do not see the conversion of the Labour Party as the Campaign's greatest success. Mindful of past Labour governments' records on the nuclear deterrent, they argue that unilateral nuclear disarmament will only be implemented if, as well as a sympathetic government, there is a substantial body of informed and public opinion pressing for it. Nevertheless, even those who are most cynical about Labour's determination to implement unilateralist policies when in office acknowledge that, even if Labour's support is not in itself sufficient, it is certainly necessary if nuclear disarmament is to become the effective policy of a British government in the foreseeable future.

Labour governments in the sixties and seventies adhered to orthodox defence policies. Although the 1964-70 Labour governments rejected the notion that Polaris constituted a deterrent that was effectively independent from the United States, they were insistent on obtaining Polaris nevertheless - because it gave NATO a 'second centre' of decision-making, and thus represented an insurance of the U.K.'s security. The 1974-79 government was even more clear-cut in its support for a nuclear-
armed Britain within NATO. Despite a manifesto commitment to remove American Polaris bases from the U.K., the bases remained and the government approved a $1,000 million improvement programme for the Polaris system. Termed the Chevaline programme, this up-dating of the Polaris warhead system was first considered by the 1970-74 Heath government, but subsequently implemented by Labour even though parliament, the Labour Party and indeed most of the Labour Cabinet were not informed of this. It has also been claimed that the Labour government had developed plans to replace Polaris (Prime Minister Callaghan favouring Trident as the best option), but that these were interrupted by the general election of 1979(38). To the extent that they were kept informed about the government's policy, there was little serious opposition from either the P.L.P. or the Labour movement as a whole. Although both the 1972 and 1973 Party Conferences had approved resolutions opposing reliance on nuclear weapons, neither the 1974 nor the 1979 manifesto contained any commitment to unilateralism. Similarly, the Labour government's commitment to NATO did not come under serious attack until the late seventies. Labour was able to agree in 1977 to the proposal for all NATO members to increase their defence expenditure from 1979 onwards, but from 1978 there were indications that the party's acquiescence in the Labour government's Atlanticist perspective was coming to an end.

There was, of course, some sympathy for the unilateralist cause within the Labour movement during the seventies, but it did not start to attract significant support until the end of the decade. A National Executive Committee study group established in 1974 to look at defence policy was
dominated by unilateralists: their report discounted the notion of a real Soviet threat, and called for both the scrapping of Polaris and a reduction in spending on conventional forces, but was firmly rejected by the Labour government. However, as Pimlott has noted, throughout the seventies a new generation of trade union leaders and officials was emerging; for many of them, their earliest experience of national politics had been during the Campaign's first phase (in the late fifties and early sixties), and they had remained loyal to the principle of unilateralism and provided the basis for the revival of unilateralism in the Labour Party during the eighties(39). The first concrete sign of this revival came in 1978, when Conference approved a resolution against the basing of American Cruise missiles in the UK, despite the Labour government's endorsement of NATO's modernisation programme. Such disagreements were overshadowed in 1979 by the Labour government's industrial problems, and defence was not a major issue in the general election. This was short-lived, however, particularly after the Transport and General Workers Union decided in 1979 to try to obtain a commitment from the party to unilateralism (the T.&G. being one of the few
unions, and the only major union, to remain committed to unilateralism throughout the sixties and seventies). A combination of this, Labour's defeat in 1979, the decision by NATO to adopt the Cruise and Pershing option, and resentment within the Party over the 1974-79 government's reluctance to implement much of Labour's official policy, was such that during the early eighties defence policy became one of the most significant factors in Labour's bitter dispute over its constitutional arrangements which resulted in the breakaway of the SDP(40).

The 1980 Conference signalled a major shift in Labour's defence policy. The Party's commitment to NATO was overwhelmingly supported, a motion calling for the substitution of non-alignment for NATO membership being defeated by 6.3 million votes to 0.8 million. A resolution calling for the next election manifesto to contain a commitment to unilateralism was carried, however, as were resolutions calling for no British participation in a defence policy based on the threat to use nuclear weapons (i.e. NATO policy), the removal of all nuclear bases from Britain, and for multi-lateral negotiations to be conducted with the aim of calling off the deployment of Cruise and the creation of a nuclear-weapons free zone in Europe. Taken together, these resolutions were somewhat ambiguous and contradictory (especially over NATO), but the move towards a fully fledged unilateral policy was now underway. The split with the SDP in 1981 meant that leading Atlanticists in the party (for example, Bill Rodgers, Labour's defence spokesman until the split) had not only left but were tainted with charges of treachery. The 1981 Conference reaffirmed Labour's commitment to NATO
(by 5.2 million votes to 1.6 million), but a 
Transport and General resolution calling on the 
National Executive to ensure that the next mani-
festō included an unambiguous commitment to 
unilateralism was accepted by 4.6 million votes to 
2.3 million. In the same year, the Trade Union 
Congress approved a resolution advocating unilat-
eral nuclear disarmament, largely at the instiga-
tion of the T.G.W.U. It was not until 1982, 
however, that unilateralism received the two-thirds 
majority support at a Labour party Conference which 
ensured that unilateralism was once again an 
official element in Labour's policy programme. By 
1982, of course, the party was led by Michael Foot, 
a long-standing advocate of unilateralism, but the 
significant factor in the construction of the 
two-thirds majority was the gradual recruitment of 
major trade unions to the unilateralist cause. By 
1982, only two major unions (the A.U.E.W. and the 
General and Municipal) were opposed to unilatera-
lism. 1982 saw the unions steering Labour towards 
a more moderate stance in most policy areas, but 
both the 'soft' and 'hard' left retained a loyalty 
to the cause of unilateralism. The net effect was 
that the 1982 Conference approved a resolution 
which called for unilateralism to feature in the 
next election manifesto, the cancellation of both 
Cruise and Trident, and the removal of all nuclear 
bases from the U.K., by a majority of 4.9 million 
to 1.9 million. A more radical resolution, 
covering not just these matters but also calling 
for the removal of all American bases (whether 
nuclear, conventional or indeterminate) from the 
U.K. and the nationalisation of the arms industry 
was just passed - by 3.43 million to 3.40 million - 
but a motion on withdrawal from NATO was once again
lost by 5.7 million votes to 1.2 million. Despite the fact that the Shadow Cabinet contained a number of known multilateralists (not least the deputy leader, Dennis Healey), the Conference had clearly committed the Party to adopting some variation on the unilateralist theme in the next election. Although there is a long history in the Labour Party of the Parliamentary leadership refusing to prioritise everything the Conference calls for, the combination of a sympathetic leader and the two-thirds majority at the 1982 Conference meant that, at the very least, Labour's manifesto for the next election would be very different from those in the seventies. Even the Falklands war, and the Labour leadership's support for the government once hostilities had commenced, did not sway the determination of unilateralists to see their policy both adopted and prioritised by the Party.

Consequently, Labour went into the 1983 election with a series of commitments on defence in its manifesto. These included the cancellation of Trident, opposition to the deployment of Cruise (and Pershing elsewhere in Europe) and a freeze on the development and deployment of all new nuclear weapons. More generally, the manifesto called for a move towards conventional defence although it also argued that Britain should reduce its spending on defence overall. Most controversially, however, the manifesto called for the removal of all nuclear bases (i.e. British and American) within five years, although it did not explain how 'nuclear' bases could be isolated from other bases, and an apparent commitment to scrap Polaris; 'apparent' because the manifesto said that Polaris should be included in global disarmament negotiations whilst simultaneously saying that Britain would have a
non-nuclear defence policy within five years anyway. This ambiguity was clearly an attempt to do to the multilateralists in the party what they had been doing to the unilateralists for the last twenty years - namely, offering just enough in the manifesto to retain their loyalty. The multilateralists responded by criticising the manifesto during the election Campaign, arguing that Polaris should only be scrapped in return for (unspecified) Soviet concessions. The Conservative and Alliance leaders were able to present Labour as a party which could not agree on a fundamental issue. For a party which had only recently seen the 'defection' of ardent multilateralists to the SDP, the doubts voiced by Callaghan and Healey about the wisdom of unilateralism served only to increase the suspicions of grass-roots activists about the commitment of the Parliamentary party to implementing Conference decisions. Michael Foot's efforts to explain Labour's policy in terms which did not contradict his own well-known commitment to uni-lateral nuclear disarmament, or provoke a public argument with some of his senior multilateralist colleagues, lacked conviction. The way was open for the Conservatives' to present Labour as, at best, disunited and, at worst, intent on leaving Britain 'defenceless'. Even if Labour had been truly united on the principle of unilateralism, its commitment to NATO membership would have left it open to charges of ambiguity; as it was, the public disagreements over Polaris were sufficient to give the impression that Labour had yet to think its policy through on defence.

Clarification of Labour's policy did not come until 1984. Under its new leader Neil Kinnock, another long-time supporter of the unilateralist
cause, Labour undertook an adjustment of its defence policy which was approved by the 1984 conference by 5.3 million vote to 1.3 million. The new policy reaffirmed much of what had been adopted over the preceding two years: the cancellation of Trident, the removal of Cruise missiles and of all nuclear bases remained as priorities (41). Equally firm was the intention to remain within NATO, though it was argued that a Labour government would use NATO membership to press for a change in NATO's nuclear strategy and a greater say for Western Europe in NATO's decision-making generally. A Labour government would attempt to persuade NATO to move towards 'defensive deterrence' and a policy of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons: in the long term, Labour would like to see the 'mutual and concurrent' phasing-out of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the short to medium term, however, Labour's new policy was explicit on the need to maintain strong conventional forces. Partly as a response to the charges of 'defencelessness' levelled at Labour in 1983, and partly to ensure the loyalty of its right-wing, Labour emphasised that no-one should expect substantial savings on defence expenditure, at least in the short-term. The policy document made it clear that money saved by the cancellation and abandonment of nuclear weapons would almost certainly have to be reallocated to meet escalating conventional equipment costs. In subsequent comments, senior Labour politicians intimated that, given Labour's commitment to strong conventional forces, defence spending might actually go up from its present levels (42). In other words, the shift to 'defensive' defence remained a long-term priority for Labour, to be achieved through multilateral
agreement with our NATO allies. In the short-term, Labour was committed to maintaining such 'offensive' conventional weaponry as the Tornado aircraft and existing aircraft carriers: as one peace movement journal commented,

Labour's alternative defence policy has been reduced to the present force structure and to current military equipment, with little planning for the transformation to nonprovocative, defensive-oriented defence. (43)

Similar ambiguities remained over the question of what constituted a 'nuclear' base (to be removed), and what constituted a 'conventional base (Labour making an explicit commitment to retain American bases which had a role to play in conventional defence.

Whatever the ambiguities, Labour's redefinition of its policy met the leadership's prime objective, which was to restore party unity. When the new policy was presented to the 1984 Conference, both Callaghan and Healey gave it a qualified endorsement, although both voiced doubts that the removal of U.S. bases could simply lead to them being re-established on the European mainland. The new policy was approved by a four to one majority, and thus became Labour's policy for the next election, with one proviso. This was the so-called Hattersley clause, a section in the policy document which pointed out that this policy - like any other policy - could change before the next general election. The overwhelming endorsement of non-nuclear defence by the Labour Conference made it unlikely that there would be any substantial changes, however. In short, in the space of five
years, Labour had moved from a position in which it was a firm supporter of NATO, a British nuclear deterrent and strong conventional forces to one in which the commitment to NATO and conventional defence remained just as strong, but there was now an explicit commitment to introducing a system of non-nuclear defence. Not surprisingly, the policy was hailed by the peace movement as a significant advance, even if Labour's thinking on NATO, bases and 'offensive' conventional weaponry was still out of line with that of CND. Rather than highlighting these remaining differences, CND concentrated its efforts on trying to persuade Labour to actually campaign on its new policy. The Labour leadership's apparent reluctance to give the new policy a high profile prompted the 1985 Conference to pass a resolution calling for a coordinated campaign in support of the defence policy. Kinnock's response was to re-launch Labour's defence policy in the latter half of 1986, with a much greater stress on the desirability of boosting spending on conventional defence. This did little to allay the fears of the Reagan administration, which argued that Labour's policy was unrealistic in that NATO members could not pick and choose which obligations they would observe and which they would reject. Indeed, there was evidence of bi-partisan opposition to Labour's policy in America, with leading Democrats such as Senator Nunn (Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee) and Congressman Steven Solarz (Chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Relations sub-committee) publicly endorsing this kind of criticism.

Domestic electoral considerations may well have weighed heavier with Labour's leadership than pressure from a combination of isolationists and
budget-cutters in American politics, but Labour still faced agitation for a higher profile campaign on non-nuclear defence from constituency party and Labour CND activists. Labour went into the 1987 election with a manifesto which stressed the party's commitment to NATO, but laid equal emphasis upon the commitments to cancel Trident, de-commission Polaris, remove American nuclear weapons from Britain, and to use the money saved by these actions to pay for improvements in Britain's conventional forces. Labour's campaigning on the issue during the 1987 election remained muted, however; most commentators were agreed that, at least to some extent, this was a deliberate tactic by the party's campaign managers.

The Trade Union Movement

Dissatisfaction over the way in which Labour played down its defence policy has been largely confined to the left in the party, particularly among the constituency organisations. The major trade unions appear more inclined to acquiesce in the leadership's strategy, and have in any case tended to opt for a somewhat softer policy stance on nuclear weapons in recent years. The T.U.C. passed a unilateralist resolution in 1981, and followed that in 1982 and 1983 with resolutions calling explicitly for the removal of all nuclear bases from the U.K. In 1984 and 1985, however, the T.U.C. merely reiterated its opposition to Cruise, Trident and Star Wars (and its support for arms conversion programmes) with no mention being made of the removal of bases or the general principle of unilateralism. The importance of the unions in
Labour's conversion to non-nuclear defence (and, indeed, Labour's commitment to NATO) should not be underestimated, however. CND, and particularly Trade Union CND, may not have enjoyed much success in generating interest and activity for their cause at the shop-floor level in the trade union movement, but they have been successful in persuading unions to adopt non-nuclear policy stances at the national level. Trade Union CND claimed that a majority of British trade unionists were affiliated to CND at a national level in 1985, with some twenty eight national trade unions formally associating themselves with CND(44). This commitment at the national policy-making level is significant, as it is this which has led union delegations to Labour Party Conferences to support and re-affirm Labour's non-nuclear stance. It may be stating the obvious to point out that Labour's new approach could not have happened without the support of major unions, given their dominant voting power at Labour's Conference. The point should be made, however, that without the efforts of major unions, particularly the Transport and General, CND's impact on the Labour Party's policies would have been substantially less.

The Alliance

If CND has cause to be pleased with the progress it has made with the Labour Movement, the same cannot be said of its efforts towards the 'new force' in British politics in the eighties, the Social Democratic/Liberal Alliance. As we have noted, the growing influence of the left in the Labour Party towards the end of the seventies
prompted the breakaway of the SDP, and Labour's leftward drift in defence was one of the policy issues which the nascent SDP leadership found particularly unacceptable. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the SDP has consistently rejected any endorsement of a unilateral leap to non-nuclear defence. Indeed, since the accession of David Owen to the position of leader - and his subsequent strength up until the 1987 election as undoubted final arbiter of SDP policy - CND has effectively given up any real hope of persuading either Owen or his party to modify their position. Apart from continuing routine lobbying, and the efforts of a few individuals in the SDP, virtually all CND's efforts have been directed at the Liberal wing of the Alliance - especially since 1983.

In a discussion document produced for its first ever Conference, the SDP set out its policy on defence in terms which have remained largely unchanged since then(45). Stressing the need for an internationalist approach to defence and foreign affairs, the party offered strong support for NATO and for multi-lateral disarmament. The need for Britain to possess a nuclear deterrent for so long as the Soviet Union had a nuclear capability was emphasised, making it necessary for Polaris to be maintained. Trident was condemned, however, partly on grounds of cost and partly because the SDP argued that it represented an unnecessary escalation of the arms race. The idea of a battlefield nuclear weapons-free zone in Europe was endorsed. By 1982, Owen was arguing that there was no need to decide yet on the question of what, if anything, should succeed the Polaris system when it became out-dated in the nineties. NATO's modernisation programme and the deployment of Cruise was sup-
ported until or unless the Soviet Union was prepared to negotiate mutual reductions in intermediate nuclear forces. In short, with the exception of opposition to Trident, the SDP proposed a policy that was firmly committed to a nuclear NATO. It was Atlanticist, in that it endorsed the continuation of the Anglo-American defence relationship, but this was tempered with the argument that Britain and other European members should exercise more influence in NATO's decision-making.

Liberal policy was not quite so clear cut, as there had consistently been a minority of Liberal Party grass-roots activists who - if not fully persuaded of unilateralist argument - were certainly sceptical about the merits of a new generation of nuclear weapons. The Liberal leadership, not bound by party rules to follow the wishes of the Party's mass membership in any case, was successful up until 1981 in keeping such doubts confined to a minority. Party policy in the seventies and into the eighties rested on an acceptance of NATO and a belief in multilateralism, although the Party has been opposed to any independent British deterrent since 1957. Concern over NATO's modernisation programme, however, and perhaps some unease at the firm line that the SDP was developing on the nuclear issue, resulted in a notable set-back for the leadership at the 1981 Liberal Assembly, which voted to oppose the deployment of Cruise. The Liberal leader, David Steel, rejected this vote, arguing that he alone must have a final veto over party policy, and there was little support for the Assembly motion among Liberal MPs.

The two parties went into the 1983 election with a joint manifesto(46). Condemning the
Conservatives for pursuing policies which would escalate the arms race, and Labour for advocating 'one-sided' disarmament, the Alliance offered a middle course (even if they did describe it as a 'radically different' alternative). Both parties could agree on the cancellation of Trident, and it was proposed that although Polaris should be maintained, it should also be included in super-power disarmament negotiations. The Alliance's position on Cruise was undecided, the argument being that any decision on whether or not to oppose Cruise deployment would depend upon what progress had been made in disarmament talks and the attitude of other NATO members; in other words Liberal activists' desire to see a manifesto commitment against Cruise deployment was frustrated. The Alliance did, however, call for some system of dual Anglo-American control over Cruise - a system rejected by the Government as unnecessary and costly. Should disarmament talks fail, then the Alliance was prepared to consider the idea of a multilateral freeze on the production and deployment of all nuclear weapons - a rather different stance from those Liberal activists who favoured the unequivocal introduction of an immediate freeze. NATO participation was strongly endorsed, as was a strengthening of NATO's conventional forces. NATO strategy caused some disagreement, Liberals favouring a policy of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and the SDP a policy of 'no early use'; a compromise was reached by proposing in the manifesto that NATO should 'move towards' a no first use policy. The idea of a battlefield nuclear weapons-free zone in Europe was again proposed, as were proposals to ban chemical weapons and to work for a comprehensive test ban.
Apart from the insistence on cancelling Trident, the Alliance approach was set firmly in the multilateralist camp. Partly, of course, this stemmed from sincere doubts about the wisdom of unilateral acts, but it also served to allow the Alliance to blur differences between its two parties. Difficult decisions on both Cruise deployment and a Polaris replacement were deferred pending negotiations between and with other states. Whilst this may be a perfectly defensible policy stance in itself, there is little doubt that, under scrutiny, it could have proved a fragile foundation for Alliance unity on defence. One may only speculate, but if the media had not been preoccupied with Labour's divisions over defence, then the suspicions of Liberal activists that the SDP leadership was determined to retain a modern nuclear capability at almost any cost might have received more exposure and discussion. As it was, apart from some interest in the concept of a dual-key control system for Cruise, the Alliance kept a generally low-profile on its defence policy during the election campaign.

David Steel's problems with his extra-Parliamentary party continued after the election. The Liberal Assembly in 1984 voted once again against Cruise, but this time in unequivocal terms, calling for the removal forthwith of those missiles already deployed in the U.K. This was despite a plea by David Steel, unprecedented in the party's history because it was delivered from the rostrum of the Conference rather than the platform, for the Assembly to settle instead for a freeze on further deployment and thus (implicitly) leaving those already deployed in place - a policy with which the SDP could agree. Although Anti-Cruise activists in
the Liberal rank and file were delighted with this vote, it was a narrow victory (611 votes to 556) and was secured only at the price of a compromise over Polaris. In an effort to secure support for their anti-Cruise motion, Liberal activists (including Liberal CND) gave their support to a motion which reversed the policy on Polaris. Rather than pronouncing against the very idea of an independent British deterrent, as the Liberal Assembly had in 1980, the 1984 Assembly voted to maintain Polaris but to include it in arms control negotiations. This was clearly designed to give David Steel some room for manoeuvre in his negotiations with the SDP, who were much keener than the Liberals on replacing Polaris with some (cheaper) alternative to Trident. The Assembly reaffirmed the Liberals' commitment to a 'no first use' policy for NATO, however, and called for NATO to develop an 'effective non-nuclear, non-provocative system of defence'.

Some in the peace movement hailed the Assembly decisions as representing a Liberal commitment to an essentially non-nuclear defence policy, but there was a general realisation that much of this policy would have to be modified if agreement on a common stance was to be concluded with the SDP. The two parties established a joint commission to examine defence policy, albeit 'in the context of Britain's membership of NATO and the European Community', although there was little danger of either party subscribing to the idea of withdrawal from NATO. During 1985, while the joint commission was still considering the issue, the Liberals moved away from their 1984 stance and closer to the SDP. At the 1985 SDP Conference, Paddy Ashdown - the Liberal MP who had spearheaded the anti-Cruise
campaign a year earlier - backtracked, to the horror and fury of the anti-Cruise activists in the Liberal Party who had so admired his stance in 1984. In 1985, however, Ashdown argued for the compromise his leader had attempted to get the party to accept the previous year - a freeze on further deployment, but no removal of those missiles already in place. The issue was not debated at the Liberal Assembly that year (which restricted itself to a rejection of the Star Wars programme), but it was hoped by the Liberals that this compromise by their party would be matched by a similar concession from the SDP. In the event, the 1985 SDP conference did move closer to the Liberals over the idea of a freeze on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. However, whereas Steel favoured an immediate freeze, the SDP's commitment to a freeze was dependent upon progress in arms control negotiations - the SDP favouring a freeze only if the arms talks failed. To the extent that the two parties differed on defence - and they agreed on much, including opposition to Trident and support for NATO - any significant movement towards compromise came from the Liberals rather than their partners. David Owen made no secret of his own attitude when he suggested in 1985 that it would be desirable to limit the number of Alliance candidates in the next general election who supported CND(47). He also began to discuss more frequently and publicly the possibility of a 'Euro-deterrent' - cooperation between Britain and France to produce a successor or alternative to Polaris. Meanwhile, Neville Presley, one of the SDP's founder members and also a member of CND, was elected to CND's National Council and subsequently removed from the
SDP's list of approved parliamentary candidates.

The joint commission on defence reported its conclusions in 1986(48). The report contained few surprises, although it confirmed the fears of Liberal unilateralists by reiterating the argument that Polaris should be maintained and a decision on whether or not to replace it be deferred. As expected, the cancellation of Trident was endorsed. On Cruise, the commission favoured multi-lateral negotiation to remove all intermediate missiles from Europe, but was prepared to advocate a British initiative for a freeze on further deployment by the West - those in place, however, should remain because of the need for Britain to be seen to be playing a responsible role in NATO. On specifics the commission tended towards the SDP's position - endorsement of a battlefield nuclear weapons-free zone in Europe but not of a 'no first use' policy for NATO, for example, as well as the basic position on Cruise and Trident. Liberal internationalism was reflected in the commission's vision of a Europe free of the traditional East/West confrontation. Indeed, the report adopted a European perspective throughout; Polaris was conceptualised as a 'European contribution' to NATO, and much was made of the need to develop European cooperation in NATO to counterbalance American influence. The commission believed that this would be welcomed by the United States as evidence that Europe was willing to play a more active part in western defence.

The European perspective took on an unexpected importance after the publication of the commission's report. To the surprise of some (although not Liberal CND activists), David Owen publicly rejected the report's recommendation that a
decision on a Polaris replacement be left open. Owen's initial reaction was to argue that the Alliance - or, if necessary, the SDP alone - should enter into a clear commitment to replace Polaris, albeit with some alternative to Trident. This was despite the fact that the commission's position on Polaris was virtually identical to that adopted by Owen during the early sixties. David Steel, already faced with a substantial body of opinion among his own party activists who favoured no replacement at all for Polaris and who favoured the removal of Cruise rather than freezing it in place, made it clear that he was less than pleased with Owen's reaction. The two leaders, realising the potential for a serious rift in the Alliance over the issue, attempted to compromise by way of exploring further Owen's preoccupation with the development of a European deterrent. Owen and Steel held talks with French government ministers and opposition leaders in September 1986. They returned and reported that the French responses to the prospect of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation had ranged from cautious acceptance to enthusiastic endorsement, but that none of the leading French politicians actually rejected the idea(49). Such ideas are clearly only at an exploratory stage, but the political significance of the move was that it allowed Steel and Owen to pull back from a position in which the Liberals would move towards rejecting any replacement for Polaris and the SDP would commit itself to a 'British deterrent based on Cruise. Talk of Anglo-French cooperation offered the SDP the prospect of a continuing nuclear deterrent, whilst it circumvented Liberal resistance to an 'independent' British deterrent and appealed to the party's
long history of commitment to further European cooperation.

This did not deflect another embarrassment for Steel at the 1986 Liberal Assembly. Steel could have pursued the compromise course of seeking endorsement for the joint commission report. Instead, he opted for the more challenging task of trying to get support for the idea of an Anglo-French nuclear deterrent. This was opposed not only by Liberal CND and Liberal activists from the constituencies (especially London), but also by three Liberal M.P.s (Meadowcroft, Kirkwood and Hughes). This opposition just won the day, although only 1300 of the 2000 registered for the Assembly were present when the vote was taken.

The Anglo-French initiative was not given much publicity by the Alliance during the 1987 election, when most of their effort went into attacking the other parties' defence policy, particularly that of Labour. David Owen repeatedly emphasised that defence was the crucial issue differentiating the Alliance from Labour, and castigated what he saw as the fundamental irresponsibility of Labour's unilateralist stance. The Alliance manifesto stated unequivocally that although Trident would be cancelled it would be replaced by a 'minimum British deterrent' unless multilateral negotiations on a global scale progressed to such a stage that Britain's deterrent could be dispensed with. Although Owen took the leading role in stressing the defence issue (more and more as the election campaign went on and the Alliance slipped back in the opinion polls), there was little sign of any serious dissent from the Liberals. This only emerged after the election, when the Alliance parties engaged in discussion and at times bitter
argument over whether they should merge into a single body. At the time of writing, such a merger seems likely, which has prompted Owen to resign as leader of the SDP. He cites Liberal Party thinking on nuclear weapons as a crucial factor in his opposition to any merger.

The 'Minor' Parties

If the Alliance's position on Polaris and Cruise is somewhat equivocal, the same cannot be said of the other contender for the role of 'mould-breaker' in British politics, the Green Party. Although very much a minority party in electoral terms, and numbering only some 6,000 members in the mid-eighties, the Green Party has seen all the other major parties adapt their programmes to include more 'green' policies, so it is not without influence. Its position on nuclear weapons is - and always has been - unequivocal. Its 1983 election manifesto set out the party's position with admirable brevity:

Let's start with the basics. No Cruise. No trident. No Polaris. No nuclear weapons of any description. No chemical or biological weapons. No American bases. No involvement in NATO.50)

and these commitments were reiterated in the 1987 general election. The Green Party does not stop at this comprehensive rejection of nuclear weapons, however, but is concerned to put the whole issue in a wider perspective. For the Greens, a non-nuclear defence policy is just one aspect of their approach
to defence and foreign relations. Nonalignment, for example, is also endorsed:

We need to adopt a defence posture which is neutral as regards both superpowers, and to distance ourselves from those who continue to promote the 'Cold War' mentality. We should encourage other European countries to join with us in securing the removal of Soviet and American military personnel and equipment from Europe, with a view to establishing a genuinely defensive, non-nuclear, non-aligned European Alliance, incorporating countries in both Eastern and Western Europe. (51)

Nuclear weapons, the arms race and the cold war all have their roots in the systematised exploitation and oppression which characterises our industrial society, according to the Greens, and they argue that only by changing basic assumptions about economic growth, materialism and our relationship with the Third World will the way to peace, as distinct from mere disarmament, become possible. Although they acknowledge a need for defensive conventional weaponry, the hope is expressed that even this need could be progressively diminished over time. In short, the Green party is in complete agreement with all of CND's aims, and indeed takes many of the issues further than CND. It's main argument with CND is not so much over what CND does as what it doesn't do. We have already noted persistent pressure from the Greens for CND to include opposition to nuclear energy in its constitution; Greens have also been among the most vociferous in encouraging CND to develop campaigns against the infringement of civil
liberties, and make frequent if abortive attempts to persuade CND to radically decentralise its own organisation and decision-making structure.

The Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru are similarly in virtually total agreement with CND. Both espouse unilateral nuclear disarmament and withdrawal from NATO, for their respective countries, even though both have minority factions who would not prioritise withdrawal from NATO or would even oppose it. Prior to 1981, the SNP envisaged a non-nuclear Scotland remaining in NATO, but the direction of NATO strategy and its modernisation programme have convinced the party to opt for straight withdrawal since then. The SNP is particularly opposed to Trident and the American bases in Scotland. The Communist Party of Great Britain also propounds a defence policy which is in accord with CND's aims, as it proposes non-nuclear defence and withdrawal from NATO. The internal splits in the CPGB during the eighties, between the traditionalists and the Euro-Communists, have been reflected in debates within CND (the traditionalists shunning CND's criticism of Soviet nuclear weapons, as they see them as purely defensive), but this internal disagreement has not affected the basic non-nuclear, non-NATO policy stance of the party.

CND's Impact outside the Parties

Given that a change in public policy is CND's ultimate goal, the Campaign's principal targets are naturally those institutions which have a direct input into the political system - the parties and the electorate. Other institutions in Britain's
political and social system are important to CND, however; for example, trade unions may have been frozen out of consultative status by the Thatcher administrations, but CND's campaigning in the Labour Party and over civil defence and nuclear-free zones would be severely hampered without trade union support. Similarly, the Church has always been a significant institution for the Campaign. This is not because of any direct input it has into the political system (via the House of Lords, for example), but because of a combination of the nature of CND's message and the Church's position in British society.

CND and the Churches

The moral dimension is rarely absent from any of CND's activities, whether in the realm of protest or persuasion. It is possible to find those in the Campaign whose motivation and perspective is totally moral and unimpeded by any consideration of a pragmatic or political nature, but it is very rare to find arguments for unilateralism emanating from any part of the movement which do not make at least a passing reference to the moral dimension. A moral dimension is a necessary, if not usually sufficient, element in CND's campaigning. The Churches in Britain may have become less salient in British public life, and less likely to be seen as the authoritative source of moral judgement; but they are still powerful contributors to any national debate on moral issues, and thus an important potential ally for any campaign with a moral dimension. The Churches, and especially the established Church of England, cannot dictate to
the political parties on moral issues as they could a century ago, but they still cannot be entirely discounted or ignored.

Perhaps because the larger Churches are aware that they are not without influence, their positions on the questions of nuclear weapons and unilateralism tend to be more guarded than those of the smaller denominations. The non-established churches in Britain have moved towards stances which are broadly in line with that of CND. The Methodist Church is opposed to the deployment of Cruise and the acquisition of Trident; it favours a freeze on the development and deployment of any new weapons, and is opposed to the use (as distinct from possession) of nuclear weapons in any circumstances. The United Reform Church and the Church of Scotland favour unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain; the Baptist church is also unilateralist, and does not accept that the phasing out of nuclear weapons requires any compensatory increase in conventional weaponry. The Quakers are, of course, completely opposed to nuclear weapons and have formed a small but stalwart contingent within CND since the fifties. The larger Churches are more ambivalent on the matter however. The Roman Catholic Church has criticised the deployment of Cruise and argued in general terms that the use of nuclear weapons is wrong, but it has been conspicuously silent on many of the specific political developments in this area, preferring to keep its judgments on a very general level. Unlike the other churches under consideration here, the Catholic Church is of course adopting a global rather than localised perspective on the issue, and thus feels constrained from adopting a high profile in the British debate. Despite intermittent criticism,
however, it continued to grant leave of absence to Monsignor Bruce Kent to allow him to work for the Campaign, before he himself decided to devote all his energies to the Campaign.

The Church of England has become involved with specific issues in the mid-eighties, notably the controversy over the sale of Church land at Molesworth. It was in the early eighties, however, that it became embroiled in debate over the general issues raised by nuclear weapons. This debate was initiated by the 1979 General Synod of the Church of England, which commissioned its Board for Social Responsibility to establish a working party to examine the question of the Church's attitude towards nuclear weapons. The working party, chaired by the Bishop of Salisbury, produced its report in 1982(52). It examined the question from the perspective of theological thinking on the concept of a 'just war' - briefly, that war for a just cause, with a right intention, declared by lawful authority as a last resort, and fought within certain moral limitations, could be morally justified. Their report pointed to the inevitability of widespread civilian casualties in any nuclear exchange, and argued that such indiscriminate killing contravened the moral limitations of any 'just' war. (It should be remembered that this argument was made before the concept of a 'nuclear winter' - the inevitability of a nuclear exchange wreaking havoc with climate and ecological balance on a virtually global scale - became widely known). They concluded that it is in our view proven beyond all reasonable doubt that the Just War Theory, as this has developed in Western civilisation and within
the Christian Church, rules out the use of nuclear weapons.(53)

This rejection of use (and thus, implicitly, of any 'first use') of nuclear weapons was not unexpected. More controversially, the working party took its analysis further, arguing that not only use but also possession of nuclear weapons was wrong - in other words, that deterrence could not be justified on moral grounds, because deterrence implied a willingness (however conditional) to use nuclear weapons. Therefore, the working party concluded, Britain should adopt a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament, phasing out existing weapons, cancelling new ones and removing American nuclear bases from the U.K. They recom­mended, however, that Britain should remain a member of NATO, and that it was unrealistic to expect the superpowers to get rid of their nuclear capability in the short-term. Nevertheless, British unilateralism was seen as not only morally correct, but also a useful impetus to multilateral disarma­ment between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The report attracted considerable publicity in the media, and was seized upon by the peace movement as a significant validation of their arguments. When the report was presented to the General Synod, however, it attracted some heated criticism, unilateralism being associated with the evasion of moral responsibility to prevent war if possible. More restrained criticism pointed to the apparent inconsistency of unilateral nuclear disarmament and continued membership of NATO. The Archbishop of Canterbury argued that unilateralism could destabilise NATO and thus impede progress.
towards global multilateral disarmament. In the event, the Synod rejected the working party's proposals by 338 votes to 100. A compromise policy advanced by the Bishop of Birmingham was accepted by 275 votes to 222; this opposed any first use of nuclear weapons, but accepted that possession of a nuclear deterrent was necessary, particularly in the light of potential nuclear blackmail. This remains the position of the Church of England, as the issue has only been discussed by the General Synod on one occasion since, when a motion to the 1985 Synod on Cruise was talked out before a decision could be reached. The eruption of the nuclear disarmament issue into the forefront of party politics in Britain in the eighties has presumably discouraged the established Church from becoming too closely involved in the specifics of the debate.

CND and Public Opinion

Whatever its impact on institutions, the Campaign is convinced of the necessity of reinforcing this by creating a broad cross-section of public opinion in its favour. Its experiences in the sixties have persuaded CND that the actual implementation of nuclear disarmament is unlikely to come about unless such support exists and is expressed, both through the political institutions and outside them. In the early days of its 'second phase' CND had reason to be pleased with the impact it was making, with up to a third of respondents in public opinion polls favouring unilateral nuclear disarmament by 1981. The 1983 election, however, saw a dramatic down-turn in the popularity of the
Campaign's message. In an overview of national polling data, Ivor Crewe has charted the rise and fall of the unilateralist message during the early eighties. He makes the point that one very significant achievement by CND and other peace campaigners was to put the issue firmly on the political agenda; from barely registering in the public's consciousness since the early sixties, defence and foreign affairs rocketed in the early eighties to the point where it was the second most important issue in the 1983 election. However, whilst support nationally for unilateral disarmament rose to a high of around 33 per cent during 1981, it dropped to just over 20 per cent by 1983, and went down to around 16 per cent during the 1983 election campaign. Similarly, although in 1982 no less than 42 per cent thought that having American missiles based in Britain increased the chances of a nuclear attack on the U.K. (as against 29 per cent who thought they provided greater protection), the 1983 election campaign saw supporters of cruise outnumbering opponents - and this shift, moreover, occurred throughout the electorate, not just among Conservative supporters responding to calls for party unity. Examining Labour voters during the eighties, Crewe notes that support for nuclear disarmament has ranged between 30 per cent and 40 per cent, never reaching a majority. By the 1983 election, even among those who stayed loyal to Labour, unilateralism was rejected by 59 per cent to 33 per cent (comparative figures for Conservative votes being 92 per cent to 5 per cent, for Alliance voters 82 per cent to 14 per cent) - Crewe notes,
those sticking with Labour did so despite Labour's defence policy; those deserting Labour did so, at least partly, because of the policy.

On the issue of leaving NATO, Crewe argues that this has never been popular with the British electorate, and became even less so by 1983; in 1981, around 10 per cent were in favour of leaving NATO, but during the 1983 election campaign this dropped to only 6 per cent. Interestingly, however, Crewe discerns some unease among the British electorate about defence links with America - not because the British people think America cannot be relied upon in times of crisis, but because there is a feeling that America shows a 'reckless abundance' of will to get involved. As Crewe puts it, 'the United States is a dependable defender of Britain, but also a reason why Britain needs defending'.

In general terms, the 1983 election marked a watershed in British public opinion about unilateralism and existing defence policy. Crewe's summary is as follows -

The 1983 election campaign decisively shifted opinion, among supporters of all the parties, towards positions favourable to NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. The relatively favourable impact of the unilateralist anti-cruise missile demonstrations in early 1983 was obliterated by the campaigns of the Conservative government and the Alliance during the election. The specific issues of Cruise missiles and Trident were smothered by the general question of whether Britain should
have 'strong' or 'weak' defences, which came to be synonymous with 'nuclear' and 'non-nuclear'; that question was resolved by the unity and conviction of the pro-nuclear parties, in contrast to the confusion and divisions within the Labour party.(55)

There is some consolation for CND in this concluding comment. Crewe seems convinced that Labour's inability to unite around its unilateralist manifesto was a most significant factor. Labour's leader, Michael Foot, lacked credibility as a potential Prime Minister, and this may well have diminished the appeal of the unilateralist cause, with which he has always been closely identified. There is little evidence of bitterness among the national membership over Labour's performance in the election, however. In the 1985 survey, respondents were given an open-ended question asking them what lessons (if any) they thought CND should learn from the 1983 election. Only just over half of respondents gave an answer to this, and, of those that did, only some 15 per cent (8 per cent of all respondents) suggested that CND should in future distance itself more from the Labour Party - while 13 per cent thought that even closer links should be established. A third of those answering this question thought that the only lesson to be learnt was that CND improve the presentation of its arguments rather than change them, and a further 25 per cent that the only moral to be drawn from the 1983 election was to work harder in the future.

Crewe offers some evidence of public sympathy for CND and its allies. During 1983, some 25 per cent approved not only of the objectives of the
peace movement, but also its tactics; a further 25 per cent approved of the objectives, but were sceptical of the methods employed (demonstrations and peace camps like Greenham Common figuring largely in the public's conception of the peace movement) and would not participate. Some 40 per cent disapproved of both tactics and objectives, and 10 per cent did not have any opinion - as Crewe comments, 'that the later figure is so small is testimony to the impact of the peace movement'.

Two further points of interest emerge from Crewe's account of public opinion. Firstly, having disaggregated the data to look for attitudinal differences among different social groups, Crewe found that sex, age and class made for virtually no significant differences in opinions on nuclear and defence issues. The one significant differentiator was education; on the basis of admittedly limited data, Crewe argues that the better educated (i.e. university graduates) are the best informed about nuclear and defence issues, the most apprehensive and the most likely to take an anti-nuclear position. This factor is reflected in the 1985 survey of CND's national membership. Secondly, and more disconcertingly for the peace movement, Crewe detects a resigned indifference to nuclear weapons already in place, but unease about accepting new weapons. He argues that this accounts for the rise in unilateralist opinion in the early eighties, but infers that the 1983 election marked the acceptance by most of the British public of the inevitability of a new generation of weapons - particularly Cruise. Discussing the 1983 election, he concludes that 'except for the shouting (literally), the issue of Cruise missiles had effectively been
killed in Britain, even before the weapons were installed.

Since 1983, there has been some restoration of support among the public for CND's arguments. Indeed, by 1986 there was some evidence to suggest that support for unilateralism was surpassing even the levels set in the early eighties, but it still fell short of a majority. The 1985 report on British Social Attitudes (based on 1984 data) (56) found that support for unilateral nuclear disarmament had risen to 23 per cent, compared with 19 per cent in the previous year's survey. 57 per cent of those favouring unilateralism were Labour supporters, but just over half of all Labour supporters thought that Britain should only pursue a multilateralist path to disarmament. A Gallup poll in 1986, however, (commissioned by CND) recorded 44 per cent in favour of unilateralism, and a NOP poll taken earlier in 1986 also produced some 42 per cent responding positively to the idea of unilateralism (57). There has been a similar, although less dramatic increase in opposition to the siting of American missiles in Britain: the 1985 Social Attitudes report found 51 per cent who considered that such missiles made Britain less safe, compared with 48 per cent the year before. As far as 'British' missiles were concerned, however, 56 per cent thought that they made Britain a safer place, although this did represent a slight drop from the preceding year. Membership of NATO has remained consistently popular, with 79 per cent backing it in the 1985 report - even among Labour voters, 70 per cent favoured continuing membership. Suspicion or apprehension about the United States defence policy remains, however; the Social Attitudes report found that 53 per cent thought that
Britain's interests would be better served by developing closer links with Western Europe, whilst only 21 per cent thought closer links with America would serve this purpose. No less than 54 per cent thought that the United States represented just as much of a threat to world peace as the Soviet Union - as the 1985 report comments,

given that the United States is a close ally of Britain and shares a common language, common institutions and a similar culture, these attitudes are quite remarkable.(58)

It should also be remembered that this data was gathered prior to the American action in Libya in 1986.

Unilateral de-commissioning of British nuclear weapons still failed to find majority support among the electorate however, and this was confirmed by the 1987 election. In his analysis of the results, Crewe noted that defence was one of the issues which swung voters away from Labour, and that this disadvantage outweighed the advantages Labour held on the issues of health, education and employment. Slightly fewer people nominated defence as one of the most important influences on their voting choice, but, among the 35 per cent who did, Labour lagged behind the Conservatives by an even greater majority than it had in 1983.(59)

CND and the Media

The Campaign's impact on public opinion is, of course, influenced by the extent and type of coverage that the media devotes to the subject. CND
faces two obstacles in this respect: most of Britain's national newspapers subscribe to a political orientation which is inimical to the idea of unilateral nuclear disarmament, and policy-makers in British television are wary of giving exposure to viewpoints which will render them open to charges of bias and 'imbalance'. It was apprehension over this latter point which in part prompted the BBC to firstly decline to transmit an Open University 'Open Lecture' in 1980 by Professor Michael Pentz, a leading member of the Campaign; and secondly, amid considerable public controversy, to withdraw its invitation to E.P. Thompson to deliver the 1981 Dimbleby Lectures. When Channel Four found that a series around the nuclear theme scheduled for transmission in May 1983 was to coincide with the election campaign, it quickly arranged for the multilateralist argument to be put in a series of 'Opinion' slots to evade any suggestion of advocating pro-unilateralist views. (Similar apprehensions lay behind the BBC's refusal to transmit The War Game until some twenty years after it was made.) The impact of the peace movement in the early eighties, however, was such that television could no longer ignore the nuclear issue, and several major documentaries were shown in 1984(60).

One reason for this greater willingness to broach a formerly 'taboo' area was the salience the nuclear issue had attained during the 1983 election. Another was the exposure peace campaigners had received on news programmes. CND's marches and demonstrations, and the action of the Greenham women, all received wide coverage during 1982 and 1983, although this decreased dramatically after the election and has remained at a much lower level.
since. Television news pictures can have an appreciable impact on public attitudes - the Vietnam War and Ethiopian famine being classic examples - but television news coverage of the peace movement tended to concentrate on what had happened rather than why it happened. As part of a lengthy study of media coverage of defence-related issues, the Glasgow University Media Group examined television news coverage of CND demonstrations and commented -

Demonstrations are in themselves ritualised events, expressions of the deep feelings which thousands of people have about the nuclear issue - deep enough to make them want to identify with the movement. However, it is not an obvious vehicle for the expression of rational argument, especially if coverage of the speeches is restricted. It becomes easy for opponents to depict this as an emotional movement rather than as a reasoned opposition containing people who are at best well meaning but naive, and at worst subversives playing on the fears of the population. If coverage of CND tends to be restricted to such occasions as television news, along with incidents such as Bruce Kent's address to the British Communist Party or his supposed difficulties with his Church or with Cardinal Hume, then the central argument of the peace movement, that the system of deterrence is unstable and precarious, is unlikely to be articulated consistently and clearly in any regular way. (61)
The Glasgow group cite many instances in which television appears to ignore the underlying reasons for actions in favour of concentration on personalities. In their defence, television news producers could presumably plead extreme scarcity of time on news programmes for individual items. This is not a defence the national press could make, but in general they have been even more prone to sensationalism and trivialise the activities of the peace movement. Only The Guardian, The Morning Star and, to a lesser extent, The Observer have devoted anything resembling regular coverage to CND's activities and the reasons for them. It is interesting to note in this context that, when questioned in the 1985 survey about their main sources of information about nuclear weapons and disarmament, no less than a quarter of respondents singled out The Guardian. It was noticeable during 1986 and 1987 (including the general election period) that even The Guardian ceased to offer much coverage of the Campaign's activities. Although the tone has varied, the rest of Britain's national press (that is, in circulation terms, the vast majority) have made little or no effort to explain the peace movement's arguments, have consistently attributed virtually all forms of campaigning to CND regardless of whether the Campaign was actually involved or not (the Greenham Women are invariably presented as part of CND's campaign, for example) and has usually availed itself of any opportunity to highlight the more bizarre or unconventional side of campaigning while giving a very low profile to the actual arguments which inspire that campaigning.
Conclusions

It is impossible to pronounce with certainty about the impact of CND upon Britain's parties and electorate, because its campaigning has been only one of a number of factors affecting the way in which opinions have formed on the nuclear issue in the eighties. International developments, the changing policies of other countries and international organisations, and intra-party and group disagreements over other issues have all contributed to thinking on the issue as well. It is just as impossible, however, to deny that the Campaign has had some effect. Given the electoral uncertainties of unilateralism, it is hard to conceive of the labour movement making the fundamental shift away from a nuclear-based defence policy without the persistent lobbying and persuasion that CND has mounted. Similarly, had it not been for the organisation of protest activity by the Campaign and its allies, it is unlikely that unilateralism would have assumed the status of being one of the essential credentials of the left in British politics in the eighties.

As we noted in Chapter One, CND is seeking changes in public policy which can only come about through parties and governments being convinced of the case for unilateralism. Arguably the only impact the Campaign has had on the Conservative governments of the eighties has been to harden their pro-nuclear attitudes. Perceiving the need to counter the unilateralist message, the Conservatives have spelt out much more clearly than they did in the seventies their view that the nuclear deterrent has not only kept the peace in Europe since 1945, but is the only realistic means of
averting the threat of 'nuclear blackmail' in the future. Similarly, the SDP has fastened upon the nuclear issue as a key element in its strategy of presenting itself as a more 'responsible' party than the Labour Party and indeed - especially in the aftermath of the 1987 election - than their erstwhile partners, the Liberals. As with the Conservatives, support for some kind of nuclear capability was to all intents and purposes effectively non-negotiable for the SDP, at least as long as it was led by David Owen.

As the time of writing, the future of the Alliance is uncertain, as the SDP and the Liberals try to decide whether and how to merge. If such a merger were to take place, and if the Liberals were to become the dominant force in the 'new' party, then CND would certainly be encouraged by its past successes with the Liberal Party to continue trying to persuade them. The Liberal Party in 1987 is far from being wholly persuaded by the Campaign's arguments, its only concrete commitments being to cancel Trident and to seek, via multi-lateral agreement, the removal of Cruise. The important change, however, is that there is now a minority of Liberal activists who are prepared to argue the case for full unilateral disarmament, and who at least receive a hearing from the leadership. David Steel's own attitude may be one of opposition to unilateralism, but there is a distinct possibility that were he to be succeeded by, for example, Paddy Ashdown, then the party as a whole might well move closer to CND's position - although Ashdown's record suggests that it is unlikely that the Liberals will adopt a non-nuclear defence policy without real progress being made on a multilateral basis.
It is, of course, within the Labour and trade union movement that CND has seen the major changes take place. Although still differing on the questions of conventional weaponry and membership of NATO, Labour and some of Britain's major trade unions have now adopted policies – and broadly stuck by those policies during two difficult elections – which are very similar to those advocated by the Campaign. It must be said that at least some of the credit for this belongs to those who were active in the first wave of CND's activity in the fifties and sixties. Although the Campaign has managed to attract the support of many grass-roots activists in the Labour Party, there is very little evidence that such attitudes are shared by many of the 'ordinary' members of trade unions; it is their leaders who have been convinced, and many of them seem to have been converted to the unilateralist cause early in their political lives rather than in the eighties. However, whatever the cause, the major institutions on the left in British politics are now set upon the non-nuclear path, and seem unlikely to deviate from that, at least while they remain in opposition.

Whether a future Labour government (or even some form of Labour/Liberal coalition) would actually implement a non-nuclear policy once in power is questionable, given Labour's past record. CND itself is well aware of this, and consistently maintains that whilst it is necessary to persuade parties of its case, it is not sufficient, and must be backed up by real impact upon other social institutions and public opinion as well. One problem for the Campaign has been that, as parties have adopted clear-cut attitudes, so the nuclear issue has taken on a partisan dimension which has
led other institutions to draw back. It is noticeable that the major churches have become much more circumspect now that the nuclear issue is so obviously one which polarises the major parties. Much the same can be said of the electronic media, whilst at the other extreme most of the national press has been even more forthright in its repudiation of the Campaign and its message once it was clear that the left was committed to the idea. The net effect of this upon public opinion is hard to assess unless one is prepared to place considerable faith in public opinion surveys, which - generally speaking - suggest a minority in favour of British unilateral nuclear disarmament, but something close to a narrow majority in favour of ejecting American nuclear weaponry from Britain.

On the other hand, the exact state of public opinion is perhaps of secondary importance, in that what really matters is that the issue is discussed at all in contemporary British politics. Governments can no longer assume, as they did in the seventies, that a nuclear-based defence policy is immutable and not open to discussion outside of the executive branch of government. The major change in the eighties is that the issue is now firmly on the political agenda; moreover, the evidence from the 1987 election suggests that the electorate is slowly becoming used to the idea of the possibility of some form of disarmament, at least in so far as fewer people see the issue as a main determinant of their voting choice. Admittedly, the idea is commonly associated with left-wing attitudes and parties, but the Campaign's efforts to win over the Liberals, the Churches and other social institutions has meant that unilateralism is not seen as the exclusive preserve of the left. CND may only
have been the catalyst rather than the sole cause of this change in the political agenda, but it is a development in the practice of British politics in which the role of the Campaign cannot be discounted.

NOTES


2) Francis Pym (then Secretary of State for Defence), H.C. Debates, Hansard, 24.1.80, col. 679.


4) John Nott (then Secretary of State for Defence), H.C. Debates, Hansard, 29.3.82, col.26.


7) Sixth Report from Select Committee on Defence, The Trident Programme, H.C. 479, 1984/85: the Committee also noted that whereas in 1980 it was estimated that some 70 per cent of the total expenditure would be undertaken in the U.K., by 1985 this had fallen to 55 per cent - the remaining 45 per cent to be spent in the United States, and thus subject to fluctuating exchange rates. Recosting the expenditure forecasts in terms of constant 1984/85 prices, the Committee calculated that the total cost estimate rose from £6.8 thousand million pounds in 1980 to £9.3 thousand million in 1985. CND estimate that the Trident Programme will eventually cost some £12 thousand million - see 'Factfile 20', Sanity, Feb. 1986.

9) H.C. Debates, 29.3.82, op.cit.


11) The British government had little choice in the matter, as the United States was intent on developing the D5 system; if Britain had insisted on acquiring earlier C4 system, it would not have been able to benefit from much of the American research and development programme.

12) See H.C. Debates, 29.3.82, op.cit., col. 102.


17) See John Nott, H.C. Debates, 29.3.82, op.cit., col.25.


22) Ibid., pp. 13-14.


28) Heseltine also made the point that the Labour government spent around £250,000 in 1969 on national advertising designed to explain why nuclear deterrence was a necessary policy for Britain, and that this constituted a precedent for his own proposal - see The Times, 1.12.83.
29) The Times, 20.7.83.

30) Letter from Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine to Conservative Party Candidates, Conservative Party News Service, 17.3.83. These allegations were preceded by a swingeing attack on CND by the Bow Group in the Conservative party who, in conjunction with colleagues in West Germany, issued a pamphlet entitled 'Playing at Peace'; their many criticisms of CND are too numerous to detail here, but the following is a good example.

'The membership is so designed that virtually every individual member or organisation can be closely monitored . . . As soon as the National CND Headquarters receives the details of a new applicant, he is allocated a computer number under which his name, address and information about his activities within the CND are entered. The computer stores information, for example, on the number of times the member attends meetings, his political views and how actively he participates in the general running of the branch and regional organisation. All this information is usually compiled by a member's branch secretary or by a person responsible for regional membership.

When a candidate decides to stand for an elected post or apply for an appointment at a branch, regional or national level, his track record within CND is normally closely examined by the Internal Organisation and Membership Sub-Committee. If that sub-committee finds that the candidate is unsuitable because of his views and past activities within the CND, he could be actively discriminated against. This is usually achieved primarily by talking to the candidate and persuading him to stand down and improve his
standing within the branch or at the regional level.

If he persists in his candidacy for appointment or elected post, a discriminatory campaign against him might be put into operation. It often starts with moves against his adoption as a candidate or a representative and then it slowly escalates until he himself is forced to resign or step down. In the case of people applying for full-time posts within the organisation a simple refusal letter is usually sufficient unless the applicant is supported by a large group of people, then similar tactics might be applied by the sub-committee.

In this way, the CND leadership, which is mainly composed of Communist Party members and members of The Tribune Group, protects itself from being unseated or forced to change the policy of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament by people with different views and political beliefs.


CND denied these charges outright, maintaining that the only information they kept on their membership related to names and addresses. Although this author was not given direct access to CND's membership records, I have no reason to believe that anything other than subscription details are recorded on the national membership.

Similar charges are laid by the Coalition for Peace Through Security, a right-wing group founded in 1981 for the explicit purpose of opposing the unilateralist message propagated by CND. A small group, the CPS has been active since then, making a
point of attending CND meetings to challenge speakers. A good example of the CPS approach can be found in P. Mercer, 'Peace' of the Dead, Policy Research Publications 1986, which purports to reveal the true extent of left-wing and Communist influence in the Campaign.

31) H.C. Debates, 10.12.84, col. 740: the definition of 'subversion' employed by the Government sees it as 'activities which threaten the safety or well-being of the state, and which are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means', H.C. Debates, 12.3.85, col. 155.

32) The Massiter allegations were the subject of a Channel Four programme ('20-20 Vision'), originally banned from transmission by the Independent Broadcasting Authority, but subsequently shown in March 1985. A full account of the allegations can be found in The Observer, 24.2.85 and The Guardian, 1.3.85.

33) Ms. Massiter gave as an example the case of Joan Ruddock, then chairwoman of CND. Mrs Ruddock apparently gave an interview to a Soviet journalist based in London who was actually a KGB officer - 'Joan Ruddock didn't know that, but it provided the grounds for recording her as a 'contact of a hostile intelligence service', which was ridiculous' - but a file was opened on her and filled with press cuttings and Special Branch references to her movements. The Observer, 24.2.85.

34) Leon Brittan, H.C. Debates, 12.3.85, col. 154.

35) Ibid., col. 156.

36) The Guardian, 3.9.86


39) B. Pimlott, 'How Labour went unilateral', New Statesman, 8.10.82.

40) At the Labour Party Special Conference at Wembley in May 1980, David Owen argued forcibly that arms control and disarmament could not be tackled by way of unilateral national decisions.


43) Ibid.

44) Among the more important affiliated unions are AUEW, ASLEF, ASTMS, COHSE, FBU, NALGO, NUM, NUPE, NUR, SOGAT, TGWU, UCATT and USDAW.


46) Working Together For Britain, SDP/Liberal Alliance Manifesto, 1983.

47) The Guardian, 6.4.85


49) See John Cartwright (SDP Defence Spokesman), 'The Alliance Fights for European Defence', The Guardian, 12.9.86.


51) Ibid., p. 8.

53) The Church and the Bomb, p. 143.


55) Ibid., p. 65.


57) See The Observer. 14.9.86.

58) P. Whiteley, op. cit., p. 102.


60) For example, 'Threads' — which went on to win several major awards and 'The Day After', both of which dealt with the impact and aftermath of a 'small-scale' nuclear attack.

61) Glasgow University Media Group, War and Peace News.

62) When Joan Ruddock announced to CND's National Council her intention not to seek re-election as Chairperson because of her intention to stand as a parliamentary candidate, she was asked how this decision was going to be communicated to the mass membership. She light-heartedly replied that it would suffice simply to leak the information to The Guardian and The Observer; there would seem to be some validity in this.
Chapter Nine

CONCLUSIONS

There is a sense in which CND's continued existence is its most notable achievement. It has mobilised hundreds of thousands of people to risk punitive action by engaging in protest, which is more than any other group in British politics in the eighties can claim. It has done so, moreover, in a climate in which the possibilities of concrete changes in governmental policy on nuclear weapons have consistently been slight. Its supporters have not been motivated to participate by any kind of material self-interest. The Campaign does not have any selective rewards or incentives to offer its supporters. Activity within the Campaign does not even offer some kind of entry route into national party politics. Joan Ruddock's election to Parliament in 1987 is very much the exception (and had little to do with her role in the Campaign anyway); there has been no trend for other leading figures in CND to move onto the national political stage.

The Campaign's success in recruiting support is a classic example of mobilising 'conscience constituents'. If one seeks to explain this success, then it is necessary to distinguish between active and passive supporters. As far as
the more active are concerned, then it may well be
the case that they derive a personal satisfaction
from engaging in collective activity with like­
minded individuals, almost irrespective of whether
such activity produces any progress towards the
goals of the Campaign. As our survey suggests,
however, such activists comprise only a minority of
the Campaign's supporters. This leaves us with the
problem of explaining the motivation of 'sympa­
thisers', who register their support but (through
choice or necessity) forgo the opportunity to rein­
force their commitment and sense of solidarity
through active participation.

This is a problem confronted by Parkin in his
account of the Campaign's first wave of activ­
ity(1). Reduced to its essentials, Parkin's
explanation is that such people are likely to
subscribe to 'deviant' values, cannot find an
outlet among conventional and established institu­
tions in which to express this, and so support
groups like CND as a way of affirming their
generally 'progressive' attitudes and values. This
is an acute insight into the nature of British
society in the fifties and sixties, but the
question remains as to whether it still holds true
for Britain in the eighties. Clearly, we cannot
simply apply Parkin's argument as it stands, as
significant changes have occurred over the last
twenty five years in both the specifics of the
party system and the generalities of the political
culture. Thus, for example, in discussing the
notion of 'deviant' values, Parkin identifies
'dominant' values as being support for nationalism,
capitalism, the monarchy and the established
church. Whilst the first two of these are arguably still relevant in the contemporary British political culture, the latter two are generally accepted to have lost much of their former importance and relevance. Similarly, at the time Parkin was writing, the Labour Party was more of an 'outsider' in the political system than it is in the eighties. In the early sixties, Labour had only formed one majority government and had suffered three election defeats in a row, leading to the supposition among some of its supporters as well as its opponents that it was destined to be in virtually permanent opposition. Admittedly, Labour's position in 1987 might not be considered to be a great improvement upon this. At the time of CND's major expansion in the early eighties, however, this was not apparent and Labour's electoral record from the mid-sixties onwards had established it much more clearly as a potential governing party than it was twenty years earlier. Parkin was able to argue that middle-class radicals could express their dissent from the prevailing norms of their class by lending support to the Labour Party and, almost incidentally, to CND. By the eighties, middle-class support for Labour was no longer an unusual phenomenon.

If the conjunctural circumstances have changed, however, the essence of CND's appeal has remained the same. It is, by its very nature, an oppositional grouping. The eighties have been the decade of Thatcherism and the ascendancy of the 'New Right'. There has been a fundamental shift engineered in the expectations held of government. The emphasis upon consultation between government and groups which led many to see a nascent corpora-
tism developing in British politics in the seventies has been swept away in favour of a belief in the workings of a market economy which would only be distorted by government seeking accommodation with groups. The Thatcher governments have, at one and the same time, reduced the role and scope of the public sector in many areas, and emphasised and increased the role and authority of central government in those few areas where it is considered to have an appropriate role – of which defence is a notable example. There is no doubt that many members of the middle-class have benefited materially from this, and those employed in the private sector have had their role in economy and society given repeated validation by the Conservative governments. For those in the public sector and other non-commercial occupations, however, this has been noticeable by its absence, and must have encouraged many to feel relatively undervalued in contemporary British society.

For those wishing to express dissent from this prevailing trend in the political culture, CND has proved an attractive option. It offers the psychological satisfaction of a moral absolutism which, unlike the environmental movement, does not entail a conflict with those on the left committed to continuing economic growth. At the same time, its focus upon the very question of human survival gives it a greater claim to urgency and relevance than that of other moral concerns. Singled out for opprobrium by the Conservative governments, it is not surprising that CND has once again become the medium through which many of the more radical-
inclined of Britain's middle class have chosen to signify their opposition to prevailing norms.

This opposition has been most effectively expressed in protest activity, as it is this which has received the most publicity and contributed the most to provoking public discussion of the issue of nuclear disarmament. Had it not been for the large-scale demonstrations, peace camps and similar activities which were the prominent features of the Campaign between 1979 and 1985, it is hard to imagine that the concomitant efforts made in lobbying and persuasion would have had much impact. Such protest requires targets, however. The deployment of Cruise at Greenham, and the erection of the fence at Molesworth, meant that protest at these bases lost much of its original meaning, whilst the predominantly English membership of the Campaign has yet to show much enthusiasm for participating in actions centred around Trident in Scotland. The first deployment of Cruise at the end of 1983 marked a turning point for the Campaign and its choice of tactics. Seeing the unilateralist option go down to such a disastrous defeat in the 1983 election was no doubt a disappointment, but the Campaign's supporters were accustomed to thinking of themselves as a battling opposition, so if anything it served to increase their resolve. The arrival of Cruise, however, marked the first concrete set-back for the Campaign, and could have led to a gradual loss of enthusiasm and commitment, which might well have accelerated as the plans to mount similar actions at Molesworth were thrown into confusion by the erection of the fence.
Such actions by the authorities as occurred at Greenham and Molesworth pose a dilemma for the Campaign, as it is inevitably a reactive organisation. It cannot determine its own targets, but must react to developments which results from decisions made by others, notably British and other governments. By 1985, CND was in danger of becoming marginalised as a protest group, with no simple and easy targets around which it could mobilise its actions. It could have shifted its ground by redefining and perhaps moderating its goals in the light of the new circumstances it was facing but, as we have noted, too many of the Campaign's supporters view different parts of its existing ideology to be non-negotiable for goals to be changed without a very real risk of serious internal dissent.

Instead, CND has survived by making a virtue of necessity. Since 1985, it has thrown much of its energy and resources into a campaign of persuasion and lobbying around the much more general theme of unilateral nuclear disarmament, rather than the protests against the specific weapons systems of Trident and Cruise which marked the early eighties. Although this has meant a diminution in activity, it has sufficed to give the membership new initiatives to maintain their interest and, more importantly, has enabled the Campaign to retain its image as a dynamic organisation in the eyes of the media and the public.

CND's organisational structure is a great advantage in this kind of situation. The hallmark of proceedings and decision-making within national CND is informality; although its structure bears
more than a passing resemblance to that of the Labour party, it conducts its affairs in a less authoritarian and bureaucratic manner than Labour. Compared with the Peace Movement as a whole, however, national CND is a centralised, bureaucratic and formal organisation, and as such it enjoys the great advantage of permanence. Peace Movement activists may complain bitterly about the time and money spent on the drafting and passing of paper resolutions at National Conference and Council meetings, but it is this formalised structure which ensures that the organisation stays in existence, ready to act as a rallying point and focus whenever the stimuli for protest activity presents itself. If such a formal structure did not exist, then protest would have to be mounted from scratch every time events such as the American action in Libya or the Chernobyl disaster occurred.

Survival is a necessary prerequisite for success, but it is not sufficient. As we have noted, the nature of the issue with which the Campaign is concerned is such that concrete changes can only occur as a result of actions by the established members of the political system. To assess whether this has happened, we need to take a broad overview of developments since the seventies.

Throughout that decade, the necessity for a nuclear dimension in Britain's defence policy was an assumption shared by virtually all the important actors and institutions in the political system. Successive governments felt that they were acting quite legitimately in spending considerable sums of money on maintaining and modernising Britain's nuclear capability without first discussing the
matter within the full Cabinet, nor did they perceive any necessity to consult Parliament or the public on such decisions. Opposition to the nuclear deterrent was voiced only by small minority groups who were either on the far left of the political spectrum (for example, the Communist Party) or who espoused outright pacifism on moral grounds (for example, the Quakers) - with CND itself only surviving because of the support of such groups. The political agenda was dominated by economic issues, and it seemed inconceivable that any major changes to the 'independent' deterrent would be envisaged, let alone implemented.

Between 1979 and 1983, all such assumptions were brought into question, and for the first time a major party included a form of unilateral nuclear disarmament in its general election manifesto. At least partly because of this, the Labour Party suffered a resounding defeat in the 1983 election. Rather than dropping its commitment, however, it actually strengthened and clarified it, chose a unilateralist as its new leader, and even persuaded well-known multi-lateralists like Dennis Healey to declare their support for unilateralist measures. Whilst the Conservatives and SDP reiterated their support for the nuclear deterrent, activists in the extra-parliamentary wing of the Liberal Party embarrassed their leadership by objecting to the deployment of Cruise missiles as well as the acquisition of Trident. By the time of the 1987 general election, Labour had resolved many if not all of the ambiguities in its non-nuclear defence policy, and it was the SDP/Liberal Alliance which was experiencing serious internal dissent over the
issue. Although there was little in the 1987 results to suggest that unilateral nuclear disarmament had become more popular with the electorate, there were indications that fewer voters were preoccupied with the potential disadvantages of a radical change in defence policy.

To some extent these changes in domestic politics were a result of developments on the international scene. The defence and foreign policies of the Reagan administrations, and the Thatcher governments' support for them, caused more people in Britain to question the desirability of the Anglo-American connection. More important, however, was the apparently fundamental change in the attitude of the Soviet Union after the accession of Gorbachev. Prior to this, the Soviet Union's stance on unilateral action was best summarised by President Andropov's statement in 1982 - 'Let nobody expect us to disarm unilaterally. We are not naive.' Gorbachev, however, announced a unilateral ban on nuclear tests by the Soviet Union in 1986, and accompanied this by first proposing a bi-lateral agreement to remove intermediate-range nuclear weapons from Europe and then extended this proposal to incorporate short-range nuclear weapons as well - the 'double-zero' option. At the time of writing, negotiations are still continuing on this. Whilst there is no guarantee that it will not meet the same fate as the previous attempt to reach agreement on the elimination of medium-range weapons in 1982, there is informed speculation in the press that an agreement is imminent. Even if agreement fails to materialise, Gorbachev's initiatives have made a generally
favourable impression on public opinion in the West. (2)

Should some agreement be reached, it makes possible the following (speculative) scenario. By the end of the decade, Cruise missiles could have been removed as part of a bi-lateral agreement on intermediate weapons. Trident could be cancelled, either because its acquisition would entail too heavy a burden on the defence budget (leaving insufficient funds for expenditure on conventional weaponry), or because the United States might renege on its agreement with Britain to supply Trident as part of some bi-lateral agreement with the Soviet Union, or simply because the international climate had changed such that a system as powerful as Trident was no longer perceived to be necessary. Even if it seems unlikely that the present Conservative government would voluntarily reverse its decision to introduce Trident, the early nineties could see a Labour government (or possibly some form of Liberal/Labour coalition government) coming to power, in which case Trident will be cancelled unless there are powerful economic reasons for keeping it in place. It is even possible that a majority Labour government would not only implement a non-nuclear defence policy, but also pursue multi-lateral agreement on substantial reductions in conventional forces.

None of this may happen, of course. The interesting point, however, is that such developments - inconceivable at the end of the seventies - are now realistic possibilities. Should such changes occur, they would represent the kind of concrete modifications to defence policy that CND
has advocated for so long. Yet it would require a very sympathetic observer of the Campaign to argue that CND and its counterparts in Europe had been primarily responsible for bringing about such a transformation. The Gorbachev initiatives may well revitalise the Campaign. Not only do they seem to substantiate the Campaign's argument that unilateral actions can lead on to multilateral progress. They also mean that unilateral actions by Britain take on a new and more important meaning, as they could speed up or impede progress towards agreement on intermediate and short-range weapons. As in the fifties, CND can now claim that 'Britain can make a difference' - an argument that had a somewhat hollow ring to it during the preceding twenty-five years. It is hard to imagine, however, that Gorbachev has been motivated to make these radical proposals solely or even mainly by the weight and force of arguments enunciated by western peace movements.

This is not to dismiss the impact of the Campaign, or to suggest that it has no future. Indeed, whatever the outcome of the present super-power negotiations, the Campaign is likely to continue. Should the talks fail, or result in new deployments (for example, sea and air-launched Cruise missiles), then this would represent the same sort of stimulus for protest activity that NATO's twin-track decision did at the end of the seventies - particularly if the Soviet Union is able to lay much of the blame for failure at the door of western governments. If the talks succeed, the size and activities of the Campaign are likely to diminish in the same kind of way that they did
in the early sixties. This time, however, the Campaign has amongst its leading figures a number of individuals who, as part of their internationalist perspective and links with END, have a commitment to developing ideas about an alternative foreign policy which is much wider in scope than just opposition to nuclear weapons. There is every possibility that such figures, who have exercised increasing influence in the Campaign since 1985 anyway, would keep CND alive even if it was as less of a protest group and more of an intellectual pressure group.

Whatever the future holds, the Campaign and its allies in the broader peace movement can lay claim to one major achievement. They have been instrumental in creating a climate in which the policy of nuclear deterrence is now open to question. It is true that the only established members of the polity to have been converted to the idea of a non-nuclear defence policy (the Labour Party, some trade unions and some local authorities) have all done so at a time when they were in a relatively weak position in national politics. In the case of the most important of these, the Labour Party, its conversion has contributed to its present weak political position, but it has not sought to reverse its stance and there is some evidence that it is becoming less of an electoral liability. In 1987, the chances of Britain implementing a fully non-nuclear defence policy by the end of the century still seem rather slight, at least so long as the left and centre-left in British politics remain divided among a number of political parties. This should not detract from the
fundamental change that has occurred in the status of a nuclear-based defence policy on the political agenda. From being a policy on which discussion of alternatives was effectively restricted to the governmental and military elite, it has become one on which there is genuine popular and widespread discussion. The idea of non-nuclear defence has, in short, entered into the realm of the politically negotiable - and for that the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament must be given due credit.

CND and Social Movement Theory

In conclusion, it is to be hoped that our contention at the beginning of this thesis - that CND in the eighties can most usefully be conceptualised as a social movement rather than a conventional pressure group, and most fruitfully analysed from a resource mobilisation perspective rather than one based upon ideas of relative deprivation - has been substantiated. As we have seen, CND's organisation, tactics and strategy are significantly different from those of protective and promotional groups, and much closer to those of other social movements. The resource mobilisation perspective has been useful, in that its focus upon the interaction which occurs between social movements and other institutions has drawn our attention to the competition for resources between different social movements. This is crucial to an understanding of the success of CND, at least in terms of attracting support if not in seeking its aims translated into public policy.

In this competition for resources, CND has been able to offer a cause which does not require
renunciation of other party or group loyalties, which is not linked to sectional self-interest or (at least in theory) restricted to one particular political philosophy, which is clear and, in essence, simple rather than complicated, which provides the opportunity to express opposition (either actively or with considerable passivity) to the swing to the right which has characterised politics in the western world during the eighties, and which lays claim to a high degree of moral rectitude. These have proved decisive advantages for CND in its competition with other movements and groups (particularly in the environmental sphere) to secure the support, time, energy and money of that section of the British population which is minded to reject Conservative thinking. Admittedly, this success has been only partial, the appeal of the Campaign not having extended to any significant degree beyond the educated middle-class, and there is little evidence of its managing to politicise those who were not previously interested in and informed about politics generally. This, however, does not invalidate the resource mobilisation perspective, which seeks only to draw our attention to the phenomenon of competition.

There is one aspect in which resource mobilisation theory does not appear to accord with the experience of CND, and that is its assumption that discontents and grievances lie dormant in society, and are awoken by the efforts of social movements to mobilise them. In the case of the peace movement, specific events such as NATO's twin-track decision and the Conservatives' commitment to
acquire Trident would appear to have created discontents which had not existed for much of the previous two decades. Having said that, however, resource mobilisation theory goes a long way to explaining how this initial discontent which arose in 1979/80 was given the momentum to grow and survive throughout the eighties.

Resource mobilisation, however, is a very generalised perspective, with a somewhat imprecise terminology; as such, any criticisms of it can be refuted simply by employing different definitions of its basic concepts - 'resources', for example, being open to a number of different interpretations. As stated in Chapter one, however, this thesis is concerned not only with the utility or otherwise of the broad sweep of resource mobilisation theory, but also with the more specific theoretical arguments which relate to social movements.

Some of these arguments are corroborated by this study, even where they appear to be mutually exclusive. Thus, for example, although we have posited the arguments of Gamson and Gerlach and Hine as two opposing poles in the thinking on the organisational structure of social movements, this thesis contains empirical evidence which partly if not wholly substantiates them both - it all depends upon where one focuses attention. Gamson's argument that centralisation and bureaucratisation enhance a social movement's chances of success is borne out to some extent if applied only to national CND rather than the peace movement as a whole. Admittedly, his contention that a formal organisational structure will enhance a movement's chances of being accepted by its antagonists as a valid mouthpiece for a legitimate set of interests has not been substantiated by the Thatcher governments'
attitudes towards CND. This has been because of the nature of the issue which CND engages, and Gamson, in common with a number of other social movement theorists, does not pay sufficient regard to the importance of the kind of issue a social movement pursues as a variable in his model; this is a point to which we shall return.

Apart from this, however, Gamson's argument that centralisation and a degree of formal organisation enable a movement to minimise internal conflict is applicable to national CND. The decision-making system adopted by national CND — based on the Annual Conference, the National Council and the various national committees — has provided its leadership with a sufficiently powerful authority structure to repel attempted infiltration by far-left groups, to keep the Campaign committed to tactics of persuasion as well as protest, and to present to 'bystander publics' an image of the Campaign as a coherent and truly national body — all factors which must have enhanced the survival chances of the movement in the absence of any concrete achievements in the sphere of public policy.

Gerlach and Hine's SPR model is also relevant, but to the peace movement as a whole (taking this to mean local CND and other peace groups, and quasi-autonomous groups like Cruisewatch and the Greenham Movement) rather than national CND. The relationship between national CND and the wider peace movement does demonstrate many of the advantages which Gerlach and Hine identify. They
argue that a decentralised and informal organis­
tional structure gives a movement the ability to evolve
decentralisation by political authorities, and to
survive if parts of the organisation fail or become
discredited. These possibilities have been fully
exploited by the leadership of national CND.
Whilst understandably incensed at what they have
seen as attempts by the political authorities to
covertly investigate the movement's activities,
they have been able to take comfort in the fact
that monitoring everything that happens in the
Campaign cannot be accomplished merely by infil­
trating it at the national level. When faced with
pressure from within the Campaign for it to adopt
more confrontational NVDA tactics which they
thought might detract from its impact on public
opinion, the leadership has often been able to
divert this onto sub-groupings within the peace
movement - the Action '84 episode being a notable
exception.

Indeed, what is striking about national CND is
the extent to which potentially divisive issues and
decisions can be 'exported' - either to within the
broader peace movement or outwards to other
institutions, such as political parties - or
subdued by calls for unity. Debate over what should
replace nuclear weapons to provide for Britain's
defence is discouraged on the grounds that politi­
cal parties are the appropriate institutions to
formulate such policy. Practitioners of NVDA who
express frustration that considerable time and
money is spent on lobbying MP's and organising
conferences to discuss policy resolutions, and
advocates of reasoned persuasion who feel that
their arguments will not be taken seriously when they are associated with unconventional protest, are persuaded to co-exist in relative harmony by appeals which stress the need to maintain solidarity in the fact of a hostile government, and the moral rectitude of the Campaign's fundamental aims.

Such appeals might well be less effective if national CND had a different organisation structure, because power relations within its present structure make it difficult for the mass membership to exercise any significant degree of accountability over their leadership. As we have seen, activists who favour protest rather than persuasion, and who wish to base their protest upon issues which enjoy even less popularity with the electorate than unilateralism itself (withdrawal from NATO being the best example), are able to take advantage of CND's organisational structure to the extent of winning formal endorsement of their aims by the whole Campaign. What they cannot do, however, is find a means of bringing sufficient pressure to bear upon those who are responsible for day-to-day decision-making to ensure that they actually pursue these aims with real commitment and enthusiasm. In many ways, the anti-NATO/pro-NVDA activists are reminiscent of left-wing activists in the Labour party of the sixties and seventies - able (after some considerable struggle) to win endorsement of their aims from the Annual Conference, but then frustrated by their inability to make the Parliamentary Labour Party and Labour Governments prioritise these commitments in practice. Unfortunately for the activists in CND, the organisational structure of the Campaign has no
equivalent of re-selection as a way of bringing pressure to bear outside of the Annual Conference. There is another parallel: just as the electoral system means that disgruntled labour activists have no other viable left-wing party to turn to, so the Campaign's predominant position in the public's perception of the peace movement means that there is no other grouping on the national stage through which peace movement activists could expect to work so effectively.

Freeman's arguments about the impact of prior experiences and contemporary reference groups upon the attitudes and expectations of social movement participants has some relevance in this context. Admittedly, there is little evidence in CND of the clear distinction between 'old' and 'new' activists that she found in the women's movement. Of all the cross-cutting memberships and allegiances which we have identified among the Campaign's membership, only the Communist Party and the Green movement appear to inspire loyalties which lead their adherents to try to manipulate the Campaign in a certain direction - the small Communist element arguing against stances which appear critical of the Soviet Union (with little discernable impact), and the larger Green element exercising more effective pressure to get the Campaign committed against nuclear energy as well as weapons and to adopt a much more decentralised structure. As we have seen from our survey, many of the Campaign's supporters also subscribe to the Labour Party and Trade Union Movement and/or to other 'moral' campaigning groups. It is problematic whether Freeman's argument applies to these people. On the
one hand, one might argue that the relative lack of internal dissension suggested by our survey is evidence that such people do not allow cross-pressures to influence them. On the other hand, one might equally well argue that these other loyalties complement rather than conflict with the aims and practices of the Campaign. Those with a background in the Labour movement are accustomed to exhortations to prioritise unity above factionalism, and those who are drawn to 'moral' campaigns are similarly used to working with people from a variety of backgrounds in the name of a higher moral imperative. As with resource mobilisation theory generally, Freeman's argument is useful for focusing our attention upon important influences on social movements, but open to different interpretations when that focus is narrowed down to specific variables.

So far, we have been looking at aspects of our study which appear to substantiate, at least partly, the arguments of social movement theorists. There are some important respects, however, in which the Campaign differs from the model provided by social movement theory. These are that there is just one important SMO within the peace movement rather than several, that this SMO is more formally organised than its counterparts in other social movements, and that it employs conventional tactics as well as the more unconventional and places greater importance on these than one might expect from social movement theory. Why, then, is this? The answer lies in the nature of the issue which the Campaign is engaging.
CND's aims can only be met by convincing established members of the polity, particularly one or more of the major political parties. The 'personal' dimension which is such a distinctive feature of other social movements, giving them momentum and enhancing their chances of survival, is lacking. In this context, it is instructive to speculate on the form the peace movement might take were it to be committed to outright rather than just nuclear pacifism. Were this to be the case, the movement might well be smaller, but it would have a personal dimension - in that adherents could practice pacifism in the private as well as public sphere - and would be more likely to organise itself upon an unstructured, informal and networking basis. Pacifists would be less concerned to make an issue-specific impact, and more concerned to propagate their message by personal example; less interested in gaining the support and affiliation of established institutions like trade unions and local authorities, and more interested in converting individuals to the cause. The peace movement would become a social movement in its 'purest' form.

As it is, however, the peace movement is primarily interested in making an issue-specific impact - at least, in the short to medium term. It is seeking to influence policy in an area which is dominated by the executive branch of government, and which has no history or tradition of consultation or open debate - and in a political system noted for its secrecy generally. Britain's political culture offers certain advantages for such campaigning - freedom of speech and assembly
remain established values, despite attempts in recent years to impose limitations - but its emphasis upon pragmatism does not provide fertile ground for causes which rest upon moral principles. Opposition to government and even protest are seen in a positive light by at least some of the electorate, but direct action usually attracts negative comment and presentation from the media.

All of these factors combine to make CND different from other social movements. It is more formally organised, because this facilitates relationships with established members of the polity. It complements its moral case with strictly pragmatic arguments, because this is the only way it can hope to convince parties and an electorate accustomed to thinking in such terms. Similarly, it pursues tactics that are conventional as well as the more unconventional which attract many of its activists, because a degree of respectability is a necessary condition for it to be perceived as a serious contender in the nuclear debate. It is our contention that it is the nature of the issue which CND is engaging which is the fundamental cause of these differences. Were it not seeking to influence public policy in an area which is commonly accepted to be one of the basic functions of the state - the defence of the nation - then it would not be subject to the mix of constraints and opportunities which have resulted in its adopting a form and practices which differs from most other social movements. Whilst social movement theory is based on concepts which offer the potential for a much better understanding of a group such as CND than conventional pressure group
theorising, the finding that emerges from this study is that it pays inadequate attention to the nature of the issue that a social movement takes up. It is to be hoped that this thesis makes some contribution to establishing the need for such a perspective in future studies of social movement activity.

NOTES

1. F. Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism*.
2. For example, the results of an opinion survey conducted in nine Western European countries in June 1987, suggested that most Western Europeans approved of Soviet policies on disarmament - see *The Independent*, 19.6.87.
APPENDIX

CND National Membership Survey 1985

The survey comprised the following questionnaire and a covering letter from the General Secretary of CND assuring respondents of confidentiality. The survey was distributed by post, national CND undertaking the task of generating a stratified random sample of 1% of the national membership, based on a regional breakdown. A total of 1011 surveys were distributed; 620 replies were received, representing a response rate of 61%. The survey has a sample error of +/-4%.
Please answer the questions by a tick and/or by writing in. [If there is a household or a couple membership of CND, only one person should answer the survey.]

**FIRST, SOME GENERAL QUESTIONS**

1. In which region do you live (please state county if unsure)?
   - [ ] 16 or under
   - [ ] 17-24
   - [ ] 25-40
   - [ ] 41-59
   - [ ] 60 or over

2. In which age group are you?
   - [ ] 16 or under
   - [ ] 17-24
   - [ ] 25-40
   - [ ] 41-59
   - [ ] 60 or over

3. Are you male or female?
   - [ ] Male
   - [ ] Female

4. Are you at school or a student?
   - [ ] At school
   - [ ] Student

   If not, at what age did your full-time education end?
   - [ ] Do you hold a diploma or degree?
   - [ ] Yes
   - [ ] No

5. What is your occupation (or previous occupation if not currently in paid employment)?

6. If you are in full or part-time employment, are you employed in...
   - [ ] The private sector
   - [ ] The public sector

7. If there was a general election tomorrow, how would you vote?
   - [ ] Liberal/SDP alliance
   - [ ] Labour
   - [ ] Conservative
   - [ ] Ecology
   - [ ] Other (please say)
   - [ ] Don't Know
   - [ ] Wouldn't Vote

**SECOND, SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT CND AND OTHER GROUPS**

8. In which year did you join or rejoin national CND?

9a. Are you a member of a local CND, anti-nuclear weapons or similar peace group?
   - [ ] Yes
   - [ ] No

9b. If you are a member of a local group, how many times over the past year have you taken part in events or meetings organized by that group?
   - [ ] None
   - [ ] 1-3
   - [ ] 4-6
   - [ ] 7-9
   - [ ] Over 9

10. Do you participate in any of the following activities on behalf of CND?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public speaking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations/Marches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Camps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Converging the public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying politicians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leafleting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting the local press</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing badges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Are you a member of a political party?
   - [ ] Yes
   - [ ] No

   If yes, please say which
   - [ ] If no, have you ever been a member of a political party (please say which)

12. Are you a practicing member of any church or religious denomination?
   - [ ] Yes
   - [ ] No

   If yes, please say which

13. Are you a member of:
   - [ ] a trade union
   - [ ] a woman's group
   - [ ] a professional association
   - [ ] a voluntary organization

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14. If you are a member of any of the groups in questions 11-13, do you actively work for nuclear disarmament within them?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please state group</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. In recent years, have you supported any public campaigns other than CND?
Yes  No

If yes, please say which:

Are any of these more important than CND is to you?

16. Who or what most influenced you in your decision to join CND?

17a. Listed below are six possible activities and six possible campaigning areas which CND could pursue. Please tick three from each list which you consider are the most important.

**Activities**
- Educational work
- Big public events
- Considered non-violent
- Illegal direct action
- Small public events and local work
- Lobbying politicians and decision-makers
- Developing international contacts

**Campaigning areas**
- Nuclear Civil Defence
- Nuclear disarmament
- Trident
- British unilateral
- British withdrawal from NATO
- Cruise
- Removal of all USA bases in Britain

17b. If there are others which you consider are more important than these, please mention them.

17c. Are there any of these activities or campaigns that you would not want to take part in yourself? (please say which)

17d. Should CND campaign more actively than it already does against the nuclear weapons policies of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. How much influence would you say the following have within CND?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Too much</th>
<th>About right</th>
<th>Too Little</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian CND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth CND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green CND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND paid staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You yourself</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Did you support unilateral nuclear disarmament (tick one only):
- As soon as you became seriously interested or involved
- Intuitively from the word go, but took a while to work out why
- After a lot of consideration of pro and counter arguments
- Am still considering this issue

20. Which arguments against unilateral disarmament do you find hardest to refute - either in your own mind or in discussion with others (you need not say why)?

21. Which one of the following four arguments against British possession of nuclear weapons carries the greatest weight with you personally?

- It is an inefficient means of defence
- They are morally unacceptable weapons
- It is a waste of economic resources
- It would enable Britain to give a moral lead to other nations.
22. What priority do you think CND should give to campaigning against:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical and Biological Weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Who do you think bears the main responsibility for the arms race in recent years?

- USA
- USSR
- USA & USSR equally
- Other (please say)
- Don't know

24. Please say whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain should leave NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Britain gives up all nuclear weapons she should have more conventional ones.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain should leave the EEC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money saved by nuclear disarmament should go primarily on overseas aid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain should substantially reduce its present defence and foreign policy links with the USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviet Union does not pose a serious military threat to Britain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain should pursue a strictly non-aligned defence and foreign policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am a pacifist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. In your opinion, what is the effect of non-violent, illegal direct action upon CND's campaigning generally?

- Strengthens the campaign
- Weakens the campaign
- Don't know

26. What are your main sources of information about nuclear weapons and disarmament? [ ]
a) BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Adam, C., "The Children of Aldermaston", Spectator, 12.6.82

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b) CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PUBLICATIONS

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Campaign, (CND's monthly Newsletter)

Civil Defence Campaign Guide

Civil Defence: the cruellest trick, (P. Bolsover)

Europe's Folly: the facts about Cruise, (O. Greene)

Legal Advice Pack for Nuclear Disarmers

No No NATO, (J. Cox)

Nuclear Disarmament Starts Here, (I. Davidson)

Nuclear Free Zone Bulletins

Nuclear Free Zone Campaign Manual

Ploughshare, (Christian CND Newsletter)
Sanity, (CND'S monthly magazine)

Questions and Answers about CND

Questions and Answers about Christians and Nuclear Disarmament

Questions and Answers about Non-Nuclear Defence

Sign of the Times, (Youth CND Newsletter)

Towards Nuclear Free Communities

Trade Union CND News

What Do We Do After We've Shown 'The War Game': a Disarmament Action Manual, (D. Plesch)

c) MISCELLANEOUS

In addition to material from local CND and Peace Groups, I have consulted pamphlets and other publications from the following groups and organisations:

Action '84

Arms Control and Disarmament Unit (Foreign & Commonwealth Office)

British Atlantic Committee

Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom

Center for Constitutional Rights (New York)

Coalition for Peace through Security

Cruisewatch

Direction '85

END

Greenham Women against Cruise

Greenpeace

INLAW

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Lawyers for Nuclear Disarmament
Peace Through NATO
Scientists Against Nuclear Arms
Teachers for Peace
Tories Against Cruise and Trident
Women and Families for Defence
Women's Peace Alliance

d) INTERNAL CND DOCUMENTS

I have been given access to a wide range of material filed at national CND headquarters: this includes -

National Council Minutes
National Executive Committee Minutes
Minutes of other national committees
Reports from Specialist Sections to National Council and National Executive Committee
Reports from Working Parties to National Council
CND Research section press cuttings