Higher Education
development in Greater Peterborough: a case study
of public policy

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Higher Education Development in Greater Peterborough: a Case Study of Public Policy

by

Zoë Slote Morris

A Doctoral Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the award of
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University.

June 1999

Supervisor: Professor J.B. Thomas

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Abstract

The aim of the research was to examine the impact of power on public policy using higher education development in Greater Peterborough as a case study. The research focused on the 'Towards Peterborough's University' project managed by Greater Peterborough Training & Enterprise Council (GPtec), funded by Government Office Eastern Region (GOER), and which aimed to establish quality university education in Greater Peterborough. It represents an ethnographic study (chiefly participant observation) concentrating on the first two years of development - from the setting up of the project in October 1994 to establishment and formal registration of a project company in December 1996.

It is argued that local public policy ('policy' because it involved more than decision making, 'public' because it was made within the framework of government - Peterborough City Council, Fenland and South Kesteven District Councils, The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), and the Department of Employment (DoE), for example) is not made in a vacuum, but influenced by the macro, and organisational context within which it is formulated and implemented, as well as by the specific individuals who participated in the process. It is further argued that the individuals active in this particular case were there not because of their specialist interest or knowledge in the policy area, but because they occupied prominent positions in other areas of the community, often because they were seen, or paid, to represent others.

The research therefore examines critically the theoretical issues of policy input and accountability against the case evidence, using the following methodology - observing and describing the policy process to identify evidence of power relationships, and identifying the bases of such relationships in order to analyse their impact on the development of higher education in Peterborough.

Key words:

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<th>power</th>
<th>Peterborough</th>
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Acknowledgements

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I would also like to Professor John Thomas for all his help and advice, and also Mrs Paula Cross for her help with dealing with the administration.
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<tr>
<td>DfE</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
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<td>DfEE</td>
<td>Department of Education and Employment</td>
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<tr>
<td>ED</td>
<td>Department of Employment</td>
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<td>FE</td>
<td>Further Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOER</td>
<td>Government Office, Eastern Region</td>
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<td>GPtec</td>
<td>Greater Peterborough Training and Enterprise Council</td>
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<td>HE</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
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<td>HEFCE</td>
<td>Higher Education Funding Council, England</td>
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<td>LEA</td>
<td>Local Education Authority</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Manpower Services Commission</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>Peterborough Regional College</td>
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<td>SKDC</td>
<td>South Kesteven District Council</td>
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<td>SRB</td>
<td>Single Regeneration Budget</td>
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<td>TEC</td>
<td>Training and Enterprise Council</td>
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<td>TVA</td>
<td>Tennessee Valley Authority</td>
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<td>UCAS</td>
<td>Universities and Colleges Admissions Service</td>
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Chapter 1

1. Introduction

1.1 Statement of the Problem

In 1994 the Greater Peterborough Training & Enterprise Council’s (GPtec) Strategic Education Forum grew concerned that local commitment to the notion of ‘lifelong learning’ was being undermined by the lack of local provision of higher education (HE). In response a higher education sub-group was set up under Dr Geoff Forbat to examine the need for such provision.

The study revealed an 18+ transfer rate higher than the national average despite inadequate local provision of HE (Forbat, 1994a). The report noted that whilst the national Age Participation Rate (APR) for 18+ in 1993 was 30.9%, and a local figure of 41.4% there were significant differences within the three areas covered by GPtec (Peterborough City, Fenland District and South Lincolnshire). However, of these nearly 95% left the area to take up higher education.

From its findings the report concluded that:

The issues would seem to be the retention of local student populations, the improvement of student take-up in certain areas ... and the provision of part-time facilities (Forbat, 1994a).

Local part-time facilities were required for the sake of mature students with family or work commitments, who were effectively excluded from higher study owing to these geographical ties. The report also recognised an ‘acute’ industrial need for updating the skills of an ageing workforce, together with providing local access to research and consultancy. The 1991 Census of Population, for example, (OPCS, 1991) showed that only 4.9% of the resident workforce of Greater Peterborough was qualified to degree level or above, as against 7% of the national workforce. This deficit was reflected in achievement against the National Targets, specifically, the National Target (Lifetime 2) for the percentage of the workforce to be qualified to first degree (NVQ Level 4) or higher was 30%. National achievement was 24%, but only 20% in Greater Peterborough. It was argued that this was a direct result of lack of local provision (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996) and the associated pull-through.
In October 1994 GPTec embarked on a project funded by the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) to develop higher education provision in Greater Peterborough. A project manager employed by the TEC was assigned to the project, with two research assistants. Their first task was to undertake 'needs' research, and to identify good practice occurring elsewhere from which to learn. 'Strategy' was assigned to the Higher Education Steering Group, under the chairmanship of the Director of Retail of Thomas Cook.

The project's mission was:

To establish quality university education and services in Greater Peterborough and thus to provide a skilled workforce which will generate economic growth (Forbat, 1994b).

Higher level skills were seen to contribute to economic growth (see Tight, 1995), and local provision of higher education would help to achieve the appropriate lifetime target.

In 1993-94, the year the project commenced, nearly £4000m of public money was spent on higher education from tax revenue (DIe, 1994). Since the Robbins' review of Higher Education (Committee on Higher Education, 1963) indicated that higher education was a suitable area for public policy-making and planning, the number of students and the number of institutions offering higher education has continued to grow (DIEE, 1998; Tight, 1987 and 1996), as has central control over individual institutions. On a local level the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough would involve many key figures from public or representative organisations. As a result the issues of equality, equity and accountability have become more significant, particularly as it can be assumed that spending in higher education substitutes for expenditure in other areas of public policy. This research focuses on the second issue.

It has been argued that the study of public policy implies an interest in improvement; of identifying strengths for replication, weaknesses for elimination (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984), but Hill (1997) suggested that participation in the public policy process does not. Whilst there is some debate as to the role of researchers within this; Wildalisky (1979), for example, argued that policy analysis is about improving policy within the existing framework of society, and not about 'presenting utopian scenarios'. Others, Ham and Hill (1984), for example, suggest that policy choices and processes can not be considered without critical reference to the social,
political and economic systems within which they function and nor should they. Castles et al. (1971), included a section on macro political systems in their Reader on decision-making on the basis that:

Since men and women are capable of reflection that make decisional choice possible they are also capable of reflecting on the consequences of the decisions made for or by them, and deciding in terms of their own values whether or not they like what they see (Castles et al., 1971).

This suggests a general need to examine whether particular societies are structured in such a way as to ensure that certain groups regularly benefit from the decision process more than others, and if this is the case then why. However, in this particular instance, the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough, we know that the organisations participating in the decision process were deliberately arranged and structured to support 'competitiveness' and the economy (capital accumulation), and that the interests of business were paramount therefore. This research did not seek to 'prove' this, or to discuss the normative implications. This is not to say, however, that these circumstances are either inevitable or desirable.

The focus of this study was more specific. It aimed to examine the way in which power impacted on the development of higher education in Greater on a micro level. It did not attempt to address the wider issues relating to the relationship between education and the economy (see for example Hughes and Tight, 1995; and Tight, 1995). Macro factors were only relevant to the study insofar as they effected local policy-making.

The study examined one policy arena. However, it is important to add that the development of higher education in Peterborough had a large number of facets and involved a large numbers of people, including representatives of local and national government, businesses and education. Many of the participants were involved in the process because they held public offices generally; not because they were particularly interested or equipped to deal with higher education specifically. There would seem to be no immediate reason to assume that such participants' behaviour patterns were any different in this context than in any other area of public policy, although some constraints and opportunities could be context specific.

The aim of the research was to examine the impact of power relationships on public policy using the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough as a case study example. There were four operational objectives: to describe and observe the policy process (in its
formulation stage); to identify evidence of power relationships and their sources; to explain
decision outcomes using different theoretical approaches to power and decision-making; and
where appropriate; to modify theoretical concepts in the light of the empirical evidence.

It is argued that the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough was a public
policy; public policies are made up decisions; which are effected by a series of factors we can
call ‘interests’ (Morgan, 1986). Interests will vary by individual, and are open to the effects of
power. It follows that individual decisions are affected by the organisational arrangements
within which they are made because the latter helps to define interests and incentive structures,
and the way in which society is structured and power distributed generally. Policy changes over
time as actors (individuals and/or organisations) move in and out of the process, adjust their
interests, and so on. Decisions and sets of decisions, whilst reflecting perceived current
relationships between actors may also impact on future arrangements, both organisational and
societal; which in turn impact upon the way decisions are made.

1.2 Structure of the thesis

First, general theories of the public policy-making process are examined. Chapter 2, considers
the meaning of ‘public’, ‘policy’ and the nature of the process, and proposed an analytical
model of power.

Chapters 3 and 4 compare two contrasting models of decision-making - rationality and
incrementalism. It focuses on decision-making in a public context, the relationship between
policy and politics. The theory of legitimate power and issues related to the changing nature of
public policy-making are considered.

In Chapter 5 different theoretical models of community power are discussed in order to inform a
critical analysis of the distribution of power beyond the activities of formal institutions. The
three main models of power and decision-making are reviewed in the context of policymaking
(pluralist, elitist, and Marxist). The specific role of professionals and experts is also considered.

Models of power in and between organisations are reviewed in Chapter 6. The project was
formulated and progressed by different organisations, and people with in them. These
arrangements affect individual choice in the decision process by helping to define interests and
effecting incentive structures.
The individual and power is examined briefly in Chapter 7.

The methodology is discussed in Chapter 8.

The second part of the thesis, Chapters 9 and 10, addresses the case study itself, using the theoretic concepts from Chapters 2 to 7 to guide analysis. Chapter 9 is a brief review of national higher education policy, which defined the context of the development of the higher education development project in Greater Peterborough. Chapter 10 describes the policy process in chronological order, focusing the decision-making process. The theoretical framework presented in Chapters 2 to 7 is used to analyse and explain the decisions, actions and outcomes of the process in order to judge who has power. Critical commentary has been placed after appropriate sections, and largely cross-refers to the detailed analysis given in Chapters 2 to 7.

Some general conclusions are presented in Chapter 11.
The last quarter of this century is witnessing the virtual disappearance of the Weberian distinction between the roles of politician and the bureaucrats, producing what might be called a ‘pure hybrid’.

This issue is examined in further detail below.

A policy is ‘public’ if it is initiated and/or processed within the framework of government (i.e. the body and successive bodies of persons governing the state) (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). The development of higher education in Peterborough involved numerous local, regional, national government bodies, quasi-autonomous non-governmental bodies (quangos) such as the Greater Peterborough Training and Enterprise Council (GPtec), and the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE); as well as businesses and other non-governmental organisations. Subject to regulation and funding by central government, approval from local government, and implementation via a TEC, higher education for Peterborough lies firmly in the public sphere.

2.2 Policy

So what is meant by ‘policy’? Hough (1984) suggests that policy can be thought of as a set of goal oriented behaviours (positive and negative) designed to treat an issue (a problem or opportunity) from identification, implementation and through to succession/termination. Cunningham (1963) ‘describes it as ‘rather like an elephant - you recognise it when you see it but cannot easily define it’. It is argued therefore that ‘Any policy is subjectively defined by an observer as being such’ (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). In this instance is used to refer to the development of the provision of higher education in Greater Peterborough.

Hogwood and Gunn (1984) identify the several specific uses of the term. Perhaps the most common use of the term ‘policy’ is as a broad label to refer to a field of government concern - ‘economic policy’ or ‘foreign policy.’ ‘Policy’ is also used to refer to a statement of intent in terms of broad objectives, or to refer to a model or theory, for example monetarist policy. It is also used to refer to specific proposals, or a programme (also called a ‘policy’). Often this use includes statements of specific action which one organisation would like to see implemented by another. Particular decisions are sometimes dubbed ‘policies’.
‘Policy’ is also used to refer to formal authorisation. When an organisation ‘has a policy’ it means that their declared position and/or proposed action which has been legitimised. Outcomes, i.e. the product of a decision at the point of delivery, may also be referred to as ‘policies’, as are outputs, i.e. the actual consequence of the activities. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) conclude that:

Any public policy is subjectively defined by an observer as being such and is usually perceived as comprising a series of patterns of related decisions to which many circumstances and personnel, groups, and organisational influences have contributed. The policy-making process involves many sub-processes and may extend over considerable periods of time. The aims and purposes underlying a policy are usually identifiable at a relatively early stage in the process but these may change over time and, in some cases, may be defined retrospectively.

Hogwood and Gunn (1984) offer this as a ‘definition’ of policy, but what they actually describe is context, not the thing itself. Hill (1997) argues that the ‘definitional problems posed by the concept of policy suggest that it is difficult to treat it as a very specific and concrete phenomenon’. Policy may sometimes be identifiable in terms of a decision, but very often it involves either groups of decisions of what may be seen as little more than an ‘orientation’. The attempts at definition also imply that it is hard to identify particular occasions when policy is made. Policy will often continue to evolve within what is conventionally described as the implementation phase rather than the policymaking phase of the process’. All these things may be true of the making of public policy, but they do not describe what it is.

Such arguments over meaning are un-necessarily complicated. As Cunningham (1963) suggested we know it when we see it. In fact defining ‘policy’ is either so hard, or so obvious that many people writing about public policy do not even bother to define it and yet produce widely read work on the subject - Hill (1997), for example. Burch and Wood (1983) offer a straightforward definition. They define policy as ‘the products of government: what it is that the government produces’, the outcomes of the activity of government. They identify three types of ‘policy product’:

(1) Rules, regulations and public pronouncements: as laid down in a variety of ways ranging from Acts of Parliament to more general statements of intent.
(2) *Public goods and services*: the facilities that government provides for the population, or a section of it, to use and benefit from, such as roads, health care, police forces and defence facilities.

(3) *Transfer payments*: the transfer of money from one group of citizens through government to another.

There is overlap between the types - the provision of services requires transfer payments for example, but Burch and Wood (1983) suggest that for analytical purposes they may be treated as discrete types. Thus policy-making involves the management of transfer payments, and the production (and delivery) of public goods and services, and rules and regulation. This occurs through the policy process, which itself implies something taking place over time, and resulting in changes to the entity being processed (Burch and Wood, 1983).

Before examining the policy process in more detail, it is worth adding that whilst accepting Burch and Wood’s (1983) definition on what policy is, Hogwood and Gunn’s (1984) and Hill’s (1997) ‘definitions’ are still useful for describing how it is- it is essentially about decision-making by government through a series of stages - policy formulation, and carrying out the policy - implementation. Public policy is complicated and multi-faceted and is best analysed as a series of sub-processes.

Policymaking involves decision-making; a decision being ‘a conscious choice between two possible courses of action’ (Castles et al., 1971). A ‘decision’ itself is not a single act, but a series of subordinate activities each of which is subject to (potential) power relations. Scott (1967) suggested that decisions were made in the following way: by identifying the problem/opportunity; formulating objectives; selecting alternative treatments to meet those objectives; and evaluating likely outcomes; and choosing one. Thus rational policy-making involves the selection of alternatives which lead to the achievement of previously stated goals. Smith (1976), too, suggests that ‘the concept of policy denotes ... deliberate choice of action or inaction, rather than effects of interrelating forces’. Policymaking is purposive.

Against this, Hogwood and Gunn (1984) argue that policy goals (aims) are usually identifiable in the early stages of the process but are often subject to ‘drift’ as the policy develops over time. One reason for this is the fact that policies tend to involve a series of related decisions made by individuals, groups and organisations, each with their own goals and expectations. Individual actors may participate in the process for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily congruent, or even compatible, with others. This leads Hill (1997) to suggest that policy can not be seen
simply as courses of action orientated towards specified goals but also as an more or less independent outcome of political and state bureaucratic processes (see for example, Cyret and March, 1963, 1972; and March and Olsen, 1976, below). It may be the case that the definition policy excludes non-purposive outcomes, but the study of policy should not. This issue is discussed in more detail below in the context of the policy process (2.3) and in decision-making (Chapter 3).

We will see from the discussion of the legitimate model of power (Chapter 5) that those involved in the policy process, in theory do so on behalf of others, to whom they should be accountable. It is assumed that the formal product of politics is policy, which should reflect the interests and preferences of the people. Hill (1997) suggests that whilst many students of policy are motivated by a desire to improve it, many actors involved in ‘doing it’ do not see their role in this way. Instead: ‘Power may be more important to them than policy, and power may be used to further personal ends rather than to try and solve problems in the way presumed in discussions of policy analysis’ (Hill, 1997).

2.3 The Policy Process

The simplest model of policymaking ignores the political process and focuses on the internal processes, embodying the rational model. It is a linear model whereby demands enter the political process (government) in some unidentified way; then information feeds into the decision-making process; and a policy is chosen based on a rational model of decision-making (i.e. searching for goals, formulating objectives, generating all the possible alternatives strategies of dealing with the goal, assessing the likely of consequences of each, and the evaluation of each against objectives; and then making a choice). The decision is then implemented. For something to be ‘rational’ it must be orientated towards a specific goal or aim (Smith, 1976). The model assumes a logical progression from one stage to the next in order to reach that goal. The idea is illustrated in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: A linear or ‘stagist’ model of the policy process.

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<tr>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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We have already noted that policy is not made in a vacuum as this model suggests but rather in historical context, and an existing political framework, which can 'disrupt' the stages. However, this is not to dismiss the 'rational' completely, nor to suggest that the model has no use at all. It highlights the fact that there are more or less distinct processes that underlie the policy process as a whole, and these stages often involve different actors.

With regard to the rational assumption of the model it is worth noting that this also remains of significance. We use the rational model to explain what we think should have happened, what would have been the rational outcome, and define 'political' behaviour and outcomes against it. In addition, despite the fact that rational decision-making is rejected as a descriptive process of arriving at decisions and policies, it has also endured as the ideal type. Jones (1985) suggests two reasons why the rational approach has endured. First, a policy maker must be seen to be undertaking goal-orientated activity in order for that action to be deemed legitimate. Secondly, as Lindblom (1979) argues:

In partisan mutual adjustment and all politics, participants make heavy use of persuasion to influence each other, hence they are constantly engaged in analysis designed to find grounds on which their political or indifferent participants might be converted to allies or acquiescents' (Lindblom, 1979, quoted in Jones, 1985)

A common alternative representation of the policy process is the 'systems' model proposed by Easton (Easton, 1953), illustrated in Figure 2, below.

Figure 2: A systems model of public policy.

Easton (1965) assumed that the political system, where policy was made, existed alongside social and environmental systems and needed to adapt to pressures placed on it by those other systems in order to survive. Inputs into the system include demands (individuals or groups wanting official sanction) and support (voting, paying taxes and obedience to the law). These feed into the political system and are turned into decisions and actions. These then feed back into the system following an implied evaluation of outcome.

The specific strength of the model is that it recognises that pressures are put upon the political system, the assumed centre of policy action, by the environment; and that such pressures may be countervailing. However, it does not really explain the political system as a structure, which is itself dynamic and complex, and one within which political actors may be a source of demands, i.e. the concept of ‘withinputs’. It suggests a neat logical sequence of events, and having made central the significance of the political process itself the model does little to illuminate this aspect. Yet, this is central. Policymaking is a result of conflict and the resolution of interests. In the absence of opposing interests it would be unnecessary.

The decisions that make up policymaking are not simply a result of the inputs identified in Easton’s (1963) model. A decision is a function of the aims and interests of the decision-maker, and potentially one actor’s choice is another’s constraint. It is therefore also influenced by the circumstances within which decision-makers make their decision (Cyret and March, 1963, 1972; and March and Olsen, 1976) (3.3). These ‘circumstances’ are products of the current position, prevailing administrative processes, attitudes and values of society as a whole, and are related to the way in which power is distributed within a society.

Therefore it seems that the difference between the linear and systems models of policy is potentially one of focus. The two need linking perpendicularly. I would suggest that throughout the stages of the process we have the factors described in Easton’s (1965) model coming into play behind it. The fact that some issues fail to make it to the formal decision-making stage, or are not implemented, or the extent to which they deviate from the original goals, and so forth, may themselves be and the result of pressures from elsewhere in the social system, and the operation of power.
2.4 Power

The purpose here is not to provide a comprehensive review of power, but rather to identify key issues, in order to develop a analytical conception of power which can be applied to the study of public policy. It is not presented as the ‘final’ model of power but rather a starting point to ‘guide’ the analysis (see 8.3.2 and Stone, 1989). ‘Power’ is not like something which can be recognised through comparison with commonly identified criteria like a dog or a cat (Clegg, 1975). Rather, it is a concept that relies on models to ‘evidence’ its presence and to provide rules to interpret it. The model suggested below enables one means of assessment (Hindess, 1986).

Models of policy tend a pluralist approach to power associated with Dahl (1957) - policy is the outcome of competition and bargaining between interests. Dahl (1957) used a decision approach to develop his theory of power, defining it in the following way:

A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.

Actors who prevail in, or win, a ‘key’ (Dahl, 1957) decisional conflict can be said to have exercised power. In order to assess who has power it is necessary to look at decisions where there is conflict, where participants are pursuing different preferences, and to see who wins.

Bachrach and Baratz (1962) reject Dahl’s (1957) conceptualisation of power as inadequate, adding that:

power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public considerations of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A (1962).

In defining power thus Bachrach and Baratz (1962) recognised that those with power would deliberately limit the agenda in order to prevent the discussion of issues which did not serve their interests - ‘power is not solely a matter of getting B to do something that she does not want to do, but can also be a matter of preventing B from doing what she wants to do’ (Digeser, 1992). Bachrach and Baratz (1970) termed this ‘non-decision-making’. A non-decision is one:
that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker. To be more clearly explicit, non-decision-making is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed, to gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or failing all those things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970).

Lukes (1974) believes, however, that in many cases even this is not necessary. Power works to prevent us even knowing what are interests are in the first place, so they need not be thwarted - B willingly does something that A wants them to do (Digeser, 1992) because A has manipulated B’s interests (the third dimension of power). Lukes (1974) argued that pluralists have an incomplete picture of the way in which power operates and the way in which public policy is formed because: A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests’. Power operates not simply through resolution of open conflict in formal decision-making, (Dahl, 1957) (the ‘first dimension’ of power); nor through covert conflict which excludes some issues from decision-making (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963, 1970) (the second dimension) alone; but rather there is a ‘third dimension’ which shapes peoples’ preferences in such a way as to prevent conflict arising at all.

If it is the case that power is used to shape actors’ preferences then it is doubtless a most important aspect of power, but it is also the most difficult to identify. Lukes (1974) recognised that his conceptualisation of power raises methodological difficulties. There are two. The first is the condescending nature of this analysis - B can not recognise his or her real interest because they have been subject to socialisation, yet ‘the enlightened academic’ (Hay, 1997) can. The second follows on from the first, that:

The notion of interests is an irreducibly evaluative notion ... So it not surprising that different conceptualisations of what interests are are associated with different moral and political positions ... I would maintain that any view of power rest on some normatively specific conception of interests (1974).

Hay (1997) suggested that Lukes’ (1974) problem arises from his aim to offer a radical, a critical, view of power (Hay, 1997) which involves attributing blame. Hay (1997) believed that he offered a definition of power which maintains the essence of Lukes’ (1974) third dimension, that is not just the B’s actions are affected by direct action by A, but also by A’s ability to define
context, whilst reducing the normative element inherent Lukes’ (1974) model. What is also helpful about Hay is that he actually provides a definition of power which describes what it is, as opposed to how works. Dahl (1957), Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963, 1971) and Lukes (1974) seem to assume that power allows some actors to prevents others from doing things, but ‘define’ power in terms of how this achieved.

Hay defines power as:

The ability of actors (whether individual or collective) to ‘have an effect upon’ the context which defines the range of possibilities for others (Hay, 1995; and Hay, 1997).

This represents a positive view of power - power to, as opposed to the power over, which is negative (Clegg, 1989). However, as Dowding (1996) notes power over also implies power to. Hay makes his definition of power negative in the following way:

Actor A may be regarded as occupying a position of domination [power] over B insofar as s/he has the capacity through intentional or strategic action to transform the context within which B finds himself, and where there is not a reciprocal relationship (i.e. where B’s actions would not have similar effect on the context within which A finds himself/herself (Hay, 1997).

Hay’s definition depends on his acceptance of Lukes (1974) proposition that B is constrained by direct action by A and also by A’s ability to define B’s context, but not in same other terms than ‘socialisation’ (Lukes, 1974):

Power then is about context-shaping, about the capacity of actors to redefine the parameters of what is socially, politically and economically possible for others (Hay, 1997).

This is what Hay termed ‘indirect power’ which forms the basis of legitimate power, chiefly legislation, which is mediated through ‘structures, institutions and organisations’. This is ‘authority’ (Weber, 1978). It does not have a direct and instant impact on B, but defines new limits for B with the potential for direct power by law enforcement agencies. Direct power ‘by contrast is immediate, visible, and behavioural, and is manifest in such practices as decision-making, physical and psychological coercion, persuasion and blackmail’ (Hay, 1997).
Hay’s (1997) contribution is useful to the conceptualisation of power, but incomplete. ‘Having an effect on’ provides a definition for the potential for power, but an operational definition also needs to explain why power ‘has an effect’, why people adjust their behaviour to a modified context, or why they are coerced and blackmailed. Hay (1997) also implies that power relationships describe only those where the effects produced are intended.

The issue of intention in conceptualisations of power is a thorny one and much debated. Russell (1940), Wrong (1968, 1979) and Weber (1948), for example, argued that intention is inherent in power. Saunders (1979) and Clegg (1979) disagreed; they argued that intention confuses causal responsibility with moral responsibility (Saunders, 1979). Dowding (1991) seems to offer a solution to the problem, by recognising what he called the ‘blame fallacy’ and identifying two types of power - outcome and social (Dowding, 1991 and 1996):

The blame fallacy asserts that, because something did not turn out as intended, someone must be to blame ... it suggests that the fact that actor [B] is powerless to bring about outcome x implies that there is another actor [A] who is powerful enough to stop her (Dowding, 1991).

Dowding (1991, 1996) assumed that this is not always the case and that this is why it is important to differentiate between outcome and social power. Outcome power is ‘the ability of an actor to bring about or to help bring about outcomes’ (Dowding, 1996), a Parsonian notion of power (Clegg 1989; Parsons, 1967). Social power is ‘the ability of an actor deliberately to change the incentive structure of another actor or actors to bring about or help to bring about outcomes’ (Dowding, 1996). Thus social power is intentional and deliberate; and outcome power is not, although outcome power can still have an effect on actor B.

The other key concept to Dowding’s (1996) conceptualisation of power is that of ‘incentive structures’:

The incentive structure is the full set of costs and benefits of behaving in one way or another. Typically actors have power over others to the extent that they can manipulate other’s incentive structure. Taking away options from a choice set, or making the cost of an action higher or lower, or making the benefits higher or lower [or making the costs and benefits appear to have changed (Dowding, 1992)], will encourage some actions and discourage others. Changing the incentive structure may involve straightforward coercion, or subtle alterations in the incentives to behave one way or another (Dowding, 1996).
In this way Dowding (1991, 1996) provides the link to Hay's (1997) context/structure. Actor A may have an effect on Actor B by deliberately changing the context, that is the incentive structure, within which B chooses their action - social power. In Hay's (1997) legislation example, therefore the issue is not the legislation *per se* but the threat of punishment which is attached to it, or the sacrifice of reward associated with it (Dowding, 1996). Actors make rational judgements as to how likely they are to be caught and convicted, as well as deciding to what extent they value a prohibited action, and choose their action accordingly.

The ability to change the incentive structure is not, however, equally shared, but 'structurally suggested' (Dowding, 1991). The range of options each individual will consider is contingent on the social space they occupy and context-relevant resources they have. Dowding et al. (1995) and Dowding (1991, 1996) identified five sets of resources which affect and incentive structure allowing Actor A to change the context for Actor B (Hay, 1997). They were (1) knowledge or information ('the information set of actors') (Dowding et al. 1995), (2) legitimate authority, of those either in authority (bureaucrats) or of authority (professionals and experts) (Dowding, 1996), (3) 'unconditional incentives to affect the interests of others', (4) 'conditional incentives to affect the interests of others' based on scarce and valued resources; and (5) reputation.

'Unconditional incentives occur when one actor changes the decision structure of others by making changes to his environment' (Dowding et al., 1995) (Hay's indirect power); whilst conditional incentives 'occur when one actor threatens or makes an offer' to another to bring about behavioural changes' (Dowding et al., 1995) (Hay's direct power). Threats must be credible and part of whether they are perceived as credible or not will depend on reputation. Reputation might also cover Freidrich's (1941) 'rule of anticipated reaction'. This suggests that some actors will not make demands because they anticipate failure and it is not worth the bother of trying. However, it is argued that sometimes reputation can distort the relationship between actual power and actual resource, a process Morriss (1987) termed the 'vehicle fallacy'. Advantage can also be gained by earning a reputation for stubbornness.

1 Italics added.
2 Italics added.
Some modification to Dowding's (Dowding, 1991, 1996; and Dowding et al., 1995) resource list is required. Knowledge and information are not resources of power per se, but as relative factors. The key issue in the potential for power becomes therefore the ability to control resources (Clegg, 1979). Thus, the five sets of power bases which will affect an incentive structure, and allow Actor A to change the context for Actor B (Hay, 1997) - become (1) [the ability to control] knowledge or information, (2) legitimate authority, of those either in authority (bureaucrats) or of authority (professionals and experts) (Dowding, 1996), (3) [the ability to control] 'unconditional incentives to affect the interests of others', (4) [the ability to control] 'conditional incentives to affect the interests of others' based on scarce and valued resources; and (5) reputation.

Dowding et al. (1995) suggested that '[m]aterial resources generally underlie both unconditional and conditional incentives', but reputation, knowledge and information (and silence) are also tradable resources which can be directly traded themselves (Morgan, 1986). These issues are addressed in the context of power in organisations (Chapter 6). Formal authority is more complicated as it is legitimate only to the extent that the right to command rather than the actual content of the command is held to be legitimate. Behind authority lurks threat and reward (in political terms Hobbes’s (1991) notion of ‘reserve powers’). As Dowding (1996) himself recognised; if authority breaks down it is the threats and sanctions, i.e. conditional incentives, which are used to produce compliance.

The incentive structures are therefore the key issue to understanding why people act in the way they do. Power then can be loosely defined as to 'have an effect upon' something or someone by means of effecting incentive structures. This capacity is not confined to formal decision-making and the negotiation and compromise associated with it, as Dahl (1957) argued; nor to formal agenda setting as Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963, and 1970) supposed. Instead, it applies to the context in which people (might) act (Hay, 1997).

Hindess (1986) states that: An actor is a locus of decision and action, where the action is in part a consequence of the actor's decisions (Hindess, 1985) ... Analysis of what actors do, their actions, the struggles they engage in and the relations between them, therefore includes analysis of their decisions. Thus, this model of power can be operationalised by observing the actual decision choices made by actors, followed by an analysis of their choice situations and the incentive structures they faced in making the choice without recourse to real and perceived interests (Lukes, 1974).
Given a difference between outcome and social power it is also necessary to make some assessment as to whether the incentive structure faced by the actors any one time is the result of the deliberate actions of others, or through 'some non-deliberative process akin to the process of natural selection' (Dowding, 1996). By this means it is possible to make structured judgements as to the way in which power affects policy-making.

The focus of the research case study is on the impact of power on the formulation stage of the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough as an example of public policy. To contribute to the aim this chapter has addressed what the terms 'public' and 'policy', and the 'policy process' mean. It also proposed a conceptualisation of power to guide the analysis. 'Public Policy' is used to describe the products of government (Burch and Wood, 1983). It is 'public' because it is processed and within the framework of government. It was argued that the study of policy is undertaken in order to improve it, but practitioners may not share this aspiration. Two models of the policy process were described and it was suggested that whilst the two are normally presented as conflicting models there is scope for combining them perpendicularly for a more complete description of the process. One describes the management process - the linear model; the other the political process within which the other takes place. Common to both is the centrality of decision-making. This is modelled in the next chapter.
Chapter 3

3. Decision-making

In the previous chapter two models of the policy process were presented - the linear and the systems models. It was suggested that by combing the two perpendicularly a more complete picture of actual policy-making is presented. In the linear model the policy process is usually viewed as a series of stages. It was argued that such an approach, whilst often criticised, enables analysis of a larger process which is complex enough to require some initial structure, and that for the sake of analysis it was possible to break the process down into two main elements - policy-making/formulation and implementation. The focus of this study is the formulation of policy which, in broad terms, refers to the process of deciding what to do, choosing an action. Formulation has been the traditional focus for the study of policy and it is significant that some theorists, Lindblom (1959) for example, use the terms ‘policy’ and ‘decision-making’ interchangeably. This chapter presents two conflicting models of decision-making.

The way in which policy is made, and should be made, is subject to some dispute. Models of the policy process, such as that adopted by Smith (1976), for example, assume that policy-making is a rational planning process undertaken by a neutral administration. Bureaucrats undertake goal oriented, purposeful action, based on (reasonably) comprehensive analysis of policy options and their related consequences. Against rational models, stand so-called ‘incrementalist’ ones, which suggest a more evolutionary approach to policy-making. These models are examined below.

3.1 The Rational Model

Herbert Simon’s Administrative Behaviour (1957) still marks one the most significant contributions to the theory of organisational decision-making, assuming that organisations and the people who staffed them were motivated by ‘getting things done’ (Simon, 1957). He was concerned that existing theories of decision-making were inadequate because they made too many assumptions about the nature of organisations and failed to define the individual decision-maker in any useful way. Simon complained that:
At the one extreme we have the economist who attributes to economic man a preposterously omniscient rationality ... At the other extreme, we have those tendencies in social psychology traceable to Freud that try to reduce all cognition to affect ... showing that people aren't nearly as rational as they thought themselves to be (Simon, 1957).

Simon sought to argue that man is not rational in the economic sense, nor is he irrational in the Freudian sense. Instead, he exhibits a limited rationality which Simon termed ‘bounded rationality’.

The model of rational decision-making involves the selection of an alternative course of action which will maximise the decision-makers’ values or goals, following an analysis of alternative options and their consequences. Thus ‘objective rationality’ (what Lindblom (1959) terms ‘comprehensive rationality’) implies that the decision-maker will behave in the following way, by:

(a) Viewing the behaviour alternatives prior to a decision in panoramic fashion, (b) considering the whole complex of consequences that would follow each choice, and (c) with the system of values as criterion singling out one from the whole set of alternatives’ (Simon, 1957).

‘Values’ to Simon are preferences (goals, a desired end). They do not involve complex philosophical or psychological considerations.

Rational behaviour is goal orientated, purposive, and means-ends related:

Behaviour is purposive in so far as it is guided by general goals and objectives; it is rational in so far as it selects alternatives which are conducive to the achievement of previously selected goals (Simon, 1957).

Simon argued that the idea of ‘purposiveness’ implies a hierarchy of decisions, in that a person is required to make many sub-decisions in order to achieve a larger goal. He adds then, that ‘in so far as decisions lead towards the selection of final goals they will be called ‘value judgements’; in so far as they involve the implementation of other goals they will be called ‘factual judgements’. ‘Ethical’ decisions can not be inherently ‘correct’ or ‘good’, and factual
decisions can only be evaluated in relative terms - 'whether they are correct, given the objective at which they are aimed'. Factual judgements are used to achieve ethical ones.

Simon (1957) broke the term 'rational' down into qualifying elements. He recognised, that there may be a difference between what is rational in terms of organisational goals and what is rational for an individual member of said organisation. Thus:

A decision is organisationally rational if it is orientated to the organisation's goals; if it is personally rational if it orientated to the individual's goals.

However it was not until much later that Simon realise that personal and organisational rationality might not only be different, but possibly in conflict (Simon, 1983).

Simon did not, however, see 'rationality' as the easy, straightforward concept his critics seem to assume. He recognised that time will have an impact on the available choices, and that imperfect knowledge would also have an influence. Simon also recognised the issue of group behaviour, for example anticipating the behaviour of one's colleagues, or the effect of authority. So, rationality is undermined, limited, or bounded by two factors: the decision-maker and his context:

It is impossible for the behaviour of a single, isolated individual to reach any high degree of rationality. The number of alternatives is too great, and the information he would need to evaluate them so vast that even an approximation to objective rationality is hard to conceive. Individual choice takes place in an environment of 'givens' - premises that are accepted by the subjects as bases for his choice; and behaviour is adaptive only within the limits of these 'given' (Simon, 1957).

In the end Simon (1957) concluded that, contrary to the rational (economic) model, rational decisions are limited by certain factors. These included: incomplete and fragmented information; unknown consequences; shifting attentions, i.e. the decision-maker cannot make all his decisions at the same time which causes shifts in values and priorities attached to individual decisions; and inadequate memory. Rationality was also affected the fact that of experience was of greater significance than predication in influencing behaviour; as well as mans' tendency towards routine and habit; and the constraints applied by the organisational framework within which the decision is processed (Simon, 1957).
In the second edition of *Administrative Behaviour* (1957) Simon presented two more distinct models of decision-maker:

While economic man maximises - selects the best alternative from among all those available to him; his cousin, whom we call administrative man, satisfices - looks for a course of action that is satisfactory or 'good enough'. Examples of satisficing criteria that are familiar enough to businessmen, if unfamiliar to most economists, are 'share of the market', 'adequate profit', 'fair price'.

Economic man deals with the 'real world' in all its complexity. Administrative man recognises that the world he perceives is a drastically over-simplified model ... He is content with this gross simplification because he believes that the real world is mostly empty - that most of the facts of the real world have no great relevance to the particular situation he is facing (Simon, 1957).

When administrative man 'satisfices', he chooses an option which serves the purpose, or is good enough, and ignores unnecessary complexity. He makes decisions based on information he has and which he also has the cognitive capacity to handle, measured against outcomes he can anticipate from experience, all chosen from within the existing organisational framework. Simon argues that 'common sense' accords with this model.

With so many factors apparently undermining rationality it is tempting to ask why Simon continued to pursue the idea of rational decision-making at all, but he argued that rationality could be procedural. The whole point of *Administrative Behaviour* (Simon, 1957) was to examine ways in which decision-making might be improved, that is more goal effective, through better co-ordination of staff, better communication between them and so forth. He argued that:

> The need for an administrative theory resides in the fact there are practical limits to human rationality, and that these are not static, but depend upon the organisational environment in which the individual's decisions take place. The task of administration is to so design this environment that the individual will approach as close as practicable to rationality (judged in terms of the organisation's goals) in his decisions (Simon, 1957).

At the time Simon did not consider himself capable of such a challenge beyond identifying the need for better co-ordination and communication, lacking the 'linguistic and conceptual tools' (1957) demanded for such an enterprise. By 1960 he was ready to present a prescriptive model
of decision-making (Simon, 1960) and published *The New Science of Management* to deal with exactly that, based on the assumption that decision-making should be rational and purposive.

### 3.2 Incrementalism

Probably the most significant critic of the rational theory of decision-making was Charles Lindblom. In *The Science of Muddling Through* (1959) Lindblom not only rejected the idea that rational decision-making was possible, but also the belief that it was inherently desirable. Lindblom saw no benefit in either rational decision-making (outcome) or rational analysis (process). In the latter case this was partly because he feared it would undermine political agreement and consensus by presenting a 'total' plan under which the goal would justify the means, disregarding influence from outside the immediate decision process. Lindblom associated rational policy-making with grand planning and the tyranny to bureaucratic elites.

Lindblom (1959) described policy-making as a process of 'continually building out from the current situation, step-by-step, and by small degrees'; as opposed to Simon’s (1957) rational model. Lindblom (1959) understood this to mean 'fundamentals anew each time ... and always prepared to start from the ground up' (Lindblom, 1959). This seems a somewhat extreme interpretation of Simon.

Lindblom (1959) proposed instead a decision-making method described as 'successive limited comparison':

In the method of successive limited comparison simplification is systematically achieved in two principal ways. First, it is achieved through limitation of comparisons to those policies that differ in a relatively small degree from policies presently in effect. Such a limitation immediately reduces the number of alternatives to be investigated and drastically simplifies the character of investigation of each ... The second method of simplification of analysis is the practice of ignoring possible consequences of possible policies, as well as the values attached to the neglected consequences.

Lindblom’s (1959) argument starts from the same point as Simon’s (1957) in that he too dismisses rational decision-making as possible given man’s inability to predict the future and so forth. The difference is that Lindblom (1959) argued that ‘successive limited comparison’ provided the basis for ‘good’ decision-making in the context of these limitations. Rather than develop inadequate methods to ‘enhance’ rationality, as suggested by Simon (1957), Lindblom
(1959) argues that 'successive limited comparison' was already the best method of decision-making available.

In 1963 Lindblom co-authored *A Strategy of Decision* (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963) with David Braybrooke in which he sought to develop his 'successive limited comparison' approach to decision-making. Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) rejected the rational-comprehensive model or the 'synoptic idea' on the grounds that it failed to deal with the following:

- Limited human problem-solving capacities
- Situations where there is inadequate information
- The costliness of analysis
- Failure to construct a decent evaluative method
- The closed relationship between fact and value
- The openness of variables which effect the policy process
- An analyst's need for strategic sequencing
- The diversity of policy problems (adapted from Hill, 1997)

The refinement of the basic model of successive limited comparison they termed 'disjointed incrementalism'. It involves examining decisions that differ incrementally from each other and those that differed incrementally from the status quo, choosing from the limited options, and applying only incremental changes. The method is only suitable when the change required is minimal, but Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) argued that these were the only sorts of decisions that decision-makers could actually deal with, essentially amelioration policy. Decisions were made by the setting of vague objectives that would be controlled by existing policies and finance, followed by a process of trial and error: A policy is directed at a problem; it is tried, altered, tried in its altered form, altered again and so forth (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963).

Such decisions were described as 'disjointed' because each individual policy and/or problem was analysed at different (chance) points without any overall planning, control or co-ordination.

In *The Intelligence of Democracy* (Lindblom, 1965) Lindblom returned to the issue of coordination. He argued that decision-making was a process of bargaining and negotiating among and between decision-makers. This had been implied in *The Science of Muddling Through* (Lindblom, 1959), but not given any particular significance. By 1965 Lindblom was explicitly
arguing that such adjustment and compromise gave rise to a democratic but co-ordinated decision process. This process, which he termed 'partisan mutual adjustment', involved adaptive adjustments 'in which a decision-maker simply adapts to decisions around him', and also manipulated adjustment 'in which he seeks to enlist a response from other decision-makers' (Lindblom, 1965). This embodies the notion of compromise through negotiation and bargaining, assumed in pluralist models of politics and policy-making.

In Politics and Markets (1977) however, Lindblom recognised that some groups, that is businesses and corporations, were in a better position to make policy than others were. While recognising that the incremental decision-making was perhaps not as ideal as he had originally supposed Lindblom (1977) maintained that it was still preferable to centralised planning. He wished to see the development of political methods by which the influence of ordinary citizens in the policy process could be enhanced. What is also interesting is the way in which Lindblom came to believe that the apparent homogeneity of opinion demonstrated in politics in the USA was indoctrinated. Lindblom described what is essentially a dominant ideology, that is the existence of a unifying set of beliefs that are transmitted through the church, the media and schools (1977, Ch. 15). He believed, however, that the influence of ideology on decision-making is limited, but the mere recognition of this phenomenon marks a significant shift away from the pluralist assumptions associated with his earlier work.

3.3 Garbage Can Theory

Cohen, March and Olsen (1972), and Cyret and March (1976), also argued essentially an incremental model of decision-making. They suggest that it process, not ideology, which constrains and defines policy. Decision-making is not comprehensively rational nor optimal because in practice alternatives are not sequential. Decision-makers search for solutions one by one and once they find one that will 'do' they stop looking. Search is also driven by failure; it is reactive to a specific issue, not proactive and general; what Hogwood and Gunn (1986) describe as 'issue search'. More than this March (Cohen, et al., 1972) go on to propose that these failures and the solutions for problems were only accidentally related. This idea, which they termed 'Garbage Can Theory', is described thus:

Suppose we view a choice activity as a garbage can into which various problems and solutions are dumped by participants [note that the solutions already exist; they are prior to or concurrent with the problem]. The mixture of garbage in a single can depends partly on the labels attached to the alternative cans, but also depends on what garbage is being

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produced at the moment, on the mix of can available, and the speed with which garbage is collected and removed from the scene (March and Olson, 1976).

Cyret and March (1992) later concluded that whilst there is an order to decision-making, it is ‘temporal rather than hierarchical or consequential’. In other words:

Problems and solutions are attached to choices, and thus to each other, not because of their means-ends linkages but also because of their simultaneity. At the limit, almost any solution can be associated with almost any problem - provided they are contemporaries (1992).

Kingdon (1984) made a similar argument in terms of policy streams. He described something bigger than a decision but the idea is similar. The critical factors in whether or not a policy or decision is made is first dependent upon the current position having failed, and there being some alternative solutions available at that time. Particular policy outputs occur when policy, politics and the problem converge. They are therefore haphazard and largely incremental.

There has been an assumption that incrementalism is the mode of practice in decision-making within pluralist, liberal-democratic systems, while the rational-comprehensive model of decision-making have tended to be associated with totalitarian societies (see for example, Popper, 1966). Hill (1997) suggests that this position is no longer tenable as it is now clear that ‘planning’ in communist societies was often either haphazard, or dependent upon standard ‘programmed’ bureaucratic responses. Nor is it fair to assume that it is only the ‘Left’ of politics who have rejected the benefits of ‘piecemeal social engineering’ (Popper, 1966), that is of the modest and responsive trial and error of incrementalism. Hill (1997) notes that the elimination of ‘socialism’ in the institutions of the central and local state and the restoration of ‘Victorian values’ in Britain by Margaret Thatcher provides recent examples of the same phenomenon from the ‘Right’.

Rational policy-making has endured as ideal aspiration (Jones, 1985), even where incrementalism provides a deliberate method for achieving a goal. As such it is argued that the two methods are not mutually exclusive. The issue is perhaps not so much whether the policy process is rational or not, but the way in which, and the extent to which, bargaining between interests, which characterises policy-making, prevents a goal being achieved, or the extent to which interests are neglected in purposive decision-making.
Hill (1997) suggested that 'Simon’s rational model envisages politicians making values choices, framing ‘premises for the more detailed decision processes to be carried out by officials’. Simon’s (1957) assumptions reflect an early work of Wilson’s (1887), which tried to delineate the respective territories of ‘politics’ and ‘administration’ (Hill, 1997). Hill adds that Wilson’s notion has been much criticised as a descriptive model, as it is common to find both parties ‘on the “wrong” side of the boundary’. Chapter 4 looks the two systems of politics and administration and examines the ways in which they inter-link, or indeed, overlap.
Chapter 4

4. Political Decision-making

In the preceding chapter two models of decision-making were presented - the rational model and the incremental model. It was stated that rational models assume a logical and planned process towards pre-specified outcomes. Incrementalists (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963, Lindblom, 1959, 1965, 1977) argue that decisions are not, and should not (Popper, 1966), be made in this way. Instead decision-making should involve small deviations from the current position until a satisfactory position is achieved. Simon’s rational process is reflects the assumptions of Wilson’s (1887) model of government (the noun) which separates ‘politics’ and ‘administration’, and Weber’s (1978) conceptualisation of the pure type modern state. Politicians provide the ‘value judgements’ (Simon, 1957), the ultimate goal, and bureaucrats the ‘factual judgements’ required to meet the goals. Conversely, incremental decision-making embodies the notion of competition and bargaining between interests. Politicians and citizens are involved in both processes; as well as the bureaucrats. This debate highlights the issue of who does what in the policy process.

This chapter presents the formal model of political decision-making and the notion of legitimate power, or formal authority. The second part of this chapter will examine the specific issue of the state bureaucracy within this broader framework of legitimacy.

4.1 The Theory of Legitimate Power

Policy-making is rule bound, both in terms of constitution arrangements, but also in terms of ‘political culture’. Constitutional rules govern the governors. Their powers are formally defined and delimited. Constitutional rules provide a ‘framework of norms and practices which define and regularise the management of political relationships’ (Rose, 1965, quoted in Smith, 1976). These rules are not ‘given’ however, and the way in which they work (or not) depends upon political culture, that is the values and beliefs of the society in which they operate.

The British system of government is formally, democratic. This means that the wishes of the people are reflected in the decisions of government. A democratic government is both representative and responsive. According to Pickles (1971) a democratic government ‘must,
first, be able to elicit as accurately as possible the opinion of as many people as possible on who shall be their representatives and on how the country ought to be governed. Secondly it must provide ways of ensuring that those chosen by the public do in fact do what the electorate want them to do or that they can be replaced if they do not, even between elections' (Pickles, 1971, quoted in Smith, 1976).

Direct democracy is impossible and has been replaced by representative democracy - representatives are elected by the people to undertake government on their behalf. Smith (1976) argues that in Britain however, it is only the selection process itself that is representative, and not the elected members' subsequent behaviour. Members of Parliament (MPs) are not expected to act as delegates or agents for their constituency. They are subject to periodic re-election and this alone is meant to enable the people to express their preferences by choosing MPs who represent their interest. Citizens vote for those candidates who promise action and legislation which they value. Thus:

"Representation ... carries with it the clear implication of delegation from the people to a legislative body [i.e. Parliament] ... Through Parliament the representatives of the people frame laws and decide policy by majority vote (Smith, 1976)."

The idea of a majority vote assumes that the people are not all going to agree over choices of representative or preferences, whilst also assuming that some type of agreement is required in practice. The majority vote supplies this, but can only claim superiority in terms of numbers, not virtue or 'right'. It is further assumed that all people have an equal right of forming the majority, and minorities can attempt to become majorities. Thus basic freedoms exist to protect minorities.

'Effective government requires the appointment of office-holders whose responsibility it is to implement the laws' (Smith, 1976). In the model office-holders (bureaucrats) are 'anonymous and loyal servants of the government, neutral in their political outlook and recruited on the basis of merit, a qualification which excludes ideological predisposition and therefore patronage' (Smith, 1976). It is assumed that officials are goal orientated and rational (Simon's 'rational judgements' (Simon, 1957)), goals having been given to them from their political masters (Simon's 'value judgements'). Officials are responsible to the government, which is responsible to Parliament, which is elected by, and responsible to, the people.
Parliament also sets up Local Authorities, which are designed to allow local democracy. However, given that ‘they owe their powers, their territories, their status, their very existence to statutes passed by Parliament’ (Smith, 1976) there seems a limit to their independence and ability to represent ‘local interests’ alone therefore. Nevertheless, ‘Local democracy, in theory, ensures the responsiveness of administration of the peculiar interests of local communities, and protects the general health of democracy’. The way in which local government is organised, that is with elected representatives and paid meritocratic officials, parallels that of central government.

Thus public policy is formulated at the intersection of two systems - the political one (the elected representatives) and the administrative one (bureaucratic officials responsible for carrying out policy), which together form the ‘state’. This pattern is repeated down through regional and local government, but not all issues are dealt with at all levels. Defence for instance is not the concern of local government. The participants in a particular policy arena are therefore specific to its content and context.

The system of legitimate power does not work in quite the same way as it is modelled to do so in theory in practice. One major issue is related to the participation by citizens who are often less significant in practice than the formal model assumes. Policy or decisions made by the state or government are meant to reflect the will of people, and in order for ‘the people’ to impact on the process, they must participate in it, and to be able to do this, they must understand it. The extent to which they do is of central significance to democracy and accountability.

The model of legitimate power presented by Smith (1976) above explicitly assumes an administration which is ‘neutral’ and rational - ‘it is rational insofar as it selects alternatives which are conducive to the achievement of previously stated goals [stated by politicians]’ (Smith, 1976). These two claims beg two obvious questions - one, to what extent is the state administration neutral; and two, to what extent it is rational and purposive; rational and purposive in the sense of meeting policy objectives. It is the latter of these two points that serves as the location for debate between Simon (1957 and Lindblom (1959) discussed in Chapter 3. It is now necessary to look at the issue of bureaucratic neutrality.
4.2 Bureaucracy

Basic models of policy and political decision-making have tended to assume that the administration, or bureaucracy, is a neutral body which carries out policy devised by politicians, but delegated to them for implementation. Thus officials are accountable to elected representatives who are in turn accountable to the people. Weber (1978) provided a model of this.

Weber (1978) identified several characteristics that defined a ‘bureaucracy’. Specialisation refers to the way in which the organisation splits its main task into specific and distinct sub-tasks, which are assigned to specific categories of employee (i.e. specialists). Authorisation describes the way that authority is assigned with tasks. This implies a third characteristic, hierarchicisation. Authority is delegated from above. Delegation is controlled through contractulisation, the detailed specification of duties, rights, accountabilities and so on.

Bureaucracies are meritocratic typically. Because tasks are defined it is possible to make explicit the skills required and recruit an individual who can demonstrate possession of those skills. This means there is a tendency towards careerisation, the pursuit of higher office. Different positions within the hierarchy carry different remuneration packages, and intangible benefits, such as status differentiation. Together these reflect the tendency towards ‘stratification.

The actual process of work is defined, leading towards formalisation. These processes are documented - standardisation. Individuals and individual tasks are controlled and co-ordinated from the centre, or the top, thus promoting centralisation. The actions of individual members of the organisation are legitimised through the separation of their work, and themselves as individuals. Similarly, power (authority) is seen as belonging to the office and not the incumbent individual, and there is a tendency therefore towards officialisation and impersonalisation. Thus at the base of rational bureaucracy is a shared belief in the legitimacy of its existence, its rules, its staff and its policies.

Bureaucratic administration Weber (1945, 1978) argued, ‘means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge. This is the feature that makes it specifically rational’. Bureaucrats were also promoted on merit and/or seniority. Each official is judged by the contribution they make to the purpose of the organisation. Staff have fixed terms of
employment, under which they were paid fixed salaries, again according to their position in the hierarchy. In Weber’s pure type employment was permanent with pensions paid on retirement, however this is increasingly not the case.

Weber (1978) suggested that rational bureaucracy was the most common sort of organisation of the modern state because it was ‘technically superior’. Bureaucracies ordered out personal emotions in order to achieve organisational goals rationally and more effectively. They are also arranged in such a way as to make them technically efficient, achieving their pre-stated ends in a parsimonious way.

However, Weber (1947, 1978) also recognised that there were serious disadvantages associated with such a system. Whilst strict rules resulted in an efficient organisation they also undermined personal freedom. Regulation of tasks prevented ‘spontaneity, creativity and individual initiative’. Weber was also concerned that individuals charged with specific tasks would lose sight of the whole. He worried that bureaucrats would tend to pursue uniformity for its own sake, or the sake of security. Thus, in the last analysis Weber felt that the process of rationalisation and the accompanying bureaucratisation was both irrational and aimless. Ultimately it would destroy the traditional values that gave life its meaning. Weber further believed that the development of a state bureaucracy, whilst inevitable, undermined the very essence of democracy.

Democracy, Weber argued, moved politics away from a single leader to administrative institutions and political parties, which were themselves massive bureaucracies. Democracies

Weber recognised two kinds of rationality. ‘Formal rationality’ describes calculated means-ends rationality, with the focus on the process of means, and the ends taken as ‘given’. ‘Substantive rationality’ refers to a process that amounts to deconstruction of the world into a series of discrete, simpler concepts in order to facilitate calculation.

‘Substantive rationality’, Weber argued ‘cannot be measured in terms of formal calculation alone, but also involves a relation to absolute values or to the content of the particular end to which it is orientated’ (Weber, 1947). These absolute values, were those which governed behaviour as a whole - mystical and traditional beliefs, such as the Calvinistic asceticism which had, he believed, allowed the development of capitalist activity. Ultimately these would disappear, as technical (formal) rationality needed no such base.
had elections, which required administration, which needed bureaucracies. The associated culture demanded mass education, welfare administration, and a variety of other functions also requiring bureaucracies to manage them. Yet, as soon as a mass administration was involved in the management of democratic systems the meaning of democracy changed so radically that it no longer made sense to call it that. Specifically, technical elites formed. Thus, according to Weber (1947) 'the question is always who controls the existing bureaucratic machinery. He concluded that:

... control is possible in a very limited degree to persons who are not technical specialists. Generally speaking, the trained permanent official is more likely to get his own way in the long run than is nominal superior ... who is not a specialist ...in normal conditions the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overpowering. The 'political master' finds himself in the position of the 'dilettante' who stands opposite the 'expert', facing the trained official (Weber, 1947).

Weber (1947) concluded that officials were not neutral agents implementing the decisions of politicians, but are actually better placed to control the process and product of government, and nor were politicians subject to accountability to the electorate, as prescribed in the theoretical model of legitimate power. He felt that most citizens are incapable of making a political decision and the election process served as the most effective way of producing a leader who may go some way to curb the despotic, if unimaginative, tendencies of the 'headless bureaucracy' (Weber, 1947). 'Liberal democracy was described as:

A sort of charismatic rule concealed behind the legitimacy which is formally derived from the will of the governed, and dependent on it for its existence. In fact the leader rules by virtue of devotion and confidence in him as a person.

Weber thought that things could be worse. This less-than perfect process still provided some input, and therefore checks on the otherwise closed and self-interested bureaucracy.

Clegg (1990) provided a useful summary of Weber's (1978) argument of expert versus dilettante in the following terms:

The political leader is engaged in a struggle for power. Such a person should serve ultimate values, ultimate ends... In order to exercise power in the pursuit of such ultimate values the political leader must be able to call upon a reliable administrative staff as an instrument of
authority. This involves bureaucracy. Members of this bureaucracy must prove themselves by impartial performance, whilst political leadership proves itself in the competition for votes during elections and in heroic performances in the legislature ... Ideally, then the bureaucratic organisation as a whole is a simple tool in the hands of the political masters ... Weber was aware that such an ideal was rarely attained in practice ... The power posits on the bureaucracy based on expert knowledge constitutes a major source of countervailing power to that of the political master. Such political mastery is premised in part on those sources and resources which the bureaucracy enables access to ... Against this, the political masters can try and control a bureaucracy by juggling internal conflicts between bureaucrats, promoting this person, favouring that person, exploiting the competition for promotion which can enable them to control recalcitrance with the help of antagonistic colleagues (Clegg, 1990).

Considerable debate has centred on this issue concerning the extent to which the bureaucracy is in fact controlled by political leaders. Newton (1976), for example, applied Weber’s concerns to an empirical study of Birmingham City Council. He found that elected politicians were not as amateur as Weber’s model would predict, nor as transient. However, he did find that the politicians he interviewed ‘were conscious of and jealous of their role as the political master of public servants, and were also aware of the sorts of tactics which officers use to get the decisions they want’ (Newton, 1976). Two-thirds identified one or more of the following:

1. Writing such a large number of long reports the committee members cannot possibly find the time to read them all.
2. Writing reports which were so short that they contain inadequate information for committee members to make their own decision.
3. Writing reports which are full of technicalities and statistics.
4. Introducing plans for departmental reorganisations which are supposed to cut costs but actually increase them.
5. Bringing in supplementary agendas in order to catch committee members unawares.
6. Introducing a few deliberate errors into the first paragraphs of the report in the hope that members will be so pleased at finding them that they let the rest go through.
7. Trying to sell ideas to the committee so that the committee believes they were theirs in the first place.
8. Withholding information or bringing it forward too late to effect decisions.
9. Presenting reports which make only one decision seem possible.
10. Rewriting but not changing a rejected plan, and submitting it after a decent interval.
Whilst this describes the specific context of elected politicians *viz. a viz.* permanent officials in the democratic system of local government, it may also describe the more general relationship between experts and other policy makers. It also works both ways. In the case of the higher education project in Peterborough for example, there is more evidence of the ‘non-expert’ Steering Committee members themselves filibustering and engaging in protracted tangential or circular arguments (Morgan, 1986) instead of discussing substantive issues presented in discussion papers, than there is of discussion papers being deliberately too long, short or late.

Weber’s (1947) view that bureaucracies dominate others in the political process was shared by Michels (1949), although his focus was interest groups and not the state bureaucracy itself. Michels attempted to explain why the socialist movement would not achieve emancipation. The basic principles of socialism and liberal democracy he accepted, but felt that in practice they are unachievable owing to three factors that were ignored by both theories - the nature of man himself, the nature of political struggle, and the nature of modern political organisations. Specifically, Michels held that people were not rational; they were base and greedy. In addition, he felt that the masses were psychologically incapable of complex decision-making; they needed leaders to motivate and organise them. The political struggle was not about high-minded principles, but about the pursuit of power. The core of Michel’s argument rests on the third factor - the nature of organisations.

As Weber (1978) had argued, Michels (1949) also believed that democracy was inconceivable without organisation, but also that organisations bring with them domination. Individuals join interest groups to have their interests represented, but in order for the groups to function properly they need to be small. As a result a representative system is used where delegates represent the formally sovereign mass and carry out their will. However, this gives rise to a professional, appointed staff and a division of labour - a bureaucracy. As a result the once radical organisations thus become a rigorously defined and hierarchical bureaucracy. As procedures and activities become more complicated the rank and file are obliged to leave business to the leaders who have the time and knowledge to handle them properly. Decisions are taken on behalf of members by smaller groups, from which most members are excluded. Increasingly member depend on instruction from their leaders. Hence Michels’ (1949) belief that ‘the oligarchic structure ... suffocates the basic democratic principle’, becoming instead ‘petty, narrow, rigid and illiberal'.
Promotion depends on a superior’s sponsorship or patronage, sycophantic behaviour is key, and as such individual initiative is ‘crushed’ (Michels, 1949). Once in position the leader’s main concern is maintaining their own positions. Michels identified a ‘mania for promotion’ that results in a ‘displacement of goals’. The organisation becomes an end in itself because it carries power, and leaders become increasingly less radical in order to maintain the organisation and their position within it. Leaders do this by playing politics.

Leaders develop skills in ‘the art of controlling meetings, of applying and interpreting rules, of proposing motions at opportune moments’. (Morgan (1986) illustrates the significance of this point, and specific strategies are covered in Chapter 6). They control publications, and thereby information flow, and use this to consolidate their position. They appoint less senior staff and Michels suggests that they will choose fellow travellers to support their position. They also maintain their own position by fulfilling the mass’s psychological need to be led. Successful leaders will create a feeling that the ‘Le parti c’est moi’ among members (Michels, 1949).

Importantly, the failure of democracy at an organisational level results in failure at societal level. Michels (1949) believed that whilst a ‘technical and practical necessity ... it is organisation which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandatory over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organisation says oligarchy’. As with Weber (1978) Michels (1949) saw no practical alternative, however.

Michels claim that organisation inevitably resulted in the exclusion of the majority of members at the expense of a self-interested oligarchic leadership was later tested by Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956). They examined the organisational structure of the International Typographical Union (ITU), a print union in the USA and found it to be an exception to the ‘iron law of oligarchy’. Two internal groups and frequent elections enhanced accountability of the leadership. Many decisions were put to referendum - changes in union regulations and officials salaries for instance, and procedures were in place whereby rank and file members could call for a referendum on a decision. Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956) observed that changes in leadership resulted in real changes in policy.

These factors led Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956) to conclude that the ITU was a democratic organisation with a high level of genuine participation, so that he who says ‘organisation’ does not necessarily say ‘oligarchy’. However, they also argued that the ITU was organised within a peculiar set of circumstances which helped promote democracy locally. On the whole they
considered the prospect of democratic organisation unlikely given that most leaders of organisations control ‘financial resources and internal communications, a large permanently organised political machine, a claim on legitimacy, and a near monopoly over political skills’; coupled with the fact that most rank and file are seldom sufficiently interested to take up trade unionism vigorously (see also Dijlas, 1957).

Far from being neutral administrative bodies, bureaucracies are themselves frequently seen as a source of self-interested political demands, and with considerable bases in its control - knowledge and expertise, for instance. Tullock (1967), for example, claimed that the state bureaucracy was the largest producer, and also consumer, of public services and as such they would inevitably over supply (see also Gould, 1981). It was in their interest to do so because they derived benefits from larger size: ‘As a general rule, a bureaucrat will find that his possibilities for promotion increase, his power, influence and public respect improves, and the physical conditions of his office improve, if the bureaucracy in which he works expands’ (Tullock, 1967).

Tullock (1967) argued that politics, policy-making and bureaucracy were based on the same set of behaviours as those of the firm and its customer - i.e. self-interest and the maximisation of utility. As a result of this political parties made excessive promises during elections in order to win votes from citizens who also wanted to maximise their utility. Once in power politicians continued to demand excessive delivery of services. They would have to make deals for support in order to secure support for the services promised in the election (pork barrel politics), delivery of which would be necessary for re-election which would further increase spending. He believed that bureaucrats were just as interested in increasing the size of their departments and budgets, and that the checks and balances associated with liberal democracy were inadequate to the degree of control required. The solution lay in ‘the Market’. Market mechanisms such as contracting out, privatisation and performance rewards, would help reduce the impact of bureaucratic self-interest because increased service provision would cease to equate with larger departments and the attendant benefits. A similar, and equally influential argument was offered by William Niskanen (1971), but neither model stands empirical testing (Lewins, 1991). None the less these arguments have had a huge impact on the actual development of public organisations, a point to which we will return.

Dunleavy (1991) also suggested that Tullock (1967), among assumed a model of bureaucratic self-interest that is too narrow. He argued that size is not a measure of success, as indicated by
the fact that the most highly paid roles within the civil service are those in the smaller
departments, such as the Treasury. Different public services have different career structures,
different constraints and so forth, which means that bureaucratic self-interest is likely to
manifest itself in different ways according to specific circumstance. This is partly true (the
Treasury for example), but it should be added that those different structures and constraints are
also partly a result of the arguments of Niskanen (1971) and Tullock (1967) which have
promoted the redesigning of the state apparatus precisely to escape the tendency they described.
If senior bureaucrats of the 1980's and 1990's are rewarded for reducing their budgets, and
shedding their services this is not by chance (see for example, Self, 1993; and Stretton and
Orchard 1994).

Dunleavy (1991) suggests that bureaucrats are self-interested, but that size is not their main
objective; the key issue is one of 'shaping'. His argument is based on a study of the civil
service during privatisation under Thatcher. Dunleavy (1991) found that bureaucrats were more
concerned about advancing their interests in the same direction as politicians and business, than
growing in physical or budgetary terms. He argued that there was little resistance to
privatisation because it served the class interests of senior civil servants, in that they held on to
strategically significant jobs which they would keep after privatisation, whilst 'savings' were
made further down the bureaucratic pyramid at the operational/delivery level. (Dunleavy
(1991) also noted a direct relationship between level of post and success in securing budget.)

He identified several reasons why budget maximisation should not be seen as the only rational
motivation factor for self-interested bureaucrats. Budgets are controlled, not by one, but by
many bureaucracies, which leads to competition for funds. One budget grows at the expense of
another and the larger the budget the greater prestige. However, prestige is derived from
relative size, not overall size so it is not rational to pursue bigger budgets overall (Tullock,
1967). Second, it is only rational to push for a larger budget if the effort involved in achieving
it is less than the anticipated return. Bureaucracies all have different strategies for maximising
utility depending upon what they do and how they are funded. Each position will have an
optimum (as opposed to absolute) level of budget-maximising which will be affected by its
position relative to others.

Dunleavy (1991) also argued that rank and seniority would affect the extent to which an
individual bureaucrat attempts to pursue their own interests. Bureaucracies are not the
homogeneous, unified bodies that Niskanen (1971) and Tullock (1967) assumed. The more
senior, the more self-interested, and the more they will choose to manage a small bureau: Rational officials want to work in small, elite, collegial bureaux close to the political power centres. They do not want to head up heavily staffed, large budget but routine, conflictual and low-status agencies (Dunleavy, 1991).

Dunleavy (1991) argued that the more powerful agencies - control, transfer and contract agencies - do not attempt to grow. Instead they ‘adopt a bureau-shaping strategy’ composed of the following options: major internal reorganisation, including strengthening the policy-making domain and shedding separate routine functions; transforming internal work practices, i.e. increasing the importance of control activities. Other options included: redefining relationships with external partners (in order to maximise policy control and divesting routine functions), ‘load shedding, hiving off and contracting out’ functions which do not fit the desired ‘shape’. Thus, Dunleavy (1991) concluded that:

Bureaucrats typically do not embark on collective action modes [i.e. open ended budget maximisation] of improving their welfare unless they have exhausted individual welfare boosting strategies [i.e. vertical promotion, transfers from smaller agencies to larger ones, lateral transfer, or those between sub-divisions of the same agency, upward job regarding, etc.](See Dunleavy, 1985: 302) (Dunleavy, 1991).

Recent reorganisation of the state has allowed senior bureaucrats much opportunity to pursue their individual self-interest in such ways, given the trend away ‘from hierarchy to contract’ (Harrison, 1993). This describes the process whereby government departments have contracted out specific functions and services to other bodies, thus replacing the Weberian notion of a unified, hierarchical state bureaucracy with a complex array of executive agencies, public-private partnerships, and other private bodies with public functions. Indeed, Osbourne and Gaebler (1992) have been able to identify 36 alternatives to public service delivery other than by public sector employees, now deeply entrenched in the practice of policy and politics. Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) are a product of this trend. They were set up the Department of Employment and now contract with them to deliver services prescribed by the department which has retained strategic responsibility.

The underlying issue, as indicated by Tullock (1967), is one of control; at this level how officials can be controlled and made accountable to their political masters, and also represents temporal issues; it is partly a response to a continuing process of failure. The post-war period, when bureaucracy was at its height in government, was a direct result of the belief in technical
solutions, using knowledge and expertise to limit or ameliorate society's ills. This period saw a massive growth in the recognition (or definition) of social problems and government interventions to deal with them. By the 1970s 'belief in experts and government faltered' (Parsons, 1995), the New Right lamented the spread of the over-weakening state and sought new solutions in management and markets (Buchanan et al., 1978; Tullock, 1967).

4.3 Markets

Much of the development of markets in practice has its origins in the work of Hayek (1986). He proposed that government failure was more common than market failure because the market was rationally superior. Much of Hayek's analysis developed in direct response to the normative Keynesian economics which required considerable government intervention in the economy. Hayek believed that this created two problems - it drove up inflation, and also resulted in government overload. This refers both to the increased management role of government, but also to its inability to meet upwardly spiralling expenditure.

Free markets and individual freedom were the solutions. According to Hayek (1976) markets were better able to adapt to change, and would also help develop entrepreneurship as against expensive and destructive welfare dependency. Hayek (1986) argued that 'Through the pursuit of selfish aims the individual will usually lead himself to save the general interest, the collective actions of organised groups are almost invariably contrary to the general interest, even the poorest would benefit from general improvement'. The market may not produce equality, but it is fair - it is spontaneous and any inequalities are unintentional. Besides which, inequalities are good as they provide incentives.

For the market to work properly individuals within the market place need freedom - freedom to choose, and freedom from state intervention. Hayek (1976) assumed a traditionally liberal view of the role of the state: it was there to protect property rights and enable the functioning of the market. All other things, including education, should be left to the market. Privatised services would increase choice and efficiency.

The impact of Hayek's (1976, 1986) ideas on the provision of public services and the organisation of government after 1979 was profound. Ball (1990) comments that 'Some aspects of the once unproblematic [Keynesian] consensus are now beyond the pale, and the policies which might have seemed economic barbarisms twenty years ago now seem right and proper', a
view supported by Stone (1998). Post-1979 governments have set themselves the task of ‘rolling back the frontiers of state’, accompanied by aggressive privatisation programmes.

In practice big government was not dismantled, apparently as resilient as Hayek (1986) feared, but renamed or re-organised into ‘quasi-markets’. Resolute attempts were made to undermine bureaucrats and professionals, and ‘public sector management’ replaced ‘public administration’ with public choice at its centre (Self, 1993). The result has been a massive complication of the policy system in terms of the organisations that formulate policy options and deliver policy products (Kooman (ed.), 1993; Metcalf and Richard, 1992; and Smith, 1985).

Rhodes (ed.) (1992) suggests that:

Governments increasingly resort to a variety of instruments for pursuing their policies. Functions are not allocated to general purpose governments ... but to special purpose authorities. Institutional ‘ad hocaracy’ is the order of the day, a process which generates conflicts between agencies competing for ‘turf’ and between central and local government which resents being bypassed. Government has not been rolled back but splinters and politicised, a process which can only frustrate the attempts to control through centralisation. Such fragmentation not only thwarts control and fuels policy slippage (or deviancy from central expectations) but also increases governmental complexity.

Parsons (1995) suggests that with the increase in the number of public-private partnerships (PPPs), increased involvement of the voluntary, or third, sector, and, widespread ‘marketisation’, a slice through a public policy arena looks less like ‘Battenberg’ than ‘marble cake’. Public and private have become more difficult than ever to delineate, and more to the point this fragmentation has also undermined democratic control and accountability, ‘whether through the alleged emasculation of local authorities, the erosion of ministerial accountability by agencies, or the growth of non-elected, special purpose bodies and patronage appointments’ (Rhodes, 1997).

This has resulted in the ‘hollowing out of the state’; that is delegating responsibility upwards to the European Union (EU), and downward to executive agencies and similar bodies, including Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs). Given that the development of higher education in Peterborough has been led by a TEC it is worth taking some time to examine them more closely.
4.3.1 Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs)

Published in December 1988, the White Paper, Employment in the 1990s (Department of Employment, 1988) announced the Government's plans for the overhauling of training. Britain's industrial performance against its competitors was poor, and relatively low levels of qualified workforce was seen as part of cause (Evans, 1991). Central to the plan was the establishment of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) based on the US models of Private Industry Councils (PICs).

TECs were a natural product of the political and ideological mores of Thatcherism. Training was no long tripartite, but deliberately not so. Consistent with Hayek's (1986) theory the Thatcher governments did not feel inclined to involve labour (trade unions) in their activities. TECs were to be business-led organisations, which would contract with government to plan and deliver local training, and to develop support for small and start-up businesses. They were set up by civil servants from the Department of Employment (now the Department for Education and Employment, or DfEE), mainly on secondment.

TECs are private companies limited by guarantee with Boards from which two-thirds of members are drawn from the private sector. The remaining third are chosen by them and must 'support the aims of the Council' (Department of Employment, 1988). Board members are local leading business people chosen for business expertise, not representativeness (Haughton et al., 1995a). It was felt by government that business leadership would encourage other businesses to participate in training, and that the local element would allow the local community greater commitment to the strategic aims of TECs, which the Area Manpower Boards had failed to do. As Peck (1992) points out:

It might be argued that this was a somewhat naive assumption since it was precisely those people, i.e. employers, who had failed to train in the past, thus resulting in the skills shortage. The House of Commons Employment Committee described it as 'a triumph of hope over experience'.

TECs aimed to increase employer investment in skills, to motivate young people to acquiring the skills required to sustain a competitive economy, to re-skill the unemployed in order to get them back into jobs in occupational areas for which there was a shortage. In addition, they were to encourage individuals that 'learning pays', to encourage the development of flexible and appropriate provision of training, and undertake business support (Vere, 1993).
In 1989 local groups, led by employers were invited to submit proposals for TEC developing funding to the Training Agency by April 28. The proposals were considered by the National Training Task Force (NTTF), a group of which two-thirds were business people, who advised the Secretary of State. Nineteen successful applicants were announced on June 1 1989. By 1991 there were 82 TECs in England and Wales. One of these was Greater Peterborough TEC (GPtec), established in 1991.

Each TEC has a operating agreement with the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE), managed through the Regional Office (following their establishment in 1993), based on a corporate and a business plan which details performance targets and budget forecasts and so forth. There is an inherent conflict in the fact that TECs are private limited companies, with legal accountability and liability, and the contractual arrangement they have with the Department. Funding is mostly output related, although they are increasingly expected to generate income. They are subject to audit by the regional office (in Peterborough’s case Government Office for the Eastern Region, GOER).

TECs have responsibilities for managing the delivery of prescribed government programmes (Training for Work, Youth Credits and so forth). They do not undertake service provision themselves, but commission work from others through a process of sub-contracting to third parties such as employers, Further Education (FE) Colleges, and private training organisations. Over time, however, they have expanded their remit to include education. In 1992 TECs were also given the role of co-ordinating local business support by means of Business Links. This came with additional funding from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). In November 1993 Integrated Regional Offices were established. One of their tasks would be to administer the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB). Successful bids require involvement of a Local Authority or a TEC, but in practice both are expected. TECs may now also bid for European Funding. In February 1994 the Secretary of State for Employment announced that TECs could merge with Chambers of Commerce, thus rationalising support services (in theory at least) and increasing the TEC's resources for economic regeneration.

One final issue which was bound to impact on the development of local partnerships was the review of local authorities undertaken by the Local Government Commission which was assessing the appropriateness of existing boundaries, and in some case two-tier functions becoming a single unitary one. Peterborough was one area discussed, and became a unitary
authority with responsibility for its own education on April 1 1998. This is of significance because TECs are expected to work in ‘partnership’ with their local community. As Vere (1993) explains:

They are responsible for assessing local economic and social needs, setting a local agenda for action in meeting those needs, planning and delivering suitable local training and business support programmes and ensuring their targets and objectives are met. Within their communities they are a catalyst for change, provide a forum for local leadership to address training and business needs in their areas and to forge links with all organisations who are active in this sphere.

TECs have three sets of accountabilities then - to their shareholders as limited companies, to the Secretary of State for Education and Employment with whom they contract, and to the local resident and business populations. It is the second of these that is the most developed.

The Department of Employment’s Guide to Planning (1989) states clearly who the stakeholders are:

A TEC’s primary customers are the businesses that operate in its area and local people. As a consequence, organisations which represent local businesses or their interests will be important stakeholders in the work of the TEC. Providers of vocational education, training and support or enterprise will also be significant stakeholders. Stakeholders will want to share and shape a TEC’s vision and will be vitally interested in playing their part to achieve this goal. Indeed the chances of a TEC realising its vision will be substantially reduced if these stakeholders are not actively consulted and involved.

To this end TECs are required to explain their channels of communication to their constituency in order to ensure accountability. The Planning Guidance (Department of Employment, 1989) goes on to say that:

It is very important that a TEC does not see its various resources in isolation from each other or from those of the wider community. A TEC’s programmes and other resources are best seen as tools to be used in combination to help mobilise investment by businesses, individuals, and community organisations. The challenge for each TEC is to weave the resources together into a coherent, flexible package of services that secures this result.
TECs are explicitly and unashamedly capitalist: they exist to support business. While it may be an interesting debate as to whether public money should be used to fund private enterprise, it is not appropriate to do so here. This is not to say that there are not normative reasons for doing so elsewhere. However, in terms of description we can safely assume that TECs support the accumulation process, and that employers have privileged access to decision processes. The mere fact that Haughton et al. (1995a) undertook a study of TECs and Their Non-employer Stakeholders makes the point; so deliberately privileged are employers (businesses) that they need not be mentioned.

The Guide to Planning (1989) also recognised the following as non-employer stakeholders: company and employer organisations, industry training organisations (ITOs'), voluntary sectors and community groups, local authorities, educational interests, trade unions, the employment service, training providers and economic development interests. Haughton et al. (1995a) found from a survey conducted in 1994 that their entire sample TECs identified local authorities as stakeholders, and particularly important ones. Five also specified the regional office as significant. However, some did not see ITOs, and voluntary and community groups as significant. For the sake of this study we will concentrate on two - local authorities and educational interests.

Evans (1996) commented that: 'many TECs have been sensitive to the fact that they are entering an already crowded policy arena and need to build upon that than cut across existing positions', including that the Local Authorities. Working relationships were felt to be reasonably good, but any mistrust or impatience appears to have mutual.

Many TEC boards included local government officers (as was the case in Peterborough where the Chief Executive of Peterborough City Council was a member of the board), although local politicians were deemed ineligible for membership. Haughton et al. (1995a) suggest that the relationship between TECs and local authorities is not, however, a 'steady' one and changes in one can produce problems for both. One TEC officer from their study commented that:

I think our biggest problems, and a downside for our relations with the local authorities for the last three months and probably the next twelve months, is local government reorganisation [above], which is inevitably causing a political vacuum (TEC Officer quoted in Haughton et al., 1995a).
Haughton and colleagues (1995a) also found that in one case the boundaries between the TEC, the local authority and the Chamber seemed to have collapsed altogether as the three parties undertook joint initiatives. Such an arrangement did not go without criticism however, as it seems to have supported those three groups at the expense of others:

People are in the periphery, or are not involved, [some of whom] are trying to find a role, but just don’t understand what’s going on. [There are] people who are not on the scene who don’t understand it, who don’t understand whether the TEC’s taken over the Chamber, or whether the Chamber’s taken over the TEC, and what the hell’s going on (TEC Officer quoted in Haughton et al., 1995a)

Haughton et al. (1995a) suggest that such an arrangement does make lobbying more difficult, as it is no longer clear whom one should be approaching with regard to specific issues.

The relationship between TECs and local educational interests (i.e. schools and colleges) was found by Haughton et al. (1995a) to be particularly successful. One TEC suggested that the Local Education Authority (LEA) was keen to establish close relationships within them in order to reach the GM (grant maintained) schools; and another saw ‘partnerships’ as a means of linking with the community as a whole via pupils and parents. The case study of higher education shows this to be a more mutualistic relationship - GPTec (JB) wanted LEA support in order to secure work in the future. The case also supports Haughton et al.’s more general point about the nature of the relationship between these two particular organisations.

According to Haughton et al. (1995b) TECs are not felt to be properly accountable. They found that the way in which TEC board members were appointed was seen as opaque and haphazard by stakeholders, and with justification. As, one TEC Director’s commented:

We’ve very little accountability, well no accountability. To whom are the people who sit on the TEC board accountable? Themselves! (TEC Director, quoted in Haughton et al. 1995b).

They also found that some non-employer stakeholders felt they had been deliberately marginalised in the design of TECs. They found that local failings are often attributed to the

*independent non-statutory bodies set up to replace the Industrial Training Boards (ITB)*
structure of TECs in general, and not ascribed to specific personnel and local attitudes (Haughton et al., 1995b).

This chapter opened with a description of the theory of legitimate power. It suggested that policy is made where politicians and bureaucrats interact. Politicians decide and administrative officers implement the decision. This conceptualisation, termed the ‘formal model’ by Peters (1987), is based on pure type models of bureaucracy (e.g. Weber, 1978; and Wilson, 1887). Peters (1987) argues that in spite of evidence that the theoretical model is flawed in practice it remains of importance. As with rational decision-making (Simon, 1957), the model represents ‘a normative standard against which to compare the real patterns of interaction and policy-making’ (Peters, 1987).

We went on to describe a model where ‘the political executive and senior civil servants are assumed to be competitors for power and control over policy’ (Clegg, 1990), based on the arguments of Weber (1978). It was noted that since 1979 there has been considerable ‘restructuring’ (Flynn, 1993) of government administration by politicians in an attempt to undermine the control of the bureaucracy over them, and ostensibly the people they serve. Hence the development of ‘markets’ and ‘choice’ and the introduction of alternative methods of delivery of public services (see Osbourne and Gaebler, 1992).

TECs provided an example of both a ‘contract’ and ‘partnership’ arrangement directly relevant to the research. It was argued that TECs are not particularly accountable, but certainly are more so to their sponsoring department (DfEE) than to their other ‘customers’, and large businesses (Haughton et al., 1995b).

It was suggested that because ‘restructuring’ (Flynn, 1993) organisational arrangements for policy-making have become more complicated, and less visible. Democratic control and accountability are more difficult than ever. Shaw (1991) argued, therefore, that a new focus is required for the study of local politics and power. He shared the view of Haughton et al. (1995b) that it is increasingly difficult to identify the diverse agencies active in the public sector, and argues that access to them had become more onerous. No longer is it appropriate to focus on the institutions of the democratically elected (local) state. This is ‘conceptually out of step with the realities of an increasingly fragmented and complex [local] environment’. Instead Shaw (1991) suggested that: ‘As a starting point of contemporary studies students of local politics could do worse than to consult the American community power literature of the 1950s
Chapter 5

5. Community Power

In the preceding chapter a theory of legitimate power was modelled (Smith, 1976). This described the way in which power is distributed in the formal model of liberal democratic government - the people elect politicians against promises made, who then give direction to administrative officials (civil servants, or bureaucrats) to implement. It was then argued that this model reflects theory and not practice. The organisation of government is more complex than the model allows, and power seldom emanates from predictable sources in order to secure decisions chosen by the electorate. Shaw (1991) suggested that models the community power, models which seek to describe and explain power in situ, rather than focusing on the formal power attached to political institutions, could provide a more appropriate framework for analysis. This chapter reviews the main models.

It should be noted that there are overlaps between theories, but essentially Pluralism focuses on the way in which power is dispersed throughout a political community. Elitism focuses on how power is concentrated. Marxism also focuses on the way in which power is concentrated, but with particular emphasis on economic structures and class conflict.

5.1 Pluralism

Pluralist approaches to power predominate in policy-making literature, which, like all the other theories, have evolved over time. Indeed, given the variety of theories embraced by the term, Jordan (1990) found it surprising that critics ‘can reject it with such confidence’. He suggested that pluralism might be better seen as an ‘anti theory’ in that pluralist theorists have tended to reject other models of community power, chiefly, elitist models, more than attempt to establish an alternative one. Jordan was a lone voice however, and most researchers recognise a cohesive theory and literature on ‘pluralism’. Dahl (1957), the most significant contributor, may not have planned to develop an explicit model of pluralism, but in testing the elitist one, did so none the less. Moreover the principles of pluralism implicitly underlie formal theories of government, politics and policy.
In *Who Governs?* (1961) Dahl applied his theory of power (1957) to the community of New Haven. He set out to answer the following question:

In a political system where nearly every adult may vote but where knowledge, wealth, social position, access to officials, and other resources are unequally distributed, who actually governs? (Dahl, 1961).

Specifically Dahl explored two opposing hypotheses: the elitist view that a unified oligarchy governed New Haven; or that the city's political system could be described as polyarchy - meaning the rule of many, not strict democracy - the rule of all (Dahl, 1961). In a polyarchic society power is neither equally distributed, nor concentrated in the hands of a few. Dahl addressed the problem by analysing the formal decision process involved in the resolution of three apparently separate issues - urban renewal, nomination of the mayor, and the location of schools and teachers' salaries.

Dahl assumed that power 'involved the ability to get another person to do something that he or she would not otherwise of done' (Morgan, 1986). Power was a simple, direct relationship, which could be discerned in formal conflict between interests - Lukes' (1974) first dimension of power. Dahl (1961) examined formal decision-making processes and identified the individual or group whose will prevailed against articulated opposition from another individual or group.

He argued that by looking at three unrelated issues he had shown that the issues were independent, that is different people were involved in each. Some groups who were opposed to each other on one issue joined together on others. Thus he argued that no single elite controlled a number of areas of policy. Against elitist claims he argued that economic classes were not the primary determinant of politics:

Economic notables, far from being a ruling group, are simply one of many groups of individuals which sporadically emerge to influence policies and acts of city officials. Almost anything one might say about the influence of economic notables could be said with equal justice about half a dozen other groups in New Haven (Dahl, 1961).

Dahl (1961) supposed that policy-making involved competition and exchange between groups who must seek compromise through a process of bargaining in a formal setting. 'Resources of influence', or power bases, were widely dispersed, which gave a range of individuals or groups the opportunity to bargain. Such resources include social standing, access to cash, credit and
wealth; and access to certain resources at the disposal of elected leaders - legal powers, jobs, popularity, and control over information.

A successful pluralist culture relies on the free flow of accurate information from which citizens may judge the actions of government, and make choices. As such, the issue of information is sometimes viewed as potentially problematic due to manipulation associated with elite ownership. Dahl believed however that this effect would be tempered by the need to select stories that interest people. He also argued that most people relied on television for immediate news and press for more detail. They also read national and local papers, which offer different perspectives. This plurality of access, Dahl suggested, insured that information was accurate and objective and allowed the citizens to form genuine preferences, which they would act on.

Ordinary individuals had access to the policy process, through elections and the right to form pressure groups, and Dahl felt it was 'unwise to underestimate the extent to which voters may exert indirect influence on the decisions of leaders by the means of elections' (1961). Issues that interested voters could not be neglected if a politician hoped for re-election. Concomitantly, politicians would not deal with those issues that their electorate found unacceptable.

Elections only gave the voter an episodic opportunity to express their preferences. Furthermore, for the most part elections involved 'bundles' of issues, some of which individual voters might be indifferent towards, or even find unacceptable. The answer lay in the formation of pressure groups. Believing that most people found politics 'remote, alien, and unrewarding' (1961) Dahl felt that they would only become active in a pressure group if they were particularly moved to do so. Therefore pressure groups provide indications to politicians of what is important to the electorate, and how strongly they feel. Conversely, if no pressure group develops to promote (or protect) an interest policy makers can assume that everyone's interests are being met by current action.

Within this the state bureaucracy was also viewed as just another actor in the political process with resources and interests, for which it was also obliged to bargain, negotiate and compromise. Indeed, the term 'State' itself is seldom used at all. Pluralists, concerned by the normative connotations associated with the term, prefer to speak of 'government'.
Dahl's (1961) view of New Haven was endorsed by Polsby (1965) who also disputed the prevailing elitist theories of community power using Dahl's (1957, 1961) method. Polsby (1965) confirmed Dahl's claim that power was not equally distributed throughout society, but was widely spread across it. Even the least influential groups had access to the decision-making at some point in the process, because sources of power (money, information, and expertise) were 'distributed non-cumulatively' and no source was dominant.

Newton (1969) identified several weaknesses in Dahl's formal model. Newton found that in practice Dahl's claim that the citizens of New Haven enjoyed an inclusive political structure was not supported by evidence. Specifically, he stated that:

Compared with working class people, middle class people are more likely to participate in politics, be better informed about politics, more interested in politics, more likely to join a political and other organisation, having a higher sense of political competence, have more political skills, and are likely to vote, and are more likely to attempt to influence the course of political events (Newton, 1969).

He concluded that whilst there may not be a single power elite, society tends to produce a small number of men who are always more powerful than others. A disproportionately high number of poor people do not vote, for example; the easiest form of participation. Cloward and Fox-Piven (1988) believed this to be caused partly by the attitudes of those in power; the poor are quite simply not part of the political community. Registration is difficult, and literacy necessary. Dahl (1961) recognised that many people did not vote, but suggested that they had some indirect influence none the less. Newton (1969), on the other hand, believed that Dahl (1961) overstated the significance of indirect control. Voters vote on packages of policies and people and it is impossible to deduce specific choice, and the idea of the median vote representing the majority assumes that those who do vote do so with knowledge, confidence and selflessness. Newton (1969) also suggested that paid officials may have a much stronger influence over elected politicians than Dahl (1961) supposes. These issues were explored in Chapter 4.

In his own study of local democratic processes in Birmingham Newton (1976) also found a low level of participation in local elections. He suggested therefore that whilst the ultimate responsibility of voting depends upon the individual, it was also necessary to acknowledge that secretive government was likely to reinforce apathy. He found that:
Little important business is done at the public meeting ... perhaps for the very reason that they are public (Newton, 1976).

In addition he noted that the City Council did little to inform the voters before an election. Newsletters dealt with only uncontrovertial material. The council appeared to send no other communications to the local citizens. Thus he argued that local elections were ‘defective as a means by which citizens can influence or control political leaders’ (1976). They had limited success in encouraging annual participation by the community and then gave little indication of voters’ real preferences. He concluded therefore that the local state was to a large degree autonomous.

Many British community power studies conclude that power rests in the hands of a local elite, or with less localised business elites (Friedman, 1982; and Saunders, 1979, 1980). Friedland (1982), for example, argued that business interests were served because of the desire of local public agencies for inward investment. Businesses do not need to be active in order for their will to be carried out. They are ‘lucky’ (Dowding, 1991), or can free ride.

Whilst Dahl (1961) recognised that not all members of a community participate in the political process, and do not exercise power, it is unclear however whether power is exercised against them to exclude them. In pluralist theory such non-participation is assumed to indicate contentment with prevailing politics of the community.

In the late 1960s any notion that minority voices were being heard through the formal decision process was shattered. As racial and social violence erupted in major cities of the USA, the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ indicated that an empowered and open society had yet to be realised. McLennan (1989) believes that the Vietnam War was most significant in highlighting this fact:

Nothing could more dramatically reveal ... the coercion which lay behind the consensus, the brutalization behind homilies of freedom, and the imperial interests which sustained an advanced economy upon which, according to pluralism, democratic norms depended (McLennan, 1989).

Similarly in Europe; the events of 1968, the resurgence of micro-nationalist movements, such as those seen in Ireland; and economic crises (‘stagflation’) resulted in an attacks on pluralism, both as a descriptive and a prescriptive model. Erstwhile Pluralists found their positions untenable, and in some cases anti-pluralist prescriptive theory developed. Crozier et al. (1964)
for example, proposed, the 'overload' thesis: that government was being bombarded with too many disparate voices and had become too responsive to minority demands. A more frequent response however, was a modification of 'classical' pluralism to what McLennan (1989) calls 'critical pluralism', 'neo-pluralism'.

5.1.1 Neo-pluralism

Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) suggest that neo-pluralism represents a distinct and separate conceptualisation of community power. With McLennan I would argue that this is not the case, but rather that neo-pluralism represents a matured and more sophisticated version of pluralism.

Dahl, together with Lindblom, (1976), revised his view of how power was distributed in society during the 1960s and 70s. Rejecting the earlier idea that individuals participated in the political process only when their interests were challenged or ignored and were otherwise happy, Dahl and Lindblom, began to see 'consensus' as 'indoctrinated complacency' (1976). The mass media and education system were seen as creating an 'irrational and deformed public consciousness' (Dahl, 1982) by removing the 'key' issues from the political agenda completely to leave the preferences of the powerful incumbents paramount and unchallenged. Lindblom (1977), in particular, saw the biases of the system leaning towards businesses:

The mere possibility that business and property dominate polyarchy opens up the paradoxical possibility that polyarchy is tied to the market system not because it is democratic, but because it is not.

Thus, polyarchy favours the capitalist system and businesses precisely because it gives the appearance of equal opportunity and participation. This marks a considerable shift away from their earlier beliefs (e.g. Dahl, 1961). Dahl and Lindblom (1976) had started to believe that the political system itself is structurally determined by business therefore:

It becomes a major task of government to design and maintain an inducement system for businessmen, to be solicitors of business interests, and to grant them, for its value as an incentive, intimacy of participation in government itself. In all these respects the relation between government and business is unlike the relation between government and any other interest group in society (Dahl and Lindblom, 1976).
Any previous ideas of the parity of interest groups was now ‘unthinkable’ (Lindblom, 1977). Neo-pluralists have been forced to look critically at the imperfections of the polyarchic society as is, and acknowledge that inequalities in resources and access to the policy process do exist, and they are skewed in favour of business. Increasingly neo-pluralists have also been inclined to accept the notion of engineered ‘consensus’ (Dahl and Lindblom, 1976) bringing them closer to the elitist theorist whom they sought to refute.

In the last analysis therefore perhaps the difference lies in (neo-)pluralist’s innate optimism which allows them to commit to the principles of polyarchy and examine its workings in the hope of enhancing it. The belief remains that liberal democracy, if flawed, is essentially about satisfying the preferences of ordinary people, and that capitalism and liberal democracy are still the most rational and effective systems devised for achieving this.

5.2 Elitism

The pluralist theory expounded by Dahl (1961) and Polsby (1965) developed in response to elitist theories. Dahl (1961) examined whether the town of New Haven was oligarchic or polyarchic, concluding the latter. Polsby (1965) set out more deliberately to ‘test’ the proposition that the community were governed by a single elite which was made up of an ‘upper class’ who co-opted political and civil leaders (Mills, 1956) and to develop a methodology which would not lead inevitably to elitist interpretations. Polsby (1965) and Dahl (1961) levelled their criticism at what Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) term ‘radical elitism’, a critical hybrid of the original prescription, or classical elitism (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987) of Pareto (1966) and Mosca (1939).

Classical elitism, embodied in the work of Pareto (1966) and Mosca (1939), describes the ‘the belief that government by a small ruling group was normatively desirable’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). It was prescriptively anti-democratic and anti-liberal and need not be examined in any detail here therefore. Of more significance is the ‘critical elitism’ which grew from it.

During the 1920s the hitherto European elite theory began to evolve in the USA. There, it was transformed from its anti-democratic origins to a radical anti-pluralist position. Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) suggest that a significant absence of socialism in North America left ‘an unoccupied ... niche into which elite theory could fit’. From the mid-1930s onwards
sociologists undertook a series of studies of community power and it was these studies that Polsby (1965) set out to disprove. Lynd (1929, 1937), and more significantly, Hunter (1953) and Mills (1956) for example, concluded from their studies of community power structures that only a few people (an ‘elite’) controlled local decisions thus forming a major challenge to the entrenched pluralist view.

Mills (1956) argued that the nature of organisations allowed those at the top to monopolise power (see also Michels, 1968) (4.2), and that certain institutions held ‘pivotal positions’ in society. Their leaders formed the elite. Such organisations included the major corporations, the military and the federal government. Because of this ‘coincidence of economic, military and political power’ three way consensus was easily reached, allowing decisions and policies to be taken and implemented without conflict between them, or the involvement of others. This represents the ‘village model’ of the bureaucracy and governance (Peters, 1987).

Mills (1956) found that all three elites were sufficiently socially similar to form a single cohesive elite, which he called the ‘power elite’. Their cohesiveness was supported through shared backgrounds giving rise to shared values and interests, and being reproduced through the social processes such as inter-marriage and so forth, as well as occupational interchange between the groups - a businessman becoming a politician, for instance. These factors led Mills to conclude that US society was dominated by an elite with ‘unprecedented power and unaccountability’.

The resulting ‘decline of politics as a genuine and public debate of alternative decisions’ caused the excluded majority to withdraw from participation where they saw the same polices represented by the two major parties and considered the whole process of political activism rather pointless. Also excluded from the ‘command posts’ ordinary people increasingly neglected their democratic concerns and duties, only reinforcing the positions of the existing elites. Interestingly, Mills (1956) suggested that whilst an elite did exercise power, elite domination was new to the States and not inevitable.

Dahl (1958), however, argued that Mills had identified those who had the potential for power, not those who were powerful. His evidence was circumstantial and not conclusive. This is a common argument in the theorising of power. Martin (1970), for example, argues that it is necessary to distinguish between having power and exercising it. In other words it is possible to occupy a position which ‘gives’ power, without actually exercising, or needing to, exercise it.
This distinction has been the subject of considerable debate (see for example Clegg, 1989) which need not be rehearsed here. The definition of power as 'the ability of an actor ... to bring about outcomes' (Dowding, 1991) adopted for this study assumes that power is dispositional (see 2.4).

This problem highlights the significance of fundamental differences in approach. Dahl (1958, 1961), for example, wanted hard evidence of the exercise of power through decisions. Mills (1956), as an elitist could not apply such a methodology on the grounds that he did not think that power was exercised episodically; unequal power relationships were constant. This is a more complete conceptualisation of power as it is logically true that in order to exercise power an actor must also have power. However, the similar argument was used against Hunter (1953) who adopted a reputational.

In Community Power Structure - a study of decision makers Hunter (1953) offered an analysis of power structures in 'Regional City' (actually Atlanta) based on a reputational method from which he concluded that community decision-making was dominated by the 'businessman's class'. Hunter examined a number of decision areas and concluded that the economic elite, the businessman's class, formulated policy which the politicians then translated into legislation for subsequent implementation.

Domination was achieved through persuasion, intimidation, and coercion and, only if necessary, force. Local political parties were kept in check by the fact that they depended on local business to finance their campaigns. In addition to this, the economic elite, Hunter (1953) argued, also controlled the media, either through direct ownership or through advertising revenues. The community as a whole was controlled through the flow of credit, mortgages and so forth.

Hunters' (1953) conclusion has however been criticised for being based on a flawed methodology. He used a 'reputational method' involving local peoples' judgements of who held power, whose support was necessary for a successful decision outcome and so on. Hunter gathered his evidence from newspapers, letters and documents, and interviews based on a sample selected by positions held in organisations. Critics argue that Hunter merely shows how people thought power was structured, which was not necessarily the same thing as how it actually was. They also argue that by selecting the policy issue in which the economic elite had expressed an interest he had skewed the results. This seems a reasonable criticism. A broader sweep of policy areas might have revealed different results and the latter criticism is probably
more valid than the first. The way in which power is perceived will effect the way in which power is. According to the model of power (Dowding, 1991), in deciding whether to engage in conflict over a decision B must consider whether it is worth the effort. If B thinks that A is more powerful than them, the likelihood of B articulating a preference which runs counter to what they believe A's to be is probably reduced. Reputation can create and support an elite (Dowding, 1997), and it can be usefully managed as a result (Morgan, 1986) (see also 6.10 and 6.13).

One specific elite group which has suffered considerable attack in recent years is professionals. This is a symptom of the postmodern debate over power and knowledge (Foucualt, 1989, 1991) and more general disappointment with 'experts' and 'expertise'. It is worth taking some time to look at the issue of professionals and experts because much of the criticism against them has had profound impact on New Right management of public policy, specifically the zealous commitment to public choice and marketisation discussed above (4.3).

5.2.1 Professionals

Professionals tend to be seen as a sub-group which possess different distinct characteristics without too much clarity as to what the characteristics are precisely. Greenwood (1957) attempted to delimit professionals using the following criteria:

All professions seem to possess (1) systematic theory, (2) authority, (3) community sanction, (4) ethical codes, and (5) a culture.

Ham and Hill (1984) feel that this is an unsatisfactory definition because it confuses occupational characteristics - systematic theory, ethical codes, a culture - with societal treatment - authority and community sanction. This difference in view might itself reflect the changing position of professionals in society, in that Greenwood writing in 1957, took these characteristics for granted. The important thing is the interaction between the two aspects - how authority is derived from knowledge, and authority confirms knowledge. Parsons (1994) gives up on attempting to find a neat definition at all, but includes the occupational areas 'health, education, and welfare services' as 'professions'.

The relevant issue here is the extent to which professionals have power in public policy and the extent to which it is justified and/or necessary. Despite the weaknesses of Greenwood's (1957)
definition Ham and Hill (1984) accept it because it highlights the importance of specific skills and knowledge to a professional's power; and the additional power derived from/bestowed by society. Ham and Hill use the example of medics to illustrate their point.

Doctors, it is argued (Ham and Hill, 1984) possess knowledge that can contribute to good health, and that health is valued. They further argue that medics possess power (authority) that is greater than the level of skill they actually possess. They note that the medical profession manages its own education, sets its own standards, and monitors its own members, and has been granted a state monopoly in provision of services through a system that until recently it managed and which it also helped to create; despite recent changes to accountabilities (see Department of Health, 1998). Yet, medics do not have a monopoly of health knowledge - the knowledge medics possess is (potentially) available to all, suggesting that another factor serves to magnify their skill-based power. Thus Ham and Hill (1984) conclude that:

[Medics] have succeeded in persuading politicians and administrators that the public will receive the best service if their discretionary freedom is maximised, and if they are given powerful positions in the organisations which run the health service.

They have been successful in this because they have expertise, around an emotive issue, and have also benefited from the (unexplained by Ham and Hill (1984)) status of doctors before the introduction of state provision of health care.

It has been suggested that much of the concern about the role of professionals in organisations had been fuelled by popular perceptions of both. Friedson (1970), for example, suggests that 'bureaucracy' is generally seen as something negative, whilst 'professional' is 'positive in connotation'. Therefore, in discussing the two together any strengths of 'bureaucracy' tend to be undermined, as it is something that limits professionals who are, by definition, 'good'. Professionals claim that outside control would have a negative impact on the ethic of service and altruism they demonstrate.

It is often argued, however, that so-called 'ethical concerns' are more about protecting the groups' interests than protecting the consumer of a service (see Gould, 1981; and Illich 1975, 1977, for example). Professionals recruit their own members, define the problem which they seek to address, supply the solution to the problem, and in some cases address activities well beyond the immediate focus of their expertise. Ham and Hill (1984) again use the example of doctors to illustrate this point: besides defining what 'good health' is, and how it should be
achieved, medics are called upon to make decisions concerning whether and when life support systems should be used; who should, or should not, be allowed to have abortion; and where the limits of individual cases of criminal responsibility lie.

Socially, professionals are not merely specific occupations - solicitors, doctors, social workers, teachers, and university lecturers (Ball, 1990) - with a code of ethics and expert knowledge. They possess delegated power which is deemed legitimate by society. Society has been convinced that professionals will deliver a better service if they are allowed to get on with it, free from the processes that control other occupational areas. This privilege, Ham and Hill argue, is a result of a complex relationship between state, society and the professions in terms of ethics and culture, which has ultimately resulted in the devolution of authoritative power to certain groups. Recent reforms to the Health Service, in response to fatal errors on the part of doctors still stress the need, and government support, for professional self-regulation (Department of Health, 1998).

At the same time a belief in the power of professions to shape policy, in a self-interested way has led to an attack from both the left (Dunleavy, 1981; Illich, 1975, 1977; and Wilding, 1982); and the right (Green, 1985) of the political spectrum in recent years. Here, professionals themselves are seen as the 'problem'. However, it is argued that attempts to control their power (increased consumer involvement, the use of incentives, and so forth) has merely resulted in the shift of power to other groups. The outcome is that accountants, lawyers and managers are now thought to control policy provision, not that a more balanced relationship between professional people and their clients has been developed (see Alford, 1979a; Flynn, 1991; Ham, 1985; and Harrison, 1990, for examples).

In the context of health care in the 1980s and 90s Harrop (1992) found that power had moved from clinicians to managers and administrators at a national decision-making (policy formation) level, and also at an operational level. This has been a result of the introduction of quasi-markets designed to improve the control of government over professionals, and experts in general (ostensibly on behalf of the end user, the public), and to increase the effectiveness of the administrator (Degeling, 1993; Flynn, 1993). The same phenomenon has been identified in other policy areas too: the police force (Day and Klein, 1987; Loveday, 1993); local government (Laffin and Young, 1990); and in education (Barnes and Williams, 1993), again at both levels of national policy-making, and at an operational level. Laffin and Young (1990) argue that this assault has been so successful that the esteemed position previously enjoyed by professions has
been lost. No longer is their position taken for granted, but will need to be negotiated and argued for. They conclude that:

The notion of professionalism has survived from the nineteenth century into the late twentieth century. Will it survive under the pressure for 'adaptation' into the twenty-first century? At first sight, it seems improbable. The old grandeur of the professions has been lost irretrievably. Professions in both the private and public sectors no longer enjoy the social status and influence they once enjoyed. The loss of status and influence is even more marked in the case of professionals associated with the welfare state. The professions no longer hold the initiative in policy formation and individual professions within the welfare state have experienced declining relative incomes and a diminution of their career prospects.

Laffin and Young's (1990) statement might refer equally well to experts in general, including those associated with 'technocracy'.

5.2.2 Technocracy

'Technocracy' involves rational decision-making on a macro scale. Young (1958) saw it evolving out of the growth of technical knowledge resulting in a (Weberian) meritocracy in which the highly educated/skilled would form the social elite. Young's exception was not fulfilled, but his comment is useful as an indicator of the strong post-war belief that science and technology would re-shape (i.e. progress) society, including government. (See, for example, Dahrendorf, 1959; Maynard, 1968; Smith, 1976).

As a social movement technocracy dates back to the work of F W Taylor (1991/1947), for example. Technocratic scientific rational planning was first applied, with limited success, during the Depression when it appeared that existing methods of policy-making had resulted in chaos (Akin, 1977). Akin suggests that the movement was unsuccessful because it failed to reconcile technocratic elitism with democratic decision-making - the still unresolved conflict between 'instrumental' and 'communicative' rationality (Sanderson, 1999) - and instead resulted in disillusionment.

Burnham (1942) argued in the Managerial Revolution that with the development of technology, the technical and managerial classes had formed a power elite because their role in modern technical society was central (see also 6.7 and 6.8). This idea was updated by J K Galbraith
(1969). He suggested that society had developed into a 'technostructure' in which decision-making for policy remained a group activity, but within which experts dominated. Thus he argued:

There will often be instances when an individual has the knowledge to make or change the findings of the group. But the broad rule holds: if a decision requires specialised knowledge of a group of men, it is but to safe review only by the similar knowledge of a similar group. Group decisions, unless acted upon by another group tend to be absolute ... Effective power of decisions is lodged deeply in the technical, planning and other specialised staff.

This was not a criticism. Galbraith (1969) did not lament the ascendance of experts at the expense of politicians, and ideological decision-making. He saw in it an opportunity to dispense of 'the notion of inevitable conflict based on irreconcilable difference'.

It is clear from recent events that Galbraith's (1969) positive support did not dominate. Jaques Ellul (1964), for example, was concerned that experts were undermining the position of politicians in decision-making, as Weber (1978) had forecast, and Newton (1976) found to be the fear of councillors at Birmingham City Council. Ellul (1964) felt that rationalisation had been replaced by technocratisation. Thus apparent increases in the alternatives from which to choose really meant that politicians chose between the options presented to them by experts of which only one is feasible. Ellul (1964) argued, therefore, that:

In fact the politician no longer has any real choice; decisions flow automatically from preparatory technical labours ... every advance made in the techniques of enquiry, administration, and organisation in itself reduces the power and role of politicians.

Fischer (1991) also expressed concern about the power of experts vis. a vis. politicians. He believed that the (failed) 'Great Society' programmes represented technocratic government; decision-making was controlled by experts who defined the problem and the solution. He quotes from President Kennedy's speech at Yale University in 1962 as typifying the attitude that threatened the political system:

The fact of the matter is that most of the problems ... that we now face are technical problems, are administrative problems. They are very sophisticated judgements which do not lend themselves to the great sort of passionate movement which stirred this country so
often in the past. Now they deal with questions that are beyond the comprehension of most men. most governmental administrators, over which experts may differ, and yet we operate through out traditional political system (Quoted in Fischer, 1991).

Massey (1988) found fears such as those of Fischer (1991) to be unfounded. He explored policy-making in the context of nuclear power, chosen because it seemed to represent a ‘technical’ arena. He found that experts had less influence in practice than was generally supposed. Their influence, he argued, stemmed from their ability to mediate between the civil servants and politicians, and contrary to Ellul’s (1964) claim, the options and issues were not entirely down to expert knowledge: It is clear that technocrats have indeed influenced nuclear policy and will continue to do so, on terms laid down for them by the policy arbiters (Massey, 1988).

In other words experts operate in a political environment and institutional context which is defined for them. Ultimately nuclear power is controlled by politicians and business people rather than scientists (experts) (Massey, 1988). Brown and Lyon (1992), Mills (1993) and Touron (1992) drew similar conclusions based on their work in other policy areas. On the whole they found that experts were ignored by politicians, except in the case of economics (see Coats, 1981, 1989; Singer, 1993; Stein, 1981, 1984; and Stockman, 1987), and those they actually chose themselves. Henderson (1986) suggests though, that even in the area of economics ‘do-it-yourself’ predominates.

This indicates that ‘politics’ has been fairly resistant to the impact of experts and technocrats.

Higher education development in Peterborough fits this model. During the first two years of the project ‘experts’ from existing higher education institutions were deliberately sidelined from the process so that ‘consumers’ could define their needs. Far from feeling a need to consult professionals, most participants in the policy process were confident about their own role and their ability to contribute, despite frequent admissions of not ‘being an expert’. Experts were viewed as threatening and to be kept out until a product specification had been agreed, which they would then deliver. The needs were defined very much in terms of ‘performativity’ (Lyotard, 1984) (9.2).

5.3 Marxism

In Marxist models of community power, it is not argued that power is widely dispersed as in pluralist theory. Instead, power is seen to derive from unequal ownership of property (and
increasingly knowledge), which is perpetuated through the actions of the state. Analysis should not focus on government (the formal source of power), but on the economy. The relationship between the state and the economy forms the focus for much Marxist theorising of power.

Marxists reject the pluralist notion of power as a societal good held in trust and directed by those in authority for the benefit of all, as Parsons (1967) argues. Instead power is seen as concentrated in the hands of a small group, or class, at the expense of others because of their economic superiority. Power is derived from the economic infrastructure, either the means (ownership of) or the mode (management) of production. Given that ownership is not equally distributed through society then power can not be either. Politics favours property.

'Classical Marxist' theory generally assumes that the social structure of capitalist society is based on class structure. Two classes are in conflict - the owners of capital, or the owners of the means/mode of production (the bourgeoisie); and those who work for them (the proletariat). It is argued that the struggle between the two classes would accelerate over time and result in a proletarian revolution, which would overthrow the bourgeoisie and capitalism, replacing it with socialism/communism.

Having said this Marx's own first discussion on the state was more individualist than class-based in approach. In his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Kamenka, 1983) Marx was interested in the philosophical argument advanced by Hegel that the state is independent and abstract of civil society. Marx argued instead that their relationship was mutually dependent and they could not be understood in isolation therefore. The separation of state and civil society was not inevitable; nor could it be achieved through the appointment of a 'neutral' bureaucracy. Marx further argued that the state could not reconcile the desires of self-interested individuals with 'common good' or 'universal interest' as Hegel claimed, because the individuals who held power would use it for their own interests. The reason for this was simple: civil society is egotistic; it is systematically selfish and self-interested, and therefore so are bureaucrats or elected officials. Any notion of 'universal' interest is abstract and impossible because the state bureaucracy is simply another interest group. In other words not only is the state not neutral, but it is actively self-interested. Thus:

The purposes of the state are transformed into the purposes of the bureaux and the purposes of the bureaux are transformed into the purposes of the state (Marx, 1843, quoted in Kamenka, 1983).
This mirrors Michels’ (1968) argument about representative organisations. However, Marx (Kamenka, 1983) offered a different and specific reason as to how state officials are able to pursue their own interests. Namely, every group in Prussian society fought to stop the bureaucracy undermining its own autonomy, at the same time as expecting the state to protect their interests against threats from other groups. Formal state action attempts to reconcile these demands, becoming negative and ‘impotent’ in the process. ‘This fragmentation’, said Marx, ‘this oppression, this slavery in civil society is the natural foundation on which the modern state rests’, and yet the state itself admits no such charge. Rather:

The state and the organisation of civil society are not from a political standpoint two different things ... so far as the state admits the existence of social evils, it attributes them either to natural laws ... or the private life ... or the inadequacy of administration (Marx, 1843, quoted in Kamenka, 1983).

The state bureaucracy was ‘the elitist formalisation of civil society’ in which the closed community of bureaucrats used their state power (authority) to advance their own personal ends. Of particular interest is Marx’s suggestion that the division of labour within the bureaucracy allows the different levels within it to ‘mutually deceive each other’, thus perpetuating group antagonisms, as well as failing to realise the universal interest. The only way universal interest could be achieved would be through the abolition of private property, not through the allocation of formal freedoms. The Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law (Marx, 1994), identified the agents of emancipation - the urban proletariat. They would abolish private property instead of reforming it. They would need to do this because formal political freedoms do not match practical social freedoms.

In On the Jewish Question (Marx, 1844, Kamenka, 1983), a critique of Bruno Bauer’s suggestions for Jewish emancipation, Marx stressed that whilst the state can end (religious) inequality formally by granting equal rights to all individuals, it can not eliminate a religion’s social significance. People may be politically free without being socially free. The parallel, for there can be no doubt that ‘the Jewish question’ had, and indeed still has, unique characteristics, is that self-interest shapes political activity and emancipation needs more than formal political freedom, and that power also resides in relationships and social roles. The source of the inequality, property, has to be eliminated.

The concept of ‘class’ (the urban proletariat above did not constitute a class as such because they lacked a binding ideology), which has come to identify Marxism, was not adopted by Marx
himself until 1845 and the publication of the *German Ideology* (Marx, 1845, in Kamenka, 1983). In *the German Ideology* Marx introduced the notion of the 'present state' which has become the central tenet of much Marxist theory. He argued that different forms of economic base, that is different modes of production, required different styles of state. This idea commonly is termed 'economic reductionism' because it argues that the way in which the state operates depends entirely on the economic structure which it supports.

In the *Communist Manifesto* (Marx, 1848, Kamenka, 1983), for example, Marx suggested that the state was an instrument of class rule (the capitalist class). He described the state bureaucracy as a 'committee for handling the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie'. The state attempts to reconcile all groups by 'active consent', which is achieved by controlling the political, intellectual and moral leadership of society. Marx argued that whilst in law 'property relationships are declared to be the result of the general will' (Marx, 1848, quoted in Kameneka, 1983) this is not the case. They serve to protect and perpetuate the existing economic structure, which does not bestow its benefits equally or fairly.

From a historical case study of the Second French Republic in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Marx, 1852, in Kamenka, 1983) Marx concluded that the state is independent of the capitalist class in periods of equilibrium in class struggles, or during periods of internal disunity within the dominant class. In these circumstances the interests of the ruling class are subordinated to the interests of the state:

> All upheavals only improved this [the state apparatus] instead of breaking it, the parties competing in turn for mastery, regarding the possession of this monstrous edifice of state as the principle spoil of the victor (quoted in Kamenka, 1983).

A divided society empowered the state; calling on it to make every decision and arbitrate between interests, because during such times the bourgeoisie saw that their economic interests (their primary ones) were best served by political stability so relinquished control of the state. The state was never completely independent because of its need to raise taxes to pay for itself. In the specific case of the Second French Republic, according to Marx (quoted in Kamenka, 1983):

> The bourgeoisie clearly now had no other choice but to elect Bonaparte ... He sees himself as the representative of the middle classes and daily breaking it anew. In this he sees himself as the opponent and of the political and literary power of the middle classes.
Consequently, the relationship between the state and capital is an inherently contradictory and unstable one. Both parties need each other, at the same time as wishing to ‘break’ each another.

In *Das Capital, Volume 3* (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987) the state is viewed as having passed through this phase however. In this model ‘state policy is ... set by the impersonal logic which drives government in capitalist society to develop the economic base and coercively maintain social stability’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). The state provides a means for co-ordinating the complexities of the division of labour, where government, laws and policy develops to support accumulation, whether the state is directly controlled by the capitalist class or not. Those state functions which appear to be in a wider interest and support legitimation.

Each model has provided the basis for development by different Marxist theorists. Milliband (1969) assumed an instrumentalist model associated with *the Communist Manifesto* (Marx, 1848, Kamenka, 1983), for example. Poulantzas (1973) allowed the state some autonomy, as Marx had done in *the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Marx, 1853, Kamenka, 1983); and Althusser (1969) developed the ‘structuralist’ model implied in *Das Capital* (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987) (also Poulantzas, 1978).

Milliband’s (1969) *the State in Capitalist Society* developed in direct response to pluralist analyses. It disputed the neutral position of the state which pluralists claimed, and instead declared the state an instrument of class domination. Milliband (1969) argued that the state undertook a process of ‘massive indoctrination’ on behalf of ruling economic class so that not only did society accept the policies of sustainable capitalism, but also the associated values and goals.

Milliband (1969) based his conclusions on three factors: first, he found that the bourgeoisie and other elite groups, including state bureaucrats, shared a common social background. Secondly, he found that they were willing to use these personal networks in order to achieve their own (class) ends. Finally, Milliband also recognised some ‘constraint placed on the state by the objective power of capital’ (Ham and Hill, 1984), that is the need to create wealth. Thus, he proposed that the state must develop policy to support the process of capital accumulation and reproduction, in order to remain in office. This is termed ‘instrumentalist’, because the state acts as an instrument of the bourgeoisie to maintain their long-term interests.
Milliband was criticised by Poulantzas (1973) who accused him of being pluralist in methodology and concept:

Milliband sometimes allows himself to be unduly influenced by the methodological principles of his adversary. How is this manifested? Very briefly, I would say that it is visible in the difficulties that Milliband has in comprehending social classes and the State as *objective structures*, and their relations as an objective system of regular connections, a structure and a system whose agents, 'men', are in the words of Marx, 'bearers' of it – trager' (Poulantzas, 1973).

Poulantzas (1973) argued that the social origins and business connections of policy makers were irrelevant. He believed that by looking at individual officials and their backgrounds, Milliband was missing the point. It is Milliband's third factor, the constraints placed on the state by the objective power of capital that is crucial. It is this relationship that explains the supremacy of the economic class. Indeed, he argued that the needs of the capitalist class are best served when they do not participate in politics. The most successful arrangement is 'when the *ruling class* is not the *politically governing class*', when the state is 'relatively autonomous' but shaped by the basic infrastructure (or superstructure) and interests of capital. Thus:

Relative autonomy allows the state to intervene not only in order to arrange compromises *vis-à-vis* the dominated classes, which, in the long run, are useful for the actual economic interests of the dominant classes or factions; but also (depending on the concrete conjecture) to intervene against the long term economic interests of one or other faction of the dominant class: for such compromises and sacrifices are sometimes necessary for the realisation of their political class interests (Poulantzas, 1973).

Poulantzas (1973) argued that the capitalist class did not controlling the state directly was actually a necessity for the maintenance of capitalism because the ruling class is itself not a homogenous, or unified, entity and might not be able to put up a unified front to the proletariat as a result. He argued too, that such an arrangement allowed flexibility for the state to deal with conflicts, facilitating the making of concessions and creating the myth of representative government. The state has an ideological role in appearing to do one thing, whilst actually doing another. Elections, pressure group lobbying, strikes, and so forth, enable the state to keep in touch with social movements and to realign before a crisis (Poulantzas, 1978). In turn, Poulantzas himself has been criticised for using a pluralist approach with Marxist language (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).
Westergaard and Resler (1976) support Poulantzas (1973) view however. They point to the fact that 'welfare', for example, comes from tax contributions on all wages; so whilst it is viewed in terms of concessions it is in fact self-financing, or at least has little impact on re-distribution of income. Welfare payments do not change the basic structure of inequality. Westergaard and Resler (1976) further argue that increased state intervention into the economy is aimed specifically at 'establishing conditions of general prosperity and growth.

In *Marxism and Politics* (1977) Miliband changed the emphasis of his argument in relation to Poulantzas's (1973) criticisms, giving structural constraints more focus. At the same time he criticised Poulantzas (1973, 1978) for determinism. He argued that such structuralist analysis 'deprives 'agents' of any freedom of choice and manoeuvre and turns them into the 'bearers' of objective forces which they are unable to effect' (Miliband, 1977). Milliband maintained that the state did have some autonomy, reflected in the fact that it undertook reforms to improve the lot of the worker.

Althusser (1969) argued a more determined relationship. Structural Marxism, to which Althusser's work belongs, views the state as the cohesive factor in a society. It organises the ruling class, and disorganises the masses through repressive or ideological apparatus. Repressive state apparatuses (RSAs) includes the army and police, and Ideological state apparatuses (IRAs) are whose which support stability - religions, education, trade unions and so forth. Indeed, Althusser includes almost all non-economic organisations in his model, except the revolutionary party of the working class. Both RSAs and IRAs support the capitalist mode of production by producing docile and disciplined objectified individuals.

Althusser implies that Marx himself denied the existence of intentional individuals, a claim rejected by others, Elster (1985), for example. There is room between the voluntarism assumed in early pluralism and the structural determination of Althusser. Between the two sits an individual with some choice over some matters, but constrained by the environment in which they live and the bases of power they have at their disposal (Dowding, 1991).

One of the reasons why structural determinism in particular, and Marxist models in general have suffered credibility crises in recent years is their apparent inability to explain undeniable 'anomalies' - why actual political mobilisation is not class-based, and why stability has been maintained over time despite continuing inequalities, for example. There is not a direct
relationship between individual action and structure in terms of actual action, and in explaining these problems structuralists have had to give up some of the economic determinism. Althusser (1969) for example, argued that the political and ideological structures of capitalism exist and operate independently from the economic base, thus blurring the distinction between Marxist and elitist theories (Parkin, 1979).

Cawson and Saunders, (1983), Gough, (1973), O'Connor, (1973), and Wolfe, (1977) have argued that the state has several roles which are inherently contradictory. The state must preserve order, and promote capitalist accumulation, as well as manufacture legitimation. These functions involve different types of activity - social expense policy, social investment policy and social consumption policy respectively (O'Connor, 1973), and carry different levels of strategic importance. Cawson and Saunders (1983) argue that accumulation is more important than legitimation. They suggest in their ‘dual state thesis’ that the latter functions are assigned to local government, and are pluralist and conflictual in nature; whilst those policies related to accumulation are closely managed by the centre using a corporatist model of decision-making. The dual state thesis does have critics however. Goldsmith and Woldman (1992) argue that the process described by Cawson and Saunders (1983) is country-specific and does not work as a general model, and that it is wrong to assume that production issues are not dealt with at a local level. Furthermore, it can not be assumed that corporatist modes of decision-making do not take place at a local level. The issue of inherent contradiction and tension within the activity of the state remains an important one however.

Offe (1984, 1985) suggested that the capitalist welfare state faces a ‘crisis of crisis management’. By this he means that the needs of legitimation, amelioration through welfare, increases the need for formal planning, which reduces the opportunities for democracy and therefore legitimation. Participatory decision-making increases democracy but reduces scope for planning and thus creates work for the state, reducing its capacity to deliver, and therefore undermines its legitimation function. Offe concluded as a result that there is a permanent conflict between the needs of accumulation and the legitimation function which can not be ‘managed’ indefinitely.

O'Connor (1973) used the same idea to predict fiscal crisis, and Habermas (1973) legitimation crisis; but Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) suggest that all public policy involves choice, and therefore dilemma:
Rationality or administrative crises are no more than the dilemmas one would expect in the complex decision-making of any modern state, and there is no reason to suppose that they will not remain in a socialist mode of production.

There are obvious problems with particular aspects of Marxist theory. Few people accept that the modern capitalist state will be overthrown by a unified proletariat in order to achieve a classless society based on public ownership of the means of production and distribution. Nor would they accept the moral prescriptions to achieve this. Fukuyama (1992), for example, argues that liberalism and capitalism are triumphant. General attitudes have changed (Ball, 1990). The distinction between public and private is less, and as citizens we seem willing to accept the use of public money to support private enterprise without criticism (Ball, 1990; Stone, 1998). TECs are a case in point. However, Marxist models remain crucial to our understanding of power because they highlight the weaknesses of liberal democracy and the pluralist assumptions about it. Specifically, this refers to the way in which resources are distributed in a society and the way in which this distribution distorts the theoretical models of politics, participation and policy; and also highlights the need to investigate the particular role of capital within them.

This chapter has reviewed broad models of community power (pluralist, elitist, and Marxist models) on the basis that assumptions about the theory of legitimate power, described in Chapter 4, do not translate into practice. Community power models take a broader view of the processes of power, which may contribute to our understanding of the theme. In simple terms pluralists argue that power is broadly distributed across a community, elitists that power is concentrated, and Marxists that power is concentrated in the hands of those who own or control the economy. It should be emphasised that none of the models described above are discrete.

From the elitist and Marxist models it is clear that organisations are also significant to the discussion of power. Michels' (1968) Political Parties and Marx's (1843, in Kamenka, 1983) Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, for example, focus first on power within organisations, and how the organisation relates to other parts of a society. Chapter 6 examines these issues in more detail.
Organisations, like states, exist to co-ordinate (or control) individuals. Weber (1978) proposed that this was achieved through the allocation of a task, which comes with specific and prescribed powers (authority), position, salary and so forth (3.2). Closer examination suggests that is not entirely the case. There are times, for example, when authority, which indicates a power differential based on a bureaucratic hierarchy, is legitimised by technical and/or professional considerations, rather than by hierarchical rules. In this case the actual position within an organisational structure may be subsumed by the employee’s ‘other’ status. This is particularly true of the professions who have a shared values system that may be at odds with those of the organisation that employs them. The latter’s values may be secondary, or even irrelevant, because power goes beyond hierarchy.

Morgan (1986) identified fourteen sources of power, of which ‘formal authority’ is the first. He suggests that power ‘involves an ability to get another person to do something that he or she would not otherwise have done’ (Morgan, 1986), based on his interpretation of Dahl’s (1957). This oversimplifies the theoretical conceptualisation of power, but maintains its intuitive sense (see Clegg, 1989). Morgan’s (1986) list is comprehensive and based on analysis of political systems, thereby escaping the narrow conceptualisation of power usually associated with organisational analysis, which tend to focus on formal authority. It provides a useful structure which is used here but expanded to include inter-organisational issues where appropriate.

### 6.1 Formal Authority

Following Weber (1978) Morgan (1986) distinguishes three types of authority based on charisma, tradition, and the rule of law. He suggests that all three types may be found in modern organisations:

A hero figure may acquire immense charismatic power that allows him or her to control and direct others as he or she wishes. The owner of a firm may exercise authority as a result of his or her membership of the founding family. A bureaucrat may exercise power as a result of the formal office he or she holds.
Formal authority is mostly derived from hierarchical position, which defines one’s rights and obligations. Morgan suggests that the extent to which the authority structure matches the power structure depends upon the consent of the subordinates. In other words, power is seen to emanate downwards but it actually relies on whether those at the bottom view their subjugation as legitimate. Mostly they do. They also have power which is formal, but in reality the effect of this authority will depend upon collective action because it is accompanied by fewer ‘back-up’ resources.

Related to the issue of formal authority is that of expert knowledge (neglected by Morgan, 1986), both in the Weberian (1978) sense that it a valuable resource which can be used for bargaining (see 6.2), but also of relevance because authority legitimises knowledge (Foucault, 1991). This issue has examined in some detail in the context of ‘technocracy’ and the position of professionals in Chapter 5, with particular reference to medics (Ham and Hill, 1984) (5.2.1).

Related to both authority and expert knowledge is the issue of discretion, which according to Johnson and Scholes (1989), is often overlooked. This may be the case in management literature, but there is a significant body of work to be found related to public policy, and more particularly social policy. It is most pertinent to social policy because of its importance in the delivery of policy:

The execution of strategy [or policy], by its very complexity, cannot be controlled in minute detail by one person or group and hence many other people within the company will need to interpret and execute particular parts of that policy and in doing so will use their own personal discretion (Johnson and Scholes, 1989).

It is perhaps worth noting, although Johnson and Scholes (1989) do not, that ‘discretion’ refers to the area of organisational activity ‘where the rules give specific functionaries in particular circumstances the responsibility to make such decisions as they think fit’ (Ham and Hill, 1984) (see also Bull, 1980; Donnison 1977; and Ham and Hill, 1984). It is therefore about individual judgement, decision, or choice in the context of shared rules or organisational procedures. It links the issues of formal authority (6.1) and expert knowledge (6.2) because it also involves delegation, and in the context of public policy this is often related to professional groups (doctors, teachers, and so forth) who are given delegated authority from the state to deliver often general outcomes (health care, or education). All work can be seen as involving some discretion because all rules need to be interpreted in order to be applied, but the extent to which they should be ‘open’ is debated.
Johnson and Scholes (1989) make another important point concerning implementation based on the fact that policy implementation is often inter-organisational. It is that implementation of policy often involves linkages between different organisations, and not just elements of the same one. As such the sources of power identified by Morgan (1986), such as resource dependency (6.2), the control of knowledge (6.3), and the use of networks (6.9), as well as the issue of discretion, are of extra significance (Aldrich, 1979; Friend, Power & Yewlett, 1974; and Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

6.2 Control of Scarce Resources

Another source of power identified by Morgan (1986) was the control of scarce resources - money, materials, personnel, customers, and so on. Control of such factors improves one’s bargaining position as long as the resources are in scare supply, and another actor is dependent upon them. Gaventa (1980) in his study of power relations in the Appalachian Mountain mining community described a situation where employee B will lose his company house, if he joins a union. This also illustrates the point made above about collective action: however unjust B feels such action by the company to be, if his skills are not scarce, he will be easily replaced with someone willing not to join the union, and therefore has little scope for bargaining.

Morgan (1986) suggests that one of the most significant resources is money, because it is the most liquid. Money can buy other scarce resources, such as skill, materials and so forth. He also claims that ‘Money can be converted into promotions, patronage, threats, promises, or favours to buy loyalty, service, support, or raw compliance’.

Pfeffer (1981) qualifies the money issue by suggesting that power is linked to the control of discretionary funds. It is not necessary to control all financial decisions, most of which follow on from previous commitments and are incremental anyway, but useful to be able to create changes at the margins. This helps explain the weakness in Tullock’s (1967) argument, and supports Dunleavy’s focus on ‘shaping’ (1985, 1986, 1991). However, where money comes from outside the unit the scope for power is disproportionately high, if the receiving unit is ‘critically dependent’ on the funds, as with TECs’ and their Regional Offices for example. Hence the reason for relationship between TECs and their sponsoring government department (DoE) being considered to be the most developed of TEC stakeholder relations (Haughton et al. 1995a, 1995b).
Control of resources can also reduce dependence on others. Morgan (1986) suggests that this explains much of the apparently unnecessary duplication of resources in many organisations, as separate operating units under-utilise their own machinery and set of experts. Any resource for which there is dependence enables power relationships, and not just money. Lukes (1974) suggested that personal ‘autonomy’ is valued, and that individuals will act to defend it. It may be, therefore, that for some there is not only a physical need to reduce dependence on others, but a psychological one as well. The reverse of this is the need or desire to control. Astute actors will create dependencies.

6.3 Control of Information

Morgan (1986) suggests that the possession of knowledge and information a person can ‘influence the definition of organisational situations and can create patterns of dependency’. It is argued that by controlling information individuals are able to construct others’ perceptions of a situation and thus influence the ways in which those others act. Such people are often called ‘gatekeepers’. The concept overlaps with the issues of ‘control of boundaries’ (6.6) and impression management (6.10) explored below. On a more basic level it may simply come down to timing the release of information which others would find useful, or failing to acknowledge the genuine source of information or an idea.

Dowding (1991) argues that information is crucial in an individual’s assessment of whether to act or not. ‘Groups who wield their control of information for their own purposes rely upon the rationality of ignorance’ (Dowding, 1991). According to Goodin (1980) there are four elements to this: people have imperfect knowledge, they know that they do, there is a cost in acquiring more information, and also in evaluating it. The cost of acquiring more information may be felt to be higher than the expected gains of its acquisition so only when it is apparent that one’s interests are suffering does it become worthwhile to gain more information. Thus Goodin (1980) goes on to suggest four ways in which information (or lack of) may be used to advantage. Lying; secrecy, employing propaganda, and arranging information overload to increase the cost of evaluating the quality of information (see for example Newton, 1976). There are also costs to pursuing such strategies. There may be penalties if caught, including a loss in credibility and authority.

6.4 Control of Organisational Structures, Rules and Regulations

The use of organisational structures, rules and regulations is another source of power (Morgan, 1986). The ability to do so depends upon having the appropriate authority, or access. Morgan
argues that the size and status of a group or division of an organisation is often an indicator of its power within the overall organisational structure. Clearly, lumping 'size and status' together is not always helpful, as Dunleavy (1986, 1991) suggests in the context of 'shaping' (4.2). Notwithstanding, Morgan (1986) suggests that downgrading a function or group (individuals are nominally protected by the law) will reduce its power base. He also argues that people will resist changes to organisational structure if their power derives from current arrangements. This idea might also be applied to macro social and political systems (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963).

Rules and regulations can work both ways however. Following them can be as problematic to control as changing them in some circumstances, and hence the need for discretion (6.1). Thus Morgan (1986) comments that:

One of the ironies of bureaucratic organisation is that job and departmental designs that were originally introduced to control the work of employees can be used by employees to control their superiors.

He uses the idea of 'working to rule' at British Rail to make the point. Morgan (1986) describes a situation where the procedures and regulations governing the service are so minute and complex that when strictly applied they result in total paralyses of the actual service. (For classic examples of the impact of rules on organisations see Blau, 1963, 1974; and Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; and Gouldner 1954, 1957).

Any 'bureaucratic regulations, decision-making criteria, plans and schedules, promotions and job evaluation requirements, and other rules that guide organisational functioning give potential power to both the controllers and those controlled' (Morgan, 1986). With specific regard to public organisations there are some additional issues, because in order to participate in decision-making individuals need to understand how they can, and what to do. This is perhaps less important in commercial organisations, but crucial to democracy. Saunders (1975) argues that the process of rule interpretation 'may be observed in political bureaucracies as much as any other formal organisations'. Tacitly agreed 'rules of the game', informal dealing and other activities work to include some actors and not others. In Saunders' (1975) study of local government in Croydon, for example, he quotes a Chief Officer who remarked that:

Its extremely difficult to describe the real decision-making practices. You can construct organisational charts, but these are only theory, and life isn't like that.
Haughton et al. (1995a, and 1995b) noted a similar observation about TECs (4.3.1). This outcome may not be intentional, but is still convenient. Saunders (1979) found the success of particular political groups in participating in formal policy-making depended upon the method of approach they used, and the 'congruence' of interests (see also Dearlove, 1973; Newton, 1976). In Saunders' (1975) case businesses were able to make direct contact with decision-makers in the council, and at the highest levels, over lunch or golf. At the same time those without privileged access, and who were generally ignored instead, were forced to undertake more 'militant' strategies, such as occupying the Town Hall. This was deemed irresponsible, 'rabble-rousing' behaviour, and used to justify their exclusion. Thus Saunders (1975) concluded that:

> It is apparent then that bias may be consistently generated by virtue of the continuing implementation of established and largely informal political procedures which, though limited in scope by the formal organisational context in which they are embedded, are never the less flexible and responsive to the interests and assumptions of those who maintain them. An adequate explanation of how political systems work must therefore take into account the effect of member's mundane and largely taken-for-granted actions and procedures in reproducing and operationalising a system which then gives rise to such bias.

Saunders (1975, 1979) notion of bias reflects Schattschneider's (1960) concept of the 'mobilisation of bias' (see also Mair, 1997). Both assume that certain issues are ordered out of, and others in to, the political system by means of rules and structures, but that this process is not deliberately 'managed'.

Bacharch and Baratz (1962, 1963), however, identify four ways in which issues can be excluded from decision-making deliberately, and these include the use of rules and structures. They are force, by co-option of dissenters on to decision-making bodies; the introduction of rules and procedures, and by reshaping existing rules. It might be the case, as Saunders (1975) implies, that active strategies such as those identified by Bacharch and Baratz (1962, 1963), are only employed when 'natural' processes fail to filter out unwelcome demands.

6.5 Control of Decision-making Processes

Direct control of decision processes is particularly important. Specifically, there are three elements to controlling decision-making - premises, processes, and issues and objectives.
It has been argued above that many issues do not arise, or are resolved in a predictable way because of a bias inherent in social and political systems (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963, 1970; Mair, 1997; Schattschneider, 1960; and Saunders, 1975, 1979) (6.4). At its deepest level this is ideology or hegemony (Benson, 1975, 1983; Clegg, 1975, 1979 and Clegg and Dunkerly, 1977, 1980), and relates to the premise.

Based on a study of a construction site Clegg (1975) concluded that relationships between managers and workers were mediated through the capitalist mode of production, which formed an ‘iconic system of domination’. Put simply this means that both were oriented towards profit, and accepted (that is did not even question) their power differentials in order to make profit. Clegg and Dunkerly (1980) argue, therefore, that the power of capital need not be exercised because it is built into the routines and of rules of society. Public organisations have a dual role in supporting accumulation, and carrying out legitimation. The latter role depends upon surplus and taxes derived from the accumulation process.

Benson’s (1983) development a similar argument, but it focuses on inter-organisational relationships (as opposed to intra-organisational). He argues that those theorists who concentrate on the issues of co-ordination between organisations by examining dependencies are missing the point. Two other factors are important: ‘deep structures’, and the interest structure which interact and mediates between the deep levels and the ‘surface levels’, by defining the administrative possibilities and arrangements. The ‘deep rules of structure formation’ relate principally to wealth creation, structuring some policies in and others out of the formal policy process, depending upon whether they support or challenge capital accumulation. The role of structural factors in constraining and developing policy is an important one (see 6.12), as is the ability to control decision premises therefore.

Decision processes are somewhat simpler to conceptualise than decision premises. Morgan (1986) suggests that managers have ‘considerable’ impact on decision outcomes if they use the available mechanisms effectively: ‘by determining whether a decision can be taken and then reported to appropriate quarters, whether it must go before a committee, and which committee, whether it must be supported by a full report, whether it will appear on an agenda where it is likely to receive a tough ride (or easy passage), the order of the agenda, or even whether the decision should be discussed at the beginning or at the end of the meeting’ (Morgan, 1986). He is describing practical methods by which the exclusion of issues identified by Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963, and 1970) may be achieved. Morgan (1986) suggests that one of the most effective ways of getting a decision through is by having it made by default, or without
discussion. One way to do this is to create a diversion thus marginalising the original issue (Crenson, 1971).

The final way of controlling decision-making is to influence the issues and objectives and evaluative criteria. Morgan (1986) suggests that such things are managed through the preparation of reports and contributions in meetings. Individuals can miss out arguments from their reports, or highlight the importance of others as Newton (1976) described. Morgan (1986) believes that success will also depend upon 'soft' factors such as individual eloquence (charisma), and personal commitment to a particular option. It might also depend upon 'personal commitment' to ignoring or neglecting issues and arguments. This explains why 'politics' (Morgan, 1986), those hungry for power, spend hours in meetings in 'circular discussion that ends in stalemate, dedicating as much energy to preventing some issues being made, as to those which they wish to see carried through.

6.6 Control of Boundaries

The control of boundaries - the interface between different elements of the organisation is another source of power, which relates to the control of scarce resources (6.2) and information (6.3), and to ‘symbolism and the management of meaning’ (6.10). For instance, Morgan (1986) suggests that by monitoring interaction between separate units (individuals or organisations) a person is able to identify dependencies and control them. Anyone with a role that overlaps with other units - secretaries, special assistants, project managers, and so forth - can potentially control information, and access, and in so doing also creates a particular view for their subject. Morgan uses the example of President Nixon to illustrate the point:

Top aides Richard Erlichman and Bob Halderman exercised tight control over access to the President. In doing so it seems that they were able to manage the President's view of what was happening in the White House and elsewhere. One of the issues in the notorious Watergate affair and the collapse of the presidency was whether Nixon's aides had allowed him to receive the critical information regarding the Watergate affair.

Boundary management may allow a unit to gain autonomy from other elements. Morgan (1986), like Lukes (1974), believes that autonomy is an important element of organisational life and one in which each individual or group inevitably strives towards. The net result is that organisations become loosely, and temporarily, bound elements or actors, and not an integrated whole. If every element is pursuing autonomy, every move is necessarily countered. ‘Politicos’ (Morgan, 1986) will use boundary management to develop divide-and-rule strategies.
6.7 The Ability to Cope with Uncertainty

Another source of power in organisations is the ability to cope with uncertainty. Uncertainty may be of two kinds - environmental (markets, sources of raw material and so on), or operational uncertainty (machine breakdowns for example). The real issue underlying this is that of scarcity and dependence (see 6.3). The scope of one's power derived from the ability to control uncertainty will depend upon how easily one's skills or knowledge can be substituted (Crozier, 1964), and how one's function affects the central operations of the organisation (Hickson et al., 1971). In public policy it is perhaps most often about having access to information about the future, or people who control the uncertainty.

6.8 The Ability to Control Technology

This brings us to another base of power in organisation, that is the ability to control technology. This is ‘technology’ in the broadest sense, essentially the mode of production, or work arrangements (see Clegg, 1979). Morgan (1986) suggests that this factor is of most significance in organisations with highly integrated systems, such as process or assembly lines. In this instance, task A must be completed before B, B before C and so on. He who controls A also controls B therefore; who in turn controls C. Changes in technology at any point in the process may alter the balance of power and are likely to cause disruption as a result. It is assumed that actors who have not initiated change will inevitably resist it.

Morgan adds that new technology is frequently introduced to increase control of managers over subordinates, but workers have an in-built advantage over their superiors because they understand the technology they use. From Whyte's (1955) study, Morgan quotes the following example:

Ray, famed among his fellow workers for his skill in outthinking and outperforming his controllers, finds ways of getting his machine to destroy the product on which he is working when he is asked to work at too fast a pace. He also has a great ability to look as if he is working harder than he is, generating a profuse sweat to impress and deceive his observers (Morgan, 1986).

Clearly, none of the people involved in the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough had this opportunity, as none used machinery or worked on production lines. The point to note is that people doing a job, any job, 'usually have a clear understanding of the
power relations inherent in current work arrangements and [Morgan adds] are usually ready to marshal all their resources and ingenuity to fight changes that threaten their position' (Morgan, 1986). The ability to control technology is also linked to the issues of discretion (6.1) and rules (6.4).

6.9 Interpersonal Alliances, Networks, and Control of “Informal Organisation”

A source of power, and that which is prominent in elitist conceptualisations of power for example, (Domhoff, 1978; Mills, 1956; Milliband, 1969), is what Morgan (1986) describes as ‘interpersonal alliances, networks, and control of “informal organisations”’. By this he means:

Friends in high places; sponsors; mentors; coalitions of people prepared to trade support and favours to further their individual ends; and the informal networks of touching base, sounding out, or merely shooting the breeze (Morgan, 1986).

These contacts give individuals advance warning of movements afoot, or opportunity to prepare the way for a proposal, and, needless to say, politicos will spend time creating such alliances. Successful networking however is mutually beneficial.

Informal networking is a common concern in studies of local power, as the discussion of structures, rules, and regulations (Saunders, 1975, 1979) revealed (6.4). It was noted that Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963) suggested that one way to ‘buy off’ formal opposition was to co-opt dissenters onto the decision-making group. Selznick (1966) used the term ‘coöptation’ to describe a similar process based on a study of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a government agency set up in 1933 to manage the development of the Tennessee River Valley area as part of Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’. Key to Selznick’s (1966) analysis was the fact that the TVA was added to a policy arena already occupied by other organisations, a situation shared by Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) (Evans, 1996). Therefore to Selznick’s (1966) work is of some relevance here.

The general aim of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was:

The broadest duty of planning for the proper use, conservation, and development of the natural resources for the general social and economic welfare of the nation (Selznick, 1966)

In order to achieve this there was a deliberate attempt to ensure participation of grass root actors, and to use existing organisations in the delivery of policy where possible. Selznick found
that this latter strategy undermined the democratic ideal of the TVA. The use of existing organisations produced the relationships between them, excluding the public as whole but not their landlords.

Selznick (1966) believed that this occurred because the TVA needed to survive, and adapt to its environment in order to do so. Administrators entered the process with commitments and values, as did their clients, and the public, but adapted for survival through a series of adjustments, modified commitments, and the development of new relationships both within and external to the organisation between individuals. The TVA had to adapt itself 'not so much to the people in general as to actually existing institutions which have the power to smooth or block its way' and in doing so it not only failed to oppose the positions of its more powerful clients, but actually came to represent them'. The means by which this occurred was cooptation - 'the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organisation as a means averting threats to its stability or existence'.

Selznick (1966) identified two forms: 'formal cooptation, when there is a need to establish the legitimacy of authority or the administrative accessibility of the relevant public; and informal cooptation, when there is need of adjustment to the pressure of specific centres of power within the community. He observed that:

Cooptation which results in an actual sharing of power will tend to operate informally, and correlatively, cooptation orientated towards legitimation or accessibility will tend to be effected through formal devises' (Selznick, 1966).

In other words the real sharing of power was hidden in informal networks. Mills (1956), Milliband (1969) also argue that informal networks are crucial, based on shared a common social background, or 'by specified relationships ' and that 'Groups are linked to each other by common membership' (Domhoff, 1978). Morgan (1986) supports the view that such coalitions or alliances remain informal and 'to a degree invisible'. Hence the inadequacy of the pluralist method (Dahl, 1957, 1958) which focuses on expressed conflict in the formal decision-making domain.

Morgan (1986) added that psychological or emotional dependency on another person who is often outside the organisation can also develop, and will influence the way in which actors use (or pursue) power within their organisation. This does not seem to have been of immediate
relevance to the case study, but it was also impossible to investigate. Among such ‘influencers’ Morgan included spouses and lovers, for example.

6.10 Symbolism and the Management of Meaning, or Impression Management

Implicit in the control of boundaries (6.6), and the control of information (6.2) (Morgan, 1986) is another source of power in organisations - that of symbolism and the management of meaning, with specific regard to leaders. By managing meanings people control others’ perceptions of reality and thus influence the way in which they behave. Morgan (1986) identified three separate elements - the use of imagery, theatre, and gamesmanship.

Morgan (1986) uses ‘impression management’ in the context of theatre and relates it specifically to ‘style’. Given that all three factors, imagery, theatre, and gamesmanship, are related to the ‘politico’ adopting actions to support their image, that is to say that the management of meaning focuses on them, and not a situation, I propose to use it as the generic term instead. This differentiates better between the aspects of the management of meaning already discussed, the control of boundaries (6.6), and control of information – gatekeeping – (6.3), for example, which influence the perception of a situation, and those related to style, theatre and so forth, which influence the perception of a person.

Imagery (images, language, and stories) contributes to the organisational culture within which people operate. So, managers will ‘often encourage the idea that the organisation is a team and the environment is a competitive jungle, ... symbolise the importance of a key activity or function by giving it high priority and visibility on their own personal agenda, or find ways of creating and massaging the systems of belief deemed necessary to achieve their aims’ (Morgan, 1986).

Truly skilled ‘politicos’ also possess an understanding of theatre. This refers to physical setting, appearance, and style of behaviour. Morgan (1986) describes an executive’s office with a formal desk with a ‘thronelike chair’ and some more casual chairs around a coffee table. He suggests that anyone entering the office will sense the tone a meeting depending upon where they are seated. Even having an office at all might be an indicator of power (Johnson and Scholes, 1989), which in turn becomes a source of power.

Appearance too is important to theatre. Morgan (1986) suggests that people dress according to function or status. In order to progress up the hierarchy a person needs to understand such things and ‘look the part’. The appearance of one’s workspace can also be important, according
to Morgan. He suggests that some workers symbolise their activity with paper strewn desks (and perhaps also their independence if the organisation has a clear desk policy), whilst others suggest their control of their work by means of an empty desk.

Style is also important. Morgan (1986) suggests that being slightly late to a meeting where all other members require your presence is very good style, as it highlights one's importance. The same is true of being seen at the right time and place. Thus many senior managers 'dramatise their presence' at high profile events and fade away at lower status ones'. Morgan provides a particularly interesting scenario of White House staff exaggerating their personal access to the President, by arriving early for a meeting so that others see them there and assume a pre-meeting meeting, hoping to indicate their special access privileges. Moreover, this becomes self-fulfilling:

Access to the president is itself both a reflection and a source of power, because if others know that you have such access, it can usually be used to acquire even more power (Morgan, 1986).

The final element in symbolism and the management of meaning is the issue of gamesmanship. Morgan believes that different types of organisation will require and accommodate different rules and therefore different characteristics of gamesmanship. This notion refers to the foxes and lions idea of Pareto (1966). Foxes are crafty and not obviously visible, but manipulate others at every opportunity. Lions are 'reckless and ruthless' (Morgan, 1986) and are generally more noisy and openly arrogant. Foxes will backstab and manipulate, and Lions bully and threaten. A close match between individual style and organisational culture supports effective gamesmanship, and the associated capacity for power.

Such 'soft' (Morgan, 1986) factors contribute to what Dowding (1996) termed 'reputation', and are significant in defining the way in which individuals, and their incentive structures, are perceived (see 2.4).

6.11 Gender

Morgan (1986) recognises that gender, and the management of gender relations is also a source of power. Organisations are dominated by gender-values, which serve the advancement of men, to the detriment of women. This situation is partly derived from the operation of gender stereotyping where men are seen to 'match' the characteristics of organisations ('rational, analytical, strategic, decision-orientated, tough and aggressive'), and women (emotional,
intuitive, spontaneous, supportive, and submissive) do not. This is an interesting and worthwhile area of study, but one that is not immediately relevant to the case study. The same is true of the 'control of counterorganisations' (Morgan, 1986).

6.12 Structural Factors

What is of both interest and importance to the case study is the concept of 'structural factors that define the stage of action' (Morgan, 1986). The idea 'suggests that while organisations and society may at any one time comprise a variety of political actors drawing on a variety of power bases, the stage on which they engage in their various kinds of power play is defined by the logic of change shaping the social epoch in which we live'. Basically, what this means is that a manager who controls an important budget, has access to key (and scarce) information, and 'style' is still constrained in his decisions, because of factors outside the organisation. Specifically, his organisation exists within a capitalist structure. As such his decisions are constrained by the need to make a profit and survive. This introduces the notion of deep structures of power, as opposed to surface manifestations normally associated with organisational power. There is however, overlap with organisational structures, rules and regulations (6.4); as well as with decision-making processes (6.5). Clegg (1975) saw rules and the means by which structures and organisational decisions were linked for, example. This has been discussed this within the context of decision-making premises above (6.5).

However, both terms, rules and structures, are used to describe a similar phenomenon at different levels. Thus, Benson (1982, 1983) and Clegg (1975) focus on organisations and rules. Althusser (1969) and Poulantzas (1973, 1978), on the other hand focus on macro theory and structures. To them the individual is merely a bearer of social relations:

Individuals should always be seen not as rounded historical figures but merely as bearers of roles ... supporting the unfolding of structural laws without reshaping of laws (Althusser, 1969).

This view would seem to render all other discussions of power somewhat redundant. What is more likely is that power involves choices within structural constraints (Dowding, 1991, 1996; Saunders, 1975, 1981). Consequently, Bergman and Luckmann (1966) argue that:

Man (not the individual, of course, in isolation, but in his collectivities) and his social world interact with one another. The product acts back on the producer. Externalisation and objectivisation are moments in a continuing dialectical process (quoted in Saunders, 1975).
This seems a more reasonable position. Structure influences individual choice because it affects the information and sources of power available to an individual, but it can not determine it. Where this is the case all politics and policy could be predicted from structure.

It is important to recognised, however, that structural factors capture more than just those those related to the needs of capitalism and profit (Benson, 1982, 1983; Clegg, 1975). Perrow (1979), for example, noted that structures underpin communication, attitudes, rules and so on. These in turn determine the way we think and act, including the way in which we make decisions. Dowding (1991) supports this view. He suggests that:

Rational choice theorists have always seen ideology as a cost-saving devise (see, for example, Downs, 1977: 98). Rather than developing a completely specific viewpoint on each issue, individuals relate issue to their general philosophy or viewpoint, thus saving themselves time and energy.

This helps to explain apparent inconsistencies in an individual’s interests. Ideology is a satisficing device; it is not optimal, but ‘good enough’ in particular circumstances. Dowding (1991) continues:

The relationship between ideology and power therefore is a close one and operates on two distinct levels. Ideology may be utilised by individuals or groups as part of their resources in the bargaining game ... it effects the way in which individuals view their own interests. In the less restricted sense particular ideologies help to bind collectivities together and help them overcome collective action problems (Taylor, 1982: 1988). [Ideologies] act as labour-saving devices to enable individuals to identify their interests quickly while they get on with the business of their daily lives (Dowding, 1991).

6.13 The Power One Already Has

Morgan (1986) also suggests that the power one already has is also a source of power. Power is used to acquire more power. He suggests that: ‘the presence of power attracts and sustains people who wish to feed off power, and actually serves to increase the power holder’s power. In the hope of gaining favour, people may begin to lend the power holder uninvited support of buy into his or her way of thinking so that he or she can see that they’re on the same side. When the time comes for the power holder to recognise this interest with active support all kinds of IOUs come into play’.
There is also a deeper element to this. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) identified a role of 'anticipated reaction' in preventing demands being made, interests challenged. They did not consider it to be non-decision-making in a strict sense because the block was not actively initiated on A's part. However, it is worth noting that Vidich and Bensman (1958) described a situation in 'Springdale' where the entire community believed that one person dominated decision-making and always achieved his will. It was considered pointless to organise against him as a result. More than this, Vidich and Bensman found that people even anticipated his wishes, and acted in accordance with how they imagined he would want them to. A produced an effect on B just by being perceived as 'powerful'.

Morgan (1986) also believes that power has an empowering effect. By this he means that an individual who acquires power will be energised into acquiring more. He is not referring simply to individual megalomania, but also to those situations where those who believe themselves to be without power suddenly find themselves empowered for some reason - for example, outside intervention, or changing circumstances (Gaventa, 1980).

Gaventa (1980) argues therefore, that A must be sensitive to B all the time if A is to maintain a position of dominance. Thus:

A will act to thwart challenges to B regardless of whether they appear in the immediate sense to be directed against A; for once the patterns are broken the likelihood of further action by B increases and the options of control wielded by A decrease.

Much thwarting by A may be symbolic therefore.

Morgan (1986) recognises an 'ambiguity of power' which remains an issue. Specifically, he argues that a specific definition of power remains allusive, because the phenomenon itself is. This makes power difficult to locate and challenge. Morgan (1986) remains unclear 'whether power should be seen as an interpersonal behavioural problem or as the manifestation of deep-seated structural factors; whether people have power as autonomous human beings or simply are carriers of power relations that are the product of more fundamental forces; 'whether there is a distinction between power and processes or societal domination and control, whether power is linked to the control of capital ... or whether it is important to distinguish between actual manifestations of power and potential power. Such issues, he suggests, 'continue to be the subject of considerable interest and debate' (Morgan, 1986) and are yet unresolved. (The model
of power used to guide this research (see 2.4) assumes that individual agency is 'structurally suggested' (Dowding, 1991)).

Morgan (1986) assumes in is his working definition of power that it is something which 'involves an ability to get another person to do something that he or she would not otherwise have done' (Morgan, 1986). Implicit in Morgan's (1986) list of power sources is the idea that this ability to get another to act to a particular way depends upon an asymmetrical control over scarce resources and the ability to manage meaning. This provides the theoretical underpinnings for community power literature - Dahl (1958), Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963), and Lukes (1974) may disagree over how power is, but they agree about what it does - and is also consistent with the conceptualisations of power proposed by Hay (1991) and Dowding (1991, 1996) (see 2.4). It is used here as a working tool with which to analyse power in local policy-making.

Power then is the means by which certain individuals and groups are able to dominate others, based on differential access to, and distribution of resources. Power is not just limited to the public domain of political institutions, but 'is potentially or actually in play or contest in all social relationships' (O'Sullivan et al., 1994). Nor is it necessarily prohibitive or coercive. Authority refers to legitimate power relations, where legitimation makes the exercise of power (i.e. the control of one by another) seem 'right' or inevitable. Social control refers to 'socially generalised authority... [and] implies a consensually authoritative social order, whereby society regulates itself' (O'Sullivan et al., 1994). It does not involve (overt) conflict.

To summarise then, it has been suggested that policy-making, in this case policy formulation, is essentially about decision-making by politicians and state administrators where the political system and the administrative system bisect. Two models of decision-making were discussed. A model of the state administration system, based on the work of Weber (1978) was presented. This represented 'bureaucracy'. Weber argued that the development of bureaucracy was inevitable, but at the same time was concerned that permanent officials of the state would come to dominate elected politicians. It was also argued that the organisational arrangements described by Weber are no longer adequate to describe the modern state, and the move towards governance. It was suggested further that people within organisations themselves are not neutral, but political.

This raised the issue of what we mean by power exactly - whether it is personal or behavioural, whether there is a difference between power and control, whether, or to what extent it is related to capital, and whether there is a distinction between actual and potential power. In practice it
may be that power is all these things, if defined in terms of mechanisms causing other people to
do things that they would not otherwise have done. It seems likely however, that power
operates in different ways in different contexts, and at different levels (Saunders, 1975; Ball,
1990).

Gaventa (1980) found in his study of power in the context of the Clear Fork Valley
communities in Appalachia (i.e. six counties of Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia and West
Virginia), for example, that power operates at all three levels as Lukes (1974) had argued. At
the first dimension are the surface mechanisms described by pluralists (overt activity); at the
second, the control of agenda, the mobilisation as bias and the setting of rules (covert activity);
and at a third dimension through the manipulation of wants and beliefs by myths and symbols
(Gaventa, 1980). He concluded therefore:

While each dimension of power has its mechanisms and uses, it is only through the
interrelationship of the dimensions and the reinforcing effect of each dimension on the
other that the total impact of power upon the actions and conceptions of the powerless may
be fully understood. What is voiced by the power holders in the decision-making arenas
may not always reflect the real conflict, but may articulate norms and myths which disguise
or deflect the more latent conflict ... What does not happen or goes unsaid in the first
dimensional arenas ... may also shape conceptions about which matters are appropriate for
consideration upon the dominant agendas. Similarly, second dimensional exercises of
power affect vulnerability to the shaping of wants and beliefs, as in the third dimension of
power, which in turn strengthens the symbolic resources available from the second ... From
this perspective, the total impact of a power relationship is more than the sum of its parts.
Power serves to create power. Powerlessness serves to reinforce powerlessness. Power
relationships, once established, are self-sustaining (Gaventa, 1980).

The extent to which power relationships are self-sustaining, and are deliberately managed is also
open to debate. It has been discussed above that this may ‘just happen’ (Saunders, 1975). This
is not to deny its advantage to someone, but to recognise ‘luck’ (Dowding 1991, 1996).
Theoretically, and methodologically, it is safer to have more than less therefore, and the idea of
applying different models of power to the same case is a useful exercise in understanding the
way in which power impacts on decisions (see Blowers, 1983, 1984, and Whitt 1979; 1982, for
examples). Blowers (1983) comments that ‘it is clear that different perspectives illuminate
different aspects of power conflict and that each is flawed’ (Blowers, 1983).
Before exploring methodological issues in more detail however (Chapter 9) it is necessary to consider one other level in the analysis of power thus far focused on macro approaches (community power) (Chapter 5) and organisational approaches (Chapter 6). This is the individual.
Chapter 7

7. Individuals and Power

The majority of literature on policymaking assumes that self-interest is the motor. Diverging interests give rise to conflict (overt, covert or latent) (Lukes, 1974) which is resolved or perpetuated through power relationships (Morgan, 1986). However, it has also emerged from the literature that some writers believe that some individuals are more ‘political’ than others (Michels, 1949; Morgan, 1986; Pareto, 1939). Morgan (1986) describes such people as ‘politicos’. He added however that such individuals represent one end of a common spectrum:

The corporate Machiavelli who systematically wheel and deal their way through organisational affairs merely illustrate the most extreme and fully developed form of a latent tendency present in most aspects of ... life.

Others, Althusser (1969) and Poulantzas (1973, 1978) most notably, suggest that the individual is beside the point; they are just the impotent ‘bearers’ of structured social relationships. Hence Morgan’s (1986) question as to whether power is individual or structural (6.13). Dowding (1991) suggests that ‘careful individualists admit that the reasons why individuals act may depend on their structural properties ... and embark on a causal account of outcomes by entering the thought processes of individuals’. But in order to do this we need a plausible framework that is explicitly stated in order to allow an evaluation of it.

Hence the purpose of the conceptualisation of power presented in Chapter 2.4. An analytical model of power was proposed in which was applied to the case study to structure data gathering and analysis, and to inform explanation. From actual behaviour, interests/motivations can be deduced from the model. It is not suggested that this is a ‘final’ model, but rather a tentative suggestion (see 8.3.2).

Following Dowding (1991) the model assumes a half-way position on agency and structure, individual agency is not subsumed by structural factors, nor are individuals wholly autonomous. Instead the two elements are ‘mutually shaping’ (Sibeon, 1999). Thus ‘structure, depending on the circumstances of the actors in question, can constrain actors or facilitate and enable them’. The model also recognises the issue of ‘luck’ (Dowding, 1991) or ‘chance’ (Sibeon, 1999).
This is not to say that personality does not effect individual behaviour as Greenstein (1969, 1975, 1992) and Laswell (1936, 1948) argue. Nor does it suggest that personality might not be prior to structure, that is some people are drawn to power for its own sake using public decision-making to live out their private motives (Laswell, 1948). Detailed psychological analyses may yield interesting data about the type of personality which is drawn to power or why some individuals are more 'political' than others, but here we are interested in process and the 'how-it-is-ness' (Pollitt et al., 1990) of actual policy, as opposed to policy makers. Thus we enter a research arena which is already peopled.

This study of the impact of power on the development of Higher Education in Greater Peterborough focused on ‘real’ people already engaged in actual policy-making. Using the analytical model of power presented in Chapter 2.4 for guidance it attempted to investigate the impact of power on public policy. A token is used to illuminate type (Levine et al., 1987) and help to answer the questions related to the impact of power on the policy process. (The issue of token and type is considered in 8.3.4 of the methodology, in the context of external validity and generalisability). The specific methodology and the issues around it are discussed next in Chapter 8.
8. Methodology

8.1 Aims and Objectives

The aim of the research was to examine the impact of power relationships on public policy using the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough as a case study example. There were four operational objectives:

1. to describe and observe the policy process (in its formulation stage)
2. to identify evidence of power relationships and their sources
3. to explain decision outcomes using different theoretical approaches to power and decision-making; and where appropriate
4. to modify theoretical concepts in the light of the empirical evidence.

8.2 Method

The literature relevant to the study of power and policy-making was reviewed. This provided a theoretical framework, and identified gaps in existing bodies of knowledge.

The research took a case study approach, using as its focus a project to develop higher education in Greater Peterborough on which I was employed as a Research Assistant. The study took place between November 1994 and December 1996. An ethnographic approach was used. The research focused on local power structures.

The policy process was observed in order to identify and record behaviour indicative of a power relationship. Observation was semi-structured, using indicators of power derived from the review of existing literature on power (for example, Dowding, 1991; Hay, 1996; and Morgan, 1986). It was assumed that a semi-structured approach would also allow unanticipated behaviour or events to be recorded if and when they occurred.

The researcher was a ‘natural participant’ (Hunter, 1995) observer. My presence at meetings was explained in terms of ‘getting a wider picture of the project’ (not untrue), but my additional
purpose, as a researcher of power relations, was not revealed to some participants in order to be ‘non-reactive’. A non-reactive approach was used to minimise disturbance to the subject of study so as not pre-determine or change relationships.

Documentary evidence (minutes, policy documents, press releases, correspondence, etc.) was used to support observation and to evaluate outcomes of the process, by comparing them with the stated objectives. This supported data triangulation.

8.3 Rationale - values; validity and reliability; and ethical issues

‘In analysing public policy we use ‘frameworks within which and through which we can think and explain’ (Parsons, 1995). However in doing so we also impose an artificial order on the phenomenon that we seek to illuminate. The frameworks are models: ‘representation[s] of something else designed for a specific purpose’ (Bullock and Stallybraus, 1997), be it ‘representation, simulation, explanation, prediction, experimentation, [or] hypothesis-testing’ (Hogwood and Gunn, 1986). Hirchman (1970), following Popper (1969) argued that: ‘without models, paradigms, ideal types and similar abstractions we cannot start to think. However, ‘the kind of paradigms we search out, the way we put them together, and the ambitions we nurture for their powers - all this can make a great deal of difference’. Underlying this claim is the notion that ‘facts’ only exist within the context of theories, and beliefs and are not independent of them’ (Popper, 1969). Popper (1957, 1963) argued that scientific methods did not find ‘truth’, but could only specify under which conditions a theory could be falsified. ‘Knowledge’ is never final, but tentative and conjectural. ‘Knowledge progresses by a process which gives rise to tentative theories, subjected to tests of falsifiability, out of which new problems emerge’.

\[ P_1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P_2 \]

where \( P = \) initial problem; \( TT = \) tentative theory/trial solution; \( EE = \) error elimination , and \( P_2 = \) new problem (Parsons, 1995).

Popper (1957, 1963, 1969) rejected the scientific paradigm of inductive positivism. Positivism assumes a world independent of our perceptions of it, which exhibits certain objective patterns that can be tested through value-free empirical research, and forms the justification for quantitative methods. The opposite view (that of Popper), ‘The conventionalist perspective ... holds that observation is itself determined by theory, that different theoretical frameworks
cannot therefore be assessed through recourse to empirical evidence, and (in some versions at least) that there is no external reality independent of our perceptions of it' (Saunders, 1979). Two positions follow: either objective phenomena may exist but it is impossible to assess what they are since any assessment would be theory-dependent; or that there are no objective phenomena, only theories, and therefore each theory is a valid as the other (Saunders, 1979).

Saunders (1979) identifies a third position, which he terms 'realism'. It is this which best describes the position of my research. 'Realism shares with positivism the view that an external reality exists and the task of science is to generate theories which can explain features of this reality', but argues against positivism that this reality is necessarily observable, and that inquiry is values free. Thus 'social analysis consists of synthetic a priori production of hypotheses about the nature of structures, and the subsequent testing of them through empirical examination of their effects' (Porter, 1993). Hence the conceptualisation of power presented in 2.4. Following a constructivist perspective it is further assumed that no single theory or model is adequate to explain phenomena, and some theoretical triangulation is required. There is no objective 'truth', only a personal one, which is based on the current state of knowledge. Individuals present 'open' analysis for criticism. Theory can not be based on 'proof' or 'truth', and instead we should consider whether it makes sense, holds together, is complete, consistent with the evidence, and convinces us. We might also consider whether it adds anything usefully different to existing theories (Parsons, 1995).

§ 3.1 Values

Such arguments reflect ultimate values about the nature of being (ontology) and the nature of knowing (epistemology). These in turn impact on the nature of research (methodology). Hogwood and Gunn (1984) describe values as 'beliefs, ethics, standards, and more specific norms'. They can not be proven right or wrong, and are not always consistent. They 'express conviction and preferences which do not rest upon empirical support' (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). (Facts on the other hand are based on knowledge and can be verified (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).) Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) go on to say that 'it may not be possible to have an extended rational argument between people of different persuasions'. Values are ultimately incontestable, but are open to change. As well as influencing moral judgements, values also effect views of human nature, 'gut' preferences for particular styles of explanation, and the type of social phenomena which are deemed 'interesting' or 'problematic' (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). This impacts on method. For some research questions qualitative methods are simply
not an option. Examples from public policy include those situations in which the researcher can not determine the goals of an intervention, or control the inputs; or measure precisely the outputs (Pollitt et al., 1990).

At extremes the values problem at this level is irresolvable: individuals are innately one thing or the other. Increasingly, scope is seen for combining the two approaches for different purposes” (Murphy and O’Leary, 1994, Popay and Williams, 1994). Having acknowledged the relationship between values, theory and methodology it becomes necessary to find practical ways of mediating this relationship, to ‘drive out’ researcher bias. One solution is by adopting a plurality of methods or theoretical frameworks - a process known as ‘triangulation’.

8.3.2 Triangulation

The purpose of triangulation is to militate against the impact of research values on research, rendering it less subjective, more valid and reliable, and therefore more credible. Cohen and Manion (1984) describe it as ‘the use of two or more methods of data collection in the study of some aspect of human behaviour’, but it can be more than this. Denzin (1970) identified four types of triangulation, data being one with three parts: time triangulation (longitudinal); space triangulation (comparative studies); and person triangulation. Closely related is methodological triangulation, either ‘within method’ - the same method applied to different settings, or ‘between method’ - different methods applied to the same study (Wellington, 1996). In investigator triangulation more than one person examines the same situation; and in theory triangulation different or competing theoretical frameworks are used to guide and analyse the same study (Blowers, 1982) (see also Hill, Aaronvitch and Baldock, 1989; and Ham, 1982).

Clarence Stone (1989) offers an alternative method, suggesting that ‘many heads are better than one as a check of subjectivity’. He offered his conclusions as a starting point and calls upon colleagues to qualify or refine his proposed model of the urban regime. He writes:

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5 Popay and Williams (1994) argue persuasively a need to reconcile such issues: ‘Those who spend time pondering the contours of ‘high-modernity’ (Giddens, 1991) may smile, shrug their shoulders, and murmur, ‘c’est la vie post-moderne’. Those who spend their lives at the intersections of theory, research, policy and practice have no such escape. And amongst those for whom the closure of a ward, an accident and emergency department, or a whole hospital means something more than the deconstruction of a discursive practice, these questions will have continuing and urgent relevance’.
The larger process of challenge and response among scholars is only an extension of the individual researcher’s movement back and forth between concept and observation. Because research is subjective to a significant degree, the check on soundness of characterisation comes from the challenges of others, and such challenges of necessity involve both conceptualisation and consistency of detail. The interaction of concept and observation is ongoing, and none of us does more than offer a guidepost in the journey. ‘Urban regime’ is a concept I offer, and a public record of events is the source of the details I draw from. Because I can claim that neither my conceptualisation nor my use of evidence [nor, surely, the evidence itself!] is unflawed, it is now my responsibility to say: Let the process of challenge and responses begin.

The main strategies employed in this study were theory triangulation (the use of rival macro theories of power for example (Chapter 5), and data triangulation - documents and longitudinal; and, where possible, personal triangulation (meeting debriefs with the project team, for example).

8.3.3 Ethnography

Pollitt et al. (1990) suggest that the qualitative approach of ethnography (defined by them as: ‘that tradition in the social sciences where the method is to watch and interact with others on their own “territory” and using their own language (rather than, for example, the technical language of the experimental psychologist or econometrician”), has a particularly valuable contribution to make to the study of public policy. They note however that it is often seen to be less valid than the quantitative methods.

Ethnographic research techniques can include ‘participant observation, informal and more formal interviews... sample surveys ... and analysis of archives’ (Hunter, 1995). The main technique used in this study was participant observation (or ‘natural participation’ (Hunter, 1995)).

Stone’s (1989) challenge has been received with considerable enthusiasm (see for example, Brown, 1999; DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999; Dowding et al., 1999; Gottdiener and Pickvance, 1991; Huizenga, 1995; Kantor, Savitch and Haddock, 1991; Sites, 1997; Stocker and Mossberger, 1994; Stone et al., 1991; and Stone, 1993).
of a case study. Eckestein (1975) comments that 'it is not much of an exaggeration to say that case study literature in the field [of political science] comes close to being coterminous with the literature as such'. Classic case studies of community power include those of Dahl (1961), Crenson (1971), Gaventa (1980), Hunter (1953), and Newton, (1976), all cited in this research.

8.3.4 External Validity

Bogdon and Biklen (1982) define case study as 'a detailed examination of one setting, or a single subject, or a single depository of documents or a particular event'. It is the focus on the unit, the particular, that is both the strength and a weakness. The problem is 'generalisability', or external validity:

Purposely choosing the unusual or just falling into a study leave the question of generalisability in the air. Where does the setting fit the spectrum of human events? The question is not answered by the selection itself, but to be explored as part of the study. The researcher has to determine what it is that he or she is studying, that is of what is this a case? (Bogden and Biklen, 1982).

Stake (1994) argues that generalisability may be irrelevant to some cases, and the case study may be of intrinsic value. A more common defence is made by Adelman et al. (1980). They argue that case studies can contribute to generalisation because they are presented in a way which is 'in harmony with the reader’s own experience', and thus provides a 'natural' basis for generalisation. Wellington (1996) supports this view. She argues that 'the write-up of a case study should be enjoyable and interesting to read. Readers should be able to 'learn lessons from it' (Anderson, 1990). The ability to relate the case and learn from it is perhaps more important than being able to generalise from it'. Hunter (1995), too, suggests that: 'One great strength of ethnographic research lies in its ability to provide detailed accounts that make social life not only understandable but also accessible and believable to a wider audience'.

None the less the issue of generalisation remains in some quarters (Lowi, 1974), and there are ways to address it. Many of these strategies also serve to enhance internal validity. Before examining them in more detail, however, it is worth noting that the individuals active in this particular case were not involved because of their specialist interest or knowledge in the policy area, but because they occupied prominent positions in other areas of the community. Whilst policy options specific to higher education would be constrained, it is not clear why their actions should be any different in this context than any other. Thus it would seem that the
findings of the research might be generalised across public policy-making in Peterborough at least.

8.3.5 Internal Validity

Generalisability ('transferability' or 'fittingness' (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) as it may be called in qualitative research) refers to external validity. On the other hand, internal validity 'tells us whether an item measures or describes what it supposed to measure or describe' (Bell, 1994). This stems from the positivist assumption about the objective phenomenon to be measured. For qualitative research the issue translates to: How does the researcher effect the case being studied? And to what extent are a researcher's observations and subsequent interpretations theory or values laden' (Wellington, 1996). 'Credibility' and 'confirmability' describe similar issues and are alternative terms used in qualitative research.

Pollitt et al. (1990) and Wood (1986) point out that the issue of validity is not specific to qualitative research, but is likely to be more of an issue because the process is necessarily more reflective and subjective. That is its strength. Results can not be subject to test of significance, and are open to particular charges of bias. This issue corresponds with the notion of 'confirmability' or 'objectivity', that is that conclusions are based on the subjects and conditions of enquiry, and not researcher opinion. Dargie (1998), for example, notes that observation has been criticised because it does not 'address the cognitive process of actors' (Snyder and Glueck, 1980), but relies on the observers interpretation of behaviour behind an event.

Pollitt et al. (1990) identify a series of strategies to enhance validity. For example, fieldwork should not be completely open-ended but guided by theories; a research project should follow four separate stages - research design, data collection, interpretation and analysis, and explanation; and these procedures should be fully documented (see also Robson, 1993; and Shipman, 1985). Important evidence should be checked through a variety of sources (see also Dargie, 1998; Guba and Lincoln, 1981), and through triangulation. To ensure confirmability, Ruddick (1985) recommends that records should be presented 'as raw as possible' to allow the interpretation of evidence to be verified. Miles and Huberman (1994) make additional points, including being self-aware of personal bias and assumptions, and to give consideration to rival conclusions (Chen's (1970) notion of 'boot-strapping'). Other factors enhancing credibility include prolonged involvement and persistent observation (Miles and Huberman, 1994)

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7 Pollitt et al. (1990) recommend the use of 'phased assertion' techniques in interviews in order to explore
Hunter (1995) comments that: 'The good community researcher collects data wherever and however possible within ethical limits and cost constraints [and time constraints], and this was the source of the analytical power of the earlier community studies that earned them enduring status as classics. They were for this reason rhetorically convincing (A. Hunter, 1990), ... in the use of different methods, diverse data, and alternative analyses that converged to heighten the credibility of their conclusions' (Hunter, 1995).

The case may also be used for comparative work, for example (Eckstein, 1975). Dahl's (1961) data on New Haven, for instance, has been analysed several times to yield different conclusions (Domhoff, 1978; and Newton, 1979); and Stone's (1989) regime theory has been applied to numerous case studies in order to 'test' it.

This research employed many of these strategies to enhance its validity. It was not open-ended but guided by theory. It followed four stages (research design, data collection, interpretation and analysis, and explanation). Although in practice there was some interaction between them, they remained conceptually distinct. That is, field observations were semi-structured by preliminary reading and written up at the time, but theoretical concepts continued to be explored throughout the research in the light of the data collected. The basic approach taken was fully documented. Measures to address researcher bias and the consideration of rival explanations were inherent in the research design through the use of theoretical triangulation. 'Thick' description (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was presented within the constraints of commercial confidentiality. (Perhaps it is worth noting too that the project did not proceed in the way in which the researcher had expected, during a prolonged involvement in it, suggesting some 'openness').

However, consulting during the research process had been deliberately designed out of the project to address the issue of internal bias caused by research itself. Findings were not validated by taking them to the sources from which they were drawn and asking [people] whether they 'believe them or not' (Guba and Lincoln, 1981) for practical reasons, which did not emerge fully until the research was well under way. This strategy was considered at the 'individual reticence'. They comment that 'Like many other interviewers we have sometimes been awarded additional information simply because we have appeared to know more than we did'. In my case I think the reverse is true - I was given information because I was so insignificant and not in a
beginning of the research, but from the experience of other colleagues undertaking research (with informed consent) it seems likely that had participants seen the data they would not have allowed its use, or else adjusted it beyond ‘credibility’ to the researcher.

8.3.6 Non-reactive Research

The final issue related to internal validity is that of reactive bias or error. Webb et al. (1966) suggested that historical analysis (physical traces and archives) and ethnographic (observation) produce less bias than other research methods, because they are non-reactive, or unobtrusive. Awareness of being tested may prompt subjects to change their behaviour or responses. It is further argued that by singling out as a suitable subjects of interview or experiment subject are likely to assume to a role - ‘what kind of person should I be as I answer these questions and do these tasks’, and the validity of the data decreases as the role assumed moves further from their ‘natural’ state. There is the issue that measurement itself is an agent for change. Webb et al. (1966) note that Crepsi (1944, quoted in Webb et al., 1966) found that interviewees who ‘don’t know’ at the start of the process do so as it progresses. Other issues include the effect of the age and gender of the interviewer (Webb, et al., 1966), and the researcher can change the instrument during the research. Webb et al. (1966) concludes that: ‘each ... reactive error can be reduced by employing research methods which do not require the co-operation of the respondents and which are ‘blind’ to him’, of which observation is one.

This research focused on power in situ. It needed to maintain ‘natural’ phenomena, and be required a non-reactive or unobtrusive approach therefore. The aim was to minimise disturbance to the subject of study so as not pre-determine or change the data acquired. According to Dargie (1998):

The crucial advantage of observation methods is identified as understanding the context and environment in which action occurs and decisions are taken ... The researcher gains a feel for the interaction by noting the features such as ... aspects of the main participants (who talks most, who are questions directed at, how are discussions conducted); and the atmosphere (conflictual: relaxed: intense: routine) (Dargie, 1998).

In terms of observational techniques Webb et al. (1966) suggest that this can be achieved by hiding the researcher, or camera, or by participant observation - that is assuming a role other knowledge/power relationship.
than researcher. Johnson (1994), however, suggests that ‘Disturbance is minimised best by a repeated presence, a low key role on the part of the researcher, and by non-obtrusive means of data recording’. It was the approach adopted for this research. I attended meetings of formal decision-making bodies, such as the Steering Committee, primarily to give administrative support, and to ‘get a wider’ appreciation of the project. In my note-taking capacity I also had access to other informal meetings which would feed into others. (Minutes I prepared were subject to formal scrutiny and approval, and in some instances I was asked to prepare notes to be held on file and minutes to be circulated). I suspect that being young and female, my presence as secretary was taken for granted – remarks about comments not to be minuted, for example, were always addressed to me, even when it was stated that my (male) colleagues would be servicing the meeting.

Observation runs across a wide spectrum from complete participant to complete observer, and there is some confusion as to who does what (Gold, 1970; Robson, 1993; Simpson, 1995) and with what justification. The participant observer, according to Bulmer (1982), is covert deceptive and as such unethical. Yet, the simple observer who is ‘not completely open and frank’ appears to be ethical.

8.3.7 Ethical Issues

Ethics are a major concern in all research, but social research in particular because it deals with human beings (as opposed to atoms, say). However, covert, which unobtrusive research must be to some extent, is particularly problematic. Homan (1991) identifies no less than thirteen possible objections, based on either ‘moral’ or ‘more pragmatic considerations’.

8.3.7.1 Informed Consent

The first objection to covert research is that it undermines the principle of informed consent, which Cohen and Manion (1994) described as ‘the bedrock of ethical procedure’. Informed consent is an issue for all social research, and not just that of covert nature. It refers to the procedures in which individuals choose whether to participate in an investigation after being informed of the facts that would be likely to influence their decisions (Diener and Crandell, 1978, quoted in Cohen and Manion, 1994). Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992) argue that although usually desirable, it is not absolutely necessary for studies where no danger or risk is involved.
Homan (1991) does not see informed consent as the ‘bedrock’ of ethical research, nor as something that is ‘sacred’. He argues that the primacy given to it is (mis)placed on two assumptions. First, there is an assumption that the subject has the right to refuse to take part. Homan (1991) notes that there are times that the subject has no choice and yet we would not really consider the research to be unethical. The collection of national census data is one such example. He also believes that there are times when the subject does have a choice when they should not—because they are accountable to the public for instance: ‘those from whom consent is sought may refuse it in order to withhold from scrutiny a practice or system in which there is legitimate public interest’. This was an important issue in the context of the study of power relationships in Greater Peterborough, particularly so given Hunter’s (1995) suggestion that: ‘although the public frontstage may reflect the power of local elites, it is the backstages where the power itself is often wielded. [Yet] The backstages of elites are carefully guarded from public view, and they have the power to protect them’.

The second assumption underlying the notion of informed consent, which Homan (1991) seeks to refute, is the idea that consenting participants know what they are doing when they consent. He argues instead that ‘the subject may have control over the release of raw data but the researcher attaches a significance to these that the untrained subject may not apprehend’ (p. 92). Homan (1991) quotes Walker (1985: 84, quoted in Homan, 1991) to illustrate the point:

Teacher: Don’t expect me to tell you anything about the Head.
MacDonald: You just have.

Homan (1991) argues that the notion of informed consent ‘provides less of a protection for the subject than for the researcher. ‘In the act of consent, responsibility for such aspects as the safety of the subject transfers from the investigator to the subject’, and the ‘acquisition of consent allows the abdication of ... responsibilities’. Moreover, ‘there is a vast difference between exhorting consent by overwhelming psychological suggestion through cleverly chosen information and gaining consent through completely objective information presented in such a

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8 It is also argued that covert methods discriminate against the defenceless and powerless. Whilst recognising that some subjects are more protected than others (by the Official Secrets Act, for example), Homan (1991) rejects Warwick’s (1982) suggestion that Humphreys’ subjects, men engaging in homosexual encounters in public toilets (‘tea rooms’), ‘could not fight back’ owing to the nature of the issue.
way as to invite the full exercise of judgement and freedom’ (Haring, 1972: 215, quoted in Homan, 1991) which is often the case in practice. When consent is denied it is seen as a challenge to be overcome, not as a ‘legitimate position to be honoured’ (Homan, 1991), particularly when the research has already started and the subject wishes to withdraw. Informed consent may be more about allaying fears than allowing genuine choices to be made.

This is not to say that the principle of informed consent is unnecessary, but rather to suggest that ‘ethical’ and ‘unethical’ research methods are not dichotomous and easily defined as such. There is therefore an inherent conflict in social research between ‘the right to research and acquire knowledge and the right of individual research participants to self-determination, privacy and dignity’ (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992). It is further argued that:

If you watch people, record observations about them and draw inferences about what you have seen or heard without declaring yourself or asking permission are you committing an ethical violation? If you do not effect their lives, and preserve their anonymity so that others can not use your observations to effect them most of us think not. But this is not informed consent (Brewster Smith, 1979, quoted in Bulmer, 1982).

8.3.7.2 Privacy

A related issue is that of privacy - ‘the condition of being protected from unwanted access by others - either physical access, personal information or attention’ (Bok, 1984: 10-11, quoted in Cohen and Manion). Homan (1991) argues that some subjects are unaware of the ways in which their privacy can be invaded and are ‘incompetent to protect it’ as a result. This means that additional care should be taken by the researcher to protect the subject from being identifiable in any write up. The most common strategy is to assign false names, or to change the location of the site, but this is not always possible.

In this case for example it was planned to use pseudonyms for the actors, but two problems became evident. First, role was important and anonymised the individual without anonymising their roles meant that they would be not be anonymised at all - Lorna Doone, Chief Executive of Peterborough City Council was still a give-away because of the role. Anonymising the location did little to help. Disguising location - Higher Education Development in Trumpton, for example, was no more feasible because the geographical (demographic) issues were so significant. Giving it a more generalised rural region, the East say, made little difference
because no other new university developments have been TEC-led. All of this also had implications for the related issue of confidentiality, that is not revealing attributable information. In the end it was agreed that the thesis should be confidential, and any papers derived from it would be expurgated as necessary. This would be possible because papers would have a tighter focus and cover specific elements of the research. It is interesting to observe, for example, that in spite of the persistent debate over methods in community power research, regime theorists tend not to describe their methodology at all.

8.3.7.3 Deception

Cohen and Manion (1994) note two further ethical considerations. The first is betrayal, ‘usually applied to those occasions where data disclosed in confidence are revealed publicly in such ways as to cause embarrassment, anxiety... to the subjects’. This is not relevant here, as no information was supplied in confidence as such.

The second is deception, or not telling the whole truth. The most extreme example is that of covert research, such participant observation as defined by Bulmer (1982). Homan (1991), and even Bulmer (1982) to an extent, note that deception is inherent in any research. It is argued that a study of ‘racial prejudice’ would not be described as such when seeking consent. Kimmel (1988) writes that it is impossible to state that all deception has potentially harmful effects on participants. The issue must be in deciding ‘what is the proper balance between the interests of science and the thoughtful human treatment of people, who innocently provided the data’ (Cohen and Manion, 1994).

Some fear, however, that covert methods pollute the research environment, making subjects less keen to participate, as well as damaging the reputation of social science as a whole (Mead, 1969; Warwick, 1982). This is possible, but, to my knowledge, untested. The argument (below) that most covert research is undertaken by graduate researchers because they alone have the time, would seem to suggest that there might be natural limits to the spread.

It is also argued that covert methods are ‘invisibly reactive’ because the presence of another inevitably changes behaviour. Bulmer (1982) makes some issue of this and the fact that participants are often seen through - Rosenhan and colleagues (1973) were believed to be what they purported to be, that is insane, by doctors but not by patients. (Bulmer also suggests that over-use of the method is likely to distort ‘natural practices’ anyway - in the same way as
subjects of experiments 'now routinely expect to be deceived' (Bulmer, 1982). Homan (1991) accepts that covert methods will have some effect, but still argues that they are less reactive than more overt ones.

Some argue that covert methods are un-necessary. Bulmer (1982), for example, notes that Caudill (1958, quoted in Bulmer, 1982) made a second study of the mental hospital in which he had been a participant observer 'patient' and had found that the 'study yielded a wider range of data over which it was possible to exercise a higher degree of control and with which he was more satisfied both intellectually and emotionally'. However, Caudill's needed to do the first piece in order to be able to make comparisons. It would also have given him the opportunity to identify what was most 'interesting'. Barbour (1979: 9, quoted in Homan, 1991) suggests that covert methods confine the scope of research as it 'disqualifies the investigator from asking certain questions from ignorance'. In my case for instance, it was not possible to introduce conversations about colleagues, or to ask who was 'powerful', or to 'test' for power needs (Winter, 1973, 1993) without disturbing natural relationships. However, covert methods are only used in situations where other methods would fulfil the research purpose (Wellington, 1996).

The final criticism of covert methods identified by Homan (1991) is that the researcher suffers excessive strain in order to protect 'their cover'. Gold (1970, in Hayes, 1970) identified negative issues across the whole spectrum of observation stances however. At one end is the completely covert, role-pretence model, which 'calls for delicate balances between demands of roles and self' (p. 112), where the latter might subsume the former ('going native'). The 'complete observer' role, the issues are ethnocentrism and a lack of engagement with subjects. Notwithstanding, Erickson (1967) complains that the stresses of assumed roles might be transmitted to the 'academic elders' responsible for postgraduate students, who are the main users of the method.

Bulmer (1982) claims that to study [subjects] secretly is ethically comparable to a doctor who carries out medical experiments on human subjects without their agreement', but this is a false parallel. After all, the whole point of participant observation is that it is 'natural' and unobtrusive, not interventionist. In the final analysis Bulmer (1982) is forced to concede that: 'the most compelling argument in favour of covert observation is that it produces good social science which would not have been possible without the method. It would be churlish ... not to recognise that the use of covert methods has advanced our understanding of society'.
8.3.7.4 Natural Participation

Hunter's (1995) term 'natural participant' is a useful one in considering these important ethical issues. In a 'natural participant' role the researcher fills both participant and observer roles at the same time. Hunter's term is useful for two reasons. First, it resolves the problem of what 'counts' as (participant) observation (see for example, Robson, 1993; Simpson, 1995; Gold, 1970), and second, in doing so, it ensures that ethical issues are delimited appropriately. There are numerous roles in natural participation, which may be concurrent. Gans (1967) commented on his own experience in the following way:

The activities cast me in three types of research roles: total researcher, researcher participant, and total participant. As a total researcher I observed events which I participated in minimally or not at all, for example as a silent audience member at a public meeting. As a researcher-participant, I participated in an event but as a researcher rather than a resident, for example at most social gatherings. As a total participant, I acted spontaneously as a friend and neighbour and subsequently analyzed the activities in which I had so participated (Gans, 1967).

My own case was complex too. I was employed as a Research Assistant at GPtec on a bursary with Loughborough University to undertake a PhD. As a research assistant I was expected to administer meetings as well as undertake project-related research. My line manager and my immediate colleagues also knew the purpose of and nature of the PhD research. All the other participants knew that I was a research student, and anyone who did ask what I was doing I told that I was looking at decision-making processes within the project (not untrue). Some colleagues with whom I did not work directly knew more because they asked. At the university, my supervisor, Director of Research, and one other member of staff also knew, and my methodology had been submitted formally. I was not therefore an interloper, deceiver or liar. My position seems much the same as Suttles' (1990).

Suttles (1990), in his study of land use in Chicago, became 'absorbed as a participant' (Hunter, 1995) and had already been involved in meetings for a year before he started to take notes. When he began to do so it was without telling anyone. He then had two simultaneous roles, not one hidden behind a deceptive other. In my own case, I attended the meetings first as an 'officer', and second as a researcher taking field notes. It is worth saying that when Suttles
(1990) did reveal that he was writing a book on planning in Chicago he was not re-appointed to the Local Planning Committee.

It is clear from actual events beyond the scope of the research project that had some participants known that I was writing a thesis on power relationships, my research fate may have been similar. Put simply, I would have been left without a thesis at all. It might be argued that this would indicate that the research should not have been undertaken at all therefore. But I would counter this by suggesting that there are real reasons for undertaking such work. Before stating these, however, it should be said that the significance of the issues emerged over time. Had they been predicted it would have been expedient to do something else. Research degrees are time bound and also require an outcome for qualification - there comes a point when it is practically impossible to start again. The final issue therefore is often not what was planned at the outset.

There is also a principle involved however. Gans (1962) is of the view that social science is a vehicle for promoting dialogue between elites and masses. Hunter (1995) argues, however, that this is currently a one way information flow, and that most research adds to the asymmetry. ‘Elites’, he argues, ‘are ... relatively understudied, not because they do not have or are not part of existing social problems but precisely because they are powerful and can more readily resist the intrusive inquisition of social research’. He suggests that by presented ‘detailed accounts that make social life ... accessible ... to a wider audience ... ethnography can contribute to making knowledge, and its correlated power, a democratic part of a broader society’.

It is recognised however that the material presented here is limited in its achievement of such an aspiration. The case study text is not easily accessible, because it is long and unstructured (reflecting the way in which the project developed). The plan was to present ‘thick’ data (Miles and Hubberman, 1994) which was as ‘raw as possible’ (Ruddick, 1985), and there is a drawback to this. Had meetings followed a tidy pattern there would have been less of a problem, and if the intention had not been to present field data as completely as possible, likewise. For reasons of legal/commercial confidentiality it has not been possible to include actual evidence to support dependability or auditability. However, there does seem scope for the work to make a contribution in some way. It is hoped that from it papers might be drawn which do contribute to the development of the community power debate, recently de-centred by regime theory which focuses on power to; as well to the literature on higher education, and regional issues in particular.
There now follows a case study, which describes the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough between 1994 and 1996. It describes the policy process in situ as it developed over time. The foregoing theoretical framework (Chapters 2 to 7) is used to analyse and explain decisions and actions of participants focusing on outcome, using the model of power presented in Chapter 2. For the sake of continuity, the description and analysis of the university development, and to prevent the interrupting the flow, critical commentary has been placed after appropriate sections, and largely cross-refers to the detailed analysis given in Chapters 2 to 7. (In presenting the case study specific cross-references to the theoretical framework are shown in brackets and are bold). General conclusions are presented Chapter 11. Chapter 11 also includes an evaluation of the methodology and some suggestions for future research.

Before presenting the case study evidence, however, it is first necessary to examine the wider policy context in which the university project has developed. This explains the justification for a university in Greater Peterborough and the particular nature of its development. It also gives some illustration of contemporary attitudes towards higher education and its current role in society, all of which help to structure the local policy arena.
Chapter 9

9. Universities and Higher Education Policy- the context of change

It has been argued above that the development of higher education in Peterborough would be influenced by the existing structure of the policy arena; that national policy defines and constrains the policy options available to local decision-makers. Lindblom (1959) suggested that policies were seldom 'new' but deviate slightly from the prior position - 'successive limited comparisons' (3.2). The aim of this chapter is to review the recent development of national higher education, specifically university education. The distinct sectors of university and 'public' higher education institutions had already been replaced before the study of higher education in Greater Peterborough started in 1994. It contributes little to the context, therefore, other than enabling the massive overall expansion of higher education in mainly urban areas (see DES, 1996; Carr, 1998).

This chapter covers key aspects of policy between the two major reviews of the system - Robbins (Committee on Higher Education, 1963) and the establishment of the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education (NCIHE, 1997), the Dearing Committee, in 1995. Its purpose is to provide a policy context for the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough. The layout is chronological, as it is not always useful to separate out themes covered by the same legislation which together reflect contemporary mores. The main areas to be examined are those issues which provide the context for the Peterborough project. Two contradictory trends characterise the period under study, expansion in participation and contraction in public finance.

9.1 The Robbins Committee and Expansion

In 1961 the Robbins Committee was set up to examine the provision of higher education in Britain, marking the first attempt at national planning of the system which had hitherto been run with little regard to national need or duplication of effort (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). The Report (Committee on Higher Education, 1963) argued that such planning had become necessary because of the increasing amount of public money being spent on higher education, and because the system had become increasingly complex. The aim of the committee was:

- to review the pattern of full-time higher education in Great Britain in the light of national needs and resources, to advice Her Majesty's Government on what principles its long-term
development should be based. In particular to advise in the light of these principles whether any new types of institutions were desirable and whether modifications should be made in the present arrangements of planning an co-ordinating the development of the various types of institution (Committee on Higher Education, 1963).

The Committee claimed to be responding to the ‘growing realisation of [Britain’s] economic dependence upon the education of its population’ (1963) and that economic developments had led to changing cultural aspirations resulting in an increased demand for university places. Increasing demand and continuing expansion have remained features of the development of higher education since then. However, the principles underlying this have changed over time.

The Committee proposed that supply of places should be based on demand from students and not on the demands of the economy (except teacher training, which was considered too important to be left unmanaged). The report stated that ‘courses of higher education should be available for all those qualified by ability and attainment to achieve them and who wished to do so’. In fact this did not happen because demand increased at an even greater rate than the Committee predicted, increasing competition and decreasing acceptance rates in Arts and Social Science. The Report called for 390,000 extra places to be available by 1973/74, and 590,000 places by 1980/81 (Committee on Higher Education, 1963). These would be provided by the expansion of existing universities and through the establishment of six new ones, plans for four of which were already underway.

Whilst the Committee wished to see expansion of postgraduate education and argued that money should be made available to support its development, the provision of undergraduate study remained the funding priority. In the current climate of lifelong learning it is interesting to note that the Committee looked primarily at full-time provision for people leaving school with A levels. ‘The Education of Adults’ (Committee on Higher Education, 1963) was discussed only briefly, stating that adults wishing to resume their education should be encouraged to do so.

The Committee assumed that spending on education was an ‘investment’ and believed that the money necessary for expansion (£1,420 million between 1963/64 - 1980/81 inclusive) could be funded by central government if the people wanted it. It was suggested that tuition fees should cover at least 20% of an institution’s expenditure. The fact that the Treasury continued to fund at full rate indicates the level of political and societal commitment to higher education as a public good. This is further reflected by the committee’s rejection of loans to students. (Loans were introduced in 1990) (Stone, 1998). The Committee believed that such expansion was
necessary to ensuring 'the maintenance of our material position in the world, but much more, it is an essential condition for the realisation in the modern age of the ideals of a free and democratic society' (Committee on Higher Education, 1963).

However, following the publication of the Report higher education ceased to be taken for granted as public good. Against a backdrop of economic decline, poor technical performance and student unrest, questions were raised about the benefits higher education bestowed on society as a whole. The early 1980s saw severe 'contraction' in the funding of higher education, but not admissions, and a significant change in attitude. Thus, Stone writes that:

While [the themes of higher education as a social good and a collective responsibility] persist, since the 1980s governments have placed greater emphasis on the economic returns from higher education and the needs of efficiency and improved management (Stone, 1998).

9.2 UGC Circular Letter 12/85 and 'Contraction'

On 9 May 1985 the Chairman of the University Grants Committee (UGC) wrote to Vice Chancellors (UGC Circular letter 12/85) warning of an anticipation of a 2% (at least) in the recurrent grant. The letter noted that the Government wished to see an increase in the number of students studying vocationally relevant courses and that the Secretary of State expected to see a redistribution of existing funds towards science and technology as a result. The fact that students themselves remained more inclined to study Arts and Social Science seemed beside the point. The UGC also announced that in future it intended to be selective in its funding allocations in order to support areas of particular strength or promise across the entire university sector. Quality output (and indeed input) by autonomous professionals was no longer taken for granted. Higher education was not uniquely effected by 'contraction', and Stone (1998) suggests that it joined a long list of 'nationalised industries'. In this sense higher education was also seen to require reduced funding to help promote focused and efficient service provision, which was fit for purpose.

Together these two issues - the status of the academic as 'expert' and the issue of fitness for purpose - reflect wider changes in society. It is argued by Bloland (1995), for example, that 'A consumer culture calls into question the assumptions that the academy has a monopoly of knowledge. This delegitimates belief in professors as experts, particularly as ultimate experts on the subjects they teach. Thus, Lyotard (1984) claims that 'performativity' is the only viable criterion of assessment of worth in today's society, and as such higher education can only be
judged by its ability to contribute to the economic system and not the pursuit of knowledge and truth. The role of higher education is now to:

... create skills, and no longer ideals ... The transmission of knowledge is no longer designed to train the elite capable of guiding the nation towards emancipation, but to supply the players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by institutions (Lyotard, 1984)

The discrediting of the professor as expert has left a void which to be filled by the Economy. Bloland (1995) comments that:

Some of the most striking postmodernist changes are associated with economic life viewed in terms of performativity, and these changes profoundly affect the place of higher education in the society.

He is referring to four general tendencies: increased numbers of jobs in the service sector relative to manufacturing; the changing emphasis on producing information as opposed to goods; the expansion of multinational trade based on telecommunications; and the tendency for large conglomerates to be replaced by smaller enterprises. All of these factors have had an effect of the demand for graduates (see for example, Brown and Scase, 1994; IRS, 1996; and Harvey, Moon, and Geall, 1997). At the same time higher education has experienced changes in its shape and structure. A wider variety of institutions offer higher education, thus heightening competition between them. Modes of delivery have increased. The autonomy of institutions has declined, and competition between them has increased.

9.3 The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s (DES, 1985)

In 1985 the government also published a Green Paper on higher education - *The development of higher education into the 1990s* (DES, 1985). This stressed the government’s concern about (declining) economic performance since 1945 and the way in which higher education would be to contribute more directly to the economy in future in order to justify its receipt of public money (performativity). This concern was mirrored in other areas of policy and explains the development of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) as discussed, for example, and also justifies their involvement in higher education. Specifically, universities were required to graduate more scientists and engineers. It was felt that the provision of Arts places should decrease relative to the number in science and technology and that institutions should build links with business and encourage more positive work attitudes among students. Institutions
should become more flexible and provide a quick response to manpower needs. This issue was made more pressing by an anticipated 14% decline in the number of students in the 1990s drawn from a shrinking number of 18 year olds in the population.

9.4 Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge

April 1987 saw the publication of the White Paper, *Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge* (DES, 1987), which became the higher education part of the Education Reform Act of 1988. As with the Green Paper the government claimed to subscribe to the aims of higher education as expressed by Robbins but in both cases the summary aims of the Paper were rather different. Under ‘Aims and Purposes’ it was stated that higher education should: ‘serve the economy more effectively’, ‘pursue basic scientific research and scholarship in the arts and humanities’ and, again, have ‘closer links with industry and commerce and promote enterprise’. Whilst ‘meeting the needs of the economy was not the sole purpose of higher education’, it was argued that activities should be organised more positively towards business and industry. Public funding would be arranged so to ‘encourage and reward’ (DES, 1987) institutions who did this.

Again the paper stated that the number of 18 year olds in the population who could potentially benefit from higher education was declining. Employer demand for graduates, on the other hand, was not. Coupled with the remaining shortage of science and technology graduates it was decided that student demand should not be the main determinant for planning, but rather the demand for the ‘Requirements of Highly Qualified Manpower’. Course provision should be relevant to employer need in terms of size and also curriculum content. Greater focus should be given to science. Admissions policies were also expected to reflect the changing demography. Institutions were encouraged to admit mature applicants who may not have had traditional qualifications (A Levels). Btec qualifications and NVQs were suggested as the second access route; Access courses the third. Continuing education would also be encouraged.

Implicit in the widening of access was also the issue of physical access, actually more of a problem in practice than the demand of three A Levels (Tight, 1987). Mature students tend to study part-time owing to existing family and work commitments, and given these latter commitments often have to find ways of attending as cheaply as possible. Living at home is one solution. Therefore, local access was considered to be vital to supporting the process of widening participation (Tight, 1987). Tight (1987) identified five ‘policy implications’ following from this:
provision should be increased in areas currently under-provided for; institutions should adjust their provision so as to serve a greater regional and local role; part-time provision, particularly at higher degree level, should be expanded; mixed forms of distance and face-to-face higher education should be developed; less emphasis should be placed on the residential element in higher education.

Two themes emerged from the White Paper of relevance to the development of higher education in Peterborough - provision would be relevant, access would be inclusive. The purpose of the national changes was not to expand the system in overall terms, but to expand access opportunities to compensate for the declining number of 18 year olds. In practice however major expansion occurred. The demand for places by 'non-traditional' students was huge and costly. New forms of finance had to be considered.

9.5 The Education Reform Act (ERA). 1988

The Education Reform Act 1988 had a huge impact on higher education. It changed the legal structure of the sector and the way in which it was funded. Polytechnics and selected colleges would be released from Local Authority control, becoming independent corporate bodies under contract to the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) which would also be newly established, for example. Universities would be financed though the UFC (University Funding Council) which would replace the UGC (University Grants Committee). The UFC would contract with universities to deliver specific educational services for which in return for payment. Money from government was to be seen as payment ‘to secure delivery of educational services which are of satisfactory or better quality and which are responsive to the needs of students and employers’ (DES, 1985). ‘Contracts’ would be used to encourage institutions to become more enterprising in attracting funds from non-government sources; to increase accountability in the use of public money, and ‘to strengthen the commitment’ of institutions to the provision of educational services agreed by the UGC. Such arrangements were consistent with the ‘marketisation’ found in other areas of public policy (4.3).

9.6 Further and Higher Education Act of 1992

In 1991 the Government published another White Paper - *Higher Education: a New Framework* (DES, 1991), which apart from abolishing the binary line legally established in 1966, reaffirmed the emphasis on manpower needs of the previous White Paper. *Higher Education: A New Framework* promised a formal commitment to expansion in the form of to ‘lifelong learning’. Such expansion had to be ‘cost effective’ however. Programme lengths were to be reviewed,
credit accumulation and transfer (CATs) investigated (ironically, given that the Act which resulted from the paper abolished the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA)), and ways of encouraging more people to undertake study in science and technology were to be explored.

The Further and Higher Education Act of 1992, not only abolished the binary line but the necessity for two separate funding councils. Instead funding councils would be set up for England (HEFCE), Wales and Scotland. They were responsible for the assessment of the quality in both teaching and research, as well as the funding of tuition and non-specific research.

9.7 ‘Consolidation’

In 1992 a period of ‘consolidation’ was announced which resulted in ‘capping’. This meant that any institution that admitted more students than agreed with HEFCE would be penalised. Furthermore, HEFCE anticipated ‘an average reduction in planned intakes in 1994-95 for about 3.5% compared with actual intakes in 1993-94’ (HEFCE, 1993). Then in November 1994 the Department for Education (DfE) announced that the number of funded student places would remain capped beyond 1996. This would result in planned numbers being reduced by 2,000 in 1995-96 and a further 7,000 the following year (Times, 30/11/94). In addition, HEFCE also announced that the tuition fee maxima would be reduced by 45%, and that DfE expected to see an increase in part-time study. Tuition fees paid to universities by HEFCE were frozen in 1994.

In 1998 funding per student was 73% of what it had been in 1989 (Stone, 1998). DfE also cut student grants by 10% in 1995-6 and expected a further cut of 8% for 1995-96. Student loans were increased accordingly. In 1997 'students eligible for maintenance support [got] £3,335 a year ... 50% through a means-tested grant and 50 % through a subsidised loan (DfEE, 1997).

9.8 Review

It was the belief that such massive growth could not be supported indefinitely by public money which resulted in the second major review of higher education. In May 1994 DfE initiated a review of higher education inviting stakeholders to submit comments on the higher education system which effectively removed it from the public agenda until after the general election in 1997. In the first phase they were asked to consider the following questions:

(a) What is the purpose of higher education? How should it support society in general? What role should it pay in underpinning a modern, competitive economy?
(b) What are the implications for the future shape of higher education...?

c) What are the implications for the future size of higher education?

This review became the formal Dearing Review, which published its finding and recommendations in July 1997, and therefore falls outside the period of this study. Two expectations of the review are of particular relevance to the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough however. It was anticipated that some sort of tuition fee would be introduced (actually the case); and that regional issues would become more explicit (Chapter 12, NCIHE, 1997).

In their response to the Dearing Report (NCIHE, 1997) DEE (1997) noted that the last decade has been a period of dramatic change and growth in higher education. In particular:

- full-time student numbers increased by 70% between 1989 and 1995;
- one in three young people now enter higher education compared with one in six in 1989; but
- public funding for institutions has fallen by around 25% per student over the same period, putting considerable pressures on universities and colleges.

Higher education has never been free, as Stone (1998) points out, but increasingly governments have made greater demands at the same time as reducing their support. Courses should be more relevant, manpower-led instead of subject to the demands of students who persist in their study or Arts and Social Science at the expense of Science and Technology. Governments have also demanded that this extra provision be supplied at a lower cost. Indeed, Rothblatt (1997) comments that:

Since recovery from the Second World War, Europe has moved from elite to mass higher education, revamped entry, degree and diploma requirements, altered the relationships between university and non-university sectors, created European student exchange programmes, open universities and market-related higher education responses. The transformations have occurred with breathtaking and confusing rapidity, and no end is in sight. Funding has been re-thought, and distinctions between pure and applied subjects have been greatly muddled and governments have assumed responsibility for more and more of the missions of universities than could be imagined once totalitarian states had been overthrown.
Thus the higher education project in Greater Peterborough was developed within the context of increasing participation, both in both breadth and volume in the face of decreasing state funding and increasing central control of that funding. Higher Education institutions have been required to look to the private sector to support the delivery of public objectives, designed to support private enterprises; and individual students to funding at least some of their own costs.

9.9 ‘Regionalisation’

The National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education (NCIHE, 1997) identified one of the purposes of higher education as: ‘to serve the needs of an adaptable, sustainable, knowledge-based economy at local, regional and national levels’ (NCIHE, 1997). Contributions to this aim included: research and consultancy; attracting inward investment; meeting labour market and skills needs; supporting (electronic) lifelong learning which is specifically focused on local social and economic needs, which encourage ‘entrepreneurship’.

Tight (1996) writing on the ‘relocation of higher education’ since his 1987 proposition (Tight, 1987) (see above) argued that changes such as the increased cost of higher education to the individual, and the type of individual now attending higher education (the ‘relatively poor, mature and part-time’ (1996)) rendered local access and locally focused provision even more important. Reviewing progress towards local access since 1987 he concluded that provision in England had changed ‘significantly’.

He identified a series of developments, still underway, which were designed to equalise, at least physical, access. Such strategies included the expansion of existing colleges, the creation of satellite branches of existing colleges, greater use of distance and open learning, the development of HE opportunities in FE colleges (which alone made up about 8% of full-time equivalent (FTE) enrolments in 1995 (HESA, 1995)), and ‘plans for new foundations’ (Tight, 1990). Tight identified six new regional universities for England by the end of the decade - Lincoln[shire], Gloucester, London Docklands, Cornwall, Cumbria and Suffolk (THES, 21/4/95, quoted in Tight, 1996). However he also suggested that local access had developed much more in urban areas than in the rural ‘northern, eastern, western, and south-western peripheries’ (Tight, 1996) including the ‘educational sinkhole’ of East Anglia.

Tight (1996) divided England into ten regions and compared the number of higher education students with the number of residents in each region. Between the most populated region, Greater London, and the least, East Anglia, he found a threefold difference in the student/resident ratio for full-time students and a ten-fold difference for part-time students.
Furthermore, comparing the ratios for 1992/93 with those for 1984/85 Tight found that East Anglia was the only region in which the density of students had actually fallen over time. He concluded therefore that 'this region’s position as an area poor in higher education provision would appear to be becoming relatively more pronounced' (Tight, 1996).

Relative disadvantage justified, defined and gave impetus to the TEC-led project to develop higher education in Greater Peterborough, but the project was initiated at a time when despite widely accepted support for expansion, there was also serious financial constraint and an increasing private burden of cost. Provision aimed to be relevant, business-led, responsive, also cost-effective and appropriate to local need.
Chapter 10

10. The Development of Higher Education in Greater Peterborough

10.1 October 1994

In October 1994 Greater Peterborough Training and Enterprise Council (GPtec) set up a project to:

Establish quality university education and services in Greater Peterborough and thus provide a skilled workforce which will generate economic growth (Forbat, 1994b).

Specifically, the project aimed to make local access to higher education available to all who could benefit from it, to establish research and consultancy facilities for local businesses, and to develop open and flexible learning systems in addition to traditional models. The project's objectives were to:

- develop best access and admission facilities for all relevant groups, including the disadvantaged, and people with work and family commitments, and to support the concept of lifelong learning;
- integrate academic and competency assessment;
- establish appropriate guidance systems for progression to and through higher education; and
- develop curriculum models which will meet the need for a flexible graduate labour market in the twenty-first century (1994b).

The arguments for the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough were set out in the report Development of Higher Education in the GPtec Area (Forbat, 1994a). The paper prepared for GPtec's Strategic Education Forum's consideration stated that Peterborough was the largest city in England without a university, nor was there one within 'reasonable daily travelling distance' (Forbat, 1994a). It was argued that the absence of a university in Peterborough resulted in relative 'academic, cultural and economic' deprivation. The paper called for planned provision of higher education for the area, which should be designed to accommodate an increase in the number of students who required home-based study, and anticipated increased demand for part-time study which had been experienced by other areas.
It was argued that local study facilities would support progression, and therefore the National Targets for Education and Training, most particularly lifetime learning (see http://www.tec.co.uk/tecnc/sec4/nacett.html). It was also suggested that an increasing number of young people were seeking local study opportunities and that mature people with family and/or work commitments might wish to study locally.

Secondly, local employers needed to update the knowledge and skills of their workforce. This was made more difficult by the lack of local provision. Furthermore, it meant that there was no local facility for advanced research or consultancy. It was also argued that there was a need to develop advanced programmes of study, such as MBAs (Masters in Business Administration) and support those courses already on offer by Peterborough Regional College (PRC), such as the DMS (Diploma in Management Studies), in order to support the Investors in People Programme (IIP), and therefore the lifetime target 3 for which the TEC was responsible.

The paper outlined the national position of growth in the number of students in higher education, from 15.1% of 18 to 21 year olds entering higher education in 1988 to 30.9% in 1993 (the last available figure). It was noted, however, that the current national target was for a transfer rate of 33% by the year 2000 had still to be reached. Greater Peterborough had already exceeded the target with a transfer rate of 41.4% in October 1993. Of these students half transferred from schools, and half from the three main colleges of further education (FE). Of the total transfer 3.5% remained in the area, half of them to undertake HND courses. Given such a high transfer rate the paper argued that in the case of young people 'the issues would seem to be retention of the local student populations, the improvement of student take-up in certain areas of the GPtec region as a whole [of the 18+ transfer 31.9% were from South Lincolnshire, 18.5% from Peterborough City, and only 13.8% from Fenland], and the provision of part-time study facilities' (Forbat, 1994b). Overall three client groups were identified - businesses, mature people wishing to undertake continuing professional or personal development (CPD), and those specific groups of young people from within the area.

The report identified four possible models of development and made one recommendation:

the incremental development of programmes of study based upon the progressive expansion of current FE facilities and an increase in the present postgraduate graduate arrangements [i.e. an MA in Education Management and a planned MBA].
the purchase or rent of a suitable building and the establishment of a ‘new’ university [not really an option unless established by statute]

the purchase or rent of a suitable building to be used as an ‘outreach’ facility for an existing university.

Alternatively, we could consider a new development in Higher Education, geared to the likely business requirements of the area over the next decade and beyond, including the needs for part-time study facilities, and catering for full-time young students as well as providing flexible learning opportunities for all age groups (Forbat, 1994b).

This would mean developing provision of higher education in Greater Peterborough with an existing institution. In order to achieve this the TEC agreed a project team, a project manager and two research assistants. Their task was to undertake ‘needs’ research, conduct comparability studies, and to organise the running of the project. ‘Strategy’ was assigned to the Higher Education Steering Group, under the chairmanship of Richard Martin, then Director of Retail at Thomas Cook. The steering committee would make the decisions required to move the project towards a Business Plan scheduled for December 1995.

The steering committee met for the first time on October 27 1994 when they agreed their Chair (Richard Martin), the Marketing Manager of Thomas Cook Retail (later Managing Director) and the principles of the project – the aims and objectives of the university development, and the project plan.

10.2 November 1994

The second time the steering committee met was on November 23 1994. Edward Davenport, the Higher Education Manager at GPtec, and project leader, went over the background of the project (Forbat, 1994b) for those members who had not attended the previous meeting, and presented a discussion paper on Admission, Progression and Guidance (Forbat, 1994c). The position of Peterborough Regional College (PRC) which was already providing some higher education courses in the area was also discussed.

Davenport stated that the idea of the project had originated with the TEC’s Strategic Education Forum which was responsible for local implementation of National Education and Training Targets (NETTs) (see http://www.tec.co.uk/tecn/sec4/nacett.html). The Forum was concerned
that lifelong learning and the impact of the supposed 'draw factor' were being held back in Greater Peterborough in the absence of local provision of higher education. A massive national increase in student numbers to meet the 33% national target for the year 2000 had not benefited potential students in the Greater Peterborough area who were unable to move. (Much of the increase in student numbers was in those who were female and/or 'mature' - by 1997 over half of all students were mature (DfEE, 1997).) In addition, Davenport suggested that the incidence of young students studying from home would also increase given the move away from grants to loans (see Tight 1997). If this trend were to continue it would mean that local young people would also be disadvantaged. In the meantime young people would continue to migrate out and not be replaced by incoming students from elsewhere. One particular issue raised, but not covered in the report, was the current relative disadvantage of Asian (mostly of Pakistani origin) young women who are discouraged from studying away from home and thus found it impossible to enhance their employment.

Next discussed was the issue of 'quality'. One employer from the engineering sector on the steering committee (Trevor Newton) argued that the location of this or that institution was irrelevant to his organisation. When they recruited staff or commissioned research the company chose an institution with a reputation for 'excellence' in relevant areas; and when recruiting graduates they looked for individuals who had a 'total education experience'. The Chair accepted the point and suggested that any university for Peterborough should be a 'centre of excellence', not a generalist institution replicating the dominant model. None the less he supposed that reputation was something to be built up over time.

Given the existing provision, and the privately acknowledged threat the project represented to them, Peterborough Regional College (PRC) were invited to update the committee on their provision of higher education. It was shown that there had been a steady increase in the number of students enrolling since the courses started four years previously (1990). Full-time numbers had dropped in the last academic year, apparently as a result of capping in funding. It was felt that this was particularly significant as many of the courses offered by PRC were 'franchises'.

¹An alternative history was offered later in the meeting. It was said that the Greater Peterborough Partnership, or GPP, Economic Strategy Group had identified the need for a university. This had been communicated to the TEC through their Chief Executive, who was also a member of the GPP, who assigned it to Davenport for action. By the end of 1996 there was yet another version which suggested
and thus vulnerable to the whims of the franchising institution. Part-time registrations were also down for the year 1994/5. This was thought to be a result of industry being forced to ‘retrench’.

Richard Hall, Chief Executive of Peterborough City Council, thought that this suggested that whilst the ‘vision’ of local access to higher education was ‘great’, it also seemed rather pointless. If PRC could not fill existing places the need for expansion seem dubious.

Next Davenport presented the paper Admission Progression and Guidance (Forbat, 1994b) to the steering committee for their consideration. It argued that the current absence of existing provision of higher education in Peterborough allowed for innovative models to underpin the main development. It was suggested that local students should have a right of access to appropriate courses once they satisfied the admission criteria, and that there should be clearly identifiable progression routes to local higher education. The paper proposed the notion of a ‘seamless transfer’ between educational phases. Profiling or Records of Achievement were suggested as possible means for supporting this process. Adequate guidance should be offered at all stages. This was seen to be particularly important given the trend towards modularisation of courses, and the potential for credit accumulation and transfer. It was envisaged that proper support for students would also help reduce withdrawal rates.

In discussion Hall responded that the current UCAS system would remain the same and, as such, no amount of discussion would have practical effect. This was not a view shared by Neil Johnson, Head Teacher of Bretton Woods Community School, however. He argued that local access policies and support systems were possible and desirable. He argued that fundamental change was necessary in order to mobilise broader sections of society. Existing recruitment methods may have been appropriate when 20% (c. 1989) or less of eighteen year olds transferred from school into higher education, all with A Levels, but this was no longer the case. Johnson explained that, just as the elite model of higher education had once met the needs of the economy (or at least was designed to), it was now seen as economically expedient to expand access, and such expansion depended upon more flexible access and admission procedures (DES, 1988), progression through would henceforth depended upon more flexible delivery systems. Johnson’s point was not discussed however.

the Craig had conceived of the idea following a presentation by a member of the Department of Employment (Craig).
In order to deal with specific issues related to admission, progression and guidance, it was agreed to set up sub-groups, to be managed by Davenport, which would report to the steering committee. It was agreed that co-optees would allow a broader discussion base. The Guidance sub-group was the first established, with Johnson, Claire Smith and Davenport as members. It met once in this form.

Under ‘Other Business’ Hall asked whether the group had developed a ‘philosophy’ concerning the nature of the institution, whether they had considered the issues of quality and equity, and where the money to fund the development would come from. In response the Chair, Martin, suggested that the committee needed some ‘team objectives’ on which to focus data, as well as some terms of reference and some agreed outcomes for steering committee meetings. It was agreed that Gillian Grey, Chief Executive of the Greater Peterborough Partnership (GPP), Martin and Davenport should meet again before the next meeting in order to prepare an overall work plan, even those this already. A work plan already had been given to the research assistants to the project (Rebecca Anderson and Helen Cannell) on their first day, by Davenport. The project had a mission statement, explicit objectives and a timetable which, according to Davenport, had been agreed at the meeting of the steering committee in October and disseminated to them. Grey and Martin ignored this implying that their intervention was necessary for the rational and successful progression of the project. This is an example of impression management (Morgan, 1986) and the way in which actors will seek ways to express their importance to others in order to enhance their reputation (7.10).

10.3 December 1994

The steering committee did not meet in December, but the ‘planning’ meeting suggested by the Chair took place on 16 December 1994 between Martin, Grey and Davenport. Only Davenport attended from the project team. In feedback to them he explained that it had been agreed at the meeting that the project had two aspects which might be separated. Research would become the responsibility of GPtec, and ‘development’, securing public funds and so forth, would be managed by the GPP. There remained an issue in whom should ‘own’ the research publications, which was left unresolved. It was agreed, however, that the Chair would produce a flow chart of activity for the steering group, together with the new overall plan. Apart for a minor error about dates in the new document, the two were identical in content. The emphasis of the meeting seems to have been on ‘ownership’ more than actual planning therefore.
Davenport also reported that during this meeting the role of Peterborough Regional College (PRC) was also discussed. All three members recognised PRC that PRC were feeling threatened. Concern was expressed that PRC were in fact in a particularly difficult position as they were being promised things that would not be forthcoming, e.g. funding to deliver social science places. This recognition seems to have had little impact in practice.

Before the next committee meeting Davenport sent the meeting’s agenda to the Chair for formal approval, willing meet Martin and other participants’ demands in order to maintain their support for the project. Davenport also faxed a message to Martin suggesting that they discussed the meeting beforehand. Both his communications were ignored. Morgan (1986) uses ‘the control of boundaries’ (7.6) to describe the process whereby a third party blocks the flow of information between two others in order to create a particular understanding of a situation. He uses Nixon’s manipulated ‘ignorance’ of the Watergate affair as an example. However, Morgan provides no suitable heading to describe the situation where A denies access to B themselves, in order to exclude B from the decision process, to make the point that B is relatively unimportant, or to be able to deny involvement if the issue is not resolved successfully. These are useful techniques, which can be used to delay decisions thwart B’s resistance. A further example from this project is provided by James Pine; having demanded to be consulted he then became completely unavailable (see Martin’s comments in September 1996), and in doing so delaying progress months (from May 1995 to Jan 1995).

10.4 January 1995

At the meeting of the steering committee on January 9 1995 the ‘new’ project plan was presented by Martin. The objective of the steering committee was ‘to oversee a project which is looking at the future higher education requirements of the GPtect area’, but the solution, he suggested, may not be a university at all². The output would be ‘to produce by the end of January 1996 a suitable business plan’ working through the areas identified on the Gant chart put together by himself and Grey.

The committee, he said, existed to air and resolve conflicting issues and he warned that all members were going to have to give, but he asked David Felix what would happen in the event

² Johnson suggested that the word ‘university’ be used with the outside audience who would not understand the subtleties of ‘higher education’ against ‘university’.
of irresolvable conflict: would GPtec have the final say? (Presumably because the TEC was funding the project). Before Felix was able to make his reply, however, Hall asked about the Greater Peterborough Partnership (GPP) and their role. Felix stated that the steering committee represented a ‘community’ project in which the TEC was just one partner. Conflicts had to be resolved within the committee, or else not at all, in which case the university would not be created. To Davenport’s expressed surprise Felix suggested that ‘for the GPP’ be added to the objective in order to emphasise this ‘partnership’ aspect. Grey suggested that she make the interim reports, which had been requested by another member of the committee earlier in the meeting (Smith), therefore. She would ask Martin, as Chair, to make the main presentations to the GPP board. Grey also asked whether everyone agreed with her dealing with the press. Davenport protested, but in vain. The rest of committee thought that Grey should handle the press unless enquires were particularly ‘technical’ in which case they should be passed to Davenport.

The other main item of this agenda besides the framework for future meetings (i.e. the workplan), was discussion of the likely economic impact of a local university on the Greater Peterborough area and was supported by a prepared by Davenport and already circulated. He stressed that it was a preliminary paper as many influencing factors were changing. A Preliminary Consideration of the Economic Impact of a University on the Greater Peterborough Area (Forbat, 1995a) suggested ways in which certain university models could be expected to contribute to the economy of the area in which it was sited. The paper stressed that the considerations were indeed ‘preliminary’ and were aimed at indicating general areas of likely impact rather than making specific forecasts: ‘The purpose of this paper is to indicate the parameters of the economic benefits, rather than to quantify them precisely under each of the sub-headings’ (Forbat, 1995a).

There would be a direct economic effect of the university as an employer and as a research establishment. The paper suggested that the income of a university is ‘general’ (grants, fees and other receipts for services), and ‘specific’ (chiefly research grants and contracts). In 1993 the smaller universities (e.g. Aston, Essex) earned a total of about £40 million; the middle-size universities (e.g. Southampton, Warwick) earned around £101 million; and the larger universities (e.g. Birmingham, Leeds, and Manchester) between £160 million and £198 million. An average of 59% of a university’s budget is spent on salaries; most of which is drawn down from outside the university’s local economy. In terms of salary alone, a small university draws
in about £23.6 million, a middle sized university some £65 million, and a large university £116 million.

A second factor for consideration was the effects of student spending (grants). The paper explained that the basic annual expenditure of full-time undergraduate students not living at home was around £3768 (based upon 35 weeks of university term-time). Given student bodies of between 4,415 (Aston), 3,985 (Southampton), and 13,541 (Birmingham) for example, full-time students at a small university (Aston) can be expected to boost the local economy by about £16 million; in a middle-size university by £33 million (Southampton); in a large university (Birmingham) by about £57 million. It was added that: ‘Major variables are the number of students living at home, the number of part-time students, and the number of post-graduates. All of these groups are likely to be differently funded but will impact on the economy’ (Forbat, 1995a). This point was generally overlooked when the information was used latterly.

The third area of economic impact identified in the paper (Forbat, 1995a) was the effect of the university as a purchaser of goods and services. This referred to expenditure on non-salary costs - equipment and furniture; general educational expenditure; administration and central services; maintenance and premises; facilities and amenities, accommodation and catering. Based on selected existing institutions it was estimated that a small university would spend around £16 million on purchasing goods and services and other non-salary costs; a middle-size university may spend £45 million and a large university about £79 million. The proportion of the whole that is spent locally depends upon the purchasing choices of individual institutions.

The multiplier effect was identified as a further economic factor - the way in which direct expenditure by the university results in indirect expenditure and induces further expenditure and creates further jobs. It was also suggested that the development of the university was likely to have an economic impact in terms of the potential expansion of the leisure industry - sport, travel and tourism, theatre, concert facilities, exhibitions, library services (in addition to the university library), and festivals. This would also create jobs.

It was suggested that the potential secondary uses of resources would also create an economic impact. It was also hoped that the university would facilitate and encourage relocating companies to the area, the so-called ‘magnet effect’ This would be of particular interest to the GPP which was responsible for inward investment (see Saunders, 1975). Longer term economic impact would be a result of increased upskilling of the local workforce thus
enhancing competitiveness. The paper argued that: ‘there is an identifiable issue in the
difficulty of obtaining degree and post-graduate level staff development in a range of subjects
(including management) without incurring considerable direct and indirect costs of study
outside the area’ (Forbat, 1995a).

Based on an review of existing studies of economic impact of universities the paper (Forbat,
1995a) concluded that:

A small university will bring into Peterborough an annual economic boost in excess of
£40m; a medium size university will generate around £100; a large university up to £180m
per annum.

The paper stated however that the university’s earning power would depend on other factors:
‘the size of the university (staff and students), its ability to draw high-calibre staff; its status in
attracting research funding, and its ability to draw students from outside as well as inside the
area (for undergraduate and post-graduate programmes)’ (Forbat, 1995a). Although there were
two problems with them as predictors.

The first problem was that patterns of impact were based on existing institutions and therefore
described a specific type of university - one with residential full-time students who came from
outside the area bringing with them new money from outside the local economy. A university
without such students, either because they were following distance learning courses at remote
sites, or who were already active in the local economy, would have less of an economic impact,
except in terms of upskilling which was not quantified.

Secondly, references to the likely economic impact further assumed that the university in
Peterborough would be ‘medium sized’ based on the Student Population Forecasts (Morris,
1995a) presented to the steering committee in March. However, the forecast was too high as it
was based on all students in higher education and forecast potential students therefore,
assuming that all subjects of study were offered. Offering only a small range of courses would
attract only that proportion that would have chosen to study the subjects offered, and thus
reduce the overall size.

Neither of these factors was considered when the information was used for presentations, press
releases and other communication activity. Some notice must have been taken of the paper
(Forbat, 1995a) because the information was used (see GPtec, 1996), but perhaps not enough of
the ‘preliminary consideration’ aspect. At the actual meeting however the steering committee were dedicating their consideration to the issues of ownership.

In the minutes of the meeting (prepared by Davenport) the new objective read: ‘to oversee a project looking at the provision of a suitable business plan for developing the future higher education requirements of the GPtec area’. On distribution Davenport received a telephone call from Grey wanting clarification. First, she wanted to see the addition of ‘on behalf of the GPP’, as agreed by Felix; second she wanted ‘Greater Peterborough’ replace the ‘GPtec area’ in order to make it clear that the work was being carried out on behalf of the GPP. Davenport refused to make this change, arguing that the work was being undertaken on behalf of the community as a whole. This was a false argument as both terms were used interchangeably to describe the same geographical area, and either would have done. Grey was obviously keen for ‘tec’ to be removed for personal and professional reasons, and Davenport was as keen to keep it in for the same reason. Again, impression management (Morgan, 1986) (7.10), and the whole point of the ‘ownership issue’. On this occasion Grey chose not to push Davenport, but met her objective in the end.

10.5 February 1996

At the opening of the meeting of the steering committee on February 6 Grey stated that Hall, absent from this meeting, had asked for the addition of the ‘on behalf on the GPP’ to the project’s objective. The committee accepted it without discussion. Grey also expressed concern about an unreferenced article in Business Weekly, which had quoted an unnamed person who had apparently said that a university would be admitting students in 1997. Grey was responsible for the marketing of the project and had not been asked for an interview and the person who had been interviewed seemed to have given incorrect information. They were never identified. Both Felix and Davenport claimed not to have seen the article, still less to have contributed to it. Nonetheless, it served to reinforce the point that marketing was Grey’s role. Grey added that she was worried that the committee might be promising things on which they might ‘underdeliver’.

The main agenda item for this meeting was a proposed model prompted by the fact that many participants had said they found it difficult to conceptualise what they were discussing. The model described a core facility, the University College which would be staffed by members of the partner institution (Loughborough University) with Associate Colleges. These were the
local FE colleges, who would deliver a limited range of core-sponsored provision, and have their courses validated by the parent body if they wished.

Davenport stated that it was necessary to have a main provider of higher education for a stated period (stated by HEFCE/HEQC). An existing quality provider, he argued, would have an economic benefit as well as an educational function. Referring back to the paper prepared for January’s meeting (Forbat, 1995a). Davenport noted that the economic impact of a university was related to the money it draws in from outside the locality. The model adopted would influence the relative impact of the development; specifically the proportion of local to external students, and the way in which the institution delivered its courses. Electronic distance learning would not increase the level of spending in the local economy, for instance.

Another reason for choosing an existing provider would be the need to ‘fill in’ a modular system. In the short and medium term it would not be possible to offer students a full range of options from which to choose, but students would expect a broad range of module choices from the start of their course. This demand could only be met by offering existing courses in the new location. Providing a full choice of learning opportunities to students was particularly important given the commitment to credit, accumulation and transfer (CAT)³.

Felix, acting as Chair in the absence of Martin, asked if the committee had anything to add because the model was key and needed to be right. Grey said that she was keen to see a ‘partnership’ of higher education institutions, that is with an existing provider delivering core services but also making use of the provision by others. Felix suggested that no one would disagree with building on what already existed. Davenport stated that the model assumed ‘University College’ status for the central provider with satellite Associate Colleges, none of which would have degree awarding power. Only the parent institution would award degrees, and the Associate Colleges would be free to continue their existing relationships with other universities.

Arthur Kidd, Human Resource Manager at Pearl Assurance, asked what the main purpose of the project was; and whether it was it about money making. Felix thought that different partners

³Watts suggested that the CAT was still very ‘theoretical’. Whilst it was recognised that a degree required 360 credits, that national system of accreditation had broken down, if it ever existed outside the CNAA, which made it very difficult to actually move.
would have different agendas. In the TEC's case the purpose of the development was to increase wealth through services to businesses (training in higher level skills, research and consultancy), and to provide an opportunity for mature students with ties to develop their skills and careers. Grey stated that the GPP's interest lay in a university's potential to attract inward investment. Many businesses would be keen to relocate to Peterborough if it could offer local provision of quality higher education.

Mike Watts, a representative from Peterborough Regional College (PRC), standing in for the college principal (Paul Rennie), argued that it was crucial to look at funding first since the funding would define realistic options anyway. He noted that the Lincoln project had set themselves a target for raising £40 million, but at that time had raised only £17 million, £10 million of which had come from Lincolnshire County Council based on the mistaken belief that Lincoln City Council would be granted unitary status. At the same time they were facing problems with their provider, Nottingham Trent University, whose expansion was constrained by 'capping'. This indicated, he said, that the whole idea behind the project went against prevailing government policy and appeared to be rather hopeless. Davenport assured Watts that the idea had been cleared with government as he had himself spoken to the Department of Education (DfE) and HEFCE about it. Whilst neither had committed funding for student places, or capital spending, DfE were making a financial contribution to the project through SRB (Single Regeneration Budget). He added that the chief target cohort would not be eighteen year olds but adults who were self-funding anyway. Davenport was inconsistent on this point.

Watts then asked how the development would impact on Peterborough Regional College (PRC). Felix suggested that this was what the steering committee existed for; together they would devise ways of using and developing existing provision of higher education. Whilst he recognised that PRC had achieved much in the face of difficult challenges he felt that the existing Further Education colleges could not provide the necessary volume and breadth of higher education quickly enough and meet the resulting increased demand for further education.

Watts went on to express the concern that an imported university would bring their own courses, heedless of the particular needs of Peterborough and the area. Grey felt that this would not be the case, as any university would recognise it as a lucrative opportunity and therefore provide courses for which there was a demand. Davenport stated that if the project resulted in FE colleges reducing their current provision instead of strengthening their positions it would have failed anyway. Watts saw the choice of higher education provider as 'crucial' to the
achievement of this. Some would be more willing to work with the FE colleges than others would.

PRC always had a problem however, because no one was willing to discuss the issue properly, preferring to pretend that PRC had nothing to lose, whilst admitting to each other that this was not the case. Morgan (1986) notes that people tend to deny ‘politics’ in public, because it is opposed to ‘the idea that organisations are supposed to be rational enterprises in which the members seek common goals’. He goes on to suggest that this is unfortunate, as issues are not dealt with and therefore never really resolved either. For Aristotle, Morgan suggests, politics ‘provided a means of creating order out of diversity while avoiding forms of totalitarian rule. Political Science and many systems of government are built on this basic idea, advocating politics, and the recognition of interplay of competing interests that politics implies, as a means of creating a non-coercive form of social order’. This describes ‘politics’ at the highest level, but applies equally to small, local conflicts. When one or both parties refuses to discuss an issue it is perpetuated, not resolved.

There are several reasons why an issue might not be made explicit. Goffman (1967) suggests that the desire ‘to save face’ and save the face of others, against reprisal, is a common human process. We naturally avoid difficult topics, and develop sophisticated conversational skills to avoid them, what Goffman (1967) terms ‘avoidance strategies’. PRC were probably co-opted (6.9) onto the steering committee specifically to ‘buy off’ their dissension (Bachrach and Baratz, 1969, Selznic, 1966), to ‘keep them on board’ (see 10.23). Part of the tacitly agreed deal of co-option seems to be that co-optees ‘sign-up to’ the perceived dominant view (probably the loudest one).

Morgan (1986) makes the useful observation that each participant in a ‘coalition’ makes demands but must also contribute to it as a ‘price for participation’:

All coalitions have to strike a balance between the rewards and contributions necessary to sustain membership.

This begs the question of why actors are willing to pay a price for participation. Morgan provides some answer, suggesting that:

Coalition development offers a strategy for advancing one’s own interests ... Whether formal or informal, confined to the organisation or extended to include key interests
outside, coalitions and interest groups often provide important means of securing desired ends.

Thus, membership implies a certain status which in itself begets power - impression management (Morgan, 1986) (6.10). It also provides an opportunity to acquire information which would not otherwise have been forthcoming. It is perhaps this latter reason that encouraged other members of the committee to keep silent on the issue of Peterborough Regional College (PRC). They wished neither to save face nor feelings, nor to ‘keep in with’ PRC, and Rennie in particular, but rather to deny information from him. Goodin (1980) suggested four ways in which information may be used to advantage; including arranging information overload to increase the cost of assessing information (6.3). Perhaps there are also costs related to information ‘under-load’ (see also Newton, 1979) (4.2). Pushing, probing and being tenacious in the pursuit of information concerning the position of PRC within the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough would not only have been tedious, but might also have jeopardised KS’s position with the coalition making it a potentially costly trade-off.

10.6 March 1995

The steering committee next met on March 6, this time to discuss business expectations from the university development, and projected student numbers. This meeting was poorly attended with only six members present. Those absent included the Chair. At this meeting Hall complained that the minutes were too brief, as they seemed to ignore much of the discussion which surrounded the issues; yet ‘issues’ were seldom discussed. Davenport started the meeting by summarising the issues and recommendations made in the two discussion papers (Wilson, 1995a; Morris, 1995a), but the committee then moved on to discuss other things which were not tabled. These should have been two important papers, as they gave some indication of the level of business interest in the local development of higher education, and what their demands were likely to look at. The university development was after all supposed to be ‘customer-led’.

The paper, Business Expectations from Higher Education (Wilson, 1995a), presented the results of a survey of businesses in the Greater Peterborough area which aimed to assess the current level of engagement with higher education as well as to quantify future demand. Proportionately more large companies than small ones completed and returned surveys, but companies with over 501 employees represented 25% of the total employed workforce in the
Greater Peterborough area. Therefore the return covered 77% of the Greater Peterborough workforce.

The survey found that larger companies contribute to study costs more often than smaller companies. Of a total of 455 companies which responded to the survey (10.9% of the company-based mailing sample) 170 companies said that they paid for, or contributed to, the costs of higher education courses. There were however wide variations between firms of different sizes. For example, of the 3-20 workforce sample, more than two-thirds of the companies did not contribute to courses, whereas within the 501+ employee band two-thirds did.

Diplomas and professional qualifications were the most commonly supported courses. Eighty-two per cent of the companies who did contribute to higher education did so to diplomas and professional qualifications. Management and Professional studies were the most frequently funded subjects, and Social sciences, Law, Sciences and Languages the least.

Decisions about company financial support tended to be based upon perceived benefit to the company (rather than personal development of the employee), and the preferred delivery methods for staff were those which intervene least in the normal working day. Questions related to perceived need demonstrated a clear demand for management development. There was some interest in research and consultancy facilities. Again, this was particularly true of the larger companies.

On the whole local companies saw the local provision of higher education as benefiting young people first, then currently employed workforce, and lastly companies as a whole. This perhaps reflects the common perception of higher education as something a young person does between school and employment, as opposed to any real commitment to, or understanding of, the notion of continuing education and lifelong learning. About one-fifth of the companies stated that they had existing arrangements with a university, mostly sandwich students/placements (63.6% of the respondents), and again mostly common in larger companies.

The second paper dealt with likely (potential) student numbers. Student Population Forecasts (Morris, 1995a) forecast the potential demand for Higher Education in the Greater Peterborough area between 1995 and 2000. It stated that Development of Higher Education in the GPtec Area (Forbat, 1994b) had reported that in 1992/93 a total of 1555 people from schools and colleges in the Greater Peterborough area transferred to higher education. These represented 41.4% of the
student cohort, which was higher than the national target of 33% and the CBI target of 40% by the year 2000. A follow-up study for 1993/94 found an 18+ transfer rate of 40.7%, lower than the previous year, but still above both the National Education and Training Targets (NETTs) and CBI target. Forty-seven per cent of these had transferred from FE colleges, as opposed to schools.

The paper then went on to forecast the number of local 18 year old transferring from local schools and colleges to higher education in the future. This was based upon the number of children currently in schools, and projected on a transfer rate of 41% (the average of the two prior years). The impact of net migration was considered, but was not accurate. An increase of 1.7% per year between 1994 and 2000 was made, following advice from the Lincolnshire and Cambridgeshire County Councils. Numbers forecast are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: 18+ transfer forecasts for the Greater Peterborough area

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The participation of local mature students, thus far mostly excluded from higher education owing to the necessity of moving for access, was then calculated from the national proportion of mature to young using the projected 'young' figures derived above. Potential Mature entrants for the years 1995 to 2000 were anticipated as shown in Table 2:

Table 2: Mature student entrant forecasts, 1995-2000

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Source: Morris, 1995a.

Both young and mature projections were added together to form an aggregate total entry, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Young and mature student population forecasts, 1995-2000

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<td>3306</td>
<td>3715</td>
<td>3852</td>
<td>4014</td>
<td>3824</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Morris, 1995a.

The paper also suggested that there was increasing trend for young people to remain at home in order to study, probably as a result in diminishing student support, and a broader base of students (Tight, 1987). This could not be quantified at the time, however.

Students from Abroad were also considered. The paper noted that there continued to be an increase in the number of students from abroad attending universities in Britain generally, but added that assessing the direct impact of overseas students in Greater Peterborough would be premature. Their impact would depend on the institution’s desire and ability to attract them. It was noted however that ‘Engineering and Technology courses were the most popular choice of students from abroad, followed by Business and Financial Studies’ (DfE, 1994).

The paper concluded by combining consecutive three years’ first year entrants (above) to represent the whole undergraduate student body, the (potential) totals are shown in Table 4:

Table 4: Aggregate total student population forecasts, 1995-2000

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3220</td>
<td>6526</td>
<td>10241</td>
<td>10373</td>
<td>11581</td>
<td>11690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Morris, 1995a.

These totals would be modified by demographic increases, migration say; the impact of overseas students; students following professional and other certificates (mainly part-time); and also the number of students studying for higher degrees. The paper stressed that these were ‘based upon a number of variables and [were] therefore a best guess at this stage. The status of the university which becomes our main provider will affect the ‘draw’ for overseas students and the extent to which students from within the area continue to move outside, and the extent to which students from outside Greater Peterborough are drawn here for their studies’ (Morris, 1995a).
What the paper did not make clear enough however, was that these forecasts were also based on a national range of study opportunities. Any subject offered by any British institution could be included potentially in the current transfer rate. The university in Peterborough would offer a restricted range of courses, and would lose those students committed to subjects not offered. Thus the actual student body was likely to be much lower. A more accurate forecast would have included participation rates by subject. This work was undertaken in September 1996 once curriculum areas had been formally identified. However the forecasts were never used, but rather numbers were submitted to HEFCE presumably based on ‘experience’. As noted above, however, the mediating variables were not considered forecast student numbers were used for marketing activity and other calculations based on the size of the student body - economic impact (Forbat, 1995) and the costing of a library resource centre (Morris, 1995b) for example.

10.7 April 1995

The next meeting of the steering committee took place on April 6. At this meeting the resignation of Chris Smales, the Head teacher of the largest school in the Gptec area of South Lincolnshire was announced, although he had not yet attended meetings anyway. He expressed continuing support for the project, but was finding his position difficult because he also sat on the Lincolnshire project. It was suggested that a replacement be appointed in order to represent the interests of South Lincolnshire. Hall suggested asking Johnson to find one, as he was the head of the Regional Association of Head Teachers. This was agreed. (When Johnson found a replacement it was in fact the Head of a Peterborough School - Walton Comprehensive).

The main item for this meeting a paper on Student Expectations of Higher Education (Wilson, 1995b) presented by Davenport at the meeting. This was the first time that the paper presented was actually discussed. The paper reported on research, which focused on people still in the school and college in the Greater Peterborough area who would be leaving sixth form in the summer of 1996. The sample included those who had applied to higher education institutions (HEIs) and those who had not.

The research found that most of the students applying for entry to university in October 1995 did not feel that they had been influenced by whether or not their parents have been to university. Indeed, half the students in the sample were the first in the family to go to university. One third of the students had applied for an ‘insurance’ course in a different subject.
to that of their first choice. Most students were realistic in relating their predicted grades to the places.

The majority of students were still applying for traditional three-year courses (rather than 'sandwich' and other structures). Two-thirds of them had paid a preliminary visit to their chosen universities, most on formal Open Days. About half of these Open Days were considered useful. The main stated reasons for applying to particular universities were the course, and the university's reputation. This was derived mainly from personal contact with people who knew the university - friends and teachers. Social aspects of a university are also important, with consideration chiefly being given to sport and entertainment facilities in the city, and student union facilities. Students tended not to look at study facilities in any detail. They saw living in halls of residence as providing a friendship-base and giving easy access to university facilities.

Most of the students who had considered location of their university choice had done so with 'near home but far enough away' in mind. A third did not consider location an issue at all. Students were equally divided between those who would consider local study a favourable option, and those who would not.

Some students had deferred entry either because they felt a need for experience before continuing their study (paid work abroad was the preferred option); or because they were applying for a course which required preparatory study (particularly art foundation courses). Some were still undecided about their intentions (often intending to travel in the mean time). This latter group had still been encouraged to apply to university by their schools but felt that they had received little guidance on how to spend their year out.

Of the small number of students (eleven) who had no intention to go to university nine expected to move directly into employment. Ten of these students were unlikely to achieve the minimum university entrance requirements anyway. The paper suggested that this raised questions about whether these should have been on the A level programme in at all therefore (Wilson, 1995b). The paper concluded that students are unaware of innovative university structure; that most want to attend a university which is away from home, but not too far; and that guidance is discontinuous and of varying quality.
Felix was surprised that students were not aware of potential money problems and wondered if it was more important to students already in the system. Martin commented that the paper had identified material which might be useful for marketing to prospective students and that the information should be included in the Business Plan. Felix and Grey agreed with him. Smith, careers officer with Cambridgeshire Local Education Authority, added that with regard to marketing to young people it would be necessary to target teachers, as they often had significant influence over the options of their students. Grey suggested that the project's marketing subgroup should come under the GPP marketing group when it was established.

Davenport also presented a Progress Report (Forbat, 1995b) summarising all papers to date, prepared at the request of the steering committee. Hall said it should go to the Greater Peterborough Partnership (GPP), for Grey to present it. Hall then stated that Martin, as the Chair of the higher education steering committee, should present the project to the GPP board, which Grey agreed. Martin appeared to be hearing the proposal for the first time asking whether he had been at the meeting when this was decided. He accepted the task never the less.

During this meeting of the steering committee the issue of potential provider was also discussed. Davenport circulated a list of institutions he proposed to evaluate, and asked the committee to comment. The list included all those institutions within about a 50 mile radius of the city of Peterborough. He also suggested a list of criteria against which to evaluate existing reputation for quality, research background, strengths in a wide range of subjects, especially: engineering and management/business/finance, technology, flexible course delivery, amenable to negotiation, and reasonably local. ‘Existing reputation for quality’ would be measured using HEFCE’s assessments. He explained that research was particularly important as businesses who commissioned research from universities did so by reputation and not by locality.

Smith supported Davenport’s statement that ‘research’ funding was based on historical information - the amount of funding paid by HEFCE depended upon the amount of research funding already paid to a said institution causing a spiralling process, and of limited use as a quality indicator therefore. This was also a reason why it would be necessary to secure private funding before HEFCE could be expected to give financial support. She also suggested that ‘teaching’ be added to the list of evaluation criteria. With regard to flexible learning Smith pointed out that method of delivery would have economic implications. Part-time study, she argued, would not draw down money from the LEA or HEFCE because such study was not supported through mandatory grants. Part-time students were self-funding. This point had been
made at the January meeting (10.4), but it is not clear that member assimilated it then or on this occasion either.

Felix asked how the three existing further education colleges stood within the issue of ‘being amenable to negotiation’. Davenport felt they were potentially a problem as it was unlikely that any quality university would want the colleges integrated without conformance with the university’s quality assurance. (There were no representatives from FE at this meeting). Felix noted however, that all three colleges in the area already had relationships with other institutions and would probably continue to do so. Grey asked how the new, central, body would cope with this diversity. Davenport did not see it as a problem.

At the end of the meeting there was some ‘banter’ over Anglia Polytechnic University (APU) not having been included on the list of ‘local’ universities to evaluate. Grey’s husband worked at APU and this as a selection criteria was joked about openly. APU’s main campus is in Chelmsford and therefore fell outside the 50 mile radius limit. After the meeting, during a project team debrief, Davenport confessed that he was concerned that Grey might push APU as a potential provider. On the other hand it excused his (unexplained) ‘premature’ overtures to Loughborough University, given that she had already spoken to APU.

10.8 May 1995

The next time the committee met was May 9. The main agenda item was the DfE consultation document: Super Highways in Higher Education. It was little discussed. Grey and Martin had met between times to discuss the presentation of the project to the GPP board. They had decided that Martin should propose a written report followed by a longer oral presentation at a later date. It was also noted that a replacement for Smales had not been found. Davenport and Johnson were to address this problem outside the meeting.

Davenport presented a revised project schedule to the committee, urging them to progress more quickly (minutes, 9/5/95). He was concerned that other new university projects were developing much faster than Greater Peterborough’s. There were three new projects when the project started, and that there were now eleven and most of these seemed to have a much higher profile (Tight, 1996, did not include it in his list). Davenport suggested the apparent obscurity of the Peterborough project may have been because they were not yet working with a partner university. Whatever the reason the project’s position needed ‘boosting’.
Davenport explained that he had recently attended a conference of the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) which had indicated that (funded) growth in higher education was anticipated in order to meet the government-set of target of 33% of young people entering higher education by 2000. Given that at that time (1995) only 30% of 18 year olds were transferring into higher education the academic community were anticipating a 3% increase (10% growth) in places for 2000. The CBI proposed an output of 40%, and CVCP an entrance rate of 41% to allow for wastage. Davenport concluded therefore, that actual entry rates were likely to be higher than 33%, but the difference would not be funded by HEFCE. However, the point was that when HEFCE lifted capping the project needed to be in a position to bid for that extra funding. Whilst DfE were reviewing higher education, the result of which would probably be a change in funding mechanisms (actually the introduction of fees for students), in the meantime all the other new university projects were planning to gain funded places from HEFCE. Crucial to the project’s development therefore was the identification a partner university and a funding strategy. Both were urgently needed therefore. An application made jointly by the project and the university would promote the overall concept of ‘partnership’, which DfE, HEFCE’s sponsor, were keen on. The steering committee needed to look at funding quickly, and also at raising political awareness. Davenport had made the point that both the Suffolk and the Docklands projects were of higher profile because local politicians had declared their support for them.

Martin expressed the concern that in the circumstances it might not be appropriate to present to the GPP at this time therefore, as many would be hearing of it for the first time and might ‘derail’ it. It is not clear why he considered it to be a problem. Instead, he said that the committee should look at ways of increasing communication ‘laterally’ but also ‘upwards’ to government. Davenport agreed that communication with government should be improved, but reiterated the importance of finance and the need for private funding which would have to come from local business, but businesses could not expect to fund something they know nothing about. He asked the committee to agree to expedite these issues (university partner and funding).

The Dean of Peterborough Cathedral (Matthew Holland) asked if the project team had the expertise to be able to progress it. This was a recurring theme with the Dean. He had a contact from Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, who he felt would make a significant contribution having set up a new university before. Davenport argued that if the project team
itself lacked certain expertise, it would lie elsewhere within the partnership, that is with the partner university, and as such outside intervention was unnecessary.

Rennie asked who exactly was the ‘partnership’. Davenport replied that at the moment Grey had a contact at APU, and that GPtec were already working with Loughborough University. He added that neither of these was perfect and the choice of academic partner would need to be a collective decision of the committee. Martin felt that it was necessary to set up a task force from the committee to ‘interview’ the prospective partners, in order to see if their ‘intentions were honourable’, and to learn what they expected to gain from the arrangement.

The Dean expressed the view that the quickest way to local provision would be to identify an institution that was keen to expand. Rennie felt it was not so simple as this; there were other issues to consider, such as quality of provision. The quickest way to expand would be to build on existing provision (presumably local, provision and expanding PRC’s higher education delivery capacity).

Rennie thought that Peterborough was ‘due for’ a university, but he had reservations about Loughborough. He thought they were a good choice in terms of subject base and so forth, but from experience, found them ‘rather cold’. He suggested therefore that a relationship needed forming as soon as possible with interchange from the earliest stages. Martin stated that this was premature as a decision had not yet been taken on which universities to contact. In the meantime he wanted an increase in communication. He asked the group to go and ‘interface’ with other people, to identify other skills and expertise that might contribute to the project. Grey would make contact with key regional staff of British Telecom (BT), with regard to Information Technology. Felix and Grey suggested Rennie use his contacts in this area also - those working with him on PRC’s Competitiveness Fund bid (Felix). It is perhaps worth noting the Competitiveness Fund was managed by the TEC. Rennie himself suggested that the HEFCE be contacted. From his dealings with them he believed them to be sympathetic to Peterborough and its need. Martin added ‘Brian’, the Peterborough MP, to the list of people to speak to. Rennie felt that ‘Brian’ was not so important, given that an election was some two years off and that he was losing support anyway.

Back to the partner institution, Johnson wanted the University of Warwick adding to the list of possibilities for his ‘sectional reasons’. Warwick, he argued, had a good research record, and could be reached within ‘an hour or so’ from Peterborough. His request was more or less
ignored. Instead, Davenport warned that the information presented to the committee for evaluation purposes on the universities was 'not entirely objective' because much of it was based on marketing material (prospectus, and other such literature), and that higher education was not subject to inspection in the same way as schools were and polytechnics had been. Rennie thought that the committee, when considering the criteria, should not be too worried by research. Davenport argued that research draws in money, and is therefore extremely important.

Martin asked for the minutes of the meeting to request members to identify any other institutions they wished to be considered by the end of the next week. He felt it was important to approach the chosen partner as soon as possible in order to 'get them on board', and that the best choice would be one which was keen to work in Peterborough in order to enhance their own position. Rennie warned again that the key agreement issue was that provision should be relevant, and it was not enough to move existing courses to a new site.

Felix added that there was also an issue with funding; he felt that sensible institutions would want to know how such an endeavour was going to be funded which was not yet resolved, but the committee gave Davenport leave to make preliminary approaches to some universities. Funding was addressed again after the formal meeting however. Grey identified various private sector organisations that she felt might be forthcoming with donations (Thomas Cook, Brotherhoods, Perkins, and possibly American Express). Davenport argued that a strategy was needed however, and Felix suggested setting up a task force that included the GPP. The GPP was the only organisation he specifically mentioned. Rennie suggested the need for a 'prospectus', and argued that companies were more likely to show an interest in something 'real'.

On May 22 Davenport sent a memo to Felix proposing the establishment of sub-groups to handle specific areas of project development, including project-development with partner university. Other groups were finance/fund-raising, and marketing; and later on property development and community relationships. Davenport argued a need for co-ordination, to avoid them losing sight of the whole project. This would be particularly for the finance and marketing group. He suggested, therefore, that he should sit on all of them in order to co-ordinate and report back to the steering committee, which would still be providing the strategic steer. He was also conscious of the issue of 'ownership' by all the project participants and sought Felix's advice on the political expedience of his proposal and the best way to achieve it. However, before they discussed it the issue of ownership arose from elsewhere.
On May 15 1995 Felix had met with Pine to update him on developments in his constituency. According to Felix this was a routine event and on this occasion the university project was one item covered. It appears from a memo attached to a letter sent from Pine to Felix that the idea had not been welcomed by Pine - the memo's subject title was '[Pine] Explosion'. The note states that Pine's immediate reaction to the university project was rather stronger than the letter indicates. Interesting, then, that nothing had been said to the project team at the time of the 'explosion', but only when a letter arrived from Pine to Felix which required an 'expert' response and was passed to Davenport for preparation therefore, ten days later.

Apparently, Pine's main objection was the plan of using an existing institution to deliver courses and award degrees in Peterborough, that is, an existing university other than the Open University, or, at a push, one that was 'geographically very far away'. Pine stated that a 'neighbouring institution' was less likely to leave, or to grant independence than one from afar. Indeed, so strong was his conviction on this point that he stated: 'Were this proposal to be pursued, I would find it very difficult to offer it my support in discussions with ministerial colleagues in the Department of Education'. However, given that is argument focused on 'validating and awarding degrees', rather than actually teaching which is prior to validation, Pine's ministerial colleagues may not have been convinced by the premise of his argument. The letter was also copied to Martin and Grey. At the same time Pine wrote to Martin requesting a meeting to discuss the matter further. The circulation list is significant.

Davenport's response to Felix pointed out the many factual errors in Pine's letter. Besides these he concluded that Pine had a 'hidden agenda'. Davenport understood from Felix that Felix had kept Pine informed of developments relating to the project despite what Pine claimed. On 26 May Davenport and Felix meet to discuss the situation. Davenport assumed that Pine had wanted greater involvement in the project and proposed that he be invited onto the steering committee (hoping that he would be consistently absent), or else offer to consult him formally. In return Davenport wanted to see Pine supporting the project publicly. Felix agreed that Pine should be offered the opportunity for consultation, but thought it unlikely that Pine would support the project publicly, and by implication was unwilling to ask.
10.9 June 1995

The June steering committee was cancelled due to lack of members available to attend. This was convenient given the problems with Pine and the problems of progressing the project further anyway.

Grey, Davenport and Martin were due to visit the Registrar of Loughborough University on 20 June 1995. At this meeting Davenport proposed to discuss the background to the project, including the findings of the research undertaken by GPTec relating to curriculum needs, potential funding, and the expectations of the community (see memo, Davenport to Felix, 8/6/95). On 14 June Davenport received a phone call from Martin’s secretary. Davenport reported that the purpose of the call was to postpone the meeting with Loughborough University because ‘the whole university project has changed direction, hasn’t it?’. Davenport argued that it would be ‘difficult and embarrassing’ to cancel or postpone, besides which it would not be practically possible to reschedule until September, which would put the project still more behind.

Martin called a meeting for the morning of June 20 at his office. Davenport assumed this would be to feedback on Martin’s meeting with Pine. Davenport asked Felix if he could or wanted to join the meeting, but Felix did not. According to Davenport Martin said very little about his meeting with Pine; other than to comment that Pine had said many ‘interesting things’ and that they should all meet him. This they did on the 23 June.

In the meantime, the meeting with Loughborough University took place as scheduled. This was, attended by Davenport and Grey only, and Clive Lewis (Registrar), Peter Moss (Senior Pro Vice Chancellor) and Jack Wright (Department of Education) from the university. Davenport reported that meeting was a smooth one, at which Grey said very little. The notes from the meeting state that ‘It was made clear that this meeting was not expected to result in a firm proposal and that it was purely exploratory, examining the possibilities for future collaboration’.

It was the Registrar who raised the issue of independence, asking if Peterborough would wish to award its own degrees in time. Davenport explained that it was understood that there were criteria of duration and breadth that needed to be meet with the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC) before independent university status could be expected. He added, however,
that there was a significant issue in some quarters and it was hoped that the university would
give Peterborough its independence when it fulfilled the criteria. Loughborough University
confirmed that this was what they had expected and that they did not see it as a problem.
Therefore, the proposal to work together would be referred to the University’s Senior Planning
Committee but no problems were foreseen. It would also have to go the steering committee in
Peterborough where a major problem could be foreseen - that of Pine.

Grey, Davenport, Hall and Martin meet Pine at the Swallow Hotel at 6.00 on 23 June,
Davenport having been warned beforehand to be ‘tactful’. Davenport reported that at this
meeting Pine said that he wanted university provision to be: business led, modular in structure.
Although not yet discussed by the steering committee the paper *Curriculum Provision and
Course Structures* (Forbat and Morris, 1995) had already been circulated for the June meeting
which was cancelled, made these very points, which given the prevailing issues in Higher
Education were more or less predictable anyway. More significantly Pine argued that the
university should be geographically distant, ‘Aberdeen or Penzance’, for example. Without this
final stipulation being met Pine would not support the project. Indeed, more than this, he would
tell his colleague at the Department of Education that the plan was flawed (as he had indicated
in his letter of May 26). Davenport also reported that Pine’s response to the suggestion of
building on existing provision at PRC would be ‘over [his] dead body’.

Davenport reported that after Pine had left the meeting Davenport had pointed out to Hall that
they were in fact being blackmailed. Hall returned the answer that yes they were ‘but he is a
politician’; it was not necessary to like him, but it was necessary to work with him and it was
necessary to keep in happy. Davenport felt that Pine was anxious to make an impact on the
project and was therefore promoting a different partner for the sake of it.

Curiously, according to Gordon Craig, Director of Educational Services, GPtec, when he saw
Felix about the meeting, Felix said that he had since spoken with Grey about a meeting that she
had had with Pine in the meantime, at which Grey claimed to have asked Pine about
independence for the university and his response had indicated that Pine did not present an
surmountable problem. This seems remarkably inconsistent, and is difficult to explain, not least
why Felix seems to have accepted Grey’s interpretation of Pine’s position, when he
acknowledged that Grey was ‘bullied by James’ and that she was not a sophisticated negotiator.
It seems unlikely that Pine had recognised the errors in his argument and was seeking to save
face by assuming a more tenable position, however.
10.10 July and August 1995

On 3 July Davenport and Grey journeyed to the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) at their London offices to meet Sid Williams, Head of the Institutions and Programmes Division. The notes of this meeting say that Williams explained that HEFCE would not be funding any capital building programmes, but instead would be supporting PFIs (Private Finance Initiatives). HEFCE, he said, would not be able to commit itself to any further development during the ‘period of consolidation’ which would end in 1997. Nor were they prepared to discuss what might happen beyond that date. Any change in Council policy would not occur until after the Public Expenditure Survey (PES) in November, which would then only affect the following year’s funding (1998). He added that given the sheer number of new university initiatives HEFCE was not committing itself to support any. What seemed more likely was for them to set up a Special Initiative into which individual projects might bid.

With specific regard to the status of Peterborough’s project, Williams felt that a University College was the only practicable way forward. In this case the Council would be dealing with the parent university. However, he did think it was unlikely that an existing university would be willing to take part in such a project if they would be expected to grant independence.

With regard to potential partners on July 5 Grey and Davenport met the Vice Chancellor (VC) of Anglia Polytechnic University (APU) in a meeting arranged by Grey. Davenport made it clear that this was an exploratory meeting and was not intended to indicate commitment from either party. The VC suggested that the best model for Peterborough’s higher education development would be by working with existing institutions, including APU, in the local delivery of customised modular courses, where standards would be controlled by the parent university. APU was already participating in such franchised courses. These formed associate colleges, or ‘nodes’, linked in with ‘satellite’ points in further education colleges. Such agreements could be terminated by twelve months notice by either side.

This marked an important meeting for Davenport personally. Feeling that his own position within the project was vulnerable, and the fact that APU’s Vice Chancellor was to retire that month, he suspected that Grey was manoeuvring to replace him as project manager. As it was this did not occur, and it seems more likely that Grey was merely attempting to have APU, her husband’s employer, considered further than it might otherwise have been; that she wished to
make a contribution and APU was her only contact, or that she genuinely felt that APU should be considered as the parent university and was using personal contacts to facilitate the process.

After this meeting Davenport and Grey joined the steering committee who were meeting to discuss potential partner universities, and also to consider Curriculum Provision and Course Structures (Forbat and Morris, 1995). The paper was in two parts. Part one gave a series of recommendations for discussion. Part two defined terms and described some of the issues relevant to university degree courses on which the recommendations were based. The recommendations also relied on findings from the earlier papers Admission, Progression and Guidance (Forbat, 1994c); Business Expectations from Higher Education (Wilson, 1995a); and Student Population Forecasts (Morris, 1995a).

The paper recommended that priority be given to courses in Management; Business Studies and Finance; Engineering; Travel and Tourism; and Estate Management (including Architecture, Surveying and Environmental Health) programmes. It was noted that Travel and Tourism was only offered at 12 universities, none of which were in East Anglia or East Midlands, and local provision could become national focus therefore. Second priority programmes of study were Social Sciences, Law, Sciences, and Health Care.

It was recommended that the balance of students should be approximately 50% for full-time and 50% for part-time students, and curriculum structures should be designed to meet their needs. They ‘should reflect the different ‘aptitudes, ages and geographical locations of students’, including the preferences of employers, mature people, as well as young students. Thus is was argued that there should be a proportionate mix of full-time site-based courses, part-time off-site courses (day, evening, week-end, summer-school), distance learning, and programmes taught wholly or in part on company premise. Courses should be modular, as Pine had suggested, in order to allow study programmes to be related to individual need; in other words to allow students (especially mature students) flexibility of time to complete the qualification at their own rate.

With regard to the structure of the academic year the paper commented that the appropriateness of semesters, trimesters or traditional terms would be dependent on both the modular nature of the degrees offered, but also upon national decisions still to be made. Many of the existing schemes were little more than the division of the existing three terms into two administrative periods. A more radical change, for example, a restructure of the academic year to allow for a
post-results admission system, had implications for student-funding and for the timing of A-Level results over which the steering committee or partner university would have no direct control. Similarly, credit accumulation and transfer (CAT) would be a national or international issue. A decision on this was considered to be 'premature' therefore.

The paper recommended clear progression routes from local schools, and FE colleges, based on access courses, NVQs, GNVQs, and also the accreditation of work-based learning. Related to this was the recommendation for a coherent assessment and qualification system capable of supporting such progression routes. Student Profiles were suggested as a possible solution for recording validated achievement. It seems that these innovations were unable to gain sufficient commitment from the members of the steering committee to the point that the partner university was not required asked to implement them. Few of the recommendations made it to the final development.

The paper (Forbat and Morris, 1995) suggested that further investigation was needed for various work-based schemes, and this should take place in close consultation with local industries. A working group, representative of several industrial sectors, would be set up to do this. They would be charged with assessing the relative strengths of the different models available and to make recommendations. This responsibility was given to the Curriculum sub-group, were it more or less stayed; again there was little evidence of work-based schemes in the final proposal. The involvement of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the consultation process was stated explicitly. This was consistent with Department of Employment interests, but in practice the larger companies were of more significance. This is partly because SMEs are harder to reach and organise. The paper also recommended that IT systems should support the development of distance and electronic course provision.

The committee did not discuss the paper, and few of the recommendations were adopted in the final outcome. However, this does not mean that the two factors are related. Bachrach and Baratz (1963, 1971), Morgan (1986) and Saunders (1974) (6.5), for example, state that decision outcomes can be thwarted by keeping them off the agenda and out the discussion arena. Those who control decision-making procedures and processes are able to influence what is discussed, and in turn what comes out of the decision process. Non-discussion and the non-decision making represented here was not likely to be a result of a deliberate desire to not recognise GNVQs as admissions requirements, or to not use Student Profiling to support guidance and progression, but rather a general tendency to avoid 'technical' issues, and to discuss selected
issues over and over - for instance, the model at this meeting. Whilst this is a strategy which can be employed to deliberately prevent decisions from being made (Morgan, 1986), and indeed was, in this instance it seems to have been unplanned - an inevitable product of lack of expertise perhaps. The purpose of Part 2 of the paper (Forbat and Morris, 1995) was actually to provide basic information and definitions, but the steering committee always seemed reluctant to address substantive issues.

Johnson gave an update on a replacement for Smales, Head of Deepings School. He suggested Martin Cragg who was moving from a school in Huntingdon to take up a Headship at Walton Comprehensive School in Peterborough. The committee agreed this, even though Smales was on the steering committee as representative from Lincolnshire Rennie also point out that Fenland was under-represented. Grey agreed to find a representative for the committee. This would be Steven Richmond, Principal of Isle College, the college of Further Education in Fenland.

Davenport reported back on his and Grey’s meeting with HEFCE in London. He explained that the Council seemed to have changed their position since his previous visit, and was now saying that money would be redistributed rather than expanded when the ‘cap’ was lifted in 1997. HEFCE also seemed to be suggesting that students would be responsible for their own fees. Given that HEFCE were unlikely to be funding new places in 1997, Davenport thought that his suggestion of the May meeting (10.8), that is to expedite the development process was now inappropriate. Instead, it would be necessary to explore new ways of funding places.

Davenport went over four alternative strategies: first, to carry on as before and assume that funding methods would not change. This he considered to be of a very high risk. Secondly, to find a parent university which Peterborough’s potential student body would complement. (Whereas Peterborough was held to be the largest city in England without a university, Loughborough University was referred to as the largest university without a town). The third option was to look for a under-subscribed university; and fourth and finally choose as partner a university which was seeking to relocate.

Rennie thought that this was what had happened in Lincolnshire. Since Lincolnshire’s separation from Nottingham Trent University who, according to Rennie, had offered them two hundred and fifty places, half of what the project needed to justify the expense, they had gone into partnership with Humberside University. Humberside were now applying to change their
name, to ‘Lincolnshire and Humberside’, rather than the other way round. Rennie suspected that they would close their Grimsby site and move to the new one in Lincoln.

The committee was then sidetracked into discussing the model again, instead of addressing the key issue of funding. Davenport attempted to re-focus the discussion on funding, but when Grey left the meeting discussion of funding was again suspended. It was considered pointless to discuss it at the meeting given the absence of so many people. Discussion of this was deferred for another month. This provides evidence of the importance of Grey’s perceived reputation – steering committee business could not be discussed in her absence.

What was left of the committee then turned their attention to working groups. Davenport had identified six topic areas proposed as follows: financial considerations, learning methodologies/IT, project development with the partner university, community relations, guidance, and real estate and property. Members of the steering committee would serve on those they wished, or could offer the most to, and additional members could be co-opted.

Johnson suggested that Rennie go on the group responsible for identifying the university partner. (This group that was not strictly necessary as reflected above; whilst there was still no formal agreement with Loughborough University it would still have been difficult and embarrassing to go with another provider at this point). Felix asked Davenport which he would like to be on, although it had already been agreed between the two of them that Davenport should sit on all the groups. Davenport said that he felt that in order to maintain project coherence he should attend all meetings. This was agreed. In addition, Felix was to join the finance group, with Grey ‘as she’s good at getting money out of people’. This was a common strategy of Felix’s.

Johnson and John Palmer, who represented the Chamber of Commerce on the committee and an employee of PRC, agreed to join the learning styles/IT group, and Rennie to join the university partner group. With the minutes of the meeting Davenport sent out a memo asking anyone not present who wished to contribute to specific sub-groups to let him know. The final list of sub-groups was marketing, finance, learning styles (including IT), guidance systems, and project development with partner university.

It was not planned that the steering committee should meet in August. Following the July meeting Grey wrote to Felix requesting that the setting up of sub-groups be halted until Pine had
been properly appeased. Felix discussed the issue with Davenport in August. According to Davenport, he told Felix that he wished to ignore Pine until such progress had been made on the project so as to prevent Pine's intervention. Felix disagreed that Pine could just be ignored however; and told Davenport that he would ask the Chairman of GPtec, and other business representatives, to speak to Pine and make the point that he was out of touch with constituency opinion. It must be said, however, that no one knew what constituency opinion was. The 'constituency' in this case taken to mean large businesses and agencies. Felix also disagreed with Grey with regard to the groups and advised Davenport to set them up regardless.

When setting up the sub-groups Davenport discussed with Felix the appropriateness of appointing Chairs who were less dominant on the steering committee. This had two purposes. It would hopefully increase 'ownership' and their commitment to the project, as well as redistributing power away from the persistently dominant (Grey, Hall, Felix and Martin). It was envisaged that the sub-groups would make operational decisions and would report to the steering committee. This should have placed them in a position of superior knowledge in their given area. Whilst this strategy was followed it did not have the required effect, and the system was abolished formally by the Chair in September 1996, without question or resistance. The Chairs lacked credibility and knowledge, and the 'partnership team' members continued to dominate. The sub-groups remained ineffectual and largely irrelevant, probably not even giving a convincing illusion of power sharing. Felix's agreement is particularly interesting too, as his position seems to have been somewhat ambivalent. During this time he appeared to have distanced himself from the other members of the 'partnership team'. This reason behind this, and the indeed the later change, is not clear.

10.11 September 1995

On Thursday 7 September 1995 Davenport went to Thomas Cook to meet Martin. This appointment was made by Davenport through Martin's secretary for 11.45. The time is significant because the secretary later rang to tell Davenport that the meeting would have to be put back to 12.00 as Martin was stuck in traffic, and would not be back in time for the 11.45 start. Davenport noticed when signing in however, that Grey, who had not been mentioned when the meeting was first set up, had signed in at 11.30 also to see Martin and was not seen to be waiting. It would appear that Martin's secretary had been asked to change the meeting time with Davenport in order to allow Martin and Grey to prepare for their meeting with him. This
provides more evidence of Morgan's (1986) control of boundaries (6.6) and the importance of the control of information (6.3). (See also 10.3.)

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Pine's 'needs'. According to Davenport, Martin and Grey stated a need to look at a far-off university. Davenport agreed and felt that both Martin and Grey were surprised by his agreement. Martin said that he might resign from the steering committee in protest to Pine, but if this claim was ever genuine he seems to have been dissuaded by Grey. Martin also declared, reported by Davenport, that should Pine ever 'get on the wrong side of him', he would not think twice about exposing Pine's behaviour at their meeting in June.

Morgan (1986) suggests that power begets power. The apparent 'possession' of power attracts others who wish to gain favour (6.13). The '[Pine] explosion' would seem to provide a good, if unpleasant, example of this. Individuals who thought themselves powerful locally, the self-proclaimed 'movers and shakers' (Martin), were drawn into a subordinate role by Pine and played by his rules. They acted on his demands, all the time agreeing with each other that these demands were morally wrong (inappropriate to an elected representative) and practically stupid or unnecessary; and yet at the same time sharing the view that his demands had to be met or at least managed. What is not clear from Morgan (1986) however, nor from his discussion of coalitions, but made clear in Martin's comment is just how fragile this relationship is. Even if this was not a genuine statement, but one designed to indicate his own power and independence, it still makes the point that the ability to offer support itself is a source of power, and one that is easily withdrawn or bestowed. This seems to provide evidence that a coalition or oligarchy depends on tacitly agreed silence (see also February 1995) 10.5), 'tact' as Grey preferred to call it, but involves the permanent risk of exposure. This risk seems likely to increase paranoia of 'in' groups, and encourage the exchange of petty favours, thus also increasing insularity and exclusion.

At the steering committee meeting of 7 September Martin again made an attempt to resign. He explained that he that finding his job was taking up an increasing amount of his time, and as such the project manager was not getting the access he needed. He did not want the project to slip and suggested that the committee find a new chairperson. He did add that he had a mobile phone so was possible to contact. (This was not what his secretary had told Davenport when Martin was 'stuck in traffic' that morning). Hall thought that the Chair needed to be a member of the business community and that Martin should stay on, but have a deputy; Grey for instance.
Again, Martin showed particular political skill in suggesting that his involvement in the project was fundamental. Davenport needed access to him. In fact Martin's practical use was limited; he had little knowledge or understanding of higher education, he never referred to the project in the context of his own company's educational needs, but he was potentially important as a means of gaining funding from Thomas Cook for the project. (Thomas Cook made little contribution to the project; Pearl Assurance hosted the MBA and Perkins who promised to house the Engineering Department. Thomas Cook did offer office space to the project team in November 1996). His involvement gave the impression that the project was 'business-led' none the less, and his support was important because it was deemed so by others (Dowding, 1991, 1996), in the same way as finance could not be discussed in a meeting from which Grey was absent (July 1995) (10.10).

Felix believed that the Chair should be someone with a high profile in business, but their deputy should be someone who understood education. When he stood in as Chair he found it difficult because of his lack of expertise in education. Martin suggested that leaving the issue unresolved was not fair on 'him', Davenport, and pressed for an outcome. Newton asked Davenport his view. Davenport explained that the project was supposed to be customer-led and therefore access to business leaders was important. Davenport also endorsed the view that Martin and Thomas Cook had much to offer the development and that Martin should therefore remain on the committee. With regard to feedback to education and business, he felt that the Greater Peterborough Partnership (GPP) was better at communicating with businesses than the TEC's Education Forum was with education interests. He agreed with Felix therefore, that a Deputy Chair from education would be most appropriate.

Hall argued that the role of Chair was more than a feedback mechanism. He felt that the group needed direction from the Chair, at the same time as providing a public image. Davenport still felt that the link with education was too weak. Hall suggested that the retiring head of Cambridgeshire Local Education Authority (LEA) might be a suitable replacement. Felix, however, disagreed. He believed there to be a need for someone more locally focused. Hall concluded that a small group would be necessary to decide such a thing. Davenport suggested that they could use the time slot allocated to the October steering committee meeting which had been cancelled to discuss it. He also added that the nature of the project would be changing anyway with the establishment of sub-groups. Hall proposed that Felix, Hall and Rennie should appoint a Deputy Chair, thought it was not made clear why these particular people should be...
selected for the task. When Davenport stated that he would like to be involved too he was told not to worry he would not be left out.

Moving on Davenport outlined a proposal for progressing the project agreed that morning. Davenport explained that whilst most people had anticipated an increase of 10% in funded places before 2000 in order to meet the National Education and Training Targets, it appeared that such expansion was not inevitable. Therefore Davenport proposed an incremental approach to the project development which would allow for changes as funding policies became clearer. This would be three-stage plan: the curriculum would be developed, then costings made based on curriculum and current funding, followed by the implementation of agreed programmes of study.

Hall argued that the project needed key political support before a detailed project policy/plan was decided. He referred to the meeting with Pine ‘as you probably discussed at the last meeting’ from which he was absent. Hall continued to say that at the meeting with Pine, Pine had suggested that the committee speak to senior civil servants at the ‘DES’. Felix responded that members were unaware of the meeting with Pine because it had been not ‘discussed’ (or disclosed). Hall then went on to explain to the rest of the committee what had been said: Pine was supportive of the university initiative, but had some ‘divergent views’. It was crucial to capitalise on Pine’s ‘political clout’ and Hall would manage this as the two were often in contact anyway over local authority matters. (Pine was supporting the City Council’s bid for unitary status). Martin added that he too also had a meeting with Pine the following day so would discuss it then.

This episode supports the claim that those with power attracts those who seek power (Morgan, 1986). A relationship with a person perceived to be powerful is used to signify one’s own power – impression management (6.10). All the ‘mover and shakers’ were meeting with Pine, whilst the others were ignorant of any interaction with Pine at all. Without Hall’s blunder the ‘non-partnership’ team might never have known about the difficulties with Pine. This is not to say that their knowing of it would have changed either their own position or that the project, or that those that did know had anything to gain from the others not knowing, except perhaps some self-importance. It seems to have been the case with this group of people that problems were not shared until after resolution. This was perhaps because those who did know wanted to solve the problem alone, in order that they did not need to share the credit. Perhaps instead it was the case that those who had set themselves up as ‘movers and shakers’ did not want to share the fact...
that they could be subjects of pressure themselves with others. What is surprising is the extent to which the rest of the steering committee seemed content for this to happen, when they were themselves 'hand-picked'. There is no indication that the others minded being kept in ignorance by their ostensibly equal colleagues.

This does beg the question of why this should be the case that some members of the steering committee seemed so indifferent to the domination of the few. Gavanta (1980) argued that if an actor's demands are repeatedly ignored they withdraw from participation. Apathy, fatalism, acceptance and resignation become so entrenched that they do not even bother to express demands. Gavanta (1980) was describing relationships which were inherently unequal - those between employers and dependent employees. None the less a similar situation can occur where actors are formally equal. Morgan (1986) suggests that control of decision-making processes can enable one actor to dominate another. In organisations the control of decision-making processes are inherently biased towards senior positions. However, factors in the decision process can be extended to include those which are not related to formal authority, such as 'stubbornness' (Dowding, 1991). This explains why some actors dominated - they put in more effort, and to some extent why others were dominated - they were less active and less persistent perhaps due to different personalities (Greenstein, 1969, 1975, 1992; Laswell 1936, 1948; Morgan, 1986) (Chapter 7). It seems reasonable that those members of the committee who found their comments and opinions ignored constantly withdraw from comment, becoming apathetic, and resigned to the fact that what they said was not of importance, and hence accept that they had not been informed of significant events. It does not, however, also explain why they continued to turn up to meetings, which many did. Maybe they were interested in the process or the idea of the university and attended in order to have some idea of what was going on. Perhaps it was just easier to keep turning up than it was to make the effort of resigning. Whatever the reason, no one was challenged over why the rest of the committee had not been informed. The discussion that followed Hall's blunder was dominated by the usual figures - Felix, Hall, Martin, Grey, with support from Rennie and Davenport.

Felix agreed with Hall's suggestion that the project would benefit from Pine's support, but emphasised that Pine should be supporting 'our needs' as opposed to his own agenda. Rennie expressed surprise that Pine was supportive at all because when he had spoken to him about eighteen months ago Pine was supporting consolidation, not expansion. Pine simply may have been supporting formal policy on higher education. Given his comments at the Swallow Hotel it is unlikely that Pine would want to encourage Rennie to expand the provision of higher
education via Peterborough Regional College (PRC). However, like everyone else involved in the project he was probably unwilling to say so directly, and perhaps found in ‘consolidation’ a useful disguise.

Rennie at the same time endorsed Felix’s view that Pine should support the needs of his constituency primarily. He ‘should be representing Peterborough in Westminster, and not Westminster in Peterborough’. Hall, whose own view on such things was made clear at the June meeting at the Swallow Hotel (10.9), insisted that the sooner the ‘DES’ were contacted the better. Martin supported this view believing that if contact was not made soon, and Pine’s ‘advice’ acted upon, there was a chance of ‘petulance’ and possibly ‘blocking’.

Davenport again explained that the Department of Education and Employment (DfEE) were already aware of the project, and were showing their commitment through SRB funding. Whilst top level political support was necessary, Pine should be aware of local needs and be prepared to support them. Martin still thought it expedient to make a show of doing as Pine had asked. Thus it was agreed that Martin would discuss the project with Pine at their meeting as scheduled, for which Davenport would prepare a briefing sheet.

This is another illustration of the point made above that powerful individuals undertook tasks they considered to be unnecessary for the sake of ‘keeping in’ with another, the price for participating in a coalition (Morgan, 1986). Hall was keen to be seen taking advice from Pine, as was Martin. The less powerful Davenport and Rennie seemed more willing to defy Pine, perhaps because they had less to lose by upsetting him. In this sense positions of power are disempowering for the individual. Paradoxically, once in a positions of power individuals acquiesce to others whom they perceive to be powerful in order to maintain their positions of power. They become the subjects of power rather than agents. Within the ‘partnership team’ individuals acted with and supported each other, thus maintaining a steady state of mutual impotence.

Hall wanted to raise the issue of a newspaper article which had appeared on the front page of the Evening Telegraph (25/8/95), ironically next to an article critical of Pine’s decision to ‘switch seats’ following the redefining of constituency boundaries (Daily Telegraph, 17/8/95 and Daily Telegraph, 24/8/95). Hall objected to the article on the university development ostensibly because he was worried about raising expectations too high. The article stated that the university would create two thousand jobs, and generate between £80 and £100 million when it
reached its planned size of eleven thousand students. Hall complained that he, and he supposed
Martin also, had been inundated with calls from people wanting to know what was going on.
He wanted to emphasise the fact that all publicity should go through Grey.

Davenport explained that the article had already been discussed with the Chair and Grey at their
earlier and as such there was no need to cover it again at this meeting. Davenport said that
when people had contacted Grey she had referred them to him. Hall did ‘not care’ - the
committee had a system by which all enquires went to Grey and Davenport should use it.
Martin supported Hall’s point. This discussion was ended by Hall: ‘you’ve made a decision and
I’m quite happy with that. Let’s move on’.

There followed brief discussion of curriculum issues, and also whether the research papers
should be traded, sold or kept confidential. The rest of the meeting was taken up with the issue
of the partner university.

Martin raised the need to look at a distant university in order to cover the ‘audit trail’, and also
because he too was now concerned that a local partner would not withdraw. Felix countered
that with regard this second point it was academic anyway, no institution would be leaving for
about fifteen years at a minimum, so discussion around it was a waste of time. Martin and Hall
insisted, however, that its importance outweighed the time and that as such it should be
addressed. Kidd asked Davenport what his view was. Davenport wanted to ‘lay ghosts’, and to
do it for the sake of being able to say that it had been done. Rennie was less certain that ghosts
could be laid, believing that a large university, such as Leeds or Manchester, could see
Peterborough’s size as small and manageable and as such be interested. It was left that
Davenport and Rennie should decide which other institutions to contact. The University of
Exeter was chosen.

On September 19 1995 GPtec held its annual public meeting in Peterborough. Three meetings
take place annually, one in Stamford, one in Peterborough City, and one in Fenland District.
They are attended by Operational Directors, including the Director of Educational Services
under whom the project fell, and the Chief Executive (Felix). Before the meeting the Director
of Educational Services, Craig, had remarked to Davenport that he would make higher
education his ‘theme’. According to Davenport, who attended the Peterborough meeting, when
the presentation came, Craig’s ‘theme’ was covered by a single sentence ending in ‘GPP’. If it
did not inform the public of the development of higher education in Peterborough, Davenport noted that the presentation earned the praise of the GPP’s Chief Executive, Grey.

On 20 September 1995 Davenport, covering the audit trail in order to comply with the wishes of Pine, wrote to Exeter University asking ‘whether you would be interested in discussing with us whether they might be interested in becoming the main provider of local Higher Education ... The proposal is to establish a University College in Peterborough, which would achieve independent status as Peterborough University once the legal requirements were satisfied’. The reply stated that Exeter University were already ‘engaged in a major project to establish a new higher education campus in Cornwall’, and were therefore not interested in delivering higher education in Peterborough. They would however be interested in validation.

10.12 October 1995

The steering committee was not scheduled to meet in October. Since May 1995, and Felix’s first discussion with Pine regarding the university project, no formal progress had been made. For seven of it’s eleven-month duration the project had effectively been on hold until Pine had been appeased, co-opted or whatever was necessary to prevent his derailing it. On 31 October Felix met Grey and Hall to discuss a way forward. He had been advised by Davenport that to delay any longer would mean no business plan, no partner university, and no university in Peterborough for at least another year. It would mean also that GPtec had failed to deliver on its contract with Government Office for the Eastern Region (GOER).

Perhaps as a result of this the next day Martin telephoned Davenport in order to discuss the project. What makes this approach seem less spontaneous than might otherwise appear is the general reluctance of the key members of the steering committee to contact, rather than be contacted, and this is particularly true in their dealings with Davenport. Take for example the local part of the discussion paper on social and cultural issues (Morris and Wilson, 1995). Given that this paper contained results of interviews conducted with senior officers of Peterborough City Council Davenport sent the relevant parts to Hall for approval and received no response, not even to a follow-up telephone. The other factor that makes Martin’s call to Davenport seem out of place was the fact that Martin suddenly appeared to be very positive. After months of negativity and delay his proposal seemed somewhat out of anomalous.
Martin said that he been trying to set up a meeting with Pine, which was proving problematic since Pine could not find time to attend. He said that would persist and wanted Davenport to suggest some people to go to the meeting were Pine to agree to some time. In addition, Martin outlined his plan to arrange a dinner with some business people in the Peterborough area in order to give information on the current state of the project and to get some feedback. He also wanted to present a coherent presentation to the GPP board because he was concerned that they all had different ideas of what the project actually involved (despite the fact that the work was being carried out on their behalf). He was essentially asking for support, though not in those terms.

The most likely reason for this change in attitude would be the request from Felix to move the project forward for the reasons outlined above. Martin might not have cared what the specific reasons were. It is true that GOER would pay against outcome and without their payment the project would be abandoned and he may have had little desire to be associated with a failed project. It is more likely that his chief concern was to maintain his relationship with Felix who was a well-networked ally.

10.13 November 1995

The steering committee met again on November 1 1995. This was an important meeting in that items for discussion included a ‘Decision on Partner University’ and also to agree an outline structure and framework for the Business/Strategic Plan. In Martin’s absence Felix chaired the meeting.

Palmer, on the committee as a representative from the Chamber of Commerce, but also a lecturer at PRC, asked how the issue with Pine was developing. Felix asked Grey if she wished to discuss it. Grey explained that she had had a meeting with Pine, at which he had stated his intention to bring someone from DfEE to talk to the committee. Felix commented that if they were coming here to talk to us it would be necessary to be well rehearsed. Davenport, however, said that according to his conversation with Martin that morning they would not be meeting people from DfEE particularly, but rather Pine’s ‘approved’ people (actually one person from HEQC). Martin did not see Pine’s not coming himself as a problem as such as long as those he had recommended had sufficient credibility to ratify the major strategic decisions on his behalf. Felix thought Pine’s agreement to a meeting represented a ‘significant shift’ by Pine.
Grey was seeing Pine later that week anyway and would seek clarification about whom they would be meeting. Felix felt that this information was important in order to 'adopt a position and assemble an appropriate team'. From his point of view he explained, carrying the project forward was crucial as it was funded through SRB and had performance criteria (milestones), and the TEC could only draw down the SRB funding if it met those milestones. There were also the issues of the project's credibility to consider, particularly given the increasing competition from new university developments. He suspected that Pine would choose a team to 'test our credentials'. Davenport agreed, expecting Pine to be checking that the position of the project could be justified in policy terms.

Felix asked Grey if the GPP members could be used more for support. In his own case, he used the (TEC) board as 'the infantry' (the specifics of this comment were not clear until December 1996). Grey agreed that they might, if they were properly informed. This they would be after Martin made his presentation in a few days time. She added that Martin also wanted to arrange a dinner with top business leaders within the forthcoming three weeks, but was concerned that the short time scale would prevent it. Davenport thought Martin's proposal should be supported, as it would provide an opportunity to exchange views collectively. Felix saw it as an ideal opportunity to invite those employers who might house a university department. Grey said that this was what Martin had in mind. Other matters arising included the announcement that Ben Millar of Walton Comprehensive School had accepted a position on the committee but could not attend this meeting.

Next, Davenport spent some time reviewing the 'context' in which the project was developing in order to underpin the business plan, and this was one of the rare occasions when the committee discussed the items actually tabled for discussion. First, he reiterated the point that the national policy agenda was still unclear, and that the incremental approach agreed at the September meeting of the steering committee was still the most appropriate way forward (10.11). There were also other significant changes in the system that had to be considered in developing the plan. Specifically, there were fourteen 'new university' projects all of which would be hoping for HEFCE funding. Any business plan had to recognise the context in which Peterborough's university project was itself developing. It was dynamic, complex and, in many ways, unpredictable.

Local factors to be considered in the writing the Business Plan included the following: 'management' was the most important area for development; that Peterborough had a lower
percentage of people with qualifications at a higher level than the national average, against an
average industrial/employment profile. This had implications for local competitiveness. Other
factors in need of thought would be the role of IT in the university development, and the
changing emphasis on ‘learning’, as opposed to teaching, in the delivery of programmes of
higher education. The Business Plan needed to be flexible enough to allow changes and moving
decision points. As proposed at the September meeting (10.11), the project plan would be
incremental.

The proposal to adopt an incremental approach to the development is a useful illustration of the
limitations of the dichotomous presentation of the two models of decision-making - rationality
and incrementalism (Chapter 3), as methods the two can overlap. The main process of the
development was rational: a general problem was identified (low competitiveness due to low
skills levels), a general solution suggested (upskilling of employees), and also a specific
solution (upskilling through local access to higher level skills training). However, it did not
demonstrate comprehensive rationality in a Lindblomian (1959) sense. It sought to develop
within existing structures, deviating slightly (incrementally) for rational reasons. In order to
attract government funding it would be necessary to show that the project fitted the national
agenda. It was based on a partnership approach with the Greater Peterborough Partnership
(GPP), further education, higher education and other organisations all working together to
realise the objective; that it represented ‘value for money’, and that proposed delivery structures
matched wider policy aims of flexibility, relevance and cost-effectiveness. However, just as
these factors were ‘givens’ and constrained options, so changes not yet given would also
constrain future options. As a result the strategy adopted was one of ‘wait and see’, again
apparently incremental, but also rational. It would be irrational to pursue ‘what if’ scenarios
when important aspects of the decision context were beyond the direct control of local decision-
makers. An incremental method can be used to secure a rational outcome. Perhaps the
difference between the two models is one of size - Lindblom (1959) is describing decision-

Davenport suggested all this provided the background to the business plan and asked for
specific comments or suggestions to be identified for discussion at the next meeting committee
on December 6. In writing the Plan he wanted to indicate that the partners involved had reached
a consensus. He also hoped to show how the university project business plan linked in to the
business plans of the partners, as it did in with GPtec’s plan. This did not happen. Davenport
suggested that the mission statement should include a commitment to the local community, and
that the business plan should include the proposal to establish a project company. The committee must decide what sort of company was the most appropriate, whether it should be charity for example.

It was asked whether a different business plan would be produced for each delivery method, as each of these would have quite different financial and economic implications. Davenport stated that the business plan would be based on the model already chosen by the committee, which had a physical centre based on ‘traditional’ delivery with open learning, for example electronic delivery, emanating from the centre, although he did recognise there were financial implications for the model, which was why he was proposing an incremental approach to development.

Felix suggested a need for pre-specified decision points to guard against the project plans being undermined by unanticipated external events during implementation. The committee needed to ensure that action was taken before any existing organisation established itself in Peterborough. Rennie argued that the sooner a start was made the better. He supported the view that it would be sensible to aim for traditional provision first, because it was easier, needing only staff and classrooms, and address new projects later. For example, a Business School could be set up quickly and easily. Davenport agreed that this would be perfectly feasible, after all Loughborough University was already delivering an MA in Education Management and an MBA in Peterborough.

Johnson returned attention to the background because he thought that some important considerations had been - environment, resources and buildings, access for minority groups, in terms of age and part-time provision, for example. The strategic plan should be proactive in encouraging people into higher education. Johnson also felt that what he called ‘the professional or ethical culture’ should be addressed explicitly. By this he meant the balance between teaching and research, and the boundary between education and business. Felix thought this premature as the partner university would influence the approach taken.

It was at last agreed that Davenport should prepare a plan to be discussed by the committee at their next meeting. It was recognised that it would be rudimentary at first, but it was also felt that a draft document ‘to shoot at’ would be helpful. Grey suggested that Davenport impose a deadline for comments so that the process did not drag on. Again the use of the term ‘university’ on the grounds that the project was developing a cohesive strategy for the provision of higher level skills not a university in the restricted sense was argued (Craig Scully) -
something which had been discussed many times before on many different occasions; and Holland, also again, articulated a need for personnel who had set up a university before.

The next item for discussion was a decision on the partner university. Davenport explained that there was still to be a meeting with Pine for ratification purposes. The committee had agreed that the project needed a local provider, and Pine wanted a distant one. Davenport explained that to this end he had written to Exeter University, who did not want to be involved. Thus he felt that the committee could make its own choice and asked a ‘tentative recommendation’. This was Loughborough University of course.

On the 10 November 1995 the project was presented to the community at the first of the Strategic Education Conference. The Strategic Education Conference had been set up to replace the Strategic Education Forum as the mechanism by which the TEC consulted with the community at large, and those interested in education in particular. It was hoped that the conference would attract a wider audience thus increasing the level of community input into TEC initiatives (see Houghton et al., 1995a and 1995b). The conference provided an overview of performance against National Education and Training Targets (NETTs) and then broke into workshops on areas of education in which the TEC had an interest.

The workshop on higher education, which focused on the university project, discussed curriculum areas, the community, educational and economic benefit of the development and briefly the issues of funding and quality assurance. Two main themes emerged: first, the importance of the project to ethnic minority community leaders, especially the Pakistani community; and the reaction of staff form Peterborough Regional College (PRC) to the project.

Staff of PRC and also a member of the board attended the workshop. It was clear that they were less than happy with the development as it was. What was interesting was the extent which staff members were ill informed given that their Principal was a member of the steering committee. They asked that Davenport, who was facilitating the workshop, to give presentations to the board in order to increase the level of understanding. They also asked that when the university partner had been identified that PRC were informed before the public announcement was made so that they could ‘manage’ their existing relationships with other higher education institutions. This was agreed.
The next meeting of the steering committee was scheduled for December 5. The paper for discussion was the *Social and Cultural Impact arising from the University Development in Peterborough* (Morris and Wilson, 1995). These papers presented three case studies of the perceived impact of the university on the town, and also interview material from Peterborough City Council. Consistent with research protocol Davenport sent the relevant pages of paper to Hall 'to confirm that there [was] nothing here that causes you any difficulty' before the paper was copied and circulated to other members of the committee. Davenport did not receive a response from Hall. However, on 17 November (Davenport had asked for comments by the 8 November as the paper was due out the following day) Davenport received a telephone call from Felix's secretary to say that Hall wanted changes to the paper, Hall having spoken to Felix rather than Davenport. Each council division that had contributed would be re-writing their sections. In fact when the fax with corrections came through, there were no significant changes at all.

On 20 November 1995 GPtec's Education Services Team met together in order to prepare the TEC's business plan. Davenport was absent from this event. All the team's activities were discussed, and not just higher education. In his introduction Craig, the Director of Education Services, under whom the project formally fell, outlined what he felt would be significant changes in the future. First, the decision on Peterborough City Council's application for unitary status was expected in December which would be followed by a year's transition period, ready for April 1 1998. There was an argument, he said, that in the event of unitary status being granted that Peterborough City Council would not deliver education services directly, but instead through agencies. This would leave only two players in the education field - the TEC/Chamber and the Local Authority, thus creating a huge opportunity for management development in schools. Secondly, at the last GPtec board Away Day there had been some suggestion that the TEC would combine with the Chamber of Commerce, thus becoming the 'real' Greater Peterborough Partnership, also enhancing the TEC's position.

Craig's comments are important for two reasons. It indicates his attitude towards the GPP, and probably Grey. His suggestion that the combined TEC and Chamber would form the 'real' Greater Peterborough Partnership would seem to suggest that the thought that the existing GPP were not. This view was not unique. Davenport (and more importantly Felix) had expressed similar sentiments at the same time as declaring the GPP to be powerful body. Grey herself was a 'hopeless negotiator' (Felix), 'bullied by Pine' (Felix), and as the evidence of this case-study shows, and was also a relatively unsophisticated decision maker or politico. His comments also
reveal Craig's own aspirations (increasingly evident until climaxing in September 1996), and GPtec's relationship with Peterborough City Council which this implies.

With particular regard to higher education Craig stated that the project's partner institution would be Loughborough University, failing to add that this was confidential. He went on to say that their involvement in the project would now be increasing, and that he (Craig), Felix, Davenport and Anderson (Cannell having handed in her resignation was from then on ignored by Craig) would be active on sub-groups. He also planned to expand the higher education team's remit to include further education and Education Management. The Strategic Education Conference to be held in May would focus on higher education and, he thought 'should create a big splash'. However, he was still nervous because there were some key issues to be resolved, chief of which would be funding. He wanted to warn the whole team that this would impact on them, as the same budget would need to be spread further.

On 23 November Davenport, still off sick, came in to attend a panic meeting with Grey in order to prepare her presentation to the GPP board. She asked if Martin had also asked for help with his speech, which he had not. Davenport offered his and Felix's help to present to the board but this was declined. Davenport described it as a friendly meeting, during which Grey admitted that to date the GPP knew little of the project because Martin was always vague in his presentations.

In the afternoon of the same day Davenport had a meeting with Felix. This was because Felix had a meeting with Hall, Martin and Grey the following morning and he needed to understand what the issues were. The issue of the Social and Cultural paper was also discussed because Felix understood from Hall that there were more comments than those indicated on the fax of 17 November.

When Felix reported the results of the meeting to Davenport the latter sensed a change in Felix's position. Quite what prompted this change is unclear. What is clear however is the fact that Felix was now aligning himself more closely with the other members of the 'partnership team', even giving it such a name, and that they were suddenly keen to progress, making decisions and providing leadership to do so. Felix confirmed Grey's earlier position that 'We' (Hall, Martin, Grey, Felix) did not need Davenport to attend the GPP board meeting. They felt ready to take the project forward but it was important for the board to be seen as fronting it. There did appear to be a communication issue between them however, as Martin had had two
meetings with Pine about which he had not told the others. As such they needed to ensure that there was only one story - 'that they were all singing from one song sheet'. They had agreed that Loughborough University should be the key partner 'subject to final contract' (memo 24/11/97) and that the relationship should be progressed by Davenport. Such a decision had of course been agreed by the steering committee at their last meeting, but it appears that support from the 'Partnership team' (Felix, Martin, Hall, and Grey) gave it action. Martin had been charged with telling Pine that Loughborough University had been chosen for the academic partner for the development, but he would also say that the steering committee would still like to see his recommended contact.

On the 27 November Davenport rang Peterborough City Council regarding the paper which Felix had understood to be unresolved. Having at last understood that the pages which the Council had been sent for approval, only those pertaining to themselves, did not represent the complete paper it was agreed that it could now be sent out ready for the next meeting due in December.

10.14 December 1995

The paper was tabled for discussion at the December meeting along with a progress report on the Business/Strategic Plan. Martin came to the meeting with Hall’s apologies. The latter would not be attending as he was dealing with council problems arising from the death of a councillor. Martin said that he had set up a meeting with Grey, Felix, and possibly Hall at 8.00 the following day to plan their meeting with Pine on 13 December. Arising from the minutes on the November meeting he explained that he had been unable to arrange a dinner between that last meeting and Christmas. He felt that the people who he had contacted who were not already involved in the project, were concerned that they would be asked for money. He suggested that it be ‘revisited’ after their meeting with Pine.

Rennie was interested to know who Pine would have attending that meeting. Martin knew it was with someone called Ian Brown, but did not know who he was exactly (except he had some association with the Leprosy Mission), but did not think that he was from DfEE. The purpose of the meeting was to ‘keep in with’ Pine and to gain effective access to HEFCE.

Martin had made his presentation to the GPP board. He considered that it had two purposes: one, to increase the understanding of the GPP board with regard to the project; and secondly, to
get them comfortable with the fact that the project was ‘being managed professionally’ (Martin). He had deliberately not presented them with the business case as such, but had offered a ‘brief glimpse’ (Martin). This would ‘wet their appetite’ for later. He had told them at if they required more information they should speak to Grey or Felix (note the exclusion of Davenport).

Grey said that after Martin had left the board meeting, for he was not yet a member and there only to deliver his presentation as Chair of the steering committee, there had been an enthusiastic response to his presentation, and it had been suggested that he also presented it to the [Policy and Planning] Committee of Peterborough City Council. This was met with general murmurs of ‘rather you than me’ nature. Even Martin appeared burdened by such an ordeal, maybe because he was hearing the suggestion for the first time. Felix suggested that with the death of the Councillor the urgency and appropriateness of such a presentation may have changed they should speak to Hall for advice.

Martin then confirmed the decision taken at the previous meeting that Loughborough should be the partner university, but argued that this should remain confidential until after his meeting with Pine, adding that Pine was becoming increasingly difficult to contact. Felix agreed, but added that Loughborough University themselves would need to know. (He had been advised by Davenport that they would not hold on forever whilst local problems were sorted).

Felix felt that a ‘Plan B’ was required. He said that this would be discussed by the smaller group in a meeting the next morning. This was necessary in case Pine did not approve the choice put to him. Plan B was not described here. Felix only added that one of the TEC board members had a ‘special relationship’ with the Secretary of State for Education and Employment and could therefore bypass Pine anyway. (This ‘special relationship’ became an issue again in December 1996 when Pine appeared to be threatening the progress of the project again. Felix offered the same solution).

Davenport, perhaps trying to suggest the significance of Pine was being overstated, made the point that capital expenditure was no longer available from public funds anyway, therefore what was required of Pine was ‘support in principle’ and not actual money. Capital expenditure was not going to be forthcoming, except through schemes like PFI (Private Funding Initiatives). Martin proposed that in order to stop the meeting dragging on they should agree to his securing Pine’s ‘support in principle’ and move on to discuss the tabled paper. There of little evidence of
Martin using his roles as Chair in this manner before, and it serves to support the argument made above that the ‘partnership team’ had suddenly become more committed to progressing the project.

The purpose of the paper, Social and Cultural Issues arising from the University Development in Peterborough (Morris and Wilson, 1995) was to assess the likely social and cultural impact of a university on the Greater Peterborough area by exploring the experiences of three comparator institutions and relating the issues raised by them to the Peterborough context. Social issues were defined as those issues which relate to the quality of life of people in the area; and cultural issues as those which refer to a set of values (including intellectual and aesthetic values) embedded in identifiable groups.

Views and responses to issues were elicited from representatives of Peterborough City Council and other local under the headings of: Leisure and Amenities, Housing, Traffic, Ethnic Minorities, Students with Disability, and the Relationships between the University and the Community. The collation of these perspectives, local and non-local, led to the recommendations. The paper (Morris and Wilson, 1995) stressed that these were indeed ‘recommendations’, rather than conclusions - ‘a number of specific and important issues for further detailed research and investigation’.

It was stated that all consulted firmly believed that Peterborough needed a University. Most of the views reported which related to the likely social and cultural impact of a university development on Peterborough came from the City Council itself. There were two specific issues that influenced the response of Peterborough City Council. First the ‘City Council [was] likely to achieve Unitary Authority Status which will aid local decision-making’; and secondly, the development of the Southern Township, essentially a ‘new town’ being built to the South West of the City which was anticipated to draw in new migrants and new businesses.

Taking each heading in turn, the report noted that the Council’s Leisure and Amenities Department believed that an increased market for services by students would put pressure on current leisure facilities whilst budget constraints meant that expansion of facilities could not be funded. Based on successful experiences in the comparator areas the paper suggested that:
Partnership and dual use strategies, and developing the present “Passport to Leisure” scheme including some joint funding, are likely to be the way forward, so that provision for both the resident community and new students can expand both in quantity and in range.

A new Concert Hall/Auditorium would be desirable, and the Key Theatre will need to be in a position to cater for a different market, with the influx of a ‘new culture’.

It was suggested that Leisure and Amenities Department employees might also benefit from further training about the Leisure industry from the university.

The University’s Library and Resource Centre could be made available to local residents (Morris and Wilson, 1995).

With regard to housing the City Council anticipated that private sector rented accommodation would expand with an influx of students from outside the area. This, they thought may have implications for local first-time buyers, because houses in lower price bands (most particularly city centre terraced accommodation) may be bought by landlords for rental purposes, thus removing these properties from the general market. The areas of the Park Ward and Central Wards were mentioned specifically. This included Gladstone Street and nearby roads; areas with a largely ethnic minority community (Asian) and little off-street parking.

There were concerns that there might be a switch from availability of housing in these areas for local residents, to availability to students - this might have a significant effect on low-income families whose traditional accommodation may transfer, over a period of time, to student occupation. This in turn would have a knock-on effect for Council Housing by generating an increased demand. It was noted that there was currently a strain on resources in some areas, that the council was no longer building houses and that Housing Associations are only providing limited new housing. Council officials felt that special student halls might be required (but see below) therefore. At the time of the study however, the Council had vacant properties which they might consider renting to students, and most of this was out of the city centre.

An “Accredited Landlord” system was suggested by the Council as a means to avoid overcrowding in sub-standard accommodation. Such a system involves inspection of a property by the Council or its representative, and star-rating being awarded to each approved property. This is designed to help indicate the level of rent which might be reasonably charged for a given property.
One major issue of concern to the City Council was that of traffic. Their statutory function was to help traffic flow rather than to provide parking space. Council officials suggested that there are currently 3,000 parking spaces in 13 car parks. However, it was added that there was less parking space in the older parts of the city, and if most students lived in Park and Central Wards, where there is little off-street parking, probably causing problems with traffic-flow. It was hoped that the (likely) extension of the current 30 miles of cycle way would facilitate student movement. A park-and-ride scheme was also suggested.

The Council suggested that housing students out of the City in the Orton and Bretton areas might reduce some of the pressure on parking as there is more available domestic parking space there (though still insufficient). It was recognised that student accommodation may also generate income in vacation time, if it is made available to tourist groups or to those attending summer school.

Although it was not possible to hold discussions with the ethnic minority representative contacted, several issues were indentified for consideration by the committee. These included the wide variations in take-up; the low number of applications from ethnic minorities for courses with low entrance requirements, notably teacher training courses, compared with the high number of applications from ethnic minorities for competitive courses such as medicine and law; and the tendency for ethnic minority students to apply to a limited set of universities, usually in their home region, and to a specific 'type' of institution - ex-polytechnics more than universities (See for example Madood, 1993; and Power et al., 1993). The paper added that 'for Peterborough, there is the additional need to meet the university requirements of Asian girls who for cultural reasons often find it difficult to leave home to study' (Morris and Wilson, 1995).

The needs of students with disabilities were also considered in the research. Representatives of the visually and hearing impaired suggested a number of practical steps which universities should follow where possible. It was really only the issue of ethnic minorities that was discussed in any proper detail by the committee when the paper was presented to them, and even then somewhat fruitlessly.

Davenport expressed a desire, supported by EMAG (Ethnic Minorities Advisory Group to GPtec), to establish baseline information against which to develop appropriate strategies to
support equal opportunities for access to higher education in Greater Peterborough. Rennie explained that whilst PRC were picking up a representative number of ethnic minority students (11%) they were all young, and tended not to come from African, and Afro-Caribbean groups. Gender was also an issue; girls were not permitted/unwilling to go on residential courses. Other than this there was no real discussion of the issues and recommendations made in the paper, except for Davenport’s repeated suggestion of changing the project’s mission statement so to include a commitment to the local community in common with an increasing number of existing universities.

After this Davenport presented the draft business plan which was based on the discussions of the November meeting of the steering committee. It included a spelling error, which was pointed out by Grey. Felix suggested each member should read and consider the plan and get back to Davenport with comments individually. Rennie, however, picked up on the term ‘Partnership’ used in the document and asked for clarification. Specifically, he wanted to know if PRC ‘partner partners’ (an integral part), or just agents for delivery (a franchise). Davenport thought this a difficult question to answer as it would partly depend on the position adopted by the academic partner, and that Rennie’s membership of the sub-group dealing with the partner university would place him in a position have some say himself. Following some discussion as to what was a ‘partner’ and was not Martin called the meeting back to the task in hand. He restated Felix’s suggestion that members should speak to Davenport directly if they had comments once they had absorbed the document.

Rennie’s question on ‘partnership’ had indeed been a difficult one, particularly as Davenport was left to answer it himself. When Rennie was not present, the ‘partnership team’ admitted that they did not want Peterborough Regional College (PRC) to be too heavily involved because of its poor reputation for quality. However, still no one seemed willing to say this and PRC can be forgiven for thinking they were held in better esteem that perhaps they were. This habit of appearing to support an actor whilst disparaging them to others is a recurring tendency, and one which has been covered in some detail above in the particular context of PRC. A similar situation occurred when Davenport resigned in September 1996. According to Davenport Felix said to him that everyone thought that he was not the person most suited to taking the project forward, but Felix had been ‘too kind’ to say so before (Davenport). Even if it were the case that the committee did not see Davenport as the most appropriate project manager it was Felix’s duty, or Craig’s anyway, as his manager to discuss the problem with him. It is difficult to see how this difficulty would have developed had Davenport not resigned.
Next, Grey said that the Chair of the GPP board had asked that Martin to make another presentation to the board between sometime between 16 and 19 January in order to update them on progress. Felix felt that the presentation should be made when the steering committee felt ready, but Martin felt that to ‘take the board with us’ it needed to be done as quickly as possible. Martin had already told the board that the partner university would be announced in January or February.

Davenport then fed back on the Strategic Education Conference. Martin told him not to undertake presentations to the FE College boards, as requested at the workshop, but wait until Martin had had his meeting with Pine. Felix saw that it would be necessary to give FE colleges information in advance in order to allow them time to discuss the situation with their existing partners. He added that in giving presentations it was crucial to adopt a united approach in ‘spreading the message’.

Davenport then raised the proposal for a Business School in Peterborough. He suggested that the current provision of MBA and MAs in Education Management was likely to double the demand for accommodation in the next academic year when another cohort would be added. Felix requested a costing before the committee could consider the proposal properly. Davenport asked Martin if he might pursue this, with Grey’s support because of her relationship with the Commission for New Towns (CNT) who held property in Peterborough. Grey added that after Martin’s presentation to the GPP board, the representative from CNT had offered more than just buildings to support the project (cash?). By the end of the following year, however, CNT had made no contribution to the project in any way, and it is likely that Grey’s claim was inspired by the desire to appear to be an influential negotiator; an element of impression management (Morgan, 1986). In this she failed (Felix, Craig, Davenport), but as with PRC no one was willing to say to her that this was a weakness, and instead made attempts to relieve her of the obligation to negotiate by other means; by offering their ‘moral support’ at meetings and such like.

What was interesting about this meeting was the singular lack of participation by business representatives, other than Martin. Also present at the meeting were senior managers of Pearl Assurance, and Perkins, the latter in fact hosting the meeting. As these people had no less to offer the discussion with regard to knowledge about higher education it may that they felt excluded by the ‘in jokes’ of the more active committee members (Felix, Grey and Martin).
This was a common feature of meetings; jokes about shared acquaintances, whom the rest of committee would know of but not know, and the borrowing of each others’ lawn mowers.

It was at this meeting that ‘partnership team’ (Felix) was named thus, for the first time. Reference was made to the meetings the ‘partnership team’ had had to discuss issues related to the project. Meetings were said to have taken place, but still the specific content of their discussion was not shared with the rest of committee. It was clear too that Felix had allied himself much closely with the members of this group, as indicated in his meeting in November (10.13) and the follow up discussions with Davenport. Up until this point Felix often expressed views of the needs of the project which were often against those of Grey, Martin and Hall. This was not always the case of course, as making the project accountable to the GPP as opposed to his own board would indicate. Nonetheless, this had been a defensive action designed to appease Grey and keep the project alive, whereas his concessions now appeared to be for their own sake; or perhaps more accurately to make clear to his colleagues on the ‘partnership team’ exactly which side he was on.

Davenport suspected that this overt alliance was designed to control him, Davenport, but also thought it unnecessary. Davenport felt that Felix believed that he (Davenport) wished to lead the project and argues that this was not actually the case. Davenport knew all along that in order to get support (money) this would be impossible. Only the ‘partnership team’ could achieve the necessary support owing to their status and networks (Morgan, 1986).

On 14 December a delegation from the steering committee (Felix, Martin, and Hall) travelled to London to meet Brown, Pine’s contact, as planned. Pine himself was not present throughout the meeting as he left to discuss ‘constituency matters’ with Hall. Brown’s connection with higher education turned out to be his employment by the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC). Davenport prepared briefing papers for Felix, passed via Craig, which covered background information to the HEQC; the issues associated with independence for the university, and the rationale for the choice of provider, Loughborough University. The paper argued that the partner university would need to be involved in planning meetings and can not be expected to travel from Aberdeen or Penzance to do so. Furthermore, there would be some movement of staff and students between sites in the short and medium term due to a modest number of students at the new site who could not be expected to chose from a limited number of courses owing to their unfortunate physical location. In order to pass HEQC’s rigorous assessments necessary for independence the new development would need to be monitored and controlled by
experienced staff from the partner institution, which would again create logistical problems were the partner too distant.

This issue of independence was important to Pine since it had ostensibly prompted his original outburst in May. What he had overlooked at the time was that was not legally possible to just open a university and awards degrees from inception. Since the establishment of the new universities in the 1960’s only one new institution had been established which was Buckingham. Buckingham offers a restricted range of courses to paying students and award Licences, not degrees. Davenport stated in the briefing paper that to some extent this issue was irrelevant; all the agreed objectives, in terms of educational, cultural and economic benefit would be achieved whether the institution was independent or not and could still include ‘Peterborough’ in its name. The paper stated that Davenport saw no practical importance in the issue of independence, although he did recognise that there were ‘political’ ones.

Recounting the meeting with Pine to Davenport, Felix said that Brown had raised the usual issues concerning independence (that is that they would not be keen to grant it). He recommended therefore that the partner needed to be one of ‘quality’, although this was not defined. Felix regretted that Pine had not been present throughout the meeting as he had missed many of the important points made by Brown. However it had been a positive meeting with Parry agreeing with the plan so far, although Loughborough University was not mentioned by name. Felix felt that the barrier of Pine had now been overcome with the endorsement of Pine’s own expert. Davenport did not share this view. Felix gave a similar report to the steering committee at their next meeting in January. In the meantime it had been left that Martin would speak to Pine about the plan to progress the development with Loughborough University as partner, which Martin found difficult given Pine’s increasing elusiveness.

10.15 January 1996

On January 4 1996 Davenport gave an interview to the Herald & Post, a newspaper delivered free to homes in Peterborough city and the South Lincolnshire area. The first Davenport knew of the arrangement was when a secretary relayed a telephone call from the reporter to say that he would be late. Half an hour before the time when the interview was scheduled to take place he was informed by Craig that the journalist was expected. Davenport expressed his concern that this was a highly political area, and premature statements could result in irreparable damage. Craig sought advice from Felix who suggested he speak to Grey. According to Craig,
Grey had given her consent to the interview. The interview would go ahead but the partner university would not be named.

The reporter came with a photographer. Davenport reported that at first, Craig insisted that Davenport only be photographed, because it was 'his (Davenport’s) project'. However, Davenport, suspecting that Craig now understood the sensitivity of the situation and made sure that both were in the picture. Similarly, Craig introduced the journalist to Davenport, and then said he would leave them to it. Davenport again insisted that Craig stay, keen to prevent Craig from being in a situation where he could easily shed responsibility. The article was never actually published.

What is interesting about this event is the way in which Craig, having apparently set up the interview, or at least agreed to it, became nervous of upsetting Grey and attempted to extricate himself from it. To allow someone else to get the credit for something that he could take himself was out of character. Craig was skilled in impression management and given to dramatising his presence and significance (Morgan, 1986) (6.10), going out of his way to find reasons to approach Felix when the latter had ‘important’ visitors, and claiming ideas as own which had actually originated with his (junior) colleagues. Davenport’s warning against giving the interview seems to have been heeded, if not openly.

During January 1996 Davenport was preparing costings for the Business School as instructed by the steering committee at their meeting. Based on University Grants Council (UGC) space recommendations and Commission for New Town (CNT) estimated rates he anticipated a cost of £16,000 per year, with some additional set-up costs. Davenport wished to discuss the proposal with Felix in order to assess how it should be presented to the committee.

On 23 January the steering committee met again to agree formally the partner university and to discuss the proposed Business Plan. Davenport also fed-back on his presentation to the Ethnic Minority Advisory Group (EMAG) concerning the higher education project. EMAG had requested the meeting through their Chair who had been present at the workshop at the Strategic Education Conference in November 1995. Davenport reported that a proposal to undertake some benchmarking had been well received. Johnson stated his support for the research and wanted to make the point again that there was a significant gender issue within the ethnic minority ‘problem'; fewer girls than boys progressed to higher education irrelevant of achievement at school. Johnson added too that a disproportionately high number of students
from ethnic minority groups remained in education post-sixteen, seemingly indicating a significant potential demand for post-compulsory education. The committee agreed that the project team should undertake research to establish baseline data for local ethnic minority participation in education. (This was attempted but later abandoned as neither DfEE, nor the LEAs, nor schools themselves gathered statistics on ethnicity. As a result establishing baseline figures for participation in education by the local ethnic minority population would have demanded a much larger study than was originally intended).

At the previous meeting of the steering committee (10.14) there had also been some discussion as to whether to invite a representative from CNT to join the committee or not. Davenport reminded the group that they had not yet made a decision. Felix grimaced at the proposal and asked Grey what she felt. Her view (maybe based on Felix’s expression) was that it was too early yet. Hall also agreed. CNT were never represented on the steering committee.

Felix, again in the absence of the Chair, reported back to the committee on the ‘valuable’ trip that he, Hall and Martin had made to London in order to see Pine and Brown. As he had said to Davenport previously, Felix had found DP supportive of the Peterborough university proposal and was sure that there would be no contractual problems associated with the proposed model of a university college. Felix felt that the only problem was the fact that Pine was out of the meeting when this had been agreed.

Agreement of the partner university was the first formal agenda item. Felix stated that the committee had agreed that Loughborough University would be the academic partner for the project, but it would be courteous to inform Pine of this before it was made public. Martin, as Chair, would do this; or at least was trying to. Felix explained that Martin had eventually written to Pine asking for a meeting, as he had become impossible to contact by telephone. This had been arranged for February 2. Felix added that ‘we’ considered this to be too late and Martin was now ‘locked in’ discussion with Pine’s secretary attempting to change it to a telephone conference at an earlier date. Felix said that both he and Grey had offered to tell Pine because they were meeting him anyway, but that Martin saw it as his responsibility - more examples of control of boundaries (6.6) and the management of meaning (6.10) (Morgan, 1986).

Pine’s significance as an individual in the power relationships of Greater Peterborough is further reflected in the fact that in spite of Pine’s apparent hostility Grey and Felix were still keen to show others that they had access to Pine, particularly given that Martin was being denied access
to Pine. Morgan (1986) comments on the importance of being seen with powerful people in order to increase one's own power. This event is likely to be an example of this phenomenon given that all three seemed keen to give him news that Pine was unlikely to. It might be argued therefore that Felix and Grey saw this an opportunity to show the rest of the committee just how well connected they were (see also 6.14).

Nevertheless, Felix was keen to progress the project in the meantime because SRB funding required a ‘partner’ as a milestone performance indicator, against which money would be drawn down. Felix faced a dilemma therefore, which he had to manage carefully. Pine had to be appeased because it was necessary for Felix to maintain their relationship in other areas of activity, but previously prescribed outcomes also had to be delivered. Felix was able to resolve the issue by going through the motions of taking advice from Pine and being grateful that the latter had taken time to discuss it, whilst pursuing the original plan quietly. Pine made no substantive input, but key actors, such as Felix, devoted considerable time to making him think that he had; or perhaps to making him think that they thought that he had. Open conflict did not occur because it was ‘managed’.

Continuing down the steering committee agenda Davenport remarked that the sub-groups would need university expertise, and could not be set up until Martin had spoken to Pine therefore. Hall disagreed, and offered a solution to Felix’s dilemma. He failed to see why operations needed to be deferred, and instead proposed that activities be taken forward with Loughborough University, just not publicly (again going through the motions of acquiescence). Grey and Felix mumbled agreement. Davenport asked for the committee’s explicit agreement that he might contact the university and get on with the necessary work therefore. At this point Rennie asked for clarification as to the position of Loughborough University - whether they had been identified, contracted, or whatever. His question was ignored, probably less because it was superfluous, than because discussing it would have required committee members articulate their expectations for PRC within the overall university development and cause embarrassment (Goffman, 1967). Instead Felix introduced the discussion on the Business Plan.

He reminded the committee that they would need to have discussed the business plan before it went to the OPP board in March. Other members of the committee were not ready to move on however. Hall, returning to the previous discussion suggested that ‘we’ write to the Vice Chancellor of Loughborough University to confirm the proposal to work with them, and acknowledging existing informal relationships. He was concerned that if senior managers were
unaware of events they would become impatient. Davenport said that the committee had had a formal meeting in June 1995 (which Davenport and Grey had attended). Nonetheless, Hall was determined that they should 're-visit' it. He suggested that Davenport draft a letter and the Chair would send it. Grey felt it should go on GPP paper, particularly now that Martin was a member of the GPP board (itself an interesting observation). This was agreed.

Returning to the Business Plan Davenport said that the committee should be made aware of the fifteen new university projects, two of which had recently received 'tangible support'. The London Docklands project had won £17.5 million of SRB funding, and had significant political support. The Ipswich (Suffolk) project was now being supported by six named MPs. In both cases the emphasis on provision was in terms of part-time attendance and electronic delivery. Felix explained that in informal discussions with GOER about SRB he had been warned that, having won twice, not to expect to win again; higher education was the only area GOER could consider supporting in Greater Peterborough.

Felix asked Davenport when he felt he would have the draft ready for discussion given the Committee's agreement to progress with Loughborough University before Pine had been informed. Davenport responded that if it was agreed that Loughborough could be mentioned as the partner university, then it could be ready in a week. He would need to let the university see it and approve it, for whilst it was 'our' plan, if there were huge barriers as far as the university was concerned it would be better to identify them and sort them out before it was circulated. Felix asked if everyone agreed. Rennie wanted to know when the PRC board would be addressed about the choice of partner - 'when you've, we've, made the decision?'. Rennie's expression seems to suggest that he felt that the decision of partner did not reflect his choice - 'you've' corrected by 'we've'. Felix, himself a member of the board, advised that presentations should be left until the committee was happy with the plan. Davenport supported Rennie however, and thought that information should be given to the PRC board sooner rather than later. Hall felt Martin and Grey should undertake the presentation, 'especially to such an esteemed body' as PRC's board. Johnson wondered whether this meant that the 'less esteemed members' of the steering committee should be bound to silence. Felix was glad that Johnson had raised the point as it gave opportunity to remind everyone that all enquires were to be fielded to Grey in order to keep the message 'clear and consistent'.

What emerges from this discussion is the fact that some members of the steering committee clearly did not see themselves to be equal partners (see also September 1995) (10.11). Rennie
implied that decisions, in this specific case the partner institution, were being made elsewhere, hence ‘you’ve’, and it might be argued that this could reflect Rennie’s particular position. As the principal of an HE provider he would be sensitive to the choice which would be seen as ‘competition’, and all the time suffered mixed messages concerning the position of the college within the university development. However, Johnson’s reference to ‘less esteemed members’ of the steering committee would tend to indicate that this sense of ‘us and them’ was more widespread and more general in focus. Johnson had no obvious gripe in the way that Rennie had. If both comments were meant as invitations to the ‘partnership team’ to include the full committee in discussion and decision they were ignored. Again, it is difficult to explain why members of a selected committee, and therefore ‘important’ in some way, yet conscious of their own status as ‘junior partners’, should still tolerate being when being on the committee appeared to yield such little benefit by itself.

Following Johnson’s comment about ‘less esteemed’ members of the committee being bound to silence, Davenport asked who therefore would be making the presentations. The question was not answered, although Grey added that she had invited Davenport to a meeting at Peterborough City Council the following Wednesday, on account of him having conducted the research and ‘contributed a lot’ to the project. She also thought it would be good for him to go to PRC too (where he was likely to receive a hostile response). She added that this would not be on his own, but it was not made clear with whom.

The proposal for a business school was then discussed. Davenport reminded the committee that he had been asked to look at costings at the previous meeting. The reason for this was that two courses were already running - an MA in Education Management, and a MBA - and were likely to become four classes in the coming academic year, without accommodation. His concern was that at the current rate of hiring accommodation (a lecture theatre belonging to Business Link) delivering the courses would cost £11,200 in the first year, rising to some £25,000 in the next. Davenport recognised that PRC were offering diploma level study (DMS) with success, thus indicating a real demand for management courses and asked the steering committee to agree action to establish a business school.

Rennie expressed concern that a business school was ‘quick and cheap’. Throughout the development process concerns had been expressed about ‘cherry picking’, i.e. that the partner university would set up courses which were easy, and neglect those which had no immediate pay back but were appropriate to local needs. PRC, he explained, could have a set up a business
school with DeMontfort University but had chosen not to, believing it to be 'the wrong way to
go'. Also, PRC did not offer an MBA because demand could not last forever. (Since then they
have set up an MBA run with Nene College, Northampton and validated by Leicester
University). He also said that PRC planned to offer an undergraduate business studies
programme in September, which would be validated by Sheffield University.

Davenport explained that the issue for him was one of progression, and not one of competition.
In other words he supposed that PRC would continue to offer their DFlexible which would feed
into the MBA offered by Loughborough University in Peterborough. PRC could also develop
their access courses further. All previous discussion alluding to competition had ended with the
agreement that nothing offered by current providers should be replicated, despite specific
concerns about quality and general ones about the appropriateness of FE colleges developing
higher education rather than focusing on further education. Davenport also stated that he was
unaware that PRC had planned to offer Business Studies. Rennie then added that the course
was not yet validated but would be. No such plan was identified in PRC’s Business Plan.

Davenport went on to say that the provision of an undergraduate business degree by PRC was
not really an issue anyway. Postgraduate courses would be funded through different channels
than the full-time undergraduate study Rennie was proposing. In the former case individuals
were responsible for their fees, whereas full-time study fees would (probably) come from
HEFCE. However, he appreciated Rennie’s concern.

Felix thought that the point made by Rennie about cherry picking was an important one. This
inclination, he believed, could be prevented by careful contracting, thus ensuring that provision
was developed in response to need as had been the plan.

Rennie then suggested that PRC and the university project could share accommodation for the
business school. Davenport agreed that they might, but research had shown that the particularly
pressing need lay in postgraduate education and the TEC could no longer support the current
cost of hiring premises, so he needed a solution fairly quickly. Hall suggested a paper outlining
the issues be presented to the February meeting of the steering committee. Before the meeting
closed Rennie restated that he wanted to see a ‘tight and tidy’ contractual arrangement before
the partner university commenced delivery.
10.16 February 1996

On 16 February Davenport wrote to the Registrar of Loughborough University stating that ‘local issues’ had now been resolved and that the project was ready to proceed. Peterborough City Council had given formal support and the Greater Peterborough Partnership was likely to do so in March. He also stated that Martin, as Chair, would be writing to ‘formalise our arrangements with you with a view of moving towards contract’. That letter was dated February 23 1996 and sent on Thomas Cook notepaper, not GPP paper as Grey had proposed.

The University Registrar returned a letter stating that he had a meeting arranged with Davenport which aimed to ‘take matters forward’, and expressed the view that ‘The University is very much looking forwards to the prospect of working with you and your colleagues on this important project’. Davenport received a similar letter from the Vice Chancellor who, whilst looking forward to their working together, was also anxious to know whether 10,000 students would need funded places, and if so where such places were likely to come from. A meeting was arranged for May 15 1996 to discuss such things.

Meanwhile, decision making in Peterborough went on as before. The steering committee met on 28 February to discuss the, now called, Development Plan (GPtec, 1996), once called Business Plan. The reason for the name change rests with Craig. Davenport had completed the document at home and I had brought it in to photocopy and circulate in his absence. By chance Craig walked past the copier as I was starting my task, checked to see what I was doing and then told me that the Business Plan could not possibly go out without him seeing it. I explained that it was in fact a draft and the whole point of circulating it was to allow members of the committee to comment on it and that it was also behind. My comments were apparently misplaced as I was told that he ran the department, at least did so up that moment, so the decision of what went out and what did not was his, and only his. On Davenport’s return he discussed it with Craig, changed a few words, including one in the title, and then it was circulated as planned, but a little late.

This provides another example of individuals using their power (formal authority) because they could. Craig’s behaviour mirrors that of Hall over the research paper (see October 1995) (10.12). Craig had not seen discussion papers and minutes before their dissemination in the past and only saw this one by accident. The changes he demanded were minimal (trivial) and for the
sake of change. The Business Plan had already been discussed by the steering committee in its draft form at their January meeting and was being circulated to them again in draft before its final preparation for presentation to the GPP board the following month. Given that he did not consider the changes to be trivial it might be argued that his intervention at this point was inappropriate, as he was undoing the work of the steering committee (the strategic body which represented the 'community'). However, for some reason Craig seems to have decided that it was time to associate himself more closely with the development of the project and saw in the Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) an opportunity to do so. Craig was able to use formal authority (6.1) and the related organisational structure (6.4) to justify his claim. Craig was Davenport's line manager and formally responsible for the project in that capacity.

When the steering committee met again on February 28 Craig attended for the first time. His sudden addition to the committee was neither explained nor questioned. Martin opened the meeting with feedback on the Pine problem. He explained that he had taken it on himself to speak to Pine and had finally managed to do so three weeks earlier. Pine was now aware of the choice of partner institution, but still had reservations, and was still paranoid about potential predator behaviour, which would result in the parent university not granting independence. Martin had told him that the committee had heeded the advice of DP, but it appeared that Pine wished to attend a meeting to give them the 'benefit of his own experience'. He concluded that Pine was now less likely to 'scupper' the university project but was still likely to remain an 'irritation'. Hall suggested that Martin write to Pine concerning contracting with the partner, in order to indicate that the steering committee were taking Pine’s suggestions 'most seriously'.

Rennie asked for confirmation that Loughborough University had agreed to be the partner in writing. Davenport stated this to be the case, explaining that there had been numerous 'roll-on' meetings, ending with a confirmation meeting in January (three months previously). He was also meeting members of the university the following week to discuss the proposed Development Plan (GPtec, 1996).

Craig thought that as long as Pine was able to say that the project was his idea he would allow it to progress. There was also some discussion of marketing and Hall asked to see the project stationary before it was printed.

Grey reported that a presentation had been made to Peterborough City Council concerning the university development. Davenport had accompanied her and Hall. The event had been 'more
lively' than she had expected, and many members had spoken to her since the meeting privately. In particular she noted that the new mayor was finding it difficult to conceptualise a new university which was not a green field site development. Hall said that council officers were diverting press enquiries to Grey as agreed.

Davenport then introduced the proposed Development Plan (GPtec, 1996). He explained that it contained no new information, but rather material which had already been discussed and agreed. He added that it had been called a Development Plan as opposed to a Business Plan because a finance section was missing - it would be undiplomatic to presume sources and donations. It was also missing a time schedule, as this had to be agreed with the University who would be responsible for actual delivery. He anticipated it being upgraded to a Business Plan after presentation (and agreement) to the GPP board and appropriate bodies of Loughborough University. In the meantime, he offered it as a draft and welcomed comments.

The paper is covered at some length below because it provides a useful summary of the development plans for higher education in Greater Peterborough. It restated the project's mission, aims and objectives described likely student numbers (still wrong), proposed areas of study and a tentative schedule for development. It also identified the new administrative structure for the development of the project. The Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) was agreed by the steering committee, the GPP board, and Loughborough University and can be viewed as a blueprint document against which to evaluate outcomes.

The final Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) again made the point that Peterborough was the largest City in England without a university thus creating specific needs and opportunities. It stated that: 'the specific need, and the impetus to drive the development forward, results from simultaneous interest from the Strategic Forum, (representing local and national education perspectives) and the Greater Peterborough Partnership (representing local business, local authorities, and other agencies concerned with economic development)'. As a result of this 'widely recognised need and strong expressions of support' GPtec had funded a research and development programme, using Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) funds. The project was managed through GPtec's Higher Education Team, working through a steering committee which was established in September 1994. The steering committee reported to the board of the Greater Peterborough Partnership (GPP).
The Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) was the product of research conducted between June 1994 and December 1995, and was based on the discussion papers that were presented to the steering committee during that period. It stated the agreed mission of the university development project as being:

To establish quality university education and services in Greater Peterborough and thus to provide a skilled workforce which will generate economic growth.

In doing so, it would: (1) make local higher education available to all who can benefit from it; (2) meet the needs and requirements of local businesses; and (3) improve the quality of life in the community. The third aim had been added to the original set at the start of the project. These aims would be achieved through the following objectives:

(i) to provide delivery modes appropriate to the needs of individuals and companies, both in terms of modular course structure, and in terms of flexibility of time frame and location
(ii) to develop open and flexible learning systems in addition to traditional delivery models
(iii) to put in place a technology infrastructure which will allow the university to develop its courses by remote delivery as well as by traditional means
(iv) to establish a quality system of advice and guidance

Also:
(v) to establish research and consultancy facilities for local businesses
(vi) to embed processes for technology transfer
(vii) to develop work-based learning schemes

Thus the Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) claimed that the main beneficiaries of the project development would be:

the People of Greater Peterborough (represented by the Peterborough City Council and by the Cambridgeshire and Lincolnshire Local Authorities), whose educational opportunities will increase and whose quality of life will improve.
Others to gain would be the GPP, and GPtec. It was suggested that the economic impact of the university would make a major contribution to their aim of local economic development. For example, the GPP, 'with all core partners', would benefit from the university’s presence which would encourage inward investment. It was anticipated that the university would provide a major attraction to relocating companies by offering local access to higher-level training, opportunities for research and consultancy; and education facilities for young people, and improved leisure amenities for their employees.

Local businesses would be able to access a full range of professional development opportunities ‘including a leading business school, a prestigious engineering department, quality provision for pure and applied sciences, for leisure and recreation management, and the full range of university courses’. The new university would offer workbased learning schemes and also support technology transfer.

As well as businesses, educational institutions would also benefit from the new university development. Further Education Colleges would gain opportunities to support progression. The Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) stated that this would mean ‘that the FE Colleges will have the opportunity to build on their existing strengths and to increase the through-flow of students by maximising the benefits of the pull-through effect which the university will have’. It was further suggested that if ‘handled as part of an integrated system, this will bring about support and strengthening of their existing HE courses, and an increase in their sub-degree level courses, including access courses and courses for mature students seeking diploma and other qualifications for entry into the university’. Schools in the area could develop ‘compacts’ with the university, and use their relationship with the university to help inculcate the idea of lifelong learning into their students. The new development, it was argued, would also provide a unique opportunity to establish a guidance system which would provide support and advice for people of all ages which would enable them to ‘make autonomous but informed decisions’ about their own development needs.

To achieve this the strategy chosen was the establishment of a University College by working with an existing university. Courses would be delivered by the parent body consistent with their quality procedures. After ‘careful consideration of research quality, teaching quality, strengths in the identified curriculum areas needed in Peterborough, technology, and amenability to the project’ Loughborough University had been chosen as the partner.
A series of working groups would be established to manage the detailed development of this process. They would deal with: administration; finance, including buildings and resources; and curriculum; learning styles, including information technology marketing; progression and guidance; and work-based learning. These groups would be made up of three local representatives (members of the steering committee); people co-opted because of the particular value which they could bring to the development; and up three representatives from Loughborough University. The working groups would be serviced by Greater Peterborough Training and Enterprise Council (GPtec) and would report to Greater Peterborough Partnership (GPP) via the steering committee. Strategic planning would be the responsibility of a Strategic Planning Group, which would include any three of Martin, Felix, Grey, Hall, Davenport, as representatives from the steering committee. They would meet with senior managers of Loughborough University at bimonthly intervals to plan development and review progress. This group would report back to the steering committee.

A new schedule for development was outlined as follows:

- Agreement in principle with Loughborough University: June 1995
- Primary research papers completed by: January 1996
- Endorsement by City Council: February 1996
- Development Plan: February 1996
- For endorsement by [GPP] board: March 1996
- Target date for contract with Loughborough University: June 1996

These dates would be matched with the following incremental academic dates:

- MA in place: October 1994
- MBA in place: October 1995
- Establish Business School: October 1996
- Full Business Studies and Management provision (including Tourism Management), Engineering: October 1997
- Delivery of Secondary Priority Programmes of Study (Sciences, Social Sciences, Education): October 1998
- Full Delivery: October 1999

The university would be developed in existing city centre premises, but specific space requirements would be decided in consultation with Loughborough University's Estate Department. Only the Library and Resource Centre would need purpose-built accommodation,
requiring significant capital investment as well. Accommodation for students who were not local was likely to be a mixture of private rented accommodation and any available council housing. It was not felt necessary to build new halls at this point, but if this became necessary it was suggested that Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) might provide appropriate funding opportunities.

Electronic delivery of distance learning courses was anticipated, hopefully through a ‘partnership’ arrangement with a leading technology/cable company. It was noted that advanced guidance systems would need to be developed in order to support this distance learning in particular. Electronic distance learning was, however, considered to be ‘central in the provision of Peterborough’s University and [would] make quality higher education available to large numbers of individuals and companies, providing the flexible learning environment which will characterise lifetime learning in the next decade and beyond’ (GPtec, 1996).

Finance for the project was outlined vaguely - one of the reasons Davenport gave for calling it a Development Plan and not a Business Plan. A particular issue existed in making assumptions about ‘donations’, and naming likely donors. It was simply suggested that the ‘university development [was] likely to rely upon a variety of funding mechanisms, being a mixture of individual (fees, loans, learning accounts), industrial, European and public and private funding (HEFCE, PFI projects)’ (GPtec, 1996).

Finally the Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) stated that the management of the financial and legal responsibilities of the project were likely to demand the setting up of a University Company. Specific recommendations related to this were in preparation. Grey wished to disseminate the document to the GPP board as soon as possible. It was agreed therefore that a deadline for comments be set. This would allow those not present at the meeting to input without protracting the process further.

There was immediate response to the section on further education, however. Davenport was concerned to show that existing FE colleges would be included in the development as an integral, but feeder, element of a complete and coherent education system. Richmond, Principal of Isle College but actually invited onto the committee to represent ‘Fenland’ (by Grey), objected to this attitude. First, Isle already offered higher education, accredited by Anglia Polytechnic University (APU). Secondly, he considered it wrong to characterise the FE sector as non-advanced generally, and therefore the Plan’s reference to ‘pull-through’ (GPtec, 1996)
represented an incomplete picture. Third, he also expressed concern that a new provider might create direct competition with Peterborough Regional College (PRC), and, as such PRC should be encouraged to form the centre of the development. He concluded, therefore, that there were still some unresolved issues with regard FE.

Richmond’s attitude towards FE colleges’ delivery of HE appears to have been slightly ambivalent. On other occasions he was emphatic that Isle College had no desire to develop higher education. It seems likely that in this instance that he was supporting his FE colleague because of their common link in FE. The FE principals met on a regular basis, and may well have traded favours. Given this Richmond may have more to gain from supporting his FE colleague, perhaps on an IOU basis which Morgan (1986) (6.9) identified, than by admitting indifference. Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) describe this process of trading favours as ‘log-rolling’, and it helps to explain why state bureaucracies over-supply (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1967) (4.2) (11.4). As Crenson (1971) argues, specific issues are not discrete but spill over into apparently separate arenas.

In response to Richmond’s declared concern Martin identified a need for debate, and some ‘give and take’. This was the first time anyone other than Rennie, had addressed the problem, or potential problem of the FE colleges at all. Rennie had raised the issue at the previous meeting, and no one had felt it necessary to support either Rennie or Davenport. Martin argued that by taking entrenched positions both parties could end up with the same customer base (i.e. in competition), and this should be avoided. Rennie agreed with Richmond; he complained that he could see no ‘integration’ in the development model as presented (see February 1995) (10.5). Martin again made the point that there would be no ‘added value’ in replicating higher education provision which already existed, suggesting that the development would require some clearly defined roles, but also recognising that some grey areas would always remain. Martin expressed a need to discuss ‘like adults’; he did not want to see the ‘disenfranchised poisoning the market place’. Davenport requested agreement to discuss integration at the next meeting therefore, but instead Martin asked that FE be made a standing item on the agenda of the steering committee until the issue was resolved.

Martin’s involvement at this point is interesting as it indicates that he too was now making some effort to actually progress the project, just as Hall had done in the January meeting (10.15), and probably for the same reasons - to support Felix in meeting his organisation’s milestones. Grey also made the point that the issue had come up before, but had always been ‘hedged round’.
She thought that perhaps now was the time to look at the 'partnership' closely, and discuss what the existing colleges might gain from the development overall. Thus all the 'partnership team' mobilised support for the project, and prepared to make potential enemies of FE together. This is revealed in the discussion that followed.

Hall felt that it was necessary to involve Loughborough University in any discussion of further education colleges within the context of Peterborough's university development. Grey agreed, but Davenport felt that 'the Peterborough end' needed to be sure of what they wanted before discussing it with others. Hall understood his concerns, but thought that it would waste time if Loughborough University refused to work in a way chosen by the steering committee. Rennie and Felix stated agreement. Hall, having made his point, urged the committee to 'summarise and move on'. In doing so and returning to discuss the Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) there was considerable amusement derived from some incorrect grammar and some well-written sentences that followed.

Of more substance was the discussion concerning buildings. Grey knew of a city centre building, currently owned by 'the Arabs', which one of her contacts was interested in purchasing, and whom might be persuaded to give up space to the new university project. Craig saw this as leverage potential. Peter Longhurst (Pearl Assurance) wondered whether the initial cost of the buildings would not be reduced by the use of IT. Martin suggested that contacts be made with potential suppliers, but Hall wanted to see a more structured approach to contacts than this and suggested that a list be drawn up of whom was speaking to who. Craig felt that it should be dealt with a sub-group and the issue died.

Before returning to the discussion of the Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) other activities were presented - Davenport had arranged a meeting in Lincoln to discuss the setting up of a company, and also planned to speak to the solicitor who had acted for Nottingham Trent University during their relationship with the Lincolnshire University project. He also spoke of a meeting with Loughborough University to be attended by himself, Grey, Martin, Felix and Hall; and explained that GPtec would be holding their Strategic Education Conference on Higher Education in May. The Vice Chancellor of Loughborough University would be attending and he thought that it would provide a suitable opportunity for Grey to make her public announcement concerning the chosen university. (Davenport seems to have been particularly deferential at this meeting - the steering committee would report to the GPP, and Grey would make the public
announcement concerning the partner university. Davenport was probably trying to indicate to the ‘partnership team’ that he had no aspiration to assume their leadership role.

Davenport next outlined the new structure of the project which had been described in the Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) - with working groups reporting to the steering committee which would report to the GPP, via Martin. There would also be a management committee set up in two or three months time which would monitor progress against an agreed schedule. With regard to the schedule presented in the Development Plan (GPtec, 1996), Martin felt that, whilst the committee needed to push itself, the contract date of June 1996 was too optimistic.

Rennie asked who would be doing the contracting. Davenport explained that a decision had not yet been made. Following Martin’s advice Davenport wanted to speak to people who had undertaken similar work in the past before choosing an appropriate solicitor. He was planning a meeting with the solicitors who had acted from Nottingham Trent University during their relationship with the Lincoln University project therefore, to discuss precisely this. Craig explained that he had just been through setting up a company with his involvement with Cambridgeshire Careers Company, so had some understanding of what was involved. Rennie suggested that as a public organisation, the project company needed to reflect local interests, and not just represent ‘the great and the good’. Felix agreed. It was sometime before actual membership became an issue, however.

10.17 March 1996

On March 8 Davenport and I visited the Chief Executive of the Lincoln University Project Company. Davenport’s particular interests were how relationships with existing providers of higher education had been managed in Lincoln with the development of their university, and the way in which they had set up the project company itself. The project had been set up after Lincolnshire County Council had funded a feasibility study in 1992 and identified a need for specific higher education in the area. It was business-led. With the regard to the specifics of the company formation and activity, David Cook was unwilling to say too much as they had paid for expensive legal advice, and did not feel inclined to give it to others for free. He did explain that Lincolnshire County Council was keen to keep independence, but the university was a key partner in the development. The partner university had two places on the project company board and it were expected to decide all academic issues. The project company assumed no role in promoting access, for example, because it was viewed as an academic issue.
company assumed no role in promoting access, for example, because it was viewed as an academic issue.

As far as higher education provision by FE colleges on the whole, Charles Smart did not consider there to be a problem with further education colleges. In Lincolnshire it appeared that increased higher education provision offered by the university development was not seen as a threat, but as providing pull-through opportunities for FE (highlighting the significance of special issues in defining policy issues, and the relationships which underlie them). Smart was keen to avoid a HE/FE hybrid institution, and also wished to avoid duplication. He saw no reason for conflict with FE colleges in Lincolnshire as each would assume specific roles.

On March 11 Victor Baldry of Cartella and two colleagues came to see Davenport in order to discuss a PFI (private finance initiative) which related to the development of the university. They had been directed to Davenport by Peterborough City Council. The plan they had in mind focused on two pieces of land. One was on a long-term lease by Peterborough City Council from the Milton Estate and lay about a mile from the city centre. The other was described as ‘City Centre’ and was in fact Peterborough Regional College’s (PRC) main site. The proposal depended on selling the high value PRC site for residential development, relocating occupants to the first site, and using the balance to fund the building of a campus university also on the new site. The success of the plan clearly depended upon PRC (assuming that they owned their site) in agreeing to sell and move.

Davenport explained that the proposed plan was contrary to what to steering committee had agreed so far in that they had agreed to use existing empty space in the City Centre. Nor did the steering committee want to appeal to the community for money and a new build would obviously be more costly, at least in the short to medium term, than renting and refurbishing existing accommodation. He also explained that the steering committee was keen to locate some departments on company premises. The final factor against an out of city location was that of cultural deprivation. One of the arguments for a city centre location was that it would bring people back into the city and would allow the community to ‘identify’ with the institution because they would actually see it. However, he thought the proposal interesting nonetheless, partly because of the potential links with other projects already underway in the city, such as an Arts Development project in which Grey was involved, and it was agreed that Davenport would speak to the steering committee and arrange a presentation of the PFI proposal if the committee thought it to be appropriate.
On March 21 the steering committee met again, to discuss Further Education in the context of the university development, as well as the project schedule. Davenport told the committee that the letter confirming the wishes of the steering committee to work with Loughborough University had been sent. The university had replied they were keen to progress. The Vice Chancellor had agreed to make the keynote speech at the Strategic Education Conference, where he would talk about IT in the context of lifelong learning. This would be an important event as it would provide the opportunity to unveil the project and name the partner institution.

Grey then gave an update on buildings. She had set up a meeting with the Midland Bank who were the receivers of the building discussed in the February meeting (10.16). Grey would meet them in two weeks time and she aimed to discuss how the bank might contribute the building to the university project. At the same time she was having discussions with her contact, now named as Adam Porter, a local independent businessman, who was interested in purchasing the building. He already owned the neighbouring one, the Odeon Cinema.

Davenport fed back to the committee on his meeting with David Cooke in Lincoln. He explained that he had not learned much on the legal aspects of the company because they wanted to keep the information restricted, having paid for it. Grey reported that the university project had been proposed to the GPP board and had been agreed, and that they recognised that it was a 'moving animal'. Securing their agreement was considered to be of crucial importance to the development of the project. She added however there was some concern that insufficient comparative work had been carried out during the research phase. Felix responded that a good deal of comparative work had been undertaken. Grey neither defended nor clarified the point. Felix, acting as Chair in the absence of Martin, said that during the meeting Davenport would update the committee on the Dearing Review of higher education, Felix would talk about changes to the committee structure, and that Craig would input on the TEC discretionary fund (TDF).

The presence of Craig at this meeting is particularly interesting in terms of the project’s management. It will be remembered that the February meeting had been the first he attended and that his attendance was not formally explained. On this occasion he was actually on holiday but came in especially to attend the meeting in the evening. It is unclear whether this was as a result of a request from Felix or not. What is clear however, is Craig’s sudden personal commitment to the project.
Davenport spoke about the Dearing Review of higher education. He explained that the Secretary of State for Education had started a review at the end of the previous year, which had resulted in the collection of massive amounts of evidence well beyond the scope of the original review. It had now become a formal review under Sir Ron Dearing. It was a widely accepted view that neither major political party would want a report and recommendations before the general election in 1997. However, the higher education community believed that the report would support the growth of higher education. Davenport thought it likely that the undergraduate start for the Greater Peterborough project would need to be delayed a year, until October 1998, to allow the report to be published and the recommendations implemented. He did not see that the review would affect the time-scale of the business school, because it was anticipated that postgraduate funding would not be affected because it was not funded by the state.

It is important to note therefore that local decisions are constrained by the context in which they are made as Benson (1977, 1983) and Clegg (1975) and Clegg and Dunkerly (1980) suggested but in a general sense (see 6.5 and 6.12). In other words the interactions and products of organisations are products of the existing administrative arrangements which are designed to support wealth creation and accumulation. More specifically, local decisions occur in a context that is already structured by national government and the contemporary needs of capitalism. Just as Hall had argued that discussion of admissions was pointless because it would take more than one new university development to change the UCAS process (November 1994) (10.2), so Davenport now argued that given changes in the national policy on higher education, local provision needed reviewing.

Returning then to the agenda of the meeting Felix clarified the responsibilities of each subgroup. The project as a whole fell under the embrace of the GPP. Below that was the steering committee, below that the Strategic Planning Group, which would form the main interface with Loughborough University. There would also be a series of sub-groups, as discussed previously, which would deal with the details of specific work areas. They would report to the steering committee.

The steering committee would be preserved intact, despite the setting up of the Strategic Planning Group. University staff members were excluded from membership of the steering committee deliberately so that it represented ‘Peterborough’. Felix outlined three functions for which it was responsible: first, to ‘receive, challenge and filter’ reports of sub-groups before key
which it was responsible: first, to ‘receive, challenge and filter’ reports of sub-groups before key
issues went to the GPP for approval; second, to review the business plan from a purely
‘Peterborough’ perspective; and finally, to act as a ‘sounding board’ for the proposals of the
Strategic Planning Group. He wanted to be clear that [the needs of] ‘Peterborough’ were not
being subsumed. He added that the GPP did not possess technical expertise and was merely a
ratifying body.

Here Felix expressed an attitude similar to that of Craig at the TEC’s Education Team’s Away
Day in December 1995 (10.12), except this time in the specific context of the university
development, that is that the GPP was ineffectual and unnecessary. Unless Felix had changed
his view of the GPP during their working together over the proceeding year it would seem that
his proposal made at the January 1995 (10.13) meeting of the committee, that the research
project to support of the development of higher education was being undertaken ‘on behalf of
the GPP’, was a symbolic concession. Given the fact that GPtec and not the GPP were funding
it, it seems plausible that Felix made the concession because he knew that Grey wanted to be
seen leading it, and that the GPP would have no impact on outcome. Had he considered the
GPP to be a more effective body he might have been less keen.

Rennie remarked that he liked the model of the way in which the project would be managed, as
it appeared that local ‘ownership’ would be maintained. It would be very easy, he argued, to be
drawn into Loughborough University’s overall planning, what he termed an ‘academic vortex’.
Felix agreed and expressed the view that some parties would wish to remain separate
throughout, the local authority for example. The project needed to move forward in a controlled
manner, with the Strategic Planning Group responding to local need and negotiating this with
the university.

Davenport then asked for the Committee’s formal approval of sub-groups. He had hoped to set
up one to deal with work-based learning but had not yet been able to because it was unclear who
should be involved. It was agreed that additional members could be co-opted when need was
identified. Felix added that should another sub-group need to be established it should be the
responsibility of the steering committee to do so. Longhurst asked for some formal terms of
reference for the sub-groups to aid co-opting.

Felix then asked Craig if he would like to introduce the TEC Discretionary Fund (TDF) to the
steering committee. He felt it was important as it represented a further and significant
commitment from Government Office Eastern Region (GOER) for the university project overall. Craig explained that the TDF was drawn from the Local Initiative Fund (LIF), also the source of SRB. The TDF was divided into two ‘pots’, one local, the other regional, which together valued about £700,000 over three years. Bidding was competitive and successful bids would be those which ‘levered in’ the most private funding.

Craig had put a proposal to the TDF contract manager at GOER suggesting use of the funds to support the development the library-resource centre. (Felix commented that he was pleased that GOER seemed keen to support the bid now because it indicated a change in attitude towards the project as a whole which had not been evident in the earlier stages). According to Craig, the contract manager had declared it the most exciting idea he had heard of for years. Government Office was looking for a ‘flagship project’ and this might provide it. There was a strong possibility of being able to bid for between £500,000 and £600,000. Grey, Davenport, Craig were investigating specific opportunities. There was, however, one practical problem in that the TEC had to submit a ‘slightly more that indicative’ bid in less than a month.

Felix asked what had been decided then. Grey explained that they would be bidding for the library-resource centre. She was going to ask Porter to buy the now named building, Shelton House, from the Midland Bank and to donate it to the university project. This would then represent the ‘private’ funding. Hall commented that this was likely to be problem, in terms of timing and whether Porter could be persuaded to be sufficiently specific about his donation in time for the bid. Not mentioned were the additional problems of him having still to make the purchase and then being persuaded to ‘donate’ it. Felix stated that only two-thirds of the required minimum 50% matched needed to be ‘private’. Hall thought it would be better to approach Porter none the less as it would be easier to get one large donation than lots of smaller ones. Rennie saw this as an opportunity for other organisations to show their commitment to Peterborough’s University.

It was agreed that if Government Office sought a flagship project the bid should ask for the maximum available (Hall). Rennie stated that he wished to be kept informed and could ‘donate’ surplus from PRC were the project of benefit to them. Grey would also speak to Kidd (Pearl Assurance), absent from this meeting, about their contribution. It was left for Craig to set up a working-group dedicated to the TDF bid.
Moving on to further education Felix asked Rennie if he would open the discussion. Rennie said that Grey had spoken to the Peterborough Regional College (PRC) board about the university project, which had ‘got things moving’. He then described PRC’s current position with regard higher education provision. In 1997 they would received £250,000 of HEFCE funding for about 300 higher education students, (including franchised courses) and some 1000 post A-level, mostly undertaking courses related to business and management. The college was, he said, ‘busily trying to get as much into place as we can’; an interesting comment given the commitment to co-operate and not compete.

Within the overall university development he stated that PRC would like to deliver HNDs and the first two years of degree courses. Rennie personally wanted to see an increase in the importance of HNDs, although there was no commitment from the College board for this. He anticipated a change in the study pattern with students undertaking two years of higher level study, then having a gap (i.e. working) for a year, and then returning to complete their third year of study in a fourth year - a structure known as ‘2+2’. Within this he saw a role for the university in providing the third year of education, and PRC the rest.

Rennie also expressed concern about integrating into the university project as planned; he felt that Loughborough University would have difficulty integrating the colleges as they were now because of the weaknesses in staffing and resources - they lacked research facilities and the teaching expertise for the final year of a degree. Felix said that the committee needed to know how the colleges wanted to fit in before they entered negotiations with Loughborough University.

Richmond, of Isle College, again stated that Isle had no desire to deliver degree courses. His college was more interested in delivering HNDs and HNCs, particularly in engineering. Demand for higher education would always be modest in Fenland, and the principle aim of the college was to meet local need. Felix asked for confirmation that Isle would be comfortable as a ‘feeder’ into the university. Richmond said that he saw this very much as their role. Felix wondered if the college’s board would wish to see increased degree provision, but Richmond did not believe this to be the case.

Stamford College was not represented at the meeting, and their views were not sought formally. It was agreed that their input should be dealt with in sub-group, but this did not happen. Felix thanked Rennie and Richmond for their contributions, adding that it had not been clear until
nothing from the development, except perhaps the opportunity to continue its provision of HNDs, and PRC wished to deliver the first two years of a degree programme.

10.18 April 1996

On 10 April 1996 Davenport had a telephone conversation with Longhurst concerning the discussion about the FE colleges at the March meeting of the steering committee. According to Davenport, Longhurst, as with many of his colleagues from business was concerned by the quality of PRC, and therefore had reservations about their involvement. He explained to Davenport that he had been aware of conflict with PRC but was uncertain what he could say at the meeting. Given that Martin wanted further education to remain a standing agenda item until the issue was resolved, and the steering committee was the forum in which such conflicts were to be resolved (Felix) Longhurst’s remarks are telling. Despite these statements by Martin and Felix there seems to have prevailed a tacit understanding between all members of the committee that conflict would not be made open, and challenges would not be made openly. This is particularly true of the handling of PRC. The practice served to perpetuate discontent at the same time as creating the impression of consensus and agreement. Decision-makers appeared to refuse to discuss difficult issues *en masse*, without actually saying so, but not because they failed to recognise that conflict existed (Lukes, 1974), nor because those in positions who were threatened were ‘bought off’ before they articulated their grievance (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963) (2.4). This does raise questions as to why such a phenomenon occurs, and such questions are not easily answered.

Perhaps there was a threat implicit in Rennie’s actions, which was based on the shared rules and the knowledge that he knew there was a real tension. Thus, in maintaining the silence he managed to convey the idea that his acquiescence was in fact a choice made in anticipation of a return for some future good. Overt expression of the conflict was always a potential threat, but one to be used in the last resort. It is worth noting that use a method such as that favoured by Dahl (1957) which would involve identifying overtly expressed conflict in the decision process would mean that such tensions would be missed (Gaventa, 1980). To some extent the same is true of Bachrach and Baratz’s (1963). They recognised that issues do not always get as far as formal discussion, but suggested that the already powerful are active in eliminating challenge, and seek evidence of threats, sanctions, co-option and so forth. What is interesting about the phenomenon here is that *all* actors consent to the silence without agreeing on the issue. It is not simply a case of the subject being ignored or the subject’s interests having been distorted. This
point has been discussed at some length in the context of the partnership coalition (see December 1995) (10.3) and September 1995 (10.11), but the fact that Longhurst was also subject to it makes it slightly different. He represented a large employer (Pearl Assurance) and should have enjoyed privileges as a result, both an important customer of the university, and as a source of funding and had less reason to maintain good relations with Rennie. This may indicate that the silence was more to do with the local political ‘culture’, and the shared rules that governed the decision process, than with the distribution of resources and preferences (2.4).

The TDF bid discussed at the steering committee was submitted to GOER on 19 April. The objective of the proposed bid was to ‘establish a University and Learning Resource Centre’ (bid, 1996) using integrated learning systems. These would include: ‘information management (data storage and retrieval) ... computing facilities and electronic data sources, a media workshop containing physical resources, copying, binding and audio-visual equipment, a 30,000 book library by 1999’ (bid, 1996).

The bid was successful, largely because it promised a high level of private funding. It stated that ‘Precise individual levels of contribution will be determined once an equitable balance of interests has been achieved’ (bid, 1996) but also included the following table which is quite specific:

Table 5: Declared funding sources for the library-resource centre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Partner</th>
<th>Form of Contribution</th>
<th>Value of Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Midland Bank [Shelton House]</td>
<td>discount</td>
<td>£1.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterborough Regional College</td>
<td>cash</td>
<td>£1.0m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Companies (listed†)</td>
<td>cash</td>
<td>£1.72m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>£4.22m</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDF</td>
<td>cash</td>
<td><strong>£658,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>£4.8836m</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: bid (1996)

According to the bid PRC’s contribution was to come from college surplus in exchange for their students having access to the University Learning Resource Centre.
According to the bid PRC's contribution was to come from college surplus in exchange for their students having access to the University Learning Resource Centre.

The steering committee met again on April 24. This was the first meeting to which the newly formed sub-groups reported. The other main item was the 'Formation of a University Company'.

Davenport started the formal proceedings by presenting the report from the marketing sub-group in Grey's absence (Grey was assumed Chair of the sub-group). He asked that Ellen Field, GPtec's marketing director and also on the university project's marketing sub-group, be allowed to attend the next meeting of the steering committee in order to present a draft marketing plan. The committee agreed this. Most of the discussion around marketing focused on the text printed on the folders used to send out information about the project, which was being reprinted. The address was no longer accurate and Davenport also made the point that the project had moved away from research and development phase described in the original folders, to an implementation phase. Davenport recalled that Hall had asked to see the new text before it was used, but Hall was late to the meeting and was not able to comment here.

It was, however, agreed to drop the GPtec logo from the folder in order to give the project its own identity. This was also true of letterhead. Davenport reiterated that Grey should handle all communications unless channelled through the GPP to Field. He also invited everyone to the Strategic Education Forum, at which Grey would be making the announcement that Loughborough University would be the academic partner (subject to contract) for the development of university education in Greater Peterborough. This would take place on May 17. Grey would be preparing a media release. Martin stressed that the 'subject to contract' was important.

Davenport also reported from the Finance and Buildings sub-group which had met once but without its Chair, the Dean of the Cathedral. Davenport explained how members of the group had visited the Cathedral precinct, as the Dean was keen to use Cathedral buildings as a base for the university development. Davenport said that he felt they lent the right sort of atmosphere, which was generally agreed within the steering committee. He went on to say that the sub-group planned to co-opt an industrialist to advise on finance. The group was looking at PFI opportunities as any capital funding would probably have to come from this source. The two
other items considered by the sub-group were the proposal for establishing a business school, delegated by the steering committee, and the library-resource centre.

The Dean, present at the steering committee meeting, added that the Cathedral was preparing a Lottery-Heritage bid and thought that if the bid included plans for the new university then this would improve the chance of success. He also said that on May 22 some students of architecture from the University of Cambridge would be visiting the cathedral to present their ideas for the renovation of Table Hall. This was a building in the cathedral precinct which the students had used for a design project and which the Dean wished to see as a library. The Dean invited all the members of the committee to attend the presentation.

The next item on the agenda, a lengthy one, dealt with the formation of a University Company. Davenport told the group that the first joint meeting with Loughborough University was scheduled for May 19. This would be a meeting of the Joint Strategy Group, whose ultimate purpose was to devise a draft contract. Davenport asked that the steering committee identified issues to be raised at that meeting and items for the agenda. So far, he explained, the view was that a project company Ltd. should be established with charity status (for tax purposes). He had discussed the possibility of using the GPP as the core organisation with Andrew Cawford, the TEC's finance director, but they had concluded that a separate body would be more sensible, as had been the case with the Lincoln University Project Company.

Davenport again suggested that the project needed to gather momentum ready for the implementation of Dearing's recommendations, which, he believed, would be accepted by whichever party formed the next government. With a 20% expansion anticipated it was vital for Peterborough's project to be firmly in place in order to benefit from any additional funding. The quickest and cheapest way of establishing a project company which would be able to contract with Loughborough University was to buy a company 'off the shelf' and change its name. This could be carried out by a local firm, Proform.

Martin expressed a need for sound company and contracting advice. There would also be a requirement for tax advice in terms of VAT and charity status. He suggested that the company model should be discussed with solicitors before it was pursued further. Newton pointed out that such an event had occurred before - Davenport had already mentioned the examples of Lincoln and Gloucester and was keen to avoid the situation where lawyers were 'practising on us'. It was therefore suggested that solicitors who were known to have undertaken similar work...
be contacted. Millar warned that seeking charitable status was a long and complex process. In his experience it had taken twelve months. Moreover, in the area of ‘education’ charities abounded, and the company would have to be clear in its aims that it was not replicating the activities of an existing charity organisation in order to be successful in its application to the Charities Commission.

Davenport asked if he should contact the solicitors who had acted for the Lincoln project for example, adding that, he did not want to go on his own because he lacked the necessary expertise. Newton said that he would ask Perkins’ lawyer if any firm had a particular reputation in the field. Martin would do the same at Thomas Cook. Rennie asked if the Law Society could make suggestions, which Davenport agreed to investigate.

Davenport asked again if anyone had anything they wished to be covered by the Joint Strategy Group at their meeting on May 19. Felix said they needed to be clear on an approach with regard FE.

Rennie emphasised a need for reputable and profitable research to take place in Peterborough as well as in Loughborough, and a need to prevent income earned in Peterborough being taken back to Loughborough. Newton asked if it was known what Loughborough University wanted from the planned arrangement in Peterborough. Davenport replied that he did not know for sure, but thought it was an opportunity to benefit from the anticipated 20% increase in student numbers and to develop distance learning through IT, but it was possible that they did have a secondary agenda of which he was not aware.

Newton wondered whether Perkins had any influence. To clarify, he explained that Perkins were ‘thrilled’ with the choice of partner with whom they already worked, but he was also concerned whether their business might create some problems at the end of the ten years (the period envisaged as the duration required for independence), whether the parent would be willing to lose business to the independent institution in Peterborough. Felix responded that the issue of ‘independence’ was irrelevant. What mattered was the way in which the local community viewed the university; and this was essential a ‘marketing job’. In practice the development had to have a Peterborough ‘identity’. Davenport expressed ‘comfort’ that ‘Peterborough’ was so important to members of the steering committee.
Rennie believed that an exit strategy would be necessary in case the university failed to deliver what they had been contracted to do. Martin added that there was a need to ensure quality, and Millar commented that they would not want to offer a lower quality product simply because it was 'home-grown'. Much of the new market for higher education, he claimed, did not care from where their degree was awarded. Millar also added that research is not simply research, and not only should the steering committee demand research to take place in Peterborough, as Rennie had suggested earlier, but should also specify individual high profile researchers to work in Peterborough.

This meeting reflects a change in mood. It seems that suddenly, perhaps because the threat of Pine had been removed and the project looked likely to progress at last, a new threat had developed - that of the academic partner itself. Previous to this comments had been made, chiefly by Rennie, about 'cherry picking' and so forth, but only now did people really start to question what Loughborough University 'wanted' and how elements of the development needed to be guarded and protected, and how the university would have to be made to make concessions. It is not clear what prompted this change in attitude, and it may simply be a result of there not being threats from elsewhere and a general negative tendency among the group; they judged others by their own standards.

The next item for discussion was the library-resource centre. Davenport explained that he was expecting a response from Government Office Eastern Region (GOER) regarding the TEC Discretionary Fund (TDF) bid in the next couple of days. He was optimistic because he felt a strong and detailed bid had been submitted. He said that the integrated centre would combine traditional textbook materials, serials on-line and in CD-ROM format, and PC learning spaces. Rennie asked who would have access to the centre. Davenport responded that this was a 'decision to make'. His evasiveness is perhaps not surprising given that he had been told by Craig that PRC did not expect anything for their contribution, which Davenport had thought unlikely. Rennie went to say that it was, however, 'very important' and pushed the point. Felix stated that the money to fund it was local and access should be, the inference being that those who had made contributions had legitimate claims on use. Davenport argued this would have implications for library stock, but added that detailed practicalities should be discussed outside this meeting. However, he was able to say that he envisaged electronic links with FE colleges, but felt that physical access would depend on the number of full-time equivalent (FTEs) students. Felix suggested that this would be more an issue for students studying at colleges in Peterborough and Stamford than those at Isle. Millar suggested linking with Loughborough
University's library in order to prevent duplication. This was particularly true of research materials. Davenport explained that sub-groups would be exploring Library Information Plans (LIPS) and that it was not necessary for the steering committee to consider details.

The meeting ended with Davenport stating that Keith Benn had been recruited to replace Cannell, and Martin saying that he would arrange the dinner postponed from October 1995 (10.12) after the Strategic Education Conference on May 17 where the partnership with Loughborough University would be formally announced by Grey.

10.19 May 1996

May 3 saw the first national press coverage of the Peterborough university project when the Times Higher ran a front page on 'Plans for University College, Peterborough (THES, 3/5/96). The partner institution was unnamed, said only to be a 'Midlands university' other than DeMontfort. The article stated that 'A local-needs survey found a potential market of around 12,000 students, of whom 52% would be mature’. Course provision would reflect local need - business management, finance and engineering - and would be modular. It was estimated that the development would bring in £100 million per year to the local economy, and create 2000 additional jobs. Again, it should be noted that this was based on the discussion papers which had forecast the number of students assuming comprehensive provision of all subject areas offered by all higher education institutions in the UK, not for three subjects (see March 1996 for a full discussion) (10.6). When economic projections were made from the figures it was further assumed that student attendance would follow the traditional residential model whether part-time or not.

Nothing was covered by the local press until after the announcement naming Loughborough University as the partner university at the Strategic Education Conference on May 17. This was deliberately managed, as some people were still wary of Pine, and were also generally concerned about 'over-promising and under-delivering' notwithstanding the release of information such as that described above. Perhaps if the discussion papers had actually been discussed more fully at the time of their presentation to the committee those dealing with the press would have remembered that the economic impact of the university was contingent on the model of development. Smith had made this point at the meeting of the steering committee in January (10.4), but it seems to have been forgotten by her colleagues on the committee.
Once the partnership with Loughborough University was public (17 May 1996) fears of upsetting Pine also seemed to have weakened. The ‘partnership team’ was then publicly committed to the development and their reputations depended upon delivering something. By this time too, Government Office Eastern Region (GOER) had agreed the TDF bid. Indeed not only had the local funding been awarded, but also 66% of the regional allocation as well. The specific level of contribution had been apparently promised to Craig at a meeting with between himself and Rennie, and Craig claimed that Rennie asked for nothing in return for the contribution (Davenport), and the demand for access was assumed when the bid was written by the TEC. Rennie has since said to Davenport that he made no such promise, not least because he did not have the authority to allocate college funds to that value without permission from the board. Whatever the background to this incident the result was that GPtec won funds at the expense of other TECs in the region based on overstated levered-in funding (approximately 1:6:5).

The local press coverage of the university development, following the conference, was interesting. Nearly all picked up on the ‘2000 jobs’, and the promise of an increase of £100 million into the ‘local economy’. What was particularly interesting though was the way in which the word ‘local’ was used. The *Fenland Citizen* ran a story on the Isle College ‘hoping to be an associate of a new university for the Fens’ (23/05/96). Similar articles were run by the *Bourne Local* (23/05/96) and the *Stamford Mercury* (24/05/96). They heralded universities for Bourne and Stamford, respectively. Whilst, most press coverage attributed the conception of the university reject to the Greater Peterborough Partnership (GPP), the *Evening Telegraph Business Review* (27/05/96) gave a history of the project’s birth in 1991 under the auspices of the then chief executive of GPtec who had ‘proposed businesses coming together with universities to lay on their own courses’. This might have been a poorly phrased version of work-based learning such as that delivered by Luton University for Vauxhall, but University College, Peterborough, or PUC, (THES, 18/5/96), seemed to be offering complete responsiveness to the customer. The *Times* (16/05/96) stated the new university would be admitting students in September 1997. In the meantime all that remained to be done would be to find premises, develop courses and recruit students and staff.

The first stage of this would be to contract formally with Loughborough University. The Strategic Planning Group had been set up to do just that, as Felix had explained in the March meeting of the steering committee (10.17). It met with the Joint Strategy Group composed of the following members: Clive Lewis (Registrar), Peter Moss (Senior Pro-Vice Chancellor), John
Payne (Pro-Vice Chancellor, Teaching), and Robert Parker (Academic Secretary) from the University; and David Felix, Richard Hall, Richard Martin and Edward Davenport from Peterborough. This latter group also formed the ‘Peterborough Chief Executives Group’, although only two members were chief executives (Grey and Felix), to differentiate from the ‘mixed’ Joint Strategy Group or Strategic Planning Group. Not featured at all in the planned restructure of March (10.17), the Chief Executives Group assumed increasing importance.

The Joint Strategy Group met on May 15 for the first time. The minutes of the meeting state that it was agreed that detailed discussion should take place in sub-groups, which would be served jointly by the University and the Peterborough ‘partnership’, with the exception of the Progression and Guidance group which would not include the university ‘for the time being’. The TDF allocation was taken as an indication of government support for the development of a university in Greater Peterborough. The minutes of the meeting also gave mention of a visit made by the Chief Executive of HEFCE to Loughborough University at which he had ‘indicated his expectation that HEFCE would be able to support the project’.

The Joint Strategy Group also discussed the proposal for a project company, which would be formed to contract with the university as discussed at the steering committee. The minutes of the meeting state that ‘It might, alternatively, be possible to come to a partnership agreement by a different route’. In a conversation with Davenport following the meeting, he said that this was the preferred route for the University, and meant, what they termed, a ‘gentleman’s agreement’. Whilst Davenport himself had no particular problem with this, other members of the Peterborough Chief Executives Group were less keen. The reasons for this were evident in the steering committee meeting of April (10.18) in which some individual concerns with the university’s intentions as well as its ability, or willingness, to deliver were expressed.

On May 20 Davenport met with Rennie at Peterborough Regional College (PRC) in order to clarify Rennie’s view of the position of the college within the overall higher education development. In his feedback memo to Craig Davenport stated that Rennie wanted open access to all facilities associated with the university development; and that Rennie claimed not to have promised £1 million for the TDF bid. Rennie had also expressed concern that should the arrangement fail (as it had done between Lincoln and Nottingham Trent University) that other institutions might move in to the breach. In addition Rennie wanted to see a wider discussion forum, less dominated by GPtec and the GPP, and with stronger involvement from businesses. He wanted to be more directly involved in the project himself.
On the same day Davenport sent a memo to Felix giving background information for a meeting between them which would also include Craig. Davenport referred to a meeting he had had with Craig concerning the development of the project and the now inappropriate project structure. The memo stated that Davenport and Craig, 'we', had agreed a number of items which they wished to discuss with Felix with a view to seconding Davenport to the University Company for a period of some 18 months. The basis for the proposal went as follows:

(i) We feel that the project now needs a structure which is not tied so directly into the administrative systems of one organisation (GPtec) but with accountability to another (GPP), but one which is managed as a separate entity and accountable to all the major stakeholders.

(ii) This could be achieved structurally through the establishment of the Peterborough University Company as a separate legal identity, with its board of Directors representing major stakeholders (GPtec, GPP, the City Council, the FE Colleges, others, and the University) in agreed proportions ...

(iii) Accountability would be direct to the board, with channels of discussion and lines of communications to all partners.

It was proposed that the board of Directors would take over from the Chief Executives Group at an 'appropriate time'. None of this was new. The need for a project company had been discussed in some detail at the April meeting of the steering committee (10.18), and the supporting processes actioned - identifying suitable solicitors for example. It is significant because it demonstrates Davenport’s attempt to expedite the generally slow process; in a way he preferred. It is also significant because it suggests that the proposal had the support of Craig.

On 29 May 1996 the steering committee met again. This was the first meeting attended by newly appointed Keith Benn, and more significantly Tom Nuttall. Tom Nuttall accompanied Hall and it was explained to the committee that he was currently attached to the Chief Executives Office at Peterborough City Council on secondment from Cambridgeshire County Council with specific responsibility for 'interagency activities'. His purpose was the help Peterborough City Council prepare for unitary status in April 1998.
Under matters arising Davenport said that the lawyer from Perkins had named Martinuea Johnson as possible solicitors for the project. He had also warned that some firms would accept the work without the expertise, and be forced to seek advice themselves, thus increasing the cost to the client. Hall stated a need to be seen to be going to the ‘right people’ and through the ‘right process’, and he wanted to speak to others such as the City and County Councils’ lawyers. He had had opportunity to do this after the meeting in April and had not. Felix, acting as Chair in the absence of Martin, asked that all alternatives be submitted by the end of the week (June 7). Hall felt that Martin should also be asked to nominate an appropriate solicitor.

Field had been invited to the meeting to present a marketing plan as agreed. The plan had not been circulated to the committee because the marketing sub-group had only met that morning (19 May) and she had not had opportunity to add in comments from that discussion. Two main target audiences had been identified - businesses and individuals. Individuals could be further divided into 14 to 18 year olds, 18-21 year olds, ‘mature’, and ‘unemployed students’. With regard the first group, the young people, there were maybe three ‘influencers’ - parents, teachers, and colleges. (Cannell had prepared a research paper on the Expectations of Young People from Higher Education (Wilson, 1995) one objective of which was to discover what influences young people in choosing their course and location, but the paper was not used in the preparation of the marketing plan). Field explained that each of the target groups would require a different set of messages, but overall the marketing plan should aim to increase the profile of the project within the whole community.

This would be achieved through PR and media relations managed by Smye Holland. The marketing plan also aimed to enable the recruitment of students, although Loughborough University would also recruit for Peterborough through their usual methods (UCAS). Rennie asked if Smye Holland were being used because there was already a connection. Grey answered that this was the case that she thought ‘it was important’. Smye Holland undertook the PR activities of the GPP. Field reiterated that all enquires about the university project should be handled by Grey, unless they involved the ‘nitty-gritty’ in which case they might go to Davenport. In the meantime what was required was a series of presentations to community bodies, professional associations, and so forth, to raise awareness. She also suggested that a regular newsheet might be circulated to colleges with information on the development of the project. Rennie complained that announcements in the press stating that the university would have 170 students by 1997 had caused a rush for information which was not yet available. It is
interesting that the rush should focus on PRC, and not those bodies identified as the project leaders in the press articles - the GFP and GPtec.

Felix asked if there was to be any focus on ‘funding’, which probably meant fund-raising in the marketing plan. Grey said ‘yes’ at the same time as Field said ‘no’. Field added that businesses had been recognised as a target group as customers of higher education provision. Felix thought that such a view was fine as far as it went, but funding would be crucial. Whilst the TDF had identified some cash, it was not enough. (The TDF was also given for a specific purpose). Grey argued that funding was a separate issue and would need a separate marketing process. Felix, however, thought a link was necessary because he thought that financial support was more likely to be forthcoming from those businesses with an interest in accessing local higher education.

Hall asked just what funds were available through the SRB, and similar streams, so that the committee could be more focused and organised in its approach to fund raising. Craig explained that public funds secured so far - SRB and the TDF - totalled about £20,000. Moreover the latter was strictly limited in terms of use. The TDF bid had not included the cost of legal fees say, so it was essential to find more money to pay for such things. Rennie added that the TDF relied on matched private funding as well, so this needed to be found before public money would be released. Hall requested a financial appraisal for the next meeting. Felix argued this would not be necessary; he was only ‘signalling’ the need to consider fund-raising. The details of funding would be dealt with by the sub-group set up for that purpose. Furthermore the details of funding were not really the point; the point was that a fund-raising strategy was required. At this point Grey made a request for money for marketing, for despite the fact that the GPP were to assume responsibility for marketing the project they had no money to pay their contractor for it. Felix asked that all sub-groups should submit plans to the Finance sub-group in order for the latter to build up a total view of the funds required.

Nuttall advised that in talking to businesses (that is asking for money) it would be easier to sell the ‘university’ rather than the idea, the project. This is probably a different point to the one made on numerous occasions before, concerning lay-people’s conceptions of ‘universities’ and ‘higher education’, but rather suggested that potential sponsors would need to see a solid base before they committed their own money to the development. Felix again asked Davenport to prepare estimates with the finance sub-group.
Johnson asked to return to marketing as it had missed one potential target group. He suggested that in order to meet national targets (NETTs) it was crucial to increase the rates of participation amongst the ethnic minorities. The Dean suggested that the project needed to attract international funding, and that this might be achieved through evidence of support for the ethnic minority community. This was probably not what Johnson meant. After some discussion between Felix and Hall, Felix suggested ‘reinforcing’ the sub-groups with representatives from the ethnic minority community, and Hall suggested using the ‘high profile’ Mayor - high profile because he was of Pakistani origin and had had the Pakistani High Commissioner to attend his inauguration. Johnson conceded that this was ‘excellent symbolism’ but ethnic minority input should be used in more substantive ways as well. Hall closed this discussion by asking Field when the draft marketing plan would be circulated. It is clear from this discussion that the ethnic minority community had ceased to be an issue, and their relative disadvantages and the special opportunities afforded by a new university had long since lost meaning to many of the decision makers.

The next item tabled for discussion was a report on Property and Finance. MB, as Chair of the sub-group, reported back to the steering committee. He said that from their first meeting it had been decided that the group was too small, both in size and expertise, and they planned to co-opt people from Pearl Assurance (Finance) and from Loughborough University Estates Department (Property). He explained again that Peterborough Cathedral had applied for National Lottery funding for a new visitor’s centre and that he was still arranging for the Architecture students from the University of Cambridge to present their work. The Dean felt that the Cathedral would lend a sort of ‘ambience’ and historical perspective which would enhance the university development should the precinct be used as, say, the administrative centre. Other members of the committee agreed that using the Cathedral for the university development was an excellent idea, particularly given its city centre location, but recognised some disadvantages. The Dean also had an itinerant College of Theology interested in locating to the Cathedral. In his position as Chair of the sub-group the Dean was able to present the discussion of the sub-group in a way focused on the Cathedral. He made use of decision-making processes to present his own particular preferences (6.5).

Nuttall also suggested that the committee might consider offering Islamic Studies. Craig thought that it would only be possible to offer subjects which had a specific funding stream attached to them. He was concerned about spending money on the wrong things at the expense of others. A ‘total view’ was needed. The Dean suggested that this indicated a demand for
additional personnel, presumably his contact at McGill whom had set up universities before. Rennie suggested that appropriate expertise would be supplied by Loughborough University. With specific regard to international links Hall felt that this should be handled through the University and the Mayor's office. Craig agreed. Johnson tried again to make the point that in order to increase the participation of the Asian community it would be necessary to deliver what was required by them. The Dean hoped that this would still mean that courses would be taught in English. Hall stated that these were areas of detail which should not be discussed by the steering committee, but in the sub-groups.

It is worth noting that this provides another example of Hall's excellent ability to control meetings (Morgan, 1986) (6.5). In the early months of the project when relationships were being formed, or 'cemented', he raised the same issues time and time again, he debated over detail which was too 'subtle' for his committee colleagues to appreciate, and found numerous ways to delay the decision process by filibustering. To some extent this was irrelevant to the development of the project as the papers and recommendations were never formally accepted or rejected. However, once he was committed to progressing the development further, free from the threats of Pine, he focused both his discussion and that of others, summarised the points at the end of discussion topics in his own words, and moved it on when he felt that useful discussion was ended. Given Hall's position as Chief Executive of Peterborough Council, Newton's (1976) finding that elected politicians in his study of Birmingham City Council 'were also aware of the sorts of tactics which officers use to get the decisions they want' would seem they were right to be so, and the finding holds, no less relevant because of temporal and spatial differences. Hall's ability to control decision processes in situ (as opposed to engineering them as Felix did) stood out from his committee colleagues.

The next major agenda item was the Library-Resource Centre. Davenport explained that he was in the process of putting together a project team to manage its development and would welcome any suggestions of other individuals who might contribute. Hall asked who would be dealing with the IT element. Davenport explained that he was discussing the project with IT companies. Hall thought Davenport's efforts to be unnecessary, as Loughborough University must already have the expertise. Johnson and Rennie wanted to see the IT system spread to schools and FE colleges. This received nods of approval from Craig. Felix, on the other hand, responded that, whilst the principle was an excellent one, it would not be possible to fund it. Hall insisted none the less that access should be more open and wider than the university development itself; the 'principle' should be a 'long-term vision.'
Grey then updated the committee on developments concerning the potential site of the Library - Resource Centre. The building would be going on the market the following day (30 September) at a value of £1.2 million. She had three possible plans: the first was for Porter to buy the building and then donate it to the university project; the second, for Porter to buy the building and give some space to the project, and finally for the Midland Bank to donate the building to the University project. These are listed in order of Grey's stated preference and it is interesting to note that last month's only option had been replaced by two others which she now preferred. The last of these was better for the TEC Discretionary Fund (TDF) bid since it specifically states funding support from the 'Midland Bank' in the form of a 'discount' valued at £1.5 million. However, Grey, perhaps having told the committee what she thought they wanted to hear in the preparation of the bid, after all the £1.5 million donation would have been to her credit, now found herself in a position of also wanting to support her contact, Porter, with whom she dealt more generally. The first option was no more likely to be a credible proposal for essentially the same reason as the third - that is Porter would not want to buy a building for someone else anymore than the Midland Bank would give the building away when they had a buyer. Thus in practice the second one was the only likely option.

At the end of the meeting Holland raised the 'delicate' issue of Martin's sporadic attendance at meetings, adding that he himself was also often absent. Hall responded quickly saying that now was an appropriate time to address the issue, that Martin would agree and had conceded to remain Chair only with Grey as Vice-Chair. This had not been agreed despite Hall's claim (see 10.11) and merely reflects his own preferences. Furthermore when Martin was absent from the meeting Felix acted as chair, and not Grey, although not officially vice-chair either. However the issue was not resolved because Felix explained that the imminent establishment of a company to manage the project would replace the steering committee itself. Whether this was to avoid a decision, or because Felix genuinely felt that the changed structure was imminent is not clear.

Hall pointed out that there were not any representatives from business at the meeting. Rennie wondered was because business people were concerned that they might soon be asked for money. This may have been the case, but may also reflect a sudden realisation that they were wasting their time at meetings. Their input was minimal at meetings from the beginning. Of the representatives from business only Martin was included in the 'partnership team', and then less perhaps less as a representative of a business (Thomas Cook) than as a 'mover and shaker'.
although it is likely that the first gave him opportunity to develop the second role. Hall also announced that Nuttall would be attending the Strategic Planning Group meeting instead of himself on Monday 24 June.

10.20 June 1996

On 13 June 1996 Craig prepared an 'Issues Paper' concerning 'University for Peterborough - next steps', for Felix, his manager. A copy also went to Davenport. The paper identified four main issues: the TEC Discretionary Fund (TDF); a need for a project plan with costings, company formation, and the role of Peterborough City Council within the university project.

The issue with the TDF was one of control. Craig argued that the plan to involve 'key partners to the point where there is an agreed strategy for development' was inappropriate to the TDF because GPtec alone was accountable for it. Such accountability could not be devolved to other partners, but at the same time the TEC could not separate the Library-Resource Centre from the rest of the project. He proposed therefore the setting up of a separate Library-Resource Centre Project group which would be controlled by GPtec, but fed into the university project 'Finance and Property sub-committee'. This latter group would integrate the fund-raising activity of the project as a whole. 'The group would be able to co-opt members, but GPtec would retain control'. It is not clear from the paper however, how if the initial problem was one of outsiders, co-opting them onto a GPtec project group which fed into a partnership group would 'ensure control', or how it would differ from the current structure.

The second 'issue' Craig addressed in his paper was the need to develop a project plan that would aid 'co-ordinated' fund-raising, with 'collective responsibility for the steering group'. The plan was already in preparation and this issue is likely to be included in the paper to indicate the project and planning skills Craig would bring to it were he involved more closely - 'symbolism and the management of meaning' (Morgan, 1986) (6.10). Most career manuals include sections on gaining recognition. Willis and Daisley (1990), for example, suggest that 10% of recognition is based on performance. A massive 60% is based on 'exposure', being seen and telling people (who matter) about your performance. A comprehensive 'how to' guide should also include the ability to expropriate the work and ideas of other, and Craig made good use of this strategy.
The third issue raised by Craig was related to the project company. Craig expressed two concerns. The first problem was that GPtec alone would be required to pay for the company's establishment and support. His second concern was expressed thus:

I believe ... it would be unwise for GPtec to set up the University Company until we can see clearly an independent funding stream ... If the purpose of the company then is to manage income from donations (!) that would be better done through obtaining charity status for the 'University for Peterborough'.

The final issue covered by Craig in his paper was the role of Peterborough City Council. He anticipated an issue in 'ownership of the project'. He felt that so far they had been happy to 'watch from the sidelines' possibly because they were not certain whether the project would succeed. Now it was time to increase that ownership, and he felt that the City Council would 'be prepared to offer resources' to this end. Concomitantly, there was no way that Councillors would agree the necessary sums in the longer-term if they did not feel that they had been a significant part of the development. This helps explain why Davenport and Felix were always keen to keep the City Council 'on board'. What makes it particularly interesting, however, is the significance given to one individual, Nuttall. Craig went on to say that:

[Nuttall's] arrival at the Council is also useful. He will be an enthusiastic supporter of the project and worth cultivating. He needs to make his mark early and might see the University as an area to which he can contribute.

In one sense there was absolutely no reason for Nuttall to 'make his mark early'. He was on secondment to the Peterborough City Council from Cambridgeshire County Council to undertake tasks specifically related to the movement towards unitary status for the City, including, interagency activity. Craig concluded however that what was required was a project plan, an agreed funding strategy with prescribed responsibilities which linked 'the TEC, City Council, Cathedral, Loughborough with GPP in the formation of a University charity'. None of this was particularly new or of additional help to the progress of the project, but the paper was an important document none the less, as it clearly reflects Craig's own desire for increased 'control' of the project.

Just as Peterborough City Council were no longer content to 'watch from the sidelines', nor was Craig, and perhaps for the same reason as he attributed to them - because they were now certain that the project would succeed. In levering himself into the project he was explicit in his
attempt to take Nuttall with him. This emerged as a strong and potent relationship, based partly on a historical connection - they had worked together for Cambridgeshire Local Education Authority - and the anticipation of mutual benefit in future. Craig had expressed the view that with the establishment of unitary status Peterborough City Council would find themselves with a new educational function (previously the responsibility of Cambridgeshire County Council). He thought it likely that much of this work would be contracted out, and that GPtec would be well placed to offer appropriate provision. For their part the City Council would be looking for reliable contractors, but also a way into grant maintained schools which would not come under their control. Again, Craig felt that GPtec could help them with this.

The Strategic Planning Group (or Joint Strategy Group) met in Loughborough on June 24, with Ryder (Head of Policy and Planning, Peterborough City Council) attending for Hall, and not Nuttall as understood from the previous steering committee meeting. The minutes of the meeting state that ‘it was agreed that the [cathedral] precinct would provide a very suitable location and for the university’s administration’, and Davenport agreed to arrange for representatives of the university to visit the Cathedral site. With regard to company-based sites, it was noted that contracts would need to ‘ensure that use was committed beyond the existing company’s occupancy’. The meeting also included some discussion of student numbers and staffing requirements. It was recognised that these would need to be decided fairly quickly even though the 1998 intake was expected to be local and not managed through UCAS. Davenport was charged with arranging a meeting between the university and FE Principals.

The steering committee met again on June 25. Davenport fed back to the committee his conversation with the Law Society regarding solicitors for the project. They could supply a list of solicitors who dealt with ‘Education’ but this tended to be appeals for schools and similar. It seemed necessary to identify a suitable firm by some other means therefore. Martin again stated that in his view what was needed was a contract lawyer, rather than someone with experience in education as such. Grey suggested a ‘beauty parade’, but Felix was concern that GPtec would have to pay for it.

Craig said the discussion raised the more general issue of handling community money. He believed that this would be best arranged through the setting-up of a charity. This meant that the breadth of skills required of the chosen firm would be more than simply contracting. The point of setting up a charity was that people would be more likely to give to it than would to GPtec say, and that a charity would be easier to set up than a trust.
Felix said that a 'sinking fund' was required, some up-front money. The issue needed addressing by the funding group (which in fact he sat on). Rennie agreed that raising money was crucial and asked if there had been any progress there. Felix responded that there had not yet been any as the issue itself had only been raised in the last two weeks. This was a chicken and egg situation Grey felt, as in order to raise money one needed a product, and in order to decide on the sort of product one offered it was necessary to have some idea of how much money would be available. The problem, she explained, had been discussed with the university at the Joint Strategy Group meeting on the previous evening. Felix stated that Davenport was preparing an 'order of cost' which would be available in three weeks time. He added that Loughborough University was now committed to finding more money to support the development. However, in the meantime Davenport would prepare the costing. Martin asked that the schedule with costings be available at the next meeting of the steering committee. Davenport agreed that he would submit amounts, sources and a possible time frame, but they would be based on judgements and could not be taken as accurate or prescriptive.

There followed a brief discussion related to PFI (private finance initiatives). Davenport explained that the take-up of PFI was not as successful as the Department of Education and Employment (DfEE) had hoped. He mentioned the interest shown by a consortium, led by Baldry of Cartella, who had already developed a preliminary plan for Peterborough’s University through a PFI. Rennie argued however, that the commitment of the consortium would depend on a risk analysis, and that the project represented a high risk with no capital funding, and no guaranteed students. This was true, but it would have been interesting to hear his comments if he had been aware that the proposed plan also depended upon selling his college site to finance the construction! Carrying on from the PFI discussion Davenport added that Baldry and colleagues would be visiting to present their PFI proposal at some future date and members of the committee would be welcome to attend.

In the Dean’s absence Davenport reported on the Finance, Buildings and Resources sub-group. He circulated a report that listed the group’s members, and explained that the group’s immediate aim was to prepare broad costings. He referred the committee to the report which ‘Proposed [the] establishment’ of a ‘Company with Charity status/ Charitable Trust’. It is worth noting that this report was a product of the sub-group on which Felix sat. Given the line-management relationship between Felix and Davenport, whilst Davenport was responsible for physical preparation of the report it is unlikely that he would have given public circulation to a proposal...
with which Felix disagreed and which he knew would be potentially problematic. This is important in the context of Craig’s May ‘issues paper’ and subsequent developments in the project’s management.

To return to the meeting however, Davenport said that Grey and Martin had attended a meeting with Porter concerning Shelton House, and invited Grey to feedback to the committee on the meeting. Grey had nothing to add except to say that she was also meeting with representatives of the Midland Bank who still owned the building. Felix asked if she wanted to ‘orchestrate’, and Martin put in that he had already offered to ‘influence’ the Bank’s decision. Martin had the impression that Porter was nervous, and also ignorant of the property process. He was also concerned that Porter was being ‘gusumpted’. However, Martin felt that Porter was unlikely to tolerate this, and would instead withdraw from the sale against the threat of it. Martin understood that Porter had sold £4 million of stock (a restaurant franchise), which he believed to be for investment in Peterborough.

Craig expressed a need for a ‘Plan B’ should the sale of the building develop in ways not convenient for the TDF bid for which he was responsible. Grey explained that there was a Plan B - to go to the Midland Bank direct. However, in practice Grey’s alternative plans amounted to a single one as they both focused on acquiring the same building from one or other source, and the same risk applied therefore.

Martin then elaborated on the point he made earlier and explained just how he could ‘influence’ the bank’s decision. Thomas Cook, for whom Martin worked, had been owned by the Midland Bank and they still had what was described as a ‘close relationship’. Martin proposed that he should ask the Chief Executive of Thomas Cook to have a ‘word in the ear’ of the Chief Executive of the Midland Bank, at a social event. Martin did not know him very well, and thought the task would be better carried out through some one else. He also thought that this would be a ‘card that could only be played once’ so the timing would be crucial. He felt that having gone straight to the top, ‘if the man said “no” that would be it’. This provides clear evidence of the importance of alliances and networks (6.9) and the many of the assumptions of critical elitist theory (5.2). Martin then added that it might be possible to offer members of the local branch of the Institute of Bankers free access to the Library-Resource Centre, or some other ‘carrot’. Johnson commented that this was an interesting meeting; he felt as though he was intruding upon a private game of monopoly but was also concerned to re-focus on the curriculum needs of the university development. This effectively stopped any further discussion.
about the Midland Bank and its relationship with Thomas Cook, as Davenport went on to explain to Johnson that the curriculum was also being developed by a sub-group set up to deal with precisely that.

What was said before Johnson’s intervention is telling enough, however. Martin’s frank description of the strategy serves to confirm the importance of access. It is clear that since the various studies of public decision making were conducted in the 1970s (Dearlove, 1973; Newton, 1976; and Saunders, 1975, 1979 for example) little has changed. Power still resides with those have access to individuals who are more powerful, and informal networks are key (Morgan, 1986) (6.9). Martin did not propose making an argued request on behalf of the steering committee to the Chief Executive of the Midland Bank, but rather the use of a third-party contact at a social event, following Felix’s comment concerning ‘orchestration’. Not only was such ‘wheeling and dealing’ (Morgan, 1986) acceptable and common practice, but it would seem that the ability to engage in it is seen as a positive asset. Felix had indicated that he and Grey had the power to bring about certain outcomes, and Martin was obliged to demonstrate that he too had such a capacity - another example of impression management (Morgan, 1986) (6.10).

Following this Rennie pointed out that no one from industry was represented on the sub-groups. The representation of business had become a recurring theme of Rennie’s, presumably to highlight the project’s claim to be ‘business-led’ as being inaccurate. Felix was unconcerned, but Martin was more so. Davenport stated, however, that there were already representatives from Anglia Water, Perkins, and Pearl Assurance on the sub-groups and asked Rennie if he had anyone to add, which he did not.

Changing the subject rather Nuttall asked about marketing to the ethnic minority community, some of who already had expectations of what the development of higher education in Peterborough would mean for them. Davenport said that they had already been recognised as a target group. Back on marketing, Davenport explained that the planned 1998 start for undergraduate students would require marketing to start now.

Johnson proposed that the University of the Third Age (continuing education for the over 50s) should also be built into the overall university development. Felix responded that Loughborough University had stressed the importance of building on existing provision, including that of the Open University which already had significant numbers of students in the
Greater Peterborough area. The University of the Third Age, Johnson explained, had a European, indeed international dimension, and in Peterborough was based at Bretton Woods Community School; Johnson's own school. Students were self-financing. Johnson proposed therefore, that post-retirement higher education be referred to the marketing sub-group for specific consideration. This was omitted from the minutes, and was not followed by the sub-group. Nor did Martin's reference to the Midland Bank appear in the minutes, again illustrating the fact that the formal records of meetings are unlikely to be an accurate reflection of the discussions undertaken in them.

Davenport reported some general progress on the project - meetings between Loughborough University and the FE Colleges in the Greater Peterborough area were planned, following a request by all parties; discussions concerning the use of buildings in the Cathedral Precinct as an administration building were continuing, and senior staff from the University were expecting to visit it in the near future. Reports from the sub-groups revealed that the business school and the theology department were the most pressing curriculum issues. The Curriculum Sub-group had also agreed that there was some urgency for decisions to be made on delivery methods. Distance learning in particular would require a long lead-in, and marketing would soon be required in order to attract students to courses.

Rennie felt that the setting up of an administration would need 'very careful handling', as donors would not be willing to put money into administration costs. He suggested therefore, that the university administration in Peterborough 'piggy-back' on the administration of Peterborough Regional College. Successful college administration required specific skills, which his colleagues would be able to supply. Nuttall explained that the attraction of the Cathedral site was its centrality, and its close proximity to the library resource centre. Rennie still felt that proposal for an administration centre 'sent the wrong message', but Grey felt that PRC handling both sets of administration would 'send out confusion'. Felix suggested that a separate administration be established in the Cathedral Precinct but it should be called something other than 'administration'.

From this discussion of the committee it would seem that Felix, Grey and Nuttall were all keen to establish a separate 'administration' in the Cathedral Precinct, to such a point that they were unusually willing to reject Rennie's proposal in the open meeting. Craig seemed to support their general view, but was less specific as to physical location. He explained that the issue was one of 'ownership'; the administration (that is the project) should not stay at GPtec offices in...
Stuart House. Felix, agreed, saying that it could not - the project needed to be perceived as a community project, and not a GPretec one - as did Martin. Sharing ownership argued Craig, also meant sharing the risk however. Nuttall responded that to get other partners to share the risk depended upon them actually understanding the concept of the higher education development. The City Council was potentially very important in this and would, he said, want to support the development, once they understood it. At present he thought they had little understanding of even the simple things such as the economic impact of the university on the local area (Forbat, 1995a). Felix stated that contributions were also needed from businesses, adding that 'partner' contributions 'don’t count' as they were expected anyway. Nuttall responded that Peterborough City Council was concentrating on things other than the university development, with only a year to go before unitary status.

It is unclear whether Nuttall's comment was a veiled threat designed to facilitate his, or Peterborough City Council’s, increased involvement in the project, but it is worth noting that the involvement of personnel from the Council had increased over time. Nuttall had joined Hall on the steering committee, at no-ones’ invitation, and LF, Head of Policy, attended both the steering committee and the Joint Strategy Group for Hall. Taken at face value Nuttall seems to have been demanding increased involvement for the City Council in the running of the project at the same time as saying that they would not be committing resource, perhaps indicating that increased involvement would be necessary as a prerequisite to financial contributions from them.

Nuttall’s attitude towards council members is also interesting. It should be noted that in theory Councillors had no excuse to be as ignorant as Nuttall suggested them to be. Hall had been a member of the steering committee from its inception in October 1994, there to represent Peterborough City Council. According to the theory of legitimate power (Smith, 1974), in order for Hall to represent the views of the Council he would need to represent the views of the elected representatives, the Councillors and not the officials (4.1). In order to have a view they would need to understand the concept, and officials would support them in this by providing information and so forth. Nuttall’s revelations suggest more evidence of the formal model being flawed, as Weber (1947) suggested and Newton’s (1976) councillors feared (4.2). Rather than seeing the councillor’s ignorance as a failing of the political processes of the council however, Nuttall simply adopted a somewhat patronising attitude towards them. Again, this would seem to suggest that the concerns expressed by the councillors in Newton’s (1976) study were justified (4.2).
Johnson asked whether national politicians, MPs, might not be called upon for support. Felix was determined that this should not be the case. As well as the 'problem' of Pine, Felix told of how he had had a meeting with a prospective constituency candidate who had issued a press release of the meeting before the meeting had taken place. (Fortunately, the editor of the paper to whom the release had been issued had checked with the TEC before they used the statement). Incidentally, by illustrating the point that politicians were not to be trusted Felix was also able to highlight his own significance; (prospective) MPs desired access to him, and newspaper editor sought his approval in running stories in their papers (Morgan, 1986) (6.10 and 6.13).

The steering committee was due to meet again on July 29, and also added a meeting for 9 September to discuss finance. Ironically, Davenport had hoped to reduce the number of meetings because he felt that the committee did not have anything to discuss, nor would have until the sub-groups had actually done something. However, the key members of the committee seemed keen to press ahead so the date was set.

10.21 July 1996

On July 5 Davenport received a letter from Martin explaining that he had spoken to Thomas Cook's solicitors who believed that 'they as a firm would be in a position to assist in the contracting of Loughborough University'. Martin wrote that they had not offered to 'amend their fee structure, and to be fair I haven't yet asked them'. The letter surprised Davenport, because no agreement to speak to specific solicitors, other than those who had acted for the Lincoln University project had been made. Following the steering committee meeting in April (10.8) Hall planned to speak to Cambridgeshire County Council's lawyer for advice on who might be approached, as Newton had with Perkins, and had also suggested that Martin, absent from that meeting, should do the same.

On July 8 Davenport gave me a copy of his objectives for the period July 1996 to June 1997. These were set and agreed with his line manager, Craig. The objectives state that by September 1996 Davenport was to 'Establish a University Company/Trust, independent from GPtec, to manage the university development'; and by December of that year to 'Formalise an agreement or contract with Loughborough University for the provision of local Higher Education'. In June 1997, the end of that year of objectives he would 'Present final details for all courses with a
1998 start-time, on: finance, curriculum, progression and guidance systems, learning styles, marketing'.

On July 19 1996 GPtec's solicitor submitted a 'Report' dealing with the setting up and corporate structure of the company discussed above. As with Martin's letter concerning Thomas Cook's lawyers Davenport claimed that this was a surprise and it appears to have been prompted by Craig. There is no documentary evidence of the report being requested or discussed by either the steering committee, or the Strategic Planning Group; nor did it represent the model that was finally selected, and its significance would seem to be in its reflection of new trends in decision making.

The production of the report signals the fact that decisions were taking place in an arena other than the steering committee. This had always been the case but by this point there were two essential differences. The first difference was that the partnership team's decisions had once been tangential to the substance of the project. This is not to say that they were not important in the overall scheme of things, because they were, but they dealt with general issues - who would front the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough irrespective of the form such development took, for instance. This had ceased to be the case by July 1996. Instead, there was an increased focus on operational specifics. Second, 'behind the scenes' activity now also excluded Davenport and the project team. They had seldom been allowed to participate in decisions, but had been 'privy' to them. Previously, Felix had been open with the team about these smaller meetings, but no longer.

On July 29 the steering committee met again to discuss a limited agenda. What is interesting is the membership. Craig was absent and sent David Wilson, a subordinate on the same tier as Davenport but responsible for adult learning, on his behalf, even though Craig was not himself a formal member of the committee. Nuttall, also not formally a member had sent LF, Head of Policy and Planning at Peterborough City Council, in his place, despite the fact that Hall was already present to represent the Peterborough City Council. Given Nuttall's remark at the previous meeting of the steering committee in which he stated that the Council could not be expected to commit resources this seems an unnecessarily heavy burden in staff time.

Martin opened the meeting by stating that he had now had, what he described as a, 'cordial' meeting with Pine who now approved the planned university development.
The main agenda item were reports from various sub-groups. It will be remembered that sub-groups reported to the steering committee, who then decided to accept the recommendations or not (see March 1996) (10.17). The Finance sub-group, Davenport explained were preparing a draft costing which would be available to the steering committee for their meeting of 9 September. He was able to confirm that the £10 million required to draw down the TDF money could be more or less identified. A presentation by Baldry and colleagues was planned to discuss their PFI proposal with the steering committee, although a date had not been set. He felt that even if this particular idea was not followed through the presentation would still be useful as it would provide a general introduction on PFI.

Hall, joining the meeting late, immediately put in that ‘Nuttall’ had been chatting with Craig, and they felt that a financial strategy was required. Felix said that this would be presented to the meeting on September 9. Felix explained that if Nuttall was not already on the Finance sub-group then he should be. Davenport claims that in a meeting he had had with Felix on Tuesday July 30, Felix had said that he had made a ‘unilateral decision’ to ask Nuttall to join the Finance sub-group. Davenport suspected that this was actually Craig’s decision and not Felix’s, but the incident provides as a good illustration of Felix’s skill in engineering decision outcomes. Thus instead of him coming to the committee with a specific proposal to be presented and possibly disputed, he made an apparently spontaneous, yet planned, remark which was simply accepted as the discussion followed its course. This may reflect the fact that all members of the steering committee were happy with the decision, but still illustrates Felix’s technique of using ‘chance remarks’ to bring about desired decision outcomes. There was a similar example when Felix secured the agreement of the steering committee for Davenport to sit on all the sub-groups in July 1995 (10.10), for instance.

Hall continued to say that Craig had said that he was working on the financial projections at the last steering committee meeting (which Craig had not said), and Hall wanted clarification as to whether they would be specific or not. Davenport answered the question, perhaps because it was he and not Craig who was working on the projections, as Hall had suggested. Hall seemed happy to accept that sufficient financial information would be available at the next meeting of the steering committee. At least, he consented for the meeting to progress.

Hall’s behaviour at this meeting also seems significant. It appears that he had made a decision to bypass Davenport in favour of Craig who had a closer relationship with Nuttall. Thus Hall openly stated that Nuttall and Craig had been discussing the project outside the formal processes
('chatting') and their proposal should be essentially ratified by the committee. Moreover, their suggestion was presented as new and useful information, as though they had identified the need for the financial strategy, when in fact the committee had been discussing it since April (10.18). It had even been discussed at this meeting before Hall had arrived. It seems possible that his comments were symbolic (Morgan, 1986) (6.10). Hall was not saying that a financial strategy was a good idea as such, but that Nuttall and Craig were the men to prepare it, and to take the project forward. This was further underlined by his still attributing the preparation of costings to Craig, even having been corrected by Felix. It seems plausible that Hall was making a deliberate attempt to refocus the attention of the committee away from Davenport and onto Craig and Nuttall. Felix himself seems to have been ambivalent about his support this point, defending the effectiveness of the project team without supporting Davenport as an individual.

Hall, dominating this meeting, then said that the marketing plan needed expanding to recognise all the partners. Ownership should be increased and presentations to stakeholders would be a way of doing this. Felix gave his support for the proposal '200%' and made the point again that he did not want the project to be seen as 'TEC'. Rennie felt that the project itself needed an identity first. He argued that developments had 'gone too far, too soon' with Loughborough University, and that the committee had not really consolidated their own position. Felix countered that this was unfair, and also not true; discussions had to include the university, because they would have the final say in many decisions - they possessed the experience and expertise which was essential for the development of higher education in Peterborough, and would deliver courses and award degrees. As such their bargaining position was strong. Rennie also argued that if someone had money to give away they would not give it to the project because of the lack of identity. Hall insisted that his discussion with Nuttall had revealed a pressing need to set up a company, which would form the focus that Rennie was describing. Again, Nuttall was in no position to provide better information to Hall, since both would acquire it from the same source - the steering committee. As before, it seems likely that Nuttall was being presented by Hall as possessed of superior understanding and information because Hall wanted others to see him in that way. It might be argued that Hall's main aim was to increase the control of Peterborough City Council over the development of higher education in Peterborough now that it looked more secure (Craig had made this point in his issues paper in June (10.20)), and was pushing Nuttall into the main decision making arena as a means of achieving this.
Martin agreed that finding and projecting an identity would be a necessary function of the company, but of more importance was the fact that it would also be required for contracting with the University. This, he added, should also be a big issue for ‘them’ (i.e. Loughborough University). Rennie and Felix understood this to be the case. Felix, however, thought that it would be ‘helpful’ to have a formal organisation, but not ‘critical’. (Under the discussion item ‘Company structure’ Felix explained that the University were interested in a ‘partnership’, not a legal arrangement, arguing that this would avoid incurring two lots of solicitor’s fees which would need to be paid out of money the project did not have.) Martin frowned at this suggestion, and expressed that view that the steering committee would be an inappropriate body to carry the project forward. He asked Davenport to prepare a draft structure for the next meeting.

Moving on, Davenport stated that the FE principals had met with the senior staff from the University. The meeting had been ‘frank’, and had achieved a useful outcome. The University would be preparing a report of the meeting. Davenport then asked Rennie if he wished to add anything. Rennie said that he had not found the meeting particularly useful. There were still unresolved issues related to HEFCE funding, specifically, where the funded places would come from; and he felt the University had seemed reluctant to consider the use of APL (accreditation of prior learning), and there had been no real outcome. Davenport responded that he understood the outcome to be for the FE College principals to visit the University and discuss their individual needs and expectations. Martin asked Rennie to expand his comments because he appeared to be ‘unenthusiastic’. Rennie concluded that the University was not forward looking, not interested in working with FE, and had no experience of the things being discussed.

Hall suggested that the FE colleges should to specify their needs, and these put them forward as a group - to prevent each being ‘picked off one by one’. Rennie declared that he would ‘sing any song, if it’s the one of the group’. Felix proposed that when the report of the meeting was issued by the University, it should be circulated to the steering committee and Rennie be invited to comment. Martin stated a need to resolve the problem before specific legal arrangements began to be discussed. Otherwise they would be paying solicitors for what amounted to mediation.

Rennie’s comments seemed to release an upsurge of animosity towards Loughborough University. Laura Ryder and Millar wanted to know if the university had made written confirmation of their expectations from the project - ‘a statement of intent’. Davenport
suggested that the University saw two developmental opportunities in the partnership: to set up a technology structure from scratch, and to develop customer-led courses, both of which would support provision at their main site in Loughborough. Rennie argued that Loughborough University could not simply be ‘transplanted’ to Peterborough, because of the nature of their client base (young, full-time and residential); but also recognised that their existing local population base could not supply the students they needed to increase their HE student numbers. Millar insisted that a letter be sent to the University, stating the Committee’s requirements, to which Loughborough University should respond. That way the Committee would have some idea of what the University was willing to do and what they were not. Rennie remarked that what they were willing to do would depend on the level of HEFCE funding available.

The discussion then moved on to the reports from the sub-groups, leaving the issue of Loughborough University’s ‘intentions’ unresolved. Davenport updated the steering committee on the work of the Library and Resource sub-group. For example, Grey was in discussion with Porter over the building for the Library Resource Centre, but there was still considerable negotiation to be undertaken. Felix noted that Porter was ‘an astute businessman’ who would seek to gain the maximum benefit from a minimum of cost, and suggested that Grey, absent from the meeting, would need ‘guidance’ on handling the negotiation.

Millar again raised the issue of sharing library stock in reciprocal arrangements. Rennie felt this would involve others, say law firms (Martin had suggested banks), and could be used as a catalyst to increase the level of interchange overall. Felix agreed that this needed exploring, but in the meantime wondered when there would be sufficient information available to support effective negotiation with Porter over the building. Hall felt that this negotiation was best undertaken through the Chief Executive Group the original Strategic Planning Group, and composed of Felix, Davenport, Grey, Hall, and Martin (see March 1996, 10.17). Davenport asked for some idea of what Porter might be expected to contribute to the project, the building itself having ceased to be an option apparently. Felix thought it a wonderful opportunity for Porter, and the question was more about ‘what we can get’, than what he was willing to give. Felix stated that this was not to be minuted.

The Curriculum sub-group, Davenport explained, were discussing in a proposal to ‘provide an academic framework to support’ the itinerant East Anglian Ministerial Training College which was a contact of the Dean. The College provided full-time provision postgraduate degrees to practising clerics, and already had funding for their students. What it did not have was
accommodation. Declaring 'a vested interest', the Dean was keen to include the college in the university development because he wished to rent Cathedral buildings to them. Martin suggested that it would strengthen the project's negotiating position if it already had some funded students. Millar did not see why Loughborough University should be interested in Theology. Davenport speculated that they saw any partnership with the College in terms of the wider development of philosophy and ethics. Because the students were already funded, the real issue was one of validation.

10.22 August 1996

It was anticipated that most people would take their holiday in August so the next planned steering committee meeting was for September 9. August was, however, a significant month in the project's development.

On 15 and 16 August Davenport met with Craig and Felix to resolve, what Davenport termed 'outstanding issues' - the setting up of the company and the move of the project team off-site - before Davenport went on holiday from 19 August until 9 September. Davenport understood there to be three outcomes from the meeting. Felix would speak to Peterborough City Council about their contribution, having agreed with Davenport that they could not expect to control the development if they were also unwilling to dedicate resources. Second, Craig would arrange for a 'pre-meeting' of the Chief Executives group. The reason for this was not clear to Davenport, and yet it transpires that it was of considerable importance. Third, the Finance Director of GPtec (Cawford) would take over negotiations concerning the proposed site for the relocated project team in the Cathedral precinct (Little Priors Gate).

Before leaving for holiday Davenport prepared his monthly report to Craig, his line manager, stating that:

It is now urgent that the formation of the company and the relocation to the Cathedral happens ASAP. This will enable us to establish an appropriate management structure through the board [of the project company] to handle direct financial issues. The shift in identity away from the TEC remains an important short-term target.

However, on August 22 the Anderson and Craig were told by Craig that they would not be moving after all. The building in the cathedral precinct to which they anticipated moving was unsuitable. There was no heating, it needed re-wiring, and was therefore unfit for office
accommodation without considerable initial expense. (Davenport had visited the site with
university staff, including the RH, Deputy Director of Estates, on 13 August who had
considered it to be suitable.) Craig added that some discussion had been given the Cathedral’s
Visitor Centre as an alternative site but this was too big for the purpose. There had been some
consideration of sharing the Visitor Centre with the East Anglian Ministerial Training College,
but the single toilet was a problem, but he assured us that the move from GPtec premises would
happen. When it did Craig explained that he would expect Benn to take on a ‘liaison’ role, that
is to ensure that the TEC was kept informed of developments through weekly meetings with
Craig.

On Monday 29 August Craig informed the project team of significant outcomes from a meeting
he had had with Felix, which we were to communicate to Davenport on his return from holiday,
as Craig would be absent from the office. Craig also said that Nuttall had complained that the
marketing plan was ‘unacceptable’. Specifically it did not mention Peterbrough City Council,
which, as the Local Education Authority under unitary arrangements, should be undertaking the
presentations to schools. Craig added that Nuttall was looking at ‘support’ for the project, either
in terms of personnel or funding (perhaps as a result of Felix’s intention to discuss the issue
following his meetings on 15 and 16 August). Craig explained that whilst he out of the office
any queries Davenport might have should be addressed to Felix.

10.23 September 1996

Craig also sent a memo to Davenport outlining these developments on September 3 because
Craig would not be back in the office until Thursday 5. This memo stated that relocation to the
Cathedral precinct was ‘more medium to long term’ because the building was unsuitable; the
problems with wiring and toilets and so forth. Secondly, and most importantly, it noted that:

Felix [had] called a Chief Executives Group this morning [sic] - [Martin] proposed
restructure - CE’s group + Holland, Rennie, Millar should take over (other members of the
steering group to be asked to serve on subgroups) sub-groups to report direct to this group
through their ‘chairs’. [Nuttall] and myself asked to involve ourselves more directly in the
project and work closely with you for the next three months. Terms of reference to be
agreed on the 9th September (already drafted). Martin writing to members of the steering
group informing them of the change.
Martin & Hall both proposed premises for housing the project at Priestgate with likely 'cash' from both sources (Details later) ... (memo, 3/9/96).

It was also stated that Craig would be making a presentation to the City Council on September 24, and that 'we must keep Rennie on board - he can do a lot of damage and should not be underestimated' (memo, 3/9/96).

On September 4 the letter from Martin explaining the new structure arrived, with both Davenport's name, and the name of his employer spelt incorrectly. It began by saying that 'At the last meeting of the steering group it was requested that the Chief Executives' Committee should reflect on the overall status of the project and in particular look at the structure going forward'. (In fact, at the meeting Martin himself had commented that the steering committee was not the vehicle to progress the project further, but it had not been discussed and it had not been agreed that the Chief Executives Group should consider its abolition (20.21)). Nonetheless, the letter continued to outline the new arrangements:

We are of the view that the 'Steering Committee' should now assume a new role and that members of that forum could best bring value to the next phase of the project by co-opting themselves to the sub-groups which have been established ... The steering committee then will in effect be replaced by the Chief Executives group which will be joined by [MB, Rennie and Millar] in view of their particular expertise and representation.

Given that one of the above (Millar) had attended only two meetings of the steering committee it is hard to see where some of 'their particular expertise and representation' lay. Curiously, Pearl Assurance who had agreed to host the MBA delivered by Loughborough University in Peterborough (Evening Telegraph, 24/9/96), and Perkins, with whom negotiations were underway concerning their support for a engineering found themselves unrepresented on the new decision making body. The only member of the body designed to take the customer-led project forward to come from the private sector was Martin.

Martin's letter illustrates a point made by Morgan (1986), that those in positions of power (i.e. formal authority) may use privileged access to 'organisational, structure, rules and regulations' to improve their position (see also Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963, and 1971) (6.1), (6.5), and (6.13). Using his position as Chair Martin was able to simply remove people from the formal decision making body (the Steering Group) without consultation or warning. In practice this
was not done on his own, as the evidence indicates, but his position disguised the actions of others and gave them some sense of legitimacy, even though the steering committee had not asked for the Chief Executives Group to review the management structure. Arguably, this is also an example of the cumulative effects of power, and the way in which the potential bases interact with each other, as Gaventa (1980) argues: Formal authority gives access to the control of decision processes, which in turn can be used to enhance one’s position of power and in so doing enhances authority.

The decision had profound practical significance as it left the ‘partnership team’ free to pursue their own interests without opposition from, or reference to, others (Bachrach and Baratz; 1962, 1963, 1971, and Gaventa, 1980) (2.4), (6.5), and (6.13). Businesses would find it more difficult to demand flexible delivery of quality provision, and Johnson would cease to remind his committee colleagues of ethical consideration such as equality of access; and any credit resulting from the project’s development need not be shared so widely. The single decision had also resulted in the relegation of the project team, most particularly Davenport who had gone from managing the project to ‘officering’ it; and the ascendancy of Craig and Nuttall. It is difficult to identify any reason why Millar should be included in the new group other than the fact that he was, according to Craig, a friend of both him and Nuttall from the days when they worked together at Cambridgeshire LEA (Craig). Holland might have been included because he was harmless, but lent credibility and would bring funded students through his contact with the East Anglian Ministerial Training College; and Rennie because he was threatening and had to be ‘kept on board’.

The threat of Rennie had at least two sources: he could refuse funding for the TEC Discretionary Fund (TDF) which would cause practical problems and considerable embarrassment to Felix and Craig, but also because of the relationship Peterborough Regional College (PRC) had with the TEC in other areas of their activity. This supports Crenson’s (1971) view that specific policy issues are not made in isolation but tend to be interconnected. In this instance is the TEC funded PRC through the Competitiveness Fund and Development Fund. Therefore PRC depended on the TEC for financial support; but at the same time the TEC depended on PRC delivering the agreed outcomes for the TEC. There was a wider dimension to the situation however, in that offending one FE college was also likely to create problems with the others. Richmond had expressed concern that the university project would present competition to PRC at the February steering committee meeting for example, whilst also admitting that his college had few aspirations to develop higher education and had no direct
difficulty with the project therefore (10.16). It was argued then that Richmond's expression of concern might be assumed to be one of sympathy for his FE colleagues, for if he supported Rennie when he was indifferent to the outcome he might, in theory, call in the favour later.

It is also worth noting that single relationships underlying a series of policy arenas, together with the choice of individuals to take the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough forward, adds evidence to Evans' (1996) suggestion that TECs are conscious of the fact that they have been added to existing organisations and relationships, on which they are better to 'build upon' than to challenge. Selznick's study of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) (1966) found that TVA's use of existing organisations in delivering their outcomes reproduced existing power relationships (see 6.9). It illustrates a wider point therefore that power structures are generally self-perpetuating and exclusive, as any policy change depends upon the support of the already powerful. This is reflected in the fact that so many of the 'partnership team' had no knowledge, experience of or demand for higher education, Hall and Grey most obviously, and nothing substantive to offer the project. Yet, they were considered vital to its progress, however, because they were powerful (Morgan, 1986) (6.13) and (6.9). It also supports the suggestion that power is dispositional and reputation is an important resource (Dowding, 1991) (2.4).

The new arrangements for the management of the project were presented in notes of the meeting to which Martin had referred in his letter, made by Craig on September 9. They state that:

Martin proposed a structure for the time being in which the heads of the sub-groups reported to an amended Chief Executives Group ... The group would [now] include [Craig and Nuttall].

[Davenport] would 'officer' the group.

Cooptees would include [Millar, Rennie, and Holland] ...

Craig and Nuttall were asked to meet with Davenport on a regular basis to provide planning support and to ensure that Nuttall was fully briefed. This would be regarded as Peterborough City Council's initial contribution to the project.

Although the outcomes are more or less the same as those that Craig described to Davenport in his memo of September 3, the tone is quite different. In Craig's memo to Davenport he said
that Nuttall and Craig had 'asked to be more involved', and would be working more closely with Davenport. In the notes Nuttall and Craig had been asked to meet with Davenport who would provide 'planning support', and brief Nuttall. Davenport would 'officer' the Chief Executives Group. Nuttall's time spent on the project was seen as a 'contribution', and yet the issues paper of June (10.20) states that it is he who needed 'to make his mark early'.

Later that day, 9 September, Davenport tendered his resignation from GPtec. Davenport wrote to Felix saying that:

The various changes which have taken place in the management structure and the organisation of the University project during the period when I was on holiday (19 August to 3 September) have created a situation where I find now my position at GPtec untenable (letter, 9/9/98).

Davenport argued that not only had the project been restructured without his prior knowledge and consultation; but the solution offered by Felix to Davenport's role as 'officer', that of a 'triumvirate' (Craig, Nuttall and Davenport), was structurally impossible since Craig was Davenport's line manager. Davenport also claimed that Craig had gone back on his word regarding the setting up of a university company and Davenport's position within it. In May 1996 Davenport had sent a memo to Felix outlining agreements agreed between Davenport and Craig which included the proposal of seconding Davenport to the University Company for a period of 18 months (10.19). Davenport felt that such changes had altered the nature of his job and role 'in a significant way', reducing his status and undermining his authority, thus leaving him no choice but to resign. His resignation was accepted. According to the official (agreed) statement Davenport had left GPtec to 'pursue personal interests elsewhere in education and management and goes with our best wishes'. Davenport worked only a week of his three-months notice. His early release was agreed against 'sensible and co-operative ... hand-over arrangements' (CO to Davenport, 12/9/96). Davenport's last day in the office was 13 September, leaving the day to day control of the project in the hands of Nuttall and Craig.

Just as Martin had used the formal authority of the Chair to disband the steering committee, so Felix and Craig had used formal authority (6.1), their role as managers, to reorganise 'organisational structure, rules and regulations' (Morgan, 1986) (6.4) in such a way as to affect Davenport's work without his knowledge or consultation. (More evidence that power sources are often structured cumulatively). Morgan (1986) (6.1) argued that 'authority becomes effective only when it is legitimated from below. The pyramid of power represented in an
organisational chart thus builds on a base where considerable power belongs to those at the bottom of the pyramid as well as those on the top'. Morgan’s claim is true only to a point, however, because it relies on those who view an action as illegitimate acting together. Ultimately the power Felix and Craig had to change organisation structures based on superior formal authority outweighed Davenport’s belief that the actions were illegitimate leaving him no choice but to resign, or suffer working with superiors who he felt had taken away his authority and undermined his autonomy. People might be forced to suffer the consequences of actions of colleagues against them which they perceive to be illegitimate simply because they need the salary which is attached to the job, and because the imperative of collective action implicit in Morgan’s (1986) view is absent.

To me it seems unlikely that either Craig or Felix wanted Davenport to resign but instead assumed that he would settle in his new role providing support for Craig. This might have come from the fact that most people are tied to their jobs, or because they believed Davenport’s commitment to the project would feel greater than his perceived injury, or perhaps they did not think about him at all. Davenport had knowledge and information which neither Felix nor Craig, nor anyone else involved in the process, possessed. It is apparent that Felix and Craig knew this because part of Davenport’s new capacity was providing advice and support to ‘Nuttall’. This gave the impression that Craig needed no such help, but it was a common strategy of his to ask someone (e.g. Davenport) to brief another (e.g. Felix) and then sit in on the meeting, rather than reveal ignorance and ask for information directly, an element of what Morgan (1986) would describe as ‘impression management’ (6.10). Perhaps it was for the same reason that Davenport was unable to use his control of knowledge and information in bargaining; for Felix and Craig to change their position would have meant admitting they had been in error, as well as requiring them to give up some newly acquired control of the project. Goodin (1980) suggests that where the cost of getting information is higher than expected gains actors will choose to remain ignorant until their interests are threatened directly (6.3). This helps explain why Craig preferred to ‘busk it’, as he described his approach to the management of the project immediately after Davenport’s departure.

The information gap was filled from another source. The sudden departure of Davenport and his significance as ‘expert’ is indicated in the equally sudden increased involvement of Loughborough University in the project. Only they could provide the necessary ‘expertise’ to fill the void. Fear and accusations of ‘cherry-picking’ and asset stripping were conveniently forgotten.
The Chief Executives Group, with its new members and renamed the Higher Education Strategy Group met on Monday 9. Actually getting people together had been problematic, because Martin’s letter seemed to have caused some confusion. Some members of the now defunct steering committee were uncertain as to whether they should attend this meeting or not, thus highlighting the fact that changes made to the project were not anticipated or a result of consultation. Nuttall and Craig prepared the agenda and supporting papers, previously the responsibility of Davenport, although Davenport was still formally in post.

They would discuss the terms of reference, which Craig and Nuttall had drafted. They would also need to discuss the management structure, although at this point Davenport’s resignation was not public, as well as some other operational issues. Felix chaired the meeting in the absence of Martin. He started by saying that Davenport would not be present at the meeting but gave no explanation. It is probable that one was not needed either, as those who remained would be key contacts and likely to be ‘in the know’ anyway. He explained that, consistent with Martin’s letter, the project had been restructured, as the old steering committee was not ‘sufficiently pointed to progress’. A more formal structure was required, and this would be provided by the new ‘Strategy Group’ who would carry the project forward on behalf of all the original members.

Craig explained that he and Nuttall had ‘met hurriedly’ to prepare the terms of reference and that they did not contain anything surprising. The purpose of the group was to direct and implement a strategy for the development of a ‘University of Peterborough’. They would:

1. Oversee a planning process including the production of
   - five year corporate plan;
   - a business plan;
   - a funding strategy to cover development revenue and capital funding.

2. Establish and maintain an effective working partnership with Loughborough University.

3. Determine and implement an appropriate corporate structure for managing and financing the project.

4. Ensure the involvement and commitment of community interests, business, public and voluntary sectors.
5. Provide and explain the rationale and benefits of the University to the wider public of Greater Peterborough. To manage and maintain a series of sub-groups...

6. Take whatever other action is required in the interest of the successful development of the University.

The group as a whole would concentrate on the last three, he said. It was not made clear who would deal with the others.

Nuttall added that a clear statement of purpose was necessary, with goals and milestones. These, he complained, had been lacking so far. Rennie asked about the legal nature of the new group. Felix replied that this was not clear and would not be so until they had had their next meeting with the University, when they would discuss whether a company was necessary or not. Craig added that there were two outstanding issues which were affecting the view; the Local Government Act and the way in which Loughborough University saw their position as ‘partner’, that is whether a contract was actually necessary.

The next item on the agenda related to management structure. Craig, leading the item, suggested that this should be the focus of discussion with the University at the meeting on 18 September mentioned by Felix. He had spoken to the TEC’s solicitor about ways in which to prevent Loughborough University withdrawing from the arrangement, and they had advised that little could be done to prevent it. Grey argued that this was the view of one solicitor and it would be necessary to see more. Rennie felt this was premature.

Nuttall asked who would be running the company, because Peterborough City Council would not be happy if it were Loughborough University, but agreed that a ‘partnership’ might be better than a contractual relationship, because it was ‘less adversarial’! Craig argued that if the university were to withdraw it would be because of funding from HEFCE, and no amount of contracting would deal with this problem. He thought therefore that what was needed was a ‘partnership’, which would create a better relationship! It was agreed that formal legal advice was needed and Felix asked Craig and Nuttall to prepare ‘fishing letters’ to that end.

Moving on to finance Felix said that Davenport was working on costings. He also said that Craig, Nuttall and Davenport would form a ‘triumvirate’ to manage the project, if the latter ‘sustains that role’ (again suggesting that others knew about Davenport). Felix asked that the
date of HEFCE’s visit arranged by Loughborough University be confirmed at the next meeting of the Strategy Group. Rennie suggested that they might be more successful in securing HEFCE funding if the university and PRC submitted a joint bid. The college was turning students away because of the limited number of funded places.

Next, premises for the project team were discussed. Grey stated that she had received an offer of space from the Peterborough City Council, but for the short term. Felix added that he had also had an offer from Martin and this would be free. Holland admitted that the Cathedral could not compete with offers of free accommodation. He was disappointed that the ‘administration’ would not be relocating to the Cathedral precinct after all, but still expected the East Anglian Ministerial Training College to take up space in 1997.

Forthcoming presentations were also discussed. Craig noted the importance of securing the support of councillors of Peterborough City Council, suggesting that there was a limit to how far the paid officers could take the project forward. He was to give a presentation on 26 September, to which he hoped to invite the ‘vice-principal’ of Loughborough University. Grey commented that she had found that councillors and her GPP board were (still) finding it difficult to understand the concept being described and advised Craig to keep his presentation simple therefore. Craig felt it would be important to make it clear to councillors and the GPP that the specific requirements for higher education in Peterborough were ‘ours’ and not the university’s. Grey added that Martin would also be making a presentation to the GPP board before Craig made his to the council (24 and 26 respectively), and they would have to make sure that the two were the same. Felix suggested therefore that Craig and Nuttall should liaise with Grey who would in turn advise Martin. Craig said that he would be meeting Davenport to discuss the presentation, and Nuttall would see it before it was actually made to ensure that it would not ‘hit any nerves’. No professional group, no FE college, nor any other organisation was consulted or informed.

At the end of the meeting Felix stated that Nuttall and Craig would devise a new project plan. Nuttall and Craig would have a pre-meeting meeting to prepare a plan to deal with a representative of the NatWest bank with whom Nuttall had made contact, and who it was understood would be forthcoming with funding. Again Holland complained of the Chair’s absence and the impact this was likely to have on the project’s momentum. Grey countered that Martin had a good relationship with Pine and should be kept on therefore. Felix added that he
was confident that Martin’s role would increase now, as well as those of other ‘key partners’, such as the City Council.

The meeting with the University (the Joint Strategy Group) took place on 18 September as planned. The minutes of the meeting stated that Davenport had resigned, and that the project would now ‘be carried forward by [Craig], GPtec and [Nuttall], Peterborough City Council until a project consultant is appointed’. The minutes go on to say that:

The recruitment of a Project Manager is considered imperative. The appointment will be a joint decision by the Strategy Group and Loughborough University, who may be in a position to fund part of the salary costs. It was agreed that the position would not necessarily require an educational background and would be offered on a fixed-term contract basis.

It was agreed that a company should be set up, and solicitors appointed to facilitate the process. The date for the HEFCE presentation was said to December 19, and it was agreed that the Dean of the Cathedral should host it.

Meanwhile ‘Peterborough’s ambition to become a university city [was] taking shape following the launch of a new site for a business studies degree course ‘with ‘City-based Pearl Assurance ... offering its training centre at the Lynch Wood business park for use in the MBA degree’ (Evening Telegraph, 24/9/96). This had been planned for some time, but the formal opening took place on September 19. It gave the impression that real progress was being made under the new project management.

Given the agreement of the appointment of an interim Project Manager at the end of September, Craig and Nuttall began to prepare the way. They interviewed two people, one of whom was a contact of Nuttall’s who had recently lost a position at Cambridgeshire County Council. The other, the successful candidate, was the Chief Executive of the Lincoln University project. Felix had received his CV on 16 July 1996 and this it coincides with Felix making contact with someone who could refer him to the Lincoln University project’s solicitors. The planned end date for the recruitment of the project manager was October 9. At the same time interviews were arranged for three firms of solicitors. These would take place on October 10.
On October 1 the Strategy Group met for the second time. Again Martin was absent, and Felix took the chair. The meeting opened with an update on the ‘Project Manager’. Felix explained that Nuttall and Craig had discussed the issue with the Registrar of Loughborough University and it had been agreed that a Project Manager was needed, and that the emphasis should be placed on the project management aspects, and not on experience and knowledge of higher education. Names had been offered from various sources but, on reflection, such a recruitment method seemed to be unsatisfactory in terms of employment practice. Felix proposed that candidates named so far were interviewed for appointment ‘pro tem’, and then the permanent post could be advertised. This process would fulfil any legal requirements. Nuttall questioned whether there was actually an issue in making an appointment without advertising the post; he felt that it would only be the case if the appointment were to be made to the TEC, as opposed to the project company (once established). One of his concerns was that the temporary post would seem unattractive to the quality of individual it was necessary to recruit. He was also concerned with ‘continuity’ and was keen to see a project manager in place as soon as possible as a result. Felix agreed but said that this would be impossible in practice, because ‘the TEC needs to be seen as whiter than white’. The discussion ended with Felix expressing the view that the dilemmas would be resolved somehow, and Nuttall seemed satisfied with the so-called ‘inventive conclusions’.

Moving on to the appointment of solicitors, Craig explained that four firms would be interviewed by a team including the GPTec’s Director of Finance, Cawford, and Peterborough City Council’s lawyer, together with Craig, Grey, Nuttall, and Loughborough University’s Registrar. Nuttall believed the single issue to be the extent to which each firm had knowledge of higher education ‘in-house’. Craig suggested four selection criteria - expertise; proposition of ideas regarding charities, and trusts; cost; and finally knowledge of higher education.

The next item to be discussed related to premises, first of which was a proposed visit to Shelton House (the Library-Resource centre). Grey informed the group that the building had now been purchased by Porter, and it was now necessary to get down to the ‘nitty-gritty of negotiation’, which was at a sensitive stage. In the meantime, two meetings were being arranged for ‘key’ people to look over the building. Craig added that he had also been in negotiation with a local business, which had agreed to donate land to the university development, and were also offering
the use of their equipment. Only ‘class-room’ space was a problem therefore. The business was Perkins and Craig was continuing discussion started by Davenport. Nuttall asked whether any progress had been made on premises for the project company, remembering that Martin had made an offer of accommodation. Grey and Craig both said that Peterborough City Council, that is Hall, had also made an offer. Nuttall remarked that perhaps Hall had not given this sufficient thought.

Next, Craig outlined a plan necessary for preparation for the visit of HEFCE to Peterborough in December. This mainly involved re-organising sub-groups. Nuttall stressed a need for more definite student numbers to aid the Curriculum sub-group in their discussion. This was in hand; Craig would be meeting the Academic Secretary of Loughborough University later in the month to confirm numbers.

Returning to sub-groups Craig expressed a need for ‘one of us’ (the Strategy Group) to report to the Strategy group from the sub-groups, in order to keep them on course. Nuttall was concerned about the overall arrangements of the sub-groups. Specifically, he commented that there was no uniformity of membership, size or expertise, and no terms of reference defined by the Strategy Group. It was thought appropriate for Craig and Nuttall to define terms of reference, membership, outcomes to be delivered and when; and how sub-groups should report back, therefore. Nuttall was also concerned that GPtec was over-represented, as at least two members sat on every group. Felix pointed out that Benn or Anderson were merely present for administration purposes. All this was somewhat unnecessary given that the sub-groups did little business before they too were disbanded. Instead, decisions were made directly between the Craig, Nuttall and Grey and senior staff from Loughborough University. This was probably less about deliberate exclusion, than the practical pressures of time.

On October 9 and 10 preliminary interviews were held with two potential (temporary) project managers. These were conducted by Grey, Craig, Nuttall and Lewis. The four solicitors were also interviewed. The outcome of this was the appointment of David Cooke as project manager until the end of December 1996 when he would move to a new post to which he had already been appointed. He was employed by the GPP and paid by GPtec with some additional funding from Loughborough University, and Martineau Johnson Solicitors were instructed to investigate a structure for a project company.
On October 15 Craig met with the Academic Secretary of Loughborough University (Robert Parker) to finalise student numbers in preparation of the HEFCE meeting of December 19. The provision of Theology and Agriculture were quickly agreed, since both required little more than quality assurance and then validation. The East Anglia Ministerial Training College would provide staff and funded students, and the provision of agriculture would be organised through Brooksby College in Melton Mowbray, Leicestershire which had already contacted the university regarding the development of degree level courses.

It was agreed that initial teacher training would be limited. No undergraduate courses would be offered, and PGCE only in shortage subjects. This was seen to provide a progression opportunity for students studying other degrees as part of the overall development of higher education in Greater Peterborough. Business Studies was recognised as an important area of study, but it was decided that a course should aim to attract fifty full-time undergraduates and a further fifty part-time. Engineering was also seen as crucial to early development, not least because it was expected that Perkins would offer facilities and students. Thus whilst recognising the importance of engineering to the economy of Greater Peterborough as a whole it was agreed to aim for thirty full-time undergraduate students in the first year, thirty in the second filled by students topping-up HNDs and HNC, with a further twenty part-time. Postgraduates students should number thirty. It was also noted that access courses had to be put in place immediately if for non-standard students were to enter in 1998, and that a strategic plan would be necessary for the same time next year (1997) to allow the recruitment of students for October 1998. Student projections, based on the number of local students forecast to enter higher education between 1998 and 2001 (Morris, 1995a) factored against national take-up by study area were not used. They predicted a much higher demand.

During this meeting the University stated that they would like to see some development funding put in by other partners, specifically Peterborough City Council who had not yet made their contribution. The university also wanted some investigation of the likely size and pattern of demand for higher education to be made by 'house-wives', although it was generally recognised that social policy, social psychology, communication and media studies were popular. Members of Peterborough City Council were also keen to see the curriculum expanded into these areas, believing that the curriculum planned so far was biased towards males (true of Engineering, but not of Business Studies).
10.25 November 1996

The (Joint) Strategy Group settled final student numbers at their next meeting on November 7. The student numbers presented to the group (prepared by Benn and approved by Craig) were stated to be based on the expectations/needs studies carried out by GPtec in 1994/5 (Morris, 1995b), and population forecast against national patterns of attendance. It has already been remarked that whilst this work was carried out, it played no part in the planning of student numbers. In 1998 235 undergraduate places, and 219 postgraduate places were planned in three Schools - Business, Engineering, and Agriculture. By the end of the second year (i.e. 1999) these students would contribute to a total student body of 1026 with two additional areas of study - Social Science, and Environmental Science (specified by Nuttall’s contact at NatWest as a target area for their support). Given that in 1994/95, for example, 19.3% of students in Britain studied Business or Engineering (HESA), it means that the final student numbers presented in the Briefing Paper (Peterborough Higher Education project Company, 1996) (10.26) represented 22% of the forecast number. This might suggest that planning was based on Lindblomian (1959) administrative experience (3.2), rather than some rational method as advocated by Simon (1957). It also provides some illustration of the role of chance in public policy (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972; Cyret and March, 1996; Kingdon, 1984) (3.3).

Thus, whilst suggesting that the proposed courses were responsive to need - ‘curriculum planners will ensure that the specific requirements of Greater Peterborough will be the overriding factor in course design’ - and that:

The courses listed cover the priority areas identified in Greater Peterborough and should be able to operate on a modular basis providing maximum flexibility within and across departments. It is expected that course design will draw from existing degrees already in operation at Loughborough University where appropriate’

Yet, research and, what might be described as ‘informed opinion’, had revealed a need for business and engineering, but very little for theology, agriculture or environmental studies (Wilson, 1994a) (10.6). Similarly, courses tailored specifically to the preferred modes and so forth of Greater Peterborough, were now going to be adapted from existing courses, even though Loughborough University were charging the project for course development costs. There are perhaps limits to how tailored and specific a course can or should be. There are core
areas of knowledge in most disciplines, but this was as much the case in 1994 when the original research was undertaken as it was in 1996. The principle of local need, and the fierce independence, which supported the notion, was soon untenable, as decision-makers wanted a quick outcome for which they could claim credit. (Note, for example, that change in pace and tone of the meetings after September 1996 (10.23) with those of the previous eighteen months). Practical necessity displaced all other considerations; evidence to support both Lindblom's (1959) claim that values and options can not be separated in decision making (3.2), as well as Cohen et al.'s (1972) and March and Cyret's (1976) Garbage Can Model (3.3).

The Garbage Can Model (Cohen et al.; 1972, March and Cyret, 1976) (3.3) helps to explain how theology, agriculture and environmental studies became three of the first subjects to be developed in the provision of higher education in Greater Peterborough despite there being no discernible need or demand for them. They were, in effect, 'solutions'. The TEC Discretionary Fund (TDF) provides another useful illustration of March et al.'s (Cyret and March 1963; Cohen, et al., 1972; March and Olsen, 1976) point, as the opportunity to bid for funds for not actually anticipated. It was recognised that a library would be required and an interim costing had been prepared in August 1995 (Morris, 1995b). However, the TDF opportunity does not seem to have been anticipated and the bid submitted in April 1996 was prepared in some hurry, but it is the order that matters here. The TDF was announced and then local decision makers, chiefly Davenport, Grey and Craig, put effort into thinking how they might use it. Related to this is the bid was Shelton House, also stumbled across by accident: Grey happened to have a contact, who happened to have an interest in an suitable building, as well as an increasing interest in Peterborough. Had these events not occurred when they did the decision process and outcome may have been different.

Returning to the meeting of the (Joint) Strategy Group, the minutes also noted the appointment a project consultant (Charles Smart) who was attending his first meeting. He was investigating the formation of a project company. There appeared to be two options - to establish a Peterborough Higher Education Company incorporating existing 'partners', or for Loughborough University to establish a Project Company which would deliver courses in Peterborough. Smart stressed to the committee that some sort of company would need to be in place by the meeting with HEFCE on December 19. A decision as to the specific nature of the arrangement was scheduled for the (Joint) Strategy Group's next meeting on December 3. In the meantime it was agreed that the Project Company board would have fifteen members, of which five would be from Loughborough University, and four from businesses - NatWest, Pearl
Assurance, Thomas Cook, and Perkins. The board was 'likely to meet every 4/6 weeks and [would] be supported by a full-time staff, that [would] include a fund-raising team (minutes, 7/11/96).

Arrangements for the HEFCE presentation were also discussed. It was agreed that Pine should be invited to the presentation, and this was left to Grey to arrange. It was stated that the visitation from HEFCE was interpreted as providing an indicator of support, and not commitment to funding.

10.26 December 1996

The (Joint) Strategy Group met again for the last time on December 3. Smart explained the company structure. There would be a Peterborough Higher Education Company and a University College Company. The Project Company would manage the project, raise finance for development costs, and promote the project; whilst the university college company would be the mechanism by which Loughborough University could manage activities specifically related to Peterborough, and would ultimately provide the governing body of the independent institution. The minutes stated that 'it was expected that the company and the initial members [would] be in place by the 19 December'; in time for the HEFCE visit.

HEFCE's visit to Peterborough was then discussed, including the preparation of a briefing sheet for HEFCE, presentation logistics and who should send out invitations. This was important, as it would signal to recipients who was the lead organisation, thus enhancing their status (Morgan, 1986) (6.10), and continued the tension over 'ownership' (see December, 1994 (10.3) and January, 1995 (10.4) for examples). It was agreed that the invitations should be sent by Grey for the GPP.

The minutes of the meeting state that an advertisement for the position of Chief Executive (of the Project Company) was circulated, but it was agreed that a secondment was preferable. If this strategy proved impossible recruitment would be arranged through an agency. (Smart was replaced by a consultant who had already undertaken work for Loughborough University, and was jointly funded by the University and GPtec).

HEFCE's anticipated visit made front-page news on December 16, as the visit of Professor Fender, Chief Executive of the Funding Council, and colleagues raised hopes of support that
was 'vital to ... plans' (Evening Telegraph, 16/12/96). The visit was viewed optimistically as it was believed that attendance by such senior personnel suggested that HEFCE did not think they were wasting their time visiting Peterborough from Bristol in order to hear more about the proposal for the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough. The Peterborough Higher Education Company had been set up just in time, December 15, for the meeting on December 19.

A Briefing Paper (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996) was prepared to give the visitors from HEFCE, and indeed some of their hosts, a background to the project, and to make the case for funding. When sent to HEFCE it was accompanied by letters of support from businesses, including Perkins, Pearl Assurance, Thomas Cook, and NatWest, as well as from Porter.

The paper claimed that in recent years Peterborough had grown from a market town into a 'major city' aided in this by excellent transport links to London and the North, and was still growing. Hampton (the Southern Township), was the fourth township to be added to the original city and when completed would form the largest new settlement in the UK. It had a predicted population of some 14,000 contributing to a population growth to 185,000 by the year 2006 (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996). It was argued, therefore, that the economic need for the university development was paramount in supporting the continuing growth of the city.

Local access to higher education was necessary to allow for upskilling of the workforce and the maintenance of existing economic growth. It was noted that Greater Peterborough already housed the headquarters of several 'worldclass' companies, including Pearl Assurance, Perkins, and Thomas Cook. The area had a labour force of over 145,000 people, which was growing, but was also getting older; over two thirds of the workforce was over the age of 45 and the number and proportion of young people was declining. The paper summarised the issue thus: 'These demographic changes which are compounded by skills shortages in critical areas pose a challenge, and potential threat, to the area’s competitiveness' (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996). The poor local performance against the Lifetime 2 target (30% of the workforce to have a ... qualification at NVQ level 4 or above) was attributed to 'a direct effect of the lack of local provision'.
Local access was considered vital to redress regional imbalance in higher education opportunities, and was considered particularly important given the changing pattern of participation in higher education (see Tight, 1987 and 1996 for example). It was also believed that an increasing number of young people were starting to study locally whilst living at home. Mature students, 34% of the national full-time student body, often required locally based study because many were tied to the area by family and work commitments. It was anticipated that ethnic minority communities would also benefit from local access. The paper argued that "A university in Greater Peterborough will make a contribution to equality of opportunities in the area, addressing the barriers to learning highlighted above, and more specifically those faced by ethnic minority groups who represent 10% of the Greater Peterborough population" (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996).

Preliminary curriculum planning, ostensibly based on the local needs analysis, indicated the need for courses in the following areas: Business and Management; Engineering (Engineering Science and Technology); Agriculture (rural and land-based studies); Education; and Theology. Because these courses built on existing ones it was hoped they could be offered in 1998. For 1999 or 2000 another set of study areas were planned - Environmental Sciences, Social Sciences, and Information Technology. Science and humanities would also be offered in the future.

Two hundred and ten undergraduates, and 190 postgraduate, registrations were anticipated for 1999. Undergraduates would be spread across three study areas (Business and Management, Engineering, and Agriculture (Rural and Land-Based Studies). Education (MAs and PGCEs) and Contextual Theology would be offered at postgraduate level only. By 1999 when Social Science and Environmental Science were planned to be offered as undergraduate options, total registrations were expected to be around 818, rising to 1221 the following year (2000) with Information Technology added as a study option.

Two curriculum areas appeared on this list that had not appeared in formal documentation before (see Forbat and Morris, 1995; and GPtec, 1996, for example). They are Agriculture and Contextual Theology. The notes to the paper stated that: "There is an existing identified group of students (at Brooksby Agricultural College, Melton Mowbray and Cambridgeshire

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5 Ethnic Minorities represent 10% of the population of Peterborough City, not the Greater Peterborough area (OPCS, 1991).
Agricultural & Horticultural College) who will enter the undergraduate programme when this becomes available'. As has been noted above, (10.24) Brooksby College had approached Loughborough University about validating degrees in the first instance, and the Cambridgeshire College had been approached thereafter, although the project had been outlined to them in its early stages. ‘Similarly’, the paper states, ‘there are existing students from the East Anglia Ministerial Training College scheme who will enter the postgraduate theology programme’ (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996).

Priority areas for curriculum development explained the choice of academic partner. Loughborough University had been chosen for its ‘particular strengths in Engineering and Business Studies’. These factors, ‘together with its major commitment to flexible and student centred learning systems, and to courses tailored to meet the specific needs of industry mean that it [was] well placed to develop and deliver the kind of University education which Peterborough requires’. It had:

one of the largest and most successful Engineering Faculties in the UK; a large Business School with a superb reputation for teaching and quality systems, considerable strengths in research; particular strengths in computing/IT, Mathematics, Sciences and the Social Sciences (including European Studies); an outstanding record of graduate employability; a staff support and development programme with a national reputation; a proven track record in student centred learning and national leadership in flexible learning; and an excellent record of partnership to meet the needs of industry and commerce and the professions (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996).

Flexible student centred learning systems, and courses tailored to meet the specific needs of industry seems represent wishful thinking more than anything else. Similarly, the paper claimed that research would be ‘developed on a selective basis’. Although it was not clear what ‘a selective basis’ meant, it would seem to imply less rather than more, and provides another example of slippage between original aspiration. At the May 1996 meeting of the steering committee Millar had argued that it was not just research that mattered, but also the people who undertook (10.19). ‘Research and Consultancy’ had been a required output from inception of the project (see Forbat, 1994b; Gptec, 1996), and a key source of economic advantage.

The University College in Peterborough would be slim and efficient; flexible and adaptable; customer oriented; and the courses it offered would be relevant to the needs of industry and society (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996). Efficiency would be
achieved by various means. It would have low overheads, because it would occupy existing buildings and facilities. Investment in IT would be high, linking the University and its students. It would be ‘a virtual University with compact administrative systems, strong emphasis on student guidance systems and a state of the art resource centre’ (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996).

A project company limited by guarantee, and at the time applying for charitable status, would manage the project up to the establishment of the University College in October 1998 (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996). This was necessary in order to employ project staff, own assets, enter into contracts, and seek sponsors, and so forth. The costs of running the Project Company, estimated at around £400,000 per annum, were to be born ‘principally by the Partners’ (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996). Capital costs were estimated at £1.5 million in 1998, rising to about £6.3 million in 2000. The Project Company would work with Loughborough University in order to establish higher education in Greater Peterborough. The principles of this partnership were ‘enshrined’ in a Joint Venture Agreement between the Project Company and Loughborough University. Part of this arrangement involved a separate University Company set up by Loughborough University responsible for the management and governance of higher education in Peterborough, and to ring fence funding. Independence was the ultimate aim of both parties.

The board of the Project Company would include representation from Peterborough City Council (three), GPCCTE (formally GPtec) (two), GPP (one), Loughborough University (five), local businesses (four), one representative from the FE sector, and four co-opted members, one of which would be an independent Chair. (Martin resigned from the Strategy Group but was persuaded to stay on as Chair until after HEFCE’s visit to Peterborough, after which he was replaced by Felix as ‘Acting Chair’).

The changing strength of representation is obvious and significant. First the heavy representation of Peterborough City Council; second the fact that only four of the twenty board members of this customer-led project were in fact ‘customers’ (‘industry and society’). It is also significant that Loughborough University went from being predators who were not to be trusted (Millar wanted the University to make a formal statement of intention in July 1996 (10.21), for example; and Nuttall had commented that Peterborough City Council would not be happy with Loughborough University running the project company as late as September (10.23)) to the single largest body on the board within a couple of months. It is likely that this
was due largely to necessity. When Davenport left the project the Strategy Group would have found themselves almost completely without relevant knowledge, but also at this point committed to the development of higher education and in a hurry to achieve it. Only Rennie would have been able to make some 'technical' input, and there would have been obvious problems with this. Staff from the university filled the void. It was essential to recast from cherry-pickers to crucial members of the development team.

The Briefing Paper (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996) concluded that local support, including financial support, for the university development would need to be underpinned with support from HEFCE. It was therefore planned that Loughborough University would propose to bid for an allocation of numbers to be earmarked for use in Peterborough within their own annual application for HEFCE. It was added that, whilst the Strategy Group were looking at PFI possibilities, 'the availability of private finance and support will be dependent on existing support from public sources also' (Peterborough Higher Education Company, 1996). Rennie had made the point in June that the companies engaging in PFI would only do so where the risk was reasonable (10.20).

The Evening Telegraph (16/12/96) quoted a spokesperson of HEFCE as saying: 'since 1992 the Government has had a moratorium on expanding higher education. The council is interested in looking at areas that are under-provided for and East Anglia is a bit of a black spot for [higher] education'. This sounded positive. Greater Peterborough seemed an ideal candidate for the anticipated policy of regionalisation (9.8) and both the Briefing Paper (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996) and the presentation made by Grey and Felix to HEFCE, tempted to make this clear. According to the Evening Telegraph, (16/12/96) a decision from HEFCE was expected by mid-January.
Implementation

December 19 ended the formal ‘formulation’ stage of the policy process to ‘establish quality university education and services in Greater Peterborough and thus provide a skilled workforce which will generate economic growth’ (Forbat, 1994b). An assessment of local need had been completed, together with the identification of good practice occurring elsewhere. The model for the development was selected, as well as the partner institution which would deliver the higher education itself. This was Loughborough University. However, even a casual comparison of the Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) from the start of 1996 and the Briefing Paper (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996) from the end of the year reveals considerable ‘drift’ (Hogwood and Gunn, 1986). As examples: curriculum areas had changed to be more supply than demand led and research was no longer an issue.

The first undergraduate students matriculated in October 1998; thus actual provision was implemented between January 1997 and October 1998. This is beyond the scope of this research, mainly due to temporal issues. The process of higher education development in Greater Peterborough took nearly twice as long in practice as was originally planned. Some of this delay or protraction was due to the impact of power structures, however, and are significant to the study therefore. By way of conclusion, Chapter 11 seeks to summarise key features of the policy process in terms of the impact of local power relationships upon it (Chapters 9 and 10) using the theoretical framework (Chapters 2 to 8).
Chapter 11

11. Conclusions and Recommendations

The aim of the research was to examine power structures in the context of the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough. There were four operational objectives: to describe and observe the policy process (in its formulation stage); to identify evidence of power relationships and their sources; to analyse and explain policy outcomes using different theoretical approaches to power and decision making; and, where appropriate, to modify theoretical concepts in the light of the empirical evidence. This chapter addresses the last two objectives; it seeks to analyse and explain political sociological features of the policy process (Chapters 9 and 10) using the theoretical framework presented in Chapters 1 to 8.

11.1 Public Policy

The term 'Public Policy' was used to describe the products of government (Burch and Wood, 1983). Two conflicting models of the policy process were described - the linear model (e.g. Jenkins, 1978), the systems model (Easton, 1965). It was suggested that there is scope for combining the two models perpendicularly for a more complete description of the process, the first describes the management process; the other the political process within which the management takes place (2.3). The research evidence supports the proposal.

In the case of the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough the development process was planned using a linear model - the problem would be defined, information gathered, considered, and options identified, chosen and then implemented. However, at each of the stages of the development the political process, or power, impacted on the policy output, and the way in which the project progressed through its various linear stages. Neither model alone adequately describes the policy process in practice, but both are essential to study and the desire for improvement this implies (Hogwood and Gunn, 1986). A similar issue is reflected in decision making. In action the two models, rationality (Simon, 1957) and incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959), need not be discrete and conflicting.
11.2 Decision-Making

The initial policy process followed the linear model and was therefore rational in approach. It was purposive and designed to meet pre-stated goals (Simon, 1957) (see Chapter 3). For instance, there was an agreed mission statement, and aims. The aim was broken down into objectives each of which would require decisions about them within the wider context of the mission. The formal decision process was designed to allow the series of sub-decisions to be made by a group of people, the steering committee, resulting in the consensual achievement of those ends thorough a carefully planned process of information gathering. The nature of the decision process differed markedly between the high level planning and the sub-decisions required to meet those aims. For the sake of analysis the former are termed ‘strategic’, the latter ‘operational’. These are not perfect terms but serve the purpose of differentiation based on level.

11.2.1 Strategic Decisions

It emerges from the case study that decisions can be both incremental (Lindblom, 1959) and rational (Simon, 1957) at the same time. Some specific examples illustrate the point. It was submitted that a local university was essential for maintaining local competitiveness (Forbat, 1994b; Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996) and it could be argued that the general response to the problem of competitiveness was incremental. It was after all based on the assumption that economic prosperity and education are connected, and that expansion of higher education would contribute to economic growth, by providing local access for example (Tight, 1987, 1996). Specific policy ‘solutions’ grew out of existing policy therefore; the model of decision-making, which Lindblom (1959) called ‘selected limited comparisons’. Also, the specific strategy adopted to address the issue of relatively low qualification levels in Greater Peterborough which was believed to be undermining competitiveness were not new. The steering committee did not model their proposal from scratch, nor planned to establish a new way to eliminate skills shortages and competitiveness based on a comprehensive analysis of need, rates of return and so forth, but developed their strategy from the status quo position. The development of a university college, increased part-time provision, making greater use of distance learning, placing less emphasis on residential courses, and being more locally and regionally focused in provision, all included in the project plans of 1994 (Forbat, 1994a), had been occurring elsewhere for many years (see Tight, 1987). However, the decisions to pursue
such strategies were in fact rational. They were purposive and designed to achieve specific goals (Simon, 1957).

In order to attract students and public funding any development had to fit into the existing policy structure. Thus in practice few development models were actually available and it would have been irrational to spend time and resource on setting up ‘what if’ scenarios. Hence also Davenport’s suggestion in September 1995 to adopt an incremental approach to the development given the uncertainty in the higher education system following the establishment of the Dearing Committee (NCIHE, 1997) (see 10.11). In this sense it would have been an irrational decision not to adopt an incremental process, but in order to achieve a rational outcome.

Such a view might easily be criticised for being conservative; surely, a new development provides an ideal opportunity to question those deeper assumptions, rather than to perpetuate them. As such the case study also seems to confirm Kingdon’s (1984) view that real alternatives are only sought in times of crisis, that is when existing solutions have failed. Instead, still credible ‘solutions’ were available (see DES, 1987; DfE, 1991) and the problem itself was defined by wider contemporary political values, such as worries over competitiveness (Tight, 1995). The problem itself led from the solution (March and Cyert, 1963, and Cohen et al., 1972).

11.2.2 Operational Decisions

According to Simon (1957) ‘good decisions are those which are correct given the objective to which they were aimed’. In this case study many operational decisions which would fit this description, in that they appeared to contribute to the progress of the project, were not actually made. In otherwords, they were incremental (Lindblom, 1959, 1963). The key formal decision making body seldom discussed alternatives, evaluated their likely impact, and then chose their preferred option (Scott, 1967; Simon, 1957). For the most part they ignored the information presented to them and discussed issues other than those tabled. The recommendations presented to the steering committee were therefore ‘made’ by default in that proposals made by the project were not actively rejected. Thus, whilst most decisions contributed to the ultimate mission, on the whole they were rational (‘good’) in outcome, but not rational in process.

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Simon (1957) also differentiated between organisational and personal rationality, later recognising that the two may not agree, and might even be in conflict (1992). However, what emerges from the case study is that skilful policy makers were able to use the organisational rationality to support personal rationality. Most participants were keenly aware that they needed to deliver the stated outcome (a university) in order to maintain professional credibility (for example, Grey, Felix, Davenport), and in some cases, also meet their contractual obligations (Davenport and Felix). This may be a two-way process; personal rationality (i.e. individual self-interest) will encourage a person to make the effort to achieve the organisational goals in order to gain credit or avoid the embarrassment of an organisational failure which will reflect on them personally. At the same time they will use ‘good’ organisational decisions to reflect their own contribution to the success; hence Grey’s desire to manage the project’s publicity, at the same time as worrying about ‘over promising and under-delivering’ project outcomes. It is important to be seen to do things and making things (Morgan, 1986) (6.10)

11.2.3 Inertia

It has been noted above that specific decision options were seldom discussed by decision-makers and went through the process by default. Recommendations made to the steering committee were not rejected, accepted or modified, because they were not discussed. The final proposal as presented to HEFCE in the *Briefing Paper* (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996) made no reference to integrated guidance systems, competency assessments, APL, and most other innovations which had been included in the original *Development Plan* (GPtec, 1996) written earlier that year, and yet there is no evidence of any deliberate action to remove specific recommendations. They just ‘fizzled out’.

The first of these documents (GPtec, 1996) was prepared by Davenport, and not the other (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996). It is likely then that his personal presence was needed to keep the recommendations on the agenda. This tendency perhaps describes a third mode of decision-making - inertia. Inertia describes a ‘property of matter by which it continues in its existing state of rest or uniform motion in a straight line, unless the state is challenged by an external force’. In policy terms the external force is something which challenges or steers away from the *status quo* position. When this force, Davenport in this case, was removed the decision reverted to its inertial position. Inertia describes a process even less rigorous (and vigorous) than the step-by-step change by small degree associated with incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959), and one to be avoided. Simply reverting to an existing
position without actually rejecting recommendations, generally speaking following the least line, renders the preparatory work pointless and is a waste of resource and opportunity.

In summary then, incremental (Lindblom, 1959) and rational (Simon, 1957) decision processes are not mutually exclusive and can be used in combination to good effect - an incremental means to a rational end for example. The political process can support the progression of a project through its stages. The management structure of the higher education development project was designed to provide a forum for decision by 'partisan mutual adjustment' (Lindblom, 1965) towards rational objectives. Whether the policy process is rational or incremental is somewhat beside the point. Interest should be focused on what is being described - process or outcome; how the two methods might be used in combination to bring about preferred outcomes most effectively; and how appropriate a particular method is to specific circumstances, the issue of conservatism.

11.3 Political Decision-Making.

The case study evidence supports the view that the theory of legitimate power (Smith, 1974; Weber, 1978) is not reflected in practice. The model assumed that administrators implement policy on behalf of elected representatives who are carrying out the will of the sovereign people (Smith, 1974). Hill (1997) suggested that in practice the political and administrative systems overlap, particularly with the recent mushrooming of agencies and quangos. The key issue here is one of accountability.

11.3.1 Government

The project involved only one national politician, the constituency Member of Parliament (MP), and his involvement was not formal. It was no less significant because of that, however. Local government officers were open in their desire to 'keep in with' the constituency MP because he was supporting their application for unitary status, for example, and demands made in one policy arena could be placed against sanctions or threats in another, as Crenson (1971) noted. Therefore Peterborough City Council were happy to meet the demands of Pine in the development of higher education in order to secure unitary status which they valued more. Any intervention by the MP was not a result of the constituency pressure.
Local government was involved in the development of the higher education in Greater Peterborough formally through membership of the steering committee. Representation came from council officers from South Kesteven District Council (Lincolnshire) and from Peterborough City Council. In the former case the representative attended two meetings and eventually resigned from the committee. In the latter case representation grew over time. Most of the discussion that follows relates only to Peterborough City Council therefore.

Councillors did not provide the strategic leadership assumed by the formal model of legitimate power; nor was higher education development ever an election issue. Elected representatives from Peterborough City Council were not involved in the development process until they took up Project Company Board membership at the end of December 1996. Until then members had received three formal presentations about the project, and it was claimed that many had had private conversations with Grey and Hall concerning the development. However, it was admitted that their level of understanding about the project was generally low (Grey and Nuttall) and even as late October 1996 presentations to councillors had to be kept ‘simple’. The public was largely ignorant.

Once Peterborough City Council was committed to the project officers were diligent in pushing the (declared) preferences of the councillors. It was claimed for instance that the councillors found the prospect of a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with Loughborough University, as opposed to a formal contract unacceptable, for example, and as such Hall and Hall would not support it. When councillors were invited to participate actively in the policy process it was at the time when officers (both council and agency) considered it appropriate; and then not because their input was valued, but because it was a political necessity. However, there is little evidence to suggest that councillors were manipulated in the ways in which those in Newton’s (1976) study of Birmingham City Council believed themselves to be, except by being kept in ignorance. It should be noted, of course, that this study did not focus on the micro-politics of Peterborough City Council; only the interactions of the council with other agencies in the context of higher education development. Therefore examples of manipulation may exist but would not have been picked up by the study.

The relationship between politicians and paid officials is more complex in practice than the formal model allows. It appears to sit, between Michels’ (1968) model of oligarchic leadership and Weber’s (1947) model. Whilst officers in this case seemed generally dominant over councillors, the relationship seems to have depended less on expert knowledge (Weber, 1947)
(of higher education), than their being officials, that is having delegated authority and knowing ‘the rules’ (Saunders, 1975) (6.4).

11.3.2 Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs)

It is also important to accountability that the state has ceased to be simply two groups as Weber (1947) assumed, but is a mixture of more or less accountable bodies (Parsons, 1995). The project was led by the TEC, which lacked even the normative accountability associated with the local authority. The case provides evidence to support Haughton et al.’s (1995a) finding that TECs are more accountable to the Department of Education and Employment (DfEE) than any other of their local stakeholders (except perhaps large businesses whose interests are entrenched). TECs are dependent upon national government for their establishment and maintenance. Thus the proposal for the university in Peterborough had to relate to the TEC’s business objectives defined by GOER, and local policy was produced, defined and constrained by a national Department of Employment and Education (DfEE) agenda. The extent to which DfEE itself is accountable to formal political masters falls beyond the scope of this study.

TECs are private companies, and therefore not open to public scrutiny and perhaps find it particularly easy to remain unaccountable. They are products of the market model of political accountability, which depends on giving stakeholders information on performance and options, allowing stakeholders to participate and express preference, and thereby legitimating responsive delivery choices. Yet, in this case there is little evidence of public consultation and communication. In practice, therefore, it seems that TECs have formalised the privileged position of business in their activities, including those related to higher education; made power (formal authority) less easy to locate and challenge (Haughton et al. 1995a); and made bargaining over and with public resources, and the resulting allocations, is essentially private.

In this case there is no evidence of control over TEC activity by those interest groups recognised as ‘stakeholders’ in the Employment Departments Planning Guidance (1989) - ITOs, voluntary groups, and community groups. The one community group which did attempt to participate, the ethnic minority community through the TEC-sponsored EMAG was ignored until they withdrew from the process. Members were not denied access to the decisions process. They were listened to but not heard. This is not to suggest that voluntary and community interests were deliberately ignored in order to maintain their disadvantage (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963), nor that the groups were deliberately ignored in the hope that they would
withdraw (Gaventa, 1980). The actual process reflects the 'least line' on the part of decision-makers, and withdrawal of the extra demands as perhaps a 'lucky' convenience.

The Employment Department Planning Guidance (ED, 1989) also formally recognised local authorities as TEC stakeholders. Haughton et al. (1995a) found the relationship to be particularly important one, but not always a 'steady one' (Haughton et al. 1995b). As TECs have increased their remits (Vere, 1993) this has involved a movement into policy areas previously the sphere of the local authority, regeneration and education for instance, and brought with it problems. TECs are meant to work in 'partnership', but their mere presence threatens the autonomy of their 'partners'. For instance, Hogwood (1995) noted that following the introduction of the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) Local Authorities could no longer make applications without the TEC. Most applications are made by both the local authority and the TEC. This has created dependencies and with it the potential for log-rolling (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). It may also have given rise to mutual resentment as 'partnership' can also undermine the desire for autonomy (Lukes, 1974; and Morgan, 1986). Both factors have particular implications for the way in which the TEC has interacted with the local authority and other policy actors. This is explored in some detail below (see 11.4). First, however, it is necessary to look at the TEC’s accountability to their stakeholders.

Training and Enterprise Councils are business-led, and businesses represent a major stakeholder. Two-thirds of a TEC’s governing board is drawn from local industry with the aim of encouraging the support of other businesses and increasing the commitment of local people towards them. Assuming that members of organisations act in ways to ensure the survival of their organisations, the interests of TEC employees are by definition the same as those of business. It is a practical necessity for a TEC to ally itself with business. It has a statutory obligation to do so, and will survive through effective delivery of desired outputs.

This need to form relationships with business also suggests some support for Dunleavy’s (1991) class claim, although perhaps 'class' is a misleading term - it is the difference between the dominant oligarchy, in this case the 'partnership team' and the rest of the group, which is significant. Dunleavy argued that the self-interest of senior bureaucrats is congruent with those of the class to which they belong. Privatisation, his case, was not resisted by senior bureaucrats because it was more in their interest to maintain personal relationships with politicians and businesses than defend the public service, particularly as they held strategically significant jobs which they would keep after privatisation (4.2).
Dunleavy's (1991) model helps to explain why Davenport lost the support of Felix. It could be argued, for example, Felix was more anxious to maintain relations with significant politicians (Hall and Nuttall) and business leaders (Martin) than to support his own employee. Dunleavy's model also suggests reasons for this. That is, the more senior an employee, the greater their responsibility for survival of their organisation, and therefore, the their need to secure the support of people and organisations which can enable survival.

11.3.3 The Greater Peterborough Partnership (GPP)

A key organisation, on whose behalf the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough was carried out, was the Greater Peterborough Partnership (GPP), a mainly business membership organisation. The GPP Board's ratification of the Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) was considered essential for the project to proceed to implementation. The GPP was represented on the steering committee and the Joint Strategy Group by their Chief Executive, Grey. She seems to have been able to gain concessions for no apparent return, fronting the project whilst the TEC funded it and did the work, for example. This perhaps reflects a general belief in the need of the GPP's support of any major proposal, but in practice such support seems to have been somewhat circular owing to a common membership. In October 1996 members of Board included Holland, and Martin, but also four members of the TEC Board. Felix had also been a member in 1994.

Comments on the GPP Board's understanding of the project (ordinary members were not mentioned at all) indicates that it was low, and as Craig had commented, the GPP had no real function (10.14). Perhaps its main role lay in lending legitimacy and credibility to the preferences of a small group, therefore. The GPP could be used to add formal support to the projects and proposals being articulated by the same people in other groups, thereby suggesting a broader and higher level of consensus than may have actually been the case. This may have been possible precisely because the GPP had no operational function and therefore did not have organisational preferences of its own. Martin, Holland and Felix were members of the GPP because of the positions they already held, because they were already 'powerful' (Morgan, 1986). It appears therefore that the GPP did not create relationships but perpetuated existing ones; which because of their permanence and entrenched nature are better described as 'structures' than 'relationships'.
11.4 Power Structures

Evans (1996) pointed out that: 'many TECs have been sensitive to the fact that they are entering an already crowded policy arena and need to build upon rather than cut across existing positions'. In other words TECs were not immediately welcomed by the communities they were going to serve. Anecdotal evidence indicates that when first established GPtec was not sufficiently sensitive to this and made little attempt to build on existing relationships. As a result it found the community hostile and resistant. When Felix took up the post of Chief Executive he may have been forced to be more sensitive than ever. To engage other organisations he would have needed to develop relationships with hostile partners, through mutual support and favour. This might also perpetuate those existing relationships and positions.

This need is not specific to TECs. Selznick (1966), from his study of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), concluded that the TVA had to adapt itself 'not so much to the people in general as to the actually existing institutions which [had] the power to smooth or block its way'. This was achieved through 'cooperation' - 'the process of absorbing ... elements into the leadership of the policy-determining structure ... as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence'. Given that the TVA had gone through this process over sixty years previously (1933) and in another country (the USA, it would seem that the phenomenon endures as well as the specific relationships and positions which it supports.

Rhodes (1997) suggests that TECs are an imperfect example of the trend towards governance which is meant to characterise (post)modern government. He uses 'governance' to refer to 'self-organising, interorganisational networks characterised by interdependent resource exchange and [shared] rules of the game' which provides checks and balances on each other until a consensus position is reached (Lindblom's (1959) model of good government). However, the case study would suggest that some groups had considerably more influence than others - Peterborough City Council, and the GPP had more, and EMAG less - with out any evidence of real interdependent resource exchange. Perhaps, then, the influence enjoyed by some can be explained in terms of 'intangible' factors. There are two aspects to this.

First dependencies did exist, but they were not 'real'. Money, access to important or useful information, support in implementation and so forth were of very little consequence. Again, the GPP had few resources with which to bargain, but was allowed to front the project;
Peterborough City Council made no financial input and yet assumed increasingly significant control; whilst Pearl Assurance and Perkins, who had made, or were making, more contribution than all the others (except GPtec from the SRB), were removed from the decision making process altogether in September 1996 (10.23). Arguably, in this case most of the exchange and dependency rested on non-specific, and indeed non-specified, 'support'; what Morgan (1986) termed 'interpersonal alliances, networks and control of 'informal organisation' mutual anticipated 'back scratching' (7.9).

The second point follows on from the first; that is that because participation depended on giving support it meant that only the already powerful are included in the policy process. The networks of support existed prior to the problem - Hall and Davenport were on the steering committee because they were already powerful, 'movers and shakers' to use Martin's term. Thus, power relationships did not form around the issue (Dahl, 1961), but were prior to it. Existing power structures defined relationships and options, and relationships between actors in one policy arena effect those in another. It follows that the power relationships under study at any one time are only partly and indirectly related to the issue and dependencies featured there (Crenson, 1971). The incidence of logrolling on the outcomes of policy (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987) is probably far greater than a single issue study would suggest therefore.

Logrolling 'relies on two or more groups having different interests that do not directly contradict each other, so that each group is prepared to trade a vote for the other group's priority concern in return for a reciprocal concession' (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). It is common where policy decisions are being made by multi-member institutions. Dunleavy and O'Leary describe logrolling in a formal setting, which allows vote-trading. However evidence from the case study suggests that the principle would seem to apply equally where there is not such a formal arrangement but where benefits of any type might be traded. 'IOU's (Morgan, 1986) are equally important as the material dependencies in the incentive structures and considerations of decision-makers. IOUs can carry a risk when they are not articulated or agreed, and are often based on anticipated returns.

An example of this is the way in which Craig supported Nuttall's sudden interest in the university project because he expected some future return, that is receiving work from Peterborough City Council (Team Away Day November, 1995) (10.13). In future Nuttall (now Director of Education for Peterborough City Council) may or may not respond in a way that
Anticipated returns are unlikely to be completely random however, and may instead be based on rational decision informed by incentive structures (Dowding, 1991), including issues related to reputation. This makes Hunter’s (1953) reputational method seem credible therefore, because it suggests that the way in which people believe power to be structured may ultimately contribute to how it is structured (see Friedrich, 1941).

Logrolling relies on two or more actors having interests which do not directly contradict each other (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). In this case however, only one actor had interests in conflict with the development of university provision in Greater Peterborough: Rennie. Other actors appear to have created conflict over sub-decisions in order to advance their wider interests. This may have been possible precisely because they shared and ultimate aim which was to provide university education in Peterborough. Knowing that they agreed over the fundamental aim (for whatever reason) they could take issue over other things - (who would front the project, who would chair the steering committee, who would manage the day-to-day running of the project- without threatening the final outcome, and having hopefully secured some more personal gains along the way. Indeed, this opportunity may have been a real point of participation for many of the ‘partnership team’, given that they could make so little substantive contribution to the project anyway.

All were anxious to be involved, perhaps because power begets power (Morgan, 1986). Being involved in a prestigious project was itself an indication of, and following from this a source of, power. The importance of being perceived as powerful might explain the ‘partnership’ team’s constant allusions to their various contacts, their own comments which indicated that they occupied other positions of power and influence; their easy access to each other, and their shared jokes. It is plausible that here we see more evidence that power relationships are prior to the problem, and that ‘power relationships, once established, are self-sustaining’ (Gaventa, 1980).

The ‘Pine Explosion’ (May 1995) (10.8) would seem to provide an extreme example of the importance of power for its own sake, both in his own action and the responses of others. It also explains the potency of co-option to neutralise conflict (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963; and Selznick 1966). Pine’s original outburst seems to have promoted by a claimed lack of
consultation. He was annoyed that he had not been asked to participate in the process, declaring to know more about higher education than most. However the letter sent to make this point indicated that the claim was in fact factious.

I would suggest, therefore, that Pine’s real problem was one of ego. He felt piqued that he should not have been seen as crucial to the development process, and made the point forcibly; indeed so forcibly that he threatened to go to his colleague in the Department of Education and tell her that the project (of which he knew little by his own admission) was fundamentally flawed. It seems reasonable to suppose that Hall felt safe to threaten thus because he could predict that other powerful people (Felix, Hall, Martin) would sooner acquiesce than risk his public disfavour. It could also be argued that they would acquiesce owing to their commitment to the project, but it has already been noted that Peterborough City Council, for one, wished to maintain his support for their application for unitary status. Only Rennie and Davenport, neither of which were ‘movers and shakers’ and therefore subject to the pressures of coalition membership (Morgan, 1986), made explicit the point that Pine’s function was to represent Peterborough in Westminster, and not vice versa.

There are three points worth noting from this. First, that the problem was used by the ‘partnership’ team to reinforce their own positions despite the fact they were now, as subjects of power, going through the motions of tasks which Pine had set which none thought intrinsically necessary or valuable. They repeatedly highlighted their access to Pine (see Morgan, 1986) (6.6 and 6.9). All of a sudden, that is after Hall accidentally told the rest of the committee that there was a problem (December 1995) (10.14), anyone who was anyone had meetings set up with Pine, or would be seeing him at some event or another. If they were going to be bullied by him they needed some return – maybe enhanced image and status (Morgan, 1986).

This expectation is made most clear in Martin’s alleged comment to Davenport, that if Pine ‘crossed him’ Martin would not hesitate to expose Pine’s behaviour. This was personal, and not an act of principle. For Pine’s part, seeing his prescribed actions being carried out, he withdrew. This was also convenient for him as he had problems related to the parliamentary party which he needed to manage. However, it is possible that had the ‘partnership’ team not followed his wishes he would have found time to do both. Certainly, the ‘partnership team’ was unwilling to wait and see.
The second point is related to the first; the problem of Pine was not shared with all members of the steering committee. Not until the threat had been resolved and then only following a blunder by Hall, did the main body of the committee have any notion of the threat over the project, some six months after the problem arose. This may suggest a belief that there was no point sharing the problem because those members of the committee who did not know did not precisely because they were insignificant and could not therefore be expected to contribute anything useful to the crisis. On the other hand it might also have been an issue to do with image. Members of the 'partnership team' might not have wanted others to know that they could be the subjects of power and they were not all powerful. Furthermore, if the issue was resolved by them alone the greater their share of credit which in turn would enhance their perceived power - symbolism and the management of meaning (Morgan, 1986) (6.10).

The third point to notice about the 'Pine Explosion' relates to the solutions which were planned to resolve the problem. The first was to go through the motions, symbolic action. Thus, for example, Exeter University was invited to consider the opportunity of partnership in order to, what Martin described as, 'cover the audit trail' - actually to be able to tell Pine that his wishes had been complied with, knowing perfectly well that Exeter would decline the offer. Failing this, 'Plan B' would be invoked. This did not involve obliging Pine to justify his position publicly, nor seeking the views of the community to legitimate one or other position. Instead, it meant using personal contacts of GPtec Board members to approach Pine's colleague at the Department of Education and Employment directly, and before Pine; again, the issues of access (Mills, 1956; Saunders, 1975, 1979).

None of this was 'public', and the only reason the project team knew of such a strategy was because Felix had told them in December 1996 when, according to MA, Pine threatened to become a problem again. Specifically, Felix would speak to the Chairman of the TEC board, a businessman and personal friend of the Minister in question, and suggest the Pine was out of touch with constituency opinion. This is a far cry from the 'recognition and interplay between competing interests that politics implies' (Morgan, 1986), and legitimate power requires (Smith, 1974).

Such dealings leave no formal evidence. Moreover, those who are privy to such plans are either so insignificant that they pose no threat (the project team) or were already members of an in-group and therefore controlled by the rules of coalition membership (Morgan, 1986). Group relationships are maintained because there is little threat of exposure, because the threat of
exposure also threatens the coalition itself. Thus, it becomes self-sustaining and also disempowers members. In this case, once the coalition had formed conflict occurred over minor issues which had very little impact on the essential development of the project, nor challenged entrenched power relationships in any real sense.

Thus, it is possible to speculate that the power relationships underlying the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough existed prior to the policy issue, and the project itself served to develop and extend them. This implies a permanence that makes them better described as 'structures', than relationships. Evidence from the case also supports Shaw's (1991) proposition that focusing on the formal institutions of government in order to understand local politics is inappropriate, and that multiple theories of community power might be more so. This issue is addressed below.

11.5 Community Power

11.5.1 Pluralism

Dahl (1961) argued that individuals entered policy arenas if they had an interest (a direct interest) in the issue, and that participation matched preference. No person or group dominated in more than one area. He assumed that any conflict was articulated, visible and reconciled through the formal decision process (1957). Observing the outcomes of which would reveal who had power. This case study provides evidence which suggests that the pluralist method is flawed.

It has already been illustrated from the case study that the formal decision making process (Dahl, 1957) is not the place to find decisions being made. Powerful participants appear to prefer making decisions at pre-meeting meetings. The restructuring of the state has made even locating formal decisions-making more difficult. In this case, examining the formal decision-making process would have yielded little to indicate who had power. Votes were not taken, minutes were expurgated, and conflict deliberately kept outside formal processes, as with Pine; or denied altogether, the case with Peterborough Regional College. The conclusions that follow therefore are also likely to be flawed.

Thus, in the case study power was not dispersed, but was concentrated because actors entered into the policy process because they already have power. Issues were not independent for the
same reason. Were they independent logrolling and tacitly agreed IOUs would be less useful and therefore common, but the case study presents evidence to suggest that concessions are made in one arena against concessions elsewhere - the earlier example of Nuttall’s increased influence in anticipated exchange for work or support, for instance. Furthermore, information was not freely available, a pre-requisite for the pluralist model. Those groups which did attempt some participation, the ethnic minority community specifically, were largely ignored and eventually withdrew from the decision-making process. Thus, against pluralist claims that non-participation indicates satisfaction with a certain state of affairs, non-participation is likely to reflect ignorance and exasperation rather more than either contentment and trust.

Dahl’s (1957) suggested sources of power are reasonable, if incomplete - access to resources, control over jobs and patronage, and the control of information, but they are also appear to be more concentrated than he supposed. Nor is the relationship between base and issue direct or immediate (Dahl, 1957); ‘intangible’ bases seem to be of considerable importance in bargaining.

Dahl also argued that ‘economic notables’ (1957) were simply another group in the policy process; that is they did not enjoy any particular privileges. At one level the case study might confirm this view. Business representatives (excluding Martin whose interests seem to have been more about advancing his own career than the interests of his employer) made little contribution to the meetings when compared with the ‘partnership team’; and whose non-participation was easily brought about by abolishing the steering committee.

There is evidence from the case study, therefore, that the active involvement of business was limited. Friedland (1982) however, argued that active participation of businesses is often unnecessary, and this seems to be reflected in the fact that when these two businesses were removed from the formal decision process in September 1996, their subject areas remained ‘priorities’ (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996). Evidence elsewhere in the case study might suggest that this was because pressure was being applied ‘behind the scenes’, however, it is more likely that they were simply able to free-ride, their interests being entrenched in the wider policy process.

Elitist conceptualisations of power, for example those of Mills (1956), Hunter (1953) and Saunders (1975, 1979), provide models more relevant to the case of power structures in the context of higher education development in Greater Peterborough.
11.5.2 Professionals/Experts

Whilst the needs of capital and economic growth have been an implicit function of higher education for some time - the Robbins Committee (1963) called for expansion of the system in response to a ‘growing realisation of [Britain’s] economic dependence upon the education of its population’ for example - the notion of explicitly business-led provision is more recent. During the 1980s, however, businesses increased their role in the development and provision of higher education to the point of allowing the development of university education in Peterborough to be led by a Training and Enterprise Council (later combined with the Chamber of Commerce), ‘on behalf’ of the GPP (Greater Peterborough Partnership). Expert educators from Loughborough University were viewed as threatening and had a limited role in product specification in the first instance. The project’s needs were defined very much in terms of economic perforativity (Lyotard, 1984) as opposed to more general educational objectives. Thus, Higher education’s role in supporting the labour market is largely accepted (Ball, 1990; Stone, 1998) and the achievement of relevant and cost-effective provision now structures higher education policymaking.

These issues have been covered in some detail above (Chapter 9) and the point to emphasise here is that the enhanced role of business, whether personal (active) or ‘structural’ (passive), is partly matched by the displacement of the group previously responsible for higher education - the universities themselves, and the lecturer as ‘professional’ (Ball, 1990). This reflects a wider ideological/cultural change (Bloland, 1995), which appears to be mirrored in the development of the Peterborough project. For instance, staff from Loughborough University were more or less excluded from the strategic decision process until Davenport’s sudden departure (September 1996) (10.23). This left the ‘partnership team’ with little choice but to include ‘experts’ because of their own low level of understanding. A dominant theme in steering group discussions was that the university should not be involved in discussion until ‘we’ (essentially the ‘partnership team’) were sure what was required of the development.

It is plausible that this fear arose from concerns that superior knowledge of a working system could result in manipulation (Ellul, 1964; Weber, 1978). Where an individual knows little of a subject and wishes to appear knowledgeable they should avoid those who do know more - people who may be loosely termed ‘experts’. For one the expert will highlight one’s relative ignorance. As well, experts may make proposals which the non-expert is unable to assess critically owing to inferior knowledge. One practical solution to the first problem, and one that
Craig employed to good effect, is to ask an ‘expert’ to ‘brief’ someone else and then sit in on the briefing. However, the evidence in this case study would seem to support those who argue that the influence of professional’s and experts over policy making is often overstated (Brown and Lyon, 1992; Thourmon, 1992, and Mills, 1993) and that ‘do-it-yourself’ predominates (Henderson, 1986). Hence Craig’s plan for 14 ‘faculties’, for example.

It is also significant that once Loughborough University became more actively involved in the development, following the resignation of Davenport in September 1996, the nature of planned provision changed. Notions of customer focused provision were diluted somewhat. For instance, the Briefing Paper (Peterborough Higher Education Project Company, 1996) prepared for HEFCE’s visit states that: ‘It is expected that course design will draw from existing degrees already in operation at Loughborough University where appropriate’. Whilst, it would seem organisationally rational for Loughborough University to choose the quickest, cheapest and easiest provision; and it is clear that the university did have ‘power’ (derived from access to funding, approval of courses, as well as superior knowledge of the higher education system), it is also worth noting that at this point their wider interests became congruent with those of the partnership team. Specifically, both were interested in expediting the development process, in order to have higher education in place in Peterborough as soon, and as simply, as possible. In other words, the partnership team may not have been bowing to expert knowledge or conditional incentives, but now wished to work with Loughborough University in order to bring about a general outcome (i.e. a university). Perhaps the specifics had always been trivial to them.

Thus, it might be argued that power structures, and the relationships which form them, are not always stable and predictable, but are also partly contingent on spatial and temporal factors, both generally (Bergman and Luckmann, 1966; Saunders, 1975; and Kingdon, 1984) and in specific contexts (Blowers, 1983). The university did not change its position between August and December 1996, nor made concessions to the demands of their partner. They achieved their aims none the less because of changes elsewhere in the policy process that resulted in a convergence of interest and the opportunity to carry the project forward in a way that suited both parties. This also supports the view that not every outcome which is to the advantage one actor is a result of a power relationship (Westergaard, 1977), made by Polsby (1971) and Dowding et al. (1995) for example.
11.5.3 Marxism

In the analysis of the development of higher education in Peterborough so far many Marxist models of the distribution of power have been covered, thus illustrating the point that whilst possibly over simplistic, they provide a useful guide to macro issues (Bowers, 1982; 1983; Ham, 1982). It can be argued for example, that Benson’s (1982) ‘deep structures’, Clegg’s (1975), and Clegg and Dunkerly (1980) ‘iconic system of domination’, which suggests that policy inevitably follows the needs of capital, would seem to be correct. Yet, Benson’s (1982) additional claim (also Habermas, 1976; O’Connor, 1973; and Offe, 1975) that these strategies would also inevitably result in fiscal and/or legitimation crises inherent in it, seems to have been incorrect. It has also bee argued that Althusser (1969) and Poulantzas (1976) overstate the structural element of capital (Milliband, 1977) reducing individuals to ‘bearers’ of structured social relationships. Were all human relationships derived from structure they would be wholly predictable. Instead they have been characterised as ‘structurally suggested’ (Dowding, 1991) (see 2.4).

It would seem to be correct that policy does support capital accumulation - higher education in Peterborough was aimed at producing manpower to support commercial ‘competitiveness’. The logic of capitalism is inherent in all policy. Businesses had privileged access (Friedland, 1982; and Saunders, 1979, 1981) to local decision making which they did not really need, because national government has designed processes and organisations to ensure that their interests are dominant. Thus Stone (1998) argues that ‘once fiercely disputed, privatisation has become an accepted instrument of public policy’. Mills (1956) and Lukes (1974) would argue that this is a result of ‘massive indoctrination’ (Mills, 1956) or ‘socialisation’ (Lukes, 1974), but from the case study this seems unlikely or unnecessary. The case yields little evidence of the state being actively, instrumentally, manipulated by capitalist interests too. Neither does it necessarily follow that because policy favours the interests of business and capital that it are also against the interests of other actors (Dowding et al., 1995).

What is interesting from the case however, is the way in which ‘less esteemed’ members of the steering committee appeared to accept the fact that they had not be informed or consulted about some key issues, the ‘Pine Explosion’ for example. Dowding, (1991) suggests that action is based on rational expectation (Harsanji, 1977) and actors will only act if they believe it to be in their interest to do so. This is not the same as being manipulated or indoctrinated and such arguments make analysis complex and subjective. Being ignored may prompt actors to
withdraw because it is a waste of their time to participate, because they either have, or think
they have, few resources with which to bargain or threaten (as with EMAG).

In a micro study such as the case of higher education development in Greater Peterborough,
Marx's own early writings are of particular interest because they focus on the state as an
organisation, rather than its relationship with capital, which we have already established is close
and mutualistic. In his *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* (1843, in Kamenka, 1983) Marx
proposed that bureaucrats were self-interested and argued that this leads them to deceive each
other in order to achieve their individual aims. Marx rejected the view that there could be no
such thing as an independent bureaucracy as Hegel had suggested. Instead officials of the state
would inevitably use their positions to pursue their own interests, supported in this by the
division of labour which allowed them to deceive their colleagues. It is perhaps this that
explains the seemingly ambivalent behaviour of Felix towards his junior colleague, Davenport.
Felix occupied the inconvenient position of needing to support his colleague for reasons related
to the management of GPtec (morale and so forth) at the same time as seeking to maintain his
good relationship with the rest of the 'partnership team' (Hall, Grey and Martin).

Dunleavy (1991) also claimed that bureaucrats pursue individual strategies of self-interest, not
collective ones (Tullock, 1965, 1976; Niskanen 1971, 1973), unless they are forced to through
the failure of individual ones. He also suggested that rank and seniority affect the level of self­
interested behaviour. He argued that rational self-interested bureaucrats maximise control,
which he called 'shaping'. In the case of the higher education project in Greater Peterborough
there is evidence that organisations such as the GPP, and Peterborough City Council, and some
key individuals (Pine, Martin), wanted involvement, or perhaps more accurately to be seen to be
involved, without having to do the work. Dunleavy's (1991) model can perhaps be modified
therefore to include the idea that appearance of control is desired for its own sake ('impression
management' (Morgan, 1986) (6.10), rather than through any desire to shape the development
of policy per se.

Dunleavy's (1991) and Marx's (1843, in Kamenka, 1983) argument differs from that of Lipset,
Trow and Coleman (1956) because it focuses on deception and competition within a group,
rather than between groups. Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956), like Michels (1986) and Weber
(1971), suggest that elite leadership groups deceive other actors (rank and file) in order to
maintain their positions of dominance. The case study does provide evidence to support this
view too. The 'partnership team' assumed a particular role within the steering committee, held
private meetings, planned outcomes before committee meetings and so forth; but it also supports Marx's (1843, in Kamenka, 1983) view of deception within groups. The incidents leading up to Davenport's resignation would seem to provide a clear case of deception between layers of a single bureaucratic hierarchy.

A direct example of intraorganisational individual self-interested behaviour is that of Craig using his formal authority to restructure the project management in such a way so as to assume control himself during Davenport's absence on holiday (August 1996) (10.22). Craig proposed that Davenport should 'officer' the streamlined steering body. Arguably, this reflects Craig's aim to secure more control without the burden of more work. Routine tasks would remain with Davenport whilst Craig undertook 'shaping' (Dunleavy, 1991). It might be claimed, as indeed it was, that the fact that Davenport was on holiday when the project was 'restructured' thus changing his role from managing it to officering a group chosen and led by Craig (and Nuttall), was coincidental. There is, however, no obvious reason why the decision could not have been delayed a week until Davenport’s return.

In *On the Jewish Question* (1844, in Kamenka, 1983) Marx argued that formal legal equality is meaningless unless accompanied by social equality and freedom. This broadens the focus of power. The point that Marx is making is that unequal power is derived from the unequal distribution of private property. However, his argument also serves a more subtle point in that it implies that power is personal, and is channelled in rules, roles and relationships (Disegger, 1992). Jews are not subjugated because they are without private property, but because they are Jewish; power is channelled through rules and relationship which do not necessarily match formal ones. This highlights the need to look beyond the formal structures of power, and beyond the institutions of power for sources and evidence (Shaw, 1991).

From this point on Marx's analysis assumed a more economic and class-based focus, which ironically may have contributed to its own predicative failure. Few people accept that the modern capitalist state will be overthrown by a unified proletariat in order to achieve a classless society based on public ownership of the means of production and distribution. Nor would many accept the moral prescriptions to achieve this. Fukuyama (1992) argues that liberalism and capitalism are triumphant and the only credible ideologies and social arrangements remaining. However, Marxist models remain crucial to our understanding of power because they highlight the weaknesses of liberal democracy and the pluralist and normative assumptions about it.
However from this analysis of the case study of higher education development in Greater Peterborough it appears that Marx’s earlier writings can contribute to the description of public policymaking. First, the case provides evidence that public organisations are not independent and neutral (Marx, 1843, 1844 in Kamenka, 1983) either in terms of reconciling the demands of all groups of society, or in carrying out objectives defined by political leaders based upon election mandates (Smith, 1974); and, second, they are not designed to be (Hogwood, 1997; Haughton et al. 1995). Third, individual decision-makers pursue self-interest and while the successful progression of the project depends on some convergence of these interests (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987) individuals also to create conflicts and dependencies as a means of generating power for themselves (Morgan, 1986). What it also demonstrates is that analysis has to be multi-levelled. It supports the view that the overlaps between macro and organisational issues are considerable and fundamental to understanding power relationships (Blowers, 1983, 1984; Robbins, 1991).

The case study also yields the following conclusion: access seems to be more important to control than expertise (Weber, 1978), confirming Saunders’ view (1975, 1979). That is to say that in the case study decision makers were able to access, and therefore impact on, the policy process, not because they had superior knowledge (Morgan, 1986) or control over technology (Morgan, 1986), but because they already occupied positions of perceived importance (Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1969).

11.6 Summary

The aim of this research was to observe policy making in situ in order to assess the impact of power relationships on public policy using the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough as a case study example. It has been argued that different theoretical positions on power draw their conclusions from different methods and that a combined approach is the most appropriate. From the case study we can conclude that business as a whole has power which is embodied in the general processes of public policy making and also the specific policy arena under study, higher education. Not only do businesses have superior financial resources (Morgan (1986) suggests that ‘Money can be converted into promotions, patronage, threats, promises, or favours to buy loyalty, service, support, or raw compliance’), but also have formal authority to participate in the policy process (DES, 1987; DfE, 1991). Businesses were involved in the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough because they had to be
'seen to be', and also because they were considered a vital source of resources in the context of privatised, relevant higher education provision.

This apparently supports Lindblom's suggestion that policy making represents a series of incremental changes, 'successive limited comparisons' (1959). Substantive impact by individual policy makers was constrained by the way in which the national higher education policy arena was already structured which in turn was defined by the logic of contemporary. National policy affected the way in which the local project was defined and who should take part, which then reinforced the definition and constrained the selection of existing solutions to be brought to bear on the problem. Most specific policy options entered and subsequently left the policy process without real discussion or impact, through a process described as inertia. However, it is also important to note that in the specific context of this time and this place this was also a rational option.

According to Simon (1954) 'good decisions are those which are correct given the objective to which they were aimed'. It is possible to conclude therefore, that whilst in this case policy making seems to have been less about choosing between alternatives than validating default outcomes, there were limits to how comprehensive the decision process could be anyway. The local policy arena is multi-levelled; structure determines perceptions, options and constraints, which suggest outcomes, which in turn act back on structure.

In the case of the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough it appears that all the 'partnership team' agreed over the principle of a university in Greater Peterborough for whatever reason, and therefore chose instead to conflict over secondary issues in order to make personal gains there. When threats were made to the project itself, most noticeably from Pine (see 10.8), as was the partnership team acting in complete unity and the steering committee emerged intact. In other cases, the extension of 'consolidation', for example, against which the partnership team were powerless they simply had to 'wait and see'.

Yet, power has the potential to empower as Morgan (1986) and Gaventa (1980) suggest, as does the reputation for power (Hunter, 1953; and Dowding et al, 1997). This would seem to indicate some accumulation of resources contrary to Dahl (1961) and pluralist claims.

As well as businesses, others who had power in the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough were those with the formal authority to carry out the policy - the Training and
Enterprise Council for example, and those who were already linked with them in other policy arenas - the Greater Peterborough Partnership (GPP) and Peterborough City Council. These organisations were involved in the decision making process surrounding the development of higher education because they were already considered to be powerful, or ‘influential’. More than this, it was not just the organisations that had significance but also the individuals. ‘Networking’ was crucial. Anyone who had networked successfully, could be described as powerful - in this case study, the ‘partnership team’. The relationships were structured. This was possible because expertise and understanding of higher education were not required; ‘influence’ was. Options were more or less defined by national policy and therefore local actors were needed to start the process and carry out the logistical arrangements necessary to carry out the available option(s). Thus Ham (1982) concludes that: ‘[I]ndividuals and groups may have an impact on policy, but under conditions not of their own choosing’.

Power also disempowers. In joining the group individuals were required to give up some individual autonomy - to pay a ‘price for participation’ (Morgan, 1986) in an elite coalition. Decisions involve each of them in a balance between the rewards and contributions necessary to sustain membership’. A reputation for power based on membership may be one gain, access to other ‘powerful people’ may be another, and trade-offs elsewhere (log-rolling) another. The ‘partnership team’ appear to have used their power to develop their own personal interests. Agreed on the main principle, generally incapable of making a useful contribution to the specific content of the development, they devoted their energies to getting the most out of the process for themselves without damaging the coalition. In the longer term the local community might benefit from the development, enjoying access to local provision of higher education and the benefits associated with it. This remains to be and falls outside the time focus of this study.

Marx (1845, quoted in Hill, 1997), argued that ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it’, but recommendations as to the management of this project seem largely irrelevant, because their practical significance depends upon the will to improve the process. Nothing went wrong with the local policy process owing to bad planning, poor communication, or lack of resources for example - commonly cited problems in implementation (Hogwood and Gunn, 1986). Options were realistically defined within the context of national policy, and most obstacles were results of social power (Dowding, 1991), designed not to protect a general interest, but to advance a personal one.
It was noted in the introduction that Castles et al. (1971) included macro theories in their review of decision making, because they argued that when we make decisions which impact on society we can also evaluate the impact of the decision and decide whether we like the results or not. Normatively, this makes sense, but in practice it appears almost impossible to achieve as those people who benefit from the process are also those who have to change it. Perhaps the solution lies in the personal aspect of power identified by Disegger (1992); as individuals we should be active in reflection and evaluation, and challenge appropriately.

Education can play a key role in developing this capacity. John Stuart Mill (1867) argued:

Universities are not intended to teach the knowledge required to fit men for some special mode of gathering their livelihood. Their object is not to make skilful lawyers, or physicians or engineers, but capable and cultivated human beings ... Men are men before they are lawyers, or physicians, or merchants, or manufacturers; and if you make them capable and sensible men, they make themselves capable and sensible lawyers or physicians.

Perhaps then, education in general, and higher education in particular, should not only develop the skills necessary to sustain modern society, but also continue to support the individual's capacity to participate equally and critically in a society they help to create.
11.7 Evaluation

The aim of the research was to examine power relationships in the context of the development of higher education in Greater Peterborough. There were four operational objectives:

1. to observe and describe the policy process (in its formulation stage)
2. to identify evidence of power relationships and their sources
3. to explain policy outcomes using different theoretical approaches to power and decision-making
4. where appropriate, to modify theoretical concepts in the light of the empirical evidence.

Below consideration is given to the extent to which these objectives were met by the research. Recommendations for further research, which includes some methodological issues, are also discussed (11.8).

11.7.1 Objective 1

The policy process was modelled (described theoretically) in Chapters 2 to 7. The focus of the research was power (relationships and sources), and the observation of the policy process was structured by existing theories of power, as suggested by Pollitt et al. (1990) for example. Whilst, a broad range of existing theory provided a structure to guide the empirical study, the final presentation of the literature is not comprehensive, nor supposed to be. The research process was an iterative one, and the final theoretical framework presented in Chapters 2 to 7 includes only those models and concepts found to be of direct relevance to the research findings in the final analysis. For instance, the original aim did not focus on the formulation stage, as there are persuasive arguments that formulation and implementation can not be separated (see for example, Barrett and Hill, 1981) and that the test of who has power is who benefits most from the intervention. However, given the slow progress of the development and the time constraints inherent in the research project it became necessary to focus on the one stage.

It is important to note that in practice the stages of research process inter-link too. Lather (1986), for example, notes that:

'Building empirically grounded theory requires a reciprocal relationship between data and theory. Data must be allowed to generate propositions in a dialectical manner that permits
use of *a priori* theoretical frameworks, but which keeps a particular framework from becoming the container into which the data must be poured* (Lather, 1986).

Thus having described the policy process theoretically, key issues were ‘tested’ by observation of the process of development of higher education in Greater Peterborough (Eckstein, 1975; Pollitt *et al.*, 1990). The description of this was covered in considerable detail in Chapter 10, following Ruddick’s (1985) advice that the more complete a record, the more open it is to verification or reinterpretation.

11.7.2 Objective 2

The second objective, that is to identify evidence of power relationships and their sources, was therefore related to the first and third objective. Focusing the research on power structured the observations of the policy process in practice by providing theoretical basis for ‘evidence’ gathering. The conceptualisations of power developed from the literature (2.4) were used to define and identify power relationships. Hence the need for theoretical triangulation (Chapters 5 and 6).

11.7.3 Objective 3

The third objective of the research was to explain policy outcomes using different theoretical approaches to power and decision. Again, in the original plan this was meant to capture the issue of impact (discussed in the Recommendations for Further Research) (11.8.1), and not to refer to the decision outcome in terms of stated intention (Hogwood and Gunn, 1986). The latter were themselves indicators of specific models of power relationships, and the second and third objectives collapse into one as a result. Both the sources and the outcomes are captured by the same relationship, given the definition of power used, and the focus on social power (Dowding, 1991).

11.7.4 Objective 4

Objective 4 was to modify theoretical concepts in the light of the empirical evidence. One key aim of the conclusion (Chapter 11) was to do this, recognising, however, that the research represents a single case study, which may or may not be generalisable. Nevertheless, the case-study evidence presented here does provide examples of actions which can not be explained by...
singular existing theories. For instance, one outcome of the research was to restate the importance of reputation in power relationships (Hunter, 1953), and to suggest that formal institutional decision processes are one of the last places one should look for actual decisions being made.

Thus, whilst the research is not perfect it is possible to argue that the objectives were met. Below some recommendations for further research are considered some of which address methodological weaknesses.
11.8 Recommendations for Further Research

There are limitations to the research resulting from the protracted nature for the project for example, as well as methodological issues specific to a non-reactive approach. However the findings are such as to suggest that further research in some areas would be interesting and useful.

11.8.1 Evaluation

At the start of the research the aim was to investigate the process of development of higher education in Greater Peterborough through two main phases - formulation and implementation - ending with an evaluation of outcomes. Evaluation was not built into the project development itself. Thus one obvious area for further research would be to undertake such work. Issues to be addressed might include whether the objectives of the project were met, and whether they were the right objectives; any side effects; costs; political issues; and the impact (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).

An evaluation of impact might also include research on, what Hogwood and Gunn (1984) term outputs, that is what is actually delivered, as opposed to what is intended (formally). In the case of higher education development in Greater Peterborough, for example, the ultimate issue was of 'competitiveness', skills shortages, and the economic returns of lifelong learning. The impact of the development of higher education on such factors is necessarily longer term.

Furthermore, the relationship between education and 'economic development' is not a clear one and might be usefully investigated further. Keep (1996), for example, argues against the expansion of higher education in economic terms (See also Metcalf, 1995).

11.8.2 Comparative Work and Higher Education Development

The 1990s has seen considerable expansion in higher education, including the number of institutions (Tight, 1996), yet little research has been done on specific developments. Research has tended to focus on general changes in higher education (see for example, Coffield and Williamson, 1997), or on historical studies of particular institutions (for example Burgess, et al., 1995; Harrop, 1994; Kelly, 1981). The development of new institutions in the 1960s (Rees, 1989; Stewart, 1989) and the Open University (Perry, 1976) has received attention from
historians, but at a broad level. Such work is useful as well as interesting, not least because it serves to illustrate the changing nature of attitudes and funding towards higher education. Comparing these developments more formally with those of 30 years later would help to illuminate this relationship, as well as providing some grounded advice on how to develop higher education.

Given the number of new higher education developments (fourteen during the Peterborough project) there would also seem scope to undertake useful comparative research of these. There can be no doubt that sharing experiences in each new university development could enhance the process overall, as it is unlikely that each problem suffered, or innovation pursued, was unique. Rowe's (1997) Review of Institutional Lessons to be Learned 1994 to 1996 by Lancaster University provides an unusual example, as it reports on the university's progress through severe financial difficulties. Perhaps the biggest issue preventing this exchange of experience has been competition over HEFCE funding, and as such comparative work will only take place once the projects are sufficiently established and have secured such funding. This position is to be regretted, if understood.

Comparative research would also enable a deeper understanding of the impact of local polities on public policy, using here higher education development as an illustrative case study.

11.8.3 Decision-making

The research undertaken made little use of existing models of prescriptive decision making. Parsons (1995), for example, identifies a series of strategies designed to produce 'better decisions' (for example cost-benefit analysis, economic forecasting, financial planning, operational research, systems analysis, social indicators, impact assessment; scenario writing, simulation, gaming and counterfactual analysis; cross-impact analysis; brainstorming; delphi; cognitive mapping; Strategic Options Development and Analysis (SODA); Soft Systems Methodology (LonghurstM); strategic choice and the Analysis of Interconnecting Areas (AIDA); Robustness Analysis; Meta-game Analysis; Hyper-game Analysis; communicative rationality, and communitariansim). Future research might seek to investigate and develop this aspect of decision-making, perhaps using a more experimental or action research design.
11.8.4 Participation

One issue that emerges clearly from the research is related to the problems of participation and accountability in the policy process. This is of increasing importance in local government decision making (see for example, Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), 1998; 1999) where ‘enhancing public participation in local government’ (DETR, 1999) is key. However, it has been argued above that ‘power’ lies outside local government, and that TECs in particular do not engage effectively with their constituency, nor are they obliged to in the same way as local authorities, and ‘participation’ needs to be broadened.

There is a growing body of work on strategies for promoting participation and capacity building in various areas of policy including regeneration (Barr, 1995; Peida, 1997), community development (Checkoway, 1995), and a considerable focus on aspects of care (for example, Braye and Preston-Shoot, 1995; Croft and Beresford, 1992). There has been less, however, focused on higher education, and nothing undertaken in Peterborough. One option for future research therefore might be to undertake a critical review of strategies for improved participation and empowerment in higher education or Greater Peterborough. This might include the formal study of the attitudes of policy ‘officials’ towards participation. Peterborough might provide an interesting case study because of the recent designation of the city council as a unitary authority, whilst other agencies maintained wider (cross-county) boundaries. Such research may yield useful information for those local authorities in similar positions. Again, a more experimental or action research approach might be adopted.

11.8.5 Historical Sociology

It has been argued above that much of the ‘politics’ of the project was hidden from view because it was not recorded; minutes were expurgated, some meetings were not minuted at all, and so forth. It was also argued that this was important because it is bound to influence the conclusions drawn. Allison (1971) made the point in his multi-focused analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Of interest, then, would be a contrasting approach to the study of higher education in Greater Peterborough, such as that employed to effect by Stone (1989) in his study of governance in Atlanta - what he termed ‘historical sociology’. Not only would this give some indication of the effect of method and data sources on conclusions, but would have the added benefit of broadening the focus of the research to include all participants equally.
One weakness of my study has been that it has focused chiefly on one partner - the Training and Enterprise Council (TEC) - albeit an important one. An analysis based on documents, however, could also include those from Loughborough University and other partners, thus providing more than one perspective on the process. This was impossible in the first study because it was designed to be non-reactive.

11.8.6 Measuring Power

A related issue is that of ‘measuring power’. Because the focus of the study was power in situ any reactive methods were discounted. Instead power relationships were deduced from a formal model of power. One interesting follow-up might be to investigate the extent to which individuals are, what Morgan (1986) describes as, ‘politics’. Winter (1973, 1993), for example, identifies a series of tests which can be administered to individuals in order to measure the strength of their ‘power motivation’ (1993). This could provide an alternative method to explore who has power and how they use it. Test data could be used to compare or compliment results yielded from observation.

11.8.7 Reputational methods

The model of power and incentive structures (Dowding 1991, 1996; Dowding et al., 1995) used in this research gives some importance to the reputation of actors. It was noted also that Hunter (1953) had used reputation as the key indicator of power by asking interview respondents to identify those people they held to be powerful. My research has relied on ‘chance’ comments and observations to indicate who was deemed powerful in the policy process in Greater Peterborough (not necessarily a weakness (see Hunter, 1995)). It was impossible to verify this, and at the same time maintain a non-reactive approach. Additional research focused on reputation would be useful to understanding the significance of the issue therefore. This might be done by interview, as with Hunter (1953) or by analysis of documentary evidence.

Dowding and colleagues, for example, in their study of governance in London, used ‘online newspapers to collect data on the number of mentions different individuals and issues had over time’ (Dowding, 1999, private communication). This has the benefit of being non-reactive, but may also disguise ‘real’ power relationships. As Hunter (1995, in Hertz and Imber, 1995) comments: ‘Although the public frontstage may reflect the power of local elites, it is the backstages where the power is most often wielded’, and there is evidence from the case study.
that the frontstage is manipulated. Who would ‘front’ the project was a separate issue to who should control its development. Nonetheless, reputation is clearly an important issue in power relationships because it helps to define possibilities for action.

11.8.8 Positional methods

Similarly, a more formal analysis of links and networks might be undertaken, and across a broader spectrum of actors and issues, in order to assess who was powerful in the local community. My research concluded that formal role is significant because it effects incentive structures and the ‘ideology’ of individual actors (Dowding, 1991), but also that much bargaining appears to be based on resources or issues outwith the immediate policy area (Crenson, 1971). Thus a more formal network analysis would clarify these relationships and contribute to the explanation of particular outcomes by identifying possible links elsewhere. This basic method has been used by Domhoff (1981), Dowding (1999, private communication) and Mills (1959), for example.

There is a second issue which relates to the issue of locality. Hunter (1995 in Hertz and Imber, 1995), for example, noted that Trousinte and Christensen (1982) ‘in Movers and Shakers ... highlighted that the “new guard” of local elites tends to be a regional and even national corporate elite in contrast to the old guard made up of local industrial and financial elites’. Morriss (1987) implies a similar observation with regard to Croydon, suggesting that inward investment was of central importance to local decision makers, thus increasing the influence of national businesses on local politics. Network analysis would help illuminate such issues (Domhoff, 1981).
At the end of its first year of undergraduate provision the University in Peterborough has around 150 undergraduate students, mostly public funded, following Business Studies courses. (In addition there are about 100 MBA students (self-funding/employer-funded), MA in Educational Management, PGCE (TTA funded), 6 distance learning engineering students (self-funding/employer-funded)).

1999/2000 will see the introduction of an IT course. It is suggested, however, that the real demand for undergraduate courses is in the Social Sciences, Media and so forth. It is also likely that the IT course will be offered as an 'add on' to an HND delivered by Peterborough Regional College (PRC) as part of a '1+2 scheme'. An Environment course is also being developed in collaboration with local organisations, such as English Nature, Anglia Water, and the National Rivers Authority (NRA).

Most of the current cohort are 'local' (resident at home), except those who were transfers from Loughborough University main campus. It is anticipated that this will change in future years as Peterborough will be listed in the UCAS handbook as a separate option and might draw students more widely as a result. Entry requirements are lower for Peterborough than for Loughborough main campus, but higher than PRC (18, 22, 12 points respectively). The local 'quality vs quantity' argument continues to be an issue.

Guidance offered in Peterborough is the same as that at Loughborough University main campus.

IT and open learning are still under development. The IT equipment provided in the Library-Resource and teaching centre (Shelton House) is 'good', but the development of distance learning through IT is limited. First, there is the shared view that it is necessary to become properly established first (the need to walk before they run), and second, most of the students are local anyway. Loughborough University's audio-visual (AV) department is involved in planning developments likely to be delivered by BT.

1 Based on a semi-structured interview with a member of the Peterborough Higher Education Project Company in May 1999.
Technology transfer is evident in the local management of the Shell Technology Enterprise Programme (STEP) and the Teaching Company Scheme (TCS), although these draw from a pool of students from many universities.

Currently all the teaching takes place in Shelton House, including the MBA. The use of Pearl's training centre has remained an option for the sake of matched funding.

Peterborough City Council (PCC) and Greater Peterborough Chamber of Commerce, Training and Enterprise (GPCCTE) (formally GPtec) are currently paying £100,000 each year for operational costs, Loughborough University the same for development costs, and Thomas Cook are expected to give £100,000 to support the development of a Leisure and Tourism course. The media group, EMAP, may also support Media courses in time.

Tuition fees come through Loughborough University as 'additional funding' on an annual bidding basis. An application is being prepared for 120 full-time places and 30 part-time for the next bidding round, in a joint bid with Stamford College and PRC. The request is for funding of places on the IT course.

Any PFI would focus on a Students Union, but to date this has not been pursued. There are two issues. The first is that the students would not be able to make money out of it. The second issue relates to whether a union is built to attract students, or whether it is more expedient to have some students to make use of it before capital investment is made.

During implementation the model of provision has moved to a much closer partnership between Loughborough University and PRC through the 1+2 system. Members of the Project Company look forward to when they are no longer be dependent upon PCC and GPCCTE for financial support, as there are still considerable irritations in managing the partnership arrangement.
Bibliography


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Scott, F. 30 November 1993, letter to HEFCE-funded institutions and Principals of FE colleges in receipt of HEFCE funding DENI-funded institutions.


Newspaper articles

*Bourne Local*, 23 May 1996.


*Evening Telegraph*, 24 September 1996.
Evening Telegraph, 16 December 1996.


Fenland Citizen, 23 May 96


Stamford Mercury, 24 May 1996.

The Times, 16 May 1996.

The Times, 30 November 1994.

Times Higher Education Supplement, 16 May 1996.

Times Higher Education Supplement, 3 May 1996.
### Appendix 1

#### Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca Anderson</td>
<td>Research Assistant, GPtec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith Benn</td>
<td>Project Assistant, GPtec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helen Cannell</td>
<td>Research Assistant, GPtec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Craig</td>
<td>Director, Education Services, GPtec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Davenport</td>
<td>Higher Education Manager, GPtec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Felix</td>
<td>Chief Executive, GPtec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellen Field</td>
<td>Director of Marketing, GPtec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Cawford</td>
<td>Director of Finance, GPtec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gillian Grey</td>
<td>Chief Executive, GPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Hall</td>
<td>Chief Executive, Peterborough City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew Holland</td>
<td>Dean, Peterborough Cathedral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neil Johnson</td>
<td>Principal, Bretton Woods Community School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Kidd</td>
<td>General Manager (Human Resources) Pearl Assurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Longhurst</td>
<td>Human Resource Manager, Pearl Assurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Martin</td>
<td>Director of Retail, Thomas Cook Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Millar</td>
<td>Head, Walton Comprehensive School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevor Newton</td>
<td>Personnel Director, Perkins Engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Nuttall</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Executive, Peterborough City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Palmer</td>
<td>Peterborough Chamber of Commerce and Industry; also Lecturer, Peterborough Regional College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Rennie</td>
<td>Principal, Peterborough Regional College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven Richmond</td>
<td>Principal, Isle College, Wisbech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura Ryder</td>
<td>Head of Policy and Planning, Peterborough City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Porter</td>
<td>Independent Businessman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claire Smith</td>
<td>Careers, Cambridgeshire LEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig Scully</td>
<td>Careers, Cambridgeshire LEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Watts</td>
<td>Lecturer, Peterborough Regional College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Smales</td>
<td>Head, Deepings School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Role</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuart Walls</td>
<td>Chief Executive, Peterborough Chamber of Commerce and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Wilson</td>
<td>Learning Link Manager, GPtec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Smart</td>
<td>Pro tem project manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Wright</td>
<td>Lecturer, Loughborough University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Parker</td>
<td>Academic Secretary, Loughborough University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clive Lewis</td>
<td>Registrar, Loughborough University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Moss</td>
<td>Senior Pro Vice-chancellor, Loughborough University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Payne</td>
<td>Pro Vice-chancellor, Loughborough University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Davis</td>
<td>Chief Executive, Midland Bank plc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Pine</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ian Brown</td>
<td>HEQC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sid Williams</td>
<td>Head of the Institutions and Programmes Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Baldry</td>
<td>Cartella</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix 2

Time Line

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Section</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) application made to GOER</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>MAs in Education Management commence in Peterborough, delivered by Loughborough University</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GPtec sets up ‘Towards Peterborough’s University’ Project with Davenport as Project Manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Higher Education in the Greater Peterborough Area</em> (Forbat, 1994a) is presented to GPtec’s Strategic Education Forum for approval</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Steering Committee meet for the first time</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Martin appointed as Chair</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• ‘Principles’ and work plan agreed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Anderson and Cannell join project as Research Assistants</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Steering Committee meeting</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <em>Admission, Progression and Guidance</em> (Forbat, 1994c) presented</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Review position of Peterborough Regional College (PRC)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Need for a work plan agreed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Planning Meeting (Grey, Martin and Davenport)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>• Agree that the GPP (Grey) should head development and that GPtec (Davenport) should head the research</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• PRC recognised as being vulnerable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<td>-------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 1995  | January 9 | Steering Committee meeting  
- *A Preliminary Consideration of the Economic Impact of the University on the Greater Peterborough Area* (Forbat, 1995a) presented  
- Grey will handle the Press enquires                                                                                                               | 10.4 |
|       | February 6 | Steering Committee meeting  
- Final aim of the project agreed - now undertaken 'on behalf of the GPP'  
- The development model of an Associate College agreed  
- G Ptec and GPP declare agendas                                                                                                                      | 10.5 |
|       | March 8 | Steering Committee meeting  
- *Business Expectations from Higher Education* (Wilson, 1995a) presented  
- *Student Population Forecasts* (Morris, 1995b) presented                                                                                           | 10.6 |
|       | April 6 | Steering Committee meeting  
- *Expectations of Potential Students from the Higher Education System* (Wilson, 1995b) presented  
- Project Marketing Sub-group to report to GPP Marketing Group  
- *Progress Report* (Forbat, 1995b) presented  
- Evaluative criteria for the partner university agreed                                                                                              | 10.7 |
|       | May 9 | Steering Committee meeting  
- *Superhighways in Higher Education* (DfE, 1995) discussed  
- Davenport requests expediting the process  
- Committee agree to increase 'communication'                                                                                                         | 10.8 |
<p>|       | 15 | Felix has meeting with Pine                                                                                                                     | 10.8 |
|       | | Davenport proposes setting up sub-groups to Felix                                                                                               | 10.8 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Page</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 6</td>
<td>Steering Committee Meeting cancelled</td>
<td>10.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- <em>Curriculum Provision and Course Structures</em> (Forbat and Morris, 1995) circulated</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Grey and Davenport meet with senior staff at Loughborough University to discuss proposal</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 23   | Martin, Grey, Hall and Davenport meet with Pine at the Swallow Hotel, Peterborough to discuss an academic partner  
|      |  - Pine requests a distant university and rejects any proposal to develop higher education from PRC |      |
| July 3 | Grey and Davenport meet with HEFCE, Head of Institutions and Programmes Divisions, who advises that there is no financial support for new university developments | 10.10|
| 5    | Davenport and Grey meet with VC of Anglia Polytechnic University (APU)                     | 10.10|
| 5    | Steering Committee Meeting  
|      |  - *Curriculum Provision and Course Structures* (Forbat and Morris, 1995) presented  
|      |  - Funding discussed                                                                     | 10.10|
|      | Grey asks to delay setting up sub-groups until the Pine problem is sorted                  |      |
| August 11 | Davenport and Felix discuss sub-group Chairs                                             | 10.10|
### September

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 7    | **Steering Committee Meeting**  
* Martin proposes to resign from steering committee, but is persuaded not to  
* Davenport proposes an 'incremental' approach to the project’s development  
* Pine problem exposed to committee  
* Agree to write to a 'distant' university (Exeter) |
| 19   | **GPtec Public Meeting**  
* Craig makes higher education his theme |
| 20   | **Davenport writes to Exeter University concerning a 'partnership'** |

### October

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>MBAs commence in Peterborough, delivered by Loughborough University</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td><strong>Felix, Martin, and Grey meet to plan progress - TEC targets now threatened</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### November

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 1    | **Steering Committee Meeting**  
* Plan meeting with Pine in December  
* Millar joins steering committee (not present)  
* Martin proposes to arrange a business dinner  
* Business Plan discussed  
* Business School proposed  
* Loughborough University agreed as partner |
| 10   | **GPtec’s Strategic Education Conference**  
* Workshop on university project |

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>GPtec Education Service’s Team Away Day for business planning</td>
<td>• Craig states that Loughborough University will be the academic partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Craig suggests implications for the TEC and the GPP in the</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Authority’s application for unitary status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>steering committee Meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>• Social and Cultural Issues arising from a University Development</td>
<td>• Rennie seeks clarification on ‘partnership’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in Peterborough (Morris and Wilson, 1995) presented</td>
<td>• Business School proposal justified</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Felix coins ‘Partnership Team’ (i.e. Felix, Hall, Martin and Grey)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for the first time</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Development proposal approved by DP (for Pine)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Davenport and Craig interviewed by Herald and Post</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Steering Committee Meeting</td>
<td>• Presentations to the GPP Board and Peterborough City Council discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Business School agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Davenport writes to the Registrar of Loughborough University to</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>progress project</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Martin writes to the Registrar of Loughborough University to confirm</td>
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<td></td>
<td>proposed partnership formally</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Steering Committee Meeting</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Development Plan (GPtec, 1996) discussed</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Craig joins steering committee</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>March 8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Davenport and Anderson meet Chief Executive of Lincoln University Project</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>PFI proposal made to Grey, Davenport and Anderson</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>10.17</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Steering Committee Meeting</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Craig breaks his holiday to attend</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- GPP Board ratify project proposal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- New project schedule and administrative structure are presented</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Grey outlines strategy to acquire Shelton House for the library-resource centre</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Davenport gives update on the Dearing Review</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- TDF bid presented by Craig</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- FE's expectations are discussed - PRC want to deliver the first two years of 2+2 courses</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>TDF bid sent to GOER</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Steering Committee Meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Sub-groups discussed</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- New stationary approved</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Table Hall (Peterborough Cathedral) discussed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Martin proposes a dinner</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Benn's appointment as Project Assistant is announced</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Establishment of a project/university company is proposed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>THES announces the development of a ‘University College of Peterborough’ (PUC), with an ‘East Midlands’ academic partner</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>10.20</td>
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</table>

324
| 15 | **Strategic Planning Group (Joint Strategy Group) meet for the first time.**  
  
  - There are indications of support from HEFCE. | 10.20 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td><strong>Announcement of Loughborough University as the academic partner at GPtec's Second Strategic Education Conference</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 20 | **Davenport and Rennie meet and discuss:**  
  
  - PRC's pledge for TDF library-resource centre bid  
  - Rennie's desire for more involvement in the university development  

Davenport sends memo to Felix covering:  
- establishment of a project company independent of GPtec  
- secondment of Davenport to the company | 10.20 |
| 29 | **Steering Committee Meeting**  
  
  - Nuttall attends for the first time  
  - Solicitors for the project are discussed without conclusion  
  - the project Marketing Plan is presented by Field  
  - Davenport is asked to prepare preliminary costings for the development  
  - Shelton House options 'reviewed' | 10.20 |
| June 13 | **Craig submits 'Issues Paper' to Felix**  
  
  - advises not to set up a project company  
  - suggests that relationships with Nuttall need cultivating | 10.21 |
| 24 | **Strategic Planning Group meeting**  
  
  - agree that Peterborough Cathedral would provide a suitable site for the university | 10.21 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Date Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 5</td>
<td>Davenport receives a copy of a letter from Thomas Cook’s solicitors to Martin saying that they would be willing to undertake work for the project</td>
<td>10.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 8</td>
<td>Davenport agrees objectives with Craig and copies them to Anderson and Benn, they include establishing a project company</td>
<td>10.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 19</td>
<td>Davenport receives a proposal from GPtec’s solicitor for setting up a project company</td>
<td>10.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 29</td>
<td><strong>Steering Committee Meeting</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Wilson attends for Benn&lt;br&gt;- Martin asks Davenport to prepare a draft project development structure&lt;br&gt;- Davenport states that the matched funding for the TDF can be identified&lt;br&gt;- Davenport reports back on a meeting of FE Principals with Loughborough University, and Rennie is ‘unenthusiastic’&lt;br&gt;- Millar suggests asking Loughborough University for a Statement of Intent&lt;br&gt;- Shelton House is discussed, and Grey’s negotiation skills&lt;br&gt;- the East Anglian Ministerial Training College is referred to the Curriculum Sub-group for discussion</td>
<td>10.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 13</td>
<td>Davenport and RH (Estates, Loughborough University) visit Little Prior’s Gate, Peterborough Cathedral to assess as offices for the project company</td>
<td>10.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15 &amp; 16</td>
<td>Davenport meets with Craig and Felix to discuss setting up a project company and the movement of the project team from GPtec’s site</td>
<td>10.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Davenport submits monthly report to Craig stating that the establishment of a project company and the move of the project team of the GPtec are 'important' and 'urgent'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Davenport goes on holiday</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Anderson and Benn are told by Craig that the project team will not be moving yet, and when they did Benn would be expected to maintain a 'liaison' role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 29   | Craig briefs Anderson and Benn on his meeting with Felix  
  - the proposed marketing plan is 'unacceptable' to Peterborough City Council (PCC)  
  - PCC (Nuttall) are looking to 'support' the project |
| September 3 | Davenport returns from holiday  
  Craig, absent, leaves a memo for Davenport  
  - the project team is not moving  
  - the Chief Executives Group is reconstituted  
  - Nuttall and Craig would like to be 'more involved' in the project  
  - Craig will make the presentation to PCC planned for 24 September, instead of Davenport  
  - Rennie must be 'kept on board' |
| 4    | Davenport, Anderson and Benn receive letters from Martin announcing the abolition of the steering committee; Pearl Assurance and Perkins are no longer represented. |
9 | Craig circulates memo confirming new project management arrangements
- Nuttall and Craig will join the Chief Executives Group
- Davenport will 'officer' the group
- Nuttall's time is PCC's 'contribution' to the project

Davenport resigns from GPtec

Chief Executives Group meeting
- terms of reference are agreed; the Group will
  - oversee planning
  - establish and maintain a relationship with Loughborough University
- Craig to write to solicitors to arrange interviews
- a 'partnership' arrangement with Loughborough University is proposed
- noted that Davenport, absent, is preparing costings
- Nuttall, Craig and Davenport will form a 'triumvirate'
- Nuttall and Craig will prepare a new project schedule
- Rennie suggests a joint application (project company and PRC) be made to HEFCE
- premises discussed

10.23

13 | Davenport leaves GPtec

10.23

18 | Joint Strategy Group meeting
- agree to appoint a project manager
- agree that a project company should be set up
- Peterborough Cathedral Dean will host the HEFCE meeting in December
- Pearl Assurance will host the Peterborough MBA

10.23
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>October 1</th>
<th>(Joint) Strategy Group meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• agree to appoint a project manager <em>pro tem</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• agree a process for choosing solicitors for the project (selection criteria, interview team)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• visit to view Shelton House (purchased by Porter with whom Grey is now negotiating) agreed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Application to HEFCE (student numbers) discussed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Craig and Nuttall will prepare terms of reference for the project sub-groups</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>9&amp; 10</th>
<th>Interviews for a project manager and solicitors held</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Charles Smart appointed as Project Manager</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Martineau Johnson appointed as solicitors</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>15</th>
<th>Craig and Parker meet to finalise student numbers</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• agree to offer Agriculture and Contextual Theology (validation), and PGCE in shortage subjects</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Loughborough University request some ‘development funding’, and information on ‘housewives’ (the size and pattern of their likely demand)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>December 3</th>
<th>Joint Strategy Group meeting</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• final project structure agreed; Peterborough Higher Education Project Company and a University Project Company will be established</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Grey will send out invitations for the HEFCE meeting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• recruitment advert for the project company chief executive discussed; a secondment is preferred</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Project companies established</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- HEFCE Briefing Paper (PHEPC, 1996) is discussed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- final curriculum plans are agreed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- independence is agreed as a long-term goal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- members of the project company board are agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>HEFCE meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October First undergraduates matriculate</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix C

### Organisations

#### Steering Committee

- Waltham Comprehensive School
- Bretton Wood Community College
- Cambridgeshire Local Education Authority
- Isle College, Wisbech
- Peterborough Regional College
- Peterborough City Council
- Fenland District Council
- South Kesteven District Council
- Greater Peterborough Training & Enterprise Council (GFTec)
- Greater Peterborough Partnership (GPP)
- Greater Peterborough Chamber of Commerce
- Peterborough Cathedral

### Denotes membership of (Joint) Strategy Group

- Loughborough University

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