The postanarchist, an activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal type

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THE POSTANARCHIST, AN ACTIVIST IN A ‘HETEROTOPIA’: BUILDING AN IDEAL TYPE

TERESA XAVIER FERNANDES

A doctoral thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy at Loughborough University.

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The postanarchist: an ideal type

To Madalena, Pedro, Guilherme and Francisco.
"I have always written my works with my whole body and my life:
I do not know what are purely spiritual problems »

Nietzsche (Wolting, 2016)
The postanarchist: an ideal type

ABSTRACT

The Postanarchist, an activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal type is the theme of this doctoral thesis. The main aim is to elaborate a design for the postanarchist figure, picking up its main characteristics from the work of the postanarchist Saul Newman. The argument also bears on two other authors: the post-structuralist Michel Foucault, considered a strong influence of postanarchism, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the first author who labelled himself as anarchist and the first to embrace anarchy positively. Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari are introduced as mediators to provide deeper understanding of the main authors.

The dissertation offers a novel theoretical revision of postanarchism through Michel Foucault and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. It notes the close similarities between Foucault and Proudhon - in terms of concepts of space, struggle, movement, necessity and consequently anarchy; establishes a conceptual net around them and uses Proudhon’s thinking to fill the “bibliographic gaps” in Foucault’s writings. The goal is to better understand the thought and the activist practice of Foucault in terms of anarchism and, in the last instance, to better grasp the postanarchism of Saul Newman in order to carve the postanarchist ideal type.

Postanarchism is understood as the constitution of autonomous spaces; the notions of space and heterotopias - the Foucauldian space - are central in the dissertation. Accordingly, the thesis is structured by three hypotheses: (i) postanarchism is space constitution; (ii) the constitution of space is a struggle; (iii) to establish space is to survive. The sub-concepts of the dissertation are: movement, necessity, struggle, power subject, body, sign, truth and utopia.

The thesis provides an interpretative analysis of primary sources - books, newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and manifestos - of the three main authors supported by secondary commentaries. It departs from conventions by adopting a theoretical approach inspired by Foucault’s solar and circular worldview (and Tommaso Campanella’s City of the Sun). This facilitates the fluid organization of the argument and avoids imposing linearity on the content, thus highlighting the interrelation between content and the structure of the argument. This thesis is an exposition, an interpretation that develops new knowledge through the connections and methods that enable us to better know who the postanarchist activist is.
Keywords: Anarchism, postanarchism, post-structuralism, postmodernism, space, movement, necessity, French theory, political theory, Michel Foucault, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Saul Newman.
When we arrived in Loughborough University in July 2013 and we met our supervisors, Ruth Kinna and Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, our walk or adventure through postanarchism really started. In our first meeting, talking about our initial project, our ideas on postanarchism and about *The State of the Art*, Ruth advised us to find a space in this literature in order to construct the thesis. The meeting finished and during the walk to home Ruth’s words echoed in our mind: “space”…“to find a space”.

In the following days, when we started deepening the postanarchist authors, the analytical researchers’ nose started working and suddenly we felt my supervisors’ suggestion there: “you had to open a space”. Indeed, Ruth was right – as always! She had given me the key to solve my thesis: the space.

We had been accepted in Loughborough University as a research student and we could now create our space in academia. In fact, in Loughborough, from the first moment we had opened our space we felt wonderfully at home. Ruth and Alex always respected our time and space and our independent way of life. We really appreciated this and we are in debt to them and very grateful; Ruth was an excellent and attentive supervisor since the first moment she received our initial project. She always gave us her precise, surgical and precious guidelines and also her imaginative and creative suggestions that contributed greatly to the organization of the argument as it is today and to the selection of the authors. Alex was also always a great stimulus and incentive, caring about our subject and going along our path. We are also very grateful to him.

Nevertheless, there was something else in Ruth’s suggestion. This creation of space was not just the creation of a place neither in academia nor in the literature. This space was postanarchism itself. Postanarchism was about this construction of
space, and more, this construction of space was something collective. So, all those
reasons and feelings allow us to start to know what postanarchism was and inspired
our main working hypothesis: postanarchism is about creating space.

We learned also that the anarchist space was a collective construction, a “we”
or a plural self. For this reason also, we chose to use the majestic plural in this thesis.
This dissertation is a collective and plural work that just exists due to our supervisors’
generosity and scientific care. The literature came to confirm this after.

And part of this plural “we” is also shared with our examiner, Ian Fraser.
Special thanks to Ian for the insightful way he followed our progression. Ian read our
papers every year attentively and carefully, giving his useful and practical perspective
and making great and interesting critiques and comments.

We really appreciate also the excellent and precious help given by the French
philosopher Philippe Chevallier during our fruitful research visits to study Foucault’s
papers in Paris. Philippe shared with us some fundamental Foucauldian ideas, for
instance the very important concept of battle and the crucial “silences” or “ghosts” of
Michel Foucault. These clues were decisive to ground our argument and the choice of
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This plural self includes also David Berry, the Head of Department of Politics
and founder, with Ruth, of the Anarchist Research Group (ARG). Dave was the first
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All of these people are part of this plural and anarchist self or space that we found and constructed in Loughborough University.
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INTRODUCTION

Having as theme “The Postanarchist, an activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal type”, this thesis aims to study postanarchism in depth, constructing an ideal type. The dissertation’s goal is also to re-evaluate postanarchism, giving a novel theoretical perspective of the topic and understanding its genealogy.¹ The concept of space or the Foucauldian heterotopias are the main concepts of the thesis, being postanarchism understood as the constitution of autonomous spaces. In order to ground and better grasp the meaning of the postanarchist concept of space we need to add other fundamental concepts or sub-concepts. These are: movement, necessity, struggle, power, subject, body, sign, truth and utopia. These concepts arose during the readings of the main literature and were chosen because (i) they showed to be intimately connected with the concept of space and (ii) they are fundamental to better understand this concept and generally postanarchism, the thesis’s topic.

This dissertation is a philosophical and circular walk² from postanarchism to postanarchism, visiting, in between, first of all, the main literature on the subject, then understanding postanarchism’s roots and its main concepts and after studying postanarchism in depth – the construction of the ideal type. Through this genealogical path we are going to meet mainly three authors: the post-structuralist ³ Michel

¹ Genealogy is understood in this thesis from the perspective of Friedrich Nietzsche's “On the Genealogy of Morality” as a method that aims to challenge the dominant culture by deconstructing and understanding the concepts considered acquired truths by that culture.

² We adopt the Foucauldian concept of walk in this dissertation. For Foucault (2006:362,365,359), a walk is a “form of exercise” or a way “to know what the outside world is”. This knowledge about the world has spiritual and ethical consequences, as we are going to show in the course of the thesis (Foucault, 2006:362,365,359). For Foucault (2006:373), spirituality or spiritual knowledge is to understand the value of things and their place in cosmos. It enables the subject to see himself and his place - or space - in the cosmos; this knowledge allows the transfiguration of the subject’s way of being: the “displacement of the subject” (Foucault, 2006:373).

³ Regarding structuralism and post-structuralism, we adopt as framework the definitions of the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. According to this encyclopedia, the term structuralism “emphasizes structures and relations”, but it especially designates a twentieth-century French school of thought that “applies the methods of structural linguistics to the study of social and cultural phenomena. Starting from the insight that social and cultural phenomena are not physical objects and events but objects and events with meaning and that their signification must therefore be a focus of analysis, structuralists reject causal analysis and any attempt to explain social and cultural phenomena one-by-one. Rather, they focus on the internal structure of cultural objects and, more importantly, the underlying structures that make them possible”. According to the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy post-structuralism is “a late-twentieth-century development in philosophy and literary theory” and a response to structuralism. Post-structuralism challenges “the assumption that systems are self-sufficient structures and (questions) the possibility of the precise definitions on which systems of knowledge must be based”.

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Foucault, the anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the postanarchist Saul Newman. We will have also the aid of some secondary authors such as Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

Saul Newman points to Max Stirner as an important figure in postanarchism, but we decided not to include him in this dissertation for two reasons: (i) our intention is to study postanarchism in the framework of the poststructuralist French thinkers of the twentieth century critical theory, such as Foucault; (ii) Stirner’s ego is a polemical concept, which presents some issues for the modelling of the postanarchist ideal type. For instance, Stirner’s ego seems (a) to clash with the postanarchism plural self or space and its openness to the other; and (b) with postanarchist genealogy, for example, the poststructuralist Foucault and the anarchist Proudhon. In our opinion, Stirner’s controversial influence on postanarchism deserves another programme of research. We will return to Stirner’s egoism at the end of the thesis, once the postanarchist ideal type is outlined (Chapter V, pg: 229).

Thus, in this thesis, we decided to walk with Foucault and Proudhon because, in our perspective, they help to deepen postanarchism’s roots. Foucault is considered a strong influence on today’s anarchism by the main literature, as we will observe in the next chapter - The State of the Art. Foucault also shares (or is very close to, as we will see in Chapter V - The Postanarchist Ideal Type - pg: 229) some fundamental concepts with postanarchism, such as space (or the Foucauldian concept of heterotopia) struggle, movement, necessity and power.

In turn, we have chosen Proudhon because (i) he was the first author to embrace anarchy positively and label himself anarchist (Kinna, 2009:8,9; Préposiet, 2007); (ii) there are many similarities between Proudhon and Foucault, for example, in terms of the concepts of space, struggle, movement, necessity, power and consequently anarchy. We discovered these similarities during the readings of the main literature of both authors; (iii) pursuing these similarities, it appeared that Proudhon could have been an author that Foucault read, but did not talk about (Revel, 2011:132,134). Looking for some of the bibliographic gaps in Foucault’s work during our research at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and Collège de France in Paris, we discovered that Proudhon filled the Foucauldian gaps and we show how in Chapter IV (pg: 135); (iv) Proudhon could be seen as a great influence on
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postanarchism, although the main postanarchist literature does not acknowledge him. In this thesis, we review critically this postanarchist stance, and show the value of Proudhon as an inspiration for today’s anarchism.

In terms of genealogy, we intend to discover who the activist that inspires the postanarchist is, studying Foucault and Proudhon, and building the Foucauldian ideal type with Proudhon’s aid. The construction of this Foucauldian ideal type is based on Foucault’s life, activism and writings. Nevertheless, the personal life of Foucault as such is not the object of our research or interest. When we refer to Foucault’s personal life, for example, his alleged homosexuality, the goal is strictly to better understand his activism and his work. This thesis accepts Foucault’s resistance to labels (Foucault, 1976:51,60). Hence, this Foucauldian activist ideal type aims just to introduce the postanarchist ideal type, helping to better characterize and to know it.

Thus, in terms of Foucault’s writings and activism, we will study mainly Foucault’s life after May 68. This historical event is a turning point in his political activism, although Foucault was in Tunisia during that time, where he followed the local students’ struggles closely as well (Eribon, 2011, 2016). Nevertheless, Foucault then came back to France where he witnessed intensively the aftermath of May 68. Although we stress the importance of May 68 in Foucault’s path, in this dissertation we consider his life and work as a whole, because Foucault was principally a wonderful researcher who left behind him works and papers in great quantity that complement each other (Eribon, 2016).

In turn, in terms of anarchism, we do not intend to put a label on Foucault, stating: ‘Foucault is anarchist’. As we have affirmed, Foucault is completely against tags and we do respect his stance, although he admitted at least once he was a “left anarchist” (Foucault, 1976:51,60, Eribon, 2011). We just want to show the great and interesting similarities between Foucault and Proudhon in order to better understand both authors and postanarchism.

Those similarities between Foucault, Proudhon and postanarchism are the main novelty of this thesis, which allow us (i) to discuss the mainstream academic literature on Proudhon critically, proposing a different perspective of his anarchism due to the proximity with Foucault; (ii) to show the compatibility between Proudhon and Newman that could disturb and question critically Newman’s perspective of classical anarchism; (iii) to better understand postanarchism, contemporary activism and horizontalism as being only anarchism.
Another original contribution of our thesis is to construct the postanarchist ideal type. Our doctoral dissertation aims to design this powerful, non-hegemonic, emancipated activist, also inspired by Nietzsche’s (2002) superman, extracting it from Saul Newman’s literature. This extraction work is something new, because the main authors working on postanarchism have not yet done it.

What is an ideal type? As Weber (2012:24) argues, it is a theoretical and abstract concept and also a “methodological resource”. Its goal is to construct “a rational and teleological” figure – a set of actions - in order to characterize particular and individual patterns (Weber, 2012:24). Following Weber (2012:24), the ideal type shows how far the “concrete actions” of a particular (ideal) type are influenced by “irrationalities of all kinds” in real life. In other words, the ideal type, being a rational construction, contrasts with irrationalities or spontaneities of a concrete situation or individuality. Irrationalities always overcome or transgress the ideal type. And this contrast or transgression is necessary and fundamental because it helps us to better know and feel the world around us. For Weber, the ideal type is a tool or instrument, not a model of reality. There is a parallel in Foucault. Foucault (2006:392) argues, reason or “logos is what comes to aid us”; it is not what prescribes. Like Weber Foucault uses reason to help us understand the world. As we have already said, according to Foucault (2006: 359, 362,365,373), science is fundamental because science and virtue are intertwined. It is important to know the exterior world in order “to make the soul great and to release it” (Foucault, 2006:359).

Bringing these ideas together in the thesis, we propose the postanarchist ideal type as an instrument or tool, a measure or a theoretical point of comparison or a theoretical reference – a rational one. The idea is its rational “univocity” or homogeneity to facilitate knowledge of the real struggles in social movements today: their desires, wills, emotions, irregularities and irrationalities (Weber, 2012:24). Our ideal type is not a generalization or a general conceptualization. Rather it is the result of inductive analysis – a synthesis – and it is designed to carve the postanarchist figure to enable its study through the construction of its main features.

This Weberian ideal type is also a simplification (Weber, 2012). And, here, too, Weber, Proudhon and Foucault converge. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Michel

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4 We are going to study those postanarchist authors in *The State of The Art* (pg: 23).
5 Quoting Marcus Aurelius, Foucault (2006:369) says, “Who am I, what am I? Well, I am flesh, I am a breath, and I am a rational principle”. Foucault assumes the importance of rational principle.
Foucault also rely on simplifications. Proudhon (1965; Préposiet, 2007:209,210) claims a “simplification” of legislation, reducing all legislation to just one law: the “mutuality principle”. On the other hand, Foucault shows the “statement”, or the “enunciation”, is “the building block of all kind of ventures” (Kendall, Wickham, 2003:75). For Foucault, there is always “the same organizational block”: to affirm, to tell. And it is a simple one (Kendall, Wickham, 2003:75). The three simplifications – the Weberian, the Proudhonian and the Foucauldian - seem to be a worldview or a political option, a way to facilitate or to organize life scientifically and socially.

Nevertheless, Weber (2012:24) warns, this conceptual ideal type should not be interpreted as a “rationalist prejudice” or a “belief in the effective predominance of the reason over life”. So, in order to avoid those myths and prejudices, Weber proposes critique (Aron, 1963:28). Or in order not to rationalize research through theoretical work, Weber suggests the ideal type should be criticized (Aron, 1963:28). According to Weber, the ideal type could become a “mythology figure” if we considered the scientific “schemes” are real life, forgetting “the multiple senses of the spread of phenomena” (Aron, 1963:28). Following Weber, critique reminds us the fundamental “mystery of the supra-individual sets” (Aron, 1963:29).

And, here, Weber, Proudhon, and Foucault again meet. For these authors, critique is a necessary device. Proudhon (1861:33,58) tells us about the divinal and sacred antagonism or war. Foucault (2012:9) talks about “the immense and proliferating criticality of things, institutions, practices, discourses; a kind of general friability of the soils”. And the same happens with the ego. There is also a fragility of the ego. According to Foucault, critique is the way to fight the types – or the identities - or the way to show the subjugation of the subject or the fascism of the ego. Thus, in Foucault’s (1977b) terms, we could almost say this ideal type is an ego or an objectification or a “subjectivity”. However, as Foucault also remembers: there is always the critique. For that reason, this ideal type is a subjective and revisable work also à la Foucault. With this subjective “objectification”, our goal is to generate circularly more resistance and critique and then new objectifications, new resistance and so on and so forth, as Weber also teaches.

Thus, our thesis aim is not to create a political programme or a virtual concept, without a creator or a reality as a Frankenstein or an alien (Newman,
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Our goal is not to establish a norm or a theory, or an essence, because, according to Michel Foucault, “any particular theory of what a person ought to be like by nature is false, and has effects of constraining human possibilities and marginalizing those who fall outside this ‘nature’” (Pickett, 1996:452). Or as Freud (nd) says, our work will not be an exercise of “free imagination” in which images “call one another, by association” without an agreement with reality. We agree with Arditi (2012:2), the new activism or “the insurgencies of 2011 were not about programs, (...) they are the plan, (...) their occurrence is already meaningful regardless of what they propose”. Or, according to McLuhan (1962,64:203), the medium - or the insurgencies - is the message. For McLuhan (1962,64:203), “the personal and social consequences of any medium – that is, of any extension of ourselves – result from the new scale that is introduced in our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology”.

So, we would like our work to be the medium and the message or to be always seen as a creative process, which illustrates what postanarchism is, or as a genealogical and aesthetic proposal of reflection, assumedly subjective, which contributes to thinking anarchism and actuality. As May argues (2011: 43, 44), “what the (researcher) can do is to provide the instruments of analysis”, because “the project, tactics and goals to be adopted are a matter for those who do the fighting”. We join both. This thesis is already the fight and also provides an instrument of analysis.

Hence, critique is a fundamental device and also the main proposal of this thesis. According to Foucault, critique offers the possibility of creating ‘other subjectivities’? or ‘other types’ and this is our dissertation’s goal (Eribon, 2011). Critique reveals that typing is a way “to isolate” and to control “men of unreason” in our societies, such as the “homosexual, the magician, the suicide, the libertine” (Eribon, 2011:167). Foucault attacks these rational types. Nevertheless, he accepts the Weberian scientific type which welcomes particularly those “men of unreason”. In Weber’s perspective, these “men of unreason” are schematically or scientifically rational types or simplifications plus irrationalities or irregularities or abnormalities of the concrete person. And this junction of rationalities and irrationalities is made by critique. Weber wants to bring to light irrationalities and irregularities, as we have

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7 In this thesis when we use only single quotation marks (‘...’), this means that it is our term or our expression.
stated above, in order to better know social phenomenon, for instance, capitalism. Foucault goes in the same direction. According to Foucault, we are all types without type or irregular/abnormal types; we are particular - although collective – constructions: works of art or ongoing constructions (Damien, 2009:22). Foucault’s goal also is to unveil these other types.

We can now sum up the methodological, analytical and political importance of this postanarchist ideal type. Methodologically this construction underpins an inductive analysis that aims to build an abstract picture of the postanarchist. It is synthesis, a set of actions or concepts, which takes its main characteristics from a particular context: Saul Newman’s writings. Analytically, the construction of the ideal type offers a lens to examine postanarchism in depth and in a novel way. The approach allows us to grasp the main concepts or features that compose Newman’s postanarchism, to look at them in turn, deconstruct them, discuss them and reconstruct them. In this the thesis follows Deleuze (2005:11) who says that the philosopher’s role is to discuss and to construct concepts. By synthesising all those concepts at the end of the thesis we will obtain an overview of postanarchism or a typical image for postanarchist design. Politically, the ideal type can be understood as an anarchist or postanarchist tool. Why? The answer is because the ideal type looks like an instrument that just works with an engine: criticism. As Weber warns, the ideal type is not a model, nor a “mythological figure”; it does not prescribe; its goal is to be criticized, overcome and transgressed by reality, in order to uncover irrationalities and spontaneities of the real world. The ideal type needs critique in order to work and to be useful and helpful for science and life. Without critique, the ideal type does not make sense nor serve any purpose. Criticism is a fundamental tool of anarchism or postanarchism and we shall see during this dissertation, how we can infer that the ideal type is politically an anarchist or postanarchist device because it is a critical one. It is an ongoing transformation; it is open-textured and also a simplification of scientific analysis and of real life.

Our ideal type is, on one hand, an exercise of political theory – a theoretical point of comparison - rather than an empirical study or a fieldwork and, on another hand, an aesthetic proposal, a construction, a fiction. This postanarchist ideal type intends to be an experience or, better, an invention. As Foucault (1980a) says, regarding his books: “this experience is neither true nor false. Experience is always a fiction; this is something that allows us to fabricate ourselves”. And this thesis or this
fiction is also a fabrication of ourselves inspired by the Foucauldian ‘aesthetics of the self’ or ‘the self-invention’ (Pickett, 1996:462). This thesis is about an aesthetic attitude that is also a spiritual, an ethical and a political one, as we are going to see. This dissertation will be a process of creation, the sculpting of an ideal type, a process of space opening based on the adopted literature.

And this fiction proposes also another kind of political representation. This aesthetic path means also the emancipative/creative dimension of the postanarchist that is seen as a symbolic or representative process. And this is also an innovative feature of our study. This symbolic or representative dimension, inspired by Foucault and also Proudhon, means space creation, or creative work (Foucault, 2000). This is about taking care of ourselves and of the others, the people around us, as we are going to show in Chapter IV (pg:135). Our goal is to discuss this Foucauldian symbolic or creative perspective – the sign, the simplification and care - having as framework the cynic, the post-structuralist and postmodernist philosophical contributions, because the postanarchist authors do not explore this path.

Another originality of this work is its main method: the solar or circular method. Foucault, Proudhon and the postanarchist circular worldview inspire our method. And this worldview is also the Nietzsche’s method or the child’s one. This is about playfulness, “innocence and forgetfulness”. As Nietzsche (2002:37) affirms “the child is innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a toy, a wheel that turns on itself, a movement, a holy affirmation”. For Nietzsche (2002:37), “for the game of creation ... we need just a holy affirmation” – again Foucault’s simplification - or we just need this “innocence and forgetfulness” or that joy that allows us to forget and to jump again and again into the new (see image 1 below).
Foucault (2012:40,62) talks about the permanent “beginning of history”: birth, development, death and re-birth and so on and so forth. Foucault (2012:40,62) explains how this circular plan works: “the beginning of history... (is) physical vigor, force, energy, proliferation of a race, weakness of the other, etc.; series of chances, contingencies … : failures or successes of defeats, victories, revolts; successes or failure of conspiracies or alliances”. For Foucault (2012:17), we are beginning permanently, as the “sunlight”. This is the permanent solar revolution or the “cyclical movement of history” (Foucault, 2012:128,129). According to Foucault, we are living in the age of The City of Sun or in the age of the multiple suns, the multiple power spaces. So, The City of The Sun of Tommaso Campanella is the Foucauldian organizing concept and it is also ours (see below image 2).

![Image 2](image2.png)

According to Campanella (2002:59), the City reflects the organization of the celestial bodies and when the City was built “they tried to have propitious the four constellations of each of the four angles of the universe, which are also observed in the conception of each individual”. Our thesis plan also works regarding the same logic, reflecting the sun system. As we have explained, we are doing a walk from postanarchism to postanarchism, visiting in the meanwhile its roots. We are going, through antipathy, from the centre - the concept of postanarchism - to the periphery – its roots - and we return to the centre again, through sympathy, closing the circle. As Foucault (2009:18) says regarding the body, it is The City of The Sun and it is from the body, as by sympathy and antipathy, that all places radiate out: possible, real or utopian places. Our intention is that our thesis becomes a body or a microcosm linked to the universe around us, and reflecting it. As Foucault (2006:362) explains this circular method is an interesting way or path to look at the world around us and to be open to it in order to better understand what the postanarchist concept of space and the constitution of autonomous spaces or heterotopias are, as we have just studied.
Our centre is the concept of space or the postanarchist autonomous spaces (Newman. 2011). And, like Campanella’s City was protected and defended by seven circles of walls, our centre (the space) is also involved (or sub-divided) in seven concepts - movement, body, necessity, utopia, power, sign and truth - that constitute and explain this main concept of space (see below image 3).

In the course of this theoretical walk, we will visit all of those concepts, in small circles, in order to return to the concept of space or the postanarchist autonomous spaces (see below image 4).

The three main authors of our thesis - Proudhon, Foucault and Newman - will also do this circular walk with us. On this philosophical route, Newman starts jogging and meets Foucault who gives him the baton; Foucault then walks and meets Proudhon, receiving also his testimony; due to their similarities Foucault and
Proudhon share the same road and travel together; finally we conclude the circuit linking the three testimonials – Proudhon, Foucault, Newman - and constructing the postanarchist ideal type.

So we adopt the postanarchist - also Foucauldian and Proudhonian - non-foundationalist approach. This means postanarchism develops “a critique of essentialist identities and deep ontological foundations” (Newman, 2011:5). As we are going to see, postanarchism supports Levinas’s concept of “an-archy” (Newman, 2011: 178). It does not contend there is an arche or some foundational principle, which would be the ground of knowledge. In this way, postanarchist “deconstructive tools are poststructuralist thought and elements of psychoanalytic theory” (Newman, 2011:5). According to Newman (2011:6), postanarchism calls in to question the

essentialist conception of the subject; the universality of morality and reason, and the idea of the progressive enlightenment of humankind; a conception of the social order as naturally constituted (by natural laws …) and rationally determined; a dialectical view of history; and a certain positivism, whereby science could reveal the truth of social relations

For that reason, Newman (2011:5) explains, postanarchism interrogates classical anarchism and its alleged foundationalism. As we have shown above, our method is also a non-foundationalist proposal or a circular path, which has neither beginning nor end. Instead, it links beginning and end, inviting and defying us, and the community around us, to a new start.8

Those are the challenges we are facing in this postanarchist walk that is oriented or conducted by three working hypotheses or intuitions that also move in circles. The hypotheses are: (i) postanarchism is space constitution; (ii) to establish space is to survive; (iii) the constitution of space is a struggle. These three hypotheses resume our initial circular intuition on postanarchism in the following way: postanarchism is a fight for survival that creates space and this creation of space is postanarchism.

Those hypotheses inspire the plan of the thesis. The first one, postanarchism

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8 Of course this thesis has a goal: to construct the ideal path. Nevertheless this path would like to be only a new critical beginning. With this purpose at the end of the dissertation (Chapter V, pg: 229) we are going to present a new research programme.
is space constitution, drives Chapter I, The State of the Art, where we start our walk through postanarchism. We are going to visit the main literature on the topic, the postanarchist authors and concepts oriented by the concept of space. We are going to also study some variations of this concept as such: space constitution, state, non-humanist space, nomadic space, rhizomatic space, micro-space, cyberspace, working space, utopia.

This first hypothesis - postanarchism is space constitution - and the concept of space also guides Chapter II, entitled: The Concept of Space: The Framework. In this chapter we start our walk through postanarchism’s genealogy. We will meet Kant and walk with him for a while in order to design the Kantian framework of this thesis that helps to discuss Foucault and Proudhon’s concept of space as well.

In the Chapter III – The Concept of Space: Proudhon and Foucault - we continue our genealogical walk through the postanarchist concept of space meeting Proudhon and Foucault. Nevertheless, we join two important concepts, movement and necessity, in order to understand, in the following chapter, who the Foucauldian activist is and what the similarities with Proudhon are. We add also another hypothesis: to establish space is to survive. The goal is to analyze the concepts of necessity and movement, having always present the spatial framework.

Chapter IV – The Foucauldian Activist Ideal Type - aims to carve the Foucauldian activist with Proudhon’s aid. In this chapter we continue the walk and the talk with both authors, in order to better know this activist figure; how Foucault’s anarchism works and which are its similarities with Proudhon’s anarchism. We look at Foucault’s life and activism to understand in depth who the activist he gave us is. We join the concept of war or battle or struggle, a fundamental one, in order to enrich Foucault and Proudhon’s thought and practice. Consequently, we have again a working hypothesis helping us: the constitution of space is a struggle. We present this activist as a fighter or a warrior, a nomadic or mobile self, who constitutes space. In this chapter we also include all the concepts we studied previously: space, movement, necessity, sign, etc. The construction of the Foucauldian activist, being also a genealogical work, introduces the postanarchist activist.

So, in Chapter V, the last one, called The Postanarchist Ideal Type, we are going to extract the postanarchist activist from Saul Newman’s writings, concluding our philosophical and circular walk. We meet mainly Saul Newman and we are going to confront him with Foucault and Proudhon’s ideas, concepts and practices. The
concept of space will be the main drive of the chapter. Nevertheless, the concepts of necessity, movement and war are also fundamental ones. For that reason, we maintain the three working hypothesis in order to guide the argument: (i) postanarchism is space constitution; (ii) to establish space is to survive; (iii) the constitution of space is a struggle. In this final chapter, we present also some clues for future work. We finish our philosophical and theoretical walk with a conclusion.

In the next chapter, the first one, we will set out *The State of the Art.*
THE STATE OF THE ART

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we are going to present The State of The Art of the PhD thesis that has as its theme: “The Postanarchist, an activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal type”. We start here our philosophical path through postanarchism in order to build the postanarchist ideal type. More concretely, this chapter aims to make a point of play on the chosen research topic: postanarchism. The goals are to give an evaluative account of the existing literature and thereafter to present a critical reading of the authors who work on postanarchism. This critical reading has the following aims: (i) to understand in depth, and in a contextualized way, what postanarchism is; (ii) to grasp the differences and the commonalities of postanarchist theory; (iii) to understand why post-structuralism is anarchist or why postanarchism is poststructuralist; (iv) to outline the differences between postanarchism and classical anarchism; (v) to extract from several works and authors the perspectives, concepts and ideas needed to build the postanarchist ideal type.

So, in this State of the Art, we are going to expose the main ideas of those authors that work on postanarchism. The authors are, first of all, Saul Newman, our main postanarchist author, who coined the expression postanarchism⁹ and developed

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¹ The post-left anarchist theorist Hakim Bey included the term post-anarchism, in 1987, in an essay entitled: Post-Anarchism Anarchy (Adam, 2003). Bey was the first person that brought the prefix ‘post’ to anarchism. For Bey (1991, 2010), this prefix has two meanings: (i) “post-anarchism” is a post-nineteenth century anarchism. Hakim Bey is largely critical of classical anarchism, or strands within it. For Bey (2010), “anarchism staggers around with the corpse of a Martyr magically stuck to its shoulders — haunted by the legacy of failure & revolutionary masochism — stagnant backwater of lost history”; (ii) in another way, Bey’s “post-anarchism” means a ‘post-post-structuralism’ (our term). According to Adams (2003:6; Bey, nd), Bey says that his goal is to “pick up the struggle where it was dropped by Situationism in 68 & Autonomia in the seventies & carry it to the next stage … far beyond where the grassroots radicals, anarchists, existentialists, heterodox Marxists and poststructuralists have ever taken it in the past”.

For Hakim Bey (1991, 2010), Anarchy is “chaos”, “excess” and a “criminal” and “wild” attitude beyond the law, the established. Bey (2010) says that “Anarchism ultimately implies anarchy — & anarchy is chaos. Chaos is the principle of continual creation...& Chaos never died”. According to Bey (1991, 2010), “post-anarchism anarchy” means the creation of a “Temporary Autonomous Zone” (TAZ). For Hakim Bey (1991), TAZ is the poetic act. It is a space/time of creativity or a space of art. Bey (1991) argues that TAZ “is the only possible ‘time’ and ‘place’ for art to happen for the sheer pleasure of creative play”. And “the artist is not a special sort of person, but every person is a special sort of artist” (Bey, 1991). TAZ is the creative act defined “literally”, a poem: “the TAZ is a philosophical thought experiment that can be, should be, and is often produced literally” (Generic Pronoun, 2013). In Bey’s perspective, anarchy is art or the creative act that is by nature transgressive and overcomes the established limits in order to create something new. As Bataille (2002:82) explains art is “transgression”, is “the sacred” that opens “spaces” or transcendences. Nevertheless, unlike Bey,
The postanarchist: an ideal type

the topic directly in several works and, in terms of genealogical framework, Todd May, Lewis Call and Richard Day. We have chosen the first three authors (Newman, May and Call) because, like us, they work on anarchism in a theoretical perspective, in the framework of the poststructuralist French thinkers of the twentieth century in critical theory. We have decided to work on this perspective because we believe that post-structuralism and postmodernism, inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche, influences today’s anarchism, even postanarchism (Frank, 1098:20, Call, 2002:23). Call (2002:33) considers that Nietzsche creates the postmodern anarchist. Call (2002:35) says that after Nietzsche’s controversial, innovative and explosive thought, “the genie does not go back into the bottle”. In terms of framework, we have decided also to opt for the genealogical perspective of Richard Day, who investigates the logic of struggles, specifically the “newest social movements”, internally and externally, rather than opt for definitions or historical and chronological updates (Day, 2011: 95,96). The author analyses the emergencies that he finds interesting for his ethical, political and theoretical commitments and welcomes new and different genealogies (Day, 2011:97). Like Day (2011:97), and, as already noted, we avoid “universal and objective narratives” that we consider do not fit into postanarchism, as we have just explained.

When discussing the Richard Day’s work - the newest social movements - we will analyse the work of David Graeber and the anti-globalization movement and its relationship with postanarchism. In terms of the dialogue between postanarchism and post-marxism, we will study the work of John Holloway, very close to the Zapatista project in Mexico. As Jason Adams (2003) says, “the Zapatistas, while clearly ‘antiauthoritarian’ in orientation, do not explicitly identify with anarchism as a

Bataille (1957:99) notes that to create is not a total disorder nor chaos, but the creation of another order. Bataille adopts the inverse perspective. Bey intends to carry post-structuralism to a “new stage” or to overcome post-structuralism, giving to ‘post’ terminology the idea of paradigm shift. As we have decided in this chapter, The State of the Art, to work only postanarchist authors that could be situated within the concept of post-structuralism/post-modernism, we have not analysed the writings of Hakim Bey in this thesis.

10 See bibliography.

11 Regarding the terms modern and postmodernism, we adopt as our framework the definitions of the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. According to this encyclopedia, the term ‘modern’ has mainly a historical meaning and is “understood as anything since medieval history”: Renaissance or Enlightenment. The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines postmodernism as also “a historical term, indicating something that comes after modernity” (or Renaissance or Enlightenment).
‘tradition’ so much as they identify with its ‘spirit’”. We will point out the commonalities and differences between both authors and postanarchism and also the contributions they give to better understand the theme.

Now, specifying the reasons for the choice of the four main authors in turn - Saul Newman, Todd May, Lewis Call and Richard Day, - we choose, first, Saul Newman - our main author - because he coined the term ‘post-anarchism’. As Adams (2013) says, Newman developed the term in his book *From Bakunin to Lacan: antiauthoritarianism and the dislocation of power*. Newman (2001, 2011) shows how postanarchism works on the limits of classical anarchism, being a step forward or an update in terms of classical anarchist doctrines of the nineteenth century, precisely because it has poststructuralist roots. Newman “comes from within the anarchist tradition and tries to gain some insights from post-structuralism to create a more effective anarchist politics” (Evren, 2011:9). And this means that poststructuralist ideas are being thought through the framework of contemporary anarchism (Evren, 2011:9). Newman assumes postanarchism as anarchism – not as poststructuralism or postmodernism - working the inverse perspective of Todd May and Lewis Call.

We choose Todd May because he works on the concept of post-structuralist anarchism, assuming the opposite perspective of Newman. May highlights that poststructuralism contains anarchism, although the French authors do not present themselves as anarchists. As Evren (2011:9) concludes, “May is predominantly working on the politics of post-structuralism, while gaining some insights from anarchism to create a more effective post-structuralist politics”, although May’s expression “post-structuralist anarchism” depicts also “a marriage of post-structuralism and anarchism” (Evren, 2011:9).

We choose Lewis Call, because, following May, the author demonstrates how postmodernism itself contains anarchism, broadening the poststructuralist discussion through, for instance, Jean-François Lyotard and his “postmodern condition”, Jean Baudrillard and his concept of simulation, and also through the internet world, hypertext and cyberpunk. “Call depicts postmodern anarchism as an anarchism that seeks to undermine the very theoretical foundations of the capitalist economic order and all associated politics” (Evren, 2011:9).

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12 We will develop those ideas later in Chapter V (pg: 229).
Notwithstanding the different anarchist perspectives and designations given by the three authors - Saul Newman/postanarchism, Todd May/poststructuralist anarchism, Lewis Call/postmodern anarchism, - all of them are considered post-anarchist thinkers because they relate classical anarchism with post-structuralism and Nietzsche - as inspiration (Noys, 2008:115).

In turn, Richard Day (2005:10) accepts the postanarchism term and works assumedly on the theme, like Newman but in a more practical perspective. Day writes to scholars and activists (Day 2005:10). The author makes the genealogy of the struggles of the twentieth century social movements and plots also the trajectory of the hegemony - hegemony of hegemony, - showing that the postanarchist actions are “something new”, regarding the old and new social movements of the twentieth century, being beyond these social movements and not fitting their analytical perspective. (Day 2011: 96). According to Day (2011:96), these actions have opened a new space, where postanarchism, or non-hegemonic activism, arises.

Following the readings, and giving a motto to The State of the Art and the dissertation, we adopt here our first working hypothesis:

*Postanarchism is a space opening or a space occupation or a setting up of autonomous and emancipated space.*

Or more specifically, regarding the thesis subject:

*‘the postanarchist is a space creator or a space occupant or an autonomous and emancipated constituent of space’*

And what does “to constitute” mean? For Negri (2013), to constitute means the ability to give birth or the “birth of something”; it is an “open device”. It is the constituent power. For Day, the constituent power means a “politics of the act”, “the self-valorisation”, a direct action, a “construction of affinities” (Day, 2011:108,109,111). According to our initial hypothesis, postanarchism is this constituent power; it is self-valorisation and emancipation, to build up affinities, to act directly, to open up possibilities. And what does space mean? It is a non-essentialist “outside” (Newman, 2001: 132). The space is relations, encounters with the other (Newman, 2011:7). The space born when we do “a structural renewal”,
when we self-valorise and “we (re)make our own connections to each other and the land” (Day, 2011:112). This is the space. And who does create this space? The subject of the constituent power does: the cyborg, a nomadic subject, “a labouring subject, a creative, productive, affirmative subject” (Day, 2011:112).

This is the postanarchist panorama that has postmodernist and post-structuralist roots. Manfred Frank (1989:20-23) explains that postmodernism was born with Nietzsche’s nihilism, when the ‘genie comes out from the bottle’, as we have mentioned above (Call, 2002:35,54). For Lyotard (1979:7,8), postmodernism means incredulity towards metanarratives or incredulity towards metaphysics. It is the crisis of the great heroes, of the great dangers and of the great ends, which are dispersed in clouds of language and narrative particles, each of them containing pragmatic originalities (Lyotard, 1979:7,8). For Frank (1989:20-23), postmodernity, or nihilism, starts with the end of the Enlightened Copernican revolution or the end of modernity, when human reason ceases to be “the supreme bastion that ensures the self-confidence of man”. According to Frank (1989:20-23), in postmodernity, the earth turns away from the sun; there are no longer references; existence loses its foothold and man has left himself. We are drifting in space. As Frank (1989:106) says, we need to rebuild the lost origin or our lost space. This is postanarchism. Postanarchism is the constitution of a new space of self-encounter and encounter with the other. This space is also our initial subject, the cyborg, and consequently also our initial hypothesis.

Moreover, according to Foucault (2000) and his poststructuralist framework, thought or the creative thinker is represented only by the externality of signs or creatures. It is transparent and does not hide anything in consciousness (or creative thought); there is a transparency, an immediacy, an absence of mediation and time, an eternity between thought and sign or representation - thought externalization (Frank, 1989: 102, 103). The sign is thought or the medium is the message (Frank, 1989: 104; McLuhan, 1962,64). So, our goal is to distinguish between sign and simulation. Foucault’s (2000) sign is transparent and true. According to Baudrillard (1981:3), “simulation threatens the difference between the ‘true’ and the ‘false’, the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary’”. Simulation, as Frank (1989:106) says, means the loss of the origin or the immediate connection with the creators. Baudrillard speaks of hyperreality -

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13 The cyborg is a kind of a disassembly and a reassembly of a personal, collective and postmodern self, a cybernetic personality (Call, 2002:131).
without reality or beyond reality. Call (2002:120) says we live within a “space suit”, drifting without references. In turn, the May 68 revolutionaries attack what they call the wrong representation, which is just symbolic, and blow graffiti on the walls (Call, 2002:103,119). They choose micro-representation (Call, 2002:33,34). The cyberpunks plunge into the hyper-real, into an immediate, timeless fusion within the symbolic (Call, 2002:119). It is this fusion, this transparent, immediate and aesthetic micro-space that the postanarchists want to build up. Our thesis goal, that inspires the construction of *The State of the Art*, is also to study this Foucauldian sign or representation, this rhizomatic, multiple and Deleuzian root, carried out by cyborgs, the postanarchists, cybernetic multiple subjectivities, that recover the origin, the root and the creative act.

According to the above, *The State of the Art* is oriented by our first hypothesis *anarchism is space constitution* and has three sub-chapters: (i) Postanarchism: the word; (ii) Postanarchism: space constitution; (iii) Other contributions;

We start *The State of The Art* answering the question: what is postanarchism?

1. POSTANARCHISM: THE WORD

This sub-chapter aims to explain what postanarchism signifies, based, as we have mentioned in the *Introduction*, on the main authors of *The State of The Art*: Saul Newman, Todd May, Lewis Call and Richard Day. We also join other authors close to the topic, broadening the discussion, in order to better understand postanarchism and its main concepts.

We are going to brainstorm definitions, concepts, and ideas on postanarchism. We use brainstorming because, as Lyotard (1979:86) says, it is a postmodern method that enhances researches. According to Lyotard (1979:97), postmodern science is useful because it gives birth to new ideas.

The aim is also to undertake a review of the main ideas on postanarchism and to contrast perspectives and traditions, finding also ‘gaps’ in the literature.

This sub-chapter and the following sections have as guiding principle the thesis theme – “The Postanarchist, an activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal type” - and our initial hypothesis: *the postanarchist is a space creator.*
For a genealogical understanding of postanarchism, in this sub-chapter we are going to study the word, breaking it down into its constituent parts: “post-anarchy-ism”. The aim is to prepare the ground for the second sub-chapter, when we are going to discuss what postanarchism is, having in mind our initial hypothesis.

So, in this sub-chapter, in the first section, we are going to study the word: ‘anarchism’; in the second section, we analyse the prefix: ‘post’; in the third section, we discuss the suffix: ‘ism’.

As we have seen above, we start this sub-chapter disassembling the word postanarchism, defining what anarchism is.

**Anarchism**

We are going to analyse briefly and in summary the meaning of the term anarchism that is, as we have said, a component part of the main concept of our thesis: postanarchism. In this section, we will work mainly on the perspective of classical anarchism, but at the end of the section we are going to distinguish between classical anarchism and contemporary anarchism for an improved framework of postanarchism. At the outset, we analyze intentionally the Greek etymology of anarchism for two reasons: (i) it is important for a better understanding of the practical and discursive content of postanarchism; (ii) we understand that postanarchism is a returning to the Greek Ancient *episteme*, in terms of Foucault’s influence as we are going to study in *Chapters IV* and *V* (Foucault, 2000; Frank, 1989). Then, in this section, we will study the main components and derivatives of anarchism: anarchy and anarchist. We will do also a brief historical review on the word anarchy. At the end we will distinguish between classical and contemporary anarchism.

Anarchism comes from anarchy which derives from the Greek *anarkhos*, meaning ‘without rulers’. For a better understanding, we hyphenate the word ‘anarchy’: *an* means ‘no’ or ‘without’ and *arkê* means ‘rulers’ or ‘government’. *Arkê* means also ‘the first principle’, ‘the first truth’. As we will see, postanarchism is about an-archy or ‘an-archic deconstruction’ (Newman, 2011: 53). Postanarchism aims to interrogate the *arkê*, the principles, the authority of the concepts and the essences (anti-essentialism) (Newman, 2011: 53).

Anarchy is also the goal of anarchism and means:
the society … described to be without government or without authority; a condition of statelessness, of free federation, of ‘complete’ freedom and equality based on rational self-interest, co-operation or reciprocity, or of resistance built on continuous action (Kinna, 2005:5)

Regarding anarchism, in theory, it is the ideology of anarchy (Kinna, 2005:6). In practice, anarchism “has often lacked the ideological and political coherence of other political traditions”: “anarchism has always been heterodox and diffuse” and “anarchists have usually been more concerned with revolutionary practice” (Newman, 2011:1). Nevertheless, in sum, anarchism’s central claim is: “life can be lived without a state, without centralized authority” (Newman, 2011:1). According to Préposiet (2007:49), anarchism could be understood as also the bad conscience of authority, conserving, for that reason, “a background of religiosity, by its fight against evil on earth”, in a secularized world, although Newman (2011:181) labeled anarchism as the “most heretical form of radical (anti)politics”. So, theoretically, we can affirm that the anarchism is “a doctrine that aims the liberation of peoples from political domination and economic exploitation by the encouragement of direct or non-governmental action” (Kinna, 2005:3). In other words, and stressing the expression ‘without rulers’, anarchism is a doctrine or a political philosophy that requires the elimination of all forms of government, advocates the autonomy of politics and criticizes and deconstructs political authority (Newman, nd). However, in this deconstruction of political authority, classical anarchism has, according to Newman, an essentialist discourse, a rationalist, dialectical and reconciling view - social harmony - of History, seeing science as absolute and universal, having a positivist\(^\text{14}\) view of the social (Newman, nd). Anarchists are “those who struggle in the name of anarchism”, those who work to further this cause and their goal is anarchy (Kinna, 2005:4,5).

Historically, the term anarchy has its roots in the French Revolution when “a group of revolutionaries known as the enragés (the fanatics) … demanded that the Jacobin government introduce draconian measures to protect the artisans of Paris from profiteers” (Kinna, 2005:7). The group did not call themselves anarchists, but

\(^{14}\) We read, here, ‘positivist’, as scientific and also programmatic, as having a programme.
their opponents did, because the *enragés* asked people “to take direct action against profiteers and ... demand that government provides work and bread” (Kinna, 2005:7). The leaders of the movement, Jacques Roux and Jean Varlet, “rejected the idea of revolutionary government as a contradiction in terms... associating anarchism with the rejection of revolution by decree” (Kinna, 2005:7,8). The legacy of the *enragés* remains and, 100 years later, inspired the French writer Pierre-Joseph Proudhon who in his first book *What Is Property?* labeled himself as an anarchist. Replying to the question ‘What are you...?’ Proudhon said: ‘I am an anarchist’ (Kinna, 2005:8,9). Proudhon suggests that anarchy means “progress and harmonious co-operation”, because, for him, anarchy is “the natural counterpart to equality: it promised the end to social division and civil strife” (Kinna, 2005:9). Proudhon dismisses the ideas of social ruin and chaos that the term anarchy - “without rulers” - could imply, although some anarchists, as such Michael Bakunin, pick up the controversial anarchist aspect of chaos and “disorder order”, explaining that “the passion for destruction is a creative passion, too” (Kinna, 2005:9). Peter Kropotkin considers that order is servitude and disorder is “the uprising of the people against this ignoble order, breaking its fetters, destroying the barriers, and marching towards a better future” (Kinna, 2005:9,10).

Distinguishing between classical anarchism and contemporary anarchism, we labeled ‘classical’, following Evren (2011:9), anarchism that starts in the nineteenth century and ends in 1939 with the defeat in Spain, and included authors and schools as such mutualism (Proudhon), anarcho-communism (Kropotkin), collectivism (Bakunin), individualism (Max Stirner, William Godwin, Henry David Thoreau) and Nietzschean anarchism (Emma Goldman), among others.

Regarding ‘contemporary’ anarchism, we could say that the term includes the two last periods identified by Evren (2011:9): the second period that begins with the movements from 1960s and embraces May 68 and the third period that runs together with the anti-globalization movements. Postanarchism belongs to this third period or, as it is sometimes referred to, to the ‘third wave’ of anarchism (Evren, 2011:9). As Kinna (2005:3,4) confirms, “the origins of contemporary anarchism can be traced to

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15 The name, *enragés*, was assigned because of the violence of their campaigns and their popular riots against starvation and the cost of life (Préposiet, 2007:35).
16 The “dilemma between authority and revolution” reappears later, around Marxism (Préposiet, 2007:39).
17 Day (2005:4) considers that the anti-globalization struggle “speaks to important concerns about capitalism, colonialism and democratic accountability”.

1968, when … student rebellion put anarchism back on the political agenda”. Postanarchism belongs to this ‘classical’ and ‘contemporary’ ‘fruitful family tree’, where we can find different types of anarchism and activism (Evren, 2011:7). Day (2005:4) adds that contemporary radical activism, to which contemporary anarchism belongs, found its pillars in the contemporary anti-capitalist movements of the late 1990s and early 2000s, but “with roots reaching back to the new social movements of the 1960s – feminism, the US civil rights movement, Red Power, anti-colonialism, gay and lesbian struggles – as well as to ‘older’ traditions of Marxist and anarchist socialism”.

In the next section we will study the prefix ‘post’ of postanarchism.

“Post”
After studying the anarchism that constitutes the word postanarchism, in this section, we are going to analyze the prefix ‘post’. To get a better understanding of the concept of postanarchism, we are going to first study the prefix ‘new’ from the expression ‘new anarchism’ and to find the differences and the similarities between both concepts.

Evren (2011:3) remembers that the expression ‘new’ was coined by David Graeber’s article ‘The New Anarchists’, published in the Marxist oriented journal New Left Review, although “David Graeber rejects the honour”.18 As we have said, Graeber is close to the anti-globalization movement. So, at the outset, we could deduce that “new” anarchism has some proximity to the perspective of the anti-globalization movement, that David Graeber associated with.

Discussing the expression ‘new’ in further depth, Evren (2011:3) considers that the word signifies, in fact, “something new”, “a consensus” that there is “an-anarchism re-emerging”, an “updated ‘contemporary’ anarchism” that is not “a reincarnation of nineteenth–century anarchism from the days of the First International or the Spanish anarchist revolution”. For Evren (2011:3), the “newness” of the new anarchism is “its spectrum of references”: “all the anarchistic principles employed (are) defined as consequence of actual activists’ experiences. There (is) no intention to describe the movement as an application of an anarchist theory (which is

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18 Graeber explains that, although he never objects to it, the expression ‘New Anarchists’ has been made up by the review New Left Journal when his article was published. The first title of this article by Graeber was: “The Globalization Movement Some Points of Clarification” (Evren, 2011:15,16).
fundamentally anarchistic in attitude).” Kinna (2005:4) confirms this “new anarchistic attitude”, in fact, influences contemporary politics and has real consequences, as we can see in many campaigns from “protests against animal vivisection, militarization and nuclear arms, to less well-known programmes for urban renewal, the development of alternative media, free education, radical democracy and co-operative labour”.

So, briefly, we could say that this “late-twentieth and twenty-first-century” or new anarchism, inspired by Graeber’s title, corresponds to Evren’s “third wave” anarchism that, as we have defined, runs together with the anti-globalization movements, belonging to contemporary anarchism.

And what does the particle ‘post’ of the term postanarchism mean?

Saul Newman (2011:63) explains that the prefix ‘post’ “does not mean after or beyond”, but rather “a working at the conceptual limits of anarchism with the aim of revising, renewing and even radicalizing its implications”. According to Newman (2011:63), postanarchism is also anarchism but with the prefix: ‘post’, because “postanarchism is still faithful to the egalitarian and libertarian project of classical anarchism”. However, this anarchism is also ‘post’ and Newman (2011:63) explains why: because “the project is best formulated today through a different conceptualization of subjectivity and politics: one that is no longer founded on essentialist notions of human nature or the unfolding of an immanent social rationality”. This different conceptualization of subjectivity and politics corresponds to the poststructuralist conceptualization and shows ‘post’-anarchism’s “close fit” to ‘post’-structuralism (Evren, 2011:4). Nevertheless, Evren (2011:10) notes that:

postanarchism is better understood as an anarchist theory first and foremost rather than a post-structuralist theory. … Newman even describes it as a combination and composition of classical anarchism and contemporary anarchism, which means that post-structuralist qualities are being framed through the lenses of contemporary anarchism.

‘Post’-anarchism is also related to the broader ‘post’-modernity that encompasses also ‘post’-structuralism, as we have already remarked in the Introduction by the analysis of Manfred Frank (1998). Postanarchism shares the main
principles of postmodern anarchism, as Call (2002:21) formulates it: (i) the lack of meaningful revolutionary potential of the Marxist or classical-anarchist ‘radical’ position “which insists upon the primacy of economics and class analysis (Call, 2002:21); (ii) the necessity to develop “a much broader critique of power by making the concept of hierarchy itself into an object of analysis, … by expanding the anarchist project into the cultural and linguistic realms” (Call, 2002:21).

According to Evren (2011:9), the prefix ‘post’ also indicates a proximity between postanarchism and post-marxism, although some postanarchists are critical of Marxism: “the term postanarchism … directly brought to mind ‘post-marxism’, especially considering that the introduction to From Bakunin to Lacan was written by Ernesto Laclau”, considered a post-marxist. Adams (2003) agrees, “Newman’s conception is actually quite similar to the ‘postmarxism’ of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe”. There is a critical discussion between both currents and there are some similarities and some differences between both.

Newman (2010:146) warns also that ‘post’ does not mean a difference between one anarchism that is “political or ‘leftist’ and one that is hedonistic, anti-political and ‘post-leftist’”. Newman (2010:146,147) adds that:

it makes no sense to me to see contemporary forms of anarchism as ‘post-leftist’, if by ‘post-leftist’ is meant an abandonment of the radical horizon of emancipation. While contemporary anarchism might be ‘post-leftist’ in the sense that it is no longer closely affiliated with the labour movement or the socialist tradition, it obviously still retains an anti-capitalist and egalitarian agenda

As we are seeing, the particle ‘post’ is quite controversial and can have various meanings. For example, Jason Adams (2003), closer to post-struturalism and Todd May, deviates from Newman and notes that while postanarchism “is ‘post’ anarchist, it is also post ‘anarchist’”. For Adams (2003), this signifies that the prefix ‘post’ “is not a complete rejection of classical anarchism, but rather a step beyond the limits defined for it by enlightenment thought”.

But there are other interpretations. Evren (2011:9) mentions some anarchists who thought that the prefix ‘post’, applied to its new object, implies that anarchism, as thought and practice, is “somehow obsolete”. For instances, Cohn (2002) starts an
article asking: “What is Postanarchism ‘Post’?”, pointing out some “misreadings” on classical anarchist theory, for example, around the opposition between human subjectivity and power.

The particle ‘post’ in itself, in fact, is polemical. Manfred Frank (1989:24), considers that this prefix ‘post’ seems to refer to something that is not concluded and cannot be assessed globally, something that is “undetermined”. Evren (2011:4) seems to agree when he says post-anarchism is something open: “an open-ended experimental approach to revolutionary visions and strategies”. For Evren (2011:4) this “open-endedness” and “elusiveness” permit one to think about “rupture” from “classical anarchism” or about “a paradigm shift” (Evren, 2011:4). In turn, Rousselle (2011:VII) argues that “postanarchism is the radical contemporary equivalent of the traditional anarchist discourse”, bringing “traditional anarchism into new relationships with the outside world”. For Rousselle, (2011:VII), “a kind of post-anarchist moment has arrived”.

Beyond these controversies and particularities surrounding the prefix ‘post’, as we have seen, ‘post’-anarchism belongs to anarchism’s third wave (or ‘new anarchism’), and, consequently, to the contemporary anarchism. So, what are the differences between the ‘new’ and the ‘post’?

First, the ‘new’ is wider than the ‘post’, because as we have just seen, the ‘post’ belongs to the ‘new’. As Call (2002:21) states, there is not a “monolithic vision” of contemporary anarchism, but a “strengthened diversity”. So, postanarchism fits into this wider wave and represents only a single strain.

Second, among this diversity in ‘new’ anarchism, as Day (2005: 4, 5, 6, 8, 9) says, postanarchism is the ‘newest’. And why? Because, according to Day (2005: 4, 5, 6, 8, 9), the “newest social movements” are postanarchist. And what are the “newest social movements”? The “newest social movements” are the “non hegemonic movements” - and not “counter hegemonic”, reformists or against the power and the state, as the anti-globalization movements - or the movements that do not want to take power, the ‘movements’ that do not fit the framework of social movements, because they bring “something new”. What is this something? These struggles “seek change to the root” and want “to address not just the content of current modes
of domination and exploitation, but also the forms that give rise to them” (Day, 2005: 4).

Taking into account this ‘newness’ and this diversity of postanarchism, in the next section we are going to analyse the suffix ‘ism’.

“Ism”
In this section, we are going to define the suffix ‘ism’ of postanarchism to better understand the content of the concept. What does the suffix ‘ism’ mean?

Postanarchism evokes other similar expressions also ending with the same suffix ‘ism’: liberalism, socialism, Marxism. These expressions and these suffixes refer to ideologies or “coherent set of doctrines and beliefs that can be laid out ‘positively’ as a bounded totality” (Adams, 2003). And is ideology acceptable or not? Call (2002:40) recalls that, for Nietzsche, the ‘isms’ represent a fragmented, a decadent and a dangerous culture. In turn, Baudrillard (1981:6) notes the ‘sacred’ dimension of ideology: “a theology of truth and secrecy”, something that manifests our will or imagination.

And how does postanarchism deal with this ‘ism’? Is postanarchism an ideology? Here, there are also different evaluations. Adams (2003) answers ‘no’, “postanarchism is not an “ism” or an ideology or a “coherent set of doctrines”. And why not? For Adams (2003), because postanarchism is a “profoundly ‘negative’ term” that signifies, as we have just verified, a diversity, “a broad and heterogeneous array of anarchist and ‘anarchistic’ theories” and not a closed ideology. To Adams (2003), postanarchisms have been “rendered homeless by the overly normalized doctrinarity of most of the classical anarchisms such as syndicalism, anarchocommunism, and platformism as well as their contemporary descendants (like social ecology)”. For Adams (2003), postanarchism does not have “key thinkers” and there is not a postanarchist “canon” because postanarchism embraces the “borderless multiplicity of (smooth) theory”.

Evren (2011:4) thinks differently. In his opinion, this picture does not mean a lack of ideology, because the new forms of organization of postanarchism are its ideology: horizontal and decentralized networks based on non-hierarchical democratic consensus, instead of top-down structures like states, parties and multinational companies (Evren, 2011:4). Evren (2011:5) sees postanarchism as “an explicit body of thought” or a “new and developing current in the world radical
scene, and also cultural studies”, emerging from the radical anti-authoritarian post-structuralist theory, heir to the anarchistic May 1968 movements. Evren (2011:5) considers postanarchism as “an attempt to create the theoretical equivalent of the anti-globalization movements”: (i) because the debates around postanarchism are linked to the “post-Seattle spirit”; (ii) because post-structuralism, which inspired postanarchism, is related to the Deleuzian “rhizomatic character of the new anarchism that is shaking the foundations of the globe” (Evren, 2011:5). In turn, Cohn (2002) concludes that Newman’s project is “the reconstruction of an anarchist theory within a poststructuralist framework”.

Newman (2011:62) admits that postanarchism is not so much “a distinct model of anarchist politics”, seeing his work as a “field of inquiry and ongoing problematization” of the conceptual categories of anarchism. For Newman (2011), post-anarchism is “an ethical-political horizon”, “an openness to the other”. Newman (2001:1,2) advises against “the pernicious error of advocating a purer or more universal revolutionary theory that would seek to be more complete and sweeping in its paroxysm of destruction”. Maybe this practical, open ideology or, as Newman affirms, this “field of inquiry and ongoing problematization” is not a total contradiction of the ‘sacred’ epiphany or ideology or ideologies that manifests and extends our will or imagination, as Baudrillard suggests and Foucault argues, through the “eternal” alliance between sign and thought.

After the decomposition of the word postanarchism, in the next section we are going to answer the question: What is postanarchism?

2. POSTANARCHISM: SPACE CONSTITUTION

Regarding our initial insight that postanarchism is space constitution, in this sub-chapter, we are going to explore what postanarchism is, working on this hypothesis. We will see what the main authors of The State of The Art - Saul Newman, Todd May, Lewis Call and Richard Day - think on the topic. The goal is to contrast the various positions and to find the ‘gaps’.

So, regarding our initial hypothesis - postanarchism is space constitution - in this sub-chapter we are focusing on the concept of space. We are seeing how the authors relate postanarchism and the notion of space. First, we are going to analyze
what the expression ‘space constitution’ signifies. Then, we develop this concept of space, studying the following subjects: the state, anti-humanist space, nomadic space, rhizomatic space, micro-space, cyberspace, working space and utopia.

**Space constitution**

Looking at the relation between postanarchism and space, Saul Newman discusses politics, autonomy and space. Postanarchism, he argues, is a “politics of autonomy”, a politics of “autonomous spaces”. And what does a politics of autonomous spaces mean?

Starting with the term “politics”, for Newman (2011: 8), politics is “an ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of the political”. But postanarchism is not a kind of “politics”. For Newman (2011: 4), “postanarchism is not a specific form of politics; it offers no actual programme or directives. It is not even a particular theory of politics as such”. Postanarchism is about “the political”. And what is this “political”? According to Newman (2011: 8), “the political” is “the dimension of antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations”. To do “the political” is (also) to explore and to interrogate existing limits and tensions (Newman, 2011: 7). Postanarchism is “as kind of deconstruction”, and a kind of construction, an ethical “openness to the Other” (Newman, 2011: 5,139). Postanarchism is an exploration of the limits or “the gaps between politics and ethics” (Newman, 2011: 10). “Ethics is … something which disrupts … sovereign political identities, opens them to the possibilities of the Other” (Newman, 2011: 139). As Nietzsche (nd) states, ethics is “the fire eternally active” which builds and destroys “without any moral imputation on an eternally equal innocence”.

Turning to the term: “autonomy”, Newman (2011:179) claims that it is “the horizon for radical politics”. And why? Newman sees autonomy as ‘ownness’. For Newman (2001: 68), “one should seek ownness”. And “ownness is a positive freedom, by which Stirner means freedom to reinvent oneself, because we are, as Call (2002:52) affirms, “selves-in process”. Ownness means that “one can be free even in the most oppressive situations”, because freedom starts with the individual, and the individual is always free to redraw itself (Newman, 2001: 68).
However, Foucault (1994a) argues that sometimes we forget our autonomy. For Foucault, autonomy is the “process that releases us from the status of ‘immaturity’”. By ‘immaturity’, Foucault (1994a) understands “a certain state of our will that makes us accept someone else’s authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for”. In this case, Foucault (1994a) says, the individual is not autonomous. So, people reach adulthood or autonomy when they have the courage to know and to realize their ownness permanently and collectively or when they decide to be voluntary actors in society (Foucault, 1994a; Newman, 2001: 68). Franks (2008:43) concludes that “ownness is the creator of everything”, and, first of all, the creator of ourselves. And this capacity to create is the horizon of the politics of autonomy.

So what does ‘a politics of autonomous spaces’ mean? What does space mean? As we have just studied, the “political” is the dimension of antagonism that can take permanently many forms and emerge in different types of social relations (Newman, 2011: 8). These “forms”, or better, this “process” (May, 2008:31), this “emerging antagonism” or these “different relations” are the space or the micro-space that, as we have seen above, we occupy when we attain adulthood and start acting freely, reinventing ourselves individually and collectively. So politics of autonomy means the realization of our ownness and the creation of these open, free, and collective spaces.

State

We can see that, for Newman, to carve space is “a precondition of autonomous politics”. Nevertheless, Newman stresses, this space is carved “beyond the sovereignty of existing institutions”¹⁹ or beyond the state.

For Newman, the modern²⁰ state is “the place of power” or the place of sovereignty. Newman (2011:10) explains, “the autonomy of the political invokes the idea of the politics of autonomy”: the idea that politics defines spaces of autonomy beyond the state, spaces where people determine their own lives, “free from the looming shadow of Leviathan”. And how is it possible? For Call (2002:75), as Foucault teaches, “power is everywhere”, “omnipresent and capillary” and “comes

¹⁹ In turn, Newman remembers that spatial autonomy is traditionally understanding as carving territorial or political space.
²⁰ In this thesis thesis, modern age means the Enlightenment as we have already stated. Nevertheless, for Foucault, as we will see, modernity starts after the nineteenth century.
from everywhere”. So, power is not exclusive of the state or rulers or dominant social classes (Call, 2002:75). Resistance is also power and cannot destroy power (Call, 2002:75). Power delocalises politics from the state. For these reasons, postanarchism is about “what politics means outside of the ontological order of state sovereignty” (Newman, 2011:4). Postanarchism disrupts, through power, sovereign political identities. Postanarchism delivers sovereignty everywhere.

In turn, for Newman (2001: 3,157), the state, being “a manifestation of the place of power”, is an essence or a fixed identity or a preconception. According to Newman, the (modern) state is ‘place’, something closed, a limited space, already defined, with rationalist and essentialist foundations. It is not space or “non-place”, something open and non-essentialist. The state is not a process of ongoing definition. For postanarchism, the appropriate domain of power or politics is this “non-place” or autonomous spaces (Newman, 2011:9,11) and not the state.

Newman (2011:9) adds also that the state is the place of “depoliticisation”: it “polices politics, regulating, controlling and repressing the insurgent dimension that is proper to the political” (Newman, 2011:9). According to Newman (nd), these spaces of resistance are, in fact, ‘insurgents’, they are political moments of creation and are autonomous spaces that exist in contrast to the state or the state of exception or the more actual “bio-political state”, the Foucauldian security state, controlling and ordering people’s space through biology and the body.

For these reasons, for Call (2002:130), the solution is this “insurgent dimension” beyond the state rather than the revolution against the state.

Newman (2011:13) explains:

radical politics today should be conceived of in terms of rupture with the existing order. … However, the politics of the ‘event’, which this notion of rupture implies, should be conceived of in ways that avoid the violent, terroristic and potentially authoritarian revolutionary forms of the past.

Postanarchism, “refuses to smash the state, … preferring instead to pursue the deeper project of semiotic liberation, … sketched by Baudrillard, Debord and the

21 We can also relate this ‘non-place’ with the ‘no place’ or utopia. Later in this chapter we will discuss the matter (pg: 48).
situationists” (Call, 2002:130). For Call (2002:42,51), the postmodern anarchist goal is this semiotic project with new creative languages and not “to reform the state or the seizure of power” (2011:51). Call (2002:52) remembers, by the way, the Nietzschean superman, or “the first true an -archist”, that creates his own values and “no longer needs the state or any other institution”. For Call (2002:74), this creative semiotic project presupposes “to abolish the conditions of thinking which make the state possible” (Call, 2002:74). These “new creative languages” are the solution. According to Call (2002:74), the problem is not properly the state, but the previous power relations: “no revolutionary theory has ever accounted for underlying power relations which exist prior to the state and which make the state possible”. For Call (2002:74), maybe “the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction”, maybe it is a “lot more limited than many of us think”. Maybe “what is really important ... is not so much the étatisation of society, as the ‘governamentalization’ of the state” (Call, 2002:74). By ‘governamentalization’, Call means “the network of power relationships which make possible the modern state”. For Call (2002:74), an attack on the state institutions could be harmful, because it would mask these power relations that are “the crucial problem”.

In Richard Day’s (2011:113) perspective, the postanarchist logic is to act ‘alongside’ the state with different power relations and goals. This logic is:

- a desire to create alternatives to state and corporate forms of social organization, working ‘alongside’ the existing institutions; proceeding in this via disengagement and reconstruction rather than by reform or revolution; ... enabling experiments and the emergence of new forms of subjectivity; and finally, ... inventing new forms of community.

So, these new forms of community or “new creative languages” beyond the state are the solution.

**Non-humanist space**

These new subjectivities and these new forms of communities are the non-humanist space. Call (2002:75) points out that the postmodern anarchist solution is “the revolt against humanism” and this revolt is a kind of “emancipatory project”. And what is humanism? As we have seen in the Introduction of *The State of The Art*, humanism is
the Copernican revolution that places human being at the centre of the world and sees the reason – *logos* - as the point of orientation (Frank, 1989:20-23). This humanist Man is a “religious ideal”, a “fixed idea” (Newman, 2001: 60). According to Call (2002:75), humanist thought believes there is a human essence, “an elementary nucleus”, “a primitive atom” and human beings need to emancipate this essence. Call (2002:74,75) remembers that, “for the modernist anarchist Bakunin, capitalism and state must be destroyed because they interfere with the liberation of an authentic human essence”.

But, in terms of anti-humanism, Call (2002:75) notes, “there is no need to uphold man in order to resist” because there are not essences nor nucleus. For Frank (1989:20-23), the anti-humanist man was released in cosmos, in anti-humanist space without references. Regarding anti-humanism, there is “an anarchy of the subject” or “an anarchy of becoming” that “violently destabilizes” the Enlightenment subjectivity which, as we have seen, is the basis of classical anarchism and also of Marxism (Call, 2002:33). This anarchy means a “perpetual project of self-overcoming and self-creation, constantly losing and finding ourselves in the river of becoming”.

For Call, (2002:33) we have a “fluid, dispersed, multiple and pluralistic” rather than “fixed and centred, singular and totalitarian” subjectivity. Newman (2001: 60) agrees that this “fixed idea” restricts and oppresses open individuality. According to the anti-humanists, the individual is the “un-man” that “refuses to conform to human essence, to the ideal of man” (Newman, 2001: 61). The un-man is “the other of man, a Dionysian force that cannot be contained — both a creation of man and a threat to it” (Newman, 2001: 61). This “Dionysian force” is also the anti-humanist revolt against humanist fixed essences of man. As Newman (2011: 139) says, it is the ethical openness to the other that disrupts sovereignty and political identities” (Newman, 2011: 139). And this revolt against humanism does not mean to destroy power (Call, 2002:75). For Call (2002:75), as we have seen, power is ubiquitous, “comes from everywhere”. According to Call (2002:74,75), as we have noted, to fight against the state is to reinscribe previous power relations or the “problematic” network of power relationships that constitute the state. It would multiply “places” of power rather than create autonomous “spaces” of power or non-humanist spaces. So, Call (2002:75) concludes, resistance can fight everywhere against humanism, creating non-essentialist power relations (autonomous spaces).
Nomadic space

For Call (2002:74), non-humanism is the nomos. In Greek, nomos, means the pasture and nomadic signifies the shepherd, who changes his place frequently due to herding. Yet in Greek, the word nomos also means the god or spirit (daimon) of law, which stands in contrast to other, an-archic, non-humanist meaning. Could we say that the nomadic space is the mix of these two Greek nomos, a permanently disordered order?

For Call (2002:74), nomos signifies “the space outside the state” or non-humanism. Humanism means the logos, reason in Greek, or the state’s reason or the space inside the rationality of the state (Call, 2002:74). So nomos is the space of “theoretical and political resistance” outside the state, a space without rulers: a stateless or “nomadic anarchy”. (Call, 2002:36,74,82). This nomadic anarchy is also the an-archy - without principles - of the subject: the non-humanistic subject that disrupts Enlightenment rationality, subjectivity and discipline (Call, 2002:82). As we have seen, this anarchic subjectivity signifies a perpetual self-overcoming, a self-creation and a “fluid, dispersed, multiple and pluralistic” subjectivity (Call, 2002:33). Becoming a nomad means this need to respect multiplicity and to find permanently ways of action that reflect this complexity (Call, 2002:62). To be a resistant or become a nomad is a permanent ‘exceed-itself’. As Pickett (1996:447) asked: “What, then, is resistance against? Foucault’s answer is ‘limits’”. This is the goal of “the great social nomad”, the anarchic personality “who prowls on the confines of a docile, frightened order”, pushing and disordering the limits of this order (Call, 2002:82).

It is “the outlaw”, someone that is beyond the law, someone that shows that “the dominant discourse of our culture - that of rationality, science and Enlightenment - is not the only available. There are other, subterranean, outlaw discourses and spaces which plagues and torment (this) comfortable world”: the space and the discourse of “the departure from the norm, the anomaly” or the transgression (Call, 2002:63,82,83). But, as Bataille (1957:99) remembers, the transgression is not a total disorder: it is an assumed act with an intention. According to Bataille (1957:71-78), “the transgression has nothing to do with the first reality of animal life”. It is as a mix of rationality and irrationality. Transgression opens a space or “an access beyond the limits of the ordinarily observed, but it knows these limits” (1957:71-78). It is like a party or a carnival “in which no one takes it badly”
(1957:71-78). Pickett (1996:451) explains: “Transgression seeks to undermine or at least weaken any given set of limits in order to attenuate their violence. Transgression then is nothing less than the affirmation of negation”. Transgression transcends without destroying the profane world (Bataille, 1957:76). The transgression is the sacred world that complements the profane world, opening new spaces (Bataille, 1957:76). For Call (2002:82), too, “the outlaw and the anomaly help to sketch out the space of the nomos”. So, Call (2002:82) affirms that we need to keep space for nonconformity, for transgression, for dissent and difference. The transgression or the violation of the law opens a space of radical difference, of multiple thinking, of nomadic and dispersed multiplicity (Bataille, 1957:71-78; Call, 2002:83, 84). It is a multidimensional or multilinear space rather than “an oppressively linear space, as the logos space (Call, 2002:71). Bataille (1957:72) explains how the transgression opens a space: we break the law when we have a positive emotion, when we have a negative emotion we obey. Bataille (1957:103) compares this positive emotion with the creative and violent explosion of eroticism, as Freud (nd:14) compares with the libido or Plato’s Eros. In turn, Call (2002:62) notes there can be no social change without this force that characterizes the nomadic subject. We have to become nomads or “desiring, molecular, nomadic and multiple subjects” and we must start opening nomadic spaces: “experimentation, search and transition spaces” (Call, 2002:62). As Nietzsche (2002) suggests: “you must have chaos within you to give birth to a sparkling star”.

The rhizomatic space

As we just have seen, this “nomad thought” is also “a decentred and multiplicitous thinking” or a “rhizomatic thinking” (Call, 2002:123). Call (2002:123) defines rhizome as “a non-hierarchical, centerless mode of organization”. The rhizome is a space “in which every point or node is linked to every other” (Call, 2002:123). This kind of multiple space is inspired by a root plant, the rhizome, which has horizontal, underground stems capable of producing the shoot and root of a new plant. An example of this rhizomatic space is the network space that is an anarchic and centerless space and mode of thinking, contrasting with the rooted, binary, logical state’s way of thinking (Call, 2002:123). The rhizome means there is not a centre

22 Here, Call refers the logocentrism or the history linearity of modern age, from Plato to Hegel and Marx.
where power is located, but several sites, where power comes from, and interlinks between these sites (May, 1994:11).

The rhizomatic space settles Deleuze and Guattari’s “war machine”, that is “an assemblage that makes thought itself nomadic” (Call, 2002:123). And how thought remains nomadic? This machine is “a metaphor of war, rift, and antagonism”, used to open space, breaking down “the essentialist unity of human subjectivity, showing its dependence on the power it claims to oppose” (Newman, 2001: 6). As we have seen, power, or desire, is ubiquitous. So, this war machine is also a nomadic and desire machine that aims to flow freely and to threaten society’s structures of exploitation and oppression (Call, 2002:123). The postmodernist war is the Nietzschean war: the energy that makes things change permanently and become nomadic. For Nietzsche (2002), war is the desire that joins people together through antagonism. As Nietzsche (2002) says, “the friend is our enemy”. The war is the agonistic power that, through contrariness, is a vital part of self-creation (Pickett, 1996:464). It is not our destruction, but “the creation of something entirely different, or a total innovation” (Pickett, 1996:464). As Nietzsche (2002) concludes, “the destructor is the creator”.

So the war machine, settled on the rhizome, creates more rhizomatic space and more nomadic thinking. How? By generating successive lines of flight through desire, power and antagonism, outside the state, its sovereignty and its law. Through these lines of flight, agonistic power creates this multidimensional and multilinear space that disrupts “the subject-centered thinking which authorizes all modern states” (Call, 2002:123). The rhizome is this resistant space, where “people can make their own decisions, form their own movements, and reach their own objectives” (Pickett, 1996:463). The rhizome is where, through agonistic power, we open our space and participate in society.

**Micro-Space**

What is this node through which each of us may participate in society? This is the micro-space. And why is this space micro? As we have seen, Frank (2008:143) writes that “ownness is the creator of everything”. Stirner (1901: 18) explains, “I am the creative nothing, the nothing out of which I myself as creator create everything”. Foucault (1994a), quoting Kant, recalls that we start individually when we are autonomous and when we are autonomous we open our space: we occupy space. So,
if each of us is the nothing out of which we can create everything, this means we can do as we wish voluntarily (Frank, 2008). Frank explains (2008:143) “the individual should concentrate only on their ever-changing needs and desires, and take responsibility for constructing an account of the good which meets these desires: ownness created a new freedom”. In turn, for Call (2002: 52), “our primary duty is to reprogram or redesign ourselves, creating our anew as the kind of being who can legislate new values and inscribe new laws”. To redesign ourselves, as someone autonomous and able to create new values, our own law, as we wish, is the first goal: the micro goal.

For Call (2002:51), this “micro goal” means also “becoming minoritarian” and it is a political option, different to the seeking of a majority in liberal democracy. Call (2002:51) explains: “this is the opposite of macropolitics … in which it is a question of knowing how to win or obtain majority”. The “becoming minoritarian” means “become those we are” (Call, 2002:51); it means to be a Nietzschean “enemy” or to choose political autonomy and antagonism, to participate in society opening space. Call (2002:51) adds, “becoming-minoritarian is a (different) political affair and necessitates a labour of power, an active micro-politics”. Power is the question here.

As we have seen, power is ubiquitous. It is everywhere for all of us. And when we assume deliberately the power we have, we are autonomous and we do as we wish: we create. Newman (2011:62) adds that “any sort of emancipatory transformation of social relations must start with a transformation of power relations at an everyday micro-level”. So, emancipation is the creation of new agonistic micro power relations between autonomous individuals. Emancipation means to create oneself and means also the openness of collective micro-spaces by empowered people, interacting in the rhizome. These collective micro-spaces are the nodes of the rhizome through which each of us may participate in society. And, answering the initial question: for postanarchism, space is micro because it is opened by ownness, by autonomous individuals that create themselves responsibly, permanently and collectively.

Cyberspace

As we just have said, cyberspace, the network space, is an example of the rhizomatic space. As Call (2002:123) affirms, like the rhizome, the Internet is an anarchic space and mode of thinking, where “every point or node is linked to every other”. Call (2002:124,125) compares this “electronic matrix” to the “desire machine” of Deleuze...
and Guattarri that disrupts the “suspect” centered systems and centered subjects. For Call (2002:125), more concretely, the rhizomatic Internet is a finite centreless space, where communication runs through neighbours; where channels of communication are not pre-existing to the communication but simultaneous; the individuals are interchangeable and defined by their position at a given moment. Following Call (2002:125), the computer network has a postanarchist “subversive sense”, due to its social and political functioning. For Call (2002: 24, 125), this desire machine is a ubiquitous power space: a ‘hallucinated’ net of power points where “any gesture, no matter how radical, is possible”.

As Call (2002:125) argues, cyberspace is a set of “micro communities of Hackers”. For Call (2002:125), a community is an autonomous group, which creates and shares “certain recipes, rules or programs which govern behavior”. According to Call (2002:125), the Hackers are the Internet users that create cultures – values - and communities and who innovate permanently generating new combinations of net (Call, 2002:125). For Call (2002:137,138), the hackers reject also “an outmoded, bourgeois subjectivity” and manifest an anarchic subjectivity. According to Call (2002:131), Hackers look like the cyborg. It is a kind of disassembly and reassembly of the personal self (Call, 2002:131). It is a collective, postanarchist, cybernetic personality that inhabits and constitutes the centreless rhizomatic cyberspace (Call, 2002:131).

Working space
As we are seeing, the postanarchist is an ongoing “disassembly and reassembly”; it is a permanent becoming. For Call (2002:51), the individual is not a finished being; it is a work in progress; it is “a work of art”: “become who you are and create yourself as a masterpiece”. This means carve yourself and carve your own law. And, as Call (2002:51) notes, “needless to say, this kind of radical individual legislation is hardly compatible with the legislative system of any statist order”. And why is it not compatible? Because the legislative system is about coercion and radical law is the result of an aesthetic work: “a work of art”, a creative work. And this creative work is the true work for Nietzsche. Nietzsche (2002) says, “the table of goods is the table of triumphs of their efforts; it is the voice of their will to Power”. And Nietzsche (2002) adds, “I love those who the soul overflows, I love those who work and invent”. In the Nietzschean perspective, our life, our values, our inventions are the result of our
desire or of our “will to power”. And to work is all of this process of creation. Newman (2001:59) affirms that our life is a construct. And Stirner (1901:18) explains, we are creative: “I am the creative nothing”. For Pickett (1996:462), there is a Nietzschean ideal of aesthetic self-creation and this ideal is connected to the idea of resistance. We create ourselves through antagonism - agonistic power. Nietzsche assumes that this becoming is not an easy way: “your work is a struggle. Your peace is a victory”. For Nietzsche (2002), the superman is a “brave”, not a “soldier”. For Nietzsche (2002), the soldier just obeys. According to Nietzsche, work is affirmation; it is not ‘human labour’ that dominates “self-will”, as Newman (2001:60) recalls. Work is fight. May (2008:30), working on Rancière, says:

Democracy\footnote{For Rancière (2008:173), Democracy or “the power of the people itself is anarchic in principle, because it is the affirmation of the power of anyone or of those who have no title to it”.} is the community of sharing, in both senses of the term: a membership in a single world which can only be expressed in adversarial terms, and a coming together which can only occur in conflict. To postulate a world of shared meaning is always transgressive.

As we have discussed above, to be “transgressive” or nomadic and ‘to postulate a life of shared meaning’ signifies an intention to disrupt limits and to affirm ourselves. Franks (2008:140) notes, “Nietzsche identifies how social forces play an important role in the construction of the aesthetic project”. We are the result of a fight between our will and other forces in social life.\footnote{The social space is the set of all relationships that exist in society (May, 1994:53).} And it is through participation in this struggle of forces that we constitute our space. All of us could fight and participate. According to Pickett (1996:462), “through practical engagement, it is possible to work up on the self, and to create more ‘space’ for self-creation apart from the political world”. So, working is to fight: is the process through which we autonomously create ourselves and create a space and a law. So, all of us could be fighters and workers and could open a working space.
Utopia

Do as you please, do as you think, do as you imagine (Frank, 2008). This is the postanarchist creative work. And this is also the postanarchist utopia now, as we will see.

Taking the expression “Utopia now” and starting from utopia, u-topia means, in Greek, ‘no place’: u signifies no and topos signifies place. In turn, ‘now’ means, for Zúquete (2011:1,11), “the politics that does not wait”; the politics that “acts in the moment”; “the politics of the here and now”. Hence utopia now means “a sweeping drive for change” (Zúquete, 2011:1).

Why is utopia now “a sweeping drive for change”, if utopia signifies a no-place, something unattainable, as Thomas More (Morus, 2003) describes it? Or, being a drive for change, does utopia mean a revolution? If the answer is no, as Day puts it, how might we “continue to struggle against oppression without reproducing the modern fantasy or a final event of totalizing change (the revolution)”? Why does postanarchist utopia change the world without a “totalizing” happy end? The answer is because utopia now means the return of Foucault’s sign and Greek episteme (Foucault, 2000; Frank, 1989:102-109).

May (1994:74) adds: epistemology is inseparable from politics, and postanarchism, through the Greek episteme, shows clearly this relationship between power and knowledge. And why? The Greek episteme has a fundamental epistemological dimension where the value or the sign is the truth, as Foucault states (Call, 2002:51; Foucault, 2000; Frank, 1989:102-109). And the sign is the truth, because, as we have seen, values, as signs, are the product of our thought, of our imagination or of our creative work (Nietzsche, 2002; Foucault, 2000; Franks, 1989:109). Franks (1989:109) explains that the individual has an organizing subjectivity that presents itself as will to power, a productive force or as linguistic energy, having the ability to forge, and to modify the sign’s sense. The individual has the creative power to generate signs and values. Consequently, according to Foucault (2000), the signs are our thought or imagination. The signs are thought (Foucault, 2000, Frank, 1989:102). There is an “imaginary coextensivity” between both (Baudrillard, 1981:1,2). Franks (1989:102) notes, thinking just represents itself by the externality of the signs; the idea – representation - and the object are the same thing. Zúquete (2011:12) adds, “imagination is the remedy. … The most powerful weapon that we have is our imagination”. The truth is the product of our imagination or of our
Frank (1989:102,103,106) adds that there is an immediate link between representation or objects and thought; there is a transparency between both. As Koch (2011:35) notes, there is no foundation for truth beyond the individual. For Koch (2011:28), truth cannot exist apart from those who possess it. So, according to the Greek *episteme*, the signs are as an epiphany, a manifestation of the creators’ thought. The signs also are the creator (Foucault, 2000, Frank, 1989:102). The principle of equivalence manages the relationship between the sign and the real. There is no mediation or mediator (Frank, 1989:104); Foucault (2000:86,87) explains, “the relationship between signifier and signified inhabits a space where there is no more intermediate that ensures the meeting of both”. Foucault (2000:88,90) argues, “the sign is entirely transparent because the meaning is lodged inside the sign without residue and without opacity. … The sign have no other laws, except those who can govern their content”. So, the sign is the message or the emissary; it is the truth because it is the thought. And utopia now means such a truth and such a representation: something that is the immediate product of our imagination, being also exterior to it.

For Zúquete (2011:9), utopia now is “a primal, creative, and Dionysian force”. May (1994:70,82) explains that all representation has a source: the libido or the “constitutive force”, Bataille’s transgression, the nomadic anarchy or the desire machine of Deleuze and Guattari. According to Zúquete (2011:9), utopia now is “an ongoing process of becoming”, the result of the imagination or the creative work that, as we have been studying, generates “space for all of us, … allowing us to be who we are – and who we really can be” (Zúquete, 2011:8). The autonomous spaces are a true representation. For Zúquete (2011:11), “liberated spaces … represent revolutionary acts in which the future is shaped and experienced in the present”. Autonomous spaces are the utopia now.

So, we can say, postanarchism reverses liberal representation: state, government, parties. And this is the reason why utopia now is “a sweeping drive for change” (Zúquete, 2011: 1). It means the return of the sign: the true representation here and now. This representation is an achievable alternative world, “experienced, in a variety of ways, in the present” (Zúquete, 2011:7). Utopia now means to make utopia concrete or to make concrete “the world of our dreams (Zúquete, 2011:4,10,11). And this is the transparent and immediate classical truth that contrasts
with “the tedium” of politics when “the adventure of changing the world is transformed into waiting for its change” (Zúquete, 2011:11).

For Baudrillard (1981:1,2,6), this “tedium” is simulation or “false representation”. According to Baudrillard (1981:1,2) simulation is the modern, liberal and Marxist - vanguard party - representation that signifies “a model of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal”. Simulation is when “the map precedes the territory”, when the map engenders the territory, when the territory no longer precedes the map (Baudrillard, 1981:1). In turn, Baudrillard (1981:1,2) notes the sovereignty of the territory (creator) engenders the poetry of the map (created). For Baudrillard, with simulation this sovereignty disappears. “The charm of the territory, the magic of the concept and the charm of the real” have disappeared (Baudrillard, 1981:1,2). As Foucault (2000:63) imagines, “Don Quixote must fill in with reality the signs without narrative content”.

For Call (2002:33,34), this simulation happens because “our politics remains stubbornly modern, trapped within the intellectual horizons of the Enlightenment”, the liberal revolutions of the eighteenth century, liberal states, epistemology and representation (simulation) of such states. On the other side, Call (2002:33) continues, stands “the postmodern politics of the millennium” that:

are characterized by the commodification of political candidacy and the simultaneous decline of voter participation in most liberal states, the increasing irrelevance of nations-states in the face of globalized ‘free trade’ agendas of multinational corporations, and the constant mystification of political issues by an ever more ‘spectacular’ mass media system

This picture shows that political representation no more ‘represents’ our will and we distance ourselves from politics because it is no more what we want (Newman, 2011:32). For Call (2002:93), we live in a world of dead signs that have no relation to the real, to our desires, to our dreams.

For many of these reasons, as May (1994:13) argues, classical anarchism has mainly rejected political representation. In the context of the enlightened Leviathan, the enlightened dictatorship of the proletariat and the enlightened vanguard party, anarchism of the nineteenth century has made a difference; it spread the struggle and
The postanarchist: an ideal type

sought political intervention in a multiplicity of struggles or a multiplicity of representations (May, 1994:13; Newman, 2011:32; Rancière, 2008:175). Rancière (2008:175) notes, classical anarchism has “a certain organicist conception where the social cell as a living organism is opposed to political artifice”.25 This could mean that anarchism has always seen the state’s representation as the locale of oppression, as an artifice, as a simulation without reality. In turn, anarchism has offered a naturalist vision, opposing the oppression of state representation to the liberty of society, incarnated in the social group of producers and in tactics of direct expression of popular will, as spontaneous revolt, self-organization and direct action (Newman, 2011:32; Rancière, 2008:175).

In this way, classical anarchism offers a kind of utopia now, although, Rancière (2008:175) remarks, such natural society is apolitical, and Newman (Newman, 2001: 82) adds, it is also essentialist and humanist. Newman (2001: 81, 82) comments:

truth does not exist in a realm outside power, as anarchists and other classical political theorists believed. … “the political question … is truth itself”. This argument is shared by Stirner, who … rejects the idea that truth is beyond the realm of individual perspective and struggle. There is not one Truth, but many truths, as many as there are individual perspectives. Truth is a weapon in a power game.

Rancière and Newman are right: “the political question is truth itself” and anarchists do not see nature as power. Nevertheless, anarchists distinguish between the oppressor state’s artifice or simulation and the true, natural, social production. And we can understand this natural multiple production as the utopia now. Here their natural world is closer to Nietzsche (2002) who says, “everything is body and nothing more”. And as we have noted, for Nietzsche, the body and man are a perpetual self-overcoming, and not a closed organism (Call, 2002:33).26 So, Nietzsche (2002)

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25 Here, for Rancière (2008), there is proximity between anarchism and Marxism because anarchism stresses, “the opposition between production and exchange and the parasitism of forms of the State” and, according to Rancière, “this vision is quite close to the Marxist opposition between economic and social reality and politics as appearance”.

26 For Lyotard (1979:24,25), the modern age has two methodological principles: (i) society forms an organic whole (functionalism, self-regulating systems, cybernetics); (ii) society is characterized by class struggle and dialectic.
concludes “the work of people on fire is good and evil”. For Nietzsche, this body, this will to power, is the desire, the source of all power, of all creativity, of all production. So, these struggles and natural productions of the anarchists can be seen as the utopia now.

For the aforementioned, utopia now is the real revolution or, better, the drive for change, because, as we have seen, it changes radically the organization of space and time and changes also the way people decide their ongoing organization from now on (Call, 2002:100).

Utopia now is as an “insurrection of signs”; it looks like the explosion of graffiti on May 68 walls (Call, 2002:23,103). As Newman (2011:7) notes, utopia emerges in political struggles themselves, at localised points, in immediate actions of creating alternatives within the present, rather than waiting for the revolution. Newman (2011:7) completes the thought, as we have already studied: “imagining an alternative to the current order is not to lay down a precise programme for the future, but rather to provide a point of alterity or exteriority as a way of interrogating the limits of this order”. For Newman, the emergence of this point is the insurrection or the transgression of Bataille.

Newman (2001: 66) explains that the insurrection starts “from men’s discontent with themselves”; insurrection is a rising of individuals. Insurrection is autonomy: it leads us “no longer to let ourselves be arranged”, but “to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on institutions” (Newman, 2001: 66).

Insurrection is not the revolution that addresses new arrangements; it is not a fight against the established; it is not an armed rising (Newman, 2001: 66). If insurrection prospers, “the established collapses of itself” (Newman, 2001: 66). For Call (2002:102), insurrection looks like a party, a festival or a carnival, as Bataille states. Play, joy and enjoy now is the rule. According to Call (2002:102), “play is the ultimate principle of the festival, and the only rules it can recognize are to live without dead time and to enjoy without restraints”. Call (2002:102) argues that the postanarchist revolution is like a gesture that might be artistic, political, satirical or subversive and, above all, it would be playful. As Nietzsche (2002) affirms: “man has been very little fun. This is the only original sin”.

For Call (2002:38), the insurgent or the resistant is the Nietzschean superman: the life force that is active, creative and affirmative and rich in possibility. Utopia now is the will to power that allows us to open autonomous spaces free from
hierarchy, authority and oppression, where we can give wings to creativity and build ourselves.

So, the postanarchist answer to the question of how might we “continue to struggle against oppression without reproducing the modern fantasy or a final event of totalizing change (the revolution)?” is: through utopia now.

3) OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS

As we have said in the Introduction, in this sub-chapter we are going to examine the contributions that David Graeber and John Holloway have made to postanarchism, being always mindful of our initial perception: postanarchism is space constitution. Neither authors assume postanarchism, although there seems to be some similarities and some differences that can be very useful to better understand postanarchism.

First, we are going to analyse the contribution of David Graeber, an anarchist, close to the anti-globalization movement (Evren, 2011:10). Then, we will study John Holloway, a post-marxist or a neo-libertarian, as Noys (2008:115) defines him.

So, in the next section, we start with David Graeber.

David Graeber’s contribution

In this section, we analyse the anarchism of David Graeber, having always in mind our initial hypothesis: postanarchism is space constitution. As we have already defined above the expression “new anarchism”, now we should just recall quickly that new anarchism belongs to contemporary anarchism, more concretely, to the anarchism of the third wave that has some proximity to anti-globalization movements. New anarchism is wider than postanarchism and the anti-globalization movement. Postanarchism is just a single strain in the diverse currents of anarchism today. Nevertheless, they are both anarchism and here we can find some similarities. We start from the global to the micro.
As we have said, Graeber is close to the anti-globalization movement\textsuperscript{27} and he works on a global perspective. His goal is to show that a new wave of anarchism is emerging through the anti-globalization movement. For Graeber (nd, 2002), anarchism is the heart and the soul of the movement: “everywhere, from Eastern Europe to Argentina, from Seattle to Bombay, anarchist ideas and principles are generating new radical dreams and visions”. And, according to Graeber (nd), these anarchist principles are: “decentralization, voluntary association, mutual aid, social networks, and above all, the rejection of any idea that the ends justify the means”. Graeber (2011:82,83) adds that, in an anarchist perspective, the anti-globalization movement aims also to bring about the demise of the nation state\textsuperscript{28} and the elimination of national borders. Graeber (2002) shows that the anti-globalization movement has internationalist origins and demands:

the three-plank programme of Ya Basta! in Italy, for instance, calls for a universally guaranteed ‘basic income’, global citizenship, guaranteeing free movement of people across borders, and free access to new technology.

We can find some proximity between Graeber’s new anarchism and postanarchism. Newman (2011:181) agrees that there is a new global wave of anarchism today: “the radical struggles for autonomy appearing today on the global terrain indicate that … the anarchism moment has finally arrived”.

Nevertheless, regarding the global perspective, Day (2005: 4) notes that the anti-globalization term does not cover “the entire spectrum of resistance to the new world order”. Day (2005:4) recalls that postanarchism seeks “change to the root”; it focuses the micro rather than the global. As we have seen, postanarchism is about openness of micro spaces of autonomy, self-determination and creative work.

\textsuperscript{27} The anti-globalization movement was arguably born during the manifestations of Peoples’ Global Action, in late 1999, in Seattle, United States of America, on the occasion of the Summit of the Organization World Trade Organisation. During and after this demonstration, the movement spread all over the world (Day, 2005:1,2,3,4). For Graeber (nd), the anti-globalization movement aims at, “rather than seizing state power, exposing, delegitimizing and dismantling the mechanisms of power while increasingly (creating) larger spaces of autonomy and participatory management”.

\textsuperscript{28} For Graeber (2011:51), a nation state is a people who speak the same language that lives within certain boundaries and recognizes a common set of legal principles.
Regarding the micro, there are also some similarities between Graeber’s anarchism and postanarchism in terms of the principles that inspired the anti-globalization movement: decentralization, voluntary action, social networks and the refusal that “the ends justify the means” - as we have seen, for postanarchism, the means are always the ends or the signs that are always thought. Along the same lines, Graeber seems to valorize the epistemological relationship between power and thought/imagination. Graeber (2011:43) points out “counter power”, or the inner contradictions or inner wars of society, which “sinks its roots in imagination”.

Before analyzing imagination, regarding this “counter power”, despite the importance of antagonism or agonism for postanarchism, here, Day (2005:8) warns that, for postanarchism, there is a distinction between counter-hegemonic and non-hegemonic movements. For Day (2005:7), hegemony means “a simultaneously coercive and consensual struggle for dominance”. So, he says about counter-hegemonic movements, rather than “seeking to take the power, they seek to influence its operation through processes of pluralistic co-operation and conflict” (Day, 2005:8). For Day, (2005:8), this means accepting the “hegemony of hegemony” or “to remain within the logic of the neoliberalism”. Noys (2008:115) adds, the counter-summits of the anti-globalization movement are an example of this counter-hegemonic power because they reflect and valorize the power summits they oppose: they are as mirrors. Noys (2008:116) suggests, “rather than waiting for them to decide where and when to meet, no longer running behind them, we’ll jump on the driver’s seat and decide this for ourselves”. And this jump on the driver’s seat is non-hegemonic power. As Day (2005:8) explains, the non-hegemonic movements or the newest movements, that are not social movements because they have non-branded strategies and tactics, “seek radical change, but not through taking or influencing state power”. For them, “there is no single enemy” (Day, 2005:5,6), but “a disparate set of struggles, each of which needs to be addressed in its particularity”.

Graeber (2011: 44) admits that this generic “counter power” is “an imaginative source” that is responsible for the creation of new social forms and the transformation of old ones. Without speaking about the symbolic or representational question, Graeber (2011: 44) notes, this imaginative source is constituent power which, as we have seen, is also what postanarchism affirms. The author stresses self-determination and autonomy of these forms. Graeber (2011: 56) defines these forms, generically, as “autonomous communities” that constitute and reexamine themselves
continually and create their own principles of collective action. For Graeber (2011: 56), these communities are by definition revolutionary acts. Graeber (nd) remarks that the revolution is not to seize power, but to build a new society “within the shell of the old one”. It is a long process presumably (Graeber, nd)

The author seems also to have a rhizomatic vision of the new social forms of the anti-globalization movement. Graeber (2011: 51) points out that communities, associations, networks and projects, that arise at any scale, local or global, overlap and cross one another in every imaginable and unimaginable way.

Graeber (2011:91,93) does not have a relation between this creative “counter power” and work, but considers that work is a fundamental subject. Graeber (2011:91,93) points out that the fight against work has always been central to anarchist organization and the main purpose of this fight is to abolish work as a relationship of domination. For Graeber (2011:91,93), in the short term, if work cannot be eliminated, it can be reduced. Graeber (2011:91,93) admits that if we find that work is necessary for having a comfortable and environmentally sustainable life, because there are many people who really enjoy their work, the situation can be greatly improved by eliminating humiliating aspects that a hierarchical organization of work involves.

Another meeting point between Graeber and postanarchism is the question of the state. Postanarchism does not seek the demise of the nation state, but works beyond the state. As Newman (2011:181) affirms: postanarchism “consists in the invention or re-invention of spaces, movements, ways of life, economic exchanges and political practices that resist the imprint of the state and which foster relations of equal liberty”.

With the above, on a micro scale, we could find some important overlaps between Graeber and postanarchism. But the difference is that Graeber does not focus on the micro. Graeber’s goal is not to develop, understand and discuss the self-determination question or space constitution or work as a creative action through the lens of anarchism. Graeber’s focus is always the global anarchist forest. In turn, for Graeber, anarchism is a practical philosophy, being the ideology of the new movement, the form of its organization and its organizational principles (Evren, 2011:10). As we have studied, Call, May and Newman are part of a different project, which combines anarchist theory with poststructuralist and postmodernist theories that are critical of modernity (Evren, 2011:10).
In sum, Graeber has a global approach on anarchism, different from the micro approach of postanarchism that aims for the determination of the individual, creative work and the openness of autonomous spaces. Nevertheless Graeber approaches many of the main questions of postanarchism, thinking about the anti-globalization movement through the lens of anarchism.

In the next section, we will present John Holloway’s contribution on postanarchism.

**John Holloway’s contribution**

In this section, we discuss John Holloway’s ideas on radical politics, having always in mind our initial motto: *anarchism is space constitution*. As we have said above, Noys (2008:115) characterizes Holloway as a post-Marxist or a neo-libertarian. Analyzing his post-Marxism, we can see Holloway is also a neo-libertarian, coming close to postanarchism. Holloway works on important questions for postanarchism as such rejection of the state and the party, the critique of revolution as an event and also the critique of the Marxist teleology or the revolutionary happy end. As a neo-libertarian, the work of Holloway complements postanarchism. Holloway discusses *working spaces*, as we are going to see.

Like Graeber, Holloway (2010) has always in mind the whole, the fight against capitalism - “Crack Capitalism”. But, like postanarchism, the author is mainly concerned with the particular: with space opening. Holloway (2010:261) explains that “crack capitalism” is a suggestion to fight from the particular, to fight from where we are: here and now. It is a suggestion to “create spaces or moments of otherness” (Holloway, 2010:261). And how does Holloway create these spaces? The spaces are created by the fetishism of Marx.

Holloway (2010:88) recalls that, “Marx introduces the idea of the dual labour in his youthful work, the ‘1844 Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts’”. In this work, Marx (2005:31) considers there are two ‘labours’: capitalist labour and non-capitalist labour or the “doing”. Holloway (2010:84) explains that labour indicates “a doing that is unpleasant or subject to external compulsion or determination”. The “doing” indicates “an activity that is potentially self-determining”, although Marx does not discuss this “doing”, as Holloway (2010:31,84) observes. So, according to Holloway (2010:88), in his work, “Marx turns to labour as it exists in capitalist
society, which he characterized as alienated or estranged labour. The object which labour produces – labour’s product – confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer”.

Holloway (2005: 31) explains that in capitalism production separates subject and object or separates the “doer” (producer) and the “done” (product). According to Holloway, the product of capitalist production is not ours, belonging to those who possess the means of production. This means that, on the one hand, the product belongs to the producer because he produces it. On the other hand, the product does not belong to the producer and is an alien that gravitates in the market with no connection to its creator. So, in Holloway’s (2010:88) perspective, this product is something alienated, “a power independent of the producer” (Holloway, 2010:88).

Holloway (2005:27,31) explains, capitalist production breaks the “doing” or the “power to” or “our capacity to do” or to create. For Holloway (2005:28), power is ‘can-ess’, capacity-to-do. According to Holloway (2005:29), when the “doing” is broken, the power-to becomes “power-over”, “a relation of power over others”. And this is the reason there are two labours: capitalist and non-capitalist. Our “doing”, non-capitalist labour or our capacity to create, is turned into labour or “the incapacity-to-do”, or “the incapacity to realise our own projects, our own dreams” (Holloway 2005:29).

This “incapacity” to realize our desires and dreams, this incapacity to do as we wish is, as we have seen above, a fundamental point for postanarchism. For postanarchism, we need to recuperate the doing, as for Holloway. In postanarchism, we only open space when we self-determine and realise our dreams, when we do creative work. And, in this case, as Holloway affirms (2005:42), the “done” belongs to the “doer”. The done is not alienated, because, as Foucault states, the immediate and transparent link between the done and the doer, between sign and thought remains (Holloway, 2005:43). There is not a rupture of the doing or Marx’s fetishism, as Holloway (2005:43) adds.

So, postanarchism is self-determination, the “drive” that permanently controls the flow of doing, and is not alienation, as Holloway (2010:39) says. For Holloway (2005:36), self-determination is also emancipation or “the struggle to liberate power-to from power-over”, doing from labour, subjectivity from objectification. And here, Holloway meets the non-hegemonic power of Day (2005:8). “It is not a matter of power against power”, as Holloway (2005:36) clarifies. It “is not the struggle to
construct a counter-power” or “a power that can stand against the ruling power”. It is a struggle that builds up “an anti-power” (Holloway 2005:36). And this anti-power means “the dissolution of power-over, the emancipation of power-to” (Holloway 2005:36, 37).

In turn, Holloway (2010:58) recalls, anti-power signifies a doing beyond the state, because the state is part of alienation; it is “part of the process of separation of the done from the doer”. The state “relates to people not as subjects but as objects”: “as citizens, individuals abstracted from their social context” (Holloways, 2010:58).

Turning to counter-power, for Holloway (2010:254), this means to destroy capitalism when the proposal is to refuse capitalism or to create the anti-power beyond capitalism. For Holloway (2010:254), to destroy capitalism would valorise and reproduce the power-over and “erect a great monster in front of us”. This is why the doing is not about revolutions or “great fables” or “great parties with heroic leaders” (Holloway, 2010:254). They are aliens against aliens. Radical politics is about ordinary people here and now (Holloway, 11, 254, 258). And ordinary people are not activists: some are, some are not (Holloway, 2010:77). For Holloway (2010:255,256), radical politics has no recipes and is about people that “think for (themselves), use (their) imagination, follow (their) inclinations and do whatever (they) consider necessary and enjoyable, always with the motto of against and beyond capital”. It is a negative and a positive movement: refusing and creating. Radical politics is about setting our own agenda (Holloway, 2010:259). And there are many examples:

For some, this will mean throwing themselves into the preparation for the next anti-G8 summit.29 For others, it will mean trying to open up perspectives of a different world for the children they teach in school. Others will join with their neighbours to create a community garden, or take part in activities of the nearby social centre. Some will dedicate all their energies to organising opposition to the extension of a motorway that threatens the livelihood of thousands of peasants, some will devote themselves to permaculture or creating free software,

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29 Holloway has a different perspective of the anti-globalization summits. The author does not see these activities as mirrors or counter power, unlike Day (2005:8) and Noys (2008:115). For Holloway, the activities of the World Social Forum are “doing”. They are a non-capitalist ways of doing.
others will just play with their children and friends, or write a book on how to change the world (Holloway, 2010:256).

Holloway notes that these activities are always collective. The doing means a collective and multiple subject or “a multiplicity of forces”: a “we” (Holloway, 2010:42,44). Holloway (2005:26) explains, the doing is social, plural, choral and communal; it is always part of a social flow and the pre-condition of my doing is the doing of others; the others provide the means of my doing. There is a mutual recognition and the recognition of the dignity of others (Holloway, 2010:39).

For Holloway (2010:89), the doing is a “conscious life activity”, is “the lost truth of humanity”. Here, Holloway seems to have a humanistic perspective of doing and man. But Holloway (2005:7,26) explains, subjectivity is not something closed: it is “the identity and the non-identity”, “a historical construct”. We are always constructing our truth. The done is our truth. Holloway is closer to Foucault and the true collective sign. Holloway (2005:39,41) adds that this truth is process, self-determination and ongoing antagonism between the doing and the labour or between the power-to and the power-over. We always fight to reject labour and to affirm the doing or our truth. And it is also the main goal of postanarchism: self-determination, agonism and a permanent creative work.

So, Holloway says directly what postanarchism insinuates: the goal is to constitute a true space of emancipation and self-determination or, as Holloway affirms, setting up a working space, not a labour space.

THE STATE OF THE ART: CONCLUSION

The goal of our thesis is to build up a postanarchist ideal type (“The Postanarchist, an activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal type”). As we have shown, this ideal type is an innovative proposal in terms of postanarchism because our main literature on postanarchism does not develop the subject on this perspective. The main authors - Saul Newman, Todd May, Lewis Call and Richard Day - develop, analyse and discuss in depth postanarchism: Saul Newman studies postanarchism, Todd May works on post-structuralist anarchism and Lewis Call deepens postmodern anarchism. In turn, Richard Day presents a genealogical study of the twentieth century social
movements, showing that postanarchism is something new and beyond these social movements. No author aims to examine the profile of the postanarchist or outline a postanarchist ideal type. Our goal is to create the postanarchist figure having as background this *State of The Art* and focusing on the work of Saul Newman, the author that has presented the concept in depth theoretically, as we have explained above. We think this theoretical construction is an interesting complement or framework to understand the practical and real utility of postanarchism or anarchism and horizontalism today.

In turn, as we have also stated, in this thesis, our intention is to develop the symbolic dimension – the productive or discursive activity or the truth - of Michel Foucault, because, as we have verified in *The State of The Art*, it is a fundamental way to understand the meaning of postanarchist space, action and work. So, we are going to discuss the sign and the concept of representation, because as we have seen, here there is also a gap in the main literature. No author develops this dimension. They address the question, but do not focus on the answer.

Saul Newman (2011:32) assumes that “central to anarchism is the critique of representation”. For Newman (2011:32), liberal, parliamentary arrangements and Marxist revolutionary vanguard parties are “inadequate fashions” to represent the will of the people. Newman (2001: 82) admits also the true power of Foucault’s sign:

> for Foucault then, morality, truth, and knowledge do not enjoy the privilege of being beyond the grasp of power. They are not pure sites uncontaminated by power but, on the contrary, are effects of power: they are produced by power, and they allow power itself to be produced.

Nevertheless, Newman’s (2001: 139) intention is to show that liberal and Marxist representation is impossible: “the subject is the *subject of the lack*: it is the name given to this ‘gap’ or void in the symbolic structure, this fundamental misrepresentation” (Newman, 2001: 139). Newman, then, turns the focus from the creative symbol to this misrepresentation or impossible representation: “there is, therefore, a lack between the signifier and what it signifies — an excess of meaning that eludes signification, and yet enables it to take place” (Newman, 2001: 139).
The same happens with Todd May. For May, representation is also this impossibility. May (1994:81,82,83) works directly on representation; he recognizes the immediacy and the transparency of representation, like Foucault; he admits that the libido – desire - is the source of all representation, despite being beyond all representation (May 1994: 81,82,83). Nevertheless, May (1994:81,82,83), like Newman, turns the focus from transparency to impossibility, the Heideggerian excessive being never grasped by the sign. May works on Lyotard (1994:81,82,83) to show that representation or self-representation is always negative and does not disclose the essence. For May (1994:132), representation is not synonymous with truth due to this excessive being. May (1994:132) explains, for instance, that philosophical practice aims to create concepts that are defined by their effects and does not aim to achieve truths. May’s goal is to show why political representation must be rejected. May (1994:81,82,83) advocates non-representation, leaving the door open to our work on Foucault’s true sign.

Lewis Call works mainly with symbols and simulations. As Baudrillard, the author distinguishes between the truth of the sign and the falsehood of the simulacrum. As Foucault, Call assumes the transparency and immediacy of the symbol and notes the importance of these new languages. However, Call’s aim is to work on the simulacrum and to show how we live in a world of dead signs that have no connection with reality. Then the author turns to radicalising the focus by diving into the alternative, radical, cyberpunk world of undead and new symbols (Call, 2002:93). So, also Call does not look directly at Foucault’s true sign, freeing this working space.

Day hits the target. Day (2011:108) says we need to go “through the fantasy” or through the utopia as we have outlined above. This is the secret:

crossing the fantasy means surprising both oneself and the structure – by inventing a response which precludes the necessity of the demand and thereby breaks out of the loop of the endless perpetuation of desire for emancipation. This is what is being done by those who are participating in the forms of direct action (Day (2011:108).

Day focuses on the core issue, nevertheless, his goal is, as we have seen, to do a genealogical work of twentieth century struggles, framewworking the differences and
particularities of postanarchism. So, Day provides the motto, but leaves the door open for those who want to focus on utopia or on this fantasy toward emancipation.

Working on our dreams and fantasies is our focus or the postanarchist focus. It is the path we are going to take. Our goal is to carve our ideal type and to show its desiring, imaginative, creative, creator, representative and symbolic profile. And this carving will be based on our initial hypothesis that postanarchism is a politics of “autonomous spaces”. As we have seen in this State of the Art, postanarchism is the constitution of autonomous spaces that are beyond the State: non-humanist, nomadic, rhizomatic, micro, cybernetic, working spaces. They are the utopia here and now, where we realise our dreams and fantasies. Postanarchism is the construction of equal, free, horizontal, fluid, mobile, circular, non-authoritarian, non-oppressive and non-repressive relations of people. These postanarchist frames and concepts are the devices that we need to start extracting our postanarchist ideal type from the main literature of our PhD dissertation. This is our conceptual starting point.

The next chapter will be the outset of our genealogical walk through postanarchism with the creation of the Kantian spatial framework.
II. THE CONCEPT OF SPACE: THE FRAMEWORK

Space: Introduction

The main concept of this doctoral dissertation is space. This was the theme of The State of The Art. In The State of The Art we started our walk through postanarchism studying also postanarchist space in depth. Now, in this chapter, we continue to focus on the concept of space. The intention is to give a general and brief metaphysical, deontological and historical overview of the concept, having as background the first hypothesis of the thesis:

Postanarchism is space opening or space occupation or a setting up of autonomous space.

The aim of this chapter is also to prepare the way to meet Proudhon and Foucault. Why these authors? Our thesis’ goal is to show, through the anarchist Proudhon, and via the mediation of Foucault, that there could be many important unacknowledged similarities between some classical anarchists and postanarchism. The purpose is to criticize Newman’s gap between these two anarchist periods. We would like to demonstrate that classical and contemporary anarchisms are both in fact ‘anarchism’, due to the similarities between Proudhon and Foucault (a great inspiration of new anarchism) and consequently between both authors and postanarchism.

In order to start developing these similarities between Proudhon-Foucault and postanarchism, in this chapter, we would like to discuss the concept of space and to

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30 We adopt a Kantian metaphysical perspective in this thesis because Kant was a strong influence on Foucault (1990), Proudhon (2009:135; 2014) and consequently for postanarchism. As we are going to show later in this chapter, Foucault (1990) dedicates a whole article to Kant: “Qu’est-ce que c’est la critique?” In this article Foucault develops Kant’s fundamental contribution, explaining why the Kantian “today” is so important. Proudhon (2009:135; 2014) also adopts Kant’s metaphysics because his intention withdraws from the study metaphysical issues. Following Deleuze (1969:11) Kantian metaphysics “asks first of all: what is the fact of knowledge (Quid facti)” and Kant answers that “the fact of knowledge is that we have a priori representations (which allow us to judge)”. Kantian metaphysics is about knowing the a priori capacities we possess.

31 In this thesis, deontology means a normative theory or a theory of duty, about questions of right (quid juris?) (Deleuze, 1969:13).

32 In this thesis, History is the science that studies human beings and their actions in time and space. More, as we will see, human beings live in a time and space grid, having also a “historical a priori” (Jensen, 2016).
show that, in this thesis, inspired by postanarchism, we interpret space and time as the ‘here and now’. ‘Here’ is space and ‘now’ is time.

As outlined in *The State of The Art*, postanarchism is ‘the utopia here and now’. And ‘the utopia here and now’ means the will to power or the desire that allows us to open autonomous spaces free from hierarchy, authority and oppression, where we can give wings to creativity and rebuild ourselves ‘here’, where we are, and ‘now’ immediately or in the present. We will adopt a Kantian idea of space and time as a framework. Although Proudhon and Foucault advanced some significant criticisms of Kant and distanced themselves from him, the Kantian background is key to understanding: (i) how Proudhon and Foucault’s desire (will to power) works and overlaps with Kantian *a priori*; (ii) how this desire is linked with the Kantian concept of “today” and (iii) how postanarchist’s space (‘the utopia here and now’) begins permanently or cyclically.

As Foucault (1976:121,122) explains, we are powerful people; we have power. Power means “the multiplicity of force relations that are immanent in the domain in which they are carried, and are constitutive of their organization” (Foucault, 1976:121,122). So, our power or power relations are immanent or exercised “in the domain in which they are carried”: here where we live and now, in the present. For Foucault, this power, this desire or this force “is an action over actions” (Deleuze, 2012:77). We are acting people among people here and now. And this domain of exercise or action is mainly our body, the “element of power relations” (Foucault, 1976:141). Nevertheless, this force that has the body as a fundamental domain is not the body; it is immanent in the body, but it “is never singular. It is connected with other forces, although each force is already a relation, that is to say power - force has no other object or subject than force” (Deleuze 2012:77). For Foucault, “all we have is immanence, this precise instant of space–time in which we live, act and breathe, and because we are ‘it’ (this force without object and subject), we can change, reshape, and ultimately transform ‘it’” (Springer, 2014:3). Likewise, in this thesis, we are “it”, a powerful body, “this space and time” or here and now, this domain and “this precise instant”, that “we live and breathe”. It is ‘here and now’ that we need to decide, to act and to exercise our power, reshaping ourselves, transforming ourselves, in order to live or to survive. As we will see (*Chapter IV*, pg: 145), Proudhon has a similar stance regarding power and immanence.
All we have, then, is that ‘necessity’ and that ‘capacity’ to survive here and now. As Kant (1969:26) argues, “necessity” is when something “could not possibly exist otherwise”. So space and time are that capacity and that ‘necessity’ to live and breathe that could not be ‘otherwise’. Space and time are “necessity”, the way we process the world that affects us, or the way we set the world - or the postanarchist space - to our measure or according to our needs. Space and time are “necessity”, so space and time are innate or ‘inherent’. They are also our body. According to Kant “space ... along with all its determinations, can be cognized by us a priori, … space, as well as time, inheres in us before all perception or experience” (Janiak, 2012).

Space and time or the powerful body are the conditions of possibility of our world. They are a kind of compass or reference, as we will explore later. As Foucault says, this Kantian framework is a great inspiration for him. As affirmed above, for Foucault, this powerful body is also a compass in order to survive and Proudhon goes in the same direction, as we will analyse in Chapter IV (pg: 145). For both authors, the need is the measure of all things. With this Kantian explanation, we start also demonstrating our second working hypothesis: to establish space is to survive.

Thus, space and time mean the power we have in order to survive. As we have said, all we have is that “immanence” or that ‘inherency’, that ubiquitous Foucauldian power or that ubiquitous and immanent Proudhonian “God”, this energy, this ‘here and now’ where and when we decide that we live or die, this “instant” that allows us to continue (Foucault, 1976:21,22; Proudhon, 1873; Springer 2014:3).

So, what does ‘here’ or ‘where we are’ mean? ‘Here’ means space that, as we have just observed, is a necessity or is “necessary”. ‘Here’ is our space or our body or the “zero point”, the strategic point from which we create and we relate with the exterior world (Foucault, 2009:18). This strategic point is the “pure function” or the pure force function, a “non-formal function, grasped regardless of the concrete forms in which it is embodied” (Deleuze 2012:78,79). For Foucault (2009:12), our

33 Proudhon welcomes Fourier’s notion of God. Proudhon (1973) writes, “according to Fourier, God is the soul, the universal life, the intimate and the all-pervading force, which, according to mathematical laws, agitates, animates and moves all beings. These laws, this mathematics, as Fourier says, preside over the divine operations are as pure intelligence and the mind of God”. We could find some similarities between Fourier’s concept of God, adopted by Proudhon, and the Foucauldian concept of power that is also an ubiquitous and widespread energy or force (Foucault, 1976:122). We will study the Foucauldian concept of power later in “Space: Introduction”. Regarding religion, Proudhon speaks also about a religion that “is inscribed in the coordinated practices of industrial action”, a ‘re-ligare’ (Damien, 2009:26). We will analyse this Proudhonian God or immanence later (pg: 84-86).

34 Force also means power or energy.
body is a *topia*, a place. It is “the absolute space”: the little fragment through which we are present, although our body is also a *u-topia body*: a body that is linked with every place in the world, and beyond the world (Foucault, 2009:17). For Foucault (2009:10), the body is the reason why utopias emerge. As Foucault (2009:14,15) says, the body is the author and the receptacle of all utopias. Our body is real - and unreal - and it is also a reference. So, ‘here’ signifies this ‘necessary zero point’ - the compass - or our body with our needs and powers.

And what does ‘now’ mean? ‘Now’, as we have just pointed out, means time or the decisive ‘instant’ we decide to live or to die. So, time, as space, signifies also body, a necessity or capacity or a power that allows us to know what succession or simultaneity is (Kant, 1969:47). Time is also as space a pure force function. Without time we could not know that “things exist together at one and the same time or at different times, that is, contemporaneously, or in succession” (Kant, 1969:47). Without time we could not have priorities regarding our necessities. Time, like space, is immanence. Time is the power or the capacity that permits us to organize our body priorities - internal needs or desires - in order to satisfy those priorities or needs or in order to survive (Kant, 1969:49).

Deleuze connects the concept of immanence with ‘space-time’ and power:

Gilles Deleuze viewed immanence as a liberatory space–time, precisely because it is obliged to create action and results, rather than establish a framework for transcendence, where to live well means to fully express one’s power in attendance with, rather than over others (Springer, 2014:3)

According to Deleuze, the immanence - or the Foucauldian ubiquitous power - is “a liberatory space-time” (Springer, 2014:3). Or, simplifying, ‘space-time’ is the power to live with the others and to build up our world or the power “to live well” (Springer, 2014:3). This immanence or power has a producer role - “it is obliged to create action and results”: to create space also *a posteriori*, as we will see later (pg: 115,116) - and consequently it is a “strategic situation” (Foucault, 1976:123,124). Thus, identifying space-time with power and commenting those ‘transcendental’, ‘a

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35 We will study the Foucauldian concept of body later in this chapter and in the Chapter IV (pg: 135).
priori’ and strategic concepts of Kant - space and time, Deleuze (1984:13) specifies: “‘transcendental’ qualifies the principle of necessary subjection of what is given in experience to our a priori representations, and correlatively the principle of a necessary application of a priori representations to experience”. So, to Deleuze, space and time, the Kantian transcendental a priori pure principles, are “principles of necessary subjugation”. Through these principles we could infer the Hobbesian and Proudhonian ‘war of all against all’ or Foucauldian agonism. So, for Kant and also for Deleuze, the exterior world affects us through our sensibility and we (acting on a defensive instinct, an “immediate intuition”, a necessity) organize the exterior world or create our world: the postanarchist space (considering our needs through space and time). As Kant (1969:44) asks: “what, then, must be our representation of space … ? It must be originally intuition. … But this intuition must be found in the mind a priori, that is, before any perception of objects, consequently must be pure, not empirical intuition”. Equipped with this non-empirical intuition or necessity/capacity, we are able to “go beyond what is given in experience” (Deleuze, 1969:11). As we have just said, this intuition is strategic and ensures our survival. Why is this so? Because, as Janiak (2012) notes, for Kant, “intuitions are singular, immediate representations”.

36 Regarding the transcendental and a priori concepts, Kant (1969:25) explains, “there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions. Knowledge of this kind is called a priori, in contradiction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience”. And Kant (1969:26) clarifies, “by the term ‘knowledge a priori’, therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience”. Then, Kant (1969:41) explains that this a priori knowledge connects with experience through intuition: “In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear, that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them, is by means of an intuition. To this as indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us”. And Kant (1969:41) clarifies that our capacity to be affected by the exterior objects is called sensibility: “The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility”. And Kant (1969:42) adds that this sensibility has two forms: space and time: “there are two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge a priori, namely, space and time”. So, for Kant, the exterior world affects us through our sensibility and we, like through a defensive instinct, an “immediate intuition”, a necessity, organize the exterior world - or create our world - postanarchist space - regarding our needs through space and time. As Deleuze (1969:11,12,13) says, space and time are not just a capacity quid facti that we have, but also a quid juris question, because through space and time we ‘subjugate’ or organize the exterior world - create our law or our postanarchist space: “it is not enough to note that, in fact, we have a priori representations. We must still explain why and how these representations are necessarily applicable to experience, although they are not derived from it… this is the question of right”. And Deleuze (1969:13) concludes, “The principle by virtue of which experience is necessarily subject to our a priori representations is called a ‘transcendental principle’”.

37 We are going to study the concept of agonism later in Chapter III (pg: 126) and Chapter IV (pgs: 146-148). We have already seen above that the Foucauldian power is force relations or “ceaseless struggles and confrontations” (Foucault, 1976:122).
To represent my desk in intuition is to represent it as something I point to, as *that there*. This does not indicate, of course, that this is a desk, my desk, a piece of furniture, made of wood, etc., but it does pick out a particular. It does so *immediately* at least in the sense that it makes use of no other representation (Janiak, 2012).

So when we have intuitions, we point immediately to particular things, saying *that there*, in that space and that time, regarding my ‘zero point’, my necessity. For that reason, intuition is strategic, regarding ‘my needs’, ‘my survival’.

As Deleuze (1969:11,12,13) says, space and time are not just a ‘metaphysical’ capacity *quid facti* that we have, but also a deontological or *quid juris* question, because through space and time we organize the exterior world. So, for Kant (1969:41), those transcendental principles, space and time, are aesthetic - Transcendental Aesthetic – principles. They are the way (or the means or the devices or the coordinates) we have to create social space, collective space, postanarchist space or a different space.

As Foucault (1994a) notes, Kant - as Foucault himself regarding the twentieth century - is concerned with his actuality, ‘the here and now’ or ‘the space and time’ of his epoch, modernity or the Enlightenment. For that reason, Kant decided to answer the question “What Is Enlightenment?”, publishing an article, in November 1784, in the German periodical, *Berlinische Monatschrift*. Kant would like to reflect on the Enlightenment in order to create – an aesthetic dimension - a better present. And Kant (nd) affirms:

When we ask, are we now living in an enlightened age? The answer is, No, but we live in an age of enlightenment. As matters now stand, it is still far from true that men are already capable of using their own reason in religious matters confidently and correctly without external guidance. Still, we have some obvious indications that the field of working toward the goal [of religious truth] is now opened. What is more, the hindrances against general enlightenment or the emergence from self-imposed

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38 As Kant explains (1969:42) “The science of all the principles of sensibility *a priori*, I call *Transcendental Aesthetic*.”
nonage are gradually diminishing. In this respect this is the age of the enlightenment and the century of Frederick [the Great].

Kant is engaged in his time and space (the Enlightenment in the century of Frederick, the Great, 1784, in Königsberg, Prussia) and he is concerned with ‘the needs’ of his time and space (also his needs). Kant notes these necessities: men are not “capable of using their own reason in religious matters” yet. And Kant feels something needs to be done to meet these ‘needs’. In this sense, the philosopher proposes ‘to go beyond’ these needs pointing the way or setting up the path: “the field of working toward the goal [of religious truth] is now opened”.

Foucault (1994a), commenting on Kant’s article, confirms this contemporary Kantian concern (or necessity) or this Kantian “today”,

It is a reflection by Kant on the contemporary status of his own enterprise. ... It seems to me that it is the first time that a philosopher has connected in this way, closely and from the inside, the significance of his work with respect to knowledge, a reflection on history and a particular analysis of the specific moment at which he is writing and because of which he is writing. It is in the reflection on “today” as difference in history and as motive for a particular philosophical task that the novelty of this text appears to me to lay.

As Foucault notes, Kant is engaged “closely and from the inside” – necessarily - in his time and space. For that reason, he analyses ‘that there’ (“the Enlightenment in the century of Frederick, the Great, 1784, in Königsberg, Prussia”) which is (i) a particular moment (or now) and (ii) a specific place (here): “the specific moment at which he is writing and because of which he is writing”. And Foucault underlies that this particular ‘today’ – necessity - leads Kant ‘to go beyond’ (quid juris) this ‘today’ with a new task: “‘today’ as difference in history and as motive for a particular philosophical task”. So, according to Foucault, we could conclude that Kant is the pioneer of ‘the utopia now’, because Kant himself confirms the implementation of his utopia: “the hindrances against general enlightenment or the emergence from self-imposed nonage are gradually diminishing”. Or, as Kant
The postanarchist: an ideal type

paradoxically answers: “Are we now living in an enlightened age? The answer is, No, but we live in an age of enlightenment”.

We see that Foucault himself assumes this ‘utopia here and now’. For Foucault (1994a:569), criticizing – also as Kant did with his Critiques - is the new task or “the will of heroicizing the present”39 and this concern about the present is confirmed by the whole of his philosophical work. As Newman (2011:62) affirms, “Foucault’s thinking can be described in terms of continual problematisation of existing practices and institutions”. And Bounache (2013:140) adds that, for Foucault, to work personally and collectively is to assume an “untimely action”, a “fundamental attitude of thought”, of “resistance to the present”.

In order to introduce the study of and the meeting with Foucauldian and Proudhonian space, and making the bridge to Kantian space, we start giving a brief historical overview of the concept of space, focusing mainly on two authors that were also discussed by Kant: Newton and Leibniz.

**Space: Brief Historical Overview**

Having outlined the Kantian perspective of space and time, we will now examine Newton (1643-1727) and Leibniz’s (1646-1716) conceptions of space and time, which inspired Kant. Those modern40 perspectives (Newton and Leibniz) on space are relevant since they shape the Kantian framework, and in turn (as we shall see) influence Proudhon and Foucault’s concepts of space, necessity and movement and consequently Saul Newman’s postanarchism and the role of space in it. The modern framework on space also provides a way to better ground Proudhon and Foucault’s anarchism, melting those three concepts (space, necessity and movement), as we will show later.

Newton and Leibniz’s analysis of space and time is contextualised by “the ontology of space and time” prevailing in the seventeenth century (Janiak, 2012). This ontology might suggest that space and time are “substances in their own right, or else properties of some substance” (Janiak, 2012). The “ontology of space and time” leads modern philosophers to ask several questions:

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39 We will return to the concept of critique (Chapter III, pg: 126-127; Chapter IV, pgs: 144-146, 193-194, 197-198, 202-203, 242-243).
40 As we have already explained, modern means from the Enlightenment.

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Is space ‘real’, or is it ‘ideal’ in some sense? Is it a substance in its own right, or merely a property of some substance? Is it somehow dependent on the relations among objects, or independent of those relations? What is the relationship between space and the mind? And finally, how do these various issues intersect with one another? (Janiak, 2012)

Inspired by those modern ruminations about space, Newton focuses his attention on the debate between absolutism - also called substantialism - and relationalism (Janiak, 2012). For absolutists, as Newton, “space and time exist independently of all possible objects and object relations” or “space and time points exist” (Janiak, 2012). According to Kant, Newtonians think space or spaces “as a kind of quasi-object” or “substances — in that they are independent of all objects and relations, on the one hand, and independent of the mind (and of intuition), on the other — and yet lack causal relations” (Janiak, 2012).

By contrast, for relationalists, such as Leibniz, “space and time depend … on possible objects and relations”, or space and time do not exist (Janiak, 2012). According to Newton (absolutist), “space and time are actual entities”; for Leibniz (relationalist), space and time “are determinations or relations of things” (Janiak, 2012). As Janiak (2012) explains, Newton, a mathematician of nature, defends the idea that “space and time ‘subsist’ on their own”; Leibniz, a “metaphysician of nature,” asserts that “space and time ‘inhere’ in objects and their relations”. Space and time “cannot exist independently of objects”. Nevertheless, both authors, absolutists and relationalists, are realists. For them, space is something real and not ideal. It exists \textit{a posteriori} and not \textit{a priori}, as Kant argues.

Nevertheless, Leibniz questions materiality and absolutism: “space is nothing other than an order of the existence of things observed in their simultaneity. And therefore, the fiction of a material finite universe, moving forward in an infinite empty space, cannot be admitted” (Janiak, 2012). Taking the middle path, approaching Kant, Leibniz admits a certain ‘idealism’: “relations are ‘ideal’ because they are neither substances nor accidents, and are therefore not elements of reality” (Janiak, 2012). Leibniz asserts, “the mind ‘adds’ relations” (Janiak, 2012). Leibniz concludes, “since space is the order of the possible relations of objects, it is presumably ideal in some sense” (Janiak, 2012). Janiak (2012) explains the apparent
contradiction between Leibniz’s ‘idealism’ and realism: Leibniz is a transcendental realist and not a transcendental idealist as Kant. And what does transcendental realist mean? In Kant’s perspective, Leibniz is a realist because, for him, “space has a reality independent of intuition” (Janiak, 2012). For Leibniz, space is not an a priori ‘necessity’ (which would be idealist or independent of the exterior world) nor is it strategic for our survival, as it is for Kant. For that reason, Leibniz is a realist and not an idealist, unlike Kant. Janiak (2012) explains how a relationalist could be also a realist:

A realist can be a relationalist if she thinks space is the order of actual and possible relations among actual (and maybe possible) objects and she thinks those relations are real. This indicates, incidentally, that realists about space need not think of it as a kind of object: it can be perfectly real and the order of possible relations among objects”.

As we have seen above, for Kant, thinking of space as independent of intuition does not make sense. According to Kant, space is not ‘real’, because the Kantian space is an a priori ‘necessity’ or the ‘strategic zero point’. Kant says: “if one abstracts from the subjective condition of our sensible intuition, it is nothing at all, and can be considered neither as subsisting nor as inhering in the objects in themselves (without their relation to our intuition)” (Janiak, 2012).

Following Janiak we can see that those modern perspectives - the material, the transcendental and the relational - are interrelated and, as we are going to show in the following chapter (Chapter III), we can see this ‘intersection’ in Proudhon and Foucault’s notions of space: material, transcendental and social spaces. Does this ‘intersection’ apply to postanarchism? How can we understand postanarchist space/time regarding the modern framework? What possibilities does postanarchism give us or open up, taking into account this modern framework of Newton, Leibniz and Kant? We are going to answer these questions later in the final chapter (Chapter V on postanarchism). For now, we use the questions to frame the following chapters. With this in mind, we are ready to continue our postanarchist walk, to meet Proudhon and Foucault and to discuss with them their concept of space, taking modern space as background.
III. THE CONCEPT OF SPACE: PROUDHON AND FOUCALUT

As we have just explained, the concept of space or postanarchist space is the central concept of this thesis. Having provided an evaluative account of the postanarchist concept of space in *The State of The Art* and having given a brief, general metaphysical, deontological and historical overview of this concept in the previous chapter, we are ready to continue our postanarchist walk. We are now ready to meet Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Michel Foucault and study their concept of space. We intend also to analyse the concepts of movement and survival, which, in our opinion, are inherent in the concept of space. In the previous chapter we began the discussion of our second hypothesis, *to establish space is to survive*. So, this second hypothesis and our first hypothesis, *postanarchism is space constitution*, are both themes of this chapter.

As we have explained earlier, Proudhon and Foucault are two of the three main authors of this dissertation - the other one is the postanarchist Saul Newman. We have chosen Proudhon for three reasons: (i) there are several similarities between Proudhon and Foucault, not only on the concept of space but also on the concept of battle or struggle, as we will see; (ii) research in Paris (at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and Collège de France), suggests that Proudhon fills a bibliographic gap in Foucault’s work (Revel, 2011:132,134) and can be considered as an author that Foucault read, but did not discuss; (iii) Proudhon is the first author that labelled himself as anarchist and also the first to embrace anarchy positively; consequently, he is a fundamental author that helps us to better understand Foucauldian anarchism and postanarchism (Kinna, 2009:8,9; Préposiet, 2007).

We have chosen Foucault because he is a strong influence on postanarchism, as we concluded in *The State of The Art*, and because the Foucauldian concepts of space and heterotopia are similar to postanarchist autonomous spaces, as we are going to study hereinafter.

Given what has been said, in terms of space, in this chapter, we are going to work on three kinds of space: material space, transcendental space and social or political space. As we have defined in *The State of The Art*, postanarchism - our theme - is about the political and not politics. Postanarchism distinguishes the two

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41 The terms ‘social’ and ‘political’ are synonyms in this thesis as we are going to see.
The postanarchist: an ideal type

concepts. According to Saul Newman (2011:4), postanarchism “offers no actual programme or directives”, as politics does. For Newman (2011:4), postanarchism is about the political: “the dimension of antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations”. For Newman (2011: 5,7,139), the political is to interrogate existing limits and tensions; the political is a “kind of deconstruction” and construction and an ethical “openness to the Other”, assumed beyond politics. So, in this chapter, we are going to discuss these social antagonism or encounters with the other (this political or social or postanarchist space) with the aid of the material (influenced by Newton) and transcendental (influenced by Kant and also by Leibniz) concepts of space. In our opinion, these three kinds of space - social, material and transcendental - are interrelated, and we will see how in this chapter.

This chapter will re-utilize Immanuel Kant and Gilles Deleuze as secondary authors since they help us to understand better the sub-concepts of material, transcendental and social space. As we have already explained, both authors are fundamental to the study of Proudhonian and Foucauldian concepts of space, movement and survival.

Thus, in this Chapter III, we continue using our solar or circular method, inspired by Tommaso Campanella’s City of the Sun and Foucault’s cyclic worldview. This cyclical movement is: (i) a method or a “grammar of production” for our thesis (Damien, 2009:22); (ii) a “producer alphabet” that allows us, by analogy, to better understand the postanarchist space which is also about this circular “grammar”, as we will see (Damien, 2009:22). Moreover, as we have just explained, in this chapter we will be looking at the concept of ‘movement’ - in Proudhon and Foucault - and observe how this movement works cyclically, replicating our method.

So, in this chapter, we are also working circularly between the concepts of space, movement and necessity: (i) analysing the concept of space micrologically or in depth and also its counterpart, the concept of movement - solar or circular movement - in Foucault and Proudhon (Deleuze, Guattari, 1977:26); (ii) discussing the sub-concepts that constitute both concepts - space and movement - especially, the sub-concepts of survival, necessity and desire.

Our first aim is to know what space is for Proudhon and Foucault and why, for both authors, we constitute space. As we have already explained, the answer is that we have an initial intuition: we constitute space in order to survive. The concept
of survival inspires our second working hypothesis: *to establish space is to survive* and it is the driver of this chapter. We arrive at this intuition by considering that: (i) for Proudhon (1861: 117,118,359), the condition of survival or living in peace is to produce or to create collectively. When we produce collectively, we create social space; (ii) in turn, for Foucault (2012:184; 2013:XII) we recognise an *ars erotica* or an aesthetics of desire. For Foucault, when we are in need, our desire explodes and creates space or something that helps us survive.

For Proudhon and Foucault, we create space when we are homeless or in a state of desire, in a state of revolution or ‘insurrection’, when our survival is at stake (Proudhon, 1851:11,12; Proudhon, 1861:176,177; Castleton, 2009:71; Foucault, 2013:XII). In this situation, when we are ‘homeless or spaceless,’ we need a space. Our desire fires when we feel that lack or feel overwhelmed. For both authors, space and survival are interrelated (Castleton, 2009: Foucault, 2012:184). That is to say, when space becomes repressive and no longer meets our needs, we feel in danger; we feel the presence of death; we run away and we create space again. As Proudhon’s idea of revolution suggests, although our survival is always in question, we do not feel the limit everyday (Proudhon, 1851:7; Préposiet, 2007:179). Revolution is a cumulative of lacks or crushings, which reaches a point of no return: the need for survival (Proudhon, 1851:8,11,12). At this point of no return, our desire or rage explodes and we are creative. We create our space, which is a new chance, a new network of relationships, a new virtual ball with many tips and many interconnected spaces, with permanent connections and disconnections (Rajchman, 1998:117,118,121). So, we just fight when our survival is in danger. Moreover, we live in peace. Hence, as Proudhon (1861: 117,118,359) says, there is a difference between struggle or war (good and peaceful intentions: survival) and piracy (bad intentions: futility). As Proudhon (2012:257) points out, “life is a struggle, but this

42 Foucault talks about an *ars erotica* and a *scientia sexualis*. The *ars erotica* is what we are studying here, “an economy of pleasure” about free pleasure practice (Foucault, 1976:93). In turn, the *scientia sexualis* is “an ordered regime of knowledge” about this free sexual practice or “a complex dispositif”... to produce true sex discourses ... And it is through this complex dispositif that it has been possible to appear, as the sex and its pleasures truth, something like sexuality”, as we are going to examine later (Foucault, 1976:91).

43 As we have discussed in The State of The Art, for postanarchism, the concepts of “revolution” (a totalized happy end) and “insurrection” (the fire of desire that emerges in localized points) are not similar, but, in this chapter, mainly for Proudhon, in a given perspective, as we will see, both terms are similar. For contemporary anarchism, the spectacle of revolution is replaced by the “ongoing course of insurrection” (Springer, 2014:2).

44 This is our philosophical term.
combat is not a fight of man against man but a fight of man against nature and each of us has to pay for oneself”. So, our fight’s goal is not the other, but our survival or ourselves.45

In order to affirm this hypothesis, to establish space is to survive, we need to probe several questions and we put these to Proudhon and Foucault individually: (i) How to define space? (ii) How to define movement? (iii) Are movement and time synonyms and why? (iv) Are space and movement two sides of the same coin? Why? (v) Is space movement and if so, why? (vi) Is movement space and if so, why? (vii) Does movement cause space? And why? (viii) Does space imply movement? And why? (ix) How to create space? (x) Why create space?

After answering these questions, we ask another two: (i) what are the commonalities between Proudhon and Foucault in terms of space and movement? (ii) What are their differences in terms of space and movement?

In order to answer all those questions and discuss those concepts, we have divided this Chapter III in two sub-chapters and a conclusion. In the first sub-chapter, we are going to work on the Proudhonian concepts of space, movement and necessity. In the second sub-chapter, we are going to study the Foucauldian concepts of space, movement and necessity. In conclusion, we are going to look for the similarities and differences between the two authors - Proudhon and Foucault - on space, movement and necessity in order to build common concepts and notions for the next stages. The goal of this conceptual net is, first, to construct the Foucauldian activist ideal type with the aid of Proudhon’s anarchism and, second, to better understand what postanarchist space is in order to carve out the postanarchist ideal type.

In the next sub-chapter, we are going to study Proudhon’s concepts of space, necessity and movement.

1. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: space, necessity and movement

In this sub-chapter we are going to study the concepts of space, movement and necessity in Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, having in mind our new working hypothesis (to

45 The Foucauldian agonistic act, being a transgressive act, aims to stimulate the other rather than to destroy the other. We will develop this idea later in Chapter III (pg: 126) and Chapter IV (pgs: 146-148).
establish space is to survive) and as background our main hypothesis (postanarchism is space constitution). We will have also as framework the Kantian perspective of space and time, understood as the ‘here and now’.

As we already stated, in this sub-chapter, we will analyse Proudhon’s concept of space in three perspectives: (i) the transcendental space, inspired by Kant, (ii) the material space - similar to Newton’s space and (iii) the social or political space. For Proudhon, those three spaces are interrelated. In our viewpoint, just through an overall vision of those three spaces, we could understand the social scope of Proudhonian space and connect it to postanarchist space, as this is our intention in the coming chapters. In this sub-chapter, we are going to define the three kinds of Proudhonian space separately in order to understand better the several concepts in question. We will discuss Proudhonian material space, then transcendental space and finally social space.

We start with the Proudhonian concept of material space.

**Proudhon: material space**

For Proudhon, material space is a non-social space or a space not created by man.\(^{46}\) There are two kinds of space that are not created by man: (i) matter or substance; (ii) ‘*a priori* or transcendental space’. We will study material space first and transcendental space in the next section.

Proudhon does not denominate matter as a space. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, in the modern age, matter or substance is defined by absolutism or by substantialism and by the mathematicians, Newtonians, as a space: material space. As we have stated above, the “ontology of space and time” in the seventeenth century defines space as “substance in its own right”. So, we could include Proudhonian matter in this substantialism. As we have seen, for absolutists, as Newton, space exists and is independent of “all possible objects and object relations”.

So, what is matter or material space for Proudhon? For Proudhon, matter could be understood as the globe or the earth, as “everything undivided, indistinct, undifferentiated that cannot be conceived as ordered”,\(^{47}\) something that was created

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\(^{46}\) In this thesis when we write created by ‘man’ or ‘men’ this means human being that includes woman and man. Those are expressions used by the authors - Proudhon and Foucault - and we adopt them in order to facilitate the writing.

\(^{47}\) Later (pg: 86 and note: 55) we will define the Proudhonian concept of order.
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by God,\textsuperscript{48} and not created by man, as we have already explained (Proudhon, 1873). Proudhon (2009:240) defines what matter is:

They [the workers] create a productive capacity that previously did not exist; but this capacity can just be created if a matter supports it. The ground substance remains the same; there are only its qualities and modifications that were changed. Man has created everything. Everything, except the matter itself.

Thus, matter is the “ground substance” that was not created by man and that has unknown origin (Proudhon, 1873). According to Proudhon (1873), the error is to just aspire to know and to explain matter. For Proudhon (1873), “matter does not change with the figures that we print on it and with the uses that we give to it”: matter “remains the same”. It is always the substratum. Proudhon (2009:240) gives some examples of matter: fields, land for cultivation, the sea, water, air, rocks and stones, woods.

For Proudhon, matter is the \textit{sine qua non} condition for man’s production and creation (Proudhon, 1873). Following Proudhon (2009:255), two things compose work: the association between workers and matter. As Proudhon says, the productive ‘capacity can just be created if matter supports it’. According to Proudhon (1873), matter is the substance “of any series, any organization; the principle of any inertia or resistance”. Proudhon (1873) adds, the cause or action “requires a substratum, a substance where it resides and where it soars”.

And because matter is the condition of possibility of all creation, in order to create or to produce man can temporarily, while he is producing, occupy the earth: matter. According to Proudhon (2009:210), “occupation leads to equality and prevents property”. Proudhon (2009:210) explains,

\begin{quote}
every man has the right of occupation just because he exists and he needs matter to explore and work in order to live. \ldots So, occupation is always subordinated to the population; \ldots Possession, in law, can never remain fixed; it is impossible that it becomes property.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{48} As we have already added, Proudhon (1973) welcomes Fourier’s immanent notion of God, defined as “an all-pervading force that agitates, animates and moves all beings”.
Thus, for Proudhon, this occupied matter is something “common” or “collective” that could not be possessed permanently. Matter is no one’s property, because, for Proudhon, as we have already said, only what man creates can be possessed. ‘Creation’ is the sine qua non condition for possession. According to Proudhon, human creations have, as we have quoted above, “productive capacity that previously did not exist” or surplus value. Speaking about workers, Proudhon (2009: 250) explains: “each of them adds to the matter, that passes through his hands, a certain value, and this value, the product of their work, is their property”. Then, according to Proudhon (2009:280), as matter is common, everyone can be occupier, creator or surplus value creator; possession is collective:

As the traveller does not appropriate the great road on which he passes, so too the farmer does not appropriate the field on which he sows; If, however, by the fact of his industry, a worker can appropriate the material he exploits, every exploiter, in the same way, becomes an owner; So, all capital, whether material or intellectual, being a collective work, therefore, forms a collective property.

For Proudhon (2009:276), property is collective because work, as we have just said, being an association of workers, is also collective or social:

The man of talent contributed to produce … a useful instrument so he is co-owner; he is not the owner. There is at once in him a free worker and an accumulated social capital (Proudhon, 2009:276).

Thus, according to Proudhon (2009:277) our intellectual capital is social capital:

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49 For instance, Proudhon (2009:219,221) considers that water, air and fire are common things because they are necessary to survive, for instance, man without air could not survive. So, in this thesis, ‘common’ means something that belongs to everyone, something that is neither public nor private. ‘Common’ is the Proudhonian “negative community” or the “first stage of civilization”, although Proudhon (2009:406,407) criticizes communism: the ideology that defends community. For Proudhon (2009:409), communism is based on property. Nevertheless, “the community or association, in a simple mode, is the necessary end, the primordial effort of society, the spontaneous movement by which it manifests and raises”. We will discuss this later (see: Proudhon: social space, pg: 96).

50 Proudhon criticizes mainly the concept of property, as we will see above (pgs: 80-81).
Whatever the capacity of a man, since this capacity was created, no longer belongs to him; like the matter that an industrious hand shapes, he had the ability of becoming. Society made it.

If matter is common and our intellectual capital is social, so too all are workers - equality:

All work produced by human hands, compared to the raw material from which it is formed, is of inestimable price; in this regard, the distance is as big between a pair of shoes and a walnut trunk as between a statue of Scopas and a block of marble. The genius of the simple artisan outweighs as much on materials he exploits as the spirit of a Newton on the inert spheres in which he calculates distances, masses and revolutions (Proudhon, 2009: 272).

Regarding the equality of workers, Proudhon (2009:277) explains:

Few masters, few years, few traditional souvenirs are required to form the farmer and the craftsman: the generator effort and, if I may use that language, the duration of social gestation are due to the sublimity of the capacity. But while the doctor, the poet, the artist and the savant produce little and late, the production of the labourer is much less lucky and does not expect the number of years.

For Proudhon (2009:285,287,294), if matter is common, if the work is collective, if the workers are possessors and equal, so, individual property is “impossible”, it is a “metaphor”, it is unfair, it is the negation of equality, it is not true and it is useless. Proudhon (2009:363) justifies this view, “any consumption that is not reproductive of utility is destruction; Property, if it consumes, if it saves, if it capitalizes, is a producer of worthlessness, a cause of sterility and death”. Thus property is useless when it is not creative and it is not intended to satisfy human needs. It causes “sterility and death”. For Proudhon (2009:364, Damien, 2009:31), property is “nothing”; it is a “right of bargain”, “the right to produce without working”. And Proudhon (2009:349) adds, “property is the great cause of privilege
and despotism”. Property is “theft” and the thief is a “man who hides, takes, deviates something that does not belong to him in any way whatsoever” (Proudhon, 2009:129,411). So, Proudhon (2009:350) asks, “What is the owner? It is a machine that does not function or, running for its own pleasure and according to its own caprice, produces nothing”. Proudhon (2009:437) concludes, “the owner, the thief, the hero, the sovereign, because these names are synonyms, imposes his will through the law, and suffers no contradiction nor control; that is to say, he pretends to be legislative power and executive power at the same time”.

We can conclude that Proudhonian matter has political consequences. Because matter is common, Proudhon criminalizes private space or property - it is “theft” - and criticizes the public space or the space of liberal democracy that is similar to property. As quoted above, the sovereigns’ space or the space of the state is a machine that does not function or, running for its own pleasure and according to its own caprice, produces nothing. For Proudhon, in terms of production, private and public spaces do not exist. They are null. Proudhon fights also against liberal individualism (Proudhon, 1865; Damien, 2009:26). According to Proudhon, the owner and the sovereign are thieves and “the government of man by man is illegal and absurd” (Proudhon, 2009:425; Damien, 2009:19). For Proudhon, just common space – matter - transcendental space and social space allow people to be creative, to meet their needs and to live in peace.

Thus, as matter is a ‘common space’ and man could just possess collectively what he creates - the surplus value - regarding his needs, due to social capital, so possession is the right solution:

Individual possession is the condition of social life; five thousand years of property demonstrate it: Property is the suicide of society. Possession is within the law; property is against the law. Remove property and retain possession and by this single change of the principle you will change all in laws, government, economy, institutions (Proudhon, 2009:437).

51 As we have already said, Proudhon (1865, 2009) fights also against communism – public space. As we have just said, we will study the Proudhonian critiques against communism in the section about Proudhonian social space (pg: 93).
52 According to Proudhon (2009:425), “The more man is ignorant, the more his obedience, the more his confidence in his guide is absolute”.
For Proudhon, possession is the condition of social life and consequently the right solution because possession is interconnected with man’s necessity:

“the dominion of man over things, like the dominion of man over people, is null: man has the right to draw things, provided he return them in the same currency, only when necessary for him to live (Castleton, 2009:71).

So, necessity, in the Kantian sense, grounds material space possession and grounds also, as for Kant, the Proudhonian transcendental space.

**Proudhon: transcendental Space**

Proudhonian transcendental space, like material space, is also not created by man. In terms of our framework, we could say that Proudhon’s conception of transcendental space is very indebted to Kant. Briefly, Proudhonian transcendental space is Kantian space - and time. Proudhon is also interested in Kant’s main philosophical questions -“What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?” Notwithstanding his critiques of the Kantian *a priori*, Proudhon is occupied with those “problems that concerned his contemporaries: how to identify at once the place where the certainty of reason lies and to demonstrate the reason and the truths that constitute it?” (Castleton 2009:53). For Proudhon (2014), influenced by Kant, space, time and diversity are “sensible intuitions and not real objects.” So, being an ‘intuition and not an object’, Proudhonian transcendental space is transcendental idealism - defined above - inspired by Kant. Like Kant, Proudhon is convinced that those sensible intuitions - space, time and diversity - are something transcendental or created by God - not a human creation, as we have just said. They are immanences.

So, why, for Proudhon, is space transcendental? Or, what does transcendental or immanent mean? As we have argued earlier, transcendental means *a priori* - independent of experience - or universal and necessary. And Proudhon is inspired by

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53 Proudhon (2009:135) says he does not believe in the innateness of ideas, forms and laws of Kant. Nevertheless his intention is not to do a critique of pure reason. Therefore, he adopts, as hypothesis, Kant’s vision: “our more general and necessary ideas, as time, space and substance exist primordially in our spirit” (Proudhon, 2009:135).

54 Proudhon (2014) joins another *a priori* concept: diversity. Proudhon (2014) explains what diversity is: “We must distinguish diversity as an attribute or a predicatable of quantity and diversity as an absolute condition of all phenomenality. So, the same objectivity, the same infinite character and necessity that are found in the concepts of space and time also belong to this concept that particularly reveals us the divisibility of matter and which is in itself the inevitable synthesis of space and time”.

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those Kantian definitions of universality and necessity. As stated, for Kant, something is necessary when “it could not possibly exist otherwise”. In turn, universality, Kant explains, (1969:26) signifies “no possible exception”: “If … a judgment carries with it strict an absolute universality, that is, admits no possible exception, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori”. For Kant (1969:26), ‘necessity’ and ‘universality’ are “inseparably connected”. So, for Proudhon (1873), as for Kant, transcendental space is a universal and necessary concept (as time and diversity also are) or an innate capacity/necessity (a priori or independent of experience). Like Kant, Proudhon sees transcendental space as the ‘here and now’ or the innate necessity to survive, the innate necessity to live and not to die. As Proudhon (2009:262) suggests, the need is the beginning: “the need gives the idea and the idea makes the producer”. And this “innate necessity” or this transcendental space is, as we have just affirmed, something a priori created by God, the immanence.

Proudhon reveals what immanence is: “man is endowed with a moral and intellectual capacity, but he needs an external cause, acting through the senses, to illuminate his soul”. And, what does this cause or immanence signify?

In the outset and during the process, the categories of ideas and consciousness are revealed by the presence of another spirit, which allows us to perceive them in the wake of sensation and in the perception of sensation. Communication is the sparking that allows categories of understanding to form themselves in spirit, because the phenomenal world is not enough. And, at the origin of this communication, there is a first revelation linking humanity with the perfect thought that is God (Castleton 2009:54).

For Proudhon, immanence is power and communication, as we could verify through the following example about language:

Language could be the work of man, but its formation proves that the necessary and adequate thought, that develops it, is obviously given to him because man does not speak naturally. Thus, the names of primitive things in Greek and Hebrew prove the presence of a pre-existing intelligence and proved a perfect revealed thought. … It is from this first
communication or revelation of thought, before any language, that we acquire our knowledge of all kinds (Castleton 2009:54).

Thus, using Deleuze’s concepts, which we have already discussed, space is, first, a Proudhonian “metaphysical” capacity *quid facti*, given by God or immanence. Space is the innate capacity to communicate with the exterior world, according to our needs. And, second, like Kant, Proudhon poses the deontological or the *quid juris* question. Kant teaches, through space and time we “subjugate” or organize the exterior world (create our law or our postanarchist space). And Proudhon clarifies, to “subjugate” is to communicate with the world. Proudhon recalls why we need to apply our capacities and to communicate with the world: because we need to survive and matter produces nothing, matter is just the “ground substance”.

The salt of sea, the water of fountains, the herb of the field, the wood of the forests are for him (man) as if they did not exist. The sea, without the fisherman and his net, does not give fish; the forest, without the woodcutter and his axe, does not provide firewood nor timber service, the prairie without the mower, does not provide neither hay nor renewal. Nature is like a vast field of exploitation and production; but nature just produces for nature (Proudhon, 2009:300,301).

Thus, for Proudhon, space is a strategic capacity/necessity of communication - the Foucauldian zero point - in order to deal with the nature that “just produces for nature”. Space is “necessary for the formation of our ideas” and for our survival (Proudhon: 1873, 2014). As Proudhon (2009:262) explains,

the need gives the idea and it is the idea that makes the producer. We just know that the excitement of our senses leads us to desire and what our intelligence asks; we strongly desire only what we conceive well; The better we conceive the more we are able to produce.

Hence space, the here, is necessity and desire that allows us to know and lead us to communicate, to create and to produce. For Proudhon (2014), without this *a priori* concept of space any perception of phenomena or any production would be
impossible. Regarding these multiple perceptions of phenomena and these multiple communications and productions, Proudhon (2014) concludes, they are multiple, interrelated spaces – relationalism - and, quoting Kant, Proudhon (2014) says, “the transcendental space is as an aggregate of limited spaces that are all together and are also endless and spread in all directions”.

So, if, for Proudhon, the “spirit of God” reveals to us space during creation, space is God’s energy/power or immanence in ourselves through our body. According to Proudhon, there is no “prior knowledge of body experience” (Castleton 2009:54). Also for Proudhon, as for Foucault, the body is the zero point or the topia, and the transcendental space, being an innate potentia in the body, is activated by experience: “the nature of our ideas is determined by the non-self that are the objects of our perception” (Castleton 2009:55).

Thus, the Proudhonian a priori space or the Proudhonian ‘here’ is a transcendental idealism very close to relationalism. Being innate, a priori and a God creation, transcendental space is a Kantian transcendental idealism. Being a priori and linked to experience and to the “non-self”, and being the condition of possibility of social communication and production of interrelated social spaces, the Proudhonian transcendental space approaches relationalism – “determinations or relations of things”, in Leibniz’s terms. For that reason, transcendental space is closely linked to social space.

Considering this, we can conclude also that the Proudhonian transcendental space has political consequences. Transcendental space, meaning the immanence or the necessary energy of power, is spread in human’s bodies and not concentrated in just a place. And even this body, that has power, belongs to a man that, “by his nature and instinct”, has “always an inconstant and multiform personality due the permanent needs or limits of existence” (Proudhon, 2009:398, Castleton 2009:57).

Thus, after analysing Proudhonian transcendental space, we can reaffirm our new working hypothesis: to establish space is to survive. For Proudhon, as we are discussing, the a priori space - and also time and diversity - is the way to organize the world regarding our needs here - and now. And to organize the world means to establish our social space in order to survive. So, what is social space?
*Proudhon: social Space*

The Proudhonian social space is a space created by man and is not a space created by God, as matter and transcendental space are. Nevertheless, as matter, Proudhon does not denominate social space as ‘space’. As we have already outlined, there are some similarities between Proudhonian social space and Liebniz’s relationalism and the transcendental realism. For that reason, we can consider social space as a space.

As we have observed above, for Leibniz, space and time “are determinations or relations of things” (relationalism) and are also “an order of the existence of things observed in their simultaneity” (transcendental realism). In turn, Proudhonian social space could be defined as postanarchist space (relations and “encounters with the other” or “an openness to the other”) and, consequently, characterized in the framework of relationalism à la Leibniz: “determinations or relations of things” (Newman, 2011:7; Day, 2011:112).

In another way, for Proudhon, social space is also a creation of order.55 Proudhon (1873) says, “for our intelligence, … to create is to produce order: in this sense, we can say that creation was not limited to the six days of Moses and to the work of the seventh day; the great work of the eternal poet, the creation of order in society, is being accomplished”. So, for Proudhon, to create or to produce is to order and, here, Proudhon approaches Leibniz’s transcendental realism that considers space as “an order of the existence of things observed in their simultaneity”.

This Proudhonian relationalism and transcendental realism is not in contradiction with the Proudhonian transcendental idealism, as we have noted. The three types of space for Proudhon (material, transcendental and social) are interrelated, as we have already explained.56 So, we could classify Proudhon as a substancialist regarding matter, as a transcendental idealist regarding transcendental space and as a relationalist and transcendental realist regarding social space. And the

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55 Proudhon (1873) defines order: “I call order anything seriated or symmetrical .... Order is the supreme condition of all persistence of all development, of all perfection. Order, in its various manifestations, is series, symmetry, relation, being subjected to the conditions in which it can be decomposed, which are the immediate principle, the form, the reason, the meter. These conditions are called laws”. And Proudhon (1873) continues: “Order is not something real, but just formal; it is the idea carved in the substance, the thought expressed in every collection, series, organism, genus and species, as the word in writing. Order is all that man can know about the universe. About beings, we just know their relations”

56 Proudhon warned, in advance, that the transcendental space of Kant does not convince him completely, in terms of formation of ideas, as we have just observed. For that reason, Proudhon is also a relationalist.
three Proudhonian types of space, being complementary, aid understanding of social space.

For Proudhon, for instance, the creation of ideas or production, being social space, is a compound of three spaces: (i) substantial space: matter is the condition of possibility of all creation; (ii) transcendental space: our capacities are the condition of possibility of our ideas and knowledge and our survival, and we process, here and now, contact with the exterior world through space, time and diversity, regarding our needs; (iii) social space: we produce social space when we create ideas through signs, for instance, language. And these ideas and signs are the result of our “spirit efforts”, plus matter, plus collective or social knowledge and work. According to Proudhon, we are condemned to signs, language or representation or, as we have set out above, to communicate (or we are condemned to the other that communicates with us). Proudhonian signs aim “to identify and distinguish (to order) the phenomena caused by the sensations”, always with reference to our needs (Castleton, 2009:). As Castleton (2009:55) points out, for Proudhon, “language ... is the analysis of thought by speech”. Or, otherwise, the sign is a production of our spirit stimulated and wrapped by the exterior world - transcendental + matter + social. The sign could be oral language or it could be another kind of language or product (bearing on matter) created by our ideas (transcendental space + common or social knowledge), such as books, statues, paintings, movies, furniture, handicraft, industries etc. So, the sign is social space also due to matter (material space) and due to our needs and capacities (transcendental space).

And, why is the sign social or, better, what does social mean? First of all, the word ‘social’ means also political, because, for Proudhon, political equality implies social equality. Proudhon (1865) says: “without social equality, political equality is an empty word ... Political equality = social equality. This turn of mind is new; moreover it implies, as the first principle, individual freedom”. So, for Proudhon, there is no distinction between political space and social space, if the individual is free.

Secondly, according to Proudhon (2009:367), social means society that signifies a “set of relations, in a word, a system” or a group. For Proudhon, the word

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57 We are going to study later (pgs: 214,216) Proudhonian political representation.
58 We have already noted that Proudhonian power or immanence is universal and, for that reason, widespread and not concentrated. For Proudhon, everybody has power and could act or produce in society, if people are free to apply this power.
relation means “group” and this is “the only way we can conceive ourselves and represent being” (Castleton, 2012:114). Castleton (2012:114) explains the Proudhonian concept of group:

The group could have the form of the animal, the vegetable and the mineral, of simple bodies and complex bodies. Its constitution is essential to being to be defined as a synthesis of the multiple and the one. Man is an organized group in which the spirit is born from the organization of the organs, ... the same goes with society ... the formation of collective unity within diversity of individuals.

Proudhon rules out the notion of “simple substance” (Castleton, 2012:114,115). The substance and man itself also are compounds (Proudhon, 2009:384). Man is the one and the multiple; he is a set of organs and each organ is also another set. This set of organs recalls the Deleuzian and Guattarian “desire machine”. As the authors say, “each organ-machine interprets the entire world from the perspective of its flux, from the point of view of the energy that flows from it” (Deleuze, Guattari, 2013:16). Proudhon also notes the whole machine and its parts. As Castleton (2012:114) clarifies: “the relationship of the parts ... makes the condition of the being, gives reality to things, and allows us to grasp the concept of unity”. So, for Proudhon, society is a collective being, is a set of relations or a group or a set of groups and, consequently, is a concept that shows Proudhon is really a relationalist.

Third, the space or the sign is social or political because, setting up a collective being and a collective reason, Proudhon defends a “social ontology” (Castleton 2012:103). According to Proudhon (2009:367,368, Scelle, 1959:11), man is a “sociable animal” by instinct - negative community - and “everyday he becomes sociable by reasoning and by election”. As we have seen above, two things compose work: the association between workers and matter. And, we have furthermore said, regarding associative work, for Proudhon, intellectual capital is also social capital and our capacities and knowledge are always made by society. As Castleton (2009:70) summarizes, according to Proudhon, “man belongs more to

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59 For Proudhon we are condemned to representation, as we have seen above, and representation is always collective, as we are studying now.
The postanarchist: an ideal type

society than to himself”, because man “owes these abilities, his talent, his capabilities and his work” to society. In another perspective, according to Proudhon (2009: 245), the social whole is superior to the set of parts or, as Castleton (2009:105; Damien, 2009:32; Préposiet, 2007:186,187) states, “the collective force being irreducible to the sum of individual strengths in production, all capital should be considered as collective due to the combination of efforts from different producers in the division of labour”. For those reasons, Proudhon (2009: 384) defends a social ontology and a social being and pictures what social space is:

Man does with man a perpetual exchange of ideas and feelings, products and services. All that is learned and executed in society is necessary to him; but this huge quantity of products and ideas, which is given to everyone to make and to acquire on one’s own, is like an atom before the sun. Man is man just because there is society, which, for its part, is just sustained by the balance of forces and the harmony that compose it.

So, in order to characterize social space, Proudhon highlights that: (i) the social space or men’s production, as we have already seen, bears on needs - the here and now - that is the beginning of society; (ii) man is a social being or a “becoming” in social space – “man is man just because there is society” (Préposiet, 2007:183); (iii) this “becoming” in social and through “industrial work” is, as Damien (2009:22) shows, an invention or a representation or a “plastic work” or an aesthetic of becoming; (iv) the Proudhonian social space, producing a “huge quantity of products and ideas” and “a perpetual exchange of ideas and feelings” is, Damien (2009:22) adds, a “positive metaphysics”, that “generates plural rationalities and multiple identities”; (v) in order to characterize social space, Proudhon utilizes the circular image of the solar system\(^6\) that resonates with the Foucauldian circular principle of the intelligibility of the world or the Deleuzian and Guattarian “wheel of continual birth and rebirth” (see image 2, pg:18) (Deleuze, Guattari, 2013:18).

From the above we can infer that Proudhonian social space is also a social movement or an atomised personality or group that is like a solar system or a sun surrounded by ‘a huge quantity of products and ideas’ (see image 5).

\(^6\) As our circular or solar method, referred above.
Proudhon designs a social or solar space or social being composed by multiple groups and movements. For Proudhon, “in place of substances ... we need to put the groups in perpetual movement” (Castleton, 2012:115).

How, then, should we define movement for Proudhon? Movement or social movement means creation or production. And, according to Proudhon, as we have already outlined, “to create is to serialize” or to order (Proudhon, 1873; Damien, 2009:21). A series is “the figure, laws and relations, according to which every being created will be separated from the undivided whole” (Proudhon, 1873). So, we create through series and through series we can generate, as we have just written, ‘plural rationalities’, ‘multiple identities’ and products: social beings or social space.

For Proudhon, this circular movement is made of material interests or needs - the here and now or the immanent power - and ideas. Both - needs and ideas - “rule society.” Castleton (2012:109) explains that Proudhonian material interests or needs are “mobile and unstable”, not “fixed and permanent”, and “subjected to continuous displacements”. In turn, ideas are also mobile, as interests, because they are subjected to opposition, contradiction and cannot be utterly destroyed but only substituted for other ideas (Castleton, 2012:110). Proudhon (1861:33,58) defends antagonism or perpetual war or our need to survive.

In the state of nature, … that we can only suppose outside the religious institution, in this State where there is no legislature, where God never

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61 We will develop this ‘an-archy’ or ‘necessity rule’ later (Chapter IV, pgs: 144-146, 175-176).
62 We are going to study Proudhon’s war later (Chapter IV, pgs: 142-144).
more appears; no laws, no authority; where all is at war against all; where the distinction between good and evil does not exist, what can the human action rule? In other words, what can we imagine as the mobile ruler of his will, and therefore the law of his existence? It is obvious that he must do everything to prevent death and suffering. Common sense says, the preservation of his body and his limbs, by all possible means, this is for man in the state of nature, the only true law, the dictates of pure and right reason (Proudhon, 1861: 176,177).

According to Proudhon, (2009:404,405) this movement or battle or antagonism is an aesthetic and poetic war, because history and men are created daily, perpetually, with reference to their needs, as we have already described. For Proudhon (1861:42), existence results from this “divine struggle”. Thus, in Proudhon’s perspective, war or contradiction is the unavoidable first intelligibility principle of history, society, politics and economy: the first movement (Proudhon, 1861:33,58, Castleton, 2012:110). And this first movement has an “unknown origin” or divine origin (Proudhon, 1861:33,58, Castleton, 2012:110). As we have observed, its origin is a priori; need: “the preservation of his body and his limbs, by all possible means”; this is the “only true law”.

Hence, according to Proudhon, this ‘divine’ and circular movement composed by interests and ideas in society is also the revolution or, rather, the micro revolutions that just occur when man is in need – or overwhelmed. Proudhon (1851:7) argues that this war or revolt is not innate in masses (Proudhon, 1851:7). The revolution has its origin in the violence of needs, in the lack of bread and work (Proudhon, 1851:8,11,12). As Proudhon (2009:90) argues, “every man has the right to work to live, and to live from his work”. The revolution is a force against which no other power, divine or human, can prevail. Its nature is to strengthen and to grow against resistance it meets, up to a point of explosive no return (Proudhon, 1851:5).

Proudhon (2009:151,152) adds, “when, due to a physical, intellectual or social fact, our ideas ... change completely, I call this movement of the spirit revolution. If there is just extension or modification of our ideas, it is progress”. Thus, for Proudhon, revolution, as desire, is something circular and discontinuous that dies and is born again and again. And progress is a continuous and reformist line that never changes completely.
So, for Proudhon, movement is the same as time. As Castleton (2012:110) points out: “the Proudhonian concept of movement is the unique and essential form of reason. It is the condition of the whole experience and time is just its synonym”.

In turn, for Proudhon, movement or time or creation is the other side of social space and vice versa. Time and space, the here and the now, are the power or the immanence that creates social space. For that reason, Castleton (2012:110) concludes, for Proudhon, the laws of movement or time - and space - are “eternal and absolute” or necessary and universal, as we have learned with Kant.

The Proudhonian social space is also spiritual and providential - immanence. The social space is spiritual because, as Castleton (2012:123) explains,

the physical relationships lead to purely organic relations, from the individual to the family, from family to society and from society to mankind. ... The spirit seems destined to progressively remove the body, as individuals become constitutive members of a superior person.

The social space is this “superior person” or a purified common body. For that reason, the Proudhonian social space is providential, because it looks like a new ‘re-ligion’ (from the latin religare: re-ligare) that means ‘re-connection’ (or a “civil religion”) (Prichard, 2008:117,119,132,146). This civil religion is constituted by free and intelligent individuals who replace God by the immanent and creative power that crosses their body and the social space as a whole, creating new groups - spiritual and ethical relationships - and new social space or new pure organic relations (Prichard, 2008:117,119,132,146).

And, in order to create this spiritual and providential social space, Proudhon identifies three possibilities: mutuality, federation and anarchy.

According to Proudhon (1865), mutuality comes from the French word mutuel, mutualité, mutation, that means “reciprocal”; reciprocity comes from the Latin mutuum, which means “loan” – consumption - and, in a broader sense, “trade”. The original premises of mutualism63 are: “service for service ... product for product, loan for loan, insurance for insurance, credit for credit, bail for bail, guarantee for guarantee, etc.” The ancient Law of Talion inspires these principles: eye for eye, tooth for tooth.

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63 Mutualism is the thinking movement that advocates mutuality.
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for tooth, life for life. Mutualism presupposes “free”\textsuperscript{64} and “fair”\textsuperscript{65} individuals and their goal is justice, “to become equal” and to “reject alms”. Mutualism claims freedom of labour, competition, solidarity, responsibility and equality of dignity (Proudhon, 1865).

The aim of mutualism is also to “banish communism”, property and also “the liberal and individualistic vision”, in order to promote the concept of “participation” and the “principle of mutuality” - “one should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself” and “one should not treat others in ways that one would not like to be treated” (Proudhon, 1865). Proudhon (1865) compares mutuality and community. For Proudhon (1865), mutuality supposes, “sharing of land, division of property, independence of work, separation of industries, specialized functions, individual and collective responsibility, minimized general expenses, elimination of parasitism and misery”. In turn, community means “hierarchy, property, centralization, complication of machines, subordination of wills, loss of force, development of unproductive functions, indefinite increase of general expenses, parasitism and misery” (Proudhon, 1865).

According to Proudhon (2009:408,409), community bears on property, as we have said above, and signifies ruin, state property, a “beatified uniformity” where work is commanded, where there is “passive obedience” (Castleton, 2009:80; Préposiet, 2007:200,201). On the other hand, for Proudhon (1865), mutuality is “collective force” that aims “to dismiss any velleity, any possibility of speculation, to reduce the random element making the risk common, to systematically organize the principle of justice in a series of positive duties and material guarantees”.

As Ritter notes, “this principle of justice” which defines a “series of positive duties and material guarantees)” is contract. With contract, Proudhonian mutualism “opens the way to unlimited liberation from outward coercion” (Ritter, 1967:470). How does it do this? The answer is: through a “universalized negotiation” (Ritter, 1967:470). The idea is to engage in direct bargaining without mediation: “individuals and groups, unimpeded by hierarchy, law or market, bargain directly with each other for the things they want, without any intermediaries, until they arrive at mutualized acceptable terms of agreement” (Ritter, 1967:470).

\textsuperscript{64} The Proudhonian free man is “a person (that) must be ‘liberated from all internal and external coercion’” (Ritter, 1867:468).

\textsuperscript{65} We will discuss the concept of justice or law later (this Chapter III, note 68: pg. 98; Chapter IV, pgs: 152-153).
Proudhonian contract is the law: “when I negotiate for something with one or several of my neighbours, it is clear that my own will is my only law” (Ritter, 1967:470). Thus, direct bargaining sets up the contract or the Proudhonian social law (Proudhon, 1951:123). Proudhon denominates this kind of justice, “the commutative justice”, which, as we have already seen, “imposes on each contender the supreme duty of giving to all others goods just as valuable as those which he receives from them. It obliges equivalent exchange” (Ritter, 1967:473). Proudhon’s goal is to move from distributive justice to commutative justice (Proudhon, 1851:122). Commutative justice is the kingdom of contracts, an economic and industrial system (Proudhon, 1851:124). Redistributive justice is the realm of laws, feudalism, government or a military regime. The future of humanity is this replacement of distributive justice with or by commutative justice (Proudhon, 1851:124).

In this way, Proudhon (1863) defends a commutative principle (“each party is committed to give or to do something that is regarded as the equivalent of what is given or done to it”, as we have defined above) and synallagmatic (“the contractors are reciprocally obliged”) social contract that focuses only on exchanges, increasing freedom (Proudhon, 1851:127). The Proudhonian contract opposes government, because the producer is the negotiator or the ruler and his organization is incompatible with authority (Proudhon, 1851:139). So, the contract succeeds the government (Proudhon, 1851:140). According to Proudhon (2009:424), “the government of man by man is illegal and illegitimate”. Thus, the Proudhonian solution is “the organization of economic forces under the contract”.

How should this political contract be designated? Proudhon answers: It is a “federation”. Criticizing the social contract of Rousseau, Proudhon defines federation as a “political contract” based “on mutualism that, therefore, should be synallagmatic and commutative”, as we have seen above. This political contract is a way to organize the groups externally and internally. It depends on the perspective that could go from micro to macro or from macro to micro. Proudhon (1863) specifies, through federation, “contractors, heads of families, municipalities, cantons, provinces or states … reserve themselves individually … more rights, freedom, authority, property, than they give up”. Proudhon (1863) highlights that federal contract, even in big groups, is “essentially restricted” and is not a government but an “agency”, having specific and revisable services, allowed by the contractors. Proudhon (1863) points out the federal
agency is “limited to special services”. The author adds, the bigger the number of contractors, the lesser its services “in number and immediacy”. 66

As Préposiet (2007:209,210) notes, in the framework of federation, through contract and mutualism, Proudhon (1965) advocates a “simplification” of legislation, as we have just said above. For Proudhon (1965; Préposiet, 2007:209,210), legislation could be reduced to just one law, the “mutuality principle”: “one should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself” and “one should not treat others in ways that one would not like to be treated”. As Préposiet (2007:210) adds, the “mutuality principle” is “the basic formula of justice, the rule of all transactions” in a federal space.

We can see that mutualism, contract and federalism constitute the Proudhonian way to weave social ‘tissue’ or social space and that they have political consequences. As we have shown, they replace government. What should we call this new political reality?

For Proudhon, “anarchy” is the political organization of people under the contract (Proudhon, 2009:428; 1851:145). Proudhon assumes himself as an anarchist and, consequently, “a great friend of order” 67 and the author explains this relationship between anarchy and order or law (Proudhon, 2009:421,432,439). For Proudhon (2009:428,432,433), anarchy means “absence of master and sovereign” and is based on four principles: equality, law, independence and proportionality: equality signifies similar “conditions or means”; the law, as we have observed, is the commutative contract, which results from “the science of the facts” 68 and is based on need;

66 According to Scelle (1958:19,20), federalism, for Proudhon, is a “powerful synthesis”, of “authority and freedom, two antagonistic principles, however, necessary”, but this Proudhonian conciliation bears on “struggle, which is the basis of revolutions and wars”. Criticizing Proudhon, Scelle (1958:19,20) says, this Proudhonian conciliation is not balanced, because Proudhon gives "preponderance, sometimes excessive, to the principle of freedom over authority”. Therefore, Proudhon considers “most of the federalist competences must belong to the local authorities”. In his opinion, federal authority should have only competences such as "public education", a “federal army” and “the government of the banking system”. As we have found above, for Proudhon, we are condemned to representation, language, sign, communication or creation of space. This new kind of representation or mutualism is Proudhon’s proposal. As we have just said, we will further develop this Proudhonian political representation later (Chapter IV, pg: 135).

67 As we have already studied, the Proudhonian order is series, symmetry, relation or the law that is the commutative contract, the manifestation of our common will. For Proudhon, to produce is to create order.

68 For Proudhon, the law is the contract that is an expression of common will, as we have just discussed. So, the contract does not precede the experience, but succeeds it after practical verification, regarding the needs of those involved. Proudhon (2009:430) says, law signifies “to repeat an experiment, to observe a phenomenon, to state a fact”. As Préposiet (2007:190) affirms, “the law is not invented, it is discovered”.

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independence means “the autonomy of the private reason” and derives from “the
different talents and capacities”; proportionality belongs “to the sphere of intelligence
or feelings and does not violate justice or social equality”. Proudhon (2009:433)
summarizes, “anarchy is freedom” and freedom is also order or equality, law,
independence and proportionality. And Proudhon (2009:433) concludes, freedom is
anarchy because it does not admit “the governmental will, but just law authority, that
is to say, necessity”. Then Proudhon explains, “right and duty are born in ourselves
from necessity” and necessity means “the need to eat and sleep: to get the needed
tings to sleep and to eat is a right and it is a duty to use them when nature asks; to
work in order to live is a necessity; it is a right and a duty”. So, here, we could
confirm our working hypothesis, to establish space is to survive. We would add: it is
a right and a duty.69 For Proudhon, to create social space is to create anarchy or
powerful, free, ordered and autonomous groups, legitimated by our ‘necessity’ in
order to survive - the Kantian here and now. In short, Proudhonian anarchy is the
constitution of free, fair, localized and autonomous spaces here and now, regarding
our needs, desires or dreams.

In the next sub-chapter, we are going to study the Foucauldian concept of

2. Michel Foucault: space, necessity and movement.

In this sub-chapter, we are going to study the Foucauldian concept of space and also
the concepts of necessity and movement. We consider the concepts of necessity and
movement to be inherent in the Foucauldian concept of space (and we will show this
in the following discussion).

The Kantian framework also inspires this chapter. As we have already stated
in the previous chapter, Kant is a great inspiration for Foucault and, according to
Foucault, he was the first author who was concerned with his time and driven to
contribute to it through his work. And, in turn, Foucault has helped us to better know
this Kantian spatial framework understood as the here and now – the today. So, in
this sub-chapter, we are closing the circle between Kant and Foucault and showing
how Kant helps us to know Foucault. Our main goal is to analyse the Foucauldian

69 The Proudhonian necessity is not just a lack. It could be excess or a dream and it is mainly a right
and a duty.
space, movement and necessity through this Kantian framework, understanding the Foucauldian space and time as the ‘here and now’.

Since it is also our intention to compare the thoughts of Proudhon and Foucault in terms of space, necessity and movement in the conclusion, at the end of this Chapter III, we will adopt the same structure used for the Proudhonian sub-chapter here, with one small difference. As before, we will analyse the Foucauldian space in three perspectives: transcendental, social and material. Nevertheless, this time, we will start with the transcendental space because (i) the Kantian ‘here and now’ is a fundamental goal of Foucault’s work, as we are going to see; (ii) we have already analyzed some features of the Foucauldian ‘here and now’, in the discussion of the Kantian framework (Chapter II); and (iii) for Foucault, the social space and the material or real space is the same space. Both spaces are social, because power relationships or force relations constitute both spaces, as we are going to see. And both spaces are also material, because two parts constitute each of those relations: a formal one and a material one (Deleuze 2012:78,79). The formal one is, as we have discussed above, the a priori power, the “pure function” which is “grasped regardless the concrete forms in which it is embodied” (Deleuze 2012:78,79). The material one is “the pure matter, unformed, taken independently of the formed substances, the beings or qualified objects” (Deleuze, 2012:79). This “pure matter” is the matter before the action that will affect it. Thus, all social space is material space because “each force is defined by its power to affect other forces … and to be affected by other forces” (Deleuze, 2012:78). Beyond these pure form and pure matter that constitute power relations, in our perspective, this social or material space could also be divided in two ways: (i) the social-material or the ‘we’, designated just as ‘social space’; (ii) the material-social space beyond the ‘we’, designated just as ‘material space’. For that reason, in terms of argument organization, it is important to discuss them one after the other.

So, this sub-chapter is organized in three sections. In the first part, we will study Foucauldian transcendental space. In the second, we will analyse Foucauldian social space. In the third part, we will discuss Foucauldian material space.

We begin with Foucauldian transcendental space.

70 We will develop the concept of power later (pg: 218).
71 We could find here some similarities with Proudhonian matter.
72 For Deleuze (2012:79), this Foucauldian pure matter is “a physics of the first bare matter”.

99
Foucault: transcendental space

In this section, we are going to study Foucauldian transcendental space. Perhaps, at first glance, Foucault would not identify himself with the title of this sub-chapter. For Foucault (1969:277,278), transcendental signifies the “crisis” of our time. According to the author, this crisis means the failure of phenomenology, Marxism and liberalism. And phenomenology, Marxism and liberalism failed because they identified themselves with this Kantian transcendental reflection (or transcendental subject). So, consequently, the transcendental concept failed too (Foucault, 2012b). Foucault (2012b, 1969:277) explains, the transcendental is linked with the questions about the origins of knowledge, about the origins of discourse, about “hidden laws” or about big final events. Foucault (2014) clarifies, those “questions about the present have been comparisons between the present and the past, inquiries about our decline, about the “announcement of a new age”, or about “the arrival of the promised last days”. For Foucault (2012b, 1969:277), with those questions, the transcendentalism of Kant opened the door to phenomenology, to Marxism and to liberalism.

During the years 1945-1965 (I am referring to Europe), there was a certain way of thinking correctly, a certain style of political discourse, a certain ethics of the intellectual. One had to be on familiar terms with Marx, not let one’s dreams stray too far from Freud. And one had to treat sign (systems - the signifier) with great respect (Foucault, 2013:XII)

After the apogee of Marx, Freud, phenomenology and political representation (liberalism), the crisis and the critique of 1968 arrives to the European world:

At the gates of our world, there was Vietnam, of course … But here, inside our walls, what exactly was taking place? … A movement toward political struggles that no longer conformed to the model that Marxist tradition had prescribed … (a movement) toward an experience and a technology of desire that were no longer Freudian. … The combat shifted and spread into new zones (Foucault (2013:XII)

73 We have referred the main Kantian philosophical questions above.
Facing the crisis and after the failure of “the Marxist end of the line” and the phenomenological “academic concrete”, in the same context of Kantian transcendentalism, Foucault wants to work another perspective on Kant, a May 68 perspective, to explore the present, those “new zones”, and to find out or to set up ‘other alternatives’, ‘other subjectivities’ or ‘other spaces’, as we are going to see later. Foucault (2013:XI) is not “concerned with why this or that” but “with how to proceed” or with the non-Freudian “desire”. And this non-Freudian desire is ‘desire here and now’, ‘the other’ Kantian perspective (the perspective of May 68) or the transcendental idealism of Foucault, as we are going to study below.

Kant is, indeed, a strong influence on Foucault. And, Foucault (1994a, 2012b) embraces this influence. Foucault (1994a, 2012b) explains his whole work is inspired by the Kantian interrogation of the present - the reality of eighteenth century Prussia - or the Enlightenment. Foucault (2012b) argues to ask “what is enlightenment?” is the same as demanding, “what is happening around us?” and this is the question that inspired his work. With this Kantian question “philosophy acquired a certain task it did not have before” (Foucault 1994a, 2012b). According to Foucault (2012b), Kantian philosophy launched the search into “who we are”, “what is our present or our actuality?” and “what is it today?” (Foucault, 2012b). Foucault also searched in this way.

As a result, Foucault supports the Kantian ‘here and now’ or the Kantian a priori ‘space and time’. Foucault (2012b) asks, “what is this ‘instant’ that is our today, the reality?” Foucault (2012b) answers, this “instant”, is a “fundamental intuition” (a priori). The author (2012b) contextualizes, according to Kant, “the consistency of his work is linked to a circumstance that belongs to all of us, to a ‘fundamental intuition’”. So, this “fundamental intuition” is also the Foucauldian a priori that means necessity or desire - the non-Freudian desire. As we have just discussed, the Kantian a priori space and time is necessary and universal, or is that ‘instant’, or the desire, here and now, to live or to die. Thus, for Foucault too, this intuition is universal and necessary, as we have just affirmed.

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74 This “how to proceed” is neither a lack – a negativity - nor a explanation about the why, the fundamentals, but an affirmation.
75 Here we confirm our working hypothesis: to establish space is to survive.
76 As we have seen above, this fundamental intuition is the concept that distinguishes Kant’s transcendental idealism from Leibniz’s transcendental realism (Janiak, 2012).
And why does Foucault consider this intuition universal? Foucauldian intuition is universal because it is linked to the body. For Foucault, everybody (everybody) has a body, that is, as we just analysed above, the “zero point” or “the strategic point” from which we organize our life in order to survive. And this body is strategic because we have, *a priori* or innate, this ‘fundamental intuition’ that allows us to process the world that affects us in terms of space and time - pure form + pure matter. It is this body or this ‘fundamental intuition’ that permits us to ask about the actuality in order to have a better life and not to die. So, this body is universal because everybody has a body and, according to Kant (1969:26), as we have already said, universal signifies “no possible exception” or what ‘belongs to all of us’.

Turning back to Foucault, why is this intuition necessary? The answer here is that, as we have just pointed out, this intuition is also a vital necessity or a capacity or a desire. And what does desire mean? For Foucault (2012), desire is a “force” or an energy that is explosive, a power that is widespread, multiple, ubiquitous and immanent.\(^77\)

For Foucault (2012, 2013:XII), as we have just seen, power signifies “relations between individuals - and not the Marxist superstructure - when one can determine the conduct of another, having a set of objectives”. Thus, Foucauldian necessity means desire or, better, an explosion of desire. And why is desire an explosion? As Kant (1969:26) teaches “necessity” is when something “could not possibly exist otherwise”, it is the point of no return (the Proudhonian revolution, as we have discussed above). So, when we are in need, we explode, because ‘it could not be otherwise’. We need to satisfy our necessities. Foucault (2012) explains, this is the ‘question of death’ and we do not want to die. This is our need of survival that leads us to act\(^78\) or to ask about the present, the here and now, as Kant and Foucault do.

So, Foucault (2012,2014) supports Kant, in terms of space and time, utilizing the Kantian *a priori* ‘fundamental intuition’ as a method or an innate – immanent - capacity to organize his philosophical work regarding his necessity or the necessity of his epoch. Foucault (2012,2014) pretends to give a meaning to his individual present or to his philosophical task in order to contribute to a better social ‘today’ in the

\(^77\) We have identified above the Foucauldian power with the Proudhonian immanence.

\(^78\) The concept of action and movement are fundamental in this thesis and, as we have said, they help to understand the concept of space. We will discuss them later in this sub-chapter.
western world. As we have written earlier, phenomenology, Marxism, and liberalism do not use this Kantian perspective. The difference between Foucault and the others is the approach he adopts. Foucault acts today and thinks in the present. The others look for the very beginning or the final goal. And Foucault (2012, 2013:XII) radicalizes this difference and considers that this new Kantian perspective has social and political consequences - as we are going to see later in Chapter IV (pg:135) - and has also three adversaries: (i) “the political ascetics, the sad militants, the terrorist of theory, those who would preserve the pure order of politics and political discourse, bureaucrats of the revolution and civil servants of Truth”; (ii) “the poor technicians of desire – psychoanalysts and semiologists of every sign and symptom”; (iii) fascism, the main adversary, “not only the historical fascism of Hitler and Mussolini … but also the fascism in all of us”. In this point of view, we could conclude that Foucault is, like Kant, a transcendental idealist who works also on an a priori space and time, coming back to the source, the Kantian will to work ‘here and now’. Foucault proposes another trajectory from that a priori Kantian thought, taking into account the path already trodden by phenomenologists, Marxists and liberals. And this Foucauldian trajectory is “the analysis of practice” here and now (Foucault, 1969:277). Just like Kant wrote to the German periodical, Berlinische Monatschrift, so Foucault defines himself as “a journalist” or “historian of the present”. Foucault (2014) wants to “have a certain role in the natural and spontaneous story of reason”. Through “his attention to the present” and through his “philosophy as a practice of ‘radical journalism’, Foucault tries to transform the present reality” (Tazzioli et al, 2015:1,2). This is his ‘transcendental’ spatial dimension.

In the next section, we are going to analyse the Foucauldian concept of social space, including the Foucauldian concept of critique and movement.

**Foucault: social space**

In this section, we will study Foucauldian social space. We again utilise the Kantian a priori space and time, understood as the ‘here and now’. We are using our second hypothesis, to establish space is to survive, to contextualize our main hypothesis, **Postanarchism is space constitution.**

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79 As Tazzioli et al (2015:1) remember, “whole Foucauldian work is about to “historicize power relations and to grasp them in their transformations”, for instance, in prisons, in hospitals, in hospices, etc.
In this section, the Foucauldian concept of social is understood as the ‘we’ or the ‘\textit{a posteriori} subject’\textsuperscript{80} (Tazzioli \textit{et al}, 2015:2). Why is the Foucauldian social concept a “we” or an ‘\textit{a posteriori} subject’?

As we have said in the \textit{Introduction}, the condition of postmodernity, which influenced Foucault’s thought, is the end of modernity or the end of the Enlightened Copernican revolution when human reason ceases to guarantee the self-confidence of man; in postmodernity there are no longer references; the earth turns away from the sun and man has left himself drifting in space (Frank, 1989a: 20-23). Nevertheless, in our perspective, for Foucault, we are not in postmodernity. We still are in modernity, although in his earlier works, Foucault “largely depends on notions taken from Nietzsche”, such as the idea of the subject, as unity, which is “dead” because it is created by “discourses, institutions and relations of power”\textsuperscript{81} (Danaher \textit{et al}, 2000:116). Nevertheless, as Foucault (1980a) notes, his intention is really to step beyond modernity in a transformed way. With this goal, Foucault has recaptured the sun and now we are not drifting in space. And this intention to ‘exit from modernity’ causes, as Foucault (1980a) says, a “metamorphosis” or a transformation: we have found another kind of sun, another kind of subject or subjects.

So, Foucault recaptures the sun and we recover the lost consciousness\textsuperscript{82} of ourselves, although “absolutely dependent” and as “somehow \textit{determined}” (Frank, 1989a: 90). As we are going to discuss hereinafter, Foucault recuperates the subject.\textsuperscript{83}

For Foucault, to be a subject has three meanings: subject, subjectivity and the subjectivation (Revel 2016).

First of all, the subject is the sovereign facing an object, this object being another person or another being, for instance, the non-human beings or nature in general. However, Foucault criticizes this Kantian subject and also phenomenology, Marxism and liberalism which presuppose this sovereign, vertical and hierarchical subject far from his object. As Gros (2014:54) argues, Foucault is “the prophet of man’s death”. For Foucault, the vertical subject or “the man” is about to end. According to Foucault, “man has not always existed”; it is a “recent invention” and

\textsuperscript{80} Our philosophical term.

\textsuperscript{81} The ‘I’ is a set of geography, history, society, politics, culture, arts and so on (Eribon, 2016).

\textsuperscript{82} We understand here the term 'consciousness' in its modern sense, created by Kant (Libera, 2014). For Kant, consciousness, subjectivity, subject, \textit{a priori} - space and time, we are studying -, transcendent, the self or ideality oppose to objectivity, the object, the \textit{a posteriori}, the transcendent, the effectiveness or the real thing (Libera, 2014).

\textsuperscript{83} We are going to develop the concept of subject or the ‘self’ later in Chapter IV (pg:133).
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“should disappear soon”, as a “face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault, 1966, Deleuze, 2012:131,139). For Foucault (1966), “man is not the oldest or the most constant problem that is posed to human knowledge”; “it was not around him and his secrets that, for a long time, obscurely, knowledge spun”. Man corresponds to “a new configuration of knowledge” that arises in the nineteenth century (Gros, 2014:55). In Foucault’s (1966) perspective, man is “the effect of a change in the fundamental provisions of knowledge”, for instance, with phenomenology, capitalism, liberalism and Marxism, as we have noted above. Foucault shares with Nietzsche his stance on man. For Foucault (1966), Nietzsche does not only announce “the absence or the death of God”, but also “the end of man”. According to Foucault (1966), “the death of God and the Last Man are bound up”.

Secondly, the subject can also be a “subjectivity”, an essence or an identity (Revel, 2016). This “subjectivity” is the subjugated person that becomes an object. For Foucault (1982), to subjugate is to make the subject an object or a crystallization, a definition, something that does not evolve, as we have already studied. All of Foucault’s work is about this “objectification of the subject” and its “dividing practices”, for instance, “sharing between the mad and the sane man, the sick and the healthy individual, the criminal and the ‘nice guy’” (Foucault, 1982).

So, thirdly, Foucault’s main goal is to fight those divisions in order to unveil something different, new ways of life (Bounache, 2013:139). As Deleuze and Guattari (1977: 27) say, Foucault’s intention is “to express another potential community” and “to forge the means for another consciousness”, for “another sensibility”. Foucault criticizes the vertical subject and proposes an ‘other subject’ that has an equal and free relation with the other beings, whether human or nonhuman, as we have seen. It is an ongoing definition or a subjectivation. This ‘other consciousness’ or ‘other subject’ could be understood, for instance, as the emergence of the abnormalities or, in the last instance, of “the monstrosity”. The monster is the subject that “undermines the prohibitions of the civil, religious and divine law” and “forces the law to question its very foundations”, because the monstrosity “alludes to another reference system” (Foucault, 1999: 59). “It creates disorder in order”, the man dies and the Nietzschean superman - the monster - is born (Bounache, 2013:139; Foucault, 1999:59).

And Deleuze (2012:131,139) adds, “it can be predicted that forces in man cannot combine necessarily in a man-form, but can invest up differently, in another
compound, in another form”. And this new compound could be the Nietzschean superman indeed (Deleuze, 2012:131,139). Deleuze (2012:139) explains, “Foucault is like Nietzsche, he indicates just drafts, in an embryological sense, not yet functional. Nietzsche said: man imprisoned life, the superman is he who frees life in man himself, in favour of another form”. So, for Foucault, this death of man is not a “tragedy”, but a “liberation regarding the humanist ideology” (Gros, 2014:56). Foucault affirms, “for all those who still have questions about what man’s essence is ... we can only oppose a philosophical laugh” (Gros, 2014:56).84

This ongoing definition or a subjectivation or combination of forms shows also the subject is dependent or has a dependent body. Both, subject and body are as a constitutive nothing or a process or a devir. They depend absolutely on the exterior world to realize themselves. In another way, we could summarise that, for Foucault, the recovered consciousness of ourselves has four main features: it is ‘dependent’, ‘free’, ‘determined’ and ‘not sovereign’.

Consciousness is ‘absolutely dependent’ because, in ontological and epistemological terms, “the self is the basis of its own self-knowledge, but not the basis of its own Being (and not even of the Being of its self-knowledge)” (Frank, 1989a: 90). Consciousness ceases to be its own foundation and starts being the foundation of its own projects (Frank, 1989b: 87).85

And what does this ontological path mean practically, in ethical and political terms? It means that, ethically, the subject is limitlessly free. As Heidegger adds, this “inescapable dependence of Dasein presents no limit to its freedom” and to “its own projects” (Frank, 1989a: 87,88). The consciousness is “necessarily situated and dependent”, because there is a ‘not’ which is constitutive of this self and “the character of this ‘not’ as a ‘not’ may be defined existentially” (Frank, 1989a: 88,92). The self is essentially “nullity-nonetheless”. As Frank (1989a: 88,92) concludes, as ‘nullity-nonetheless’, “the self … we are does not possess itself,86 one could say that it ‘happens’”. So, its projects ‘happen’ with no limit, freely, and, it is “irrelevant” how the self determines itself (Frank, 1989a: 87,88,90). All possibilities are opened.

Politically, this means the self has not “the exclusive and instantaneous right” to sovereignty, because consciousness, as we have just said, being a dependent “not”

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84 Here Foucault criticized Sartre (Gros, 2014:56).
85 As we have just said, we are going to develop the ontological and ethical path of the Foucauldian subject later (Chapter IV, pg: 135).
86 This possession here means property.
or a dependent “nullity-nondetheless”, does not possess itself (Foucault, 1969: 283). It needs to determine itself. In his later works Foucault draws further this non-sovereign subject. Foucault (1984:91) explains that the subject has a “self control” - *maitrise de soi* - and this self-control is like a “possession”, but this possession is not “a mastered force”, an established identity or essence or a “sovereignty over a potency that is ready to revolt; it is a pleasure one takes in oneself.” This is a “work of art”: “life should be lived and performed – determination - as a work of art”87 (Danaher *et al*, 2000:117). For Foucault (1984:91), this self-possession or self-control just exists because the other and the exterior world exist as conditions of possibility. This possession means a “perpetual and serene” self-possession88 and a plurality, as we are going to explore later in the *Chapter IV* (pg135).

And how does the self determine itself in society? The subject determines himself89 through the sign. As for Proudhon, Foucault also sees the ‘subject’ completely condemned to signs or representation in a novel way. For Foucault, the exterior world is the *sine qua non* condition of the subject, as we have already said. And, according to Foucault, the sign inhabits this *sine qua non* outside world, and also the interior dimension of thought, the *a priori*, the strategic or transcendental space or power. Foucault’s sign is the true way we can realise ourselves, create and work. For Foucault, there is a close relationship between power (*a priori*) and knowledge (*a posteriori*) and the sign illustrates this relationship - this mix.90 Foucault considers that the sign, being a consequence of power, is the truth (Call, 2002:51; Foucault, 1994; Frank, 1998b: 102-109). For Foucault, in terms of sign, the political or power dimension is the other side of the epistemological dimension. So, what is Foucault’s sign? How can it be the truth?

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87 We will explore this aesthetic perspective later in *Chapter IV* (pg: 133)
88 We will develop this idea of self-possession in *Chapter IV* (pg: 133). In turn, as we have just said, the Foucauldian self as “nullity” does not possess itself. It is dependent and non-sovereign. Nevertheless, as we are going to see, for Foucault, just ‘my self’ can be an object in relation to ‘my self’ in terms of dependent self-government. The other ‘selves’ should not be objects or should not be subjected to ‘my self’. They should not be slaves, because, as Bernaz (2014:244) explains, “Foucault’s power constrains insofar as it succeeds in producing, in the very act of coercion, the subject on which it exercises itself”. So, if ‘my self’ was an object for ‘me’, ‘I’ could possess ‘my non-sovereign self’ in order to produce ‘myself’ as free subject - always in a dependent and serene way.
89 We use the masculine form in this chapter and in the next chapters because it is the form adopted by the authors (Proudhon, Foucault and Newman) who do not develop the gender issue nor have a feminist perspective, as we will analyze in *Chapter IV* (pg: 133) and *Chapter V* (pg: 229).
90 In terms of novel representation, Foucault presupposes an “audio-visual battle”, as we are going to study below in this section (Deleuze, 2012:119).
We begin by answering the first question: what is Foucault’s sign? For Foucault (1994: 58), in classical age, the sign could be defined according to three variables:

first the certainty of the relation: a sign may be so constant that one can be sure of its accuracy … but it may also be simply probable … Second, the type of relation: a sign may belong to the whole that it denotes or be separate from it … Third, the origin of the relation: a sign may be natural … or conventional.

According to Foucault (1994:63,64) these variables show the close relation between sign and thought:

these variables show that the relation of the sign to its content is not guaranteed by the order of things in themselves. The relation of the sign to the signified now resides in a space in which there is no longer any intermediary figure to connect them: what connects them is a bond established, inside Knowledge, between the idea of one thing and the idea of another”…. In fact, the signifying element has no content, no function, and no determination other than what it represents: it is entirely ordered upon and transparent to it.

Sign depends on thought - the inside. Thought is its content. In turn, thought depends on the sign to realize itself, as we have already outlined above and as the second quote shows. As Foucault (1994:64) recalls, “in its simple state as an idea, or an image, or a perception, associated with or substituted for another, the signifying element is not a sign. It becomes a sign only on condition that it manifests … the relation that links it to what it signifies”. For this reason, sign and thought communicate in a “space without intermediary”. Their relation is immediate and transparent. Thought communicates through sign. The sign is an extension of thought.

91 This ‘inside’ is an a priori that is already outside. We could say that thought is the need or the strategic a priori + ideas stimulated by the exterior world (pure form + pure matter).
92 This mutual dependence is the audio-visual battle, we have already referred above and we are going to study from now on.
In another way, for Foucault, the sign is the “to be - to know” that could be subdivided in two ways: a “being-language” and a “being-light” (Deleuze, 2012:119). The “being-language” is the “enunciation” and the “being-light” is the “visibility” (Deleuze, 2012:119). They are different, but they are also “interlaced”, not “chained”, because there is not an “intentionality” (sovereignty) between the two, rather than a “strategy” (a power strategy) or a “reversible intentionality” in “both directions” (Deleuze, 2012:119,121). For Foucault, “to see and to say is to know”, but “we do not see what we say and we do not say what we see” (Deleuze, 2012:117).

For Foucault, there is a “battle” between these “irreducible opponents”, the audio-visual battle, although Foucault considers that the “enunciation” has primacy over the “visibility” (Deleuze, 2012:74,119). So, the sign or the space - our creations - is this permanent battle between the ‘to say’, the enunciation, and the ‘to see’, the visibility, being the sign primordially enunciation.

Now we turn to the second question: how can the sign be the truth? The sign is the truth because, as we have just said, the sign is an extension of thought (a priori or need + ideas + signifier) or a “being language”. For Foucault, to tell the truth is to communicate our thought. For Foucault (2008:9), telling the truth is parrhesia - the truth telling - that, etymologically, is the Greek “activity that consists in telling everything”. To practice parrhesia is “to hide nothing and to tell what is true” (Foucault, 2008:10). According Foucault (2008:11), “the parrhesiast gives his opinion, he tells what he thinks - he does not lie - he personally signs, as it was, the truth he states, he binds himself to this truth, and he is consequently bound to it and by it”.

So, according to Foucault (2008:11), “parrhesia, the act of truth, requires: first, the manifestation of a fundamental bond between the truth told and the thought of the person who told it; (second), a challenge to the bond between the two interlocutors - the person who tells the truth and the person to whom this truth is addressed”. Parrhesia or the act of truth is also a collective act, as we are going to see later (Chapter IV, pgs: 159).

To sum up, the sign is the truth and when we create signs, for instance,
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Foucault’s books, we are telling the truth because we fabricate ourselves, we determine ourselves according to our will, need or desire, as Foucault (1980a) says:

The people who read me, especially those who appreciate what I do, they often say to me, laughing: ‘Basically, you know that what you say is fiction’. I always answer, ‘Of course, there is no question that this is anything other than fiction’.

And Foucault (1980a) continues:

the essential issue is not whether the observations are true or historically verifiable, but rather the experience that the book can offer. But this experience is neither true nor false. Experience is always a fiction; this is something that allows us to fabricate ourselves. It is something that does not exist before, but exists afterwards. That is the difficult relationship to truth.

Thus, we ‘need’ fiction (signs + thought) in order to say the truth, satisfying our ‘necessity’, our strategies or our a priori will. We need representations of our will (the truth) or, we could say, we need an aesthetic (cultural) and spatial dimension.

The sign and the truth are synonyms of the subject determination or of the subject de-individuation. As we have just studied, the sign and the truth are a collective practice, a practice that depends on the other (the exterior world) and, at the same time, allows our self-creation (aesthetic dimension). The production of signs is a direct - immediate and transparent - production (Foucault, 1994: 63,64). To create signs means to open transparent direct and virtual spaces without intermediaries, and collectively, spaces where we express our thinking, our imagination, our utopias and our dreams. Sign allows thought to materialize\textsuperscript{95} itself and to determine itself. Or, to put it in another way, the subject depends on sign - exterior world - because the sign is the ‘self’ - or the subject - that determines himself in a transcendent way through language – sign - or through the signified being. Or, in another way, the being of the self, that is a devir, determines himself through sign (Frank, 1989b: 89,90).

\textsuperscript{95} We are going to study the spiritual dimension of the self later in Chapter IV (pg:133).
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The subject is dependent because he “interacts symbolically in order to perceive objects, to relate them to other objects, to differentiate them from other objects: in short, to determine and differentiate his world” (Frank, 1989a: 92). These signs are the conditions of possibility of the subject existence or “the conditions of his production” (Frank, 1989a: 91). Foucault (1980a) gives again an example how the books or the signs - that are the ‘self’ that determines in a transcendent way - transform himself or his being:

I never think quite the same for the reason that my books are for me experiences, in a sense that I want those experiences the fullest possible. Experience is something that gets you out of yourself ... I write them because I do not know yet exactly what to think on this thing I would like so much to think. So, this book transforms myself and transforms what I think. Each book transforms what I had thought when I finished the previous book.

As Foucault says, the signs are ‘experiences’ here and now. Through signs we transform the other and transform ourselves.

In turn, “the signs, through whose application we theoretically and practically survey – articulate - reality, (transform) and determine ourselves, are put at our disposal by structure96 that is exterior to us” (Frank, 1989a: 93). We do not create the sign in its entirety. It is created by us - our thoughts - and by society. This is the reason the subject is not “the proprietor or primary authority of the discursive field” or of the signs (Frank, 1989a: 92). There is joint authorship. The subject is not ‘proprietor’ (it is dependent) because there is “a certain order of discourse”97 (the signs, the exterior world or the culture of a certain time) which is exterior to the

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96 For Foucault (1984a) structuralism is “the effort to establish, between elements that could have been connected on a temporal axis, an ensemble of relations that makes them appear as juxtaposed, set off against one another, implicated by each other - that makes them appear, in short, as a sort of configuration”. This configuration or set of relations is the structure. According to Foucault, this kind of effort has the subject as centre or is an affirmation of the primacy of the modern subject, which Foucault wants to dissolve. In question, for Foucault, as we have seen, are Marxism, existentialism and phenomenology.

97 For Foucault (1994:XX), order is “given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and also that has no existence except in a grid created by a glance, an examination, a language”. The order is a relationalism or aprioristic relations between people, animals and things, the Kantian space and time strategic grid that allows us to organize the world.
subject (Frank, 1989a: 91). This “order of discourse” implants into the subject “the
gaze for (his) world” (Frank, 1989a: 91). The society - “a certain order of discourse” -
or the others give us the needed devices - “the gaze” - which allows us to create the
world and ourselves.

According to Foucault (1969:283), the signs or the conditions of possibility of
the discourse are not “determinations that are imposed from the outside into the
individual thought, nor do they inhabit it previously”. For Foucault, the signs - that
inhabit outside the self - are neither oppressive nor impositions. They are “the set of
conditions under which a practice is exercised” and “through which this practice
gives rise partially or totally to new statements, through which this practice can be
modified”; the signs do not impose “limits onto the subject initiatives”; those
conditions are “the field where these practices are articulated” freely, the rules that
these initiatives utilize and the relationships that support these practices; the signs are
stimulus and reciprocities (Foucault, 1969: 283).

Foucault (1969:283) just aims to show the “complexity and thickness” of
discursive practices. According to Foucault (1969:283), speaking is not just
expressing what we think and know; it is not also playing with the structures of a
language: speaking is to put together a statement in an existing set of statements. It is
“a complicated and costly gesture” which involves conditions and rules (Foucault,
1969: 283). Foucault (1969: 283) aims to show that changing the order of speech is
not only to add new ideas, a bit of creativity, invention and another mentality; it is
more than that. It means changing a practice and possibly the neighboring practices
and their common articulation (Foucault, 1969: 283). For Foucault, “changing the
order of speech” is to create a new provisional order. So, Foucault does not deny the
possibility of transformed speech. Foucault (1980a) gives writing books as an
example. Treating Foucault’s books as an experience, as we have just seen, this
experience allows the Foucauldian transformation, his realization or his
determination, and more than that, the transformation and the realization of others, or
better, others can have this experience too. So, the subject can intervene, participate
and transform society and it is, as we have just observed, “a complicated and costly
gesture” or a ‘fight’98 (a force relation or pure form vs. pure matter) or an agonistic

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98 We are going to study this concept of ‘fight’ later in Chapter IV (pgs: 133, 139-141).
gesture that creates new spaces or new orders that are also changeable (the Foucauldian cyclical vision) (Foucault 1969: 283; Pickett, 1996: 464).

For Foucault, the sovereign subject is an “impossibility” because there is an “experience limit” or an excess that prevents the contours of any subject; the subject has no identity and he is as an “eternal return” (again the cyclical vision); subjectivity pops and dissociates itself by proposing “another way of speaking, acting and thinking” (“de-individuation”) (Fernández, 2010:43).

In turn, Foucault wants to remove the “instantaneous and exclusive sovereignty” of the subject. Foucault (1969:275) pretends “to free the history of thought from its transcendental subjection”. Foucault does not support the a priori, sovereign and independent Kantian subject, because, as we have analyzed before, for Kant, the subject and its knowledge are independent of the exterior world. As we have already examined, the conditions of possibility of knowledge for Kant are the a priori, the universal and necessary forms of sensibility, space and time or the here and now, that which we are working on; they also refer to the categories of understanding and the ideas of reason that are beyond the scope of our thesis. This set of Kantian possibilities is internal to the subject and does not depend on experience. Nevertheless, for Foucault, the subject is a posteriori or dependent of the exterior world and no sovereign. We will complete this idea of Foucault’s subject in Chapter IV (pg: 135).

The Foucauldian goal is, first, “to let the history of thought unfold through anonymity,”99 because the creator shares propriety and because to create is mainly a collective experience, as we have just seen. For Foucault, as above noted, the subject is not proprietor of its knowledge, but co-proprietor. It always shares its knowledge and its creations with the other and the exterior world, because the other and the exterior world are the conditions of possibility of its knowledge and of its creations, as we have been saying. Second, Foucault aims to prevent the imposition of the subject form by a transcendental constitution. Foucault pretends to avoid the self-

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99 According to Danaher et al (2000:8), this anonymity or “death of the author” is an influence of Nietzsche, as we have said above, and also of structuralism. For structuralists, ideas and activities are produced by structures and, for that reason, people are not really free. In our opinion, Foucault does not coincide with structuralism. For Foucault, the subject is free and is not dead as we are going to see in Chapter IV (pg:133). As far as Foucault is concerned, (i) structuralism cannot explain everything’s meaning; it can just analyse the “relevant” relationships (for instance, structuralism cannot explain what has been repressed); (ii) structuralism is not aware of “change and discontinuity”; (iii) structuralism can explain the rules, but not people activities (Danaher et al, 2000:8,9).
sufficiency or the totalitarianism of the \textit{a priori} Kantian subject. In terms of sovereignty, as we are going to study later (\textit{Chapter IV}, pg: 135), for Foucault, the subject has power, but this power is an effective power just when the subject exercises it \textit{a posteriori} or through practice. In brief, Foucault (1969: 275) pretends to deprive “all transcendental narcissism”. For Foucault (1969: 275), man is not the centre of the world as Kant and his successors argue.

So, according to Foucault, “consciousness is a feature of relations between elements” and not between a central I and an object (Frank, 1989a: 96). There is not a pure human consciousness or essence or a closed identity disconnected from the world. For Foucault, there is this “feature of relations” and this \textit{devir} in the human consciousness. For that reason, Foucault (1969:277) departs from anthropological thought and humanist ideology and instead of questioning the human being, he turns to the analysis of practice and the experience with the other.

As Foucault explains, the goal is to decentre the absolute or \textit{a priori} subject or the centered subject. According to Foucault (1969:278), the aim is to accomplish “a decentring which leaves any center without privileges”. Nevertheless, an \textit{a posteriori} subject, a ‘decentering’ centre, still exists. Foucault recaptures the sun that is a ‘decentering’ sun, an ‘explosive’ sun. As Foucault (1980a) illustrates, “questioning the subject means to experiment something that would lead to his real destruction, dissociation, its explosion, his returning into something else”. And “something else” means the \textit{a posteriori} subject.\footnote{We will continue to study the development of this “subjectivation” – the spiritual and ethical path - in the \textit{Chapter IV} (pg: 133).}

In \textit{The Order of Things}, in the purpose of the sixteenth century similitude\footnote{According to Foucault (1994: 17), similitude is a kind of resemblance that, in the sixteenth century, is the drive that “organize the play of symbols, made possible knowledge of things visible and invisible and controlled the art of representing them”} and \textit{aemulatio},\footnote{For Foucault (1994:19) \textit{Aemulatio} is a kind of similitude or “a sort of ‘convenience’ that has been freed from the law of place and is able to function without motion from a distance”. \textit{Aemulatio} has “something of reflection and mirror” (Foucault, 1969:19).} Foucault (1994:20) explains that:

\begin{quote}
It pertains to the firmament of man to be ‘free and powerful’, to ‘bow to no order’ and ‘not to be ruled by any other created beings’. His inner sky may remain autonomous and depends only upon itself, but on condition that by means of his wisdom, which is also knowledge, takes
\end{quote}
it back into himself and thus recreates in this inner firmament the sway of that other firmament in which he sees the glitter of the visible stars.

For Foucault, the subject is not an Absolute because man reflects the various relationships of the world. As Foucault says, the subject exists as “inner sky”, as a mirror that reflects “the sway” and “the glitter of the visible stars”. In political terms, for Foucault (2013:XIV), to deprive “all transcendental narcissism” or the decentering or the explosion of the sun means an encounter with the other or a “de-individualization”.103

What is needed is to ‘de-individualize’ by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations. The group is not the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization.

For Foucault, the individual is not a closed organism, but an opened set or an element of several groups that create permanently another set of opened groups. Foucault (2013: XIII, XIV) aims to free political action from fascism and “all forms of totalizing paranoia”, because “the individual is the product of power” and, for the author, we should “not become enamored of power”. So Foucault (2013: XIII) asks:

How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our behavior?

Foucault (2013:XIV) then writes the recipe: we should “prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic”.104 We need to understand ourselves as a “we” or a ‘mobile or nomadic I’. So, as Foucault (1984:2) explains, the subject (a posteriori) belongs to “a certain

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103 In his later works, Foucault concludes this idea of “de-individualization”, showing how this “de-individual” is an “other subject” or a changeable subject. We are going to study this in the Chapter IV (pg:135).

104 We have studied the nomadic space in The State of The Art.
‘we’, a ‘we’ that belongs to a distinctive cultural group of his own today”. Tazzioli et al (2015:1,2) add, Foucault, as a historian of the present, establishes himself as a “we” and introduces an “ontology of ourselves”. As we have seen, Foucault, as a radical journalist and as a philosopher, inspired by the Kantian here and now, intends to transform the actual, social and collective reality, leaving, for that reason, “the boundaries and the meaning of the pronoun ‘our’ quite elusive” (Tazzioli et al, 2015:1,2). For Foucault, “the present we belong to … is … what needs to be produced and re-enacted from time to time, not simply as singular subjectivities but along with the others who share ‘our present’” (Tazzioli et al, 2015:1,2). And ‘to share our present with others’ is, in fact, the Foucauldian goal. Foucault (2012b) admits that, facing today’s crisis, his intention is to contribute to a ‘new light’ in the western world: “there is a moment where the evidences are fogged, the lights turn off and the evening falls. People realize they act in darkness and a new light is necessary, a new illumination, new rules of behaviour”. Foucault, as a ‘we’, wants to start again and, with his writings and work, to enlighten his present and the present of his contemporaries. Thus, for Foucault, ‘social’ means a collective, elusive and shared “we”.

And space, what does it signify to Foucault? As we have stated before, for Foucault, space means ‘here’. And, translating this ‘here’ to social language, this ‘here’ or space means also ‘we’ (‘here’ or the body or topia + exterior world = a posteriori subject). For Foucault, social and space are synonyms, meaning ‘we’. For Foucault, the space is always social and virtual. As Foucault (1984a, 2001: 1572) defines, space is a set of relations of proximity between points or elements or neighbourhood relations described as “series, trees, or grids”. For Foucault (2001: 1573,1574), this is

(the) outside space … by which we launch out ourselves, where precisely takes place the erosion of our lives, our time and our history, this space that erodes us and puckers us, it is also a heterogeneous space. We ... do not live in a kind of void ... we live inside a set of relations … that are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable.

105 According to Danaher et al (2000:7), the Foucauldian concept of relational space could be influenced also by structuralism that understands the “meaning” as “relational”.

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It is this outside space, or social space or “we” that we are studying in this section.

And, as we have just concluded, this Foucauldian social-ontological position about space has political consequences. The conceptual ‘we’ is fundamental to understand Foucauldian thought about space and its political dimension, as we are going to probe right now.

Thus, we could say that the ‘we’ solves the Foucauldian paradox that seems to exist in relation to the transcendental question. On the one hand, Foucault criticizes the transcendental a priori subject of Kant. On the other hand, Foucault adopts the Kantian ‘fundamental intuition’ - here and now - as inspiration of his philosophical task, also claiming a transcendental space. How could Foucault use something that he disdains and criticizes? How does the conceptual ‘we’ solve the Foucauldian paradox?

As we have shown, Foucault advocates an a posteriori subject, completely dependent on the outside world due to the question of survival or death. As we have explained, “the self is not the basis of its own Being”; “the self … does not possess itself; … it ‘happens” (Frank, 1989a: 88,90,92). Nevertheless, for Foucault, this a posteriori subject has also a ‘fundamental intuition’, an ubiquitous and omnipresent a priori power, as we have just learned. And Foucault wears the skin of this paradoxical ‘transcendental a posteriori’ subject, when he says he is a ‘historian of the present’ (transcendental: survival) and he wants to participate (a posteriori: practice) in his time, contributing to a ‘new light’ in the society in which he lives (a posteriori world). Therefore, the Foucauldian ‘we’ personifies and solves this paradoxical ‘transcendental a posteriori subject’, which combines the a priori need to survive with the a posteriori world that also constitutes us. We have the need to survive in the world with the other.

As Proudhon says, it is not worth trying to explain what is not created by man: a priori power (Paixão, 2015). There are fundamental paradoxes that we do not understand but we must “conserve”, respect and let them to be as they are.

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106 We have already studied the Foucauldian concept of the inside or the transcendental space + ideas stimulated by the exterior world. And we will continue the study on this ‘inside’ later (Chapter IV, pg: 135). For Foucault (2001:1573), the inside or unreal space is “the space of our first perceptions, of our dreams, of our passions” so far in this thesis.

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(Paixão, 2015). Foucault has the same concern when he criticizes the phenomenologists, Marxists and liberals and questions the ‘origin’ and the ‘end’. It is not worth explaining the origin of this ‘fundamental intuition’ or Kantian power, this ‘divine’ or immanent power that was born with the man but was not created by him. And here is the meeting point of Kant, Proudhon and Foucault. Kant is right; the ‘intuition’ is \textit{a priori}. And Foucault and Proudhon agree. However, it is this fundamental and inexplicable ‘intuition’ or ‘need’ that throws us to the exterior world, to others - civil religion - and leads us to create space in order to survive. This fundamental ‘intuition’ makes us ‘relationalists’ like Leibniz, Proudhon and Foucault. Digging this paradoxical intuition, such as phenomenology, Marxism and liberalism do, leads to the creation of a sovereign, vertical and hierarchical subject – principle - who falls into crisis as we are now observing. For Foucault, it is worth remembering, we are a Heideggerian \textit{dasein} or a “being there”, a being in the world.

After all, the sovereign, hierarchical and vertical subject, far from his object, is no longer sovereign or is no longer ‘proprietor’ (Foucault, 1969:275; Frank, 1989a: 92,93). He was overthrown; He lost his place and he urgently needs a ‘light’ in order to build up a space. The sovereign subject is homeless and he needs to rethink and set up himself otherwise in order to survive.

And it is here that the Foucauldian way of May 68 appears, as we have talked about above. It is here that the “other subjectivities” of Foucault arise (Foucault, 1999:38,39,40; 2012:8,12,13; Bocquet, 2013:124; Bounache, 2013:139, Chevallier, 2014:32,33). And Foucault shows those “other subjectivities” through this conceptual “we” or, as we have just studied, dependent, determined, free, and not sovereign \textit{a posteriori} subject. The conceptual ‘we’ is a set of relations and this set of relations, for Foucault, is called ‘space’ and also ‘power’, the other side of space - the reconciliation of \textit{a priori} and \textit{a posteriori}. Tazzioli \textit{et al}, (2015:7) highlight this relation of space and power: “\textit{Spaces of power: relations of power are always inscribed in space and contribute to the shaping of a certain spatial economy. By the same token, in Foucault’s view, spaces are eminently productive – of borders, of disciplining mechanisms and of differentiations: \textit{power of spaces’}. And Foucault (2001: 1573,1574), as we have quoted, describes, what the ‘space’ or the “we” is: “this space that erodes us and puckers us, it is also a heterogeneous space. We ... do not live in a kind of void ... we live inside a set of relations ... that are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable”. Foucault (2013:XIII; 2013b:139)
summarizes, space is a set of positive, multiple, different, fluid, mobile, nomadic and productive relations that Foucault calls heterotopias, ‘other spaces’.

And, what does the word heterotopia mean? Etymologically, hetero-topia comes from the Greek *hetero* or other and *topos* or place. So, heterotopia means ‘other spaces’ (Foucault, 1984a). Foucault explains that heterotopia - or other spaces - is a kind of contestation of the space where we live; it is a real 108 space that is “something like counter-site” where “the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” (Foucault, 1984a). Heterotopias are “absolutely different from all the sites that they reflect and speak about” (Foucault, 1984a). Nevertheless, heterotopias work through relationships with the other sites that surround them (Foucault, 1984a). Heterotopias are places “outside of all places” (Foucault, 1984a). Foucault (1984a) gives an example of a heterotopia:

The mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence from the place where I am since I see myself over there. Starting from this gaze that is, as it was, directed toward me, from the ground of this virtual space that is on the other side of the glass, I come back toward myself; I begin again to direct my eyes toward myself and to reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over there.

So, the mirror gathers the four characteristics of the heterotopia: (i) it is real; (ii) it is a site of contestation, because, as Foucault says, the mirror comes back towards himself and reconstitutes himself or we could say that there is a confrontation of the space in which Foucault lives; (iii) it connects with the space that

108 Regarding the term ‘real’, as we have defined above, we adopt here the Kantian sense of the word: something related to the empirical word, related to experience. In turn, regarding the term ‘unreal’, we are going to problematize it and we are going to adopt the term in Foucauldian sense. As already said, it is something relative to the human mind, but always dependent on the order of things.
surrounds it; (iv) it is a virtual site or a space “absolutely different”. As Foucault remembers, the mirror could also be seen as utopia, since it is a placeless place.

Foucault distinguishes between utopia and heterotopia, although, for Foucault (2009:23), heterotopias are utopias that have a precise and real place and a determined time. According to Foucault (2009:23), “each human group, whatever it is, likely cuts-out in the space it occupies, where it really lives, where it works, utopian places, and, during the time it works, cuts-out uchronic moments”. So, heterotopias are real utopias and uchronias. And what does the author mean by utopia and ucronia?

Etymologically, u-topia means in Greek no-place, as we have just seen. And u-cronia means in Greek no-time. As, in this thesis, space is the central concept, we are going to explore mainly the concept of utopia.

For Foucault (2009:23), “there are countries without place; towns, planets, continents, universes that it would not be possible to meet them on any map or in any heaven, just because they belong to any space”. These places born “in men’s minds or … in the interstices of their words, in the thickness of their stories or yet in the place without place of their dreams, in the emptiness of their hearts; in short, they are the sweetness of utopias” (Foucault, 2009:23). So, we could say that these no-places or no-spaces, these places without real existence are utopias or dreams.

Foucault (2009:23) explains that those utopias are places of “consolation”: a “fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold; they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the road to them is chimerical”. Utopias are a consolation or a compensation for man’s life; they are dreams or chimeras; they are unreal and they contrast with heterotopias that are “disturbing”, “undermining” and real. As Foucault (1994:XVIII) explains:

Utopias permit fables and discourse: they run with the very grain of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the fabula; heterotopias … desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences.
In this sense, perhaps we should consider, these “compensatory” and “fabulous” u-topias (no-space) are eu-topias (good-spaces) remembering that the origin of the utopia term is ‘good-place, no-place’ (eu-topia and ou-topia reduced to utopia). These ‘compensatory’ and fabulous sites are good unreal spaces or good discursive spaces (Defert, 2009:40). Defert (2009:40) outlines that this language of utopias is also space, in a Foucauldian sense. According to Defert (2009:40), utopias sing a different place that does not exist, but they implant themselves in an imaginary space or they localize themselves in a discursive space because since ancient times the language intersects space. For instance, as the Bible (John 1:1) says: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”. Here we see the Word or the order - in opposite to Chaos - or God, as the Creator of the world: we see language intersecting space or language creating space.

Defert (2009:41; Foucault, 1994: XXII, XXIII) recalls, Foucault considers we cannot think without the support of a “space of order” or without this “middle zone” or without the sign, which Foucault calls “space of knowledge”, \(^{109}\) where the conditions of possibility of this knowledge are constituted. This zone is located “below our perceptions, our discourse, our knowledge, where we articulate the visible and enunciable: the language, the look and the space” (Defert, 2009:41). It is from this “space of knowledge” that the \(a\ posteriori\) consciousness and also its dreams and its utopias rise up, as we have studied above. To sum up, we could affirm that, for Foucault, utopias are space, better, unreal or fabulous space inspired by real space, the space of knowledge. We could say, for Foucault, utopias are unreal heterotopias or unreal other spaces.

In turn, according to Foucault (2009:24), the localized and real utopias are heterotopias and, for instance, children know very well these localized utopias. They are “the garden background”, “the Indians’ tent” or the big parent’s bed, the place where we realize all dreams and utopias:

It is on this big bed that we discover the ocean because we can swim through the blankets; and then this big bed is also the sky because we can jump on the mattress; it is the forest, because we can hide there; it is the night, because we become ghost through the sheets; finally it is the...

\(^{109}\) We will study this “space of knowledge” or material space in the next section (pg: 126).
pleasure, because when parents return, we will be punished (Foucault, 2009:24).

As we have seen above, real utopias or heterotopias are not reserved for children. Adults can also realize their dreams and utopias, creating heterotopias. Foucault (2009:25) recalls, children learn utopias and heterotopias from adults.

Foucault gives some examples of adults’ heterotopias. There are two main categories of heterotopias: (i) crisis heterotopias: in primitive societies, they are “privileged or sacred or forbidden places reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis: adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly, etc”; (ii) heterotopias of deviation: in our society, they are “those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed. Cases of this are rest homes and psychiatric hospitals and of course prisons” (Foucault, 1984a). The boarding schools, in the nineteenth century, or the military service for young men or the “honeymoon trip” are also examples of deviation heterotopias110 (Foucault, 1984a).

These are the two main heterotopias but, as Foucault (1984a) mentions, “the heterotopias obviously take quite varied forms, and perhaps no one absolutely universal form of heterotopia would be found”. Foucault (1984a) affirms that every human group has diverse forms of heterotopia. This diversity and ‘no universal form’ are the first principle of the heterotopology. And what is heterotopology? It is the Foucauldian (2009:25) dream. Foucault would like to be a heterotopologist and he assumes he is about to create this “science”111 (Foucault, 2009:25). For Foucault (1984), the heterotopology is “the systematic description” of heterotopias in a given society or, in turn, the object of the heterotopology is the study, analysis, description, and ‘reading’ … of these different spaces, of these other places”: the heterotopias (Foucault, 1984a).

The second principle of the heterotopology is that a “society, as its history unfolds, can make an existing heterotopia work in a very different way”. As an
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example, we shall take the heterotopia of the cemetery that changes and has many forms over time (Foucault, 1984a).

Regarding the third principle of heterotopology, heterotopia is as a juxtaposing of places in a single “microcosm”, as the theatre, the cinema, the traditional Persian gardens, for instance. Foucault (1984a) illustrates:

Heterotopia is able to juxtapose in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible. Thus … the theater brings onto the rectangle of the stage, one after the other, a whole series of places that are foreign to one another; thus … the cinema is a very odd rectangular room, at the end of which, on a two-dimensional screen, one sees the projection of a three-dimensional space, but perhaps the oldest example of these heterotopias that take the form of contradictory sites is the garden … The traditional garden of the Persians was a sacred space that was supposed to bring together inside its rectangle four parts representing the four parts of the world, with a space still more sacred than the others that were like an umbilicus, the navel of the world at its center - the basin and water fountain were there; and all the vegetation of the garden was supposed to come together in this space, in this sort of microcosm.

Foucault adds magic carpets. The author (Foucault, 1984a) explains carpets were originally “reproductions of gardens (the garden is a rug onto which the whole world comes to enact its symbolic perfection, and the rug is a sort of garden that can move across space)”.

The fourth principle of heterotopology sees heterotopias linked to slices in time: the heterochronies. Foucault (1984a) enumerates three types. According to Foucault, the heterotopia functions “at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time”. This is, for instance, the case of the cemetery. By contrast with this “absolute break” with time, there is the will to “accumulate everything, of establishing a sort of general archive, the will to enclose in one place all times, all epochs, all forms, all tastes” (Foucault, 1984a). For Foucault (1984a), we could find this “sort of perpetual and indefinite accumulation of time in an immobile place”: museums and libraries. In turn, we have the time in its
flowing, transitory, precarious aspect, not oriented toward the eternal: the festivals or the fairgrounds, “these marvelous empty sites on the outskirts of cities that teem once or twice a year with stands, displays, heteroclite objects, wrestlers, snakewomen, fortune-tellers, and so forth” (Foucault, 1984a).

The fifth principle of heterotopology, always presupposes heterotopias as a “system of opening and closing that isolates them and makes them penetrable” (Foucault, 1984a). The heterotopias are not accessible like a public place: “the entry is compulsory, as in the case of entering a barracks or a prison, or else the individual has to submit to rites and purifications” (Foucault, 1984a).

In terms of the sixth principle, heterotopia’s role is to create “a space of illusion that exposes every real space, all the sites inside of which human life is partitioned, as still more illusory” (Foucault, 1984a). For Foucault (1984a), for instance, brothels had this function. In turn, heterotopia’s role is “to create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled”. This latter type would be the heterotopia of compensation, and, for Foucault (1984a), certain colonies functioned somewhat in this manner.

For Foucault (2009:36), the heterotopia par excellence is the ship:

Civilizations without boats are like children whose parents do not have a large bed on where they can (jump and) play; dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure and hideous policemen take the place of the sunny beauty of corsairs.

We could say, for Foucault, the ship brings together the main features of heterotopias. Its place is diverse (not universal) and nomadic.112 It is always in movement. For this reason, the ship is a juxtaposition of places in a single microcosm; it is also a system of opening and closing and is both an illusion and a perfect space in our imagination, that exposes and contradicts the space surrounding it.

So, Foucault (1994:XVIII) adds, “heterotopias are disturbing … because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that,

112 We note the wanderer – the explorer – is either way in nineteenth century literature where the nomadic movement emphasises the idea of home, even if it cannot be located.
because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in advance”. For Foucault (1994:XVIII), heterotopias or people who build up heterotopias are as aphasics that “create a multiplicity of tiny, fragmented regions in which nameless resemblances agglutinate things into unconnected islets”: heretopias are these fragmented nameless regions.

We can see that, for Foucault, heterotopias are ‘other spaces of power’. As Defert (2009: 53,54) affirms, Foucault assumes a “phenomenology of the anarchic dispersion of power”. Defert suggests Foucault has an anarchic view of space and power. Indeed, Foucault plans to write a history of the spaces or a history of powers; Foucault wants to be heterotopologist, as we have said (Defert, 2009:56). For him, the problem of space is a political problem. Foucault speaks about a “policy of spaces” or a “spatialization of power” (Defert, 2009:56). As Defert (2009:53,54) recalls, “the non-place of power is at the center of a multitude of heterotopic locations”. Power is ubiquitous or it is everywhere. It crosses this “multitude” of heterotopias. Space and power go side by side: “thinking about and organizing space is one of the pre-occupations of power” (Brabant, 2009). Power wants to give an order or form to matter. Power creates spaces or forms or orders. For Foucault, what characterizes power is the way that “its internal complexity goes hand in hand with a multiform intervention on the plane of space” (Brabant, 2009). Power creates relations or spaces that are sets of relations. Thus, heterotopias are other spaces or anarchic spaces: sets of relations in a permanent fight against rules or rulers in order to create new rules and rulers in a cyclical eternal movement. Heterotopias are spaces where our inner power manifests itself in a good way and this good way is an ongoing de-individuation or the “we”.

Foucault (2001:1571) considers that we live in a “space epoch”:

we are in the era of the simultaneous, we are at the time of the juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and the far, the side by side, the dispersed. We are at a moment when the world feels less like ... a great life that would develop through time than a network that connects points and intersects its skein.
For Foucault, we live in the epoch of *The City of Sun* or, we could say, the age of the multiple suns,\(^{113}\) multiple power sites, multiple relations and heterotopias.

And these heterotopias or relationships are fluid and nomadic because they are a mix of power that is also movement (*a priori*) and exterior world (*a posteriori*). So the “we” or the social space means also movement. For Foucault (2013:XII), movements are “multiplicities, flows, arrangements and connections”. According to Foucault (2013:XII), movement signifies also ‘desire’ or “the relationship of desire (or power) to reality”, which means “art” (*ars erotica, ars theoretica, ars politica*) or an aesthetic proposal or production of ourselves, as we have just written (Foucault, 2013:XII). As Tazzioli *et al*, (2015:2) remember, “the ‘we’ of our present needs to be constantly produced and transformed”. And it is through our explosive desire - or power - that we are permanently starting in a circular movement, as we had said. And Foucault assumes this circular movement when he wants to start again with a new light. Foucault (2012b) explains, this circular vision spreads the cyclic form of social movements and groups or autonomous spaces that are born, die and grow again. They are as an eternal return, a cyclic or circular struggle, as the movement of the planets around the sun or as “sunlight illuminates the territory” (Foucault, 2012:129). As we have pointed out earlier, this circular movement inspires also our thesis method. This is the Foucauldian “philosophy of the cyclical history” or the “philosophy of the cyclical time” or the “solar revolution”. So, for Foucault, desire means doing or producing as we wish and dreaming cyclically through signs, as we have studied above.

In turn, movement also means critique (and here Foucault again meets Kant)\(^{114}\) and that signifies resistance, struggle, revolt or agonism. The agonism or the agonistic act is “a will of domination that does not seek to destroy the other” (Chevallier, 2014:57). The agonistic act stimulates the other.\(^{115}\) This fight is the Foucauldian anarchy and it is similar to the Hobbesian state of nature; this is “the war

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\(^{113}\) This seems to be the Foucauldian worldview or spatial worldview. In turn, Foucault (2001:1571) does not deny the time; he explains that his way is just a different way to deal with time and history as we are going to study right away.

\(^{114}\) Kant did three main writings on critique: *Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, Critique of Judgment*.

\(^{115}\) As we have already studied, the force is composed by a pure form and by a pure matter: the power to affect and the power to be affected. This fight can be understood as the creative act (Deleuze, 2012:78).
of all against all” (Foucault, 2012:62,129,130). So, movement signifies the critique or a reciprocally stimulating fight in order to establish our space or our “we”.\textsuperscript{116}

For that reason, this critique or fight has also a spiritual dimension. The mystic in Middle Ages thinks directly (the Scriptures); this attitude means not to accept the dogmas and the mediation and the pastor: material dimension (Foucault, 1990:59,60). The spiritual resistant “does not want to be ruled” – this is the question of governamentality. He affirms himself directly and opens a space or a “possibility” in society collectively (Foucault, 1990:59,60; 1994a: 564,565). So, as Proudhon says, the ‘we’ is less body or more spirit\textsuperscript{117} than an ‘I’.

As Kant says, through critique, man has ‘to become major’. And, in our view, for Foucault, that majority has two senses: (i) ‘major’ means bigger: the man or the ‘we’ becomes bigger or larger because he occupies more and more relational space or the ‘we’ tends to increase; (ii) man becomes ‘major’ à la Kant or man reaches majority when man criticizes and determines himself freely, ruling himself and not being ruled - also the question of governmentality in a large sense (Foucault, 2012b).

In another perspective, according to Deleuze, the man who rules himself goes towards a “minority”. For Deleuze, when the “non-sovereign”, a posteriori subject determines his space, he becomes “minor” localized, giving rise and bringing out “minorities” or “other spaces”, “other subjectivities” or ‘other wes’ that were hidden or had not manifested yet. Foucault (1969:278) explains what this “minor” work is: “it is to deploy a dispersion that can never be reduced to a single system of differences ... it is to operate a decentering that leaves no privilege to any centre ... It is to bring up the differences”. Foucault (2014), explains, the man who rules himself “takes care of himself,”\textsuperscript{118} in a decentralized way concerned with the present. The man who rules himself becomes minor and constitutes himself as “we” here and now (Foucault, 2014).

For Foucault, the constitution of this conceptual ‘we’ is, as we have seen, an “art” of living collectively against fascism. And Foucault (2013: XIII, XIV), once again concerned about the present, suggests some principles of this art of collective creation of social spaces. For Foucault (2013: XIII, XIV) social spaces should be: (i) “free of all unitary and totalizing paranoia”; (ii) spaces of “desire by proliferation,

\textsuperscript{116} We are going to develop the concept of critique in Chapter IV (pgs: 143-147, 240-241).
\textsuperscript{117} The concept of spirituality will be explored in more depth in Chapter IV (pg: 133).
\textsuperscript{118} We will discuss “the care of the self” in Chapter IV (pg: 133).
juxtaposition and disjunction”; (iii) positive, multiple and different spaces and not negative related with law, limit, castration, lack, lacuna; (iv) happy spaces because “it is the connection of desire to reality … that possesses revolutionary force”; (v) space of “political practice”, as “an intensifier of thought, and also spaces of analysis, as multiplier of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action”; (vi) spaces of ‘de-individualization’ “by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting the hierarchized individual, but a constant generator of de-individuation”; (vii) spaces where people must “not become enamoured of power”.

Those are the ‘simple’\textsuperscript{119} principles or features of the Foucauldian ‘we’ or the Foucauldian social spaces or heterotopias. And those social spaces or heterotopias are summarily relations of participative happy and desirous people, attentive to their present - or survival -, which determine themselves collectively, freely, horizontally, transparently, locally, cyclically in a non-fascist and non-totalitarian way. So, this social “we” has also political consequences. As Defert (2009:53,54) says, the Foucauldian social spaces or heterotopias are an “anarchic dispersion of power”: they are anarchic - without rules and rulers - multiple and widespread spaces of power.

We now turn to Foucauldian material space.

\textit{Foucault: material space}

In this section we will study the Foucauldian material space; we are working in the Kantian framework, as in the previous sections, and always inspired by our hypothesis, to establish space is to survive and, postanarchism is space constitution. As we have learned, Foucault is influenced by Kantian transcendental idealism, seeing the self as a subjectivation – a work of art – that is moved, \textit{a priori}, by desire or necessity or power that crosses this subjectivation or self or body – the zero point. Nevertheless this desire is desire only when it effects itself (or creates itself) in the world, \textit{a posteriori}, positively and collectively (relations of people that invoke Leibniz’s relationalism) as a “we” or a space or a heterotopia (social space). These arguments help us to better grasp the genealogy of postanarchism understood as the constitution of autonomous spaces in order to ensure our necessity of survival. Thus,

\textsuperscript{119} Foucault works, for instance, on two simplified and decentralized solutions of government: the Iranians (Revolution, 1979) and the Franks. We will study these both cases later in the Appendix (pg: 275).
in this section we will study the Foucauldian material space or the Foucauldian "order of things" or the matter where the power or desire effects itself collectively as a "we".

As we have already stated, material space is also social space. Nevertheless, Foucauldian material space, in our perspective, is a social space beyond the "we" - although this material space is always part of the "we", as the study of the concept of the sign showed - (Foucault, 1969:283; 2001:1573). This section thus complements or extends the previous one.

What does it mean: a material space ‘beyond’ the “we”? This means material space is, first of all, exterior or a real space that exists beyond the \textit{a posteriori} subject and beyond the transcendental space. Secondly, material space is neither transcendental space nor unreal space, nor “the space of our first perceptions, of our dreams, of our passions”, nor the ‘personal’ space of our signs and creations (Foucault, 2001:1573). Third, material space is the exterior world or the ‘outside space’ or the space of knowledge, this zone that Foucault intends to understand and to describe in the \textit{Archaeology of Knowledge} through the enterprise he calls ‘archaeology’ (Foucault, 2009:41; 2001:1573; 1994:XXII, XXIII).\footnote{Archaeology is a descriptive analysis that (i) defines discourses as “practices that obey rules”, treating documents in their opacity, impossible to represent; (ii) defines discourses in their specificity, showing how the game rules they use are irreducible (archaeology is a differentiated analysis of the modes of discourse); (iii) defines types and rules of discursive practices that cross individual works (archaeology does not see the worker as a sovereign figure nor face the creating subject as the \textit{raison d’être} of a work or as the guarantor of its unity); (iv) systematically describes a speech-purpose and aims not to try to repeat what was said in the creative act (Foucault, 1994).}

Why? For Foucault, the material space or the ‘other’ or other \textit{a posteriori} subjects surround a certain \textit{a posteriori} subject - or the \textit{topia}, the strategic zero point. So this material space is exterior - although also interior\footnote{In our perspective, an important Foucauldian question about the self resides in this tension between interior-exterior: for Foucault, is it possible to reach the self (or to conclude the self’s path), although the Foucauldian self is always a virtuous walk or openness to the other (as we are going to show in Chapter IV, pg:135)? Where does the self finish? And, consequently, where are limits of the self placed? Those questions will be answered in a future research as we are going to propose in Chapter V.} to a certain \textit{a posteriori} subject. Fourth, the material space is a social space, because it is a space made of relations, created by people. As Foucault (2001:1573) says, we ... do not live in a kind of void ... we live inside a set of relations”. Thus, the material space is this “set of relations” or social space, because people always create material space, concerned with their present.

By the foregoing, Foucault seems again to be a relationalist: we live in a set of relations. In turn, Foucault seems not to be a substantialist, because, as the author says, the ‘void’ or a substantialist space does not make sense.
So, in terms of content, what is this material space? As we have already answered, the material space is social space, a set of relations that exists beyond the *a posteriori* subject. Foucault (1969:283) defines this exterior set of relations as “positivities”. And these positivities are the “archives” or the condition of possibility of the practice of the “we” or the *a posteriori* subject. For Foucault (1969:283), these positivities are defined as:

All the conditions under which a practice is exercised, according to which this practice gives rise to partially or totally new statements, according to which it can finally be changed. ... This is the field where a practice is based (without constituting the centre), the rules it uses (not having been invented or formulated by it), the relationships that serve as support to it (without being the last result or the convergence point).

According to Foucault (1969:283), this material space or “positivities” is “a pre-existing set of statements” which involves “conditions and rules”. Those “positivities” are “the field where a practice is based”. Those “positivities” are the we’s field. And studying those “pre-existing set of statements”, Foucault (1969:283) just wants to highlight those discursive practices or creative practices “in their complexities and their thickness”, as we have just analysed. According to Foucault (1969:283), speaking or creating social space or changing the present is not just expressing what we think and know. As we have seen before, to create social space is to put together a statement or a practice in a preexisting set of statements and practices and it is “a complicated and costly gesture” (Foucault, 1969: 283).

Because creating social space is a costly gesture, as Foucault (1969:39) points out, our “manifest speech would be finally the repressive presence of what it does not say”. Foucault explains that the “we” could not say all it thinks, although, as we have quoted, it could “give rise to partially or totally new statements”. As we have affirmed above, the ‘positivities’ are “conditions of possibility”; they are conditions and they are opportunities as well; they are not “determinations stressed from the exterior”, nor “impositions that inhabit the individuals thought internally”, nor “limits imposed on the subjects’ initiative” (Foucault, 1969: 283). Despite these conditions, individual creativity is free and has no limits, as we have studied. Thus, those “conditions” are, for instance, the Foucauldian agonism, the mutual and stimulant
fight of all against all. Lefebvre (207:366) adds, “heterotopias (are) mutually repellent spaces”; they are “repellent” or repulsive or “counter-sites”, but they are also mutual and reciprocal. The “we” could take part, participate or change the present, although it is a ‘costly gesture’. As Rigal (2015) notes learning to live is “the most beautiful and the most difficult task”; this is to learn to be on places that are essentially “irreducible spherical extensions, surrounded by a ring of abandoned and distant things”.

And, this entire field, constituted by spaces or “spherical extensions, surrounded by a ring of abandoned and distant things”, that conditions and stimulates the “we” (also a spherical extension) being exterior (and also interior) to it, is, in our opinion, the Foucauldian material space (Foucault, 1969: 283). And, as Rigal (2015) observes, if the “we” wants to live or change the present, it must learn how to deal with this material space or must “learn to be on places”, because even “the abandoned and remained at a distance things” participate in this material and spherical space.

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE - PROUDHON AND FOUCAULT: CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have studied the concepts of space, movement and necessity on Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Michel Foucault and we have found some important similarities between them.

We have observed that for Proudhon and Foucault, space and time are inspired by Kant’s space and time or the ‘here and now’ or the utopia now, a concept also adopted by postanarchism. This Kantian framework has enabled us to open up new lines of thought between Proudhon and Foucault and also between both authors and postanarchism, as we are going to confirm later (Chapter V, pg: 229).

Kant is an important meeting point for Proudhon and Foucault. His transcendental idealism – space and time – is key to understanding the anarchism of Proudhon and Foucault. Both authors quoted Kant and adopted transcendental idealism, despite their critiques and detachment from it. Proudhon and Foucault assume we have a Kantian a priori or strategic necessity/capacity - quid facti. This a priori or necessity is the need to survive in the present. It is fundamental – a key - because it is the measure of all things: the law. Necessity is the reference we have in order to live a harmonious and balanced life today. Necessity legitimates our actions, productions or
creations of space. Nevertheless, for Proudhon and Foucault, this necessity/capacity, although fundamental, is not enough in order to understand our “today”. For Proudhon and Foucault, there is something beyond Kant: a quid juris. As studied, this necessity or power needs to operate in the exterior world, a posteriori.

Hence, there are more similarities between both authors, beyond this Kantian a priori: (i) the relationalist vision of space – relations of people - discussed by Leibniz; (ii) the substantialist space or matter – the world around us - discussed by Newton. Proudhon and Foucault relate the a priori with the a posteriori:

Necessity + relations of people + world

For Proudhon and Foucault, the Kantian a priori space and time - quid facti - leads people to create space here and now - quid juris – always collectively. According to Proudhon and Foucault, spaces are relations of people in the world: collective spaces. So, this necessity (N) - a priori – implies movement (M) or the action in the world – a posteriori - which constructs that collective space (S) - a posteriori. In turn, for Proudhon and Foucault, this necessity, movement and space are the same thing or are interrelated. They are power (P) or immanence - with unknown creator - that leads us to act always circularly:

(N=M=S=N=M=S=N) = P

Thus, necessity explains also the Proudhonian and Foucauldian interest and engagement in their actuality: the need to survive here and now. Proudhon criticizes the regime of his epoch, a liberal democracy, and also Jacobin; he assumes himself as anarchist/mutualist/federalist and proposes anarchy and the contract as the alternative fair way to rule society collectively.

Moreover, Foucault is strongly engaged in his epoch, influenced directly by Kant, dedicating his whole work as philosopher to think the present. For Foucault, his today is in crisis too. According to Foucault, the present needs a “new light”. And Foucault’s intention is to contribute with his writings, talks and actions. Like Proudhon, Foucault (2012; 2013:XIII, XIV) criticizes liberal democracy and Marxism, and, not wanting to be a “prophet”, writes some recipes “to everyday life”, in order to contribute to a better today. Those Foucauldian recipes are “the art of living counter to all forms of
fascism” here and now. This anti-fascist “art” presupposes the constitution of “positive, multiple, different, fluid, mobile, nomadic and productive relations”. And this kind of Foucauldian relation is named heterotopia or “other spaces” or “counter-sites”. So, also for Foucault, the Kantian transcendental space, to live here and now, has social and political consequences, contributing to the constitution of the powerful social space. As Defert (2009: 53,54) affirms, the Foucauldian heterotopias are “the anarchic dispersion of power”.

In another way, for Proudhon and Foucault, the Kantian transcendental space justifies the constitution of social space, which is also our plural self or “we”. This plural self is an ongoing transformation in order to survive and to satisfy our needs that change all the time. So, Proudhon, like Foucault, is neither an essentialist nor a humanist. He is against essences and sees man as a becoming and a group – a plural self. And, in our opinion, this perspective could open a new relationship between classical anarchism and postanarchism. This solves or overcomes the main barrier of The State of The Art: the essentialism and humanism of classical anarchists. In this chapter we have shown Proudhon, the first person from the nineteenth century that labelled himself anarchist, is neither essentialist nor humanist. He is very close to Foucault - a great influence on postanarchism - in terms of space, movement and necessity. So, this is the greatest novelty of this chapter. There is, at least, a classical anarchist, Proudhon, the first one, who is neither essentialist nor humanist.

So, Proudhonian and Foucauldian anarchism and postanarchism seem to have a similar anarchist perspective, the constitution of plural and dispersed spaces of power – or heterotopias - as we are going to verify later in Chapter V (pg: 229). Nevertheless, before confirming these similarities, taking into account Kant’s perspective we could conclude now that Proudhonian anarchism and postanarchism are ‘anarchisms from today’. They try to solve their need to survive and to have a better life in their epochs. We could also state that there is a great and fundamental proximity between Proudhon and Foucault in terms of space, necessity and movement. The work of comparison regarding the other concepts that feature in the Foucauldian activist will be done in the next chapter where we are going to construct the Foucauldian ideal type with Proudhon’s aid. Our intention is to construct a conceptual network with both authors - Foucault and Proudhon. We would like to (i) better understand Foucault and Proudhon’s thought in terms of anarchism, (ii) fill Foucault’s bibliographic ‘gaps’ with
Proudhon’s concepts and also (iii) give a novel perspective and interpretation of postanarchism, our thesis topic, situating it within anarchism.

In this chapter we have also confirmed our new working hypothesis: to establish space is to survive. As we have shown, for Proudhon and Foucault, the constitution of space here and now is a necessity. Inspired by Kant, both authors consider, to constitute space means to create regarding our needs or wishes or dreams.

So, the questions that launch the next chapter – The Foucauldian ideal type - are: (i) having as framework the Proudhonian and Foucauldian concepts of space, movement and necessity, is Proudhon and Foucault’s anarchism an ethical path or a becoming – a movement - or a subjectivation, having as a criterion or rule just necessity? (ii) Being a “we”, is this Foucauldian and Proudhonian activist or anarchist or plural self a constitution of space or a heterotopia? If yes, what are the political consequences of this?

Regarding Chapter V – The Postanarchist Ideal Type – the questions are: (i) if there are so many similarities between Proudhon and Foucault, is Proudhon as close to postanarchism as Foucault is? (ii) If the Foucauldian and Proudhonian activist was a heterotopia, would the postanarchist activist or self also be a heterotopia? (iii) For the postanarchist, is to create space as we wish or need in a non-fascist way the postanarchist utopia here and now, as it is for Proudhon and Foucault?

In order to answer those questions, in the next chapter we are going to construct the Foucauldian activist ideal type, with Proudhon’s aid.
IV. THE FOUCAULDIAN ACTIVIST IDEAL TYPE

The Foucauldian activist: Introduction

In this chapter we will design the Foucauldian activist ideal type. We will carve this Foucauldian ideal type, based on Foucault’s writings and activism, with the aid of Proudhon. As we have observed in the previous chapters, Foucault strongly influenced postanarchism and there are many similarities between Foucault and the anarchist Proudhon, not valorised by postanarchism, as we have just verified. In our perspective, this close affinity between Proudhon and Foucault is an interesting lens to better understand postanarchism and horizontal activism today, as we will confirm in Chapter V (pg: 229).

Thus, this conceptual network joining Foucault and Proudhon’s ideas is the basis for Chapter V (pg: 229), the postanarchist ideal type, the main aim of this thesis, bearing on Saul Newman’s work. In this chapter, our intention is to show that: (i) Foucault and Proudhon are a strong influence of postanarchism; (ii) there are continuities and many similarities between Newman’s, Foucault’s and Proudhon’s work; (iii) postanarchism is an anarchism like classical anarchism, because, as we have demonstrated, at least, Proudhon, the first anarchist of the nineteenth century, is neither essentialist nor humanist as postanarchism attests.

As we indicated in the previous chapter, the questions that launch this chapter are: (i) is Proudhon’s and Foucault’s anarchism an ethical path or a becoming – a movement - or a subjectivation, having necessity as the only criterion or rule? (ii) If Proudhon’s and Foucault’s self is a “we”, will this Foucauldian and Proudhonian activist - or anarchist or plural self - be a constitution of space or a heterotopia? If yes, what are the political consequences of this?

As we have started to see in the previous chapter on space, there are many overlaps between Foucault and Proudhon. The authors share important concepts, perspectives and influences, for instance, in terms of subjectivation, space, movement and necessity (and Kant influences both authors). Notwithstanding the proximity between these thinkers, there seems to be a silence surrounding Proudhon in Foucault’s writings. As Judith Revel (2011:132) explains, there are “bibliographic gaps” or silences in Foucault’s work. And Foucault confirms those “gaps”. Foucault assumes there are three categories of philosophers in his writings: “philosophers that he talks about, those he does not know and those he knows but he does not talk
about” (Revel, 2011:134). In our perspective, Proudhon seems to be one of those authors that Foucault knows but he does not talk about or, as Revel (2011:134) describes, the “great absentees”. For Revel (2011:134), these silences in Foucault’s work are as “ghosts” or “challenges” launched deliberately by the author to his followers. According to Revel (2011:134), Foucault’s idea would be to lead his successors to discover these “gaps” and to complete or develop his work. On our part, we have accepted Foucault’s challenge and we are researching this “great absentee” who is Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Our goal is indeed to fill those Foucauldian “gaps” with Proudhon’s thought and to build up, as we have already said, a conceptual network between both authors.

In order to construct that network and the Foucauldian activist ideal type, we have read Foucault with several questions in mind: who is the Foucauldian activist? What does activism and activist mean in Foucault’s thought? Was Foucault an activist? If so, what kind of activist was Foucault? As it is our thesis goal also to reflect on contemporary activism, horizontalism and, in the first place, postanarchism, we have also asked: what does resistance mean in Foucault’s thought and life? And, finally, what are the characteristics of the Foucauldian activist?

After reading several of Foucault’s works, after studying the Foucauldian concepts of space, movement and necessity in the previous chapter and after trying to answer those questions, we have arrived at a primary conclusion and another intuition. First, we have demonstrated our first and second hypothesis: the Foucauldian activist is mainly a creator of space here and now; and he establishes space in order to survive. As we have explained, Foucault’s intention is to turn on a new light to improve our contemporary condition. Secondly, we have intuited that, in order to carve space here and now, the Foucauldian activist is also a fighter or a ‘being-in-struggle’. For Foucault (2012:116), to be a fighter means to be in a permanent struggle, war, “conflict” or in an ongoing “problematization” in order to open personally - maitrise de soi - and collectively space in society. Thus, the concept of struggle is also a Foucauldian fundamental concept in order to understand the concept of space.

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122 See this thesis Bibliography.
123 Our philosophical term.
124 We are going to study this maitrise de soi later in this chapter (pg: 157).
125 As we have defined previously, for Foucault (1984a; 2001: 1572-1574) space is “a set of relations” that are “irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable”. Foucault has a non-essentialist perspective of space.
And why is the concept of struggle a fundamental concept in Foucault’s thought? As Deleuze (2012:78) explains, for Foucault, this concept of struggle bears on an *a priori* or immanent force or power that crosses and animates the human being. And this force or power is prepared in itself for that struggle. And how? As we have studied above, that force is in itself constituted by two parts in order to fight: a pure form or a power to affect and a pure matter or a power to be affected. Foucault (1984:19,21,22,47;1985:46) goes further and considers that force means a biological and reproductive struggle, a pleasure or sexual battle, a difference male-female\(^{126}\) or an active force and a passive force - dominant-dominated, winner-loser. Foucault (1984:44,47,48;1985:46) explains the masculine organ, *anagkaion*, is a “necessary element”: “one that is constrained by the needs and by its strength the others are constrained”. The *anagkaion* signifies a set of relationships and activities that fix the individual status in the city. Foucault (1984:44,48;1985:46) sees penetration as a strategic and biological game of domination-submission, which is a “driving force”, being above the primordial creative order of discourse. According to Foucault (1984:44), the sexual act, being a physical act, has also a social and an economic plan: (i) socially, it might concern social relationships of superiority-inferiority; (ii) economically, it concerns expenses (or energy expenditure) and profits (benefit or pleasure). Nevertheless, this pleasure or sexual battle could also be seen in an ethical perspective. This biological or sexual agonism might be virtuous, if virtue and the care of the self - *maitrise de soi* - controls that desire and achieves a social balance between those two positions: the male active biological force and the female passive biological force (Foucault, 1984:90).\(^{127}\)

For that reason, in this chapter we will start by studying the concept of struggle in order to launch the other features of the Foucauldian activist. With this objective, we have advanced a new working hypothesis that will orient our study

\(^{126}\) As we have already said, we do not work the gender perspective in this thesis. In our interpretation, Foucault is against a gender analysis. Foucault sees gender as a consequence of capitalism. In our opinion, Foucault just has a biological perspective about sexual issues. Foucault accepts naturally the biological or sexual division man/woman. Foucault looks like Rousseau (2009:516,519) who talks also about this natural division as “nature order” or nature “law”. Foucault admits, nevertheless, there are uncommon sexual cases, for instance, people that born with two sexes. Regarding gender, Foucault is mainly against identities or “sexual species” or “sexual heterogeneities” that, in his perspective, are a creation of capitalism (Foucault, 1976:51,60). In that sense, Foucault distinguishes between “sex nature” - *man/woman* -, which is an “element of the living being’s system, an object of biology”, and “sex history” or “sex signification” or “sex discourse” - gender perspective -, a product of capitalism and biopolitics (Foucault, 1976:56,60,102).

\(^{127}\) We will develop this idea later in this chapter (pgs: 167-171).
The postanarchist: an ideal type

here: *for Foucault, constituting space is a struggle*. Beyond this third hypothesis, we are going to analyse the concept of struggle, having also always in mind our initial hypotheses: *postanarchism is space constitution* and *to establish space is to survive*.

In terms of method, we continue our conversation with Foucault and Proudhon, nevertheless we enter a new circle in this dialogue, from the concept of space to the concept of struggle in order to come back again to the concept of space in the next chapter on postanarchism.

So, in this chapter, our goal is: (i) to study the Foucauldian concept of struggle or war with the aid of Proudhon; (ii) to launch a philosophical bridge between both authors, departing from the concept of war or battle; (iii) to find the common points between both authors’ concepts; (iv) to build up a network of other concepts and notions around their ideas of war/struggle/confrontation; and (v) to construct the Foucauldian activist ideal type with the aid of Proudhon, presenting its main features, based on that conceptual network.

As Proudhon was an anarchist or, more concretely, the first thinker who labelled himself ‘anarchist’ (Kinna, 2009:8,9), our intention is also to investigate whether or not, both authors - Foucault and Proudhon - have a similar anarchist perspective. The aim is to check in the next chapter whether the relationship of Foucault to Proudhon complicates the postanarchist relationship to Foucault. As we have just affirmed, the final goal is, through the design of the Foucauldian activist ideal type, to better characterise and introduce the postanarchist activist.

**The Foucauldian activist: main features**

Who is this Foucauldian activist? Or how shall we characterize it? At the outset, and taking into account our third hypothesis, *for Foucault, constituting space is a struggle*, we would see this Foucauldian fighter and creator of spaces as an ‘other-political-being’. For that reason, we already laid the Foucauldian ontological path in the previous chapter. This path showed us this ‘other’ (being) is a “we”, a set of “plastic” relations - a space - without previous definition or essence. In order to design and to understand who this Foucauldian ‘other-political-being’ is, always with

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128 Explaining this expression (‘other-political-being’): (i) we use the word ‘other’ in Foucauldian sense, meaning ‘alternative’, ‘different’, as “other spaces”; (ii) regarding the concept of “the political”, in *The State of The Art* we have defined it; (iii) the Foucauldian activist is a ‘being’ because it is a *devir* or an ‘ongoing’ definition or determination.
the aid of the anarchist Proudhon, we start imagining a biological\textsuperscript{129} human figure that is divided in three parts: the legs, the torso and the head.

We are going to work on those parts separately, as if we were making a work of art.\textsuperscript{130} In the beginning, we will sculpt the legs, then the torso and, lastly, the head, in a bottom-up movement. In our opinion, and starting to answer our first question (is Proudhon and Foucault’s anarchism an ethical path or a becoming – a movement - or a subjectivation, having as criterion or rule only the necessity?) Foucauldian ‘anarchism’\textsuperscript{131} is mainly a spiritual path (from the body to the spiritual body or corporal spirit), \textsuperscript{132} “une ascèse de soi” (self-asceticism) through which Foucault pretends to free himself from sexuality or, in other words, to ‘delete’ the body\textsuperscript{133}, the main target of biopolitics\textsuperscript{134} and capitalism (Foucault, 2014:46; Eribon, 2011:512).

\textsuperscript{129} Although the Foucauldian subject is a set of ‘plastic’ relations without definition, Foucault accepts the biological or natural perspective of human being and just criticizes the historical one, as we have already explained and as we are going to develop later in this chapter (pgs: 164,165).

\textsuperscript{130} For Foucault, we are all works of art, as we will study later in this chapter (pgs: 193-196).

\textsuperscript{131} Foucault just once assumed, and informally, he was a “left anarchist”, when he said to his friend Jules Vuillemin: “Fundamentally, you are a right-wing anarchist, and I a left wing anarchist” (Eribon, 2011:229). As we have already explained, Foucault was against fixed identities and labels. He considered they are an effect of capitalism and biopolitics. So, in our opinion, it could be not fair to say that Foucault was an anarchist, fixing him a label or an identity. Nevertheless, our intention is only to show the similarities between Proudhon and Foucault, mainly in his last writings, and, consequently, to better understand postanarchism.

\textsuperscript{132} This Foucauldian spiritual path remembers Plato’s path: from the body to the soul. Nevertheless, Foucault’s spirit is not an “ethereal soul”, but an “engaged” or corporal spirit or a spiritual subjectivation, as we are going to develop in this chapter (pgs: 142-143, 167, 200-201) (Gros, 2014b: 67).

\textsuperscript{133} As we have just said, the Foucauldian body is the “zero point” where everything begins, the referential, and a fundamental point in order to eternalize the individual (Foucault, 1985:139). As Nietzsche (2002:47) affirms, “everything is body and nothing else; the soul is only the name of something in the body”.

\textsuperscript{134} For Foucault (1976:185,188), biopolitics are a set of power techniques that go beyond the state and are present “at all levels of society and used by a variety of institutions - the family or the army, the school or the police, the individual medicine or the administration of communities”. Biopower means “the subjection of bodies and population control” and this biopower is “indispensable to the
Nevertheless, Foucault adopts a Nietzschean perspective. For Nietzsche (2002:50), the body just wants “to create, overcoming himself. It is what he most desires. This is his whole passion”: to be a “superior body” (a superman or a virtuous self). Foucault seems to agree. Foucault’s intention is not literally to delete the body (but the ego). His goal is to use the body virtuously in order to live in a harmonious and virtuous way. And when we achieve this virtuous stage we achieve the (always collective and open) self, as we are going to see later in this chapter (from pg: 163,164). For Foucault, the body explains why utopias emerge. The utopian’s goal is to erase the body or to make it beautiful, limpid, transparent, bright, powerful and infinite - purified, as Proudhon suggests (Foucault, 2009:10). So, the first Foucauldian utopia is the will to get “an incorporeal body”, because utopia - or eutopia -, as we have studied, is a place out of all places, where we find a body without body (Foucault, 2009:10). As Foucault (2009:10) contends, in order to realize this utopia we just need to be a body (our zero point or reference). It seems that to overcome the body or, better, to take a spiritual or purification path is Foucault’s utopia or might this be his main (corporal) heterotopia (assuming the body)?

Hence, in order to answer that first question, we start sculpting the Foucauldian activist from the legs that symbolize action, movement and struggles. Then, we will carve the torso or the arms that means the work or the construction of “other spaces”. And, finally, we will draw the activist head that signifies anarchism or the Foucauldian spiritualism which is not, as we have already noted, a Cartesian division of mind and body.

In the next section, we will sculpt the legs.

devolution of capitalism” (1976:184). According to Andrés and Gros (2014:48,49), “the biopowers solve the fundamental equation of liberalism: how to govern less without losing control” over the widespread and ubiquitous power of bodies. In question is “the politicization of life”, for instance, “laws on euthanasia, on pensions, food or health scandals, politicization of sexuality with debates on prostitution and homosexuality”.

As we have already asked, for Foucault, when you achieve virtue we achieve the self? We think Foucault does not give a closed answer to this question. Nevertheless, at least, to find this virtuous path is to achieve a better and happier life, as we are going to see later in this chapter (pg: 164,165). This is matter for another research as we will propose in the Chapter V.

This question joins the other two we have covered at the start of the chapter: (i) is Proudhon and Foucault’s anarchism an ethical path or a becoming – a movement - or a subjectivation, having as criterion or rule just the necessity? (ii) If the Foucauldian and Proudhonian activist was a heterotopia, would the postanarchist activist or self also be a heterotopia?
THE LEGS | The fighter, the activist, the movement

In this section we are going to sculpt the legs of the Foucauldian activist, with the help of Proudhon’s anarchism. The legs symbolise the permanent fight and movement of the Foucauldian activist.

Taking into account our third hypothesis, for Foucault, constituting space is a struggle, the Foucauldian activist is fundamentally a fighter or a being-in-struggle, as we have just affirmed. Why? We start answering by using the concept of struggle or war and then we will analyse the concept of being.

Regarding the concept of struggle or war, the Foucauldian activist is a fighter because, as we have already argued, his life is a constant struggle in order to survive and to open its space in society, here and now. According to Foucault, (2012:184; Bounache, 2013:140) struggle is the daily fight for survival now. For Foucault, war is the first intelligibility principle of history and, as we have pointed out before, it means power, desire, force, movement, creation or “perpetual action”. So, the fighter is an agent or an activist, a person who acts in order to survive. Foucault (2012:184) explains, “every moment, we go from rebellion to domination, from domination to rebellion”, and it is this “perpetual agitation”, war, that permits an understanding of history and the subject.

Proudhon has a similar understanding of the activist or the subject and his life. As we have learned above, for Proudhon, the human being is also mainly a fighter. According to Proudhon, in the beginning there is always perpetual war. Proudhon (1861:33,58) also considers war to be the unavoidable first intelligibility principle of history, society, politics and economy, because to fight means to act or action-activism (Proudhon, 1861: 75). Proudhon (1861:45) adds, the “war is the condition of all creatures”. So, the creature or the subject is a fighter. Foucault agrees.

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137 For Foucault, to survive = to open space here and now.
138 We have already studied the Proudhonian and the Foucauldian concept of movement or action.
We could say that all of Foucault’s work, his genealogies and his archaeologies, aim to understand this perpetual fight between forces and to understand his own life that also was a perpetual fight. As we have just shown, Foucault as activist or philosopher or as fighter has a dual task: (i) to contribute to the present, (ii) fighting against that present in order to give a new light: to open the possibility of being otherwise. In other words, Foucault pretends to establish the conditions of possibility of our present in order to transgress it and to have a different experience (Fernández, 2010:30,36). Jean Birnbaum says, Foucault is “a great illuminator” that wakes us permanently, that illuminates “our political condition, our daily lives” (Birnbaum, Artières, 2016). In Foucault’s vision, this ontological illumination of the present is a political and resistant choice inspired by the “excluded” and the “silenced” - the madmen, the prisoners, the “new plebeians”, the “Marxist lumpenproletariat”, “the margins of wage-labour” - in order to understand our culture, the experience of ourselves and the possibility to invent new ways of being (Fernández, 2010: 31,43 Golliau, 2014; Zamora, 2016). Foucault wants “to give voice to the ‘infamous’ men, giving dignity to madmen and rejected people”: the people of his time “who do not have language yet” (Eribon, 2011:190; Golliau, 2014:7). This is his main fight.

The same is in Proudhon, as we have studied before. Proudhon (1861:9) is concerned with his present and writes about his time. And why? Proudhon is also an illuminator who wants to give a new light. Proudhon had a “fleeting light” when he investigated lawyers, historians and ordinary people and, after seeing this light, he decided to write, for instance, War and Peace (Proudhon, 1861:8). Proudhon (1861:9,10) wrote about his time, fighting against his time, and suffering the

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139 Foucault distinguishes between archaeology and genealogy. As we have already seen, archaeology is Foucault's method in order to study “the formation of discourses” about “madness, medicine or human sciences”; the goal is to identify “the structures of knowledge and power that impose a certain discourse in a given place and time”; Foucauldian archaeology, for example, wants to know “why people are enclosed in the eighteenth century” (Andrés, Gros, 2014:48). In turn, the Foucauldian genealogy refuses “any historical goal” and also the “singularity of places and times”; it has a “more militant” aim (Andrés, Gros, 2014:48).

140 Foucault says he cannot define himself as a philosopher because philosophy is a “practice” or an experience, something that does not have definition (Adler, Laure, 2016). Foucault prefers the expression “specific intellectual” - as we are going to study later in this chapter, pgs: 211-215 - that means an activist philosopher or an “engaged thinker” (Fassin, 2014:80). We could consider that Foucault has an ‘active’ perspective on Philosophy. As Eribon (2016) remembers, Foucault stresses, for instance, that his book Discipline and Punish, a “sage book”, “was born from the struggles and would return to the struggles”. For Foucault (2014b:47), his books are “instrumental” or “toolboxes”.

141 This experience is an ontological and critical gesture: the “ontology of the present” (Fernández, 2010:30,36).
consequences of his actions. Proudhon is also a fighter against the present. As we have already noted, for him (Proudhon, 1861: 75,117,118), war means action, “struggle” - “resistance” - here and now, just as for Foucault.

Regarding “being”, what does life or “to be” mean for Foucault? In brief, we could say, for Foucault, life means struggle and struggle means life. Nevertheless, life is a huge concept in Foucault’s thought. Life means power and also power over life or “biopower” that presupposes death, body, blood, molecules, micro-powers, naked life, desire, pleasure and also resistance (Foucault, 1976:180,181,185,196,197). As Bounache (2013:140) explains, for Foucault, life is “a set of forces that resist”. As we have just studied, power transverses bodies and is in itself a dual force (active and passive). This human force is primordially biological or sexual, as we have stated above. And the sexual force is also plural: feminine and masculine. For that reason, our life is never completely controlled by biopower, because it “always produces resistance” (Danaher et al, 2000:80). As Danaher et al (2000:81) exemplify, the rules produce some people as normal or healthy and others as excluded and that distinction - between normal and abnormal - ensures opposition and resistance between both parts, as effects. At stake is “the transgression of normality by excess”, because life is transgressive in itself or “ab-normal” (Fernández, 2010:28). Or, in another way, as Oleg Bernaz (2014:244) explains, the Foucauldian body is “both a subjected force and the location of an emancipatory force: the body exceeds from inside the power space that instrumentalises it”. This “excess” is the resistance against power. Or, life is excessive – abnormal -, for that reason, man’s power is able to defy his culture limits by transgression. And also, its dual power would allow man “to put himself at stake”, joining, for instance, “laughter and sovereignty”, “profane and sacred” (Fernández: 2010:47). We could summarise, for Foucault, life is a set of forces that resist and are affected by other forces.

For instance, his censor accused him of attacking the emperor’s policy, law, people and jurisprudence, but the author denied saying he just intended to show “the perfect regularity of the last war” (Proudhon, 1861:9,10).

For Foucault, excess is what goes beyond the norm or the need, as we shall see in the following lines.

Trangressio (lat.) means “the action to pass to the other side” (Fernández, 2010:47).

We could say that the Foucauldian excess is good and bad. The excess is good when it helps the subject to transgress biopower in order to satisfy his needs. The excess is bad, when man lives a non-moderate life, beyond his needs, or when an excessive attitude transgresses his needs. We are going to further develop the concept of moderation later in this chapter (pgs-171-175).
For Proudhon, life is force and fight, as we have just argued. And Proudhon has also this plural and sexual understanding of force: feminine and masculine. For Proudhon (1875:5) feminine force is “beauty” and masculine force is just “force” and they are “equivalent” because woman and man have each other their own, particular and “special prerogatives” - force and beauty. It is like the “form and matter”, an active force and a passive force (Proudhon, 1875:8,9). For instance, the marriage is this union between form and matter or “the union of strength and beauty” (Proudhon, 1875:8,9). Proudhon considers, “beauty is the correlative of strength, power and virtue” (Proudhon, 1875:7). Although his critics call him a patriarchal thinker or, as postanarchists characterise, an essentialist and humanist thinker, Proudhon says, “beauty guides force” because “the beauty in women is more effective and more creative than the force in her partner”. For Proudhon (1875:5,7) “the woman is the living representation of the ideal”. Nevertheless, woman and man are “equal”, “the balance of their rights and duties should be reached so that there is between the two sexes welfare and honour equality”. Likewise, for Proudhon, life is also a balance of forces that resist: active and passive, form and matter, man and woman.

Thereby, to be a being-in-struggle presupposes (i) a body and (ii) a “critical attitude”. As we have observed above, for Foucault, the body is the ‘zero point’, the little fragment through which we are present. In turn, to have a body means to be mortal or the chance to live or to die permanently, circularly: to be a survivor. As Deleuze (2012:102) says, we have a “multiple death” - a cyclical death or movement -and “life is only to take a place, every place, in the ‘one dies’ cortege” - the eternal return. And this battle or cortege of battles is “the life of infamous men” (Deleuze, 2012:102,103). The “infamous men” are the ‘homeless’ - the madmen and the prisoners, etc - the dead person or the person that lost its place inside the system. Foucault assumes himself as an infamous man or “an anonymous life that just manifests itself when it crashes against power, when it fights against power with brief and strident words and then come back into night” (Deleuze, 2012:102). Foucault felt this “night”, for instance, when his prison movement, GIP - Prison Information Group - failed and lost its place and in many other personal and activist circumstances (including as regards homosexuality), as we will see later in this chapter (pgs: 168,169 note: 182; 189-191) (Deleuze, 2012:101). For Foucault

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146 As Éric Fassin (2014:81) argues, those Foucauldian infamous men, the madmen, the prisoners, could be understood as “metaphors” of Foucault’s homosexuality. They are almost biographic.
(1999:198), the body is the site of this battle or “cortege” because the body is crossed by power and by need - desire, sexual impulse, pleasure. The body is the site of this “multiple death” or “the place that opposes the silence and the cry to the speech rule” and “the involuntary revolts to the obedience rule”. For that reason, for Foucault, the main state goal is its power over bodies (Eribon, 2011:443).  
Regarding the body, Proudhon has a similar stand. As we have studied earlier, according to Proudhon (2009:398), the immanence or the necessary energy and power is spread in human’s bodies and not concentrated in just one place (Proudhon, 2009:398). So, for Proudhon, the body is a “group” or a “synthesis of the multiple and the one”. It is also where everything begins - the rule. According to Proudhon, there is no “prior knowledge of body experience” (Castleton 2009:54). Proudhon (1861:38) adds, “it is on the enemy’s body, shot down by him – man – that he first dreams about glory and immortality”. As we have already seen, for Proudhon (1861:176,177), the conservation of the body and limbs is the “only true law” or the “law bases”.  
On the other hand, as we have seen before, to be a fighter or rebellious is also a “critical attitude” in order to survive. For Foucault, critique is a child of war. Critique also means movement and signifies creation or production, as we have studied earlier. To resist is to criticize or to be a critic (Foucault, 1990:59,60). And to criticize is “a constant verification”, a problematization about “what (human beings) are, what they do, and the world in which they live” (Foucault, 1985:10). For Foucault, to criticize is also a “revolt” - “the historical, practical uprising” - or a “spiritual” attitude. Proudhon also assumes this critical attitude, inspired by the spirit of war. For Proudhon, war is also the origin of the critique. According to Proudhon, as we have discussed earlier, this critique is an “antagonism” or the beginning of movement; it means creation or production. This antagonism is a “state of war” that preserves society “worthy, moral, pure, generous, even laborious” (Proudhon,

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147 We will develop this idea later in this chapter (pgs: 199-200).
148 We note that Proudhon (1861: 75,117,118; Préposiet, 2007, 95) is a pacific person and does not support violence. Although he discusses the concept of war, war is the first intelligibility principle of life and the first step of a spiritual way, as we have just pointed out.
149 Through the Kantian notion of critique, Foucault shows that he does not reject the Enlightenment totally (Danaher et al, 2000:10).
150 We will develop this critical and spiritual attitude later (pgs: 159-160).
151 Again the war is the first step of the spiritual path, we have noted before.
According to Proudhon (1861: 86), “it is through the diversity of opinions and feelings and through the antagonism ... that a new world is created above the organic, speculative and affective world” (Proudhon, 1861: 86). Proudhon (1861:61) adds, “there is no justice, no jurisdiction, no authority, no law, no politics, no state, outside that antagonism”. Hence, this critique or antagonism is “eternal” and war is an essential point, a reciprocal stimulus or a constructive and creative “antagonism” that means, in that sense, the same as Foucauldian agonism (Proudhon, 1861: 77).

For Foucault, the agonism is the battle, critique and also the intelligibility of history. This is a “perpetual agitation” (Foucault, 2012:184). Foucault (2012:184) explains, “the field in which the power unfolds is not a ‘dreary and stable’ domination: we are all fighting”. As we have already noted, for Foucault (2012:184), “every moment, we go from rebellion to domination, from domination to rebellion”. Nevertheless, as we have stated above, this Foucauldian agonism is about force, not about violence; it is a pacific way, as Deleuze (2012:77) explains:

The balance of forces exceeds singularly violence, and cannot be defined by it ... violence focuses on body, objects or certain beings which are destroyed or their form changed by violence, while the force has no other object than other forces, and not other beings, only that balance of forces.152

Man might fight force with force. The body is not the target of force. Foucault is against violence. With this purpose, for instance, as Eribon (2011:446) remembers, Foucault participated in a press conference against piracy in 1981, in Geneva. The Foucauldian agonism is a stimulated, reciprocal and positive battle and not a destructive one. The struggle is the way to open harmonious space in society.

And Proudhon has a similar pacific position. Proudhon (1861: 75,117,118) is really a non-violent man, as Préposiet (2007, 95) characterizes him; he presents himself as a man against “banditry”. Proudhon (1861: 117,118) writes, “the feelings that wake up war are diametrically opposed, regarding the morality of the fact, to those that would inspire the spectacle of a pilgrims caravan attacked by a gang of

152 Here Deleuze describes a situation where “the force has no other object than other forces”. Deleuze refers to a spiritual stage, a balance of forces, which is some steps forward from the idea of the “enemy's body”, we have quoted before. This stage does not delete the body, nevertheless uses its spiritual force in order to achieve a harmonious level.
theft” (Proudhon, 1861:117,118). According to Proudhon (1861:54), the difference between war and violence is the “forms, laws, rituals” of war. War has a “virtuous and chivalrous character” (Proudhon, 1861:78). For instance, taking into account those rituals, “the warrior who insults his enemy and uses illicit weapons is a murderer” (Proudhon, 1861:77). According to Proudhon (1861:54), those laws make war “the first and most solemn jurisdiction from whence came the entire system of law: War and Peace Law; International law; Public Law; Civil law; Economic Law; Criminal Law”. For Proudhon, war is a spiritual breath or the immanent power.153

Proudhon (1861: 33) just wants to highlight this “universal, speculative, aesthetic and practical character of war”, because man’s last goal is peace:

Peace … without the war does not make sense; it does not have anything positive and true; it has no value nor meaning; it is a nothingness. Nevertheless humanity makes war and tends with all its strength to peace (Proudhon, 1861: 26).

As we have learned, war is a peaceful path because it is “divine”. And what does divine mean? Proudhon (1861: 34) answers, “I call divine everything in nature that proceeds immediately from the creative power, in man from the spontaneity of the mind or consciousness”. So, divine means creativity and war is divine because it is creative power: “the divine imposes itself by living force” (Proudhon, 1861:34). The divine is the creative and spontaneous force. For Proudhon (1861:25), war is “primordial and essential to life, to the production of man and society”; it constitutes “the universality of human relations”. Déjacque (2015) also helps us to understand the difference between violence and the harmonious force:

If you wanted to do violence to your neighbour, male or female, your neighbour answers you with violence, and, you know, his force is almost equal to yours; free all your appetites, all your passions, but do not forget that it needs to exist harmony between your force and your intelligence, between what you like and what pleases others. And now go: earth, in this condition, will be for you the garden of the Hesperides (Déjacque, 2015).

153 For Proudhon, the element that distinguishes the force – war – from violence - banditry - is the ‘order’ or the agreement – the Law of War and Peace – accepted by the belligerents, like a contract.
Hence, Déjacque remembers that force is a peaceful path because it is also a way of equality that provides harmony. Crowder (1991:78) adds, for Proudhon, “the instinct of revolt is only a partial expression of man’s nature, the totally of which embraces a moral life in the society of his fellows”.

So, Foucault and Proudhon have a similar perspective on agonism. For Foucault (2012:61), “the war of all against all” means we are all equals and fighters - critics. According to Foucault (2012:61), war is equality. We have all the right to criticize or to make war: “an equal war, is born from the equality and takes place in this equality” (Foucault, 2012:61). For Proudhon (1861: 54.135), too, war or antagonism generates equality. The author argues that everyone has the right to make war – to criticize - that gives the right to act or to work to those who do not have this right (Proudhon, 1861: 54.135). And this right to act or to work is Foucault’s main intention. The fighter is also a worker, as we will see in the next section about the Foucauldian other worker.

In this section, we will sculpt the torso or the arms of the Foucauldian activist. The torso means in this thesis the work or the construction of “other spaces”. For that reason, in this section we will have always in mind our third hypothesis, *for Foucault, constituting space is a struggle*, and also our main hypothesis, *postanarchism is space constitution*.

As we have said, for Foucault, to fight means to work, to experiment, to invent, to create or to act. Foucauldian agonism is a constructive battle. For Foucault,
to work is to assume an “untimely action”, a “fundamental attitude of thought”, of “resistance to the present” (Bounache, 2013:140). The reason is our survival. We work in order to survive now. Proudhon has the same focus on the present, based on need, as we have analysed in the previous chapter on space. In turn, in Foucault’s perspective, this concept of the present leads to the concept of critique, to Kant and to Enlightenment that influence him. Foucault shows this relationship between critique, Kant and Enlightenment when he quotes Kant’s article “What Is Enlightenment?” in his article “What Is Enlightenment” (Foucault, 1994a). For his part, Proudhon talks about antagonism, instead of critique, but the meaning is similar in both authors, as we have studied above. Proudhon aims to “preserve the becoming” and “the antagonistic development of forces” (Damien, 2009:18). Moreover, for Foucault (1994a:568), critique signifies an “ethos” that means, as we have examined above, an “attitude facing the present”, a “deliberate choice”, a “way of thinking and feeling, a way of acting and conducting”. According to Foucault, modernity is the “voluntary and difficult attitude of criticizing or trying to capture something eternal and heroic that is not beyond the present nor before the present” (Foucault, 1994a:569). Proudhon agrees. For him, we are heroes or fighters and this fight – our work - here and now, is divine or eternal, as we have explained before. For Foucault, criticizing is the new work or “the will of heroicizing the present” (Foucault, 1994a:569). And why is this present heroic and eternal?

This present is heroic and eternal because it implies (i) a heroic act and (ii) an eternal result here and now - an apparently contradictory eternalization of the ephemeral.155

(i) The act is heroic because the hero, the ‘other worker’, made it, for instance, the Nietzschean “superman” - super because he transcends and creates himself, as we have outlined in The State of The Art (Nietzsche, 2002:12). The hero or the warrior – or the superman - is the “creator”, who “works and invents”, who “harvests and has fun” (Nietzsche, 2002:17,30,31). The hero does as it dreams. The ‘other work’ is the “lightning” and the “delirium” (Nietzsche, 2002:16,19,26). It is a warrior act, as we have already analysed. According to Foucault (1976:211,208), it is a courageous and hard gesture of critique, a “counterattack” that signifies also an “other economy

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154 For Foucault, Modernity starts after the nineteenth century.
155 As we have seen above, we could say that Foucault has a solar or ephemeral worldview, as the daily sunlight. Nevertheless, for Foucault, there is an eternity in the ephemerality, as we are going to argue.
156 The warrior act is a corporal and a spiritual act, as we have argued above.
of bodies and pleasures”, as we are going to see later (pgs: 154-158). For Nietzsche (2002:17), the superman or the ‘other worker’ is “the great worshiper”, “the arrows of desire”. In Negri’s opinion, to work means an alternative attitude or an ‘other way’ of doing directly, as we wish or desire, with pleasure. Negri (2011:200) adds, “the struggles are what takes the needs and the viewpoints, the projections and the wills, the desires and the expectations”. In a struggle or through the critique, there is not delegation to anything or anyone. As an explosion, the ubiquitous solar power, made of body, dreams and pleasure, is “led to the network of acts that constitutes it” (Negri, 2011: 200,202). Déjacque (2015:78) explains, the idea is the strength, the “beginning of whole movement”, as a “volcano”, an “uncontrollable energy” (see the image 9 below).

For Foucault, to work is a mixture of power and pleasure. Foucault explains how power links with pleasure: “pleasure and power do not cancel each other, do not turn one against each other, they follow one another, entwine one another and relaunch themselves. They link together through complex and positive mechanisms of excitation and incitement” (Foucault, 1999b:48). This link constitutes the heroic act, the ‘other work, that is creative and a pleasure. As Déjacque (2015:152,153) concludes, “work is pleasure and pleasure is work”.

For Proudhon, the heroic act is also creative. To work is a heroic and poetic attitude. Proudhon speaks about an aesthetic war. For him, history or men’s history are created daily and perpetually by war, victories and defeats. Creation, existence result from this “divine struggle” (Proudhon, 1861:42). So, “the poet is a hero” and vice versa (Proudhon, 1861:63). We are all heroes and poets because we create ourselves permanently. This is our work: a work of art. Proudhon (1861: 33,59)
assumes his intention is to highlight this alternative work, this “universal, speculative, aesthetic and practical war”.

Moreover, Foucault (1999:176) points out, the creative or heroic act (to do as we wish and dream) implies the concupiscence that “begins by a certain body sensation that is produced by Satan”. Foucault (1999:177) explains how it works: “first we have an impulse (the first thought that leads to the evil or transgressive performance), then the consent and after the delight (pleasure of the present - which is followed by pleasure) delight of looking at the past (or complacency)”. Finally, this creative and heroic act is “a will of domination that does not seek to destroy the other” (Chevallier, 2014:57). What does it mean? It means the ‘other worker’ or the hero is the “devil” or a “transgressive” person - a sinner - beyond the norm and the rule. Nevertheless, this other worker or hero, when he wins, creates another rule or another space here and now. Hence, the hero or the worker is also a lawmaker. For Foucault (2012:177), “the elliptical and dark god of the battles must lighten the long days of the order, work and peace”. This ‘other worker’ is a heroic figure, a darkness fighter or the Kantian enlightened critic that, through the battle (agonism), occupies space and invents an ‘ab-normal’ or evil way of acting, creating or working now. The ‘other worker’ is a hero, a critic and a lawmaker. As Nietzsche (2002:30) says, the Superman is the “creator” that inscribes “new values or new tables” (space) having fun.

For Proudhon (1861: 133), it is the same: the strength – that leads to the heroic or transgressive act - is the first right. War produces the law, solves misunderstandings and creates discipline and peace between individuals (Proudhon, 1861:62,119,127). So, war and peace are “the alternative conditions of people’s life” (Proudhon, 1816: 91). In another way, Proudhon elucidates, “the peacemaker (or the legislator) is a conqueror (the hero), whose reign is established by the triumph”

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157 Satan is the Cartesian evil (Descartes, 1979:75,79,83) or the Devil of ‘the possessed’, that inspires also the monster (Foucault, 1999:59,192). For Foucault (1999:192), “the possessed is not as the witch that is a docile servant of the devil. The possessed will be under the power of the devil - she is a devil receptacle -, but this power will find a resistance. The possessed is one that resists the devil”. She is also the Devil. In another way, the possession is a “flesh escape”, a “counter-power” that the Church needs to control. For that reason, the possessed resists and she does not make a pact with the devil, as the witch makes (Chevallier, 2014:60). In turn, the Foucauldian monster is “the nature form of the unnatural” (Foucault, 1999:52). It is a “mix”: a “mix of animal kingdom and human kingdom, a mix of two species, a mix of sexes, a mix of forms (Foucault, 1999:58). The monster is the “transgression of natural boundaries, classifications and law (Foucault, 1999:58,59). Foucault has a metaphorical vision of the Devil, because, for him, as Nietzsche (2002:25) says, “there is no devil, nor hell”. The Foucauldian devil could be seen in a positive way. The devil is the creator, the person that invents something new beyond the borders of the existence.
The postanarchist: an ideal type

(Proudhon, 1861: 91). The victory sets up the reign or our law. This presupposes domination, sovereignty, power and warrior legislation (Proudhon, 1861: 133, 140). For Proudhon (1861: 134), legislation means conquest, occupation and creation of space (Proudhon, 1861:134). This signifies peace that leads to a new struggle – transgressive act - or work.

(ii) And why is this ‘other worker’ or lawmaker eternal? What does eternal mean? The result of this battle or ‘ab-normal’ way of working now is eternal because it is the sign and its truth. As we have argued above, for Foucault, the sign is the result of our wishes and dreams. It is the truth or our it is our thought. According to Foucault (1999b:60), to tell the truth is to say “what we are, what we do, what we remember and what has been forgotten, what we hide and what is hidden, what we do not think and what we think inadvertently”. It is to confess. The sign is an enunciation of ourselves, “an affirmation about what we find deep in ourselves”, as we have observed (Foucault, 1999b:59). For that reason, the sign or our production is eternal. Eternal means there is an immediate relationship between the sign and us, as we have already set out. There is no time between the thought and the sign. There is not an intermediate between our creations and our thought. There is eternity, identification now. The worker and his production are eternal.

According to Proudhon, we also utilize signs in order to produce ourselves and those signs are our space or our creations. They are a mixture of our thoughts or ideas and the outside world. They are social space, as we have studied above. And, for Proudhon, these ideas and signs are the result of our “spirit efforts” or the product of our work, as we have discussed. According to Proudhon, our “spirit efforts” are warrior attitudes. And the war is divine and eternal, because it is “the highest manifestation of justice” or a product of force - or man’s creation. So, the sign, the product of our work, is also eternal (and just) (Proudhon, 1861:29,38,41). In turn, although, for Proudhon, we are condemned to representation - the sign - we create our products, our signs, our laws - the contract - or ourselves without intermediation, directly. For that reason, our creations are eternal. Proudhon gives the example of the contract: individuals bargain directly until they achieve a common ground (Ritter,

158 We already discussed both concepts in the previous chapter.
159 It is the ‘utopia now’, as we discussed above.
160 We could say, for Foucault, there are two kinds of confessions. One is an obligation, an imposition, and Foucault is completely against it, as we have already seen. The other one is a voluntary confession or an act of insurrection, as we are studying now.
In Proudhon’s perspective, for that reason, they achieve an eternal (and just) common ground.

According to Foucault, those ‘direct actions’, to confess or to tell the truth, are agonistic acts, as we have just noted. They are revolts or insurrections. For Foucault (2012:39,177), the “truth is the result of a power struggle”: a “truth-weapon”. For Foucault (2012:177), the “truth works as a weapon”, because it is “the strategic and perspective truth” or the strategic power, that allows “the victory”. For Foucault (2012:177), the heroes or warriors win when they affirm their truth directly. As we have seen, this truth is our rule, our values, our justice, “a singular right marked by conquest, domination or antiquity: a race right, the right of the triumphant invasions or the ancient occupations”. When we tell the truth, we occupy space without intermediates. For Foucault, to tell the truth is to work or to create ‘other working spaces’ or heterotopias, as we have discussed in the previous chapter.

For Proudhon, too, law and justice depend on the war and antagonism (critique), as we have pointed out. Proudhon (1861:61) argues, “there is no justice, no jurisdiction, no authority, no law, no policy, no State, outside that antagonism”. And this antagonism and this law spring from our “feelings”, from our most intimate will directly. Foucault would say this law is our truth. Proudhon adds:

The notion of what is just is ... both an idea and a feeling. Since feeling is the first expression and principal force in my life ... instead of making my duty and law depending on the more or less precarious state of my reason, I decided to subject my reason and opinion to my feeling of duty and law (Crowder, 1991:111).

The Proudhonian law is the result of our deepest will and feelings. We create our law being faithful to our own being. It is the affirmation of our truth, the Proudhonian warrior conquest, an occupation of space. As we have just studied, Proudhon’s mutualist contract has that ability to establish our will with others, setting directly an “essentially reciprocal” agreement for “equal exchange”, which corresponds only to our will and desires, without the existence of any authority or

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161 We will discuss the Foucauldian concept of colonialism later (pg: 199).
intermediary (Crowder, 1991:105). For Proudhon, to work is to fight in order to affirm our truth reciprocally.

Nevertheless, this space, that is our victory, is also an exteriority “under our eyes” (Foucault, 1984:90,91). It is a dependent exteriority – our product, our creation - and, at the same time, it is a sovereign exteriority. This sovereign exteriority means another battle, an audio-visual battle, as we have just referred to it (Foucault, 1984:90,91). In other words, our productions or our signs have an immediate link with us. They are our discourse, as we have observed above. They are part of ourselves because they are our enunciations. But, in another way, those productions are something else that imposes on us and defies us. They are creatures that turn against the creator.¹⁶² There is a battle between what we say - the audio - and what we see - the visual, as we have affirmed before. The audio and the visual never coincide. They are in a permanent fight. This means also our products are not ours. For Foucault, we are not their proprietors. Or, better, each of us is just the owner of a “myself”, a point of resistance - a sovereignty not sovereign or an a posteriori subject - which contributes to the final product. Nevertheless this “myself” is also in a permanent battle with itself, as we are going to show in the next section (pg:158). Hence, we tend to an almost anonymity, as we have already explained. Those products, signs or spaces are first of all a collective production or work that transcends us - the Foucauldian social space. The Foucauldian victory is just the beginning of another struggle or work - critique.

Proudhon goes in the same direction. According to Proudhon, the worker is just a possessor. He possesses just the surplus value. All the rest is not from him. As we have studied in the previous chapter, Proudhon is against property which he considers “theft”. As Crowder (1991:85) explains, Proudhon is mainly against “unearned” ownership. We could say, for Proudhon, the worker is the owner of the surplus value he creates:

Proudhon … does not attack all ownership but only that species of it which is characteristic of the bourgeois system … the ownership he opposes is basically that which is unearned – he sometimes uses the word aubaine or

¹⁶² They are like Frankenstein, as we have compared before, a monster that could be seen here also as the Foucauldian ab-normal - beyond the norm. Just to remember that Foucault distinguishes between the monster and the abnormal. The ab-normal is less monster than the monster. For Foucault (1999:52) “the monster is the law breaking taken to the extreme”.

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windfall – including such things as interest on loans and income from rents. This is contrasted with ownership rights in those goods either produced by the work of the owner or necessary for that work, for example, his dwelling-house, land, and tools (Crowder, 1991:109).163

So, for Proudhon, our creations or productions do not coincide with the final product. We are not the owner of the collective final product. We just possess the surplus value we create. There will always be a misfit - a battle - between what is said and produced and what is seen or the final product, because the work is always collective. Proudhon does not use the expression “audio-visual battle”, but shares the same perspective.

Nevertheless, as Foucault emphasises, this critical and collective work realizes our desires and dreams. This is the heroic and eternal Foucauldian ‘other way of working’, an aesthetic economy164 and a non-capitalist way of creating space. As we have noted, this ‘other space’ implies an “innovative production” and another knowledge or epistemological perspective – the Foucauldian truth (Negri, 2011:203). Foucault suggests true and eternal commodities (Negri, 2011:203). Those eternal commodities are healthful products through which we also create ourselves165 - as a work of art or aesthetically - with pleasure according to our needs and dreams.

For Foucault, capitalism causes mental illness or alienation: “we are alienated, we are sick” (Eribon, 2011:120). According to Foucault, alienation means to be subjugated, oppressed, not to be a critic, not self-ruled, to have a work that destroys us. According to Foucault, capitalist social relations provoke alienation through “competition, exploitation, imperialist wars and class struggles” (Eribon, 2011:120,121). People become amorphous and unresponsive, become crystallized. However, according to Proudhon and Foucault’s cyclical perspective, excessive pressure or oppression can always lead to such an initial explosion and a new

163 This Proudhonian possession is something that does not exist in reality due the right to private property and Proudhon found great resistance when he presented his proposals. So, in our perspective, this Proudhonian strong critique on private property could be seen as a device used by Proudhon in order to better understand we are collective beings, opened to the other, and all we give and have is ‘just’ a contribution or a surplus value. To understand it is to better know ourselves and the way to live better, happier and balanced with the other in the world, valorising just what is worth it. This is a fundamental stage in order to be able to do the spiritual path we are going to study in the next section (pg: 156).
164 We do not develop in this thesis the economic perspective.
165 We are going to develop this idea in the next section (pg:159).
beginning or a new work. Foucault (2012:120) points out, for instance, the struggle between the small artisans and the big industrials: The aim of this industrial knowledge is to annex, confiscate, and take over smaller, more particular, more local, and more artisanal knowledges. There was a sort of immense economico-political struggle around or over these knowledges, their dispersal, or their heterogeneity, an immense struggle over the economic and power effects, its dispersal and its secret

Furthermore, Foucault (2012:120) says, biopolitics is a “fascism” that excludes and exterminates the “politically and ethnically dangerous and impure” - the smallest knowledges. According to Foucault, the solution or the therapy for this “fascism” is to create a “new relationship with the environment” or “to disalienate” (Eribon, 2011:121). And these solutions are the true, heroic and eternal economy through which we create ourselves in harmony with the other.

Foucault finds inspiration for those anti-capitalist solutions in the hospices and prisons, as we have already said. These polemical stands give him, for instance, the epithet of “the father of anti-psychiatry” (Eribon, 2011:220). Nevertheless, Foucault considers people who are in psychiatric hospitals or the non-capitalist mental patients as “the wonderful manifestation of madness or more exceptionally as the spark of poetic geniuses”. For Foucault, madness is a “cultural phenomenon”, created by capitalist societies and biopolitics (Eribon, 2011:220, 221, 388). And the alternative solutions come from those “poetic geniuses”, from the margins, where those “geniuses” glimpse and create different and non-capitalists ways. Negri (2011:203) argues, “Foucault sees capitalism as a prison and he is surprised by the revolt, the communication, the self-esteem that come from the prisons”- explosions of revolt. For Foucault, work is about this revolt that also comes from the prisons and from the psychiatric hospitals because work aims at welfare and freedom.

166 From Proudhon’s and Foucault’s perspective, these extreme situations allow to distinguish between force and violence. Before a desperate situation of big oppression, we can witness moments of violence – a big and uncontrolled explosion. Before a daily situation of pressure managed agonistically, we will have just the needed force to restore the balance of forces – small explosions.

167 The main new relationship is the “death of man”, as we are going to study in the next section (pg: 156) (Foucault, 1994b Gros, 2014:54,55,56). Proudhon would say the solution would be the death of property that leads to the “death of man”, as we have noted.
Proudhon has a similar anti-capitalist position. The author does not use the concept of alienation, nevertheless he tells us about “hierarchical organisation” and the “oppressive nature” of wage labour (Anarchist Writers, 2010). Proudhon asks, “do you know what is to be a wage-worker? It is to labour under a master, watchful for his prejudices even more than for his orders... It is to have no mind of your own... to know no stimulus save your daily bread and the fear of losing your job” (Anarchist Writers, 2010). Proudhon is well aware of the alienated nature of wage labour, although he does not describe it as such. The author stresses, the wageworker does not have a ‘mind of his own’; the wageworker does not have critical spirit, the main device to exit from nonage\textsuperscript{168} – this is alienation - as Kant and Foucault teach. And Proudhon adds, “the property owner who hires him (the wageworker) says: What you have to make is none of your business; you do not control it” (Anarchist Writers, 2010). Proudhon concludes, this is a “precarious” work, because “the worker (only) maintains his job due to the free will and necessity of his boss-owner” (Préposiet, 2007:187). It is a work that bears on an “injustice” and on a “fraudulent denial”: the boss refuses to give the worker the value he created or the surplus value produced by his work (Préposiet, 2007:187).

In order to end that “injustice”, Proudhon (1861:11,12) proposes to rekindle “the warrior spirit, slandered by the industrial spirit”. Proudhon (1861:62) remembers, “society preserves itself worthy, moral, pure, generous, even laborious through the antagonistic state, through the state of war ... it is the same with poetry and literature”. Proudhon suggests an aesthetic solution: wealth and economy depend on the creative genius. According to Proudhon (1861:65), “wealth ... receives its value from the genius which manages it, from the heroism it serves, from the poetry that gives it illustration” (Proudhon, 1861:65). For Proudhon, industrial work must be an aesthetic work or a plastic work like the work of any producer (Damien, 2009:22). And, according to Proudhon, this poetic and also ethical solution is the workshop, a solution from below. For Proudhon, the workshop will be “the main focus of moral regeneration” (Crowder, 1991:103). The workshop is a “collective” solution that is neither “individual” nor “familiar”. Proudhon clarifies, “in learning to cooperate in the workplace the individual learns to put aside his self-interest and to see his own dignity as a self-directing being reflected in the people around him” (Crowder,

\textsuperscript{168} For Foucault (1990:40), minority is the “inability to use your own understanding without another person’s direction”.

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1991:110). This is Proudhonian non-capitalist work, a collective path of freedom and adulthood. Proudhon explains, “liberty is man’s right to make use of his faculties, and to do so as he pleases” (Crowder, 1991:87). And the Proudhonian liberty means also moderation, a law of “simplicity of wants considered ‘the principle of our happiness’” (Crowder, 1991:104). So, Proudhonian ‘other work’ is a collective path and a personal fight for moderation and self-direction, also a struggle – a revolt - for dignity, harmony and happiness.

From what has been said, we confirm our third hypothesis to constitute space is a struggle, from both a Foucauldian and a Proudhonian perspective. For both authors, to work is to struggle and when we win the war, we create space in order to have a better life or in order to survive.

In the next section, we are going to draw the head of the Foucauldian activist.

**THE HEAD | The ‘other political subject’**

In this section we are going to sculpt the head of the Foucauldian activist, or his anarchism, always with the aid of Proudhon. We identify the head with anarchism, because, in our perspective, Foucauldian anarchism is mainly the construction of an interiority - the we. It is an ethical and reflexive path, as we are going to study in this section. Proudhon has a similar understanding. His anarchy is the self-direction and the creation of a virtuous war or antagonism or a permanent collective *devir*. According to Proudhon, we live in a solar society that presages “the wheel of continual birth” of Deleuze and Guattari. As we have observed, Foucault shares this solar ethical path, which inspired also this thesis’s method.

So, in this section we focus on the questions that launch this chapter: (i) is Proudhon and Foucault’s anarchism an ethical path or a becoming – a movement - or
a subjectivation, taking necessity as criterion or as the only rule? (ii) Being a “we”, is this Foucauldian and Proudhonian activist or anarchist or plural self a constitution of space or a heterotopia? If yes, what are the political consequences of this?

So, in order to answer this question and to understand who this Foucauldian other political being is, we will start tracing the ethical path. Then we will study his aesthetic dimension, because the Foucauldian subject is also a work of art. Finally we will feature the political side of the Foucauldian other subject.

We commence with the ethical path, explaining why the ethical path of this aesthetic subject is politically an anarchism.

**THE ETHICAL PATH**

In this sub-section we are going to start explaining who this Foucauldian political being is, with the aid of Proudhon. This Foucauldian political being is, first of all, a being in movement. He is a person that opens an ethical itinerary, walking this path. And what is an ethical path? It is a path of moderation or a virtuous collective option or a self-direction or adulthood or a critical attitude. Critique, we have studied in the previous section, is the Foucauldian key to design his ‘other subject’ or for the subject to design himself and the society where he lives. For Foucault, the ‘other subject’ is an “author” and can be invented by this critique or by “truth telling”, *parrhesia*, as we have studied before (Foucault, 2011b:161; Danaher et al, 2000:150,152). Foucault (2011b:161) explains what this “truth telling” or the critique is:

> This discourse which gives an account of oneself must define the visible figure that humans must give to their life. … This truth-telling now faces the risk and danger of telling men what courage they need and what it will cost them to give a certain style to their life.

This critique or truth telling is the discourse that constructs each of us. It is also a painful act of “courage” - a struggle - as we have already studied. This act of courage has spiritual or ethical consequences and, consequently, aesthetic (self-stylization), epistemological (the truth), and political (the other as *polis*) aspects, as we are going to observe. As we have planned, in this sub-section we are studying mainly the ethical perspective.
So, ethically, the Foucauldian moral self-direction, being a spiritual attitude - virtuous and critical - has two main characteristics: (i) it is an adulthood, as we have started to see, and (ii) it is also a virtue, an interiority or a “third dimension” - *le pli* or the folding (Foucault, 1982; 1985; 1990:59,60; Deleuze, 2012:113,114,115). These are interlinked.

**To be adult**

To be adult means to rule oneself - self-direction - as we have pointed out. Foucault is inspired by cynicism, by the mysticism in the Middle Age, as we have already said, and also by Kant. Regarding the mystical, Foucault says, he reads critically and thinks directly about the Scriptures and this means he does not accept dogmas and material mediation,\(^{169}\) as we have studied above (Foucault, 1990:59,60). For Foucault, some ascetical practices of Christianity are closely related to “the exercise of a personal liberty” (Vintges, 2004:289). And, this “personal liberty” means to “take care of one’s own salvation independently of ecclesiastical institutions and of the ecclesiastical pastorate” - independently of Christian dogmas (Vintges, 2004:289). The mystic takes care of himself alone, without a guide. He speaks directly to God. The mystic rules himself and has a *parrhesiastic* or critical attitude. As Foucault (2011b:337) notes: “it seems to me that the long and difficult persistence of mysticism, of mystical experience in Christianity, is nothing other than the survival of the *parrhesiastic* pole of confidence in God”. And this mystical behaviour or direct link with God or direct confidence in God, beyond dogmas and mediation, is the adulthood that inspires Foucault.

In fact, Gros remembers, Foucault is fundamentally an “anti-dogmatic” person, for instance, when he assumes he could not define himself as a philosopher, because the philosophy is an “experience”, as we have just written, cannot tell “what day and night are” (Defert, Gros, 2016). The Foucauldian philosopher is someone that experiments directly without dogmas or closed definitions. And this experience is a “de-identification”, a “becoming other”, a becoming adult (Le Blanc, 2016). The philosopher is the adult. According to Foucault (2011b:203,204), the philosopher looks like the Cynic that stylizes itself permanently, telling the truth to the others “on street corners, in the lanes, at the doors of the temple”. Foucault (2011b: 294) adds,

\(^{169}\) It is not a material, mediated attitude.
the philosopher is like the sun which gives light to the world and sets everything in motion, great and small; the philosopher is like the bull who advances and fights (militancy); the philosopher is also like someone who can command men, just as Agamemnon commanded against Ilium; finally the philosopher is capable of withstanding the hardest battles against faults and vices, just as Achilles was capable of fighting Hector.

For Foucault, philosophy is this cynical, truth telling – critique - which also inspires the author. Philosophy is the courageous act of the adult - the philosopher - who is a “sun”,\(^{170}\) a “militant”,\(^{171}\) a “commander man”,\(^{172}\) a “fighter” against its faults and vices. And, for all those reasons, Foucault is a philosopher as well, although it is not possible to define what a philosopher is. According to Foucault, philosophy is a struggle and also an “askesis”, a “spiritual exercise”, which is “the sign of the Cynical mission” (Foucault, 2011b:298; Vintges, 2004:282). Foucault explains what spirituality is:

by spirituality I mean … the subject’s attainment of a certain mode of being and the transformation that the subject carry out on itself to attain this mode of being. I believe that spirituality and philosophy were identical or nearly identical in ancient spirituality (Vintges, 2004:283).

So, to be philosopher or adult or a spiritual person means also to do some kind of exercise such as “meditation, dialogue with oneself, examination of conscience, exercises of imagination and of styling of daily behaviour” and those kind of exercises transform “one’s mode of being, not just one’s thought” (Vintges, 2004:282).\(^{173}\) These exercises are the critical attitude, the practice of the fighter or spiritual resistant: the one or the author who produces himself and becomes other; “the one who does not want to be ruled” (Foucault, 1990:59,60; 1994a: 564,565). According to Foucault (1990:59,60; 1994a: 564,565), not to be ruled by a master, but

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\(^{170}\) Foucault wants to give a new light to his present, as we have just noted. We will return to this fundamental concept of “sun” or solar revolution later (pg: 219).
\(^{171}\) We come back to this “militancy” later (pgs: 208-211).
\(^{172}\) The commander man is the ‘other representative’ or the ‘other politician’. We return to this later (pgs: 211-216).
\(^{173}\) We will develop and explain better this kind of spiritual exercises later.
to rule oneself is “the individual refusal of governmentality”. Here, Foucault is really influenced by Kant and the Enlightenment (Danaher, 2000:10). As Kant (nd:1) explains, adulthood defined by critique, to have the courage to use our one’s own understanding or to rule oneself:

Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: *Sapere aude!* Have the courage to use your own understanding!

Thus, for Foucault (1994a:565), inspired also by Kant, “adulthood” or the Enlightenment signifies bravery or “having the courage and the audacity to know” and to rule oneself. Adulthood is an act of personal courage and will. For this reason, according to Foucault, (1994a:565,566), when people become adult, people can obey, because “they obey and reason as much as they want”.

Consequently, through that critical attitude, the adult affirms directly and collectively through the statement, the cry or the silence and opens a “possibility” - a space - in society in order to survive (Foucault, 1990:59,60; 1994a:564,565). According to Foucault (2011b:160,161), truth-telling, “role and end”, is “to give form” to life and this form occupies space; this form “defines” the “visible figure” of the existence, as we have argued above. So, adulthood means *parrhesia* or “fearless speech”, a brave act of occupation of space. As we have seen, the cynic is charged with “veridiction”, with “announcing the truth”; and this cynical “manifestation” of the truth occupies space. Why? It is a relation with the other. To occupy space or to tell the truth is an act of “courage”, because it is a “collective” process” (Foucault, 2011b:309, Balibar, 2016). As we have studied, the cynic tells the truth, for instance, “on street corners”, publicly in society. To tell the truth always implies another person, hence, it is a “risky attitude”, as we have already studied (Foucault, 2011b:183; Balibar, 2016). It is an “irruptive, violent, scandalous” mode of life that

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174 For Foucault, governamentalty means the “new rationality” of the classical age, which is called “the reason of state and of police”. This new rationality adopts “political technologies” with the aim to increase the state dominion (Foucault, 2012:180).

175 As we have seen above, for Foucault, the statements are always collective.
could “displease” the other and could lead to “errors” (Foucault, 2011b:183; Balibar, 2016). To occupy space is to have the courage to fail facing the other. To be adult is to rule oneself engaged with the other through discourse and acts. As Danaher et al (2000:161,162) comments, for Foucault, to be an author or a creator of space is to be a “we”, an ‘other subject’:

Certainly there is a degree of self-interest in our attempts to apply an aesthetics of existence: we write to be beloved. … But … art and judgments of taste aren’t divorced from the wider community, and the arts, or practices of the self are ‘not something the individual invests by himself. They are patterns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society and his social group’

To become adult is to become an a posteriori subject, influenced and created also by society, as condition of possibility, as we have discussed before. It is a reciprocal act from the self to society and from society to the self. And that reciprocity has political consequences. As Vintges (204: 286) argues, Foucault accepts the subject that speaks “for himself in the first person as such”, but adds that “being occupied with oneself” is to be linked with the “polis” and with the “world”; it is to engage in “political activities”, as we are going to study later (pgs: 211-2013).

Proudhon has also a critical and a self-critical perspective, as we have already studied. The Proudhonian activist is a critic who also treads an ethical path. Proudhon (2009:142,143) asks, what is deepest in man? And the author answers, “the man himself, that is to say, the will and the conscience, the free arbiter and law, opposed in a perpetual antagonism. The man is at war with himself”. For Proudhon, this “perpetual antagonism” or non-dogmatic adulthood or free arbiter is a “paramount commitment to freedom understood as moral self-direction” (Crowder, 1991:29).

This perpetual antagonism and moral self-direction and adulthood are the Proudhonian ethical path. And Déjacque (2015:20), close to Proudhon, complements the idea: man ceases to be a slave or a youth and becomes adult, when he revolts against the force. To be adult is also a protest or critical act against force or the oppressive power. This critical attitude is his main point. According to Proudhon, social life is “conflict and the interplay of opposing inseparable and irreducible
forces”: war (Castleton, 2012:110). Thus, for Proudhon, this force or critique could also be seen in a dual way, personally and collectively: it could be our own self against whom we fight in order to govern ourselves - self-direction, interiority. It signifies also the fight against the other in society, a reciprocal encounter that generates a collective subject and also has political consequences, as we are going to see later (pg: 198-200). It is a struggle against “modern civilized society” which is pictured by Proudhon as “destructive of moral self-direction” (Crowder, 1991:29).

The virtuous path
According to Foucault, to be adult implies also a virtuous and spiritual path: a fold. And this fold is the Foucauldian care of the self, the critical work each can do in order to sculpt the interiority or self now, having our needs as reference. This care of the self is self-stylization, we have explained above. This care of the self happens when our “formal power” (force) fights against our “material power” (force) and sculpts our self (force). The Foucauldian self cares for himself or fights against himself because he “does not want to be subjected” by the others and by his passions, but rather to rule himself, creating his “subjectivation” (“self-invention”) (Foucault, 1985:73; Fernández, 2010:29; Revel, 2016). For Revel (2016), through this spirituality, the Foucauldian subject breaks its subjectivity, its “fixed point”, its identity; it ceases to be temporarily a “subject”, in order to be an ongoing “subjectivation” or invention of itself.

Proudhon explains also this creative fight between forces is the way to avoid a “Meta-Subject” or the “essentialisation of forces taken at the Absolute”, such as “a universal class, a higher state or an absolute ownership” (Damien, 2009:17). Déjacque (2015) adds a complementary idea: “earthworm, ignorant, slave, cretin, the man would be all of this today if he had never rebelled against the force. And here he is great, giant, God, because he dared everything!” For Proudhon this self-critical attitude is divine and spiritual, as we have just explained above. Foucault agrees.

Thus, in order to counteract that absolute subject, Foucault proposes care of the self as a personal and collective work. We care for ourselves or we rule ourselves and, at the same time, we prepare ourselves to encounter the other. As Foucault (2011b:313) adds regarding the cynics, “the care of others thus coincides exactly with the care of the self”. And, for that reason, this care of the self is a virtuous path, a
source of peace and harmony. According to Foucault (1985:73), the care of the self is the route to worthy social life,

this *epimeleia heautou*, care of the self, was a precondition that had to be met before one was qualified to attend to the affairs of others or lead them, included not only the need to know (to know the things one does not know, to know one is ignorant, to know one’s own nature), but to attend effectively to the self, and to exercise and transform oneself.

For Foucault (1985:76), “governing oneself, managing one’s state, and participating in the administration of the city were three practices of the same type” and they are linked reciprocally. So, the care of the self is not an egoistic path, but a collective one, as we are seeing.

The Foucauldian care of self is mainly an ethical path. For Foucault (2011b), this ethical path means “its privileged, essential object [is] life and the mode of life”. And this Foucauldian “mode of life” is the constitution of an interiority and a virtuous relation to the other. According to Deleuze (2012:109), Foucault finds this ‘ethical and beautiful path’ in his last works, for instance, in *The Uses of Pleasures* that “represent a kind of turn regarding the preceding books”, as we have started studying above. In his last works, in the very end of his life, Foucault “discovers the relation to himself - *rapport à soi* - as a new dimension which is irreducible to power relations and to knowledge relations that were the object of his previous books” (Deleuze, 2012:109).

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176 Those last Foucauldian works were published just some weeks before his death (Gros, 2014b:67).
177 In the two last volumes of *History of Sexuality*, it seems Foucault concludes his subject design, drawing the head of the figure or the inside - the interiority - or the spiritual and ethical path of the self. Foucault stresses something that is already embryonic and almost subjacent in his previous works, namely, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, when in the end of the book Foucault clarifies that the subject is not suffocated by power and knowledge relations, but stimulated by them. Those relations are the condition of possibility of his determination - the aesthetics of the self, as we have already explained. So, it seems, first of all, Foucault designed the exteriority of the subject - its conditions of possibility - and, then, eight months before his death, he drew the inside of the self. And it was also a personal experience. As Eribon (2011:531) tells us: “during the last eight months of his life, to write his two books played for him the role which philosophical writing and private diary played in ancient philosophy: that of a self-work, a self–stylization”, as we have already studied. In a different sense, Clare O’Farrell adds, this Foucauldian ‘design’ of the self and his latest works have as goal the contrast between “Greco-Roman techniques of the self with those of early Christian monastic culture in order to uncover, in the latter, the historical origin of many of the features that still characterize the modern subject” (Foucault, 2015a). Taylor, Vintges (2004a:3) complements, the ancient Greek “aesthetics of existence” or “care of the self” or “practices of freedom” are “key elements in a ‘counterattack’ against modern (normalizing) form of power”. For Foucault, the introduction of those practices today
Virtue and sexuality

And why is this new spiritual dimension irreducible to power and knowledge relations – the Foucauldian historical dimension? It is because, as we have just noted, the “relation to oneself” or the “care of the self” has “a selective link with sexuality”\(^\text{178}\) and “it is in sexuality that this new ethical dimension sets up and realizes itself” (Deleuze, 2012:109). As far as we understand, this care of the self has its root beyond history. Sexuality is first of all something \textit{a priori}, as we have studied in the previous chapter. The care of the self starts with power. That means sexual power too or a sexual impulse or desire. Power crosses us and gives us strength in order to fight with this same power - the fold - and to follow a beauty and a virtuous path or to create a beauty or a virtuous relation with ourselves and with the others, as we are going to show. According to Foucault, that sexual power leads to the \textit{aphrodisia}. As Foucault (1985:43) explains, the \textit{aphrodisia} is an “ethical experience” that presupposes the “ontology of the force”: the human being is a sexual “dynamics” or movement made of desire, action and pleasure reciprocally linked.\(^\text{179}\) The human being has to deal spiritually with this force or sexual “dynamics” in order to live virtuously, as we are going to observe.

Inspired by the Greeks, Foucault (1985:48) has a positive understanding of sexuality as something “natural and necessary”.\(^\text{180}\) According to Foucault (1985:48), for the Greeks, he says:

the sexual activity tended toward the restoration of the highest state of the being that man had achieved. In general, sexual activity was perceived as natural (natural and indispensable) since it was through this activity that

\(^{178}\) The Foucauldian concept of sexuality is the Greek \textit{aphrodisia}, “‘things’ or ‘pleasures of love’, ‘sexual relations’, ‘carnal acts’, ‘sensual pleasures’” (Foucault, 1985:35). Foucault (1985:35) explains that our idea of sexuality is not so wide because the Greek concept implies a “diet” and an “economy”, as we are going to see in the following lines. Foucault (1985:40) resumes, the \textit{aphrodisia} are “acts, gestures, contacts, which produce a certain form of pleasure”.

\(^{179}\) Foucault (1985:43) tells about a sexual “dynamics” that joins in a circle “the desire that leads to the act, the act that is linked to pleasure, and the pleasure that occasions desire”.

\(^{180}\) In the previous chapter on space, we have already studied the concept of necessity and we have concluded that power is necessary, universal and strategic. We have also confirmed our second working hypothesis: \textit{to establish space is to survive}. 

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living creatures were able to reproduce, the species as a whole were able to escape extinction, and cities, families, names, and religions were able to endure far longer than individuals, who were destined to pass away.

Foucault (1985:48) adds,

the desire that led to the *aphrodisia* were classed by Plato among the most natural and necessary; and the pleasures that could be obtained from the *aphrodisia* had their cause, according to Aristotle, in necessary things that concerned the body and the life of the body in general.

Foucault (2011b:265) notes, the body (*bios*), for Cynics, means “animality” and it is something fundamental in human being’s life, as it is for Cynics materially and morally.

This animality, which is the material model of existence, which is also its moral model, constitutes a sort of permanent challenge in the Cynic life. Animality is a way of being with regard to oneself, a way of being which must take the form of a constant test. Animality is an exercise.

For Foucault, this animality – body - is the condition of possibility for an ethical life; it is a “material” and a “moral model”, as we are going to examine in the following lines; it is a “permanent challenge” and a “test” in terms of spiritual experience. And Foucault (1985:48) concludes, “finding that sexual activity was deeply and harmoniously grounded in nature (in the body), there was no way that it could be considered bad.”

Although sexual activity is a natural and necessary thing, for Foucault (1984:90), this spiritual “relation to oneself” through sexuality is not immediate. It is a path, a learning process. Proudhon (2009:402) tells us about a “progressive and painful education of our instinct” and “a slow and insensitive transformation of our spontaneous perceptions in reflected knowledge.” For Foucault (1984:90), care of the self arises along an agonistic path: a “victory over forces that are difficult to tame”,

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starting from the glutton - like a propaedeutic. According to Foucault, “the constitution of an inside, an interiority, is first of all a food issue rather than a sexual issue” (Deleuze, 2012:109). For Foucault,

the free man’s relation to himself as self-determination presupposes sexuality in three ways: in the simple form of a ‘Dietary’ of pleasures, in order to govern oneself and to be able to actively govern its body; as a composed form of an ‘Economy’ of the household in order to be able to govern the wife, and she reaches herself a good receptivity; in the form of an unfolded ‘Erotic’ of boys in order to make boys also learn to govern themselves, to be active and to resist the power of others (Deleuze, 2012:109,110).

The Foucauldian interiority or spirituality is shaped by the “transformation of one’s whole mode of existence, including body, heart and soul” (Vintges, 2004:284). The body is already the soul when we work on it and control its excesses or satisfy its needs. As we have defined above, spirituality is the control of the body’s needs. So, diet and bodily care play a key role in spiritual learning and are already forms of spirituality and control of oneself. Thus, to have the ability to resist, as a battle - the fold - and to tame food, familiar and sexual excess is the Foucauldian spiritual, virtuous or philosophical path.

Human nature is divided, man (is) perpetually ‘at war with himself’, his higher rational and moral nature constantly struggling to control his lower animal desires and inclinations. The free man is contrasted with those who are at mercy of their animality, ‘beasts of burden, whose whole business is to drink, eat, sleep and fornicate’ (Crowder, 1991:79,80).

Although Foucault admits the possibility of achieving a different state of consciousness with the help of “yellow pills or cocaine”, Foucault finished his life believing that the attainment of the spiritual path beyond sex did not require drugs and could be achieve through a natural “askesis”. And this “askesis” is the Foucauldian political and philosophical path or inheritance. As we have argued, for Foucault (1985:244), this “askesis” is achievable through a natural “economy of
pleasures ensured by the control that is exercised by oneself over oneself” - self-agonism. As the Greeks recommend, the soul practices a regime of moderation or “an orderly regimen that is possible because she is ‘mistress of herself’ and she is ‘heedful of measure’, she has ‘subjected the power of evil’ and ‘liberated the power of virtue’” (Foucault, 1985:244). Nevertheless, this virtuous mode of life or this moderate soul, that could also be beyond sex or not, presupposes always “animality”, the body as an ongoing challenge, as we have seen.

This personal path of moderation by need - the body - is spirituality or the spiritual path of truth that is also social and political. In other words, this path of truth is the virtuous path that satisfies the needs - the truth; it is the expression or the representation of our needs - opening space or creating signs in society or in polis. We are going to develop this political side later.

And here Foucault meets again Proudhon. As we have already argued, Proudhon is also concerned with the primitive instincts, with the dietary and bodily care. Proudhon warns, “the animal in man is never wholly obliterated or defeated; it must be kept in check by continually renewed effort of reason and moral will” (Crowder, 1991:80). For Proudhon, the body and the animality are fundamental conditions of possibility of the self-direction or are its measure.

Virtue: man and woman

And, according to Foucault, this “continually renewed” spiritual attitude, through dietary regime, family and sexuality, creates the relation to oneself - rapport à soi - that is, as we have already said, a social, virtuous, free and beautiful path, rather than a patriarchal, vertical, repressive and egoistic one, as it could seem. And why is this Foucauldian “relation to oneself” not patriarchal and repressive, despite the warrior, masculine force?

For Foucault (1985:46), as for Proudhon, as we have just noted, in the practice of sexual pleasures and in the reproductive function two roles and two poles can be clearly distinguished: man and woman or the subject and the object (Foucault, 1985).

182 In the Use of Pleasures Foucault bases his argument on the biological division of two sexes, man/woman, in order to study and ground the “care of the self”. Nevertheless, in The True Sex, regarding the “medicalization of sexual uncommon” of a nineteenth century French hermaphrodite, Foucault (1980) accepts the existence of the sexual uncommon – hermaphrodites, as we have referred above. And Foucault (1980) asks: “do we really need a true sex?” Then, Foucault (1980) answers that a hermaphrodite does not need a “true sex” - to be male or female -, admitting, for that reason, there is also a world of an uncommon “one sex”:
According to Foucault, the male is an active force. This means he has an

Alexina … want neither one nor the other. She was not crossed by this great desire to join the ‘other sex’ experienced by some who feel betrayed by their anatomy or imprisoned in an unjust identity. She liked, I think, this world of just one sex where all her emotions and all her loves were, being ‘other’ without ever to have to be ‘the other sex’, neither woman loving women nor man hidden among women. Alexina was the subject without identity with a great desire for women; and, for these women, she was a point of attraction of their femininity and for their femininity, and nothing forces them to leave their all-female world.

For Foucault, that sexual uncommon is also a biological morphology, not a historical one, as homosexuality (Fassin, 2014:80,81). As we have already written, Foucault does not develop gender topics (Fassin, 2014:80,81). We will develop the homosexuality issue (pgs: 189-191).

183 In *The Use of Pleasure* Foucault does not say explicitly that he adopts this Greek biological division man-woman or active force-passive force as his own vision. There are different interpretations about this point. For instance, according to Nussbaum (1985), Foucault changed his mind on this subject, maybe because he wrote last volumes of *History of Sexuality* “while already dying”. Nussbaum (1985) notes and criticizes Foucault’s “departure from views about the inseparability of ideas from social institutions that have been his most valuable legacy to modern philosophy”. Nevertheless even criticizing *The Use of Pleasures*, Nussbaum (1985) underscores that this “work deals with the thinker’s deepest personal and political concerns” and Foucault, a “serious and courageous thinker”, wanted to show “the possibility of other ways of life.” Also Taylor and Vintges (2004a:3), commenting the late Foucault, argue that with his last two books the author intentionally “creates a theoretical framework”, the ancient Greek “aesthetics of existence” or “care for the self” or “practices of freedom”, with a specific propose: to “counterattack” modern (normalizing) form of power and to produce “something new” (Taylor, Vintges, 2004a:3). For Taylor and Vintges (2004a: 3), Foucault identifies himself with the Greek “aesthetics of existence” as a way to get rid of biopolitics. Furthermore, in 1978, Foucault was interviewed by D. Trombadori about the method of his book, and Foucault answered (as quoted above: pgs.111, 112) that his writings are “experiences”. For Foucault, a book “is something that allows us to fabricate ourselves. It is something that does not exist before, but exists afterwards.” And Foucault (as quoted above: pgs.111, 112) goes further:

I never think quite the same for the reason that my books are for me experiences, in a sense that I want those experiences to be the fullest possible. Experience is something that gets you out of yourself … I write them because I do not know yet exactly what to think on this thing I would like so much to think. So, this book transforms myself and transforms what I think. Each book transforms what I had thought when I finished the previous book.

My contention here is that Foucault identified himself with his books. He wrote his books in order to clarify his thinking about a certain subject. Foucault explains: “I write them because I do not know yet exactly what to think on this thing I would like so much to think”. His writings transform what Foucault thought before. So, we could infer that this Foucauldian in depth research on Greek sexuality was a way that Foucault had in order to clarify his ideas on this relationship between man-woman and also his practice or his experience on sexuality. As Eribon (quoted above: pg 166, note: 177) explains, the two last volumes of *History of Sexuality* played, for Foucault, “the role which philosophical writing and private diary played in ancient philosophy: that of a self-work, a self–stylization”.

So, in this thesis, we treat this biological distinction man-woman as one of Foucault’s own positions, perhaps the position he adopted most clearly during his final years. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore fully the complex issues of authorial intention and Foucault’s conception of method and his approach to the history of ideas. The argument here is that this Foucauldian study of Greek sexuality is suggestive and can be treated as an alternative that Foucault offered to us. In the context of the method adopted in this thesis, it provides a way of re-thinking resistance. As Taylor and Vintges (2004:8) point out, there are “a wide range of strategies for resisting modern forms of subjection” or for criticizing capitalism or, better, for living beyond it, as we will see later on (pgs: 178-192).
The postanarchist: an ideal type

energy that could be applied sexually (a biological perspective) and also in a virtuous and freeway (the ethical perspective) essentially, when man controls his excesses and temptations and is not passive, nor a slave of his passions, and when man fulfils his active and masculine role (his fighter role). For Foucault (1985:128,139), this man’s battle implies “tumultuous forces” (Foucault, 1985:128,139). The aphrodisia “is really the most violent of all pleasures and is, for that reason, mainly masculine”. According to Foucault (1985:128,139), woman is a passive sexual force, in the act itself, the women’s pleasures is much less intense than that of the man, because in the case of the latter the excretion of fluid occurs abruptly and with much greater violence. In the case of the woman, in the other hand, the pleasure begins at the start of the act and lasts as long as intercourse itself. Throughout intercourse her pleasure depends on the man; it does not cease until ‘the man releases the woman’; and if she happens to reach orgasm before him, this does not mean her pleasure ends – it is only experienced in a different way (Foucault, 1985:128,139).

Foucault’s intention seems just to take the impulse of the “violent” male energy, to use it, to make it useful and social, in order to build up a virtuous self and a harmonious life in common. For Foucault, the man who takes care of himself is a “gentleman” and, for that reason, he teaches his wife when she could not access education and information (Foucault, 1985:154,155).\(^{184}\) Foucault (1985:154,155) sees woman’s role or skills as a supervisor or a manager “in accordance with her fitness”, as we have just said. For Foucault (1985:154,155), as for Proudhon, woman has naturally finer abilities than man. She is beauty and man is force, the violence of desires. If we observe with attention from a non-capitalist perspective, Foucault has a matriarchal point of view. Woman is the family ruler, the basis of society, and man, as fighter, has the harder tasks in the polis. As we have said, she would be mindful of her family provisions in order to educate their children well, make them good citizens.

\(^{184}\) Foucault (1985:154,155) talks about Xenophon’s times when girls married very young, for instance at 15 years old, with low knowledge and education and lack of life experience. From Foucault’s words, we deduce that an educated woman does not need man as her pedagogue, just assuming her duties in accordance with her biological abilities whatever they are and taking care of herself.
and to achieve a harmonious household and city. Woman and man are a partnership. Foucault (1985:155) explains his non-feminist position.\(^{185}\)

He had trained her so well and had made her such a valuable partner that he could put the house in her care while he went about his work, whether this was in the field or in the *agora* – that is, in those places where male activity ought to be exercised in a privileged way.

For Foucault (1985:153), “to manage the *oikos* is to command,\(^{186}\) and being in charge of the household is not different from the power that is to be exercised in the city”.

So, this moderate way has consequences in the *polis*, as the behaviour of the Greek Nicocles shows:

unlike so many tyrants, he has not used his power to possess himself of other men’s wives and children by force; he has been mindful of how attached men are to their spouses and their progeny and of how often political crises and revolutions originated in abuses of this nature (Foucault, 1985:172).

In the context of the *oikos* or the economy - the art of managing the *oikos* -, according to Xenophon’s thought, man has an aristocratic\(^{187}\) governmental responsibility or, as Nietzsche puts it, a “happy action”. Foucault (1985:178) explains,

the association of man and wife seems to be aristocratic; the man rules in accordance with his fitness, and in those matters in which man should

\(^{185}\) Foucault talks about the virtuous man, the carer, and also at another time, about Antiquity. Nevertheless, Foucault is not a feminist and criticizes feminism.

\(^{186}\) We would say to be a manager or an ‘eco-nomist’ in a mutual perspective, as Proudhon defends.

\(^{187}\) Here Foucault seems to have an ethical-political or aristocratic perspective influenced by Plato and Nietzsche. For Plato (1958:545) the man who is “just and good” is aristocratic or is “like aristocracy”. For Nietzsche, aristocracy means freedom, happiness and health. Nietzsche (2006:17) affirms, “the chivalric-aristocratic value judgments are based on a powerful physicality, a blossoming, rich, even effervescent good health that includes the things needed to maintain it, war, adventure, hunting, dancing, jousting and everything else that contains strong, free, happy action”. As we are going to argue later, this aristocratic Foucauldian man is also anarchist.
rule; which implies, as in every aristocratic government, that he will delegate to his wife the part she is suited to play (if he tried to do everything by himself, the husband would transform his authority into an ‘oligarchy’).

Foucault points out that the noble or virtuous man, for the Greeks, is an aristocrat or a warrior, in Nietzsche’s terms, and not an oligarch or patriarch. Its nobility or virtue leads him to delegate tasks to women in order to make his wife a “co-worker”, because she has the tranquillity necessary to govern the household, due her biological constitution (Foucault, 1985:155,178)

Proudhon shares this perspective. For Proudhon (1875:3,5), as we have stated above, man and woman are “equivalent” and each one has a “special prerogative”: man is the force and woman is beauty. According to Proudhon (1875:7), beauty balances strength and power. Proudhon (1875:II,III) specifies, in terms of force, “man is for woman in the ratio of 3 to 2”. So, for Proudhon, the man’s force is also a kind of motor of virtue and society as it is for Foucault. Notwithstanding, despite man’s force or ‘man-engine’, women’s beauty guides this force - the motor - because beauty is “more creative” than force. For that reason, Proudhon (1875:8) celebrates in woman “the eternal and celestial beauty”. In his perspective (1875:3,4,7), the “honest women” are “the beautiful half of humankind”; they are “the living representation of the ideal”. Proudhon (1875:11) writes, “woman, incarnation of the ideal, seems to have a superior nature than man who just has the strength”. We could say, as in the Bible, woman offers knowledge of sensuality – sensibility – to man: the apple. The Proudhonian woman seems to be the utopia now or the Foucauldian heterotopia - “the living representation of the ideal” - or the space where man creates life - the nest. She is the space of man’s eternity. Thus, despite their different features, according to Proudhon (1875:4,5), man and woman are “equal”, each with its function. For the author (1875:5), “the balance of their rights and duties should be made”, because there needs to be “welfare and honour equality” between both sexes. According to Proudhon (1875:5), the rights and dignity of woman should be recognized; woman might feel “emancipated and safe”, because this is the condition to have a harmonious society.

Thus, for Foucault, the virtuous man assumes his sexual activity or energy, his biological features; he denies passivity and controls the excesses of his energy. He is
not a slave of his desires, but a warrior. And this attitude has important consequences personally and socially - in the polis. Foucault explains human beings are always working on the limit of their force. For Foucault (1985:50), “this force (is) potentially excessive by nature, and the moral question (is) how to confront this force, how to control it and to regulate its economy in a suitable way”.

**The virtuous law: need**

For Foucault, inspired by the Greeks, there are no moral rules in order to control force. Foucault (1985:252) explains,

> Greeks neither inherited nor developed a belief that a divine power has revealed to mankind a code of laws for the regulation of sexual behaviour; they had no religious institution possessed by the authority to enforce sexual prohibitions. Confronted by older and richer cultures, more elaborate than their cultures which nonetheless differed greatly from each other, the Greeks felt free to select, adapt, develop and - above all – innovate.

Then, Foucault adds (1985:50), this human force is always on the “point of overshooting the objective”. And what is the objective? How to know when the excess begins? How to know we are below the objective? Foucault (1985:49,55) talks about the “strategy of needs”\(^{188}\) that is the criterion. Our “animality” or our body with its necessities is the measure. As we have said above, this “animality” is a “moral model” and “constitutes a sort of permanent challenge”, as happens in the Cynic life. That is to say, for Foucault, the “satisfaction of needs” is the moral law: after this satisfaction the excess begins and before this satisfaction we are in need - in a passive or feminine way (Foucault, 1985:49). Foucault (1985:49,50) explains,

> people were led to go beyond the satisfaction of needs and to continue looking for pleasure even after the body has been restored. The tendency to rebellion and riotousness was the ‘stasiastic’ potential of the sexual appetite; and the tendency to exaggeration, to excess, was its ‘hyperbolic’ potential.

\(^{188}\) In the previous chapter, we have already studied the concept of ‘strategy’ in terms of space, time and also necessity.
To rebel and to riot is a good thing or a natural thing - the ‘stasiastic’ potential - in order to satisfy needs and to be happy, as we have just outlined. In turn, to fight against excesses is also a peaceful or harmonious way of life, because excess is a bad thing - the ‘hyperbolic’ potential. For Foucault (1985:52), question turns on the “right use” of this force and pleasure. This is the *chresis aphrodision* or “the use of pleasures” (Foucault, 1985:54). And this *chresis* is adjustable regarding need or the here and now, as we have set out in the previous chapter. As Foucault (1985:54) clarifies,

it is more a question of variable adjustment in which one had to take different factors in account: the element of want and natural necessity, that of opportuneness, which was temporal and circumstantial, that of the status of the individual himself. *Chresis* had to be decided on the basis of these different considerations.

Then, Foucault (1985:56) explains,

need ought to serve as a guiding principle in this strategy … The strategy made possible an equilibrium in the dynamics of pleasures and desire: it kept this dynamics from ‘running away’, from becoming excessive, by setting the satisfaction of a need as its internal limit; and it prevented this natural force from revolting, from usurping a place that was not its own, because it provided only for what was necessary to the body and was intended by nature, and nothing more.

Foucault (1985:56) points out that to have need as referential is the way to avoid immoderation, slavery or an unnatural way. Inspired by the Greeks, Foucault (1985:57) clarifies, moderation is “an art, a practice of pleasures” and a self-limitation based on need through the “use” of those pleasures. We “use” the pleasures as this is “intended by nature, and nothing more”. This is moderation or to know bodily necessities.
The virtuous person

The relationship to desires and pleasures is self-agonism: we fight against ourselves. As Foucault (1985:67) explains, “the relationship to desires and pleasures is conceived as a pugnacious one: a man must take the position and role of the adversary with respect to them, either according to the model of the fighting soldier or the model of the wrestler in a match”. For Foucault (1985:70), to be virtuous is to be a fighter, divine, or a moderate person.

Hence, this moderation implies also some “poverty”, that signifies a striving “to get back to the ground of the absolutely indispensable” (Foucault, 2011b: 258). “Poverty” signifies here to have just what we need. This means, as we have observed, the moderate individual is one who desires “not more than he should, nor when he should not”. As we have written, to have more than we should is “usurping a place that was not its own”. This is an unbalanced way, a reason for revolts.

As we have seen, Proudhon also advocates moderate living. Crowder (1991:80) remembers, “the need to moderate desire for the sake of true freedom is a favourite Proudhonian theme, reappearing in many different contexts”. For instance, in terms of economy, Proudhon defends also a “law of poverty” that signifies “man should always want sufficiently to be obliged to work”, for two reasons: (i) work absorbs and dissipates the passions; (ii) a true or moderate consumption always generates utility or new production. So, production should not generate a greater capacity of consumption, because it would lead to economic crises and losses (Crowder, 1991:80). According to Proudhon (2009:305), in a fair or moderate economy, there will always be an “equation between production and consumption”. Proudhon (2009:308) argues,

economists see all unproductive consumption as an evil, as a theft made to mankind; they are never weary to exhort owners to moderation, to work, to savings; they preach them the need to be useful allocating what they receive to production; they fulminate luxury and laziness with the most terrible imprecations. This morality is very beautiful, certainly; it is a shame it did not meet the common sense.
For Proudhon, the free individual is not slave of his passions, “luxury” and “laziness”; he controls his desire and is not excessive. The free individual is a moderate person and not a slave. Proudhon argues,

who is not free, who is not governed by the authentically human part of his nature, is not truly a man; where there is no freedom, there is no humanity. Outside ‘the society of free men there is only a ‘society of savages’; ‘liberty is an absolute right (Crowder, 1991:80).

In turn, according to Proudhon, liberty is “a *sine qua non* condition of existence” and it is also “war”, as we have already shown (Crowder, 1991:80). The battle is fundamental to Proudhonian thought. In terms of ethics, Proudhon affirms, virtue will be challenged permanently and “the individual must be armed with his own moral strength in order to assert his freedom and humanity” (Crowder, 1991:80). As we have studied, according to Proudhon, we are in a permanent fight with ourselves in order to control our animality or our primitive instincts. And this is a fight against excesses and lack that includes woman and man. Woman could be also a virtuous being. For Proudhon, as we have studied, woman should know her animality, its natural features and her appropriate and useful task in order to construct an harmonious and balanced society. Her task is not pre-determined. Just her needs or animality - the law - could fix it.

We could conclude, this Proudhonian and Foucauldian - sexual and ethical - path is moderation, freedom, and equality, rather than a repressive, tyrannical, hierarchical and patriarchal way personally, socially and also politically (Foucault, 1985:80). Foucault (1985:80,81) highlights,

in order not to be excessive, not to do violence, in order to avoid the trap of tyrannical authority (over others) coupled with a soul tyrannized by desires, the exercise of political power required, as its own principle of internal regulation, power over oneself. Moderation, understood as an aspect of dominion over the self, was on an equal footing with justice, courage, or prudence; that is, it was a virtue that qualified a man to exercise his mastery over others. The most kingly man was king of himself.
Woman should also “avoid the trap of tyrannical authority (over others) coupled with a soul tyrannized by desires”. She has also a political task or a task in polis or political power. According to Foucault (2012:16,17) and Proudhon’s non-feminism and non-capitalism, woman could not have the force and the abilities to participate in the Agora’s affairs because “politics is the continuation of war by other means”. And also because both authors – Foucault and Proudhon - are looking for new ways of life. But, as we have argued, woman would have the abilities and the skills to be a supervisor or a manager controlling her excesses and deficiencies. We will develop those ideas in the next sub-header.

The virtuous polis: equality and freedom
For Foucault (2011b:277), each of us is “king by nature” personally and politically. Foucault adds (1985:79), everybody is equal and could be “king” or free:

the freedom of individuals, understood as the mastery they were able of exercising over themselves, was indispensable to the entire state. Consider that passage of Aristotle’s Politics: ‘a state is good in virtue of the goodness of the citizens who have a share in the government. In our state, all citizen have a share in government’.

This ethical or sexual – aphrodisiac - battle’s goal is moderation or to live harmoniously, freely and in peace - to be peaceful - with ourselves and with the others. And all of us could participate in this fight. According to Foucault, for instance, man and woman could be either “kings” or warriors regarding their excesses and lacks. According to Vintges (2004:287), Foucault “wants everyone to have access to the domain of freedom practices” that are, for this reason, “universal”: “freedom practices for all”. Foucault (2011b:302) refers to “an ethical universality”. It is not “the political universality of the group”, but “the universality of all men”: man and woman.
And because this ethical battle or path is mainly a sexual one, in terms of the marriage, for example, Foucault (1985:156) believes, spouses are also “partners” notwithstanding their biological differences; man and woman, both care for themselves ethically:

the respective contribution of each does not have to be taken into consideration, but only the way each acts with a view to the common goal, which is ‘to keep their substance in the best condition but also to add as much as possible to it by fine and just means’.

Foucault says that, to be married, for the Greeks, is an ethical attitude: it is to take care of the self in order to achieve a balanced common goal. Foucault (1985:157) explains, this “common purpose” of the marriage has a “dual finality”: (i) the children and (ii) the “maintenance” and the “dynamics” of the household. And, as Foucault (1985:156) points out, there are no fixed rules between husband and wife, but freedom; there is just the way husband and wife act in order to construct that common goal through “fine and just means”. For Foucault (1985:157,158) again, the need or the nature of each partner is the criterion that governs the household and each nature or need is necessary and complementary – sufficient - in order to have a harmonious oikos: “each of the two marriage partners has a nature, a form of activity, and a place, which are defined in relation to the necessities of the oikos”; the “two roles are exactly complementary and the absence of one would make the other useless.

And here, Foucault (1985:157,158) meets Proudhon again, when the latter uses men and women to show how his anarchy works. Proudhon specifies, there are “two places, two forms of activity, and two ways of organizing time” defined physically or biologically. Inspired by the Greeks, Foucault also underlines, the objective is to utilize this available energy and the natural abilities of both, man and woman, in a useful social way in order to organize society. Foucault (1985:158) explains,
the gods endowed each of the two with particular qualities … first of all:

for man, who must work on open air ‘plowing, sowing, planting, herb ing’, they have the capacity to endure cold, heat, and journeys on
foot; women, who work indoors, were given bodies that are less resistant.

Foucault (1985:158) continues,

Woman has a natural fear, but one that has positives effects – it induces her to be mindful of provisions, to worry about losing them, to be in dread about using them up. Man, on the other hand, is brave, because he is obliged to defend himself outdoors against everything that might cause him injury.

For Proudhon too, marriage is a complement or “the union of strength and beauty” that is comparable to “form and matter”, as we have studied (Proudhon, 1875:8,9). It is a “free union” and “solid marriages” are the base of a “virtuous society” (Proudhon, 1875:10). So, beyond its biological function, the Proudhonian marriage is a “pact of absolute devotion” or a spiritual, virtuous and social path and union, where “pleasure just figures at a second plan” (Proudhon, 1875:9). As Crowder (1991:80) notes, the Proudhonian “marriage represents the freedom ‘from the tribulations of the flesh’. For that reason, Proudhon criticizes “all courtship cares” and the “romanticism as an effeminate cult of unruly sentiment” (Crowder, 1991:80). Proudhonian marriage also bears on the care of the self and, for that reason, partners are free ‘from the tribulations of the flesh”’. For Proudhon, to convince the other by loving techniques or “courtship cares” is not to control oneself; it is to betray one’s nature - or need as law; it is not to understand that just desire makes sense or is the measure.

For that reason, like Proudhon, Foucault (1985:161) highlights the equivalence of those differences between husband and wife made by Greeks and “the partnership that must be established between them”. Foucault (1985:161) considers that “partnership” as a “community” (Koinonia) or a “threefold community”: a community of property, a community of life and a community of bodies. Foucault (1985:161) clarifies, a community of property signifies that “each partner ought to
forget the share he or she has contributed”; a common life has as objective “the property of the estate” and a “community of bodies”.

**An ‘other’ virtuous way**

This free and equal “community of bodies” is another way to organize life and society, in a non-capitalist way. We can summarise: Proudhon and Foucault have a similar position, a non-capitalist vision of woman, marriage and society.

At first glance, we could say Proudhon is anti-feminist or patriarchal, as several argue (see: D’Hericout, 1860; Déjacque, 2003; Guérin, 2005 and Arni, 2001). But observing in a non-capitalist perspective, we can discover a “puritanist” or an idealist stance in Proudhon’s thinking, as his critic Daniel Guérin (2005) notes, or even a matriarchal stance. Proudhon is an idealist and very exigent in terms of spiritual path, mainly regarding women, who in his time had no access to information and education (Guérin, 2005). A century later, Foucault shares the same puritanical viewpoint and the same exigency in terms of ethical and spiritual paths to both man and woman. Both do this same exigent way. As we have written, Proudhon says the spiritual, informed and educated woman and her beauty guide man’s force, because woman’s beauty is “more creative” or is the “ideal” - the utopia now. So, we can state briefly, for Proudhon, the female guides the male ideally. Nevertheless, Proudhon assumes his idealism is very hard to achieve due to women’s status in society. For instance, regarding Greek wives, Proudhon admits they faced very tough social conditions. The patriarchate does not allow them to develop according to their nature or necessity having a good and happy life. Proudhon says,

> Such wife, at the end of the Heroic Age, whose civilization would have to make, nevertheless just gave her pride, the triviality of her occupations and his importunate lasciviousness that repressed hardly the troubles of pregnancy and marital rebuffs. Love flew from the morning after the wedding night, and the heart was left deserted. There was not a bit of love in the harem, says Plutarch energetically.

> Although Proudhonian woman is beauty and should realise herself according to her needs, the author considers in reality woman is neither ideal nor beauty. Society is patriarchal and neither stimulates women nor gives her the love she needs in order to
learn to take care of herself – to follow the Proudhonian self direction or the ethical path. As Guérin (2005) stresses, for Proudhon, “conjugal life is deprived of ideal and love”: “marriage is the tomb of love”.

Proudhon (1875:12,13) explains that the goal for woman is to achieve, the conditions she deserves and needs to become as free and spiritual as man:

I do not want (women in) politics because politics is war; I do not want (women in) political or governmental functions, because it is always war. I say that woman’s reign is the family, that the sphere of her influence is the family home; it is because woman must not love man’s beauty but his force that allows man to develop his dignity, his individuality, his character, his heroism and his righteousness; and it is in order to make man more valiant and just and his wife therefore increasingly queen that I attack centralization, bureaucracy, financial feudality, governmental exorbitance and the permanence of the state of war. For that reason, since October 1848 I have protested against the restoration of the Empire that I have considered a national prostitution and I have not ceased to demand economic reforms in order to make pauperism, rebellion and crime less frequent and less intense; reduce gradually the number and duration of magistratures, leading little by little the social order to the outright freedom which means the full restoration of family and the glorification of woman (Proudhon, 1875:12,13).

Rousseau also talks about an ‘other empire’. Rousseau (2009:520) explains, although “woman’s reign is the family”, or “the family home”, we live in “the woman’s empire” that is not given by man, but by “nature”. For Rousseau (2009:525), nature “wants them (women) to think, to judge, to love, to know, to cultivate their mind and their figure; these are the weapons it gives them to supply the force they lack and to lead our own”. Nevertheless, Rousseau (2009:525) adds, due this lack of force, woman’s empire depends on man: woman depends more on man’s force than man on woman’s. For Rousseau (2009:525), men survive better without women than women without men. According to Rousseau (2009:526), man depends only on himself. Rousseau (2009:526) concludes,
All the education of women must be relative to men: to please them, to be useful to them, to be loved and honoured by them, to educate them when they are young, to care for them already adults, to comfort them and to make their life pleasant and sweet.

Nevertheless, Rousseau (2009:526) highlights, only the “man of merit” and the “truly loving man” deserves this kind of treatment. “These pleasant little ones who dishonour their sex and the one they love” do not deserve to be loved and cared in this way (Rousseau, 2009:526). So there is really a “woman’s Empire”, because although dependent, they are responsible for men’s virtue in the last instance.

Proudhon (1875:9) clarifies this ‘other Empire’ or this non-feminist or non-capitalist or non-commercial proposal. Proudhon criticizes the “prostitution” of capitalism and also the liberal politics that symbolizes the degradation of humanity: “centralization, bureaucracy, financial feudality, governmental exorbitance and the permanence of the state of war”. For that reason, Proudhon advocates another kind of society, where force and beauty are different and complementary, as we have said above, where force and beauty “do not pay reciprocally”; they complement each other naturally and, for that reason, they differ from “civil and commercial union” and its “profit” goal.

For Proudhon, in a capitalist society, man and woman are just a workforce. They both are force and objects or subjugated subjects - not virtuous people - as Foucault would say. Capitalism does not distinguish feminine beauty from the masculine force in terms of work; woman and man are completely similar and their biological particularities and abilities and skills do not matter. In capitalism woman loses her beauty or her skills and, as she is not so strong - she has less force - than man biologically, she produces less theoretically and has lower wages in reality. And this is something unacceptable, in Proudhon’s perspective.

For that reason, Proudhon is against feminism. The author warns, feminists also do not distinguish between beauty and force. For them, both woman and man are force or working force. As Vintges (2004:276) notes, for some authors, feminism presupposes the “values of western Enlightenment and liberalism”. Those authors have the same capitalist perspective of woman as an object in two ways:

Firstly, some feminist authors create an oppressed feminine essence or an object that cannot care for itself nor develop historically its needs; some feminists
defend ‘woman’ as kind of “liberal cage” or essence or disciplinary “species”, as Foucault would argue, from where she has to be liberated (Vintges 2004:275). Foucault, like Proudhon, proposes an alternative way. For Foucault, to be woman is a biological feature. Vintges (2004:275) adds, the Foucauldian idea is to “unravel and deconstruct the fixed meaning of femininity” – subjectivity - and to open a space that allows woman to take care of herself and to shape “new ways of thinking and living” - subjectivation. This is to say, to be a woman biologically is a historical becoming - a subjectivation, and not a subjectivity. To be woman is to have an “ethical, spiritual way of life”, shaping her whole life freely according to her needs (Vintges 2004:293). And this is a hard and exigent gesture in society, but also a simple and happy one, for Foucault and for Proudhon as well. We will return to Foucault’s anti-feminism later in this chapter (pg: 186).

Secondly, for Proudhon, feminists defend woman inside the workforce, just as force or an object, trying to treat woman and man alike in a capitalist perspective. Proudhon (1875:8) explains his standpoint sarcastically: “it can happen that women whose figure seduces us, are really ugly, so ugly they have the privilege of becoming detestable in wanting to resemble men”. According to Proudhon (1875:5,6), woman is humiliated when she resembles man because woman is also a “moral creative” becoming. Proudhon (1875:5,6) affirms, “it is unacceptable that woman, reasonable and moral creature, man’s partner, be treated as if your sex deserved humiliation” or does not exist.

This humiliation also points to prostitution. For Proudhon (1875:2,3), “emancipation of women” seen as workforce and “free love” is linked to tyranny and prostitution; this is not moral self-direction; it means not to respect women’s biological particularity and necessities: beauty, and the virtuous and spiritual link with men that puts sexual pleasure on the back burner, as we have already pointed out. Capitalism, for Proudhon (1875:2,3), is a “pornocracy” to woman and to man as well. According to Proudhon (1875:9), “the exchange of wealth” between men and women is “mutual prostitution”. It is to forget our spiritual potential. As an alternative, Proudhon proposes an “economy of existence” that is composed by “production” and “consumption”; the former, which is ruder, is for man, the latter, which is easier and more joyful, is for woman. And both works have the same value: to do what one needs in order to have an harmonious life in common; both works are surplus value, as we have studied before. Both occupations take into account their
biological abilities and needs that are not objects nor exchangeable by money. We cannot exchange or sell what is necessary and fundamental to our survival.

As we have argued before, Foucault does agree with this complementarity or community between woman and man, this non-capitalist or anarchist solution, this freedom path or “universal” aesthetic of the self that balances and considers “spiritual, biological and social dimensions” and differences, as Vintges (2004:291) features.

So, this way of moderation or the agonistic way is not a man’s exclusivity, but a universal path. Foucault (1985:83) highlights, although this “agonistic contest with oneself” and this struggle in order to control desires is a warrior role and an “ethical virility”, this does not mean “women were not expected to be moderate … Where women were concerned, this virtue was always referred in some way to virility” (Foucault, 1985:83). Nevertheless, this virility or warrior path has a social justification. As Foucault (1985:83) adds,

moderation was imposed on (women) by their condition of dependence in relation to their families, their husbands, and their procreative function, which ensured the perpetuation of the family name, the transmission of wealth, and the survival of the city.

Man has also this social duty. For Foucault, there is a symmetry between man and woman “each on their own account”. They are both dependents and with the same need for moderation. Foucault (1985:169) underlines, “it is because they have a certain role to play for the common purpose – that of father and mother of future citizens - that they are bound exactly in the same way by the same laws, which impose the same restrictions on both”.

Then, Foucault asks because love is an important stage in this virtuous and plural ethical path, how it is possible to choose a right partner? The answer is: we do it naturally through animal attraction. To choose a partner is not something random. Desire, animality or the body are always the criteria - the rules. Foucault says: “the attraction that should come into play between husband and wife is the one that expresses itself naturally”. And how to be sure that attraction does not fade away? Or, for instance, as Foucault (1985:162) questions, how does the wife maintain beauty and guard against being supplanted by someone younger and prettier? In the
The postanarchist: an ideal type

Foucauldian perspective, the some question could be posed to man: how does the husband maintain vigour? How does someone stronger not supplant him?

The answer is “the household and the government of the household will be the crucial factor”. This presupposes the care of the self (Foucault, 1985:162). According to Foucault (1985:162), the wife’s beauty is

...guaranteed by the household occupations, provided that she goes about them in the right way ... she will stand, she will observe, she will supervise, she will go from room to room checking the work that is in progress; standing and walking will give her body that certain demeanour, that carriage which in the eyes of the Greeks characterized the physique of the free individual.

So, at stake again is freedom or the care of the self or the care of the household that includes marriage, as an ethical and aesthetic practice that sculpts the body, bringing beauty with it. Foucault (1985:162) points out, “by virtue of the forms of physical beauty that is indissociable from her privileged status and by virtue of her unconstrained willingness to gratify, the mistress of the household will always be preeminent over the other women of the household”.

Thus, as Proudhon also explains and Foucault agrees, there are no norms of fidelity between husband and wife,

there is no illusion to the sexual faithfulness of the wife or to the fact that her husband should be her only sexual partner: this is taken for granted as a necessary principle. As for the self-restrained attitude of the husband, it is never defined as the monopoly over all his sexual activity, which he would concede to his wife. What is at stake in this reflective practice of marital life, what appears as essential to the orderliness of the household, to the peace that must reign within it, and to the woman’s expectation, is
that she is able, as the lawful\textsuperscript{192} wife, to keep the preeminent place that marriage has assigned to her (Foucault, 1985:163).\textsuperscript{193}

Wife and husband must be able to give the norm of fidelity a “preeminent place”. This is the virtuous attitude that links both. As Foucault says, conjugal fidelity - or partnership - is the “reflective practice of marital life” or an ethical path linked to the “mastery of the self”:

conjugal fidelity can be associated with a moral conduct that aspires to an ever more complete mastery of the self; it can be a moral conduct that manifests a sudden and radical detachment vis-à-vis the world; it may train toward a perfect tranquillity of soul, a total insensitivity to the agitation of the passions, or towards a purification that will ensure salvation after death and blissful immortality (Foucault, 1985:28).

So, for Foucault (1985:169) conjugal fidelity does not mean, “husband and wife are held to ‘sexual fidelity’ by a personal bond that would be intrinsic to the matrimonial relation and constitute a mutual commitment”. Rather, between husband and wife there is a voluntary bond - a voluntary partnership - as Foucault (1985:169) explains,

their compliance must be voluntary, the result of an internal persuasion; but the latter does not involve an attachment they should have for one another. … The relation of the individual to himself and to his city in the form of respect or shame, honour or glory – not the relation to the other person – is what imposes this obedience.

For Foucault, this harmonious love or partnership is a friendship or \textit{philia} - not a patriarchal relation between wife and husband - rather than just love. Duties are shared by both, as we have just studied. This results in the common good and prevents “political crises” and “revolutions”. Friendship is a peaceful path.

\textsuperscript{192} Here we understand “lawful” as ‘the one’.

\textsuperscript{193} So, we could affirm the same for man, he is able, as the lawful husband, to keep the preeminent place that marriage has assigned to him, when he takes care of his self, as we shall see in the following lines.
For Foucault (1985:231), the Greeks distinguished between two loves: the first aims at “the satisfaction of its desires (slavish one)” and the second one “desires above all to test the soul (a free and equal love)”. The latter is the philia and, according to Foucault (1985:234,236,237), “every relationship must be based on the constituent element of friendship”, because love is just an “intermediate” that is characterized by “deficiency” since “it does not possess the beautiful thing that it desires”. The love of the soul is the “true love” that “seeks in friendship the principle that gives value to every relation”: the truth (Foucault, 1985:233). And, as Foucault explains, to love the soul is just to love the truth. According to Foucault,

it is not the other half of himself that the individual seeks in the other person; it is the truth to which his soul is related. Hence the ethical work he will have to do will be to discover and hold fast, without ever letting go, to that relation to the truth, which is the hidden medium of his love.

Thus, for Foucault, friendship or true love, as a self-agonism, is a spiritual movement or a “work upon oneself”. Foucault (1985:243), adds, this erotics “tries to determine the self-movement, the kind of effort and work upon oneself, which will enable the lover to elicit and establish his relation to true being”. This true love is also a creative act: “a work upon oneself” or a stylization. It is God’s love, an act of creation – “in the beginning was the Word” - a parrhesiatic act. Foucault (2011b:328) explains, “when God is endowed with parrhesia, it is insofar as He speaks the truth, but also insofar as He manifests Himself and His love, His power, and possibly His anger”. For Foucault, moral rules do not exist, just this creative and parrhesiatic “relation to true being.” 194 Foucault (1985:243,244) does not separate what is “honourable” from what “brings disgrace”. Once again the author uses moderation by need as the criterion. For Foucault, “the progress of desire – with its difficulties, its ups and its downs, and its setbacks – leads to the point where it reencounters its own nature”, its creative nature: the truth (Foucault, 1985:244).

In turn, as Proudhon also defends the Foucauldian idea that erotics is neither centred on “courtship practice nor on the recognition of the other’s freedom”, but on “an askesis”, a spiritual path, that is the subject’s “common access to truth” or to

194 As we have already studied, the Foucauldian truth or “veridiction” is a subjective truth, rather than an objective one. It is a statement or an enunciation that is created according to our will or desire.
“true love”. Foucauldian friendship and asceticism have a general and a personal focus. In a general perspective, Foucault (1977b) talks about an ascetic tendency that says “no to the sex-king”. For Foucault (1977b), there is in society a “rumbling ‘anti-sexo’”, we would say, a non-capitalist trend, in order to “make other forms of pleasure, relationships, coexistence, links, loves, intensities”. According to Foucault (1977b), it is because, since Christianity, in the West, sexuality is the place through where power is exercised. Foucault (1977b) argues that for so long we said to women: “You are nothing but your sex”. Or Western thought states: “in order to know who you are, know what your sex is” (Foucault, 1977b). For Foucault (1977b), in western societies “sex has always been the home where our truth as human subjects has been forged, along with the future of our species”. For Foucault, capitalism is scared of sexual power and wants to control or organize it.

And, like Proudhon, Foucault also criticizes feminist movements. For Foucault, feminist movements took up this sexual challenge of western societies and continued to define themselves sexually (Foucault, 1977b). Feminists draw the consequences of this capitalist sexual obsession and reinvent their own type of existence, “politically, economically, culturally” (Foucault, 1977b). Or, in another way, they fit the woman into “sexual species” or cages, as Foucault characterises, created historically by capitalism in order to control society, as we have mentioned. Foucault (1977b) explains, the feminists assume they can define their identity sexually and include themselves in the same western sexual movement: “from that sexuality in which woman is colonized” and subjugated. For that reason, Foucault (1977b) reveals, a movement is now emerging toward an askesis, a care of the self or against this sexual colonization, contradicting the demand “always more sex”, the “always more truth in sex”.

Personally and also politically, through this askesis and friendship, Foucault’s aim seems to be to find a way to free himself from this sexual cage, although for him, sexuality is also something natural and necessary,195 as we have already affirmed (Eribon, 2011:512,513). Foucault attaches a fundamental and decisive importance to the body, to animality or to need as moral rules. Nevertheless, Foucault really tries to achieve a state beyond sex, for instance, with the use of drugs, as we have already shown. Foucault explains, “orgasm ... seems to me to be a way to locate the sexual

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195 We could say, for Foucault, sex is almost a paradox: sex is the way to free oneself from sex.
possibilities of pleasure that things like yellow pills or cocaine allow to burst and to spread throughout the body. The body becomes the global place of a total pleasure and, to that extent, we must get rid of sexuality” (Eribon, 2011:512). Can this sexual clearance - “get rid of sexuality” - through friendship be the way Foucault solves and understands, in the last months of life, his relationship with ‘homosexuality’ or sexuality?

Eribon answers affirmatively. Foucault seems really to have embarked on Greek “philosophical life” - the spiritual path. Eribon (2011:538) tells:

in his last two books, Foucault’s writing changed significantly: it became calm, dispassionate “appeased”... sober ... almost neutralized. As if the approach of death and the feeling he had about it since few months ago would lead Foucault on the path of serenity, following the ‘philosophical life’s model ... Foucault seems to have internalized this Ancient wisdom.

Eribon (2011:52) adds, Foucault’s last books are his “personal ethics, won over himself” or his “archaeological base”. And this victory over himself could be seen as a way to solve his ‘homosexual’ discomfort that seems, at the same time, to have been a propaedeutic to better understand life. Eribon (2011:56) continues, although Foucault gave his personal testimony about his homosexuality several times, he never “confessed” or assumed it, because he had always some “allergy” to “confessions”, “an allergy that could be interpreted as a resistance”. And, for Eribon (2011:56), we find traces of this personal and political “resistance” “in the entire effort developed by his texts of the seventies in order to refuse this injunction to speak, to talk, to make talk”. In turn, Eribon (2011:49,50) suggests, in his youth, Foucault felt “uncomfortable with himself”, having “bizarre” behaviour, “attempting suicide several times”. Perhaps, Eribon argues, Foucault’s period of “happiness” and freedom in USA and, then, being ill, those last days of writing allowed him to solve and to better understand that sexual “discomfort” and “allergy”, through the concept of friendship. As Foucault says,

homosexuality has become a problem ... because friendship is gone ... while friendship had represented something important, no one realized that men had, between them, sexual relations. Once the friendship disappeared,
as a culturally accepted relation, the question is asked: 'But what do men do together?' (Eribon, 2011:513).

And according to this argument, in his last writings, Foucault (1985:199) explains that in Ancient Greece the physical affection and pedagogical love between master and disciple - two men - should be transformed into friendship or spiritual love. This happens when the disciple begins to have a beard - “the first bear” - and becomes a man, an active being and not a passive one (Foucault, 1985:199). From this stage, the master’s physical love by the disciple becomes spiritual love - through self-agonism. According to Foucault (1985:190), there is in Ancient Greece “a disqualification of effeminate men” that do not assume their ‘activity’.

Furthermore, Foucault talks about bisexuality196 or sexuality without definition. Foucault (1985:190) says, in Ancient Greece, “the enjoyment of boys and of women did not constitute two classificatory categories between which individuals could be distributed; a man who preferred paidika did not think of himself as being ‘different’ from those who pursued women”. Foucault (1985:192) continues, Greeks “believed that the same desire attached to anything that was desirable – boy or girl”. Nevertheless, they guessed a different ethical form was required when one loves a woman or a man; each kind of love required a “special stylistics” that gave rise, between Greeks, to an “extraordinarily complex problematization”. For instance, the Greeks and Foucault too have a different approach to sex between man and woman and sex between men. Sex between man and woman could continue all life long. The goal is to manage this kind of love with moderation and according to the nature of each lover, because sex is natural and necessary. The Foucauldian question seems really to be here about sex between men without philia. So, as Eribon (2011:513,514) shows, this ancient stance on friendship or spiritual love - care of the self - seems to solve Foucault’s sexual or ‘homosexual’ discomfort, ridding Foucault of sex and reconciling the author with himself.

As we have just stated, Foucault’s personal askesis is also a political question – ‘other’ virtuous way. Foucault blends erotics and politics, as we have already shown. This sexual askesis is also the way Foucault gets rid of capitalism or biopolitics -

196 Our term.
sexual and corporal control. This sexual liberation is related with his political militancy and with his political worldview, as we will show later (pgs: 211-213).

Proudhon also advocates a spiritual path that has a double perspective. It could be individual and collective. Individually, the spiritual path is the consequence of the battle or the creative power, as we have already stated. In turn, collectively, Proudhon talks about a “collective being” constituted by free individuals, supporters of moral self-direction. For Proudhon, this spiritually is a kind of a paradoxical liberation from the body, assuming this body is a necessary permanent existence (Castleton, 2012:123). As we have seen, Foucault goes in the same direction. This Proudhonian spiritual path is “above all intellectual”, “more spiritual than material”; it is formed by “relations of free and intelligent individuals”, which “it overcomes in spontaneity, conscience and reason” (Castleton, 2012:123).

Proudhon defines this collective being as a “civil religion” (from the Latin religare), as we have outlined. This “civil religion” is a social ontology - a we - and a social capital both constituted through mutualism, as we have developed before. According to Proudhon, the social being or social space is a superior being; it exists primarily as “providence” rather than as “animal and flesh” (Castleton, 2012:117).

For Proudhon, “the ontology of the composed beings” sees society as “something superhuman and supernatural that has many God-like features” (Castleton, 2012:118). Proudhon talks about a “spiritualization of humanity”, a “general movement from the object to the subject, from the thing that is made to the person who makes it, from matter to spirit” (Castleton, 2012:116). For Proudhon, “the collective being sanctifies itself through the mutations of its form - and not through an essence. Its reading is made diachronically through the different revolutions of history - not biologically as an organism (Castleton, 2012:123). This is also the ‘other’ virtuous way.

The virtuous construction of space

This Foucauldian “relation to oneself”, individually and collectively, this battle, could result in “glory” or conquest, in two ways. First of all, as we have already outlined, war or self-agonism signifies the glory of peace, moderation and beauty. Secondly, this glory signifies possession, that means to have an “in myself”, a “mine”, a sui juris

197 Foucault seemed to achieve this beauty and this peace in the end of his life, as we have studied above.
that is exerted on oneself as a power that nothing limits or threatens: one holds the *potestas sui*, but through this political and legal form, the relation to oneself is also defined as a concrete relationship that allows to enjoy oneself as one thing that simultaneously we have in possession and that is under our eyes (Foucault, 1984:90,91).

As we have analysed above, we possess an “in myself”, an interiority, that is a power, a *potestas sui*, an ability to resist or a power to be virtuous. For Foucault, we are free persons and freedom allows us to have a relation to ourselves – the myself - that resists codes and powers - the ‘myself’ is a resistance point (Deleuze, 2012:111). Nevertheless, this “myself” escapes us permanently. The Foucauldian power is, on the one hand, a ‘myself’, a point of resistance or sovereignty and, on the other hand, a dependent point that is another sovereignty or an exteriority “under our eyes - the audio-visual battle, as we have discussed above.

So, Foucault completes the picture and the cycle and returns also to his previous works. As we have already noted, according to Foucault,

the relation to myself does not remain the reserved and refolded zone of the free man, independent of any ‘institutional and social system’. The relation to myself will be grasped in power relations, in knowledge relations. It will reintegrate the systems he has started drifting apart (Deleuze, 2012:110).

As we have said, according to Foucault, this relation to myself, this self-agonism, and this ethical battle presupposes power and the other or the exterior world as a condition of possibility in order to open a place in society. For Foucault, there are “three ontologies”: knowledge (the exterior world or *episteme*);\(^\text{198}\) power (ubiquitous energy) and the self (the fold and interiority). They are all interlaced (Deleuze, 2012:119,121,122). In this way, Foucault breaks with the phenomenological and vertical concept of “intentionality” and adopts the concept of “strategy” (Deleuze, 2012:116,119,120). When you open space in society there is that egalitarian and

\(^{198}\) *Episteme*, which means Science in Greek, is a Foucauldian term that signifies “all relationships between science and discourse in a certain epoch” (André; Gros, 2014:49).
audio-visual battle between our enunciations and the “visibilities” or the \textit{episteme} or “the order of things that organizes everything, makes some things possible and others impossible, permits us to say certain things but makes other things unthinkable” (Deleuze, 2012:119; Danaher \textit{et al}, 2000:16,17). There is a battle in two directions or there are two strategies, as we have already explained. Using the man-woman example, we could say that man creates space in woman’s receptacle – woman: the utopia here and now. But woman is a visibility that always escapes him (Deleuze, 2012:119,120).

This Foucauldian self-power-knowledge relationship is also the new epistemological attitude: “every true statement constitutes a certain power”, a certain “possibility”, “strategy” or space - sign (Foucault, 1990:56). To create space is to know, it is to affirm our truth, so that this fighter is also powerful and true, as we have just studied. And critique - we return to critique - plays an important task here. For Foucault (1990:39), criticism is “the movement by which the subject asks the truth and its effects as power and the power effects as truth” - the ‘veridiction’ issue. Critique questions real power and, at the same time, affirms its power. As we have already said, criticism - battle - is the main device in man’s spiritual path. Critique aims mainly at the “de-subjugation” – adulthood - in “the game called the politics of truth” (Foucault, 1990:39). As Foucault points out, to criticize or to fight is the art of affirmation (the “true statement”) of “voluntary inservitude” (mastery or self-control: \textit{maitrise de soi}) the “reflected indocility” (to be indocile) in order to participate in the ‘here and now’ or in order to open a space today – the “true statement” as a power effect (Foucault, 1990:39).

As we are seeing, this spiritual struggle for truth is neither a solitary one nor a “narcissist individualism”, but a collective or social path (Gros, 2014b:68). The ultimate goal is the harmony of the city. Foucault speaks about a “subject that reconstructs his relationship with others from a critical government of himself” (Gros, 2014b:69). This care of the self is from the very beginning a collective way (in \textit{polis}): a struggle between the twofold of power and also between man and woman or master and disciple. And Foucault (1985:244) remembers,

the struggle has been able to sustain oneself against the violence of appetites, one would not have been able to conduct oneself without a
twofold relation to truth: a relation to own desire questioned in its being, and a relation to the object of desire recognized as a true being.

As Bernaz (2014:244) says, for Foucault, there is a “pre-subjective libidinal force” – desire or sexual force - that makes the subject a “we”.

Proudhon has also a collective perspective of the subject as a “we” or group or a social capital, as we have discussed above. For that reason, for Proudhon, the individual is always a co-owner or a possessor. Foucault and Proudhon share and interlink these two concepts: possession and social ontology. Propriety is something we share in an ongoing agonism with ourselves – moderation of excesses and impulses - and with the others. For Proudhon, we are just owners of the surplus value we create, as we have studied earlier. According to Proudhon, property escapes us permanently because we are collective beings and our reasons or foundations are “a posteriori” (Castleton, 2012:120). Also for Proudhon, we are plural beings or spiritual ones in a constitutive agonism against our passions, treading an ethical and virtuous path with the other: the constitution of virtuous spaces.

THE OTHER (POETICAL) SUBJECT

For that reason, Foucault defends an ‘other subject’ that is mainly a “de-subject” or a “de-subjugated subject”. Free and adult, he is a “subjectivation”, a “self-invention” or the Nietzschean superman, as we have highlighted above (Revel, 2016). For Foucault (2002:19,20), “the subject in his unity and sovereignty disappears. We can admit subjects or we can admit the subject does not exist” And why?

As we have already studied, Foucault teaches that the modern self has exploded and other configurations have been created (Eribon, 2011:275). Foucault explains:

The 'I' has exploded ... it is the discovery of the ‘there is’ (du ‘il y a ’). There is an ‘it’ (il y a un ‘on’). In a certain way, we return to the perspective of the seventeenth century, with a difference: we do not put man in the place of God, but we see him as an anonymous thought, a knowledge without subject (Eribon, 2011:275).
So, this explosion of the “I” has aesthetic consequences and is caused by the spiritual-sexual path or the “economy of pleasures ensured by control”. This aesthetics presupposes a “technique of existence” that distributes sexual acts “in the closest conformity with what nature demanded”: towards a spiritual life liberated from the capitalist sex. For Foucault (1985:138,139), as we have already seen, aphrodisia is “the most violent of all pleasures; it is the “game of life and death”, and this “techniques of existence” allow the individual “to control, limit and apportion” those “tumultuous forces” in the “right manner”. For Foucault (1985:139), these aesthetic techniques are a “privileged domain” for the ethical formation of the self, as we have already noted. This techne - technique of existence - allows the self to form himself as “a subject in control of his conduct” - the subjectivation - and “to make his life into an œuvre that would endure beyond his own ephemeral existence” (Foucault, 1985:139). Those are the “arts of existence”,

those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an œuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria (Foucault, 1985:139).

Foucauldian care of the self is also an “art of life” - a stylization (Gros, 2014b:67). The individual “sculpts the shape of his existence”, answering, for instance, the questions “how should I live?” and “who am I?” (Gros, 2014b:67,68,69). And sexuality, as we have shown, is the “privileged entryway” to answer aesthetically those questions carving the spiritual and poetic path (Foucault, 1985:13; Gros, 2014b:69).

And Foucault (1985:28) specifies how a “relationship with the self” or an ethical dimension involves an aesthetic action:

self-formation as an ‘ethical subject’ (is) a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and

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199 For Foucault, poetic means creative or aesthetically determined.
decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself.

Proudhon has also a poetic or aesthetic appreciation of the battle or the antagonism that shapes people and societies. For Proudhon, the battle is a creative act, as we have already seen. According to Proudhon (1861:58) without war man “would be deprived of his aesthetic skill, he would not know to produce and to taste the sublime and the beautiful”. According to Proudhon (1861:58), war is the principle that pulls man “from the treasure of his conscience and his reason” (1861:58). It is our interiority - “conscience” and “reason” - or our needs or treasure that pulls us to the exterior in order to conquest our space or construct or create ourselves. Also for Proudhon, ethics and aesthetics are linked.

Through this spiritual and aesthetic way Foucault glimpses other forms: an anonymous thought, a knowledge without subject, a theory without identity. And, as we have shown in the previous chapter, those Foucauldian new configurations have a “general principle”: “every form is a composite of force relations”. Each form is a plastic form. Each form could take ‘another form’ or to form another space. Thus, the Foucauldian activist, being a fighter, is always ‘another form’, a new combination of forces and a creator of space. The other subject is a heterotopia, a set of relations in permanent mutation. The being is a mutant. The ‘de-subjugated subject’ is the free subject, the adult, and the critic, rather than an object, as we have said above. To fight is to take care of the self, it is to criticize ourselves permanently, in order to survive harmoniously and to find new ways of life - new spaces. For Foucault, “life appears as resisting the power with the aim of creating; life is the existing ‘potentia’ that leads to other configurations” (Bounache, 2013:140). For Bocquet (2013:124), in Foucault’s work, power and life are connected and form resistance and to resist is to invent new forms of life: “other subjectivities”. For Foucault, as we have already analysed, those “other subjectivities” open ontological and aesthetic perspectives: ontological because we “diagnose what we are”; aesthetic because we create a “virtual fracture”, “a possibility of fiction”, 200 or “invention of ourselves” as a work

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200 Foucault’s books are self-experiences.
The postanarchist: an ideal type

of art (Chevallier, 2014: 32,33). We are a poetic project. As we have already defined, poetic means creative or aesthetically determined.

Proudhon sees also man as a mobile subject, a set of relations, a “we” or a group or a space, as we have just affirmed. As Déjacque (2015:85) says, “man is essentially a revolutionary formed by movement and light” - versus borders. For Proudhon, being is the “synthesis of the multiple and the one”. As we have written, being “sanctifies itself through the mutations of its form” (Castleton, 2012:123). As for Heraclitus, so too for Proudhon, “everything is in flux, and in its most fundamental terms, this constant change takes the form of give and take between forces opposed to one another” (Crowder, 1991:81). According to Castleton (2012:119), as we have already explained, Proudhon is not an “organicist”; the author compares the various organs of the human body to the various beings of the collective being. So, as we have said, according to Proudhon, the human shape is in a permanent mutation and the author admits ‘other’ forms and ‘other’ figures, as the Nietzschean superman. As we have studied, for Proudhon, the warrior is a hero. And the word hero, for Proudhon (1861:83) means “the strong man, devoted, without fear or reproach. A god is with him, a god presides over all his performances. He is the son of the gods, he took the two natures”. Hence, Proudhon also claims for ‘other subjectivities’ - a mixture of two natures: human and God - as Foucault does.

We could affirm, for Foucault, we have a ‘virtual’ self and, for that reason, a poetic self. Why virtual? What does virtual mean here? Virtual comes from *virtus* that means potential or force (Rajchman, 1998:117). Virtual signifies “the multiple potential” (Rajchman, 1998:117). But here the virtual is more than the potential, the possible or the *potentia*, in Aristotelian terms (Rajchman, 1998:117,118). In turn, the virtual is not the act or the actual as it is to Aristotle; it is not equivalent to realize the potential (Rajchman, 1998:118). The virtual is as an intermediate between the *potentia* and the Aristotelian act: it is “the real not being actual and the ideal not being abstract” (Rajchman, 1998:118). The virtual is all acts we do not realize when we opted to follow one way, but they stay with us. The ‘virtualities’ are the fallen ends that we left behind us on the path of life. It is the virtual that we can activate at any time, making new connections, new poetry. These virtualities are “singular points that allow the most complex connections” or forms here and now (Rajchman, 1998:121). Those permanent complex connections and disconnections – virtualities - form our virtual self or our heterotopia.
And this virtual self is the “abnormal”, the transgressive, or the monstrosity, which is beyond the capitalist norm - the law - or the normal, as we have already developed (Foucault, 1999:38,39,40; 2012:8). Those other subjectivities constitute the “knowledge of the anomaly”; they are the “crazy” (Foucault, 1999:40; 2012:8). As we have also studied, Foucault is interested in the knowledge of the crazy or “people knowledge”, “particular knowledge, local, regional knowledge, differential knowledge, incapable of unanimity” and generator of resistance (Foucault, 2012:11). In front of the “centralized humanity, we must hear the roar of the (local) battle” (Negri, 2011:201). As Foucault (2012:11) concludes, “criticism is made by the re-emergence of those disqualified knowledges”. Critique creates “the historical knowledge of the struggles” or the knowledge of the “insurrection” of the people (Foucault, 2012:11, 12). The Foucauldian goal is this “battle” or movement that signifies also the “de-subjugation” of these ‘minor’ struggles, making them free (Foucault, 2012:12,13). Foucault (2012:12,13) is interested in the creativity of those struggles; they are ‘other subjectivities’, or virtual, abnormal, crazy, transgressive and poetic subjectivities.

As Chevallier (2014: 31,32) concludes, “the originality of the Foucauldian project is that the critique allows a “new experience of ourselves”, the “openness of new fields of possibility” or “new fields of unprecedented transformation”. And this means, “working to no longer be oneself and become other”, having “the audacity to invent oneself” – heterotopia –, as a work of art: as an ‘other subject’, an ‘other worker’, and an ‘other political being” (Chevallier, 2014:32).

**THE OTHER POLITICAL BEING**

The ‘other political being’ is the critic: the person that has critique as his main political tool. Foucault, himself, is a critic or an ‘other political being’, as we are going to see. To criticize is the “new task” or Foucault’s main task or his philosophical work, as we have studied above. The critic is the Foucauldian “will of heroicizing the present”, creating space here through a perpetual movement - the ‘now’ or the time.

For Foucault, the aim of critique is not to be governed, because critique is the alternative to government, as we have already seen. When we asked “how not to be governed?”, the answer is: through critique (Foucault, 1990:37,38, Eribon, 2011:11).
First, Foucault (1990:38) explains, the “critical attitude” is “the art of not being governed or the art of not being governed … at such a price” (“l’art de n’être tellement gouverné”). This art signifies, for instance, the practice of revolt or refusal to accept real government or the concept of “governmentality” (Foucault, 1990:159). And that art could be understood as a type of anarchism. At the end of his conference on critique, Foucault (1990:159) noted that he was silent on “fundamental anarchism”: not being governed at all. Nevertheless, Foucault (1990:159) clarified, “I did not talk about this, but it does not mean that I exclude it absolutely”. Foucault does not oppose anarchism or the desire of “not being governed at all”. And, as we have explained, the author concludes his life, his last months, working on this anarchy or on this critical, spiritual and ethical path in order to achieve a self-collective government without fixed rules: care of the self. 

Critique is anarchism or the anarchist device; critique allows care of the self, adulthood or self-collective government, as we have seen. Critique aims mainly to “de-subjugate” - “subjectivation” (Foucault, 1990:39). And the de-subjugated subject governs himself collectively and lives in anarchy without rulers or “fixed rules”, for example, moral rules and norms of fidelity between husband and wife. According to Foucault, there is just fidelity to oneself, to its body, as we have studied. For Foucault, care of the self “resists codes and powers”, having necessity or animality as referential. Déjacque (2015:28,145) says, “the mouth and the belly need makes man” or “leads man to move”. Nietzsche (2002) adds, there is an “I that creates, wants and gives measure and value to things”.

Foucault brings together both thoughts: this self-collective government – anarchy - by need, has no rules, but is “an orderly regimen” of moderation, based on the “right use” of force and pleasure. As we have written above, the ‘soul’ is “mistress of herself” and “heedful of measure”. For Foucault, this “orderly regimen” or anarchy is really ordered and organized. It prevents excesses, “political crises” and “revolutions”, because the subject achieves perfect tranquillity of soul and becomes totally insensitive to the agitation of the passions, solving his problems with moderation, as we have studied above.

Hence, for Foucault (1990:162), this critical and ethical attitude is also a political one; an “attitude of resistance” in order to take care of oneself and live with

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201 Foucault (1990:159) “Qu’est-ce que c’est la critique?”, see Bibliography.
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the other. For Bocquet (2013:109), Foucault looks like an “anarchist”, because, for him, “the moral and political are united together”. Chevallier (2004) talks about the Foucauldian “political spirituality” - la spiritualité politique. The care of the self - an ethical and spiritual path - as a political option. It is the basis or the way we choose to act - a behaviour or an ethos - to relate to ourselves and with others. And this political choice influences the way we organize society or the polis. Foucault (1990:46) remembers his moral and critical perspective has a historical and political framework; this critical attitude inspired by Kant arises in a certain political context, as a reaction to the “formation of capitalism, the constitution of the bourgeois world, the constitution of the state system, the foundation of modern science, the organization of a confrontation between the art of being ruled and not being ruled”.

So, Foucault seems to point out an anarchist and political path against the state, capitalism and Marxism. As Zamora (2016) argues, Foucault “found anti-statism and desire to de-statify French society seductive”. For instance, he challenges “social security” and is “seduced by the alternative of the negative income tax” (Zamora, 2016). The idea would be to make the state pay a “benefit to anyone who finds themselves below a certain level of income”, in order to combat poverty (Zamora, 2016). On the other hand, Foucault compares the mechanisms of social assistance and social insurance with the “prison, the barracks, or the school” (Zamora (2016). For Foucault, those mechanisms are “indispensable institutions ‘for the exercise of power in modern societies’” (Zamora, 2016). According to Foucault, “the welfare state fulfils the dream of biopower” (Zamora, 2016).

For Foucault, the state is synonymous with liberal democracy or “police equipment”, “repressive techniques” and also big parties - big apparatuses or small states. Nevertheless, Foucault (2015) clarifies his main battle is something beyond the state. And why? For Foucault, the state is more than a set of apparatuses nowadays. Foucault explains what the state is: “the state, with its big judicial, military and other apparatuses [appareils], only represents a guarantee, the reinforcement of a network of powers which come through different channels, different from its main apparatus”.

For Foucault (1976:118), those diffuse “networks of power” that constitute the biopolitics or the disciplinary power of capitalism and liberalism work behind the state. They are capitalist “civilization” which started producing a “temperate social order” or the “disciplinary work”, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - the Kantian period - which is linked to industrialization (Danaher et al, 2000:108,109).
This capitalist order or civilization is based on various institutions and “modes of
governmentality”, such as “schools, workhouses, family life”. This disciplinary order
also involves surveillance, “inquiries and surveys into the conditions of life and moral
values of the people living in the emerging urban slums associated with

For Foucault, this capitalist or industrial civilization or ‘new’ state has three
other features: (i) it is like a big prison; (ii) it is racism; (iii) it is colonialism.
Foucault explains this disciplinary society is a “carceral continuum”, constituted by
“techniques of prison” that are widespread in the whole society, for instance,
surveillance cameras or the surveys we have mentioned above (Danaher et al,
2000:108). And this “carceral continuum” means also racism. According to Foucault,
race is not about skin colour, as we have already explained. Race means a particular
worldview that is imposed on people, in this case, through this “carceral continuum”.
Foucault (2012: 54) clarifies his concept:

There are two races when there are two groups who, despite their
cohabitation, are not a mix because there are differences, asymmetries,
barriers that are due to privileges, customs and rights, the division of
fortunes and the manner in which power is exercised.

In Foucault’s perspective, this imposed civilization or racism through which
“power is exercised” is also colonialism. And this colonial question, as the racist
question, is not again about skin colour, but disciplinary forces that shape bodies all
over the world (Danaher et al, 2000:106,110). \(^\text{202}\)

By the foregoing, Foucault (1976:118; Bocquet, 2013:109) argues that the
former state is a reality in extinction and “we live in a disciplinary society”, because,
as Foucault depicts, “the state has been replaced by science since the king’s
decapitation. From there state theory has been dying”. For that reason, Foucault
(2015) notes he is interested in the state but “differentially [différentiellement]”. According to Foucault (2015), his main struggle is “to attempt an analysis of the
different levels of power in society”, which “assure the hegemony of a class, an elite,

\(^{202}\) As Danaher et al (2000:106) explain, “when Foucault wrote about colonialism, he rarely did so
directly. For example, there are no books of his on the implications of the French colonial occupation
of Indo-China, the Pacific and Africa, for example”. The question is the disciplinary power, as we are
studying.
or a caste”, because “the state occupies an important place in this, but not a preeminent one”.

Critique is the Foucauldian tool to analyse and fight against this disciplinary power. Critique or the care of the self is the alternative or the other side of this ubiquitous repressive and widespread power. For Foucault, as we have observed, critique or care of the self or adulthood or anarchy is the way to escape from this disciplinary and repressive society where we are all minors. So, Foucault warns, “beyond the state’s power over bodies, there is also the resistance of individuals who know how to say no” to this disciplinary power (Eribon, 2011:443). And Foucault is one of them, as we are seeing.

In this sense, there is here a close resemblance between Foucault’s fight against this spreading state and the Proudhonian anarchist fight. Both authors propose an anarchist alternative, care of the self or Proudhonian moral self-direction to fight against the state or the coercive, vertical, oppressive and disciplinary power. Proudhon gears also his anarchy toward an ongoing critique or antagonism. As Préposiet (2007) says, Proudhon proposes a “critical anarchism”. For both authors - Proudhon and Foucault -, the unique law is the body or necessity.

Proudhon also criticizes distributive justice, which is, as we have already written, the realm of laws, feudalism, government or a military regime. Proudhon proposes commutative justice or anarchy based on freedom.

So, critique or struggle is the way to fight disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977b). According to Foucault (2012:37), this strategic model looks like “a battlefront (which) crosses the whole society, continuously and permanently”; Foucault (2012:62,130) adds this warrior model once generalized appears like the Hobbesian203 “war of all against all” or the “state of nature”, an “anarchist” political option that has beneficial consequences, as we are going to discuss from now on.

This battlefront puts all of us in one camp or another. We are engaged fighters or critics. For Foucault (2012: 37), there is no neutral subject; we are obviously “the adversaries of someone”. And why? We need to survive and to construct a space. According to Foucault (2012:39), “the more I accentuate the balance of forces, the

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203 Foucault (2012:62) criticizes the Hobbesian state of nature as an artificial or “diplomatic” way to justify the birth of the state. According to Foucault (2012:62), the Hobbesian war is not a “natural and brutal” war, in which “forces would be in direct confrontation”. For Foucault (2012:129,130), the Hobbesian wild is a “theoretical and legal wild that come from the forests to contract and to found the society”. As we have seen, that Foucauldian “brutal war”, made of energy and desire, finishes in the pacific care of the self.
more I fight, the more effectively the truth will unfold before me”. For Foucault, “the more the subject is decentered, or better, engaged in the battle, partisan, the more the truth can show itself and deploy itself before him” (Chevallier, 2014:100). And this truth is our space. Chevallier (2014:100) adds, the Foucauldian truth “implies the full engagement of the subject into the discourse he addresses” or into the space he creates.

And Foucault here seems again to know Proudhon. For Proudhon, antagonism or the perpetual war or our need to survive is fundamental, as we have already shown. Proudhon also finds inspiration in the Hobbesian state of nature - the war of all against all. Proudhon uses this state of nature as a device to show that in his anarchy need or the “body and limbs” are “the only true law” - a virtuous way. Proudhon (1861:78) also criticizes Hobbes who, in his opinion, did not grasp the ethical and “chivalrous” perspective of the state of nature; Proudhon says:

It is this virtuous and chivalrous character of the war that Hobbes did not grasp; having wisely recognized that the war is inherent to humanity, and almost its natural state, immediately contradicted himself, saying that this state of nature is a bestial state, an evil and wicked war and, through a new contradiction, Hobbes claims that the state was established for the sole purpose of preventing that state of nature.

For Proudhon, war or antagonism or critique is “the natural state of humanity”, and the virtuous tool human beings use to take care of itself and of society through anarchy.

As Revel (2016) and also Chevallier affirm, Foucault politicizes ethics. When we fight or take care of the self, we constitute our power (Revel, 2016). For Foucault, truth telling or critique means the enunciation of our values, rules and provisional order or space, as we have already studied. When we create space, when we win, we install our “stable mechanisms” (Chevallier, 2014:57). We pass from the subjectivation to the “objectivation” or subjectivity or the constitution of power (Revel, 2016). The “non-person” becomes “person”, a subject with an identity or subjectivity. For Foucault, a power relationship sets up an “aiming point” and a “border” (Chevallier, 2014:57). Foucault (1977b) explains, when the resistant wins
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and creates space, he crystalizes: “in order to resist, we must be like power, as inventive, as mobile, as productive as it. Like power, resistance organizes itself, coagulates itself, and cements itself”. But this “coagulation” is temporary or cyclical, because, Foucault (1977b) clarifies, “since there is a relationship of power, there is again a possibility of resistance”, as we have already discussed. Thus, when we crystallize, we pass once more from objectivation to subjectivation, from “person” to “non-person” (Revel, 2016). And this way to see power is spiritualization and an ethics: a political ethics.

Proudhon also supports a political ethics. For Proudhon, we are warriors and war and struggles are our natural state. So, when we win the battle, we occupy space or affirm our values or laws, being faithful to our own being or needs. When we win, we create power which is the affirmation of our truth or necessity. Proudhon’s mutualism is supported by this ability to establish our will with others through the contract. This reciprocal agreement is an affirmation of wills and desires. And this is a cyclical or revisable process, a perpetual struggle or modification, because our wills and desires change permanently, as we have already outlined. According to Proudhon, as we have stated in the outset of this section, “the war of all against all” is a solar society or a permanent devir or an anarchy constituted by fighters – an ethical and a political perspective. This is “the wheel of continual birth” of Deleuze and Guattari, as we have quoted before (see image 1, pg: 17).

For Foucault, our need is the motor of this perpetual movement, as we have examined above. We have only our need as free law in order not to be governed. The other exterior laws are always oppressive, unless our will agrees to follow them. So, when we face crystallization or identities and our will does not agree with this objectivation or exterior law, war or resistance re-starts in ourselves. Why? The spiritual fighter resists or re-acts in order to restore his needs here and now, as we have already argued. For that reason, Foucault notes, “philosophy’s question - critique - is a question about this present which is ourselves”. The Foucauldian activist lives ‘today’, realising its power. At stake is this ubiquitous power here and now. According to Foucault, the truth of history or our truth is “its ability to weaken and modify the present”, setting up through critique a new pacific order again and again or a “new temporary balance of forces” (Chevallier, 2014:90; Negri,
Jolly and Sabot (2013:10) conclude, “power is what structures and what mutilates identities, what does and what undoes the ‘human’ lives” here and now.

Proudhon has also this perspective of power as a strategic force or ‘space and time’ or an action here and now, as we have outlined before.

Hence, as we live now according to our needs and we are engaged persons or not neutral persons, our truth and our values are always subjective. As we have shown, we are historical beings, determined by our necessities here and now. The Foucauldian subject has a “historical a priori” (Jensen, 2016). We live on a time - and space - grid, as we have studied earlier. Our knowledge, thought and sciences are “built on the categories of a certain time” and they “change throughout time” (Jensen, 2016). Our truths and our knowledge are always ephemeral and subjective and never absolute. For this reason, we need to fight in order to live and to create our values or space in harmony with our needs and the world around us – our time. Nevertheless, at the same time, we cannot be subjugated by others’ subjective power, values and truth – by the Foucauldian order of things. This is a horological work in order to create a delicate collective balance.

Foucault also shares this historical perspective with Proudhon. For Proudhon, we are also historical beings. The author explains history is time, movement, force or war. For Proudhon, we create ourselves permanently through an aesthetic and poetical war - antagonism, critique – according to our needs. And our creations, laws or contracts or mutual spaces are, for that reason, always subjective or mobile or historical.

This historical or mobile feature of Foucault and Proudhon’s values, laws and spaces is the safeguard against oppression and crystallization. Mobility created by resistance is the way to fight against vertical or hierarchical links, establishing horizontal or egalitarian relations between people. This historical perspective is the guarantee of equality. For Foucault (2011b: 326,327), the “[horizontal] axis” links people together and even the intellectual - the person with “the courage of truth” - is linked horizontally “vis-à-vis those who are mistaken”. For Foucault, we are all

204 Foucault (2012:20) explains his intentions:
“What I have been trying to look at since 1970-1971 is the ‘how of power’. Studying the ‘how of power’, or in other words trying to understand its mechanisms by establishing two markers, or limits: on the one hand, the rules of right that formally delineate power, and on the other hand, at the opposite extreme, the other limit might be the truth-effects that power produces, that this power conducts and which, in their turn reproduce power … the triangle: power, right, truth”.

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equals; we are beside the other rather than above or below. Foucault (2012:61,62) talks about “the anarchy of the small differences that characterize the state of nature” - the widespread struggles in order not to be governed or oppressed. According to Foucault (2012:61), this anarchy is the “war of all against all”; it is “an equal war, born from the equality and taking place in this equality”; and this equality is “a non-difference” or an “insufficient difference” or a “pacific difference”. And how is it pacific when it is conducted by warriors? These struggles are “pacific”, because “even the weak knows - or thinks in any case - he is not far from being as strong as his neighbour” (Foucault, 2012: 62). According to Foucault, even the weak knows that he has power and is able to create space. For Foucault, this perpetual fight or anarchy is a pacific way.

According to Foucault, there is a difference between this “war of all against all” and the classic war, for instance, between states. For Foucault (2012:63), in terms of “war of all against all”, at stake is “the forces themselves in a direct manifestation” here and now. For instance, when we discuss the conservation of the building where we live with our neighbours or when we solve misunderstandings in our workplace with our co-workers; these are direct actions. In classic war, there is “theatre” – and struggle is “a representative system that operates in the field of diplomacy” (2012:63). Foucault prefers the former approach. The Foucauldian idea is that people solve permanently the spread of struggles - “the war of all against all” or agonism - in order to make classic war unnecessary (Foucault, 2012:18). And this is a solution or a way that everyone can access.

Here Foucault seems again to know Proudhon or to be inspired by him. The theme of war and peace, and consequently of equality, is a central topic, in Proudhon’s thought, as we have just seen. This topic inspires and entitles one of his fundamental writings War and Peace. And, as we have already analysed, for Proudhon, war - the permanent antagonism - is divine and not the same as violence or piracy or terrorism; it is creative power or immanence, as we have already outlined. This immanence is everywhere and all of us are fighters and have access to this creative power or force. We are all equals because we have all similar “conditions or means” and this similarity or equality is a pacific way, as Foucault also explains. This creative power or spontaneous force allows us to satisfy our needs directly or, in other words, to achieve satisfaction, tranquillity and peace. Proudhon stresses, “directly” is synonymous with an immediate and equal power that manifests itself
without hierarchies, for instance, in order to set up the mutualist contract. As we have already pointed out, Proudhon defends the idea of individuals and groups bargaining directly “with each other for the things they want, without any intermediaries”. As we have studied, mutualism is justice or to “become equal” and this is a harmonious social way.

According to Foucault (2012:39,177), this anarchy is similarly an “explanation from below”. And, although harmonious, for Foucault (2012:39,177), this anarchic “below” means, “the most confused, the most obscure, the most disordered, the most hazardous”. Nevertheless, Foucault (1977b) adds, resistance “comes from below and distributes itself strategically”. As we have already noted “strategically” signifies the direct manifestation of our will or power or truth. According to Foucault, this anarchy or state of nature works from the chaotic micro level to the level of truth. This micro level is the beginning of that strategic path which leads to truth, the ‘other epistemology’ or the local knowledge. The ‘other epistemology’ is the true knowledge of the weak or the small, those – everybody - who are below. So, if those struggles are the truth or a pacific way, how are they chaotic as well? Foucault (2012: 124) clarifies, “this varied technological knowledge in their dispersion, in their morphology, in their regionalization, in their local character, with the secrecy surrounding them, were the challenge and the instrument of an economic and political struggle”. Those ‘knowledges’ without voice – secrecy - are transgressive and challenge politically and economically institutional or installed knowledge or order. And this is the reason they are chaotic. Nevertheless, their novelty or contribution is the truth and another perspective of order. For Foucault, as we have studied above, when we rise up, we introduce subjectivity or space in history and “give it breath” - novelty (Bocquet, 2013:120). Nevertheless, Foucault warns, “these ‘confused voices’ do not sing better than the others, nor tell the – objective - truth” (Bocquet, 2013:120). Each of them is just one more - equality.

Proudhon also defends a bottom-up perspective, criticizing the concepts of government and authority. According to Proudhon, as we have just explained, “the government of man by man is illegal and illegitimate”, is verticality, oppression or even theft: private property. According to Proudhon, modern government means private dominion - and “property is theft”. Proudhon’s life was a public combat” against this social, economic and political reality: property and government. Proudhon wants to finish with the notion of government and authority. For that
reason, he criticizes Rousseau’s social contract that “sets up an authority that is external regarding the contractors” (Préposiet, 2007:203). Proudhon would prefer Saint Simon’s stance, which intends the end of government (Préposiet, 2007:207). According to Proudhon, government works from above and, for that reason, is repressive. For Proudhon, the producer or the worker or the author is the ruler, ruling his creations from below and horizontally (with the others), for instance, in groups through the contract in a legitimate way. Proudhon proposes those "inter pares conventions" (Préposiet, 2007:203).

So, we could depict this Foucauldian and Proudhonian anarchist landscape, as “a field of power”, composed by “a set of occasional and disseminated struggles, a multiplicity of local unpredictable and heterogeneous resistance” (Foucault, 2012: 187). And this variety of points of resistance is the Foucauldian “diagram”. The diagram is a “cartography” that exposes “power relations that constitute power” (Deleuze, 2012:42,44). For Foucault, as we have already noted, those power relations are “microphysical, strategic, multi-point, diffuse”; they are “local” and also not “localizable” connections (Deleuze, 2012:44). The diagram is a “network of alliances” or “small local groups” of power relations, which forms “an unstable system in perpetual imbalance” (Deleuze, 2012:43). The diagram is “inter-social”, fluid and a “becoming” (Deleuze, 2012:43). This is the permanent war of all against all. This is anarchy.

As we have set out, Proudhon calls this “diagram” or set of struggles “federalism”. For Proudhon, the federation is a “political contract” based on mutuality or mutualities. It is also a way to organize groups externally and internally. Foucault and Proudhon give the same image of this anarchic field of power: the war of all against all. Nevertheless, the authors have a complementary task. Foucault is a researcher. Proudhon is more political.

Foucault’s proposal develops this informal war – no form - and its content. In our opinion, it seems Foucault explains how Proudhon’s federalism, mutualities and contract works from inside, how their content behaves. Foucault talks about heterotopias, diagrams and virtualities – abandoned tips we could link at any time. As we have studied, Foucault (2013:XIV) just gives some informal political recipes,

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205 Foucault distinguishes between diagram and structure. The diagram is constituted by alliances that create a “flexible and transversal network that is perpendicular to the vertical structure” (Deleuze, 2012:43).
suggesting “what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems”. In short, Foucault tells us how power works. For this reason, his philosophical experiences and recipes explore, explain and complement Proudhon’s proposals, showing why they are so important and useful.

In turn, Proudhon just says that these federations, mutualities and contracts are something collective, fluid and mobile. Nevertheless, the author does not work on this fluidity. Proudhon is more concerned with the pragmatic and practical side of politics: people need to understand and to know how to organize and to work together freely and directly. So, Proudhon goes further than Foucault politically – in terms of polis organization - and suggests some more specific formulas or solutions, although without any content.

This complementarity between Foucault and Proudhon continues. For Foucault, this big heterotopia or diagram or federation created through critique or parrhesia - the scandalous truth telling - and permanently opened to the exterior world is the alternative landscape to property or government, as Proudhon says. Foucault gives the example of the Cynic, in order to show how truth telling - parrhesia - or critique opens a transparent way of life that contrasts with the closed way of property. Foucault (2011b:254,255) remembers that the Cynics applied the principle of non-concealment literally. For instance, the Cynic Diogenes ate and masturbated in public. For Foucault (2011b:254,255), the aim of this exaggerated “blaze of naturalness” was to scandalize and to explode the “codes” of privacy associated with property implicitly or explicitly.

Thus, we could say Cynic activists inhabit this Foucauldian “diagram” or big heterotopia. This Cynic or Foucauldian activist, an egalitarian person, works directly without intermediaries and representatives. He is a nomadic, mobile, and plural personality, opened to the other, who creates transparent spaces in order to survive and to live in peace. He is the other political subject or the anarchist that runs a spiritual path of moderation, having need as the unique law and critique as the main political tool or alternative to government.

And Foucault also seems to be one of these activists. Foucault is really interested in those struggles; Foucault is an engaged intellectual, as we have just shown. Critical struggles are his main field of work. But more than work, they are his life or his “autobiographic” work, as we have pointed out. For Foucault, “to think is to experiment and to problematize”, also about his own life (Deleuze, 2012:124).
Foucault says, “whenever I had tried to do theoretical work, it was from elements of my own experience” (Eribon, 2011:54). According to Foucault, “theory is not the result of a disinterested intellectual” (Bocquet, 2013:121). As we have seen, the “theory does not dictate the law”, because the intellectual is engaged (with his life) in his theories: “in truth and power regime” (Bocquet, 2013:121). The intellectual is an activist or a militant.

For Foucault, this engagement in truth - the other epistemology - is his concept of “militancy”. Militancy means “bearing witness by one’s life in the form of a style of existence” (Foucault, 2011b:184). This militancy “must manifest directly, by its visible form, its constant practice, and its immediate existence, the concrete possibility and the evident value of an other life, which is the true life” (Foucault, 2011b:184). According to Foucault, to be an activist, and also an intellectual, is to act in order to create true space or the truth or the true life. It means to stylize his existence according to his necessity. In another way, the truth or the true space is his life or his body, which he sculpts militantly. The body is the very beginning of the militant heterotopia or the autonomous space. The body is the Absolut zero point from where the heterotopia or the militant space begins. So, for Foucault, to be militant is a “mode of life”, the “scandalous” life of truth - the courage of truth - an “other life” or anarchy. Militancy is a life in a diagram composed by heterotopias or in a big heterotopia.

Foucault explains that this militancy or heterotopias or autonomous spaces already exists in society and gives living examples:

the aspect of bearing witness by one’s life, the scandal of the revolutionary life as the scandal of the truth were, roughly speaking, much more dominant in the movements of the mid-nineteenth century. Dostoyevsky should of course be studied, and with Dostoyevsky, Russian nihilism; and after Russian nihilism, European and American anarchism (Foucault, 2011b:185).

Foucault sees nineteenth century anarchism as a living example of the true life that even should be studied in order to better understand what this true life or militancy really is. So, we could deduce that Foucault’s own practice or life from this kind of militancy or anarchism. And as we have been arguing, Proudhon, an anarchist of the nineteenth century, seems really to share this same kind of militancy and true
life. Proudhon is really an intellectual that “sinks theory into practice”. Proudhon researches and fights as a politician and anarchist in order to change society, for instance, theoretically through mutualism, federalism and anarchy, and practically through workers’ associations, cooperatives and the bank of the people (Préposiet, 2007:177,192,194).

Foucault had the same anarchistic and militant attitude, for instance, when he created the GIP - *Groupe d’information sur les prisons* - his “scandalous” prison movement (Bocquet, 2013:113). For Foucault (2011b:185), the political function of the intellectual is to “denounce the intolerable” - scandal - or “going after the truth, manifesting the truth, making the truth burst out”. And this is his main objective regarding his concrete struggles, for example, in prisons. Foucault (1971) wants “the intolerable, imposed by force and silence” to “cease to be accepted”. According to Foucault (1971), the GIP’s fight “is not made to accumulate knowledge, but to increase our intolerance and to give rise to an active intolerance”. Foucault (1971) throws down his challenge and invites people to become intolerant about “prisons, justice, the hospital system, psychiatric practice, military service, etc”.

Foucault is a “specific intellectual” or activist thinker engaged in particular fights - prisons, for instance. “Specific” means the intellectual is linked with struggles, which occur on particular issues, in concrete places: “local struggles” (Eribon, 2011:409,410). For Foucault, “the era of the universal intellectual (*à la* Sartre) is over” (Bocquet, 2013:118,121,122, Eribon, 2011:409). Foucault and his GIP companions explain their local or concrete work: “we ask those who … have had an experience of prison or a relationship with it. We beg them to contact us and let us know what they know” (Foucault; Domenach; Vidal-Naquet, nd).206 Foucault and his companions include themselves in the prisons fight. They write in GIP’s Manifesto: “we are under ‘custody’ (**garde à vue**); prisons are “one of the hidden regions of our social system, one of the black boxes of our lives” - the “carceral continuum” - (Foucault; Domenach; Vidal-Naquet, nd). This said, for Foucault, theory strengthens

206 Kelly (2013) frames Foucault’s prisons activism: “This research on prisons began in activism. The French state had banned several radical leftist groups in the aftermath of May 1968, and thousands of their members ended up in prisons, where they began to agitate for political rights for themselves, then began to agitate for rights for prisoners in general, having been exposed by their incarceration to ordinary prisoners and their problems. Foucault was the main organizer of a group formed outside the prison, in effect as an outgrowth of this struggle, the *Groupe d’informations sur les prisons* (the GIP – the Prisons Information Group). This group, composed primarily of intellectuals, sought simply to empower prisoners to speak of their experiences on their own account, by sending surveys out to them and collating their responses”.
struggle (Bocquet, 2013:121). In another way, theory is a practice that multiplies the struggles and does not totalize them (Bocquet, 2013:122).

And Foucault really multiplied those fights during his life. As Eribon (2011:444) says, Foucault was a great organizer. He participated in several movements or spaces - relations of people - in order to give visibility to those at the margins. Foucault fought against prisons, racism, the death penalty, for migrants’ rights, against the administration and tax following a fire at a nightclub that killed about 50 people, against people’s courts in China, against the justice system as a whole, against the Franco’s regime because eleven people were sentenced to death in Spain, against oppression in Poland, and against the Gulag in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

While he was involved in political activism, Foucault does not fix himself in a movement – preferring informality instead (Golliau, 2014:7). He is always inside and offside. Zamora (2016) describes Foucault as follows:

he believed in neither Marx nor Freud, nor in the Revolution nor in Mao, in private he snickered at fine progressive sentiments, and I knew of no principled position of his on the vast problems of the Third World, consumerism, capitalism, American imperialism

As Eribon (2011:385) remembers, Foucault was viscerally against institutions, which, in his perspective, threaten every movement and uprising. So, Foucault dwells in this unstable and informal landscape, the diagram, and he is also an informal or nomadic person - also an intellectual - in perpetual motion.

And what is the political goal of this perpetual movement? As we have already affirmed, Foucault inhabits a non-representative diagram. Deleuze (2012:43) explains, the Foucauldian diagram

does not work to represent a pre-existing world. It produces a new kind of reality, a new truth model ... It makes history, undoing the realities and previous meanings, providing new points of emergence and creativity,

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207 As we have affirmed, Foucault supports the diagram, rather than the structure.
unexpected combinations and improbable continuities. It overtakes history in a becoming.

In his writings Foucault presents the intellectual as an informal person or a theoretical activist, a becoming or a critic, rather than a representative. Foucault really assumes his “philosophical life as militancy” in his last days (Foucault, 2011b:292). And as we have already argued, this militancy is a style of existence or the care of the self. For Foucault (2011b: 243,300,302), the philosopher is “the physician of everyone” who has a double task, “a double *epimeleia*”; “to take care of men’s care”, as kind of “universal night-watchman” or as a cynic “guard dog’s life”. This task is an “aptness and general usefulness” based on *parrhesia*, the courage to tell truths useful for everyone (Foucault, 2011b:326). And Foucault characterizes the person that tells those true things. This kind of person has a “pure heart, courage, and a noble soul”, because he takes care of himself (Foucault, 2011b:326). So, for Foucault (2011b:243), those noble’s souls and this double care is “useful to all men”. Foucault (1971) explains his political intentions and how to be a useful intellectual; Foucault wants to give the word to those who have experience of prison. Although they do not need help to ‘become aware’: the consciousness of oppression is there perfectly clear, knowing very well who the enemy is. But the current system denies them the means to formulate, to organize themselves.208

So, the intellectual or the philosopher who is immersed in the struggle is there also to help them to organize and fight - “to take care of men’s care”.

Thus, as we have already shown, this Foucauldian critical alternative presupposes an “other” kind of representation, “a new truth model” or a ‘truth’ representation, inspired by cynicism. “The Cynic appears as a man whose poverty, destitution, lack of home and country are nothing other than the condition for being able to exercise, in a positive way, the positive mission he has been given”: to be

It seems, here, Foucault admits some kind of representation. However, in our opinion, as Foucault states, the intellectual’s task is just to be an amplifier *ipsis verbis* of the voices that have no “means to formulate” or “to organize” themselves, because reality – the system – forecloses them. And the intellectual is always engaged in the struggle. Foucault also feels himself a prisoner, as he writes in GIP’s Manifest: “we are under ‘custody’”. So, the intellectual or the activist just looks after his comrades, just manifests *inter pares* solidarity.
“guard dog’s life” (Foucault, 2011b:300). Foucault suggests these new kinds of ‘politician’ – with “pure hearts, courage, and noble souls”- criticizing the “intermediary” concept. The other politician might also have the austere conditions of life, we have referred above: “poverty, destitution, lack of home and country” (Eribon, 2011:387). As Tacheji (2008:151) tells us, in his later works, Foucault invents a “new figure”, “the latest figure of Foucault’s philosophical breviary”. This figure is “the dog”, the cynic described as kataskopos, as “scout” - éclaireur; the cynic sees with “other eyes” and “beyond our human too human perspective”; the cynic “does not think differently, but is inherently different”. For Foucault (2011b:302,303), the cynic who tells the truth to the other in a scandalous mode is the politician par excellence. The Foucauldian politician takes a protest action or “the duty to contradict the other” (Balibar, 2016). And this critical true mode is democracy and “contra-democracy”; it is “not to accept a real government”; for instance, it is to criticize the liberal democratic representation or government (Foucault, 1994a:565,566; Balibar, 2016). This cynic is the Foucauldian politician or activist: the anarchist.

Nevertheless, from a Foucauldian perspective, to become anarchist or cynical is a possibility open to everyone. As we have already seen, for Foucault, we are all philosophers or ‘kings’ (‘sun kings’: éclaireurs) by nature. Nevertheless, not everyone wants to take this path (askesis). Hence, to be cynical or anarchist is the challenge Foucault takes upon himself, answering the question: “what is the task of the intellectual today?” (Tacheji, 2008:151). Foucault answers with his own life. As we have studied before, Foucault wants to take this cynical path and to provide a new light for his time, as the cynics do. For Foucault (2011b:233), “cynicism sheds a new light on, gives a new form to that grand old political and philosophical problem of the courage of the truth”. And to be anarchist is to shed this light and to take care of ourselves, having our animality as law; to be anarchist is that spiritual, ethical and political path without exterior laws and moral laws. The cynic is the naked man who reduces “all pointless conventions and all superfluous opinions”; he practices “a sort of general stripping of existence and opinions in order to reveal the truth” (Foucault, 2011b:171). This is the ‘other life’; it is an effort of personal and collective organization. The one who takes this ethical and virtuous path (askesis) becomes anarchist: who takes care of oneself and at the same time contributes to another world – ‘taking care of the other’ care.
To be anarchist is to be a carer, as Foucault (2011b:279, Eribon, 2011) pretends to be; he is not a doctor as his father would want him to be, but, as a cynic and as activist, he has a “care relationship, a medical relationship” with others. He was ‘doctor to everybody’. He was not the physician of bodies, but he was a ‘doctor of humanity’.

And also like the cynics, to be anarchist is to be a nomadic person, as Foucault was. Foucault lived many years abroad a kind of exile, for instance in Sweden and Tunisia where he was lecturer and professor (Eribon, 2011). From a Foucauldian perspective, to be cynic or anarchist is to “roam”, is not to be “integrated into society”, is not to have “household, family, hearth, or country” (Foucault, 2011b:170). To be anarchist or cynic may also be to be unmarried or without children, and to devote oneself to philosophy, as Foucault did. In turn, to be anarchist could be to have a marital life. Perhaps, for that reason, Foucault (2011b:302) launches the question,

‘Who’, Epictetus asks, ‘provides the greatest service to men, those who bring two or three ugly-snouted brats into the world [that is to say, those who marry and have children; M.F.], or those who, to the best of their ability, exercise supervision (hoi episkopountes) over all men, observing what they do, how they spend their life, what they care for, and what they neglect contrary to their duties’.

So, Foucault does not deny the cynic or the philosopher could be married and have a partner and a family. Nevertheless, it might be hard to reconcile these ways. It seems Foucault thinks about himself, a single man, and he suggests to be an anarchist is to have another kind of family where both partners take care of themselves. As we have already seen, for Foucault, marriage would be more virtuous and society too, if partners share the same spiritual path or life. Foucault (2011b:170) illustrates with the story of Hipparchia and Crates.

Hipparchia really wants to marry Crates, a Cynic philosopher who, as such, has absolutely no desire to marry. So Crates, exasperated by the attentions of Hipparchia, who said she would kill herself if he did not
marry her, stood before her, stripped naked, and said: This is your husband, this is what he possesses, decide then, because you will not be my wife unless you share my way of life

As we have seen above, the relationship between husband and wife is based on the care of the self and this is the main key and law to the resolution and arrangement of common lives. This is the main way to have a spiritual and happy life in common or an anarchist life - in *polis*.

For that reason, the other political being lives an alternative life. It is a carer and not an intermediary or a representative who, according to Foucault, shares the ideological values and themes imposed by the bourgeoisie and capitalism (Eribon, 2011:387). As we have seen, the political being just looks after his comrades, manifesting solidarity in common struggles. As we have just argued, for Foucault, the intellectual is also a carer and a kind of courageous whistle-blower who shares and makes his fellow fighters’ claims heard, because those claims are also his claims. The intellectual’s task is just one among others, because each participant has his own task and contribution.

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209 It is interesting to note that nudity or the body is the ultimate thing the Cynic possesses: it is his law or his virtuous referential.
For Foucault, the intellectual or the anarchist must above all “listen” to fellow activists and “reproduce in quotes the words of those who speak” (Eribon, 2011:394). Foucault adds, regarding his work in GIP with prisoners, “everyone must know that one is participating in the writing by the fact one speaks” (Eribon, 2011:394).

The Foucauldian anarchist is very similar to Proudhon’s anarchist. Proudhon is also against the concept of political representation – representative government. Although he was a member of parliament (1848-1849), he was so direct and so radical he was arrested for fighting against property in the French National Assembly. Then, as Préposiet (2007:178) tells us, Proudhon became an “abstentionist”; he stopped participating in formal or representative democracy and he wrote “Shame on universal suffrage!” (“Honte au suffrage universel!”). Proudhon (2009b) declares himself “disappointed” about “direct universal suffrage”, and considers it “responsible” for the Second Empire. Proudhon (2009b) blames both the “imbecile” proletariat and the “coward” and “greedy” bourgeoisie though he tries to conciliate them. Consequently, as we have seen, Proudhon proposes the contract as an alternative to government. And in terms of federalism or coordination between spaces, as the author has mainly a local perspective, he just suggests a political simplification: the agency. As we have analyzed, the agency has revisable functions.
and very limited ones. The idea would be: the bigger the number of contractors, the fewer the agency services. This agency is created and allowed by the contractors in order to help the articulation between groups and is based in a perpetual fight. So, instead of a representative, Proudhon proposes a contractor limited by a permanent fight working in a local dimension. In terms of larger dimensions or federations, Proudhon suggests just a coordinator with restricted functions that are also permanently revised. For Proudhon, as we have seen, this contractor is a free person who follows a virtuous path, understood as moral self-direction - the care of the self. It is the anarchist who supports the mutuality principle and federalism. It is a group or a collective or mobile subject who lives through ongoing transformation.

For Foucault, those fluid political figures - intellectuals, philosophers, anarchists - who inhabit this informal map are “new subjectivities”, forms without form or an undefined set of power relations, as we have discussed earlier (Deleuze, 2012:123,131). Deleuze (2012:123) takes up the story, “for Foucault, everything is variable and variations”. According to Deleuze (2012:123), this Foucauldian “new self” emerges slowly from “capitalism mutations”, as a “nucleus of resistance”. This Foucauldian permanent fluidity is the way not to fall in to crystallized, oppressive and fascist situations and relations.

For that reason, for Foucault, this alternative subject is also a mutualist one as it is for Proudhon. As we have seen, this nomadic self is the conjugation of a pure matter and a pure form (Deleuze, 2012:43). The self is constitutively pluralistic from the start. Form and matter work together, allowing, on one side, the subject to take care of itself and to be free and self determined. And, on the other side, this critical path permits the subject to create nomadic relationships with the others - ‘other spaces’ or heterotopias – in a double sense: (i) escaping from capitalism and from hierarchical and oppressive relations; and (ii) emerging from those capitalist relations in a mutualistic, collective and harmonious way, taking care of the others’s care.

Foucault highlights, those “specific” struggles that rise from oppressive relations “are part of the revolutionary movement”, because: (i) they are “radical”, they have “no compromise nor reformism”, they do not attempt to develop the same power with only a change of holder (Eribon, 2011); and (ii) they have to “fight against all controls and constraints that lead to that same power everywhere” (Eribon, 2011). For Foucault (2012:54), the revolutionary discourse has placed itself on “the history-claim, the history-insurgency side”. For Foucault, what produces unity
between those partial struggles and the revolutionary movement is the same system of power; both fight against “all forms of exercise and application of power” (Eribon, 2011). According to Foucault the revolutionary “problem of exploitation and wealth” is also a problem of “too much power”. Zamora (2016) believes that Foucault was not concerned with exploitation and wealth, as a consequence.

Nevertheless, there is a difference between those nomadic struggles and the proletarian movement. The proletariat wants to take power - “for the first time in history” - through a “violent dictatorial and bloody revolution” - the dictatorship of the proletariat (Eribon, 2011:388,399). But, for Foucault, this attitude is a “bureaucracy” or the rest of “the petty bourgeoisie” that exercises this power rather than the proletariat itself (Eribon, 2011:388,399). And here is the difference. The specific intellectual is not a member of this “petty bourgeoisie” and his role is neither administrative nor the state’s work; his role is neither to “form the working class consciousness” nor to take power, but to help this “consciousness” - just in case it wants to be helped - and this “worker knowledge” to “enter into the information system in order to diffuse their ideas”.

As we have argued, for Foucault, we could not seize power nor the state, nor make a revolution, as Marxists suggest, nor just reform the state, because we live in a disciplinary society: (i) invaded and surrounded by that diffuse power or by relations of power that are not seizable and where (ii) the state almost does not exist, as we have pointed out before (Foucault, 2012:173,174; Bocquet, 2013:116).

And here Foucault recognizes his proximity with some anarchists, like Proudhon. Foucault (2002:154,155) argues,

According to that, I would be much more anarchist. I must say that I do not accept this entirely negative view of power, but I agree with you when you say that the revolutionaries want to take power ... the question is whether, within the current system, we can change power relations in microscopic levels, at school, in family, in such a way that when there will be a political and economic revolution, we will not find the same relations of power that we now find.

So, Foucault could not support the Marxist “theoretical and political vanguard” that claims to have a scientific discourse in order to educate the proletariat
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to seize power. Nevertheless, Foucault (2012:12) notes his main objection regarding Marxism is its pretension “to be a science” (Foucault, 2012:12). Foucault (2012:12) asks, “which speaking subject, which discursive subject, which subject of experience and knowledge do you want to minimize as long as you say ‘I have this discourse, I have a scientific discourse and I am a scientist?’” And Foucault (2012:12) continues, “What theoretical and political vanguard do you want to enthrone?” Foucault (2012:12) sums up: this is the bureaucratic “petty bourgeoisie’s” “ambition of power”. For that reason, the author (2012:120) would prefer

an immense and multiple combat of knowledges, ones against the others. …

The plural, polymorphous, multiple, dispersed existence of different knowledges, which exist with their differences according to the geographic regions and the size of businesses and workshops, … a kind of huge economic and political struggle … and not the day progressing over night nor the knowledge over ignorance (Foucault, 2012:120).

It should be noted that Foucault opposes the economic theory of power. According to Foucault (2012:15), power is not a “good”, as it is in the juridical conception, to liberals, to eighteenth century philosophers and later to Marxists. They all defend a kind of “economism” in the theory of power (Foucault, 2012:15). Foucault (2012:15) explains, for eighteenth century philosophers and Marxists, “power is regarded as a right” which we could possess as a good and “we could therefore transfer or dispose totally or in part, by a juridical act or by a law founding act”. As we have already shown, Foucault has another conception of power. For Foucault (2012:16), “power is not given, not exchanged, not taken back, but it is exercised and it exists only in act”.

According to Foucault (2012:16), power is a movement, a “balance of forces” and “what represses”; it is a “struggle”, a “confrontation” or a “war”. For Foucault (2012:16), “power is the continuation of war by other means”, as politics is. Foucauldian power is ubiquitous and dispersed, as we have seen. Power is not “univocal”; there are “countless points of conflict”, temporary fights and “inversion of the balance of forces” (Negri, 2011: 202). And the inversion of these micro-powers “is not acquired once and forever with a new control or by the destruction of institutions”. They are something biological, also sexual, mutual and permanent, as
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we have outlined. Negri (2011: 202) explains “these localized episodes may just be etched in history through the effects they produce on the whole network where they happen”. They are just another kind of reality or spaces that rise beyond the existing institutions inside the system, but not “beyond power”, as we have said (Sabot, 2013:18). Those “localized episodes are “counter conducts”, “rebellions” or “forms of dissent” (Sabot, 2013:18). And Foucault’s main goal is the reactivation of this local and “minor” knowledge using the archaeological method and genealogical tactics (Foucault, 2012:13).

Chevallier (2014:57) gives an overall vision of Foucauldian thought; on one side, we have “immediate and anarchic struggles that are always transversal and local” - the diagram; on the other side, we have “devices or very complex systems” with “global goals” that aim at “governing a particular community as a whole and each individual over a lifetime” (Chevallier, 2014:58). We face two kinds of historiography, an anarchic and local and another systematic and global, which are linked together by freedom (Chevallier, 2014:58). So, this anarchic power that creates space undermines also the system and its power relationship locally. We could say that this anarchy is the ‘true regime’ that mines every system - or political system -, occupying space permanently and not taking power through revolution. This is the Foucauldian agonistic concept of power or movement (Negri, 2011: 202).

The Foucauldian solution would be a cross between revolution and constitution. According to Foucault (2012:128), “what is fundamental … is the coupling of these two concepts”. In this sense, for Foucault, revolution is a subjectivation, a “revolution of forces”, for instance, “the move from night to daybreak or from the lowest point to the highest point” (Foucault, 2012:128). In turn, constitution is an objectivation or “a balance of forces” (Foucault, 2012:128). As we have already outlined, Foucault talks about a “philosophy of cyclical history” (Foucault, 2012:129). This means “history develops in circles” permanently: after a revolution a constitution, after a constitution a revolution and so on and so forth.

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210 As we have studied Foucault advocates a freedom that is successively an objectivation and a subjectivation. Foucault (2012:100) defends a warrior’s freedom or a “freedom of selfishness, avidity, the love of battle, the love of conquest and plunder. The warriors’ freedom is not that of tolerance and equality for all; it is a freedom that can be exercised by the domination ... freedom of ferocity”. Foucault (2012:106) adds, “Freedom is to be able to take, to be able to appropriate, to take advantage, to be able to order, to be able to obtain obedience. The first criterion of freedom is to deprive others of freedom. ... Freedom … is exactly the opposite of equality”, although we are all equally free, as we have studied. Freedom is the capacity we all have to create our space.
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(Foucault, 2012:129). Foucault (2012:129; Bocquet, 2013:116) defends a “solar revolution” and not a democratic or conventional one, because the *demos* does not exist, only the “avant-garde” exists but Foucault does not believe in it.

Once again, Proudhon has a similar position regarding revolutions. Proudhon is a “moderate” man with a “peasant common sense”, as Préposiet (2007:178) characterizes him. Proudhon advocates a “slow” and “patient” revolution, considering that “only the ignorant makes revolutions” (Préposiet, 2007:179). In Proudhon’s opinion it was not necessary to “bring down the entire superior sense” to achieve equality and anarchy (Préposiet, 2007: 179). In a letter to Michelet, Proudhon says, “a revolution lasts centuries” and is “a long process without an end, more than a cataclysm”. Proudhon supports anarchy or a permanent revolution or a daily struggle or production: an economic\(^{211}\) revolution above all (Préposiet, 2007: 179.180). As an anarchist, Proudhon is also a critic of Marx with whom he shared long hours of discussion (Préposiet, 2007:217). As Foucault, Proudhon believes neither in revolution by the *demos* nor in Marxist vanguards (Castleton, 2009). Proudhon (2009b) notes, “the people are a monster that devours all his benefactors and liberators. There is no revolutionary people; there’s only elite men who thought they could excite people and put their ideas of public good into practice” (Proudhon, 2009b).

Nevertheless, Proudhon believes in the “working class” and affirms its revolutionary practice should be exercised “outside the influence of the bourgeoisie” (Préposiet, 2007:199). The workers have a word to say due to their “numerical power”; their force could change society (Préposiet, 2007:193). However, Proudhon notes the working classes have no practical experience of economic or commercial life, which, in his opinion, is fundamental to act as in real life (Préposiet, 2007:193). For Proudhon, the workers need just the economic and commercial help of some "enlightened" and experienced people, in order to transform society according to their will (Préposiet, 2007:193). Those “enlightened” and experienced people seem very similar to the Foucauldian specific intellectuals who similarly exercise a solidarity with their struggles.

\(^{211}\) Proudhon does not accept the distinction between politics and economy, although Proudhon, as Foucault, does not see power as a good, as Marxists do (Préposiet, 2007: 182). Nevertheless, Proudhon has a mutualistic or reciprocal perspective of life and, in this sense economic because based on the exchange (reciprocity). For the author, “from the government to the administered people and from the administered people to the government all is reciprocal service, exchange, wage and reimbursement” (Préposiet, 2007: 182).
Hence, this Foucauldian other fighter is a non-Marxist fighter - not anti-Marxist - and also a “violent anti-communist”, although it sounds contradictory or paradoxical (Eribon, 2011:237,238). Foucault wants to avoid the repetition of “dangerous traditions”, as the USSR was. We use the expression ‘non-Marxist’, taking Foucault’s life as example because Foucault joined the *Parti Communiste Français* (PCF) in 1950. Foucault had been a PCF militant for three years (1950-1953) and, after that experience, he developed that “ferocious hatred” against communism. Kelly explains (2013),

Foucault began his career as a Marxist, having been influenced by his mentor, the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, as a student, to join the French Communist Party. Though his membership was tenuous and brief, Foucault’s later political thought should be understood against this background, as a thought that is both under the influence of, and intended as a reaction to, Marxism.

Foucault had practical experience of Marxism. Foucault became completely opposed to communism, the party of the proletariat and the “petty bourgeois” vanguard, as we have already seen he called it. He did not want to attempt revolution once and for all, lead by this ‘bourgeois’ vanguard.

In turn, as we have already highlighted, Proudhon was also completely against communism and its radical revolution. According to Proudhon, the concept of community means “absolutism” and is also synonym with “the economic idea of state” that absorbs the “personality” and the “individual initiative” (Préposiet, 2007:200). For Proudhon, the concept of community bears on the concept of property (Préposiet, 2007:201). Although the members of the community possess nothing, the community is the “owner” of “goods”, “persons” and their “wills” (Préposiet, 2007:201). And here is the point of discord with Marx.

Proudhon tries to synthesise the concept of property and community through the concept of mutuality, based on reciprocity and solidarity, as we have already studied (Préposiet, 2007:190,191). And Marx does not agree at all. Marx accuses Proudhon of being a protector of “the middle classes, artisans and peasants” and also an “apologist of the smallholding” (Préposiet, 2007:190,217). And here is Proudhon’s main point. This issue could be the great Achilles’ heel of the later communist
regimes after Proudhon - for instance, in Foucault’s period. For Proudhon, those “intermediate elements” of society, such as farmers, other more or less definable social groups and some “marginal survivals” intervene decisively in societies (Préposiet, 2007:219). For Proudhon, all those groups, farmers, artisans, the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the “white-collar”, marginalized by the Marxists, always maintained their “historical burden” (Préposiet, 2007:219). They broke and delayed the Marxist “duel” between labour and capital (Préposiet, 2007:219). Those groups had a voice in history and Proudhon’s intention was to show these marginalized cries of protest, complementing the dualist Marxist perspective of history (Préposiet, 2007:219).

And Foucault agrees again with Proudhon. First, Foucault supports the ‘other voices’, as we have been developing. And, second, his fighter or activist is a critic of Marxist political methods and their liberal roots. As Foucault (2012:182) explains,

Fascism and Stalinism have only extended a series of mechanisms that already existed in the social and political systems of the West. After all, the organization of the big parties, the development of police equipment, the existence of repressive techniques like forced labour camps, this is a legacy well established by liberal Western societies that Stalinism and fascism just absorbed.

Foucault (2012:182) adds, “there would be between ‘liberal societies’ and totalitarian states, a strange affiliation, from normal to pathological, even monstrous”.

Foucault sees in liberal democracy the roots of big states, “big parties”, “police equipment” and “repressive techniques” that would be adapted by fascism and Stalinism. For that reason, perhaps, when his party of the proletariat’s pet hate arose, Foucault never again joined another party. He collaborated with Maoist movements, for example, on prisons, but, as we have already explained, Foucault never belonged to any of these movements. His political option was the nomadic subject engaged in fluid movements or spaces.

Notwithstanding his leftist stances, Foucault did not vote for the socialist party nor support François Mitterrand’s election (Eribon, 2011:476,478,485). Some days

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212 For Foucault (2012:151,152), liberal means bourgeois.
after the election, he gave “public and spectacular support for the new socialist government” (Eribon, 2011:476,478,485). However this support “deteriorated quickly” (Eribon, 2011:476,478,485). At stake were the public disagreements between intellectuals and the French government about the coup d’état in Poland in 1981 (Eribon, 2011:476,478,485). At the same time, French intellectuals claimed their “independence” against “all powers”, pleading for a “return to ‘the libertarian tradition of the left’, stifled by the left’s political apparatus and apparatchiks” (Eribon, 2011:485).

In fact, as we have seen, Foucault dreamt of another kind of politician inspired by Cynicism. He defended another kind of government, a different relationship between rulers and ruled. And “work” plays here a fundamental role, as we have already outlined. Foucault supported critical work, where “obedience” and “subjection” between rulers and ruled have no more place (Eribon, 2011:477). According to Foucault, to work is to take care of the self or to criticize; “both things go hand in hand” (Eribon, 2011:477). As we have been studying, critique is Foucauldian alternative to government.213

Proudhon shares the same alternative way. For Proudhon, work is the key to set government and social order. Work or movement or moral self-direction means “divine creation”, as we have already said (Préposiet, 2007:183). According to Proudhon, the human being is mainly a creator and through work generates goods, wealth, society and himself, as we have just analysed (Préposiet, 2007:183). For Proudhon, man should exit from “servitude”; man is not a “cogwheel” (Préposiet, 2007:183,184). Proudhon wants to “restore the cultural dimension of work” (Préposiet, 2007:184). According to Proudhon, “labour work is a practice that duplicates knowledge”, where “intelligence accompanies the hand” (Préposiet, 2007:184).

In order to restore the cultural dimension of labour and to exit from servitude, Proudhon dreamt also of another kind of social organization. Mutuality is again the solution, as we have already set out. Through the contract we oppose or criticize the oppressive state power and create or affirm ourselves (Préposiet, 2007:191). The mutual contract, being another kind of property, balances state power and ensures

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213 After Foucault’s public support for socialist government, the socialists offered him two new tasks or “places”: “cultural counsellor in New York” or “the managing director of the National Library” (Eribon, 2011:477). Foucault rejected the first proposal; nevertheless, he was open to accepting the second one. But the position had been offered to a friend of Mitterrand (Eribon, 2011:477,478).
freedom (Préposiet, 2007:191). The Proudhonian contract is “the denial of the idea of authority”; it foresees just one law, the mutualist principle: “respect for the other and for oneself” (Préposiet, 2007:210). Through the contract people govern or create themselves and share freedom.

In the aftermath of May 68, Foucault’s goal was not to reform democracy nor to make a revolution, as we have already affirmed. Foucault was not a reformist. He considered that reform of democracy was impossible, as his GIP struggle showed. Foucault would never agree with prison reforms (Bocquet, 2013:117). The author and his GIP comrades, Domenach and Vidal-Naquet, (nd) said, “it is not our intention to suggest a reform. We just want to know the reality”.

In fact, Foucault just wanted to shed a new light on his present, as we have already pointed out. Despite his critiques of Marxism and liberal democracy in his writings, interventions and actions, Foucault did not suggest either a political programme or an alternative in order to fight the state or biopolitics. Like Proudhon, the author just left one single spiritual and political testament: (i) the subject is a heterotopia, a nomadic and a collective self; (ii) the task of this subject is to take care of the self. In his final days Foucault reveals himself as an anarchist, dispensing with external laws and having only his internal guide, his body or need, as we have shown in this sub-chapter. Beyond this, Foucault proposes nothing, as he recognizes that to offer programs of another society, another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world has led in fact to set up the most dangerous traditions. I prefer the very precise transformations ... in a number of areas that concern our ways of being and thinking, authority relations, the sexes relations, how we perceive insanity and disease (Foucault, 1994a: 575).

Proudhon has an identical stance. The author does not provide a program. As he says, “I just set up some points. Do not expect me to give you a system” (Préposiet, 2007:171). As we have already discussed, Proudhon just suggests the contract and its unique law, the mutualist principle, where he bears his federalism and anarchism.

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214 Before May 68, Foucault participated in an Education reform in France. May 68 was really an important mark in his political life.
To take care of the self or to respect oneself are the anarchist suggestions of Proudhon and Foucault. In terms of their content, each of us, regarding our needs, will know what to do with these spiritual and political landmarks.

EXAMPLES

As a framework to better understand the Foucauldian – and Proudhonian - care of the self – other representation - or the Foucauldian political spirituality, Foucault presents two cases of ‘other political realities’ or agonistic societies in his writings that could inspire this permanent spiritual, ethical and political path. These examples can be found in Foucauldian studies about the Franks and the Iranian Revolution. As Foucault notes, there is, for instance, in Iran a case of “spiritual dimension” or a “new political spirituality”, as we are going to see (Eribon, 2011:463; Stangroom, 2015). Foucault uses “an almost mythic rhetoric” to explain those revolutionary struggles that, in his opinion, have “potential to transform the political landscape of Europe as well as the Middle East” (Stangroom, 2015). From our perspective, Foucault sees examples of “the utopia now” – the care of the self - in the cases of Iran and the Franks. These cases would involve an attempt to realise here and now a distant “utopia” or an “ideal” in order “to renew fidelity rather than maintain obedience” (Stangroom, 2015). And this “fidelity” is not a religious one, but just a spiritual one: the fidelity to oneself and consequently the fidelity to the other – to care - as we have studied above.

In turn, these two cases are apparently opposed types of agonistic options: a warrior type - the Franks - and a non-warrior type (but also agonistic) - the Iranians. Foucault shows with both examples how the care of the self - the agonistic path – is just a way to achieve peace and a balanced life. From our perspective, the Frank and Iran cases are key examples in order to understand Foucault’s political thought (see Appendix: tables 1, 2, and 3).

In the next chapter we are going to carve the postanarchist ideal type, the main goal of our thesis. We are about to conclude our philosophical path and to close our main circle, returning to postanarchism.
V. THE POSTANARCHIST IDEAL TYPE

The postanarchist ideal type: Introduction

In this chapter we are going to construct the postanarchist ideal type that is the final goal of this doctoral dissertation. With this chapter we are closing the circle of our thesis or concluding our philosophical walk.

Adopting our circular method, we started this dissertation by outlining postanarchism in *The State of The Art*. Along the postanarchist road, we met Michel Foucault and then Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. We found that Foucault has been a great influence on postanarchism. We also found there are many important similarities between Proudhon and Foucault, for example, in terms of the concepts of space, struggle, movement, necessity, power and anarchy. We have suggested that Proudhon can be regarded as an author that Foucault read, but did not talk about (Revel, 2011:132,134). This intuition came after reading both literatures and, then, during our research visits to Bibliothèque Nationale de France and Collège de France in Paris. The confirmation consolidates the choice of our authors.

In fact, in *Chapter IV*, we showed that there are bibliographic gaps in Foucault’s work. Proudhon seems to fill these Foucauldian gaps. Then, we also discovered striking similarities between both authors and postanarchism. These similarities underpin the surprise of this thesis: the ‘gap’ between these anarchisms – classical and contemporary – is not only as significant as Newman argues, but that Proudhon can be regarded as a significant influence on post-anarchism. So, with both authors, Proudhon and Foucault, in *Chapter III*, we tried to better understand the roots or the genealogy of postanarchism. Then, in the *Chapter IV*, we constructed the Foucauldian activist ideal type with Proudhon’s aid. The goal was to introduce the postanarchist ideal type we are creating now. The aim was also to close the methodological solar circle returning to postanarchism.

For that reason, in this chapter we will have always as inspiration and as counterpoint the Foucauldian activist ideal type. This conceptual network provides a fundamental lens to better understand and interpret postanarchism. 215 And,

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215 As we have stated in the *Introduction*, beyond Foucault, postanarchism is also inspired by the other French theorists of the twentieth century and consequently by May 68 which is “a fruitful ‘family tree’ for postanarchism” (Evren, 2011:5,7; Noys, 2000:112).
conversely, today’s anarchism is an important device to understand Foucault’s thought and his activist practices. Moreover, postanarchism is also very important to better know Proudhon’s anarchism. Hence, in this chapter, we are going to critically discuss the postanarchist activist, to characterize him and to summarize the points where the Foucauldian activist is replicated in Newman’s work. Our intention is not to quarrel with Saul Newman’s postanarchism. But we are going to examine some of his ideas, to complement them. The aim in comparing and discussing Foucault’s and Proudhon’s concepts is to better illuminate and understand the typical postanarchist.

So, now in a more enlightened – solar - way, we are returning to that initial concept of postanarchism. The goal in delineating this postanarchist ideal type is mainly to give our perspective on postanarchism, engaging critically with Saul Newman’s writings. Our purpose is also to understand what anarchism, contemporary activism, and horizontalism are at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Through the ideal type, we are going to pick up the main characteristics of today’s anarchist, including the anti-globalization social movement activist, as Saul Newman presents it (Evren, 2011:5).

To construct this ideal type is an exercise of political theory. As we explained in the Introduction, the postanarchist ideal type intends to be a theoretical point of comparison or a theoretical contribution in order to help to better discuss and understand the real struggles and social movements of today. We intend to make theoretical contribution here and now and not advance a theory for now, as we think Newman risked also doing.

As Evren (2011:5) writes, Saul Newman’s ‘post-anarchism’ “is actually an attempt to create the theoretical equivalent of the anti-globalization movement” and, in this way, to make a contribution to today’s radical politics. In other words, Newman’s contribution is theoretically (post)anarchism here and now, as the anti-globalization movement is empirically activism or (post)anarchism here and now. And Newman’s postanarchism is a theory ‘here and now’ because it is something that comes from Newman’s need in a certain moment – the contribution he intends to make in his time. Classical anarchism also had a theoretical or a philosophical

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216 See Bibliography on Saul Newman.
217 The label ‘anarchist’ is not peaceful within the alter-globalization movement, as it is not for Foucault. Many in the anti-globalization movement would dispute the label anarchism. Nevertheless, as we have written above, for Graeber, for instance, the alter-globalization movements exhibit some anarchist characteristics.
perspective or side – making a “theoretical innovation” - in its epoch, with Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin among others (Newman, 2011:1,2).

Nevertheless, we could say Newman’s postanarchism here and now could become a theory ‘for now’ when, in a top-down movement, Newman links his postanarchism (theoretical side: top) to the alter-globalisation movement (empirical side: down), as Evren notes. Or, in Foucault’s and Proudhon’s framework, Newman’s postanarchism, working theoretically, risks becoming a theory without context or an essence or a “fixed idea” that could oppress the alter-globalisation movement of movements (Newman, 2003, Franks, 2000:140). And paradoxically Newman is completely against those essences or “fixed ideas” or “spooks”. As Newman (2003) defines it, a “spook” is “an abstract ideal that has been placed beyond the individual and held over him in an oppressive and alienating way”. As Foucault explains of his writings, theoretical work is an experience, a practice and not the other side of the practice (only theory) or something theoretical that fits the experience in a top-down movement. As we will observe later (pgs: 232-235), this stance by Newman has political consequences.

One of the original contributions of this thesis is to show the theoretical significance of Saul Newman’s work for today and to discuss this critically. For that reason, we are going to construct aesthetically the theoretical postanarchist or the theoretical alter-globalization activist or the postanarchist ideal type.

The construction of this ideal type is an aesthetic or “poetic” exercise or a work of art in Foucauldian sense: a creative act. We are designing the postanarchist figure and it is just an “experience” or a discussion, as Foucault relates in his books. Our intention is to avoid, in Foucault’s terms, theorizing our ideal type for now or to make an objectification or a “subjectivity” or a crystallization, as we have stated above. In our viewpoint, this ideal type is a philosophical, subjective and revisable work, à la Foucault. It is just a ‘theory here and now’ – a need to contribute. With this subjective ‘objectification’, our goal is to generate circularly more resistance and critique and, then, new objectifications, new resistance and so on and so forth. We would not like to fit the practice, just to discuss critically the practice and the theory. This is our difference with Newman.

218 Just to emphasize that, in our perspective, Newman's work is a contribution here and now, as we have argued above.
In this chapter, we will also have in mind our three working hypotheses: *postanarchism is space constitution; to establish space is to survive and constituting space is a struggle*. Following the study of Proudhon and Foucault these three hypotheses have been confirmed. These hypotheses will once more inspire this chapter in the circular way, as we have already explained in the Introduction: postanarchism is a fight for survival that creates space and this creation of space is postanarchism.

We are going to sculpt the postanarchist figure by dividing it into three parts: the legs, the torso and the head (see image 12).

![Image 12](image)

At the outset, we are going to design the legs or the postanarchist movement – the struggle; then we are going to sculpt the torso or the postanarchist work or workspace – the survival - and, finally, we are going to carve the head or the postanarchist ethical or spiritual way – the space. We start with the postanarchist legs.

**THE LEGS | the postanarchist movement**

![Image 13](image)
The Kantian framework: a theory here and now

As we have pointed out, Saul Newman’s (2011:1,2) intention is to bring the “theoretical innovation (of classical anarchism) to light” and also to affirm anarchism “as the very horizon of radical politics” today. As we are about to explain, we do not agree in a critical perspective with the former affirmation but we do agree with the latter one.

According to Newman’s first stance - postanarchism wants to bring the “theoretical innovation (of classical anarchism) to light” - as we have already shown in this thesis with Foucault and Proudhon, anarchism is always from the present. So, from our perspective, today’s anarchism is not just an innovation on classical anarchism. It is mainly something that comes from the present. It is a practice “here and now”. It is an ethical and spiritual way having our needs or our animality as its main law, although the other or society - in this case also classical anarchism - is always the condition of possibility in our world, as Foucault teaches. For Foucault and Proudhon, anarchism is an “innovation” or a difference. And Newman’s writings go in the same direction. So, classical anarchism was an innovation in its time just as postanarchism is today. Both are ‘today’s’ anarchism and different proposals. For that reason, after studying Foucault, Proudhon and also Newman, we could designate postanarchism as ‘today’s anarchism’ and not as a ‘post-anarchism’ or a post-classical anarchism.

In our opinion, paradoxically the postanarchist, the mutualist and the heterotopist despite being temporally different proposals inhabit the same anarchist ‘paradigm’: anarchism here and now. The postanarchist is not a step forward from the Proudhonian mutualist and the Foucauldian heterotopist. Postanarchism, as we are going to study in this chapter, claims anarchism here and now. For that reason, we argue that recent anarchist thought continues to work within “the epistemological paradigm of classical anarchism” - and vice-versa – and this is the great novelty of this research. In fact, when we look closely, although historical epochs are different and proposals are time limited, there are fundamental similarities between today’s anarchists, Proudhon from the nineteenth century and Foucault from the twentieth century, as we have said before; and their anarchy here and now has political consequences, for instance, in this thesis we argue that Newman’s criticism on essentialism and humanism - of some nineteenth century anarchists - and on
feminism does not apply to Proudhon’s thought (Newman, 2011:139). As we have already shown, Proudhon is neither an essentialist nor a humanist nor a feminist as some other classical anarchists are and, in these particular matters, he is very close to Foucault who is a great influence of today’s anarchism, as we have studied. Thus, they – the postanarchist, Proudhon and Foucault - fall within the same paradigm. They are all anarchists, as we are going to develop later. We criticize and discuss Newman’s stance that lumps all classical anarchists together because he does not study Proudhon. For that reason, Newman (2009:3) assumes a new postanarchist paradigm that “transcends” classical anarchism. The author (2009:3) explains his intention is really to show the way in which the “anti-essentialist and anti-humanist anarchism transcends and, thus, reflects upon, the limits of classical anarchism”. We disagree with this kind of ‘transcendence’ because this ‘transcendence’ already exists in Proudhon’s anarchism (classical anarchism), which also is anti-essentialist and anti-humanist, as we have already shown.

According to Newman’s second stance - postanarchism wants to affirm anarchism “as the very horizon of radical politics” today - we do agree with this. Newman is right. The anti-globalization movements are really anarchist proposals for today’s radical politics. As Evren argues, the anti-globalization movements are today’s anarchism. Evren (2011:3; Graeber, nd, 2002) adds, “the soul of the anti-capitalist movement is anarchist; its non-authoritarian make-up, its disavowal of traditional parties of the left, and its commitment to direct action are firmly in the spirit of libertarian socialism”. And those are anarchist empirical examples from today that enrich radical politics.

Hence, the postanarchist is interested in the here and now - although the theoretical postanarchist postulated by Newman is not the same as the alter-globalisation protester, as we have just studied. Newman fits the Kantian framework - the concepts of space and time – just like Foucault and Proudhon did. The postanarchist is engaged in his time and space and concerned with it.219 Newman (2011:106) asks: “is it not evident that there is a massive disengagement of ordinary people from normal political processes, an overwhelming scepticism – especially in the wake of the current economic crises – about the political elites who supposedly govern in their interests?” And Newman (2011:106) continues: “is there not, at the

219 From our perspective, postanarchism is not just a ‘theory for now”, as we have explained above.
same time, an obvious consternation on the part of these elites at this growing distance, signifying a crisis in their legitimacy?” To answer these questions, we start here a set of brief sections. The goal is to emphasize the main ideas and concepts that characterize postanarchism - and postanarchist - showing as it tries to overcome the gap between ruler and ruled.

**Bipolitics**
One of the consequences of this ‘gap’ between political elites and ordinary people is Foucault’s biopolitics. Newman (2011:106) notes: “as a defensive or pre-emptive measure”, the political elites make the state “more draconian and predatory, increasingly obsessed with surveillance and control, defining itself through war and security, seeking to authorise itself through a politics of fear and exception”. The author (2011:106,107) continues,

> Societies in the developed world increasingly resemble giant, hi-tech prisons, with their surveillance cameras, databases, biometric technologies and their enclosure of the commons. Are we not all haunted by the desire to destroy the chains that binds us, to escape these confines, to roam freely in wildness of a state of nature? Does not the desire to escape domestication recur as a powerful social fantasy? (Newman, 2011:155).

**Desire and dreams**
The postanarchist desires to escape from those “giant, hi-tech prisons” and to realise the “social fantasy”. To realise this fantasy or dream would be the way to overcome that ‘gap’ between elites and ordinary people and those “draconian” politics. And the postanarchist fantasy or solution is the identification of radical politics today with anarchism, as this takes place in anti-globalisation movements empirically. Newman’s postanarchist follows the same path.
The postanarchist: an ideal type

The concept of space

This postanarchist dream is the construction of autonomous spaces here and now. As our first hypothesis affirms, *postanarchism is space constitution*. This is the postanarchist’s goal or path: to construct oneself or one’s space collectively.

Nevertheless, here the divergences with Proudhon and Foucault become apparent. Newman’s space could not be a collective self – a heterotopia or a group - as it is for Foucault and Proudhon. In this stage, Newman could not walk side-by-side with Proudhon and Foucault (see: image11). And why?

Newman adopts Stirner’s ego. And this ego is less plastic than Proudhon’s and Foucault’s proposals. Newman (2003) talks about “a continuous process of self-formation of the subject”, “an active and deliberate practice of inventing oneself”, just as Foucault does. However, this “work of art” or “self-aestheticization” for Newman is first of all an individual path, although it is fluid and mobile and it is open to the other (Newman, 2003). Newman (2003) tries to work around Stirner’s “individuality”; Newman (2003) adds that it “may be seen here in terms similar to Foucault’s - as a radically contingent form of subjectivity, an open strategy that one engages in to question and contest the confines of essentialism”. But, in our view, Foucault would disagree with Newman’s grounds. As we have shown above, although Foucault - like Newman - also fights essentialism and pre-definitions, the author is completely against a “formal” individuality like, for instance, the Kantian subject. He sees the self as a “we” or a heterotopia – something without form or a subject *a posteriori*. Foucault is even against an empty self or form. As Newman (2003) points out, Stirner’s individuality is a “creative nothingness”, “a radical emptiness which is up to the individual to define”. Foucault would criticize this...
“radical emptiness” - without definition - because it is still a form (from the very beginning).\textsuperscript{220} In turn, Newman (2003) quotes the Foucauldian “care of the self” as a help to better understand Stirner’s proposal. However, in our interpretation, this is not the best aid to clarify Stirner’s thought in this concrete point. As we have studied before, the Foucauldian care of the self means also a combat between the formal and the material sides of the self, which in itself is a plurality without fixed form. And Newman does not develop this Foucauldian plural perspective. Newman finds a ‘subject’ – a unity - in Foucault’s writings; assumes it and makes the link with Stirner. For Newman (2003; 2009:8), Stirner deconstructs “the essential subject”, but accepts the ego and constructs “a theory of ownness [Eigneheit] to describe this radical individual autonomy”. Newman (2003) gets stuck with this ‘ego’ \textsuperscript{221} or individual, which, in his vision, is “paramount”.

So, we agree with Smith (2004:2). Newman does not deepen this collective perspective because Stirner stops him (Smith, 2004:2). According to Smith (2004:2) “Stirner’s brief but important treatment of insurgent collectivity suggests an absence in his own design, and in Newman’s”. According to Smith (2004:2) Newman would need to restore this “possibility of collective uprising”, because, in our opinion, this “possibility” would help him to better present his solutions and alternatives - for instance, the concept of space - against the political context he is concerned about in his ‘today’. Stirner’s ego limits Newman’s space, as we have already stated, because, in terms of space, Newman speaks about “possibilities of individual autonomy within power” (Smith, 2004:3). According to Newman, to create space is to open these autonomous individual possibilities (Smith, 2004:3).\textsuperscript{222} Nevertheless, from the outset, this autonomy is an ‘individual’ impulse that opens space through relations of power. For Newman, we open space between others, but this is an individual – and hierarchical, as Foucault would advocate - effort through power. According to

\textsuperscript{220} As we have already argued, we could admit a self in Foucault’s thought but this self would be the end of the virtuous path. As we have just said, this question could be explored in a future research.

\textsuperscript{221} Newman is not able to release completely his postanarchist from Stirner’s ‘egoist’ or its “ownness”. He tries, through Levinas’s concept of “an-archy” and through the “openness to the other”, not to be influenced by the Stirnerite ego, but Stirner’s predominance is stronger and really limits Newman concept of space, as we are going to study later (Newman, 2011: 178). We do not develop Stirner or his egoism in this thesis. We decided to follow Proudhon and Foucault’s path and to compare Newman with both authors. Nevertheless this is a research line we could develop in a posterior work in order to design Newman’s Stirnerite ego or ideal type, complementing this doctoral research, as we have already said.

\textsuperscript{222} Newman warns against the dangers of this concept of autonomy, as we are going to study later.
Newman, space is relations of people but those relations depart from an individual perspective and construct an individual autonomy as Smith notes.

And here, as we have already said, Newman is closer to Kant’s *a priori* subject than to Foucault’s ‘we’ or *a posteriori* subject. Newman’s starting point in order to construct space is always individual, as we are going to show during this chapter. Newman (2003) tries to walk side-by-side with Foucault (and Proudhon), showing even “the long-ignored Stirner may be seen as a precursor to contemporary poststructuralist thought”, included one of Foucault’s precursors. Nevertheless, as we have already explained, in terms of subject and space, Newman goes beside, but on another path to Foucault (and Proudhon). They claim similar ideas; they have close arguments, as we are going to verify, but there is Stirner between them and, for that reason, Newman walks a parallel spatial path.

**Spaces beyond State: movements**

Like Proudhon and Foucault, Newman aims to turn a new light on to his today. And a solution would be to articulate the utopian anarchist ideas with our democracies or to work beyond our democracies and to make democracy more radical or more democratic (Newman, 2011:96). In other words, for Newman, the postanarchist intends to make democracy more anarchical, building up autonomous spaces beyond the state.

For the postanarchists, “autonomous” signifies beyond state or something we construct without the aid of state sovereignty. And here, Newman meets Foucault and Proudhon. As we have already defined it, the postanarchist space means people relating to each other free from hierarchy, verticality and oppression (Newman, 2011:9,36). Thus, in other words, autonomous spaces signify equal, horizontal and free relations of people beyond the state framework.

And postanarchists construct those spaces and overcome state (i.) criticizing the state’s limits (ii.) in articulation with others. These are the tasks of the “newly emergent radical struggles and movements”: the critique or the creation of space beyond the state. Newman’s (2011:168) goal is to show those radical struggles – critiques - are autonomous spaces. So, for Newman, postanarchism is about space or

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223 We are going to develop the concept of critique later (pgs: 242-243).
The postanarchist: an ideal type

social movements\textsuperscript{224} - or movement or relations of people. And those spaces allow us to reflect on the state and on politics today, realising the “social fantasy” or our dreams collectively (Newman, 2011:168).

**Utopia now: the other voices**

Through “autonomous spaces” – or movement of people - Newman (2011:96,161-163) develops also the utopian\textsuperscript{225} concept – dreams or fantasies - that some nineteenth-century anarchists tried also to apply: the utopia now. Autonomous spaces are the utopia now. They are the realization of our dreams or imaginary here and now. As we have argued above, Proudhon’s utopia now is his anarchy or the mutualism. Following Proudhon, this mutualism is horizontal and consists of reciprocal relationships of people or spaces that already exist. And their aim is to have a fairer, more horizontal and freer society beyond state and government. According to Newman (2011:1,2), postanarchism is likewise a “social fantasy” that already exists: the anti-globalization movements – the theory for now? Postanarchism is in the twentieth century “the recurring desire for life without government” and “the rejection of political authority in the name of equality and liberty”. As Newman (2011:155) explains, this “desire” or movement is a “kind of utopia” - or the ‘utopia now’.\textsuperscript{226} Desire is an “anti-political imaginary of freedom and autonomy”. And this “imaginary” is a “powerful” device to criticize “contemporary conditions” and politics (Newman, 2011:155).\textsuperscript{227} For the postanarchist, utopia provides

a point of escape from the current order, a way of orienting and inciting (anti) political desire. Utopian thinking might be seen a way of puncturing the ontological status of the current order, introducing into it a moment of disruptive heterogeneity and singularity (Newman, 2011:162).

This utopia or “anti-political imaginary” is the “disruptive” power which the postanarchist has in order to transgress the “ontological status” and to create his own

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\textsuperscript{224} Movement means here “instability and chaotic flow” and not something close to a party, as Noys (2000:118) argues.

\textsuperscript{225} As we have studied earlier, utopia means ‘no place’.

\textsuperscript{226} Like the Foucauldian desire, the postanarchist desire is not a lack perspective. As we will see, the desire presupposes always a certain lack or necessity, but it is mainly a constructive and affirmative movement: a fight (Newman, 2011:177).

\textsuperscript{227} The affirmative power of freedom, as Nietzsche and Foucault would argue.
world here and now in articulation with others. For Newman (2011:155,156), the postanarchist utopia is a kind of Kantian *a priori* or “a kind of negative imaginary” or desire that “point of exteriority and excess” that allows postanarchists to run away from “the mental confines of this world”. Utopia is the postanarchist’s device against repression and oppression and the path to freedom.

So, for Newman (2011:162), there are “two different utopian moments”: “scientific utopianism” and postanarchist utopianism. The “scientific utopianism” of the nineteenth century is “a future anarchist society” that is “founded on scientific and rational principles” and is “the inevitable outcome of a revolution against the state”. Newman argues that (2011:156) the construction of a utopian world or a “desalinated world would be impossible and even undesirable”. This “utopian tendency” was just a “vision of a society without a state”, a vision of “a society based on free, voluntary arrangements and decentralised social structures” (Newman, 2011:39). The nineteenth-century anarchist Proudhon whose ideas are close to postanarchism, is not included in this anarchist set.

In postanarchist utopianism - the utopianism of the here and now - the “focus is less on what happens after the revolution, and more on a transformation of social relations within the present” - now. This utopianism works with the existent world “in the immediate sense, of creating alternatives”, “at localised points” – here (Newman, 2011:7). The postanarchist’s intention is not to invent something completely new and “desalinated” from the real world. As we have said, the postanarchist supports “utopia in terms of action” or desire based on our animality (Newman, 2011:7). For postanarchists, utopia is something “which emerges in political struggles themselves”, for instance, in the anti-globalization movement (Newman, 2011:7). Postanarchist utopianism is the “spontaneous human action (movement) and the urge to rebel” (Newman, 2011:40). For that reason, the postanarchist goes beyond “visions” without connection to reality, trying to bring to light “the underworld of today” or the Foucauldian “other voices” that are desire’s manifestations (Newman, 2011:39,156). The postanarchist adopts, for example, Proudhon’s utopian federalist system, which, as we have said, the author tries to apply to his time, not waiting for a revolutionary moment – the Proudhonian federalist organization linked cooperatives, voluntary associations, etc. (Newman, 2011:40). Postanarchists could not return “to the primeval bliss of the state of nature” (Newman, 2011:156). As some anarchists and also Proudhon warned, a society without political authority would not emerge inevitably.
The postanarchist: an ideal type

(Newman, 2011:40). The postanarchist’s goal was not to set up “an anarchist society” or a regime change (Newman, 2011:162). Hence, for Proudhon and postanarchists, radical politics only has consistency if a “utopian dimension” is present; “otherwise it remains caught within existing political frameworks and imaginaries” (Newman, 2011:138,139). Thus, postanarchism is the utopia now: a real and alternative politics “outside of, and in opposition to, the state” (Newman, 2011:4).

State vs antagonism

Newman (2011:35,107) defines the state as “a violent institution of domination – as a structure which sustains and intensifies other hierarchies and relations of power and exploitation, including economic relations”. The state is about violence, repression, domination, hierarchies and exploitation. For Newman (2011:106,107), the state seems to be yet “the central problem in radical politics”. And why is it a problem in radical politics still? Newman (2011:9) answers, for the postanarchist, “the state is actually the order of depoliticisation”. And “depoliticisation” means “the structure of power that polices politics, regulating, controlling and repressing the insurgent dimension” - desire or utopia now; the state forgets “the conflict and antagonism at the base of its own foundations” (Newman, 2011:9, May, 2000:125). For the postanarchist, the state is “stabilisation and naturalisation” or sovereignty that deletes antagonism (Newman, 2011:169). And this is a big problem in radical politics today, as we have studied before (Newman, 2011:169). According to the postanarchist, there is a mismatch between the state - crystallization - and people’s lives - movement and desire. This is the ‘gap’ between politicians – also radical ones - and ordinary people, as we have said before. Newman’s stance seems to be close to Proudhon’s antagonism or war and Foucault’s agonism. As our hypothesis states: to create space is a battle. Newman sees postanarchism as an “insurgent dimension” – a war. And it is this insurgent dimension or the utopia now that radicalises democracy. As Foucault remembers, to rebel and to riot is a good thing or a spontaneous thing - the ‘stasiastic’ potential. According to postanarchists, the insurgent dimension is anarchism or democracy’s roots. It is the postanarchist solution - the fantasy or dream - to today’s ‘democratic’s gap’.

In this sense, Newman (2011:97) distinguishes between “conflictual democracy” and “insurgent democracy”. The former takes place within the “nation-state” and in the “parliamentary institutions”, as a “safe agonism”. The latter,
insurgent democracy, is the opposite of the conflictual one. It is anarchism or postanarchism. Newman (2011:97) explains,

Whereas conflictual democracy practices conflict within the state, a democratic State which in its very name presents itself as an avoidance of the original conflict, inclining as a result conflictuality towards permanent compromise, insurgent democracy situates conflict in another space, outside the state, against it, and far from practicing the avoidance of the major conflict – democracy against the state – it does not shrink from rupture, if need be.

The pacific insurgent
The postanarchist is an insurgent rather than a violent person. The postanarchist is anti-terrorist and supports a “non-violent violence” or a non-violent war as the “ethical horizon” of its postanarchism (Newman, 2011:131). This idea also resonates with Proudhon and Foucault. The postanarchist distinguishes between (a non-violent) violence and force. The (non-violent) violence is synonym for postanarchist power. As we have learned with Proudhon and Foucault, power is war and “authoritarian” and creates “sovereign relationship, something that violates the autonomy of the other”. But this power stimulates antagonism and leads the other to use the same power circularly (Newman, 2011:131). In turn, as Proudhon and Foucault teach, power is a pacific way (equality). It also allows the interior battle or the mystical battle against passions and excesses: the care of the self. According to Newman (2011:131), the problem of (non-violent) violence is when it becomes force. And it happens when violence is used by the state in an overwhelming way in order to neutralize antagonism, for instance as Jacobins did: “the terror” (Newman, 2011:131).

Political power vs politics
Thus, according to Newman (2011:169), postanarchism is about “the political” or movement and the state is about politics or crystallization (Newman, 2011:177;
Evren, 2011:4). According to Newman (2011:8; 2001:149), the postanarchist ‘political’ could be seen as “the repressed unconscious of politics – the dimension of antagonism, movement and conflict at the heart of social relations”. For postanarchists, movement presupposes “a certain lack and open-endedness” or an “unfinished act, without telos” (Newman, 2011:177). For postanarchists, “the movement is the indefiniteness and imperfection of every politics” (Newman, 2011:177; Evren, 2011:4). Movement always leaves “a residue” or a seed or a loose end, which leads to new movements or insurgencies, as we have just affirmed (Newman, 2011:177). As with Foucault, movement is “virtual”. It connects the loose ends we leave behind us. The postanarchist politics is an “unfinished act, without telos” that always exists.

Newman (2011:8) explains, “there is a certain paradoxical inextricability between the political and the anti-political moment in anarchism; a certain productive tension that postanarchism uses to formulate new approaches to radical politics” (Newman, 2011:8). From a postanarchist perspective, to move against politics is to produce. It is this “tension” or antagonism between politics and anti-politics that creates other kinds of identities or spaces, as we are going to show. And this ongoing movement comes from postanarchist needs or, as Kant explains, it is the a priori power.

THE TORSO | the power to create space

Image 15

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228 Regarding our interpretation, this postanarchist political is more crystalized than Foucault and Proudhon’s political. At sake is the postanarchist ‘Stirnerite ego’ rather than the Foucaudian ‘we’ or the Proudhonian ‘group’ we have already talked about (Eribon, 2016).
The critic, the resistant, the activist

Like Foucault, and mainly like Kant, the postanarchist proposes insurrection or critique as its main work or work device (Newman, 2011:49). The postanarchist’s aim is to overcome the current order and ‘gap’, producing the “fantasy” or utopia now or an alternative space (Newman, 2011:49). The postanarchists critique undermines the current order or established knowledge, for instance, the “claims to universal truth made by scientific discourse” and also by scientific socialism. For postanarchists, “knowledge cannot be disassociated from power” and from the here and now (Newman, 2011:49). Hence, the critique shows these punctual power-knowledge relationships (Newman, 2011:49). The critic fights it – in war. At the same time, the critic unveils those power-knowledge relationships, local “clash(es) of interpretations” and local “struggles over meaning and knowledge” that are always subjective (Newman, 2011:49). So, the postanarchist is a critic. For postanarchists, to work is to criticize or to resist or to act. The postanarchist is also a resistant or an activist.

The postanarchist workplace

For Newman (2011:169), this postanarchist “political” action creates space “between the society and the state”. Put differently, this “in between” space is the postanarchist’s space (Newman, 2011:169). To create this “in between” space is also the postanarchist’s work. In other words, this “in between” space is its workplace. For the postanarchist, “the appropriate domain of politics” is this “in between” space where it creates “autonomous spaces” or spaces outside the state (Newman, 2011:9). So, the postanarchist workspaces outside the state are relations of people free from hierarchy, verticality and oppression (Newman, 2011:9,36). They are “decentralised” and “free” “communities” (Newman, 2011:9,36). The question is: are those workplaces heterotopias?

We answer that, indeed, the postanarchist workspace seems to be a heterotopia. Nevertheless we note again, comparing to Proudhon and Foucault, that the postanarchist workspace seems less free than the Proudhonian and Foucauldian workspaces. Despite the similarities, the latter implies also a fight against the ego or

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229 Returning to utopias or “visions”, in the limit a postanarchist society without a state would be “a society of decentralised, free communities” (Newman, 2011:36).

230 Newman does not distinguish between autonomous spaces or mutualities and communities, as Proudhon does. Would it be because Newman adopts the Stirner’s ego or a closed ego’s form?
an ego’s fight against itself. The postanarchist space assumes the self as an empty form – the ego - as Stirner did. The question is to know whether the postanarchist workplaces are, in fact, relations of egos - and are those relations free? Or whether Stirner’s ego could be the Foucauldian zero point - the body – of the heterotopia. Perhaps Stirner’s ego is a heterotopia? Foucault would say no. For Foucault (2006:368), the self is virtue or on the virtuous path we have outlined. Only through virtue is it possible to achieve self-unity - balance, harmony - that is always a fight against oneself and the exterior world: the care of the self (Foucault, 2006: 221,368,386-389). Nevertheless, doubt remains. As we have already proposed, the answer to this is something that can be developed in future research.

**An ethical and powerful activity**

Newman (2011:169) answers that the existence and proliferation of such autonomous communities, other than state, dissolves or at least weakens state sovereignty. Nevertheless, the postanarchist’s goal is not to fight the state directly. As we have just said, the postanarchist goal is mainly an ethical path, which indirectly weakens the state, constructing ‘other spaces’ (Evren, 2011:5). So, for postanarchists, to work is to have an ethical activity rather than politics. As Newman (2011:176) exemplifies, this is also the anti-capitalist movements’ task: to construct ethical forms of politics outside the state “from multiple points” in different ways.

According to Newman (2011:169), the construction of these alternative spaces between society and the state creates an alternative type of work and workers that have “two functions”: (i) to rupture “the existing social relations, identities and roles” or to create a “moment of ‘dis-identification’”. For postanarchists, “dis-identification” means another kind of subject or relationships or spaces; (ii) to emphasise that “the tasks of radical politics are not reducible to politics, for instance, to the overthrowing of the state power”, as we are going to study in the next section (Newman, 2011:169).

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231 As we have argued, for Foucault (2006:368,386-389), the self is something we could achieve and not something we have *a priori* or a previous form, as for Stirner.

232 We will develop the relation between ethics and politics later (pg: 258).

233 As we have studied, there is a conceptual difference between the postanarchist self and the Foucauldian and the Proudhonian subjectification, although Newman does not refer nor valorise this difference, working beyond it.

234 Does Newman suggest here a reductive vision of anti-politics? Or a reductive difference between politics and radical politics mainly focused on the overthrowing of the state power? Could this reduction be a consequence of the way Newman defines the self? Does a ‘formal self’ limit the way
For postanarchists, to work alternatively is to construct spaces, which are
deterritorialised forms of power (Newman, 2011:169). These “deterritorialised”
spaces presuppose the postanarchist’s power concept, which is similar to Foucault’s
power. According to Newman (2011:6), the postanarchist’s power is relations of
people and also the other side of space, as it is for Foucault - despite the differences
we have already pointed out in terms of the “ego”. Nevertheless, postanarchist power
is everywhere and intersects the human body - “deterritorialised” forms of power. It
is ubiquitous as well (Newman, 2011:174). For that reason, for postanarchists, there
are always power relations in society and we never transcend power entirely
(Newman, 2011:6). The postanarchist’s desires or critiques are also power
manifestations. Power is also an *a priori* energy or necessity. Even autonomous
spaces are power manifestations or powerful relations of people. As Newman
(2011:6) explains,

Following Michel Foucault’s insight that power relations are both
pervasive and constitutive of social identities, practices and discourses,
politics – even radical politics – is an activity conducted within a field
structured by power.

In other words, only an “active engagement with power” allows us to
‘transcend’ or to modify this field of power relations (Newman, 2011:8). So, the
postanarchist is a powerful worker. He is actively engaged in power through ongoing
“practices of freedom”, as Foucault and Proudhon were (Newman, 2011:6). Foucault
points out, freedom and power take place always and everywhere - both are
“deterritorialised” and come from diverse points. The postanarchist works or acts in
this field of multiple practices of freedom. For Newman, he is a free worker and
power is his raw material. And how does he work?

**A circular work**
The postanarchist runs away circularly from power to power in order not to be
oppressed. And then immediately he creates new power relations or spaces to his

politics could develop? Does a “formal self” just propose a ‘politics for now’ – a ‘theory for now’ –
rather than open to plural politics/anti-politics relationship here and now, included a spiritual politics -
as we are going to study later? We would answer yes, in line with Foucault and Proudhon spiritual
proposals, including Foucault’s warning against the ego’s ‘fascism’, as we have studied above.
The postanarchist: an ideal type

measure – free and equal spaces. Then, if those spaces become oppressive, the postanarchist flees again, and so on and so forth. This is postanarchist activity or work. As Newman (2011:169) remembers, radical politics is permanently “confronted with the problem of analysing, mapping and contesting” deterritorialised forms of power. Those are moments of “dis-identification”.235

According to Newman (2011:8,169), today’s struggles - or work - against capitalism have another kind of work relations. They are based, as we have shown above, on another conception of power, another way to act and “different forms of domination”: victories, defeats and strategies, gains and reversals (Newman, 2011:8,169). Those alternative work relations are precarious or always renewable; they are also non-exploitative, free and equal relations. The postanarchist anti-politics has mainly a circular vision of work - or power - as Foucault and Proudhon argue as well. Those postanarchist struggles are not intended to reach a goal. They are just a walk or a path from home to home or an ongoing work. As Nietzsche teaches, the postanarchist is always working having fun (pleasure), because his life is a permanent and circular struggle to survive. The postanarchist invents himself everyday according to the day’s needs – the “dis-identification”.

In another perspective, the postanarchist inhabits mobile spaces. His walks are reversible works or nomadic forms of freedom. Like Foucault, Newman (2011:174) recognises “the reversibility of power relationships”, even those that are overwhelming. As we have argued, this “reversibility” of power works through the critique or through “instabilities and moments of resistance” (Newman, 2011:174). The postanarchist agrees with Foucault. Power is repressive, but also constitutive (Newman, 2011:141). Power “plays some role in constituting and defining social identities and practices” - spaces. Postanarchist power is mainly creative.

A collective work
Postanarchist work is an ongoing resistance and creation that implies the other. We could say his goal is to survive in a harmonious way with the other. The postanarchist worker is “an egalitarian and collective subject” (Newman, 2011:105). For postanarchists, we are all equal subjects because we are all powerful people; the

235 Nevertheless, as we have pointed out, this postanarchist ‘Stirnerite’ “dis-identification” does not seem as deep as the Foucauldian and the Proudhonian ones.
power one has is the same power the other has. And we are collective because this power is relational (May, 2000:124).236

The postanarchist claims the “equal-liberty” that “implies the inextricability of liberty and equality” (Newman, 2011:144). The postanarchist refuses “the opposition between individual freedom and collective, egalitarian freedom” (Newman, 2011:144). For postanarchists, “any constraint on one involves a constraint on the other” (Newman, 2011:144). According to postanarchists, democracy is conditioned by “an ethics of equal-liberty, where neither liberty is subordinate to equality, or equality to liberty” (Newman, 2011:179). Equality and liberty are promoted in “equal measure” (Newman, 2011:20, 179). Postanarchists would affirm “I become free … only by virtue of the liberty of others, so much so that the greater the number of free people surrounding me the deeper and greater and more extensive their liberty, the deeper and larger becomes my liberty” (Newman, 2011:20,21). For the postanarchist, equality and liberty presuppose “mutually”, as Proudhon argues (Newman, 2011:21).

From our perspective, the postanarchist equality-liberty implies also the Foucauldian concept of “care” or “care of the others’ care”. One wants the others to be free, because one wants to be free. So one fights – or cares - for others’ freedom or one cares the others’ care. Here Newman assumes again the Foucauldian and Proudhonian ‘social’ – altruist – stance or work, despite Stirner’s influence.

Non-liberal and non-Marxist worker

Hence, the postanarchist proposes new forms of workers or political subjectivities, for instance, beyond liberalism and Marxism (Newman, 2011:21,116,117). According to postanarchists, there is a difference between “the radical reading of equal-liberty” and “the liberal reading” which says “every man has the freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man” (Newman, 2011:21). For postanarchists, this is a “laissez-faire” doctrine (Newman, 2011:21). And although postanarchism “shares with liberalism a suspicion of state and an insistence on individual freedom”, there are some important differences between the two stances, because:

236 If it were not the influence of Stirner's egoism, we would say openly that Newman would be an altruist.
liberalism subordinates the political to the orders of economics, morality and law – it leads to a certain depoliticisation in which the political moment of action and contestation is swallowed up by the private interests and market preoccupations of civil society (Newman, 2011:10,17).

The liberal person is neither an insurgent nor a collective worker because the “market” and “private interests” have the last word. For postanarchists, liberalism “naturalises society as a domain of individual freedom and market exchanges”. Liberalism does not recognise “the constraints” the market imposes on society and on freedom – also on workers’ freedom (Newman, 2011:10,11,16,17). Then, in liberalism there is also the “notions of universal human rights and humanitarianism” that the postanarchist criticises as a “new form of imperialism” (Newman, 2011:11,17; Franks, 2000:141). So, for the postanarchist, a liberal fight against state is not enough, because liberalism accepts “the state as the guardian” of freedom with this notion of universal human rights (Newman, 2011:11). For postanarchists, liberalism “is neither sufficiently political, nor sufficiently anti-political” (Newman, 2011:11).

In terms of Marxism – or the Marxist revolution - the postanarchist criticizes, for instance, the notion of the proletariat (Newman, 2011:116,117). In Marxist theory, the category of the (proletarian) “worker” has two senses. Firstly, the Marxist worker is “a socio economic category” in the industrial system whose condition shows “the general inhumanity” and exploitation of capitalism. As we have studied, the postanarchist is more than a “socio economic category”. He is mainly an ethical and spiritual self, as we are going to develop later. Secondly, the Marxist worker is “a revolutionary subjectivity politically constituted through a revolutionary vanguard whose goal was the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Newman, 2011:116,117). For Marxists, the proletariat is the class “excluded from the fruits of the wealth they produce and whose deprivation is the necessary structural feature of capitalism” (Newman, 2011:119,120). In Marxist theory, the proletariat is a “disciplined, united working class” or a “coherent, uniform identity” and it is the factory that imposes this discipline and coherency (Newman, 2011:120). By contrast, the postanarchist is an autonomous, critical and transgressive subject who does not need masters –
The postanarchist: an ideal type

vanguards and parties – nor a uniform subjectivity, but heterogeneity and difference (Franks, 2000:143). 237

So, the postanarchist asks whether the proletariat was ever a coherent and uniform class (Newman, 2011:120). The postanarchist answers that the proletariat comprises “multiple, heterogeneous and often conflicting struggles and identities – artisans who sought to defend traditional ways of life and work, workers who rebelled against the coercion and discipline of the factory system”. As we have seen, the postanarchist worker is insurgent and transgressive. And it is these rebellions, “sabotages” and “spontaneous and immediate struggles” that postanarchists celebrate (Newman, 2011:120). Moreover, postanarchists criticize “the consistency” and “revolutionary consciousness” of this proletarian subject arguing, “elements of the industrial proletariat had already taken on bourgeois and conservative values” (Newman, 2011:117). For postanarchists, “other classes, such as the peasants and the lumpenproletariat should also be designated as revolutionary” (Newman, 2011:117). The “lumpenproletariat (or sub-proletariat)” is “the global poor”, the precarious or “those completely excluded from employment and the market” who are “‘disposable’ millions”.

For postanarchists, the revolutionary subject is formless (Newman, 2011:117). 238 Postanarchists break “with class as the determining element of radical political subjectivity”. Nevertheless we could not say that the category of class is no longer important (Newman, 2011:117). Postanarchists highlight that classes still exist because “economic inequalities, deprivations, exclusions and antagonisms” are very important questions to radical politics, as the anti-capitalist movement has shown (Newman, 2011:117). 239

Radical subjection

For postanarchists, radical subjection has two main characteristics: (i) an exterior struggle: the postanarchist is a critic of the state and its inherent violence and

237 The question here would be: how far is the Postanarchist subject - or worker - a non-uniformity? Is this non-uniformity far enough? Or is this still uniformity or an ego?
238 Here Newman approaches Proudhon and his revolutionary subject: the group. The question would be again to know how far this plural revolutionary subject is compatible with Stirner’s ego.
239 Newman (2011:119) says, “even in our ‘post-industrial’ societies there are still sectors of the population who do manual work and who are subject to terrible forms of exploitation – to say nothing about the countless millions of workers who live a desperate and deprived existence in poorer countries”. According to Newman (2011:119), globalisation is producing “a re-proletarianisation of the entire world”.

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domination; (ii) an interior struggle: the postanarchist makes “a kind of ethical interrogation of one’s psychological dependence on the state” – the virtuous path or struggle (Newman, 2011:118; May, 2000:130). Due to this spiritual struggle, postanarchism does not lead “into a vague notion of ‘identity politics’” (Newman, 2011:117). A “vague” option would weaken the postanarchist work condition. Here Newman is again very close to Foucault and Proudhon. He disagrees with the concept of the proletariat as well.

**Non-labels & Non-feminism**

Newman also disputes capitalism’s categorizations in terms of gender and feminism. Postanarchists criticize the gender labels as a state and capitalist control over people and workers as well. Newman remembers (2011:117), in many Western societies “the simple assertion of a cultural, sexual or gender identity difference is no longer necessarily radical, and it is often all too smoothly accommodated within the state system”. Newman (2011:117) continues, “demands for recognition on the part of minority groups often bind them further to the state, making them more dependent on the state for the recognition of this identity and the protection of their rights, thus allowing the state to extend its power over life”.

The same happens with feminism. According to Newman (2011:117), “the rights claims of certain feminist groups simply reaffirmed their status as victims requiring the protection of the state”. The feminist workers’ struggles are mainly an affirmation of woman as capitalist worker or object or wage earner. For Newman (2011:118), gender differences, sexual differences and also religious differences are “forms of identification that can be incorporated into the structure of power in ‘multicultural societies’”. Newman (2011:118) adds this kind of institutionalisation “de-politicises differences” and “is often unable to politicise capitalism”, accusing just capitalism to be “racist, sexist or homophobic”. For the postanarchist, this identity politics leads to “the restriction of freedom” or exploitation of the people or workers (Newman, 2011:118).

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240 Newman’s spiritual path is mainly a psychological struggle in order to fight state and ‘individual’s’ dependence on it. This is not an internal fight between the formal and material sides of the self, as it is with Foucault.
Non-capitalist
According to Newman (2011:118), the postanarchist claims “a more explicit problematization of global capitalism and state power”. Postanarchists propose “new modes of political subjectification” which challenge people’s subordination to capital (Newman, 2011:118). Those new modes of political subjectification call into question capitalist “authoritarian relationships, practices and institutions” (Newman, 2011:118). For postanarchists, radical subjectification is the self’s fight against “the identities and roles imposed on us by the state” (Newman, 2011:118,119). Radical subjectification is “the process” which leads the subject to “take distance” from capitalism and state, creating itself or its space (Newman, 2011:118,119). 241

The creative worker
Postanarchists propose “an active, even utopian experimentation” of the self, for instance, “in modes of artistic expression – particularly culture and poetry” (Newman, 2011:120,121).242 Postanarchists refuse “one’s established identity as worker”, as Marxists do (Newman, 2011:120,121). The postanarchist’s self is itself a worker or a creator. For that reason, postanarchists displace the Marxist concept of class, as we have already seen. Postanarchists would prefer the concept of “mass” – formless - 243 which is more comprehensive, as Bakunin suggests (Newman, 2011b:51). Although Marxists criticize postanarchist’s stance as “’bourgeois’ and unsuitable for workers”, postanarchists argue their subjectification is neither a commodity nor a crystallization or a comfortable and self-assured stance, but a creativity, an insurgency (Newman, 2011:120,121).244

Anti-essentialism & anti-humanism
For postanarchists, subjectification is about “‘dis-identification’, a displacement of one’s socially defined role – something that produces a dissonance or disruption of the order of established identities and places”, as Foucault also teaches. (Newman, 2011:120,121).244

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241 We note again Newman’s radical subjectification is not a deep and internal fight between the self’s sides, as it is for Foucault.
242 As we have stated before, Newman’s poetry or plastic path does not seem to carve the inside of self, as with Foucault, but it departs from the self or subject understood as a whole – Stirner’s influence.
243 In our understanding, Newman’s formless mass does not dissolve the self as Proudhon does.
244 Here, as we have already stressed above, in terms of subjectification, we could say anarchists, like Proudhon and even Foucault, would also criticize the postanarchist, although the anarchist’s argumentation differs from the Marxist one.
The postanarchist: an ideal type

Postanarchism is a “post-identity politics” that “is no longer strictly identified with specific class interests, or even with any sort of identity politics as such” (Newman, 2011:176). For instance, postanarchists reject also the classical anarchist “notion of rational social object” (Newman, 2011:147). For the postanarchist, this notion is a “rational social totality” that forms the basis of classical anarchism’s ethics and its “revolutionary philosophy” (Newman, 2011:147). As we have just seen, postanarchists have a creative and a “non-essentialist approach to the political subject” (Newman, 2011:122). Like Foucault, postanarchists (Newman, 2001: 129,130) also criticize the concept of “man” and humanism as something oppressive and defined a priori. It proposes “the un-man”, Stirnerite concept, which is “a reaction to this oppressive humanist logic,” as we have referred above (Newman, 2001: 129, 130). For postanarchists, “man” as an “identity” is not something “immanent”, which “has to be constructed” politically, ethically and discursively (Newman, 2011:122).

A true subjectification

Hence, according to postanarchists, this “dis-identification” or the critique of imposed roles, and the desire to live without them, is an “ethical” option – as we are going to see in the next section - and also an aesthetic one or an “artistic expression” or a work of art, as we have written above (Newman, 2011:118). That “dis-identification” is “discursive” or about language or languages whatever they are: discursive language, pictorial language, sculptural language, performative language, gestural language, etc. Foucault would say this postanarchist work is a parrhesiastic action. It is about truth telling. To work is to produce truly – plastic act - according to our desire and dreams. As Koch (2011:33) explains, the postanarchist truth is not “discovered”, but “produced”. These aesthetic and also ethical paths are what distinguish the postanarchist position from other left politics, as we are going to show (Newman, 2011:121).

245 As we have studied, Proudhon proposes a mobile and fluid self: a group. And here Newman seems to come over Stirner and his ego, but this is not something affirmed openly.

246 The question is, indeed, to know how far Stirner and Foucault are compatible regarding this “unman” concept. Does this “unman” mean the death of man and the ego as Foucault talks about or not? Were Foucault and, before him, his inspiratory, the German Nietzsche, influenced by the German Stirner? Is Stirner Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s ‘great absentee’? Another one as Proudhon seems to be to Foucault, as we demonstrated in this dissertation? Those are some of the questions we could answer in future work.
2011:118). Foucault and Proudhon also propose this kind of path,\textsuperscript{247} as we have studied before.

So as Newman (2011: 10, 17, 121) asks, if the proletariat and the liberal subject no longer serve as a category for radical politics today, who can supplement their place? The answer is: the postanarchist or the “supplementary” subject (Rancière, 2000:174). And who is the postanarchist?

**THE HEAD | the anarchist ethical path**

![Image 16](image)

**The anti-oppressive and anti-hierarchical carer**

Thus far then, we have established that the postanarchist is an aesthetic person and also an ethical one. And what does it mean? As we have argued, the postanarchist is one who resists hierarchy and oppression. And this resistance is first of all a spiritual\textsuperscript{248} and ethical path, because it implies “a certain care for the existent”, “without coercion by the subject on him – or herself”, as Foucault also argues (Newman, 2011:179). Levinas teaches, the anti-politics is “an-archical” - no-arche, no-principle, no-law - in several senses (Newman, 2011:54).

**A spiritual and ethical being**

First, it is “an-archical” spiritually in the sense that it undermines the sovereignty of the ego (Newman, 2011:54). Postanarchism leads to a “radical self-questioning” or an

\textsuperscript{247} Perhaps the differences in subjectification between Newman and Proudhon-Foucault would not be so deep if we better understood the similarities between Stirner, Nietzsche and Foucault, as we have stated before. Who knows?

\textsuperscript{248} Spiritual does not mean religious in an institutional perspective, but reflexive and ‘re-ligious’ – linked with the other - in Proudhon’s framework, as we have studied. According to Newman (2011:17), postanarchism is a heretical politics “because it rejects the principle of government and political authority … - it goes against the entire tradition of politics and political thought that maintains we cannot do without sovereignty”.

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“interrogation of one’s self-contained sovereignty” (Newman, 2011:54). These critical moments imply a break up of “the limits of one’s own identity” (Newman, 2011:55). This means “dis-identification” or subjectivation, as we have discussed above. Newman (2011:161) adopts here the Foucauldian “ethical and ascetic strategies” or “ways of thinking about the self.” These strategies are reflections about oneself that have our needs as referential; these strategies are paths the subject “constructs, rather than discovers” (Newman, 2011:161). Newman (2011:161; May, 2000:130) calls these strategies a “process of self-creation”.

The postanarchist is free when he rids the self from the self or from “essence”, because “essence is not the basis for the freedom”, as we have explained before. Essences and principles are pre–definitions or oppressions (Newman, 2011:55; Franks, 2000:140). For postanarchists, essences subjugate the power to create oneself (Franks, 2000:140). To be postanarchist or to be free implies an ongoing struggle against the self, a permanent movement or fight - a spiritual way - as Foucault and Proudhon advocate as well. Freedom is an-archical – plastic - in order to allow survival. The postanarchist sculpts himself or cares for himself permanently in order to adapt himself to life circumstances.

Transgressive and generous being

The postanarchist needs to live with the other harmoniously. And this is also an ethical perspective. So, secondly, postanarchism is an-archical because it disturbs the political order. The postanarchist opens his self and this order to “the Other” that exceeds that order (Newman, 2011:57). For that reason, the postanarchist is transgressive; he transgresses and challenges the established order. The postanarchist claims an an-archical ethics: his “terrain” or space “emerges through an encounter” with the other (Newman, 2011:54). That means, for the postanarchist,

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249 Here, Newman seems to solve Stirner’s ego and approaches to Foucault’s plural self or “we”. The Levinas’s “in-arche” seems really an attempt to avoid the ego’s closed form. Nevertheless, Stirner continues to be an ongoing influence in Newman’s writings.

250 As we have affirmed above, the question is to know how far this postanarchist “radical self-questioning” means a break up of the limits of the self or of Stirner’s ego. Or is it just a fight against defined identities and state’s labels, leaving the ego intact?

251 Is this concept of order similar to the concept of ego? Is to transgress the order (arche) and to transgress the ego the same thing? Is it to break up the ego’s form? Could we conciliate Foucault and Newman through Levinas? And Stirner? Why does Newman maintain Stirner’s contribution? The question remains.
“freedom is relational and communal” or freedom implies the other in an equal and free way, as we have just explained; freedom is not something the postanarchist guards against the other jealously, but he shares his freedom with the other (Newman, 2011:55); freedom is a “generous excess” that overflows self interest (Newman, 2011:55). Newman (2011:161) explains, although “the care of the self is ontologically prior to the care of others, it nevertheless entails a certain ethical way of relating to others”. As we have highlighted above, the postanarchist follows Foucault and the Cynics care of the other’s care. Although Newman gives priority to the care of the self (regarding the care of the others care), Foucault says both are simultaneous. Nevertheless even this postanarchist ethical way of openness to the other is a great responsibility because the other cannot be reduced to our necessity or to our “structures of conscience” or to our arche (Newman, 2011:54). In turn, the other would not allow oppression by our law. The other cannot accept our rules (arche) if those rules do not fit ones need for survival. In this case, the other causes us “disequilibrium” or unsettles our ego, refusing and transgressing our law (Newman, 2011:54). Nevertheless, we need to survive with our necessities and with the other. So, in order to survive, the postanarchist balances himelf through an “equal-libertarian ethos of anarchism” (Newman, 2011:55). The postanarchist takes care of the other’s care, in a sense of “community and solidarity” (Newman, 2011:55,56; May, 2000:131).

The anarchist: the necessity

Thirdly, as we have stressed above, the postanarchist needs to take care of himelf, with regards to his need or his law. And this configures an anarchist stance, as we have just observed with Foucault and also Proudhon. The postanarchist’s need is his law. The other’s law oppresses him if this law does not fit the postanarchist’s necessity. So, for the postanarchist, there is no-arche - no-government, no-state - than his arche. Or there is just an-archy. Nevertheless, in an anarchist way, we might harmonize our law with the other in order to survive, as we have just written. Or our law also needs to be other’s law in a balanced way. The laws shared with the other could “change over time and are opened to dialogue and critical negotiation”

252 For that reason, as we have already studied, postanarchism could be also spatial or heterotopical, although Newman does not develop the heterotopical perspective in his writings, in our opinion, due to Stirner’ego influence.
253 Is this priority a sign of Stirner’s egoism? We leave the question.
The postanarchist: an ideal type


A “spiritual politics”: a work of art

Despite the absence of universal laws, this postanarchist’s anarchy is not hostile to the idea of “political organisation” that is his “very condition of realisation” (Newman, 2011: 178). As we have noted, postanarchism is “self-organization” - the care of the self - and also in a collective dimension (Newman, 2011: 178). So, this postanarchist openness to the other is an ethical and also a ‘political’ way, although it cannot be reduced to politics - formal politics (Newman, 2011:56). The postanarchist claims a “spiritual politics”, as Foucault proposes in his later work. For Chevallier (2004), “political spirituality should be thought as an irruption” - an insurrection. Necessity leads the subject to act on his own and always together with the other – spiritually, ethically and politically (Chevallier, 2004). As Newman (2001: 131) explains, postanarchism is “an outside generated from the inside”.254

Nevertheless, postanarchism is not a politics nor does it propose a “particular form of social organisation, nor even any specific political strategy” (Newman, 2011:56). For the postanarchist, anarchy is just a spiritual and ethical path, with spatial or aesthetic consequences, that disturbs any political order. And those ethical actions are spaces or works of art or “artistic expressions” – creations - as we have already studied. The postanarchist sculpts his interior and exterior life carefully and harmoniously according to his needs and to the other’s. So, both ethical and aesthetic proposals are another option in polis and, in this sense, another political option. As Newman (2011:146) notes,

the anti-political gesture does not mean an avoidance or withdrawal from political struggles, but rather the revolutionary abolition of formal politics and power (particularly in its statist form), and this is also obviously a political gesture. This is why it only makes sense to see anti-politics – even in its utopian dimension – as a certain type of politics (Newman, 2011:146).

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254 Foucault would say both at the same time.
Micro-politics
According to Newman (2011:161), the postanarchist’s “political gesture” is the Foucauldian “micro-political ethics” or Deleuze’s intention “to become minor”, as we have already discussed. This micro dimension is the spiritual path of the self. For Newman (2011:181), “democracy to come should be supplemented with a libertarian micro-politics and ethics”. And this micro politics aims to dislodge “our psychic investments in power and authority through the invention of new practices of freedom” (Newman, 2011:181). These new practices of freedom are realised through spiritual, local and decentralised actions, as we have noted above. Examples of these practices are the several “decentralised and autonomous forms of direct democracy” of nineteenth century anarchists, which inspire the postanarchist: Proudhon’s mutualism and federalism, Kropotkin’s agriculture and industry organization, Godwin’s “progressive perfection of human society through education and intellectual improvement” (Newman, 2011:40,96).

The universal dimension
Although this spiritual and ethical path has a “micro” dimension and is decentralised, this has also a “universal dimension” (Newman, 2011:119). Nevertheless, this dimension is neither “a terrain defined by globalisation” nor a universal law, as we have already stated (Newman, 2011:119). This universal perspective goes also beyond a “mere assertion of a particular identity” or a standardization which features globalisation (Newman, 2011:119). The postanarchist accepts dissent and “seeks to form alliances, networks and solidarities” between different kinds of people (Newman, 2011:119; May, 2000:). Newman (2011:175) talks about a transnational organization “in the form of movement rather than a party”. And this transnational organization – the universal dimension - aims to build those “alliances between people and activist groups around the world” (Newman, 2011: 175). This is the case of the global anti-capitalist movement, constituted by struggles or movements that are considerably different (Newman, 2011:174). Newman (2011:174) also points to “the Zapatistas in the Chiapas region in Mexico” or “the Landless movement in Brazil”. Locally, we could find some similarities in those movements: “alternative social and economic relationships”, “innovative experiments in land sharing”, “communal grassroots organisation”, “dissent”, “direct action” and “democratic decision making” (Newman, 2011:174). In turn, those movements also develop solidarities with other
groups, articulating “global issues”: environmental concerns, the injustices of neoliberalism, the massive corporate power and the state violence and domination. (Newman, 2011: 174, 175).

As for Proudhon, the postanarchist bears this universal dimension on the “notion of political articulation” - articulation of movements or the Foucauldian diagram or the Proudhonian mutualism and federalism (Newman, 2011b: 57). 255

According to this universal perspective, postanarchism presupposes the Foucauldian heterotopical dimension: fluid and nomadic spaces or movements - relations of people - connected to one another living ephemerally or circularly in a permanent creation. 256 The postanarchist also adopts the Proudhonian federalist perspective in terms of networks of groups or movements that articulate or disarticulate themselves according to their momentary necessities in a mutualist manner, as we are going to show. Postanarchism is a no borders politics 257 and, for instance, “the figure of the refugee (or illegal migrant)” embodies ‘others’ sites of politics and “the possibility of a new postnational space”, as Foucault claims (Newman, 2011: 172).

For Newman (2011: 119), this fluid, borderless and collective dimension is the way to fight “sovereign politics – the assertion of a sovereign identity, self-contained in its difference”: the state, the government, the capitalist and the Marxist forms of organization, among others (Noys, 2000: 111). 258 As we have already studied, the postanarchist defends a radical subjectivation that applies also to collectives. And those postanarchist subjectivations are radical because “the subject or group of subjects understands its suffering and struggles in relation to those of others” (Newman, 2011: 119). For the postanarchist, “a part must come to express – if only temporarily or contingently – the iniquity of the whole and the struggle to rectify it” (Newman, 2011: 119). 259

255 According to Proudhon, this articulation or federalism is also a spiritual flow, as we have studied above.
256 The question is always the same: to know whether or not the postanarchist self is already a heterotopia, as Foucault considers.
257 As for Stirner’s ego, is it also a no borders one?
258 Could we include Stirner’s ego in this “sovereign politics”?
259 And, for postanarchist, the whole overcomes the parts, as Foucault argues? Again Stirner is between Newman and Foucault/Proudhon.
The “tyranny of private property”
So, for the postanarchist, today there can be neither this ethical path, nor equality, nor liberty, nor solidarity under the current conditions of the state, government, capitalism and its “tyranny of private property” (Newman, 2011:34). For the postanarchist, “everyone shall be a lord over himself” (Newman, 2011:16).\(^{260}\) Here the postanarchist approaches again Proudhon and “his famous slogan”, ‘Property is Theft’ or government is property and theft (Newman, 2011:35). For the postanarchist, not only does the concentration of property in the hands of an elite in effect deny property to a majority of people, it also reproduces relations of social and political domination in which those without property are subordinated and through which they are deprived of liberty. The subordination of the worker to the boss is as much a relationship of political domination as it is one of economic exploitation. Moreover, unequal relations of property always necessitate a strong and authoritarian state, a state which perpetuates the conditions for their ongoing enrichment and accumulation of power (Newman, 2011:34).

As an aside, Newman (2011:35) adds, “although Proudhon allowed for limited possession of property, seeing it as important to one’s security and liberty, he remained opposed to large accumulation of wealth, claiming that these were precisely what endangered security, equality and liberty”.\(^{261}\) Like Proudhon, the postanarchist’s intention is to transform “property relations so that they are no longer exploitative” (Newman, 2011:35).

Like Proudhon and Foucault, the postanarchist’s solution is mutualism, “in which workers would retain possession of the means to their labour and would organise economic exchanges based on voluntary contracts” (Newman, 2011:35). Newman (2011:39) notes, the foundations of mutualism could be found in a “simple

\(^{260}\) According to Foucault’s subjectivation, are we a “lord” or proprietor over ourselves? Foucault answers no. The Foucauldian self is no-sovereign. In Foucault’s perspective, to be “a lord over oneself” is more a Kantian understanding of the subject than a Foucauldian one. Could we find here a contradiction in Newman’s thinking between the subject understood as “lord” - a landlord - and the fight against the “tyranny of private property” due to Stirner’s influence?

\(^{261}\) In our opinion, Newman could have here a misunderstanding of property as possession and dominium – because, according to Proudhon, there can be no accumulation where there is no ‘right’ to property in the self and in the thing.
biological fact of mutual assistance: in struggling to survive, people must work and cooperate with one another”. As Koch (2011:25) notes, a similar situation pertains between animals that use “mutual aid” as a “tool for survival”. Examples of mutualism are “cooperative organisations, voluntary associations and mutual assistance societies which operate without any involvement from the state – the Lifeboat Association, trades unions, social and sporting clubs” (Newman, 2011:38).

**Non-Marxist**

As the postanarchist fights capitalism, he also rejects Marxism for similar reasons. Marxism presupposes the state as a sovereign identity or proprietor, as we have already affirmed. For the postanarchist, the state is not a revolutionary tool (Newman, 2011b:50). Postanarchists criticize the revolutionary vanguard party and the dictatorship of the proletariat as authoritarian, oppressive and exclusive solutions (Newman, 2011b:58). For the postanarchist, as for Proudhon and Foucault, the vanguard party is another kind of state or a small state with an oppressive method: the “dictatorship” - as the Marxists assume openly (Newman, 2011:105). The Postanarchist also dismisses the “Marxist determinism view of history” and “Marxist stagism” (Newman, 2011,127). Inspired by Foucault, Newman (2011:111) recalls, “there might be a more intimate interaction between society and power”, and this intimacy – power engagement - unsettles in a certain way “the revolutionary narrative of the great, spontaneous upheaval against state power”. As Noys (2000:117) notes, anarchists and Marxists remain divided: between ‘changing the world without taking power’ (as suggested by John Holloway) and ‘taking power to change the world’ (a more ‘traditional’ left position)”.

**Modern and democratic activist**

Changing the world without taking power implies to live here and now. As we have studied, impressed always in power, the postanarchist tries to democratise power “without the desire to be in power” and without the desire to reverse the regime (Newman, 2011:103).
The postanarchist: an ideal type

For that reason, despite the postmodernist influence, the postanarchist works always within the same paradigm: modernity or democracy (Newman, 2011:48,49). As we have argued above, postanarchism is ‘not a step forward’. The anti-politics ‘transcends’ the current order, modernity, within modernity. In fact, it does not overcome modernity, because “to do so would be to affirm the very logic of development” of modernity (Newman, 2011:49). For the postanarchist, to overcome modernity is “to invent a new set of foundations” and to conform to modern “ideas of progress, telos and origins” (Newman, 2011:49). Here the postanarchist is again close to Foucault. As we have argued above, Foucault does not intend to find a beginning or a principle nor an end, rather to start again and again – circularly - in order to capture the “here and now” or to meet the needs. The postanarchist works in the context of democracy in an anarchistic way. For the postanarchist, democracy is not just “a mechanism” for “expressing a united popular will” but it is also “a way of pluralising this will – opening up within it different and even dissenting spaces and perspectives” (Newman, 2011:179).

The event

As the postanarchist does not intend to make a revolution, nor to reverse democracy, it lives in the field of small insurrections, as we have already outlined. As Foucault and Proudhon argue, we live in an ongoing ethical battle or agonism. The postanarchist’s ‘revolution’ are the micro battles or micro-political revolutions “at the level of the subject’s desire” (Newman, 2011:6). For the postanarchist, these micro battles are “events” (Newman, 2011b:53). The event is “a different ontological register” or “the emergence of something entirely new” or “a moment of rupture with the existing order” (Newman, 2011:128). For example, a big event was the French Revolution or the Paris Commune and a micro event is to start gardening in a public garden because one loves flowers or to write poetry because one really enjoys writing (Newman, 2011:128, Noys, 2000:108,111). This event or radical moment – time - starts in a “point” or “eventual site” - space (Newman, 2011:128). For the postanarchist, the “privileged sites” of events are “art, politics, science and love”

262 Although the postanarchist criticizes certain ideas of Enlightenment – humanism and essentialism -, it supports “the politics of emancipation and the principles of liberty and equality, which motivates anarchism (Newman, 2011:6). Here, the postanarchist coincides also with Foucault and Proudhon.

263 Are there “events” inside Stirner’s ego?
The postanarchist: an ideal type


And this “new subject” is a collective subject,\textsuperscript{265} as we have already outlined. With those events, insurrectional micro attitudes, the postanarchist creates alternative spaces beyond the state or “movements at the level of civil society” (Newman, 2011:103). For instance, Foucault’s always-informal struggle for migrants’ rights just intended to invent a better and dignified life for migrants and not to fight directly against the state. This migrants’ movement is just a parallel contesting space regarding the state.

**Non-representative**

As we have already shown, the postanarchist supports a decentralised politics based on “grass-roots mobilisations and participatory decision making rather than centralised leadership” (Newman, 2011:176). Postanarchists speak for themselves, “rather representing their interests to the formal channels of power” (Newman, 2011:175). These “non-authoritarian” transnational organizations have invented “new modes of non-representative or direct democratic politics” (Newman, 2011:175). These “new modes” are anarchist modes. Those movements “display a clear proximity to the anti-authoritarian and decentralist political ethos of anarchism” (Newman, 2011:176). It happens with the anti-capitalist movement in terms of “its tactics, organizational principles and forms of mobilisation”, as we have just noted (Newman, 2011:176). According to Newman (2011:175,176), the anti-capitalist movement is “an unconscious anarchism” – about desire and pleasure. This “unconscious anarchism” is not “a coherent ideology or identity” (Newman, 2011:176). Postanarchism is not a formal politics, as we have already argued.

For that reason, the postanarchist criticizes the representation and verticality of formal politics. According to the postanarchist, representation “binds democracy to the state – it is a way of channelling the will of the people into state structures” (Newman, 2011:132). Proudhon’s approach to representation inspires the postanarchist who sees representative government as a “perpetual abuse of power for

\textsuperscript{264} How far could we conciliate this postanarchist “new subject” with Stirner’s ego? This is an interesting point of research.

\textsuperscript{265} The question is again to understand why Stirner’s ego is a fundamental influence on this ‘collective subject’.
the profit of the reigning caste and the interests of the representatives, against the interests of the represented” (Newman 2011:132,133).

As we have learned, postanarchism is an ethical and spiritual path or a harmonious care of the self always in accordance with the other (Evren, 2011:13). For this reason, the postanarchist just accepts the necessity rule and lives in mutuality with the other regarding this necessity. As Proudhon suggests, one could articulate the groups through agencies, but those informal structures never overcome the care of the self. The care of the self is the base and agencies are just supplements or precarious contracts in order to better organize people horizontally or ethically.

**The sign**

Although the postanarchist avoids representation, he accepts his creations and that spaces are representations or signs of his ideas in a collective context, as Foucault says. As Koch (2011:31) argues, representation “signifies a process by which experience is turned into the signs of experience”. Nonetheless, the postanarchist’s creations – or “experiences” - are distortions of his original plans (Koch, 2011:31). The postanarchist is influenced by postmodernism. As Newman (2011:50) explains, for postmodernism,

> there is no necessary correspondence between linguistic signs and external ‘reality’, and …the structural relationship between signifiers is itself unstable and incomplete. It is this project of questioning the consistency, stability and totality of foundations – foundations of knowledge, science, experience, identity – that is central to the postmodern condition.

In terms of representation, we could say the postanarchist follows Deleuze’s audio-visual battle. For the postanarchist, there is always a fight between what we say (our discourse, whatever the language it uses) and what we see (our creations). Hence, the postanarchist lives in a permanent battle or “movement” against representations. Newman (2001:51) calls it “the war model” which jeopardizes representations and essences, because representations and essences are the “temporary and precarious domination of certain forces - or powers - over others, and there is nothing transcendental or permanent about them.” For Newman (2001:146),
“power — as diffuse as it is — is maybe just another attempt to symbolize the un-symbolizable” (Newman, 2001:146).

And this battle around this un-symbolizable — the postanarchist’s truth — includes our own creations or representations. The postanarchist needs to fight their likely oppression and authority, because in each structure we set up there have an “authoritarian potential”, 266 as we have already noted. According to Newman (2011:139),

a politics of anti-politics points to the possibility of a libertarian politics outside, and ultimately transcendent of, the state and all hierarchical structures of power and authority. To counteract such structures requires, however, the development of alternative libertarian and egalitarian structures and practices, coupled with a constant awareness of the authoritarian potential that lies in any structure.

Or as Stirner asks, “how can one be sure that in acting against a particular form of power one does not merely put another in its place?” (Newman, 2001:54). 267 For that reason, power or insurrections happen circularly. Postanarchism is “the recurring desire for life” without hierarchy, authority and government: an ongoing struggle, as we have just said.

Political movements

“Movement” is again the suitable word here, instead of crystalized “representations” or “essences” or an “immanent 268 organic 269 social principle” that never changes, as

266 Hobbes would say all creations are about authority because they imply always the author (singular or plural). Foucault says something close: all creation are a manifestation of power.

267 Is it for this reason, according to Stirner, that we never get rid of our ego?

268 For Newman, the word “immanence” does not mean power as it means for Foucault and Deleuze, as we have already explained. For Newman, the immanence is something organic and essential. Immanent means also “natural or historically determined” (Newman, 2011:140). Or, in another way, the author identifies the “organic social principle” of some classical anarchists with the concept of ‘immanence’. And this difference of meanings problematizes the understanding of Newman’s thought in terms of his meeting with Proudhon and Foucault. For both authors, this “immanence” is something fluid and a fundamental feature of Proudhonian God and of Foucauldian power, as Deleuze notes and defends. Hence, this apparent mismatch is just a matter of conceptual convention or definition, because, as we have studied, in terms of contents, Newman (2011:64,65) also supports the Foucauldian power and criticizes essences and identities.

269 As we have seen, Foucault is against the organic or essential perspective. For him, life, body and power are intimately linked. And the body is the “zero point” of the space-power relationship.
we have seen before. “Movement” is also the political solution and the best way to fight these representations and authority. “Movement” is the way to create alternative spaces. It is a “certain displacement of social identities – a certain dislodging or rupturing of normal social processes” (Newman, 2011:103) For this reason, Newman (2011:110; Noys, 2000:112,113) works on Deleuze’s and Guattari’s “libertarianism” that bears on “polar opposites” as “Flux and System, the Nomad and the Despot, the Schizo and the Paranoic”. For Newman (2011:110), those polar opposites are a consequence of desire or insurrections and their goal is dislodging representations, identities and essences. They mean an ongoing “spontaneous, revolutionary movement of desire against fixed, authoritarian structures and identities” (Newman, 2011:110).

The postanarchist has a “constant awareness” of oppression and authoritarianism. For that reason, postanarchist politics tries to develop permanently alternative, egalitarian structures and practices. Newman warns about the dangers that exist inside autonomous spaces, beginning with the dangers of the word “autonomous” that is a controversial one, as we have already seen. According to Newman (201:179), autonomy could just refer to “the independence from the state of a particular political and territorial space”, and it is not enough in order to define a postanarchist autonomous space. The postanarchist should be concerned with “the internal micro-political constitution of that space, to the organisation of social, political and economic relationships within it”, because postanarchist spaces “can be subject to the worst kinds of authoritarian, repressive and fundamental politics” (Newman, 201:179).

Hence, for the postanarchist, we should start struggling against oppression at the micro level – the level of our spaces or ourselves. According to the postanarchist, we can only work with “what we have” (Newman, 2011:156). As we have argued, the postanarchist claims a utopianism of the immediate “that builds on the possibilities of community that already exists” (Newman, 2011:163). As Foucault teaches, the world

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270 And Stirner’s Ego?
271 Could we ask whether this ‘autonomy’ presupposes the ego and, for that reason, is a dangerous concept? As we have noted above, the postanarchist does not distinguish between autonomous spaces and communities, as Proudhon does. Did Newman feel the ego’s danger, but he himself not work on it?
272 Is this Stirner’s ego level? We would need to study Stirner to answer this question. As we have noted, in our opinion, Newman’s self is not a heterotopia, as it is to Foucault, due to Stirner’s influence.
surrounding us is just a stimulus or the condition of possibility of another world - or the Proudhonian material space. As we have learned, the postanarchist works on this world in a utopian way, “utilising and civilising” certain technologies, “resisting and destroying” others, but, more importantly, creating “new spaces for autonomy and equality, new ways of life that resist and escape domestication” (Newman, 2011:156). And, as we have sketched before, that “utopian dimension” means “a certain spiritual transformation of relationships” by “behaving differently” - a libertarian micro-politics and micro-ethics” (Newman, 2011:162). For the postanarchist,

the state or political domination as a way of thinking and as a mode of relating to others – must be overcome in our heads and hearts before it can be overcome as an external institution; or rather, that the two processes would be concurrent (Newman, 2011:163).²⁷³

This radical politics of the “hearts” or “the utopianism of the present” is not the “abandonment of politics”, as we have just noted (Newman, 2011:163). It could be a ‘small big’ gesture – just to read a book in the garden, instead to do extra hours at work, to “take part in activities of the nearby social centre”, to organise “opposition to the extension of a motorway”, to “play with … children and friends”, or to “write a book on how to change the world” – which is also a political or revolutionary action, for instance, against capitalist exploitation (Holloway, 2010: 256). According to the postanarchist, the construction of autonomous ways of life bears also on the ideas of political confrontation or contestation of the existing order, as Proudhon and Foucault also taught (Newman, 2011:163). The postanarchist utopia is expressed by struggles or movements, as Foucault’s fights against prisons and for migrant’s rights, the anti-globalisation movement, Zapatistas struggles, Spanish anarchism during the Civil War and so on. Postanarchist utopianism is the responsibility of “political engagement” (Newman, 2011:163).

Newman (2011:163) systematises the postanarchist utopia as an expression of two desires or commitments: (i) “the desire for alternative forms of existence”: the creation of autonomous spaces here and now; (ii) “the need to confront politically the dominations of the present”: “to disrupt border control activities and to campaign for

²⁷³ Again Newman distinguishes two wars: internal and external. They do not merge with each other nor dissolve the ego.
the rights of ‘illegal' immigrants” (Newman, 2011:163). According to Newman (2011:163), “in such acts is presupposed the idea of a society of free circulation, without the tyranny of the borders”. According to Newman (2011:7), this kind of acts includes both “the moment of utopia” in which everything is possible, and also “the moment of ethics” or an action here and now. The utopia now or the insurrection “might be seen as the anti-political underside of other more mainstream forms of politics, their critical conscience and their wild unconscious” (Newman, 2011:181,182).

Through those autonomous spaces, the postanarchist challenges and questions actual democracy proposing, as we have already argued, “freedom beyond security, democracy beyond the state, politics beyond the party, economic organization beyond capitalism, globalisation beyond borders, life beyond biopolitics” (Newman, 2011:2,82,111; Noys, 2000:109,110). The postanarchist calls this democracy of spaces, “democracy of singularities” 274 or “politics of anarchism” (Newman, 2011:13).

**Non-party, non-parliament, non-elections**

This “politics of anarchism might take the form of non-party political organisations which shun involvement in parliamentary processes” (Newman, 2011:109). The postanarchist organizes himself beyond, parties, elections, parliament, and, consequently, also beyond the politics of left and right (Noys, 2000:111).

In terms of elections, the postanarchist points out “the dangers of majoritarianism”, “the tyranny of the majority”, “the authoritarianism of the general will” and “the unjust sacrifice of individual rights and dissenting minority voices to the will of majority” (Newman 2011:133). For the postanarchist, “voting has become a symbolic act which legitimises political power” or “a game of revolving oligarchies” (Newman 2011:133). According to the postanarchist, there is no “ideological difference between major political parties” and Western democracies became “one-party states” (Newman, 2011:32). The postanarchist links the party, the parliament and the state. For that reason, the postanarchist does not support the “centrally organised Marxist-Leninist vanguard party”, as we have just studied (Newman, 2011:105; Noys, 2000:113). For Newman (2011:96), even “progressive

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274 Here Stirner’s influence emerges again and it seems Newman proposes an autonomous spaces of egos or singularities, as we have discussed about before.
left politics” has been deformed into state sovereignty. For the postanarchist, the ideological opposition between left and right have ceased to make sense today and has been replaced by technocratic governments, and “neoliberal economic consensus” – the “one-party states” (Newman, 2011:146,47).

Thus, the postanarchist would prefer a democracy of spaces or singularities. According to Newman (2011:112), some of those singularities failed - the anarchist collectives in Spain during the Spanish civil war or the Paris Commune in 1871, among others - but to say they failed because they tried an “autonomous existence outside the party and the state” is “entirely to miss the point”. For Newman (2011:112), the innovation of those spaces, “the way they gave us a glimpse of a new way of life, a new way of organising social relations and making political decisions, was possible only because they were autonomous from the party and the state”. Newman (2011:112) notes, an important success case was in Argentina in 2001 the way that in the beginning of “the economic crisis cooperatives and local assemblies provided basic social services in the absence of functioning government”. Newman (2011:109) clarifies, what is really called into question, here, it is the “concrete political organization” which “is not imposed by, and confined to, the state”. Then, Newman (2011:112) specifies what an anarchist politics needs:

An anarchist politics requires conscious and patient organisation: the building and defending of autonomous, collective spaces outside the state; the experimentation with alternative forms of democratic decision making and egalitarian form of exchange; and even a form of discipline, as long as it is a discipline imposed voluntarily and without coercion by the subject on him – or herself … - a discipline that comes, for instance, with a commitment to a cause (here we might speak of a discipline of indiscipline, an anarchist discipline). This is what I mean by an engagement with the realities of power.
**Engaged activist: the animality**

Hence, those postanarchist autonomous spaces imply a “patient organization”, a necessary and ethical engagement in power (Newman, 2011:112,113).\(^{275}\) Here, the postanarchist meets again Foucault – and Proudhon - who was an engaged intellectual or an activist.

This necessary engagement with the transcendent and diffuse power ‘starts’ in the postanarchist’s body – the animality or the *City of the Sun*, as Foucault would say (Newman, 2011:54). As Newman points out, the postanarchist desire is not organic, but corporal and necessary. It is something *a priori*; it is about necessity and dreams, as we have already observed with Proudhon and Foucault. Nevertheless, it is also something *a posteriori*. This engagement begins also with the postanarchist self that goes along with the others (Newman, 2011:54).\(^{276}\) For this reason, we could say the postanarchist’s desire seems “heterotopical” – spatial or relational - despite Stirner’s ego influence.

In brief, postanarchism is “a kind of ethical distance from politics which … disturbs the political order” (Newman, 2011:57). And this ethical option has shown to be an alternative or “supplementary” way to formal politics and its “high levels of voter disinterest”, the “sense of disillusionment about the efficacy and adequacy of democratic mechanisms and processes”, the “alienation from formal politics” (Newman, 2011:31; Rancière, 2000:174). Postanarchism or this spiritual and ethical path is the way to work around the “state of exception” of our democracies, “building new political relationships, new understandings of community” (Newman, 2011b:47,62). For the postanarchist, ethics “acts as a Katechon to politics” (Newman, 2011:10). The postanarchist is mainly a spiritual and ethical fighter and this is his “political gesture *par excellence*” (Newman, 2011:57).

In the next section, we will summarise the postanarchist features.

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\(^{275}\) As we have already explained, for the postanarchist, anarchy “is not a politics on its own” and it does not serve “as a sovereign principle of social organisation” (Newman, 2011:57).

\(^{276}\) Again Newman says the self “goes along with the others” and does not merge with the world surrounding it.
Although Newman’s postanarchist walks a path parallel to Foucault and Proudhon, separated by Stirner, there are many similarities between the postanarchist ideal type and the Foucauldian activist. The three could be considered anarchists and share many characteristics. As we have planned in the outset of this chapter, we will summarize the points at which the Foucauldian activist is replicated in Newman’s work (see: Appendix, table 4).

We present also a table with the common features shared between the postanarchist ideal type and the Foucauldian one. We colour the postanarchist features. Saul Newman does not develop the non-signalled features, for instance, he does not develop the Foucauldian anti-racism and anti-colonialism, although the postanarchist fights racism and colonialism within the traditional meaning of the word in terms of skin colour (see: Appendix, table 5).
CONCLUSION

Taking “The Postanarchist, an activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal type” as the theme for this thesis we constructed the postanarchist ideal type, bearing on another ideal type, the Foucauldian activist, designed with Proudhon’s aid. We drew both ideal types based on three working hypotheses: (i) postanarchism is space constitution; (ii) to establish space is to survive; (iii) the constitution of space is a struggle. Guided by these hypotheses and by a circular or solar method, we started our philosophical path through postanarchism and its genealogy.

Our itinerary was mainly: (i) To understand what postanarchism is in depth and in a contextualized way; (ii) To know why Foucault’s thought (post-structuralism) is anarchism and is a fundamental influence on postanarchism, having Proudhon as reference – the first person who labelled himself anarchist; (iii) To catch the similarities between postanarchism and classical anarchism, studying Proudhon in depth; (iv) To extract from Saul Newman’s work the postanarchist ideal type; (v) To grasp the differences in theoretical outlook on postanarchism, having as reference the Foucauldian ideal type.

Specifying those purposes:

(i) In order to understand what postanarchism is in depth and in a contextualized way, we started our circular walk (oriented by the solar method) from postanarchism to postanarchism (ideal type) - reviewing The State of The Art. In this State of The Art, first of all, we analysed how postanarchism is understood in the main literature: by Saul Newman, Todd May, Lewis Call and Richard Day. Second, understanding postanarchism as a construction of space, we discussed this concept of space in several postanarchist perspectives: state, non-humanist space, nomadic space, rhizomatic space, micro-space, cyberspace, working space and utopia. Then, in the Chapter II, we studied postanarchism genealogically, its main influences and we met Michel Foucault and also Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. We outlined the similarities between Proudhon and Foucault and we filled the bibliographic gaps of Foucault’s work with Proudhon’s concepts. Then we focused on the concept of space with Proudhon and Foucault’s aid. The intention was to know the postanarchist roots in terms of space. To better understand this concept of space, we joined three further concepts: movement, necessity and war.
(ii) In order to understand why Foucault’s thought - post-structuralism – is anarchism and is fundamental to postanarchism, we continued our walk with Foucault and Proudhon. We showed that Foucault has an anarchist perspective, developing mainly the concepts of necessity and care. We compared Foucault’s concepts with Proudhon’s, building a conceptual network in order to characterize the Foucauldian ideal type as anarchist. The goal was also, on the one hand, to confirm the “bibliographic gaps” or silences in Foucault’s work, filling them with Proudhon’s concepts and, on the other hand, to show Proudhon can be one of the “great absentees” of Foucault’s works. With the Foucauldian ideal type we introduced the postanarchist ideal type, demonstrating Foucault and also Proudhon were fundamental influences on postanarchism.

(iii) In order to catch the similarities between postanarchism and classical anarchism, we demonstrated, first, there is an important proximity between Proudhon – classical anarchist – and Foucault, a great influence of postanarchism, in terms of the fight against essentialism and humanism. In this way, first, we deconstructed and criticized the main postanarchist criticisms of classical anarchism: essentialism and humanism. Second, we highlighted the commonalities between postanarchism and Proudhon - and Foucault - mainly in terms of care, necessity and war, concluding postanarchism is anarchism.

(iv) In order to construct the postanarchist ideal type and to conclude our philosophical walk, we grasped the perspectives, concepts and ideas needed to characterize the postanarchist from Newman’s work. We designed the ideal type using the Foucauldian activist as framework and inspiration.

(v) In order to grasp the differences in theoretical outlook on postanarchism, having as reference the Foucauldian ideal type and to reopen our philosophical circular walk to the future, we pointed out the concepts and ideas of fundamental polemics between Newman and Foucault-Proudhon. We showed Newman’s studies on Stirner could be an important point of controversy due to Stirner’s egoism and structural ego that could not be compatible with Foucault and Proudhon’s thought. As a result, we drew some lines for future research on Newman, Stirner, Foucault and Proudhon.

Summing up, and regarding our first hypothesis - postanarchism is space constitution - we demonstrated that the postanarchist is a constructor of autonomous spaces which are horizontal equal, free, alternative relations of people, free from
hierarchy and oppression. According to our findings, the postanarchist seems to be - or to inhabit - a Foucauldian heterotopia, despite the influence of Stirner’s egoism. The postanarchist body is also the zero point of this heterotopia or ‘other spaces’ or alternative spaces that are similar to autonomous spaces. The Foucauldian heterotopia is “something like a counter-site” where “the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted”. So, the postanarchist and his body, the zero point – and his autonomous spaces - look like a ‘we’ or a collective self constituted by relations of people. The postanarchist, as a Foucauldian heterotopia, is linked to “all the other real sites that can be found within the culture”. The postanarchist is an opened space or self, always welcoming and contesting “the other real sites”. The postanarchist is virtuality. He looks like a virtual ball with multiple tips that could be connected and disconnected with the others and the world around them at any time. Welcoming and contesting permanently his space or the others’ spaces, the postanarchist opens and constructs more space around him, always free from oppression and hierarchy.

Due to all those spatial reasons, the postanarchist is a positive or determined – constructor - free, equal, different, multiple, fluid, mobile and nomadic self. He is an anarchist, because he admits no-archê, no law and no principle. And, regarding our second hypothesis - to establish space is to survive – necessity or survival is his unique law. As we have said, the postanarchist’s body or his necessity is the zero point. Necessity is the unity of measure, which is located in the body - although need as power overcomes it. This necessity guides the postanarchist – as we have studied, necessity is also the Proudhonian and Foucauldian law. Necessity means power that is something ubiquitous, pervasive – an energy without creator that crosses the body. For Foucault and Proudhon, power or immanence are relations of people, the other side of the space.

Nevertheless, this necessity or power has to be cared or exercised moderately. It cannot exist in a raw state. The postanarchist is neither excessive nor needy. Rather he wants to live a balanced life in harmony with himself and with the others. He is a moderate person, as Proudhon and Foucault teach. For that reason, the postanarchist, being an anarchist, is a carer or a spiritual and ethical being. He adopts Foucauldian care or the Proudhonian self-direction. He follows a spiritual or divine path controlling, moderating and caring his internal passions in order to achieve balance and harmony internally. At the same time this internal path is also openness to the
other ethically - having always just necessity as law: anarchy. The postanarchist takes care of himself or of his necessity – or power - and of his relationships with the other.

Hence, the postanarchist fight against desires in order to balance them; also his relationship with the other is mainly a struggle against oppression. And this is a permanent battle or war. For the postanarchist, to fight means to resist, to act or to criticize as Foucault and Proudhon explain. The postanarchist is a critic. The critique - or Proudhonian antagonism or Foucauldian agonism - is his main device. It is also an activism – an action - or a resistance. It implies the concept of power, as we have said. Whenever the postanarchist creates space he manifests his freedom of determination – his power. Nevertheless, once this space is created, the power could become oppressive if there is not an ongoing battle against this oppression or a battle against desires – excesses and lucks - internally and externally. Foucauldian agonism - or Proudhonian war - is the condition of possibility of free, equals and non-oppressive spaces – or selves. The war provides a grid of intelligibility in order to live better and to better understand life. The postanarchist looks like the Foucauldian subjectivation, which is an ongoing struggle or war against fascism, oppression and hierarchy in order to create himself freely and virtuosly. The postanarchist is a solar self that jumps permanently from victory to defeat and from defeat to victory to fight the oppression that could own in all the spaces it creates. The postanarchist lives a solar or circular agonism or war as Foucault and Proudhon also do. So, the postanarchist is also a warrior as our third hypothesis points out: the constitution of space is a struggle.

Postanarchism is an ongoing fight of the collective self – the “we” - for balance and harmony: a subjectivation. As Nietzsche teaches, this solar or circular fight is “playfulness”. This is about joy, “innocence and forgetfulness”. This is poetry. And this means postanarchism is also an aesthetic proposal. The postanarchist looks like a dandy, as Foucault suggests. Being a carer, he carves and stylizes his body and way of life – familiar, social and political life - carefully according to his needs and having fun. As Foucault remembers, this subjectivation and collective invention is related to the way we eat, love, manage our family, and act in polis – activism. And in all these fields (family, society and politics) there is just one law:

277 As Negri (2011:203) highlights, Foucault claims an “economy of domination”, of creation and occupation, the economy of the warrior, not an economy of exchange. The economist or the manager is a carer that acts having the necessity and its balance as unit of measure.
necessity. So, the postanarchist links or merges the personal, the familiar, the social and the political. They are all interrelated through necessity. We are facing another kind of politics: anarchism. Postanarchism is anarchism as its similarities with Proudhon and Foucault show. And, as Foucault and Proudhon argue, it is beyond liberal democracy, liberalism and Marxism. It is also beyond state and representation.

The postanarchist is a collective carer. He does not represent anyone nor is he represented. He is just engaged in fights that his necessity points out strategically. If he is not engaged ‘necessarily’, the postanarchist will not be there. Foucault and his GIP – the prison group – are an example of this engagement. Foucault felt himself a prisoner, although he was not in jail. For the author, the whole society looked like a prison. For that reason, he fought against the prison system. Foucault is not a representative of the prisoners, but just a peer, a comrade – a specific intellectual.

Hence, postanarchist activism is something transcendent that comes from our needs or power – *a priori*. And it is also something transcendent - *a posteriori* - a creation of space in and with the world.

So, again, like Foucault and Proudhon, postanarchism has no political programme, but just need as a compass and harmony, the joy and the peace as atmosphere, this peaceful atmosphere being conquered by a permanent fight against excesses and lacks. Foucault proposes some recipes “to everyday life”. It is “the art of living counter all forms of fascism”. This anti-fascist ‘art’ presupposes the constitution of positive, multiple, different, fluid, mobile, nomadic and productive relations. And these kinds of Foucauldian relation are heterotopias. These kinds of relations constitute the postanarchist collective self as we have said in the outset of this conclusion – despite Stirner’s influence. The postanarchist is an opened “we” or a heterotopia or an anti-fascist artist: a creative collective self.

So, the postanarchist seems not to be an egoist, as Stirner would suggest. His necessity needs to be in harmony and engaged with the other and the world around in a perpetual fight for peace. Necessity and war are the guarantors of non-selfishness and openness to the other. As Proudhon also explains, this creative fight between forces is the way to avoid a “Meta-Subject” or the “essentialisation of forces” – Foucauldian subjectivity. Thus, the postanarchist looks like a cyborg: a kind of a disassembly and a reassembly of a personal-collective self or a cybernetic personality. The cyborg is “a labouring subject, a creative, productive, affirmative subject” (Day, 2011:112).
It is here that the main difference between Newman and Foucault-Proudhon resides. Newman does not develop the concept of cyborg as other postanarchist authors do, for instance, Richard Day and Lewis Call. Newman (2011:125) criticizes the cyborg. For Newman (2011:125) “there is a fetishisation of the cyborg”. Newman (2011:125) adds, “while Hardt and Negri see a radical potential in such transformations, the technologically manipulated cyber-human may not signify so much an escape or exodus from biopolitical capitalism, as its ultimate fantasy”. And why does Newman’s criticize the cyborg, the nomadic and plural self? Would it be due to Stirner’s influence? It could be just Newman’s critique about the technological manipulation of capitalism, because the cyborg would be the “ultimate fantasy” of capitalism as Newman claims. But, if the postanarchist self looks like a heterotopia linked with the exterior world, why could this self not be linked with technology? Why impose limitations or impediments on heterotopia’s connections? Is it because Newman adopts Stirner’s ego? How to conciliate Stirner’s formal ego, although empty and without definition, with the Foucauldian necessity or power and Proudhon’s immanence? Is there a contradiction between Foucault’s power, something ubiquitous, shared that is in all of us and everywhere and this empty and, at the same time, formal ego? Could Stirner accept the Foucauldian subjectivation or the virtuous and collective path – the care of the self – an ongoing stylization? Could Stirner accept the self or the harmonious life is not something we have at the outset, but it is a path or a virtuous stage we achieve in a permanent agonism?

Foucault (2006:305) argues that Stirner attempted to create an aesthetic of the self. Nevertheless, for Foucault (2006:305), the question remains: to refuse or not to refuse the self. As Foucault asks, “is it possible to constitute, to reconstitute an aesthetic and an ethics of the self? At what price and under what conditions? Or else: should not an ethic and an aesthetic of the self finally be reversed in the systematic refusal of the self (as in Schopenhauer)?”

Foucault is concerned with the ego’s fascism and its “price”:

How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our behavior?
How can we articulate Foucault’s call to fight fascism in all of us, with Sirtner’s ego, a closed form or structure? On the one hand, Newman welcomes the social proposal – the heterotopia or the openness to the other – of Foucault and Proudhon. On the other, Newman lets himself be influenced by Stirner’s egoism.

Those are the questions we launch in order to engage in a future research programme on Newman, Stirner, Foucault and Proudhon, complementing this doctoral dissertation. The goal would be to better understand this postanarchist spiritual and ethical path: to create space as we wish or need in a non-fascist way: the utopia here and now.

By raising these doubts about Newman’s works on Stirner, we demonstrated in this thesis postanarchism is just an anarchism like Proudhon’s, due to the conceptual similarities between both authors. We confirmed also the proximity between postanarchism and Foucault due to the common approach and concepts utilized. So, taking into account those similarities between Newman’s postanarchim, Foucault and Proudhon, we could resume that the postanarchist is an anarchist who only has need as law. And, this anarchist is a constructor or a creator, a carer and, consequently, a permanent activist. He is a fighter against biopolitics, oppression and hierarchy or the gap between ruler and ruled in order to build himself collectively in a free, equal, horizontal and mobile way. The postanarchist is an inventor of autonomous spaces here and now.
APPENDIX

The Franks

As we have seen above, Foucault believes that “politics is the continuation of war by other means” (Foucault, 2012:16,17) and, here, the Franks are a source of inspiration. They are an example of the ‘other’ politics continued by ‘other’ means or by ‘other war’: the ethical path or agonism. Foucault (2012:100) notes the word ‘Frank’ means free etymologically. And free, for the Franks, signifies “fierce”, “intrepid”, “proud”, “cruel” (Foucault, 2012:100). The Franks or the barbarians were a warrior people and in peacetime they were a society of independent and individual owners (Foucault, 2012:100,101). They took care of themselves or ruled themselves, being headed by a king who was just a war chief and, in peacetime, just a civil magistrate who mediated conflicts (Foucault, 2012:100,101). This king looks like the Foucauldian specific intellectual whose main task is to help people to live better when people need and ask. Foucault describes him as the ‘other’ representative or carer who takes care of the other’s care. His power was minimal and the citizen’s freedom was maximal (Foucault, 2012:100). This king was chosen by a “common consent” by the group of warriors and he was also an owner like the other warriors (Foucault, 2012:100,101). They were all equal, free and powerful people. Being a warrior people, the Franks, after the victory, divided equally the conquered lands by the different winners and the king did not have privileges in this division (Foucault, 2012:101). The king had “no pre-emptive right”, “no right of first and absolute possession of what was won in war” (Foucault, 2012:101). Being a people of “independent owners”, which took care of themselves, the Franks had “no reason to accept above them the existence of a king who was somehow heir of the Roman emperors” (Foucault, 2012:101).

So, the Frankish society was a localized or decentralized warrior society, an anarchic society, as we studied above, that had the maximal freedom to self-create, to self-manage, to self-produce and to self-rule collectively, having a king with minimal powers who was above all a war chief, as we have just noted. This was “an enlarged democracy with an “egalitarian people of citizen-soldiers”: carers (Foucault, 2012:135; Chevallier, 2014:54). As Foucault (2012:130,131,135) explains, “upon this people, (there is) no followed authority, no rational or constituted authority ... this (is a) brutal Barbarian democracy” or a free society, in Nietzschean sense, that has just a useful and necessary king in order “to multiply its strength, to be stronger in its rapine, to be stronger in its flights and in its rape, to be more sure of his own invading force” – the power to create space. People and king had an equal and free relationship, which worked through reciprocity. The king was just a caring companion who was in solidarity with the people.
The Iranians

As we have already said, Foucault will find also this type of ‘other’ society, and ‘other’ politics, in a peaceful way, in Iran in the seventies/eighties - the Iranan Revolution of 1979. In Iran, Foucault discovered a kind of localized and decentralized society: a society of carers. It was a society that rejected the Shah’s regime or the modernization of the country, a political project inspired by Europe – from top to bottom -, its despotism and corruption (Foucault 1994c:680,681,682).

Foucault (1994c:701-704) found in Iran “The Revolt with Bare Hands”, a corporal power revolt. For him, this was an ‘other’ historical event that stimulates “reflection on the notion of power” (Eribon, 2011:457). This is the uprising of an entire population without weapons, just bodies - the measure of all things, as we have studied above - that “suffocated the civil war”, with an “obstinate and almost unanimous will” and “short slogans” (Foucault 1994c:701-704). This is the revolt of an entire population, despite “the distance that separates the towns” and the “communication difficulties” (Eribon, 2011:457). This was an “undercurrent” “without military apparatus”, “without vanguard” and “without parties”, just “with flowers and flags” – the need - that immobilized the Shah’s army (Foucault 1994c: 701,715,716).

This entire Iranian society was composed of “Islamic or Marxist communities of ex-guerrillas and social movements” that took care of themselves: managed themselves, governed themselves and sustained the imams economically and financially (Foucault, 1994c: 681,711,712,716). These imams are other representatives or specific intellectuals who depended on these people reciprocally (Foucault 1994c: 681,711,712,716). According to Foucault, the Iranians saw the Ayatollah just as an “invisible” and “silent” leader - the Ayatollah was living in exile in Paris - who unified in solidarity the will of the various communities in the country (Foucault 1994c: 681,711,712,716). For the Iranian people, the Ayatollah “(was) not radically away”; “the men (made) him come back as they (illuminated) him with the truth that they (were) unveiling” (Foucault 1994c:681). The Ayatollah and people worked mutually or reciprocally - like a mirror. The men’s will and action were the sine qua non condition to the Ayatollah’s return. For the Iranian people, the Ayatollah was just a symbolic figure or “mythical chief” that did not interfere in the affairs of communities, just represented them externally (Foucault 1994c:713-716.). He was a comrade with an ‘other’ task: no task. “Khomeini said nothing, nothing other than no - to the Shah, the regime, the dependence; Finally Khomeini (was) not a politician: there

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278 This is the Nietzschean “freedom of ferocity” that we have spoken about above.
279 In the Iranian case, Foucault (1994c: 716) does not agree with the term ‘revolution’. He says we are before an “insurrection”, as we are going to see later. For Foucault, the “Iranian Revolution” is the first “insurrection against the planetary systems” and the “craziest” revolt (Foucault 1994c: 716).
280 Again, the Marxist influence is present, although this revolution has neither vanguard nor representatives and is something beyond Marxism, as we are observing.
(was) no party of Khomeini; there (would not) be government of Khomeini. Khomeini (was) the fixed point of a collective will”. In Iran, the clergy does not have a function of direction and supervision, but it is as (i) a utopia towards which (ii) the Iranians go “renewing the faith and not maintaining the obedience” (Foucault 1994c:692). According to Foucault, the Islamic Iranian state and government had a program without program (Foucault 1994c:702). They just had the Iranians’ ideas, values and events – their needs as moral law (Foucault 1994c:707). Foucault tells,

Islam values work; no one can be deprived of the fruits of his labour, what must belong to all. (Water, the sub-soil) shall not be appropriated by anyone. With respect to liberties, they will be respected to the extent that their exercise will not harm others; minorities will be protected and free to live as they please on the condition that they do not harm the majority; between men and women there will not be inequality with respect to rights, but difference, since there is natural difference – the need. With respect to politics, decisions should be made by the majority; the leaders should be responsible to the people, and each person, as it is laid out in the Quran, should be able to stand up and hold accountable he who governs (Stangroom, 2015).

There is a reciprocal and solidary relationship between who ‘governs’ and the people. Externally, for Foucault, the “Iranian Revolution” is the first “insurrection against the planetary systems” and the “craziest” revolt (Foucault 1994c: 716; Eribon, 2011:457,458). This is a revolution led by people who “want to lift the tremendous burden that is upon all of us but particularly upon them, these oil workers, these peasants who lives in the empires’ borders: the weight of the order of the whole world” (Foucault 1994c: 716; Eribon, 2011:457,458). And Foucault specifies that this revolution will be able to disrupt the political situation of the Middle East, and the global strategic balance ... It would be great ... this “Islamic” movement can fire the whole region, reversing the most unstable regimes and disturbing the strongest. Islam - which is not only a religion, but also a way of life belonging to a history and a civilization - can constitute at the scale of hundreds of millions of people a gigantic powder keg. Since yesterday, all the Muslim state can be revolutionized from within, from its secular traditions” (Eribon, 2011:460).

Despite his expectations about a new political spirituality or a new ethical and political path, Foucault noted that the Iranian events were just in the outset, and his intention was only “to try to understand what is happening because in these days nothing is finalized and the dices are still rolling”. Foucault mainly stressed the spiritual dimension of the revolution. He said, “a spiritual dimension crossed the revolt of a people who risked everything in favour of another world” (Eribon, 2011:463). Foucault added, “it was not the desire to be ruled by a mullahs’ government”; Muslims sought “their future in an Islam in which they will shape its new face by their hands”: the need or the other ethical path
From Foucault’s perspective, Muslims were living a kind of ‘Arab Spring’ in the seventies trying to take care of themselves. Foucault saw this revolution as a seed indeed. Foucault explained, “the problem of Islam as a political force is an essential issue for our time and for years to come” (Eribon, 2011:459). As Eribon (2011:461) explains, “Foucault saw clearly that this country would not return to traditional forms of politics and the religious impulse that gave full force to the insurgency would not disappear after the victory”.

So, although the Iranians were not a warrior people, as the Franks were, we could say that they had agonistic “ideas” or “strong”, “resistant” and “passionate” ideas (Foucault 1994c:707,711). The “explosive force” of these ideas (the will to power or the ethical need) opened, created (produced) and occupied autonomous and decentralized communities (events) or networks of communities (Foucault 1994c:707,711). And these communities (or events) finally overthrew the Shah’s regime, acclaiming the Ayatollah (an ‘other’ representative) and, during Foucault’s time life, this pacific, horizontal, ethical and anarchic society (Foucault 1994c:707,711).

To better understand the behaviour of these anarchic Frankish and Iranian networks, Foucault (2012:145) introduces the concept of nation. According to the author, for the constitution of a nation we need two things: a common law and a legislature - that makes these laws (Foucault, 2012:145). Foucault (2012:145) emphasizes that it is not necessary to have a king or a government – representatives - in order to have a nation, as we have seen in the Frankish and Iranian cases. It is just necessary to have a group of people that takes care of itself, clustered around an interest, sharing common customs, habits, and even a language (Foucault, 2012:146). Agriculture, trade and industry are not also sine qua non conditions for the existence of a nation, but they are its necessary “effects” (Foucault, 2012:146). For Foucault (2012:146), if the nation has no ability to produce, to create or to do agriculture, trade and industry – to take care of itself - without a king or a government – representatives - it means that the nation is not a nation (Foucault, 2012:146). To be a nation means to take care of itself - inter pares - without representatives.

Adopting Chevallier’s perspective, the Franks and Iranians are also two cases of local and anarchic historiography, composed by several communities or nations - other creative and agonistic spaces or heterotopias - that rule themselves or take care of themselves according to their needs. They had ‘other political solutions’ or the spiritual politics that Foucault looked for (Foucault, 1994c:694). Therefore, the Foucauldian other political being is the spiritual fighter or “the big nomad” that, in a permanent devir and determination, “violate(s) the social pact” and creates - taking care - these ‘other spaces’ or ‘other political solutions’, perpetually according to his needs and without representatives (Foucault, 1999:89).
### Main points shared by both ideal types

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Table 4
### The activist ideal type: features

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