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Investment appraisal of the privatisation of water supply in Nigeria
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The public sector remains the dominant force in the Nigeria’s economic life, and has largely contributed to inefficient development since the early 1980’s. By 1986, the estimated number of public enterprises in Nigeria was 1,500 out of which 600 were under the Federal Government, and the rest owned by state and local governments (Obadan, 1997). These accounts for about 67% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and over 60 percent of modern sector employment (FRN, 1984). Annually the state monopolies cost over U.S $2 billion in subsidies alone.

In the drinking water supply sector, over 1000 urban and semi-urban water supply schemes existed by 1990, which were all in poor condition and deteriorating rapidly. The various state water agencies responsible for the provision of water supply services were at the lower level of development, characterised by poor funding and organisation, under passive and inadequate legal framework, and operating with little or no visible operational guidelines (FMWRRD, 1999). The effect was the fast decline of urban/semi-urban water supply delivery which if not arrested was heading to unacceptable level of about 8 litres per capita per day. The WHO/UNICEF Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Monitoring Reports for 1996 has the water supply coverage for Nigeria as 39%.

By the late 1970’s, the public enterprises accounted for one-third of all international borrowing by developing countries. This became a major source of concern for the principal international lending agencies. The World Bank thus came to see privatization as an important policy instrument for reducing the drag of public enterprises on national budgets. This became evident in the bank’s lending conditionality in the later part of the 1980’s (World Bank, 2000).

Like most other Sub-saharan African countries, Nigeria adopted the policy of privatization in 1986 as an integral part of a larger reform Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) propagated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a set of conditionalties for external debt relief.

In this connection, the government established a Technical Committee for Privatisation and Commercialisation in 1988 and launched a formal privatization and commercialization programme of state owned enterprises, which has already transferred a number of state-owned enterprises to private operations. However, because these privatized enterprises are mainly federal operations engaged in production, most infrastructure agencies and all state-owned enterprises such as water authorities have been excluded (FRN, 1992).

Nigeria is however currently fully embracing privatisation with the formulation of the National Privatisation Council headed by the Vice President. However, the privatisation of its water supply sector is still at the formative stage. Public-private partnerships offer much potential in Nigeria.

Rationale for the privatisation of water supply in Nigeria
Many infrastructure services have been regarded as natural monopolies with economies of scale and high sunk capital costs. The public perception had previously been that such services should be provided by the government. It is now becoming recognised, however, that many services can be improved and expanded by exposing them to competition through private sector participation.

Moreover, many services are extensively deteriorated, and their capacity is underutilised because of poor maintenance and lack of funds for operation, causing low operational efficiency and high service costs. The traditional approach of budgetary transfers has not solved these problems (FRN, 1992).

The inability of state water authorities to generate sufficient revenues has contributed to large financial deficits. This has left most state water authorities dependent on subventions from state governments to operate and maintain their water systems, service debt obligations, and finance new investment.

The private sector participation in the marketing of water in Nigeria has now become a major phenomenon. Recently, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of bottled and other forms of packaged water called “pure water” being sold on the streets in Nigeria. It costs about 5cents per unit of 500mls and it is available throughout Nigeria. There is a proven willingness-to-pay by the poor for real services. The poor often pay a high price for a service of bad quality provided by informal vendors.

Oyelade and Duncan (1999) undertook a study to ascertain the bacteriological quality and the potential health risk of drinking packaged water on sale in Lagos metropolis, Nigeria. They reported that most (90 percent) of the sixty (60) samples analysed had coliform count well above the maximum of 10 per 100 mls recommended by the international standards for drinking water quality (WHO, 1985). Confirmatory tests shows that they are enteric pathogenic bacteria.

Most consumers are aware of the characteristics of potable water and the potential health risks associated with
consumption of unhygienic water. Although most consumers consider tap water to be of good quality they nevertheless take packaged water because coupled with its perceived potability, it is readily available and largely affordable.

A profound change is required in the concept of water supply as a service industry. State water authorities need to operate in accordance with commercial principles and under an umbrella of adequate legislative and administrative autonomy arrangements.

The specific benefits of water supply privatization follow from the fundamental change in institutional relationship. Those benefits include increased efficiency in investment, management and operation. Moreover, the introduction of private sector arrangements would benefit the Nigerian economy by both reducing budgetary transfers to public agencies and government budget deficits, and by making more efficient use of scarce resources.

**Existing privatisation structure in Nigeria**

Nigeria has some experiences with private sector participation in water supply. The use of private services has resulted from necessity rather than deliberate policy, but has fallen short of achieving the level of competition and efficiency possible.

Several state water authorities in Nigeria has leased computer equipment for billing and collection operations. A local data service company provides and maintains the computers. The computer service has been very satisfactory. Several state water authorities in Nigeria have also tried service contracts with private firms such as property valuators for billing and collection, with mixed results.

In spite of the above, the Lagos State Government is front-lining the full privatization of water supply in Nigeria. There is an ongoing bidding for the World Bank assisted privatization of water supply scheme, a private sector participation strategy being mid-wifed by the State Water Corporation. The concession contract is expected to operate under a Build, Operate and Transfer Scheme. It will be executed under a 23 years lease contract for the management and supply of water to Lagos State.

**Methodology and estimating issues**

Data for the study was largely obtained from the 1999 first quarterly report of the National Water rehabilitation Project which is IBRD funded with the objective of improving water supply delivery by rehabilitating selected urban and semi-urban water supply schemes and institutional development. The study model the investment into the rehabilitation project and also simulates the cost recovery pattern and the profitability index with the attendant improved service delivery.

The recommended privatization model is a 20-years lease contract for already rehabilitated schemes, in which case, there is no investment risk for private sector participant. A 20-years concession contract in the form of Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) option is also suggested to rehabilitate existing urban and semi-urban water supply schemes, in which case, the private sector participant takes investment as well as full commercial risks.

The study sample cover ten Nigerian urban and semi-urban centres. The ten urban and semi-urban centres were chosen to limit the scope of the work. They cover a spread of both Northern and Southern Nigeria.

Data used for the study includes the recommended number of years for lease or concession contract, the rehabilitation investment cost, annual operation and maintenance cost in the rehabilitated systems, total number of systems available in each chosen state water agencies, total number of systems rehabilitated under the IBRD funded project in each chosen state water agencies, the population of the urban and semi-urban centers where the rehabilitated systems are sited, the pre-rehabilitation capacity of the systems, the post-rehabilitation capacity of the systems, the daily water production rate, the unaccounted-for-water, revenue collection efficiency and the recommended price of water.

The variables used in the study are defined as follows:

- SWA is the state water agencies where the rehabilitated systems are sited;
- \( R_{\text{pre-reh}} \) is the rehabilitation investment cost in each chosen state water agencies in U.S $; \( O_{\text{cost}} \) is the annual operation and maintenance cost in the rehabilitated systems in U.S $; \( S_{\text{sys avail}} \) is the total number of systems available in each chosen state water agencies; \( S_{\text{sys rehab}} \) is the total number of systems rehabilitated under the IBRD funded project in each chosen state water agencies; \( \text{POP}_{\text{reh}} \) is the population of the urban and semi-urban centers where the rehabilitated systems are sited; \( \text{CAP}_{\text{pre-reh}} \) is the pre-rehabilitation capacity of the systems in cubic metre per day; \( \text{CAP}_{\text{post-reh}} \) is the post-rehabilitation capacity of the systems in cubic metre per day; \( \text{WPR}_{\text{daily}} \) is the daily water production rate in the rehabilitated systems in cubic metre per day; \( \text{UWF} \) is the unaccounted-for-water in the rehabilitated systems in percentage; \( \text{P}_{\text{w}} \) is the recommended price of water defined as the median price paid per cubic meter (1,000 litres) in U.S $; \( \text{WRE} \) is the water revenue expected in the rehabilitated systems in U.S $; \( \text{NPV}_{\text{g}} \) is the net present value of the investment at the firm’s cost of capital \( K \); \( \text{IRR} \) is the internal rate of return of the investment and PBP is the payback period of the cost of investment.

The Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Principles including the Net Present Value method, the Internal Rate of Return method and the Discounted Pay back Period method constitute our major model for the study. The Discounted Pay Back Period method serves as further check to have an idea of the break even point in our investment analysis.

Thus the Net Present Value, NPV of our investment opportunity at the firm’s cost of capital \( K \) with constant cash flows that goes on for the life of the opportunity is given by

\[
\text{NPV} = \sum_{t=0}^{n} \frac{C_t}{(1 + K)^t}
\]

where \( C_t \) is the net cash flow at time \( t \), and \( n \) is the life of the project.
\[
NPV_k = (WRE - OM_{Cost}) \left[ \frac{1}{K} - \frac{1}{K(1+K)^N} \right] - RICost \tag{1}
\]

where \((WRE - OM_{Cost})\) is the net annual cash flow, \(RICost\) is the initial cash outlay and \(N\) is the life of the opportunity in years. \(NPV_k\) is often referred to as the Present Value of Annuity and the parenthesis in equation (1) is called the annuity factor obtained from standard annuity factor tables.

The Internal Rate of Return, \(IRR\) is the exact DCF rate of return which the investment is expected to achieve, that is, the rate at which the \(NPV\) is zero and is given by

\[
NPV_k = 0 = (WRE - OM_{Cost}) \left[ \frac{1}{IRR} - \frac{1}{IRR(1+IRR)^N} \right] - RICost \tag{2}
\]

(Lumby and Jones, 2001). The discounted pay back period, \(PBP\) usually expressed in years \((N)\) is the period it takes to recover the initial cash outlay on a capital investment in present value and is given by

\[
NPV_k = 0 = \sum_{t=1}^{N} \frac{(WRE - OM_{Cost})}{(1 + K)^t} - RICost \tag{3}
\]

The data were analyzed using computer techniques (spreadsheet applications). The Net Present Value (\(NPV\)) was computed using the variables in equation (1). The stereotypical cost of capital (10%) was used as the firm’s cost of capital, \(K\) since the interest rate used in estimating loan repayment due World Bank is 7.5% per year (FMWRRD, 1999). The Internal Rate of Return and the Discounted Pay Back Period were obtained by solving for \(IRR\) and \(N\) in equation (2) and (3) respectively using iterative technique (Newton’s approximations). The Water Revenue Expected (\(WRE\)) was computed using

\[
WRE = (P_w)(365*WPR_{Daily})(1-UFW)(RCE) \tag{4}
\]

The recommended price of water was fixed using the following criteria (a) expressing the recommended price of water as a percentage of the minimum wage of public servant and as a percentage of the per capita income assuming that a household has only one source of income (b) comparing the recommended price of water to the median price of water in Africa and other developing economies (UNCHS, 1996).

The water consumption pattern of an average Nigerian urban and semi-urban household family size of five (FOS, 1996) is about 4.5 cubic metre per month (Oyebande, 1990). Our recommended price of water is U.S $ 1.0 per cubic meter. Hence an average household would spend about U.S $ 4.50 (=N=495.00) on water consumption per month which is almost equivalent to an average household electricity charge per month.

The minimum wage of public servants in Nigeria is about U.S $ 68.00 (=N=7,500.00) per month and the 1998 per capita income is U.S $ 358.00 (ECA, 1999) hence an average household expenditure on water consumption would amounts to about 7% of the minimum wage of public servants and 15% of the per capita income.

Moreover, the median price of water in Africa and other developing economies is U.S $0.998 per cubic meter (UNCHS, 1996) which is almost equivalent to our recommended price of water.

**Result and discussion**

From Table 1 below, our mean net present value at the firm’s cost of capital, \(NPV_k\) is U.S $67,224,152.00 which is a measure of economic profit or excess return from our investment. Our mean internal rate of return, \(IRR\) is 28.35% which imply that our investment is generating a return much more higher than the firm’s cost of capital, \(K\) of 10%.

Moreover, our mean discounted payback period, \(PBP\) is 3.8 years signifying that our break even point is 4 years meaning that our investment would pay back its outlay over a 4 year period for the rehabilitated systems in each of the state water agencies. Hence the return on investment in the Nigerian water supply sector is high enough to attract a private sector participant.

On the side of efficient service delivery from Table 1 below, the result indicate that at rehabilitation and private sector participant entry, the mean per capita per day water consumption in the chosen urban and semi-urban centers would have increased from 34 litres to 58 litres which is close to the mean per capita per day water consumption of 70 litres used for planning purposes in the provision of the water supply and sanitation policy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The mean daily water production from existing plants would have increased by 70%. Unaccounted-for-water would have reduced from over 50% to 20% and mean water revenue collected which could hardly meet the cost of operation and maintenance would have increased to 65%. Hence, it is evident from our study that more of Nigerian citizenry would have access to potable water with increase in per capita per day water consumption through private sector participant.

**Conclusion and policy recommendation**

There are a number of obstacles facing private participation in Nigerian water supply sector. The main sources of capital are likely to be foreigners and most foreigners may be reluctant to invest. Political uncertainty is high in Nigeria, and in traditional utilities the capital costs are high, the expected lifetime of the investment is long, and returns will be in local rather than foreign currency. Thus investment appears quite risky, and if foreign investors are willing to invest, they may demand a high risk premium. Moreover, privatisation most often lead to higher prices for basic services such as water.

Hence, to attract foreign investors on acceptable terms, government need to create a favourable climate for business by providing macroeconomic stability, competitive...
Table 1. Capital budgetting of the privatisation of water supply in Nigeria using discounted cash flow techniques

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SWA</th>
<th>RI_{cont}</th>
<th>OM_{cont}</th>
<th>SYS_{new}</th>
<th>SYS_{old}</th>
<th>POP_{new}</th>
<th>CAP_{new}</th>
<th>CAP_{old-used}</th>
<th>WPR_{daily}</th>
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Source: The estimates reported here are obtained using spreadsheet computation procedures.

taxes, freedom to repatriate capital, and all the aspects of governance that affect willingness to invest-including contract enforcement, low corruption, and adherence to transparent rules, including for privatization (Ayogu, 1999).

Another major fear about privatization concerns the potential loss of present and future employment. Improvements in efficiency have been leading to job losses in many parts of the world (ILO, 1997). However, lack of modernization and lack of competition may eventually contribute to higher job losses. The long term effects of privatization on employment depend on whether the enabling environment exists in which they can operate efficiently.

References


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