Introduction: Leading in secret [Spy Chiefs, Volume 2: Intelligence Leaders in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia]

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SPY CHIEFS

Volume 2

INTELLIGENCE LEADERS in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia

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Editors

Foreword by
SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE,
former chief of the
Secret Intelligence Service
of the United Kingdom

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This book is dedicated to the memory of one of its contributors,
Dr. Chikara Hashimoto (1975–2016),
a dedicated scholar with a passion for the study of intelligence
and a good and delightful man.
May he rest in peace.
Introduction

Leading in Secret

Paul Maddrell

This book grew out of two academic meetings. The first was a panel, Intelligence Leaders in International Relations, organized by Paul Maddrell at the Fifty-Fifth Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. This led to a second, a conference titled Spy Chiefs: Intelligence Leaders in History, Culture, and International Relations, which was organized by Christopher Moran and his colleagues at Warwick University and held at the Palazzo Pesaro Papafava in Venice, Italy, in May of that year. The purpose of these meetings was to discuss the leadership of intelligence and security agencies—what good leadership of such agencies is and what impact it has had on the performance of the agencies concerned. These discussions have yielded a book in two volumes, both edited by scholars currently researching intelligence leadership. The first is Spy Chiefs, volume 1: Intelligence Leaders in the United States and United Kingdom; the second is this book, Spy Chiefs, volume 2: Intelligence Leaders in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Although there is a large academic literature on leadership, the literature on the leadership of intelligence agencies is tiny. This second volume of Spy Chiefs seeks, like the first, to identify what intelligence leadership is and how it can be improved for the benefit of intelligence and security agencies and thus to increase national security. It addresses broadly the same questions as the first volume: How have intelligence leaders operated in different national, institutional, and historical contexts; What role have they played in the conduct of domestic affairs and international relations; How has their role differed according to the political character of the regime they have served; How much power have they possessed; How have they led their agencies; What qualities make an effective intelligence leader; and How valuable is good leadership to an intelligence agency’s success? While the first volume examined the traditions of leadership that developed in the twentieth century in the United
States and Great Britain, the purpose of this book is to offer a broader perspective. It studies intelligence leadership from the sixteenth century to the very recent past and analyzes the three principal traditions observable across the world in the last century and this one: the Western, the Communist, and the dictatorial. The case studies contained in the book have been chosen because they shed light on these traditions. The editors hope that further research will be undertaken into the leadership of intelligence and security agencies worldwide that will deepen scholarly understanding of it and increase the number of leaders whose role in history is understood.

The three traditions are analyzed and compared in the opening chapter of the book. Then the book turns to examine the Western tradition of intelligence, whereby two parallel systems of intelligence collection grew up. The first involved intelligence collection by government agencies, these being the diplomatic service, the armed forces, and the police. The second involved intelligence collection by merchants, traders, and commercial middlemen as part of the expansion of trade. Light is shed on this tradition by Ioanna Iordanou’s chapter on Venice’s Council of Ten and Emrah Safa Gürkan’s on the “baili” of early modern Venice as well as by Bodo Hechelhammer’s later chapter on the Federal Republic of Germany’s first foreign intelligence chief, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen.

The book also studies the Communist tradition, which saw the collection of intelligence by security services controlled by Communist parties with totalitarian aspirations. Iain Lauchlan’s chapter on Feliks Dzerzhinsky, Paul Maddrell’s on Erich Mielke, and Kristie Macrakis’s on Markus Wolf shed light on this development path. The book also explores a third strand of development: that of intelligence agencies established by states that have achieved independence from European colonial domination. Paul McGarr’s chapter shows that because India has remained a democracy since 1947, its model of intelligence leadership has remained within the Western tradition. Chikara Hashimoto shows in his chapter that Emir Farid Chehab, the chief in the 1950s of Lebanon’s security service, the Sûreté Générale, tried to follow the example of the service’s French parent and make it the reliable security arm of the Lebanese government. He was frustrated, however, by the sectarian divisions that racked Lebanese society and his own service; these divisions finally caused the country, in the 1970s, to descend into civil war. As Dina Rezk shows in her chapter, because Egypt has been a military dictatorship for almost the entire period since 1952, its intelligence chiefs have been the underlings of military rulers. This is a third model of intelligence leadership: the dictatorial. It is different from the other two and is very common in the developing world. These three models of leadership will be analyzed in the next chapter.
The first volume of Spy Chiefs argued that leading intelligence and security agencies was a form of organizational leadership, reasoning that a leader guides the process by which an organization solves problems it faces. The director is an essential part of the process by which an organization overcomes uncertainty. A leader asks the questions that guide the organization toward an appropriate course of action and motivates subordinates to take corresponding action. That volume considered a model example of leadership to be President Kennedy’s role in the US government during the Cuban Missile Crisis: the president asked questions about appropriate responses to the Soviet Union’s deployment of intermediate- and medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba that required his administration to reflect carefully before taking action. That action, when it came, was moderate, placing pressure on the Soviet leadership to withdraw the missiles without being so aggressive that the result was war. This volume makes the same argument, though it maintains that the intelligence leader’s authority and ability to solve problems—and thus exercise leadership—arise from, and are affected by, the very different political and organizational contexts and cultures to be found within the Western, Communist, and dictatorial traditions.

In the first volume, leadership was defined variously as holding a particular position, having particular gifts, achieving particular results, or conducting particular processes. This volume takes exactly the same approach, though leadership in this context must come chiefly from holding the job of intelligence chief since that is what gives the leader authority to solve problems. The gifts possessed, the results achieved, and the activities engaged in are all secondary to that.2

Therefore, both the authority and ability to exercise leadership depend on the political and organizational context and culture in which the intelligence chief and the agency act. The next chapter analyzes the three principal models of political and organizational culture.

Notes
1. The two traditions are also compared in an interesting book on the spy chiefs during the Cold War of the two German states, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic: see Dieter Krüger and Armin Wagner, eds., Konspiration als Beruf: Deutsche Geheimdienstchefs im Kalten Krieg [Secrecy as an occupation: German secret service chiefs in the Cold War] (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2003).