What is leadership intelligence? Three historical trends

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Let us start with the Western model of leadership. The best way to analyze the leadership of an intelligence agency is first to explain what it is not.

The “Great Man” view of leadership, so beloved of Thomas Carlyle, does not apply, because it relies too much on individual genius; the individual displaces any organization that might have been working for him.¹

Nor does Max Weber’s model of “charismatic” leadership apply. The Weberian “charismatic” leader was a child of the mass politics of the democratic era: such a leader made a moral—indeed, quasi-religious—appeal to the masses. Some writers claim that there have been instances of charismatic leadership in business; Steve Jobs, the late, long-serving chief executive officer (CEO) of Apple Corporation, and Lee Iacocca, the chief executive officer of Chrysler Corporation in the 1980s, are given as examples. However, both men greatly increased the stock market value of their companies; in the language of modern leadership (see below) they were principally “transactional” leaders. It is questionable whether the idea of charismatic leadership can apply in a business context, in which a leader is judged first and foremost on how much money he earns for others.² Those who argue that the business leader performs a charismatic role generally mean only that he or she needs to motivate and empower subordinates to ensure the organization’s success. They also stress that this charismatic role is only one part of the business leader’s job: the other part is the “instrumental” role of managing the organization and the people who work in it.³

Quite clearly, an intelligence chief cannot be a “charismatic” leader. Weber’s “charismatic” individual is a person endowed with extraordinary powers. This type of leadership is an exceptional one, arising in times of crisis. An intelligence chief belongs to a different, much more stable type identified by Weber: the rational-legal. Intelligence agencies are firmly established parts of government; they derive their purpose and such legitimacy as they have
from the nation-state—an international legal norm. The authority of intelligence chiefs is derived entirely from their position, not from the possession of exceptional gifts. Their personal appeal, however great it may be, does not extend beyond their agency and the government it serves; they very much lead an organization—that is to say, a team, not the mass of the people. He or she is not in the same position as a political leader but is more similar to the CEO of a corporation listed on the stock exchange. There are considerable similarities between the two types of leadership: both leaders are, in practice, appointed to the position; both depend for their success on maintaining good relations with two sets of people—stockholders and employees in the business leader’s case; consumers of intelligence and subordinates in the intelligence leader’s case.

Business leadership is the principal model of leadership for intelligence chiefs today. George Tenet, the director of Central Intelligence (DCI) under Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, is a good example of a recent intelligence chief who regarded himself as, in effect, the CEO of a corporation. As DCI, he stressed the need for a long-term strategy focusing on core missions, strict financial management, good management of people, energetic recruitment of the best possible college graduates (offering salaries that competed with those available in business), unified training across the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), systematic encouragement of racial diversity among employees, development and exploitation of the most modern information technology, and performance-related pay. All these initiatives are staples of modern business management. Tenet even compares himself with Jack Welch, the former CEO of General Electric. Modestly, he does so unfavorably.

However, there are differences as well. The business leader has more autonomy than an intelligence counterpart: the former is responsible for determining the corporation’s mission; the latter’s mission is determined by its consumers (all the intelligence leader does is determine how the mission will be accomplished). The intelligence leader contends with enemies or, at the very least, threats; any failure on his or her part may cause the country to suffer very serious harm. The business leader contends only with competitors and so has only commercial failure to fear. The business leader’s success can be measured in financial terms; for the most part, the intelligence leader’s success cannot. Perhaps most significantly, as Sir Richard Dearlove stresses in his foreword to this book, the intelligence chief cannot motivate his subordinates by pointing to the agency’s successes, which have to be kept secret. Much follows from the fact that the intelligence leader’s organization is a secretive part of government. The leader has a more distant relationship with staff members than the modern business leader. The maxim of business leadership, “Be visible all the time,” does not apply well. Until recent times, the intelligence
chief neither met nor addressed most subordinates. Even the modern director of Central Intelligence, who can address thousands of subordinates at one time by closed-circuit television, needs to shun publicity in order to do the job properly. A director of the CIA also spends a great deal of time briefing the president, liaising with the Congress, and meeting representatives of foreign intelligence agencies.

Distance, rather than visibility and accessibility, has been a device used by intelligence chiefs to motivate their subordinates. According to his biographer, Dick White, the director (“C”) of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) from 1956 to 1968, “rarely ventured beyond the fourth floor to the remainder of the Broadway offices. . . . apart from the most senior officers, no one in the service knew C, who deliberately isolated himself from the majority of his staff.” He maintained a distance even from his senior officers. His predecessor but one, Sir Stewart Menzies, had been even more distant from his staff. White explained his aloof style of leadership to his biographer: “Secret service organizations don’t have reputations, but mystique, and the chief needs to adopt a similar pose.”

Since the intelligence chief is appointed to the position of leader, not elected to it, James MacGregor Burns’s concepts of the “transforming” and “transactional” leader do not apply. In his important book Leadership, Burns was trying to identify types of political leader. His two types of leader are people trying both to win the support and satisfy the needs and wishes of followers. “Transactional” leadership involves an exchange of favors between leader and follower; it is based on self-interest. The classic example is that of the electoral candidate who is voted into political office and then gives those who voted for him or her what they demanded.

“Transforming” leadership is an engagement between leader and follower in which each lifts the other up to “higher levels of motivation and morality.” It is leadership with a strong moral element; the leader tries to inspire followers to nobler conduct by invoking high ideals such as freedom, justice, equality, or peace. It is a very similar concept to “charismatic” leadership but is open to the obvious objection that such a style may be to a considerable extent transactional.

Neither type of leadership applies to the directors of intelligence and security agencies. They are not trying to satisfy the wishes of those under them but rather are trying to meet the information and security needs of a third party—the government that appointed them and that they serve. They concern themselves with the needs and wishes of their subordinates only to achieve this end. They are much more concerned with their subordinates’ abilities and responsibilities. They do not make great moral appeals. They are very much bureaucratic leaders (a type of leadership that Burns distinguished from
“transforming” leadership). That said, Burns rightly stresses that the purpose of leadership is to help followers achieve their goals. However, intelligence chiefs have two sets of followers: the employees they lead and the government officials they serve. For that reason, they have two main tasks: to manage an organization capably and to win the confidence of the consumers of their intelligence reports.

A distinction is often made between management and leadership; these are regarded as different, though overlapping, tasks. Leadership is the guiding of people and involves motivating subordinates and providing the organization with a vision and concrete goals. Management is treated as more bureaucratic in nature; it involves organizing the agency’s work, implementing its procedures, and preparing budgets. Essentially, the term “management” is used to describe the more mundane tasks of leadership; “leadership” is used to describe the more motivational and inspirational part of the leadership spectrum. As Gary Yukl, a scholar of business management, puts it, “The essential distinction appears to be that leaders influence commitment, whereas managers merely carry out position responsibilities and exercise authority.” Since both roles involve managing people and persuading them, the distinction cannot be strictly maintained. It has little relevance to the work of intelligence chiefs, who are both leaders and managers: they lead people and agencies, though they also manage the agencies’ business. The two words “leader” and “manager” can be used interchangeably and will be so used here.

This book argues in favor of using business leadership as a model for the leadership of intelligence agencies. This is a particular application of the scientific management model of leadership that became influential in the 1920s, especially in the United States, owing to modern industrial management techniques. An intelligence chief is a leader and manager, though one working in a political context. Gary Yukl considers leadership “a complex, multifaceted phenomenon” that can be defined as including “influencing task objectives and strategies, influencing commitment and compliance in task behavior to achieve these objectives, influencing group maintenance and identification, and influencing the culture of an organization.” Intelligence leadership is a form of organizational leadership; the leader-manager guides the people, goals, and culture of the agency (while the mundane aspects of organizational administration can be called “management,” that distinction will not be made here).

The core of organizational leadership is cultural leadership: a good chief of an intelligence and security agency is one who, in addition to developing well-judged intelligence operations and procedures, nurtures an organizational culture that promotes success and also maintains the confidence of political masters.
What Is Intelligence Leadership?

Many writers on business management have questioned whether the leader is important to the success of the organization; in their view, success is the result of many factors, ones both external to the organization and internal to it. In the view of Gary Yukl, “An accurate conception of leadership importance lies between the two extremes of heroic leader and impotent figurehead. How an organization performs is determined by a variety of external and internal factors. The internal factors include leadership processes at all levels, not just the competence and actions of the CEO.”

Key Aspects of Leadership

The record of business leadership illustrates the challenges that face intelligence leaders as directors of organizations: creating a culture that enables the abilities of all staff to be applied to the organization’s tasks; guiding their colleagues toward the achievement of the agency’s goals; asserting their own abilities without overshadowing their colleagues; managing resources, procedures, and structures as well as people; and representing the organization capably before the consumers of its intelligence and the general public. The last task does not come easily to many intelligence officials, who have spent their entire careers working in secret.

Culture

Because leadership involves managing people, it is embedded in culture. Leadership is above all a cultural activity: a leader’s main task is to create a culture for the organization and those who work in it. A culture is a code of values, attitudes, and behavior that governs how subordinates interact with their superiors and one another, what goals they pursue and how they pursue them. It is made up of the organization’s mentality, rules, values, procedures, and the state of its morale. It has a decisive influence on the organization’s identity and is taught to new recruits. Management of people, procedures, plans, and budgets is inseparable from this. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz describes culture as “the fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret their experience and guide their action.” Directors of organizations, whether public or private, guide their subordinates, to a considerable extent, by managing their culture.

Since intelligence chiefs, like the CEOs of corporations or the directors of any other institutions (public or private), wield authority delegated to them, they are both the products of a culture and the managers of one. Their importance as leaders should not be overestimated: they are appointed to the position of director because they conform to the prevailing culture of the
government concerned. They are appointed in part to pass this culture on. This is truer of intelligence and security chiefs than it is of any other leaders in either public or private life, save only for leaders of the armed forces themselves. Intelligence and security chiefs, like the senior officers of the army, navy, air force, and police from whom so many of them are drawn, are expected to be utterly loyal to the state. In his book *The Lessons of History*, Michael Howard noted that since they draw their strength from the entire resources of society, "armies are microcosms of their society; often indeed their core." A variant of this dictum applies to intelligence and security agencies: they are the very core of the governments whose security they seek to maintain. This is above all true of the intelligence and security services of Communist regimes, which depended on these services’ spying and coercion to stay in power. The similarity between the armed forces and intelligence services is attitudinal as well as organizational; intelligence agencies, like the armed forces, regard themselves as engaged in actual or potential combat with hostile powers. All the intelligence chiefs and organizations studied in this book were distinctive products of a political culture.

Ideas of leadership derive from complex social interactions; consequently, different societies have different understandings of it. The leadership style of directors of government agencies is strongly influenced not only by social attitudes but also by the culture of the governments they serve. In American culture, thanks to such institutions as the US presidency and state governorships, there is an individualistic understanding of leadership: a leader is seen as being a strong individual (historically a man, though this is changing) with authority over others, who can make decisions that they will not like. This understanding of leadership is very influential within the US intelligence community; it was the perception that the director of Central Intelligence was providing ineffectual leadership to the community that led to the creation of the position of director of National Intelligence (DNI) in 2005. By contrast, in Scandinavian culture, society understands leadership less as being that of an individual than of someone working in a team. British intelligence chiefs, schooled as they are in Whitehall’s committee culture, have rarely been forceful enough to stand up to the Foreign Office.

An appropriate culture should embrace all abilities (and many disabilities). The literature on business management shows that successful managers do display particular qualities such as self-confidence, ability to show initiative, ability to remain calm under pressure, and dedication to one’s work. Analytical ability, a good memory, and skill in dealing with others are, naturally, valuable. Ambition can also be valuable, so long as one’s ambition for the organization is greater than one’s ambition for oneself; one has to be willing to delegate to others. This socialized form of ambition is essential to successful intelligence
leadership. Competitiveness is not necessarily harmful, so long as it does not lead to too much independence of the team or a desire to undermine colleagues. It is essential to be able to balance character traits. For example, it is very important to be ambitious without losing regard for others and their need for success and to be energetic in promoting change without losing patience with those less supportive of it. A good way of achieving such a balance is in a leadership team—leadership skills are the attributes of a group, not an individual. Successful managers also make use of particular management styles, such as praising and rewarding subordinates and delegating authority to them and empowering them.

Abilities and Qualities
The abilities scholars of business administration have identified in leaders are possessed by their intelligence counterparts. Leaders’ abilities matter because the abilities of every member of a team are one of the factors that affect the team’s performance. The other five factors are the effort made by each member of the team, how well the work is organized, how well the team works together, whether the resources the team needs are available, and how well the team coordinates its work with other parts of the organization.

Allen Dulles’s time as DCI shows the importance of the last factor. He led the agency with conviction because he had the strong support of President Eisenhower; both men believed that the CIA had to go on to the attack and obtain aggressively the intelligence needed to inform Cold War policy toward the Soviet Union. Dulles also placed much emphasis on high standards of intelligence analysis. As a result, he was, in the words of one of his principal analysts, both “the ‘Great White Case Officer’ for all of CIA, spending at least three-fourths of his time and energy . . . on clandestine collection and covert action tasks” and the man who succeeded “in creating a dynamic, productive central intelligence system that really did enrich the policymaking process.”

Dulles finally went too far and had to resign over the misconceived invasion of Cuba by exiles at the Bay of Pigs.

Leaders are able people who, in the words of Professor Manfred Kets de Vries, are “much better than other people at managing cognitive complexity. They are good at searching out and structuring the kind of information they need; their strength lies in making sense of an increasingly complex environment and then in using the data obtained in problem solving. This talent manifests itself in their knack for simplification, of making highly complex issues very palatable” (italics in original).

John McCone, director of Central Intelligence under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson (1961–65), had this ability to a high degree, which is why he was a successful DCI. An engineer by training, McCone had been a highly successful
industrialist before joining the public service. The man he appointed head of
the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, Ray Cline, wrote of McCone that “he
absorbed more from complex briefings than any senior official I have worked
with.” McCone’s principal interest was in intelligence analysis, and under his
leadership, the agency put more emphasis on this and less on the covert action
that had prompted Allen Dulles’s fall. Cline considers that, in consequence, in
the first half of McCone’s time as director, the CIA “operated at its peak per-
formance level.” McCone not only reined in the CIA but also displayed an
ability to focus on his own core tasks of providing the president with incisive
intelligence analysis and of coordinating the intelligence-collection opera-
tions of the entire US intelligence community. He was a demanding taskmas-
ter and an excellent delegator. McCone was capable of canny intelligence anal-
ysis himself: he realized in September 1962, as his own analysts did not, that
the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev might be stationing offensive nuclear
missiles on Cuba. Under his leadership, the Directorate of Intelligence advised
the Johnson administration well about the Vietnam War, correctly arguing,
in contrast to the Defense and State Departments, that aerial bombing was
not weakening North Vietnam’s determination to prosecute the war and that
time was on North Vietnam’s side since, as the Communists knew, domestic
and international opposition to the United States’ involvement in the war was
likely to increase. Markus Wolf, who also briefly studied engineering, also
displayed an outstanding ability to manage cognitive complexity, which is ana-
alyzed in the conclusion to this book.

As Kets de Vries notes, other qualities frequently identified among good
business leaders are “conscientiousness (which includes dependability, achieve-
ment orientation and perseverance), extroversion, dominance, self-confidence,
energy, agreeableness (meaning flexibility and sense of trust), intelligence,
openness to experience (including a lack of ethnocentrism), and emotional sta-
bility” (italics in original).

These qualities enable effective business leaders to motivate others to work
well and to build successful teams. Thus they get the best out of their subordi-
nates. They generally set demanding work goals. Possessing all these gifts will
not guarantee success. As writers on business leadership remind us, “effec-
tive leadership strongly depends on a complex pattern of interaction among
leader, follower, and situation.”

Many intelligence leaders have not only displayed these qualities but used
them to give successful leadership to their agencies. Remarkably conscien-
tious men abound in the history of both the British and the US intelligence
communities. The job of director of an American intelligence agency today
is so onerous that only a very conscientious person can do it. George Tenet,
DCI from 1997 to 2004, has observed, “The work matters enormously,
and it’s never over.” Though proud to have held the position, Tenet was glad to give it up. Vice Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, director of the National Security Agency from 1977 to 1981, worked a ten- to twelve-hour day, six days a week (and a further half-day on Sunday); he was usually in his office at Fort Meade by six o’clock in the morning. Even in more relaxed ages, many intelligence chiefs have worked punishing days. Mansfield Smith-Cumming, the founder-chief of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, worked a twelve-hour day most days of the week. The charm he used to lead SIS derived from a mixture of amiability and eccentricity.

Walter Bedell Smith, often regarded as the best DCI, succeeded because the US intelligence community was then so disorganized that it needed someone of his abrasiveness to give it leadership. He was the archetypal dominant leader: thanks to his forceful personality, he was able to dominate the intelligence community; incorporate the government’s covert action agency, the Office of Policy Coordination, into the agency; and ensure that analysts from all agencies worked together to prepare agreed interagency estimates. The result was a central intelligence system that began to function as it was meant to.

By contrast, William Odom, considered by one historian of the NSA to have been one of the worst directors of that agency, was too abrasive and autocratic to get on well with many of his staff at the NSA; his aggressive style prompted resignations, and he served only three years in the position. J. Edgar Hoover’s self-confidence was the basis of his success as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He knew what he wanted to achieve and set out to achieve it with great determination.

One type of chief who automatically raises morale is a professional intelligence officer; by choosing such a candidate, the government demonstrates to the staff of an intelligence agency that it values their skills. In his foreword to this book, Sir Richard Dearlove, the former chief of the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service, has argued that appointing an intelligence professional is so important to achieving good performance that it is a mistake to appoint a nonprofessional. The leaders of Britain’s foreign intelligence service (SIS), domestic security service (MI5), and communications intelligence agency (Government Communications Headquarters, GCHQ) have usually been veterans of those agencies. With one exception (Sir John Rennie), every chief of SIS since the appointment of Dick White in 1956 has been a professional intelligence officer; indeed, he has usually been a veteran of SIS itself. The morale of SIS staff was high during Maurice Oldfield’s five years as “C” (1973–78) because he was the outstanding intelligence officer of his generation; officers who worked with him have spoken of “his very high, almost phenomenal professional competence.” The government clearly held the same
opinion of him: he was the first chief of SIS ever to be awarded the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George, a very high decoration. Oldfield was a highly intelligent man with a legendary memory. A devout Christian, he further improved morale by insisting that the service’s operations be morally defensible; he disapproved of any participation in assassination or any other violent disruptive action (as did McCone). However, he lacked balance; he lived for his work. He made conscientiousness a failing by taking on too much work—work that he might have delegated to others. His intelligence was another reason he did not delegate as much as he might have done—he reckoned that he could do a job faster than some of his subordinates.

By contrast, the United States’ director of Central Intelligence in the years between the creation of the position in 1947 and its subordination to the DNI in 2005 was usually a high-ranking officer in the armed forces or an important civilian official who enjoyed the administration’s confidence. Professional intelligence officers rarely achieved the position of DCI. Both Allen Dulles and Richard Helms might lay claim to having been the first professional intelligence officer to become director of Central Intelligence (while intelligence was Helms’s principal career and he worked his way up the agency, Dulles oscillated between careers in law and intelligence). As with all SIS chiefs since 1973, the success of both men as DCI was based on their record of loyal, successful service beforehand. Dulles drew on his intelligence experience and President Eisenhower’s support to commit the agency to its Cold War missions: energetic intelligence collection, by human sources and by technical means, and aggressive covert propaganda and paramilitary operations. In Ray Cline’s view, “No other man left such a mark on the Agency.”

Management of Culture
The most successful leaders of intelligence agencies have been those who have created a working culture that has yielded good results—by which I mean strict security and effective collection of valuable intelligence. It involves management of skills, resources, people, and the organization itself. The leader must identify problems and challenges and guide his or her subordinates toward finding solutions. The task has both charismatic and instrumental parts: the charismatic part is to motivate and empower others to achieve as much as they can, and the instrumental is to build appropriate teams, establish suitable organizational structures, allocate the necessary resources, and evaluate performance (Manfred Kets de Vries describes it as “organizational design, control and reward”). They must also devise appropriate operations or commission others to do so, changing operational techniques as the situation requires.
Those best able to create such a culture have been leaders who either founded the intelligence agency they led or who led them early on, when their culture and organization were most susceptible to influence. So it comes as no surprise that, as with other types of organization, prominent among those lauded for their leadership skills are founding or early spy chiefs such as Mansfield Smith-Cumming (SIS), Feliks Dzerzhinsky (of the Bolsheviks’ Cheka), J. Edgar Hoover (FBI), Markus Wolf (of the East German Stasi’s Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, or HVA), and Walter Bedell Smith (CIA). Cumming’s biographer, Alan Judd (himself a former SIS officer), considers the original “C’s” main achievement to have been to give his service a culture, one that expressed British national culture itself:

He personified and embodied his creation to a degree unusual even in that arcane branch of human bureaucracy, unmatched in this respect by any except perhaps Feliks Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Russian Cheka. This was probably all they had in common, for their differences were fundamental, being those of national character and national political personality. For good and ill, expression of these qualities is often found in purest form in national Secret Service.

For all the many and major differences between now and then, the service inherited by Cumming’s successors still bears his imprint. Apart from the hallowed gimmicks, such as the use of the chiefly green ink and the letter C, as well as his title (CSS, Chief of the Secret Service), there are inherited organizational structures and, more importantly, attitudes. Prominent among the latter are the insistence on putting the work first and the easy informality of working relationships.

While Cumming evidently played a significant role in transmitting these attributes to SIS’s forerunner, the Secret Service Bureau, they were characteristics of the organizations he in turn served. The Royal Navy, from which he was transferred to lead the bureau, had a centuries-old tradition of dedicated service to Britain’s national defense. Informality and collegiality were very much characteristics of the British government as a whole at that time. Within the Secret Service Bureau (known from the 1920s as the Secret Intelligence Service[^44]), they were also very much encouraged by the recruitment of officers from a narrow circle of people.[^45] That said, Cumming clearly did inspire his colleagues to follow his example. He was a workaholic with a good sense of humor and a liking for inventiveness, and he transmitted these qualities to his service. To this very day, the Secret Intelligence Service has a high reputation among intelligence agencies worldwide for its inventive use of technology to collect intelligence.[^46] His kindness aside, it was because Cumming dedicated
himself to his job, working a very long day, that he was so highly regarded by his agents and colleagues.47

It is not necessary to be a founder-director to have a profound impact on an intelligence agency. Major reorganizations are a staple of modern organizational management and are, of course, designed to change culture as well as structure, procedures, levels of performance, recruitment, or financing. J. Edgar Hoover, who became the director of the Bureau of Investigation of the United States’ Department of Justice in 1924, was in fact the bureau’s fifth chief. He made great efforts to shape the bureau’s culture, making it more professional and turning it into a bastion of American social conservatism. He drove out female special agents (for forty-four of his forty-eight years as director the bureau had no female agents at all); the men he appointed as special agents were Protestant middle-class law graduates, often from the southern states; he issued a code of conduct to his agents that required they remain faithful to their wives and consume no alcohol; and to ensure that his agents were well trained, in 1935 the FBI established its National Police Academy. Throughout his career Hoover showed great flair for manipulating the press, radio, and television, which consistently gave him and the bureau flattering publicity. While Hoover sought thereby to glorify both the bureau and himself, his efforts in the 1930s to ensure that the press gave his “G-men” (“government men”) favorable publicity had a legitimate law enforcement objective: to end Hollywood’s glamorization of gangsters and replace it with respect for the police, law, and order. In doing so he decisively improved the morale of his agents.48

The history of the US intelligence community offers many other examples of major reorganizations intended to transform the culture of the agencies concerned. To consider only recent history, in the 1980s and 1990s American intelligence agencies made strenuous efforts to recruit and promote more women and people from ethnic minority backgrounds. The termination in 1993 of the FBI’s ban on the employment of homosexuals also initiated a profound change in the bureau’s culture.49 And for the last twenty years intelligence agencies throughout the Western world have been conducting extensive reorganizations so as to keep pace with the revolution in electronic communication.

Management of People

In any organization people need to be managed well; the leader needs to motivate them to achieve the highest level of performance of which they are capable. This is essential to maintaining (and raising) the levels of skill within an organization. Empathy with colleagues and the ability to show and inspire trust in them are important to the success of any leader because these traits
enable him or her to get the best out of the organization. In the intelligence context, people need to be attracted to the agency, immersed in its culture, taught the importance of security, trained in essential skills, and guided to collect the intelligence needed. Ambitious people need to be chosen for work teams, set demanding yet appropriate goals, and given feedback and praise. Their work needs to be evaluated fairly and accurately. The morale of the agency’s staff needs to be kept high, in part by achieving success but also by persuading the staff of the importance of the work and of the need for change, and integrating changes into the agency’s culture. Intelligence agencies find it easier than corporations do to achieve high morale since national security depends on them. However, they are vulnerable to devastating blows to morale, such as when a traitor is found in their ranks—the treason of Aldrich Ames and Harold Nicholson did severe damage to morale at the CIA in the 1990s, for example. Necessary changes need to be made, and to persuade his or her workforce to support them, the intelligence chief must present them as consistent with the existing culture.

**Good Organization**

An intelligence chief needs to devise appropriate organizational structures, ones that integrate the agency firmly into the government it serves so that it receives clear guidance about the government’s information needs. Intelligence-collection agencies need to understand clearly what information they are meant to collect, and the collection requirements imposed on them must be clear, precise, and important. If they are not, then it is less likely that the agency will collect good, usable information. Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service learned this as soon as it was founded. A key step in its development was the attachment of officials from the Foreign Office, War Office, and Admiralty—the government departments that received SIS’s product—to the sections in the service that collected the intelligence. At the same time, the service needs to maintain its independence so that it works equally for all its customers, not just for one, and develops its own esprit de corps.

**Winning the Confidence of Consumers**

Some secret services have maintained their secrecy so well that little is known about how successful they really were; more is known about how successful they were considered to be by the governments they served. An example is Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service. Dick White was considered to be a successful director: when he retired as “C,” the government appointed him coordinator of intelligence at the Cabinet Office. Half of Whitehall attended the memorial service for him when he died in 1993. Yet there is no evidence indicating that under his leadership SIS was, on balance, particularly successful.
While there were successes, such as the recruitment of Oleg Penkovsky in 1961, there were serious reverses as well. One was the uncovering in the service of the penetration agent of the Soviet KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti: Committee for State Security), George Blake, which devastated its operations against the Soviet Bloc and forced a complete reorganization of SIS. Another setback was SIS’s failure to warn the government of Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. During White’s twelve years as chief, SIS became even more a junior partner of the CIA; its main value to the agency lay in its ability to supply intelligence from places where the CIA found it hard to operate, such as North Vietnam and Cuba, since the United States had no diplomatic relations with those countries.

White’s one undoubted success was to win the confidence of Whitehall in his service (which is why it thought so well of him). He was unfailingly pleasant, constructive, and honest in his dealings with his customers. The task suited his abilities well: he was intelligent, pleasant, good-natured, and modest, even deferential. He had a natural listener’s gift of appearing to defer to other people: “He [was] so good at getting on with people,” said one of his principal supporters, the Foreign Office official Sir Patrick Dean, “very honest, straightforward and never conceited.” His senior officers thought that he did not stand up enough for the service when it wanted to mount operations to which the Foreign Office was opposed, because he tended to give way to the diplomats’ objections. His senior officers thought that he did not stand up enough for the service when it wanted to mount operations to which the Foreign Office was opposed, because he tended to give way to the diplomats’ objections. White’s biography is titled The Perfect English Spy, but a better title would be The Perfect English Civil Servant. His success in building a relationship of confidence with his superiors stands in sharp contrast to the inability of some DCIs to persuade the president of the United States to listen to them. John McCone and James Woolsey (DCI, 1993–95) are examples. That said, the position of DCI has been held by men with an outstanding ability to get on well with others; George H. W. Bush, DCI from 1976 to 1977 and later president of the United States, is a case in point. Indeed, most DCIs were not career agency officials and achieved that position because the administration had confidence in them.

Since the age of modern legislative oversight dawned in the mid-1970s, intelligence chiefs in the Western world have had to win the confidence of legislative overseers as well; his ability to do so was one reason why George Tenet, a former staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, was appointed DCI in 1997. As Tenet’s nomination and confirmation by the Senate show, winning the confidence of consumers is so important that there is an argument for appointing people from the policy-making community—John Rennie, a Foreign Office official who was appointed director-general of SIS in 1968, is the British counterpart to Bush and Tenet. Bobby Ray Inman, a highly intelligent director of the NSA, is considered to have represented the
agency outstandingly well before the House and Senate intelligence committees.59

Communist foreign intelligence chiefs had much more distant relations with the regimes they served. One reason is practical: they were directors of foreign intelligence departments of large state security ministries and were subordinates of state security ministers much more important than they were. Consequently, they had far fewer dealings with their leaders, whom they tended not to advise directly. More important, Communist foreign intelligence chiefs had a more distant relationship with their political masters because the latter were skeptical of the information they were provided. Communist political leaders had an ideologically distorted view of world events, which they frequently regarded unjustifiably as developing in their favor. Much information they would not like was not forwarded to them. For example, when Leonid Brezhnev was Soviet leader (from 1964 to 1982), information that conflicted with his thinking was kept from him by the General Department of the Central Committee so as not to “upset” him.60

**Political Influence**

The security chief collects intelligence on domestic politics and is therefore well placed to wield political influence. This is so even in democratic countries, J. Edgar Hoover being the prime example. Hoover collected so much discreditable information on American politicians, including presidents, that he was, in effect, able to intimidate them into keeping him in office. As the Democratic Party’s nominee for the US presidency, John F. Kennedy reassured Hoover publicly that he would not replace him as director of the FBI. He knew that Hoover still had tape recordings of him having sexual intercourse during the Second World War with a suspected German spy, Inga Arvad. His brother, Robert F. Kennedy, whom the president appointed attorney general (and thus Hoover’s immediate superior), was as unfaithful to his wife as John F. Kennedy was to his. Hoover used to show Robert Kennedy who was boss by regularly sending him information on allegations about himself or people Kennedy knew. President Lyndon Johnson, who, as a rising politician, had been much involved in electoral corruption in his home state of Texas, feared Hoover so much that he exempted him from the compulsory retirement age for federal officials.61

Hoover cultivated the presidents he served skillfully. He did so both to stay in office and to wield influence over national policy. Strongly anti-Communist and racist, Hoover had a conservative influence on policy. He supplied presidents from Herbert Hoover in the 1920s to Richard Nixon in the 1970s with
information on their political rivals. He went too far in cultivating presidents; although he did win influence, he put his own ambitions before the interests of the bureau. In practice, he turned the FBI into an arm of the presidency. He encouraged the US Congress and several presidents to exaggerate the Communist menace within the United States. As far as presidents are concerned, he had most success with President Johnson. Johnson enjoyed information on other men’s failings, and Hoover supplied him with a lot (particularly on his political rivals). On Johnson’s instructions, FBI officers even examined televised hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for similarities between its discussions and Communist policy.

While Johnson gave instructions to Hoover, Hoover also wielded influence over Johnson. In particular, he encouraged Johnson to believe that the popular movement within the United States against American involvement in the Vietnam War was Communist-inspired. He had less success in his efforts to persuade Johnson that the civil rights movement (and particularly its leader, the Reverend Martin Luther King) were under Communist influence. However, Johnson was entertained by tape recordings he received from Hoover of King having extramarital sexual intercourse in hotel bedrooms. Hoover himself subjected King to a campaign of degrading harassment, which included sending him anonymous letters calling on him to commit suicide.

The foreign intelligence chief, by contrast, is usually under the thumb of the foreign minister, defense minister, or head of government for whom he or she works. For the most part, histories of the CIA or NSA do not show that the directors of these agencies had any particular influence on foreign policy. An exception is William Casey, President Reagan’s first DCI (1981–87). This example shows how deep-rooted the culture of professionalism was in the CIA by the 1980s: not only the agency but also the policy makers it served knew that CIA analysts were expected to be objective in preparing intelligence reports and briefing policy makers. These policy makers complained bitterly when they felt that the CIA, rather than being objective, was trying to manipulate them. Casey was as conservative as Reagan himself and had very strong views on foreign policy. Not only did he encourage Reagan to go too far in undertaking covert action to fight nonexistent Soviet expansion; worse, his own briefings on intelligence were influenced by his foreign policy views. During Casey’s time as DCI, the State Department felt that it received from the CIA carefully selected reports designed to influence policy on several parts of the world, most importantly the Soviet Union, Iran, and Afghanistan.
Shultz, Reagan’s secretary of state, considered the CIA at that time to be “an alternative State Department with its own strong policy views.” Allowing policy biases to influence intelligence analysis, as Casey did, led to erroneous intelligence advice that Shultz dismissed as “bum dope.” Casey’s influence was all the greater since President Reagan appointed him to the cabinet—he is the only DCI ever to sit in it. However, Casey’s influence was limited to the president’s first term; in his second term, Reagan was guided by Secretary of State Shultz to embrace détente with the Soviet Union.

The Tradition of Communist Dictatorship

How good was the leadership of the security and intelligence agencies of the Communist Bloc? This section analyzes the leadership and managerial culture of the Soviet security service. This service was known by several names between its foundation in 1917 and breakup in 1991; here, the term “KGB” will most frequently be used because that was its last and most long-lasting name (the security service was so called from 1954 to 1991). Can the successes this notorious service achieved be attributed to the way it was led? The position of chief of a Communist security agency was one of great political sensitivity—even greater than in the democratic case—and the men appointed were therefore expected to serve the political purposes of the state’s leader or leadership. Only in particular cases did the security chief enhance his service’s effectiveness. Since they were appointed to maintain a Marxist-Leninist regime and impose Marxism-Leninism on their subordinates, their outlook was severely distorted by ideology. Indeed, as Iain Lauchlan shows in chapter 4 of this volume, their intelligence reporting was alarmist and increased the paranoia of their political masters. Since their job was to impose the viciously repressive policies of their regime, they lacked the charm and finer human qualities of their democratic counterparts.

Throughout the seventy-four-year history of the Soviet Communist Party’s domination of Russia and the countries it conquered, the leadership of the political police displayed consistent characteristics that reflected its subordination to the Communist Party. It was an obedient—indeed, servile—instrument of the party; it was led by people who were, on any reasonable view, criminals and were willing to act criminally; its political thinking was very much that of the party; and like the party bureaucracy, it was corrupt. These characteristics lowered the quality of its leadership.

There were, of course, developments over that time. In the post-Stalin era, party leaders made great efforts to ensure that the leaders of the political police posed no threat to them. They were often drawn from the party itself.
and were political clients of the leader. Loyalty to the leader and the party tended to prevail over any other criterion of selection. Whatever the quality of the security services’ performance, their leadership tended to be mediocre or even bad.

The Soviet Political Police in the Period 1917–53

The Soviet political police was born in the throes of a popular socialist revolution in Russia, when the new Communist regime deliberately stirred up popular hatred of “the bourgeoisie” so as to stay in power. Then known as the Cheka, the political police contained many criminals and drug addicts. The Cheka’s character was criminal. Its mentality was one of vengeance and destruction and naturally attracted criminals. The local political police units were, in practice, free of any judicial control or moral restraint; they could do as they wished and became vicious and tyrannical murderers and torturers.\(^69\)

Their complete power over their victims made some of them sadists. Many drank heavily or resorted to drugs to make the task of killing easier to bear.

Since the political police’s task was to uncover disloyalty, it attracted suspicious and devious people and encouraged these failings in them. As the Communist Viktor Serge put it, “The only temperaments that devoted themselves willingly and tenaciously to this task of ‘internal defence’ were those characterized by suspicion, embitterment, harshness and sadism. . . . The Chekas inevitably consisted of perverted men tending to see conspiracy everywhere and to live in the midst of perpetual conspiracy themselves.”\(^70\)

This was criminality married to ideas: the brutal ideology of Marxism-Leninism justified the Cheka’s cruelty. Its first leader was an outstanding revolutionary: Feliks Dzerzhinsky, a Polish Communist utterly dedicated to the Bolshevik Party and the triumph of the revolution. Dzerzhinsky is the subject of Iain Lauchlan’s chapter in this book and will be discussed only briefly here. Suffice it to say that his outstanding characteristic was fanaticism: he was a devout Catholic as a child, and in adulthood Marxism-Leninism became his faith. He believed that class oppression—and the class oppressors—had to be destroyed and a perfect society created with the aid of violence. He had the mercilessness that Marxism-Leninism required. As head of the Cheka he displayed extraordinary energy, working up to eighteen hours a day, seven days a week, and sleeping in his office. His endurance earned him the nickname “Iron Feliks.” He supplied the expertise the new organization needed, showing such an aptitude for security work that he not only ran the Cheka but many of its operations as well. Until 1920, when the civil war ended, he ran not only the entire agency but also its important Special Department, responsible for the loyalty of the Red Army. He proved so industrious an administrator that he was given other important ministerial posts as well (from
1919, the position of People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs; from 1921, the job of People’s Commissar for Communications). These distracted him from the task of leading the Cheka, which he increasingly had to delegate to others.71

The political police was part of the party-state bureaucracy and quickly took on two of its main characteristics: servility to the top leadership and corruption. Viacheslav Menzhinsky, who succeeded Dzerzhinsky, his fellow Pole, when the latter died in office in 1926, did not have the strength of character to stand up to Stalin, who by the late 1920s was the Communist Party’s undisputed leader. His malleability is the likely reason why Stalin allowed Menzhinsky to remain in office until his death in 1934. Menzhinsky’s successor, Genrikh Yagoda, who led the NKVD (as it now was) from 1934 to 1936, was both servile and corrupt. He turned his ministry from being the party’s instrument to being Stalin’s. He may even have organized the murders of some of Stalin’s opponents, such as Sergei Kirov and Maksim Gorky. In August 1936 he organized the first show trial of Stalin’s party opponents Lev Kamenev and Grigori Zinoviev and supervised their execution. He also embezzled state funds and used them to build himself a magnificent dacha. Among his possessions at the time of his arrest in 1936 were 1,904 pornographic pictures and eleven pornographic films.72

This process of “negative evolution” reached its apogee in the period of High Stalinism, from the early 1930s to the early 1950s, when the leaders of Soviet state security were morally utterly degraded people. The murder and terrorism in which the regime engaged were so extreme that its own security officials were either incapable of thinking for themselves or too scared to do so. The guiding maxim of the political police, including its leaders, became “Sniff out, suck up, survive.”

An outstanding example of these degraded people is Yagoda’s successor, Nikolai Yezhov. Nicknamed the “poison dwarf,” Yezhov was a psychological inadequate. Whereas Dzerzhinsky had been devoted to the party, Yezhov was devoted to Stalin. He was appointed to kill Stalin’s enemies (his biography is, appropriately, titled *Stalin’s Loyal Executioner*). Yezhov’s principal psychological traits were how easily he could be dominated by others and a tendency to take everything he did to an extreme. In performing any task, he never knew when to stop. He suffered from a severe inferiority complex, resulting from his small stature (he was five feet tall) and his very limited education (he attended primary school for only a year74). The psychologist Viktor Topolianskii has argued that Yezhov’s inferiority complex made him a natural sadist because it prompted him to torment others (psychologists call this “infantilism”).75 Certainly, under the influence of Stalin’s paranoid and malevolent personality Yezhov became a vicious sadist. After the executions of such party grandees as Kamenev and Zinoviev, Yezhov gathered up and saved in a drawer the bullets
that had killed them. As NKVD chief he personally participated in beatings to procure confessions. He was considered insignificant by those who met him; the later Politburo member, Dmitri Shepilov, called him “a little cultured and in theoretical respects totally ignorant man.” He was crude and immature: when drunk, he and a friend used to take their trousers off and competed at blowing cigarette ash off a penny by farting. Yezhov later had the friend, Lev Mar’iasin, the president of the USSR’s State Bank, viciously tortured and shot. Indeed, in 1936–38 he personally ordered the arrest and execution of many of his former friends and colleagues (even his mistress); this demonstrates his principal psychological characteristic: his extreme zeal in performing any task. He had no political gifts; his career was made by Stalin, who gave him all the positions he held.

Yezhov became a vicious killer for intellectual as well as for psychological reasons: as a Bolshevik he genuinely believed in a huge oppositionist-fascist conspiracy against the Soviet government. He followed the Bolshevik reasoning by which any group that stood in their way, whatever it subjectively thought of itself, was objectively opposed to revolution and thus to the cause of humanity. So he saw his actions as good. Those who were not with them were against them.

From the late 1920s, when he was appointed deputy people’s commissar for agriculture, he consistently held jobs that required more ability than he had, and from that time on he depended heavily on alcohol. He was so shaken by the vicious work he had to perform as general commissar of state security that he was an alcoholic and constantly drunk throughout his time at the NKVD. His alcoholism was one of the reasons why Stalin fired him in November 1938. Throughout his career his work caused him stress, which brought on illnesses such as neurasthenia. It is questionable whether he was up to the job of NKVD chief; he himself wrote in November 1938, just after his dismissal, in an unsent letter to Stalin that his two years’ work as NKVD chief had put his nervous system under great strain. He was executed in February 1940. He was such a coward that he was dragged screaming to his execution.

As NKVD chief Yezhov had little in the way of ability. All he brought to the job was his extremism in carrying out his duties and his experience of cadre selection (he had worked in this field from 1924). There is some evidence that he was efficient, hard-working, and a good organizer, but among his early work evaluations were negative assessments of him; it is likely that his abilities were, at best, very ordinary. Anyway, they were so impaired by alcoholism, stress, and ill health during his tenure as NKVD chief that it is unlikely that he was capable of much good organization. Throughout his time as chief he drank heavily on every single day and never started work before four or five
in the afternoon. In practice, as Yezhov himself told his principal subordinates at the NKVD, the ministry was run by Stalin (his words were “Comrade Stalin is the first Chekist”). Stalin was the director-general of the “Great Terror”; Yezhov was merely his instrument. There is no evidence that he ever exceeded Stalin’s instructions. He was fired when Stalin wanted to get rid of him. He was dismissed because he had served Stalin’s purposes. In the three great Moscow show trials Stalin decided who was to receive the death sentence. The lie that his party rivals had forged an alliance with hostile intelligence services was invented by Stalin to damn his enemies. Stalin monitored the NKVD’s investigations into his enemies carefully; Yezhov had to send investigation records relating to important prisoners to the Kremlin without delay. Yezhov’s instructions to his officers seem even to have repeated phrases he had heard Stalin say (for instance, “If during this operation an extra thousand people will be shot, that is not such a big deal.”)

Yezhov’s successors were as vile as he was. He was replaced by Lavrenti Beria, a Georgian. An able and efficient administrator, Beria was also a degenerate—a serial rapist whose bodyguards procured women for him and who neglected his wife and child. Stalin certainly knew of his depravity but took no action because Beria was too useful to him. Beria’s ability made him unusual at the top of the NKVD in the late 1930s and 1940s. He had joined the Georgian secret police when it was formed in 1921. Stalin, whom he met in the mid-1920s, transferred him to Moscow in July 1938, initially as Yezhov’s deputy. He was given Yezhov’s job four months later. In his rise Beria displayed the skills necessary to survive in the Stalinist bureaucracy: cruelty, brutality, duplicity, cunning. Realizing the absolute power that Stalin had over the regime, his behavior toward his boss was utterly sycophantic. He proved a skillful courtier, flattering Stalin incessantly and fueling his suspicions of others. He cultivated the ruling elite with equal cunning and became a member very quickly. According to the Russian historian Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, “Beria felt himself at home right away. He was clinking wine glasses with the crafty Mikoian, being photographed arm-in-arm with the simple-minded Voroshilov, listening attentively to the slow-witted Molotov. He amazingly quickly and naturally joined the entourage of this inner circle.” Although he groveled before Stalin and ingratiated himself with his retinue, Beria was domineering and abusive in his dealings with subordinates. He was dismissive of their views. This mixture of sycophancy toward superiors and bullying of subordinates was typical of Communist security chiefs.

His cruelty grew and grew. In 1937–38, as Georgian party chief, he took part in the interrogation and beating of prisoners. He continued to participate in the torture of victims as NKVD chief, deriving sadistic pleasure
He reserved his particular cruelty for people he knew well. He had a feud with Nestor Lakoba, a leading Georgian Communist politician. Lakoba died in December 1936 in suspicious circumstances—many people have suggested that he was poisoned by Beria. In 1937, when Stalin’s terror was at its height, Beria destroyed the rest of the Lakoba family: Nestor’s brother Mikhail was shot after a trial in which he was convicted on false charges of treason and terrorism, Mikhail’s wife died under torture, and his teenage son was shot. Almost all of Nestor Lakoba’s family were shot or imprisoned.

Beria’s ruthlessness and organizational ability were the keys to his effectiveness. During the war he supervised the forcible deportations of the minority nationalities of the Soviet Union—the Volga Germans, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, Crimean Tartars, and others—which the regime regarded as disloyal. These deportations of millions of people caused the death by dehydration, malnutrition, exhaustion, or disease of tens of thousands, chiefly elderly people, women, and children. While this was a crime against humanity, Beria accomplished what Stalin wanted.

He also had responsibility for the Soviet atomic bomb project, and under his direction Soviet physicists and engineers made a bomb in a remarkably short time (four years). Some of the scientists who worked for him considered him an excellent, determined administrator. Others resented his authoritarian, abusive management style. One of them, A. P. Aleksandrov, called Beria “a terrifying man, vile.”

Beria had the intelligence not to treat everyone badly. He deliberately built up his own “tail” of supporters in the Georgia Cheka: Georgians like Vladimir Dekanozov, Avksentii Rapava, and Nikolai Rukhadze; Armenians like Vsevolod Merkulov and Bogdan Kobulov; and Azerbaijanis like M. D. Bagirov. (A “tail,” in Soviet parlance, was a group of supporters whom a leading figure appointed to positions below him.) Beria transferred them to Moscow when he became NKVD chief in 1938. They were so closely identified with him that Beria’s enemies made a point of executing them in the wake of his own execution in December 1953. He was the first NKVD chief to have a strong power base of supporters in the ministry and the Georgian Communist Party apparatus (the result of his service first as state security chief and then as party chief in Georgia). His predecessors as NKVD chief in Moscow had either been professional policemen (Yagoda) or party officials without a personal following (Dzerzhinsky, Menzhinsky, Yezhov). This had made them easy to dismiss. Stalin only allowed Beria to create such a strong position for himself at the NKVD because by that time so many security officials had been killed by Yezhov that expertise was badly lacking. Beria’s own competence as an administrator was valuable in a huge organization gravely weakened by the execution of much of its staff in 1937–38.
The state security chiefs of the late Stalin period were Vsevolod Merkulov, Viktor Abakumov, and Semyon Ignat’ev. Merkulov was appointed state security minister in 1943, when the security service was separated from the Interior Ministry and given its own minister. Stalin may have done this simply to reduce Beria’s power. Alternatively, the combined State Security and Internal Affairs Ministry was gigantic and may have become too big to be run efficiently. Whichever explanation is true, Merkulov added little to the position of minister. He had the cruelty and servility the job demanded. Though an intelligent man who wrote plays and screenplays, Merkulov lacked initiative. He knew the dangers of having a mind of one’s own. Before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, he refused to sign and pass on to Stalin a report by his foreign intelligence chief, Pavel Fitin, which concluded that intelligence reports warning of an impending attack were reliable. Merkulov’s reason was that he knew that Stalin considered the reports to be false. Fitin later said that Merkulov told him, “Up there at the top, they [Stalin] know how to analyze it [intelligence] better than we do.”102 Markus Wolf, the long-serving Stasi foreign intelligence chief who is the subject of a chapter in this volume, also encouraged his political masters’ delusions by not standing up for the intelligence his service had collected.

Merkulov was succeeded in 1946 by Viktor Abakumov, the former head of the wartime military counterintelligence service SMERSH (an acronym for “Death to Spies”). Stalin probably appointed Abakumov to reduce Beria’s influence over the security service. He failed because Abakumov knew that political allies were essential in order to stay alive. According to Khrushchev, Abakumov was “Beria’s man; he never reported to anyone, not even to Stalin, without checking first with Beria.”103 He was a brute who personally tortured some of his victims, which is all he brought to the position of state security minister. He was as fond of expensive foreign luxuries as Yagoda had been before him (corruption was one of the reasons for his execution). In 1951 Stalin replaced Abakumov with Ignat’ev, a Central Committee official, and had him thrown into prison. Merkulov and other rivals of Abakumov had denounced him to Stalin, whose suspiciousness had by now turned into paranoia.104 Stalin was then moving against Beria and used Ignat’ev to fabricate the “doctors’ plot,” which was intended to serve as his excuse for a blood purge. Beria replaced Ignat’ev as minister for state security as soon as Stalin died.105

From the start the Bolshevik regime relied for its existence on the NKVD. So repressive was the regime in the last twenty years of Stalin’s dictatorship that this dependence became even greater, which enabled Beria to make a bid for supreme power when Stalin died. He was one of only two security chiefs to do so. His bid failed, but that of Yuri Andropov, thirty years later, succeeded. Beria had the intelligence to see the crisis of the Soviet system in the early
Paul Maddrell

1950s; this prompted him to propose a reform policy that antagonized his colleagues and led to his own arrest and execution. The triumvirate that succeeded Stalin—Malenkov, Molotov, and Khrushchev—appointed Sergei Kruglov as a stopgap head of the security police. Kruglov had a pitiless reputation; during the war he had been responsible for the loyalty of the Soviet army and had ordered numerous executions of demoralized soldiers. He had also participated in the deportations of the minority peoples. An obscure figure, brutality seems to have been his only professional asset. The security police was not his calling; a party official, he was transferred to it in 1938 only because so many of the NKVD’s staff had been shot. Khrushchev had him expelled from the Communist Party in 1960. He died in 1977, in poverty, when he fell under a train.

As soon as Khrushchev had established himself as the principal figure in the regime in 1954, he replaced Kruglov with his own creature, the long-serving Chekist Ivan Serov. Dmitri Shepilov, who served in the Politburo and was briefly foreign minister in the mid-1950s, described Serov as “an utterly amoral and ignorant figure, directly and personally involved in many of the security agencies’ past crimes.” Serov had been heavily involved in the brutal deportations from the Baltic states in 1939–40 and of the minority peoples of the USSR in 1943–44. His cruelty was his only professional skill. He was utterly servile in his obedience to Khrushchev, the party leader. Shepilov comments that he “was ready with a serf’s zealousness to carry out any of his [Khrushchev’s] lawless instructions and personal whims.”

All these vile personalities reflected the tyranny the Bolsheviks had established. Vicious criminality and murderousness had been necessary to establish this tyranny; gross psychological inadequacies and depravity were tolerated—indeed, encouraged—because they were the price Stalin and his acolytes had to pay to get the killers they needed. They were the apparatchiks of a regime that sought complete power over society.

The Stalin era brought about another important change in the character of the political police’s top leadership. Before Yezhov became chief in 1936, the political police had been led by non-Russians. Dzerzhinsky and Menzhinsky were Poles. Yagoda, though raised in Russia, was probably born in Poland as well; he was also Jewish. Poles, Latvians, Jews, and members of other minority nationalities featured prominently among the Cheka’s senior staff. After 1936 the political police was more often than not led by Russians. The exceptions were Beria, who was Georgian; Merkulov, who was Armenian; and Semichastny and Fedorchuk, who were Ukrainians. The political police became the most xenophobic and anti-Semitic element of the regime. Russians dominated its senior staff. Poles and Jews were, of course, particular victims of the “Great Terror.”
Communist State Security Chiefs in the Post-Stalin Era

With Stalin dead, the Communist regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe declined into semi-totalitarian systems. Corruption was tolerated because it was an essential feature of all these regimes, but gross depravity became rarer. The office culture of the Soviet security service remained very mistrustful, uncollegial, and unpleasant. The KGB was a hierarchical organization that produced bullies wedded to a conspiracy theory that exaggerated the scale of dissent and blamed it all on the West; its officers acted obsequiously toward their superiors and oppressed their subordinates. It and its sister services were production lines churning out paranoid bullies. Nevertheless, their leaders had more self-discipline than the likes of Yezhov, Beria, and Abakumov. The perfect representative of this type was the East German state security minister, Erich Mielke, who is also the subject of a chapter in this book. Examples within the KGB in the late Cold War were Semyon Tsvigun, first deputy chairman under Yuri Andropov, and the Leningrad KGB chief in the 1980s, Daniil Nozyrev.113

Top appointments were made for political reasons at the expense of operational effectiveness. The KGB chairmen of the post-Stalin era lacked political stature. They were either party functionaries or professional policemen. For twenty-four years after 1958 they came from the party bureaucracy because the party insisted on control of the political police after the horrors perpetrated against it by Stalin. Some KGB chairmen were able; others were not. None save Yuri Andropov and Aleksei Shelepin had enough ability to become a considerable figure in the regime. They were closely tied to leading figures in the party, and many were supporters of the leader himself. Khrushchev and Brezhnev both put their supporters in leading positions in the “power ministries,” including the KGB.114 There was a perennial tendency for the Communist Party’s disease of clientelism to spread to the KGB: senior officers built up their “tails” of loyal clients among the officers below them by tolerating mediocrity and overlooking security lapses and blunders. Thus they strengthened their position, but at the expense of the service. Vladimir Kryuchkov, the KGB’s foreign intelligence chief from 1974 to 1988, is a good example. Their failings reflected those of the political leaders they served, who were “pompous mediocrities.”115 The senior staff of the KGB in the post-Stalin period were, like their chairmen, either career policemen or men transferred from the party bureaucracy or Communist Youth League (Komsomol). The army was also a significant source of recruits. The chairmen tended to serve for relatively long periods because they formed part of an oligarchy whose members disliked instability at the top. Yuri Andropov set the record for longevity of tenure (fifteen years). Abakumov, executed in 1954, was the last state security minister to die in this way. The KGB’s staff as a whole enjoyed excellent job
security because stability within the organization was essential to the stability of the regime. This job security, combined with the Chekist tradition, their close identification with the party, and their considerable prestige in Soviet society, gave KGB officers some esprit de corps.116

Khrushchev appointed three KGB chairmen. The first was Serov, whom Khrushchev appointed because the two had worked closely together in Ukraine when Khrushchev was party secretary there. When, in 1958, he wanted to reform the KGB and improve its public image, Khrushchev replaced Serov with Aleksandr Shelepin. Shelepin came from the Communist Party’s youth wing, the Komsomol, whose chairman he had been from 1952 to 1958. His loyalty to the party was clear. Only forty at the time of his appointment, he lacked political authority and did not undermine that of Khrushchev. The party’s authority over the KGB was enhanced by the infusion of Komsomol personnel into it. An able man, Shelepin’s most striking characteristic as KGB chairman was ambition. He was ambitious both for himself (he wanted to become party leader) and for the Communist cause. Nevertheless, he does not seem to have added anything significant to Soviet policy. He did indeed propose to Khrushchev in June 1961 an aggressive “active measures” strategy designed to exploit Western decolonization and stir up national liberation movements in the developing world, thus forcing the United States on the back foot in the Cold War. However, to make common cause with such movements was already Soviet policy.117 From his time KGB officers became better educated. Shelepin may have had a hand in this policy.

Shelepin’s ability made him no less criminal than his predecessors: during his tenure the KGB continued to assassinate troublesome dissidents abroad (the Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera was murdered on Shelepin’s orders in 1959). Shelepin’s understanding of the outside world was just as primitive and distorted by Marxist-Leninist conspiracy theory as his predecessors’: it was he who in June 1960 passed on to Khrushchev very flawed intelligence obtained within NATO that the United States was considering a first strike on the USSR. His association with the KGB harmed his later rise because his Politburo colleagues did not want a former KGB chief to lead the Communist Party.118

Khrushchev replaced Shelepin in 1961 with Vladimir Semichastnyi, Shelepin’s protégé. A Ukrainian, he was known to Khrushchev because he had become first secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol in 1947, when Khrushchev was party first secretary there. He became head of the entire Soviet Komsomol in 1958, replacing Shelepin, and was transferred to the KGB chairmanship from a senior position in the Azerbaijani Communist Party. Aged only thirty-seven at the time of his appointment to lead the KGB, he was given the job because he lacked political weight; Khrushchev put a crony in the job so as
to secure the political loyalty of the KGB. Semichastnyi was so ignorant of intelligence that he had not wanted to accept the job and did so only because Khrushchev insisted. He does not seem to have been an effective chairman, but this was not the reason he was fired. He was dismissed in May 1967 because he was too close to Shelepin, who was a political rival of the new party first secretary, Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev had by this time got the better of Shelepin in the Politburo and wanted to weaken his political position further.

Yuri Andropov succeeded Semichastnyi as KGB chairman. He was an intelligent, reflective, impressive, and civil man, so as a matter of character he was different from the KGB officials who served him. Politically, however, he was identical to them: a devout Communist wedded to conspiracy theories about the West. He stands out among KGB chairmen because he was, unusually, a considerable political figure at the time of his appointment; indeed, the job was a step down from his exalted position as secretary of the Communist Party’s Central Committee and head of its department for liaison with socialist countries. He was compensated by being elected a candidate member of the party’s Politburo the month after his appointment. Since he was not a member of any of the factions in the party leadership, he was probably chosen for the KGB chairmanship because he was a neutral figure and acceptable to all. He was acceptable to the KGB because his central committee job overseeing the USSR’s relations with the satellite states had made him very familiar with its work (these relations were, to a significant degree, handled by the KGB). He was also a proven hard-liner, having played a key role in the reimposition of Soviet control on Hungary after the 1956 uprising.

Andropov was not a crony of Brezhnev. Brezhnev was not strong enough to put his own man in as KGB chairman; his Politburo colleagues would not allow it. However, Brezhnev made sure that many of his cronies were among Andropov’s senior officials. Andropov’s first deputy chairman, Semyon Tsvigun, was Brezhnev’s brother-in-law (he had married a sister of Brezhnev’s wife). He was a career political policeman, having served in the security police since 1939. Another deputy chairman, Viktor Chebrikov, was a Communist Party official who belonged to Brezhnev’s “Dnepropetrovsk mafia” (he had served in Ukraine, had had ties to Brezhnev there, and had attended the same institute of higher education as Brezhnev, Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute). Yet another deputy chairman, Georgi Tsinyev, had known Brezhnev in the Ukrainian Communist Party, had then moved to head up Soviet military counterintelligence in the GDR, and had then transferred to the KGB. All three men were elected to the Communist Party’s Central Committee. In the late 1970s another Brezhnev associate in the KGB was Gen. Viktor Alidin, the head of the large and powerful Moscow branch. Tsvigun and Tsinyev received particularly high honors clearly intended to increase their standing in
the KGB and thus Brezhnev’s influence over it. Tsvigun also had a high public profile intended to strengthen his position in the KGB.

More sophisticated than other leading Communists—he liked jazz and wrote poetry—Andropov won the reputation among Western observers of being a liberal. This was unjustified: he was a Communist hard-liner. In the words of Oleg Kalugin, his foreign counterintelligence chief in the 1970s, Andropov “possessed one of the more virulent anti-Western streaks among the Soviet leadership” and “genuinely believed that the United States and the West were working day and night to destroy the Soviet Union.” These “orthodox communist views often blinded him to a steadily changing reality. When Western European Communist parties started to seek independence from the Soviet Communist Party, Andropov viewed the trend not as a natural historical development but as “the dastardly work of Western intelligence services.” His orthodox Communism meant that he was unable to understand why the USSR was in difficulties in the 1970s. Kalugin’s assessment is that “Andropov himself was so devout a communist that, on the domestic Soviet scene, he couldn’t see the forest for the trees. As our economy slid steadily downward in the late 1970s, he attributed the decline in production to poor worker discipline and disorder at factories. All that was needed, he said, was to boost worker productivity by tightening control over the economy and the workplace.” This shows how deluded the Politburo was.

Andropov’s Communist orthodoxy was evident from his fierce repression of dissidence. Under his leadership, the KGB’s persecution of dissidents was intense: they were committed to psychiatric hospitals; a very strict policy on state secrets was pursued; border protection was stepped up; Soviet citizens were not allowed to meet alone with foreigners; anyone whose behavior was out of the ordinary was viewed as a potential spy. Andropov’s position was clear from his dictum, “No sane individual will oppose a regime that wants so badly to make the lives of its people better.” He was a leading hawk in the Politburo pressing for repression; under his influence, the KGB’s intelligence reports to the party leadership encouraged the leaders in their belief that dissidents were in the pay of the Western intelligence services.

As a rule the KGB under Andropov persecuted and intimidated dissidents by more discreet means than high-profile trials that attracted damaging publicity and turned the accused into heroes of the international media. Famous dissidents like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn were expelled from the USSR; Jews and Volga Germans were allowed to emigrate; some dissidents were blackmailed or bullied into silence; others were incarcerated in psychiatric hospitals; yet more were dismissed from their jobs, expelled from the Communist Party, denied university places, conscripted into the army, or prosecuted...
for nonpolitical crimes that tarnished their reputation. How much of a hand Andropov had in this change of approach is hard to say, but it is consistent with his intelligent and civil personality.128

Andropov left the KGB in May 1982 to return to the Central Committee Secretariat (in practice, as the senior secretary since Brezhnev was very ill and close to death). His successor at the head of the KGB, Vitaly Fedorchuk (chairman from May to December 1982), was the first career political policeman to lead the KGB since 1958. He had no close ties to Andropov: by appointing him Brezhnev and those around him may have wanted to reduce Andropov’s influence over the KGB. Andropov’s influence had increased a few months earlier, in January 1982, when Semyon Tsvigun had committed suicide, apparently because he feared prosecution owing to a corruption investigation initiated by the KGB, at Andropov’s order, into friends of Brezhnev’s daughter Galina and her husband, Yuri Churbanov, the deputy minister of internal affairs.129

Fedorchuk had previously been the chairman of the KGB in Ukraine, where he had persecuted dissidents viciously. Oleg Kalugin describes him as “a Brezhnev hack. . . . He was a rude, conceited bonecrusher, bent on smashing internal dissent in our society and tightening discipline within the KGB. He peppered KGB offices at home and abroad with ridiculous warnings of impending Western aggression, imperialist plots, and CIA efforts to destroy the Soviet economy.”130

Fedorchuk was promoted to minister of internal affairs at the end of 1982, as Andropov extended the KGB’s influence over other parts of the government. Fedorchuk’s successor, Viktor Chebrikov, had served in the KGB for fifteen years prior to becoming its chairman (he served until 1988). Before that he had been a party apparatchik. Kalugin describes him as “an absolute nonentity, a weak and indecisive man who was a pale reflection of Andropov” and “an obedient communist party servant. He was a pleasant man, but like so many party bureaucrats, terribly cautious and afraid to move without approval from his superiors. He was a prime example of our leaders during the depths of the ‘stagnation’ period before Gorbachev—servile, sickly, and indecisive.”131

Gifted politician though he was, Mikhail Gorbachev had one severe failing for a politician: naivety, which often made him a poor judge of people. His predecessors had insisted that they have a considerable measure of control over the KGB. Gorbachev did not. He did not appoint his supporters to leading positions within the KGB; there was no Gorbachev faction within it during his time as general secretary. This was a fatal weakness; it enabled the KGB chairman in 1991 to organize a conspiracy against him and overthrow him without Gorbachev receiving any warning of the plot. Indeed, the KGB chairman concerned, Vladimir Kryuchkov, was his own appointee. In 1988 Gorbachev
replaced Chebrikov with Kryuchkov, considering him more sophisticated than the other KGB officers. One influence on him was that Kryuchkov, like Gorbachev himself, was a protégé of Andropov. Looks deceived him: Kryuchkov was a typical KGB hard-liner who was bound to oppose Gorbachev’s reform policy.

Kryuchkov was not just a political foe. According to Kalugin, who worked with him, he was a typical product of a KGB culture that encouraged sycophancy, political infighting, and bullying at the expense of operational effectiveness. Kalugin’s assessment of Kryuchkov was that he was “the classic assistant, the consummate bureaucrat”: obsequious and skilled at bureaucratic infighting and getting the better of rivals but cautious, indecisive, faint-hearted, physically cowardly, and jealous of his colleagues’ successes. He had “a serious intellectual inferiority complex” and was “a real bastard.” Kalugin maintains that, as chief of the KGB’s foreign intelligence service, Kryuchkov got rid of people willing to argue with him and replaced them with sycophants and Communist Party apparatchiks. This diminished the service’s aggression in its struggle with the CIA in the late 1970s and 1980s, while the number of KGB defectors soared. The culture of the foreign intelligence service became one of sycophantic back-scratching; office politics became more important than the fight against the CIA.

Kalugin is a biased source on the KGB’s culture since he lost his struggle to preserve his career to the sycophantic bullies he condemns. However, he is not the only veteran of the KGB’s foreign intelligence service, the PGU (Pervoye Glavnoye Upravleniye: First Chief Directorate), to claim that it was badly led. Others have called its last head, Leonid Shebarshin, “the first genuinely competent head of the First Chief Directorate in decades.” Moreover, Kalugin’s portrayal of the PGU as so racked by internal politics and poor leadership that its operational effectiveness suffered is supported by its record at the time. It was unsuccessful then in identifying and recruiting good agents. It certainly had outstandingly valuable agents in the United States’ intelligence agencies—Aldrich Ames at the CIA and Robert Hanssen at the FBI—but they volunteered their services (they were “walk-ins,” in intelligence terminology). The number of agents in the USSR’s security and intelligence agencies whom Ames and Hanssen were able to betray confirms Kalugin’s point that morale gravely declined in the last ten or fifteen years of the Soviet Union’s existence. They betrayed at least twenty Western agents in the Soviet Union, most of them reporting to American intelligence agencies. Most of them were officers in either the KGB or the GRU (Glavnoye Razveditelnoye Upravleniye: Main Intelligence Directorate), the Soviet military intelligence service. The most senior KGB officer betrayed was Oleg Gordievsky, then
What Is Intelligence Leadership?  

the KGB’s resident-designate in London, who was a spy of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service.\textsuperscript{135}

The Soviet security service took on the flaws of the regime it served. The Soviet Communist system tended to produce a strong leader: the man who dominated the Central Committee dominated the party and thus the entire regime. Consequently, their state security chiefs were, of necessity, personalities who subordinated themselves to party leaders and implemented their orders. Able men, committed Communists, and party loyalists like Dzerzhinsky increasingly gave way to ignorant, uneducated, brutal creatures of the leader like Yezhov and Serov and intelligent degenerates like Beria. After Stalin died, the party leaders agreed that none of them should control the political police and that no KGB chairman should become party leader. Appointment to the top job in the KGB was consistently a political decision: relatively unimportant party officials and colorless political policemen without any political following were usually chosen. As a rule, they did not have either the ability or the other personal qualities of their democratic counterparts. Unlike those Westerners, most seem to have contributed nothing to the effectiveness of their agencies. Indeed, some of them—Yezhov is the outstanding example—gravely impaired it.

All the USSR’s security chiefs, being brutal men, enhanced their service’s ability to act brutally. This contribution aside, Soviet security chiefs who improved the performance of their agencies are the exception rather than the rule. Dzerzhinsky’s dedication to the task of repressing White opposition and peasant and worker uprisings enabled the Bolshevik Party to hang on to power in the turbulent period of the civil war. Beria supplied valuable professional experience when the political police was being reconstructed after the “Great Terror.” He also marshaled the resources of the Soviet political police and labor camp system behind the USSR’s atomic bomb project. Some of the ferocity with which the KGB persecuted dissidents in the 1970s is attributable to Andropov personally. The organization’s political influence grew during his leadership. He also played a role in refashioning political police methods in the late 1960s and 1970s, ensuring that the KGB made more use of manipulation and less of coercion and terror, and improved his staff’s professional skills.\textsuperscript{136}

As a rule, whatever operational successes the Soviet security service achieved had nothing to do with the quality of their leadership. Political considerations prevailed over operational ones. The job was too sensitive, in the Soviet Union as in its satellite states, for the choice of chairman or minister to be decided on operational grounds. The KGB and its predecessors were successful because security service work is not rocket science and people of ordinary abilities, armed with all the powers of a ruthlessly repressive state,
Paul Maddrell

The Dictatorial Tradition

The end of European imperialism gave rise to a variety of political systems in the newly independent former colonies. Some, India being the principal example, successfully established a democratic form of government. As Paul McGarr shows in his chapter in this book, the leadership its intelligence agencies have had has remained within the Western tradition. By contrast, as Chikara Hashimoto demonstrates, owing to the sectarian politics of postindependence Lebanon, its security chiefs have been more concerned with regime security than state security. Many former colonies became dictatorships—Egypt, the subject of Dina Rezk’s chapter, is an example. The twentieth-century tradition of intelligence leadership within dictatorships is similar to the Communist, although the ideological element is less prominent because

Table 1.1 The Leadership of the Soviet Security Service, 1917–91

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Security chief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917–26</td>
<td>Feliks Dzerzhinsky (Pole)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926–34</td>
<td>Viacheslav Menzhinsky (Pole)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934–36</td>
<td>Genrikh Yagoda (Jewish; probably Polish by birth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936–38</td>
<td>Nikolai Yezhov (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938–41</td>
<td>Lavrenti Beria (Georgian of Mingrelian ethnicity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941 (February–July)</td>
<td>Vsevolod Merkulov (Armenian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941–43</td>
<td>Lavrenti Beria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943–46</td>
<td>Vsevolod Merkulov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946–51</td>
<td>Viktor Abakumov (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951–53</td>
<td>Semyon Ignat’ev (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953 (March–June)</td>
<td>Lavrenti Beria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953–54</td>
<td>Sergei Kruglov (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954–58</td>
<td>Ivan Serov (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958–61</td>
<td>Aleksandr Shelepkin (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961–67</td>
<td>Vladimir Semichastnyi (Ukrainian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967–82</td>
<td>Yuri Andropov (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 (May–December)</td>
<td>Vitaly Fedorchuk (Ukrainian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982–88</td>
<td>Viktor Chebrikov (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988–91</td>
<td>Vladimir Kryuchkov (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Vadim Bakatin (Russian)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the ideology is less totalitarian. The range of dictatorships is wide, extending from the royal and nationalist-socialist dictatorships of the Arab Middle East to the military dictatorships of Burma and Pakistan and to Russia’s contemporary authoritarian, security service–led pseudo-democracy. In such a dictatorship, the security service’s task is to provide security to the regime and its leader. It is answerable only to them. They must be protected from a popular revolt, terrorist violence, the spying and subversion of foreign powers, and even plots within the regime itself. This task has been aptly described as “coup-proofing.”137 “Coup-proofing” is a difficult task since the regime must be protected against both a popular uprising and plotters within the regime. Dictators who fear a coup on the part of officers of their own security services or armed forces more than they fear an uprising will tend to create multiple security agencies, led by men unquestionably loyal to them, and set them to keep watch on one another. By contrast, dictators who fear a popular uprising more than a coup will, like Communist leaders, tend to prefer a single security service that prioritizes the collection of intelligence on the populace.138

The security agencies of dictatorships are vicious and above the law. The most notorious examples are the security services of the dictatorial regimes of the Arab states, which make much use of torture in order to frighten their peoples into obedience. The word in Arabic for “security service” is al-mukhabarat. Since the Russian regime no longer relies on either democratic legitimacy or an official ideology to justify its hold on power, the successor agency to the KGB, the Federal Security Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, FSB) has become a Russian mukhabarat.139

The Western tradition, then, has tended to produce leaders who have reflected national and bureaucratic culture, have regarded themselves as people managers, are increasingly drawn to the model of a corporate chief executive officer, and are judged by the quality of the information they provide. It has been rare for them to have political influence; J. Edgar Hoover and William Casey are examples of ones who did. They increasingly have to cope with the tension between leading their agencies and representing them before the policy makers and legislative bodies to which they are accountable.

The Communist tradition produced sycophantic “bonecrushers” willing to engage in the mass repression essential to Communist rule. Many of these men were creatures of the party leaders they served. However, such was the importance of their service to the regime that Soviet security chiefs could be powerful political figures—Dzerzhinsky, Beria, Andropov, and Kryuchkov are the leading examples. The same tendency for security chiefs to be both creatures of the state leader and powerful political figures is visible in the dictatorial tradition. Intelligence and security chiefs who exemplify these traditions are analyzed in the chapters that follow.
Notes


9. Ibid.


15. Ibid., 277.


20. See Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 16.

22. On the influence of the presidential model on the US intelligence community and of Whitehall’s committee system on British intelligence, see Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, chap. 15.


24. Ibid., 268–69.


28. Ibid., 191.


31. Ibid., 73.

32. Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 477.


34. Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only*, 187–93.


38. Ibid., 166–68, 174.

39. Ibid., 164.


41. Cline, *Secrets, Spies and Scholars*, 112.


49. Ibid., 216–18.

51. Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 15–17.
52. Alvesson, “Leadership and Organizational Culture,” 158.
54. Ibid., 359–61.
55. Ibid., 262–71; and Davies, *MI6 and the Machinery of Spying*, 278–79.
57. Ibid., 174–77, 341, 353.
58. Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, 3, 7.
61. Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only*, 276–78, 310.
63. Ibid., 311, 364.
65. Exceptionally, Congress in 2011 passed a law enabling Robert S. Mueller III, the then director of the FBI, to serve a further two years in the position. In all, he served for twelve years (from 2001 to 2013).
67. Ibid., 865–66.
68. Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only*, 478.
71. Ibid., 250–56.
74. Ibid., 18.
76. Ibid., 182.
77. Ibid., 110.
78. Quoted in ibid., 198.
79. Ibid., 19–20, 201.
82. Ibid., 15, 179.
83. Ibid., 186–89.
87. Ibid., 58–59.
88. Ibid., 62.
89. Ibid., 84–85.
92. Quoted in ibid., 95–96.
93. Quoted in ibid., 131.
96. Ibid., 72, 81, 83. Beria was head of the Georgian GPU from 1926 to 1931; first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party from 1931 to 1938; deputy chief of the NKVD from August to November 1938; and NKVD chief from November 1938 to 1941.
100. Ibid., 30, 223.
101. Ibid., 91.
120. Ibid., 80–86.
123. Ibid., 253.
124. Ibid., 256.
125. Ibid., 259–60.
126. Ibid., 262.
132. Ibid., 242–44.
133. Ibid., 248–52.