Conclusion: The Government Men

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Chapter 1 of this book developed principles of good organizational leadership derived from the study of business management, the closest parallel to leadership of a government agency. The aim of this conclusion is to establish how and how well the intelligence leaders discussed in this collection did their job. In each case it is clear that the character of the leadership they provided was influenced by the culture of their organization and of the government of which it formed a part. The name by which officials of the FBI became popularly known in the 1930s—“government men (G-men)”—suits them well.

The preliminary point needs to be made—one entirely consistent with the findings of scholars who have researched into business leadership—that the organization is more important than the leader. This book underlines the fact that intelligence agencies are more important than their directors. It contains striking examples of agencies and leaders that managed to survive radical political changes. Nazi Germany’s Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, for example, managed after the Second World War to reestablish his military intelligence unit Fremde Heere Ost (FHO: Foreign Armies East) under American control as the “Gehlen Organization.” As during the war, it collected intelligence on the Soviet armed forces in Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe. Without Gehlen’s guile, a German foreign intelligence organization would not have emerged so quickly after the war. Nevertheless, however much cunning he displayed in persuading the US Army’s Counter-Intelligence Corps to allow him to reestablish his service, he survived because his service was regarded as important rather than the other way round.

The chapters by Ioanna Iordanou and Emrah Safa Gürkan on the intelligence-collection system of the great trading city of Venice show how early in European history the gathering of information was conducted in an organized way. It is no accident that this occurred in a relatively small polity, a
city, with a strong civic culture derived from its guilds; good organization was easier for such a polity to achieve than it was for the ruler of a large territory. Venice developed a culture of obsessive concern for secrecy: state secrets were to be kept and public security was to be further enhanced by calling on the general public to report troubling matters. Venice made great efforts to ensure that information flowed strongly to a small group of secretive old men. Iordanou shows how the political leadership provided to Venice by the Council of Ten was of the “transactional” and “transformational” types that the modern academic literature on leadership has identified. One of the great objectives of the council’s leadership was to obtain information to guide the government of the city. The three channels of information it exploited—diplomats, merchants, and the general public—are, of course, still in use today. Gürkan demonstrates that, by contrast, as intelligence collectors Venice’s baili in Istanbul were entrepreneurs who were left by their masters to gather intelligence as they thought best.

The history of Venice shows the importance of organized intelligence collection. This raises the question: How important are leaders to the performance of their agencies? This book contains examples of leaders who enhanced their organizations’ performance.

Such was the importance attributed by Communist regimes to domestic repression and intelligence collection, both at home and abroad, that very able men could and did achieve the position of leader of the security or foreign intelligence service. Feliks Dzerzhinsky and Markus Wolf are examples. Significantly, both were appointed early in the lifetime of their respective services; Dzerzhinsky was the first chairman of the Cheka, Wolf the second chief of foreign intelligence. Both were young men when they were appointed (Dzerzhinsky was forty, Wolf twenty-nine) and were not regarded as posing any threat to the party leader.

Feliks Dzerzhinsky was an outstanding political policeman. Indeed, as Iain Lauchlan demonstrates in his chapter, he was one of the most important Communist leaders in the history of the Soviet regime. In the first place, that fragile regime owed its survival, in the terrible years of the Russian Civil War and the ensuing crisis of the Russian Empire, to him and men like Leon Trotsky, who shared his energy, intelligence, and fanaticism. Dzerzhinsky had a much more long-lasting, and even more harmful, influence on the lives of those who lived—and died—under Communist rule than that: he played a key role in the process by which the Communist leadership of the Soviet Union came to delude itself about popular dissatisfaction with its misrule. Since Lenin and his followers insisted that their ideology, Marxism-Leninism, was correct, they were forced to regard popular dissatisfaction as a hostile conspiracy arising from class resistance. Dzerzhinsky was Lenin’s most faithful disciple.
and incorporated this gross distortion of reality into the daily practice of the political police. On the instructions of the party leader, whether it was Lenin or Stalin or any of their successors, the political police came to see conspiracy everywhere and encouraged their leaders to be more paranoid than they would otherwise have been. Each encouraged the delusions and cruelties of the other. By means of the Cheka and its leader, Lenin turned himself into the Soviet peoples’ persecutor—for seventy-four years. The civil war that Dzerzhinsky declared on the Soviet peoples, in the name of revolution, prevented any possibility that the regime’s rule might come to rest on popular consent. The regime, and at its core its political police, existed to coerce the people. As Lauchlan rightly says, Dzerzhinsky became the regime’s “holy executioner.”

Lauchlan shows that Dzerzhinsky and the political police he created prompted key steps in the development of the Communist regime and of its vicious repression of society. The evidence indicates that it was Dzerzhinsky, rather than Lenin, who first proposed late in 1917 that a political police agency be founded. Lauchlan demonstrates that it was Dzerzhinsky, together with Viacheslav Molotov, who in 1921, in the wake of the civil war, first proposed the theory later taken up by Stalin that class struggle would intensify as class enemies grew weaker. It was Dzerzhinsky who suggested to Lenin in 1921 that the first show trials (of Socialist revolutionaries) be held; his reason was the very ideological one of blaming the regime’s crisis on opponents. Fanatical Communist that he was, Dzerzhinsky turned his service into the Communist Party’s Inquisition—ideologically correct, completely loyal to the leader, and utterly vicious. In the 1920s the Communist Party leadership came increasingly to trust the political police’s intelligence reports precisely because they were so distorted by ideology. This deluded and alarmist reporting was, according to Molotov, one of the reasons why Stalin and his acolytes carried out their campaign of mass murder that Western historians know as the “Great Terror.” Stalin’s political police chief, Nikolai Yezhov, was merely his boss’s agent in supervising this terrible purge of imaginary enemies; in this, as Lauchlan shows, he followed the example of obedience to the Communist Party’s leader set by Dzerzhinsky. Stalin exploited Yezhov to the full before he had him executed, deflecting on to his underling much of the responsibility for the mass killings that Russians remember as the “Yezhovshchina” (“time of Yezhov”).

Lauchlan argues that Dzerzhinsky belongs to the “Great Man” type of leader. This is open to question; rather, the Dzerzhinsky myth, carefully cultivated by first the Soviet and now the Russian security service, presents him as such a leader. That myth is the outstanding example of an intelligence agency trying to strengthen its culture and morale by claiming for its officials virtues attributed to a past leader.
Because in the last decade and a half of his life Markus Wolf sought publicity, a great deal is known about his leadership of the GDR’s principal foreign intelligence service, the Stasi’s Main Intelligence Directorate (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, HVA). He even wrote an autobiography—something very rare for a Communist spy chief. He was a very good director of the HVA. His achievements speak for themselves: during his time as chief (1952–86) the service created a very large network of agents in its main target, the Federal Republic of Germany. This network consisted of approximately 6,000 spies; other departments of the Stasi recruited and ran another 6,000 in the same period. This total number of 12,000 spies was supported by about 40,000 East German couriers and instructors. The entire network gathered a wealth of high-grade political, military, scientific and technological, and counterintelligence information for the GDR and the Soviet Union.

In truth, Wolf was both a success and a failure. His careful, calm, methodical, intelligent approach to espionage was an important reason for his service’s success. Wolf was a highly intelligent man, and his intellectual brand of Marxism-Leninism made him very cynical in his dealings with others (particularly his spies): he regarded them as means to his end—the triumph of Marxism-Leninism. He had a very careful, systematic way of thinking, one encouraged by his study of aeronautical engineering as a young man (for the rest of his life he was a keen reader of aviation magazines). These are ideal qualities in a spy chief. Under his leadership, the HVA was both very concerned with security and supremely successful in recruiting promising agents and infiltrating them into its targets. Of course, it had the great advantage that the Cold War lasted a long time: it had decades in which to become proficient in infiltrating its targets. The division of Germany, mass migration from East to West, and proliferation of contacts between East and West Germans that the HVA could exploit greatly facilitated his task. Nevertheless, similar opportunities were available to West Germany’s intelligence agencies, which did not exploit them nearly as well. Wolf was an ambitious and demanding man who set high standards of achievement for his service; he consistently pressed his subordinates to obtain high-quality intelligence.

Since obtaining information from spies was his work, he saw the importance of building good relationships with people; his vanity helped him here, for he was keen to impress others. Very unusually for a foreign intelligence chief, he always ran a few agents himself. One of his top sources in the BND, Gabriele Gast, was one of them. She writes in her memoir that the two of them became friends and that he planned every meeting with her carefully and intelligently. However, his vanity and self-importance always shone through.

Wolf’s cynicism served him both well and ill. It caused him to regard others as means to his ends. It lay behind his spectacularly successful “Romeo”
operations—the use of male agents, usually supplied with false identities, to obtain intelligence over long periods from lonely, middle-aged West German women, usually working as secretaries in ministries or intelligence agencies in the Federal Republic. This was an intelligent development of the KGB’s long-standing technique of blackmail following sexual entrapment. It was so successful that the KGB itself made use of the method—it is a rare case of the KGB adopting an operational technique from a satellite service. However, his cynicism was visible to others and may have led to his downfall. Gabriele Gast, herself seduced by a “Romeo” sent by Wolf, was bitterly disappointed at the cynicism with which he tried to justify deceiving lonely women with false expressions of love into betraying classified information. He treated his wives just as badly. He was unfaithful to his first wife. His divorce from his second wife was acrimonious and turned him into a security risk for the Stasi because the BND tried to recruit his ex-wife. It is uncertain whether Wolf retired from the HVA in 1986 at his own request or whether he was forced out because of the security concerns arising from his divorce. Gast, who found him depressed at their last meeting a few weeks before he retired, believes that he was forced out of his job. In his memoir Wolf presents himself as having sought early retirement because he wanted to finish a film script left incomplete by his late brother. In fact, Mielke had given him a lot of time to do this while remaining in post as HVA chief.

Wolf had shortcomings as a foreign intelligence chief that put limits on his success. His main failing, like Dzerzhinsky’s, was his orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Since the Marxist-Leninist social system was doomed to fail, so was Wolf’s intelligence service. As HVA chief, he contributed to the GDR’s downfall. The SED regime was overthrown because the party leaders greatly overestimated its stability; Wolf, in his intelligence reporting, encouraged them to believe that its rule was stable and that popular opposition was stirred up by a hostile Western reactionary conspiracy. His intelligence reporting was not good enough.

The intelligence analysts of Western states today regard their task as to tell their political masters what they do not want to hear. Orthodox Stalinist that he was, Wolf knew he could not do this: he never argued before the party leaders that the intelligence his service had so skillfully obtained was correct. His intelligence assessors (who prepared their reports under his direction) did not analyze intelligence; they did not try to reach any view of their own. Instead, they summarized the information available to them. Their reports were accordingly very factual in character. They were sent on to the party leaders. They pointed to numerous failings, particularly economic and political ones, which West German leaders saw the GDR as having. Being very factual reports on information collected in the West, in the party leaders’
eyes they were very similar to Western press reports that they read about in summaries of information in the Western press; the leaders were very used to dismissing such reports. Consequently, according to Wolf’s successor as HVA chief Werner Großmann, they were very skeptical of his service’s reports. The intelligence so arduously collected made little impression on them; despite having an excellent foreign intelligence service, the Socialist Unity Party leadership was ill-informed. Neither Wolf nor Großmann stood his ground and argued that the information contained in their reports was correct. Wolf claims that, in the last years of his time as chief of the HVA, he realized that Western criticisms of the Soviet Bloc’s growing economic backwardness and military decline were well-founded, but he did not voice this view. Party discipline was too strict. Another failing in the HVA’s reporting is that it collected intelligence only on subjects on which the party wanted information, which further hindered it from showing the leadership the real state of affairs. Not that it wanted to show the party how matters really stood: the HVA officers were as committed to Marxism-Leninism as their leaders.

Wolf’s vanity was another shortcoming. No one was more impressed by him than Wolf himself. He was also very impressed by his family, which he regarded as a special one—intellectually minded, culturally gifted, and a bright light of the German Communist movement. His interest in other people was small and largely prompted by his work. Some were impressed by him, but others had more insight and were not. However, unlike Gehlen, Wolf was able to keep his vanity in check; it did not interfere with his work. It is a tribute to Wolf’s commitment to secrecy that he acquired the nickname “the man without a face.” However, his vanity became apparent when, like Gehlen’s, his reputation came under attack. It prompted him—after the collapse of the SED regime, the GDR, and the Soviet Union and his own forced return from exile in Russia to criminal prosecution in the reunited Germany—to seek the limelight. He published several books and gave numerous interviews to television companies and the press. His aim throughout was to present himself as a humanitarian reform Communist who bore little responsibility for the Stasi’s crimes and infringements of human rights. His claim that, by the early 1980s at the latest, he had realized that the GDR’s “actually existing socialism” was a failure and needed to be radically reformed, has been dismissed by both Werner Großmann and Gabriele Gast as a lie.

While able men could rise to the top of the Communist political police and foreign intelligence services, there was a strong tendency among Communist regimes to put the former, the more important of these, in the hands of men of mediocre ability; such men were less likely to pose a political threat to the leader. Brutal, narrow-minded, suspicious, of very ordinary intelligence,
sycophantic toward his political masters and a bully toward his subordinates, Erich Mielke was an archetypal Communist political policeman of the Cold War era and a mediocre minister for state security. His career shows how important an influence on leadership the cultural (including political) influences on a leader are. He continued the tradition established by Dzerzhinsky of subordinating his ministry completely to his political masters. However, as the chief of the security service of a Soviet satellite, he had two masters: the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party and the KGB. He codirected his ministry with them. Mielke’s longevity in office is explained by his seniority and standing among East German security officials, the backing of the general secretaries he served (to whom he groveled), and the support of the Russians (to whom he also groveled). He retained his position for so long because he did what his masters told him to do. Only one GDR state security minister, Ernst Wollweber (1953–57), seems to have done his job ably. His predecessor, Wilhelm Zaisser (1950–53), failed in the position.

Nevertheless, Mielke’s long reign had benefits for the Stasi. It was not affected, as the KGB was, by political clientelism; its leading officials were not clients of leading politicians. This was a reflection of the East German political system, which was less patrimonial than the Soviet. Stasi officers also tended to be professional policemen rather than party officials who had been transferred to the security service. From the very start of the Stasi’s existence, its leading officers were chosen by Mielke, the ministry’s deputy chief from its creation in 1950 and the minister from 1957. This is one reason why Mielke was an authoritative minister and lasted so long in the position (thirty-two years).14

Like the Soviet security service, the Stasi took on the flaws of the regime it served. However, Soviet influence over the Stasi and over the Socialist Unity Party’s leaders themselves made it harder for the party’s general secretaries to take control of it; it did not become a weapon in their struggles for power (as the KGB and its predecessors did). Though Erich Mielke was very much Walter Ulbricht’s man, Ulbricht was unable to use the Stasi against his rivals. When he became party leader, Erich Honecker did not even try to replace Mielke. One reason for this was probably that he regarded Mielke as held in high esteem by the Russians.15

Markus Wolf’s West German counterpart, Reinhard Gehlen, was also vain; he too sought fame. He made contact with the West German press in the early 1950s, purportedly to defend his service, the “Gehlen Organization,” from Communist disinformation, but evidently also to enhance his own reputation at the expense of his rivals in the nascent West German intelligence community.16 His photograph first appeared on the front cover of Der Spiegel, the leading West German news magazine, in 1954. His unreliable memoir, Der Dienst (The Service), published in 1971, has been rightly described by Dieter
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Krüger as “less an assessment than a justification of his life’s work”; it was clearly intended to maintain his service’s reputation and play down its failures while extolling the work of Fremde Heere Ost, the military intelligence unit on the eastern front that Gehlen had led from 1942 to 1945.

He also sought to wield political influence. Bodo Hechelhammer’s chapter on Gehlen’s special card file continues the trend among historians to show how much Gehlen curried favor with Konrad Adenauer and the powerful state secretary of the federal chancellery, Hans Maria Globke; Gehlen was West Germany’s counterpart to J. Edgar Hoover. He sought contact with the federal chancellor as soon as Adenauer achieved that position in October 1949, even though Gehlen’s organization was firmly subordinated to the United States’ CIA. Financed and directed by the federal chancellery, the Gehlen Organization (which from its incorporation into the federal government in 1956 was known as the Bundesnachrichtendienst) placed West Germany’s political elite under surveillance into the 1960s. This reflects how extraordinarily divided the new, fragile Federal Republic was—how great the tension was between the conservative right and the Socialist left and how much the conservative government feared Communist infiltration. Gehlen’s fear of such infiltration seems, from Hechelhammer’s account, to have reached absurd proportions. That said, his political masters shared many of his fears. One reason Adenauer was so willing to allow Gehlen to collect intelligence domestically was that he did not trust the Federal Republic’s security service, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV, Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution). The BfV’s president, Otto John, had not only been the United Kingdom’s candidate for the position—Adenauer had a considerable mistrust of the British—but also defected to the GDR in 1954.

Gehlen tried to wield political influence not just on his own behalf but also in favor of the conservative, nationalist politics of the German army he had joined as a teenager. Gehlen sought to continue a tradition—that of the Prussian general staff and its military intelligence service—by heavy recruitment into his organization of former Wehrmacht and SS officers. While his collection of damaging information on West German political figures was not illegal, it served Gehlen’s purposes and those of his political masters rather than the cause of West Germany’s defense. He tried to profit from the Federal Republic’s early insecurity.

Gehlen’s efforts to wield political influence were, over time, unsuccessful. West German politics drifted in the 1960s ever further to the left, and the BND was extensively reformed by the Social Democratic–Free Democratic government after Gehlen’s retirement. His role in the “Spiegel Affair” of 1962 is still obscure—it resulted in the resignation of West Germany’s defense minister, Franz Josef Strauß, who was then an enemy of Gehlen’s—but his involvement...
damaged Gehlen’s reputation. All Gehlen achieved by his investigation of the pasts of the Federal Republic’s political elite was to win the favor of Adenauer and Globke.

Even more important, Gehlen’s BND lost its espionage struggle with the GDR’s Stasi; the Stasi did its agent network serious damage in its “Big Operations” (Großaktionen) of the years 1953–55, when Western agents were arrested in large numbers. The BND’s success against the GDR declined from then on. It reconstructed its network in the late 1950s, but in the 1960s, in the wake of the Berlin Wall’s construction, the Stasi was able very largely to dissolve the network. Gehlen’s poor judgment of people contributed to his service’s decline, the best example of this being the trust he long showed in his apparently successful Soviet counterintelligence chief, Heinz Felfe. Felfe was exposed in 1961 as a traitor in the pay of the KGB. Gehlen retired in April 1968 a failed man. He should have stepped down a decade earlier.

In his introduction to a book on the Gehlen Organization by two journalists for Der Spiegel, Oxford professor (and officer of Britain’s Security Service in the Second World War) Hugh Trevor-Roper pointed out that foreign intelligence agencies have a more difficult job than security agencies and therefore need better leadership: “Espionage is always at a disadvantage compared with counter-espionage, for the former depends on individual skill in hostile surroundings, while the latter operates on home ground, supported by the ample resources of the state. Successful espionage therefore requires continual regeneration: fresh thought, constant vigilance, continuous adaptation to changing circumstances.”

As Trevor-Roper observes, Gehlen used the secrecy his service enjoyed to cover up its failures. His poor judgment was an important reason for them: not only did he trust traitors like Felfe (and others) and see Communist infiltration where none existed, he did not show the same concern for strict security and the collection of high-grade intelligence that his more successful counterparts, such as Markus Wolf, did. He selected his staff in the late 1940s for political reasons: they came from the Wehrmacht, and he wanted them to form the core of a new German army. Such men proved incapable of building an intelligence service to match the Stasi. Gehlen cultivated his political masters well: it is clear from Hechelhammer’s chapter that Adenauer and Globke were willing to defend him because they valued the information they had received from him. However, Gehlen devoted too much attention to pursuing his own political ambitions and too little to ensuring the skill and security of his service.

While Gehlen was able to conceal his failures, the Federal Republic’s democratic system prevented him from running amok. The lesson to be drawn from Paul McGarr’s chapter on the three Indian intelligence chiefs—
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T. G. Sanjeevi Pillai, B. N. Mullik, and R. N. Kao—is what a triumphant success Indian democracy has been: the chapter shows that all three men were wholly obedient to political authority. Kao had such good relations with Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi and such skill at foreign liaison that he sounds like an Indian Dick White. India’s democracy has kept Indian intelligence within the Western tradition of intelligence leadership.

By contrast, Chikara Hashimoto’s chapter on Emir Farid Chehab, the director-general of the principal Lebanese security service, the Sûreté Générale, from 1948 to 1958, shows what a failure Lebanon’s sectarianism has made that artificial state. Hashimoto demonstrates that, as in most of the other Arab states, the security service’s task was chiefly to protect the regime rather than the state. Since Lebanon was riven by sectarian tensions between Maronite Christians (of whom Chehab was one) and Sunni and Shia Muslims, this task was an impossible one, and Chehab resigned when the country fell into political crisis in 1958.

The chapter by Dina Rezk on Egypt’s notorious intelligence chiefs Salah Nasr, Sami Sharaf, and Omar Suleiman shows that their primary job was to protect an unstable military dictatorship from overthrow, whether by a popular uprising or by a coup organized by the armed forces or the security services themselves. The regimes they served also had a great fear of Western, particularly American, spying and subversion. The force that created the Egyptian police state was the profound suspiciousness of Egypt’s rulers since 1952: Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. In the view of United Nations secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld, Nasser was “pathologically suspicious.”22 He placed even his closest colleagues under covert surveillance, using informers, bugs, and cameras, and his meetings with them were recorded on microphone and camera. Egypt’s intelligence chiefs have been the creations of the regimes they have served.

The suspiciousness and insecurity of Egypt’s rulers has led to extensive surveillance of society; several security agencies have looked for any sign of disloyalty. The main security agencies since 1952 have been the General Investigations Directorate (GID), a civilian security service subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, which was established in 1952; the Military Intelligence Department, the intelligence branch of the armed forces that is subordinate to the Defense Ministry; and the General Intelligence Service (GIS), the foreign intelligence service established at Nasser’s behest in 1954 and subordinated to the president. Though modeled on the CIA, the GIS also collects counterintelligence within Egypt and conducts covert action abroad. It was (and remains) the leading intelligence agency, to which Nasser gave the task of coordinating all Egypt’s intelligence services.23
Egypt’s intelligence chiefs have been crucial props of the regime, feared and hated by the presidents’ critics and the population at large. They were doomed to hatred and notoriety as soon as they assumed their positions. However, like their Communist counterparts, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak also took a fateful step in appointing them; dependent, as they were, on their intelligence chiefs, they were the victims just as they were the beneficiaries of the wide-ranging intelligence collection they had ordered. Some, at least, of the information they received gave them a distorted picture of reality. Sami Sharaf was very sympathetic to the Soviet Union and Communism and was believed by the US embassy in Cairo to have passed to Nasser false intelligence received from the KGB about CIA plots to assassinate him and overthrow his regime. It has even been alleged that Sharaf was a KGB agent who was given the code name “Asad” ("Lion"). Nasser’s willingness to believe these reports harmed US-Egyptian relations.

While Nasser used his security agencies in his attempts to export his revolution to the rest of the Arab world, their key task has been to keep tabs on one another. Like the Ba’athist regimes in Iraq and Syria, Egypt’s leaders have tried to secure their rule by having several security agencies report to them. Nasr was chief of the General Intelligence Service, Sharaf, his rival, was head of the president’s own intelligence service, the Presidential Bureau of Information. Nasser and Sharaf made common cause in 1967 to overthrow their respective rivals—Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, the chief of staff of Egypt’s army, and Salah Nasr. Amer was either murdered or committed suicide, preferring suicide to trial and execution. Nasr was imprisoned. Under President Sadat, Egypt’s General Intelligence Service gravitated toward cooperation with the CIA as part of Sadat’s reorientation of Egyptian policy regarding the Middle East and the superpowers. Sadat’s assassination at the hands of Islamists in 1981 naturally increased the regime’s fear of Islamism. The last Egyptian intelligence chief Rezk examines, Omar Suleiman, the director of GIS from 1993 to 2011, turned the service into a key element in the CIA’s global anti-Islamist intelligence alliance. Such was the regime’s dependence on the United States that his closeness to the CIA much increased Suleiman’s influence. President Mubarak’s confidence in him enabled Suleiman to become an important actor in foreign policy, particularly in connection with Israeli-Palestinian relations. However important he may have been, he, like the other intelligence leaders studied in this book, was merely an agent of his government, and as an agent, he took on the government’s character.

This book, like the first volume of Spy Chiefs, has presented intelligence chiefs as leaders of organizations whose success needs to be measured according to their ability to improve their organizations’ performance. They are chief
executive officers who, like business leaders, have the job of directing organizations, motivating subordinates, and solving problems. However, there are key differences between the two types of leader, all of which cause intelligence chiefs to identify very closely with the regime they serve and to seek a close relationship with their political masters. All the men analyzed in this book did so. In the first place, an intelligence chief has less autonomy than the business leader: policy makers determine the mission of the intelligence or security agency. Success is measured not by profit but by the assistance the information obtained by the agency gives to policy making. The second difference is that the intelligence chief contends with enemies, not mere competitors; failure on the part of his or her agency may lead to severe harm being caused to the state or regime. Third, the organization’s successes have to be kept secret and so cannot be used to motivate subordinates or to influence the organization’s culture. Consequently, an intelligence agency’s esprit de corps depends heavily on the idea of public service and thus on patriotism. Its officers are inspired by carefully cultivated legends surrounding past leaders, spies, and successes. The purpose of these legends is to make them obedient, loyal, and effective in their work. All intelligence and security agencies discussed in this book were core parts of the governments they served; their officers, including their leaders, were dedicated agents of government—“government men.”

Notes


3. Interview with Klaus Eichner, formerly of the HVA’s Department IX/C, April 16, 2003.


5. Gabriele Gast, *Kundschafterin des Friedens: 17 Jahre Topspionin der DDR beim BND* [A scout for peace: 17 years as a top GDR spy in the BND] (Frankfurt/Main: Eichborn, 1999), 188–213.

11. Wolf, Man without a Face, 317.
15. Reinhold Andert and Wolfgang Herzberg, Der Sturz: Erich Honecker im Kreuzzverhör [The fall: Erich Honecker cross-examined] (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1990), 376.
16. On Communist propaganda directed against Gehlen and his organization, see Paul Maddrell, “What We Have Discovered about the Cold War Is What We Already Knew: Julius Mader and the Western Secret Services during the Cold War,” Cold War History 5, no. 2 (2005): 235–58.
23. Ibid., 30–34, 44.
24. Ibid., 51, 64, 88–93.
25. Ibid., 105–6.