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by

Peris Sean Jones

A Doctoral thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of

Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

April 1997

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Crimson flames tied through my ears
Rollin’ high and mighty traps
Pounced with fire on flaming roads
Using ideas as my maps
‘We’ll’ meet on edges, soon,’ said I
Proud ‘neath heated brow.
Ah, but I was so much older then,
I’m younger than that now.

Bob Dylan

The warrior is now a worker
and his war is underground,
with cordite in the darkness
he milks the bleeding veins of gold,
when the smoking rock face
murmurs, he always thinks of you,
African sky blue...

Juluka
ABSTRACT

The thesis brings together two important themes within Geography and Development Studies. First, post-colonial analyses of social identity and difference; secondly, the relationship between social identity and the 'new' historiography of South Africa. These themes raise important intellectual and practical questions central to rethinking the relationship between the developed and underdeveloped worlds. During the apartheid era political and cultural relations between core and periphery were (are) integral to the fragmentation of South African society and space. Apartheid discourse constantly manipulated social and cultural differences and divisions. These divisions were epitomised by the enforced racial and ethnic partition associated with the bantustans. By focusing on one bantustan, namely Bophuthatswana, the thesis shows that complex identities and interests also emerged within these territories. Under the guise of independence various marginal groups sought power and influence through vigorous efforts to create and promote a new national identity. A range of issues are used to identify and emphasise the intersection of two major discourses, ethno-nationalism and modernisation. These serve to illustrate the complex interplay of local and regional characteristics alongside more general processes associated with the changing nature of apartheid. By reference to the creation of the national capital, Mmabatho, the thesis demonstrates the shortcomings and contradictions of this nation-building exercise and of the modernist discourses on which it was based.

Key Words

Nation-building Modernisation Identity South Africa Bantustans Bophuthatswana Mmabatho Regions Ethnicity
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I got there Soli, thanks for your patience.

I dedicate the thesis to my nephews David, Joshua and my niece Sarah, and to when all three played together in happier times. Thanks also to my sister Kerry, who has provided support in her own inimitable way. To Astrid, tusen takk min skatt, especially because you understood it all!

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Chapter One: Identity and Development

1. The Problem and Place of Identity in Development Theory

1.1. The Absence of Identity

A dominant theoretical tendency within development literature is to homogenise the global, flattening diversity and denying cultural difference. This tendency has been captured in the term 'One World'. At one time a salutary effort to promote development and equality in the 'Third World' and enthusiastically deployed within development terminology, 'One World' has now been indelibly associated with the implacable march of modernity. By casting the global within a western idiom with its attendant 'regime of reason and rationale', it is now more appropriate to begin to ask 'whose world?'. This hegemonic approach is now characterised as 'evolutionary, ahistorical and delocalised'. The remaking of social relations through the triumvirate of State, Science and Market has encouraged a flattening of the local and specific. Sachs provides powerful symbolism for the erosion of the local under the aegis of 'one world' and its will to universalise:

'Ever since the temples of Tenochtitlan were destroyed in Mexico and a Spanish cathedral built out of their stones, European colonialism has been busy ravaging place-centred cultures and imposing space-centred values. In ever new waves and in all five continents, the colonialists have been terribly inventive in robbing peoples of their gods, their institutions and their natural treasures. The establishment of universities in New Spain, the introduction of British law in India, the blackmailing of North American Indians into the fur trade, these were all instances in the history of spreading science, state and market throughout the world'.

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2 Ibid.
Chapter One: Identity and Development

At the vanguard of this drive to universalize have been ideas and processes associated with 'development'. The ideological baggage accompanying the ways in which we conceptualise 'progress' and change can be illustrated through 'mapping' the interaction and tensions between identity formation and theorisation of 'development'.

The process of 'worlding' through western imagery operates at one level through a 'geo-politics of incursion' into the non-west. These images depict a reading of the globe as if 'naturally' based upon western experience and universalization of western ethnocentrism. The concept of development is therefore central to this disciplining of the non-western 'other'. Recent interpretations now locate development within and as:

'...a discourse, as an interwoven set of languages and practices...as a modernist regime of knowledge and disciplinary power. As such it can not be reduced to the outworking of deeper economic logics and structures but has its own logic, internal coherence and effects'.

As a central organising concept whose meaning still eludes definition, development continually engages the imagination and compulsion for a better future. This remains equally true for governments and development institutions who depoliticise development through their bureaucratic machinery. An enduring analogy is provided by the idea of a journey from a condition of lacking development to a modern destination characterised as developed. Propelled by the hitherto unquestionable arrow of time, the always elusive end stop of modernity is portrayed

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as a departure from disorder, civil and religious conflict. Associated with modernity, the archaeology of 'development' is therefore rooted in western thought which at worst orders the 'unredeemable' Other or otherwise at least provides 'guardianship' (read intervention), akin to the parental guidance, until the child can fend for itself independent of the parent. The internalisation of this idea within 'less developed' entities, such as nation-states, is of particular concern as will be shown in the context of the relationship between South Africa and one of its peripheries.

These notions were central to western thinkers' constructions of 'development' which became steeped in religiosity and reordering the relationship between man, god and nature. The idea of maturation was also linked to a biological unfolding or unfinished evolutionary progression. The specificity of language, thought and action is therefore subordinated to the paramount need demanding escape from the abnormality of being 'undeveloped'. The path to progress is therefore a constant remainder both of the possibility of escape but moreso for those without 'development', it signifies an undesirable and undignified condition and what they are not. Whilst this Utopian future is always unmade and an elusive fulfilment, it nonetheless provides a powerful discourse which legitimises interventions ('incursions') and transforms landscape in the name of 'development'. The place and territoriality of 'identity' is therefore prisoner to western/universal abstractions of space and economy.

1.2. Aims of the Research Project

The aim of this study is to demonstrate that at the vanguard of the drive to universalize are conflicts surrounding nation-building. The thesis discusses the ultimate example of a fragile, fragmented, artificial and heavily dependent would-be

nation-state, which can be characterised by its detachment from its civil society and its politics of patronage. The contention of the thesis is that these conflicts and contradictions can and must be informed by examining the interaction between national (and regional) identity and its relationship with development. A range of studies have begun to identify the creation of ethnicity as a fundamental challenge to a homogenous conception of the nation-state. Furthermore, (post) development literature is tackling the universalist assumptions implicit in concepts of progress and modernity. However, there has been a hitherto lack of interaction between the two sets of literature. Cultural identity has not so much been ignored, as analysed outside the relationship between nation-building and development. The failure of the nation-state to accommodate ethnic and regional differences and developmental aspirations has been connected to two fundamental abstractions:

-the first concerns the abstract idea of the nation-state as an imagined homogeneous (cultural) community which denies difference.

-the second reflects the pursuit of development and modernisation which is directed towards promoting the abstract conception of 'national' development or the 'national' economy.

The thesis seeks to contribute to these important debates by illustrating the relationship between these two abstractions and, in so doing, to show what happens to 'difference' when caught between them. The thesis examines the symbolic expressions and the practices involved in enacting one particular 'nation-building' project. This includes the contradictions between local culture and universal practices involved in the creation of a 'national' capital city; the promotion of 'national' development through prestige projects and modernisation of the landscape; the consequences of modernisation for culture, identity and 'tradition'; and the regime's ensuing political (and economic) instability and illegitimacy. A central tenet of the thesis is to suggest that our understanding of the conflicts surrounding 'nation-building' can be improved upon by adopting as a case study, and an analytical device, one of the most powerful symbols of the colonial, economic and institutional dependency and territorial artificiality of the 'nation-state'- the South African
Chapter One: Identity and Development

bantustan.

The post second world war era and emergence of development as theory and practice was central to an ethnocentric discourse managing the globe as if 'an homogenised space, waiting to be organised by universally applicable programmes and technologies". This chapter therefore locates the suspicion and disciplining of diversity within the emergence of development studies as a modern discipline and then situates this discussion alongside the analysis of nation-building as a key conduit for both national identity and developmentalist ideas and practices. First, the post-colonial challenge to orthodox theories of development is placed within the context of rethinking Marxist ideas of ‘dependency’. Second, the relationship between space, (ethno) national identity and nation-building is discussed. As a prelude to an introduction to the bantustans and the historical and regional case study of one, namely, Bophuthatswana, the last section of the introductory chapter applies these ideas of modernisation and identity to the South African context. At the end of the chapter the major themes of the eight remaining chapters are summarised and methodological issues are addressed.

1.3. Post-colonial Geographies: Rethinking Dependency

The introductory section to this chapter highlighted a new wave of writings about 'development'. These raise important questions regarding discursive power, representation, and the need to search for alternative epistemologies. These approaches-'anti-development'- are closely related to post-structural and post-modern theoretical concerns of the 'interpretative turn'. Taken together they subvert the previous economic primacy of theoretical analysis and promote or at least raise questions of cultural diversity. Re-thinking the implications of 'Dependency Theory' can help to explore questions of identity and relate the economic to cultural spheres of human activity which are essential for alternative theorisation of 'development'.

This process of 'worlding' and western intervention therefore relates on one

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level to the ethno-centrism of theory." This absence of ethnic identity within development geography closely mirrors changes within the social sciences and development studies more generally. Important questions for theory and methodology are therefore suggested by such an absence. The key to understanding how the core ideas of development theory reflect western historical experience of social change can be gleaned not only from the founding fathers of western social science but also from the specific temporal and spatial milieu in which 'development' itself evolved. The development of modernisation theory, whilst drawing upon Marx and Weber's conceptions of social change, nonetheless were refracted around the emergence of the idea of the 'Third World'. The latter was initially itself a positive term for newly emerging decolonised countries steering a 'third path', or way, between the dominant polarised capitalist and socialist blocs during the Cold War. Modernisation was therefore also connected to the reformist ideology of the west which was designed to convince the 'third world' of the merits of capitalist development. More specifically, the rapid growth of the new discipline 'Development' would tackle the more specific developmental and technical challenges facing the 'third world'. Development is therefore particularly useful in times of disorder and different historical junctures.

The basic premise of modernisation theory portrayed 'third world' societies as locked in a dichotomy between tradition and modernity. Larrain states three particular versions: the sociology associated with Parsons and Hoselitz, the Psychology of McClelland, and above all the influential economic modernisation of Hirschman and Rostow. These ideas centred upon notions of an expanding capitalist nucleus and structural functionalist approach to modernisation through which the internal barriers to modernisation (i.e. tradition) would be eroded. This would be brought about by the capacity of, for example, formal schooling, transportation, long term planning, media,

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13 Harris, N. (1986) The End of the Third World, Zed Books The vagaries of Cold War destabilisation in Africa is shown in Hansen, E.
14 Crush, J. (1995) op. cit
communications and especially economic growth. These features were seen as enabling the creation of a more complex society from which the prerequisites for a democratic, in other words capitalist, culture could be laid. The creation of 'modern values', norms and attitudes would therefore engender innovation and social change. This dominant discourse has particular significance for conceptions of identity. Hettne has suggested the anomaly between development theory's primary interest in national development, yet despite such a focus, its 'glaring' neglect of theorising ethnicity and ethnic conflict in relation to development. This tendency he suggests, is common to all three major strands of development theory:

1) In modernization theory, ethnic identity belonged to the traditional obstacles to development which, however, were supposed to disappear, ultimately, in the course of development. Claims to ethnic identity were thus seen as anti-development...Although the older modernization theory gave a comprehensive macro view on the function of ethnicity in society, it did not focus on ethnic conflict as such, since this was more or less seen as a 'pre-modern' epiphenomenon.

2) For Marxists...ethnicity discussed within the National Question, has been outside and beyond Marxist theorising, and as in modernization theory, associated with premodern values. Ethnic mobilization is usually described in terms of class, as a class struggle in disguise. Nationalism was good when it promoted social revolution, otherwise bad.

3) Dependency theory and neo-Marxism emphasised external factors, and therefore had little to say about ethnic conflicts per se, although it usefully introduced the international context into the analysis...More relevant to the analysis of ethnic conflict is the idea that ethnicity is activated in centre-periphery exploitative relations, for instance in situations of 'internal colonialism'.

All established Eurocentric biases within 'Development' and the basic yet fundamental tension between development as material advance and the struggle to preserve cultural

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identities." These particularly negative attitudes towards features of 'developing' societies such as tradition, implied the passing away of the primitive or traditional before development could take place. This can be located in the origins of influential academic discourses within modern social science and mainstream development theory. A 'theory of ideology' can be used to illustrate how modes of theoretical discourse act as expressions of 'western ideology' and often the worst excesses of western sociological intervention in the 'periphery'. Furthermore the relationship between Geography and Imperialism has also been examined. In fact Geography and Anthropology vied to be the colonial science.  

Although Weber's concept of 'ideal types' provides a degree of relativity and attempts the avoidance of value positions, his barely concealed negative attitude towards 'tradition' is revealed in the Protestant Work Ethic. In one particular passage Weber addresses an analysis of agricultural piece-rates and attempts to provide an explanation for the labourers resistance towards increasing productivity for additional wages. This assumed irrationality was located in Weber's identification of 'tradition' as the 'most important opponent with which the spirit of capitalism... has had to struggle'. Moreover, Lawrence suggests that Weber's interpretation of what constitutes a 'rational social action' is therefore economically defined. The implication is that Weber universalises western capitalism as the 'essence of man' and relegates subjectivity and difference as 'irrational'. As suggested, these ideas of rationality, modern values and norms have been central to the power and appeal of modernisation theory. Marx's (in)famous statement about Indian historical change was also in a similar vein, that in its future was reflected the mirror image of the European

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18 Lawrence, M. (forthcoming) Ideology, Development and Western Sociology, Department of Education, University of the North West, Mmabatho.
20 Sidaway, J. (1992) "In other worlds: on the politics of first world geographers in the 'third world'", Area 24, 403-408.
21 Weber, M. in Lawrence, op. cit.
experience of evolutionary social change. Although rooted in European industrial and historical experience these ideas have impacted upon and set the parameters for the 'spaces' within which the 'Third World' could conceive of development. 22

These developments were paralleled within development geography, albeit with its own specific disciplinary interests. These moved from: concerns with surface description of regions; to spatial science and where this was interested in mapping modernisation through spatial planning for integration. The Marxist approach dominated much of Radical Development Geography from the mid-1970s to mid 1980s and sought to provide a coherent theoretical framework challenging the objectivity of spatial science and its value neutrality by providing models of causation. 23 The contributions and critiques of Marxist Dependency Theory are briefly reviewed as a prelude to discussion of plurality and post-colonial geographies.

1.3.1. The Analytical Value of Dependency

As a product of the political climate and theoretical questions of the day Marxism raised important issues concerning development and identity. The pioneering work of Baran and Sweezy on 'monopoly capitalism' and underconsumption in the West, entered Development Studies through Gunder Frank. Rather than detailed coverage of Marxism per se, the salient feature of Frank's thesis for this discussion of development and identity concerns the idea of dependent development in the periphery through stagnation, unequal exchange and a comprador elite. Whilst there remain many different interpretations of dependency ideas Schuurman points to a consensus regarding:

- Underdevelopment is an historical process and not intrinsic to the Third World.
- The dominant and dependent countries together form a capitalist system

22 It also remains a durable idea, recast in different guises as 'neo-modernisation'. For example, Hyden, G (1983) No Short Cuts to Progress, Heinemann, provides a political scientist view of the constraints of the 'economy of affection' upon institutes of governance in Africa.
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- Underdevelopment is inherent to the world system and the periphery is plundered of its surplus leading to development of the core and underdevelopment of the periphery.10

This historic process of underdevelopment was accompanied by an ideology of consumption alienating the periphery from itself. This is achieved through the penetration of bank and industrial capital into the periphery, making it dependent upon the core.11 An important feature of dependency lies in its critique of a linear progressive path to modernisation. Frank’s overall contribution was to shift emphasis for causes of underdevelopment away from the internal blockages of 'tradition' or 'backwardness' to the effects of insertion into the external international capitalist economy.

However, a range of criticisms were levelled at neo-Marxism from within and without Marxism. In some instances this was a simplification and caricature of neo-marxism efforts to engage with this critique.12 A number of Marxist anthropologists in particular sought to rectify the criticism made of abstract theorisation, by providing concrete examples and specificity of social forms. Formulations of the articulations of the modes of production approach attempted to show the interactions between pre-capitalist structures and relations of capitalism.13 A particularly significant variant of these debates concerned Wolpe’s theorisation of apartheid’s racist social system as essentially functional to capitalist relations returned to in the section on South Africa.

Nonetheless, by the early 1980s disenchantment with the ability of Marxism, albeit in its different guises, to explain events was becoming widespread and the mood

25 Schuurman, ibid.
26 See Watts, M. (1988) for an alternative assessment of Corbridge’s criticism from within Marxism. Watts regards the latter as caricaturing RDG by ignoring important urban and local scale work, and positing a choice between either absolute determinism or absolute contingency, “Deconstructing Determinism: Marxism, Development Theory and a comradely critique of Corbridge, S., Capitalist World Development”, Antipode, 20:2.
appeared to be captured by Booth's seminal paper of 1985. Booth's specific criticism of Marxism as economistic, reductionist and class reductionist has been emphasised by Corbridge who also called for 'new causal narratives' and 'new theory formation'. This was especially critical of the tendency to define capital in laws of motion which work together to produce a fixed set of spatial outcomes. Important implications follow for conceptualising political struggles as not simply read off from the two major classes of capitalist society: the proletariat and bourgeoisie. More recently, commenting on that period in the 1980s, Booth has suggested that:

"Initially stimulating theoretical debates, most of them Marxist...had run into sand and real world questions were not being addressed and the gulf between academic enquiry and development policy and practice was increasing."

This was related to the 'highly generalised and economistic explanatory frameworks of Marxism and neo-Marxist origin that dominated social development theory in the west during the 1970s'. Marxist focus upon a class subject, centred and determined by economic relations had reduced the complexity of identity and therefore wider questions of agency and structure, to generic functionalism. The abstract concept of 'class' had been theoretically enforced upon a highly diverse number of social formations and situations. Although providing insight into structures of society and their transformation, as well as providing more scope for local varieties of political struggle, class remained the privileged agent of change. Social and political struggles contested by New Social Movements could not simply be understood through class struggle. Social formations of Third World countries were therefore regarded as determined by the Metropolitan 'core'. This informs the wider theoretical debates

within Marxism and the limitations of the usefulness of 'class' when seen as predetermining identity. The basic premise of dependency theory and its depiction of the relationship between core and periphery is nonetheless a useful tool for discussions of post-colonial geographies.

Dependency has been criticised as inherently flawed through its adherence to iron laws which generalised the outcomes of periphery-core relations. Both circulationist and mode of production approaches to dependency concentrated upon seeking out a global explanation for the failure of capitalist development to take root in the periphery. Despite the grounding of some approaches in different localities, the 'last instance' logic of the global system determined processes in the periphery. This totalising logic has been a particular target for criticism especially as it might have been avoided:

"From the neo-Marxist point of view, the process of diffusion is understandable only if located within a matrix of domination/subordination relationships...operating at both the national and the international level...One would expect as a logical outcome...a research strategy, stressing context in terms of space and time, a research strategy that ceases to treat the Third World in blanket fashion and draws attention to the enormous complexity and variation of the various countries of the so-called Third World. Instead of this, the neo-Marxist dependency tradition has proffered a plethora of theories which in their attempts to account for the development or lack of development of the Third World as a whole, repeat some of the very mistakes that the neo-evolutionists committed in the early fifties'."

Dependency is therefore on one level central to the project of modernity wherein it advocated national autonomy and economic growth and reproduced the parent-child dichotomy of progress and modernity. It was still bound up with the lack of industry

and development. One can also add that perhaps dependency was never intended as an absolute alternative theorisation of development. Indeed located in its own time and place its emergence within Latin America was initially to counteract the woeful neglect of external systemic causes of underdevelopment. To this extent vital epistemological questions concerning conceptions of development and historical change are also raised through 'dependency'. This is based around its critique of the assumptions of modernisation theory and the 'inevitable' evolution towards modernity. This process of answering back to the metropolitan 'core' signified an important interruption with dependency theory as:

'an intellectual/political movement, which argued, wrote and theorized back. This was the significance of dependencia and the fact that associated modes of reflection in other parts of the South during the same years...In the encompassing context of North-South relations, the dependency writers constructed and deployed a geopolitical imagination which sought to prioritize the objectives of autonomy and difference and to break the subordinating effects of metropolis-satellite relations. To the Western mind inculcated in the Cartesian tradition, 'dependency' seemed little more than a vague discontent, but in actual fact it was a key body of alternative critical thought'.

Whilst, as suggested, 'the objectives of autonomy and difference' might be seen in the context of demanding access to modernity, there is also the possibility of creating openings for an anti-modernist imagining of development. Furthermore, autonomy could also be read in some dependentista accounts as recognising cultural plurality, and autonomy of different groups. The value of dependency therefore lies in its awareness or potential awareness of the possibility of spatial variation. Dependency has therefore been interpreted within different communities of the South in different ways. A Marxist explanation would emphasise the economic processes involved in alienation. This could be extended to include increased dependence upon the 'market'

34 Ibid.
and goods of consumption, alienating the peripheral society from itself. However, there is also an economic sense in which the 'core' is dependent upon the periphery for its labour and markets.

Of fundamental importance for this thesis are the ways in which dependency provides not only the clash or dichotomisation of 'internal' and 'external' but also the ways in which the domination of the 'core' is internalised within the 'third world'. This calls for alternative ways in which the 'comprador bourgeoisie' can be conceptualised, not merely bound hand and foot through economic relations but also through discursive formations and Eurocentric knowledge. Fanon captures the dynamics of dependency, which he says:

'...is the outcome of double process primarily, economic; subsequently, the internalisation— or, better, the epidermalization— of this inferiority.'

The African petit-bourgeoisie has been identified as the major social force defining and mobilising African Nationalist movements in the post-world war two era. This broad category's interests were seen as commensurate with Metropolitan economic interests, as standard bearers of territorial nationalism especially against colonialist exploitation and important for mobilising other social groups. Whilst on one level regarded as opportunistic, it must also be asked what other influences shaped these new leaders and state managers. Reasons for the general and continental failure of the nation-state in Africa have been identified by Davidson:

'It may be fairly easy to understand that new nation-states, emerging from imperial or colonial oppression, have to modernize their institutions, their modes of government, their political and economic structures. Very well. But why then adopt models from

those very countries or systems that have oppressed and despised you? Why not modernize from the models of your own history, or invent new models?'''

Davidson has described these models and ideas of the nation-state in Africa, which he regards as integral to colonialist and imperialist strategies, as the 'Black Man's burden'.

By re-thinking 'dependency' the constraints of the economic can be seen alongside cultural, political and institutional relations influencing the response of the periphery. There is therefore no simple dichotomy or economic flow but instead a complex interplay between 'core' and 'periphery':

"While the imperial metropolis tends to understand itself as determining the periphery...it habitually blinds itself to the ways in which the periphery determines the metropolis- beginning, perhaps, with the latter's obsessive need to present its peripheries and its other continually to itself."

This relationship therefore encompasses the interactions and exchanges, particularly the legacy of European ideas and visions of Africa, which includes the prominent role given to the nation-state. Then, using this approach, not only can the true face of power of the centre be exposed in what it drives to the periphery, but also the different ways in which manifestations in the periphery illustrate a similar hidden logic in the centre. A wave of post-colonial writing is similarly addressing the cultural and social processes of marginalisation and Imperialism. The signification and mobilisation of racial or cultural differences, 'othering', has been identified as central to colonialism and Imperialism. Said in particular has shown how cultural knowledge produced about the 'Orient' has created and reinforced Metropolitan 'superiority' by projecting negative repressed aspects of the self onto the 'Other'. Central to Said's ideas

39 Slater, D. (1993) op. cit
concerning the reading of history and contested identities, is the opposition between 'advocates of a unitary identity and those who see the whole as a complex but not reductively unified one'. From the clash of these two perspectives, according to Said, two historiographies emerge, 'one linear and subsuming, the other contrapuntal and often nomadic'. To grasp 'the reality of historical experience', to reflect that 'all cultures are involved in one another' through hybridity and heterogeneity, only the second perspective captures the complexity of identity. Similarly Mudimbe illustrates the complex ways through which Africanist thought has structured representations of Africa and through which colonialists had the desire for Africa to become European. Evocations of 'The Dark Continent' are central to the manner in which Europe has intervened in Africa. These images are constructed within discursive formations, the primary one being the 'West' and 'the Rest'. Although acting to exclude the 'Rest' and drive them to the boundaries or edge of civilisation, this 'Other' remains always present in western discourses. Rather than seeing each as discreet entities Spivak has attempted to emphasis the silences and indeed repetition involved in colonial 'othering' in order to use these contradictions to prise open the dichotomisation. By suggesting heterogeneity and difference, multiple identities of race, class, gender and ethnicity can inform the critique of western universalism and transcends these binary opposites. Crush has focused these questions within the context of South Africa and

41 Ibid.
human geography, promoting a post-colonial geography which addresses:

'the unveiling of geographical complexity in colonial domination over space; the character of geographical representation in colonial discourse; delinking of local geographical enterprise from metropolitan theory and its totalizing systems of representation; and the recovery of those hidden spaces occupied and invested with their own meaning, by the colonial underclasses'.

The stress upon diversity assists in providing alternatives to the structures: agency dichotomy by raising questions of identity. For Laclau identity is essentially an unfinished business in which 'the field of social identities is not one of full identities but their ultimate failure to be constituted'. National identity is such an attempt to create a bounded, enclosed identity. Yet this process is inherently contradictory as the attainment of purity is always elusive and therefore leads us to an understanding of identity formation defined as much by what they lack as by what they include. These debates essentially concern the clash between humanism and anti-humanism which remain deep-seated and fundamental to closing the gap between the 'ideational' and 'material' realms. For example is identity and consciousness created through structures or essentially self-sufficient, united and equal as in interpretation of liberal humanism. These tensions and possibilities can be explored by locating the creation of differences within space and place. Corbridge has

48 Ibid.
highlighted ways for new approaches to causality, determination and conditions of existence to illustrate and by-pass dualisms and dichotomies such as base-superstructure itself. This would involve new ways to combine inter-dependency and political and cultural mobilisations within the periphery through the possibilities of the 'new' regional geography:

"The promise of the new regional geography is to hold together the complex interplay of the local and super-local and to take seriously the constitutive role of class, of gender, of ethnicity and culture in the production of place."  

These terms can be used to rethink the process of marginalisation at different scales, not merely reduced to economic determinism. This would go some way to rectifying political economy neglect of cultural dynamics and incorporation of local forms by the global system. Diversity would thereby put the 'human' back into human societies and suggest new interpretations of social action and political mobilisation.

It has been shown how ideas based upon mobilisation and construction of a 'modern' identity are central to 'dependency' modernisation, and development. This can been shown in the various debates concerning a particularly important identity-national identity and its relationship with Space.

1.4. Spaces of Difference

Meaning is created by discourses rooted in spatial locations and geographic imagery. Power relations are embedded in these geographies and have been a particular feature of post-structuralist and post-modernist literature with its embrace of a spatial vogue. Throughout social theory the use of geographical metaphors has

been widespread. Michel Foucault has employed terms such as territory, domain, soil, region and so on. His specific use of spatial metaphors was in order to locate the relations that are possible between power and knowledge:

'Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power'.

Foucault's particular concern was with developing a critique of the strategies through which modern society was able to discipline and control its population by using the knowledge claims and practices of the human sciences—criminology, sociology, psychiatry, psychology, medicine. Foucault's approach has had a significant impact upon shifting the emphasis of social science to focus upon the consequences of space rather than time. The revitalisation of space therefore is particularly exciting for human geography. A central concern involves the perception that as a constructed meaning system, culture is far from being 'natural' and is entwined with and constitutive of economic and political systems. In analysing representations of culture and difference, three related issues draw upon this 'interpretative turn'. Firstly, its configurations in time and space, secondly, the potential role of politics and thirdly, competing constructions of identity. Furthermore, the 'annihilation of space by time' and the 'erosion of the cultural distinctiveness of places' through globalisation, raises important questions for identity formation. Identity formation also entails not only the erosion but also the 'shuffling' and refashioning of 'location, identity and community'

58 Harvey, D. op. cit.
within incompletely globalised sites. Watts reiterates Massey's concern in calling for a global sense of place.

1.4.1. Identity and the Nation-Building

A particularly important and enduring collective identity is that of the 'ethno' national group and its often uneasy relationship with the 'state'. The 'nation-state' has been pregnant with the promise of attaining 'progress' and propelling modernisation. Its construction cannot be isolated from the project of modernity and therefore western thought, which posits that the nation be equated with 'cultural nation'. Diversity is therefore eliminated through an homogenising tendency steeped in European experience of nation-building. Indeed, the conflation of national culture with progress and development suggest this symbiotic relationship. This homogenising drive can be found in the European nineteenth century influence of a uniformising national culture. This was centred upon the urban middle classes and addressed ideas such as conscription, schooling, transport, urbanism, print capitalism and erosion of local markets. The conception of 'bourgeois nation' is linked to Marxist and modernisation theorists alike and fails to locate the 'nation' outside capitalist social formations. Thus, to think of the nation outside the project of modernity is to miss its centrality and influence upon a range of western thinkers, bursting with Utopian fulfilment:

'The destruction of inequality between nations, the progress of equality within one and the same nation, and finally, the real perfecting of mankind... We shall find, from past experience, that nature has assigned no limits to our hopes. The time is doubtless approaching when we shall cease to play the role of corrupters and tyrants

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in the eyes of these people (in Africa and Asia)...Then will the Europeans respect that independence which they have hitherto violated with such audacity...and those thieves' counting houses (established by Europeans) will become colonies of citizens who will propagate, in Africa and in Asia, the principles and the example of freedom, and the reason of learning in Europe.

The construction of 'nations' would follow many different paths but was inseparable from securing and attaining modernisation. Hence ambivalence was born at the outset of these projects. This thesis provides a range of examples to illustrate the ways in which the ambiguities of identity formation are rooted within the context of the conflicts surrounding the creation of a nation-state in pursuit of modernisation. The thesis explores expressions of this relationship, such as the importance of the creation of a capital city, and the promotion of economic development, international relations and 'prestige' projects, which all demonstrate the linkages between the global and local scales of nation-building.

The dominant discourse and practical implementation of nation-building represented the creation of the nation-state as born only through the passing away of traditional society. In spite of reifying Africa as some how a special case, nonetheless, modernisation and neo-modernisation theorists maintained an evolutionary perspective. Development was primarily concerned with the material strengthening of the state and increased cultural homogeneity. Therefore much of

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64 Again see Basil Davidson (1992) op. cit.
65 The hybridity of colonial and post-colonial cities has been recently examined in Forms of Dominance, Alsayyad, N. (ed.) (1992), Avebury With his suggestion that analyses of cities 'as essentially discrete entities and therefore as having more or less unique physical form, fabric and social life, are limited in conception' David Simon provides an important reminder that cities exist as part of a global system, in Simon, D. (1992) Cities, Capital and Development, Belhaven Press.
67 It is also ironic that in calling for a reversal of this evolutionary perspective some advocates of national socialist revolution in Africa, such as Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987) adopted another evolutionary perspective.
mainstream development theory was identical to modernization and the nation-building project. This was assumed as state-centric and therefore guided by a national elite responsible for instilling a national culture. The idea of cultural unity as national ideal, remains central to development as modernization. This always entails the identification of ethnicity or alternative identities as sacrilegious, obstructing the progressive impulse of history.

Another important critique of the process of modernisation, albeit within the European context, is provided by the work of Foucault. His central concern was with the intervention and administrative control through which the rise of the modern state defined itself. Foucault saw this as enabled by the discourses associated with intellectual thought and leading to the ordering and disciplining of the subject. As such this can also be read as an attack against historicism and the call instead for writing history without 'progress'. This also has implications for identity through Foucault's decentering of the Cartesian self-knowing and conscious individual. Instead human 'reality' is seen by Foucault as constructed, locally and culturally specific and struggling against the single totalising truth and metaphysics of modernity.

Geographical concepts can therefore heighten insight into rethinking the global and local pressures upon national identity. Taylor suggests that nationalism is inherently territorial, and geography can illuminate the 'mapping' devices used by Imperialism and this clash between specificity and universalism. The notion of 'transparent' space and its illusion of truth corresponds to a 'cartographic identity'.

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68 Hettne, B. (1996) op. cit., prefers to avoid the evolutionary connotations of the 'nation-building project' by calling it instead the 'nation-state' project.

69 For an interesting discussion of three different theoretical approaches to modernity, which the author categorizes as, rationalist (Gellner), muslim fundamentalist (Ahmed) and critical relativism (Giddens), see Tjomsland, M. (1994) A Discussion of Three Theoretical Approaches to modernity: Understanding modernity as a Globalising Phenomenon, Working Paper, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Development Studies and Human Rights, Bergen, Norway.

mapped upon objects. This emptiness or homogenisation of space can be scrutinised by undermining the hegemonic claims underpinning these maps. The image of the nation-state is an important controlling mechanism claiming to present each nation-state with its own 'universe'. The conflict between the unique and the universal is epitomised through the deliberations to integrate a modern state whilst it faces resistance to this standardisation and centralisation from the constituent parts of its nation(s). A paramount dilemma for post-colonial states is whether to promote a universal cosmopolitanism or specifically local identity. Whilst lamenting only indirect interest in the post-colonial Other, principally stemming from western scholars and societies redemptive analysis of the 'self', Duncan nonetheless accepts the problems and pressures facing the hybrid construction of national identity:

'Having said this (the lack of interest in 'other' cultures per se), there is no question that it has become increasingly difficult (some would say impossible) since the colonial period to talk about other cultures apart from the west. Identities and practices of everyday life within colonial and post-colonial societies have been fashioned out of fragments of the local and western. Even when national cultural identities are explicitly purged of western taint, it could be argued that the result cannot be understood meaningfully except as a purifying process to expunge colonialism!'

Various strategies and combinations of local fragments and the 'western' are at the centre of endeavours to reverse the perception and condition of being marginalised.

Discussions of nationalism and national identity have tended to reinforce the uneasy dichotomisation between the local and western scales because influential studies have either considered themselves as belonging to either a 'modernist' or

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71 Crush, J (1995) op. cit.
'primordialist' position. For example, Smith claims that nations and nationalism can only be understood as distinct cultural phenomena through grasping the pre-modern antecedents and questions of ethnic identity and community. Debunking modernist explanations he suggests the centrality of pre-modern ideas:

'If nationalism is part of the 'spirit of the age' it is equally dependent upon earlier motifs, visions and ideals'.

Alternatively, various modernist positions deny this continuity and explain the rise of nationalism as contingent through either the social division of labour, uneven development, or various combinations such as the emergence of print capitalism which enables communities to imagine themselves. In the modernist interpretation the evolution of states requires nations, particularly with the emergence of the bourgeoisie which 'creates' nationalism. Political analysis although similarly modernist, emphasises the struggle for political power and hence the state as central to this. Once again elites are seen as competing for power and manipulating nationalist feeling.

The British social historians have regarded national culture as the strategies through which the ruling classes have attempted to co-opt the masses. Similarly, Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to illustrate the role of culture in forming national-cultural collective identities which state managers, through local and national class projects, could ensure that hegemony. Despite focusing on culture as a terrain vital to ideological struggle, culture is nonetheless reduced to a hegemonic tool diffusing downwards. In the process of hegemonic formation, Gramsci noted that for hegemony to be successful it needed to have appeal to the masses. Geographical perspectives on (ethno) nationalism can negotiate a way to transcend the dichotomy of

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75 Gellner, Cairn, and Benedict Anderson, respectively, in the collection by Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds. 1994) *Nationalism*, Oxford University Press.
the general and particular processes associated with local conditions and structures.

Despite the Eurocentric and restricted outlook of much of the localities and regionalism literature its emphasis upon the politics of place in the context of the global is particularly useful. Three main approaches informing this literature can be expanded to cover broader debates on nationalism. In providing a review of the three dominant theories of political regionalism Cooke suggests avoidance of either a culturally or economically reductionist argument. Firstly, the region can be seen as the context in which capital is invested and as a product of local responses to capitalist processes. The region is therefore structured by these localised expressions of capitalist accumulation. Variations of this theme include David Harvey's concept of 'structured coherences' to explain the formation of regional class alliances. This regards the local state as embedded in local class relations which have been elongated through a particular mix of technologies.

Alternatively, the region is seen as the focus of identity in that places are culturally specific. Residents are tied together through locally focused communications and ideas about the place. This broadly translates as an ethno-regional explanation of regional difference.

A social-spatial oriented view interprets the region as a medium for social interaction within which people are integrated through locally based social interaction. This integration constructs collectivities with shared cultures or imagined communities which can bring together cultural and economic factors:

\textit{the effects of spatially distinct patterns of production will always be combined with and mediated through spatially distinct social practices arising in local civil society and sustained culturally through an imagined community.}^7

The result is regional variations in the creation of infrastructure within which capitalism can operate. Social relationships are also differentiated in this trade off

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between capitalist development and its filtering through the sieve of local cultures. This provides linkages for all three perspectives but perhaps undermines its own explanatory value through the lack of a more interpretative framework. For example, we need to assess how these meanings of events are interpreted and the ways in which social and economic structures are themselves reproduced through those contingencies. Once again the centrality of space and spatial discourse can elaborate on the association between places and perceptions of daily life.

Therefore connecting social identity and territorial affiliations is central to the ideological dimensions involved in the formation of a region. This tells us more not only of the role of regions in social processes but the meaning and significance of regions themselves. Murphy contends that a huge gulf exists between theory and practice when the regionalisation process is being addressed. He suggests that there is a dire need to account for regions instead of taking them for granted as 'areal frameworks'. The region should be seen not as a backdrop but constitutive of society. The fundamental starting point for this approach would be in asking how and why does the 'region' acquire significance or ideological import?

If we take nationalism and its off-spring, ethno-nationalism, then these ideologies represent circuits of ideas, which are rooted literally in the soil of the locality and then the nation-state. However, they also operate just as effectively within the homeland of the mind. The sociologist Rob Shields has proposed that a spatialised discourse for analysing the cultural interface between centre and margins can most profitably be shown as:

'key to the transformation of purely discursive "imaginary geographies" into everyday actions, gestures, crowd practice, regional identities, the "imaginary community" of the territorial nation state, and geo-politics'.

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Chapter One: Identity and Development

Nationalism involves the interpretation and construction of social space. However the essentially contested concept of 'nation' is to be defined, it involves ideas about territory and the uniqueness of space and place. Smith and Williams suggest that the nation be seen as man's 'natural' social organisation, in which a national culture is used as a tool kit to bind space and infuse it with meaning. The identity of the nation is bound up with memory which is rooted in the concept of a homeland:

'History has nationalised a strip of land, and endowed its most ordinary features with mythical content and hallowed sentiments'.

The importance of place and context in accounting for the origins of nationalism reminds us that the latter is never autonomous. Instead the '...strength of its appeal is its ability to tap a responsive chord among the local population'. Nationalist movements use and then in turn shape local and regional political cultures and attachments to place. This is important for emphasising that political and cultural mobilisations occur in particular times and places and therefore can not be explained through the primacy of economic or cultural factors. Instead the intersection of the social and spatial can provide the context for viewing multiple causation. The shaping and construction of national space involves the infusion of meanings into landscape which legitimises development strategies in the name of transformation. This thesis provides examples of these attempts to create one such wholly artificial 'national' space and looks at the inherent tensions in doing so based upon two inter-related yet usually separated concepts.

Firstly, this was underpinned by an array of eurocentric imagery and meanings

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82 Agnew in Williams and Kofmam (1989) op .cit.
related to 'othering' and Imperialism. This embraced colonial ideas and tropes which created a powerful eurocentric-modernist framework or 'gaze' upon the African. A principal colonial mechanism involved the notion of 'trusteeship' which for Manzo has been paramount in (re)creating a parent-child dichotomy between coloniser and colonised. The implication is that European intervention has been legitimised in the name of 'civilisation' and 'progress' with the colonial 'other' considered culturally and politically 'immature'.

A range of traditions introduced from Europe into Africa based upon 'invented traditions' have formed control and socialisation mechanisms for the colonising powers. The African petty-bourgeoisie has been a key conduit for Eurocentric ideas concerning hierarchy, state, etiquette and especially education.

Therefore the rituals and incantations associated with 'nation-building' have also to be seen in this context of modernisation and the 'will to develop'.

Secondly, of equal significance is the impact that this 'gaze' has had upon conceptions of 'African culture' and 'tradition' and the mobilisation of local cultural and political identities. In many instances this has been objectified and refracted around modernisation. This has involved on the one hand European categorisation, definition and therefore 'invention' of African cultural and traditional features. On the other, therefore, to mobilise local traditional values and identities is not ever to find a 'Garden of Eden' or anti-modernist alternative. In other words, for Manzo, the uncritical promotion of 'tradition', used to counter 'modernity', in fact threatens to reinscribe modernity in its most violent form because the modernist imagery has not been transcended.

The choices and ambiguous responses available to and made by local groups, particularly the state leaders, captures this hybridisation and contamination of the local with wider eurocentric gaze. The intersection of these two broad spheres- modernisation and (ethnic) identity will now be discussed in the

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86 Manzo, K., op. cit.
context of the creation of separate ethnic and racial places in South Africa. Culture is a powerful tool for contesting social struggles, and in this sense it can be used positively and negatively. However, it is never simply autonomous but embedded in political and economic structures.

The manipulation, invention, creation and politicisation of 'culture' in South Africa is a powerful reminder that culture cannot stand outside these processes. As Kofman and Williams conclude, culture is located in the modern world, responsive to socio-economic realities and reflective of tensions in global economic transformations.57

1.5. South African Spaces of Identity

These broad debates which embrace questions of identity and developmental fulfilment take on heightened significance when placed in the context of South African society and space. The construction of a formalised system of racial discrimination and segregation, elaborated during the apartheid era, has been the salient feature of the South African intellectual and political landscape. Issues concerning race relations were not marginalised like in other numerically superior white settler Dominions but were instead central to South African national historiography.58 Furthermore, spatial division and territorial controls have underpinned South Africa's political, economic and moral divisions. The explanation of these spatial and social divisions has been the primary objective of social science and historians. These intellectual debates were dominated for a number of years particularly in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, by attributing causation to either capitalism or racial domination. These have been broadly identified and labelled as the 'Liberal' (Race) and 'Revisionist' (Capital) debate.59 Briefly, the contours of the

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debate concerned the liberal attachment to the view that apartheid race relations were essentially archaic and an irrational impediment to the beneficial market forces.90 However, the 'revisionists' regarded race as merely functional to the underlying structure and logic of capitalist accumulation. The pivotal mechanism enabling these deeper economic structures was interpreted as the extension of the oscillating migrant labour system. Thus, it can be suggested that for Marxist analysis the former native reserves (recast in the apartheid era as Bantustans, and from which migrants entered 'white' South Africa), have been central to South Africa's economic and social relations.

The most influential work concerning the reserve-subsidy thesis is that of Harold Wolpe. His central idea was that segregation was merely the appearance and adjunct to the underlying need for mining and farming to acquire cheap labour. This was secured through the migrant system which enabled the capitalist owners to meet only the basic salary of the migrant because the physical and social reproduction of his family was to take place within the reserves.91 In this way the poorest regions of

Currey, London.
90 Variations on this theme included English speaking historians identification of Afrikaner racism and nationalism as the primary cause of segregationism, particularly following 1948. For the Boer the frontier was one of continual expansion and appropriation of land and labour and it is this fiercely independent drive into the interior of Africa that has been propelled from the confusion of being in the continent. For Afrikaner interpretations see, for example, Brink, who put this 'drive' as follows: 'In the Afrikaner's evolution towards nation-hood there had always been... two major streams of experience: a positive factor, which resided in the Afrikaner's increasing exploration of and identification with Africa; and a negative, in his attempts to assert himself- one of Gods chosen people- against others With the adoption of apartheid as ideology most suited to the Afrikaner Establishment's image of itself, only the negative factor was reaffirmed at the expense- no, at the total exclusion-of the positive', Brink, A. (1982) Mapmakers in a State of Siege, Verso, London. See also Gilliomee, H. and L, Schlemmer (1989) From Apartheid to Nation-Building, Oxford University Press, Cape Town. For a critical view and assessment of whether British colonial race relations in Natal were really that significantly different from the Afrikaner see Marks, S. (1986) The Ambiguities of Dependence, Ravan, Jo'burg.
South Africa were underpinning the industrial and economic development of the more prosperous (white) areas. There were obvious parallels therefore for applying ideas of dependency theory, with South Africa's black peripheries seen as historically underdeveloped by the 'white' core. The creation of rural labour reserves, stagnation and poverty of these territories has obvious implications for the way in which identity politics within the bantustans have been seen.

1.5.1. South Africa and the Bantustans

Between 1959 and 1991 the bantustans were the central pillars of the apartheid edifice, designed to preserve white minority rule in South Africa. The bantustans were elaborations of the scattered pockets of land set aside for blacks by the racial partition of South African territory ordained by the 1913 Land Act. This had given blacks, the majority of the population, only 13% of the total land area whilst whites had the remainder. From 1959 these impoverished and fragmented native reserves were recast as ethnically constituted 'Less Developed Countries'. However, the majority of each ethnic group lived outside these bantustans and within South Africa itself. Between 1960 and 1983 in compliance with the apartheid state's policy of 'ethnic cleansing' and with the Republic of South Africa now defined as the 'white fatherland', more than three and a half million people were forcibly removed to the bantustans. They were therefore associated with brutal relocation of millions of people to these remote territories on the periphery of 'white' South Africa. Furthermore, in 1985 it was estimated that despite having 41.6% of the total population of South Africa, the homelands only accounted for 7% of GDP. The international community, African National Congress and residents of the homelands themselves, therefore attacked the


bantustans as a mockery and diminution of black birthright as South Africans. The bantustans have been characterised as being 'puppet' states of Pretoria riven by both internal and external failure to gain legitimacy which was barely concealed by a facade of 'nation-hood'.

Marxist interpretations of South Africa society and the creation of the reserves/bantustans were therefore related to class struggle and capitalist development. This academic theorising often accompanied the increasing political polarisation within South Africa and implied a revolutionary rather than evolutionary (liberal faith in rationality of market forces) change. Southall's influential work on the 'independent' Transkei bantustan suggested that it was impossible for this policy to be understood, unless located within the overall context of South Africa's political economy. Only then was it possible to 'decipher the nature of the relationship between the white 'core' and its bantustan peripheries'. For Southall, the act of 'independence' was essentially the South African government attempts at elevating a class relationship (exploitation) to an apparently international transaction between discrete (white and black) nationalities. Apartheid was therefore regarded as complementary to capitalist development:

'Apartheid is principally a system whereby capital secures cheap black labour under certain historically defined conditions specific to the development of the South African social formation, its roots lying in the policies of 'segregation' which were adopted by the state subsequent to the inauguration of the Union in 1910'.

This analysis emphasised the role of an emergent black petite-bourgeoisie, encouraged by the South African state. As a comprador class this bantustan elite would enforce the suppression of resistance and compliment the array of oppressive legislation. However, in the last instance the 'logic' of the system was concerned with minimising labour costs and absorbing the 'periphery' into the structure of the South African

economy. The key features of the bantustan were therefore symptomatic of underdevelopment, appropriation of economic surplus, emergence of stratification in the form of a wage labouring-mass, and a relatively privileged elite. Whilst Southall provided detail of internal political developments and change, this was nonetheless read off from the economic base. This implied that chiefly control and manipulation of the electoral system and tribalism was no more than a 'mask for class privilege'. The emergent bourgeoisie consisting of petty-traders and businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats and chiefs, because financially dependent upon the state '...are more likely to use this influence to promote support for, and to suppress resistance to, separate development'.

Critiques of 'dependency theory' more generally were therefore applied to South African analysis. Bundy reflected upon his own failure to identify internal cleavages and conflicts which had therefore hidden a range of dynamic tendencies within these territories. A uniform homogenised outcome of underdevelopment had been generalised rather than the timing, diverse reactions and causes to this. There was also an air of pessimistic inevitability about the outcome and futility of struggle within the reserves/bantustans related causation. Recently, Southall himself accepted that the model of stagnation presented by the dependency approach could not account for the social upheavals which 'punctured the rural acquiescence of the bantustans from the mid-1980s'. This neglect had the effect of therefore presenting a one-dimensional view of thoroughly hamstrung dependencies:

'...I was exaggeratedly impressed by the weight of repression and the inexorable logic of a one-dimensional model. What was needed was a more dynamic approach capable of responding to indications of how rapidly the bantustans were changing'.

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96 Sklar in Southall, ibid.
A new wave of literature has begun to correct certain generalisations of these radical analyses which on one level never attempted to define the relationship between homeland leaders and the local bourgeoisie, simply assuming that their interests were identical. Rather than Wolpe's capitalist continuity between segregation and apartheid these new approaches also linked this to the differentiation within the bantustans and the impact of state and political policy. The rural periphery was not simply neatly and uniformly compartmentalised but internally differentiated by the uneven and variable manner in which they had been captured or uncaptured by apartheid. There was still a dire need to accept that the bantustans were valid and distinct analytical entities:

For many people from subsistence farmers to rural teachers in homeland schools to tribal authorities, to government bureaucrats, this is their reality. The aspirations, past experience, attitudes, beliefs and motivations of homeland residents can not simply be dismissed as false consciousness. They must be accounted for and recognised as the real- not imaginary consequences of grand apartheid policy.

Intellectual interest therefore shifted to the questioning of the passive role attributed to Africans, especially within the 'dependency view'. A more agency


oriented analysis injected important issues about class, consciousness and gender into the debate. Through the concept of 'domain construction' Bozzoli provided an influential approach to relating race, ethnic and gender relations bound up within the context of a society undergoing rapid and widespread economic and industrial development. Anthropologists provided crucial insights into processes within the bantustans themselves. This concentrated on the one hand upon the consequences of the 'dumping grounds' and hundreds of thousands of displaced people, with settlements urban in size yet rural in terms of access to services. This has also encouraged a wave of South African Geographic literature embracing new insights into the past and present through linking 'the hidden spaces' and struggles over the spaces to sexuality, urban protest, alcohol, disease and migrancy. The primary result has been to insist upon African agency rather than passivity. For example, Africans also manipulated the migrant system for their own ends such as control over land, chieflaincy and women. A highly significant strand of the new literatures therefore concerned the African response to changing circumstances. In many rural areas there was traditional based opposition to incorporation into colonial sphere and modernity.

1.5.2. Marginalisation and Ambiguities of Dependence

The analysis of a range of black elite 'modernisers' was also particularly important for it reveals that having been denied access into colonial society, many

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103 See Bozzoli, B. (1987) *Class, community and conflict*, Ravan Press, South Africa. It is also interesting to note Wolpe's more recent position in which he has sought to move from an overly class reductionist analysis. He does this by suggesting contingency and that for class unity or interests to converge at a particular conjecture requires not simply labour and capital concepts but also practices, discourses and organisations. Thus 'class' is repproblematised and relations of domination in South Africa reconceptualised: 'Social classes in Marxist sense of the relationship to the means of production exist by definition, as they must in any capitalist country, but they are not meaningful social realities. Clearly, pigmentation, rather than ownership of land or capital is the most significant criteria of status in South Africa', Wolpe, H. (1988:13) *Race, Capital and the Apartheid State*, Unesco, Paris. Therefore neither class nor racial structures are for Wolpe, predetermined.

104 See Colin Murray's work.
mission-educated blacks sought out strategies which were highly ambiguous. These alternated between internalising colonial etiquette and then sometimes utilising and manipulating ethnic or regional affiliations. As over 80% of Africans were still living in rural reserves by 1930, there was in some cases strenuous efforts to preserve the old way of life and 'traditions'. Given the rapid changes in society it is therefore vital to introduce the question of modernisation and social and cultural assumptions underpinning territorial fragmentation.

This involves on one level scrutinising the different strands of apartheid discourse. Dubow has uncovered the ideological assumptions of segregation and the role of intellectual and scientific thought in creating a racial science. His identification of 'Scientific racism' in South Africa is seen in relation to the forces and turbulence of modernisation:

_The development of a tradition of racial science in South Africa ought to be seen, like segregation itself, as both a response and a solution to the traumatic confrontation with industrial modernity. This process was exacerbated by virtue of the fact that industrialisation and urbanisation occurred so suddenly and dramatically following the discovery of gold and diamonds in the late nineteenth century. The impact of rapid industrialisation on predominantly agrarian societies was profound and brought with it the characteristic problems and anxieties associated with modernity: proletarianisation, mass poverty, crime, disease and social breakdown. The concerns of racial science spoke directly to these anxieties. Its findings helped to rationalise social strictures against racial and cultural intermixture, and its warnings of pollution, defilement and degeneration served as powerful justifications of the need for statutory segregation along lines of colour. In so doing, racial science helped to_

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facilitate the realisation and ideological maintenance of white power and authority'.'

This therefore drew upon earlier colonial tropes and metaphors which spoke to wider white fears of racial degeneration. Following 1948 this segregationist framework was infused with Christian Nationalism and anthropological conceptions of cultural relativity rooted in German romanticism of 'ethnos'. Despite the centrality of systems of 'difference' within South Africa, it is surprising that this signification of 'difference', or 'othering' has not been extensively discussed.

As a result, Parnell and Mabin have recently provided an important article illustrating the irony of racially defined empirical work which despite its good intentions has failed to challenge racial classification of segregationist and apartheid ideology. Race they argue should not be seen as pre-given but created as part of the intricate development of modern (urban) society. These geographers have urged the posing of questions which will illuminate the racialisation of social relationships through which racial categories were fashioned and entrenched. To that end we have still failed to grapple with 'the rationale, purpose and consequences of defining and building racial places'. A discussion of modernity within South Africa can provide important ways to transcend the dualisms and binary opposites which remain so entrenched within apartheid discourse.

The discussions of racial purity and pollution upon which constructions of race discourse were based represent the other side of the same modernist coin. In other

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words, the formation of racial identity and a form of race nationalism was in close proximity to the fears of modern society in South Africa. This represented the essence of apartheid in that it resonated with western discourses on race and metaphysics. As such it contained an 'identitary logic' embedded in totalising modernist discourse, whose major emphasis was upon identity formation:

'**This is what I have called the identitary logic: the logic of what is involved in the process of identity construction, in its broadest sense, wherein the impossibility of bridging the gap between identification and the reaching of a fully fledged identity is denied. Against such an identitary logic, the possibility of developing a more democratic logic of a 'never-sutured identity', will be held out.**'\(^{112}\)

Norval therefore argues that we need to understand the way in which apartheid has divided social and political space through the ambiguity of its 'discriminatory and discerning logic'. This ambiguity is not captured by the classifications such as 'capital' or 'race' but instead through the ability of apartheid to redraw political frontiers and locating blacks to the periphery through the binary dualisms of social spaces. This leads back to the earlier discussion concerning the frictions between state and nation formation. The ambitions of the national state were integral to this project of modernity and its quest for cultural unity. The inherent contradictions of modernity therefore relate to this logic of identity formation upon which an 'order-chaos' polarity is found.\(^{113}\)

The approach taken in this thesis is to re-situate the bantustans within the context of the creation of and interplay between a range of complex identities. African's were represented as geographically illegitimate within 'white' South Africa whilst many embraced a diverse range of identities in order to reverse a sense or


condition of marginality. This approach involves assessing the ways in which space has been represented, moralised and signified as distinct racial (and ethnic) places.\textsuperscript{14} To construct a truly post-apartheid order there is therefore a great need to assess what apartheid spoke directly to - the universal logic within every 'national' and 'racial' identity.

This can be transcended once again through mapping the relationships between culture, development and space. By looking at the discourses and practices available to the bantustan state leadership this thesis brings together two crucial but still separated sets of literature which addresses those forces permeating, constraining and creating the bantustans. The purpose is to correct the failure to recognise these territories as 'socially differentiated and economically structured geographies'.\textsuperscript{13} This involves, firstly, those broad eurocentric ideas and practices concerning development and modernisation, as alluded to at the end of the section on 'national identity'.

This is particularly pertinent in the South African context and requires the identification of 'othering' which was so central to the creation of colonial and racial frameworks. Underpinned by ideas of civilisation, progress and enlightenment, Manzo has focused discussion of the role of 'trusteeship' in enabling colonial intervention and alienation of the African. Historical geographic approaches have begun to uncover the relationship between the colonial naming and labelling of landscape and the creation of racial, environmental and gender discourses of exclusion. Powerful racist discourses embracing 'progress' have also been more recently recast as ideas of 'development'. The phenomenon of the growth of state and non-state development institutions has been examined by Tapscott who places the 'rise of development as theory and policy' within the context of South African state crisis in the late 1970s.


According to the author this structural crisis manifested itself at the economic, political and ideological levels of South African society. It resulted in policy changes, encouraged by state and ruling elites, in particular those interests represented by big business and military-security concerns. The latter envisaged a 'hearts and minds' campaign designed to legitimise separate development by giving blacks a stake in its structures and also 're-orienting the ideological discourse of the white population':

'These two social forces, in effect, created a socio-political milieu in which the notion of 'development' was to gain currency in South Africa at the start of the 1980s, although individual academics from Afrikaans medium universities had for some years been speaking of the need for a "new development paradigm". Thereafter, with state endorsement, the concept was taken up by and advanced by a variety of social agencies, including the academic community, private consultants and the press, to the extent that "development" in South Africa became something of a growth industry with a momentum entirely of its own.'

Development provided a key intellectual discursive framework which rapidly permeated across South Africa society. However, by placing the rise of development largely in the context of structural responses, it does not adequately ask just why it was that development had such 'momentum' and was inter-changed so readily with racism and the ethnic group. Furthermore, despite apparent recognition of diversity within and between the bantustans, nonetheless Tapscott says:

'This stated, the political and administrative genesis of the bantustans suggests that while the particularities of different areas vary, their dependence on the South African state and the basic structure and function of their institutional systems ensure that

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Whilst recognising these structural features of 'dependency', nonetheless, it would be erroneous to accept Tapscott's inference that the other nine bantustans were broadly similar to Tapscott's study of the Transkei. I will argue that to understand the dynamics of dependency we must assess the specific temporal and spatial context of the bantustans. Therefore the second broad grouping of literature addresses the specificities and characteristics of cultural and ethnic identity through which groups mobilise to secure the perceived fruits of that 'development'.

This literature has received belated attention in South Africa until recently because of the highly negative use and cynical manipulation of culture through apartheid. It is suggested here that any assessment of ethnicity should incorporate the following elements: acknowledgement of cultural distinctiveness, use of cultural symbols such as language and customs; the invention of tradition to create norms and roles for the members, and to establish boundaries between the 'other'. It should also recognise that in confirming group legitimacy and coherence the reading of history as a sacred text is important. Lastly, that the sense of 'them' and 'us' reinforces apartness, both superiority and inferiority, through cultural imperialism. For the analysis of ethnicity within a South African context I also suggest the need to observe the specificity of the local and regional, and its creation as a historical process which is fluid and contextual.

The bantustan literature has begun to address these specific inquiries but the creation of ethnicity remains for many commentators wholly cynical, overly corrupt and functional to apartheid 'divide and rule'. The failure to popularise ethn-

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nationalism in contexts such as the Ciskei, and Qwa Qwa, has often be explained by their wholly artificial 'nation-hood' and inability to relate to local experiences. It is also important to locate these failures (although far from lacking in impact) within the ambiguities and conflicts of the discourses of ethno-nationalism and development themselves.

The impact of the bantustan policy is therefore better understood not simply as promoted by 'collaborationists' who in some way were simply promoting the apartheid state’s separate development policy, as opposed to the ‘authenticity’ of broader South African nationalist opposition to apartheid. Rather, the bantustan policy can be reconceptualised to illustrate the more fundamental clash and conflicts between a genealogy of 'progress/modernity', integral to eurocentric thoughts on 'development' and the efforts to construct and mobilise identity from the fragments of the local and particular. This is the logic not only of apartheid but modernism itself.

Although a pattern of bantustan dependency upon South Africa was indeed generalised we must assess the different ways in which each entity internalised and drew upon competing discourses and practices in response to marginalisation. The thesis therefore addresses one such response to the 'characteristic problems and anxieties associated with modernity' and peripherality.

1.5.3. Bophuthatswana

Bophuthatswana was one of four bantustans which gained 'independence' from the apartheid regime in the late 1970s and early 1980s with another six given

Ethnicity in the Ciskei", in Vail, L. (ed.) op. cit. This was written anonymously at the time by Jeff Peires due to its sensitive nature and represents this stance. However, more recently an alternative view locates the failure of Qwa Qwa ethno-nationalism within a more complex framework, see Banks, L. (1995) “The failure of Ethnic nationalism: Land, Power, and The Politics of Clanship on the South African Highveld”, Africa 65(4). Also for Bophuthatswana State constructions of Batswana identity, see Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) Dog of the Boers, the rise and fall of Lucas Mangope in Bophuthatswana, paper to the History Workshop, University of Witwatersrand.

self-governing status. Bophuthatswana consisted of seven scattered parcels of land which from 1959 had been designated the homeland of Tswana speakers. Each area of Bophuthatswana was markedly different (see figure 1.1). The districts towards the east were close to the economic heart of South Africa, the PWV (now known as Gauteng, centred on Johannesburg) and were considerably more industrialised, and also mineral rich, than elsewhere in Bophuthatswana. Those to the west were mainly rural and agriculturally based.

The capital Mmabatho straddled this east-west axis, near to the border with Botswana, and became the centre within which the Bophuthatswana state and institutions defined and implemented 'development'. The specific focus of the thesis is upon a range of strategies and projects, centred upon Mmabatho, which were used to articulate expressions of (ethno)‘nation-hood’ in order to bind these territorial fragments together and to denote nation-hood and sovereignty.
Mmabatho was pivotal to Mangope's regime and was the centre of political power, decision-making and 'national' prestige. It symbolises both the imagined and real consequences of the Bophuthatswana nation-building exercise. Built in the late 1970s, it became a multi-million dollar undertaking to give expression to the 'nation-building' desires of the Mangope regime and in 1980 it incorporated another town, Mafeking. As if to confirm the artificiality of the bantustans, Bophuthatswana collapsed in March 1994 following opposition to President Mangope's refusal to allow the bantustan to take part in the first ever non-racial, non-ethnic elections in South Africa. The turmoil of that period illustrates the complex social relations in South Africa which had previously been subordinated to the stark dichotomy of white-black. One of the more bizarre images, was thousands of white extremist Boer Kommandos, racing as if cavalry, from the western Transvaal. They poured into the capital and

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Figure 1.1 Bophuthatswana

Note that the X depicts the seventh region belonging to Bophuthatswana, namely, the Thaba' Nchu region, between Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State and Lesotho. Adapted from Drummond, J. (1990) "Rural Land Use and Agricultural Production in Dinokana Village, Bophuthatswana", *Geo-Journal*, 22.3, pp. 335-343.
power base of Bophuthatswana, Mmabatho, to preserve Lucas Mangope's fantasy of a Tswana homeland and with it the lasting hope to create their own 'Volkstaat' (Afrikaner bantustan). Although majority rule has been achieved these dramatic events illustrate the problems of creating a unified South African identity.

My thesis reinterprets the previous conceptions of the bantustans which were often portrayed in popular and academic debate as static dumping grounds for surplus people. It focuses on Bophuthatswana, to illustrate the importance of internal dynamics which have driven a process of change in these territories, often dismissed cynically as simply the manifestation of apartheid policy. The research concentrates on the post-'independence' era of Bophuthatswana from 1977-1994 in order to analyse the concerted efforts that President Mangope's regime made towards nation-building and modernisation. The cultural and political identities of these territories were seen as uncomplicated by most observers and as ethnically homogeneous by apartheid regimes.

Bophuthatswana provides a case study to show how the regime was not simply a puppet but had its own specific political, cultural and economic agenda. The thesis demonstrates the complex interplay and shuffling of multiple- (regional, national, ethnic, class) identities in the context of the impetus for transformation and modernisation. The approach taken is, firstly, to show the ways in which the Bophuthatswana regime's ideal or grand scheme of nation-hood drew upon the renewal and desired input of Batswana tradition, identity and culture. Secondly, the ideal then needed to be translated into practice. These practicalities involved dependence upon the different types of modernist or expert knowledges associated with, among others, economists, planners and developmentalists. In the efforts to modernise Bophuthatswana and to reverse its marginal status, these practices were also culturally specific, producing profound conflicts with Batswana culture. The following chapters address the contradictory nature of identity formation in this region, each by taking a broad theme:

Chapter Two focuses upon the historical and regional context within which
apartheid discourse was deployed. This involves firstly, tracing the contours of the Eurocentric colonial framework which set the discursive and spatial parameters upon which subsequent efforts to imagine both racial and ethnic identity and conceptions of ‘development’ were based. Secondly, this ‘othering’ was closely related to conceptions and definitions of the essence of Batswana ‘culture’ and ‘characteristics’. The ambiguities of this frontier interaction are illustrated through the one hundred year struggle over the settlement of Mafikeng (Place of the Stones) and white and black community responses to being on these cultural and political ‘margins’. It is argued here that the rise of the bantustan policy and shifts in apartheid discourse should be placed in this complex regional context.

Chapter Three is based around the theme of cultural identity and the local mobilisation of Batswana ethnic identity. It involved questions of cultural purity, education policy and cultural heritage in the context of ‘nation-building’. These debates were linked, crucially, to the other side of ‘trusteeship’ and internalised locally as ‘maturation’ of the ‘nation’. The invention of ethnic nationalism relates directly to these debates and practical concerns over territory, and citizenship in the context of dependency upon South Africa.

Chapter Four, takes its main theme as the transformation of the landscape by assessing the inherited structures and ideas of modernisation available to the Bophuthatswana regime.

Chapter Five looks at the creation of an appropriate ‘national’ capital as a powerful symbol of the purity of ‘nation-hood’ and ‘independence’ from Pretoria. The debates surrounding incorporation of the colonial town of Mafeking into Mmabatho, symbolise the widening of the Bophuthatswana regime’s official discourse to embrace multi-racialism and modernisation. The design, planning and political functions built into the urban fabric of the capital illustrate the conflicts of nation-building.

Chapter Six shows the regime’s efforts to locate Bophuthatswana in the world community of ‘nation-states’ and the various strategies, most notably to do with economic and diplomatic initiatives, underpinned by the conception of the prestige project.
Chapter Seven takes the theme of contradiction to explain the manifestation of pronounced economic and political crises in Bophuthatswana.

Chapter Eight shows the regime's attempts, in the wake of fundamental political changes in South Africa, to mould the 'nation-building' discourse into a distinctive regionalist power base, with proposals for the demarcation of new regional boundaries based upon ethnic and linguistic considerations. The regime finally implodes after intense local and national pressure for reincorporation into South Africa.

Chapter Nine, by way of conclusion, places the legacy of the misplaced 'nation-building' efforts of Bophuthatswana 'independence' briefly within in the context of the problems and possibilities associated with the period of transition in the new North West Province of South Africa.

1.5.4. Conducting the Research Project

The research project was based upon a critical textual analysis which used a wide and diverse range of sources. Many of the sources were available in Britain and these were underpinned by a period of field research carried out in South Africa between November 1994 and March 1995. If we are in agreement with Sidaway’s observation that the researcher is part of the political and social world we research, then, before looking at each category of sources used in the study, it would appear particularly important to discuss some of the issues surrounding field work and the impact that this has upon the research process.

The debates concerning field work, and more generally what has been characterised as the 'crisis of representation', have been particularly vocal in anthropological research. The way we write and the ethnographic discourses and methods that we use for representing the 'researched' are deeply implicated in what the subaltern or 'other' is allowed to say. Sidaway also reminds us that it is not just

123 Sidaway, J. (1992) op. cit.
that we should identify the 'problems' of the researcher or of writing. Instead there is a need to locate this within the social context and conditions of the research, especially its consequences. In stressing the importance of local context for the research process, Madge takes the argument a stage further. Madge also explores the inter-relationship between ethics, knowledge and power in which she identifies the potential to expose power relations by turning 'boundary disputes' (for example between self-identity and ethical decisions) into positive reflections. Nonetheless, Madge also concludes, somewhat pessimistically, that perhaps radical change can never be delivered through the Academy. However, we perhaps therefore need to conceive alternative affiliations for the researcher and to rethink the relationship between research, policy-making and personal politics. Furthermore, there are surely positive dimensions to the ways in which researchers can throw both the local and global scales, and their inter-relationship, which the researcher embodies, into stark relief.

The responses to my queries and questions within South Africa, and the mediation of information made available to me, were structured through the relationship that exists between the researcher and the researched. Nonetheless, whilst aware of the politics surrounding this relationship, as an outsider, without affiliations to any local group or faction, I did not have any proclivity or bias towards any particular social or interest group (beyond that of the researcher as representative of an international class in itself). For example, whilst conducting the fieldwork it was highly noticeable that South Africa had its own core and periphery, particularly between the former bantustans and the metropolitan areas. As Jones suggests,

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therefore, to uncritically reify the local and the particular as inherently authentic is to misread the dynamics within the country being researched and is dangerously parochial. It can be argued that the neo-liberal pressures which are impinging upon academia, in conjunction with some conservative facets to the post-modern and post-structural approach are having the effect of contributing to the marginalisation of Africa. These pressures from within and without the Academy obviously affect the research being undertaken.

The approach taken to the study was to gather a range of interesting sources, bearing in mind that I would have only five months for field work in South Africa. The limited time-span therefore ruled out a more grass-roots/ethnographic approach. Instead, the decision to focus upon state-elite and institutional discourses of nation-building, including the print and broadcasting media, identified clearly the range of sources sought. These can be divided up into three broad categories. Firstly, the official Bophuthatswana and South African government and parastatal publications. Secondly, the print (and to some extent broadcasting) media. Thirdly, semi-structured interviews and informal discussions.

Taking the official publications first, both the South African Parliamentary Hansards and Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly debates contained interesting insights into the discursive representations of identity and development. The London School of Economics and the School of African and Oriental Studies contained a vast range of South African publications. A monthly publication by the Bophuthatswana

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127 The ability of the post-modern turn to be truly reciprocal and empowering is questioned by Mohan who instead suggests that the production of geographic knowledge is driven by its 'commodification' over and beyond academic fashion and the quest for knowledge, in Mohan, G. (1994) "Destructions of the con: geography and the commodification of knowledge", Area, 24, pp.387-390.


129 For example, the preparation for undertaking field work and its duration, in addition to academic fashion and ethnographic debates also depends, critically, on the more mundane, yet essential, level of funding. Indeed, it can be argued that these pressures are felt differentially within academia, with, as an example, the pressures facing young post-graduates and the nature of the PhD process itself, somewhat different to the problems facing established researchers who have stronger institutional and financial backing, see ibid.
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bophuthatswana *Pioneer*, was particularly important for government views. The Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, held an almost complete set of the *Pioneer*. Within South Africa itself, promotional documents, policy papers and even video material, concerning the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation and Bophuthatswana Development Council were obtained.

Access to Bophuthatswana state documentation was greatly constrained due to the lack of a 'national' archive in Mmabatho. There was dependence upon the goodwill of individuals and especially the helpfulness of the Bophuthatswana National Library staff. The Cullen Library at the University of Witswatersrand, the University Library (University of the North West, formerly University of Bophuthatswana) and the State Archives in Cape Town, all contained significant sources. The local journal, *Matlhasedi*, produced in the Department of Education at the University of the North West represents an important voice 'for and from the rural periphery'.

Fortunately, the most important and widely used sources, the print media, were obtainable in Britain. The one hundred year old *Mail* newspaper (*Mafeking Mail* until 1982, when it was bought by the Bophuthatswana government) provided valuable insights into the Mafikeng area over one hundred years and more recently acted as the 'national' weekly newspaper for Bophuthatswana. Although the circulation never exceeded 10,000 readers under the editorship of Joe Pobrey (1955-1980) when it was the *Mafeking Mail*, and barely touched 15,000 into the 1990s,¹³⁰ the contents of the newspaper were directed towards the power-holding elite of the Bophuthatswana regime. This included local Mmabatho residents, civil servants and business people resident in the capital. The British Newspaper Library at Colindale held almost all of the issues from 1960 to 1992. The National South African print media were also an extremely important source of information and, once again, I was

fortunate to have access to the superb collection of press cuttings from all the major English-speaking newspapers, compiled over twenty years by the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) and stored at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies.

Lastly, interviews and discussions within South Africa were extremely important for contextualising the study. There was no survey undertaken or questionnaire but instead a number of semi-structured interviews conducted with a range of policy-makers/shapers and influential actors/organisations. Interviews and discussions were held with civil servants within the North West Province’s Department of Town Planning, local African National Congress (ANC) and South African Communist Party (SACP) political parties, development workers, architects, engineers, local Mmabatho Municipality officials, academics and residents of Mmabatho. I was fortunate enough to interview Danie Schoeman whose career spanned over twenty years’ (except for a brief period in Namibia) involvement with development agents in Mmabatho, as firstly, the chairman of the Bophuthatswana Development Council, secondly, a regional employee of the Development Bank of South Africa and more recently he was Director of the Directorate of Development Administration and Planning in the Bophuthatswana/North West government. I also relied on a number of sources which Mangope’s former economic advisor, Karl Magyar, was able to send.

Other important interviewees included the former editor of the Mafeking Mail who provided valuable insights into the race and political relations in a small marginalised town. Interviews with the 1995 editorial staff of the Mail indicated the specific nation-building agenda that the newspaper was given by the Bophuthatswana government, with considerable interference in its publication. There were similar discussions at the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation and also access to their news archives. Much of the preparation for the interviews was done ‘on the spot’ because most contacts could not be established prior to the field work and involved rapid use of day to day introductions. The questions put to interviewees were directed by a broad set of issues addressing the perceptions of Bophuthatswana ‘nation-building’ and the regime’s developmental and cultural ‘achievements’. With the
Mangope regime brought to the end of its era and with transitional structures in place at the time of the field work, some of the interviews became either very personal reflections (in some cases of over twenty years involvement with Bophuthatswana) whilst others were very formal and cautious responses. Some important points concerning interviews and discussions should be expanded upon.

My arrival in Mmabatho took place eight months after the collapse of the Mangope regime. On the one hand this meant that certain officials involved with the Bophuthatswana administration were reluctant to discuss the old regime because of the activities of two commissions of inquiry, which had been established by the ANC in order to investigate corruption and malpractice in the old Bophuthatswana state and local government structures. Many officials, whose positions were threatened during the transition, therefore simply dismissed my ‘academic’ inquiries as detracting from the efforts directed towards building the ‘new’ South Africa. On the other hand, others, particularly civil servants, again whose positions were vulnerable and whose tax packages were drastically adjusting from the Bophuthatswana regime’s generous terms to the South African national level, were very critical of the new ANC administration. More generally, however, the collapse of the regime did mean that there was much more openness and emphasis upon, and even celebration of, transparency within government. Most people were very keen to discuss issues and were curious about the presence of such a young (!) British post-graduate researcher.

There is all probability that had there been more time available for the field work, then more information could have been acquired or improved upon. For example, on numerous occasions I attempted to interview the local chief and former state officials (even Mangope himself) but without success. Furthermore, the nature of my funding and the time frame for the project precluded the opportunity to build up contacts over a longer period of time within South Africa and, importantly, to achieve any degree of proficiency in Setswana. As a result, this inevitably influenced my access to sources and also to the range of people interviewed. Those interviewed were mainly educated, ‘westernised’ office-holding elites. However, it can be argued that it was exactly this group- the nucleus of the institutional and professional
Bophuthatswana elite, who, as the proponents and definers of Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' and development, were particularly well placed to provide important insights into the research project's objectives. With some invaluable personal contacts built up in Mafikeng, and many 'opportunistic' moments of contact and reflection (even on the bus or mini-cab), I was able to tap into a broad cross section of people and opinion which provided a vital context for British and archival based sources. Furthermore, if I had spoken Setswana and stayed for a longer period of time in South Africa then the focus of the research and its direction would have inevitably produced a very different kind of study.

As it turned out, in view of the issues explored and the constraints that the project would entail, new opportunities were created which enabled the project to give a strong, and vital, emphasis to nation-building as a product of both the local and global scales.
Chapter Two
2. ‘The Last Civilised Stop on the Long Trek to the North’: Mafeking and the Ambiguities of Being on the Margins.

2.1. Introduction

Before establishing the broad contours and content of the Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' discourse, it is necessary to establish the regional context within which apartheid discourse operated and interacted. Apartheid’s 'identitary logic' fed off older discourses manipulating anxieties and fears regarding cultural and political identity. The invention of Bophuthatswana can be related to a series of different and contested identities which have long been an integral feature of the region. These embraced the fostering of race and ethnic differences which were premised upon competing representations of the nature and character of nation-hood, and which were closely related to notions of 'progress' and group advancement. These regional characteristics can be seen in the context of two dominant historical periods in the area’s unfolding historical geography.

First, the frontier associated with British Imperial advance, dispossession and colonial 'othering'; European interpretations of race and tribe provided colonial tropes and metaphors lending themselves to a segregationist discourse creating a white-black division following the Boer War. Second, from 1948 the apartheid era signified a recasting of these older racial ideas and shifted the emphasis to the manipulation of ethnic differences. With the native reserves now represented as 'ethno-national homelands', apartheid discourse sought to legitimise the bantustan policy as the awakening to 'national self-realization'. Apartheid was vigorously promoted as the policy through which the preservation of these cultural and political differences could be ensured.

Taken together, these two broad periods, associated with

1 Mafeking Town Council Brochure, Mafeking Fastest Growing Border Town, undated.
colonialism/segregation and the apartheid era, provided the context within which the African was considered as legitimate only within the peripheral native reserves or later, the bantustans. The powerful forces which demarcated and detached black from white spaces were also regionally conditioned. Local anxieties concerned the enduring regional perception of being marginal and peripheral. This marginality should be interpreted not merely as topographical or economic but also as the cultural interface between core and periphery. Both black and white communities sought to either accommodate, embrace or reject the disruptive forces associated with modernisation by creating ‘new’ or defending ‘old’ identities. This mobilisation of local identities was irrevocably entwined with a society which had been incorporated into the colonial sphere and which was undergoing rapid industrialisation and modernisation.

A cultural clash between universalising ‘western’ norms and local mobilisations is illustrated by reference to the historical town of Mafeking, itself rooted within and reflecting regional history over one hundred years. Mafeking and its surrounding area symbolises the manner in which local groups have interpreted and played out competing identities. This geographic emphasis is particularly important given that the area became pivotal to Bophuthatswana nation-building efforts. The first section focuses on the controversial origins of Mafeking in the context of colonial ‘othering’ of the Batswana. It will be shown how enduring ideas linking landscape, progress and culture sought to normalise this colonisation and, in doing so, provoked variable responses. Secondly, the changing relationship between Mafeking and Botswana illustrates the apartheid interpretation of (ethno) Nationalism, in which Mafeking was caught ambiguously between the opposite poles of African nationalism and white supremacy within the emerging bantustan policy within South Africa. The core ideas of apartheid will be discussed in this context and with these, the increasing appeal of the concept of a ‘Tswana’ homeland to various groups.

2.2. Mafeking on the Margins

'Mafeking seemed a place that had a tenuous hold on the outside world: just the thin
line of the railway across the wilderness, with the telegraph poles besides it striding away as far as the eye could see... All around stretched the veld, like a barren, stony prairie, dipping a little where the town ended and then, a little later, rising again here and there to gentle slopes Mafeking lay like some insignificant scrap of toast in an enormous, shallow, brown-and-green plate'.

The region has been variously described by 'insiders' and 'outsiders' as a frontier or border zone, marginal or peripheral, threatened and neglected. A wide variety of groups have settled the region with the concept of marginality central to the creation and reshaping of identities. Referring to the town on the eve of the siege of 1899, Gardiner's description of Mafeking implied that the only comforting appearance of 'progress' appeared to be the 'thin line of railway...with telegraph poles besides it'. Otherwise, the grip was indeed tenuous with marginality, wilderness, and shadowy desolation all around. Mafeking was therefore likened to a vulnerable bastion of civilisation amidst the barren veld. This imagery has provided enduring ideas and practices through which Batswana culture has been alienated or at best filtered and refracted around. Shifting conceptions of the 'frontier' provide an analogy for over one hundred years of the creation, erosion and subsequent reaffirmation of group boundaries within and between black and white communities. The production and communication of cultural forms, reflected in this changing urban form, were integral to shifting and fluid configurations of identity. These processes of identity formation should be seen in conjunction with changing local economic and political conditions.

Mafeking had been integral to British imperial identity and more particularly the expansion of the British Empire in Southern Africa at the turn of the century. Throughout the twentieth century this small town on the fringes of the Kalahari and northern Cape, which by Botswana's independence in 1966 had a population of barely

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four thousand, was inextricably connected to a series of ‘nation-building’ projects. Mafeking’s origins long before 1948 and the apartheid era symbolise the deep roots of segregationism which preceded the bantustan policy. This policy was then entwined with complex pre-existing social formations of which Mafeking was a major example. Although Mafeking was a product of European frontier with expansionism and segregationism built into the town, ironically, its close proximity to ‘black’ rather than ‘white’ Africa, although at times sharpening racial and cultural differences also served to differentiate the town from ‘white’ South Africa. The racial divisions between Mafeking and Mmabatho were eventually subordinated to the common objective of ‘developing’ the city which was on the margins of the South African economy and society (chapters five). Throughout its short history Bophuthatswana has been characterised as a peripheral backwater and Mafeking shared this similar experience of being ‘on the margins’. Mafeking was at the vanguard of colonisation of the region and symbolised Imperial and Eurocentric ‘othering’. Yet, due to its location and proximity to the border of the Batswana ‘other’, the town remained marginal and faced questions of cultural and economic survival. These issues were also raised among the Batswana in relation to the creation and preservation of self-identity.

2.2.1. The Frontier of Conquest and Dispossession: Mafeking As Imperial Outpost

‘From its very beginning ‘the road to the north’ had been a concept, even a slogan; not something given by a neutral, impersonal geography. It had come into existence for specific historical, political, and commercial reasons, as the names by which it was known made manifest (the missionary road, the hunters’ trail, the traders’ trail, the Suez canal of the South, etc.) Here- and here- and here- was a route which would open up the continent. Which would bring the word of God to the ‘benighted heathen’. Which would ‘put Africa on the map’ (literally). Which would place in the hands of this group or that the key to the future development of the territory’.4

Figure 2.1 Mafeking’s location in relation to A) ‘Road to the North’ and the Union of South Africa and B) Native Reserves of 1913 and 1936

The history of this white settlement and its association with the surrounding area illustrates the complexity of race and ethnic relations in the country. This small corner of North West South Africa has evolved a distinctive and enduring identity during the course of this century. Mafeking's white residents have consistently viewed their town as distinctive. Ultimately this was manifest in the unique decision to join a black homeland producing a set of race relations which contradicted the rigid apartheid principles of segregation. It is argued here that this distinctive quality as interpreted by its residents and indeed absorbed by the South African government at certain times is due in part to the town's unusual if not exceptional location.

Mafeking was located at the remote northern edge of the Cape Province, near the border with Bechuanaland (which became Botswana in 1966), adjacent to Batswana native reserves later to form the core of Bophuthatswana and occupying a site within 700 yards of the Batswana settlement of Mafikeng ('Stadt').

At the turn of the century Mafeking, as a gateway into the African interior, played a pivotal role in the British advance from the Cape Province. It was the frontier along which European settlers moved into the interior of Africa bringing with them notions of 'enlightenment' and 'progress'. The town became associated with the progressive mythology of the frontier and in 1895 became the administrative capital of Bechuanaland, rather unusually outside this territory. The high point of its association with the British Empire came in the aftermath of the Boer War in 1902 with the great prestige of the Siege and enhanced optimism for the town's future. Ten years later with the 1913 Land Act and demarcation of native reserves, Mafeking became the last white settlement on the border between 'white' South Africa and the Tswana native reserves. The latter had become associated with wilderness and peripheralisation. In consequence, the town's status was also transformed from an Imperial outpost to a marginal settlement. Although Mafeking felt the streamlining imprint of segregationism and from 1948 apartheid racial zoning, the town nevertheless remained differentiated from other South African towns in the region due to the influence of its peripheral location.

Mafeking's prestige, status and economic benefits were finally eroded with the
decision to relocate the capital of Botswana to Gaborones. The British colonial character of the town began to disappear as it became transformed into one of the surrounding Afrikaner ‘dorps’ (rural-‘platteland’ towns). However, at the very time when Mafeking appeared to be losing its distinctive identity, the most important decision for the future of the town was taken.\(^6\) In 1963 Central government in Pretoria located the administrative headquarters of its newly created Tswana bantustan in the town. Mafeking was now entwined with another ‘nation-building’ project.

Mafeking has been popularly perceived as a Victorian legend.\(^7\) The siege during the Boer War fired the imagination of the whole British Empire, bestowing a symbolism on the town greatly exceeding its actual economic, political and even military importance. However, what is less well known is that in the 1850s, just one and a half kilometres away from the site upon which the European township would be built, there existed a Batswana settlement, Mafikeng. This was the ‘other’ Mafeking, hidden behind the facade of Empire-Building and in the shadow of the white town. The construction of a European settlement adjacent to this Batswana town illustrates the emerging European and colonial ideas of ‘trusteeship’ whereby ‘native interests’ would be supposedly safeguarded until considered ‘mature’. This involved on the one hand barely concealed racist colonial assumptions about the native. On the other, there was a more insidious strand of Eurocentric race and tribal discourse which invented tribal/native culture and tradition. However, both were subordinate to the conception of ‘native improvement’ and ‘civilising’. In other words, ‘trusteeship’ was a holding exercise until the emergent westernised African could be considered civilised.

These notions provided powerful legitimatory discourses justifying the alienation of native lands. This became based upon identifying the essence of Batswana characteristics and customs which were not considered commensurate with ‘progressive’ colonial settlement and use of the landscape. A brief overview of Batswana social and spatial organisation will suggest that any undermining and alienation of historical lands would inevitably have a devastating impact upon these

\(^7\) Gardener, B. (1966) op. cit.
communities. Furthermore, with this onslaught on many fronts and levels of Batswana society there was the fundamental question of maintaining cultural identity and/or accommodation of this ‘progressive’ terminology of the European. This produced a profound ambiguity within Batswana society as illustrated through the perception of dangers to the Batswana settlement at the ‘Stadt’ from the adjacent European town of Mafeking. It is these ambiguities which were so integral to the later apartheid era and rise of the bantustan policy.

By the early 1870s South Africa as we know it today was far from resembling the modern South African state. The more powerful African ‘Nations’ at this time were still largely independent and resisting external control. The Tswana covered extensive lands from modern Botswana into South Africa, with the Southern Tswana, as the South African groups can be broadly labelled, occupying the central and western region of South Africa, bounded by the Vaal and Orange rivers to the South and the Kalahari to the North West. Schapera suggested that distinct Sotho-Tswana states emerged under powerful lineage chiefs by the sixteenth century, having separated from the main body of Bantu somewhere around the Great Lakes of Central and East Africa. A clearer pattern of African history south of the Limpopo River is pieced together from 1500, with a thread of continuity established between the Late Iron Age and the present. This runs counter to the misconception promoted through apartheid discourse of static, insulated, self-contained, ethnically isolated African communities.

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9 The African societies can be divided into two main sub-sections. Firstly, the Nguni, comprising the Swazi, Zulu, Mpondo and Xhosa Secondly, the Tswana-Sotho. The latter occupied lands to the north of the Drakensburg mountain range, the Highveld, with the Nguni spread along the southern side along the fertile coastal strip. Thus the Northern Sotho were in the north and east of present day Transvaal, and the Southern Sotho south of the Vaal river towards the Drakensburg.
In describing the geography and social relations of the Southern Tswana, the over riding importance of dryness must be seen as determining the limitations of this regions ecology. Whereas the Southern Sotho formed small, loosely arranged villages, the Tswana had much larger, more compact and densely populated settlements of which Mafikeng or 'the Place of Stones' was one. Initially therefore the Tswana displayed a positive response to outside forces because of these environmental restrictions:

'The driving force behind this response seems to have been the Southern Tswana's need to overcome the severe productive limitations of their environment'.

The origins of Mafeking must be seen within the context of a highly unstable northern Cape frontier towards the turn of the century. Indeed, as Maylam suggests, the Tswana were subjected to a four pronged attack. First, the dislocation following the Difaqane (upheaval associated, in part, with Shaka's expansionism); second, Boer

\[12\] Shillington, K. (1985) *The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900*, Sigma Press, Pretoria. With rainfall being seasonally unreliable and sparse, 15 to 20 inches in the east and less than 8 inches in the North West, the delicate ecological balance between the Tswana and their environment was of primary importance. Furthermore, the Tswana 'ward' was characterised as geographically fragmented with residential areas being some distance from farm lands unlike the Southern Sotho. The basic units of production were households within homesteads and wards which were usually autonomous political and economic units. They were principally involved with subsistence production through rearing cattle and some growth of crops. These building blocks of social organisation were often grouped into villages under the charge of minor members of the royal family, or uniquely for the Tswana, towns of up to 20 000 people in this pre-colonial era. The social system was closely integrated with traditional systems combining kinship, language and culture with chieftaincy, territory and production.

\[13\] Shillington, K. (1985-3) op. cit. However just as there had been a positive response by some Tswana to external economic stimuli, this was to be the undoing of the fabric of Tswana society. In particular the almost semi-nomadic pattern of movement reflecting the vagaries of the climate meant that a large expanse of land had been necessary for sustaining that system particularly cattle grazing. Shillington provides a good example of this, in indicating that between 1800 to 1870 the principal centres of Thaping settlement, including their 'capitals' moved seventeen different times. The Batswana had occupied territory from as early as the fifth century but by the nineteenth century this was threatened on a number of 'fronts'. 
thirst for land; third, British and Cape strategic-business interests which challenged Batswana authority; and finally, the influence of missionaries including Robert Moffat and David Livingstone amongst others, on traditional Tswana social relations and customs, which directly affected Tswana economic, political and spiritual institutions. The westward expansion of the Transvaal border into eastern Tswana land caused consternation among the Rolong and other tribes.

For Europeans, the frontier was associated with the 'progress' and advance of civilisation, embodying the 'emptying' of the landscape of Africans. Africans responded to this cultural contact and dispossession of their land in a variety of ways, shaped mainly by resistance. Mafeking was an integral component of frontier expansionism and its character was shaped through the next century by this frontier experience. There are various ways in which this effect of European penetration into Tswana territory can be interpreted. On one level there is the impact upon political organisation of Tswana 'space' as land was consistently alienated. Indeed, for southern Africa as a whole it must be stated that:

'No important aspect of history in South Africa for the last three centuries can be understood without confronting the enormous fact of dispossession'.

Batswana subsistence organisation had been bounded by the limits of kinship and kinship alliances. However, Tswana lands were increasingly circumscribed spatially with increasing hardening of political boundaries. Whereas borders had previously

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14 Davidson, B. (1991) *Africa in History*, Phoenix, London. The 'emptying' of the high veld during the Difaqane (*Mfecane* in Zulu) in the early nineteenth century, itself often attributed to Shaka's expansionism, created a fundamental myth. With depopulation of the high veld during this era, subsequent mythology was created that Afrikaner settlement was therefore 'invited' into these vacant lands. This has led to the enduring visual imagery, central to both colonial ideas and Afrikaner Nationalism, of a horse shoe shaped formation of Bantu 'historic homelands', surrounding but always peripheral to the 'white heartland' based upon the High Veld (and Cape). This mental map has been used to justify white settlement and even subsequent legislation: 'The 1913 Natives Land Act and the Mfecane were close companions, the latter describing as self-inflicted what the former took by force' in Maylam, P. (1986) op. cit.

15 See Drummond, J. and Manson, A. (1991) 'The Evolution and Contemporary
been flexible and fluid between pre-colonial societies, a hardening definition was taking place. On another level, frontier interaction produced trade, religious activity and other contacts which began to heighten social differentiation amongst the Tswana. There was an accelerated process of fixing boundaries in order to procure labourers to feed the expanding mines and farms of Southern Africa.

The Keate Award of 1871 had attempted to fix the troublesome western boundary of the Transvaal and to determine the ownership of the territory surrounding Kimberley. However the Boers took advantage of British indecision and internal Tswana divisions, to extend their western boundary. Conflict engulfed the area between 1881-1884, with the diamond territory of Griqualand West having been annexed to the Cape between 1871-1880. Further Boer incursions into Tswana territory led to a land grab. The Pretoria Convention of 1881 removed the Rolong faction of Chief Montshiwa from the watered areas around the Molopo River. By 1884, British concern over continuing Boer expansionism finally resulted with the London Convention. Once again, further British weakness in acting decisively enabled the Boers to take even more Tswana land. With an unstable frontier and the establishment of the proxy Boer 'Republics' of Goshen and Stellaland, the British finally annexed Tswana lands.

2.2.2. The Creation of Mafeking

British imperial aims and objectives centred upon geo-political concerns expressed under the pretext of the 'civilising mission'. British concern in the northern Cape centred upon keeping the 'Road to the North' open and preventing a German-
Afrikaner axis forming from German South West Africa to the Transvaal. The 'Road' stretched from the Cape passing into the northern Cape and north west corner of South Africa, just west of the Transvaal border into the interior of Africa, and was considered of high strategic value. It appealed to missionaries, hunters, traders, the British and Afrikaners. However, for the local inhabitants, the Tswana amongst others, it was not a road but the territory they occupied. The 'Road' seemed to centre upon the gateway through Tswana lands and Jacobson suggests the deep rooted significance that the imagery of this 'Road' commanded:

"The advancement of science, of commerce, of true religion, of civilisation itself, let alone of the British Empire in Africa, or the independence of the Boers, or the ultimate well being (or otherwise) of the blacks themselves, would depend upon it".19

Britain had a foothold at the Cape from the early 1800s but had been reluctant to venture into the interior for a complex range of reasons.20 Boer aggression had been appeased through a combination of British domestic party politics and financial considerations underwriting an indecisive and vacillating colonial policy.21 Following the Berlin Congress in 1884, the 'Scramble for Africa' led to a general upsurge in European colonial activity.22 Now the Barolong town at Mafikeng was considered pivotal to controlling the region. Under the pretext of pacifying the area a British force was despatched and the Warren Expedition, as it was known, established its headquarters at Mafikeng in March 1885. Batswana territory was divided into the Bechuanaland Protectorate for the lands north of the Molopo River and the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland to the south. The boundary along the Molopo would lead to very different local formations either side of this border. British colonial policy was therefore responsible for dividing historical Tswana territory. Land was set aside

for Batswana native reserves by the end of the nineteenth century. However, the southern Tswana were to experience more rapid alienation from their territory than the Tswana to the north in Bechuanaland (today Botswana) with the reserves as scattered fragments of former Batswana territory. For example, the Hurutshe Tswana in the extreme west of the Transvaal Republic where pushed into 'Moiloa's Reserve' and the Rolong in the northern Cape the 'Molopo Native District Reserve'. Both were a fraction of the original territory and with British colonialism effectively splitting the Tswana lands in two, this grievance provided a central tenet of Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' discourse.

The fortified garrison adjacent to Mafikeng attracted artisans and traders. In the same year, following permission from the British High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, the European town of Mafeking was laid out in grid-iron fashion by the Royal Engineers. The site of Mafeking had apparently been decided through a combination of strategic considerations, availability of water supply and also the potential for British commerce in the region. At the time the close proximity of black and white at Mafeking caused controversy. The local Batswana Chief Montshiwa protested at the establishment of the white town so close to his own settlement at Mafikeng (henceforth the 'Stadt'). Montshiwa's fear of having his authority and Batswana culture undermined by Mafeking was put to the colonial authorities by the Wesleyan missionaries:

_He says the town of the white people, being only about a mile from his town, will most surely destroy his people, and that in order to save them he will have to move away and desert the place for which they fought and bled during a war lasting four_ [23]

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24 Sillery, A. (1971) _John Mackenzie of Bechuanaland, A Study in Humanitarian Imperialism, 1835-1899_, A.A. Balkema. Furthermore, a member of the Expedition, after stating the pacifying purpose of this then suggested that: 'It was then that the town of Mafeking was founded, with the object of creating for the British enterprise on the west of the Transvaal, and as a base for further trade into the central regions of Africa', Goold-Adams, H. (1897) _Journey from Mafeking to Lialui, Barotseland and hence to the borders of the Belgian Congo and back_, Royal Colonial Institute.
years, and which is the last remaining town of his nation, all others have been destroyed during the war. He protested against the nearness of the new township when it was being surveyed, and most earnestly pleaded that it might be established a few miles away, but he pleaded in vain."

The specific complaints centred upon the decision to establish the European township within less than a mile of the Batswana settlement. The arguments against the decision were based upon evidence of the detrimental effects that the close proximity and racial contact was having upon the Batswana and European alike. This included the sale of alcohol to local Batswana and damage to their local cropping systems caused by Europeans. Most controversial of all was the alleged rape of Batswana women by members of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police. These issues formed the basis of a series of fascinating debates in the British Parliamentary Papers for the Colonies and British press,\(^2^5\) revealing different interpretations of racial contact and virtues of the Imperial mission. In addition, Silas Molema, a Batswana historian and physician, noted that Montshiwa’s opposition could also be seen in conjunction with two other factors, the first being the threat the Mafeking Municipality would pose to the Batswana water supply at Grooofontein; the second, and of particular significance for arguments here, anxieties concerning European impact upon Batswana group identity.

The second was based upon what Molema referred to, with great admiration, as ‘Montshiwa’s prophetic eye’, which saw, it was suggested, the future of segregation in South Africa with white and black placed ‘miles and miles apart’. Molema advocated segregation in relation to factors concerning ‘health’ (Molema was a doctor and resident of the ‘Stadt’) and ‘especially for purity’.\(^2^6\) These reflections illustrate the other side of segregation. Whilst forced upon Africans, some were also


\(^{26}\) See for example the Times, 26.11.1886.

crafting identities based on the pursuit and maintenance of the purity of group identity in the midst of the social disruption associated with modernity. 28

The controversy over the European town therefore embodied the contradictory stance of colonial policy towards the African based on 'civilising' the native whilst accommodating colonial-settler aspirations. The ambivalence of 'othering' was therefore symbolised by and built into Mafeking, overshadowing the Batswana community itself. Nonetheless there was evidence of discord within the colonial community about the decision regarding the establishment of Mafeking so close to the Batswana:

'There was no reason for the hasty construction of this European town, from an Imperial point of view. The defence of Mafeking was also confined to certain known limits, and had been peacefully regulated by the chief for many years. Neither the defence nor trade of Mafeking needed the European township, which was planned and laid out for an entirely different set of reasons'. 29

This quotation, by John Mackenzie, alludes to certain more naked colonial ambitions. Momentum had been building from Cape politicians, notably Cecil Rhodes, who, attracted by the 'Road to the North', had sought to secure this gateway to the African interior. Significantly, Rhodes had replaced the so-called 'humanitarian imperialist', John Mackenzie, as Deputy Commissioner for Bechuanaland and advocated the incorporation of the whole region into the Cape. Mafeking was therefore placed on the map of empire as a product of confused and contradictory British colonial policy.

The colonial authorities, military and various townspeople denied the charge of 'corrupting the good manners of the Rolong tribesmen'. Significantly, in doing so they attempted to detract from what was a blatant example of imperial exploitation by emphasising the condition or essence of Batswana culture itself as lacking

28 See later Molema's views of the 'detribalised native' in the context of interwar segregation.
'progressive virtues'. The dispute soon became racialised and simply reduced to the word of 'untrustworthy...deceitful and unveracious natives or insincere and pharisaical negrophilists', against that of virtuous colonials. It was implied that any indiscretion was due to the characteristics of the Batswana, woman in particular. This representation played an important role in defining Batswana tribal characteristics which were portrayed in a negative way in comparison to the Zulu:

'The code of morality among a large proportion of the Bechuanas is very low, and in this respect they offer, I am informed, a striking contrast to the Zulus'.

A former resident of Mafeking also at the time reinforced this tribal stereotyping and negative representation of the Batswana:

'The Bechuanas are I believe the most miserable race of nations-if race they can be called- on the face of the earth... wretched looking creatures... whereas those under Khama and Lobengula are fine men. Zulus (are) trained to fight, (but) the former make the very worst of servants-lazy-thieves-good for nothing. One I had to whom I gave my boots, gaiters and spurs to clean on a Sunday, (he) bolted with them when I was in church and I have never heard of him or the things afterwards, the latter particularly the Matabeles make splendid servants but they are scarce, when you do get one you are to be congratulated'.

This depiction of tribal 'essences' was closely related to perhaps the most significant development of this period concerning the findings of the Bechuanaland Land Commission. This was set up in 1886 to arbitrate land claims in the region and also marked the first plot of Mafeking on 21st May. The intention behind the

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39 Royal Commission of Inquiry to clear the name of Mafeking, BPP, no. 44·21.
31 Captain Levison of the Bechuanaland Border Police regiment in BPP op. cit.
32 The unpublished diary of a H. Estridge (1887) 'An Illustrated Trip from England to Bechuanaland, 1886-1887'.
33 Molema, S. (1960) op. cit.
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Commission was supposedly to seek a balance between 'native protection and European expansion'. According to Sillery its most revealing clause concerned the differentiation between Batswana native locations and territory considered as 'waste land'. The assumption that under-utilised land was therefore considered as 'waste land' implied that it could then be available for colonial settlement. The effect was to halve Chief Montshiwa's land from 1,535 square miles to approximately 800 square miles. This was justified by linking European and colonial ideas of efficient and progressive use and settlement of landscape.

The significance of this racial and tribal labelling and stereotyping was magnified given that the same Mr. H. Estridge mentioned above was also the Receiver General and Accountant General for the Province of British Bechuanaland. According to Estridge's diary, he was keen to survey the territory and sort out the disputes in order to settle the land. He had been quoted in numerous newspapers on his views advocating European settlement in the territory. These included what he considered as the major hindrance to European settlement, the inflated price of land, and his desire to see land given free for the first three to five years of settlement. Estridge was therefore keen to identify what he regarded as the connection between land remaining unsurveyed, or unsettled, with the effect of 'colonialism making little progress... (if this) land remains uncultivated'. If the survey was quickly completed and reasonable terms were offered to persons willing to try their fortunes in Bechuanaland then according to Estridge:

'... no doubt many farms will be quickly occupied, trade increased, money circulated, the revenue expanded, and consequently a brighter future (would be) in store for British Bechuanaland'.

Mafeking was central to these efforts to annex the Batswana 'waste lands' and harness them for this brighter 'progressive' future. Although regarded as relatively defensive

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34 Sillery, A. (1971) op. cit.
36 Undated newspaper clipping in Estridge's diary.
of Batswana 'rights', Mackenzie himself was also keen to promote this mythology of the 'waste-lands'. Mackenzie saw them as the vehicle through which the regeneration of the English race could take place. Colonisation and settlement were projected as the remedy for Britain's poverty and over-crowding, as well as providing salvation to the heathen native. Mackenzie's influential view regarded 'progress' as man's ability to control the environment with 'man destined to subdue the wild beasts, and to raise human homes throughout every unoccupied land':

'Having lived for a long time in one of those comparatively unoccupied regions of the earth- Bechuanaland- I am deeply impressed with the truth that there is still, for many years to come, abundance of room for God's flowers in the garden of the Great Husbandman'.

Whilst questioning the wisdom of the closeness of the European town, Mackenzie was not against its establishment or colonial settlement itself. For Mackenzie it was not so much the question of land per se for the native but rather its utilization which was regarded as optimised through specifically European values:

'Individualism and competition are the great factors of progress in South Africa; and the Bechuanaland Land Commission has done well to keep before the view of Government the introduction among the natives, when they are quite prepared for it, of this well tried and elevating principle'.

Whilst championing Batswana culture and arguing for the sanctity of protected native reserves, or 'trusteeship', this was clearly subordinate to the promotion of progressive European values. Mackenzie was bitterly disappointed that the Commission finally decided to preserve native communalism rather than making land free-hold. This decision can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, even the more supposedly altruistic

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37 Mackenzie (1886:9).
38 Mackenzie (1886:348)
concerns of 'humanitarian' imperialism espoused by Mackenzie, were nonetheless reordering Batswana culture and shaping it in the imagery of 'progress'. Secondly, the decision itself can be seen as representing the invention of colonial and native tradition for a specifically imperial agenda. This agenda was shaped around a European interpretation of native culture with a view to controlling it and facilitating both governance of 'native reserves' and colonial settlement. Furthermore, communal land tenure would provide far less competition from the Batswana to white farmers. Both views illustrated this process of conquest and appropriation of Batswana culture. With the Anglicisation of 'Mafeking' from 'Mafikeng', the settlement was cast literally in the idiom of Empire; the Batswana landscape was renamed. The Batswana were considered, somewhat conveniently, as nomadic wanderers who in spite of the controversial origins of Mafeking, were considered as likely to move away from the European town to new lands. Yet these lands were being rapidly alienated from the Batswana who were labelled as inefficient and steeped in 'native custom'.

These ideas coalesced to provide a European gaze upon Africa, confining and condemning Africans to peripheral locations on the margins of South African society long before the bantustan strategy was introduced. Within their 'own spaces' natives could be exposed to 'their own' traditions and culture, or a distortion of them and subordinated to the imperative of 'enlightenment' and 'progressive' (individual, Christian and competitive) development. Crucially, Africans responded in different ways to this alienation of their culture, some embracing, others rejecting 'progress'. The following section illustrates these anxieties in both black and white communities at Mafeking. With the region depicted as underproductive and therefore ripe for European settlement this process of marginalisation was accelerated once a rapprochement had been reached between the Afrikaner and the British following the Boer War.

39 The European Town was therefore mitigated by turning Batswana culture against itself with the view that as a "...pastoral and agricultural community they (the Batswana) will not continue in large villages but when they feel that they have security for life and property elsewhere". (BPP op. cit.)
2.3. The White Man's War

In 1886 the discovery of gold at Witswatersrand led to a fundamental remodelling of South Africa's social relations, based on the 'Mineral Revolution'. The Imperial connection with Mafeking had already been forged and in 1895 deepened with the decision to make the town the extra-territorial seat of government for Bechuanaland. A few years earlier in 1889, and not uncoincidentally, Rhodes had obtained a Royal Charter for his British South Africa Company. Rhodes used the town as a springboard for his expansion into the African interior with the Pioneer column passing through Mafeking in 1890, colonising what became Rhodesia. The town also acted as a 'jumping off point' for Mashonaland expeditions lead by the 'great' Sir Charles Frederick Selous and therefore became an important supply depot for equipment and personnel for the 'trek to the north'. Furthermore, these Imperial credentials were heightened through the Jameson Raid an event particularly associated with precipitating the Boer War. Although originating in Pitsane Potlogo in the Protectorate, the Raid was planned in Mafeking. Despite the traffic along the 'Road to the North' and Mafeking's role in empire building the potential of the town had not been realised. Only ten years after its creation there were concerns about the survival of this frontier town and fears of being marginalised:

'We are continually hearing the doom of Mafeking foreshadowed, and the prognostications are almost invariably of ruin and decay. For various reasons we do not share this view, two of which will suffice for the present. Firstly as the frontier town of the Cape Colony, it is bound to be a military depot of more or less importance; and it is absurd to suppose that a fertile and fairly well watered country, equal in extent to France is going to be passed over and neglected although we grant

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40 Drummond, J. and Manson, A. (1991) op. cit.
41 75 Anniversary Mafeking, (1960-6) op. cit.
42 Mafeking Place of Stones (1985). This had been hatched by Rhodes to create a rebellion of the Uitlanders (foreigners) working the Transvaal mines to destabilise the Afrikaner government and bring the republic under the Union Jack. Once again Mafeking's strategical location was used in order to recruit members of the disbanded BPP formerly stationed in the town. The Raid ended disastrously for the participants and with Rhodes' resignation as Cape Premier.
Chapter Two: Mafeking on the Margins

...that Matebeleland will advance with greater rapidity. As there exists at present, no town after Mafeking is passed, until Bulawayo is reached, it becomes the base of supply to the Protectorate; the development of which may be expected to commence with the opening of the railway. Not only will this town become a base of supply, it must also be the market for much of the produce. From this consideration alone, Mafeking has an assured future.

Whilst the frontier optimism was still apparent, by the late nineteenth century Mafeking's condition remained marginal. Seemingly by-passed by the benefits of modernisation, something extraordinary was required in order to lift the prestige of this small border town.

2.3.1. The Siege

The siege during the Beer War ensured a place for Mafeking within imperial mythology and was also a brilliant propaganda victory for the British empire. However, the tensions resulting from the close proximity of the town to the Batswana was heightened when, at times of vulnerability during the siege, Europeans acted first and foremost to uphold their 'progressive' virtues whilst the Batswana contribution to the war effort was almost completely wiped from siege history. The most pressing

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43 Mafeking Advertiser, 5th September, 1896
44 For seven months between October 1899 and May 1901, the British government, press, public and indeed the Empire at large seized upon the 'physical and moral pluck' displayed in the defence of the town orchestrated by Baden Powell. In a bitter war with many set-backs for the British, the siege provided a valuable psychological weapon and left a deep imprint on imperial identity. The subsequent mythology, however, tended to obscure the town's own view of the siege and created discord between the Batswana, colonials and imperial officers. The town was besieged by over six thousand Boers (soon dropping to two thousand) due to the Boer perception of the town's proximity to the vulnerable western flank of the Transvaal. With hindsight the strategic value of Mafeking has been questioned and it appears that at the time even the Cape government was reluctant to want to provide defence for the town. See Packenham (1979). The siege had been a major disruption for the residents many of whom preferred a return to normality rather than 'making history for the Empire', Willan, B. (1984) op. cit.
45 Despite this being labelled 'the white man's war', the Batswana formed the bulk
problem was that of extending the provision of rations for the inhabitants of the white town and the Stadt during the prolonged siege. As a last effort to extend the (white) rations the commanding officer, Robert Baden-Powell took the decision to 'encourage' the refugee and foreign natives to go across the border to Kanye in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. This included some two thousand Batswana told to 'leave or starve'. The Batswana starved on limited rations and those outcast fared even worse, digging up the corpses of dead dogs buried outside the town. Natives were given a clear message once again, that they belonged over the frontier in 'Africa' itself and not European defined Africa. Indeed following the end of the siege a relief fund of £29,000 was raised for the town. Yet despite the immense sacrifices made by the Batswana, in lost cattle, damaged property and starvation, not a penny was given to the 'Stadt'.

In the aftermath of the war Englishness and its 'progressive' spirit was duly celebrated with the construction of a Gothic style church which began in 1902, designed by Messrs Baker and Masy, the same Baker who later built the Union Buildings. Furthermore, in addition to the Victoria hospital, an impressive Town Hall was built in the same year with fitting memorials to the dead of Mafeking during the

of the town's defence force. Furthermore they provided labour to bolster the intricate network of trenches and also acted as runners, often risking death trying to cross Boer lines. Pakenham, T. (1979) op. cit. Meanwhile, after over two hundred days the Empire celebrated the lifting of the siege and ensured Mafeking's status as a Victorian legend. The huge outpouring of emotions in London and Cape Town contributed a new word to the English language, 'to maffick' meaning rejoice riotously. This small border town became a powerful symbol for the whole Empire and its message reached all levels of British society.

The relief force sent to Mafeking itself was a symbolic attempt to cement the unity of the Empire with 814 Imperial Light Horse, formerly of Johannesburg, 122 colonials from the Kimberley Mounted Group and 100 Royal Horse Artillery. As if to announce this brave new dawn for the Empire, upon Milner's suggestion, exactly 100 British infantry were sent with 25 each from the four regions, England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland, solidifying the foundations of British Empire. It was indeed a good day to be English and accordingly noting this triumph of Englishness, Major Baillie, present during the siege commented: 'These foreigners Start to quick and finish quicker. They are good men but we are better, and we have proved so for several hundred years'. (Baillie, in Packenham, 1979). Joe Pobrey (1994) former owner and editor of the Mafeking Mail, described how in the 1950s he received a letter from a fifty year old women in Australia called Mrs. Mafeking Bagley, so called in honour of the siege.
siege and with the motto 'Ne Cede'—'Never Give In'. The ceremonial laying of the foundation stones of both projects was timed to coincide with the coronation of King Edward VII. In 1905 this wave of optimism was capped by the town's construction, from its resident's own private fund, of a stretch of railway line to the Transvaal border to ensure that Mafeking would be the railway junction between Cape Town and Bulawayo (Lobatsi had previously been nominated by planners). For such a small town of only 1500 whites, of mainly British stock, this indicated the concerted 'progressive' attempts to uplift the town following the immense publicity of the siege. At this time Mafeking also comprised a smaller number of Indians, Chinese, Coloureds and over 5000 Batswana in the 'Stadt'. Mafeking's economy was remarkably ordinary dependent upon retail, agriculture and the railway junction. It was indeed the Boer War which had bestowed on the town a distinctive imperial identity.

The war had been fought for the 'equal rights of all civilised men' and in the true interests of Christianity it had upheld an imperial order based upon equality before the law. What followed however, with the Peace Treaty of Vereeniging was the British imperial policy of 'Reconciliation' and its wholesale betrayal of the African who had made large sacrifices during the war, not least the Batswana of the 'Stadt'. Despite the bitterness of the war between Briton and Boer, the foundations had already been laid for a black-white division of the population which subsumed white ethnic and class differences.

Although never entirely smooth, this division based upon colour was to be the key feature, gaining momentum and dominating South African society from 1902-1948. The town was evidently aware of its role in the 'civilising mission' and attributed this to being British rather than Afrikaans, and rekindled civic pride in its frontier origins:

'... (it is) these associations with Empire-building that accounts for the British and

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progressive spirit of the inhabitants'.

The relationship between Mafeking and the 'Stadt' was based around the town's view of Batswana culture as slowly 'advancing' towards the higher standards set by western civilisation. The Cape Province extended the franchise gradually, to only 'civilised' Africans and Mafeking also supported this evolutionary ideology. These sentiments are revealed in the following quote from the Municipal Handbook of 1912:

'This "Stadt" is well worth inspection, as it is one of the largest in this part of the country. Most of the huts are round, with reed-thatched roofs, but many of the more recently erected dwellings are square, built of brick, and covered with the far less picturesque corrugated iron. This advancement from mud hut with an entrance hole, to brick building with doors and glazed windows- although, doubtless, in great part due to the appreciation of a higher standard of comfort and the desire to imitate white men- is perhaps not entirely dissociated with political ambition, as in the Cape Colony, residence in a building valued at not less than seventy pounds is a main part of a qualification for the franchise'.

With the creation of Mafeking, the 'Stadt' had become increasingly pulled into the orbit of this evolutionary ideology depicted in the above passage. Indeed Batswana cultural and political organisation was symbolically and physically bounded by this Eurocentric imagery which assumed 'imitation of the white man' and a qualified franchise. Alternatively, the 'Stadt' was represented by some Batswana themselves as increasingly associated with a once untroubled 'prosperous and happy' time, described somewhat romantically as set:

'...amidst acacias, willows and thorn bush which adorn the valley of the Molopo and (which)combine to make it one of the most artistic and picturesque settlements

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49 Mafeking Municipal Handbook, 1912.
50 Ibid.
Whilst the Batswana were encouraged by Europeans to embark upon the golden path to 'civilisation', there was certainly a sense in which some Batswana were mindful of their own lost golden period. A recreation or reassertion of Batswana identity was one strategy to mediate the disruptive forces of colonisation and modernisation.

Furthermore, white attitudes were ambiguous and periodically hardened by the town's location on the periphery of the Northern Cape. A major issue involved the growth of a post war 'white' regionalism in the northern Cape area of South Africa. The issue developed with various businessmen, traders and others wishing to annex both the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Mafeking district into the Transvaal. Mafeking's economic relationship with the Transvaal at times brushed aside their opposition to the former Afrikaner Republic's refusal to allow any franchise for the native. In the early 1900s this briefly produced a form of white regionalism within these peripheral areas of the Cape and Transvaal. Local member of Parliament for the Mafeking District, J W De Kock, epitomised the resentment of decisions taken far away at Cape Town. In an address to a public meeting in 1910 he argued that 'Coast Legislation had milked them (the North) dry'. This reinforced feelings about western province or Cape bias and a lack of representation for the northern territories at the seat of power in Cape Town. Mafeking's previously important location was rapidly becoming a major obstacle to the town's prosperity and the concerns regarding marginality were being realised with the constant battle to keep Mafeking's hard fought place on the map of the Empire. A year later the white racialised sense of identity cemented the territorial segregation now cast in stone throughout the Union with the 1913 Land Act.

A local Batswana owned and run newspaper, Koranta, articulated and effectively expressed the Tswana position. Under the editorship of Sol Plaatje, the paper was critical of the administrations of the Crown Colonies of the Transvaal and

51 Molema, S. (1960:12) op cit.
52 Mafeking Mail, 31.1.1910.
Orange Free State, as well as being full of anger at the native commissions and sub-commissions in these provinces. The white Mafeking Mail’s response was to publish an extract from a Johannesburg paper referring to the ‘Kaffir’ paper which had expressed ‘disloyalty’. The Mafeking Mail seemed unambiguously to promote its solution to the problem, clearly revealing what was thought about the ‘native’ Plaatje:

'It would be merciful if a little cat o' nine tails were applied now'.

A second dispute masqueraded as ‘The Dog Tax’ and appeared in the local Mafeking Mail as a seemingly mundane article about the ‘numberless mongrels’ in the ‘Stadt’. In effect it symbolised the rapid erosion of Batswana authority, which had been happening since the establishment of Mafeking and accelerated with the annexation of British Bechuanaland into the Cape in 1895. The creation of Tswana reserves had been supposedly to ensure autonomy and space for ‘progress’ for the Tswana but in 1903 the Mafeking Divisional Council had tried to implement control over Tswana affairs in the Stadt by enforcing the ‘Dog Tax’. However both this action and the 1904 attempt by the local magistrate to impose the Native Location Act was defeated in the Supreme Court in Cape Town. This ruling sustained the belief among elements of the Batswana community in the gradual extension of the franchise and Cape judicial policy throughout the provinces. Plaatje himself embraced this ‘progressive’ feature of imperialism and would later form part of the African elite at Kimberley who gravitated towards the virtues of the British ‘civilising mission’.

53 Plaatje was able to influence Barolong chiefs and even secured the colonial secretary Chamberlain’s assurance of the Barolongs’ (and other Tswanas’) rights and status.
55 See Willan, B. (1984) op. cit. Plaatje’s belief in the Cape judicial system was enhanced following the involvement of Chief Sekgoma of Bechuanaland in a successionist movement and his subsequent detention without trial by the Protectorate authorities, deemed unlawful by Cape law. Plaatje himself was emerging as an increasingly important nationalist figure and his vocal and energetic opposition to segregationism is of particular interest given his residence in the region. Plaatje focused upon the contradiction that existed between British imperial theory and practice such as the confusion during the Sekgoma incident.
Chapter Two: Mafeking on the Margins

With the Land Act of 1913 Plaatje was bitterly disappointed that the African opposition to this was ignored. Furthermore, it indicated the immense ambiguity for the African petite-bourgeoisie involved in ghosting between the progressive and universal ideals, whilst also defending aspects of their own tradition and culture. Despite this lively space that *Koranta*, and other black publications of the day occupied, its continued financial problems and closure gave a clear message that segregationism was becoming dominant within government circles and general white opinion.

The African intellectual elite, such as Plaatje, were increasingly denied access to this world of ‘white’ civilisation, leading to a diversity of responses, including support for African nationalism, labour militancy, the crafting of new regional identities centred upon ethnic affiliation or some combination of each. *Koranta*’s disappearance was symbolic of efforts to segregate all aspects of South African society.

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57 Massive financial debts plagued *Koranta*, which was to be an endemic feature for all black publications accentuated by widespread illiteracy. By January 1908: ‘*Koranta ea Bechuana may have been one of the finest, liveliest newspapers of its day, by the time of its collapse it had left its editor in a desperate financial state*’, in Willan op. cit.
58 Plaatje was one of the founders of the South African Natives National Congress, which became the ANC. He began his career as a postman in Kimberley before becoming a court interpreter at Mafeking where he produced a famous account of the Siege as seen through black eyes. He was also a novelist and produced what many regard as the first novel to be produced by a black South African, Mhudi, as well as translating Shakespeare into Tswana. However, in view of Plaatje’s above connections with early South African black nationalism (he died in 1936) it is interesting to note that the Bophuthatswana regime in later years would attempt to appropriate Plaatje’s Batswananness for their own ‘nation-building’. According to Willan, Plaatje at one point even co-operated with the mining giant De Beers, in order to receive support for his self-improvement and Christian based ‘Brotherhood movement’. This was clearly intended to keep the ‘Bolsheviks out of Johannesburg’. Willan, B (1984) op. cit. John Dube had been ousted as Congress leader due to his pro-segregationist stance and along with other Natal Congress members was increasingly concerned with mobilising Zulu regionalism, especially in order to combat the radicalism of the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU), in Marks, S. (1986:36&37) op. cit.
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2.3.2. Mafeking and Segregation

Mafeking interpreted this period of segregationism along similar lines to other ‘white’ towns. In particular there was a common aim of controlling the flow of natives into urban areas. In the inter-war period, urban control of the native became a key issue and integral to the definition of ‘white’ South Africanism. The impress of segregation was evident within Mafeking and urban control was closely associated with crime and the morality of the native. These controls seemed to reflect the Union wide white fear of the ‘black peril’ with the association made between ‘Bolshevism’, black urbanisation and detribalization. The Mafeking council had written to the Provincial Secretary in 1927 with a formal application for establishment of a native location, proposing a site which the local magistrate claimed to have inspected and deemed adequate. This site would replace the older native location, the creation of which in the late nineteenth century was puzzling given the proximity of the Stadt and availability of labour there. The 1925 Native (Urban Areas) Act was one measure designed to decrease the flow of natives into the location and in 1935 the ‘Committee on Natives in Urban Areas’ was typical of similar efforts. It aimed ‘to enforce the principle of limiting the numbers of natives in urban areas’ particularly those it regarded as ‘superfluous’. In the 1930s the archives show that ‘about’ one thousand natives occupied the existing native location (as distinguished from the ‘Stadt’ and coloured location) mainly as labourers for the railways, municipality or as domestic

59 Cape Archives, 1&3 MFK.
60 Dubow, S. (1989:39) suggests that prior to the 1920s although elements of segregationism were already introduced, these ‘were seldom interpreted as integral elements of a united ideological package’, in Racial Segregation and the origins of apartheid in South Africa, Macmillan, London.
61 MFK 1/3
62 See Mafeking Mail in the 1920s, with the fear of ‘red tide of Bolshevism’ reflected in the coverage of industrial disputes within South Africa and abroad. The Mail identified ‘greedy workers out for the control of industry’ with the leading article of 30.3.20, quoting the President of the National Federation of Building Trades in Pretoria, who was fearful of ‘a dictatorship of labour’. The same edition covered the great coal miners strike in England, and suggested that ‘hotheads’ were taking over the South Wales branch of the National Coal Miners Union and pronounced the likely demise of the British Labour Party.
servants. This figure was deemed adequate for the labour required to service the white town. However, whilst there had long been examples of residential mixing between Indians and whites, and even some whites resident in the Stadt, town officials were particularly concerned about the mixing of blacks with coloureds. This focus of official attention seemed to be based upon preventing socialising and, with it, the consumption of alcohol which was prohibited for blacks.

In 1943, a decade before the Group Areas Act, the Town Clerk proposed a new location with the aim of constructing fifty houses in conjunction with the Railway Administration and a loan from the Central Housing Board. The intention behind the new location also took into consideration racial mixing thought of as undesirable:

"The removal of the Natives will allow extension of the coloured township and have the additional advantage of separating them, at present they are much too close." 

There was approval, and even concern from central government regarding overcrowding and the delayed relocation. This action must be seen in the context of 1930s national concern regarding the sanitation of black urban locations which had reached Mafeking. It was suggested that the black location was in such disrepair that perhaps it should be removed rather than the coloured location. However, despite these concerns the reply from the Town Clerk indicated that the town was now not in favour of a new native location because:

"I might mention that Mafeking is surrounded by large Native Areas from which Native Labour is largely drawn, and the local Native Location is becoming a harbourage for alien Natives from the north and the undesirables from the Stadt, and

64 With regards to the Stadt it was suggested that historically White feeling was reflected in that: 'The whites, when they thought of it at all, regarded it as a place where all their blacks were confined', (Pobrey, J, personnel communication, 1996)

65 MFK 1/3
the question arises as to whether a Native Location is really required in Mafeking'.”

This quotation referred to the number of Rhodesians who were entering the location as labourers particularly as they were not eligible for stands from the Tswana chief in the ‘Stadt’.” In addition to the undesirability of a new location, the Mafeking Municipality faced the problem of choosing a site given the limited acreage around Mafeking and presence of the Molopo Native Reserve. An unsuccessful attempt had been made to purchase a slice of the ‘Imperial Reserve’ from the Bechuanaland Administration. These difficulties in deciding upon a new site therefore made the Council reconsider its decision to create a new location. However, Central government under the United Party intervened directly due to mounting concern and criticism about overcrowding. In 1945 a land swap was made exchanging a piece of commonage for tribal land of the Reserve and from 1948 the town would come more forcefully under strict apartheid racial zoning.

The 'Stadt' itself came under the jurisdiction of the Native Commissioner in conjunction with regular meetings of the Natives Location Advisory Boards. In 1939 the outgoing Native Commissioner declared that he was 'very interested in the progress made by the natives in the district'. Although marginalised and devoid of services the reserves nonetheless provided spaces within which tradition could be invented as a coping mechanism and a social force. This response often amplified Chief Montshiwa's earlier efforts to stem the erosion of Tswana identity and authority. Whilst sometimes giving the appearance of segregation, it reflected a desire to preserve the ‘purity’ of self-identity and culture.

A 1940s circular from the Natives Representative Council, the only channel available to express national black opinion in South Africa, discussed the role of marriage and attempted to mitigate what were regarded as the negative effects of modernisation. It is particularly interesting to note the different characterisation of 'rural' and 'urban' attributes because these differences were accentuated under the

66 Mafeking Town Clerk, MFK 1/3
68 MFK 1/3.
bantustan system with the deliberate manipulation of rural identities. The urban African was associated by white and black alike with erosion of tribal differences:

'I think that the matter affects Natives more who are living under urban conditions and in bigger towns where morality and immorality plays an important part. Natives there live and work under conditions which are so different to rural conditions they have come under wrong influences and then regression starts. Endeavours should be made to protect the sanctity of family life and to check this retrogression'.

These views reflected the anxieties of earlier debates regarding 'trusteeship' and a paternalistic preservation and protection of Tswana culture. There was concern for the safeguarding of 'natives' in order to mitigate the social decay associated with the European and now South African experience of industrial revolution. Dr. Molema, a prominent local resident of Mafeking, and member of the Advisory Board, voiced concerns about illegitimate children born out of wedlock and painted a picture of declining morality. He stated his satisfaction with the inquiry as 'we can not progress under these circumstances'. The decline in moral standards was attributed to the womenfolk who it was claimed, needed education 'to keep up a high moral standard ... improving the position'. The seriousness of the deliberations were indicated by the involvement of village courts or 'Kgotlas' in the district. It was an attempt to prevent 'promiscuous unions', by registering 'native marriage' in tribal areas as long as they were entered into with 'formality', in other words with consent of parents and payment of Bogadi (cattle to the bride's father). Within urban areas proof of 'civil' marriage was required and unless there was one or the other 'persons... should have no privileges'.

This issue served to illustrate that whilst whites had fears of a detribalised native who, by implication, if shorn of tribal custom would surely move to white

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69 Native Commissioner for Molopo Native Reserve (1943) MFK 1/3.
70 Howard Pim, advisor and friend to Milner, reflected these ideas and promoted this view of segregation as protection for the African so he could live 'under natural conditions which he understands and has created for himself', in Rich, P. (1980) 'The origins of apartheid ideology', African Affairs, 35, 229-51.
areas, some sections of native society also invoked notions of Tswana culture in a rapidly changing society. It was claimed by Molema that:

‘Detribalised natives live an unnatural life. They live neither according to native custom nor European custom’.\(^{71}\)

This was but one illustration of how many Africans clung to a semblance of ‘tradition’ in response to the social changes taking place, with retreat into or the nurturing of tribal custom as strategies by which to deal with the pressures of that change. It was advocated by amongst others, Dr. Molema, physician, historian and keen defender of Batswana culture. It has been pointed out how Molema identified with the earlier response of Montshiwa as a defence of Batswana ‘purity’. Indeed, prior to Molema’s death in the 1960s it is highly significant that he began to advocate his support for a Tswana homeland.\(^{72}\) Furthermore, prior to his death in 1966, Molema left many his private papers with the Tswana (Bophuthatswana) Department of Education, and to his widow.\(^{73}\) It was an intellectual and conservative reaction which was being promoted by certain sections of Batswana society.

From 1948 apartheid planning invigorated and streamlined segregation, which although a feature of Mafeking had remained quite haphazard prior to the National Party victory. However, Mafeking’s proximity to these black areas also confined the town to this periphery and the promised ‘take off’ never arrived. Mafeking was now placed in a highly ambiguous position given its historical connection to these black margins whilst apartheid planning reached its zenith.

2.4. Mafeking, Botswana and Apartheid Discourse

The transition from segregationism to apartheid should not be seen as a

\(^{71}\) Molema addressing meeting of the Native Location Advisory Committee, MFK 1/3.

\(^{72}\) In Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) op. cit.

\(^{73}\) Bureau for Economic Development re Bantu Areas (BENBO) (1977) \textit{Bophuthatswana at Independence}, van Rensburg publications, Pretoria.
smooth continuum and must be viewed against fundamental economic changes in South Africa. An upturn in the South African economy became pronounced during the second world war. Between 1939 and 1945 the value of manufacturing sector increased by 116% and the size of the workforce by 53%.” This rapidly industrialising economy produced waves of urbanisation with the increase in workforce numbers consisting overwhelmingly of blacks. Liberal historians have interpreted this period as one of a partial erosion of segregation through the modernising, rational influence of capitalism, sweeping away the archaic race relations of three centuries.” The 1948 General Election had been fought upon the segregationist issue and saw the coalescing of a triumphant alliance between sections of Afrikaans labour, agricultural capital and the petty bourgeois. The National Party election victory brought an extra dimension to the segregationist framework already in place. This was shaped by Afrikaners’ own experiences and mobilisation as an ethnic group in which earlier ideas of segregation premised upon conceptions of race and level of 'civilisation', were reformulated.

2.4.1. Apartheid Discourse and Race-Tribe concepts

From 1948, the central premise of apartheid discourse concerned the cultural and political incompatibility of different racial and tribal groups. This grew out of earlier colonial thinking which had created a racialised sense of identity based upon 'trusteeship' of the uncivilised 'native', legitimising white supremacy in a supervisory role as parent over the 'child-like' African.” Apartheid policy and discourse sought constantly to signify these racial differences by renegotiating the content and

74 Thompson, L. and Wilson, M. (1971) op. cit.
75 Lipton, M. (1986) Capitalism and Apartheid, Wheatsheaf, and see also Thompson, L. and Wilson, M. (1971) Oxford History of South Africa, Oxford University Press. However, Terence Moll has suggested that the apartheid economy has actually been in prolonged economic slump from the 1940s. He also regards apartheid as having hampered efficient resource allocation and prevented companies from making full use of black workers but Molls critique is somewhat different from the above authors. Whilst Lipton etc. are critical of apartheid state intervention, Moll instead questions the quality and direction given to that intervention. JSAS, Vol. 17, no. 2, June, 1991.
appearance of white hegemony. The modernist and eurocentric underpinnings to these discourses (and indeed of nation-building and development), as suggested in chapter one, linked questions of identity formation to the reconfiguration of political frontiers and the 'identitary logic' contained in apartheid discourse. The core ideas of apartheid discourse were centred upon the perception of 'harmful' consequences of racial contact and with it the erosion of distinctive group characteristics each rooted in separate racial spaces of the 'Bantu' and 'European'. These core ideas and beliefs are depicted in the following diagrams which illustrated the 'official' apartheid discourse as centred upon the fear of the consequences of assimilation within a common living space (shown by the shaded triangle of Figure 2.2).

The first two stages, A and B (Figure 2.2: A, Figure 2.3: B) reflected the preliminary stage of contact between white and black through the frontier relationship between the Bantu, pioneer, trader and hunter (and in addition in B, settler, missionary and officials). These diagrams depict the undermining of the 'till now self-sufficient Bantu' and significantly for the bantustan policy referred to the Bantu as 'strongly attached to their central point, the tribal chief'. The dislocation of the Bantu group thought to be enhanced by a Bantu tendency towards 'mutual extermination', conjuring images of immutable tribal warfare, supplanted by European 'intrusion'. Through contact with Europeans (implying another sub-text of restoration of order to warfaring tribes) it was assumed that inevitably the Bantu would want to acquire the fruits of 'civilisation' otherwise known as the 'cultural possessions of the European'. Being unavailable within Bantu areas, the acquisition of these possessions would consequently lead to the third or 'urbanisation' phase of contact (C: Figure 2.4), with migration into what was represented as the European sphere. These migrants with wives and children were depicted as 'squatters' in this white created and defined space, explained by the 'cultural distance' of white from black. Despite the best intentions of the civilising mission and the first two phases of racial contact, this distance remained unbreached. As a consequence these separate racial spaces were matter of factly based upon the assumption the European simply did not want to let the Bantu into the 'heart of his own sphere of life'. The policy of separate racial
development was therefore premised upon maintaining this distinction:

"The driving force behind this policy followed by the European population is its desire to preserve its identity. However, its actions are not based solely on the fact that it is white, that is on purely racial grounds. These actions are a result of a totality of factors which might be regarded as the creation of the European population in South Africa. In the absence of discrimination, what would happen is that the foundations on which European civilisation rests would vanish before the European himself disappeared. It is for this reason that the European population will not tolerate any conduct which might endanger the foundations on which its continued existence depends".  

The fundamental basis of apartheid was centred upon the maintenance of this European authority, with the warnings of dire results if this was not ensured. This authority was represented as based upon specific values, traits and characteristics which signified the European right to preserve these distinctions. Political boundaries were therefore constructed to maintain this authority and keep intact these characteristics of white spaces with the presence of any Bantu in these areas depicted as an intrusion.

The determination to preserve these frontiers was regarded as provoking three reactions from the Bantu (Figure 2.4, ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’). The first, mentioned above, was the Bantu desire for European cultural possessions and therefore presence in the white areas, depicted as ‘squatting’ or attempts at ‘intrusion’ leading to ‘assimilation’ (Figure 2.4 ‘A’). This strategy was seen as creating pressure on the European ‘to open the doors leading to his sphere of life’, synonymous with labour strikes, unrest and violence. Secondly, and most alarming for European survival, was the ‘nationalistic reaction’ of the Bantu (Figure 2.4 ‘B’) considered most threatening to the political and racial frontier and leading to ‘elimination’. The third reaction was seen as passing or

‘escapism’ (Figure 2.4 ‘C’) which would eventually lead to either the first or second response. Whilst ‘squatting’ was considered as undermining the racial division, the ‘nationalistic response’ phase was depicted as incompatible with and threatening the very basis of survival of the white population. This was shown by the arrow in the diagram which pierces straight through the European space. Bantu nationalism was therefore considered the fundamental challenge to white authority because its ‘...ultimate aim is the elimination of the European sphere of living’.

**Figure 2.2 Assimilation’ and Phase ‘A’ of Contact**

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78 Adapted from SA government, 1955.
These scenarios, we are told, presented the European in South Africa with two clear choices, assimilation whether peacefully or violently achieved, or the provision of spaces to accommodate this ‘nationalistic aspiration’ of the Bantu:

‘...they (the Europeans) must provide full opportunity for this effort to develop positively alongside of, and not in opposition to, the European sphere of life’.”

This shift in emphasis from ‘tribal’ to ‘nationalistic’ characteristics was central to the apartheid era and to the reformulation of outmoded colonial discourse. Skalnik has identified the two most widespread concepts in both public and popular discourse in South Africa prior to the bantustan state programme, as ‘race’ and ‘tribe’. He suggests that these were replaced by ethnic terminology and the fulfilment of this (ethno)nationalistic reaction. Similarly, Quinlan notes the switch from state policy based upon tribal notions to the rapid embrace of the ethnic dimension during the apartheid era. The tribal paradigm therefore rapidly gave way to a belief in the ethno-nationalist mode of identity with ‘national self-realization’ considered ‘unstoppable’ because it was ‘nationalism in essence’. These ideas were rooted within a Germanic anthropological tradition centred upon the irrefutable marker of cultural identity or ‘ethnos’. Apartheid discourse was also tied to a spatial framework which identified the old native reserves as the suitable container for the nationalist aspirations, now recast as historic ethnic homelands. The 1959 Bantu Self-Government Act laid the framework for native reserves now represented as nascent ethnic-states based upon firstly, territorial division and secondly, revival of chieftaincy. Political institutions were represented as ‘traditional’ mechanisms of Bantu society and reflected the massive invention of tradition by the National Party. Thirdly, this policy was linked to

79 Ibid.
Figure 2.3 Phases 'B' and 'C' of contact

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Adapted from SA government, 1955.
Figure 2.4 'African Responses' - 'A', 'B', 'C'.

Adapted from SA government, 1955.
the reversal of the disintegrating reserves. The cruder racial basis of the colonial-segregation and early apartheid discourse was therefore redefined as ‘multi-nationalism:

‘For South Africa is in fact and in the first place a multi-national country, rather than merely a multi-racial country ...(with) homelands of a number of other nations having their own separate identities, each with its own undeniable right to separate nationhood in a land which has always likewise been its own... in accordance with own national traditions and aspiration ..’.

White authority was renegotiated by emphasising nationalist affinities, between supposedly equal nations each with their undeniable right to separate nationhood.

In line with this policy, the Tswana native reserves were recast as the territorial basis of nascent awakening to Tswana ‘nation-hood’. From 1948 it is noticeable from the archives that the directives emanating from central government to Mafeking town council regarding separate development became more forceful than in previous decades. At a national level, the infamous bull-dozing of the multi-racial township at Sophiatown, west of Johannesburg, was felt locally in Mafeking. Of the forced removal of 45,000 people a number of ‘Batswana’ were deported to the 'Stadt'. Although possibly born in Johannesburg, the 'logic' was now ethnic identity and a return to the demarcated homelands, once again across the frontier.

2.4.2. ‘Progress’ and Apartheid

A second major focus for this emerging identification of Bantu homelands as embodying the ‘solution’ to the preservation of white supremacy, was the close relationship between ‘nation-hood’, progress and modernity. The political boundaries could be redrawn and justified through the depiction of emerging infant, immature

84 South African Minister of External Affairs to the U.N.O in 1964, quoted in Boshoff (1970) op. cit.
85 MFK 1/3
ethnic 'nations' evolving under white trusteeship. However, this differentiation could also be maintained through an emphasis on the lack of development of the Bantu areas and their deficiency when compared to the European areas. Rather than being connected to the legacy of colonialism and apartheid, this deficiency could be used to explain the need for European trusteeship until nation-hood, sovereignty and 'progress' could be delivered to these ethnic nations. The summary report of the Tomlinson Commission had identified the 'development' of the homelands as a necessary component of nurturing this emergent 'nation-hood'. The success or failure of reversing the economic and social collapse of homelands was seen as underpinning the outcome of separate development, with 'development' itself increasingly given a prominent role:

"The initial step towards practical realisation of separate development of the European and the Bantu, lies in the full scale development of the Bantu areas... the development of the Bantu areas will have to embrace a fully diversified economy, comprising development in primary, secondary and tertiary spheres."

The economic recommendations of the Report were very slowly recognised by the ruling National Party. The 1959 Bantu Self-Government Act gave increased political space to building states in rural areas but it was not until 1968 that real measures to expand the poor and underdeveloped homeland economies were introduced with the Promotion of Economic Development of Black States Act 1968 (Act 46/1968). This signified a departure from the past neglect, with the identification of growth points and industrial deconcentration of industry to white border regions with black areas. The rapid decolonisation of much of Africa in the 1950s and 1960s and internal unrest associated with Sharpeville, placed new pressures upon the maintenance of white hegemony. White minority rule was increasingly out of step with an emerging 'third

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87 Even Pobrey's Mafeking Mail with its relatively moderate challenge to some apartheid laws was targeted by security officials. Pobrey himself, along with others, was detained in prison for nine weeks during the Sharpeville emergency,
world' and by the late 1960s and early 1970s the homelands were rapidly promoted as South Africa's own colonies. Their 'independence' as nation-states was seen by the National Party as a necessary step in delivering national aspirations, whilst conveniently facilitating the preservation of white rule. The bantustan policy, with increasing devolution of political power, structures and resources, was favourably regarded by some local groups.

However, given Mafeking's historical connection with the border-landscape and particularly its association with Bechuanaland, in particular, the implementation of apartheid laws now placed the town in a highly ambiguous position. The town was pulled between two opposite poles, one expressing the impetus towards African nationalism, with Botswana's implacable moves towards independence. The other dragged the town towards the 'white' south which celebrated the virtues of racial separation and 'Baasskap' (white supremacy). There were the incongruous images of the construction of a classic low-cost apartheid township north west of Mafeking called Montshiwa whilst the virtues of black majority rule across the border were celebrated. By 30th September 1966, the headline of the Mail proclaimed the 'Republic of Botswana is born today'. It went as far to suggest:

'...the paper looked at Bechuanaland's independence with warmthness and best wishes... with sincerest congratulations from Mafeking, tied to a country by bonds of affection which have grown stronger over the decades...sorrow mitigated by our realisation that their own destiny had to be fulfilled'.

The persistent theme of marginality returned to Mafeking following Botswana's independence in 1966. This loss of prestige and functions for the town associated with the removal of Botswana's administrative body to Gaborones was amplified by the closure of the town's railway workshops. Rumours were rife of a 'ghost town', forecasting stagnation and the eventual disappearance of the town.
There was also a feeling that central government had been victimising the town, possibly in relation to the 'Empire' tag that Mafeking carried. In the mid-1960s Mafeking had attempted to cross the political and racial frontier by joining Botswana but the latter embarked upon its nation-building exercise, independent of the colonial town situated in South Africa. In response Mafeking's Publicity Association and Town Council attempted to rediscover Mafeking's historical roots as a 'frontier' town by promoting tourism and economic investment, as the entry point into the African interior:

"There were the days of the Zeederberg Coach which brought big game hunters to Weils Stores from which the hunting parties were organised and where Winter's Hotel was a favourite hostelry because of its good food and because it was the last civilised stop in the long trek to the north."

This Mafeking Town Council promotional brochure went on to suggest reasons for industrialists to locate in a town with '...tremendous growth possibilities here for border industries' and:

"...with large coloured and Black townships nearby, Mafeking becomes the ideal place to invest in. all these, plus a friendly, rural atmosphere, make Mafeking the ideal place in which to live, in which to work, in which to invest and in which to relax."

A letter from the Northern Cape Regional Committee called for the promotion of incorporation into Bophuthatswana.

90 Mafeking Mail, 7.11.1966.
91 Dale, R. (1969) "The tale of two towns (Mafeking and Gaberone) and the political modernisation of Botswana", South African Institute of Public Administration, Vol. 4, no.1, pp.130-144, refers to this proposal for annexation. However, Joe Pobrey owner and editor of the Mafeking Mail from 1955-1980, has suggested that this never raised any real momentum or even interest. Whilst his paper promoted the idea, this was ignored by both the Protectorate and South African administrations, interview, Johannesburg, December, 1994.
92 Mafeking Council Promotional Brochure, undated, op. cit.
93 Ibid.
tourism:

'..in order to make our region known through out the Republic and Rhodesia'.

It was a plea for tourism, an appeal for recognition from the rest of South Africa, in other words the old battle against marginalisation. Neither tourist or industrialist arrived. Residents' fears of the decline of the town continued and Mafeking was forced to decide whether to remain 'white' and marginal or align itself with the Batswana bantustan. Members of the business community in particular favoured the alignment and encouraged the South African government to locate the administrative offices of the Tswana Homeland in the old Bechuanaland Protectorate buildings in Mafeking. Elements of the white community therefore regarded the bantustan as necessary compensation for the erosion of prestige following the independence of Botswana. Indeed, it can be argued that given the historical condition of marginality, as constantly referred to in this chapter, the bantustan policy was the economic life-line that Mafeking desperately required. The most significant decision for the future of the town had been taken in 1963 with the sale of the Imperial Reserve from Botswana to South Africa and the decision to locate the offices of the Tswana Territorial Authority (TTA) in the recently vacated buildings.

Similarly, a number of Tswana increasingly identified with the merits of devolved power and resources to the Tswana Homeland. The TTA had been created in 1961 with eight Tswana regional authorities centralised with an administrative body. Chief Pilane, chairman of the TTA, spoke at the opening of the sixth session of the Authority and, although against one man one vote, he was envious of the ‘responsible and statesmanlike’ way in which Botswana had achieved ‘independence’. The allure

94 Mafeking Mail, 21.1.66
95 Pobrey, J. (1994) had been influential in setting up the Mafeking Publicity Association, and despite its promising beginnings soon faded. The Association made an ironic statement of its failure by erecting a tongue in cheek sign outside of Mafeking declaring, tongue in cheek, ‘Mafeking Industrial Heart of the Northern Cape’. In fact, the Mafeking Mail itself with over 120 employees (including print works) remained the biggest employer in the town, Pobrey, J. (1994).
of sovereignty was evident as Chief Pilane talked of the Batswana on his side of the border in South Africa. He promoted the concept of self-government and desire to control some of the functions of the Department of Bantu Administration and Education as soon as possible. Pilane stated that the Batswana should take care of the establishment of townships, erection and planning of buildings, law and order, promotion of education, agricultural planning, recruitment of labour and the collection of taxes. This illustrated how the apartheid ideology rapidly sought to nurture the creation of a group of ‘insiders’ who were also mobilising regional identities based upon ethnic affiliation in order to derive political and economic benefits from separate development.

The reconstitution of the TIA in 1968 as an Executive Council with members of the Authority now elected represented the pace of change. The new chief councillor of the TIA, Chief Lucas Mangope, having replaced Pilane, ‘expressed appreciation to the government for the support received and for further powers promised’. He went on to say that the Bantu’s greatest gratitude was due to the whites for the introduction of Christianity. This reflected the increasing promotion by some groups of ethnic separation and the fencing off of the new political and spatial frontiers.

By 1971 in accordance with the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, the TIA was replaced by the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly as a self-governing body with law making control over Justice, Education, Community Affairs, Works and Agriculture. The ‘cabinet’ consisted of a Chief Minister, who was required to be a chief and five other ministers, three of whom could be chiefs. This membership reflected the emerging rural and ‘traditional’ bias underpinning bantustan structures. This was a significant development which within the South African government’s official policy indicated that Bophuthatswana along with the Ciskei:

‘...have reached the last stage of constitutional development The next stage these homelands will take, will be accepting full independence’.

96 Mafeking Mail, 1966.
97 Mafeking Mail, 5 5 70
The bantustan was increasingly seen as a vehicle by both white and black residents to embolden opportunities for both 'nation-building' and material gains of 'development'. The 'nation-building' dimension, which is the focus of the next chapter, was taken on a stage with further devolved powers. Tswana was declared the 'national' language and with also scope for a 'national' anthem and flag. The Bophuthatswana regime was given considerable scope to emphasise the cultural and political dimensions of nation-building.
Chapter Three
3. Maturing the ‘Nation’: Discourses of Nation-Building in Bophuthatswana.

3.1. Introduction

‘Our people (the Tswana) became fragmented and scattered willy nilly across the sub-continent. Our culture, our language, the very fabric of our being as a people, began to be dissipated and lost in a bastardized tapestry exacerbated by the evils of apartheid. But through all this there remained the flickering flame of nation-hood which no amount of abuse or inhumanity could extinguish’. Lucas Mangope.¹

This quotation, by Lucas Mangope, typically reflects the Bophuthatswana regime’s efforts to reverse the cultural peripheralty of the region. Bophuthatswana attempted to instil a sense of Batswana identity and to restore ‘the fabric of their being’ through the promotion of ethnic renewal. The dominant factions within the Bophuthatswana power base reflected the bias towards ‘traditional’ structures or at least the regime’s interpretation of ‘traditional Batswana values’. This selective reading of Batswana history and culture was promoted as a form of Tswana nationalism which, however, also had to accommodate the drive for modernisation. This chapter demonstrates the strenuous efforts to communicate the uniqueness of being Batswana. The focus of the discussion is based upon a number of themes surrounding the cultural and political basis of Bophuthatswana’s ‘nation-building’.

First, the promise of cultural renewal embraced rural values and contrasted the purity of Batswana in ‘traditional’ areas with both ‘detribalised’ urban Batswana and also the perceived threat of ‘swamping’ by other ethnic groups. Inspired by ‘tradition’, the Bophuthatswana and the South African regimes cultivated an agenda to promote Batswana culture. This ethnic focus was also used as a political tool by Bophuthatswana, with ‘traditionalism’ increasingly used to prevent opposition and to

Chapter Three: Maturing the Nation

create an emerging network of patronage. Second, the question of ‘independence’ for Bophuthatswana from the South African government was interpreted as either a sham, in lacking viability, or alternatively for certain groups, as delivering sovereignty and reflecting the new found ‘maturity’ of the Batswana nation. Third, ‘independence’ signified the introduction of a specific nation-building agenda directed towards the promotion of Batswana identity and sovereignty through education, cultural heritage and administration policies. These strategies attempted to create ‘unifying gestures’ for the Bophuthatswana nation.

Whilst these efforts were overshadowed by dependence upon South Africa they represented a particular response to the historical condition of dependency. As such, Bophuthatswana’s strategies reflected the emerging tensions between nation-building and modernisation.

3.2. Batswana Ethnic Renewal

It has been earlier shown how apartheid discourse attempted to sustain the political and racial separation of white and black by creating ‘ethnic’ rights within the homelands for the black majority of South Africa. By the 1970s the maintenance of white supremacy became inextricably linked to giving these peripheral regions a semblance of viable entities. This strategy was promoted on the basis of economic development and also, importantly, the construction of ethnic and political identities within the homelands. The South African government’s bantustan strategy was centred upon instilling ‘national unity’ and ‘national culture’ within each of the homelands and, in doing so, it also attempted to create, and maintain, linkages between these territories and all black South Africans. These objectives were expressed by the Minister for Bantu Affairs and Development during the reading of the Bantu Homeland and Citizenship Bill in 1970:

'This Bill will therefore contribute a great deal towards stimulating among the members of each Bantu nation a feeling of national unity and national culture. And what is very important, the measure will enable the so-called urbanized Bantu person to find a home for his political aspirations with the people to whom he belongs. Too
easily do superficial thinkers and opponents of our policy say that the Bantu individuals in the white areas have become detribalized and alienated from their specific groups'.

Apartheid discourse represented the 'detribalized' African as the 'hard core of the urban Black problem'. The political and racial frontier, between the homelands and the 'white' defined Republic of South Africa was premised upon the 'failure' of blacks to absorb 'western' and 'modern' values:

'Probably less than ten per cent of all adult Black South Africans (roughly 20 per cent of all city Blacks) may be classified as predominantly Westernised, in the sense that they have substituted the Western for the traditional lifestyle. And even among these a clear majority will admit to a sentiment of Black national consciousness. Many display only, or mainly, the outward trappings of Westernisation, while they still maintain fairly strong tribal connections'.

Black South Africans were therefore excluded and, in many cases, physically removed from the 'white' Republic on the basis that they had not 'fully absorbed the Western value system'. The South African government's role was portrayed as nurturing the 'national' characteristics of the homelands:

'... (because) they feel an attachment to their specific peoples and homelands as a result of all kinds of ties such as...origins, descent, relationships, material interests, folklore, tribal connections, history and- strongest of all- language'.

South Africa was represented as a geographical block merely accommodating various

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3 BANTU, August, 1977.
4 Ibid.
peoples. Of this block, consisting of twelve ethnic units, the Republic of South Africa was the fourth which was independent, the other three being Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The implication was that the other eight ethnic homelands were under the political trusteeship of the Republic of South Africa - awaiting 'independence'. By manipulating the geographical definition of 'South Africa' the regime provided a revamped discourse which served to continue the exclusion of 'Bantu' from South Africa. At some historical moment blacks had supposedly been jettisoned from the 'white' Republic of South Africa into an Africa beyond the white frontier.

The official apartheid discourse posited crude references to inter-ethnic group incompatibility and promoted the homelands as spaces of ethnic renewal. Within the context of Bophuthatswana the South African government position was as follows:

'In recent years there has been a cultural revival through the reactivation of the Tswana authority and as a reaction against the influx of Non-Tswana into Odi (east), Moretele and Thaba Nchu, which cause anxiety about the retention of the Tswana cultural heritage''

The role for the Bophuthatswana regime was therefore supposedly directed towards promoting this revival and re-affirming 'Tswanaism' and its heritage:

'...through practical steps to encourage the survival of what is dear to the Tswana, and to protect the Tswana language and cultural heritage from foreign influences'.

Although shaped around the specific agenda of the South African government, this ethnic manipulation nonetheless sought to exploit local Batswana experiences. Chapter two indicated that from the late nineteenth century and particularly the beginning of the twentieth century, various groups had consistently raised the issue of the Batswana condition. It is argued here that by the early and mid-1970s these ideas

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7 BENBO (1977:27) op. cit.
8 Ibid.
resonated with certain sections of the Batswana ethnic group, particularly in rural and marginal areas.

Although the Bophuthatswana regime’s acceptance of ‘independence’ and the contradictions of the bantustan policy would rapidly alienate the majority of Batswana, the underlying ‘condition’ and issues of cultural identity remained important. The opening quotation, by Mangope, captured the sense of dispossession and upheaval associated with the Batswana diaspora during the pre-colonial and colonial eras. The Bophuthatswana ruling elite manipulated this instability, vulnerability and unease to suggest that they were acting for the Tswana in order to create a stable place they could call their own, reflected in the name ‘Bophuthatswana’ or ‘place were the Tswana people abide’. As Butler et al suggested twenty years ago, with 64% of all Batswana situated outside the homeland, Bophuthatswana could not qualify to be called the Urheimat or original gathering of at least a substantial portion of the people. It is shown how the prospects for creating a popular nationalist movement in Bophuthatswana foundered upon, most visibly and emotively, the fragmented territorial basis and failure to consolidate Bophuthatswana.

The bantustan strategy was intended to create rural based states and with it a fundamental division between rural and urban (‘South African’) blacks. The old Tswana Territorial Authority (TTA) had reflected this bias within the bantustan policy towards rural representation tied to traditional structures and equal representation for each of the twelve electoral districts in Bophuthatswana. The TTA was dominated by chiefs who derived substantial benefits including the establishment of schools for sons of chiefs, teacher training colleges, agricultural and industrial training centres, bore

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9 The previous chapter indicated that Batswana territory, within the boundaries of the old British Bechuanaland, had been rapidly alienated from 1895 with annexation to the Cape and its recovery was a fundamental basis of group grievances.


11 Butler et al, ibid., make the point that although the size of the population may have been greatly different between regions, each still had a similar number of representatives. Furthermore, only two representatives were elected from each district and these were designated by the regional authority. The remaining 48 seats were filled by nominees i.e. chieftaincy and headmen.
holes, bus services and boundary fences.\textsuperscript{12} The rural bias was also reflected in campaigning, elections and within the executive council of the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly which replaced the TTA in 1972. For example, the Bophuthatswana Executive Council had only two university educated members but four chiefs. These features therefore indicated for Butler et al the dominant characteristic in the composition of Bophuthatswana politics:

'\textit{The chiefs have strong traditional roots and tend to emphasise the Tswana character of their government. As a cabinet, it is more nationalistic and less overtly politicized than its counterparts (than for example, in Kwa-Zulu)}'.\textsuperscript{13}

The common Tswana interest of both the Bophuthatswana National Party (BNP), led by the chairman of the Bophuthatswana Executive Council, Chief Lucas Mangope, and the opposition Seoposengwe (United) Party (SP), led by the former chairman of the TTA, Chief Tidimane Pilane, was reflected in the education and language policy adopted by both parties.\textsuperscript{14} However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s significant differences had begun to emerge between them concerning the perception of the role that Bophuthatswana would play within the broader framework of South African politics. The SP demanded the return of 'our homeland forefathers land' and complete territorial consolidation as the basis for granting Bophuthatswana its 'ultimate sovereign independence'. Most significantly, Pilane envisaged Bophuthatswana within a broader united black homeland federation and was also less overtly Tswana traditionalist. This was reflected in Pilane's call for both black unity (within the homeland system) and representations by 'commoners' within a totally elected

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Butler et al, ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid. pp65.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Mangope had replaced Pilane as chairman of the TTA/BLA in 1972 following a vote of 60 for and 8 against, in Butler et al op. cit. Both political parties were, however, were extremely pro-Tswana. For example, the chairman of the SP, Mr. S.J.J Lesolang called for the compulsory introduction of Tswana into non-Tswana schools within Bophuthatswana, under the pretext that otherwise non-Tswana would be unable to gain government employment, \textit{Mafeking Mail}, 25.1.1974.
\end{itemize}
Chapter Three: Maturing the Nation

Legislative Assembly. By contrast, Mangope was particularly supportive of the prominent role given to chiefs within the homeland:

'We have been severely criticized for the large number of designated members (i.e. appointed chiefs in assembly), but we believe that we must lead our people from what they know- for the concept of a general election is unknown in our traditional administration'.

In 1972 with elections to take place within Bophuthatswana, these features were reiterated in the manifestos of the two parties. The BNP manifesto revealed Mangope as an ardent ethnic nationalist who consistently emphasised the rights of the Tswana within Bophuthatswana despite the presence hundreds of thousands of non-Tswana:

'I have been with the task of serving the Tswana people, and therefore to do what I regard is in the best interests of Bophuthatswana, and nothing else'.

Mangope had claimed on numerous occasions that a political system based upon the concept of one man one vote was inappropriate for South Africa; it would lead to ethnic conflict, expressed as 'another Angola'. Mangope associated the homeland system, for all its problems, as representing for blacks 'a positive acknowledgement and vindication of his particular stamp of black identity'. Mangope, more than Pilane, appeared acutely concerned with the status of the Batswana as a minority amongst black groups.

At the 1973 summit between homeland leaders Mangope had initially agreed

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16 According to the BNP manifesto in point 1(b) the BNP 'aims to build a strong and secure Bophuthatswana Nationalism, in Van der Merwe, H. Charlton, N. and Kotze, D. (eds.) (1978:499) African Perspectives on South Africa, Hoover, David Phillip, Collings, South Africa.
17 in Butler et al. (1977:88) op. cit.
19 Mangope in Van der Merwe et al (1978:64) op. cit.
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to federation with the other homelands. However, he then reneged on this decision
and expressed concern, along with his deputy, Chief Herman Maseloane, that the
Tswana would be dwarfed by a Xhosa-Zulu superstate. Mangope had reiterated the
importance of maintaining links with white South Africa but apparently came under
severe criticism for his attendance at the conference. In a radio interview Mangope
was quoted as saying that proposals for homeland federation were academic and
‘shooting at the moon’. Moreover, he expressed fears about domination by other
ethnic groups:

‘(Mangope said) His own people would be anxious about being swamped by other
larger groups, and might prefer an association with Botswana...’

Mangope therefore displayed a distinct tendency and determination to ‘go it alone’, a
feature which would be characteristic of his twenty year rule of Bophuthatswana.
Mangope’s rhetorical position on unification between Tswana in Bophuthatswana and
Botswana would provide a central tenet of his Tswana nationalism, and would re-
emerge in later years. His encouragement of Tswana chauvinism and ethnic
competition would also characterise his rule. By 1975, Mangope had expressed the
desire to extent his sphere of influence to the urban people, by supporting the strategy
of other bantustan leaders to control ‘ethnic citizens’. Ethnic competition was
encouraged through Mangope’s references to other ethnic groups such as ‘those
Xhosa who were forging ahead with their own Homeland, Development
Corporation...’ These ideas were also used by Mangope to consolidate his political
position in Bophuthatswana.

20 Mafeking Mail, 29.3.1973
21 Mafeking Mail, 23.11.1973
22 In the mid-1970s, however, the President of Botswana, Seretse Khama had
refused any contact or negotiation with Bophuthatswana because ‘Accepting the
homelands is accepting Apartheid’, and therefore unjust and impracticable,
Mafeking Mail, 25.6.1975 and 30.11.1974 respectively.
23 Mafeking Mail, 3.1.1975
24 Ibid.
3.2.1. Bophuthatswana's Emerging Elite

In the pre-independence phase, Mangope's emerging discourse also firmly accentuated the 'positive' aspects of separate development through which the Tswana could empower themselves by controlling their own development and resources. Mangope's perceived constituency had included a significant section of the rural populace and the struggle over chieftaincy in these areas became central to his preservation of control in rural areas. This rural periphery should not be viewed as an homogeneous mass. As Lawrence and Manson suggest, a material dimension underpinned the bantustan strategy, with a bias for many years from the South African Department of Native Affairs towards a prominent rural farming and commercial elite. During the 1950s, 1960s and into the 1970s, these groups had aligned themselves with the bantustan authorities in order to consolidate and expand their benefits. An important point also concerns the unfolding alliance made between a black farming elite and Afrikaner farmers in the region. This paved the way for the capitalising of agriculture in the bantustan and a development model promoted by the Bophuthatswana state parastatal, AGRICOR, characterised as technocratic and large scale. Therefore, the homeland structures were attractive for various interest groups which stood to benefit materially.

Throughout the 1970s the economic and employment opportunities in Bophuthatswana were expanding. Together with other BNP members, Mangope promoted these 'opportunities' as an escape from racism and apartheid's restrictions. High profile was given to D. P. Kgotleng, member of the BLA, director of companies and also a leading Batswana farmer who demanded equality within separate development and claimed that 'the time has come that Blacks should do things for themselves and not have things done for them'. Mangope himself farmed and this

26 For example, within government, employment increased from 872 in 1968 to 2917 in 1974 and 7 304 by 1977, not including over 7000 teachers, in BENBO (1977:41).
27 Tswana Mail supplement in the Mafeking Mail, 18.1.1974
Batswana farming group offered a potential political basis for the Bophuthatswana regime, particularly, according to Murray's observations, within the Thaba Nchu region of Bophuthatswana. Here, the Barolong (a Batswana tribe) land owning elite were able to convert their advantages into securing prominent bureaucratic positions within the emerging Bophuthatswana government. This was far removed from the vast mass of landless Africans who were forcibly removed from white areas and resettled in the homeland. Although increasingly bolstered by a rapidly growing bureaucracy, Mangope's regime sought to develop a coherent, easily identifiable ideology aimed at reformulating the unsubtle crudity of apartheid ethnic discourse, given the degree of popular resentment and social divisions within Bophuthatswana.

Batswana businessmen demanded that blacks should serve blacks in shops within Mafeking, through breaking the white monopoly on jobs. Other Batswana criticised the arrogance of whites, particularly for still referring to the Batswana as 'boys' and walking uninvited into council meetings and when inspecting black businesses. The major South African parastatal promoting economic development in the homelands, the Bantu Investment Company, was accused by Batswana of being a racist organisation. Black advancement was therefore perceived to be most effectively promoted through separate development. The 'crushing' problems of Bantu education were also discussed and many argued that education could be improved if it was under Batswana control within a Tswana homeland.

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28 See Colin Murray's work (1994) on the Barolong Progressive Association, in *Black Mountain*, Edinburgh University Press. More generally, for those who aspired to the BLA, of the 47 candidates who stood for election in the 1972 Bophuthatswana elections, most were either farmers, former teachers, shopkeepers or directors of companies, in *BENBO* (1977) op. cit.

29 Lawrence, M. and Manson. (1994) op. cit.

30 Ibid.

31 Theo Moatshe, Montshiwa businessman, *Tswana Mail* in the *Mafeking Mail*, 31.8.1973 and Councillor Percy Sampson who claimed that one white man who walked into a council meeting 'had no manners at all... if we want racial harmony in this country Whites must learn to respect Blacks', *Tswana Mail*, 24.8.1973.

32 A local Batswana shop-owner referring to BIC official, who had acted in a very derogatory manner when inspecting his shop, *Mafeking Mail*, 27.7 1973.

rural 'blackspots' and others were deemed to be surplus to the South African state and economy, once again the language of ethnic citizenship and rights was used within Bophuthatswana to compensate for this removal of rights in South Africa. Bophuthatswana officials urged Batswana residents to join the National African Chamber of Commerce (NACOC):

'...(which) should take the lead in this development. The voice of NACOC should reach out to the Bantu man in the street and up to the uppermost part of the country. And, the voice should say, 'wake up and develop your own!''.

The promise of economic opportunities and facilities was therefore another major strand of Mangope's strategy to legitimise Bophuthatswana.

In conjunction with the regime's increasing emphasis upon defining a 'national identity', it is argued that the political basis of the regime rested precariously upon a combination of traditional structures and, increasingly, of modernising agents. Each affected the other in contradictory ways. The salient feature of the 'independence' era was of an ideology of traditionalism permeating institutions and through which the Bophuthatswana regime sought to legitimise its control. Crucially, the Bophuthatswana regime also attempted to shift the emphasis from separate development to a conception of 'development' per se which provided an enabling discourse for certain sections of Bophuthatswana society to partake in the material and ideological offerings in Bophuthatswana. However, this 'progressive' face presented to the world was accompanied by and often quite contradictory to parallel efforts to provide a 'national' conduit for Batswana culture and identity. The series of strategies outlined in the following sections represented attempts to accommodate the ethnic/traditionalist basis of the state and its modern facade. As such they represented 'unifying gestures' intended to foment a national 'imagined community' of Bophuthatswana. These concerns regarding the Batswana 'condition' as an ethnic

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34 Bophuthatswana official, S. J. J. Lesolang (1972) in “Decentralisation and Border Industries”, The African Trader. Lesolang was the chairman of the SP.
group had long aroused support from Tswana intellectuals who had expressed ethnic sentiments through organisations such as the Barolong Progressive Association and Barolong National Council, established from the early nineteenth century. A recurring theme of the Bophuthatswana "independence" years was the scope provided for Batswana "tradition" or the interpretation of Batswana culture and history by the Bophuthatswana regime. Prior to "independence", Mangope had already indicated his advocacy of the mixing of chieftaincy with political decision-making and power, which he used to consolidate his political base.

In 1972, the first elections in Bophuthatswana reflected these trends with Mangope ignoring the urban vote and concentrating upon the rural areas. The voting pattern clearly showed that urban based Tswana were extremely sceptical about the homeland policy and were more concerned about their rights within South Africa itself. Of over 50,000 urban based Batswana only 4,661 cast votes whilst 45% of the rural population voted in a turn out of 50% with the BNP winning 12 of the 16 contested seats and the SP the other four. This suggested for Butler et al that:

"...Tswana who lived in or near cities were apt to disdain the whole process of separate development and/or fear for their uncertain status if they actually voted. Taking time off to go to the polls might also have deprived them of earnings. Rural dwellers, more secure and also more attuned to the policies and role of the Tswana Authority, readily cast or were persuaded to cast ballots."

Whilst these comments captured the vulnerability of the urban Batswana position, for rural dwellers the "policies and role of the TTA" was far more ambiguous than stated

35 Benedict Anderson, makes the point 'It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them or even hear them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion...', (1990:6). For these Barolong organisations see Murray, C. (1995) and Clynick, T. (forthcoming). One particularly significant Batswana intellectual was S Molema, some of his ideas concerning the Batswana were mentioned in chapter two.

36 This pattern became even more pronounced in the following general elections but with each reflecting much decreased turnouts.

37 Butler et al, ibid. pp53.
above. Indeed, the transformation of ‘traditional’ institutions and political processes under the homeland system were creating profound contradictions in rural areas.

The election results strengthened Mangope’s position within the Bophuthatswana homeland structure but his own BNP became riven by dissent and criticism of his style of leadership. Upon returning from an extensive trip abroad to sound out his plans for developing Bophuthatswana, Mangope moved against those perceived as his biggest challengers within the party. Another important pattern could therefore be seen by the mid-1970s, that of opposition consistently driven out of Bophuthatswana as Mangope removed these challengers to his authority by enacting his own set of rules.38 There appeared to be little ideological difference between Mangope and his Minister of the Interior, Herman Maseloane. Both were Tswana nationalists and reformists who condemned terrorism and spoke moderately about the role of government. However, Mangope perceived that Maseloane was undermining his authority.39 Mangope acted first to remove some key supporters of Maseloane but could not remove the Minister or his main ministerial supporter, Chief James Toto, under existing legislation. Furthermore, members of his own party accused Mangope of authoritarian behaviour and interfering in the rights of chiefs by attempting to oust Maseloane. It was also claimed that Mangope was using his official position to spy on and intimidate his subordinates and to interfere in the regional authorities, especially the Madikwe region.40 In particular, Mangope was heavily criticised by his Assembly for his tight personal control over the Bophuthatswana Development Fund.41 This displeasure was reflected in a large vote of confidence for Maseloane but Mangope consolidated his own position with a vote of confidence in himself as leader with 60 for and only 7 against. However, in 1974 unable to remove Maseloane and Toto, Mangope formed a new political party called the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party (BDP) and recruited loyal ministers and legislators.

This action clearly demonstrated Mangope’s willingness to create his own

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Madikwe was Maseloane’s home region.
rules to remove troublesome opposition. It was linked to a specific interpretation of ‘tradition’ with Mangope using this to create his own power base. For example, Mangope influenced the Barolong chieftaincy succession within the Stadt and rapidly grasped control of other traditional structures. Critically this interpretation of ‘traditionalism’ would feature prominently throughout Mangope’s rule and, according to Lawrence and Manson:

‘Mangope, as a traditional leader (though by no means paramount Tswana chief) had a profound sense of what he was owed with correspondingly little sense of his obligations’.

The labelling and definition of ‘tradition’ was emerging as a device used in order to justify government policy; a defensive shield behind which such actions could not be contested. As Moerdijk observed, the wrenching away of cultural power from communities, as if now labelled ‘African philosophy’, provided an important controlling mechanism over rural areas:

‘... it can not be discussed or refuted, for there is nobody to answer for it, nobody to admit error. It is thus an ideal tool for authoritarian rulers who wish to justify the existing state of things. Objection to it is not disagreement but disrespect, lack of patriotism or even sacrilege’.

In addition, Moerdijk suggested that ‘tradition’ provided a sort of national adhesive, embracing ‘traditional particularities’ of chieftaincy and the ‘development spirit’ of the middle classes within the bantustans. These contradictions were played out in Bophuthatswana and were compounded by a lack of effective opposition to the bantustan leadership.

However, ‘traditionalism’ could also be interpreted as Mangope’s own

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42 Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) op. cit.
ruthlessness and determination to centre all power within the bantustan structure upon himself. It heralded the era in which party membership began to determine personal advancement. Within Montshiwa township, just outside Mafeking, for example, ruling party members were placed in prominent positions within the local council, indicating that:

"The Montshiwa residents believe that the only advantage some of these Government nominated councillors had could have been their association with the BNP Montshiwa branch".  

Despite lacking the number of votes normally required in order to be elected to office, the new mayor of Montshiwa, previously an information officer in the Bophuthatswana government, was appointed by Mangope. Having dealt with opposition, Mangope began to create a network of party patronage with promises to ‘carry his people’, in other words, to give widespread benefits to his supporters in return for their unstinting support. From the mid 1970s there would be little, if any, dissension from within the ranks of the ruling elite. In 1975, Mangope’s powerful grip upon these structures was illustrated in the chieftaincy and headmen’s meeting to vote on their support for Mangope’s plans for ‘independence’. Through a combination of buying into Mangope’s Tswana vision and fear of the consequences of any opposition, the traditional leaders endorsed Mangope through a vote of 155 with only 5 against. This result apparently gave Mangope a ‘clear mandate by the chiefs and headmen to press for full independence for Bophuthatswana from the Government of South Africa’. During the South African Parliamentary debate on granting Bophuthatswana’s ‘independence’, South African government officials and National Party MPs seized upon the legitimatory role given to ‘tradition’. ‘Tradition’ was depicted as determining and ‘deciding’ the course of bantustan ‘independence’. At one moment during the debate, whilst advocating the appropriateness of ‘traditional’

44 Tswana Mail, 27.9.1974.
45 Tswana Mail, 4.10.1974
46 Mafeking Mail, 7.11.1975.
values and structures for Bophuthatswana, one National Party MP incorrectly referred to Mangope, rather embarrassingly for government representatives, as ‘Headman’ Mangope. The appearance, form or ‘fact’ of ‘tradition’ seemed of far more importance than its dynamics or local detail.47

However, the specific characteristics of this ‘independence’ were becoming problematic. As the political momentum for bantustan ‘independence’ increased the limitations and constraints of the South African government policy were becoming clearer. The National Party’s refusal to move from the territorial allocations of the 1936 Land Act amplified divisions within Tswana nationalism and Bophuthatswana politics. The refusal by the South African government to grant the white town of Mafeking the status of capital of Bophuthatswana and the debates surrounding the proposals for a new capital were illustrative of deeper tensions over territory and the ‘purity’ of Batswana cultural identity.48

3.3. Maturing the ‘Nation’ through ‘Independence’.

By 1977 the final negotiations were taking place over the Bophuthatswana Independence Bill. The Bophuthatswana regime once again sought to reclaim land belonging to the old Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland and much confusion remained regarding definition of both boundaries, as well as the need to clarify citizenship status, particularly for the Batswana remaining within South Africa. To that end, a letter written by Mangope and signed by all the Bophuthatswana cabinet, was sent to the South African Parliament and intended as an embarrassing rebuke to the South African government’s consolidation proposals when read out during the ‘independence’ debate. The letter recommended that unless both the citizenship clause of the bill and boundaries be changed then the homeland’s decision to opt for independence would be frustrated because ‘we (Bophuthatswana) are not prepared to accept independence at all costs’.49

48 This ‘capital’ issue forms the basis of chapter four.
49 RDM, 28.5.77.
South African opposition MPs and Senators questioned how the bill could be pushed through without reconciling these differences and voiced dissatisfaction with M.C Botha for apparently withholding the letter instead of reading it out to Parliament. An opposition MP leaked these details to the press which quoted Mangope’s angry reference to consolidation, particularly the South African proposals to annex the Batswana areas of Bafokeng and Moretele. The South African proposal was probably designed to gauge the level of popular opposition to Mangope within these urban areas and, furthermore, given the proximity to the vital industrial and political Pretoria-Witswatersrand-Vereeniging region (PWV), the potential security risk. These regions contained a number of townships, Ga-Rankuwa, Mabopane, Temba, Muthulung and Thlabane, all constructed to act as dormitory towns for the heavily industrialised PWV. Without these regions the territorial and industrial base of Bophuthatswana, together with thousands of forced relocations resulting from annexation to South Africa, would render ‘independence’ even less convincing than it already appeared:

'We will not accept independence if these areas are excised, we do not dispute the SA Government’s power and strength to excise these areas and remove thousands of our people from them. But as an independent Bophuthatswana we are not prepared to have been party to an agreement that we now will result in untold hardships, misery and pain that will go with removals and dispossession of land that is ours through the love of God'.

Despite Mangope’s alleged concern regarding the impact of forced relocations from South Africa to Bophuthatswana, these had been an integral feature of racial and ethnic separation for many years. The incongruence between territory and different population groups had long frustrated and characterised successive National Party governments’ plans for territorial segregation. For a supposedly ethnically pure state

50 Ibid.
51 World, 29.5.77
containing only Tswana, this was simply a fantasy. Between 1968 to 1971 alone, in order to endorse this ethnic and racial partition, 79,000 Tswana were subjected to removals, often dumped on the open veld:

'All in all arbitrary and unjust expropriation and eviction had been inflicted on the people in the name of eventual 'self-determination'.

Even following many more removals of the 1970s, by 1985 the ethnic composition of the population of Bophuthatswana still contained sizeable minorities:

- Tswana (50 tribes) = 67.4%
- Shangaan/Tsonga = 6.7%
- N.Sotho = 6.3%
- Ndebele = 4.8%

These removals therefore repudiated Mangope’s concern for the welfare of his people and caused deep-seated anger and despair amongst the many communities affected. However, the Bophuthatswana leader’s comments did reflect the platform and visibility which the South African government had given to homeland leaders. In an attempt to defuse immense opposition to the stripping of South African citizenship and with it the few rights that blacks possessed within South Africa, a momentous effort to legitimise the bantustan structures would be required. The Soweto riots of 1976 were an epochal moment for powerful popular opposition against the South African state and a strong rejection of separate development and ethnic division. The ambiguity of citizenship, particularly for urban residents, provided a central contradiction of apartheid discourse. The threat of removals of even those limited rights that urban blacks had within the ‘white’ defined Republic was a major source of

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52 International Defence and Aid Fund (1977) Profile of Bophuthatswana.
53 Jeffery, A. (1993) At the Cross Roads, SAIRR.
54 See Colin Murray's work on 'displaced urbanisation' in Bophuthatswana.
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opposition to ‘independence’.

Although this opposition exploded in urban areas of South Africa, the bantustans were not immune to waves of protest which even reached the comparatively quiet seat of the BLA (Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly), Montshiwa, adjacent to the proposed capital at Mmabatho. The fury that precipitated the burning down of the BLA in 1976 was an indication of the opposition of many within the bantustan to the removal of their South African citizenship. Through lack of consultation with the so-called regional ‘ethnic’ citizens, symbols of the Bophuthatswana regime were targeted by demonstrators. School children and youths rampaged through Montshiwa township and set alight to Bophuthatswana government cars and buildings. The editorial in the local newspaper asked ‘why did they succeed’, if, as the Bophuthatswana government claimed, these rioters were simply ‘troublemakers’? Rather, the riots indicated that the underlying current of frustration and anger was the real cause.

Against this backdrop of instability the leader of the SNP, Chief Maseloane, came out very strongly against ‘independence’ and demanded equality with white South Africans:

‘... South Africa was full of skyscrapers from the black man’s sweat... are we going to leave this for a barren land .. South Africa is surrounded by small begging countries. When Bophuthatswana becomes independent, we are going to beg as well because we have become alienated from our birthright’.

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55 The Bophuthatswana era was characterised by the immense hatred that urban blacks held for the bantustan authorities. On many occasions cars passing from Bophuthatswana into South African urban areas of the Reef, once identified by their license plate, would often be stoned, according to Joe Pobrey, (1995) op. cit. Furthermore, following the collapse of the regime in the 1990s many blacks in Soweto and other townships maintained that the Bophuthatswana government’s behaviour was as if due to ‘brainwashing’, (personal communication with residents of Soweto, February, 1995).

56 Mafeking Mail, 15.8.1976. Of those 15 people arrested, 14 were school children but one adult was actually President Mangope’s son, twenty year old Shimi Mangope.

57 The World, 11.3.1977.
Maseloane alleged that Chief Mangope had already agreed to the Status of Bophuthatswana Bill on April 25th 1977 at his meeting with Prime Minister J. Vorster in Cape Town. However, ‘Chief Mangope agreed to the citizenship clauses then but when he tested political opinion among Tswanas he took fright’.  

Again this statement reflected how Mangope had ‘walked the tightrope’ between the structural constraints of being a homeland leader and, when concerned about political feeling within his territory, the need for (occasional) overtures to his constituency. Given the considerable constraints, Maseloane regarded ‘independence’ as untenable:

‘Independence would simply have the effect of dividing the nation even further and isolating them from the rest of the world... On the present basis, the South African Government is not giving independence to our country, what they are doing is giving a country to Chief Mangope to rule as he wishes’.

Interestingly, although the opposition referred to the inadequacy of ‘independence’, they nonetheless expressed this in terms of the harmful effects of ‘dividing the (Batswana) nation even further’. In other words the imagery of the Batswana ethnic group was still potent for many Batswana. Mangope, however, was recreating the Batswana group within the limited territorial spaces defined by Pretoria. A petition which stated that ‘Homeland independence of the type visualised for blacks in South Africa, is a deliberate attempt to divide the people and weaken the forces of unity’ was presented by the SNP to the South African Peoples Representative Party, addressed to the South African National Assembly. At the national level most black leaders were cynical of Mangope’s earlier political ploy; they regarded the Bophuthatswana cabinet’s letter as a publicity stunt. Mangope was urged to think again on ‘independence’ and warned of the political repression in the first ‘independent’ bantustan, Transkei; that ‘illegal child of apartheid unwanted and

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58 Ibid.
59 Mafeking Mail, 10.6.77.
60 Cape Times 27.5.77
61 The World 30.5.77
rejected by the whole world'. It was claimed that for Mangope to accept ‘independence’ ‘he will stand condemned in the eyes of future historians and his children will cringe when they admit that he was their father...’ Black opinion at the national level condemned the partition of South Africa through the bantustan system. This view was reflected in the following letter to a leading black newspaper:

‘Every square metre of SA soil is my historic homeland, and I am unwilling to part with it voluntarily. But you, chief Mangope, are prepared to barter it away in exactly the same way the Bushmen did for trinkets and trifles. The Bushmen did not really understand what they were doing. You do. You are fully aware of the consequences of your actions, and for this reason you will stand condemned before the bar of history’.

Whilst this national and particularly urban based opposition, was forcefully expressed, there were different dynamics and discourses for some local and regional sections which interpreted even limited ‘independence’ as a significant stepping stone along the road to ‘maturity’ and ‘development’ of the Batswana.

3.3.1. Breaking the Inertia

During the 1970s Mangope had claimed that any political party rejecting the concept of homeland independence would be defeated at the polls. In the 1977 general election the Bophuthatswana opposition party, which opposed ‘independence’ and boycotted the elections, was annihilated but this also reflected the appalling turnout of less than 12% of those eligible to vote. Mangope was urged to ‘listen to

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63 Ibid.
64 Letter by W.B Ngakame in The World, 12.6.77.
65 Africa, No. 73, September, 1977.
66 'It is safe to say that no political party in this country, whether among blacks or whites, which proclaims its intention to abolish the homelands, has the remotest chance at the polls'. Mangope to the South African Institute of Race Relations Conference, Cape Town, 1974, in Van der Merwe et al (1978:62) op. cit.
67 The World, 25.8.77.
your people’. However, Mangope appeared to listen only to himself and his Legislative Assembly, now totally dominated by the ruling BDP. Independence was perceived as a powerful force which, together with the idea of development, could deliver the Tswana Nation from the debilitating effects upon Tswana culture and identity of racial and ethnic mixing. The acceptance of the ‘Report of the Committee on a Constitution for Independent Bophuthatswana’ in late 1977, indicated for some the ‘rationale’ behind taking ‘independence’. Whilst the opposition criticised the logistics and detail of agreements reached between Bophuthatswana and Pretoria as falsifying ‘independence’, the concept itself was elevated to near mystical proportions by the ruling party. Independence was portrayed as a departure from stagnation and darkness, literally likened to a bright light which was ‘kindling for the Tswana people’. The transition to ‘independence’ was justified as attainment of ‘maturity’ for the Tswana nation and a demonstration of its capability in moving from a condition of ‘trusteeship’ or childhood, to an adulthood signified through ‘independence’. To reinforce this positive attainment of ‘adulthood’, within the grasp of the Tswana, reference was made to a meeting between Batswana chiefs and headmen with the then Prime Minister, Henrik Verwoerd. A member of the BLA recalled Verwoerd’s suggestion to the Tswana that ‘Independence’ or self-rule reflected ‘maturation’:

‘Black people I am going to give you government. because you are grown and mature now. You are not children. You are going to given the opportunity to serve your own people and build your own nation’.

These sentiments represented the essence of ‘national aspirations’, the outgrowing of ‘trusteeship’ and, by implication, an end to subordination to colonialism/apartheid. This sense of unfolding growth and maturity was well illustrated by the comments of Headman T. J Montsho in his address to the BLA. He likened Bophuthatswana’s

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68 Ibid.
progress to that of the development of a child:

'I don’t know what is going to happen to a child on his mother’s back who is grown but refuses to leave the mother’s back. What must the mother do to him. Or when he is grown and his father gives him a house and he refuses to go to his own house, because he does not want progress, he wants things to be done for him'.

The ‘mature’ Batswana nation was considered as having outgrown its South African ‘parents’. With the drive to escape the ignobling experience of white domination, ‘Independence’ was seen as a dynamic process preferable to the state of being static or ‘stagnant’ and capable of restoring Batswana dignity through forward moving self-rule. Minister Setlogelo stated:

'... what is the correct position for which to fight for land, when we were self-ruling or when we are under another Government. We have marked time for the past three hundred years. I do not know whether we could continue marking time for another 300 years'.'

The imagery of ‘nationhood’ and ‘sovereignty’ was taken as self-evidently progressive. However, the six members of the opposition, most of whom boycotted the meeting, rejected the terms of this ‘independence’ by emphasising the limitations of the ‘independence’ being offered by South Africa. Mangope countered these criticisms by reiterating the almost autonomous power of development, whether elsewhere in southern Africa or in Bophuthatswana itself, to overcome such ‘technical’ disadvantages:

'From this small (opposition) group there is a statement which says that we agree with full independence only when it can be beneficial to the people. If this

71 Minister M. Setlogelo, Bophuthatswana, (1977:81&82).
independence was not beneficial to the people there would be no country in Africa which is self-governing and independent. That is why mention is made of underdeveloped countries. But some mention the fact that when Lesotho started to be independent, they had only one mile of tarred road. The difference(s) which were there when Botswana became independent and what we see now are the evidence which is visible to every person of developments that can be achieved when a country becomes independent'.

As pointed out in chapter one, during the 1970s dependency theory had been applied to the Southern African context and especially to the bantustans in view of their 'dumping ground' and labour reserves functions. However, the structural constraints associated with dependency upon South Africa were simply depoliticised by Mangope through his promotion of the conception of economic development through irresistible regional co-operation. Mangope stated that this inevitable economic interdependence would combine with a policy to prevent the outflow of Batswana citizens and income to South Africa. This ambiguous attitude towards regional co-operation whilst pursuing autonomous development, would remain a fundamental contradiction within Bophuthatswana during the 'independence' years (see following chapter on 'modernisation'). Whilst Mangope believed in the ability of 'development' to overcome these contradictions, S. V. Sifora, another opposition spokesman, could only envisage a state of dependency resulting from the failure to achieve consolidation of territory:

'We regret that in our independence that the South African Government should have seen it correctly, that the Motswana must always depend on him as he did yesterday, and as he does today, as he intends from doing tomorrow. This prime intention, if he had not had this intention, should have accepted the boundaries that were shown.. so that I have my kraal. I have a field. I am able to feed my children, like any Motswana hates to feel that he is being supported by another. We are not happy, not with

72 Ibid., pp85:86.
independence, but with the manner in which we are given, in fact forced into it, I want to say'."

Sifora voiced other sources of unhappiness with ‘independence’ including the Homeland Citizenship Bill which undermined confidence in the conception of an independent Bophuthatswana because Tswana citizenship was enforced upon all Batswana in or outside the territory. Furthermore, non-Tswana residents falling under Bophuthatswana jurisdiction, would still be required to carry the hated Identity Cards for the Bophuthatswana regime. Despite protestations, particularly from the opposition parties concerning land and respect for chieftaincy, and more generally blacks throughout South Africa as well as international opinion, the Report was accepted unanimously by the BLA. The official Bophuthatswana government justification was that it acted on behalf of the ‘Tswana Nation’. However, two essential ingredients, namely people and territory, were required. On these criteria, the extent to which Bophuthatswana could be called viable was questionable. Any pretence of self-determination was seen as wholly fraudulent by most observers. Despite global condemnation, ‘independence’ was bestowed upon Bophuthatswana at midnight 6th December 1977. South Africa was the only country in the world officially to recognise Bophuthatswana. The Organisation of African Unity, epitomised the widespread international opposition to Bophuthatswana as:

‘. the sham independence ... which amounts to nothing short of the balkanisation of the country’."

The official South African position proposed to counter-act criticism by promoting ‘independence’ as ‘decolonisation’ of black states which was supposedly achieved through non-violence. However, for some sections of both black and white South

71 Ibid., pp71.
72 RDM, 5.12.77.
73 RDM, 6.12.77. For example, Breytenbach, W. J. (1977) op. cit., was a typical pro-South African government position which promoted Bophuthatswana as the '52nd independent state in Africa'. A common ploy in these propaganda
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African society it was clear that these events, although a 'sham', nonetheless were having a real impact and meaning. They were not merely borne of 'false consciousness'. The 'independence' ceremony itself reflected the incantation and rituals of 'nation-building' formation with flag-raising ceremonies, freedom songs, parades of the national guard. Bophuthatswana was following the standard 'nation-building' formula and pretensions to nation-hood. Despite widespread disapproval, some ambiguity could be detected within the critical responses to 'independence'. The 'independence' ceremony was generally described as 'Uhuru' (black liberation) devoid of real emotions, with frayed edges and boredom shining through this fraudulent 'nation-hood'. For all its criticisms, however, the liberal press, at times also suggested that the ceremony signified the 'real Africa':

'A ruritanian operatta set on the fringes of the Kalahari with tinny march music, dignitaries and salutes and inspections. Top dignitaries lost their cars or walked out of the stadium amid urgent pleas over loudspeakers for help such as "will the driver of the Commissioner-Generals car please please come forward". It was one sign that

Publications was to compare Bophuthatswana favorably, on the basis of quite dubious assumptions and data, to the other African states in terms of 'development' indices. These methods were also used by government representatives during South African Parliamentary debates on the homelands in the mid-1970s.

For an overview of national symbols in South Africa see for example, Maake, N. (1996) 'Inscribing Identity on the Landscape' in Darian-Smith, K., Gunner, L. and Nuttall, S., Text theory, space. Land, literature and history in South Africa and Australia, Routledge.

Shillington, K. (1985) op. cit., suggests that the ceremony and 'independence' ceremony was apathetic and met with an absence of popular nationalism. One newspaper suggested that the event bore the hall-marks of a Mangope stage-crafted perfection which combined 'raw tribalism with twentieth century pizzazz- bare boobs, bands and some Barnum and Bailey'. The report attempted to dramatise events emphasising, for example, that the 'entire' stadium of 50 000 supposedly rose in mass choruses with the Tswana national slogan 'Pula'. Star, 10.12.77. Other coverage of the ceremony itself was more forceful in its criticism suggesting that the master of ceremonies had to beg for applause and ululation's. It was alleged that the crowd sang the wrong anthem, opting for Nkosi Sikelela, the banned black nationalist song. The 'anthem' was then followed by a feeble chant of the Batswana prayer 'Pula' with the failure of the crowd to draw upon the customary response of 'a ene', meaning 'let it rain'. By the time of Mangope's 'Presidential' address the stadium was half-full and it was claimed, people were rushing home to bed. RDM, 7.12.77.
Chapter Three: Maturing the Nation

The real Africa had returned to Bophuthatswana.\textsuperscript{74}

The report therefore portrayed the ‘independence’ celebration as a delayed return to the ‘real’ Africa, inadvertently reinforcing ‘official’ government discourse which promoted the distinctions between the apartheid definition of a ‘white’ Republic of South Africa and less developed ‘black’ South Africa. More critical views observed that without large scale black consent, homeland independence remained the white man’s scheme and ‘it is a backwards step, taking us away from the reality of our all being in SA together’.\textsuperscript{79}

Although these pretensions of ‘nation-hood’ were rejected by the international community there was a specific sense in which the Bophuthatswana government was now thinking and acting as if a nation-state. Bophuthatswana represented ‘independence’ as the reunification of the Tswana tribes and the reclamation of sovereignty denied by British colonialism. The Bophuthatswana regime’s discourse delved into pseudo-ethnic accounts to justify ‘independence’ as stemming from the first major move towards ‘reunion’ in 1961 with the formation of the TTA. One author drew upon the symbolism of the 1968 opening of the TTA by Dr. P.G.J. Koornhott, then South African Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, and his presentation of a mace to the chairman of the TTA Executive Council, Chief John Serobatse. The gift of this bronze mace was interpreted as symbolising the destiny of the Batswana within South Africa. The gold ring surrounding the mace engraved with the name ‘baTswana’:

‘...symbolises the unity of the Tswana nation. Above the ring rise two gold bands twined around the shaft, symbolising the two streams of Tswana who originally entered Tswana territory. The shaft is surmounted by rings of gold symbolically binding the two main Tswana streams together in one unit. From the rings rise 13 ears of wheat, one of the main crops cultivated by the Tswana people. According to

\textsuperscript{78} Star, 10.12.77.
\textsuperscript{79} RDM 5.12.77, emphasis added.
Tswana custom, at the end of the harvest one ear of wheat is always left on the field as a token of gratitude for the rich harvest gathered. The figure 13 also represents the 13 regions which constitute the Tswana Territorial Authority...

This passage reflects the discourse surrounding the 'invention' of Tswana tradition. 'Independence' fulfilled the historical destiny of the Tswana Nation, embodied in the phrase 'Tshwaraganang Lo Dre Pula E Nie'- 'To come together for progress'. Under this coat of arms, the Bophuthatswana government set about the task of promoting Tswana distinctiveness and 'development'. Increasing resources and control over policy greatly enhanced the capacity for state structures to implement 'nation-building' policies.

3.4. The Cultural basis of Bophuthatswana 'nation-building'

Following 'independence' in 1977 the regime rapidly began to act as a 'nation-state' and this section shows how Mangope sought to construct a Batswana ethnic identity around this 'nation-building' agenda. As Mangope's forced adherence to 'Tswanaism' intensified, so did the denial of being 'South African':

'Mangope therefore organised along tribal lines and tried to portray that there was no better person in the world than a Motswana. He started with this strategy for the Tswana speaking people of South Africa by telling them that here is your home and your government. But I think as time went on he began to believe his own lies and propaganda. He became stubborn to acknowledge that "I am a South African"'.

Attempts to create this 'home and government' for the Tswana were centred upon emphasising the uniqueness of the Tswana in a range of contexts. Lawrence and Manson reiterate the important distinction made by Pieterse between the objective

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80 Campion, H. (1977-9) Bophuthatswana- where the Tswanas meet, Sandton, Valient, South Africa.
81 Campion (1977:11) op. cit.
82 Ephraim Phlardy Motoko, Secretary Mmabatho Branch ANC, interview, Mmabatho, March, 1995.
markers of an ethnic group (language, dress etc.), as opposed to the subjective identification within the group (ethnic consciousness). In this way it is important to separate Mangope's emphasis upon a desired Tswana 'community' which he sought to cement through ethnicity and ethno-nationalism, from merely shared commonalities which could not be mobilised for a variety of reasons. The efforts to create a 'national' identity for the Batswana ethnic group in Bophuthatswana rested upon the extent to which the regime could redefine the highly ambiguous relationship between Bophuthatswana and South Africa. Bophuthatswana's cultural, educational and urban design policies attempted to create commonality. However, these policies also had to accommodate administrative, economic and political modernisation. The contradictions and emerging tensions surrounding 'nation-building' and 'modernisation' exacerbated the ambiguities of these contested loyalties.

3.4.1. The Tswana and traditional structures

An important feature of the regime was the appeal to Batswana identity anchored by the promotion of traditional authority. The commitment to traditional structures was reflected in the Constitution and in the 1978 Traditional Authorities Act. The Act sought to energise tribal authorities as a third tier of government, with administrative and judicial functions and tribal custom left to them and their sub-structures. The official Bophuthatswana view of the tribe cast it within an idiom of timeless tradition:

'The tribe is an autonomous community, inhabiting a specific territory and the members of the tribe are bound by a common loyalty to a tribal chief whose status and authority are sanctioned by tradition'.

A fundamental dichotomy therefore existed between the traditional role of the 'tribe' and its rapid transformation as a bureaucratic structure within the homeland system. The bantustan policy had been shaped around preservation of traditional values within

83 See Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) op. cit.
the rural tribal areas. As argued in the previous chapter, these ideas concerning African tradition had been subordinated to a European value system premised upon notions of ‘civilisation’ and ‘progress’. Mangope consistently claimed that the Bophuthatswana government attitude towards the ‘traditional’ value system was based upon the critique of ‘universal’ Western values, whilst also seeking to modify and adapt Batswana ‘tradition’:

'It is counter-productive arrogance for the European or any culture to claim that its value is invested with absolute and universal validity...while we honour and respect culture and tradition, not only as a fact but as an asset and precious heritage, we also believe our traditions to be subject to dynamic evolutionary change...'.

These comments were made following the widespread condemnation of the deaths of three men, who, following the requests of ‘traditional authorities’ to incarcerate them, suffocated in the strong room of a school at Bapong in Bophuthatswana. The incident captured the ambiguity of ‘tradition’ in the context of ‘nation-building’. Mangope insisted that his government ‘has never shared some people’s obsessive urge to freeze date’ tradition. On a later occasion Mangope in fact revered the adaptation of ‘tradition’ to ‘the wonders of the twentieth century’:

'We have not upset the traditional value system but have tried to enhance it and adapt it to the twentieth century. Indeed, the cultural value system of the Batswana people permeates our activities but this does not mean that we are unaware of or that we will turn away from the wonders of the twentieth century developed by other nations'.

However, the terms and nature of the ‘adaptation’ was the central problem. Since colonial times the office of chieftainship had been manipulated and effectively

86 Ibid.
commandeered by colonial and then apartheid administrators. Both South African and bantustan officials had recognised the potential leverage that chiefs, as paid state functionaries, could provide over rural people on behalf of government. The tensions surrounding the administrative role of ‘traditional’ structures and their increasing alienation of the communities they were supposed to serve, was intensified by the Bantustan system. The policy imposed a prescriptive system of institutional arrangements rather than promotion of the ‘process’ of indigenous politics and government. With the gradual withdrawal of ‘white’ South African officials, the responsibility for maintaining these arrangements passed to the Bophuthatswana homeland structure itself:

‘As a result, the masterplan for Bophuthatswana was based upon a model of the ‘traditional’ Tswana system which emphasized its dynamic administrative features and ignored its more complex political dynamics’.

The effect was to promote the external bureaucratic features as opposed to the political accountability and local popularity of tribal councils and authorities. From ‘independence’, traditional leaders were thrust into political positions which epitomised these contradictory functions of ‘traditional’ structures. A significant characteristic was the granting of authority and power to these structures not from their own communities but from a higher authority. During the Bophuthatswana ‘independence’ years chiefs were ‘expected’ to belong to the BDP (later renamed the Christian Democratic Party of Bophuthatswana, CDP). This practice took place throughout Bophuthatswana and led to the undermining rather than strengthening of chieftaincy as an institution. Indeed, local residents, both chiefs and members of tribal authorities, held differing views and interpretations of the external control emanating from the Bophuthatswana government. Most looked upon Mafeking/Montshiwa (still

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89 Comaroff, ibid.
the seat of Bophuthatswana government) with suspicion and rejection. Those not part of these different tiers of government expressed little interest in them. To avoid outright confrontation and trouble, according to Comaroff, this rejection was diplomatically phrased as ‘we cannot see it (the government of Bophuthatswana)...we do not know their faces and until they show us what they are doing, we will not know them’. For those participating in these structures, however, their suspicion of the objectives of the Bophuthatswana government was restrained by the concern to not endanger patronage by arousing the wrath of central government. One local member of the Tshidi Tribal Authority, based in the Stadt, expressed these fears:

"This thing here in Mafeking, it is trouble for us. In the end we have to listen. It’s like that time when they (South African government) applied for a site for the Dutch Reformed Church. We refused because we did not like that church. In the end the government did what they liked- and just because of us being troublesome. In the end we suffer if we don’t do what they suggest, even though they pretend to ask us first".91

A wedge was being driven between tribal structures, chiefs (although not all) and ‘their’ people:

‘Our chiefs are working against the people they are supposed to serve. They are being used by the government to deprive us of what is rightfully ours’.

In the early 1980s these administrative functions were further enhanced through the ‘Wiechers Commission’ which promoted ‘traditional structures’ supposedly in the name of local democracy and development.92 However, the Commission had been established by the Bophuthatswana government to provide considerable powers for

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91 Comaroff, ibid.
92 Comaroff, ibid. pp45
94 Know by its proper title as Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Local and Regional Government, the activation of Traditional Authorities and political structures in the Republic of Bophuthatswana, 1982.
traditional structures and tribal councils within rural areas, including increased control over tribal levies, customary law, as well as some aspects of law and order (including power of arrest). Perhaps the most important function of the chief concerned land allocation. With over 85% of Bophuthatswana’s population classified as ‘rural’ dwellers, and with seventy tribal authorities, the promotion of traditional structures was an extremely significant feature of governance. However, the Bophuthatswana regime portrayed its system of government as ‘forged by fusing African tribal traditions with principles drawn from the Westminster system of government and American law’. The Bophuthatswana Constitution embodied this contradiction. On the one hand it provided scope for the revival and integration of tribal structures but on the other it presented the spectre of government and administrative intervention in the tribal affairs of the Dikgosi (Chief):

‘Dikgosi shall retain their status and the designation of dikgosi, acting dikgosi, headmen (of tribes) vests in the president following confirmation by the executive council. Parliament shall not alter the boundaries of any regional authority area for any purpose except after consultation with the regional authority concerned’.

Whilst ‘status’ and ‘boundaries’ would be supposedly respected, the crucial wording concerned ‘vests in the President’. Tribal councillors could only be appointed by the dikgosi or headman, whilst only the dikgosi themselves could become regional authority chairmen or vice-chairmen. This was particularly significant as the regional authorities nominated representatives to the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly.

It is also interesting to note that in 1980 the South African Government attempted to extend the mandate of ‘traditional’ law, including the kgotla tribal law and corporal punishment, into the urban areas of South Africa. Once again, the justification was based upon the lack of ‘modern values’ amongst blacks who were considered to be not ‘so sophisticated that we should now summarily dispense with this Customary Law that has developed over the years’, Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development, House of Assembly Debates, Laws on Co-operation and Development, 2nd Amendment Bill, South African Hansard, 5th June, 1980, col. 8673. The opposition replied that these measure would be another example of government ‘enforcement’ of policy.

There was also a clear gender dimension. This policy reinforced the subordination of women as they were not allowed to be representatives or hold office. This policy was replicated throughout ‘national’ level government structures, with no females in the Legislative Assembly. Ultimately the President himself was at the apex of this hierarchical structure. Furthermore, the precise definition of the ‘traditional’ dimension remained ambiguous and vague. These features suggest that not only could a version of ‘tradition’ play a legitimatory role but, more importantly, it was open to the President’s arbitrary interpretation. Such ambiguity proved to have important local level manifestations. It also had wide implications for defining and inculcating ‘national’ values.

3.4.2. ‘Nation-building’: ‘Independence’ and Sites of Culture

On many occasions when addressing ‘his’ people, Mangope manipulated history to represent the Batswana as fundamentally different from other ‘nations’. Mangope fused these differences with religious imagery and began to represent himself as a Batswana messiah leading his people out of the darkness of colonialism and apartheid. The Batswana were represented as if the lost children of Israel, similarly scattered, but within a Southern Africa context. Bophuthatswana was portrayed as a refuge for the Batswana, their promised land. On one occasion, Mangope made a direct comparison between Israeli origins and that of Bophuthatswana:

‘...Israel and Bophuthatswana share a great deal of very significant common ground in respect of our more recent histories. In both nations, it was the flame of freedom that rose against racism, discrimination and oppression by aliens, and to reach out for the promise of dignity and self-fulfilment. In both cases, it was this vision which fired our tenacious bid for political and cultural self-determination. Or to put it into the more concrete and harsh terms of our past experiences- it was in both cases, the bid to free ourselves and our children, for evermore, from the indignities, the restrictions and the humiliations of the ghetto. It is that unquenchable spirit, which
led to Israel's ultimate achievement of statehood in 1948, even as it was the selfsame spirit, which led to Bophuthatswana's statehood in 1977'.

Through the use of a Christian discourse and religiosity Mangope tried to win the hearts of Christians by saying 'he would take them (the Batswana) to Canaan'.

Bophuthatswana, then, was represented as the repository for Batswana aspirations in South Africa, a refuge and haven for peaceful co-existence, a way 'out of the ghetto'.

As suggested, 'independence' was presented as the re-unification of previously destitute and scattered Batswana tribes and the return of the sovereignty and unity of pre-colonial times. The Tswana ethnic group was assigned origins, bounded in both time and space, which sought to legitimise Bophuthatswana as the modern repository for ancients Batswana rights denied through colonialism.

The Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' strategy emphasised the modern origins of the 'nation-state' through the rituals of the 'independence' ceremony. The founding of the 'nation' was celebrated annually on 6th December and was used as a tool to inculcate Bophuthatswana 'national identity' into popular consciousness. However, as seen in the previous section, the first ceremony in 1977 had met with little popular enthusiasm. These efforts to encourage the bonding of the nation extended to forcing people to attend. In one year circulars were sent to a school principal from central government instructing the teachers to attend a music competition at the 'celebration'. This principal and her entire staff refused because:

'We could not see why we should take part in a celebration we did not recognise'.

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100 The Bophuthatswana regime's manipulation of pre-colonial relations, along with other Tswana nationalists was based upon a Tswana tradition which ascribed mythical origins to the group having arisen from a bed of reeds at Ntswana Tdatsi (Where the sun sets) in Lawrence, M. and Manson, A., ibid.
Shortly afterwards she was dismissed. Over the years the strategies used to enforce adherence to 'independence' became increasingly elaborate and coercive. In 1987, when a decade of 'independence' for Bophuthatswana was celebrated, principals were required to provide the names of teachers not attending the 'independence' celebrations. Civil servants and politicians were ordered to pay R5 towards the celebrations and register as voters or otherwise they would forfeit their salary. It was reported that a large amount of money had been set aside for gold coins and T-shirts to commemorate the tenth year of independence. Every year chiefs in the rural areas were recruited to 'encourage' people to attend the ceremonies at the 'independence' stadium. In 1992, for example, Chief Montshiwa broadcast an appeal on local Mmabatho Television in which he enthusiastically invited people from the 'Stadt' and surrounding villages to attend the ceremony. As an added incentive, Montshiwa used the promise made by Bophuthatswana officials, that free beer and meat would be provided. Following his appeal, the camera focused on the fluttering Bophuthatswana flag, reflecting the extent to which 'tradition' was used as a political tool. With the head of a leopard situated in the upper left hand corner, the 'national' flag itself illustrated this conflation of 'tradition' with the 'nation', the leopard symbolising the prominent role given to the chieftaincy.

As Bophuthatswana sought to build its nation, inevitably this 'traditionalism' permeated state structures and institutions. Efforts were made to harness the Batswana cultural landscape in many other ways. Editors of the government-owned Mail newspaper were instructed by ministers and the Bophuthatswana National News Agency (BOPANA) deliberately to include cultural issues in their coverage. Even archaeological sites were harnessed in order to tap into the rich seam of Tswana culture. The Mail declared that the discovery in Bophuthatswana of the largest known Iron Age SeTswana settlements, three hundred years old, was:

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101 In Rogers, B. (1980:76) op. cit.
102 New Nation, 25 6.87
105 Saul, op. cit.
Other cultural sites were harnessed by the Bophuthatswana Government in order to give the ‘Nation’ historical depth and hence legitimacy. These included ‘Rock art engravings at Thaba Sion’. Landmarks were appropriated for the ‘national’ cause with Thabantsho, for example, represented as a ‘hallowed ground, a place of pilgrimage’ and a national monument. Elsewhere, for the winning author of the ‘Hero of Setswana Books’ competition, for contributions to Tswana culture, a prize of R1000 was awarded from the University publishers. An annual ‘Sol Plaatje’ lecture was held at the University of Bophuthatswana (UNIBO) to commemorate this ‘Batswana Hero’ which represented the manipulation of Tswana history and culture to solidify the regime. The attempts to link the Batswana past with the present were symbolised by Mangope’s appearance and speech at the funeral of a prominent Tswana historian. Whilst the scope for celebrating Batswana culture should not be seen as a particular problem in itself, inevitably, as has been seen, the regime shaped and moulded Batswana identity around the specific ‘nation-building’ agenda of the Bophuthatswana state.

An Institute of African Studies was created at UNIBO, with the purpose of researching Batswana history and culture. One project involved the compilation of a Setswana language dictionary:

'Shortly after independence the government of Bophuthatswana decided to compile a comprehensive Setswana dictionary as the preservation of its language was believed to be the most important heritage of the nation. It was seen as the only essential identity by which the Batswana could be known.'

This scheme involved the collection of over 55,000 words many of which had lost

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106 The Mail, 12th September, 1986.
107 Pioneer, July, 1982
108 Ibid.
109 The Mail, 31.3.86.
importance and meaning to the modern Batswana in the cities'. In order to oversee the revitalisation of Setswana, the Bureau for Setswana Language and Culture was established under the Department of Education:

'It is function is to encourage traditional culture and the retention of the purity of the Setswana language'.

Extensive trips were made to rural areas and even into neighbouring Botswana to collect Setswana words and phrases which illustrated the deliberate remembering of a Setswana linguistic past. By protecting the Setswana language from 'foreign influence', the project's central importance was reflected seen as a struggle through which the 'task to preserve such a rich culture continues'. These aims were also promoted through an educational policy which embraced Tswana identity.

3.4.3. Tswana education

In 1978, the Bophuthatswana National Education Commission presented considerable scope for the promotion of the concept known as Popagano. This was a Tswana principle now applied to the role of education in 'nation-building':

'Our reading, research, symposia and reflections have led us to decide that for the people of Bophuthatswana the educational ideology of Popagano is the most effective clarion-call in this all-in effort for educational advancement in the country. Central to every aspect of the theory and practice of the educational system in Bophuthatswana should be this ideal of mutually, intensified moulding of person by person, of group by group, of community by community, and, in this way, by the nation as a whole, towards free, full, creative and effective living in an ever-changing world'.

This document gave substance to the values which Mangope wished to associate with

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112 Ibid.
his ‘liberal democracy’, and, embodied in the Bill of Rights, voiced the rhetoric of equality and respect for individual, community and for the nation as a whole. However, a crucial component concerned the exact definition of the ‘nation’:

‘A further goal of our educational system is to nurture a strong sense of oneness of the Tswana nation’.

This education system, modelled on the Kagiso system in Botswana, was shaped around the specific criterion of ethnicity. This was then promoted as the guiding philosophy for a range of influential Bophuthatswana documents:

‘The government has accepted the concept "Education for Popagano" as the ideal that has directed the highest activities of families, tribes and groups in the Tswana nation’.

Education for Popagano was seen as embracing four key objectives for the ‘development of the human potential’:

- The creation of a new self-reliance and confidence for the individual.
- Progress and development of all the country’s resources (human and material) for the benefit of all its people.
- The creation and building of a new nation.
- The promotion of co-operation and interdependence between all the people of Bophuthatswana so that all are involved in its national life and share in its future’.

Although considerable prioritisation was given to economic development in this ‘white paper’, this was accompanied by the reshaping of ‘culture’ for the stated aims of ‘National cohesion, creative renewal and purposeful reconciliation’. Through

114 Ibid. emphasis added
116 Ibid.
Chapter Three: Maturing the Nation

Popagano, Bophuthatswana citizens were to be produced in the Tswana idiom, for the:

'...moulding of the person for his physical, mental and moral and spiritual well-being from the infancy to the state of puberty and beyond has been uppermost in the family, the mophato (clan) and the nation'.

Presented as a response to decades of humiliating treatment of blacks through colonial and then apartheid policy, Popagano was cast as a restoration of dignity and affirmation of black people. Nonetheless this educational ideology celebrated Tswana differences, the unique and particular, for it was:

'...a national philosophy (located in) the proverbs, wise sayings and idioms of the Setswana language. the Motswana is an artist, a builder, a creator of images and models'.

To reaffirm the centrality of this conception as the basis for creating model citizens, it was declared that Popagano is 'what is basic in the nature of the people of Bophuthatswana'. Bophuthatswana institutions were now seeking to possess the very nature and soul of the Batswana. This possession involved what the Commission itself identified as exploring 'those habits and customs in Tswana culture that are worthy of preservation' so as to 'sublimate and modernize them'. This selectivity in defining Batswana culture gave the Bophuthatswana government the power to define what was 'worthy' and to present these characteristics as if they were steeped in 'Batswana tradition'.

The creation of the University of Bophuthatswana (UNIBO) also illustrated the blending of modern bureaucratic and administrative functions with 'traditionalism'. It provides a further example of the unstable basis of 'nation-building'. Mangope had promoted the concept of a Tswana University as early as

117 National Education Commission, op. cit.
1970.\textsuperscript{118} With its establishment by the early 1980s, admissions reflected the ethnic ‘logic’ of Bophuthatswana; they were dominated by an 80% Batswana student intake. Interestingly the composition of staff reflected Mangope’s favouring of expatriates (and shortage of educated Batswana) with only 30% designated of Tswana origin.\textsuperscript{119} Its management structures, like many other institutions, reflected the state agenda and the constraints that this placed upon curriculum and teaching. At times of opposition the status quo was maintained within the University by asserting the irrefutability of ‘tradition’:

‘Well a good example of this contradiction is seeing a senior management official sitting at the tip of the ivory tower and turning down alternative suggestions on the grounds that “according to Tswana culture this is the way we do things...”’.\textsuperscript{120}

Traditionalism was deployed as a political device in order to use powers to circumvent any potential challenges to structures of authority. This strategy even extended to a generational conflict, with parents required to sign a declaration on behalf of students through which they would abstain from politics:

‘There is in this the idea of traditional elders being used for political ends. In fact some students think that their parents have ganged up against them’.\textsuperscript{121}

In case of a challenge by alternative structures or politics, this ideology could be used to propagate a particular view of Tswana culture. UNIBO symbolised Bophuthatswana writ large with Mangope himself the ultimate Patriarch, the sole definer of Batswana ‘tradition’ in conflict with the modern management of a university. With no ‘official’ political opposition, Mangope was free to ‘invent tradition’. Any state employee could be removed under Mangope’s self-defined

\textsuperscript{118} Mangope had advocated a fund for a Tswana University in 1970, \textit{Mafeking Mail}, 1973.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
criteria of the 'proper' traditional etiquette for a chief, civil servant, worker, academic and politician.

UNIBO embodied these contradictions of a modernising/western institution borne amidst the specifically ethnic and political criteria of separate development. The promotion of self-development and nation-building was also reflected in the high profile given to other National organisations and structures. These included the Bophuthatswana National Development Council, Bophuthatswana Housing Corporation, Bophuthatswana Building Society, Bophuthatswana Taxi Association, Agricultural Bank of Bophuthatswana, Bophuthatswana Nursing Council, Bophuthatswana Nursing Association, Bophuthatswana Family Planning Association, Bophuthatswana National Parks Board, Bophuthatswana National Provident Fund, Bophuthatswana Teachers Association, Bophuthatswana Water Supply, Bophuthatswana Recording Studio, Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation, Bophuthatswana Defence Force, and even a Bophuthatswana Parachute Club, amongst others.

The cultural and political dimensions of 'nation-building' were also strongly influenced and juxtaposed with ideas and conceptions of modernisation in Bophuthatswana.
Chapter Four
4. Discourses of Modernisation in Bophuthatswana

'We have had to struggle and to sacrifice to develop infrastructure and all the physical attributes of a state and nation that wishes to jump the gap from an African rural eighteenth century economy and way of life to join the respected nations of the world in the twenty first century— all this in the brief period of 23 years from the start of our independence to the turn of the century'. Lucas Mangope.

4.1. Introduction

Mangope’s Bophuthatswana ‘nation-building’ project, in addition to its political and cultural dimensions, was also founded upon notions of ‘development’ or more precisely, modernisation. The regime presented the idea of development as if it were a formula ‘to jump the gap’ from rural Africa to the ‘respected (developed) nations’. This view of modernisation led to emphases upon processes of grand physical transformation in the pursuit of sovereignty and nation-hood. This vision of modernisation produced profound changes in the Bophuthatswana landscape which are illustrated in the following themes.

First, the legacy of economic and institutional features of dependency upon South Africa constrained and shaped the Bophuthatswana regime’s responses to the condition of ‘underdevelopment’. Bophuthatswana was represented as an ‘independent’ and sovereign nation-state and as a Less Developed Country (LDC) pursuing the course of modernisation. Second, these responses were influenced by the litany of development discourses and structures aimed at engineering modernisation. Above all, a combination of anti-traditionalism, modernising zeal and desire for transformation characterised Bophuthatswana’s own ‘development’ structures and distorted the cultural basis of nation-building.

In the great leap to join the ‘respected nations of the world’, the demands of National development were ultimately to become an insurmountable burden upon Bophuthatswana.

4.2. The Bantustans as Less Developed Countries

At ‘independence’ in 1977 South African officials compared Bophuthatswana to ‘other’ independent African countries. It is also important to reflect upon the specific nature of the relationship between the bantustans and South Africa. Bophuthatswana’s economy and state were indelibly marked by the racial and spatial logic of apartheid’s objective of granting political rights followed later by economic entitlements for blacks within the bantustans as opposed to ‘white’ South Africa. Only in 1969 were industries allowed to locate within designated black areas. This remained minimal until the mid-1970s when a new developmental impetus attempted to direct South African government policy away from the historical control and reproduction of the labour functions of the reserves. This changing emphasis reflected the new ideological rift between traditional National Party attitudes towards the bantustans and the new ‘developmentalists’ such as the Bureau for Economic Development re Bantu Areas (Benbo) which sought to promote internal growth within these territories.

The classic ‘underdevelopment’ scenario was applied by many observers to the bantustans. It was suggested that any semblance of ‘developmental’ change was merely an attempt to renegotiate the essential features of separate development-maintenance of a supply of cheap labour to ‘white’ areas and denial of black political rights in a unitary South Africa. Influenced by dependency theorists the dominant critique represented the South Africa bantustan policy as ‘anti-development’.

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2 See for example the efforts to represent Bophuthatswana as merely reflecting the ‘normal’ characteristics of the ‘average’ African country, particularly in comparison to Botswana (pp.4) in BANTU, “Focus: Bophuthatswana in Africa”, July, 1977. Comparison was also made between the bantustans and the rest of Africa, particularly with the other former Protectorates, Lesotho and Swaziland.

3 Moerdijk, op. cit. Southall, R. op. cit.
Although inflected around the specific characteristics of apartheid policy, the new emphasis upon changing economic development within the bantustans was cast within the idiom of ‘development’. The major developmental models for Bophuthatswana were heavily influenced by South African and, more general, ideas of transformation.

From the early 1970s the South African government and its corporations, departments and other administrative structures had rapidly constructed the bantustans as Less Developed Countries (LDCs). The new imagery concurs with Tapscott’s identification of a rapidly emerging (intellectual and institutional) developmentalist discourse within South Africa, linked to the crisis of South African society in the mid-1970s. As seen in the introductory chapter, these ideas rapidly gained momentum within South Africa. However, it is important to note how the concept of development, as a powerful historical idea, drew upon earlier associations with ‘trusteeship’. Its rapid deployment in the context of South Africa indicated the redefinition of the relationship between the black ‘periphery’ and white ‘core’ in terms of ‘level’ of development:

‘If the choice should be given to me between a primitive heathen Bantu and a Christian developed Bantu, then I have no choice in the matter if I wish to be true to the traditions which the Dutch and Huguenots brought to South Africa’.

Boshoff was Inspector of Schools in the Department of Bantu Education and also Secretary of Education in the Transkei bantustan. His views illustrate the central conflict being projected onto the bantustans between, on the one hand, what Boshoff and other apartheid ideologues considered the preservation of ‘national traditions and aspirations’ in the bantustans, and, on the other, the demands of the progressive litany of the European (Dutch and Huguenot) traditions. These concepts were centred upon the fundamental belief that:

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5 Boshoff, J. L. (1970) op. cit.
'Development is growth, and there is nothing, literally nothing, which grows backwards, which gets smaller as it grows. The economic development of the homelands can only mean a growing economy, and it can only be beneficial'.

These ideas permeated official discourse and also began to appear in the South African establishment print media in the early and mid-1970s. The bantustans were integral to both geographical and developmental definitions of South Africa. Empowering and developing the bantustans was now considered the moral responsibility of the more developed 'white' Republic which was represented as honestly and altruistically seeking to relocate these groups into their constituent historical homelands, over the border in 'Africa' proper:

'Historically anchored in this Republic there is a White Nation which, politically and socio-economically, is the dominant and most developed population group on the subcontinent. As a result of a unique combination of historical factors, various separate Bantu peoples came under the political sphere of the Whites during the nineteenth century. From the outset, the latter felt themselves morally obliged to implement a policy of responsible trusteeship towards these Black peoples—trusteeship based on creative self-withdrawal as the Bantu peoples became ripe for self-government to an

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7 The South African situation was related to 'a unique population composition'. The 'uniqueness' called for the differentiation between a geographical definition of 'South Africa' as including a residual African population due to the vagaries of frontier and British colonialism, and the belief that the 'Republic of South Africa' (RSA) itself was more specifically the creation and possession of 'whites': 'Those who do use these two names as interchangeable terms, should bear in mind that, in terms of the present Government's policy of separate development, the RSA is regarded as the geopolitically demarcated fatherland of the White South African Nation and two established minorities; the coloureds and Asians. As opposed to this, SA, in the geographical sense of the word, also includes various embryonic national states, viz, the ethno-historical homelands of SA's principal Bantu peoples', Bantu Investment Corporation (1974&1975) Homelands: The Role of the Corporations in the Republic of South Africa, van Rensburg Publications, Johannesburg. As if by accident, Bantu population groups had been annexed within the geographical entity of 'South Africa'.

increasing extent'.

A more suitable, less overtly racist discourse could be formed around white possession of 'development' in contrast to black 'deficiencies':

'If we were to place them on a continuum showing economic and political status in order of sophistication, the one pole of the continuum would certainly be formed by the small Bushmen minorities of the central desert areas of the subcontinent (probably the most primitive group of people in the world). When measured against the current criteria for development, the whites of the RSA (socially and economically undeniably the most sophisticated nation in Africa), form the other pole. All the other peoples can be arranged in order of socio-economic and political status between the 2 poles of the continuum'.

There was an almost astonishing ease through which these terms, race and ethnicity were interchanged with classic 'developmental' notions of linear progress. This dominant paradigm was therefore centred upon progress and level of development with the bantustans portrayed as simply less developed ethnic entities needing to catch up with the developed mature white republic:

'In truth, the South African Bantu, culturally and historically speaking, do not form a homogenous society but consist of nine clearly separate nations recognisable as main ethnic units. In general, these groups reveal significant differences in historical background, ethnic contextual language and social and cultural composition. Politically, economically and educationally the Bantu peoples are the least developed of the four main demographic groups in the RSA and they reveal the characteristics of typical developing third world communities'.

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8 Bantu Investment Corporation (1974) op. cit.
9 Ibid.
10 Bantu Investment Corporation (1975) emphasis added.
Any association between the poverty and underdevelopment of these peripheral territories and apartheid policy was now recast as a problem intrinsic to the ‘Third World’ blockages to modernisation:

‘In this respect the RSA endorses what every real authority on the development problems of the Third World knows: the success of the development schemes in economically retarded communities is to a large extent dependent upon the capacity of these peoples to learn to help themselves... (t)here is no room for any complacent or false belief in economic short cuts to higher living standards. Nor is there any room for any baseless optimism as to how long it will take to raise the average standard of living of the Black peoples to the current level of the White population’.11

The role of the South African government was now represented as correcting the lack of development. The bantustans were nurtured as LDCs with traditional concepts and tools of regional economic development such as ‘growth poles’, ‘comparative advantage’ and encouragement of ‘local markets’ deployed.12 The bantustans were therefore portrayed as the ‘other’ and part of black Africa, situated over the white frontier of the advanced development of ‘European’ South Africa and contrasted with these underdeveloped ‘black’ spaces. A number of development agents were created in response to this shift in official discourse. The Department of Bantu Administration was renamed with the suffix of Development and also established the Bantu Investment Corporation and Development Corporations. ‘National self-realization’ implied the creation of viable economic and political structures in the bantustans, in tandem with the ‘development’ needs of these entities.13 The bantustans were caught

11 Bantu Investment Corporation (1975:9).
13 This official discourse overlapped with that of the print national print media in which the homelands became associated with issues of security, economy, development. Whilst the liberal English-speaking establishment press attacked the more blatant forms of race discrimination, nonetheless it was also drawn to idea that the bantustans 'needed' development, and that this was good in itself. One such headline, with reference to the industrial development of the bantustans, announced ‘Lighten Our Darkness’, Financial Mail, 1974.
up in questions of economic viability requiring technical rather than painful political solutions. It is impossible to understand the course of 'nation-building' and how these ideas of modernisation were projected upon Bophuthatswana without examining the options open to and the constraints faced by the Mangope administration following 'independence'.

4.2.1. Economic features

From the late 1960s, Benbo, a South African state agency within the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, was responsible for investigating development options for the homelands. Benbo's 1975 report on Bophuthatswana created widespread doubts throughout South Africa regarding the potential economic viability of this bantustan. These concerns were epitomised by the identification of two overwhelming and inter-related features of the Bophuthatswana economy. The first concerned the historical dependence upon the South African economy reflected in an extremely low proportion of the Gross National Product generated from Bophuthatswana's own internal sources. In 1975 Benbo estimated that 80% of the GNP was created by commuters and migrant labourers from Bophuthatswana working in South Africa. This dynamic indicated the failure to consolidate Bophuthatswana territory, proximity to the PWV and dependence upon white towns. Approximately 60% of Bophuthatswana's economically active population were either migrants or daily commuters to workplaces inside South Africa. Bophuthatswana depended heavily upon the transfer of taxes and incomes, together with the customs duties paid on goods brought from South Africa into Bophuthatswana by these 'ethnic' citizens. After 'independence' the contributions of migrant and commuter workers to Bophuthatswana's economy was reflected in GDP

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14 Bophuthatswana was portrayed as following an evolutionary path represented as a 'Long way to go for the homelands', RDM, 17.4.75.
15 Bophuthatswana, BENBO (1975).
as a proportion of GNP equalling 55.3% in 1980 and 50% in 1985. This dependence upon outside sources was also reflected in South African government budgetary payments to Bophuthatswana. These were referred to in the official discourse as ‘development aid’ and remained at approximately 25% of revenue during the ‘independence’ era.

The regime’s internally produced revenue or ‘own sources’ included local taxes, licence fees, royalties and interest earned. Bophuthatswana’s ‘own sources’ of revenue compared to total revenue was 23% in 1974/5, 65% in 1980/1, 46% in 1987/8 and 71% in 1992. Furthermore, as suggested above, an important component of the revenue included as ‘internal’ was actually customs payments and taxation revenue transferred from South Africa. This category included the receipts from the Southern Africa Customs Union to which all the ‘independent’ TBVC states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) were members. Again throughout ‘independence’ these customs payments were approximately another 25% of revenue. Therefore from 1977 to 1994 approximately 50% of Bophuthatswana’s revenue should be considered as controlled and allocated from outside rather than under direct Bophuthatswana government control.

A second prominent feature of Bophuthatswana’s dependence upon South Africa’s economy, obviously related to the limited internal sources of income, was reflected also in the territory’s historical function as an exporter of labour to the mines, farms, industries and homes of the white ‘core’. In 1980 Bophuthatswana’s total economically active population consisted of 41.8% migrant workers and 30.9% commuters from Bophuthatswana towns into South Africa. By 1985 this had fallen slightly to 37% and 17.4% respectively but still confirmed the overwhelming pattern

17 Development Bank of South Africa, *SATBVC Statistical Abstracts* (1987). In 1985 for example, of a total GNP of R2 938 663 929, migrant earnings were R1 246 649 515, commuter income R485 218 414 with the remaining GDP calculated at R1 206 796 000 i.e. less than half GNP, *Indicator SA*, 1988.

18 All figures from Nattrass, N. and Nattrass, J. (1990) ‘South Africa, the homelands and rural development’, *Development Southern Africa*, Vol. 7, October, except 1992 from the *Race Relations Survey 1993/4*, SAIRR, Johannesburg. However, as with all calculations concerning Bophuthatswana, a degree of caution is required as to accuracy. Nonetheless, most analysts confirm the overwhelming pattern of dependency.
that outside sources contributed to 50-60% of the populations income during the
‘independence’ era. At ‘independence’ in 1977 the level of average income derived
from inside Bophuthatswana was described as ‘extraordinarily low’. Academics and
other observers focused upon additional features of dependency including the lack of
infrastructure, small population, deterioration of subsistence agriculture and declining
ecological basis. All these features detracted from Bophuthatswana’s potential
viability and the claims of ‘independence’. With no colonial economy to inherit, no
fiscal, currency or tariff controls, Bophuthatswana was characterised as possessing an
even worse economic position than pre-independence Africa. Many of these
characteristics were also applicable to other countries and there was a tendency to
generalise and stereotype the bantustans.

Despite its dependent characteristics, in comparison to the other TVBC states,
Bophuthatswana did have the considerable luxury of royalties from extensive mining
operations, in addition to casino and gambling royalties and proximity to the
industrialised PWV. The bantustan’s territory formed part of the Bushveld Igneous
Complex and by the mid-1980s Bophuthatswana was the world’s third largest
producer of Platinum Group Metals (9.1% of world output) and second largest
producer for chrome (18.5% of world output). Mining contributions therefore
dominated Bophuthatswana’s GDP and comprised between 30-50% of this between
1977-1991. These earnings did provide Bophuthatswana with so-called ‘free money’

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20 Butler et al, op. cit.
21 Ibid.
22 Adams makes an interesting economic comparison between the South African
homelands and the BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland). However,
he concluded that both groups differed in their degrees of economic dependency
upon South Africa: ‘It appears that the cumulative economic, political, and
social disabilities of the homelands will make it impossible for them to match
the growth rates of the BLS countries in the long run’. Moreover, the distorting
effects of separate development and its restricted policies would work against
the homelands, it was suggested. Adams, J. 1978, “Economic Development in
the Small Economies of Southern Africa: Contrasting Currents in the BLS
23 GENCOR presentation to BOPIIA, (1987) op. cit.
24 Approximate calculation from SATVBC statistics and Daphne, P. and de Clercq,
6- From Red Friday to CODESA, (eds.) Moss, G. and Obery, I, Ravan Press,
that was ‘free in the sense that control from the Republic of South Africa is limited’. This ‘free money’ was arguably one of the key factors which had convinced Mangope to pursue his ‘independence’ strategy. The efforts and strategies to reverse the chronic economic dependency upon South Africa were also conditioned by the inherited institutional features.

4.2.2. Institutional features

An integral component of the emerging developmental discourse were the white created administrative structures oriented towards black ‘development’. By the mid-1970s South African developmental structures were directed towards this change from control to ‘development’ of the bantustans. No overall plan for this development existed and, according to Butler et al, there were signs of competition and rivalry between the fifteen different administrative structures responsible for ‘development’ in the bantustans. The most prominent characteristic and legacy of these structures for Bophuthatswana would be their heavily top-down attitude to the bantustans. Policy, decision-making and implementation were simply imposed upon homeland residents. Crucially, the only potential feedback to these structures was the homeland leadership itself. Even here, the South African Department of Bantu Administration and Development was the ultimate decision maker.

The lack of black participation was connected to an administrative and racial attitude shaped by ideas of ‘trusteeship’ of the Bantu. The ease with which a development discourse diffused through South Africa must be seen also within the context of the racial and ‘progressive’ ideas underpinning trusteeship. Administrative structures were exclusively white and in the day to day administration blacks were


22 Nattrass, N. and Nattrass, J. (1990) op. cit.

23 Butler et al, op. cit.

24 Chapter two indicated the historical roots of white attitudes towards the ‘native’, termed as ‘trusteeship’, based upon a paternalistic control, intervention into and management of ‘native’ affairs.

25 Tapscott, op. cit.
simply out of site.93 The exclusion of blacks from the BIC and other institutions was justified by recourse to a modernising discourse. Through these ideas blacks were deemed as lacking the essential features needed to attain modernity and development. These white administrators, by implication, were entrusted with intervention in order to correct this deficit. In its most visible form, this deficit supposedly included black's lack of 'economic and entrepreneurial spirit', explored within the context of Bophuthatswana's own structures in the following section. These sentiments underpinned a range of practices introduced to bring about development.

A new budgeting method and economic model were promoted to correct the lack of 'development' amongst homeland populations. From 1969 Benbo led the efforts to shift bantustan administrative policy from its bureaucratic and service-led orientation. A new budgeting method, the Planning Programming Budgeting (PPB) approach symbolised this changing emphasis. The PPB method was firstly, to identify developmental 'priorities' and 'objectives', and secondly to monitor the 'progress' of these. On this basis the PPB determined a per-centage allocation of the budget to each sector. The allocation replaced the previous line-item budgeting and became tied to specific planning and physical objectives.94 The PPB method reflected the growth of a technical discourse aimed at avoidance of 'wasteful' political questions by stressing the rationality of the technical argument. The emphasis upon physical delivery and growth reflected the central strategy of these developmental administrations to 'encourage' blacks to relocate from white areas to the bantustans for economic reasons. The principal objective was regarded as employment creation in the bantustans. The 'multiplier effect' model was promoted as the solution to the bantustan's failure to internalise economic growth. It was aimed at stemming flows of labour into South Africa and lessening the import of goods by returning workers. These transfers were termed income 'leakages' from Bophuthatswana to South Africa. Employment creation and improved commercial facilities within the bantustans became dominant policy positions directed towards preventing the leakage.

29 Butler et al, op. cit. The racist attitudes of the Bantu Investment Corporation towards Batswana business men was mentioned in chapter three.
30 Ibid.
Both practices appeared full of contradictions and problems for the Bophuthatswana successors to these administrations. For example, the PPB method reflected the desires of the white administration rather than appropriate black needs. Furthermore, the PPB required a high level of expertise in management but as Butler suggested no training was underway for blacks prior to 'independence' in the mid-1970s. More generally there was the perception by certain academics that these strategies were simply shaped around the requirements of separate development rather than the promotion of the political and economic autonomy of the homelands:

'The great tragedy is that time and resources are being devoted to programs to force black development into approved channels rather than allocated in response to community wishes and needs and to existing strengths'.

These features passed over into the Bophuthatswana administration. A central ambivalence characterising this emerging 'development' strategy was whether Bophuthatswana was regarded as an economically integrated part of South Africa or autonomous. In response to its economic dependency, Bophuthatswana adopted a 'national' attitude to 'development' to distance itself from any suggestion of dependency upon South Africa. In pursuit of 'national development', Bophuthatswana continued to be dependent upon inherited structures, whilst, at the same time internalising ideas of modernisation and transformation.

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31 According to BANTU, (July, 1977, op. cit.) the South African Government claimed that by 1977 'a few hundred Tswana state officials' were being trained by South Africa. Two points should be made about this. Firstly, the inadequate time-span; ‘...they received intensive training in the management of the departments, including an eight hour session on decision-making’, (emphasis added). It was therefore doubtful that the training involved the highly technical aspects of the PPB. Secondly, it is also interesting to note more generally the dominance of the 'South African' style of administration upon Bophuthatswana institutions.

4.2.3. Bophuthatswana Structures and Responses

In 1973, in accordance with the new developmental objectives, Benbo introduced a Planning Committee into Bophuthatswana. The intention was that the Committee:

‘...identifies and analyses problems hampering economic development in the territory, evaluates alternatives to solve problems and promote development’.

Planning was regarded as the key to rapid transformation of Bophuthatswana, supposedly minimising ‘painful’ change and ‘the minimal loss of those traditions and values which are highly prized by society’. The PPB method was also introduced into Bophuthatswana in the early 1970s. Prior to ‘independence’ as if to epitomise the influence of the South African model, the Bophuthatswana government requested the Department of Bantu Administration and Development to produce a National Development Plan for Bophuthatswana. Benbo in particular had an important role in defining overall development strategy. Rather contradictorily the ‘development philosophy’ claimed to balance the impetus for ‘development’ with the cultural identity ethos of apartheid policy:

‘The development philosophy is one of modernisation without loss of cultural identity wherever possible and takes place within the framework of a Christian Tswana Society and free enterprise system’.

This modernising impulse was, however, increasingly to come into direct conflict with both ‘tradition’ and cultural ‘uniqueness’.

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33 Bophuthatswana at Independence, op. cit. van Rensburg, publications.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
4.2.4. The Creation of the Bophuthatswana Development Council (BDC)

The conception of transformation had deep seated emotional and material appeal for various factions within the Bophuthatswana state edifice. The reading of the Parliamentary Bill for the Bophuthatswana Development Council reflected the magical allure of the quest for 'development'. In 1979 in order to maximise and unleash the progressive dynamism of 'development', faith was vested in the creation of the Bophuthatswana Development Council (BDC). In conjunction with South African advisors in the Department of Economic Affairs, an overall co-ordinating structure for development planning was required. The BDC would be the organising body through which all government Departments and parastatals would liaise in order to have projects approved and budgetary parameters set. The BDC was seen as providing a one stop professional service co-ordinating planning, implementation of projects, statistics and a professional secretariat to relate these dimensions. This Council would also act in an advisory role to Bophuthatswana’s President and Executive Council (Cabinet).

During the reading of the Bill, Mangope quoted the views of Albert Watson of the World Bank. It was claimed that if planning was to be a high priority, then responsibility for this should rest ultimately with a central planning authority in association with the Chief Executive or Council of Ministers. Mangope voiced Watson's opinion that '...approval of plans and the setting of planning objectives and targets...' should not be delegated. It was argued that the BDC would embody the controlling functions needed for rapid change:

'This Bill, the Development Council Bill, makes provision for the establishment of a Council with the objective to advise on the development of Bophuthatswana for the improvement of the material and social welfare of its population'.

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The ability to improve 'material and social welfare' was directly related to the BDC and its adoption of a universal language of development. Furthermore, this discourse was interpreted as assisting in the efforts to receive recognition from the international community:

'Another point is that Bophuthatswana was not taken cognizance of by the people because she was regarded as illegitimate but I feel if our objectives could be achieved through this council, Mr. Speaker, the world outside will start developing interests in Bophuthatswana'.

The creation of the BDC was perceived as the embodiment of the ability to 'do development' and enhancing both international reputation and self-improvement of the Batswana:

'We are happy that the time will not be wasted in showing the world outside that Bophuthatswana is able to maintain her own people, because it is our belief that whatever land we have at our disposal we shall use effectively in order to maintain us and for the upkeep of ourselves and our children. Time has come, Mr. Speaker, that every Motswana should stand up and work hard so that the question of starvation and the lack of work opportunities should be solved'.

The BDC was associated with increasing 'freedom' from South Africa and control over policy to eradicate poverty and realise the full potential of the land. The emerging discourse was therefore also a device to circumvent the political and economic dependency of Bophuthatswana upon South Africa. Member M.A. Tlhoaele's comments epitomised the belief in 'development' as if an irrepressible force of progress, as symbolised by the BDC:

37 Ibid. p1070.
38 Ibid.
'Now that we are free in our thinking that we are free in our administration, let us now accept this Bill as it is. If we can have the Bophuthatswana Development Council as well as the Bophuthatswana Development Fund, I have no doubt to say that Bophuthatswana within ten years will be an economic giant... Poverty will die in Bophuthatswana.'

Once again ‘independence’ was associated with the control over ‘development’ and whilst also arresting the inertia that had characterised the pre-independence apartheid era. A parallel was drawn between the modernising impetus and Tswana communal development known as Lepasa. The developmental fruits of government support to the poor, orphans, women: with land, water, extension officers and grain, was considered as a form of capitalistic ‘communalism’, likened to ‘(T)he material and social promotion of the Motswana’ through Lepasa:

‘Add to all that a Government tractor and other agricultural implements and grain to this picture... and you have an insight into the old institution in Tswana ‘Lepasa’.

A Directorate of Planning Co-ordination which had been established within the Department of Economic Affairs formed the nucleus for the establishment of the BDC. The BDC was therefore formed in 1979 and was the primary body responsible for defining departmental budgets, development planning and approval for projects in Bophuthatswana. The BDC consisted of 8-12 executives drawn from the major governmental departments, the Department of Planning Co-ordination and importantly, private sector involvement with members of the Rembrandt group (South African industrialists) amongst other ‘experts’. The important role envisioned for the BDC was revealed in a memo from the chairman of the BDC ‘to all departmental heads, chief executive officers and advisors to the Bophuthatswana Government’. It was stated that a development strategy was being devised for Bophuthatswana:

39 p1070&1071.
40 Ibid. p1071&1072
'When accepted this development strategy will become the development policy of the Bophuthatswana Government and will form the basis for a national action programme for the development of Bophuthatswana...the document will also be used in evaluating programmes and projects...when budgeting proposals from all the different Departments and Public Corporations are discussed by the Bophuthatswana Development Council'.

As the main definer of development policy, the role of the BDC illustrated the predominance of seconded or 'outside' influences in Bophuthatswana. The chairman of the BDC himself, Mr. D. W. Schoeman, had been trained in the Pretoria based Benbo before being seconded as economic advisor to Bophuthatswana at Mangope's request. By the late 1970s in the absence of internal or local capacity to create development policy it is not surprising that seconded officials had a central role in creating Bophuthatswana developmental frameworks.

In terms of organisational capacity the BDC was supposedly the principal planning institution for development:

'...(the) main functions of this Council will be to 1) recommend development strategies, priorities, plans and programmes for approval by the Executive Council and 2) prepare budgets for appropriation of the funds of the Bophuthatswana Development Fund (all funds for development purposes appropriated by Parliament

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41 Memo from D.W. Schoeman, Chairman of the BDC, Department of Economic Affairs, Montshiwa, 8.16.79.
42 After University Schoeman joined BENBO and, according to him, BENBO, began to question the impact of apartheid policy on the viability of the homelands and therefore introduced Planning Councils into various homelands. Schoeman was seconded to Bophuthatswana in 1977 and finally joined the administration in 1979. Most of Schoeman's career therefore spanned the existence of Bophuthatswana itself. Schoeman had been Chairman of the Bophuthatswana Development Corporation (1979-1981) then project consultant for the Development Bank of South Africa (1983-89) before rejoining the Bophuthatswana Administration in 1991. Schoeman, D. (1995) Director of the Directorate of Development Planning and Administration, Bophuthatswana/North West Province, interview, Mmabatho, 28.3.95.
or obtained from any other source (e.g. loans or gifts) should be paid into this source)."

In addition to their regular functions, Government Departments would also carry out budget and work programmes developed by BDC and approved by the Executive Council. The BDC Annual Report of 1979 had formed the basis for the 1981 White Paper on Development. Both emphasised the need for a tightly balanced budget and reflected the predominance of economistic concerns centred upon achieving economic growth through prioritising development objectives. The BDC was the embodiment of the modernising zeal which underpinned the ‘development discourse’.

4.3. Modernising Zeal

Development structures and the various branches of the Bophuthatswana government were supposedly connected by the White Paper on Development. The actual relation between the components of development policy was suggested more by what the White Paper omitted than by what it contained. This document symbolised the extent of ‘externally’ defined ideas. In conjunction with other sources it revealed a striking contradiction between ideas of modernisation and Batswana ‘tradition’. Given the intention of the BDC to be the key definer and planner of ‘development’ it is necessary to scrutinise its vision of development by focusing on the Reports and White Paper on Development that it produced. The basic premise of policy was development as economic and physical growth:

"The term development refers to all physical, social and financial actions required for economic growth and over-all economic development progress while policy is defined in the broader context to include policy measures, principles and objectives".44

44 BDC (1979a:2).
To promote development the growth of basic production sectors and infrastructure was a key consideration ‘...to see how and when they should be developed to best suit needs of the economic sectors and the national goal(s)’. Those national goals or objectives were stated as:

‘...to raise the standard of living of the total population; and to make the country economically and thus also politically viable’.45

There was a strong emphasis upon encouraging the role of the private sector and the creation of conditions conducive to foreign investment and large scale industry. Reinforcing the ‘multiplier’ theory was the reiteration of the importance of commercial facilities so as to enable the Batswana to buy goods within Bophuthatswana rather than South Africa. This large scale and commercial focus, given the low wages and small number of jobs being created, would not necessarily entail appropriate economic development policy (see chapter six). Large industries might be capital rather than labour intensive and externally owned, perhaps leading to the extraction of profits and very low industrial wages. With government subsidisation of the commercial sector perhaps scarce funds would be diverted from job creation.46 The two most startling features of the White Paper were as follows. Firstly, despite the Tswana nationalist and cultural basis of the regime, the ‘universal’ language of modernisation, efficiency, centralisation and optimal utilisation was strongly emphasised. Secondly, the ambivalence of policy concerning economic integration with South Africa or autonomous and ‘national’ development was not clarified.

Regarding the discourse of modernisation, the White Paper, despite the fact that it was a Bophuthatswana government publication, reflected deep-seated negative views of African capacity for ‘development’. This bias was most noticeable in the overall perception of economic growth as development which stressed that the

disruption of tribal traditions should be avoided. ‘Popagano’ was therefore promoted as the philosophy to build a ‘national identity’, thereby ‘building up, progress and development’. Even here with a strong emphasis upon nurturing culture and identity, a conflict with modernity was evident in that education should be a ‘useful contributor to the economic development process’ and preparation for the young ‘faced with the problem of being pulled into the vortex of an urban culture’. An earlier draft of the White Paper, subsequently modified, strongly reflected the negative attitude towards tradition. Development would supposedly act as a catalyst:

‘.to motivate the individuals and groups in the community to free themselves from the shackles of ignorance, idleness, superstition and stultifying cultural practices; and in this way to be forward looking, creative productive, relying on self and determined to play its special role in the development of the nation’.

‘Shackles of ignorance, idleness, superstition and stultifying cultural practices’ reflected the historical view of trusteeship now shaped around ‘development’. As suggested earlier, in conjunction with other sources, this modernising and racist discourse regarded the African generally as unfit for development purposes:

‘The country’s economy is however characterised by the same problems facing other developing countries: low productivity and under-employment. These problems are due to an inhibiting land tenure system; human attitudes which are not development-minded; a lack of motivation...’

Other prevalent themes common to the official development discourse centred upon attitudes to settlement patterns, entrepreneurs and agriculture. Agricultural

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47 Popagano was a Tswana oriented educational philosophy mentioned in the previous chapter.
49 BDC (1979a:11) op. cit.
50 BENBO (1977) op. cit. Emphasis added.
performance in Bophuthatswana was regarded as ‘beset by problems...which have their origin in age-old practices and traditions’. Fortunately, it was claimed, earlier contact with the Voortrekkers had exposed the Tswana to ‘more progressive farming methods and techniques’. Indeed, the degree of westernisation amongst the Tswana was deemed praiseworthy:

‘They were the first Black people to have substantial and sustained contact with the urban industrial civilisation of White South Africa’.

Traditional settlements were considered an obstacle to ‘progress’ because they made the ‘superimposing of modern infrastructure’ on such large areas ‘impossible’. The Institute for Regional Planning at the Afrikaner dominated Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education had suggestions for a National Plan for Bophuthatswana. Again the focus was upon assisting the transition to modernity with the labour dependency upon South Africa simply reflecting ‘the willingness of the people of Bophuthatswana to adopt the way of life of a modern western economy’. Development was a means towards urbanising and industrialising the population of Bophuthatswana because traditional settlements had little to ‘offer people who live in a modern economy’. Industry was suggested as the cornerstone of government policy. Again the multiplier effect was cited as the principal means to stem the outflow of buying power and to encourage people to ‘buy Bophuthatswana’. The modernising impulse came crashing into traditional settlements, particularly those based upon agricultural subsistence:

‘It is a matter of conjecture whether the present dwelling patterns of the rural Tswana community can be reconciled with optimal farming practices. The traditional villages spreading as they do over large areas of rural land, certainly do not promote optimal

\[51\] Ibid.
\[52\] Ibid.
land use. On the contrary they invariably present examples of overgrazing’.

These sentiments would have major importance for Bophuthatswana agricultural policy shaped as it was, around ‘National’ goals of self-sufficiency and increased production. All of these major reports emphasised optimal utilisation of land and centralisation of settlements through the creation of ‘central magnets’ with central functions. This centralisation was presumably the inevitable consequence of progress:

‘Centralization (of population) in various spheres, has shown to be essential as an innovative force in the early stages of development, to be followed in the later stages by a policy of carefully controlled decentralization’.

The lack of infrastructure in Bophuthatswana hitherto was considered to be the result of ‘the prevalence of traditional attitudes and practices and lack of entrepreneurial talent’. There was a common emphasis upon the need for entrepreneurs whose ‘almost complete absence...creates one of the major difficulties for internal economic growth and development...’. This strategy was reflected in both Benbo reports and the Bophuthatswana White Paper. It was thought that a ‘new technological class of workers and managers’ would attract better paying industries and improve internal financing.

As if not made obvious enough, urban bias was more emphatically stated with the allocation of resources dependent upon ‘cities which promise to be the most viable in order to use their productive capacities in later stages of urbanization of other

54 BDC, (1979a) op. cit. pp16.
56 Ibid.
57 BDC (1979a) op. cit.
58 Bophuthatswana (1977b) op. cit.
59 Potgieter, op. cit.
cities. The moderniser's mission was finally captured by Potgieter who perceived development not only as growth and enlargement but also as a 'series of successive transformations occurring in the system itself':

'In this way a predominantly rural community can develop into an industrial community with all the attributes of a modern economy. This is the primary object of the proposals which follow'.

In the efforts to acquire the attributes of 'a modern economy' Bophuthatswana's relationship to South Africa still required clarification.

4.3.1. Integration or Isolation

The White Paper on Development represented a standard 'development administration model' similar to many of African plans and for some, a 'healthy' statement of modernising 'mixed economy ideology'. A former economic advisor to Mangope, Karl Magyar, suggested that the Paper was 'too ambitious' and ascribed to government 'unrealistic responsibility that will not be realized'. There appeared to be a lack of prioritisation of objectives and no temporal schedule for a long term development programmes. Given the enormity of South African economic and institutional influence, the most remarkable and crucial omission was the failure to recognise the high level of dependency which supposedly warranted a 'unique approach'. The Paper shifted emphasis from border industrialisation to economic development within the 'national states':

'National Development of the countries of Southern Africa is regarded as the highest

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61 BDC (1979) op. cit.
62 Potgieter, op. cit. p76.
64 Ibid. (1982).
priority at all times. All forms of economic and social co-operation should be subordinate to this objective'.

Karl Magyar suggested that this stress upon ‘national’ development and internal autonomy was denying recognition of and hence planning for Bophuthatswana as an economically integral part of South Africa. The fundamental dynamics of the relationship between the two economies depended upon an exchange of labour in the homeland for the capital, management and skills from South Africa:

‘As neither side will progress without such an exchange, most further discussions about viability and classical conceptions of independence become inconsequential academic exercises’.

The high level of migrant and commuter workers was a powerful indication of Bophuthatswana’s economic integration with South Africa. Magyar suggested that this major feature could become an important issue for clarifying and promoting economic integration. The ‘independent’ status and political drive for sovereignty in Bophuthatswana was denying the ‘logic’ of economic ties:

‘The homelands are de facto a part of the South African political community and any increased economic integrative ties can not possibly proceed without the retention and intensification of political relations’.

The political and economic contradictions of Bophuthatswana development would be exacerbated in the pursuit of separate, autonomous nation-hood. Bophuthatswana’s infrastructure, development aid, capital and investments, key expatriate personnel, mines, tourism and extended geographical borders, were mainly if not entirely

dependent upon South Africa. In the White Paper however, there was emphasis upon the desire for efficient utilisation of Bophuthatswana’s own sources of income in order to lessen dependence upon aid from RSA and to ‘ensure the internal political autonomy of Bophuthatswana’. It is therefore ironic that during the period of his involvement with Bophuthatswana, Magyar had the opinion that in the ‘early stages’ of a country’s growth that government, as collectors of revenue, rather than the BDC, should ultimately be responsible for the allocation of funds for realising development plans. The BDC, White Paper and Directorate of Planning Co-ordination suffered from a lack of governmental input and these structures followed the pursuit of ‘an inappropriate external model’. Governmental planning and administrative control had been stressed in the Paper but ultimately the President’s office took all the crucial decisions concerning major expenditures.

There was a gap of two years between Magyar’s earlier view regarding governmental decision-making and an emerging pattern of Executive Council, particularly Mangope oriented, decision-making. Perhaps initially Magyar had too much faith in the Bophuthatswana regime as democratically elected representatives of the bantustan, which he regarded as legitimised through General Elections. Moreover, Magyar attributed ‘the lack of political sophistication- so evident in Bophuthatswana’ to a ‘pervasive form of "democratic paternalism"’ rather than a ‘dictatorial state of affairs’. The dominance of the President was also attributed to the lack of indigenous specialists within the government. It was claimed that young professional and educated Batswana left for South Africa and that by the late 1970s and early 1980s Mangope’s principal support base included mainly traditionally oriented ministers. A development discourse had been embraced by an emerging indigenous elite in the Transkei and it is particularly important to indicate the lack of such a developmental group in Bophuthatswana.

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69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Personal communication with Karl Magyar, 1997.
The development discourse, such as it was in Bophuthatswana, was based upon the unlikely combination of Mangope's top black advisors who were not educated in development theory and a range of white South Africans (and Rhodesians), mainly free market industrialists seconded from South African industry.\textsuperscript{73} It could therefore be argued that because of the failure of the emergence of such an indigenous group within the upper echelons of the Bophuthatswana administration, the 'South African' model of development, as portrayed in the various reports, remained the major influence upon Bophuthatswana development. Mangope's own ambitions and drive for 'independence' and sovereignty were then superimposed upon this framework.\textsuperscript{74} The burden of 'nation-building' in Bophuthatswana was creating internal rifts within the various factions of its administration due to the vacillating and highly ambiguous stance on 'regional inter-dependence'.\textsuperscript{75} Mangope sharply shifted towards an embrace of 'autonomy' by the mid-1970s. However, a succession of white Bophuthatswana finance ministers, South African and English, attempted to keep the Bophuthatswana economy tied to South Africa in the interests of stability and therefore legitimacy.

By 1979 the following parastatals existed in Bophuthatswana:

1) The Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation (BNDC), executive arm

\textsuperscript{73} Personal communication with Magyar, 1997.
\textsuperscript{74} Magyar suggested to the President that Bophuthatswana could never succeed as a fully independent country and worked towards building integration. However, Mangope was supposedly 'unrealistic' and became increasingly convinced of Bophuthatswana's viability, personal communication with Magyar, 1997.
\textsuperscript{75} Mangope's own attitude to Bophuthatswana's 'integration or isolation' approach had been highly ambiguous over the years. In the early and mid-1970s he had stated that 'inter-dependence' with South Africa and the homelands was the most appropriate policy. In a conference presentation in the mid-1970s Mangope suggested: 'Firstly, we are one, we must remain one, because we are economically inter-dependent. This means that the stability and progress of our economy depends directly on the rate at which full expression is given, in spirit, in action, and in legislation, to the fact of our economic inter-dependence. Secondly, we are one, and must remain one, because we depend on each other to an extent at present only vaguely dawning on the South African public, especially in its White range, in all matters concerning our political stability and territorial integrity' (emphasis already added). Mangope at African Giant-Conference 1, Symposium: The Emergent Homelands, The Economic Potential of the Homelands, Chief Lucas Mangope, undated, pp. 5.
Chapter Four: Modernising the Nation

of Economic Affairs.

2) The Bophuthatswana Agricultural Development Corporation- (AGRICOR), executive of the Agricultural Department and agent of the Agricultural Development Board, and Agricultural Marketing Board in the Department of Agriculture.

3) The Tswana Agricultural Company (TAC)- Formed between AGRICOR in Bophuthatswana, with 50% of shares and the Corporation for Economic Development in Southern Africa (CED) in the RSA, also with 50% of shares. Various projects had been taken over since independence by Bophuthatswana with AGRICOR also acting as Management Agent for some community projects.

The major point concerning both the BNDC and AGRICOR again involved the failure to integrate them into an overall development framework. These parastatals were therefore subject to directives from the President’s Office and constrained by their limited budgets determined by government. There was also a Bophuthatswana Economic Development Committee within the Department of Economic Affairs. The extent of Executive and Presidential control upon ‘development’ strategy was reflected by Mangope’s additional portfolio as Minister of Economic Affairs. Mangope’s own conceptions of development, directed towards the appearance of a ‘nation-state’, were beginning to have a distinctive imprint upon the Bophuthatswana landscape.

Development corporations were established in each of the homelands to encourage industrial decentralisation of industry through government offers of incentives to businesses deciding to relocate or establish themselves near the bantustans. The creation of the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation (BNDC) had been announced by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.C Botha, through which it would: ‘...herald a new phase of economic development in the homelands in which further expansion is given to underlying principle of greater involvement and self-determination of homeland governments’, RDM, 20.11.75. Despite media allegations of malpractice, fraud and theft, it was clear that the allure of development was spreading and gaining momentum. The image of empowerment and 'Tswana take control' was reflected in the optimism of the launch of the BNDC with M.C Botha announcing simply that 'it was a universal principle that every nation should be directly concerned with its own development', RDM, 1.12.75.

Magyar (1984) op. cit.
4.4. The Demise of the Bophuthatswana Development Council

Initially the rubber stamping of projects and budgets by the BDC, prior to acceptance by the Executive Council (Bophuthatswana Cabinet), appeared to adhere to the BDC’s objectives and priorities. At the start of the 1980s the Bophuthatswana government relied on the BDC and followed its recommendations. However, the control of the development process increasingly came into confrontation with the ‘Nation-Building’ designs of President Mangope and the Bophuthatswana regime. Mangope’s impression of ‘development’ envisioned transformation as linear progress mirroring western countries. Although it should be pointed out that scope was given in particular to education and other areas, the distribution of government expenditure indicated that these features were secondary to the physical transformation of Bophuthatswana itself. For Mangope, ‘true’ nation-hood was signified by particular physical attributes:

‘Independence and the liberation it implies are one thing on paper, but in reality is far more complex. A true state comprises inter alia a territory and a defined people but that territory has to be developed physically in order to give forth products and commodities to satisfy the needs of people and it also has to feed the aspirations of the people’.

This statement, together with the remark by Mangope concerning ‘jumping the gap’ at the very beginning of the chapter, were made in a speech celebrating ten years of achievement since ‘independence’. Mangope contrasted international non-recognition of Bophuthatswana with imagery of internal transition and change, supposedly delivered as the country was propelled forward to the promised land of ‘development’:

\[\text{Schoeman (1995) op. cit.}\]
\[\text{Mangope, in Nation on the March (1987).}\]
'In a climate of so called "non-recognition" we have, with the blessing of God, had a good start on the road of achievement that will take us to our ultimate goal. Where there was nothing we have built schools, hospitals, health clinics, community centres, sports stadia, an university, manpower centres, introduced our own television and radio stations, agricultural projects including irrigation schemes, dams, roads, thousands of homes and other buildings'.

In effect, Bophuthatswana had achieved a degree of ‘development’ ‘on the road to achievement’ reflected by physical attributes which met western criteria of development. By physical transformation Bophuthatswana was portrayed as good enough for recognition. The physical transition placed great emphasis upon the construction industry and Department of Works. The construction industry was making an increasingly important contribution to the GDP, 5.9% in 1980, reaching 6.7% in 1985. Its potential contribution was highlighted by the Chairman of the BNDC who indicated the wide scope for construction in a ‘developing country’ and in particular, for local Batswana builders:

'One of the features of a developing country, and especially that of Bophuthatswana is the high rate of construction. The acute shortage of housing, commercial facilities, industrial buildings and office accommodation in Bophuthatswana necessitates a high rate of construction. This is also the area where Batswana could really make their mark. Presently about 9% of the economic(-ally) active population is employed in construction. Artisans needed in construction include bricklayers, plumbers, carpenters, electricians'.

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The growing importance of infrastructural development was reflected in the Department of Works’ dominance of total yearly Bophuthatswana government expenditure. In 1979 this department accounted for over 26% and for 1980 26.3% of expenditure which between 1979 to 1985 averaged 18.3%. The BDC had argued for an annual per-cent-age of total ‘national’ revenue to be set aside exclusively for what it phrased ‘development’ investment. This ‘development spending’ averaged approximately 29.5% of ‘national’ revenue between 1979 and 1984, and 20% during the whole ‘independence’ era. More revealing was the allocation of this ‘development spending’ to various departments. The development priorities were clearly indicated by the dominance again of the Department of Works which received on average between 1979 to 1985 54% of total development expenditure. The Department of Works, together with the Department of Economic Affairs, received approximately three quarters of total allocation for ‘development spending’ in the first half of the 1980s.

With such a high level of expenditure and rapid rate of construction of various housing and infrastructural projects, particularly centred upon the rapidly growing urban areas of Bophuthatswana (see next chapter), the issue of tendering became a central issue. The BDC recommended provision and scope for such local input into development initiatives and especially construction itself:

"In the allocation of tenders the government departments and development corporations must afford first choice, within reasonable price differences, to Bophuthatswana based industries and business undertakings."

The BNDC claimed to have initiated the development of Batswana constructors through its Small Industries Division. Batswana builders had been organised into one major group and given construction jobs by the BNDC. However, pointing out a

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83 Calculated as a percentage from North West Province Statistical information covering Bophuthatswana, 1977-1994.
84 Ibid.
general concern with the lack of trained Batswana, even within the BNDC itself, the managing director commented on construction that:

"In general the construction industry is in a very unsatisfactory state. We do not get value for our money and our workers do not get the training they are entitled to."

With so much building development, the BDC's strict observance of tender procedure was intended to reinforce both prudent use of internal resources and local input. However, the BDC influence came under increasing pressure from Mangope's political and 'nation-building' considerations. In 1980 a final confrontation proved to be the undoing of the BDC. At a meeting to discuss the tender for the new Mmabatho High School, the chairman of the BDC disagreed strongly with Mangope's desire to award the contract to large constructors from outside of Bophuthatswana. Schoeman wanted to encourage local firms 'when appropriate' to generate local growth and, particularly in this instance, Mafikeng based companies. Mangope chose to circumvent the BDC wishes and in protest Schoeman resigned. This issue became one of many concerning the award of government contracts to consultants and outside companies. A handful of South African companies and foreign individuals were favoured. The biggest, Stocks Construction, a South African company, won the majority of large governmental contracts. Throughout the 1980s the Bophuthatswana government appeared to have a preference towards Stocks who were the main contractor for the Civic Centre and Government Offices amongst other projects.

There followed a direct correlation between the resignation of Schoeman, the confinement of the BDC to the shadows of the Department of Economic Affairs and an unprecedented spending spree in Bophuthatswana on a range of prestige projects. Given both BDC and BNDC concern for internal viability how is it possible to

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86 Bophuthatswana, Development Needs, (1980:16)
88 See chapters five and six.
90 According to Schoeman, the BDC then fell into disfavour and became a small branch of the Department of Economic Affairs between 1981 and 1990.
understand the growing predilection of Mangope for outside, large scale big business? Undoubtedly large-scale enterprises were seen as the harbinger of capitalist economic growth by the BDC and BNDC alike. In accordance with the ‘multiplier effect’ theory one strand of national economic development was aimed at stemming the outflow of both work force and particularly spending in South Africa through commercial development. This was to be done through job creation and construction of commercial shopping centres throughout Bophuthatswana. Mangope had a clear impression of how this was to be achieved; by combining ‘western’ know-how and capital a profound effort would be made to win acceptance from the world community of nations. The contract awards given to large constructors were interpreted as the ‘proper’ manner of doing things and the expertise and knowledge worth paying for:

‘...It is the policy of the Bophuthatswana government to encourage large companies and chain groups to establish enterprises in Bophuthatswana. Foreign money and knowhow are brought in to the country and the outflow of buying power is further decreased’.

Between 1977 to 1990 the number of shopping centres in Bophuthatswana increased from nil to 24.\(^9\) The BDC and the BNDC focused particular interest upon the capacity of projects to create labour intensive jobs as well as the promotion and encouragement of independent Batswana entrepreneurs. Dr. D.P. Moloto, Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs claimed that the Bophuthatswana development strategy was underwritten by an entrepreneurial class of which 5000 small traders formed the nucleus.\(^9\) The encouragement of entrepreneurs appeared to reflect the policy of creating a black petty bourgeoisie who could ‘buy’ into the bantustan system. A network of patronage controlled by government was the principal means of economic advancement and ‘embourgeoisement’ through the state.\(^9\) Therefore the criteria for

\(^9\) Van der Berge, of the BNDC, in “Mmabatho” in SA Architecture, 1981.
\(^9\) BNDC Video, Land of Opportunity, undated, Mmabatho.
\(^9\) Pretoria News, 31.10.83
\(^9\) Graff (1990) op. cit.
award of licenses and loans were not merely economic but also politically motivated.” Private sector involvement had been a key feature of the regime which based its claim to sovereignty upon Bophuthatswana’s economic differentiation from the other TVBC states. The response to this high level of dependency was therefore to encourage capitalist development. Investment was welcomed by Mangope and powers were delegated to the BNDC to encourage business and commercial ventures. It can be argued that the Bophuthatswana Executive Council saw investment and access to international capital as a necessary assertion of its independence from South Africa, particularly through high profile uses of this capital. Mangope’s ‘Nation-building’ aspirations had usurped the strict economism of the BDC and exploited economic initiatives for political gain. When development initiatives involved government itself, these schemes had to reflect ‘high standard and quality’ which in turn became unaffordable to most residents. A simpler explanation for the award of contracts was that they possibly reflected the large economic benefits to various individuals and groups in return for their loyalty to Mangope.

Mangope’s commitment to ‘development’ as modernisation became imprinted upon his decision making. Mangope demanded action and therefore saw the expansion of governmental structures as the principal means to achieve this. In just a few years from 1980 the number government Departments grew to twenty two structures and with a number of parastatal corporations. This growth of bureaucracy was perceived as the engine of action-oriented growth and ‘development’. With Mangope’s forceful dominance and lack of opposition the President’s own particular vision was stamped upon the Bophuthatswana landscape. Mangope’s influence was reflected in his demands which advisors likened to ‘Dream Lists’. These structures were regarded as the means to achieving the ‘Dream Lists’:

‘The underlying philosophy was that the President wanted action. He wanted every

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95 Its most visible manifestation was government ministers themselves being awarded business licenses despite the competition from a large number of applicants, see next chapter.
96 Schoeman (1995) op. cit.
year to see things happening. I think he got frustrated with the Public Sector. Public servants remain public servants, they are very happy when they get their pay but not very dynamic or with initiative. They (the Bophuthatswana state) were in a kind of spree that psychologically opened the flood gates for many people, not only from the private sector but even clever public sector officials, who said that you can not achieve your objectives without parastatals and boards and so on. They said "we will build houses if you have a Housing Corporation" and so on. This was an ulterior motive for building empires (within these structures) and to throw money after the problem. But the solution is not necessarily money but getting the people’s commitment and involvement in the process'."

When Mangope focused upon a particular project it was claimed that other members of these structures then simply kept their opinions to themselves." The former chairman of the BDC suggested that from 1981:

'I would say that for five to six years the development policy was probably steered by Mangope himself. He was agitated there was no development and he wanted this development badly'."

Policy making revolved around a small clique at the pinnacle of the Bophuthatswana state. The ‘development’ strategies that had been implemented had been directed from this lofty height with the cabinet acting in isolation and in a very top down manner in weekly meetings. Mangope’s combination of the ‘tribal custom’ of the chief with Presidential and constitutional powers undoubtedly exacerbated his dominance and ‘right’ to implement and control policy-making. This dominance also depended upon and influenced the extent to which the civil service was involved and interested in

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97 Ibid.
98 Personal communication with Magyar, 1997.
100 Schoeman (1995) op. cit.
policy or, moreover, in maintaining patronage and power structures.\textsuperscript{101}

In these efforts to promote Bophuthatswana’s claims for legitimacy and recognition, projects were conceived as huge public relations exercises. During the 1980s the emerging pattern was therefore that these projects were designed to reflect ‘style’, and ‘prestige’ and with a multi-racial emphasis. Without an integrated development plan linking structures with the Executive Council, the Presidential elite dominated decision-making. The Bophuthatswana state resembled a commercial conglomerate:

‘...a partner in business ventures often enjoying the marginal level of competitive advantage afforded by the right to engage in activities not tolerated in South Africa’.\textsuperscript{102}

Mmabatho, proposed as the capital of Bophuthatswana in 1976, was the most important ‘national’ project of all. Its conception and development by planners and government symbolised the cultural and ‘developmental’ ambiguities of Bophuthatswana’s ‘nation-building’.

\textsuperscript{101} See conclusionary chapter.
\textsuperscript{102} Magyar (1984:14) op. cit.
Chapter Five
5. An Appropriate Capital for the Nation

5.1. Introduction

'A new name, a new flag, a new government... Bophuthatswana could lead the way forward showing that two cultures can exist and prosper side by side if the objective is unity... The orange diagonal bar on the National flag of Bophuthatswana symbolises the golden path along which we must travel towards the fulfilment of development'.

By 1978 the design and planning proposals for the ‘national’ capital, Mmabatho, were accepted by the Bophuthatswana government. Previous studies of Mafikeng-Mmabatho have focused upon the city’s shifting political economy and the processes associated with the creation of a ‘post-colonial’ city. These processes include the effects of rapid population growth and the state’s dominant role and imprint upon the urban fabric. Other studies have focused upon Mafikeng’s racial zoning during the apartheid era and the impact of the transitional ‘decolonisation’ phase associated with the incorporation of Mafikeng into Bophuthatswana. These

1 Mafikeng Mail, 17.10.80. The Mail concluded that: 'The newspaper is in accord with that aspiration and will be conscious of any incident or matter that brings with it damage to the Nations future'.
approaches represent racial and ethnic categorisations, and the urban form itself, as ‘given’ and structurally predetermined.4 This chapter argues that the contradictions of Bophuthatswana’s ‘nation-building’ can be more fully understood by examining the competing motivations underpinning the creation of the capital city of this bantustan.

The quotation, above, an editorial by the local (soon to be ‘national’) newspaper following the incorporation of Mafeking,5 professes to embrace modernisation by government, planners, and many local black and white residents in order to reverse the marginality of the area. Mmabatho was initially intended by Mangope as a powerful symbol and icon which would promote Batswana identity and announce sovereignty. The capital epitomised the efforts made to express ‘unifying gestures’ for the Bophuthatswana ‘nation’ and embodied the features regarded as essential for creating ‘national’ identity. Paradoxically, Mafikeng’s close proximity and eventual incorporation into Mmabatho, continued to reflect the ambiguities of local ethnic and race identities. Mafikeng crossed the frontier into Bophuthatswana and, in order to appeal to international ‘norms’, the regime used the town’s incorporation to promote racial ‘unity’, as pursued along the ‘golden path to the fulfilment of development’. There was, however, a sense in which Bophuthatswana itself was being incorporated into a system of language and practice which involved constructing the ‘Nation-State’ and the ‘Capital City’ as distinctively modern.

Under the rubric of ‘modernisation’, the capital and social relations therein,
were supposedly a vivid icon for Bophuthatswana’s claims to be distanced from South Africa. It was a particular attempt to assert the appearance of ‘independence’ and convey the impression of viability through this capital city. Mmabatho’s design, motivated by Mangope’s ethno-nationalist concerns, conflicted with the representation of the city as if created ‘from nothing’. Bophuthatswana’s ‘nation-building’ therefore failed to transcend the universalism implicit in modernist practices. This failure was most visible in the developmental bias towards Mmabatho.

The conflicts and debilitating contradictions underpinning Bophuthatswana are demonstrated by the following issues. First, the intrigue and debate determining the geographical location of the new ‘national’ capital city was intimately connected to the complex matrix of cultural and racial purity, territorial boundaries and the practicalities of ‘nation-hood’, pursued by both Bophuthatswana and South Africa. Second, in part an outcome of the location, the creation of the capital was motivated by the efforts to produce an ‘anti-western’ Tswana city. Third, the incorporation of white Mafikeng into Bophuthatswana was integral to President Mangope’s promotion of a cosmopolitan, non-racial ‘place for all’. Bophuthatswana was regarded by various groups as ‘mature enough’ to incorporate the white town. Fourth, the revised Master Plan anticipated Mafeking’s incorporation and, together with Mmabatho’s Five Year Plan, reflected the increasing faith in modernisation to develop the area. These efforts and conflicts were reflected in the huge amount of resources used for the capital and the conspicuous inequality between Mmabatho and its environs. The cultural and political motives of the regime, coupled with the aesthetic functions defined by the architects and planners, reflected the ambiguities implicit in modernising the urban landscape.

5.2. Locating the Capital City

In the 1970s both the South African and Bophuthatswana governments were locked into negotiations concerning a new ‘national’ capital for Bophuthatswana, arguably the most potent symbol and icon of any ‘nation-building’ exercise. In the
early 1970s the Bophuthatswana administration was negotiating with the South African government for a loan of R5 million in order to build a new capital. Mangope had described the existing administrative capital at Mafeking (in fact, as will be seen more clearly, the township at Montshiwa) as ‘totally inadequate’ and it was proposed that:

'The intention is to build this new capital at Heystekrand, and with a character of its own, which to us is an immensely important consideration'.

The South African government had originally offered the Trust Land site (land designated as ‘black’ but held ‘on trust’ by the South African government) 48 km north of Rustenburg, called Heystekrand, as the permanent capital. By 1972 the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly had agreed to this. However, by 1975 and still prior to final planning decisions, the Bophuthatswana administration had expressed concerns regarding Heystekrand as a suitable location. The reconsideration of the capital’s geographical location took on wider symbolism, illustrating the complex matrix of territory, ethnicity and racial separation underpinning Bophuthatswana.

The Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly had delegated a committee to investigate the suitability of Heystekrand in the early 1970s. Following the recommendations of this committee and with ‘expert advice’ issued from Pretoria, 8 out of 12 regional authorities agreed that the capital of the Bophuthatswana ‘nation’ should be built at Heystekrand. There were clearly high stakes involved in becoming the future capital. For example, even the residents of Montshiwa township near Mafeking were demanding the infrastructure to befit a seat of government:

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6 Mangope's speech on the occasion of the Peter Kruger Memorial Lecture, 9.8.72, in Van der Merwe et al (1978:502) op. cit.
7 BANTU, 1972.
8 Bophuthatswana Government (1975:63), a lot of this section refers to the Debate on the Capital, Special Session of the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly, First Assembly, November, 1975.
'Let us make this, our beloved township worth living in. Let it be a pride to stay in Montshiwa Township. Let every visitor be struck by an air of progress in Montshiwa. Let Montshiwa Township assume its rightful status as the present seat of the Bophuthatswana government by providing most needed daily amenities'.

There were urges from residents that the Bophuthatswana government should correct the Mafeking Council’s neglect of this black township and electrify Montshiwa for domestic purposes and the prevention of crime. In a similar vein the president of the YMCA attacked the Montshiwa Township Town Council for not erecting desperately needed recreational facilities, ‘necessities of life’, and again for neglecting Montshiwa’s importance and ‘civilising’ influence as a ‘capital town’:

'We feel that it is about time that the Town Council did something to save this situation. Montshiwa is the capital town of Bophuthatswana. It is supposed to be the centre of civilisation in this area’

The location of the capital was therefore a very real issue for local residents within Bophuthatswana. As a ‘centre of civilisation’ a fitting capital was deemed by local residents, including Mafeking, and the Bophuthatswana government to require commensurate benefits and resources.

5.2.1. Mafeking and Consolidation

In 1973 the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly had proposals to consolidate its territory by including a number of white towns, implying that one

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9 Mr. Tlhoale, who latter became a local councillor, letter to Tswana Mail, 13.9.1974.
12 For Bophuthatswana’s consolidation proposals see ‘Bophuthatswana land issue: Batswana want their fair share of historical land occupied during the first few centuries of the millennium’ in Pioneer, December, 1984.
would be designated as ‘capital’. For historical reasons, Mafeking had been suggested as the desired capital by the Bophuthatswana regime. However, the South African government declined the attempts by Bophuthatswana to incorporate a large swathe of land, including towns considered ‘white’. By the early 1970s the fragility of Mafeking’s economic base, still dominated by retail and agriculture, remained a grave concern for the local white community. The town had eagerly awaited the decision on Bophuthatswana’s capital and was disappointed by the ‘consolidation plan that nobody wants- with not a single town to be incorporated’. Mafeking was surrounded by Bophuthatswana on three sides which had created a high level of confusion in this ‘virtually isolated urban island in a foreign rural sea’. Over the next two years, 1974-1975, the local council and business community sought to convince the Bophuthatswana government to locate their ‘national’ capital near to the town. Land consolidation negotiations were veiled in secrecy because of the sensitivity of the consolidation debate and the capital issue was no exception. By 1975, with the prospect of ‘independence’ becoming increasingly likely, the capital issue became integral to the struggles, shape and direction of the Bophuthatswana nation-building vision. One of the most emotive issue for white and black communities centred upon territory. The reconsideration of Heystekrand was related to the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly’s strongly desired territorial definition and consolidation plans.

The mainstream South African press indicated that the issue of land consolidation would indeed dominate ‘independence’ negotiations. In 1975 as the basis for consolidation of the various fragments of Bophuthatswana into a territorial entity which resembled the borders of the old British Bechuanaland, Mangope, along with the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly, once again demanded the acquisition
of the white towns of Kuruman, Taung, Warrenton, Vryburg, De la Reyville, Lichtenburg, Mafeking, Zeerust, Rustenburg, Brits and Swartruggens. Mangope insisted that:

'there must be made a fair and just sharing of the land.. we reject outright the present attempts to make the 1936 Land Act the basis of settling this issue'.

Figure 5.1 Bophuthatswana Consolidation Proposals

However, with a plan conceived by the South African government itself approved, no white towns were to be incorporated into Bophuthatswana. This decision therefore

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18 *Sunday Express*, 30.3.75.
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seemed to force the issue with the capital having to move to Heystekrand.\textsuperscript{20} The concern over land allocation had been a long term concern of the Bophuthatswana regime and the argument with Pretoria ‘appeared’ to derail the independence process and by implication the bigger projects of bantustan nation-building and separate development itself.

A second committee was commissioned to investigate an alternative to Heystekrand, should Mafeking once again be rejected. Despite the parameters of consolidation having been set by the South African government, with the BLA for all its protestations largely endorsing Pretoria’s edicts, the debate on the capital nonetheless indicated the deep-seated anxieties which existed and the textured nature of the disputed location for the capital.

Mangope was fully aware of the symbolism that a national capital afforded his regime and drew upon international comparison and experience through reference to the difficulties that the capital ‘question’ had caused Germany, Malawi and even South Africa itself:

‘It does not surprise me if this question of the capital in Bophuthatswana is the same. I want it known as it is repeated here that the capital will really be the city of the whole nation, that is true’.\textsuperscript{21}

This international experience was drawn upon to embolden the Bophuthatswana ‘nation-building’ project. The capital issue for Bophuthatswana coincided with the decision taken in Malawi to relocate the capital from Lilongwe to the more central Zomba and a parallel drawn with ‘nation-building’ in Bophuthatswana

‘I want this House to think of tomorrow. The voice of the unborn Tswana child is crying over the future. We must not get emotional. We must be cool and face the facts

\textsuperscript{20} Mafeking Mail, 8.6.1973.
\textsuperscript{21} Bophuthatswana (1975.69).
before us. Today Malawi is building a new capital. I don't wish this parliament, this
nation, the Tswana nation in future to decide to change the capital because this
House made a wrong decision and chose a wrong spot for their capital.".

Other members of the Bophuthatswana Legislature were similarly aware of the
unifying potential which a capital city could provide. The chairman of the Committee,
D. C Mokale, presented the findings which called for a new location for the capital as
firstly, an affirmation of independence from the whites and secondly, a symbol for
Batswana identification. The decision on the capital could present an opportunity for
the Batswana to conduct their own affairs and to distance themselves from the whites
who were characterised as 'strangling' black towns because, it was claimed, 'Whites
persistently approach us, in order to suck our money'. Another committee member
associated the opportunity to build a new capital city with Tswana empowerment, as a
conduit for 'their own people who can lead our development'.

The South African government also had reservations about Heystekrand. These were based on political considerations that the proximity to Pretoria and the
industrialised and more militant heartland of South Africa, could become a security
concern. In addition the region was heavily urbanised and had attracted black migrants
from all over South Africa and this ethnic mixing was incompatible with a separate
development vision which promoted ethnic division. These factors prompted South
Africa to 'encourage' the decision to locate a 'national' capital further away from the
turbulent townsships which were, according to South African government terminology,
'detribalised' and synonymous with black 'agitators' or 'nationalists'. The
'ethnological' composition of the homelands therefore attracted attention from various
academics investigating the viability of the bantustan policy. The diagram (Figure 5.2)
is taken from a University of Potchefstroom study which expressed concern regarding

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22 Member, D. C Mokale, ibid. pp44
23 Bophuthatswana (1975:42).
the extent of non-Tswana population groups in Bophuthatswana. Based on the population census of the mid-1970s the diagram shows that in the heavily populated eastern areas of Bophuthatswana, the Tswana groups, in comparison to the non-Tswana population, are mainly in the minority. The urbanised eastern districts were a source of consistent resistance to the Bophuthatswana regime. These political considerations were perhaps another important factor for Mangope’s decision to establish the ‘capital’ in more Tswana-oriented and rural areas (it is also interesting to note, however, that the other proposed locations for the capital also had substantial minority groups). As the contradictions of Bophuthatswana ‘nation-building’ grew in the 1980s, the geographical location of the capital became an important feature of Mangope’s attempts to contain unrest within the territory.

The Heystekrand location was particularly scrutinised because it was perceived as representing the spectre of ethnic mixing, and by implication, the social problems related to this. During the ‘capital debate’ in the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly the purity of Batswana culture was regarded by some members as jeopardised, contaminated and impure. This sense and fear of the erosion of identity formed the basis for the underlying rejection of Heystekrand:

‘If you take (the) history- let’s take the place where there are many people- towns like Soweto, the problems of shebeens and others will crop up in Bophuthatswana, and these will not be Tswana people’.

A number of pro-government members pursued this theme of the undesirability of high population density of urban areas and the unavoidability of ethnic mixing. This

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26 Heystekrand (later renamed Mogwase) was in-between the sparsely populated Mankwe region and the ‘platinum belt’ in the Bafokeng/Odi regions, whose main population concentrations are shown as the three medium sized circles adjacent to the largest circle denoting the heavily urbanised Odi 1 and Moretele 1 regions just north of Pretoria.

27 See chapter six.

28 Bophuthatswana (1975:42).
mixing was seen as undermining and eroding the cultural bed-rock of the nation and leading to ethnic suicide. It was claimed that this cultural decline had already affected the Batswana in urbanised areas, particularly the Bafokeng tribe through their proximity to platinum mines:

"...the most important factor for any nation anywhere is culture. We can not deny the fact that the Tswana spoken from Rustenburg to the north-east is so impure that it affects the culture. The Bafokeng have done all in their power with regard to the impact of their mines but without much success. The Central government has tried to control influx into urban areas, Johannesburg, Rustenburg, but they are beaten. In view of these factors if the capital is situated there, the matter will be worsened".29

The eastern regions of Bophuthatswana were therefore considered as denigrating Batswana language and culture due to the thousands of non-Tswana migrants. These ‘other’ ethnic groups were also characterised as underdeveloping these areas because ‘our money is siphoned of by foreign people to their different homelands...’.30 The alternative site at Ramotsogo, in the more distant and rural Lehurutshe district (slightly north east of the Molopo region and also bordering Botswana) was therefore proposed as the location to accommodate these wider ethnic ideals. This alternative site was also promoted under the pretext of spreading economic development to other less industrialised areas of Bophuthatswana. Above all, Ramotsogo was supposedly more geographically central and, by implication, a symbolically accessible centre through which to unify the diffuse fragments of Bophuthatswana. The handful of opposition members within the BLA fiercely contested the committee’s decision and provided the sub-text for the wider conflict for those Batswana intent on ‘nation-building’. There was criticism that the Ruling Party had already pre-determined the Ramotsogo option, as three out of six regional

29 Bophuthatswana, (1975:43).
30 Ibid.
Figure 5.2 Bophuthatswana’s Ethnology

authorities approached had still once again suggested Heystekrand. The initial committee was considered more democratic, having consulted a larger number of people, with 8 from 12 Regional Authorities approving Heystekrand. There was concern that the BDP was interfering in tribal affairs, after the chiefs in both the Lehurutshe and Mafeking areas ‘agreed’ to release land for a proposed capital without a tribal resolution. Chief Maseloane suggested that ‘tradition’ was under threat from Mangope and, in response to the ruling party’s jeers that he was acting childishly, Maseloane replied:

'It is the Montshiwa Chieftaincy that you refer (to) as little boys. You have done so all the years'.

It is highly significant that although these opposition members would later reject ‘independence’ there was nonetheless a detectable common emphasis on debating the desired condition of the Tswana. For Maseloane and others, the addition of land to consolidate national territory was considered an absolute pre-requisite in the pursuit of independence. With land so unequally distributed, to take tribal land for a capital was considered an affront to tribal tradition and betrayal of the ‘true’ aims of Tswana nationalism:

'It was the decision of this House here that our capital should not be built upon land that belongs to a tribe, rather on trust land, because we do not want that in future there must be hitches between a tribe and a government because we have n’t really got the money or the right to expropriate people... I heard one of the speakers who in fact was in favour of Heystekrand saying repeatedly, the soil, the soil. I do not know what bearing the soil has upon a site for a capital because what is really required is the place that belongs to me or us. I was lucky enough to be one of the councillors in the old government and there was talk then, and we all know that we can not deny

32 Ibid.
that such talks did take place. We used to say this land is ours. Even though the Barolong were compensated by being given other land (in return for the proclaimed site of Montshiwa township), the sentiment to this land is so strong that they continue to say the land is theirs.\textsuperscript{33}

The consolidation issue was a fundamental dividing line between the BDP and opposition BNSP. The decision to relocate the capital on tribal land that circumvented white areas was so strongly rejected by the opposition that another opposition leader, Chief Pilane, was sent out of the House during the 'capital debate'. A crucial issue for the opposition remained their concern that ‘independence’ would become nothing more than a mirage if it meant continually fleeing from the whites, as the retreat to Ramotsogo indicated to them. For the opposition, the capital decision was therefore integral to achieving consolidation:

'... this thing of running away from here to another place is caused by one difficulty only, and as soon as our land an be consolidated we will have removed the difficulty... I am saying that the difficulty of having to run away from these whites here can only be obviated if our land could be consolidated into one then we choose a spot right in the centre where we will be away from our boundaries'.\textsuperscript{34}

Chiefs Pilane and Maseloane had been representatives in the old TTA. Their views did not contain the level of fear and concern regarding ethnic or racial mixing as the ruling party. Nor did they disregard the vision of a Batswana ‘Nation’. Their judgement on the capital issue and hence the future of Bophuthatswana itself, was shaped by the paramount consideration of land. The opposition promoted Heystekrand with their intention that this should act as a prelude to the later incorporation of ‘white’ Rustenburg. However, the BDP’s negative impression of the eastern regions

\textsuperscript{33} Chief Maseloane, ibid., pp66, emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{34} Bophuthatswana (1975:65).
had also been motivated through their perception that ‘the opposition had already established its capital in Heystekrand’. Clearly, although the weight of the Tswana population was situated in these eastern areas, they were associated with a political threat to the ruling party, particularly as Heystekrand was situated next to Maseloane’s home region of Madikwe. Mangope claimed that he wanted the capital to be far removed from both whites and ethnic mixing but the opposition pointed out that Ramatsogo was closer to the white town of Zeerust than Heystekrand to Rustenburg and, in addition, that the government’s preferred site was totally lacking in infrastructure.

Attempting to avoid the central issue concerning land consolidation, Mangope confused the distinction between the unsuccessful incorporation of Mafeking as a white town, and the possibility of locating in the tribal reserve based at Montshiwa Stadt (adjacent to the white town). It was claimed that permission had been granted by Chief Montshiwa and that this offer depended upon the Assembly’s wish. According to the opposition spokesman, Chief Maseloane, the South African Commissioner-General for the Tswana, Dr. I. S Kloppers, had previously promised Mafeking’s incorporation into Bophuthatswana. Maseloane regarded Mangope’s remark that Mafeking was merely a ‘second hand’ capital as responsible for Bophuthatswana’s failure to acquire the town. During the ‘capital debate’ Chief Maseloane demanded to know why the negotiations to secure Mafeking had broken down:

‘I wish the Chief Minister could tell us the cause of our failure to get white Mafeking. We want the white town. We are not talking of the backyard of Mafeking. You must give us an explanation of that one. You are running away from the facts’.

Mangope could only fall back on the ‘will’ of the House as representative of the

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35 In the 1972 elections the opposition SP had won in two eastern districts which had given them four members of the BLA, the majority of their own MPs
36 Mafeking Mail, 29.3.1974.
37 Bophuthatswana (1975.71).
'nation', a convenient ploy due to the numerically superior BDP. Once again the shadow of Pretoria was cast over the BLA as the opposition demanded to know if the white officials, who had been at the official inspection of Ramotsogo the day before, had been invited by the House. Mangope replied:

'I thought that we could rely on experts as we have done at all times, and even if officials from Pretoria were there and listened to our deliberations and heard which way we inclined, I shall not debar them from going along. If press reporters can sit there and listen and learn what we are going to do, I shall not debar them from going if they can go, I take it that they went there in that manner'.'

This comment clearly demonstrated that the South African government was influencing Bophuthatswana's decision-making. Nonetheless, it has been illustrated that within the BLA, different interpretations existed as to the means of reaching the goals, rather than the goal itself, Bophuthatswana 'nation-building'.

The motion to rescind the decision to build at Heystekrand was taken unanimously and Ramotsogo was declared the new site. The reasons for the final decisions are uncertain. They appeared to be the decree of the BDP. However, all other options were probably at the time ruled out. Ramatsogo itself was already being questioned as too distant and failing to possess the commercial and transportation linkages of Mafeking. The decision on locating the Bophuthatswana capital in the Lehurutshe region was regretted by the white town and pleas were made that Mangope might reconsider in 'harsh light of practice and economics'. There were also the strong historical sentiments surrounding Mafeking which the regime wished to exploit in order to overshadow the relic of Empire, 'colonial Mafeking'. Montshiwa Stadt, adjacent to Mafeking, was one of the oldest Tswana settlements in

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38 Ibid. pp74.
39 By 21.11.75 the Mafeking Mail proclaimed 'No to Mafeking- Yes to Lehurutshe' (i.e. Ramatsogo).
40 Mafeking Mail, 21.11.1975.
Southern Africa which could be harnessed for ‘national aspirations’. The final decision on the location was announced in April 1976, with the decision not to build in Lehurutshe but instead just outside Mafeking on Chief Montshiwa’s land. It is possible that the final decision to locate there was also a product of ‘real-politik’ with the South African government, in order to keep Bophuthatswana’s ‘independence’ on course, making a tacit agreement for Mafeking’s eventual incorporation into Bophuthatswana. In the year immediately after the decision, however, the South African government were once again adamantly denying the incorporation of the white town in Bophuthatswana. This denial finally prompted a furious reaction from Mangope who was determined in 1978 to build a capital city which would completely obliterate Mafeking. The capital was to be called Mmabatho—‘Mother of the People’. It was intended as a truly ‘national’ capital once ‘independence’ had been attained.

5.3. The Tswana City

5.3.1. Government Intentions and Mmabatho’s City Plans: The ‘Kgotla’ and the symbiosis of tradition and modernity.

It has been suggested that the construction of a capital city represented an opportunity for Mangope to promote a sense of Batswana identity as a unifying step towards ‘Nation-Building’. By 1978, the possibility of Mafeking’s incorporation was denied by the South African government with its refusal to allow a white town to be governed by a black state. Mr. M. C. Botha, Minister for Bantu Affairs and Development, had ‘flatly’ refused Mangope the option of Mafeking as this would be unacceptable racial mixing. This decision provided the context within which the

41 Mafeking Mail, 7.3.1976. However, even the South Africa, 1976 Official Year Book of the RSA was caught out by the protracted affair, as it still mentioned that: ‘The future capital of Bophuthatswana will be developed at Welbedacht, in the Zeerust (i.e Lehurutshe) district’, pp.253.
42 Schoeman (1995)
43 Bophuthatswana (1979).
direction and vision of Mmabatho’s urban development took place. The initial intention was to make Mmabatho viable by counteracting the economic influence of Mafeking, so that the capital would not be just another ‘dormitory town’ supplying white areas with labour. In order for Mangope to succeed, he could not build the capital half-heartedly and the planners hired for the job drew inspiration from the Malawi experience. There a new capital was built at Lilongwe to counter-balance the dominance of Zomba that had skewed development around the Southern part of the country. Parallels existed with Mafeking’s dominance. A firm of consultants, Mallows, Louw and Hoffe (MLH), were hired from South Africa, to design the new capital. In conjunction with a range of Bophuthatswana government Departments, most notably Works and the Department of Urban Land Tenure and Local Government, MLH drew up the Master Plan for Mmabatho in July 1978. Significantly, Professor Mallows, the head of the team of consultants, met constantly with Mangope and the President’s own desires would be strongly imprinted upon Mmabatho’s urban design. The rejection of Mafeking provided the impetus for Mangope’s ‘brief’ to the planners and determined two reactions. First, Mmabatho was to be explicitly a Tswana City and second, it was also directed towards overshadowing colonial Mafeking:

‘Mangope knew he would get Mafikeng. He wouldn’t tell me then (when it was being planned the white town was excluded from the original site), but he got it...he knew he had to swallow up Mafikeng for historical reasons, because Montshi wastadt was older than Mafikeng’.

The first town plan which Mallows produced for Mmabatho had been based upon a grid-iron pattern that was rejected by Mangope. Mmabatho’s morphology was

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44 Schoeman (1995)
therefore based upon a radically different approach to the ideas which had influenced Mafeking's colonial layout:

"Autocracy is always rectangular. It was associated with white dominance - so Mangope said "I want a Tswana town so my children won't lose their sense of identity ..I do not want a white town. I want a Tswana town. Tswana build like this...(and he held up his hands indicating a circular, embracing form')."\(^{46}\)

Contradictions were noticeable from Mangope's 'brief':

"...in June 1978, on seeing the first plans for the Capital City and its Central Area, he stated that he wished the City to be a Tswana City, which would incorporate, as far as modern conditions and technology would permit, the Tswana traditions of urban living and urban forms and so assist the Tswana nation, in their Capital City to retain for their future a sense of Tswana identity'."\(^{47}\)

MLH based their Mmabatho Residential, Government and Business Centre Development Plans upon a design that promoted tradition in order to:

'reflect elements of the structure and form of traditional kgotla relationships that has always existed between the people and their chief at each level of tribal authority'.\(^{48}\)

The 'kgotla' is the semi-circular shaped open meeting place at the centre of the traditional Tswana village. It is the space in which tribal affairs are debated and around which the chief's dwelling is located. The 'Malwapa', which are clusters of

\(^{46}\) Ibid.
houses belonging to one extended family, are also shaped around the kgotla to form one ward. This circular pattern, particularly evident amongst the long tradition of Tswana town building, is illustrative of the differentiation between ‘traditional African worldviews and culture from the secularized calculating rationality of a society based upon science and technology’. ‘Die Stad’ was identified as the major historical example of ‘Tswana town development since 450 AD to the present’ and it was characterised by its:

‘...cellular conglomeration of ‘oval spaces’ surrounded by dwelling units. The main ‘space’ is called the Place of the Stones (Mafikeng), from where Mafikeng gets its name’.\(^{50}\)

The relationship between the capital and Batswana culture was depicted as a self-explanatory continuum, which for consultants had a powerful cultural allure:

‘...the long association that the Tswana people have had with Mafikeng .(which) together with Serowe in Botswana, are the two oldest traditional Tswana urban settlements which have been continuously occupied from long before the white man arrived’.\(^{51}\)


\(^{51}\) *Architecture SA*, 1981.
The consultants were therefore referred to the oldest parts of the Stadt and to Serowe ‘where the traditional grouping of families and clans into wards and tribes is reflected in the strong urban form of the town(s)’. MLH suggested ways to adapt Tswana architectural forms to ‘modern’ conditions:

"By combining aspects of formal baroque planning with ethnic Tswana architectural forms and village structures, a modern government structure is being developed that will reflect the strength, tradition and essential humanism of the Bophuthatswana nation'.'

The conception of a kgotla-style central space at the heart of Mmabatho is returned to in the discussion of the Government Buildings.

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52 Overhead photos reproduced from Cowley, J., Department of Geography, University of Bophuthatswana.
Mangope wished to harness the urban form in a way that would convey what it was to be Tswana although the parameters for this application of Tswana culture were set by ‘modern conditions and technology’. The relationship between these features exemplified the fundamental clash underpinning the Bophuthatswana edifice. The tensions between the two would increase during the ‘independence’ era. At the planning stage, Mmabatho was intended to symbolise Tswana values which, according to the residential planning report, would attempt to off-set ‘western’ development principles:

‘To provide the framework around which a town can develop which will embody the elements of a traditional Tswana town as opposed to a modern western development’.  

It was intended that the design, planning and construction would therefore incorporate local social customs and that the architecture itself would reflect this ‘uniqueness’. The architects and planners approach to Mmabatho sought to promote local context and the qualities of traditional settlements:

‘A prime consideration for the architects and planners has been to recognise that they must design specifically for Africa, and make concessions specific to the location and environment- such as local materials and low technology buildings’.  

The diagram, below, depicts the consultants genealogy of ‘rural vernacular

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55 MLH, (1979a:2).
56 The Residential report, for example, was based upon the following core points: ‘A new type of physical design which will create that sense of enclosure which the traditional Tswana town always had. A type of planning, particularly in the residential areas which would permit a wide range of choice in types of housing layouts and house types. The social customs of the Tswana must be permitted to have expression but these must not exclude other options ... local labour and local materials. .. local industries ... on which flexible building procedure (is) based’. MLH, ibid.
57 MLH in Architecture SA (1981)
'white dominated architecture- suburbia and loss of identity, social breakdown.'

However, the other was a modern idiom of South African Rural Vernacular architecture which was an outcome of changing traditional styles in relation to modern requirements to 'meet(ing) social and economic realities'. The consultants implied that this evolution to the Soweto model reflected direct western 'white' influence which disregarded tradition and led to the erosion of ethnic identity. Interestingly, the focus was on disrupting the linearity of the influence of modernisation, as symbolised by the Soweto type house. The lack of availability of traditional resources, particularly thatched roofing, was a further impetus for rethinking architectural design.

One manner in which the linearity could be disrupted was through emphasising that:

'Tswanas have traditionally led an outdoor-type of life as much as the cooking, eating and recreation takes place out of doors. This has considerable advantages in terms of the use of space and permits a smaller house to be used effectively while taking advantage of the country's mild climate.'

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58 MLH (1979a).
59 Ibid. pp5.
Figure 5.3: ‘Typological Genealogy of South African Rural Vernacular Architecture’.

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The overall residential plan had been determined by a number of factors which emphasised Tswana culture:

'1) The traditions of Tswana urban forms, suitable(y) adjusted which reflect the cultural traditions of the Tswanas and which will provide a sense of identity'. 2) The accommodation of both the traditional and western style of life and housing so that both may co-exist in the residential area'. 3) also flexibility for social and financial requirements of those wishing to live in new residential area."

To these ends, the planners proposed that the main residential area should be based upon Tswana residential groupings, namely, modernised ‘wards’, with adaptation made easier through regulations with a ‘skeleton of control’ and above-all ‘flexibility’.

These ideas represented admirable efforts to remove vestiges of ‘westernisation’, which, for the time, appeared to be innovative. However, the ‘Tswana’ cultural component was not defined within the report, the implication being that it was fixed and incontestable. There is no mention of consultation or discussion. Due to the ‘static’ portrayal of Batswana culture, these absences gave the impression of a controlled process with no reference made to what ‘the people’ would want other than the ‘goodness’ of Tswana culture. As a result, the unquestioned traditional element appeared as an afterthought of modernisation and did not appear to address why a modern idiom of the traditional wards was desired.

The consultants’ conclusion reiterated the marriage of ethnicity and modernity:

61 Ibid., MLH, (1979a).
62 MLH, (1979a:6) Consideration would also be supposedly given to the availability of houses for all income groups, assisted through ‘self-help’ schemes: ‘It (self-help) can operate side by side with the more conventional contractual home building approach and so attract all types of residents to the new City, and ensure the new City can absorb them’. MLH, ibid. pp7.
63 Furthermore, concessions appeared to be made for the anticipated influx of migrants.
it is possible to design a new residential area with Tswana character, which can be adapted to modern conditions and changing demand...".

The crucial phrasing concerns, once again, the 'adaptation' of culture and tradition to 'modern' conditions. MLH also had a particular influence on the architectural form of Mmabatho because they were considered as 'aesthetic advisors as well as town planners'. Whilst a Tswana conception of 'space' was accommodated and, indeed, integral to Mmabatho's urban design, the fundamental question is whose 'space' was this and what was its purpose? The modern 'aesthetic' of planning and urban design was increasingly overlapping with Mangope's own political considerations and discourse or ideology of modernisation of the landscape. The cultural and social characteristics of the city, and indeed Bophuthatswana itself, were rapidly superseded by the impetus for modernisation. The Bophuthatswana regime, orchestrated by Mangope, sought to create a political symbol for Bophuthatswana 'nation-building'. This was confirmed with the approval of the urban plans for the whole city as drawn up by MLH. Considerable attention was subsequently given to the housing of the three functions of government and to commercial projects. Whilst these adopted impressive Tswana style layout, they reflected a static conception of Batswana heritage.

5.3.2. Mmabatho: 'Mushrooming from nothing but barren bush'.

The creation of Mmabatho as the capital city of Bophuthatswana was intended by the regime to herald the dawning of a new age, a new 'nation', a 'leap' into the future, characterised as modernisation. The great 'leap' implied a desired and elusive endpoint characterised as being 'developed'. Mangope's view of Mmabatho's

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64 MLH (1979:8).
intended role in this process was as a catalyst to skip a stage of development. The advance towards the shimmering lights of the modernist city was perceived as the means to create social transformation and engender a new society. Transformation implied that certain values would be eroded to make way for the new. Mmabatho city was hailed as the means to reach that developed end point. Government proclaimed the sensational ‘Development of a futuristic City takes shape: Mmabatho City becomes reality’. There was the impression of transformation of the landscape with movement and mobilisation away from a pedestrian, plodding past. These sentiments were captured by the focus upon a shovel wielding President initiating the beginnings of the government complex, Garona. Transformation and change were recorded with:

‘the historic beginning in February 1979, when President Mangope turned the first sod on bare veld towards development’.  

The impetus for transformation came from harnessing the ‘wilderness’ of the ‘bare’ veld. Mmabatho would embody the central contradiction between reifying Tswana tradition and the deep seated modernising objectives of government and planners:

‘The ultra-modern Mmabatho business centre, part of the new city of Mmabatho the capital of Bophuthatswana now under construction, is fast changing the skyline of this once quiet area. Work is progressing according to schedule on this R3,5 million centre which should be completed by July 1980’.

The wheels of change were supposedly beginning to affect a previously ‘quiet’ area, implying that stagnation had reigned supreme. The planners also captured the sense of transformation:

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67 Ibid.
'All around is evidence of vast construction projects, with cranes the only really high rise features in the flat dry landscape'.

This implied that the bigger the construction the greater the development delivered, progress had arrived in the wilderness. However, the green-belt area designated for the construction of the capital had been inhabited and cultivated by Batswana residents. Their removal was to be but a minor footnote relegated to the imperatives of the modernising machinery of the Bophuthatswana state.

By defining the litany of development problems, as seen in the last chapter, solutions were therefore implied for the "correct" development strategy. A sense of creation and progress pervaded planners, government and print media. The following quotation from a tourist brochure illustrated the wonders of implacable "progress" and conversion of the wilderness of the "veldt", with "Mmabatho-Out of nothingness":

'Mushrooming from nothing but barren bush in only a few years, Bophuthatswana has given birth to Mmabatho, "Mother of the People"- its new capital city and its spiritual home... heart and soul of the Nation'.

The capital embodied the pre-requisite for social development, which according to Mangope, was identified as the 'will to develop' expressed in positive self-images, self-respect, self-reliance. These efforts could be focused upon some central unifying symbol:

'to achieve this, you need a visible symbol, like a lighthouse which will become the focal point for the awakening will to develop with Mmabatho itself reflecting the unbroken and living link with the life-style of Bophuthatswana's forefathers'.

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70 BopTour Tourist Brochure, 12:1987?
It was claimed the Batswana felt they needed a ‘definite measure of dignity’ provided by the architectural statement which the new capital made. The fundamental difference between many modern cities and Mmabatho was also supposedly the emphasis upon historical and cultural experience expressed through the urban form. In order to modernise, certain features of Tswana culture were dismissed because transformation entailed the creation of something from nothing. Mmabatho was constructed as a monument to the Batswana ancestors whilst stressing its functions in a modern world. This Tswanaism was articulated in the capital as a modern idiom of the Kgotla, appealing to history and narrative myths yet combined with ‘modern’ functions:

'This Tswana-style complex and distinctive with rounded lines and lama-style design circular style and distinctive octagonal tower office blocks encompasses a full range of business facilities such as a super-market, furniture store, bakery restaurant, chemist shop, a bank agency, butcher, and boutiques and fashion shops and many more. Trading rights for all these undertakings have already been advertised'.

Mmabatho would be a beacon of modernity overlooking and transforming the ‘quiet’ hinterland and ‘radiating sovereignty’.

Mmabatho was akin to a latter day ‘civilising agent’, echoing the role given to the historical precedent of Mafeking as the ‘Last Civilised Stop on the Long Trek to the North’. At the opening of a range of projects throughout the capital, Mangope suggested the catalytic role that Mmabatho could play in Bophuthatswana development through its maternal role:

'Just as the bond between mother and child is the strongest and most beautiful bond of caring which we know of, in that same way do I pray, that the quality of human

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72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 This function of the ‘modernist’ city has been described in the context of Brasilia by Holston, J. (1989) The Modernist City, University of Chicago Press.
caring, which emanates from Mmabatho, will grow and mature, so as to be worthy of such a great name'.

'A wave of enlightenment and reformation is spreading over the country' the President declared and it was claimed that this motion had 'begun in the Capital Mmabatho where today we find a city and not just the open veldt of seven years ago'. The capital was suggested as the heart of the nation:

'We had to have a capital, since you can not have a successful state and country without the heart from which to pump out life's blood. Our heart, the place that is ours and that is the mother of the people has always been ready and willing to spread its influence to the rest of the country and this has been done'.

All this proposed development was only 7km from Mafeking. The way in which the white town, historically on the margins of South African society, interpreted and responded to these events illustrates the contradictions of Bophuthatswana’s local and national development. The debate surrounding Mafeking’s incorporation in Mmabatho influenced the revised Master Plan for Mmabatho (1979) and subsequently shaped the Five Year Plan (1980).

5.4. Mafeking, the Tswana City and Bophuthatswana Nation-Building.

The final decision to locate the capital at Mmabatho had stimulated much interest from Mafeking residents. Within twenty four hours of the announcement, the town’s business community was invited to a meeting with the South African Commissioner-General. Sol Kerzner, the managing director of Southern Sun Hotels,

75 Mangope in Pioneer, December, 1982:2.
76 Pioneer, June, 1985:2.
77 Ibid.
78 Mafeking Mail, 7.3.76.
announced the development of a new hotel in the capital. Furthermore, personal loans of up to one hundred per cent were available for black home ownership in 'approved' townships, particularly local Montshiwa. There were additional promises of a new four star hotel and construction of over sixty houses for white personnel in Mafeking, an enlargement of the Commissioner-General’s complex and accommodation for diplomatic purposes, including a diplomatic village. A further early indication of the potential benefits to Mafeking of Bophuthatswana 'independence' were the plans to build quarters for military and police personnel and the enlargement of the local aerodrome. Mafeking had already embarked on a R2,3 million water scheme and a tender for a new abattoir had been expected. The local newspaper claimed that the new status of the region would result in an influx of people leading to a growth in the towns services.79

Despite these indications of rejuvenation and prosperity for the town, there was also concern that the abolition of sales tax within Bophuthatswana would attract business to Mmabatho rather than to Mafeking.80 By 1979 Mafeking's vulnerable position was revealed by a drop in secondary and primary school enrolment figures which caused alarm amongst residents and was attributed to the departure, in the 1960s, of over 150 families and officials of the Bechuanaland Administration. The relocation of the Protectorate capital to Gaborones had occurred over ten years earlier.81 However, even in 1979 'a gap' continued to be 'felt in all Mafeking's

79 See the Mafeking Mail during March, 1976. The town's new founded optimism reached a peak with the first ever visit of a South African Prime Minister to open the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly. In order to commemorate the event a special photographic news sheet of Prime Minister Vorster's visit was prepared with the mayor of Mafeking presenting the Prime Minister with a statuette of a white dove to symbolise his 'peace efforts'. Contrary to these 'peace efforts' the photograph's also showed signs of local black opposition to the visit. The historical desire of Mafeking's residents for recognition and economic viability was apparently met with the announcement of the discovery of gold some fifteen kilometres south of Mafeking. It was later revealed as a cruel hoax. See Mafeking Mail, 29.8.76.

80 See Mafeking Mail for most of 1979.

81 Mafeking ceased to be the administrative centre for Bechuanaland when the latter became independent as Botswana in 1966.
institutions and organisations' and constituted the 'missing generation of babies' for Mafeking.

Another indication of the fragility of Mafeking was the cancellation, due to drought, of the annual Mafeking Agricultural and Industrial Show described as 'the only shop window to the country at large and our neighbouring states, district, public, farmers and business men of Bophuthatswana and Botswana'.

It was within this context that the question of incorporation became a major issue for Mafeking and President Mangope. Local and 'national' identities were manipulated and recast for contemporary objectives.

Given South Africa's continued strict racial segregation, Mangope was aware of the positive publicity that the incorporation of a white town into Bophuthatswana would create for his regime's attempts to win international recognition. Similarly, local white residents increasingly regarded their future as bound up with Bophuthatswana. By 1979 the South African government itself was also considering the town's incorporation, as a gesture of 'goodwill' to black Africa. After numerous demands from the Bophuthatswana regime for the acquisition of some white towns, including Mafeking, finally in April 1979 the South African government set up a commission to investigate the possibilities for Mafeking's incorporation.

5.4.1. Race Relations

For President Mangope and the local white population of Mafeking the possibility of incorporation was seized upon as a unique opportunity to promote the image of a non-racial society to the rest of Africa and the world. Mangope suggested that the Tswana should be accommodative towards this white town:

'I am speaking as my spirit moves me and I am saying what I believe in. If my people

82 Mafeking Mail, 19.1.1979. It was suggested that the town's location had been an accident of history having fallen under Cape and not Transvaal administration, the Mafeking Mail, 30.4.76.

83 Mafeking Mail, 2.2.1979.
reject to accept other people then I am prepared to resign; if we can not accept one another. on this I stake my full career. Because Africa must see that we in Bophuthatswana can live together. I feel it is a miracle that the South African government should be thinking of incorporation of Mafeking into Bophuthatswana because I have always wished for the opportunity to show that we can live together and respect one another and work together and feel we are one people."

In order to convey the appearance of 'non-racialism' as a symbol of white and black co-operation, the history of race relations in the town was manipulated to reflect these sentiments and to win the confidence of the white population:

'We as Tswana have a long tradition of co-operation with the whites of Mafeking... I would like to show that this is not the type of black government that is drunk with power, that is throwing its weight about, that is going to interfere with people. I would (like) to show the world that together we can plan, that we can do things together, that we can be happy. I would be terribly disappointed if Mafeking were not incorporated because then a golden opportunity would be lost to show the world what can be done."

The local newspaper, in particular, argued that despite enforced residential segregation and the advent of apartheid, a measure of social integration was apparent in Mafeking. Being a colonial capital, with British and Batswana civil servants, the claim was that the town was very different in character, in certain attitudes such as race relations, from neighbouring Afrikaner 'dorps' like Lichtenburg and Zeerust.66

64 Mafeking Mail, 30.3.1979.
65 Mafeking Mail, 7.9.1979 Napier, C. J. and Schlemmer, L. (1985) op. cit., suggested: 'from hearsay evidence that the whites of Mafikeng regarded the leadership of the already independent state of Bophuthatswana in a far more positive light than was the case (for example) in the Transkei or Ciskei'.
66 As late as 1966 and Botswana's independence it was proposed that Mafeking was:"...more cosmopolitan than any other city or town in the Republic. One of its outstanding virtues is that here multi-racism is an accepted fact. It works
The presence of the Protectorate staff had prevented the National Party from controlling the local council until the 1970s but it was claimed that overall, the town's attitude to the Tswana had remained similar under both Nationalist and United Party control. As incorporation became a realistic possibility, and the survival of the town dependent upon the outcome, race relations were reinvented as harmonious, understanding and accommodative:

'The people of Mafeking have not in the past ignored the sufferings of Tswana people and will certainly not do so now, if as seems likely, the need arises. It has always been the practice of the towns people to feed as many as they could, and we do not doubt that we will do so again in the hard winter of 1979.'

Mangope made many more efforts to assuage the fears of white residents regarding rule under a black government. A banquet given by the local Mafeking Chamber of Commerce (MCC) in Mangope's honour provided one such example. His speech emphasised that incorporation demonstrated how 'different nationalities could live together'. Residents responded positively suggesting that the banquet rekindled the glorious days of the MCC and '...we all get on so fabulously together, why on earth without problems, without conscious effort It is so common place that few find it worthy of mention' Mafeking Mail, 25.2.66. The Anglican priest of Zeerust noted that in Mafeking mixed congregations 'worshipped together without friction' which, it was suggested, was unthinkable in Zeerust, in Parnell, S. and Drummond, J. (1991) op. cit. However, it should also be noted that the Dutch Reformed Churches in Mafikeng, to this day, are still segregated. For the owner and editor of the local newspaper, this cosmopolitan outlook 'amidst a sea of Calvinism', was attributed rather less to the Bechuanaland officials, many of whom were described as racist South Africans, than to the composition of the town itself, Pobrey, J. (1996) personal communication.

The only substantial difference between UP and NP councils, it was claimed, was that in the pre-National Party councils, the Indian population were not forced to leave the town under the Group Areas Act. However, they were not permitted to move or dispose of their properties to another Indian but could only sell to a white (often purchased at a scandalously low price) Pobrey, J. (1995) op. cit. Furthermore, the NP were responsible for the introduction of a curfew on the black population from 9pm. The curfew ended when the township was transferred to Bophuthatswana.

Mafeking Mail, 30.3.79.
have n’t we ever done this before?’. Other evidence of an increasing emphasis upon non-racialism included demands to remove the legacy of racism in Mafeking’s own institutions:

‘There can almost certainly be no room on the governing boards of the clubs and associations of Mafeking for the dyed in the wool racialists and devotees of enforced segregation. Mafeking will be practising what the rest of the country is so busy preaching’.

As suggested, the most important promotional event for the town was the annual Mafeking Agricultural and Industrial Show. Prior to its cancellation due to drought, the local newspaper called upon the town to pledge to remove racial bars that had marred previous events. Efforts to promote non-racialism, at least publicly and at the level of relations between the local whites and Bophuthatswana elite, were strengthened by appeals to Mafeking’s unique ties to Botswana. The historical relationship between the two was emphasised during the incorporation debate, when Botswana was praised for its success as a black democracy and its progress since independence in 1966:

‘For Botswana is one of the very few countries in Africa that still enjoys the benefit of universal suffrage, non-racial participation at all levels of government and a genuine parliamentary opposition’.

Such expressions of admiration for Botswana represented the continuing ambiguity that had characterised relations between this white town and the Batswana. In an
effort to depart from the 'white' Republic, the town re-oriented itself to an older deep-seated paternalistic concern for Batswana welfare. These ideas underpinned the momentum for incorporation which was surely easier for the white population to accept when connected to the appropriate 'guidance' that Mafeking could provide for the Batswana within Bophuthatswana. The Bophuthatswana government had already approached Mafeking Town Council to request their services in order to administer Mmabatho and Montshiwa on an agency basis and the benefits of 'white' skills were increasingly emphasised by the Bophuthatswana regime. An older historical theme addressing the maturation and growth of the Batswana through modernisation and western knowledge was superimposed upon the bantustan 'infant':

'...the creation of Bophuthatswana, even if an infant, the fact that it exists at all is a very significant improvement'.

Bophuthatswana was represented as mature enough, responsible and worthy of incorporating a town of seven thousand white inhabitants. However, not all of the local residents had a similar perception.

5.4.2. Incorporation

The impression should not be given that the population of Mafeking was homogenous or that English speaking South Africans and Afrikaners, Indians and Coloureds were united in their support for incorporation. Nevertheless, among advocates of incorporation, besides the local newspaper, arguably the most important

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92 The second chapter demonstrated the emergence of an 'evolutionary ideology' at the turn of the century, which characterised the relationship between Mafeking and the Stadt. This ideology was based on 'trusteeship' and 'safeguarding' the 'native' until considered mature enough to control their own affairs.


94 Ibid.
were the MCC. Sid Gordon, the chairman of the MCC suggested that the majority of residents had voted for incorporation for economic reasons, ‘I would say that more than 80% of Mafeking’s customers are from Bophuthatswana’ and that ‘since the new state was established, trade in Mafeking has increased. We want to follow the trend and maintain the status quo’. However, since the 1960s in particular, the town had become increasingly Afrikaner in character. Over 60% of the local white population were Afrikaans speaking, a majority reflected in the National Party control of the Town Council. In 1977 the Mayor of Mafeking, Andries Bloem, declared the intention that:

‘As far as we are concerned, Mafeking will remain white’.

Within the context of these divergent opinions on incorporation, the Du Plessis Commission was established in 1979 by the South African government under the jurisdiction of the Department for Plural Affairs. It met in Mafeking and listened to views on incorporation from white residents. Councillor Bloem, previously mayor of Mafeking, expressed support for a qualified incorporation, advocating certain guarantees to the residents. These guarantees included a transitional period for public services under white control and the maintenance of whites only schooling. Both guarantees were accepted by the Bophuthatswana and South African governments. Members of the Agricultural Union gave evidence, along with farmers and businessmen. Notwithstanding some emotional outbursts, overall the Commission was pleased with the findings in support of incorporation. Representatives of the

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55 *Star* 25.7.79
56 The NP, amongst other measures, also introduced a curfew for all blacks in Mafeking to be off the streets and home by 9pm.
57 *Star*, 3.12.77
58 Other guarantees included; the Victoria hospital for whites was to remain segregated but for a transition period of five years. Local Government was to stay relatively unchanged with only those moving to a Mafikeng untied from the Group Areas Act and entitled to vote in local elections, represented by whites only.
coloured and Asian communities also gave evidence and although these communities were largely apathetic about incorporation, some were drawn to Mangope’s promises of equal voting rights and economic development. Others were less happy, such as the local National Party MP, Hannes Du Toit, who personally deplored the attitude of the local business people in pressing for the ‘take over of the town’. There appeared to be a reluctance amongst some residents to enter the ‘unknown’ across the white frontier.

Residents who opposed incorporation were mainly Afrikaners, such as the headmaster of the local white only secondary school. The Afrikaner churches also disputed the merits of racial integration. No ‘official’ poll was taken on preference for incorporation and there was a great deal of uncertainty and disapproval of Central government handling of the affair. However, the assurances given by both the South African and Bophuthatswana governments on safe guarding certain ‘white’ rights appeared to persuade these dissenters, including the Town Council, that incorporation was agreeable. The indecision and secrecy on the part of the South African government must be placed in the context of the symbolism that a white town’s voluntary incorporation into a black state would have in a racially segregated country. Only one other white town had been incorporated into a black homeland. Port. St. Johns had been annexed by the Transkei in 1976 but this occurred under very different circumstances and 90 per cent of the whites had left the town.

The South African government was now aware that for separate development

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100 Interview with Raymond Roberts, formerly of Danville Coloured Management Committee, and Mafeking Mail, Mmabatho, 1995.


102 Personal communication with the headmaster of Mafikeng High School, Mr. S. Geldenhuys, Mafikeng, January, 1995.

103 Comparison of the two towns undergoing incorporation revealed key differences such as the age and property owning composition of the two towns and different economic structures. 40% of Port St. Johns population were pensioners, whilst in Mafikeng the comparable figure was just 11%, whilst 90% of people in Port St. Johns were property owners compared to 50% in Mafikeng. Port St. Johns lacked even light industry and was a poor farming area dependent upon tourism. In comparison Mafeking’s economy was ‘booming’ following incorporation, in Napier, C. J. and Schlemmer, L. (1985) op. cit.
to be maintained further efforts to consolidate homeland territory were necessary. Mafeking was intended as an indication of the South African government's cooperation with the 'independent' black states and by implication a gesture to black Africa.\textsuperscript{104} South African Members of Parliament debated the merits of incorporation and government representatives suggested that Mafeking's incorporation would promote the 'confidence' of black Africans in the South African policy:

'...just as in past history, Mafeking must also keep its place in the history of the future, and Mafeking must remain a symbol of South Africa's confidence in Africa. Allow me therefore to express the hope that Africa will betray neither our confidence nor Mafeking'.\textsuperscript{105}

The softening ideological position was revealed by the comments of the South African Minister for Co-operation and Development who described the 'transfer as a milestone in the history of the country'.\textsuperscript{106} The national press began to reflect the desires of the residents of Mafeking by reporting that the majority favoured incorporation and that 'South Africa should accept the possible incorporation of white towns into black spots',\textsuperscript{107} especially as the government was prepared to protect house prices, pensions and citizenship for whites in Mafeking. Given a choice between Dr. Verwoerd's 'better poor but racially separate' and 'better rich and integrated',

\textsuperscript{104} House of Assembly Debates, Mafeking's incorporation into Bophuthatswana, Laws on Co-operation and Development Second Amendment Bill, Hansard, (1980:8398) op. cit.
\textsuperscript{105} Dr. W. D Kotze, ibid. pp. 8395.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid. The South African Government's support for incorporation was reflected in certain guarantees, particularly intervention to stabilise the property market: 'the population of Mafikeng is urged to remain there, and there are no signs of a general intention to leave, but there will be no direct or indirect pressure upon them to remain. An undertaking is therefore given that properties will be bought by the RSA if the owner can not find a buyer in the free market at a reasonable price Market value is determined according to current prices of comparable properties, also in surrounding towns and not be fixed higher or lower by reason of incorporation'. In effect the South African Development Trust sheltered the property market. In Pickard-Cambridge (1988) op. cit.
\textsuperscript{107} Various SA national newspapers including Rand Daily Mail and Star.
Mafeking’s businessmen were portrayed as supporting integration. The majority of local residents and the Bophuthatswana government also appeared enthusiastic about incorporation. A study shortly before incorporation indicated that seven out of ten of Mafeking’s whites indicated a willingness to accept incorporation. However, the imagery of a white town’s incorporation into a black state remained powerful. Central government would allow Mafeking’s incorporation but only after having qualified the town’s reasons for voluntarily leaving the ‘white’ Republic.

In order to explain this ‘unusual’ decision, national images began to manipulate Mafeking’s difference from the rest of South Africa by representing the town as an imperial residue, a Victorian relic on the landscape with a ‘proud aristocratic attitude (which) still lives on in the town of Mafeking’. Tales from the siege days were applied to the contemporary situation with all its uncertainty and the image was of an eccentric Mafeking. The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), not renown for its subtleties, produced a programme on Mafeking and the incorporation issue. There was an angry response from the Mafeking Council and residents for its portrayal of the town:

‘. . . which had nothing to recommend it save slums, filth and donkey carts... what we may ask ourselves was the purpose of this doctored vision of Mafeking’s image to the world... ’.

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108 Ibid.
109 However, amongst a sample of 103 house owners this support decreased to 54.4% for, against 28% and 6% who did not know, in Badenhorst, M. S. (1980) op. cit. A poll conducted by Pretoria school students, not released until incorporation had taken place, indicated 66% support for incorporation (Mafeking Mail, 3.10.1980).
110 RDM, 8.9.79.
111 Therefore, focus upon characters like the 88 year old granny Crew, the oldest living Mafeking resident, indicated the recasting of Pioneering characteristics to adjust to the changing times just as the siege residents had done.
112 According to the Mafeking Mail the documentary focused on the derelict pavilion on Recreation Ground, not used for a decade, even the Victoria Hospital received this. Half the old wing (was) in camera with only the name ‘Victoria’ appearing, looking for all the world like some ancient and deserted railway siding. Talk about slanted journalism!’. Mafeking Mail, 4.7.79.
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The locals claimed that the programme's portrayal of Mafeking as a 'dorp' was attributed to either bad film making or more sinisterly:

'If we reject that (bad journalism), then the only explanation is sinister, to say the least; that the picture of Mafeking as it is today was deliberately distorted so that anyone seeing it would immediately come to the conclusion that if that is what Mafeking looks like, then the sooner we hand it over to the nearest black homeland the better. Could this really be the explanation? Surely not!'.

For many in the town, the programme appeared to epitomise the years of neglect by central governments, the failure and perhaps lack of will to encourage the provision of facilities, services and industries to Mafeking:

'We have had a good reason in the past to regard ourselves as a stepchild among towns in this country. Too often have we been passed over when communal largesse was being distributed by beneficent Authority; army camps, railway workshops, industries- these have almost always gone to others...we are not to be treated as cattle waiting for the auctioneers hammer to descend.'

This neglect had often been attributed to unforgiving Afrikaner administrations who

113 Mafeking Mail, 4.7.79.
114 The sense of marginality was captured in the following headlines: 'Let there be an end to this indecision', Mafeking Mail, 22.6.1979 and 'We have been teetering on the edge of the Cape Province, so to speak, for a number of years and it only requires the scratch of a bureaucratic pen to send us over the top', Mafeking Mail, 9.2.1979 and 'Its cold comfort that the much vaunted Border industry policy has now officially been labelled a failure. For us it was a failure years ago and as it brought us nothing, we have lost nothing in the process. . when Mafeking had been designated a growth point the (news) paper had tried its best to get some benefit for the town,. direct to interested entrepreneurs and also indirect (ly) via government pressure but with negative results..'. Mafeking Mail, 13.7.79.
regarded Mafeking as a vivid symbol of ‘Engelse Imperialisme’. 115 Mafeking was portrayed as curious, strange, possibly a one-off, and this perception of ‘difference’ legitimised its incorporation in the eyes of white South Africa. It was even suggested that South Africa ‘gladly’ handed Mafeking over to Bophuthatswana. 14 For residents it was a celebration of the pioneering spirit of the frontier. 17

The South Africa government finally agreed to incorporation on March 26th 1980 but it was not until September 18th that a final date was given. Mafeking’s name was to revert, significantly, to the original Tswana spelling of Mafikeng and ‘Mafekingians’ hearts were sore but rejoiced that after 95 years, (they would) rejoin a proper spelling’. After 95 years of searching for an identity it had supposedly been discovered in ‘black’ Africa as ‘a matter of historic justice that simultaneously the town is returning to its original destiny’. 111

Mafeking’s incorporation can be interpreted in a number of ways. It can be claimed that it was mere opportunism on the part of the business community. 119 For the majority of Bophuthatswana’s black residents it was a non-event, regarded as a token gesture, since they opposed the enforced balkanisation of South Africa through the bantustan system anyway. For white residents support for incorporation can only be properly explained, in contrast to the incorporation of Port St. Johns into Transkei, by the guarantees given by the Bophuthatswana and South African governments:

115 This Empire tag had been a product of Mafeking’s earlier history and particularly the Siege of the Boer War, which in addition to the resistance of the town and Stadt, included the burial of hundreds of Afrikaner women and children who had died in concentration camps erected by the British just outside the town.
116 Pobrey, J, personal communication, 1996.
117 ‘... Mafeking would be unique in South Africa as an entire community of whites and blacks stretching out their hand to each other. Mafeking will be 95 years old next year. If it ceases to exist under its own name, it will at least have made a whopping great contribution to the chequered history of South Africa’, RDM, 1.10.1979.
119 The local newspaper itself, with its extensive printing works, was one of the largest businesses in town. This partly explains the editors promotion of incorporation.
'If clear declarations had been issued in the case of Port St. Johns as was the case in Mafikeng concerning property rights and political rights, then uncertainties and fears about the future might be reduced and the Port St. Johns white community saved'.

These important guarantees should also be seen in the context of Mafekeng's exceptional location. Arguably, the proximity to black Africans although often producing friction also produced a tolerance bred by familiarity and in comparison to other towns, relatively more benign race relations. The reconciliation to being part of rather than in Africa was nonetheless remarkable for a 'white' town within racially separated South Africa. This was a function of characteristics of the town which over one hundred years of frontier experience had pushed Mafeking into joining a black 'state'.

Following incorporation, Mangope continued to appeal to common efforts to modernise and 'develop' Bophuthatswana and to reverse its marginality. Prominent white and black groups adhered to discourses of transformation. Incorporation rapidly symbolised Bophuthatswana's own subordination to powerful ideas, practices and for some, the opportunities associated with modernisation.

5.5. Uniting the Diversity

By 1979, with the incorporation of Mafekeng an increasing possibility, a new planning report for Mmabatho had been demanded by Mangope. The overall objective was to unify the urban components, referred to as the Mafikeng-Mmabatho-Montshiwa complex (MMM):

'To weld such diverse elements into one organic whole'.

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120 Napier, C. J. and Schlemmer, L. (1985) op. cit.
121 From Mallows, Louw and Hoffe and Partners (1979b:1) Mmabatho New Capital of Bophuthatswana, 'Revised Development Plan if Mafeking incorporated into Bophuthatswana', September, Ref. 80/511, which this section draws upon.
In order to link the urban centres of Mafikeng and Mmabatho, the planning approach shifted from a unifocal to a bifocal emphasis. As a result, a conflict began to emerge between the increasing emphasis, particularly contained in the Five Year Plan, upon 'national requirements' and local level needs. The overall thrust of the reports paid significantly less attention to the Tswana dimension that had characterised Mangope’s specific requests in the 1978 plan. Instead a distinct modernising impulse was detected which ignored Tswana culture and emphasised the control and ‘proper development’ of the urban and surrounding rural areas:

‘A glance of the map shows that if the municipal area of Mafeking is incorporated and becomes part of the capital city, other contiguous areas must also be considered for inclusion... if the total potential of the urban area around Mafeking and Mmabatho is to be properly developed and economically and efficiently planned and administered’.122

This ‘potential urban area’, shown by the diagram, included the diverse settlements of the ‘white’ town of Mafeking, the new capital, Mmabatho, the Barolong Tribal Authority area known as MontshiwaStadt (the ‘Stadt’), the Imperial Reserve, and the apartheid townships of Montshiwa Town (black township) and Danville (coloured township). It also included an area of settlement immediately north east of Mafeking, previously a farm, ‘Lonely Park’, which was characterised as a potential slum area. Incorporation represented the opportunity to control and develop urban land economically and efficiently.

122 MLH (1979b).
Whereas the approach of previous reports was one of flexibility, this changed to emphasise 'some form of regulatory control of the surrounding sub-region as well as the City... to control urban sprawl'.\textsuperscript{124} To that end, the 'Stadt' was identified as 'the real problem for planning Mmabatho':

\begin{quote}
'it becomes as time passes more and more difficult to distinguish its boundaries from
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{124} MLH, (1979b:1).
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*the remainder of the urban area*.\(^{125}\)

5.5.1. The Stadt and Mmabatho

From ‘independence’ in 1977 the Mafikeng area’s population had rapidly increased from approximately 35,000 in 1976 to over 85,000 in 1985.\(^{126}\) The population and growth rate of the MMM complex is shown by suburb in the tables. Whilst the Mmabatho suburb increased rapidly, as would be expected of a new city, at over 30% between 1980 and 1985, another significant feature was the dramatic growth of the surrounding tribal areas, approximately 60,000 or 60% of the capital area’s total population in 1985.\(^{127}\)

This rapid growth of ‘informal’ areas was related to the capital’s economic boom and the migration of those seeking employment.\(^{128}\) Most people found accommodation on tribal land following the payment of a fee to the local chief. The chief, along with the Tribal Authority, derived power from the control over land allocation. This feature of the Stadt therefore greatly complicated the proposals for the local government structure of the capital. Despite the town planners who advocated the Stadt’s incorporation into the municipal boundaries, this was never done. The most common explanation given by a number of interviewees was simply in terms of the Stadt’s status as a ‘tribal area’. As seen in section 3.4.1, Mangope had preserved and enhanced traditional authority which had given chiefs and tribal authorities control over land allocation, tribal levies and certain legal matters. However, the acceptance of chieftaincy as the basis of rural local government did not mean that Mangope was reluctant to intervene in tribal matters. It should be remembered that Mangope had taken tribal land for the construction of Mmabatho, without recourse to

\(^{125}\) Ibid. pp3.

\(^{126}\) Cowley’s estimates in Drummond and Parnell (1991) Parnell (1986) also noted the existence of several large resettlement villages in a 25 kilometre radius of Mmabatho.

\(^{127}\) MLH (1980b). By 1991 this percentage of the total population of the ‘informal areas’ was 68% or 90,000 out of the 133,000 total. Stewart Scott, Plan Associates, Mmabatho, Structure Plan 2000, Report One, Working Document, December, 1992.

the normal procedure of a tribal resolution or compensation for the local tribal authority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suburb</th>
<th>1980-1985 % per annum</th>
<th>1985-1990 % per annum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danville</td>
<td>2,00 *</td>
<td>2,00 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafikeng</td>
<td>0,97</td>
<td>-2,47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mmabatho</td>
<td>32,75</td>
<td>17,69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montshiwa</td>
<td>4,13</td>
<td>-0,09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,49</td>
<td>6,01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 Mmabatho's population increase by suburb.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{129} From Stewart Scott (1992) op. cit.
The strict control of land through a single tier local authority was considered to have a negative impact upon the Stadt and instead local characteristics were thought to require careful consideration:

'This special treatment of Montshiwa Stadt is intended to recognise its special circumstances and to provide a means of ensuring its improvement without imposing alien regulations which could seriously retard economic development'.

The Stadt was identified by the planners as capable of providing a number of uses, with cheap land available for new migrants to the area, which could complement Mmabatho’s development. Rigid control of land was considered as ‘inappropriate’ and Brasilia was cited as an example of the problems arising with ‘urban development springing up beyond the city limits’. The emphasis upon this ‘special treatment’ was directed towards avoidance of an urban landscape spoiled by squatters. The inclusion of Mafeking was an opportunity to cement the modernist vision for Greater Mmabatho that could develop the ‘entire urban area...as a whole rather than as fragmented individual entities’. There was the impression in this report that the respect for ‘tradition’ occupied a highly ambiguous position. The planners’ main concern, ultimately, was somewhat different:

'To weld together communities with such widely differing past backgrounds . present and future ambitions will be a matter requiring special skills... the Consultants strongly recommend a specialist be asked to report on this who has both Southern African and International experience'.

This exercise in welding the diffuse fragments together drew upon the professional services of Dr. L. P. Green, formerly advisor to Johannesburg City Council and also

\[130\] Ibid. pp. 28.
\[131\] Ibid. pp29
\[132\] Ibid.
an international consultant on Lagos, Calcutta and Istanbul, and, more recently, the Newtown area of Johannesburg. This appointment tended to reinforce the view that Mmabatho was being shaped by internationally applicable principles and ‘laws’ of urban development.

The conflict between the local traditional authorities and government officials, who considered the ‘informal’ areas as a ‘blot’ on the landscape of the ‘national’ capital, symbolised the friction between maintaining respect for local conditions and promoting the ‘national’ vision. The question of whether or not to include the Stadt within the municipal boundaries would remain a feature of the ‘independence’ years and these conflicts were built into the urban fabric. Indeed, the boundary between the two, the width of a tarred road, was the stark perimeter separating the ‘rural and peri-urban’ from ‘urban’ settlements.

The dependence of the ‘national’ capital upon government functions and resources was considered as natural, particularly when Mmabatho was compared to three other ‘modern’ capitals:

‘The primary sources of revenue for Mmabatho are derived from areas outside of the new city complex as would be expected in any national capital. Washington, Brazilia and Canberra being noteworthy examples’. 133

The emphasis upon the expectations of ‘any national capital’ ignored cultural and socio-economic differences between all four cities and neglected local detail. At best local particularisms needed to be modified and at worst were merely adjuncts to the project of creating a modern city. The huge level of developmental bias towards Mmabatho was revealed in the Five Year Plan.

133 Ibid. pp22.
5.5.2. The Five Year Plan for Mmabatho: 'The basic assumptions as regards the nature and requirements of a Capital City'.

The development objectives of the Five Year Plan for Mmabatho were derived by MLH from a combination of what were considered ‘national and local goals and objectives’. These goals and objectives evolved from the 1979 BDC (Bophuthatswana Development Council) Annual Report, Cabinet Policy statements, agreed priorities of the Mmabatho Technical Planning Committee and the investigations of the planning team itself, MLH. The brief of the Five Year Plan from July 1980 set out the basis for the Mmabatho Development Programme and sought to promote the:

‘harmonious development of the new capital city of Mmabatho, including the newly incorporated town of Mafeking, the existing Montshiwa town, Montshiwa Stadt, and other settlements such as Lonely Park, forming part of the total urban area’.

The report was intended as an impetus towards implementation of ‘immediate’ requirements and to ‘structure the large capital investment programmes that are presently underway’. The plan was supposedly ‘to ensure that they are being best directed to meet the real needs of both the growing population at all income levels and

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134 Mallows, Louw and Hoffe and Partners; July, 1980a:1, Proposed brief for the 5-year Plan to integrate Mmabatho, Montshiwa, Mafeking and the Adjoining Settlements to form the New Capital city, Ref. 81/508.

135 The framework for the plan was based upon both the brief and the preliminary report which stated the following more specific objectives: 'To promote job creation through encouragement of labour intensive industries; To ensure that all areas of the MMM complex enjoy reasonable access to employment opportunities; To ensure the equitable spread of investment throughout all seven areas in relation to their needs; To provide a variety of housing and social facilities in relation to the needs, preferences and ability to pay of the population; To ensure the most economic and productive use of all capital investment funds by means of, accepting and upgrading existing settlements, infilling and expanding all developed and/or serviced areas, increasing densities, reviewing design standards of roads and services; To make provision for the expected influx of migrants to the developing complex; To ensure that education and training are available to the whole population'. Mallows, Louw and Hoffe and Partners, October, 1980b:54&55, Mmabatho, Montshiwa, Mafikeng, 5 Year Development Plan 1981-1985, Preliminary report.
of the various government departments'. The framework to co-ordinate the urban development of Mmabatho reflected the technical language and modernist methods of control. This methods were reflected in the complex procedure for planning based upon the 'Mmabatho Planning Framework: Schematic Description' which was proposed as a guide by the Departments of Economic Affairs and Urban Affairs and Land Tenure for the 'functioning of the Mmabatho Technical Planning Committee'.

The service and infrastructural requirements of these areas were devised through what was called a 'component breakdown' which the consultants suggested 'acts as a check list for all the actions needed for urban development'. The method used to guide urban development and to provide the basis for calculating priorities, allocation of funds and budget control was the 'well-known "Planning Programming Budgeting System" or P.P.B.S'. This system reflected the adoption at local level planning of the technical language of the PPB previously seen at the 'national' level:

'...defined as the functional schedule for the sequential carrying out of stipulated plans and programmes and providing, as an essential part of the system, constant feedback and monitoring provisions'.

In other words 'needs' were derived from calculating 'data assessment' based upon the population for each area of the overall complex and commensurate provision of services and infrastructure. However, the shape and pattern of urban development also rested upon the assumptions that formed the basis of the 'Identification of Basic Objectives'. The definition of 'priorities' centred upon:

'The basic assumptions as regards the nature and the requirements of a Capital City, the seat of National government,... its position in the National Economy... the

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136 Ibid. pp1.
137 MLH (1980b)Figure One.
138 MLH (1980a:1)
139 Ibid.
consequent appropriate development policy'.

The exact definition and weighting given to these ‘basic assumptions’ was related to international definitions and government pressures. Bophuthatswana National Priorities were recommended by the BDC Annual Report of 1979. The ‘national’ priorities of the BDC were clearly with industry, government, infrastructure, housing and not services. It was also clear that Mmabatho itself was given highest profile as a ‘special regional project’ with a 22% rating. The top priorities for the Mmabatho development programme were housing, serviced sites, industrial sites and ancillary infrastructure. The Central Business complex, police station and local government buildings were all prominent concerns. These priorities were applied to the MMM complex on the basis that ‘development objectives’ determined allocation of funds. However, MLH were critical of these priorities:

'It would appear from the preceding analysis however, that the Mmabatho development programme has to date paid insufficient attention to lower income housing, educational facilities, the provision of employment opportunities and community facilities. It is considered essential that the priorities for the Mmabatho Five Year Development Programme take into account these specific areas of concern'.

In addition to those projects listed the government had a range of other projects waiting for approval, supposedly directed towards ‘national’ prestige, which had not even been costed into the existing framework. MLH pointed out that the local allocation had no relation to the BDC National priority rating, such as ‘economic sector’ development and ‘health and social welfare’. In Mmabatho just four projects received 72% of all funds: Housing 25%, Government Buildings 23%,

140 MLH (1980a:2)
141 Bophuthatswana Development Council (1979b·52&53) Annual Report.
142 MLH (1980b:54)
Communications 14%, Law and Order 10% and Mmabatho itself 90.5% of the total budget. Although R41 million was allocated to Mmabatho, despite containing 60% of the population for the entire area, the ‘Stadt’ and ‘Lonely Park’ areas would receive less than 2% of total funding. After deducting costs of projects underway and of those already tendered, only a fraction of the total sum would then be available for other projects.

It was clear that MLH considered national priorities to be outstripping local needs. The consultants proposed that some of the ‘national’ projects be deferred until the local level gained higher priority:

‘While it is recognised that Mmabatho as the Capital City of Bophuthatswana has an important national role to fulfil, and as such money must be available for prestigious national projects, it is felt that this has been occurring to the neglect of other important aspects of new town development. It is recommended that the emphasis of the development programme be switched for at least a number of years from national projects to more local projects so as to reinforce the social and economic base of the Mmabatho Montshiwa Mafikeng complex’.\(^\text{143}\)

An alternative proposal was suggested by MLH on the basis of these findings. Together with the following objectives, these alternative proposals formed the basis of the planning principles underpinning the Five Year Plan:

‘National goals and objectives should be reflected’

‘The real needs of the whole population should determine future development’

‘A balance between national and local needs and between the component planning areas and different needs should be aimed at’\(^\text{144}\)

\(^\text{143}\) MLH (1980b:61)
\(^\text{144}\) Ibid.
However, MLH had themselves been the principal planners for both Mmabatho and the grandiose Government Buildings which dominated the budget expenditure. Although they emphasised local ‘needs’, how these were derived was open to interpretation, compounded by an almost total neglect of participation. MLH’s revised distribution of funds to each area revealed only a slight improvement to an otherwise overwhelming ‘urban bias’ towards Mmabatho, itself receiving 87.7%. MLH suggested that their proposals be accepted in principle as the five year plan.

The Bophuthatswana government maintained its rhetorical position of “a very heavy emphasis upon rural people”\(^{145}\) despite the leading role given to Mmabatho as the catalyst of development. These pro-rural claims were hard to substantiate given that the capital received a large proportion of the National ‘development fund’. In 1980 for example, of a total development budget of R107 million, the Mmabatho Development Project received 27 million or 22% of the National Development Budget.\(^{146}\) This proportion increased through the 1980s to approximately 30-40% of the ‘Development’ Budget.\(^{147}\)

The fault lines within the Bophuthatswana nation-building structure were becoming pronounced and manifested themselves over the Five Year Plan. Mmabatho’s infrastructure was entirely newly built and could therefore be expected to cost a considerable amount. The ‘priorities’, however, were deeply influenced by the manipulation of Mmabatho as a powerful national symbol by the Bophuthatswana government, in addition to the planners, architects, engineers and consultants who saw the financial benefits of such projects. The MLH report was critically received even by those actively promoting the economic development of the bantustans. It was claimed by a leading business publication that MLH had assisted Bophuthatswana in promoting ‘image building’ projects at a much higher level of priority than the

\(^{145}\) Pioneer, 1981.

\(^{146}\) See de Clercq in Graaf de V, J F. (1986) The Present State of Urbanisation in the South African homelands and some future scenario’s, Department of Sociology, Occasional paper, No. 11, University of Stellenbosch. See also Pioneer, 1981.

\(^{147}\) Schoeman (1995) op. cit.
‘immediate needs of a developing nation’.

Interestingly this dilemma was portrayed as the typical ‘Third World Sin’. The ‘National’ ambitions of the Bophuthatswana regime were regarded as detrimental to the welfare of the majority in the Stadt because Mmabatho was being promoted as a ‘national’ capital rather than a regional centre. Nonetheless, these characteristics were used to differentiate Bophuthatswana from ‘developed’ countries and the bantustan was represented in official circles as a country considered as having a set of problems common to the third world:

“As Bophuthatswana falls into the category of a Third World, or rather Less Developed Country, it faces a host of additional problems…”

The consultants responded to the criticisms of their Five Year Plan by simply emphasising the importance of ‘modern’ symbols for nation-building:

‘When a nation is trying to exert independence, they want visible symbols. Psychologically, this is very important. The buildings are designed to express that nation-hood through a united capital city’.

Mangope strenuously denied that Bophuthatswana had fallen into ‘the wide-spread Third-World practice’ of supplying top politicians with ‘new houses that are the last word in luxury and extravagance’. In the same speech to Parliament the capital was presented as if the embodiment of Bophuthatswana’s achievements which forced the critics to concede that ‘the Batswana have something special’. Mmabatho’s Mayor suggested that the city’s facilities were necessary in order for Mmabatho to ‘live up to its name’:

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149 Ibid.
151 A spokesperson for MLH, ibid.
152 Ibid.
'The city lives up to its name which means mother-of-the-nation because as the Republic of Bophuthatswana’s first ‘city’ and capital, it is home to the seat of government and its accompanying administrative departments. It is home to our national university, the University of Bophuthatswana...all of the nation’s parastatal bodies, such as the Agricultural Corporation, Bophuthatswana National Provident Fund, Bop TV and Radio Service'.

These projects reflected the considerable government expenditure benefiting Mmabatho and those able to live within the municipality. For most of its ‘own’ projects, the Mmabatho Council had raised loans from the Bophuthatswana government and particularly, when upgrading infrastructure, from the Development Bank of South Africa. Generally, it was claimed by the Town Engineer, the municipality’s own projects were economically viable. The Bophuthatswana government financed a sewer system in the Mmabatho CBD at cost of approximately R8 million and the main stormwater drainage system at approximately R5 million. In these cases the city and Mmabatho Council received the benefit from the Bophuthatswana government’s expenditure, whilst liaison between the two was reduced to a formality. These are only two examples of the lavish government funds made available for such schemes.

In 1984 the amalgamation of the urban areas of Mafikeng, Mmabatho and Montshiwa township into a common municipality was heavily publicised as an

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155 The Mmabatho Council, when possible, recovered the cost of its loans through service charges with a uniform tariff structure. These projects were financed in various ratios, between the Bophuthatswana Government, the Development Bank and the local authority, for example, the Mmabatho Disposal Works costing R7 million, was financed by each body providing a third of costs. Smit (1995) op. cit.
156 According to Smit, op. cit.
indication of the creation of an ‘alternative’ non-racial society by the Bophuthatswana government. Whilst blacks could be elected onto the Municipal Council for the first time, Pickard-Cambridge has suggested that the creation of a unified local authority was not popularly sought amongst blacks. Instead the amalgamation was instigated by the Bophuthatswana government in order to impress the world that a desegregated ‘South African’ city had been created. The prominent positions within the Mmabatho Municipal Town Council were dominated by whites, formerly of the Mafeking Town Council and also seconded officials from South Africa. By 1987 there were five African and four white Councillors and one coloured Councillor. To cope with the rapid expansion and demand on services the Council’s personnel strength grew to 967 by 1988. Strong links to the ruling BDP secured positions within the Council. By 1983, of Bophuthatswana’s eighteen towns, only Mafikeng was a municipality, seven had town councils, whilst ten were administered by government officials ‘without assistance from the local community’. Local politics in Mmabatho, such as it existed, was an extension of the ‘national’ level authoritarianism.

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158 For instance by 1992 the Town Clerk, City Secretary and Chief Engineer, amongst others, were white South Africans.
161 M. Gcinumkhonto, personal communication, May, 1996. Chapter Six indicates that opposition political parties were banned by 1987. It is interesting to note, as shown in chapters seven and eight, that some Mmabatho Local Authority officials became involved in the ‘SATSWA’ regional coalition of conservative forces whose proposals were centered upon devolution of power to Mmabatho in post-apartheid regional dispensation. Furthermore, in the final days of the Bophuthatswana Administration, several Mmabatho Municipal officials aided the invasion of Mmabatho by white neo-fascist extremists of the AWB.
162 Minister of Local Government and Housing, S.L.L. Rathebe, Pioneer, August, 1983.
163 This is not to suggest that there was total harmony between Central Government/Parastatal structures and Mmabatho. Despite the heavy bias of expenditure towards the capital area there was a continuing shortage of housing, especially at lower income levels. The Housing Committee of Mmabatho Council claimed that this was due to the Bophuthatswana Housing Corporation (BHC) being ‘out of touch with the community’ with no community representatives sitting on the BHC board. Minutes of Committee Meeting, 1992.
With the incorporation of Mafikeng and the creation of a unified municipality, Mmabatho was increasingly represented as a multi-racial melting-pot reflecting national sovereignty and therefore distance from apartheid South Africa. To reinforce the government's representation of a non-racial society, the Group Areas Act was removed from Mafeking and other apartheid legislation was repealed. The Tswana nationalist position of the government conflicted with the portrayal of the capital as the meeting place of both the western world and African cultural heritage, through which the 'children will blend the best of both worlds together and a new and wondrous national culture will develop'. The city was consistently represented as a racially harmonious settlement amidst the turbulence of South Africa:

'To the prospective resident, Mmabatho offers you the chance to live within one of the most peaceful, harmonious and fully integrated societies in Southern Africa'.

Since 'independence' residential segregation has broken down with small movements of middle-class African, coloured and Indian residents into previously whites-only areas. By 1987 Pickard-Cambridge has calculated that about one in six residents in formerly white suburbs were black. The slow pace of desegregation, comparable to Windhoek, reflected that there was no 'significant' white exodus from Mafikeng and that housing opportunities in the white suburbs were limited. Some factors for this slow movement included the significant move to 'home-ownership' in Montshiwa.

However, it does suggest that both local and central government structures were predominantly 'top-down'.

164 Ibid.
165 Mayoral Report, 1990-1991, Mmabatho City Council. By the mid-1980s, according to Louw's study, 75.5% of local whites suggested that incorporation had been 'the right decision' and only 9.3% disagreed. 64.3% suggested that race relations were 'good', 13% 'excellent', and 22% 'sometimes good/bad'. It was significant that almost 40% of respondents had been living in Mafikeng for less than a year, suggesting a changing population composition amongst white residents. Of those resident in Mafikeng for over five years, 65.8% favoured incorporation, whilst for those resident between 1-5 years this rate increased to 81.1%. In Louw, A. D. (1986) op. cit.
166 Drummond, J. and Parnell, S. (1991) op. cit
Furthermore, prior to the 1984 amalgamation, residents of Montshiwa and Mmabatho had been exempt from local taxation whereas Mafikeng had not. The key difference between the post-independence urban transformation of Harare and Windhoek and that of Mafikeng, was the creation of Mmabatho as a new capital city with the construction and availability of non-racial suburbs. Residents who wished, and who could afford, to move from the townships would also be closer to facilities and places of employment within Mmabatho itself:

'It is thus movement to Mmabatho, rather than to formerly white Mafikeng, which provides the most accurate guide to settlement patterns after desegregation and in fact many Montshiwa residents moved to the capital, whose suburbs are predominantly black, but with a significant proportion of white residents'.

The major effect of the removal of the Group Areas Act was to ‘infill’ buffer zones that had previously separated segregated areas. The barriers between suburbs had been eroded, if not relatively unchanged internally, to give the impression of a ‘common’ city. Whites had been shown to accept residential desegregation ahead of opening ‘white’ schools to all races. Within the context of a polarised and politicised South African society, Mmabatho and even the ‘Stadt’ were portrayed as peaceful in contrast to South Africa and the eastern parts of Bophuthatswana. With political upheaval throughout South Africa there was evidence that, to some extent at least, people had sought to escape this by coming to the capital area itself. Migrant workers leaving Bophuthatswana for work in South Africa also placed their families in the Stadt due to its relative safety.

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168 One resident in Mmabatho commented that his mothers house in Klerksdorp had been the target of political violence and burnt by ANC ‘comrades’. The family fled to 'Lonely Park' squatter camp, adjacent to Mmabatho, in order to avoid being caught in further violence, personnel communication, Mmabatho, 1995.
The other predominant pattern structuring the entire city, particularly the residential areas, was the "hierarchical organisation of the civil service and other state organisations". Although over 6,000 formal housing units had been built in Mmabatho since 'independence', these were primarily, if not exclusively, for state employees. There has also been a significant level of immigration of South African whites and other expatriates, including a large number of Africans from outside of South Africa to Mmabatho. However, the Stadt and other 'informal' areas were not incorporated into the Mmabatho municipality. The failure to do so, for a variety of reasons, principally cited as the complexity of tradition and opposition from the Tribal Authorities, would serve to exacerbate the rapidly growing material rift between Mmabatho and its peri-urban hinterland.

5.5.3. The Bureaucratic Castle

As seen earlier, the first MLH plans in 1978 and the 1979 Business Centre Development Plan had been guided by Mangope's desire to create a 'living monument' for the Batswana. Whereas many of the great capitals of the world occupied a commanding hill or vantage point, Mmabatho lacked these features. According to one engineer, 'to create a focus for the nation, you had to do it with your buildings in conjunction with the landscape'. The government building complex called Garona, or 'at our place', had been intended as the focus of the entire city. The architectural team responsible for Garona described the essence of the project:

'It was felt that the building in its immediate urban context should recognise the history and identity of its inhabitants, but that it should function at the same time in

170 Drummond and Parnell (1991) op. cit.
171 Drummond and Parnell (1991) draw parallels between the number of expatriates, concerned with aid and development issues, in Mafikeng and other cities such as Harare and Windhoek. The dominance of expatriates within administrative positions within Bophuthatswana structures created serious conflicts by the mid-1980s (chapter six).
Chapter Five: A Capital for the Nation

The architects envisioned Garona as a modern idiom of the kgotla, considered by Mangope to be the core essence of Tswana architecture. In order to incorporate aspects of 'tradition', the architects proposed Baroque planning with monumental boulevards, formal geometric spaces and imposing buildings, particularly as it was stated, to counteract the featureless landscape. Mangope's own conception of the intended role for Garona was stated at the official opening of the buildings in 1983:

'My government felt that here, where the nerve fibres from all over our country converge, where the heartbeat of the whole nation is monitored, and where policies are shaped that determine the course of the ship of state, here it would be an everlasting gesture of respect and tribute to our forebears, if visible expression is given to a Setswana cultural feature, which would set our Government Buildings unmistakably aside from all others in the world'.

Garona was represented as a 'modernised' and 'sophisticated' version of 'our people’s ancient kgotla or council meeting place' built to serve the nation. The history of

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173 A major influence upon the architects 'celebration' of traditional settlements was epitomised through the work of Prof. Revil Mason, whose summary of such qualities is reproduced from Britz and Scholes (1984) as possessing:‘(1) A clear hierarchy of spaces, controlling public and private spaces, and the relationship between the two; (2) a successive layering of space as created by walls within walls, with different realms of enclosure; (3) a clearly expressed circulation system'. Britz, B and Scholes, M. (1984:34) op. cit.

174 Ibid. The inspiration behind this transformation of Tswana culture drew upon the wider architectural influence of both Herzberger and Louis Khan. Britz and Scholes were regarded as representing a new generation of Afrikaner architects described as whose work in the bantustans was considered by Lange (in Kamstra) as a new form of 'colonial' architecture, yet superior to the government monuments in Pretoria.

175 Britz and Scholes gained inspiration from looking at 'Classical' historical precedents such as Piranesi's plan of Rome (in Kamstra, 1984:40) and particularly the Colosseum where the classical orders 'are used to articulate and humanize a large building mass', Britz and Scholes (1984:36).

Garona was, however, of three buildings. The first plan proposed was never built, although it received an award from the South African Institute of Architects. The initial plan had sought to position the government buildings on one side of the square with the unity of the square maintained by overlapping ovals and circles, defined by colonnades or 'screen walls'. According to Boden, the first plan for Garona, along with the design of the residential areas, were characterised as externally imposed 'cross-cultural blunders'. Boden attributed these mistakes to the architects dependence on interpretations of secondary sources, such as photographs, and to the failure of the architects and planners to pay attention to cultural and 'anthropological cues'.

The extent to which Garona can be categorised as specifically 'Tswana' or vernacular architecture is open to interpretation. The Bophuthatswana administration did not have a Department of Town Planning at the time of the project's conception and the consultants therefore wielded disproportionate power over design, planning and execution. Garona represented the influence and interpretation of Batswana culture by external South African professionals and not the Tswana themselves. Whilst in theory there was an attempt to fuse tradition and modernity, a number of engineers, architects and planners interviewed claimed that the government buildings were entirely 'First World' rather than ethnic. An engineering consultant, who had been chairman of the Mmabatho Technical Committee in the early 1980s suggested:

'...it's not ethnic in any way, it's certainly first world as far as the whole concept is concerned. The only thing they kept was the Kgotta'.

A Batswana Town Planner in the Department of Local Government and Housing dismissed the suggestion that the buildings were overtly Tswana influenced.

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177 Boden's, op. cit., own methodology suggests that there was an 'inadequate exploration of cultural factors' in reaching these planning decisions.
178 Town Planning in Bophuthatswana remained under the directorship of a white South African, even by 1992.
180 Mr. Mosothoane, Town Planner, Department of Local Government and Housing,
However, the Chief Town Planner, also a Batswana, Mr. Mpobole, expressed the opinion that all the buildings designed and constructed during the early 1980s adapted the original Tswana-oriented concept. These ideas, however, according to Mpobole, were then rapidly superceded:

"...making a place unique sounds a very good idea but in practice economics and resources determine the route and that's what happened with Mmabatho."

The architect's intentions must be seen in the context of translating Mangope's 'ethnic' brief into a workable 'modern' format. This combination led to an architectural style identified as early post-modern. However, in addition to Boden's important critique of functionalist designs and modern aesthetics there was also an important political issue which related to the rejection of the first plan. The principal function of the first plan was expressed by the architects:

'The importance of bureaucracy would be thereby de-emphasised and the significance of the heart of the city as being multi-functional, would be highlighted'.

Mangope wanted this central space at the heart of the government buildings rather than as a more general urban space. By appropriating this central space for the bureaucratic machine, Mangope was also seeking to commandeer aspects of Tswana tradition which he believed would legitimize his regime. The modern kgotla was now

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181 Mr. K. Mpobole, Chief Town Planner, Department of Local Government and Housing, Bophuthatswana/North West Province, interview, Garona, 1995.
182 In keeping with the now considered passe post-modern phenomenon of the 1970s and 1980s, the younger generation of architects chose not to pursue this regionalist avenue of exploration. The initial post-modern enthusiasm to extend the somewhat limited modernist design vocabulary, resulted in an often misdirected formalism with occasional or blatant ethnic reference'. Joubert, O. (1994:254) "Afro-pean symbiosis", Africa Insight, vol. 24, no.4.
equated with the functions of the Bophuthatswana state (see overhead photograph of Garona).

A diagrammatic plan is also shown (Figure 5.5) with the building consisting of four stories in the form of a giant horseshoe of 40,000 square metres. The outer ring (A, B, C, D and F) represents the general office accommodation for the various government departments. The ministries occupied two separate but linked buildings (C and G). The focus of the square, however, was the building occupied by the President himself (D) which was situated on the north side and was the symbolic front entrance to the complex. The formal facades of the ministries defined the square with a formal terraced garden also contributing to the definition.

Garona can be seen in relation to the rest of the town centre from the diagram and photographs.

The Kgotla and Malwapa influence can be seen throughout this centre (Figure 5.5 and Plate 5.2). For example, another key building was the Civic Centre (No.6) the outer wall of which within Garona displayed a facebrick mural of the Bophuthatswana coat of arms, with a Kgotla to the front of it. The major buildings in the city centre included the Magistrates Court, Mmabatho Business Centre, Development House (Head Office of the BNDC), and GPO amongst others, all of which in one way or another, displayed similar characteristics to the Kgotla. The diagram also shows the original intention to make the square accessible to the public via two carefully landscaped diagonal walkways. Symbolically, shortly after the opening ceremony the walkways were closed off and these entrances chained. Kamstra suggested that the walkways were the biggest failure of all at Garona because they were regarded as badly landscaped and perceived as detracting from original MLH plan.\textsuperscript{185} Notwithstanding these problems it was concluded that Garona was a fitting celebration of sovereignty:

\textsuperscript{185} Kamstra, ibid.
Figure 5.5 Diagrams of Garona (a) and (b) Mmabatho’s Town Centre

PLAN OF MMABATHO TOWN CENTRE
1 GOVERNMENT SQUARE
2 GOVERNMENT OFFICES
3 FUTURE PARLIAMENT
4 FUTURE OFFICE EXTENSIONS
5 MAGISTRATES COURT
6 CIVIC CENTRE
7 COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT
8 PEDESTRIAN AVENUE
9 PARKING

Plate 5.2. Overhead Photographs of Garona and Mmabatho Town Centre\textsuperscript{187}

\textsuperscript{187} Reproduced from Cowley, J., Geography Dept., University of Bophuthatswana.
'I have no doubt that, with all it faults, it is an important building of many great moments and qualities. It is worthy of standing in the company of the Union Buildings in Pretoria; it is a building larger than life.'

The architects and Mangope had portrayed the buildings as Bophuthatswana's symbolic centre. By 1984 the barbed wire and army presence in response to political opposition to the regime signified a dramatic subversion of the original intentions. A statue of Mangope was erected on the east side of Garona which, together with the barbed wire fences around the perimeter, symbolised the increasing detachment of government from the 'people' and the perception that Garona was the President's possession.

Plate 5.3 Mangope and Garona

The bureaucracy and patronage within the elite echelons of the Bophuthatswana state

188 Ibid.
189 See photograph.
were, as if, a core that was becoming increasingly detached from its peri-urban ‘periphery’. Garona embodied the growth of bureaucracy and the significant, although ultimately disloyal, expansion of the regime’s support base. By the mid-1980s about 16,000 civil servants were employed at Garona.\(^{191}\)

The dependence of Mmabatho upon Bophuthatswana state resources was exacerbated by the city’s limited industrial base. Being 287km from Johannesburg, Mmabatho was considered too far from the PWV for serious industrial development. Water supply was considered another adverse factor for industrial location in Mmabatho.\(^{192}\) Mmabatho was in the Molopo district of Bophuthatswana and other regions were considered to have more potential for economic development:

'It is therefore important to accept that the role of Mmabatho in the development will not be in the supply of local infrastructure but rather in the supply of a supporting function for Industrial Development in other areas which have a higher potential. The major need experienced at this point in time is the supply of capital for development purposes. This need can be fulfilled by Mmabatho, as large sums of capital are needed in order to supply expansion needs of the 250 companies that has already been established in Bophuthatswana'.\(^{193}\)

The following diagram shows Mmabatho’s population in relation to Greater Mmabatho, the Molopo Region, the Development Region J, Bophuthatswana and finally, South Africa itself. The Molopo Region’s economic base clearly reflected the dominance of Mmabatho within the district. By 1985 almost half of the district’s industry was centred upon ‘services’ and only 5.1% was based on manufacturing. With almost three times more activity than the South African average, the

\(^{191}\) Nation on the March (1987).
\(^{192}\) 'Unfortunately water intensive industries can not be encouraged but should the need arise concessions could be made', H.J Smit, City Engineer in Economic Development of the Molopo Area, Seminar, Mmabatho Sun Hotel, 11.11.87.
construction industry was also a highly significant sector.\textsuperscript{194} Mmabatho’s economy therefore reflected the dependence upon Bophuthatswana government resources. During the ‘independence’ era the ratio of government to private spending in Mmabatho was 40:1. The local economy was directly dependent upon the government, parastatals and local authority for between 45-50% of all jobs in the capital.\textsuperscript{195} Mmabatho would offer mainly service functions for industrial development of which most located near the PWV. Attempts were made to reinvigorate the region’s historical role as gateway to the African interior:

‘However, another market which we believe has not been exploited is the African market north of Bophuthatswana. We believe that the Botswana market as well as countries further north lying on the extended rail line offers tremendous potential. The distance to Gaborone is only +150Km’.\textsuperscript{196}

This focus reflected older regional concerns for Mafeking’s origins as a spring board into the interior. Similarly, Mmabatho was increasingly looking across the border to Africa. The bias towards Mmabatho had been justified in terms of meeting the necessary attributes of a ‘national’ capital city. Mmabatho was the focus of a strategy which, more generally, sought to locate Bophuthatswana in the world community of ‘nation-states’.

\textsuperscript{194} See Figure 6.1, next chapter.
\textsuperscript{195} By 1991 the state and parastatals provided 32.6% of jobs in Mmabatho. In addition, the municipal council and defence force contributed 3.3% each, educational jobs provided 5.7%, transport, social and community services 6.5%. Mmabatho Structure Plan 2000, Working Document, December, 1992, Stewart Scott Plan Associates, Pretoria.
Chapter Five: A Capital for the Nation

![Diagram of population scales]

Note: Figures within brackets represent total Tswana population of an area in millions (next to boxes), or as a percentage of total Tswana population of the area in the succeeding box (next to arrows).

*Figure 5.6: Scales of Population.*

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197 Source, Stewart Scott Plan Associates (1992)
Chapter Six

'Because our independence was not the result of a bloody war of liberation we have not received as yet, the recognition we deserve. But no matter, we will eventually earn this since our challenge continues and we will continue to wage our own particular war in order to acquire even more in the fields of education, agriculture, housing and other modern facilities- all of which are necessary to enable us to attain our major objective of raising the quality of live of our people. When recognition comes to us, it will be recognition with great respect- the respect that is afforded to a nation that is capable of standing on its own feet. For this we are prepared to work and wait'.

Lucas Mangope, President of Bophuthatswana

6.1. Introduction

The construction of Mmabatho, opening of Garona and modernisation of the landscape, were key moments in Mangope's promotion of Bophuthatswana as a 'Place for All'. This range of strategies were used to represent Bophuthatswana as a liberal democracy, not least with the incorporation of 'white' (and coloured and Asian) Mafeking into this bantustan. Mangope's promotion of his 'alternative society' with its modernising, non-racial and liberal discourse, was directed at local, 'national' and international audiences. These different scales were, however, fused through the common notion of modernisation. Crucially the ethnic and political basis of the Bophuthatswana regime was shaped around the quest for respect 'afforded to a nation

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2 Mangope, L, 1978. 'Bophuthatswana - A Place for All', Via Afrika.
capable of standing on its own feet'. The Bophuthatswana government attempted to engage with the 'West' by promoting its modern and developed image abroad. This chapter illustrates the extent to which internal nation-building efforts were dominated by the paramount concern to locate Bophuthatswana's place in the world. Bophuthatswana's concern for international prestige and recognition was based on three inter-related 'outward' strategies.

The first concerned the representation of Bophuthatswana's economic differentiation from the other homelands, and black Africa. A multi-purpose capitalist and modernising discourse was directed at attracting local and foreign capital to Bophuthatswana through the image of an investor-friendly rapidly 'developing' country. Policies and imagery of the economic transformation of the region were directed towards providing international kudos. They were also intended to provide a conduit for particular regional groups and social classes to establish themselves in bantustan structures as agents of 'development'. Co-ordinated from Mmabatho, this strategy formed the cornerstone of vigorous efforts to take the message of Bophuthatswana beyond its borders and into the capitals of the world.

Secondly, these economic initiatives were closely related to political and diplomatic efforts to enhance recognition. 'Diplomatic' and 'trade' missions were established in major European, American and Asian cities. Networks were established to promote Bophuthatswana's image as capitalist, democratic, and non-racial. The diplomatic efforts were underpinned by the creation of the Bophuthatswana Institute of International Affairs. Attempts to gain recognition from the international community and to legitimise its 'nation-building' were underpinned by the reconstruction of Bophuthatswana's historical origins. One particular 'nation-building' argument taken to the capitals of the world, particularly during the efforts to receive recognition in the late 1980s, involved Bophuthatswana's definition of itself as an overtly ethnic Batswana nation-state whose fragmentation was a product of British colonialism in the nineteenth century. The Bophuthatswana regime reinforced this strategy by promoting Pan-Tswana association with Botswana.
Thirdly, the regime's complex interaction between the 'national' and international scales is illustrated through the politics and economics of the 'prestige' project. These efforts involved middle men or 'Uhuru Hoppers' who in return for personal reward promised international recognition through a range of often clandestine schemes and projects. Translating Mangope's nation-building ideals into tangible projects and schemes also involved reliance upon the skills and knowledge of a numerous expatriates. The high profile given to the Sun City tourist resort, and an infamous power plant project, was soon followed by the creation of a media network centred on the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation (Bop TV). Bop TV reveals the links, and conflicts, between international 'norms' and Bophuthatswana's modernisation. The creation of this broadcasting network also shows that Bophuthatswana nation-building was overshadowed by the complex regional relations of dependency with South Africa.

These energetic efforts served to highlight the conflicts and tensions between externally-orientated development and the manipulation of 'nation-building' characteristics in the context of modernisation of Bophuthatswana. In pursuit of 'nation-hood' Bophuthatswana was pulled in different directions with a debilitating impact upon the economic, political and cultural basis of the regime.

6.2.  'The Tswana have no shoe' - Stable and Free-Market Oriented

Whilst tacitly recognising the high degree of dependency upon South Africa, Bophuthatswana's national economic strategy nonetheless sought to further political sovereignty through enhancing economic viability. The attainment of economic viability was based upon free market policies which were underpinned by energetic and concerted efforts to attract foreign investment and foreign loans to Bophuthatswana. The objective behind these promotional efforts can be best

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understood with the context of Bophuthatswana's dependence upon financial flows from Pretoria.

Almost from its inception, Bophuthatswana had been avowedly oriented towards a 'free-market' economy. Mangope had often compared Batswana 'traditional' organisation to a form of capitalism. He also combined this with a Christian stance against communism with pronouncements such as '(I)t was better to a streetcleaner in a christian state than Prime Minister of a communist country.'\(^5\) The 1981 White Paper on Development emphasised the capitalist orientation. It was intended to:

'give all people in Bophuthatswana the opportunity to develop their full potential within the framework of a free enterprise system'.\(^6\)

The promotion of capitalism and liberal democracy was the basis of the Bophuthatswana regime's claims for legitimacy. This discourse sought to combine and adapt Bophuthatswana's 'differences' to the language of multi-racialism which had become increasingly vocal following the incorporation of Mafeking.\(^7\) Capitalism was also perceived as the key language to make headway into the international community. If there was one strategy which Mangope pursued above all in order to differentiate his regime from other homelands then it was his multi-racial emphasis in combination with 'sound' economic policy:

'One of the distinctive features of the Government of President Mangope has been its emphasis on economic growth and free enterprise, rather than on political slogans. As President Mangope has repeatedly stated, "If full independence does not improve the quality of life of my people, it is a useless independence" .'\(^8\)

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\(^4\) Chapter three indicated the high level of economic dependency of Bophuthatswana on South Africa.

\(^5\) Mafeking Mail, 15.5.1970.


\(^7\) Chapter Five detailed Mafeking's incorporation into Bophuthatswana in 1980.

These sentiments were directed at foreign investors in order to promote an image of stability and administrative competence. Indeed, the *Pioneer* was a monthly magazine aimed at an international audience and produced by the Bophuthatswana Department of Information and was important in publicising the region. The BNDC (Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation) *Development Bulletin* was directed more specifically at the business community in South Africa and abroad. In another publication aimed at investors, Bophuthatswana was represented as a 'fully independent parliamentary democracy'. Significantly, the territory was characterised as 'ethnically homogeneous', where this was considered as modern rather than primitive, divided and conflictual. This capitalist discourse was preached to Batswana residents themselves. Mangope attempted to legitimise these ideas by manipulating Batswana identity in order to suggest its compatibility with capitalism. One example involved the adaptation of a Batswana proverb which described their hardship and poverty as 'the Batswana never wear a proper shoe'. Mangope used this to suggest that it was imperative for the Batswana to be industrious to transform themselves and hence the region.

The Bophuthatswana regime was defining the essence of Batswana culture and character, which was shaped around and embracing economic modernisation. In order to attract foreign investment the Batswana were characterised as accommodating and peaceful:

'They are not militant and industrial strife is relatively unknown'.

Batswana tradition was invested with authorial meaning by the Bophuthatswana regime. 'Traditional' characteristics were therefore defined as unproblematically co-

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11 BNDC, Land of Opportunity, op.cit.
existing with modernisation. Mangope and the BNDC used the image of a vast labour reserve as a positive feature for potential investors. Bophuthatswana would supposedly 'suit the mentality' of the industrialist in their search for cheap labour through the availability of the Tswana people, 'particularly women'.

The relationship between 'tradition' and 'modernisation' which was presented to industrialists and developmentalists was most graphically illustrated in the BNDC promotional video 'Land of Opportunity'. Tradition and Tswana culture were portrayed as stoic in the face of the beneficial onslaught of progress and modernity. Culture was represented as a curious timeless entity, as if 'natural' and complementary to the irresistible developmental impulse:

'There is a land where a modern world exists comfortably with nature and development moves with the eternal cycles of the seasons. Where an extensive infrastructure serves thriving metropolitan areas that do not disturb the age old rhythm of rural settlements. Where economic growth has enriched the lives of the people and sparkling resorts provide recreation and revenue'.

'Development' was portrayed as an unstoppable force and as coterminous with infrastructure and economic growth. This progressive tide with its construction projects, engineers and infrastructure was interspersed with pictures of dancing, smiling villagers. Then alongside all of this evidence of progress were glistening swimming pools and that most potent symbol of Bophuthatswana- the casino. It suggested a positive co-existence of tradition with modernity, rather than the contradictions:

'Nothing is meagre in this land. A place where time keeps place with creation and

13 'Bophuthatswana, Land of Opportunity', BNDC, video, 199?
there is space to pursue such a dream—Bophuthatswana is such a land'.

The image presented to overseas investors was of smiling multi-racial school children and industrious Batswana who were apparently:

'willing to learn... acquire new skills... wanting to enhance the equality of their lives without sacrificing their traditional values'.

Bophuthatswana was legitimised as steeped in time whilst as 'modern as today'. Tradition certainly was not seen as an obstacle to modernisation but neither was its role discussed other than offering dignity and a source of strength for the Batswana. Alternative conceptions of 'tradition' were closed off and the Bophuthatswana regime's interpretation of a 'true' Batswana tradition should be understood as performing a legitimatory function. The BNDC portrayed Bophuthatswana as a land waiting for that dynamic entrepreneur who could 'unleash its power' and whose resources were waiting to be harnessed:

'...to make a dream come true, a spirit that has a vision of development and enrichment, of growth and prosperity, to share with the people A spirit that respects the dignity of tradition and understands the importance of economic expansion'.

6.2.1. 'Trickle-down' as Development

Despite the rhetoric of 'development' within the BNDC and other sources, this appeared to be synonymous with economic growth. The efforts to mature the 'nation's' economy were directed towards increasing productivity and output. Once
growth had been achieved, economic and social benefits would then supposedly accrue to the masses. Bophuthatswana lacked the usual parade of international aid organisations common to many third world countries. Furthermore, Bophuthatswana-based NGOs were virtually non-existent. Taken together with the demise of the BDC without a commensurate new propagator of 'development' policy, the BNDC interpretation of national development—which economic expansion and increased output—reflected a 'trickle down' approach. In the late 1980s the Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. E. Keikelame, gave a presentation addressing 'Bophuthatswana's Development- A Forecast', which appeared to reinforce these ideas. Although suggesting that 'development' 'apparently lacks a specific universally accepted definition', nonetheless, Keikelame still promoted the 'National Objectives and Guiding Principles for the Development of Bophuthatswana', which had been stipulated in the 1981 White Paper, as the guiding development philosophy in Bophuthatswana:

'Well, let us not get involved in this argument and just say that the term "development" refers to the actual physical, social and financial actions required to create economic growth and improve the quality of life of the population. The national objectives are: 1. to make the country economically mature; and 2. to raise the standard of living of the total population'.

Keikelame provided evidence that Bophuthatswana was supposedly 'definitely on the right path' towards meeting these objectives. Despite the self-promotion of Bophuthatswana through a number of health and education indicators, the Minister's presentation was evidence that 'development' policy was based upon maturing the national economy by promoting capitalist growth first, followed by 'trickle down' later. Modernisation would provide for the nation through the creation of jobs and

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local business as if Bophuthatswana was to be a 'little Japan in Africa'. This conception was reflected in another publication by the BNDC which forcefully reiterated its commitment to 'encouraging free enterprise and the profit motive, maintaining an open-door policy with regard to foreign investors, with their know-how, capital and integrity, no nationalisation of industry and, no direct government participation in private undertakings'.

The private sector had been represented on both the BDC committee and on the board of the BNDC. Mangope continued to promote private capitalist involvement in building his 'nation'. This policy was reflected in the regime's increasing involvement in financial projects in the money and stock exchange markets. Various companies were floated on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) such as Bodisatswana Investments. This company operated a network vehicle dealership and service stations in which a R1 million worth of shares were offered. This policy was described within the South African print media as the 'Bophuthatswana Fruits of Capitalism' and, with another company, the Yabeng Investment Holding Company, illustrating how floatation could raise funds. In this particular scheme, 70% of shares in Yabeng were held by the BNDC with the remaining 30% once again open to citizens and those wishing to 'shape Bophuthatswana's future'. During the floatation of Yabeng Mangope reiterated the Bophuthatswana stance on capitalism, stating that it:

'has borne out our faith in the free enterprise system to which Bophuthatswana is fully committed. It has put within reach of the people of our country the fruits of capitalism. As from now they have the opportunity to share in the prosperity of a

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19 Profitable industrial investment in Bophuthatswana, Industrial Advisor, BNDC, page 1.
20 According to the Sunday Times (SA) 30.5.82, 50% were held by Bromain Holdings and the remainder by the Bophuthatswana Government and citizens of Bophuthatswana.
21 Financial Mail 24.6.83.
Mangope harnessed the private sector to give his regime a semblance of 'independence'. Economic viability, Mangope claimed, was not necessarily a requirement for nation-hood, but was 'reassuring'. State officials and members of the ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic Party joined the private sector to access these financial 'fruits'. This reflected the development and growth of a petty-bourgeoisie in Bophuthatswana.

The differentiation of Tswana society and social identity increased on many levels. Even in Mmabatho, somewhat distant from the PWV, an industrial site was created and indicated that some limited industrialisation had taken place. An increasing number of Tswana were absorbed into the industrial base of the capital but in much fewer numbers than those absorbed into the state sector and industries in the eastern districts. For example, Sebowana Mill was sited at Mafikeng on a newly zoned area specially allocated for agro-industry. The Mill cost R4.5 million with 85 employees, with another project, Agric-Chicks, costing R46 million, with approximately 360 workers. Also created was Mmabatho Foods with 150 people, PC Dairy with 50 workers costing R2.5 million and NCD Diary at R4 million. With rapid industrialisation of Bophuthatswana this economic change was, however, producing another seam of contradiction between the mobilisation of organised labour and capital (next chapter).

To preach this modernising litany Bophuthatswana officials ventured abroad with the intention of recruiting investors through the BNDC's generous incentive schemes and to acquire loans for Bophuthatswana.

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22 Ibid.
23 *Sunday Times* (SA) 30.5.82
24 By 1987 20 industries had been established in Mmabatho and 1,200 people employed within them, *Nation on the March*, 1987:97, op.cit.
6.2.2. The BNDC and 'Booming Lands'

The chief agent to spearhead investment and economic development was the BNDC. This parastatal was founded in 1975 under the supervision of the South African Department of Bantu Affairs and Development 'Promotion of the Economic Development of the Homelands' 1968 Act. According to the BNDC's mission statement the path to improvement of the 'quality of life' would be through 'developing Industry, Commerce, Small Business and Human Resources' with the:

'purpose of the Corporation (being) to improve the quality of life in Bophuthatswana by promoting economic development throughout the country'.

As previously mentioned, one strategy used to promote economic development was to encourage commercial development in Bophuthatswana. The other principle economic strategy was directed at industrial development:

'The Government is convinced of the important stimulus industrial development can provide to economic development by means of job creation and income generation within the borders of the country and determines that this potential should be utilized purposefully to its optimum'.

As the economic development arm of the government, it was intended that planning and co-ordination should be undertaken on a regional basis together with the supply of information. The emphasis was upon encouraging industrial and commercial investment. This latter function was divided into two sectors, firstly that dealing with large scale industry and secondly, tourism and small industry. All sectors dealing with operations, property and administration were further sub-divided into, managerial,
building contracts and administration back-up services. The BNDC's specific objectives were to involve Tswana and foreign entrepreneurs in building up the country's economic resources through industrial development. The BNDC would also provide the necessary infrastructure within the industrial area at declared growth points, establish better business facilities in Bophuthatswana and 'build up a viable and stable economy based on agricultural, mining, industrial and commercial sectors'.

In the early 1980s the BNDC Managing Director, W. van Graan, together with a small group of key figures, had particular responsibility for creating business opportunities for the regime. Van Graan involved the BNDC in smaller scale projects rather than the government's prestige projects. Furthermore, Van Graan would not tolerate any government interference and concentrated solely upon projects, although at times the two overlapped. The focus upon 'national' development was symbolised by the relocation of the BNDC's headquarters from Pretoria to Mmabatho, intended to influence and direct the co-ordination and management of industrialisation of the territory from within its own borders. The BNDC's new Head Office was symbolically called 'Development House'. High profile effort was given to gaining access to foreign money markets in the form of loans and investors. By 1981 the Bophuthatswana Finance Minister had clearly indicated these intentions:

'Up to now, Bophuthatswana has been an under-borrowed country. In the next phase we expect to become a more extensive borrower as the tempo of our development mounts, but we shall do so in the knowledge that we have already provided a sound foundation for all our expanding activities'.

In addition to contributions from the South African government and 'own sources', a

28 The BNDC, Its role and functions, Liaison Manager, BNDC.
29 Personal communication with Magyar, 1997.
third category comprising Bophuthatswana revenue was apparent in the breakdown of the 1986/7 sources of revenue. Own sources amounted to approximately 33% and grants from South Africa another 33%. However, the third category, loans, accounted for the final 34%. These loans were raised on both the local and foreign capital markets, guaranteed by the Bophuthatswana government and for certain loans, the South African government. The sojourn into these money markets was thought to provide leverage away from South African government domination of the homeland economic and hence political policies. Such a level of dependence also influenced the more mundane fiscal planning within Bophuthatswana, contingent upon the yearly budgetary allocation from South Africa. The Bophuthatswana regime therefore envisaged access to the private sector as integral to its quest for independence from South Africa.

On an earlier trip to Europe Van Graan 'seemed highly successful' in securing R9 million loans from four central European banks, with projects under discussion worth R80 million. Van Graan claimed this success was due to Bophuthatswana's contrasting system of government to 'other' independent African states. The BNDC finally acquired its own first foreign loan of R12 million in 1983 and the second of R20 million in 1986. The Commercial director of the BNDC also embarked on more overseas trips which were described as follows:

'These trips are aimed at attracting more overseas investment. We find that business leaders and opinion makers like to listen to us'.

Foreign loans secured in the 1980s were made direct to the BNDC and amounted to R34 million with the first repayment from 1988. The purpose being that:

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31 *Indicator SA*, 1988, op.cit. Note that 'own sources' is considerably smaller than the other estimate of 47% if customs union and Rand monetary area payments are considered as South African derived sources. See chapter three.
32 *RDM* 19.6.82
'The loans were raised to provide capital for development programmes and repayment is guaranteed by financial institutions'.

Whilst a significant addition to the BNDC budget these foreign loans should be seen against the total being loaned from both the Bophuthatswana government and the DBSA. These amounted to ten loans from each, totalling R63 426 Million and R107 709 million respectively. The government loans were for 'the purpose of development and working capital'. All were guaranteed by the Bophuthatswana government. Another R42 million worth of loans were raised through stock issues on the capital market by the BNDC from 1981. These outside loans reflected the efforts to circumvent Pretoria and also supposedly made BNDC more independent of the Bophuthatswana government. However, in addition to the BNDC, many other projects were financed through loans made to the government itself. This suggested that the total debt accruing to the Bophuthatswana government was increasing rapidly throughout the 1980s.

Regarding international investment, Mangope claimed that responses had been so great that R65 million had to be put on a waiting list because homeland infrastructure had been surpassed by the level of investment. For some observers the success of Bophuthatswana's industrial strategy depended upon the success of attracting such investment. With the initiation of these 'internal' efforts to industrialise Bophuthatswana in the early 1980s, one academic, with an interest in Bophuthatswana’s economic development policy, suggested:

'\textit{The extent to which the territory is able to avail itself of this favourable economic climate will ultimately depend upon the success of its industrial strategy in attracting}'

\[35\] BNDC, Annual Report, op.cit.\[36\] Nation on the March, 1987:105, op.cit.\[37\] RDM 27.8.82.
and retaining foreign investors and industrialists. This remains the sine qua non for the accelerated creation of job opportunities for indigenous job seekers. Success in this area will most surely enhance Bophuthatswana's prospects of ensuring political stability through peaceful economic development; after all, political stability and economic development are like Siamese twins, irrevocably joined together, the one unable to exist without the other."

These comments were made by one of a growing number of South African economic developmentalists clearly impressed with the modernising discourse and efforts to industrialise in Bophuthatswana. With foreign investment and job creation 'peaceful economic development' would be conducive to political stability. Such views illustrated the enthusiasm which was underpinning Bophuthatswana's construction as a 'nation-state'.

This 'imminent industrialisation' was also encouraged through incentive schemes aimed at overseas investors. An Industrial Development Board (IDB) was established within Bophuthatswana with its executive council consisting of five members each representing the BNDC, CED, Bophuthatswana government and the private sector. Whilst applications for new industries were processed by the BNDC, the IDB also considered such applications. Moreover, besides an advisory function the IDB had the power to 'grant generous incentives for industrial development'. By 1987, these incentives focused upon the growth points located at Babelegi, Ga-Rankuwa, Mogwase, Mmabatho and Thaba 'Nchu. Babelegi was represented as '...the sprawling industrial growth point in Bophuthatswana. Industrialists from Germany, England, Italy, America and France have invested R54 million in this area. The level of concessions depended upon which of these locations was selected. The eastern

39 Ibid.
districts of Bophuthatswana, centred upon Babelegi, were easily the most industrialised in view of their proximity to the economic hub of the PWV. As a result these districts received slightly fewer incentive schemes than other areas including Mmabatho. Subsidies were given for interest rates and rental, wage bills, relocation costs, transport, housing and training costs. There was also a considerable range of individual incentives shaped around a generous tax package with car and house subsidies and low rates of income tax. These generous tax packages meant that the overall rate of income tax was well below levels in South Africa. As such the incentives, particularly for professionals, reflected another significant and costly feature of 'urban bias' in Bophuthatswana. In addition the BNDC was able to provide loans of up to 50% of the venture (35% excluding land and buildings):

'Under special circumstances (e.g. if the project is in the national interest) the BNDC will participate in joint ventures'.

These circumstances included the provision of infrastructure and risk capital. The latter was particularly important for the construction of the tourist resort at Sun City and the shopping centre schemes known as Megacities. The BNDC also had a number of investments in associated companies and subsidiary companies.

42 For example, Mmabatho was in category II of IV categories, with I being the eastern districts. To attract a firm to Mmabatho concessions were divided between long term and short term. A building costing 300,000 US dollars would receive a short term concession (10 years) for a rental subsidy of 45% of the MRIR. If the latter was 15%, rental subsidy would therefore be 6.75% of 300,000= 20,250. 80% of total wage bill would paid in the form of a cash grant upto seven years. Furthermore, relocation costs of 500,000 were offered with upto 20% more for 'unquantifiable costs'. Long term concessions included 125% of training costs deducted for tax purposes, 40% transport rebate for goods manufactured in area and in exceptional circumstances even for raw materials. 40% of applicable bond rate for housing subsidy and electricity subsidy and also road transport permits and price preferences for government tenders. (All in BNDC, 'Bophuthatswana, Land of Opportunity', 1984, op.cit.).


44 Maree, J. 1988, Managing Director of the BNDC, BOPIIA Seminar, Craft Press, op. cit.

45 Sun International Bophuthatswana Holdings (Pty) Ltd. had 44.90% of its shares
Chapter Six: Locating Bophuthatswana

The thrust of the BNDC's promotional strategy stressed the wider sub-continental context with South Africa as 'powerhouse of the continent', followed by Bophuthatswana itself. With 90% of Bophuthatswana's products sold on the South African market this strategy showed the extent of Bophuthatswana's economic integration. Bophuthatswana's access to the whole of southern Africa together with its own merits were then promoted to potential investors. Indeed, the basis of Bophuthatswana's industrial strategy was its role as a base of supply for South Africa. Inevitably, as the sanctions debate became increasingly important, Bophuthatswana could no longer rely on the South African market:

'In the last decade the fact that we were not recognised did not play a major role to most of the investors here, as they were looking at marketing their products mainly in the RSA or, if exporting, South Africa was the country of origin for their exports'.

This statement implied that non-recognition had not previously been an economic problem for Bophuthatswana. However, although there was an increasing level of investment in Bophuthatswana throughout the 1980s, by the late 1980s the sanctions issue was beginning to add pressure to Bophuthatswana's industrial policy. Nevertheless, by 1987 it was claimed that investment by the BNDC itself, mainly in providing infrastructure and buildings totalled R170 Million. This investment had apparently shown 'tremendous increase from abroad':

controlled by the BNDC, with loans of R5 million to this company in 1990 alone, BNDC Annual Report, 1990.

46 Maree, op cit.
48 Maree, J. op. cit.
49 The BNDC budget increased over the year 1980/81 to 1981/82 from R52 million to R106 million. By 1981/82 it was claimed that the number of expatriate staff had decreased by 70% to 130 and the number of Tswana increased by 9% to 1400, reflecting it suggested the encouragement of localisation. Pioneer, 1982.
'Presently 40 foreign investors are operating manufacturing concerns in Bophuthatswana. The total investment in these are estimated to be in the region of R100 million of which +/- 70% contributed by foreigners (South African industrialists excluded).'

Total investment was in fact in the region of R750 million to R1000 million. The total number of factories had increased from 81 in 1977, to 250 in 1987 and 422 by 1990. It was estimated that the number of jobs in manufacturing increased from 8,500 in 1977 to 28,000 in 1987, to 41,000 in 1990. Manufacturing contributed 10.7% to Bophuthatswana's GDP in 1980, 15.2% in 1985 before reaching a high of 16.1% by 1990. These changes were evidence of Bophuthatswana's industrial transformation, although the huge cost did not necessarily imply job creation, education and training and increased standard of living for the bulk of the population. By 1990 the BNDC had produced 12 publications aimed at investors, seven of which were available in foreign languages. A video was also available entitled 'Invest in Bophuthatswana' with soundtracks available in English, German, French and even Mandarin. In fact the attraction of Chinese investors had been the most significant of all overseas investment. By 1988, 55 Chinese industrialists were present in Bophuthatswana with school teachers recruited from Taiwan and a mandarin speaking staff member employed at the BNDC. Commenting on the origin of foreign investment into Bophuthatswana, the Managing Director pointed out:

'I have spoken of our success with foreign investors from the Far East but, apart from a handful of industrialists from such countries as the USA, the UK, West Germany, Italy and Israel, our success in other parts of the world has been negligible up to

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50 Roberts, W. 1987, op. cit. Although 'Nation on the March' places the figures at 22 and R70 million respectively, possible for previous year.
Nonetheless, the attraction of overseas investment had been a key strategy designed to create economic growth whilst reinforcing the image of a capitalistic modernising Bophuthatswana. This imagery permeated the commentaries of South African observers and was also aimed at gaining acceptance from the wider world.

During this early phase of 'modernisation' the South African press praised Bophuthatswana's economic policy which illustrated the extent to which 'sound economics' were synominous with development. These efforts increased manufacturing's contribution to GDP from a pre-independence level of under 10% to over 16% by the late 1980s.\(^54\) Between 1980-1985 GDP growth at current prices was 17.4% and 34.3% between 1985-1989 (in real terms this was 18.5%).\(^55\) GDP was still, however, dominated by mining. By 1987 Bophuthatswana had six platinum mines which employed 57,000 people and by 1989 they contributed 45% of GDP. However, it remained doubtful as to whether mining had fulfilled Magyar's desired objectives, as stated in 1982, 'to ensure that they serve the social development of Bophuthatswana and not the needs of the volatile and fluctuating international minerals market...'?\(^56\)

\(^{54}\) The South African mining corporation, GENCOR, described Bophuthatswana's mining legislation as the most enlightened in the whole of Africa, 'if not the world', in BOPiIA presentation (1988) op. cit.

\(^{55}\) Daphne and de Clerq, op. cit., make the important point that growth in GDP does not necessarily expansion of productive industrial or agricultural capacity.

Figure 6.1 Molopo Magisterial District, Region J, Bophuthatswana and South Africa: Nature of Industry 1985.\footnote{In Stewart Scott, 1992.}
The economic performance supposedly symbolised the maturing of the Bophuthatswana economy and provided opportunities to promote Bophuthatswana as appearing to be economically different from the other bantustans. For example, in 1983 on the basis of its economic performance, Bophuthatswana was invited to appear at the South Africa-Britain Trade Association. On behalf of Mangope, Rowan Cronje was able to promote Bophuthatswana's achievements by stressing its economic 'success'. The BNDC budget was supposedly nearly 80% funded by 'our' shareholders, the government of Bophuthatswana, which supposedly 'reflects a sound financial structure'. Cronje praised Bophuthatswana's development:

'...the development of economic infrastructure and the development of the agriculture of the country is an amazing feature when compared with the development trends elsewhere in Africa'.

Of the twenty three best known companies in Bophuthatswana, the BNDC controlled 50% shares. This optimism was expressed by most of the establishment press and the Bophuthatswana regime, which applauded the arrival of 'development', captured in the headline 'Bophuthatswana's once barren lands booming'. This economic transformation was described as a genesis with its roots in 'independence':

'Resisting the temptation to go for glamour, President Mangope established the priority (to) feed the people of this developing land and its natural resources'.

The other Bophuthatswana development corporation, an agricultural parastatal,

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58 The total assets of the BNDC had increased by R62.3 million to R260.5 million that year, Cronje to SA-British Trade Association, The Star, 29.8.83.
60 RDM, 30.8 83.
61 Star, 12.12 83.
62 Ibid.
AGRICOR, was taken to reflect these sound policies 'due to professional staff surrounding Mangope, (and) community development as the prime objective'. The Dinokana agricultural project was the pioneering agricultural model and showed the Israeli influence based upon the Moshav system adapted to the Tswana Temisano strategy (literally farming together). This project complemented the joint venture with the Israeli government on a huge dairy scheme costing R50 million, based in Mmabatho and again modelled on Temisano.\(^{63}\) The modernising dynamic was connected to this capitalist, large scale approach aimed at individual self-advancement. It was summarised in the soundbite of the head of AGRICOR:

'we hope to supply the boots and laces for the people'.\(^{64}\)

Development was supposedly delivered through the provision of physical structures to achieve increased output and economic growth. The implication was that 'The people' could then haul themselves up as a result of the infrastructure and knowledge provided. In the example of the project at Dinokana, the huge cost of this should be weighed against the actual benefit to local small scale farmers whose water supply was diverted and local, indigenous farming practices disregarded.\(^{65}\) For the South African taxpayer and press, development in Bophuthatswana:

'if it can survive the standard plagues of SA's "National States"- endemic poverty and debts which have to be bailed out by SA, then it could become an exemplary showpiece for separate development'.\(^{66}\)

This rosy expanding outlook was reflected in a profile of Wyand van Graan, who emphasised the bigger and better BNDC budget for 1984 of over R80 million. The

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\(^{63}\) *Pioneer*, December 1981.

\(^{64}\) *Star* 12.12.83.

\(^{65}\) Drummond, J. (1991) op.cit. See next chapter.

\(^{66}\) *Financial Mail*, 23.3.84, emphasis added.
bulk of this budget was raised on capital markets (except when the Corporation was called on to supply infrastructure, then it got soft loans from the Bophuthatswana and SA governments), some 33% from overseas and the balance from SA. This kind of coverage illustrated the manner in which Bophuthatswana's dependent characteristics of fragmentation, poverty and illegitimacy were manipulated and concealed under the 'visible' technical development projects. The BNDC, in conjunction with AGRICOR, cited industry, economic growth and increased levels of output as the panacea for the Bophuthatswana development 'problem'.

High profile was given to white advisors that dominated the management structures of the BNDC and AGRICOR, including their heads, respectively, Van Graan and Beuster. Influential individuals also included the chairman of the BNDC, J.B Sutherland, chairman of Africa Oxygen and director of other companies. White advisors were also influential in the government departments responsible for economic development. Rowan Cronje was appointed as Director of Development Co-operation and key advisor to Mangope. Cronje was an ex-Rhodesian previously in Ian Smith's UDI government and sacked from his previous position as advisor to the Ciskei regime after only weeks. Cronje was responsible to Mangope for all state and semi-state organisations involved in the economic development of Bophuthatswana. Furthermore, into this motley group was added Leslie Young, Minister of Finance, a Yorkshireman, also previously employed in Rhodesia. The dependence upon expatriate skills and knowledge is pursued in the context of the prestige project and Bop TV.

In addition to the promotion of economic development, the other key strategy was to promote Bophuthatswana abroad through diplomatic initiatives.

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67 RDM, 23.2.82.
68 BBC radio, 17.5.82.
6.3. Bophuthatswana Abroad

Bophuthatswana attempted to create a range of overseas networks aimed at economic and political lobbying. At 'independence' in 1977 Bophuthatswana had not received 'official' diplomatic status from any country other than South Africa. The regime therefore fluctuated between 'formal' contacts and clandestine operations. Bophuthatswana offices, particularly 'trade missions', were set up in Tel Aviv, Paris, Frankfurt, Bremen, London, Rome and Washington, Hong Kong and China. These structures were buttressed by the Bophuthatswana National Commercial Corporation based in London under the guidance of another ex-Rhodesian, Ian Findlay. Bophuthatswana's international ambitions were symbolised by the creation of a Bophuthatswana Institute of International Affairs (BOPIIA) in the early 1980s. BOPIIA was compared to its 'sister institutions' such as Smuts House in South Africa and Chatham House in the United Kingdom:

'Similar institutions have existed in other parts of the world for many years and we felt that, with Bophuthatswana's emerging place in the world, it was proper for there to be in our country an independent, non-governmental organisation able to open up unofficial two-way international traffic'.\(^{69}\)

Bophuthatswana's 'emerging place in the world' was however greatly restricted by the international community's continuing non-recognition. BOPIIA marshalled the frenetic efforts made by Mangope to cultivate a range of relationships geared towards enhancing Bophuthatswana's reputation abroad. A BOPIIA conference in 1988 attracted a range of Bophuthatswana representatives, American and South African journalists, academics and businessmen. The occasion provided Mangope with an

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\(^{69}\) C.C Milton, Chairman of BOPIIA, in BOPIIA, (1988.83) op cit The nucleus of BOPIIA was established one year after 'independence': 'The underlying thrust was to be whether, when and how Bophuthatswana would receive her aim of acceptance and recognition, in her own right, by the nations of the world'.
opportunity to reiterate his country's 'commitment' to a range of principles based upon the themes identified earlier as Christianity, Capitalism and the 'fundamental freedoms of the individual' based upon a Bill of Rights and Liberal Democracy:

'We are living proof that the people of Southern Africa can live together in peace, harmony and prosperity irrespective of their race, ethnic roots or religious persuasion, under a democratic government that adheres to and respects the basic tenets of Christianity, the equality of all people and the free enterprise system'.

Claims for recognition were therefore based upon clearly distinguishing Bophuthatswana's characteristics and origins from both apartheid South Africa and the economic and political problems of black Africa. Representations of Bophuthatswana's supposed differentiation was directed at 'white' South Africa and overseas. However, by the mid-1980s, the pretence of being a 'liberal democracy' were undermined internally by two factors. The 'international' liberal democratic discourse foundered upon firstly, the regime's encouragement of ethnic conflict in Bophuthatswana and, secondly, the level of political intolerance that the Bill of Rights could not conceal. These contradictions are examined in more detail in the next chapter. However, in relation to efforts to gain recognition the decreasing emphasis placed upon 'liberal democracy' within Bophuthatswana represented a significant shift in image presented to the international community.

Manson and Lawrence show that by the late 1980s Mangope's political discourse changed emphasis to embrace a conception of Pan-Tswanaism with Botswana. The purpose in doing so was for Mangope to divert attention away from Bophuthatswana's origins in the context of reproducing the apartheid system. It was also linked to Mangope's search for a clearly distinguishable and emotive discourse to appeal to various international fora, regional groups and also to deflect internal


70 Mangope in BOPIIA, (1988:92) op.cit.
opposition. Rather than being a product of apartheid policy, Bophuthatswana was represented as the indirect outcome of British colonial rule and the legacy of the British decision in 1885 to split the Tswana 'nation' in two. The emphasis upon British colonialism also reflected the official South African government position of the 1970s which sought to distinguish between a 'white' Republic and 'black' Southern Africa. The bantustans and by implication black South Africans, were represented as an 'ethnic' overspill from British colonialism's creation of the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS states). A parallel was therefore drawn between the BLS independence from Britain and bantustan 'independence' from South Africa. At the BOPIIA seminar the South African ambassador to Bophuthatswana made the association between Britain and the bantustans clearer:

'These so-called "homelands" were, in any case, created by the virtue of British policy and I say this neither as an excuse or reproach, nor to point a finger at the present British Government- it is a statement of fact'.

An increasing focus of attention in the late 1980s, Bophuthatswana's rhetorical position on unification with Botswana had also been a tactical device in the 'pre-independence' era. By the 1980s the Bophuthatswana government recognised the advantages to be gained by presenting British colonial policy as responsible for

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71 Ibid.
72 Chapter three indicated the British decision whereby BaTswana territory south of the Molopo river became the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland, which became part of South Africa, whilst land north of the Molopo became the northern Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana in 1966).
73 The implication was that black South Africans and the bantustans belonged to black Africa rather than 'white' South Africa. See chapter two.
74 Kotze, W.D in BOPIIA (1988:16) op.cit. The ambassador went on to suggest that it had been the British who 'fragmented great parts of this southern portion of Bechuanaland, by allocating farms to their kin and thereby leaving an almost impossible task to future governments of reconsolidating the land'.
75 Chapter Three indicated that as early as 1973 Mangope '...might prefer an association with Botswana' rather than domination by other white or ethnic groups.
Tswana 'ethnic' division. There was a more concerted effort to link British colonialism's denial of Tswana birthright to Bophuthatswana as a modern repository for restoring these lost ancient rights. Moreover, the 1895 decision to annex British Bechuanaland to the Cape Province despite widespread Tswana opposition, whilst the Bechuanaland Protectorate remained under British jurisdiction, was cited as British betrayal of the 'southern Tswana'. The incorporation of the southern Tswana into South Africa had resulted in decades of racial oppression and dispossession which by a quirk of colonial fate their ethnic kin in Botswana largely avoided. The implication was that Bophuthatswana's 'independence' in 1977 was represented as a restoration of the 'independence' the British had denied them through colonialism:

'According to this line of reasoning Bophuthatswana was not a child of apartheid but rather the bastard offspring of British colonial rule in Southern Africa'.

The Bophuthatswana regime's efforts to promote Pan-Tswanaism also centred upon 'encouraging' Botswana to recognise its Tswana neighbour politically. To this end, Bophuthatswana manipulated its geo-political position, the common border with Botswana. Throughout the 1980s there was conflict concerning security measures, water rights and transport between the two. In 1986/7 the decision to enforce visa requirements and transport controls upon visitors and trade from Botswana reflected these efforts to force Botswana to negotiate with Bophuthatswana and open diplomatic channels. In his speech to the Bophuthatswana Parliament in 1988,
Mangope suggested that co-existence with Botswana could be made ‘difficult’ in ‘quite a few areas…to the extreme discomfort of Botswana’. This mounting pressure was intended by Mangope to force recognition from the ‘Front-line States’ which Bophuthatswana’s President linked with ethnic association with Botswana:

'We share a common heritage and culture with our brothers across the border in Botswana. Politics aside as brothers we love each other- would the frontline states ignore this brotherhood? I doubt that the Batswana of our Republic would actively associate with any country hostile to Botswana."

However, Botswana remained adamant in its refusal to recognise anything beyond linguistic and cultural links between groups either side of the border. According to Drummond and Manson, the increased politicisation of the common border greatly surpassed Mangope’s appeals to culture and ethnicity. Yet Dale has also indicated the significance of cultural flows across the border and that the escalation of ‘the low politics of transport into the high politics of diplomatic recognition should not blot out the long-term cultural matter of ethnic merger’. 

The pressures upon Botswana only served to highlight the contradictions of Bophuthatswana’s promotion of itself as a Tswana country whilst one already existed across the border. Drummond and Manson indicate the OAU's firm stance on inviolable boundaries and also point to the fact that parts of Bophuthatswana were

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Landscapes, Rumely. D, and Minghi, J. (eds.) Routledge. Hundreds of Botswana citizens were turned back from the Ramatlabama border post, described as agony for Botswana, with the suggestion that South Africa itself was behind the ‘diplomatic chess’ and pressure on Botswana to recognise Bophuthatswana, see the Sunday Star, 18.1.87 and 15.2.87.


Dale, R. 1991, op. cit. He cites evidence of family, educational and media ties across the border to suggest the heightening significance this could take on, for example, Dale mentions that by the late 1980s over 250 copies of the Mail were sent to readers in Botswana (as well as transmission of Bop TV).
outside the original demarcations of British Bechuanaland and instead within the Transvaal and even Orange Free State. There were also more practical concerns regarding the scattered nature of Bophuthatswana and evidence of Botswana fearing domination by these other Tswana groups. Above all Mangope clearly enjoyed his own grasp on power within Bophuthatswana and did not appear to want to relinquish this.

The rhetoric of ethnic association with Botswana was placed alongside other diplomatic efforts to gain recognition for Bophuthatswana. It provided considerable leverage for 'networking' throughout the 1980s and attracted media interest. For example, in 1982 there was 'circumstantial evidence' surrounding a possible merger between Bophuthatswana and Botswana. President Masire of Botswana had apparently discussed the issue with French politicians, whilst it had also been a factor influencing Mangope's invitation to an Inter-African Socialist meeting by ex-President of Senegal Leopold Senghor. Elsewhere it was declared that 'There's Pressure for Tswana link-Despite Denials' with Bophuthatswana and Botswana also likened to the 'two Germanies'. Notwithstanding these rumours and speculation, even when pressured by Bophuthatswana to negotiate the Botswana government consistently refused to recognise Mangope's regime.

The concept of Batswana ethnic association was most keenly promoted by Bophuthatswana within Britain. In 1982 Bophuthatswana House was opened in London and a 'Friends of Bophuthatswana' association established to gain influence and credibility within British circles. It was claimed that in the mid 1980s 20-30 Conservative MPs were members of 'Friends of Bophuthatswana'. The extent of this influence was reflected in the ability of these MPs to table a debate on

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83 ibid.
84 Ibid.
86 'Friends of Bophuthatswana have made it their duty to enlighten fellow MPs in the British Parliament about the realities of Bophuthatswana and also encouraged Parliamentarians to visit our country and experience its climate of peace, harmony and prosperity', Sid Gordon, Mayor of Mmabatho, introduction to BOPJIA conference, 1988, op.cit.
Bophuthatswana's recognition in the House of Commons in 1986. Elements of Mangope's discourse and its representation of Bophuthatswana surfaced in the debate, including the praise of non-racialism, particularly at Sun City. The colonial angst of Conservative MPs was supposedly reflected by Keith Best, MP for Ynys Mon, who claimed that although Botswana and Bophuthatswana were the same only Botswana was internationally recognised:

'This is one of the great injustices of history that confront Bophuthatswana. We have consistently turned our back on the Batswana people of Bophuthatswana and that can not be right in today's world'.

MP for Basingstoke, Andrew Hunter, was a particularly strong supporter of Bophuthatswana's efforts to attract recognition and indeed an ally of apartheid South Africa more generally. During the debate Hunter attempted to distinguish between Bophuthatswana's apartheid and alleged British origins:

'Some people say that Bophuthatswana is the child of apartheid, but that is only partially true because it is the adopted child of apartheid. It is the real child of British colonial and foreign policy over the best part of a century'.

In 1988 Hunter produced a paper at the request of the Bophuthatswana office in London in order to provide advice on furthering Bophuthatswana's international profile. Hunter's main suggestions concerned 'a unilateral declaration of annexation' of South African territory in order to consolidate Bophuthatswana. Hunter also proposed that Bophuthatswana adopt its own currency, make a unilateral declaration of affiliation to the Commonwealth and that Mangope be 'seen and heard to participate

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88 Nation on the March, op. cit.
more in the search for justice in Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{89} These steps were seen as a pre-requisite for the 'ultimate aim of uniting the whole Tswana nation'.

The greatest reflection of Bophuthatswana's influence within the Conservative Party was the decision to allow the 'Government of the Republic of Bophuthatswana' to submit evidence for its rightful existence to a British Foreign Affairs Committee in 1987. The four Bophuthatswana representatives, Mangope, Findlay, Minister of Economic Affairs, Keikelame and Minister of Manpower (and soon to become Minister of Foreign Affairs), Rathebe were able to put Bophuthatswana's case for legitimacy and recognition directly to the Committee. A letter from the Bophuthatswana Foreign Minister, T.M. Molatlhwa accompanied the delegation, through which the theme of colonial betrayal and affinity with Botswana was reiterated:

'We seek a closer association with our kith and kin in Botswana who have been separated from us through enforced arbitrary division of our land by colonial powers'.\textsuperscript{90}

Once again Bophuthatswana was represented as a 'democratic, free enterprise, capitalist society, free from apartheid and non-racial in all its activities'. As only 'a minority of the Batswana enjoy international recognition and generous educational aid' Bophuthatswana appealed to Britain's Overseas Development Administration and the British Council for assistance. These attempts to acquire aid, particularly for educational matters, was a strategy to enhance recognition. Mangope compared the plight of the Tswana to east and west Germany, promoted Bophuthatswana's peaceful, democratic and non-racial image and record of development. Bophuthatswana's history was emphasised to differentiate the homeland from other bantustans. Mangope

\textsuperscript{89} In \textit{Africa Confidential}, Vol. 30, No 16, 1989.

\textsuperscript{90} British Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1986-87, 11.5 1987, Minutes of Evidence from the Government of the Republic of Bophuthatswana.
appealed ultimately to the Committee to recognise the British legacy within the region:

'Nevertheless, the British Government was responsible for our plight and it now seems reasonable to us that they should be the first to recognise us as an independent and sovereign nation'.

The ethnic character of Bophuthatswana and the importance of history and culture was compared to the relations between England, Wales, Scotland and especially 'your experience of Ireland is proof enough of this'. The Bophuthatswana delegation claimed that the Batswana would 'never again ...be dominated by either a white or black ethnic group':

'. people will always be Batswanas before, or Zulu's before, then South Africans later'.

This specific 'ethnic' focus would form another major strategy in the 1990s context of the resurgence of 'Global Nationalism'. Other tactics, were suggested during a BOPIIA presentation by the South Africa Foundations Director General, K. von Schirning. He located Bophuthatswana's problem of non-recognition within the broader context of the 'political expedience' of recognition and 'east-west politics'. von Schirning compared Bophuthatswana to Pakistan's partition, micro-state dependency upon foreign aid and export of labour, and to Taiwan's performance, despite non-recognition. Above all, although stating recognition depended ultimately upon 'South Africa ending its pariah status', von Schirning suggested that Bophuthatswana was a better example than the rest of Africa.

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91 Mangope, ibid.
92 ibid.
93 See chapter eight.
The British Foreign Affairs Committee acknowledged Bophuthatswana’s relative success in promoting multi-racialism at Sun City, of which Mafikeng was also considered an important example. One member of the Committee inquired as to whether the white population of Mafikeng, incorporated into Bophuthatswana in 1980, was ‘fitting well into the structure of your society’ to which Mangope replied ‘that is so’.94 Ironically, given the thrust of Bophuthatswana’s argument concerning British culpability in Tswana partition, the Committee responded that the weakness of the argument for recognition by the United Kingdom was indeed the emphasis placed upon a colonial past considered as ‘out of date’. The Bophuthatswana representatives replied that Britain had to rectify these historical wrongs and the mistakes through which Bophuthatswana should have been part of a sovereign and independently recognised Botswana. The 'guilt tripping' of Britain's colonial history seemed to have little influence with the Committee. Bophuthatswana was criticised in a number of areas including its collusion with forced removals from South Africa, lack of a strong nationalist movement and dependency upon South Africa. Ultimately the Foreign Affairs Committee distinguished between historical British Bechuanaland and apartheid created Bophuthatswana. The Committee’s conclusion was that Bophuthatswana therefore formed an integral part of South Africa.

Despite continuing non-recognition Mangope’s promotion of Pan-Tswanaism had enabled the regime to blur the association between Bophuthatswana and apartheid South Africa. This emphasis did provide the regime with the opportunity to mobilise some support within Britain. The Bophuthatswana regime also used similar tactics in Germany and France, although with less 'official' success.96 The greatest indicator of international 'success' was the stream of foreign visitors to Bophuthatswana in the 1980s and 1990s. An assorted array of foreign business people, entertainers, journalists and politicians were entertained in Sun City and Mmabatho. They included

94 British Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1986-87, op. cit.
a mixture of Bavarian politicians, French and Israeli mayors, ex-prime ministers, American, French and Dutch journalists, business people. These delegations were often made under the pre-text of 'fact finding missions'. The capital city formed the focus of visits to Bophuthatswana. Foreign visitors were shown Mmabatho's splendour in order to be impressed with 'development' efforts whilst the poor, rural slums and settlements were ignored. On one occasion the deputy mayor of Paris, Pierre Bas, quoted the French writer Max Jalade in saying 'For a state whose existence is not recognised, Bophuthatswana seems strangely real!'. Bas compared Bophuthatswana favourably to other African countries. He also suggested that the presence of thousands of Tswana outside Bophuthatswana was parallel to the hundreds of thousands of Czechs living in Vienna, which had not prevented the existence of Bohemia (Czechoslovakia). United Nations and UNESCO non-recognition of Bophuthatswana was linked by Bas and other 'Friends of Bophuthatswana' to the peril of communist influence world wide. Indeed in the context of France itself Bas stated:

'When France votes again and the Marxists are replaced by men of sense, we must remember Bophuthatswana, this beautiful country which wishes, and deserves, to join the ranks of sovereign nations'.

Such publicity given to these observations represented the desperate attempts to win supporters to the Bophuthatswana cause. It was noticeable that Bophuthatswana was placed within the context of the cold war with some observers suggesting that it acted as a buffer to communist inspired Africa. Bophuthatswana was therefore regarded as providing a moderate and reformist perspective within Southern Africa. The West was encouraged to respond to these positive features of Bophuthatswana (and Kwa-

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97 Gcinumkhonto, M. op.cit.
98 Pioneer, April, 1985.
99 Ibid.
American support was sought in the United States, particularly during the anti-sanctions and pro 'constructive engagement' eras of the Reagan and Bush administrations. The Bophuthatswana strategy was to encourage visits to Mmabatho and reciprocal trips to Washington in order to build up a network of allies. This network, according to a prominent US businessman, was to be established through meetings with Congressional Staff members, forming a nucleus for a US 'Friends of Bophuthatswana' group. The US media was also targeted:

'We need to work through the media and have already started to do this. For example, Ministers Rathebe and Kenkelame met with editorial writers for the Washington Times, a conservative newspaper. In the months ahead, we will be in touch with carefully chosen conservative media outlets to make sure they are aware of Bophuthatswana and its aspirations'.

In 1983 about 100 members of the Americans concerned about South Africa group (ACSA), consisting mainly of investors and industrialists, visited Sun City to 'educate Americans about the complex racial situation in South Africa'. In 1987 a fact finding delegation of Republican Party Legislators had also visited Bophuthatswana. These visits were further evidence of the support from a number of factions for Bophuthatswana. However, the top level diplomatic recognition eluded Bophuthatswana.

Throughout the 'independence' era a particular source of support was from Israel. As seen in chapter three, Mangope compared the Batswana to the lost children of Israel, similarly scattered, but throughout Southern Africa. Mangope manipulated

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101 Denson, J., Executive Director of All Points International Limited, presentation to BOPIIA conference (1988) op. cit.
the conception of Batswana ethnic struggle by comparing it with Jewish efforts to forge 'nation-hood'.

There was considerable Israeli influence in agricultural projects and through construction companies. A number of Israeli citizens were resident in Bophuthatswana and various economic and cultural exchanges were made between Tel Aviv and Mmabatho. One product of these exchanges included the creation of the Mmabana Cultural Centre in Mmabatho, with other centres throughout Bophuthatswana. These centres were built at great cost and modelled upon Israeli institutions. It was claimed that by 1991 the Israel-Bophuthatswana Friendship Society had 130 Israeli members 'currently active within the Society'. These Israeli's were attracted 'by the non-racial and anti-discriminatory attitude of Bophuthatswana and the shared humanities of enabling people to work to their optimal capabilities'.

The regime also coveted Taiwanese assistance. In 1981 six agricultural extension officials from the Bophuthatswana Department of Agriculture were invited by the Taiwanese government to study methods of rice and vegetable production. The intentions behind this programme, as suggested by the Minister of Agriculture, Chief Mokgoko, reflected the regime's overall objective, which was to expose Bophuthatswana to international ideas and techniques of development:

'...the infusion of different ideas and other minds from outside is absolutely necessary

104 Mangope had made a direct comparison between Israeli origins and that of Bophuthatswana: '...Israel and Bophuthatswana share a great deal of very significant common ground in respect of our more recent histories. In both nations, it was the flame of freedom that rose against racism, discrimination and oppression by aliens, and to reach out for the promise of dignity and self-fulfilment...' etc. See chapter three.

105 The United Nations voiced concerns about the extent of these exchanges during the 1970 and 1980s. It was also noted in 1991 by a UN Special Committee that a senior delegation from the BNDC visited Israel 'to promote investment in the Bantustan by offering various incentives especially to attract high technology commerce' United Nations Year Book, 1991:119, Vol. 45.

106 Interview with Patricia Boikanyo, Public Relations Manger, Mmabana Cultural Centre, Mmabatho, March, 1995. It is also interesting to note that the Mmabana Centre in Mmabatho would be the target of particular mob fury during the 1994 collapse of the regime, see last chapter.

to broaden our minds and to keep us in touch and abreast of developments elsewhere in the world... (to) seek advice from other knowledgeable countries... ’

In any one year during the 'independence' celebrations each of these various groups and interests were represented. For example, overseas visitors during Bophuthatswana's fifth 'independence' celebrations included Austrians, Americans, Israelis, French, Italians, Germans and South Africans. There were also student exchanges and visits by Members of the European Parliament. The efforts to secure the elusive recognition heavily influenced the pattern of development, symbolised through the concept of the prestige project. These projects appeared to embody the political, economic, and to some extent cultural, dimensions of Bophuthatswana nation-building. The regime was dependent upon a large number of expatriates from 'knowledgeable countries' and also unscrupulous individuals who exploited Bophuthatswana's chronic need for acceptance within the international community.

6.4. Uhuru Hoppers and the 'Prestige Project'

'We have learnt that it is the people that matter in the first place. Whatever we undertake in the development of our agricultural, mineral, industrial and other physical resources, it must always clearly take second place to the development of our human potential'.

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108 Pioneer, April, 1981.
110 Mangope, Pioneer, May 1980
6.4.1. Prestige as announcing 'nation-hood'

The economic and political objectives set out in the previous sections were promoted through the conception and implementation of 'prestige projects'. These large and expensive projects, which straddled the international and national scales, were supposedly an illustration of Bophuthatswana's ability to 'do development' and were intended as a reflection of sovereignty and nation-hood. There were many schemes which required the services and skills of international 'experts' and expatriates. These expatriates are to be differentiated from the more unscrupulous individuals, whom the Bophuthatswana regime often depended upon due to the illegality of the regime, in order to create some leverage within the international community.

So-called 'Uhuru Hoppers' were individuals who promised the tantalising prize of international recognition in return for personal power, prestige and economic benefit. Sol Kerzner, who established the multi-million rand Sun International Hotel network, was the archetypal example. Kerzner had calculated the capacity for these hotels and casinos to cater for the whites in SA, where gambling was outlawed, as well as North American and European tourists. The huge leisure complex of Sun City was built by Sol Kerzner as a recreational playground for South Africa's whites and increasingly Bophuthatswana's emergent middle class. The Sun International Empire formed the basis of Kerzner's fortune which had depended upon the initial foothold that Mangope decided to give him in Bophuthatswana. Sun City had been an influential attempt to attract white South Africans and to generate important revenue for Bophuthatswana. It was also one of Mangope's most influential projects used to 'normalise' non-racialism and to enhance prestige for his regime by attracting world famous entertainment stars.\footnote{Showbusiness and sports personalities were enticed to play there. A wide range of overseas politicians and guests were entertained at Sun City by the Bophuthatswana regime. The resort proved very popular with white South Africans but also an increasing number of wealthy blacks, particularly to bypass} For example, Frank Sinatra's tour of 1981 was claimed
to have 'put Bophuthatswana on the map in the US like nothing before'. A band of reporters travelling with Sinatra praised Bophuthatswana 'where segregation was unknown' and 'marvelled at the wonders of Sun City'. The following quotations from the mass circulation magazine, 'People', reflected the ability of the regime to raise its profile through its association with such 'developments':

'For 2 million Dollars, A South African homeland gets Frank Sinatra and some priceless credibility. The article said "Sun City is surely the world's unlikeliest tourist mecca. But in three years, Sol Kerzner has transformed this impoverished backwater- where the annual per capita income averages 700 Dollars- into the Las Vegas of the dark continent". These sentiments captured the appeal of the modernising language, based as it was upon the comparison and contrast of 'opposites'. Before Sun City there had been only poverty and darkness, i.e. Africa but now Bophuthatswana's answer to Las Vegas represented modernity. This supposed transformation was also noted by Sinatra himself, seemingly impressed by black 'equality':

'The whole Government is black, and is an equal partner of Sol Kerzner. Bophuthatswana gets 50cs on every rand that goes into a Sun City slot machine or roulette game. Furthermore, Sol has given much needed employment to 3000 black Tswana tribesmen'.

the outlawing of gambling in SA. Hence it was dubbed 'Sin City'. Therefore alongside the creation of Mmabatho and all its grandeur, Sun City represented another high profile adventure. All were displayed with maximum publicity by the regime and the Pioneer gleefully announced the acquisition at Sun City of celebrities as diverse as golfer Sevvy Ballesteros, tennis players Ivan Lendl and Jimmy Connors, as well as Cliff Richard, Kiss, Queen, Olivia Newton John and Frank Sinatra, Pioneer, 1986.

113 Ibid., emphasis added.
114 Ibid.
Kerzner was given exclusive rights to the gaming industry in Bophuthatswana and together with business ventures in the Transkei, his activities had been the source of rumour and speculation for many years. In the Bophuthatswana regime's desperation to gain influence and the ultimate goal of recognition, figures such as Kerzner took on great prominence. Due to the illegal nature of the regime a bewildering number of more clandestine projects were put into motion in order to heighten Bophuthatswana's image in the international arena.

One of the most publicised 'Uhuru-Hoppers' was Shabtai Kalmanovitz, a Soviet Israeli, whose considerable influence in Bophuthatswana state circles and closeness to Mangope earned him the title the 'White President' and also 'Rasputin'. In addition to his official post as 'economic advisor' Kalmanovitz was given many 'perks' including exclusive award of the government contract for the beacon of national development, the Bophuthatswana 'Independence' Stadium. It was constructed by his Liat Finance Trade and Construction company at considerable cost and, significantly, without entering the tendering process. The building of another hotel in Mmabatho, costing R30 million, also reflected these intricate clandestine webs. It was again designed and constructed by Kalmanovitz's company and a South African architect, whose tenders were well above those of a number of South African companies. The intrigue surrounding this development was heightened as the hotel was to be owned by the BNDC but leased by Sun International, Kerzner's company. The scheme was typical of an increasing number which attracted criticism and claims of corruption.

There did appear to be some rationale for the Bophuthatswana regime's behaviour. The regime attempted to use these dubious contacts as a leverage for possible diplomatic recognition and economic support. For example, the Liat Company had substantial financial interests in Sierra Leone and worked closely with a

115 The allegations will form the basis of an impending court case suspecting fraud and corruption. *Weekly Mail & Guardian*, 17.11.95.
116 *Star*, 11.2.88.
117 Due to hasty planning and construction only 60% of the stadium's seats had a
major figure in the secretive world of ‘sanctions busting’. Liat had connections with Marc Rich who had earned a reputation for defying international embargoes on the import of crude oil supplies to South Africa.\textsuperscript{118} Kalmanovitz himself was the official Bophuthatswana trade representative to Tel Aviv, at least until his arrest in Israel over charges of spying on behalf of the KGB. Whilst a Bophuthatswana government statement claimed that relations with Kalmanovitz had been ended in November 1987, it appears that Mangope had been afraid of ostracising this shadowy figure for fear that very sensitive information would be used against the regime.\textsuperscript{119} Other influential individuals included the German millionaire, Henry Landschaft, who was awarded the multi-million rand government contract to build the Ga-Rankuwa shopping complex.\textsuperscript{120} In collaboration with the Talia company, Landschaft was later awarded a R65 million Bophuthatswana Government Housing Contract.\textsuperscript{121} The award of contracts to some extent reflected diplomatic initiatives. Landschaft was integral to the Bophuthatswana regime’s efforts to covet support from a number of Bavarian politicians, whilst Kalmanovitz established links with a range of Israeli figures. Prestige projects included the multi-million rand Bophuthatswana International Airport, with trainer aircraft and an airline, new government buildings, a convention centre, a new parliament costing R90 million, a multi-million Rand opera house and a R60 million international school.\textsuperscript{122}

These projects must be seen in relation to the actual mechanism of state and the discourse of nation-building. In other words what exactly was Mangope hoping to achieve through this excessive and inappropriate expenditure? On one level this reflected mismanagement of funds rather than overt corruption.\textsuperscript{123} On another level an

\textsuperscript{118} Africa Confidential, January, 1987.
\textsuperscript{119} Star 11 2.88
\textsuperscript{120} Pioneer, December, 1982.
\textsuperscript{121} Pioneer, 1986.
\textsuperscript{123} In the context of Transkei, Donaldson has suggested that poor public policies and mismanagement of public resources were more important failures of the
important interpretation of these projects was that they were supposedly conceived as symbolising 'nation-hood'. The regime was obsessive about its ability to enact 'development':

'I think that it was the sudden power, not relying on South Africa. The usual influx of fly-by-night people with all kinds of crazy schemes. The country went through a phase of saying "we are not children anymore and can do our own thing". The way to prove that they were independent was then exploited by these fly-by-nights to make use of export credit. That's when Bophuthatswana and the Secretary of Finances started this process of borrowing'.

The most notorious example of the extent to which Mangope was determined to push this mantle of 'independence' involved the infamous construction of a huge power station from 1982. Another feature of the 1981 White Paper had been the need to avoid duplicating services that could already be provided by South Africa. These services included the generation of electricity by ESKOM, the South African Electricity parastatal. In 1982 the idea of a Bophuthatswana constructed power plant was circulated although the supply of electricity had not been problematic. It has since emerged that even the Bophuthatswana Cabinet were kept in the dark about Mangope's decision to go ahead with the project. His Minister of Finance, Leslie Young, whilst initially strenuously objecting to the scheme, nonetheless could not prevent a signing of contract between the Bophuthatswana government and an Italian company called Gie.

The scheme was totally lacking in viability with no research or project
planning done or independent consultancy.\textsuperscript{126} The only evaluation was through a company called General Consultants of Bophuthatswana which included the Minister of Economics, Mr. Keikelame, and Robert Scio an Italian. Scio had also been granted sole rights to sell and market coal mined in Bophuthatswana and had also sold a house to Mangope for a considerable reduction in its market price. A range of these 'fly-by-nights' exploited Bophuthatswana's quest for political legitimacy by offering recognition in exchange for considerable state expenditure. There was also the culpability of the Bophuthatswana state's centripetal diffusion of power, exacerbated by Mangope himself. Mangope had taken this decision unilaterally which indicated the degree of control he enjoyed. One of the most disturbing features of the whole scheme was the lack of checks that could have prevented such extravagant projects.

Perhaps Mangope's decision to build the plant had been assuaged by promises of potential economic and political support in Italy. Not without coincidence, Scio was also the BNDC representative in Italy.\textsuperscript{127} Alternative financial sources were sought in South Africa and Italy. The plant was to be built in stages and although unit one was completed, the construction of two additional units was required before generation could commence. The plant cost R78 million which, after the collapse of the rand in the mid-1980s,\textsuperscript{128} rose to R177 million. However, the plant was never completed and failed to generate a single watt of electricity. It is currently being sold for scrap metal. The plant epitomised the concept of the prestige project and was intended to demonstrate Bophuthatswana's capacity to generate electricity independently of South Africa. This badly misplaced and flawed effort can be interpreted as misguided and driven by ideological considerations. An alternative explanation suggests possible mass fraud by the three signatories, Mangope, Scio and Keikelame, together with a range of other people involved in the scheme.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{126} On many occasions Magyar had requested that President Mangope hire outside consultants but this was 'usually refused'. Personal communication, op cit.
\textsuperscript{127} BNDC Annual Report, 1990. op.cit.
\textsuperscript{128} See the following chapter for details of Bophuthatswana's financial crisis in the mid-1980.
\textsuperscript{129} It has been suggested by the Skewyiya Commission that criminal prosecution
The creation of Bop TV provides a more detailed example of how 'national development' in Bophuthatswana was overshadowed by the 'prestige project' and dependency upon South Africa.

6.5. Binding Bophuthatswana: Bop TV, National and International scales of modernisation.

This section assesses the role of the media, more particularly Bop TV, as a central pillar of the regime's efforts to disseminate positive imagery of Bophuthatswana. Whilst the media was arguably the most important source for the dissemination of information, it must be placed alongside other 'nation-building' structures and institutions detailed earlier, including Mmabatho itself. The delivery of a sophisticated media infrastructure was interpreted as prestigious and modern. It was perceived as the prerequisite for Bophuthatswana's acceptance into the community of nations. This was directed not only at the disciples of modernity but also towards nurturing a regional identity in the context of Bophuthatswana 'nation-building'. Far from being an exhaustive study of the media, this is used to illustrate the inter-twined nature of the national and international scales of modernisation in Bophuthatswana. More importantly, the regime was acting as if a nation-state and was creating the attributes of modernity for international approval.

Prior to and following 'independence', the Bophuthatswana regime had been acutely aware of the fragmentary nature of its territory. As Moerdijk noted, there was also a 'cultural' dependency which was exacerbated in the bantustans by the closely interlocked nature of the South African media's 'White ownership, management and...
However, the author also indicated the potential for local intermediaries, or internal structures, to redefine cultural policy in the bantustans. As early as 1978 the regime expressed interest in developing a communications network that would bind the disparate fragments of the 'nation' together. Mangope perceived the important role of communications in 'nation-building', particularly with its ability to transcend political boundaries and link 'ethnic' citizens to Bophuthatswana:

'Bophuthatswana comprises seven isolated pieces of land Consequently her people are widely scattered, not only over the seven different units of land but also in the neighbouring South Africa. It is therefore necessary that communication links be maintained between these people so that they should be informed of events and developments in their fatherland.'

The different mediums were intended to provide a highway through which to advertise Bophuthatswana's 'alternative society'. The theme of transformation, both economic and cultural, was now directed at creating a national media.

In addition to radio, the second major feature of media development

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130 Previous analysis of communications and cultural production in Bophuthatswana and the bantustans more generally has emphasised their high level of 'dependency' upon South Africa: 'Cultural policies in the Bantustans themselves can best be understood by examining the role in these territories of the White racist metropolitan culture. As in most peripheral regions, the modern communications system of the Bantustans is characterised by its heteronomous structure, and by the weakness of its articulation with the 'traditional' system Newspapers, radio, television (where it exists) like the roads, railways, airlines, and postal and banking services, are in the 'homelands' all simply peripheral termini of the metropolitan networks. The flow of information is one-way, from the cities to the rural areas The latter are passive receivers of messages composed in the centres of the networks. Even information about the peripheries is selected according to the criteria of the centres; the peripheries' own image of themselves is thus in fact fabricated by the centres'. Moerdijk, D. (1981:116 & 117) Anti-Development, South Africa and its Bantustans, UNESCO.


133 Radio Bophuthatswana was launched from Mmabatho in 1978 'as a service to the people and as a means of communication with government'. By 1980 it was relaunched as the more ambitious 'Channel 702' which aimed at capturing the commercial radio market throughout Bophuthatswana but also significantly, the
concerned the print media. Besides providing general news items and coverage, the paper had a number of specific functions. The Mail was a conduit for positive representations of Bophuthatswana. The new editor in the early 1980s, Ron Talkien, had been involved with both the Zambian and Swazi Times Newspapers and now applied these 'nation-building' skills to Bophuthatswana. The Mail's role was defined by Ministers and the President himself. It entailed a mandate to generate positive images of 'sovereignty' and 'self-development' within Bophuthatswana.

The Mail would focus on 'national events', official opening ceremonies of projects, Mangope's speeches and the important role of the Bophuthatswana security forces.

There was a close correlation between the erosion of Bophuthatswana's liberal democracy and increased intervention in and subordination of the press by the regime.

6.5.1. Bop Television: Modernisation, Expatriates and Nation-Building

The most innovative scheme in the creation of a Bophuthatswana media network was the development of a 'National' Television Corporation. From the mid-1970s the programme content of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was increasingly controlled and used for the most blatant propaganda by South African governments.

With the flow of information considered a key political tool...
an alternative TV corporation was potentially a highly charged political issue within South Africa. The issue of Bop TV brings together a number of strands surrounding the regime's attempts to appeal to different groups and at different scales of 'development'. Both 'modernisers' and the western world were targeted. The relationship between Bop TV and the SABC also symbolises the constraints placed upon Bophuthatswana's efforts to lessen its dependency upon South Africa. The question of economic competition for the state monopoly SABC must also be placed in the context of the broader exposure of a hermetically sealed white and black South African society to banned persons and 'subversive' programmes.

Mangope recognised the value of television in buttressing his regime in the eyes of the world. Only a year after 'independence' Mangope 'expressed a deep desire' to have a television service. Mangope regarded television as a particularly important tool to marshal his ethnic subjects and to create national 'unity':

\[\text{One of the great blessings of the modern world is the miracle of electronic media, and I am confident that the introduction of television and sound broadcasting will help to eliminate the vast distances that divide our people on this subcontinent. The bonds that hold us together will strengthen us as a new era of understanding and unity dawns.}\]

Mangope also indicated that Bop TV could convey the 'traditional' dimension involved in Bophuthatswana 'nation-building':

\[\text{'the Cultural role that TV must play should be regarded as one of its most important}\]

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tasks. It must reflect on the highly cherished traditions of the people it is supposed to serve and contribute in the advancement of the diversified traditional values of that people'.

Bop TV could function as a vocational guide nurturing religious values, respect and love for Bophuthatswana. Bop TV was therefore of central importance for cultural production and inculcating a notion of 'tradition' in Bophuthatswana:

'It reflects the traditional values of the Batswana and projects these to a large audience within and beyond the country's borders.'

The service would have the 'pick of the programmes the world has to offer' whilst also producing 'more and more programmes that will reflect the life, culture and aspirations of our people'. Mangope had consistently maintained that Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' embodied respect for local 'tradition' whilst adapting to and embracing the modern 'wonders of the twentieth century'. A range of high profile projects combined these notions and provided visible icons for international exposure of Mangope's efforts:

'Another example is to be found in our BBC, Bop. Broadcasting, which has brought radio and Television to our people and, in doing so, has respected and promoted traditional ethnic values without neglecting that which the modern world has to offer'.

The role of 'non-Tswana' advisors in Bop TV reflected their wider role in delivering

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143 See chapter three.
144 Mangope to BOPHIA seminar, (1988) op.cit.
and co-ordinating Bophuthatswana 'development'. The appearance was of all-knowing, prudent, rational advisors bestowing their skills and knowledge upon the 'unenlightened' mass of Tswana. These and key 'white' advisors dominated the upper echelons of Bophuthatswana's most influential structures, including significantly the Bophuthatswana Defence Force. Mangope, clearly based the development of Bophuthatswana upon the ability of these individuals to harness the power of modernisation and development. His faith in them surely reflected his belief in this strategy to win acceptability for the regime by transforming the region.

A feature of Bophuthatswana's independence was the consistent policy of attracting expatriates to Bophuthatswana. There were a number of overseas recruitment drives during the independence era. This policy not only extended to South African whites but also to a number of European expatriates in the educational sector (including Teacher Training Colleges, an International School and UNIBO) plus a large number of African expatriates, Ugandans in particular. In 1981 and 1982 the Department of Works intended to recruit technicians and engineers from the United Kingdom and other professional staff from neighbouring countries.145 In the mid 1980s a large team of British geologists and educationalists were also recruited.146 Mangope conceived of development as a path along which Bophuthatswana was advancing assisted by the employment of able 'experts'. Speaking in the context of the establishment of an 'International School' in 1989, much reference was made to 'experts', 'higher standards' and the 'services of a man from Cambridge', the headmaster. Mangope's conception of development was therefore based upon the wide scope given to expatriates whose involvement was more generally interpreted as follows:

'Mr. Speaker, Sir, we go out of our way to encourage foreigners who have special talents to come here, and if possible to put down roots, because we know that our

145 Chief Motsatsi, Minister of Works budget speech, Pioneer, May, 1981.
146 Mail, 1986.
children and our people will be enriched. We have always followed this policy and we still do this and what is more this Government will continue to do so. We believe that in this quest, that is to encourage people of goodwill and expertise to throw their lot in with us, and to help develop our people, even if this is simply by way of example, we are creating a climate of healthy development and competition.147

The President therefore justified reliance upon 'outside' experts through evocation of 'universally accepted' criteria for selection and merit, as delivering 'development'. However, such clamour for the wisdom and skills of the expatriate also contradicted the Tswana basis of 'independence'. The presence of a large number of high profile whites was seen as enhancing Bophuthatswana's efforts to differentiate itself from other homelands and black Africa.

The Bop TV project illustrated the role given to 'Uhuru Hoppers' or 'middle-men', such as Bophuthatswana's authorised representative in Israel, Shabtai Kalmonowitz. Along with Cronje, both of these close advisors to Mangope had been in Israel to encourage Israeli assistance in developing Bop TV. Several advertisements for personnel were placed in the Israeli press, again indicating the peculiar network of connections that the Bophuthatswana regime fostered. Whilst in Israel, Bophuthatswana officials had met and recruited American TV consultant Stanley Moss, who had assisted in setting up Kenya TV.148 Substantial scope was given to high profile expatriates in Bophuthatswana's structures. Bop TV's expatriates included Tim Ellis and Russel Kay, formerly of the SABC. The head of Bop TV was Mr. J. Neill previously responsible for Rhodesian TV during the period of Unilateral Declaration of Independence and therefore familiar with the problem of 'illegal' regimes. Neill had stayed on under Mugabe's new regime in Zimbabwe until the

147 Commenting of the International School itself. 'Higher standards and more relevant curricula will be designed and implemented and the high standards practised at the international school will thus (be) a vehicle with which to travel throughout our country', Mangope at opening Bophuthatswana Parliament, 2nd Session of 3rd Parliament, Mmabatho, 18.4.89.
148 Financial Mail 27.5.83, RDM 18.5.83, Daily Dispatch 27.5.83.
opportunity to establish Bop. TV beckoned. Richard Roy Minton was the American head of Bop TV news. Minton claimed to recognise the awkwardness of Bop TV's unique mandate and operating treaty, in conjunction with South Africa (see following section), which raised a number of 'prickly' issues. Minton reiterated Bophuthatswana's official position on the agreement that 'neither side will run stories that will embarrass the other'. Ironically, this expatriate also stated that:

"Our product has to be the product of the culture of this society".

The friction between the Bophuthatswana regime's interpretation of Batswana culture and modernisation would have debilitating effects and contradictions. The impact upon Batswana 'tradition and culture' was most devastating when subordinated and adapted to 'nation-building' in the context of modernisation.

Amidst great fanfare and intense controversy Bop TV began its transmissions in December 1983. The first broadcast took place shortly after the 'independence' celebrations in order to maximise the publicity of Bophuthatswana's 'progress'. In the 1980s the hype concerning Bop TV was directed like many aspects of Bophuthatswana nation-building towards raising international profile. Sections of both the South African and international press were full of praise for Bophuthatswana and its 'sound leadership of Mangope'. Projects such as Bop TV, were portrayed as decreasing dependence upon South Africa and appeared to signify the dramatic steps towards 'nation-hood' for Bophuthatswana. Many observers considered

149 Sunday Times, 12.2.84.
151 Ibid.
152 Household exposure to television within Bophuthatswana, with television sets in dwellings, was placed at 22%. The potential modernising and cultural role of broadcasting in Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' was reflected in the growing number of households having access to broadcasting. Within the Molopo district television ownership rose to 33% of households due to the wealth of the capital, Mmabatho. Even if not in a range from 'every day' or even 'week', if calculated as total exposure with some sort of access to television the figure reached 30% of all households. Survey to Establish Base Line Data, op.cit.
153 Cape Times, 1.5.84.
Bophuthatswana’s success as contingent upon providing evidence of progress and modernity. Bophuthatswana was represented as if a previously arid desert now ‘blooming’. Once again, South African newspapers utilised these binary images of ‘modernisation’ and ‘tradition’ when reflecting upon the creation of Bop TV:

'Dust settles in every pore and the sun scalds. Cattle roam unattended in search of grazing spots close to the giant satellite dish, a shimmering space ship in harsh light. Colour-splattered clay huts cluster near this new oasis and naked children play on the dirt tracks near the fence encircling the makeshift new headquarters of Bop. TV'.

Bop TV and by implication Bophuthatswana itself was analogous with an oasis, a desert which appeared to be blooming, assisted naturally by the wisdom of expatriates and technology. Bop TV was interpreted as symbolising transformation of the barren lands of the bantustans. The arrival of the station and its director were as if latter day pioneers and prior to their arrival:

'That building was not there. Nor was that studio. And who would of dreamed that outside broadcast vehicle possible? This should go down in the Guinness Book of Records'.

Once again there was a sense of transformation and change, with cattle grazing lands now colonised by the virtues of technology and modernisation. The satellite dish symbolised and indeed was portrayed as constituting change. This modern-technical realm was contrasted to the naked, childlike, innocent, ‘tradition’ of the African, to be adapted to Eurocentric conceptions of progress. This transformation would be underpinned by huge amounts of investment and provision of infrastructure. Other

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154 *Sunday Times Magazine*, 12.2.84.
155 Ibid.
seemingly essential prerequisites for modernisation besides 'experienced staff' were suggested as a sound proof studio, a R1.25 million outside broadcasting vehicle flown from England and the 'best video equipment in the world'. Cameramen required training, at that time Bop TV only had six trained cameramen. There were three studio cameras, LBK 14's, each costing R70,000, plus three Hawk-eye portable cameras costing R35,000 and forty-fifty members of staff many of whom were expensive expatriates. This quite ambitious project, given the dominance of the SABC, required significant resources financed by international capital. At no point was the 'appropriateness' of this investment questioned, only assumed to be inherently beneficial. The budget was described as 'reasonable' but many of the staff claimed that it was a 'wealthy little station'. Many former SABC staff members were attracted to Bop TV's opulence with salaries often twice that of the SABC and even three times the amount. Additional 'perks' included brand new three bedroomed houses in Mmabatho, with other members of staff provided with 'spacious' three bedroomed flats. Altogether it was estimated that in order to become fully operational Bop TV required R72 million, reflecting Bophuthatswana's rapidly increasing financial borrowing.

Representations of Bop TV therefore provided a graphic illustration of Eurocentric virtues replacing seemingly 'child-like' characteristics of the Tswana. Once part of the Mmabatho elite, some Tswana internalised these perceptions. The magazine article again reflected the image of the Tswana as if rapidly maturing or developing:

'The Batswana are proud of his achievements. They would prefer it if we did not photograph primitive huts near the station. They were keen that we helped to project a positive image by photographing the big houses that were erected in the past

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136 Schoeman, D. op. cit.
137 Sunday Times Magazine, 12.2.84. op. cit.
138 RDM, 29.12.83.
To assist in this process the skills and knowledge of additional South African experts and other expatriates was required, suggesting that 'learning and training scope for staff (eventually 103 people) is limitless and at present most double up on jobs'. The station eventually employed over 750 people and therefore became an important pillar of the state-oriented patronage network. Another staffer claimed that it was incredible that such a small station could cause major intrigue, having got the 'SABC hopping' in addition to BBC and UPI interest with others having visited Bop TV. Bophuthatswana ministers and the Bophuthatswana National News Agency encouraged positive representations by pumping Bop TV with 'relevant' items. Mangope was aware that it was necessary to provide a viable alternative to the SABC in order for Bop TV, and hence Bophuthatswana itself, to succeed and be seen as a separate entity from Pretoria. Bop TV therefore sought a deal with the British Broadcasting Corporation which, through the Equity Union, had placed bans upon the SABC purchasing popular BBC series except documentaries and some other material. Bop TV clinched a separate deal with the BBC along similar lines but 'independently' of SABC. The deal with the BBC was regarded as 'highly significant' and supposedly reflected some degree of success for the regime.
There were also political motivations, with Bop TV able to go beyond Bophuthatswana's borders, in order to try and attract the support of Batswana in South Africa. In Soweto, 20% of its residents were categorised as Bophuthatswana citizens and therefore 300,000 people could have voted. Instead a staggering stay away from the polls saw only 480 register and only 135 of these actually cast their vote. It was a firm and obvious rebuff by urban Batswana to separate development and enforced ethnicity. Nonetheless, the media could function as an increasingly important conduit for positive publicity for Mangope's promotion of both 'non-racialism' and Tswana ethnicity. Broadcasting Bophuthatswana's version of civil liberties, bill of rights and the repeal of race discrimination would still represent an undermining of the status quo of South Africa political life.

The developmental vision of Bophuthatswana, symbolised by Bop TV, continued to engage many disciples internationally. In the United Kingdom one journalist praised Mangope's success by contrasting Soweto with the development of Mmabatho— the 'Great White Hope'. A 'patriotic staffer', however, suggested that

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162 The capacity for an 'independent' Bophuthatswana to win electoral support, particularly in the urban areas of SA was always unlikely. In the 1982 Bophuthatswana general election the ruling BDP won all 72 seats at a very low poll turnout. The figure was placed at only 200,000 turnout, in Jeffrey, A. (1993) op.cit. As a proportion of eligible voters in Bophuthatswana this was less than a quarter. Mangope attempted to counter these hard facts by associating the poor turn out with the general apathy amongst black South Africans towards elections, reflected he claimed by a total turnout of only 6% in the 1977 Soweto Community Council vote. Whereas Mangope chose to blame blacks for the poor turn out it is obvious that the elections were used by blacks as a vehicle to protest against apartheid social engineering.

163 The Soweto Civic Association's Dr. Motlana commented on the result: 'It means that no mad planners in Pretoria are going to foreignise us by drawing lines on a map. It means Tswanas in Soweto remain firm in their view of themselves as South Africans in spite of five years of propaganda'. GN, 21.1.82. The opposition to ethnic balkanization was reiterated by Mrs. Ellen Khuzwayo of the Soweto Committee of 10: 'The Tswana people have displayed in no uncertain terms that they regard themselves as South Africans as much as Afrikaner and English people', RDM, 21.10.82.

164 The success was supposedly reflected by Bop TV 'forcing' SA to spend 18 million pounds in efforts attempting to block the SA public from its average daily viewing of 3.37 hours of Bop TV, compared to only 1.13 hours of SABC. Residents in Johannesburg and the West Rand were paying 200 pounds to obtain aerials for Bop TV and 58,300 people had signed a petition opposing the
through all the activity, Mangope was:

'doing all this for his people. It is just part of the development of the country.'\textsuperscript{165}

Projects such as Bop TV were now regarded as if national benefits to the Tswana, whereas they were rooted politically and geographically within a web of patronage.\textsuperscript{166} Bophuthatswana nation-building was therefore associated with Mangope's 'benevolent' authoritarianism. It was claimed that Mangope was 'probably an autocrat but nonetheless expressed concern for Tswana in SA'.\textsuperscript{167} Mangope's authoritarianism was overlooked due to the benefits his paternalism was creating. Mangope was portrayed as a firm, no nonsense, paternalistic leader protecting his people:

'In an unashamedly paternalistic fashion President Mangope is concerned, even obsessed with the welfare of his people. While he pays lip service to concepts of freedom and independence, he increasingly tries to shield them from ideas he believes to be harmful to them at this point of their development.'\textsuperscript{168}

Bop TV was taken by some observers as just one example that Mangope was moving his people on from 'this point of their development'. The Telegraph's conclusion represented the perfect endorsement for the Bophuthatswana and South African government strategies concerning the bantustans. With deep resonance for would be modernisers it was boldly stated:

blocking of Bop-TV: 'All I can say is that a country is independent when it starts acting that way' This journalist also appreciated Bophuthatswana as an apparently non-racial haven where one could also shop in complexes full of goods without racial friction \textit{Daily Telegraph}, 14.12.84.\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Sunday Times} Magazine, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{166} One Bop TV journalist expressed the view that positions and status within the organisation had depended upon either being white or having a Tswana surname, one preferably related to Mangope. Personal communication, Mmabatho, 1995.

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Daily Telegraph}, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Nation on the March}, 204:1987.
'Don't deride the idea of the homelands'. 169

The launch of Bop TV epitomised the direction and pattern of Bophuthatswana development, designed to maximise political capital for the regime and to generate sources of revenue for those part of this patronage system. For those not part of such grandiose high profile projects their 'realities' and life experiences were a million miles away. By the mid 1980s all of these contradictions with regards to the 'prestige' model of development 'national' and regional economic relations, labour-capital relations, urban-rural, white 'advisors', corruption, and relations between Tswana and other ethnic groups, were mounting within Bophuthatswana. Above all, Mangope's dream of legitimacy and Bophuthatswana nation-building was thoroughly undermined by the residents of Bophuthatswana themselves.

Chapter Seven

7.1. Introduction

Bophuthatswana's 'nation-building' project had placed great emphasis upon the outward quest for international recognition and investment. Within the territory, however, Bophuthatswana's edifice of state and economy was fracturing along several axes. By the mid-1980s Bophuthatswana became riven by a range of contradictory forces manifested as pronounced economic, political and cultural crises. These internal crises, heightened by the contradictions of the apartheid system and the overspill of resistance from South African anti-apartheid organisations into Bophuthatswana, led to widespread unrest. The Mangope regime increasingly relied upon the Bophuthatswana security apparatus in order to maintain control. By 1988 Bophuthatswana's claims for 'national' legitimacy and international recognition were shattered from within Mangope's own institutions. An attempted coup d'etat was a strong indication of the unpopularity of the regime. Briefly deposed, Mangope depended upon South Africa's direct military intervention in order to regain power. The conflicts undermining Bophuthatswana's 'nation-building' are discussed through the following themes.

Firstly, in the early 1980s the South African government's creation of economic 'development regions' and the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) was an admission of the failure of economic development to take root in the bantustans. The development regions were supposedly based upon economic 'logic' rather than determined, as previously, by the 'national' boundaries of the bantustans. The new approach to regional development in South Africa (SA) contradicted Bophuthatswana's pretence of autonomous 'national' development. In 1985/1986 the portrayal of credible and sovereign 'development' was dealt a devastating blow as Bophuthatswana faced a serious economic crisis with revenue unable to meet the debt
repayments of the 'prestige' projects.

Secondly, the economic crisis was illustrative of the uneven and irregular benefits of Bophuthatswana's economic modernisation. Benefits were linked to the regime's grip on political power, patronage and priorities. The pattern was indicative of the wider political and economic context of the continuing problems of regional and homeland development in South Africa. The majority of Bophuthatswana's population were by-passed by the model of 'development' which was regarded by critics as servicing the needs of 'white' South Africa. Bophuthatswana's own internal contradictions included the industrialisation policy and increasing conflict with trade union movements considered by the regime as an economic and political threat. The continuing dominance of a number of high profile whites within 'national' structures caused resentment from Batswana officials, most significantly, within the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF).

Thirdly, Bophuthatswana's claims to uphold its Bill of Rights and liberal democracy were undermined by widespread political conflict and community resistance in Bophuthatswana and South Africa more generally. The regime was highly intolerant of dissent and political opposition was consistently driven out of Bophuthatswana. Traditional structures such as chieftaincy were incorporated, ever more forcefully, into 'national' political structures as tools of political and developmental control. The Bophuthatswana authorities focused the force of oppression particularly on marginalised non-Tswana communities living precariously on the borders between Bophuthatswana and South Africa.

Lastly, the crisis in Bophuthatswana resulted in a coup in 1988 led by a faction within the BDF. The coup reflected the erosion of Mangope's institutional support and dependency upon South Africa for survival. From 1988 Bophuthatswana became increasingly out of step with the pace of political change and reform in South Africa itself.
7.2. Economic Crisis

A former economic advisor to Mangope was highly critical of Bophuthatswana's use of its revenue. Karl Magyar claimed that the Bophuthatswana elite siphoned off this revenue exclusively for themselves. Images of Bophuthatswana's workforce living in clusters of tin shacks within sight of the spectacular new government offices and shopping centres in Mmabatho were evoked:

'This type of investment is aimed at the white South African spender in Bophuthatswana and provides relatively few jobs for the labour force in menial staffing capacities'.

Magyar once again attributed this misdirected investment not so much to the existence of Bophuthatswana per se but to its confused economic relationship with SA. The basis of Magyar's criticism was that Mangope's pursuit of 'independence' was jeopardising Bophuthatswana's development potential by not recognising that its productive sector formed an integral part of SA. This criticism was indicative of the more general shortcomings of the existing relations between South Africa and the homelands. By the early 1980s a fundamental reassessment of South Africa's regional development policy was prompted by the limited economic gains of the homelands and their continued dependency upon Pretoria. The reconceptualisation of homeland development was situated within the broader context of South Africa's crisis of 'white hegemony'. SA's military and business sectors in particular called for alternative strategies to deal with economic and political crisis in South Africa. The emerging community of South African 'developmentalists' enacted and defined the new strategies as largely a 'developmental' problem.

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1 Magyar in The Star, 10.9.84.
7.2.1. Development Regions and the Development Bank of South Africa

By 1980 concerted efforts were being made to discover a new development paradigm in South Africa. The basis of this ideological transformation concerned the role of the homelands. These territories became rapidly associated with technical and developmental problems akin to other 'third world countries'. A development discourse which sought to redefine the relationship between white South Africa and its black periphery diffused throughout the South African state, academia and print media. This ideological change was integral to PW Botha's early period of reformism and his enhancement of the concept of a Constellation of Southern African states. The South African government claimed that 'Constellation' would encourage economic co-operation between South Africa and the bantustans or 'national states', whilst maintaining political sovereignty and with it the basis of apartheid policy, 'multi-nationalism'. The political aspirations of the bantustans were now linked to economic inter-dependence with SA:

'Processes have been set in motion to ensure an equitable say for all population groups so that each one may satisfy his national aspirations, and thus help pave the way for co-operation between contented, self-governing and economically viable and self-reliant states, joined together in one large constellation to defend Southern Africa against the arch-enemies of equitable nationalism'.

'Multi-nationalism' was better known through its earlier formulation as separate development. In addition to the ethnic and racial basis of apartheid policy signified through the black 'states'(homelands), new regional initiatives for economic development were proposed. The principle impetus for the new regional initiatives was based upon enhancing 'development' in the homelands.

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3 Ibid.
6 PW Botha address to the Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly, in INFORMA, March, 1981.
'Referring to the economic status of the national states, the Prime Minister acknowledged that in recent years the development of the national states had not been adequate or sufficient to meet the challenges facing the country in the 'eighties. Ways and means would have to be found whereby the developing Black states could be more closely associated with the dynamic economy of the developed regions of South Africa, thereby promoting a more equitable distribution of economic activity... the development of the national states would have to be broadened and accelerated if the concept of economic inter-dependence was not to become increasingly suspect and perhaps even unacceptable to the Black peoples of the country'.

In order to bring the 'dynamic economy of the developed regions' to the black 'states' the map of South Africa was redrawn. Following meetings in 1981 and 1982 between Pretoria and the homelands, South Africa was divided into initially eight and then nine new 'development' regions. The desire for economic co-operation was reflected in these new demarcations which cut across the political boundaries of the 'national states' and South African territory. Ideological and political differences could be subordinated to the imperative of development and economic co-operation. The effects of apartheid policy would be concealed and labelled instead as 'development needs'. In 1983 this new technical, economistic and developmentalist approach was put into practice with the creation of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).

The DBSA became 'the most influential development institution in South Africa and played a major role in the propagation of "development" thinking'. The DBSA raised loans for the 'national states' through the capital markets and with South African government funding. Shares were owned by participating 'states' (in addition to the homelands Lesotho would also be involved). The DBSA declared its political

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5 PW Botha, address to private sector audience, Carlton Hotel, INFORMA, ibid.
independence and significantly, coveted the private sector. The new thinking was supposedly symbolised by the location of its headquarters in Johannesburg, the 'hub of the country's financial sector', rather than Pretoria. The DBSA was the central pivot streamlining other development institutions. BENSO (previously BENBO) was in effect absorbed into the DBSA and the former Corporation for Economic Development was no longer considered relevant by government. The Bank's overall objective was to promote regional economic development policy 'transcending national borders, to which all the participating governments had previously subscribed'.

The DBSA's mission statement reiterated these intentions:

>'to promote economic development in its broadest sense, increasing productivity and thus raising the standard of living of the people in the less-developed areas of the Southern African economic region'.

The barely concealed racism which had previously characterised South African government policy and attitude towards the black periphery was now substituted by a 'development' problem:

>'to reduce imbalances in levels of economic development between the less-developed and the more developed areas of the region...promote the investment of public and private capital...provide finance to meet important developmental requirements of participating governments... and provide technical assistance and training in the identification, preparation, evaluation, financing, implementation of development programmes'.

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7 INFORMA, November, 1983.
8 Annual Report, 1984/85, DBSA.
9 Emphasis added, DBSA ibid.
10 DBSA, ibid.
Chapter Seven: Contradictions and Crisis

A significant feature of the emerging policy was the provision of project-based loans rather than, as previously, a one-off payment from the South Africa government to assist the bantustan economies more generally. The intention was to scrutinise allocation of resources and to acquire more control of the developmental process. By 1985/6 the DBSA financed 74 projects within Bophuthatswana alone. The projects had an expected investment of around R635 million of which the Bank loaned R337

\[^{11}\text{Source: Stewart Scott Plan Associates (1992) op. cit.}\]
million. The DBSA loans financed mainly a range of infrastructural projects. The DBSA co-operated with the BNDC on three 'Industrial Development' phases which comprised well over half of the total DBSA amount of R 107 709 million loaned to the BNDC. The controlling hand of the DBSA was resented by Bophuthatswana officials intent on pursuing 'national' development. One local government official criticised the time lag between the project proposal and its appraisal by the DBSA who often took up to five years to screen the project proposal:

'I think in the last 2-3 years the whole approach changed but in the old days it was really bad. I think that they were scared of white elephants. But I think that our City projects were very sustainable'.

The time lag was related to the armies of consultants checking if each project was in line with so-called 'acceptable norms and standards'. The excessive nature of the elaborate project appraisal and implementation was intended to protect the client (the Bophuthatswana government) from over-design and exploitation. Another indication of the DBSA's cautious approach was that the total amount loaned was never advanced but released at each new stage of the project.

The role of the DBSA and South African authorities in promoting bantustan development was criticised more generally. Firstly, the wisdom of forcing the fragile economies of the bantustan's to repay debts and loans was questioned. Secondly, the emphasis upon project appraisal suggested that these institutions were less concerned with democratic accountability and participation than with winning approval for the project from the director of the DBSA. Furthermore, the DBSA had to allow for 'goodwill' diplomacy and certain projects were sanctioned in order to keep the

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13 Annual Report, 1990, BNDC.
14 It was also suggested that DBSA delegations to Mmabatho were often heavily over-staffed, HJ Smit, Mmabatho City Engineer, op.cit.
homeland regime's faith in the system. This approach was often described as both 'patronising' and wasteful:

'We cannot afford to let public sector funds be wasted on inappropriate projects for the sake of diplomatic goodwill.'

The DBSA's capital was welcomed but the failure to involve communities at all stages of development was another basic criticism. The problems of the lack of participation was expressed by the former chairman of the Bophuthatswana Development Council who was employed by the DBSA between 1983 to 1991:

'My basic problem with the Development Bank was that they were a lot of theory and little action. I was confronted with the practical issues and problems and then had to go back to the ivory tower of the Development Bank where you spend months and months crossing the 't' and dotting the 'i'. You generate paper for Africa. With appraisal report after appraisal report, in the end it became a case of beating the system, you would write an appraisal report to get acceptance from the director. The appraisal and the project then became totally divorced from what was happening on the ground and by the time the board approved the project it was totally different from the actual project on the ground. The ideas were not even discussed with the people on the ground. To me it just became a farce with no idea of reality. The sole objective was getting the project appraisal, after that what ever happened with the damn project no one was concerned about. It could have been a failure from the start.'

15 Nkuhlu, W.L, (1987:40) Towards a more effective regional development strategy for Southern Africa, Development Southern Africa, Vol. 4, No. 1, February, 1987. The previous chapter discussed Bophuthatswana's disastrous power plant project. Despite the lack of viability and negligible consultancy it is interesting to note that the DBSA, under political pressure, nonetheless initially sanctioned the project.

These critical interpretations of the DBSA concerned its organisation and bureaucracy. For all the DBSA's increased role in promoting economic 'development' in South Africa the conflict between Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' objectives and the 'development region' logic remained unresolved. A vast network of 'multilateral' structures, which at one point numbered over 100 committees or subcommittees, would link South Africa to the TVBC states. These were described as an 'extraordinarily weak vehicle' for controlling financial in the bantustans and also, following Bophuthatswana's financial crisis, the joint planning initiatives. The upward pressure on Bophuthatswana's expenditure could not be curbed.

Despite the new conceptualisation given to economic development in South Africa there were further problems. The new regional strategy and the DBSA were constrained by South African government political objectives. There was the hope and rhetoric of economic regions whilst these lacked an empowered administrative structure. By the mid-1980s Bophuthatswana's 'national' priorities were still paramount and Bophuthatswana had been able to raise its own additional investment funds. Mangope's drive for examples of prestigious development projects were supported by access to these alternative finances. Schoeman, who was DBSA regional co-ordinator in Mmabatho observed that by the mid-1980s:

'We could see the whole thing deteriorate, what with stadiums, power stations. There were a few sorry instances when literally the cabinet was taken to the cleaners for the cost of millions'.

7.2.2. Economic Crisis

By 1985 the funding of extravagant projects began to outstrip available

revenue. The Bophuthatswana regime was plunged into debt with South Africa (SA), overseas banks and finance houses. The Financial Mail had been an influential publication for the South African business community. By 1985 it continued to praise what it called 'Booming Bop.' with evidence for this supposedly based upon the projects financed by over R2 billion since 'independence'. However, the warning signs for a looming economic crisis were provided by the former economic advisor to Bophuthatswana, Karl Magyar. With an article entitled 'How not to develop Bop.' Magyar demolished Bophuthatswana's tenuous claims for economic and developmental credibility. Bophuthatswana's economic function's were no more than in providing a dormitory and training ground for the PWV's labour needs. Magyar suggested that there was a 'failure to implement, enforce and supervise and monitor development progress'. Bophuthatswana's model of development was merely benefiting a privileged few in the elite and Magyar concluded that:

'(there is a need to) Recognise that development can not take place in a political vacuum and until this is resolved, scarce funds will certainly be wasted. Bophuthatswana is not a private corporation'.

The regime was heavily indebted and the South African press declared that the 'honeymoon' period for Bophuthatswana 'development' and public relations was over. Bophuthatswana's economic malaise was lamented as 'the jewel in apartheid's crown is headed for disastrous economic crunch' and 'Big Spending Bop. is broke'. The financial situation was considered critical with the expected deficit placed at between R575 million and R875 million or 50-85% of the following year's R1 billion budget. In the 1985 budget presentation to the Bophuthatswana Parliament, just months before the extent of the crisis became known to the public, the Finance Minister, Leslie

20 Karl Magyar, in The Star, 10.9.84.
21 Financial Mail, 1.11.85.
22 Sunday Times, 24.11.85.
Young, described the forthcoming budget as merely reflecting the need for 'the elimination of unnecessary expense and the tighter control of necessary expense'. The only indication of financial difficulty was the estimated reduction in revenue allocated for development expenditure from 22% to 14% of total budget due to 'limited financial resources'.

However, the South African government expressed particular concern about a number of projects. These included a R21 million Game Park Reserve at Pilanesburg, a R17 million soccer stadium in Mmabatho, a R20 million Olympic Sports stadium in Mmabatho, a R25 million international airport and over R40 million in local hotels. There was also speculation about interest payment on a loan of R67 million from four banks and that Bophuthatswana was being sued for breach of contract for R366 million. The critical factor had been that unlike the other TVBC states, Bophuthatswana's major developments such as the 'National' stadium and Bop TV were financed primarily through dollars gained from South African and international money markets and export credit. The Bophuthatswana government had previously repaid R1,60 for every dollar loaned but with the rand sharply devalued in the mid-1980s this increased dramatically overnight to R3 per dollar. The debt of government was supposedly manageable when it was 20-30% of current budget but those debt ratios doubled to between 60-70%. The Bophuthatswana regime could no longer carry the large government structures that had been developed and could not even pay government salaries. By 1986 the economic crisis was particularly acute with the Bophuthatswana government allocating 36% of total national revenue to the Department of Finance in order to meet debt repayments. In 1987 this allocation was still approximately 27.2%. Actual development expenditure decreased from 24% of national revenue in 1984, to 9.6% in 1985, whilst still barely 10% in 1986.

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24 Ibid.
25 Sunday Times, 24.11.85.
27 Calculated from North West figures, op.cit.
28 Ibid. Although rising to just under 20% during the end of the 1980s and Start of
Bophuthatswana government encountered serious financial problems in late 1986/1987 and by June 1987 the regime approached SA for assistance.

Deeply embarrassed, President Mangope and the Bophuthatswana government reluctantly 'agreed' to the DBSA's Joint Financial Programmes. These were devised by the DBSA to control finances and to 'lay down the line on spending in the TVBC states'.

The Bophuthatswana government defended the South African media's accusations of an absolute crisis but did admit to a debt of R300 million. The regime also claimed that SA taxpayers only contributed 3% of Bophuthatswana's budget. With a good measure of irony these denials were made whilst Bophuthatswana was reportedly in a hurry to complete its new stadium in time for the 1987 'independence' celebrations. Even the Financial Mail recognised the severity of Bophuthatswana's financial crisis and the previously gushing enthusiasm for Bophuthatswana's economic development from certain South African sectors evaporated:

'Certainly if separate development were to be measured in terms of monetary cost, it can now be said to be a dismal failure, as Bop. is the richest of the demarcated South African States'.

The conditionalities imposed by the DBSA represented the end of Mangope's relative autonomy in economic decision making which had spanned the first half of the 1980s. Bophuthatswana's economic crisis had heightened concerns throughout South Africa about the effectiveness of regional economic strategy and homeland pursuit of 'national' and 'independent' policies.

the 1990s, the amount allocated for development expenditure never regained previous levels.


30 'Bop. bust on all counts', Financial Mail, 29.11.85.
7.3. The continued failure of Regional and Bophuthatswana 'national' development.

The hopes of government, the business community and 'development' scientists for improved regional development continued to be disappointed. In 1987 the regional initiatives were presented by a member of the Institute of Development Research during a seminar investigating the Economic Development of Bophuthatswana's Molopo Region. In order to address the particular problem of unemployment it was emphasised that the economic function of this Bophuthatswana district had to be situated in the wider South African economy within Region 'J'. Economic regions were defined according to the presence of a 'natural node' of a city or town serving a 'hinterland':

'The major part of each national state is often characterised by traditional agriculture and the absence of a nodal hierarchy worth mentioning. Occupants of regional hinterlands and dormitory towns near the borders of national states are, for the most part, served by nearby cities and towns. The occupants of dormitory towns in turn supply their labour. The whole hinterland of such a city or town is thus a nodal region'.

The nodes within region J were identified as Mmabatho and also Rustenberg and Klerksdorp/Potchefstroom in South Africa. The implication was that Bophuthatswana's 'national' boundaries were to be subordinated to 'economic laws':

'The economic laws which form the basis of this structure, necessarily imply the development of a national state can not be planned in isolation, but only as part of a

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31 S. J. H. Louw, Region 'J' as an Economic Development Unit, The Economic Development of the Molopo Area, Mmabatho Sun, 11.11.87.
bigger planning region'.

A number of South Africa's emerging academic 'developmentalists' suggested that the existing regional economic strategy was doing little for poverty and unemployment in the homelands more generally. Bophuthatswana's economic development was not benefiting the Batswana themselves. From 1977-1985 the real increase in household income had been only 4%, considered 'insignificant':

'The general picture for the people living in these districts of Bophuthatswana, in terms of employment and income, is not too encouraging. Prospects of finding employment outside Bophuthatswana are slowly diminishing and employment opportunities inside the country are increasing at a very low rate'.

The 'insignificance' of economic development for the majority of Bophuthatswana's residents became even more pronounced when placed within the context of South Africa as a whole. Bophuthatswana's per capita geographic product had been the highest of all the homelands but remained only 13% that of main South Africa (South Africa minus the homelands). In 1987 the Vice-Principal of the University of Transkei and future chairman of the DBSA, Mr. W L Nkuhlu, captured South Africa's 'developmentalists' disenchantment with the approach to regional development. Nkuhlu highlighted the failure of regional policy to reduce unemployment and poverty in the homelands due to inequality not only between regions but within regions. The areas which received labour flows developed whilst those from which labour was drawn, mainly homeland border towns, lacked infrastructure, social services, and also with constraints placed upon local entrepreneurs and small businesses. The major factor stifling endogenous economic development in these 'dormitory' areas was identified as the pervasive system of

33 Ibid. (1987:8).
institutional and state control based upon central government and metropolitan dominance.4

Many of the developmentalists focused mainly upon 'socio-economic' and sectoral imbalances. Others were more vocal in identifying the predominant force shaping the pattern of economic development as territorial apartheid and the enforced political boundaries aimed at reversing black urbanisation in South Africa. The huge waste of resources in maintaining this system was condemned. It was estimated that for every job made in the 'periphery' (homelands) nine in the metropolitan areas could have been created.35 The homelands were simply not deriving any autonomous benefits and were still dependent upon transfers of labour to South Africa. By the mid-1980s the homelands accounted for only 4-5% of South Africa's economic value added although containing 42% of the total population of South Africa.36

Within Bophuthatswana it was doubtful if sectors previously identified as areas of potential economic growth and as capable of increasing local Batswana participation had achieved this. Magyar claimed that Bophuthatswana's impressive economic growth figures were misleading because only a fraction of local residents received any increased wages or profits. A large proportion of GDP went to foreign shareholders and economic development was based upon increasing GNP and output rather than providing any tangible benefit to the masses.37 Industry in Bophuthatswana was regarded as limited; what did exist was dominated by foreigners (including South Africans). The industrial decentralisation programme was the main promoter of industrial development. However, this programme was principally concerned with relocating entrepreneurs from outside to inside Bophuthatswana. The result was that:

'The local entrepreneur is often not sufficiently assisted and as a result Batswana

36 Halbach, ibid.
entrepreneurs are not seen as participants in the development process'.'

Foreign investment was either considered as 'dubious' or as locating only to receive the very generous incentives which enabled the industrialist some degree of profit. The only possibilities for self-sustaining growth were Bophuthatswana's industries in close proximity to the PWV which reflected the extension of 'white' controlled industry rather than Batswana controlled industry. The number of jobs created and the absence of backward and forward linkages with the surrounding economy therefore hardly justified the huge level of concessions needed to keep most industries functioning.

The failure of the construction industry's 'trickle down' to local residents in Bophuthatswana was an indication of Nkhulu's observation that small businesses were constrained by large scale operations. Given the earlier optimism about the role of construction in the economic development of Bophuthatswana discrimination against Batswana builders was of particular concern

'Most of the projects are large, most of the contracts usually go to the more experienced and stronger construction businesses. The result is that often the Batswana builder and contractor are discriminated against'.

The widespread use of large scale outside contractors and consultants, usually South African, had the impact of inflating prices due to 'kick-backs'. Most significantly the heavy dependence upon 'outsiders' failed to create local internal capacity. Business licenses were extremely difficult to obtain and even if granted, government contracts were dominated by the large constructors. Some Batswana

40 Nkhu1u, W.L, op.cit.
builders had to wait years for business licences, the approval of which was linked to patronage, particularly for BDP members or 'favourites' of the government. One Batswana builder put it as follows:

'I left school early, with no employment opportunities and so I helped my grandfather's brick making business. I wanted to get my own business but it was never allowed by Mangope. It took me more than two years to finally get a licence. Small builders were always ignored in Bophuthatswana."

The pattern of patronage was also indicated by the appointment of Eddie Mangope, one of the President's sons, as General Manager of the Small Business Division of the BNDC. This appointment was made despite the incumbent's failure to prove the existence of his alleged MBA certificate and without any prior business or management experience.44 There were also concerns regarding the performance of the Agricultural Development Corporation (AGRICOR) which had losses of more than R79 million and the Agri-chicks scheme which owed R50 million and had monthly losses running at R1 million. Rural co-operatives aimed at the development of peasant agriculture were also questionable with no profit being made and limited peasant contribution to GDP.45 Overall the Bophuthatswana economic surplus from the mines and casinos had been an important source of revenue for the government but, however, Daphne and de Clerq allude to the consolidation of a small elite through the modernising 'prestige' projects at the sake of the rural masses. It was a reflection of the wider tendency within Bophuthatswana leading to a privileged minority dominating the upper echelons of government structures.

Notoriously low wages within industries located in Bophuthatswana was used by the regime as a deliberate policy to attract investors. This strategy had formed the

43 Member of the Ditsobotla Artisans Committee affiliated to the North West Builders Federation representing, small black builders, personal communication, Mmabatho, March, 1995.
45 Ibid.
basis for other economic and political conflicts involving South African based trade unions and the Bophuthatswana regime.

7.3.1. Trade Unions and the Bophuthatswana regime.

Prior to independence in 1977 the opposition Seoposengwe Party had condemned the appallingly low level of wages within Bophuthatswana. Wages as low as seven rand per week were revealed by a South African newspaper investigating the opposition's claims concerning factories within Bophuthatswana. The Bophuthatswana government defended the accusations of 'slave wages' and stated that it would 'not stand by and let any industrialists take advantage of our country and people'.

Despite these claims the Bophuthatswana government's gagging orders on the Babelegi Labour Office not to release any information on wages to the press indicated the regime's true feelings. By the mid-1980s Magyar estimated that 69.8% of Bophuthatswana's workers were migrants or commuters to South Africa. Most of the remaining 30% of the economically active age group within the homeland were 'unemployed, underemployed or very poorly paid if employed'. Wages of only R117 per week were discovered at Babelegi, for which people travelled up to six hours a day to and from work. The Bophuthatswana government's hostility to trade union (TU) activity must therefore be seen in the context of this economic policy centred upon cheap labour.

In addition to the economic conflict, because TUs ignored the political boundaries of the 'national' states they were considered by the Bophuthatswana regime as a potentially hostile political force. Many workers lived in Bophuthatswana but worked within South Africa and there was a great deal of ambiguity as to whether the South African Labour Relations Acts of the early 1970s applied to the homelands and adjacent industrial zones. In 1981, this ambiguity was tested in when members of the

46 See the Post, 7.2.77
47 The Post, 30.1.77.
National Automobile and Allied Workers Union attempted to meet at the BMW factory in Garankuwa, Bophuthatswana. On that occasion the Internal Security Act was invoked by the Bophuthatswana regime to break up the meeting with the arrest of three TU members. Furthermore, meetings of more than twenty people required permission from the Minister of Internal Security through the local magistrate. Some craft unions were tolerated but ironically for a 'multi-racial' society these were often exclusively white workers' unions. The major Bophuthatswana legislation covering union organisation within its territory clearly indicated that black unions were discouraged. The Bophuthatswana Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 52 of 1984 removed much of the previous ambiguity:

'one of the Act's main requirements is that all unions, including unregistered unions, organising in Bophuthatswana must have their head office there, while union officials must be employees there. Even before the Act was passed this requirement was laid down to a number of unions to prevent their operating in Bophuthatswana'.

As SA unions did not recognise the legality of Bophuthatswana they did not wish to register within this territory as it would imply recognition. The regime argued that because these South African unions were 'foreign' their activities could not be tolerated by another sovereign state. The Act removed some negative clauses and discriminatory practices that had existed in SA, for example the obsolete clause in the SA Mine and Works Act which had previously prevented blacks from holding blasting certificates, but over all it was utilised as a control mechanism. Some observers thought that the draconian measures were worse than even within SA itself. By outlawing South African TU organisation Bophuthatswana was also attempting to 'seal its borders ideologically'. Country wide strikes between branches of the same industry but in different parts of SA and Bophuthatswana would be prevented. Other

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49 Cooper, C, SAIRR Topical Briefing, 16 7.84.
50 Cooper, ibid., 1984:4
51 RDM, 2.3.84.
clauses covering registration and collective bargaining effectively ruled out strike action. TU activity was discouraged through Mangope's fantasy of hermetically sealing territories.

Conditions for TU activity were described as better in the PWV and marginal areas of Bophuthatswana. Workers could organise meetings within SA, for example, at Rustenberg or closer to Mmabatho at Sehuba, but these were often violently disrupted within Bophuthatswana. TU organisation was therefore particularly problematic for workers who commuted into South Africa. There would be less opportunity to organise within the factory and upon returning across the border to Bophuthatswana, police roadblocks would be in place and documents often confiscated.¹² Bophuthatswana workers criticised the regime's economic and development policy which, as Magyar has indicated, was skewed towards 'white' industrialists and the provision of servicing for mainly 'white' South African sectors.

7.3.2. The Casino Economy

The South African and Bophuthatswana governments and sections of the media had attempted to conceal these negative features of Bophuthatswana's economic development behind the facade of 'progress'. More issues undermined the cosmetic window dressing and questioned whether this 'development' was reaching the mass of Bophuthatswana residents. For example the idea of Bophuthatswana's self-sufficiency in agricultural production was another acclaimed feature of development strategy. The Minister of Agriculture, Chief E.M Mokgoko had previously declared:

*Throughout the world, about 500 million people are in fact suffering from malnutrition or lack of food to the point of actual starvation... (Bophuthatswana)*

...stresses agricultural development in order to be able to feed herself.'

A very revealing indication of this 'self-sufficiency' and Bophuthatswana's development priorities was suggested in the same speech. The Minister claimed that the pattern of productivity and self-sufficiency was illustrated through the supply of R99 000 worth of meat to Sun City per month and also R130 000 of vegetables to cater for the demand from holiday resorts. Increased productive output and catering for the needs of mainly white holiday resorts did not mean that marginalised rural communities received the benefits of 'self-sufficiency'. State agricultural production was geared towards production of cash crops with little assistance provided for growing vegetables and other crops for household consumption."

Indeed the glamour and prestige of Sol Kerzner's Sun City itself was contrasted rather chillingly with the discovery of a number of 'Dead babies in Sun City sewers', dumped by a number of young girls following sexual relations with visitors at the hotel resort. Furthermore, another academic, Professor Keenan of the University of Witswatersrand, had conducted research into the conditions of employees at Sun City. Keenan found that black employees were disadvantaged in many ways relating to salary and working conditions compared to white staff. Keenan also discovered that the area surrounding Sun City had unemployment levels greater than anywhere else in Bophuthatswana. These findings led Magyar to suggest that Sun City (and tourism and gambling) provided less than 10% of Bophuthatswana's revenue but 90% of its publicity. The 'non-racial' society was particularly rewarding for white groups. Even in Mafikeng, a symbol supposedly of integration and non-racialism, a study by the Human Sciences Research Council...
found that many whites would leave if the Bophuthatswana government removed its guarantees on segregated religion and education. Four years after incorporation into Bophuthatswana there had been no cultural integration between black and white residents in Mafikeng, although a 'reasonable' degree of economic and residential integration.\(^59\)

The progressive and multi-racial complexion of Bophuthatswana was unmasked as particularly beneficial to whites and certain black 'immigrants'. This tendency was reflected in the 1985 employment figures for the Molopo region obviously dominated by the capital Mmabatho. Those classified as 'immigrants' formed 38% of the administrative, managerial and professional occupations in the Molopo region. On the other hand over 83% of the total number of Molopo residents were not 'officially' economically active with 75% classified as not receiving any income.\(^60\) Many Batswana within government and parastatals felt discriminated against. The credibility of Mangope's Batswana discourse was undermined by pronouncements by figures such as ex-Rhodesian Rowan Cronje who referred to Batswana characteristics as 'our' uniqueness.\(^61\)

The pattern of development had been directed towards visible 'progressive' icons of development. For Magyar, this policy had simply exacerbated the illogical basis of the homeland's economic strategy and was particularly beneficial to whites:

> 'When reviewing the nature of the government's economic planning strategies, a distinct corporate pattern emerges. Revenues are collected from sources which the Tswana population had little to do with (for example, mines, hotels, gambling, TV, and so on) and these scarce profits are "invested" in showpiece projects which will offer status and wages to only the few. Whites have introduced these projects, some long before "independence", and they are intended to make money primarily from

\(^{59}\) The *Star*, 17.3.86.

\(^{60}\) Secretary of Economic Affairs (1987) Demographic Profile of the Molopo Region, in Economic Development of the Molopo Region, op. cit.

\(^{61}\) *Pioneer*, 1983.
Chapter Seven: Contradictions and Crisis

other whites'.

Bophuthatswana's interpretation of 'national' development was most clearly illustrated by communities being uprooted to make way for game parks and resorts. The settlements at Groothook and Morokashoek were removed to make way for a game park and the Thaba Nchu Sun hotel. People had also been removed from tribal land in order to make way for Mmabatho itself and a range of projects including a luxury suburb called 'Leopard Park'. In Hammanskraal, the suburb of Morokolong was levelled in order to make way for an BNDC industrial site. The costs and benefits of Bophuthatswana 'development' were disproportionately felt by different groups and communities. A minority of Batswana, ex-Rhodesians and Afrikaners have accumulated substantial wealth from the civil service, commercial and retailing sectors. A large number of British, South African and other African expatriates also enjoyed lucrative Bophuthatswana government contracts and tax packages. In addition, the large number of South African consultant engineers, planners and architects profited from the regime. Certain residents of Mafikeng also benefited greatly from these developments and became important contract suppliers to the Bophuthatswana government, for cars, fuel, and the like. The benefits that may have accrued to the masses have not been gained by the rural majority, over 85% of total population.

The Bantustans were increasingly criticised by the SA media which continued to express what it called the 'taxpayers terror'. This criticism followed the disclosure that the TVBC finances estimated for the fiscal year to the end of March 1987, totalled R4.5 billion. 36%, or R1.6 billion, was to be used for the salaries of more than 150,000, probably closer to 200,000, bantustan public servants. 'Apartheid has

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64 Mr. Mosothoane (1995) op.cit.
67 Financial Mail, 25.9.87.
caused economic shambles in homelands' rang headlines and a PFP spokesman captured the concerns of the white South Africans in suggesting that ultimately it was they who would foot the bill. Even South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs which dealt with the TBVC 'independent' states admitted that many of the problems were created by 'independence'. The economic situation was described as critical because in addition to 'aid', loans to the homelands had to be guaranteed by the SA government.\(^6\) The SA press publicised the extent of economic crisis in the homelands as 'SA props TBVC states'\(^6\) and the 'Crippling cost of the homelands'.\(^7\) However, the poor internal revenues of the homelands had perhaps meant that they would never be in a position to ever repay their debts:

\textit{Having offered a Faustian bargain to ludicrously unequal partners, Pretoria has had to pay the bills for the undisciplined indulgences of opportunistic homeland administrations.}\(^7\)

Despite the set back of the economic crisis, the business community's Financial Mail maintained that 'black homelands (are) still lynchpins of apartheid' and hoped for better leaders.\(^7\) However the economic crisis was also underpinned and compounded by the political and cultural conflicts of Bophuthatswana's 'nation-building'.

\section*{7.4. Political and Cultural Control}

The emerging pattern of conflation of tradition with Bophuthatswana's political structures was suggested in chapter three. Permission was required from the chiefs and headmen for meetings and any self-help activities in tribal areas and elsewhere from the Bophuthatswana police. Both of these parties were entitled to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{The Star}, 3.10.87.
\item \textit{Sowetan}, 2.10.87.
\item \textit{New Nation}, 1.10 88.
\item \textit{Financial Mail}, 8.12.87.
\end{itemize}
attend these meetings. The chiefs were also given the power of arrest, ability to levy taxes and could even pass sentence for particular offences. Chiefs could therefore exert a considerable influence upon rural politics and development particularly through their control over land and administrative role in Bophuthatswana's national political structures. Mangope himself was at the pinnacle of these structures. When opposition was encountered from traditional figures not willing to conform, Chiefs, such as Mmankurwane in Phokeng, as well as Chief Lebone Molatlegi, were deposed. Molatlegi's wife was also exiled by Mangope. Despite the profile given to traditional structures in Bophuthatswana their potentially valuable role in development was overshadowed by their functions as control mechanisms:

'With some outstanding exceptions in every homeland, the general picture is one of lack of concern for the welfare of the community and the corrupt use of power for personal enrichment and aggrandisement'.

The subordination of chieftaincy to a government agenda was reflected upon by an ANC activist with a long experience of involvement in rural areas of Bophuthatswana. Chieftaincy was regarded as particularly significant in preventing any alternative education or development efforts:

'Village chieftainship as a political structure is a major thorn in the flesh. It is one impediment to change and development. It has kept many villagers from engaging more deeply in their own change. In our villages chiefs are paid servants of the Bantustan state. This is enshrined in law. They are not always made accountable. In some cases they are simply removed if they do not share the ruling government party's views of development. I have known some to spy on any alternative education and


development attempts to improve the lot of villagers'.

These features of rural governance therefore had an intimidating and demoralising impact upon any alternative local grass roots structures or community development workers. Villagers were dependent upon chiefs, headman and patronage for services and resources which has left an enduring legacy in these areas (see last chapter). Communities' dependency was also exacerbated in Bophuthatswana by the limited availability of training facilities for community administration, book keeping, financial planning and construction skills. Communities were also often suspicious and distrustful of the authorities and each other.

The previous chapter indicated the erosion of liberal democracy in Bophuthatswana by the mid-1980s. The regime perceived itself as under threat from a range of political forces. Traditional structures and promotion of Batswana ethnic nationalism were activated as key control mechanisms. From 'Independence' 90% of the Bophuthatswana Legislative members were representatives of the ruling political party. A number of constitutional changes were simply made to prevent challenges to the regime's authority. The government's paramount concern, even obsession, was for state security with individual liberties and the Rule of Law such as the much publicised Bill of Rights of secondary consideration. Unrest was closely monitored by Mangope and the Bophuthatswana Intelligence Service with many ex-Rhodesian and South African intelligence personnel recruited for their 'expertise'. Bophuthatswana was undoubtedly increasingly underpinned by authoritarianism and the fear factor and rapidly developed the characteristics of a police state. Mangope instilled a climate of fear and oppression which his heavy-handed security forces reinforced. The Bophuthatswana Police Headquarters in Mmabatho, with its Lucas

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75 Phil Mathole, in Matlhasedi, Nov/Dec 1991.
Mangope Hall and numerous patrol cars, was built opposite the main road entering the 'Stadt' as testimony to this desire for control and surveillance.

The Mail newspaper covered a meeting between Mangope and residents in the Taung district following Chief Mmankurwane's enforced exile by Mangope. As the meeting began Mangope attempted to speak but was prevented from doing so by a woman who produced a placard demanding, 'We want our chief back'. The reaction of the security forces epitomised the insecurity of the regime and its heavy handed response to opposition. Police attempted to arrest old and young alike and sjamboked many of the residents, condemning them as the ANC, whilst Mangope took flight. An obvious target of control was information and the media itself. The Taung story was put together by the current News Editor at the Mail and presented to the previous editor, Leslie Sehume. Fearing retribution from Mangope, Sehume appeared reluctant to sanction publication of the story. Following persuasion from his reporters the story finally won acceptance for publication by Sehume, as a front page story in the following Friday's edition. Sehume was summoned to the President's office on the same morning that the Mail was on sale and given a severe reprimand for printing the story, one of several such occasions. These 'national' structures were made accountable to Mangope himself and the President ritually summoned a range of office-holders before him, delivering fierce dressing-downs and verbal warnings. Mangope's wrath was reserved in particular for non-Tswana communities who were scape-goated for the problems of Bophuthatswana 'nation-building'.

7.4.1. Batswana ethno-nationalism

The ethnic basis of the regime posed considerable problems for the large number of non-Tswana within Bophuthatswana. Tswana nationalism had been a long term political tool used by the Bophuthatswana regime to enhance a semblance of 'nation-hood'. Non-Tswana in the bantustan were represented by the

78 The Mail had been bought on behalf of the Bophuthatswana Government by the Bophuthatswana National Provident Fund in 1982.
Bophuthatswana state as squatters. The ethno-nationalist impulses from state structures also appealed to various Tswana communities. As the weight of Bophuthatswana's 'nation-building' contradictions intensified, according to Manson and Lawrence 'non-racialism' and 'liberal democracy' had:

'little relevance for the masses, who desperate for jobs and security, viewed outsiders or "foreigners" as competitors and were more likely to buy the notion of exclusive ethnic nationalism'.

Bophuthatswana presented the facade of liberalism to the outside world whilst internally there was the denial of work permits, citizenship and pensions to non-Tswana within the bantustan. Mangope encouraged harassment of non-Tswana groups who were vilified as the ethnic 'other' and ordered to conform to Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' policies. During the economic crisis of the mid-1980s and with the austerity measures imposed by South Africa, the Bophuthatswana regime appeared even more reluctant to use resources on non-Tswana settlements. Ethnic outsiders had been criticised for many years by the Bophuthatswana and South African authorities for siphoning Bophuthatswana's precious resources. During the economic crisis non-Tswana communities were blamed and victimised. 'Squatters' were also regarded as the cause of Bophuthatswana's political difficulties in cementing 'nation-hood' and for distilling the 'purity' of Batswana nationalism.

From 1980 to 1985 Bophuthatswana's de facto population grew at a rate of almost 13.2% to 1 740 600 people. Much of this increase was accounted for by the rapid growth of a number of remote settlements on the fringes of Bophuthatswana. These were formed by people removed or relocated to the homeland from SA. Far removed from the glitz and glamour of Mmabatho, were a huge number of people living in vast squatter camps. Murray has termed this process 'displaced urbanisation'
whereby in the 1970s and particularly the 1980s black South Africans were relocated to sites politically within the bantustans but geographically on the peripheries of the established metropolitan labour markets. This resettlement policy led to a rapid increase in rural slum settlements of urban density but rural in respect of infrastructure and services.

For example in 1979 Botshabelo in Bophuthatswana was bare veld but by 1986 it formed a settlement of around 500,000 people. Throughout the 1970s this process of relocation was also taking place on the highveld in Winterveld, Qwa Qwa and KwaNdebele. Hundreds of people were relocated to resettlement villages at Ramatlabama, in the Molopo region, near to Mmabatho itself. The macro-level structural pressures of apartheid policy were then exacerbated by the enforcement of the bantustans as 'ethno-national units'. Botshabelo (formerly Onverwacht) consisted mainly of Basotho residents but initially fell under Bophuthatswana control. This jurisdiction was used by Bophuthatswana to foment and mobilise ethnic differences. Murray observed that in the 1950s and 1960s the Seleka Barolong branch of the Batswana ethnic group in the Thaba Nchu region had been riven by internal political cleavage. Following the formation of Onverwacht, consisting of thousands of refugees discarded from white farmland, there was a policy to represent the area as the 'land of the Barolong' and as peaceful prior to the 1970s and rapid increase of non-Tswana population ('squatter invasion'). The internal differences within the Seleka were rapidly projected onto the Basotho and the foundations of an inter-ethnic conflict were laid. As early as 1974 Mangope had made his government's vehicles available to the South African authorities in order to remove Basotho from Thaba Nchu. Mangope justified this ethnic cleansing by referring to the characteristics of the Basotho as 'those people who live like animals'. From 1977 the non-Tswana population were threatened with deportation from Bophuthatswana if they refused to take out

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84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Rogers, B. (1980:75) op cit.
Bophuthatswana citizenship. However, the Bophuthatswana authorities often refused or ignored applications for citizenship from these groups. Threats were made that pensions and salaries would cease to be paid unless opposition to Bophuthatswana was dropped. There was widespread discrimination against non-Tswana groups until Botshabelo's incorporation into Qwa Qwa in the 1980s.

Winterveld was another huge settlement 40 kilometres north west of Pretoria. By the late 1970s it was suggested that:

'The deportations and associated violence around Winterveld are among the worst examples of South African removals, complicated by the issue of Bophuthatswana citizenship, loss of South African citizenship and the involvement of the Bophuthatswana Government in the forefront of the official attack on squatters'.

Winterveld was a particular focus of Bophuthatswana's enforced nation-hood campaign in the 1980s and early 1990s. Access to land, jobs and pensions have been denied to this vast community, of over 90% non-Tswana composition. The Bophuthatswana authorities were apparently always reluctant to take responsibility for this non-Tswana community. In 1986 the Bophuthatswana police opened fire on a crowd of squatters in Winterveld killing eleven people which epitomised the attitude of the Bophuthatswana regime to such communities. The Bophuthatswana police commander at the time, who apparently called the meeting at which the people were shot, showed his contempt for the 'squatters' by suggesting 'I will leave them lying all over like ants'. The commander was promoted to Brigadier and the findings of the official Bophuthatswana investigation into the incident withheld by the regime.

Given the degree of hostility from the Bophuthatswana government this inevitably

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87 Rogers, B. (1980:32) op.cit.
affected any attempt to implement 'development'.

The Bophuthatswana and Central South African governments implemented the Winterveld Development Programme. With hostility on both sides and governments' 'minimalist' approach to community participation it was concluded that:

'...the government-controlled development programme did not attempt to address the urgent socio-political priorities of Winterveld residents. Instead, it focused on some of the physical and economic programmes of the Inter-Governmental Agreement by upgrading some infrastructural facilities, and this without consulting the community and their needs'.

Phase two of the programme still encountered the problem of participation, controversial selection of community representatives and institutional problems of the DBSA and other parastatals. Another sub-programme concerned the Education investigation project and identified residents' objection to the imposition of the compulsory use of Setswana in Bophuthatswana primary and secondary schools. Despite the millions of rand for the entire programme residents declared that it felt like 'apartheid money'. Once again given such features, development was hindered by the absence of grass-roots organisation and community participation, the legacy of dependency and lack of community organisations.

The Hammanskraal area, also not far from Pretoria, was incorporated into Bophuthatswana in 1977. Many of the inhabitants are Ndebele and were the focus of vicious Bophuthatswana police brutality. The government claimed that their actions, demolishing homes and forcing 600 families to flee, as recently as 1993, have been necessary to discourage 'squatting'.

These brief examples indicate the fierce battles that went on against incorporation into Bophuthatswana and discrimination once transferred to the

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90 de Clercq, F. (1994) op.cit.
91 de Clercq, F. ibid.
bantustan. Non-Tswana and Tswana communities alike, such as the communities of Braklaagte and Leeuwonfontein, bitterly resisted incorporation into Bophuthatswana.

In the 1980s more generally, opposition to apartheid and the bantustans intensified throughout South Africa. With the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 the organisation of boycotts and creation of civic organisations mushroomed. The proximity of the eastern Bophuthatswana districts to the PWV region meant that Bophuthatswana itself was also subject to opposition. However, it should be pointed out that, significantly, these civic organisations and the UDF were almost non-existent within Bophuthatswana. In the words of the present Secretary of the ANC Mmabatho Branch, to have organised in the Mmabatho region in the 1980s 'it took a brave person to do so'.

Bophuthatswana was racked by conflict with hand grenade attacks against the bantustan police force and torture and illegal imprisonment of civilians. In 1986 the Archbishop of Pretoria sent an urgent Supreme Court Order to prevent the Bophuthatswana police from 'waging a war' on the local population of Ga-Rankuwa. Mangope himself faced jail for contempt of court in a number of serious cases in and around Ga-Rankuwa. In 1986 a state of emergency was declared in Bophuthatswana and political activity was banned. Riots also swept Odi, Moretele and Bafokeng districts with vehicle hijackings, abductions and widespread damage to property. In the ten years from independence the number of prisoners had increased from 645 in 1978 to 2,677 in 1987. The Mmabatho and Molopo region was considered 'quiet' in the 1980s and indeed Mangope contrasted its relative tranquillity with the unrest in the eastern areas blamed upon 'South African aggressors'. Nonetheless, although Mmabatho was the base of Mangope's key institutional support this evaporated during the coup of 1988.

94 See *The Star*, 3.3.86, *The Citizen*, 8.3.86, *The Star*, 7.3.86 and *The Sowetan* which declared that 'Bop's Bill of Rights was just a mockery', 28.4.86.
96 Chapter Four showed that the Mmabatho areas relative safety was used as a propaganda weapon by the Bophuthatswana Government.
7.5. Elite Disquiet and the Coup of 1988

The Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' crisis exacerbated conflicts within Mangope's ruling power block. There was concern within certain sections of the Bophuthatswana state with the activities of the 'Uhuru Hoppers'. There was disquiet concerning the considerable powers given to figures such as Kalmanovitz with claims of corruption, fraudulent tendering procedures and misuse of state funds. Following the strong appeal by a number of construction companies against the award of one particular contract involving Kalmanovitz, an investigation was promised by the Finance Minister. However, the investigation was never initiated and the inaction indicative of Kalmanovitz's power. Officials who openly expressed disquiet about Kalmanovitz's dealings often endangered there own positions. Magyar himself was forced to leave Bophuthatswana following his attempts to convince Mangope to remove Kalmanovitz. Other dubious schemes included the proposals for Bophuthatswana to purchase Romanian tractors (Kalmanovitz was a confidante of Ceaucescu), gefillte fish, fraudulent securities, football stadia and suspect 'technological' purchases. Mangope's apparent infatuation with Kalmanovitz and favouritism of others alienated numerous civil servants by subordinating their civil servant ethic to his own political ends. Even those close to Mangope admitted that the President was extremely unpopular.

As mentioned, despite the Bill of Rights, Bophuthatswana was a de facto one party state dominated by the BDP. The controversy and allegations of fraud

97 The Previous chapter indicated Kalmanovitz's considerable powers and role in promoting Bophuthatswana abroad.

98 This concerned the contract for a poultry factory but followed the earlier award of a R96 million contract to Kalmanovitch's Liat company, to build houses and the 'Independence' stadium, amongst others. There was also a court case involving another Israeli company and allegations of payments to Swiss Bank accounts and bribes to Bophuthatswana officials in order to secure contracts. See Africa Contemporary Record (1987-1988:B:777&778).


100 Ibid. Kalmanovitz was eventually arrested in London in connection with allegedly passing 2.3 million dollars of counterfeit checks. Although cleared of these charges he was then arrested in Israel for spying for the KGB.

concerning the 1987 General Elections was another major catalyst to popular resentment, especially from within elements of the Bophuthatswana elite. Rocky Malebane-Metsing was leader of the opposition Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP) formed in 1985 from his power base in the Bafokeng region. Following his departure from the BDP in 1984, Malebane-Metsing had been the only independent Member of Parliament. The basis of his disagreement with Mangope concerned the differing interpretations of the eventual goal of Bophuthatswana independence. For Malebane-Metsing, Mangope had betrayed the original intention of 'independence' which was a means of moving towards a federal South Africa:

'Since independence we had been convinced that the future of the Southern African region would be a federation in which all the independent states, including South Africa, would come together and form a federal government. Mangope has since changed his stance on this, and I could not go along with this'.

The disagreement was central to a much longer dispute between the BDP and its opponents. In the mid 1970s the political parties within Bophuthatswana had split due to different interpretations of 'independence'. Whereas Mangope sought 'go it alone' ethnic nationalism the opposition parties advocated the promotion of Batswana interests in conjunction with black unity in South Africa. The PPP were articulating a federal option with Bophuthatswana as part of South Africa and attempted to contest the elections in a free and fair manner. However, the restrictions applying to Trade Unions and public gatherings also extended to opposition political parties. Malebane-Metsing attempted to rally support by contesting the BDP's miss use of political

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102 For example in the wake of the coup a number of ministers either resigned or were fired. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Chief B.L.M.I Motsatsi's resignation was particularly surprising given that he was tipped as a possible successor to Mangope. Motsatsi apparently 'vehemently' opposed the banning of the PPP as this ridiculed Bophuthatswana's claims of multi-party politics, in Africa Contemporary Record, (1987-1988:B778) op. cit.
104 Butler et al, (1977) op.cit.
power. The PPP specifically rallied around advocating land restoration, free and compulsory education, elevating the office of chieftainship, giving civil servants a 'square deal', better treatment of senior citizens, uprooting corruption and promises not to harass political opponents. The PPP also campaigned for 'the upgrading of health facilities and general improvement of social structures'.

It took three years for registration of the PPP to be sanctioned, only four months before the elections. Party meetings were made difficult and allowed negligible media coverage from the government controlled Bop TV. The Bophuthatswana Electoral Officer claimed a 47% turn out with six seats won by the PPP who complained of widespread rigging. The elections can not be gauged as legitimising the Bophuthatswana state but nonetheless the BDP certainly believed they were a ruling party. The wider political frame of reference for most Batswana and black South Africans was for a unitary South Africa. However, there were groups who were intent on fomenting local and regional identities. The question of Malabene-Metsing would remain significant because following the coup and his exile in Zambia he would later re-emerge as a dubious convert to the ANC in the North West Provincial Legislative Government (see last chapter). The disapproval of the maltreatment of the PPP resonated with a number of civil servants and even Ministers.

Key white officials still dominated the top positions in homeland structures and local blacks resented this racial hierarchy. In particular, most crucially, a faction within the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF) deeply resented the gross inequalities characterising the race relations within the homeland army. Shortly before the coup Malebane-Metsing issued a report detailing complaints concerning nepotism and corruption in Bophuthatswana. Professor Keenan had been so concerned about the extent of corruption, which his study had uncovered from local authority

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level to senior positions, that he had met senior officials of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs to warn them some eighteen months before the coup that 'a violent overthrow of the Bophuthatswana government was inevitable'. Nonetheless, the South Africa government and most commentators were taken by surprise with the attempted coup in February 1988.

The President's illusions of grandeur and sovereignty were shattered and his iron grip prised from its hold on Bophuthatswana. The Mail announced that the emperor had seemingly been dethroned. In fact the coup had taken place two days earlier and this edition of the Mail did not mention it other than in passing because Mangope had been reinstalled. The institutional support that Mangope had been dependent upon, most notably from the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF), had momentarily disappeared. For 16 hours Malebane-Metsing was President. The BDF intervention, or more precisely the National Security Unit within the BDF, had been premised upon the corruption and influence involving Kalmanovitz, the 'white president' of Bophuthatswana. The remainder of the BDF failed to intervene on Mangope's behalf and the South African Defence Force (SADF) reacted with great haste. Paratroopers were sent almost immediately into SA's supposedly sovereign neighbour to quash the coup and restore Mangope. After a short exchange of fire the SADF overwhelmed the BDF rebels and freed Mangope from his imprisonment from one of the icons of his rule, the 'Independence Stadium'.

In addition to this direct intervention into Bophuthatswana's affairs, South Africa invoked the Broadcasting agreement between the two. The South African Foreign Minister stated that the decision to cut off the Bop TV and radio signal was made because:

'South Africa did not want any messages disseminated that might cause further confusion or despondency among the public of Bophuthatswana'.

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100 Africa Contemporary Record (1987-1988·B775) op.cit.
101 The Mail, 12.2.88.
102 Pik Botha quoted in The Star, 11.2.88.
The Broadcasting agreement, it was claimed, covered this intervention. The excessive heavy handedness of the Pretoria regime related to South African fears of even a whiff of ANC influence behind the coup.\textsuperscript{113} The control of the platinum mines and other strategic interests were perhaps other contributory factors. The SA government also feared that a new Bophuthatswana regime would reveal the full extent of corruption which was finally uncovered by the 1994 Skewiyiya Commission.\textsuperscript{114} Mangope was a leading figure of the anti-sanctions campaign and an articulate supporter of the homeland policy and therefore a valuable asset for South African policy abroad.

Mangope was emphatically South Africa's man in Mmabatho, loyal and despite occasional outbursts, a reliable, enthusiastic advocate of the bantustan policy. This staunch support and nurturing of the Mangope regime was graphically illustrated in the SABC coverage of Mangope's speech just following his restoration by the SADF. Mangope praised the SADF:

'I would like to express my very very sincere thanks to the SADF for the excellent rescue job they did last night. I would like to say that we have the situation under control. Now we have to decide what to do in order to normalise everything. Thank you very much'.\textsuperscript{115}

The following evening, as if to reinforce the Pretoria-Mmabatho axis, Mangope stood in Mmabatho, flanked by PW Botha on one side, Pik Botha on the other, and with SA Defence Force Minister General Magnus Malan and General Geldenhuys in the background. Mangope thanked SA for coming to his assistance as requested:

'This rescue did not come as a total surprise to me nor my colleagues because I think

\textsuperscript{113} The Guardian (U.K) 11.2.88.
\textsuperscript{115} Bop TV archives, 10.2.88.
we count, as I believe South Africa does, we count on South Africa as a very loyal friend and want to believe that we are a very loyal friend to South Africa. Now there's a difference between just a good friend and a loyal friend. And we believe that we are a loyal friend to you and by this wonderful gesture, State President, Sir, you have shown yourself to be a very very loyal friend of my young nation, thank you very much."16

The incident was seized upon by opponents of the homeland system as reflecting the 'myth of the constellation of states'. The coup was interpreted as a 'blot on the Verwoerdian vision of independence and stable black states linked to SA in an harmonious commonwealth of nations'.17 Bophuthatswana's connotations of being a puppet regime could not be avoided following the coup. The image of the powerlessness of the Bophuthatswana regime was most strongly reinforced by one of the rebel officers involved who cast doubts on the ability of the BDF to act as an independent force. According to the officer the Bophuthatswana National Security Unit had no knowledge of counter-insurgency and were armed with only rifles, some of which contained only blanks. Despite the inadequate preparation of the NSU and even with the rapid response of the SADF, it still took almost 14 hours to suppress the rebel faction. The implication was that the BDF would always be ill-equipped to deal with any conflicts and would therefore always require the intervention of the SADF:

'As a result of this state of affairs one may be forgiven for regarding the BDF as the SADF's delaying force or assisting force because if confronted by a small well trained foreign force or internal rebel force as it was evident on the wake of the 10 February coup, the BDF will have no alternative but to revert to the SADF'.18

17 Weekly Mail, 19.2.88.
The SADF intervention was apparently under the pretext of 'loyalty' and 'friendship' to Bophuthatswana and PW Botha's justification of creating 'regional stability'. However, Mangope was clearly dependent upon Pretoria's assistance.

There were competing interpretations of and reactions to the coup which illustrated the extent to which Bophuthatswana, although condemned as a puppet state following the SADF intervention, was in fact representing itself as a 'real' entity. On one level the event reinforced the discursive barricades between 'white' and 'black' in South Africa with the coup seen by some as reflecting particular cultural traits of Africa:

_The standard response from many white South Africans is simply to shrug shoulders and say "that's Africa"-the suggestion being that there is something inherent in the people of the continent that tends to corruption, incompetence and instability. Since the Second World War, after all, there have been 71 coups in Africa. The Transkei contributed merely another two and Bophuthatswana an attempted 74th!_119

Bophuthatswana was therefore portrayed as merely another African coup statistic similar to those black ruled countries beyond the white frontier. As such the bantustans were legitimised by their illegitimacy as detached or 'independent' for white South Africa. Furthermore, the SA Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, conceded that the homelands would never be economically viable but compared their economic dependence upon SA to the influence of the IMF/World Bank in Africa. The Pretoria regime still advocated Bophuthatswana and the bantustan policy despite the set back of the coup. Botha stayed true to the older SA government theme of comparing the bantustans to the BLS states and recast questions of 'dependence' as simply a matter of Pretoria nurturing the basis for 'viability'.119

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119 _Sunday Times_, 21.2.88.
120 BBC radio interview quoted in the _Star_, 7.2.88.
7.5.1. Defending the Nation

The concept of Bophuthatswana was similarly reinforced, although for different reasons, through the pronouncements of the BDF officers responsible for the coup. These younger officers claimed to be acting against Mangope and the level of corruption in his administration rather for of Bophuthatswana per se:

'Whereas we are positively faithful, loyal and sincere to the well-being of our beloved Bophuthatswana and its people, it is with great concern that we had to take this step. Serious and disturbing matters of great concern have emerged and curiously treated suspiciously by President Mangope and his government to mention one, the issue of a Mr. Shabtai Kalmanovitz, a close associate of President Mangope who openly enjoyed preferential economic rights and interests until the leader of the PPP questioned his credentials and integrity'.

The BNSU/BDF and PPP were represented as the defenders of the Bophuthatswana nation and people. The 'defence' of multi-party politics was considered vital following the elections 'deliberately manoeuvred to secure a Democratic Party victory by hook or by crook'. The final motivation for the coup appeared to be the cover up by the BDP of an investigation conducted by the PPP through the courts:

'For such reasons we the defence forces of the Republic of Bophuthatswana have decided to seize ruling powers from the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party and to entrust such powers to the leadership of the People's Progressive Party... (who) strongly denounced corruption... invasion of fundamental ruling rights... the party also enjoys the broad support of the nation'.

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121 *The Star*, 11.2.88.
122 Ibid.
It is highly significant that the tone of this announcement and its cataloguing of details of Kalmanovitz's corruption were couched along the lines of a 'defence of the nation'. The BDF were acting as if the Defence Force of a nation, a perception that would ironically re-emerge during the final collapse of the Mangope regime in 1994.

As suggested, the coup had also been supposedly directed against racism within Bophuthatswana government structures, particularly the BDF itself. The extent of resentment and bitterness was revealed in the investigation following the coup. This became known as the 'Bop Treason Trial' with hundreds of alleged participants rounded up and put on trial. The major grievances of the faction within the BDF concerned the inequality between white and black soldiers. One of the rebels claimed that there had been unequal access to transportation, medical benefits, training courses, weaponry, disciplinary measures, appointments, access to sports facilities and even the Mess. Some of the accused officers questioned the credentials of the white South African and Rhodesian officers employed within the BDF and cited a wide number of incidents to which it was concluded:

Taking this comparison into consideration, one finds out that injustice, maladministration and apartheid prevails because such (white) officers were not taken to task... Tswana's were kept in the dark... and not allowed to attend conferences where policies are adopted. This Motswana's self-confidence as a leader is killed and he is converted into a human robot, executing the orders of his master'.

The coup was likened more to a 'palatial coup' within the ruling elite, although the news of Mangope's fall had been met with great jubilation in the capital city. Rowan Cronje, Mangope's close advisor, was asked to defend accusations of racism to which he had replied that he 'did not believe in racism and anyway it took a long time to acquire experience in government'. The faction behind the coup had

123 Bophuthatswana Treason Trial (1988) op. cit.
124 RDM, 8.2 88.
125 Ibid.
demonstrated their impatience with such a paternalistic attitude and reflected a younger generation of leaders emerging within Bophuthatswana structures.

Mangope pronounced on Bop TV that 'coup are out' and assured the people of Bophuthatswana and the nation's friends that all necessary steps had been taken to ensure that the country would never experience a coup- d'etat again. The coup was therefore portrayed as an aberration for which he blamed his own people through their failure to adapt to and embrace 'National values':

'On the day of the coup I had realised that despite the efforts to uplift the standard of life of the people and children, the government would not succeed unless the nation's most important basic values were firmly inculcated into the consciousness of all the people, young and old.'

Despite Mangope's rapid return to power the coup was a clear illustration of widespread unhappiness with his rule. At the 11th anniversary of Bophuthatswana's 'independence', given the turbulent year for the state, Mangope announced a 15% increase in salaries for public servants. The image of Mangope doffing his hat whilst the 'National' anthem played at the 'independence' celebrations captured Mangope's fantasy of 'nation-building'. The hostility of civil servants and bureaucrats would eventually precipitate the final collapse of the regime. The number of schemes, bewildering range of contacts and vast costs in enhancing 'development' and 'nationhood' had created and compounded economic and political crisis. Internal change in Bophuthatswana required political reform within South Africa. In the post-coup era

126 The Mail, 4.3 88.
127 Mangope at the opening of the first session of the 3rd National Assembly in Mmabatho, The Mail, 29.4.88.
128 Ibid.
Bophuthatswana became increasingly irrelevant to the major political changes taking place in South Africa itself.
Chapter Eight

8.1. Introduction

The 1988 coup had indicated Bophuthatswana’s continuing unpopularity and vulnerability. In the post-coup era the Mangope regime repressed political opposition and dissent. Bophuthatswana’s increasingly authoritarian behaviour was in contrast to the historical reforms made by the De Klerk administration in 1990 and the initiation of talks leading the way to majority rule in a unitary South African state. The changes at the national level of South African politics created a profoundly different context threatening Bophuthatswana, ultimately, with reincorporation into South Africa. The Mangope regime was confronted with considerable challenges. In response, a range of strategies were devised to position Bophuthatswana in the post-apartheid era. Faced with the impracticalities of its continuing fragmented existence, and the popular support for reincorporation into South Africa, Mangope’s intransigence, obstinacy and disastrous miscalculations eventually precipitated a semi-revolutionary situation in Mmabatho. The regime was overthrown and Bophuthatswana was reincorporated into South Africa, with Mmabatho competing with other cities in the region in order to become the new North West Province’s capital.

The early 1990s were characterised by Mangope’s defiance and rhetoric of ‘independence’. It is shown, however, that Bophuthatswana made preparations to scale down its ‘nation-hood’ and ‘independence’ into a presentable regionalist discourse. The final six years of the regime, and the increasing shift to a regionalist position based upon ‘rational’ socio-economic and ethnic criteria, are discussed through the following issues.

First, the coup had revealed Bophuthatswana’s security and intelligence weaknesses. Mangope acted to remove potential dissent within his own state
structures and to discourage political opposition more generally. The State of Emergency in 1990, and increased state funding of the military and police, indicated the increasing authoritarianism of the regime. Second, the profound realignment in South African politics, with the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC), South African Communist Party (SACP), Pan-African Congress (PAC) and the release of Nelson Mandela, was portrayed by the regime as undermining Bophuthatswana’s sovereignty. The Bophuthatswana administration declared its intention to remain ‘independent’ and refused to be bound by the negotiations of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and the Negotiating Council’s deliberations to deliver a post-apartheid settlement. Bophuthatswana promoted a conception of Tswana ethno-nationalism directed against what was portrayed as a Xhosa dominated ANC. The mobilisation of ethno-nationalism in Eastern Europe was used to legitimise Bophuthatswana’s own ethnic claims and, together with anti-ANC rhetoric, was promoted by the Mangope regime within fora such as the United Nations and Eastern Europe itself. Third, in 1991 the South African-Tswana regional initiative forum (SATSWA), a coalition of regional conservative forces, marshalled by the Bophuthatswana Administration, attempted to form a bulwark against the ANC and National Party (NP). The preparations included SATSWA’s regional demarcation proposals, which were based on linguistic, ethnic and socio-economic arguments, for an expanded Tswana-Boereland region and, with it, the territorial expansion of Bophuthatswana itself. Locally, a range of projects within Mmabatho were initiated to make the city a suitable capital for a new region. Other measures to maximise Bophuthatswana’s influence within a new regional context included the creation of the Information Service of Bophuthatswana (ISOB) and the covert funding for propaganda campaigns, with state payments to the ruling BDP (recast as the Bophuthatswana Christian Democratic Party).

Despite the preparations, Mangope remained obstinate and determined to preserve Bophuthatswana. The defiance led to dubious alliances, including the white right wing, which alienated Bophuthatswana residents and administrators. The increasingly desperate measures made by the regime suggested an impending
'implosion' in the face of popular opposition. A strike by Bophuthatswana’s civil servants precipitated the regime’s overthrow. South African administrators were placed in control and, one month before the first ever democratic elections in South Africa, Bophuthatswana was reincorporated.

8.2. Post-Coup Repression

The previous chapter mentioned the Bophuthatswana Treason Trial in the aftermath of the coup. Bophuthatswana’s security forces rounded up over 500 people who were suspected as involved in the coup. The included PPP members and the military factions who had taken part in the rebellion. By late 1988, despite the large number of detentions, the regime still presented ‘Bop. as a place for all’. A special session of Parliament, however, authorised an additional ‘clamp down’, with a constitutional amendment bill allowing the regime more powers when involving ‘crimes against the state’. The Bophuthatswana regime became extremely intolerant of any opposition and despised criticism. The authoritarianism attracted increasing criticism internationally, from human rights organisations. A letter from the President of the International Human Rights Group was published in the Mail. The letter highlighted the ‘non-existence’ of Bophuthatswana and condemned the detention of eight members of PPP and the continued imprisonment of three hundred other detainees. The regime’s sensitivity to criticism was illustrated by the immediate response to this letter. The Minister of Foreign Affairs for Bophuthatswana, S.L.L Rathebe, vehemently defended the right for Bophuthatswana to be classified as a nation-state because, it was stated, Bophuthatswana had a population and a government in control. The security measures were therefore justified in terms of a defence of ‘national’ sovereignty. The concern for the defence of the ‘nation’ was

1 This term was used by Peires (1992) op.cit, to denote the collapse of the outer-facade of state hood in the bantustans.
2 The banned opposition People’s Progressive Party.
4 The Mail, 12.8.88.
reflected in the increasing state expenditure allocated to Defence and Police. As a percentage of the national budget, the combined share of these two departments doubled from 5.2% in 1986 to 10.3% in 1992. Mangope also moved against potential adversaries in his own cabinet and administration.

Three Ministers had resigned after the unsuccessful coup. All the resignations were apparently connected to 'Mangope asserting control over the government in a more forceful manner'. The white Defence Minister resigned following the fiasco of the coup. However, the other two resignations were more significant. Firstly, the Minister of Education, Mr. Holele, although giving no public reason, the resignation appeared to reflect a younger generation's impatience with the limitations of Bophuthatswana's political system and structures. Lastly, although broad indications of Mangope's power base within the cabinet have been suggested, the resignation of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Chief B.L.M.I. Motsatsi, should caution against any generalisations which predetermine the political orientation of the chieftaincy. Motsatsi was the Kgosi (Chief) of the Batlokwa ba Bogatsu tribe, in addition to his Ministerial position. Motsatsi's resignation was linked to his refusal to undermine constitutional democracy, which was reflected by his decision not to use his position to ban the opposition PPP. Although traditionalist interests were represented in the cabinet, ministers acted in a range of ways shaped mainly through the demands made of state leaders and the loyalty demanded by Mangope.

Mangope's authoritarianism intensified following the South African government's decision, in February 1990, to unban the ANC, SACP, PAC and to release Nelson Mandela. The pressures for reincorporation were mounting but Mangope gave an early indication of his defiant attitude:

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5 There was a particularly sharp increase following the coup itself in 1988. Calculated from the North West/Bophuthatswana Statistics, op.cit.
7 Ibid.
8 See chapter's three and six.
'Bophuthatswana will be independent one hundred years from now'.

The working forum of the CODESA talks were convened in 1991 and attempted to negotiate a vision of post-apartheid South Africa acceptable to all of the major players. The difficulties included the configuration and details of the constitutional framework and the new regional demarcations. At the inauguration of the talks the Bophuthatswana administration was the only 'independent' bantustan which stated that it wanted to maintain its 'independence'. The depiction of a sovereign territory increasingly undermined by 'outside aggressors' was common place:

'Its (the state of emergency) introduction was reluctantly forced upon us by the foreign elements intent on using unscrupulous methods to undermine democratic order in Bophuthatswana, with the clear intention of ultimately removing my Government from power using intimidation and other illegal methods'.

Although the State of Emergency was lifted in 1991, a special session of Parliament amended the Internal Security Act with a requirement 'making it compulsory for organisations, bodies or groups indulging in political activity in Bophuthatswana to register' with the authorities. The regime clearly perceived itself to be undermined by ANC mobilisation, referred to as 'political thuggery'. In 1990 the Mafikeng Anti-Repression Forum (MAREF) was established in order to monitor the territory wide repression. The Lawyers for Human Rights organisation defended legal cases involving the victims of Bophuthatswana state oppression. MAREF indicated that Bophuthatswana's repressive system was maintained by 'the ever existing legal restrictions which thwart political expression, association and activity'. These were identified as the State of Emergency, Internal Security Act no. 32 of 1979, as amended, Section 3 of the 'notorious' security clearance Act 32 of 1979 and Section

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9 *The Mail*, 23.2.90.
11 Ibid.
36 of the Industrial Conciliation act No. 8 of 1984. Political parties were required to register in the territory before they could organise. The ANC, because it had refused to recognise Bophuthatswana, did not register, and was considered by the Bophuthatswana regime as ‘foreign’. Both the Mafikeng Secretary of the ANC and also the chairman of MAREF were deported from Bophuthatswana. The Mail covered ANC meetings, but because these organisations were deemed illegal, publication was prevented, which led to accusations that the journalists were spying for Mangope. There were also internal leaks from within the Mail to the government which pre-empted publication of stories regarded as inflammatory.

The Mail covered the opening of an ANC office in Mafikeng. It was claimed by one journalist that, even before the story went to print the next day, Mangope had already learnt of these intentions and delayed publication of the newspaper until the story was removed. The implication was that the role of the editor was especially important for deciding what could go in the newspaper and perhaps what government itself should know. In this climate of censorship the Mail became a ‘mouthpiece’ for Mangope. Even journalists began to disassociate themselves from the Mail. Throughout Bophuthatswana, funerals became an important platform for ANC supporters to express solidarity through the display of ANC colours, flags and other symbols. At one gathering in 1990, a 50 000 strong crowd attended the funeral of a local women activist. ANC and Communist Party banners and flags were on display demanding ‘away with Bop!’ to which Mangope replied in the Mail, ‘Never!’.

Despite these attempts to quell opposition it became self-evident that serious unrest

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13 Ibid.
14 SonnyBoy Mogkadi (1995) op. cit. for example, described the previous editor Ron Talkien as 'a friend of authority'. The close links between the Mail and the Bophuthatswana Government were also shown by Leslie Sehume, the editor in the early 1990s, transferring from the Mail to the Department of Information, the government's propaganda wing.
15 'I did not even want to carry the paper on me, going to and from work, as I did not want to be associated with it', SonnyBoy Mogkadi, News Editor, The Mail, interview, Mmabatho, December, 1994.
was sweeping the territory. Policeman were shot dead, buildings petrol bombed and crowds of students and demonstrators were fired upon by the security forces.

By the early 1990s Bophuthatswana’s network of authoritarian control was described as follows in a Black Sash Report:

‘Within Bophuthatswana, a pervasive system of control and information keeps people in subjection The network of authoritarian government runs through the whole society. It starts at the centre of power in the President’s office in Mmabatho and filters through the chiefs and the headmen, and even their families, to the school principals and officials of the ruling BDP (Bophuthatswana Democratic Party) at quite junior levels. The security forces, too, seem to be omnipresent’.

This network of repression was not only centred on urban areas but, as seen in chapter seven, was also concerned with maintaining control in rural areas. According to Daphne and de Clercq, the only successful parastatal rural development project, the Thusano Foundation, which had been involved in self-help building schemes, was regarded by Mangope as anti-BDP and closed down in April 1991. Bophuthatswana was described as a ‘vicious rash at the heart of South Africa, taunting and inflaming the political process, holding the country to ransom’, a ‘slap in the face to the "new South Africa"’. The Washington-based human rights organisation Africa Watch produced a report in September 1991. Since 1977, it remarked, political life in Bophuthatswana ‘has been characterised by continued torture, arbitrary dismissals, harassment and deportation of opponents of the regime’. In an early strategy to mitigate the strength of the ANC, Pretoria based diplomats continued to refer to Bophuthatswana’s status as a ‘special case’.

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20 Africa Watch, in ibid.
21 Ibid.
encouragement to reposition itself in the unfolding political situation.

8.3. Bophuthatswana Manoeuvring

The changing landscape of South African politics and the fundamental realignments had prompted Bophuthatswana to devise a range of counter-strategies. In 1991/1992 the Directorate of Development Planning was added to the Directorate of Strategic Planning, which had been created in 1990 to devise different strategies for Bophuthatswana. In 1992 the propaganda function of the Department of Information was taken over by the newly formed Information Service of Bophuthatswana (ISOB). These structures, and the media in Bophuthatswana, blended a discursive combination of ethno-nationalism, anti-communism, fear of a radical urbanised Xhosa ethnic group and, increasingly, grafted these concerns onto a territorial base.

8.3.1. Ethno-nationalism and Anti-communism

The Mail newspaper was at the forefront of governmental efforts to project the imagery of a beleaguered nation defending its territory against the Communist inspired ANC. One particular strategy was to foment Tswana fears that the ANC was dominated by an aggressive Xhosa ethnic group. On many occasions, when addressing ‘his’ people, Mangope manipulated history to represent the Batswana as fundamentally different from other ‘nations’. The Batswana were portrayed as gentle and accommodating but also fearful of Xhosa domination. People were frightened into believing that if Bophuthatswana did not exist then the Batswana would be turned into Xhosa by young urban radicals. Bophuthatswana’s population were bombarded by these ideas and repeatedly told that Bophuthatswana was ‘their place’ and the only ‘home’ for the Tswana:

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22 Schoeman, D. (1995) op.cit. Schoeman had returned to the Bophuthatswana administration in 1991 and was made the Director of the Directorate of Development Planning and Administration.
23 For example, Mail, 5th October, 1990.
"Modern day Bophuthatswana is a political continuation of a people whose values, history and political administration go back for centuries. On those grounds Bop. demands for itself self-determination."

These ancient Batswana rights, values, traditions and history, were therefore associated with Bophuthatswana and presented as threatened by the ANC and other ethnic groups.

Bophuthatswana’s promotion of ethno-nationalism was encouraged by the resurgence of ‘nationalism’ in the context of Eastern Europe. This tactic had been indicated during a BOPIIA presentation in 1988. The South Africa Foundation’s Director General, K. von Schirning, recognised the increasing potential that an ‘ethnic’ discourse could have to legitimise Bophuthatswana’s existence. von Schirning drew a parallel between Bophuthatswana’s ethnic sovereignty and the emerging ethno-nationalisms of Eastern Europe:

‘where ethnic groups are in the process of trying to establish their own sovereignty, or limited sovereignty’.

Bophuthatswana therefore sought to enhance its own claims for ethnic group sovereignty in the context of the global mobilisation of ethnic differences. Mangope also blamed the violence on communists and pledged to defend the ‘Nation’. In 1993 Mangope and other Bophuthatswana officials visited Latvia and attempted to provide a convincing historical parallel between the two which supposedly included the common bond of:

‘.the fear of communism, which in South Africa is a threat in the form of the ANC’.

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25 The Mail, 21.2.92.
27 The Mail, 9.7.93.
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia was alluded to by an editorial in the Mail through which the National Party’s promotion of ethnic differences under separate development was justified because, it was claimed, different ethnic groups ‘did not get on and separation would prevent violence’.

These issues of sovereignty and ethnicity were presented by Mangope to the United Nations Security Council. In 1992 the Security Council, under Rule 39, invited a range of South Africans to address a meeting on the political situation in South Africa. Although hailed by Mangope as an implicit recognition of Bophuthatswana, the President had in fact been called to speak in his ‘personal capacity’. Mangope’s speech crafted a blend of Batswana historical rights within Bophuthatswana and a defence against the disorder and communist threat of the ANC/Alliance. South Africa was described as riven by chaos and likened ‘in microcosm to the macro-situation prevailing in Europe after the two great wars, and more recently after the collapse of communism’:

‘In those times of need, men of vision emerged to fashion order from chaos and to restore national pride and industriousness where there was only dejection and apathy. We in Bophuthatswana are living proof that the people of our region have what it takes to rise from the ashes of near extinction and succeed where others thought we would fail’.

The implication was that the Batswana ethnic group had faced ‘near-extinction’ which was emotively stated as ‘loss of identity’, only to be salvaged by the creation of Bophuthatswana:

\[28\] The Mail, 7.5.93.
'My people, the Batswana people who speak the Setswana language, have known betrayal, subjugation, fragmentation, loss of identity and dignity, and the inhumanity of apartheid'.

Bophuthatswana was presented as resurrecting ‘national pride’. As seen in the context of the Pan-Tswanaism of the 1980s, Mangope had worked around associating Bophuthatswana with apartheid South Africa by again emphasising British colonial betrayal and Bophuthatswana’s historical claims. Mangope strongly emphasised the mystical and god given qualities of Batswana ethnicity as rooted in a pre-ordained destiny culminating in 1977 and Bophuthatswana ‘independence’. Bophuthatswana supposedly took back ‘that which was rightfully ours’. The economic differentiation of Bophuthatswana from other bantustans was represented as the outcome of enlightened economic policies through which ‘we have become one of the sole beacons of light on the otherwise dark continent of Africa’. The ‘lightness’ of Bophuthatswana was contrasted to the ominous gathering of dark thunder clouds of ‘unrest and violence’ obscuring the ‘sunlight of stability and progress to which Bophuthatswana has become accustomed’. The violence sweeping South Africa, and the creeping destabilisation through mass action, strikes and boycotts in Bophuthatswana, was attributed to the ANC. On the other hand Bophuthatswana was portrayed as:

‘...historically a non-violent nation and everything we have achieved to date has been via the process of civilized discourse and negotiation’.

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 The economic differences were also promoted by the Mail which suggested that the 'national' symbol of the leopard was, like Bophuthatswana, 'proud, independent and free'. These qualities were supposedly reflected in a 'progress report' which indicated some of Bophuthatswana's economic strengths. These included a turnover of over R3 billion per annum in the Bophuthatswana mining industry, 30% of the world's platinum, 60 000 employees in factories in the region. A Matriculation pass rate of 63% was also regarded as placing Bophuthatswana in the 'top ten in SSA'. The Mail, 26.6.92.
The concluding statement proposed that the potential ‘anarchy and hopelessness’ and problems of the region could be resolved through the adoption of a confederal system between ‘constituent sovereign elements’. Bophuthatswana and Batswana salvation could be secured through a federal system. Mangope’s attitude remained one of public defiance in the face of pressures for reincorporation, whilst, however, a number of more tangible tactics were being pursued to strengthen the case for a federal/regional option.

The most significant strategy was the SATSWA initiative which added a wider conception of regionalism to Bophuthatswana’s ethnic rhetoric and also embraced regional conservative interests.

8.3.2. The SATSWA initiative

Mangope first proposed a potential ‘regional’ option in the 1990 ‘independence’ day speech. This regionalist vision was convened at the first SATSWA symposium held in Mmabatho on March 15 1991 which attracted 320 delegates. 120 were from Bophuthatswana state structures including the University, parastatals, government, Mmabatho town council and with some private sector representatives. The 200 delegates from South Africa included regional Afrikaner academics from Potchefstroom University, businessmen, mining interests and, significantly, farmers. Mangope indicated that one of the major factors behind the forum was to provide the region with greater bargaining power in the emerging constitutional negotiations. The forum was also Mangope’s initial foray in order to persuade conservative Afrikaners, that together with Bophuthatswana,:

...these are people whose forefathers shared the same land in peace for several generations. People whose destinies were inseparably intertwined in this part of the

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34 The following extracts are taken from Pioneer, Ibid.
Initially then, Mangope played down political motivations for the forum. Instead Mangope was at pains to emphasise co-operation on the basis of ‘rational’ socio-economic regional interests. The presentation identified a few core areas of ‘commonality’ including an emphasis upon concern for the decline in the economy, ‘dangerous levels of unemployment’, ‘socialistic threats of nationalisation and the redistribution of wealth and land’, which would scare away potential investors. In a particular appeal to rural based Afrikaners, Mangope stressed the danger of urban-centred government planning and expenditure:

‘In this process the needs of the less densely populated rural areas may be easily overlooked’.

The appeal to farmers and rural values included an alleged concern for the ‘rapid deterioration of the economic viability of farming operations in our area and the resultant negative effects on rural towns’. Mangope suggested the need to pool physical and human resources together regionally because ‘drought, inflation and unemployment do not stop at international borders’. A strategy was proposed in order to promote ‘common concerns’ surrounding infrastructure, water resources, geology and tourism.

By the second SATSWA forum in March 1992, Mangope’s address shifted focus to emphasise not only regional material interests but also a specific interpretation of regional history. The political context was more emphatically stated with appeals made to regionalism in order to combat the creation of a unitary state perceived as the ‘winner takes all’. Lawrence and Manson suggest that Mangope’s presentation sought to manipulate Afrikaner sentiments and beliefs by speaking emotively in Afrikaans. Mangope appealed to common values, beliefs and norms

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25 Ibid.
26 Mangope was also a fully qualified Afrikaans teacher and he had claimed to have
between the ‘Afrikaner en die Batswana’. These included Christianity, peaceful co-existence, free enterprise and above all the belief in “waade aan ons tradities, ons taal en ons geskiedenis (worth in our traditions, our language and our history).” The presentation then identified sinister threats to this commonality. Mangope drew a parallel between the contemporary situation in South Africa and the nineteenth century when the Batswana had supposedly stood firm with the Griqua and Voortrekkers to defend their beliefs and Christian civilisation against ‘enemy’ tribes and regiments. In this way Mangope made powerful emotive appeals for cementing bonds between the Batswana and Afrikaner. The falsification of a presumed Tswana ‘unity’ was foremost in the SATSWA argument which became:

‘...elevated to a truism while at the same time the differences between the Tswana and other African chiefdoms, especially the Zulu and Xhosa, are exaggerated and highlighted to preserve a regional identity in the face of the threat of absorption into a unitary state dominated by more powerful and numerous forces’.

SATSWA was therefore extended from a purely socio-economic regionalist function to embrace the ‘ethnic factor’. The fear of ‘swamping’ by other ethnic groups had been a justification by Mangope for ‘independence’. The Bophuthatswana government manipulated the threat of Xhosa and ANC ‘swamping’, combining this with regional conservative fears, including loss of material benefits and jobs within a new ANC inspired dispensation. These arguments were used to justify SATSWA’s proposed regional demarcations for South Africa’s provinces.

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37 In Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) op.cit.

38 Lawrence and Manson indicate that Mangope falsified history in order to present the Batswana as unified which historically was not the case, particularly involving relations with the Afrikaners.

39 Ibid.

40 See Chapter Three.
8.3.3. Regional Demarcations

CODESA was postponed indefinitely in June 1992, following the ANC’s complaints of unacceptable levels of violence and the impasse with the NP regarding the detail of transitional structures and constitutional powers. The talks resumed in September but were primarily bilateral, between the ANC and National Party. The exclusion of other groups aroused a great deal of anger, from Chief Buthelezi in particular. Multi-party talks were not resumed until April 1993. In the interim the ANC’s regional proposals and bilateral negotiations had prompted SATSWA’s own proposals. By 1992 the question of regionalism had been firmly placed at the centre of South Africa’s political debates. All the major political players released their proposals for the new regional demarcations and SATSWA grasped the ‘regionalist’ issue with both hands. The ANC’s first set of proposals for South Africa’s new provinces were based largely upon the outline of the old ‘development regions’, but also included the ANC’s suggestion that both the Transkei and Ciskei bantustans be amalgamated. In 1993 the ANC’s next proposals, significantly, as it turned out for SATSWA and other regional interest groups, requested that the former Xhosa bantustans be added to a Border/Kei area to form a coalesced Region D. SATSWA interpreted these proposal as reflecting the ANC’s desire to create an enlarged Xhosa territorial base, regarded, presumably, as justifying SATSWA’s own ethno-regional claims. The National Party’s proposals at first envisioned the formation of potential political alliances against the ANC, with most of the Bophuthatswana regions, for example, preserved in a North West region.

In October 1992 COSAG (Concerned South Africans Group) was formed as a right wing bulwark alliance against the ANC and National Party. COSAG consisted of

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42 See Chapter Seven.
43 See Figure 8.1 a) and b). According to Fox these proposals were probably in order to combine poorer areas with richer areas in the event that regions might be dependent upon local revenue. Fox, R. (1995) "Regional Proposals: their Constitutional and Geographical Significance", in Lemon, A. (ed.) (1995) The Geography of Change in South Africa, Wiley.
Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Kwa-Zulu, the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU) (and later the Conservative Party and the Free Cape Movement). The National Party were regarded by COSAG as in ‘cahoots’ with the ANC. SATSWA also regarded ANC and NP collusion as acting ‘primarily for the benefit of an urban bourgeoisie and the Xhosa ethnic group’, claiming that ‘all others would be excluded from full participation in the benefits of political patronage.’ The 1993 SATSWA document called the ‘Current Status’ made a further appeal to the socio-economic basis of regionalism:

‘Whilst the political dimensions of the regional debate are widely reported on, little attention is given to the fundamental challenge of how socio-economic development in a new regional dispensation is to be achieved’.

It was claimed that SATSWA was not representing specific political interests but was merely ‘an objective and scientific analysis as contribution to the debate on regionalism’. However, the demarcation process was inherently political. SATSWA’s first regional proposals, in 1991, to amalgamate parts of the Northern Cape, Western Transvaal and some farming areas of the North Western Transvaal, had been reflected in the National Party’s first proposals which suggested a similar demarcation for the North West. By the time of SATSWA’s 1993 report, the initial focus had expanded dramatically to embrace a ‘Tswana-Boereland superstate’. The justifications for the proposed enlarged demarcations were extremely informative and reflected the recasting of history, ethnicity and geographical boundaries to promote the contemporary objectives of SATSWA.

SATSWA’s 1993 document focused upon its ‘regional options’, which were underpinned by the historical territorial claims of the Bophuthatswana government. The 1871 Keate Award, as seen in chapter two, was used to stake Bophuthatswana’s territorial claims in the ‘new’ South Africa. Interestingly, the historical lands were

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46 See also the Star, 27.3.93.
described as ‘Botswana territory’, suggesting the colonial carve-up that had taken place of territory, originally stretching from the Caprivi Strip to the Vaal River in South Africa and Bophuthatswana’s Thaba N’chu region. This historical detail formed the basis of SATSWA’s ‘Option One’ which stressed the inclusion of as much Bophuthatswana territory as possible. Furthermore, Northern Cape land, in region J, was considered as part of the original Keate Award and therefore regarded as rightfully belonging to Bophuthatswana. The tactics were a remarkable caveat to the regional proposals and the outcome to the historical claims made by the Bophuthatswana regime in the 1970s to regain territory from South Africa. Incredibly, in Bophuthatswana’s twilight years, with the pressures for reincorporation mounting, Mangope now proposed the addition of territory that had eluded Bophuthatswana and had created the fragmentation which had plagued the illegitimacy of the regime. The Bophuthatswana government went as far in calling for the recreation of borders of the old territory of British Bechuanaland.

The bravado and high ambition was reflected in SATSWA’S ‘Option One’ with proposals made on the basis that seven regions in all would be created in South Africa. ‘Option One’ therefore had been based upon SATSWA’s earlier proposed demarcations, with some extra areas, giving a total population of 3 891 369, a GGP of 21 624 249 and an area of 238 326 squared kilometres. This gave the proposed region a ranking order amongst South Africa’s other provinces, from 1 to 7 (one being the largest), of 5, 5 and 2, respectively. However, there were also proposals for a greatly expanded geographical base. SATSWA claimed that the demarcations were based upon ‘groups expressing their preference’. These additions were proposed as ‘Option Two- the largest possible region’, based upon a linguistic focus which covered other parts of the Northern Cape and Orange Free State. SATSWA also suggested that a corridor, running from the west to the east, north of Lesotho, be kept open as part of SATSWA or Kwa Zulu-Natal but not for the PWV. In a most astonishing suggestion SATSWA declared that large numbers of people in Botshabelo were Tswana.

47 The SATSWA initiative (1993:71) op.cit.
48 *The Mail*, 6.4.92.
speaking, 'with strong alliances towards Bophuthatswana'. As they had originally been part of Bophuthatswana, the area, it was claimed, should be included as part of the regional proposal. These proposals reflected the ethnic criteria that underpinned many of the regional demarcations. Kwa-Zulu demanded territory that had been conquered by Shaka, various Afrikaner groups attempted to resurrect the old sovereign Boer Republics of the last century and there was even a coloured claim for an independent state in the Western Cape. The Volkstaat proposals were based on the claim that ethnicity should be the fundamental consideration in the demarcation process:

'You cannot change a Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaner, Tswana, etc. into a colourless homogenetic frame called a South African'.

Figure 8.1 ANC and National Party Regional Proposals


The SATSWA 'Current Status' report therefore claimed that other areas, supposedly dominated by Afrikaners and Tswana speakers, be included in 'Option Two':

'This fact strengthens the Bophuthatswana government's desire to group together what belongs together'.

SATSWA's targets included political parties throughout region C (Orange Free State), who were to be approached:

'...for their views as it is believed that the principles and values emphasised by Bophuthatswana provide opportunities for the aspirations and needs of various individuals and groups to express themselves'.

Parts of region 'G' (including the farming areas of Ellisras, Thabazimbi and Nylstroom in the north-western Transvaal), were again justified for inclusion because, it was claimed, SATSWA had been approached by some of these areas at its 1993 conference in Potchefstroom. NP proposals had originally not included the Odi and Moretele regions of Bophuthatswana into the North West, for economic factors, and perhaps also political reasons. However, SATSWA considered these areas to be an integral part of its envisioned region which illustrated, by this stage, that Bophuthatswana would only be encouraged to rejoin South Africa if Bophuthatswana was not split up. All these additions would have given a population of over six million, a GGP of over 37 million and an area of almost 500,000 squared kilometres,

51 Ibid. pp74.
52 Ibid. pp73.
53 Initially, according to Fox, the omission of these districts by the NP was based upon economic criteria stating that Odi and Moretele were functionally part of the PWV. Fox, R. (1995) op.cit.
54 These regions had consistently opposed the Bophuthatswana regime, in Drummond, J. (1991) "Reincorporating the bantustans into South Africa: the question of Bophuthatswana", Geography, 76(4).
ranking 3, 2 and I respectively. The National Party’s drastically changed proposals supported Bophuthatswana’s (and SATSWA’s) expansion into the Orange Free State, even as far as Thaba N’chu. Another indication of the NP-Bophuthatswana proposals was the visit in 1993 by a Bophuthatswana delegation to the Chief Minister of Qwa Qwa and the National Party in the Orange Free State. The Qwa Qwa bantustan administration was also a member of SATSWA and appeared to support a link with Bophuthatswana. In the same year Mangope told his own Parliament that Bophuthatswana would not surrender its ‘independence’ and instead preferred self-rule to ‘centralised authoritarianism’. However, by August 1993 Mangope had also indicated that Bophuthatswana would accept a federal option as long as it was ‘not merely a disguise to reintroduce a unitary government’.

The regional demarcations and proposals also, crucially, depended upon the nature of a final constitution. There were heated debates concerning the Negotiating Council’s proposals that an elected constitution-making body should write the constitution. Bophuthatswana gave notice that it would not be bound by the Transitional Executive Council (multi-party body negotiating the interim constitution). Whilst the constitutional issue remained unresolved, the Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of States/Provinces and Regions (CDDR) was appointed by the Negotiating Council in May 1993. Although facing daunting demands and conflicts, the CDDR’s public hearings were also characterised by an absence of black and community representatives and, the repeated demands of various groups, reflecting ‘the ability of establishment groupings to mobilise their constituencies’. The CDDR was also significantly given the specific brief to rationalise the fragmented TVBC territories and structures. As Muthien and Khosa

55 The final option ‘Option Three’ was a combination of One and Two on the basis of six negotiated regions in South Africa, with a smaller area but similar population and GGP to ‘Option Two’.
56 Fox, R. (1995) op. cit. See figure 8.1 d).
59 SAIRR, op. cit.
suggest, this focus was greatly problematised by the ‘emotional appeals’ made in the
hope of restoring ‘ethnic kingdoms’ and to correct the devastation of colonial and
apartheid dispossession and fragmentation of the landscape.  

Figure 8.2 CDDR’s Final Demarcation of South Africa’s New Provinces, 1993.  

The CDDR’s original proposals reflected a compromise between the ANC and
NP. The final boundary adjustments were adopted by the Negotiating Council in

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61 SAIRR, op. cit.
62 Adapted from Christopher, A. J. (1994) op. cit.
63 Fox, R. (1995) op. cit. This compromise included the NP’s desire for a separate
Western and Northern Cape, the ANC’s proposed Eastern Cape and the
separation of the north west from the Orange Free State.
November 1993 with the acknowledgement of both the difficulties of the process and scope for possible changes. The Council adopted a number of changes to the regional demarcations subject to referendums or, in some cases, an agreement between the majority parties elected by voters of the region. Although Fox notes that ‘the regional demarcation process will continue through the activities of the Commission on Provincial Government’, except for one or two changes, the SATSWA objectives would not be met by the CDDR. The ‘new’ North West Province was, however, larger than the development region J, and included the majority of the former Bophuthatswana regions, including Odi and Moretele and the capital Mmabatho.

In July 1993 the Negotiating Forum confirmed 27 April 1994 as the date for South Africa’s first ever majority election. COSAG walked out of the negotiations because they demanded a prior agreement regarding the constitution and the election date itself was opposed. The absence of COSAG did not put an end to the negotiation process. Legislation was drawn up for the transitional period and further attempts were made to include the other factions in negotiations. Bophuthatswana, the AVU and Ciskei returned to the negotiations. In October 1993 the Freedom Alliance (FA) was formed by a consolidated white right wing group called the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF), the Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Kwa-Zulu administrations and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The major demands of the FA were based upon self-determination for the ‘peoples of southern Africa’. The FA called for southern Africa to be divided into a number of member states which alone would have the power to determine boundaries. In November, 1993 despite the absence of the FA and disapproval of other groups, the Multi-Party negotiating forum endorsed the recommendations of the Negotiating Council and Negotiating Forum. The new legislation included the draft transitional constitution and also the nine newly demarcated boundaries. At the end of 1993 the Transitional Executive Council was inaugurated to oversee the transition to majority rule.

Ibid.

The FA also stated that free and fair elections would only take place after a final constitution had been written.
For the homelands, most significantly of all, on 2 December 1993 the Negotiating Council approved the draft legislation through which South African citizenship would be returned to homeland residents from the 1 January 1994, prior to their reincorporation on the day of the elections in April. Mangope refused to acknowledge this legislation. Levels of unrest were increasing throughout South Africa and the ANC march into Ciskei in the previous year had led Mangope to declare:

'We have the resolve, the means and the ability to defend our sovereignty'.

Significantly, as it turned out, the CP responded to increasing ANC threats of enforced incorporation, as if a declaration of war against the CP as well as Bophuthatswana. The ANC attempted to assuage the FA through bilateral meetings from October 1993 but to no avail. In December 1993 Mangope outlined the essential conditions for the FA’s inclusion in the elections:

- a one-phase system of constitution making
- provision for exclusive powers for regions, as well as clear demarcation of, and constitutional protection for, regional borders
- recognition of the right of regional governments to levy their own taxes and raise additional funds autonomously
- recognition of the right of regional governments to write their own constitutions, provided these were consistent with a bill of rights and the national constitution
- provision for two ballot papers, one for provincial elections and the other for national elections

The South African government and ANC suggested that scope would be available to negotiate possible changes as long as the FA entered into a commitment of the broad proposals, including abiding by changed legislation, participation in the elections and

66 The Mail, 11.9.92.
acceptance of the results of the Independent Electoral Commission. By early 1994 Mangope and other FA members still refused to agree to the TEC’s terms. The political pressures and intensity reached a crescendo which swept aside Mangope and, with him, Bophuthatswana.

8.4. Obstinacy and ‘Implosion’.

Bophuthatswana was one of the crucial remaining links in the FA’s efforts to resist majority rule and the creation of a unitary state. Bophuthatswana had set itself up as an immovable object in the path of the irresistible force shaping the ‘new’ South Africa. The SATSWA initiative was a clear indication that despite the defiance, Mangope was investigating a range of options besides Bophuthatswana’s stance for ‘independence’ or nothing. Further indications of the preparations for the ‘new’ South Africa, and attempts to secure minority and material interests, were the award of Bophuthatswana government contracts to a consultancy firm called Q-projects. These contracts were supposedly intended for ‘voter education’ projects in 1992 and 1993, in response to the possibility of a referendum on reincorporation and also Bophuthatswana’s contestation of the April elections. The contracts were worth R6 million and in effect were propaganda exercises to promote and ‘to popularise the BCDP’ (Bophuthatswana Christian Democratic Party). In addition a further R10 million was paid to or on behalf of the BCDP through another dubious ‘project’ sanctioned by the National Security Council of Bophuthatswana. Mangope himself

68 At this stage the NP, and NP within government, briefly advocated limited self-determination for various sub-regions within the North West Province, including the AVF, Bophuthatswana’s regions and for the CP. The proposals reflected the NP’s earlier extended demarcation of the North West province to include the Orange Free State option.

69 The Q-group project is discussed in the findings of the Skewyiya Commission which found that ‘it is our view that a fraud was perpetrated on the people of Bophuthatswana’ and that tax payers money was used on a fraudulent propaganda project.

70 The ‘Western Management and Futura Accounts’ issue under which these payments were made also indicated a labyrinthine system of payments to various officials in the Bophuthatswana administration. See Skewyiya Commission.
had apparently also made his own preparations by illegally using government accounts to transfer over R1,3 million to a personnel Channel Island account.\textsuperscript{71}

In the early 1990s the number of projects being developed in Mmabatho also suggested that Bophuthatswana was promoting the city as a regional capital.\textsuperscript{72} In 1990 for example Mangope unveiled a plan at the inaugural banquet of the Bophuthatswana Arts Council to promote the arts:

\textit{‘My dream is that this Arts Council will reflect not only the rich cultural heritage of the Batswana but will firmly and courageously reflect our very cosmopolitan society’}.\textsuperscript{73}

During the period associated with the SATSWA initiative, Mmabatho was earmarked for large investment funds. New civic buildings costing R18.5 million were due for completion in September 1994. A Structure Plan was devised for Mmabatho and extensive upgrading of roads proposed which would cost over R10 million. The City Engineer (himself a member of SATSWA) spoke enthusiastically on Bop TV about a total investment of R53 million and with ‘more flocking in’, through which it was claimed, Mmabatho ‘will be far advanced compared to many (cities) in SA’.\textsuperscript{74} There were also Bophuthatswana government initiatives in the rural areas. In 1993 extensive television coverage was given to a new R2 million water reticulation scheme for Lonely Park and other areas around Mmabatho and elsewhere in the Molopo Region.\textsuperscript{75} A range of speeches proclaimed the arrival of ‘progress’ for villagers.\textsuperscript{76} New structures were established in rural areas of Bophuthatswana with self-help schemes and village committees which represented a departure from previous policy.\textsuperscript{77} The

\textsuperscript{71}\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72}\textsuperscript{72} The link between the SATSWA initiatives and the city's development projects was suggested by Mpobole, K. (1995) op.cit.
\textsuperscript{73}\textsuperscript{73} The Mail, 30.3.90. These kind of developments would be an important factor in the designation of the North West's Provincial capital.
\textsuperscript{74}\textsuperscript{74} Bop TV News Archives, 20.12.93.
\textsuperscript{75}\textsuperscript{75} Mmabatho Television Archives, 24.11.93.
\textsuperscript{76}\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77}\textsuperscript{77} Louis Du Pisani, Development In Southern Africa (DISA) Ltd., affiliated to
Bophuthatswana administration appeared to be, belatedly, redefining its relationship with rural dwellers through cynical manoeuvring to encourage rural support.

With all of these obvious preparations for entry into a unified South Africa why then did Mangope continue to remain defiantly ‘independent’?

‘He (Mangope) played his cards carefully to gain from the system as much as he possibly could before he joined it. I think that all along he knew that he was going into South Africa but then at the critical stages, his advisors told him to call the TEC’s bluff, when they should not have. Instead he should have accepted the inevitable fact, but, given the ANC hatred for him, plus the ties to the AVF, he was stubborn enough to resist’.

Bophuthatswana’s relative economic clout in comparison to the other homelands was probably another added element. However, with over 50% of Bophuthatswana revenue still provided by the South African government and the customs union, Bophuthatswana could easily be economically crippled if sanctions were applied by South Africa. Nonetheless, the extra economic weight did bolster Mangope’s posturing. During the negotiation period, as mentioned earlier, there had also been encouragement from Pretoria regarding Bophuthatswana as a ‘special case’ which required ‘special treatment’. It was noticeable that the South African government failed to deal decisively with Bophuthatswana until the regime had finally collapsed. Bophuthatswana’s alleged differentiation from the other bantustan’s had been a long-term tactic used by Mangope. In addition to the economic argument, as a further ploy to encourage its ‘special case’ status, Mangope also consistently emphasised the ‘colonial origins’ and ethnic basis of his regime’s existence. All of these features reinforced Mangope’s determined opposition but still fail to account for his ultimate decision to defy the ‘new’ South Africa. One of the Bophuthatswana civil

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servants, quoted above, who had extensive discussions with Mangope concerning the alternative scenarios for Bophuthatswana, suggested that ultimately it was the dubious alliances which Mangope had entered into which determined his final appalling error of judgement.

The AVF’s own objectives to secure a ‘Volkstaat’ were regarded as possible whilst Bophuthatswana still existed. The AVF envisioned their own Volkstaat within an enlarged North West Province. The AVF’s faith in Mangope as champion of the cause of separate ethnic development extended even to their offers to provide armed back-up in the event of conflict within the territory. This offer combined with Mangope’s pride, obsession, inability to lose face and refusal to back down in the defence of ‘his’ creation, Bophuthatswana. This ‘alliance’ and the obstinate elements in his cabinet simply exacerbated popular frustrations:

‘I think that the sudden outburst of hatred came out at a late stage as Mangope looked for allies and associated himself with the AWB and people like Hartzenberg of the CP. They became sort of trustees. They came here and saw in him the sort of person who was against integration of all the people in SA. He listened to them when he should not have. He also had a few die-hards in his own cabinet who were absolutely blind to realities. They were just people who saw the Tswana nation as the ultimate answer, their extreme right to the Bophuthatswana area."

The opposition intensified throughout 1993, particularly amongst students at the University of Bophuthatswana. Mangope sacked various officials in parastatals, such as AGRICOR and BOP TV, in order to remove, again belatedly, the racial ‘ceiling’

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81 It should also be noted that in a vote to determine whether Bophuthatswana join the elections or not, apparently the cabinet voted 9 for and 13 against. This figure was given at a meeting of Mangope’s relaunched political party, the United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), attended in Montshiwa, 26 3.95. The cabinet certainly contained some diehard Tswana nationalists but the figure given might also have been an attempt to shift the blame and miscalculation from Mangope himself who was heading the UCDP’s local election campaign.
82 D. Schoeman (1995) op. cit.
that had blocked the promotion of Batswana employees within these structures. He also castigated the civil servants and threatened them with the loss of their jobs and benefits, if they joined or identified with the ANC or SACP. According to the secretary of the ANC Mmabatho branch, the ANC had been mobilising day by day within Mmabatho. The hysteria concerning the ANC mounted and Mangope appeared to have alienated key sections of his support base through his increasingly desperate actions. Lawrence and Manson suggest that by early 1994 Mangope had lost the support of intellectuals, students, civil servants and other members of the petty-bourgeoisie, including business interests. The Bophuthatswana regime had planned to meet on March 15 to discuss its future strategy but the meeting never took place.

The initial spark for the conflagration that engulfed the regime was the strike by civil servants for a 50% pay rise. The strike was also fuelled by the increasing concerns regarding state employees’ pensions, based on rumours that the regime intended to use these funds to maintain the support of the security forces. By March 11, the protests of civil servants, staff in hospitals and schools, was accompanied by rebellions on the streets of Mmabatho, with a growing wave of students and other residents also taking part. The protests were underpinned by two political requests, firstly, the reincorporation of Bophuthatswana and secondly, the right to free political activity in the territory.

March 10 was the crucial turning point with the protesters able to convince sections of the police force to side with them in the dispute. Looting and rioting then broke out with celebrations erupting in the capital. Mangope played his last available card and called in the militias of the AVF. These also included the AWB under Eugene Terre Blanche, whose presence alienated the final support Mangope had from the security forces. The appalling actions of the AWB neo-fascists, as differentiated from the AVF, included the cold-blooded killings of over 30 civilians, most shot randomly and in the back by the gun toting militias patrolling Mmabatho. The AVF...
then requested the AWB to withdraw from Mmabatho. During the withdrawal there was an exchange of fire between Bophuthatswana security forces near Mafikeng Police Station and some AWB members in the convoy. One car was hit and two wounded AWB members, under the gaze of the world’s media, were executed by a Bophuthatswana policeman. The killings signalled the routing of the white right in South Africa. Shortly after the AWB invasion South African soldiers were sent into the area. Mangope was officially deposed by the TEC and although bitterly contesting his dethronement, he was finally ousted. Bophuthatswana’s capitulation was followed by the Ciskei regime’s collapse and then just one week before the elections, the Kwa-Zulu administration came into the elections. The framework for the ‘new’ democratically elected South Africa had finally, if not miraculously, been installed.
Chapter Nine
Chapter Nine: Conclusion

9. Conclusion: Bophuthatswana's Legacy, 'Confined to the dustbin of history' or back to the Margins?

9.1. Introduction

The ANC's victory in South Africa's historic first ever democratic general election was a momentous achievement heralding the birth of the 'new' South Africa. Few observers could fail to be moved by the emotion surrounding Nelson Mandela's inauguration as South Africa's President. The varied collection of heads of state attending the inauguration reflected South Africa's re-entry into the international community of nations and especially the optimism concerning the country's promising continental role. Most of the country was gripped by the novel outpouring of 'South Africanism' expressed by black and white alike. Given the length of struggle and palpable relief of many that the transition to post-apartheid South Africa had finally been achieved, the celebrations were made all the more joyful. The most potent symbol of enforced separation, the bantustans, were seemingly 'confined to the dustbin of history'. South Africa was hailed as the 'Rainbow Nation', 'unity' was proclaimed and nation-building initiated. The emotions were reminiscent of the euphoria of other African 'liberation movement' victories in the context of 'decolonisation'. By way of conclusion, the legacy of the Bophuthatswana era, and the major findings of the thesis, are assessed through a range of regional issues which have particular importance for South Africa's contemporary nation-building efforts and struggle to envisage a democratic and tolerant post-apartheid era.

South African nation-building is underpinned by the continuing emphasis upon anti-racial/colonialist sentiments and, in addition, by the ANC's rapid embrace of development and neo-liberal ideology. One could be forgiven for seeing parallels between the South African situation and the 1960s processes associated with nation-

1 South Africa was readmitted into the Commonwealth and to the United Nations.
2 Independent, 16.3.94.
building throughout independent Africa. Historically, the dominant paradigm of modernisation was perceived as the panacea for nation-building in the African context. Over ten years ago, in identifying the continuum between the institutions of colonial and 'liberated' Africa, Michael Crowder asked of the African nation-state 'whose dream was it anyway'? African nationalist movements have been consistently undermined by challenges to unity and nation-building. In order to move beyond the failed efforts to retain unity there is an urgent need to further our understanding of how and why it is that both the 'nation-state' and 'development' invariably become repressive and authoritarian. Reasons for this failure are urgently sought in the context of not only South Africa's transition but also as part of a global 'struggle for democracy in a changed world'. The creation of national cultural identities more generally reflects the unsteady combination of 'local fragments' and 'western' features. Moreover, the place and territoriality of local identities are constrained by and prisoner to western abstractions of space and economy.

Race relations and segregation have been central to South African national historiography and its academic literature. The examination of ethnic and developmental dynamics within the bantustans has similarly been overshadowed by the need to explain, and to contest, the apartheid state and policy, in terms of race or class in particular. To identify the importance of ethnicity and culture was somehow to reinforce, or concede to the ideas of apartheid philosophy and social engineering. The close association between culture and apartheid has in turn, ironically, obscured conceptions of regionalism and the creation and mobilisation of cultural and social differences, particularly in South Africa's marginalised regions. The analysis adopted here has benefited from the insights gained from a detailed study of Bophuthatswana's twenty year time span, which has provided an historical, geographical and regional

6 Duncan, in chapter one.
context. Whilst the major focus of the thesis has been to address the conflicts of 'nation-building', it has been demonstrated that these were situated within deep-seated regionalist concerns which have been underpinned by the 'discriminatory and discerning logic' of identity formation during the apartheid era.

The short history of Bophuthatswana, 'now one with Nineveh and Tyre... a historical might-have-been, never-was, not-a-hope',\(^9\) is a particularly powerful evocation of the limitations of 'nation-building'. Bophuthatswana’s experience has provided a number of examples of the conflicting ideas, identities and institutions that underpin 'nation-building', regionalism and modernisation in a region of South Africa in which these conflicts and issues have received little previous attention. The thesis has shown:

- the manipulation of 'traditionalism' and cultural differences as tools of political control and 'national' identity.
- the creation of a 'national' capital as the embodiment of the spirit and practices of 'nation-building' which seeks to combine the specificity of Tswana culture with the apparent universalism of modernity.
- the distortion of 'development' through the lens of 'national' priorities and international norms, including the 'prestige' project, rather than concern for local needs and participation.
- the ensuing crisis of legitimacy and conflict of loyalties.
- the conversion of bantustan sovereignty into regionalist discourses.

These features, and many more, are applicable to the incantations of other 'nation-building' efforts to generate a sense of national cultural homogeneity. Moreover, the specificities of Bophuthatswana's relationship to South African apartheid policy provides a particularly striking illustration of the coercion, fixing and embrace of identities as a modernist project. For all the traditionalist and ethnic rhetoric underpinning the creation of the bantustan policy in South Africa, these

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territories have been thoroughly subordinated to Eurocentric conceptions of modernisation. In order to distinguish the Batswana from other ethnic groups, Mangope's regime sought to identify and signify the meanings attached to Batswana cultural differences. However, in translating these internal impulses into nation-building they became embedded in a modernist framework. This framework has cast a shadow over apartheid's specific historical time span and, arguably, the conceptions and imagination of post-apartheid society and space as well.\(^\text{10}\) The rise and demise of Bophuthatswana speaks directly to these current efforts to forge national identity in South Africa.

The legacy of the Bophuthatswana era is now briefly discussed in the context of the problems and possibilities of the politics of transition in the North West Province of South Africa and Mmabatho's changing role as regional capital. A range of ideological and institutional ambiguities remain and how these are coped with will determine the future course of South Africa. These issues address the practicalities of reincorporation and, most importantly, the continuing contested nature of identity in South Africa.

The specific issues include the legacy of Bophuthatswana's imprint upon administrative structures and institutions of the North West; traditionalism and the rural periphery; the relationship between these issues and Mangope's particular imprint of authoritarianism and patronage; finally, and overall, the central importance of the 'ethnic' question in the 'new' South Africa. The influence of Bophuthatswana's virulent Tswana ethno-nationalism as a form of popular consciousness remains to be seen.

9.2. Dismantling and Adapting Bophuthatswana's Structures and Institutions

The North West Province, one of nine provinces in post-apartheid South Africa, contains most of the former Bophuthatswana regions and importantly the

\(^\text{10}\) Norval, A. J. (1995) "Decolonization, demonization and difference: the difficult constitution of a nation" op. cit.
'capital', Mmabatho. The ANC secured a landslide 85% of the vote in the North West during the provincial elections in 1994.\textsuperscript{11} The victory was a clear mandate for the ANC and an emphatic denunciation of 'separate development' and Bophuthatswana. However, during the period of field work from late 1994 to early 1995 in Mmabatho and the surrounding area, a number of tensions were becoming evident in the transitional phase. Lawrence and Manson have indicated the ambiguities of this period. On the one hand there was confusion and uncertainty associated with the power vacuum caused by the authoritarian practices and then sudden collapse of the Bophuthatswana regime. Mangope's leading civil servants, cabinet ministers and secretaries were dismissed. Residents showed their anger with the old politics of patronage by targeting businesses with BDP connections during the riots of March 1994.\textsuperscript{12} On the other hand there was the rapid growth of alternative structures known as Staff Associations which were allegedly popularly elected at the University and within a number of parastatals and provincial departments.\textsuperscript{13} Civic associations/organisations were also forming in and around the Mmabatho. In the rural areas some chiefs were forced out of office whilst others returned from exile. These newer structures represent a break with the authoritarianism of the past and also the real potential possibilities for popular democratisation.

These possibilities must be cautioned by the question of the social basis of the old and new structures and the class base of the transition. The middle classes in the homelands have been identified by Peires as battered guardians of democratic values and as well placed to refurbish democracy in the former bantustans.\textsuperscript{14} Other studies

\textsuperscript{11} Out of 30 seats in the North West Legislature the ANC won a massive 26, the NP 3 and the FF, I. SAIRR, \textit{Fast Facts}, July, 1994. Although Mangope's UCDP registered for the elections in the final moments of his regime, they decided against contesting the elections and instead waited for the local elections of the following year.

\textsuperscript{12} Amongst other places, a bottle-store (equivalent to an off-license) and fast food outlet were destroyed because of connections to the BDP. Also the Mmabana Centre, although a parastatal, had millions of rands worth of damage, allegedly because it was headed by Mangope's daughter in law who had refused to close the centre following civil servant protest.

\textsuperscript{13} Lawrence, M. and Manson, A. (1994) op.cit.

have questioned this assumption and have indicated that the formation of the middle-classes in the bantustans has shown extreme regional variations. Bank, for example, suggests that the bantustan middle classes have not been economically strong or politically independent. Within Bophuthatswana the middle classes appeared to have been close to the ruling government in order to derive substantial economic benefits.\(^\text{15}\) Whilst in Mmabatho, it was becoming clear that many members of the petty-bourgeoisie were coming out in favour of the ANC (or the National Party) and civil servants were publicly identifying with the objectives of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). However, two questions need to be asked.

Firstly, to what extent are these social groups guardians of democracy? A number of professional people interviewed lamented the ousting of Mangope, described him as a 'good man' and claimed that the former President of Bophuthatswana had done more for the region and the Batswana than any had before or would do in the future. The various estimates of Mangope's percentage of the provincial vote, had he contested the elections and based this upon the 'development' achievements of Bophuthatswana, were placed at between 15-30%. Significantly, state structures and professionals (and the older generation in rural areas) were cited as potential allies. The greatest single source of problems during the transition appeared to be the protestations of civil servants in Garona the former Bophuthatswana administrative centre, who claimed they were being overlooked for promotions and excluded by ANC appointed officials who brought with them their own 'teams'.\(^\text{16}\) Administrative structures were to be radically down-sized, threatening a number of retrenchments within the civil service. State employees in Mmabatho had also demanded parity of wages with the rest of South Africa. Another source of concern was that with the new parity came the South African levels of taxation. Extravagant housing, car and entertainment allowances that had been a feature of the Bophuthatswana era were to be withdrawn.

\(^{15}\) It should be reminded that the initial downfall of the Mangope regime related to economic factors such as fear of pensions and pay parity.

\(^{16}\) These sentiments were expressed to the author by a number of civil servants.
Secondly, the secretary of the Mafikeng ANC branch described Mmabatho as 'the power base of autocracy'. With the balance of power shifting from the old patronage system to what extent are these old structures of malpractice and corruption crossing over into the new administration?

9.2.1. Skewyiya Commission

One of the outcomes of the terms of transition ratified by the TEC had been the protection of civil servant positions held in the former bantustans, at least in the short term. The ANC were committed to democratising structures and creating 'transparency' and therefore established a number commissions to investigate abuses of state positions in the former Bophuthatswana. In 1994 the Skewyiya Commission had been appointed by the regional government led by the Premier, Popo Molefe, and was an important step in this process. The Commission was established to investigate the extent of corruption in the Bophuthatswana government and parastatals. The specific brief of the Commission was to focus on the misuse of government funds for personal ends by Bophuthatswana officials, particularly Mangope himself. The substantial payments made to certain individuals, and in order to sponsor various 'projects', has been connected to attempts to politically destabilise the ANC and improve the image of Mangope's BCDP in the North West.

One of the most serious outcomes to the Commissions findings is the extent to which the politics of patronage has crossed over into North West structures. The continuation of the fraudulent final 'Q-project' contract illustrates these concerns:

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18 *Weekly Mail&Guardian*, 15.9.95.
19 The final contract awarded to Q-projects was supposedly to undertake 'voter education' projects. However the commission's investigation of the contract has revealed the labyrinthine network of money laundering and front organizations in Bophuthatswana. The terms of the final contract to this organization continued well into 1995 and advent of the North West Administration. The administration had supposedly honored the contract which had been made before the collapse of Bophuthatswana. However, the Commission unveiled that the contract had in fact been fraudulently signed after the fall of Mangope and
'Perhaps most difficult for the Molefe administration to confront, why should an organisation that had succeeded in bribing at least one official in March 1994 hesitate to offer bribes to men and women in the new provincial administration'?\textsuperscript{20}

With the inheritance of this embedded legacy of patronage to what extent does the Molefe administration, and the ANC more generally, have the ability and political will to pursue these investigations? Many of the old structures remain untouched.\textsuperscript{21} In the event of continuing frustrations, difficulties and unrest these remnants of the old order could act as fault lines of instability.\textsuperscript{22} There is of course a more insidious question of the continuing ideological impact of the old structures upon the new ANC oriented context.

9.2.2. The Batswana Arbiters

The current situation is undoubtedly compounded by over twenty years of the deeply personalised and paternalistic rule of Mangope. It has been shown how Mangope's rule was buttressed by considerable efforts to nurture Batswana ethno-nationalism. A specific interpretation of Tswanaism was shaped around 'traditionalism' as a form of political control within Bophuthatswana's institutions. It was noticeable whilst in Mmabatho that many residents complained of the new administration because they 'did not know them'. The distrust of 'outsiders' bordered

\textsuperscript{20} See Skewyiya Commission (1995) op.cit.

\textsuperscript{21} Weekly Mail\& Guardian, 15.9.95.

\textsuperscript{22} For example the Motimele Commission was also established to investigate irregularities in Bophuthatswana local government. During the AWB invasion of Mmabatho, five officials on the local council apparently assisted the AWB by providing council facilities, communications and even fire arms. Although two years after the event, these officials were still receiving full pay and extended leave. SAPA 12.2.96.

\textsuperscript{22} These concerns also apply to the former Bophuthatswana security forces. For example, a local trade unionist was murdered by members of the police force almost a year after the ANC regional victory, personnel communication with Gcinumkhonto, M., Deputy Secretary of the SACP, North West Province South Africa, personnel communication, 1995.
upon the xenophobic. These attitudes even extended to Popo Molefe, a Batswana himself, because he was considered an 'outsider', from urban South Africa. The pattern was replicated in many state structures and parastatals and was characterised as a:

"...paternalistic power wielded by those who see themselves as the arbiters of the Batswana future. You can not break into their decision-making processes. I have found this at the university and I understand it is also true of the government administration".

This hold upon decision making by the Batswana 'arbiters' was also indicated by the resentment towards Molefe's efforts to cater for the entire province and not solely the former Bophuthatswana areas. A number of people in Mmabatho expressed resentment when Molefe gave speeches in other parts of the North West because 'they could not see them' (the provincial leadership). The Bophuthatswana Government Buildings at Garona had been closely associated with Mangope and the BDP. In the context of the new North West Province and attempts to make structures accountable and transparent, the old perception and style of governance remained embedded. State employees still took their grievances to Garona and became frustrated when informed that they should instead approach national departments and offices outside of Mmabatho and the North West.

The assets of the former homeland were contested, including even the future status of the capital city itself. Mmabatho had been extremely dependent upon government functions and finance and its future would be radically changed if as it was being debated, the capital for the North West Province were placed elsewhere. Ironically, Mmabatho's 'excellent' public sector facilities inherited from the

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23 Personnel Communication with Professor Graeme Addison, Head of the Department of Communications, University of North West, (formerly UNIBO) May, 1996.
24 Chapter Five indicated that government was 50-60% of Mmabatho's local economy.
Bophuthatswana administration and large body of civil servants were important factors in the decision. The city lacked some of the advantages of regional towns but was regarded as:

'...performing a unique and essential role and function in terms of its locality, sphere of influence, history and impact on development and the people surrounding it'.

The Select Committee on a Capital City for the North West recommended that Mmabatho/Mafikeng be nominated as the regional capital city. Perhaps the dire consequences of the removal of Mmabatho's capital status was considered too inflammatory by the new ANC dominated regional legislative. The transfer and disposal of Bophuthatswana's 'national' assets were beginning to illustrate the emergence of a conflict of interests more widely between South Africa's regions and centre.

9.2.3. Bop TV and Plurality

The fate of Bop TV's considerable assets and over 750 employees, illustrates the problems of Bophuthatswana's reincorporation. Bop TV was, significantly, the only TV news station which was separate and independent from the state owned SABC. The ANC's official position on bantustan structures aimed at eradicating 'islands and enclaves of separate development' such as Bop TV. However, Bop TV's previous Director General, Solly Kotwane, suggested that it would be a 'tragedy' if the Corporation was not allowed to fulfil a national role in the 'new' South Africa. The underutilisation of the Corporation would moreover deny the 'plurality of views' which the Independent Broadcasting Authority had been appointed in 1995 to engender. However, the ANC and SABC appeared intent on reincorporating Bop TV

and this issue has become a long-standing dispute which to date is still not resolved.

A local academic was appointed by the provincial legislative to head a technical committee to explore the possibilities for the Corporation to remain independent of the SABC. The academic in question, Professor Addison, head of the Department of Communications at the University of the North West (formerly UNIBO), criticised the ANC’s desire for the redistribution of the Corporation’s assets to the central state. These intentions were described, by Addison, as if the South African state sought to play 'big brother' to the regions. The 'centre', based on Gauteng and other Metropolitan areas, was regarded as inadequately catering to the region’s broadcasting needs. Bop TV’s fate therefore symbolised the deeper problem of regional interests usurped by the central state. Above all, the decision to dissolve Bop TV was seen as reinforcing Metropolitan dominance and securing the position of the centre against the regions. Kotwane described the conflict as reflecting 'the same monopoly and centralisation of views' as previously displayed by the old centralised SABC. Bop TV’s proposed incorporation into the SABC was most likely motivated by the Central government’s concerns about the potential influence that broadcasting could have for Regional governments, with Inkatha control of Kwa-Zulu/Natal and the NP victory in the Western Cape. The IBA’s behaviour was described as 'centrist' by Addison who also suggested that the IBA had apparently buckled to ANC pressure in order to avoid a political show down. By early 1996 over 700 redundancies were announced at Bop TV, although the corporation was exploring 'options from the private sector to retain its viability', apparently with the support of the provincial ANC government. According to Addison there was also 'evidence of interference (in the running of Bop TV) by the North West provincial government of Popo Molefe and his cabinet, in spite of professions to the contrary'. The emerging centre-region conflict therefore represents another potential fault line.

The regional ANC Party was itself riven by internal disputes, in part an

28 Weekly Mail&Guardian, 8.9.95.
29 Ibid.
30 Weekly Mail&Guardian, 2.2.96.
31 Personnel communication with Prof. Addison, April, 1996.
outcome of the Bophuthatswana era. The influence of Mangope's personalised rule and Batswana chauvinism within Bophuthatswana's structures precipitated conflicts within the ANC itself. The problems of integrating the new and the old finally surfaced within the provincial ANC government. The former leader of the PPP in Bophuthatswana, 'Rocky' Malebane-Metsing had resurfaced in Zambia following the 1988 coup in Bophuthatswana. With the collapse of Bophuthatswana, Malebane-Metsing had been installed as the North West's head of the Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs. Malebane-Metsing had assumed that he would become the provincial premier because he claimed, he 'understood the Batswana' and knew what they wanted. When it became apparent that Molefe was the preferred choice in the North West, a disgruntled Malebane-Metsing made increasingly bizarre allegations against Molefe. On the eve of the ANC's 1995 provincial conference Malebane-Metsing was ousted. The ANC was forced to admit to 'serious intra-organisational conflicts' and that there had been a faction within the provincial ANC that had supported Malebane-Metsing. Embittered by his ousting, Malebane-Metsing has since relaunched the old PPP in the North West. Whilst many of these issues can be attributed to the 'teething' problems of transition, other fault lines represent more enduring concerns of the Bophuthatswana legacy.


Historically, colonial Mafeking, and Mmabatho, have literally overshadowed the 'Stadt' and extracted facets of local practice and values in order to control and subordinate it. Mangope consistently stressed the virtues of rural and traditional areas.


33 *Mayibuye,* "How the wild west was won", December, 1995. Interestingly according to the secretary of the Mmabatho ANC and also the Deputy of the Provincial SACP, Malebane-Metsing had never been a true convert to the ANC and his contestation of apartheid from within bantustan structures was also criticized. Based on interviews. There were also other ANC problems at branch level and with regional executive committees and members of the 'alliance' (COSATU and the SACP).
However the huge material and ideological chasm between rural and urban areas in the former Bophuthatswana, presents a fundamental challenge to the urban-centred and modernist conceptions of 'development' in South Africa. Mmabatho's great expense and opulence in comparison to surrounding rural areas is a stark and powerful reminder of the urban bias which was bestowed upon this 'national' capital. Substantial developments continued until the collapse of the Mangope regime. Residents of the capital were popularly thought of as 'too demanding, insensitive, spoilt and so on' by rural dwellers. In contrast to Mmabatho's development, rural areas were at best dependent upon patronage for the delivery of clinics, schools, roads and other facilities. Bophuthatswana development was done as a 'favour' rather than an integrated process of government, leaving a legacy of authoritarian and inappropriate development schemes surrounding Mmabatho. The bias of resources to Mmabatho and other urban areas was deepened by the lack of an adequate governmental department to deal exclusively with rural areas, despite 85% of the Bophuthatswana population being rural based. The co-option of traditional structures into the old regime has created a number of conflicts in the transitional period within the rural and peri-urban areas around Mmabatho.

A strong indication of the degree of popular resentment against certain Tribal Authorities was provided during the riots of March 1994. In 1987 there had been proposals from the Bophuthatswana Parks Board to establish a 'Nature Reserve' on tribal land as part of the Mmabatho Green-Belt Project. The plan was devised by investors, the Parks Board, an engineering company and a team of consultants. The local chief was apparently told by Mangope to give the investors the land. Following the initial use of consultants to assess the local community's opinions, the engineering firm and Parks Board took control of the process and dealt exclusively with the local

34 Ephraim Phlhardy Motoko, Mmabatho Branch Secretary, ANC, interview, 29.3.95.
35 Ibid.
36 Mbopole (1995) op. cit.
37 Gcinumkhonto, M., Deputy Secretary of the SACP, North West Province South Africa, personnel communication, 1995.
chief. The local tribe was to receive R20,000 each year from the scheme but according to local residents they had not benefited from the project at Lotlamareng Dam. The growing resentment towards the scheme reflected local dissatisfaction with the Stadt's handling of its budget and the inadequate monitoring of tribal levies.

The construction of a fence around Lotlamareng, previously tribal land, symbolised the growing frustration with Mmabatho's Green-Belt Project. The fixing of Batswana culture was illustrated by the construction of a replica 'cultural village' at the site, as 'a living monument to the Batswana and other groups', in addition to the creation of recreational and barbecue facilities. The inappropriateness and failure of the project to meet the contemporary needs of local residents was finally manifested during the riots of March 1994. Residents symbolically cut down the fence and destroyed the reception area buildings and other facilities. The incident reflects the continuing ambiguities and fundamental problems associated with 'traditional' structures.

The younger generation of activists in SANCO (South Africa National Civic Organisation) accused the Barolong Tribal Authority in the Stadt of being supportive of the former BDP and Bophuthatswana regime. The disagreements developed into a fundamental conflict as the chiefs and traditional structures were regarded as authoritarian and unelected aristocrats, and as obstructing democratisation. During the build up to the local elections, the Premier of the North West administration accused chiefs of obstructing the registration of voters at local Tribal Authority Offices, and of sabotaging the elections. The continuing importance of chieftaincy and 'tradition' in the rural peoples lives problematises the current conflicts. The ANC and Alliance (COSATU and the SACP) argued that chieftaincy had lacked security during the

38 This was according to Louis Du Pisani of the Development in Southern Africa company, a team of consultants who after initially surveying and assessing residents opinions and desires, were removed from the project. Du Pisani (1995) op. cit.
40 Another concern of residents was the alleged impact that the Green-belt project had in polluting the water supply for the Stadt.
41 Popo Molefe, Bop TV News Archives, 8.10.94.
Mangope era because it was incorporated into the political and administrative process. The Alliance emphasised its aims towards 'restoration of the dignity' of chieftaincy:

'...we are not against chiefs, we are also advocating protection of culture but in a democratic manner. You can not just maintain culture that is not transforming, chiefs must also transform. We are not destroying the nation but building it. You don't have to destroy culture but must instead encourage people to except transformation as part of the democratisation process'.

The Bophuthatswana era illustrated that there was nothing inherently beneficial about 'tradition' or 'culture'. 'Tradition' per se has failed to empower rural areas, with the Mangope regime's manipulation of 'tradition' linked to paternalism and authoritarianism. The control function of 'tradition' has left another deep imprint upon communities within the former Bophuthatswana:

'The people have been misinformed for too long. Most can not read. There is a very high literacy rate. They should and must be able to understand the situation around them. But like before they expect everything to be done for them- the people in the rural areas complain that development is not to do this and do that. Even when the government thinks for them they are not proactive. Now they can say "we want ten classrooms, we are ANC and want the government to come"- that is one legacy'.

The legacy of repressive control and stifling of accountable and open democratic procedures is also connected to the lack of both political understanding and tolerance. It was claimed by one local ANC official that Mangope had done his utmost to impose his political ideas upon residents. People in the rural areas internalised this authoritarianism, as if, 'Mangope knows what we are thinking':

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43 Phlhardy, op. cit.
'They are getting very much confused, community involvement is a new thing for most of the community and will take time for them to come to grips with democratic process and they are not yet aware of this'.

The difficult debates surrounding the incorporation of the Stadt into Mmabatho's Municipal boundaries is once again a pertinent issue for the area. More generally, the renegotiation of tradition and modernity could possibly be used to redefine local government and democracy in Africa. The aforementioned issues are all related, in one way or another, to the legacy of the imprint of Bophuthatswana's Batswana ethnic populism upon the South African landscape.

9.4. The Ethnic Question and the 'Failure' of Bophuthatswana Ethnic Nationalism

For over twenty years Mangope had consistently promoted the conception of Bophuthatswana as the 'place of the Batswana'. The widespread frustration during the transitional order (happily publicised by the previously Mangope aligned Mail newspaper) was manipulated by Mangope's relaunched political party, the United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP). At a meeting of the UCDP in Montshiwa Township, in preparation for the 1995 local elections, the old themes and discourses promoted by the Bophuthatswana regime were repackaged to local residents. UCDP speakers, including former cabinet ministers in the old regime, informed the audience that 'the Batswana had no where else to go'. The level of developmental achievement in Bophuthatswana was praised, and the end to the previous access to resources of the

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44 Phlhardt, op. cit.
45 There is a growing literature on the failure of the nation-state in Africa to accommodate rural needs and the growing return to rural institutions such as chiefstainey and rural identities. There are important implications for the ways in which new 'mixtures' of governance and democracy may be more appropriate. See for example, Sklar, R. (1993) "The African frontier for political science", in Bates, R. H. et al. (eds.) Africa and the Disciplines: the contributions of research in Africa to the social sciences and the humanities, University of Chicago Press.
46 Translated from Setswana, during a UCDP meeting (1995) op.cit.
old Bophuthatswana was lamented by the speakers. It was suggested that the region would never again see the resources made available to the Bophuthatswana government. With all of the problems associated with the transition and with manipulation by elements associated with the UCDP, what success did the UCDP have in South Africa's first ever democratic local elections in 1995?

Mangope and the UCDP had been thoroughly discredited by the Skewyiya Commission whose findings were released just before the elections took place. Furthermore, for all the ANC's organisational problems and clashes with chieftaincy, the ANC's power base was undoubtedly within the rural areas.47 This rural support was reflected by the overwhelming ANC share of the provincial vote. The ANC won 74.2% of the vote, followed by the NP at 7.6%, FF 4.5% and the PAC 1.7%. The UCDP failed to make any significant inroads into the provincial vote for all the pre-election rhetoric and hype of the Mail. However there were some interesting local variations. On some of the local councils, formerly within the old Bophuthatswana, the UCDP captured around 10% of the seats. In Mmabatho, the former stronghold of Bophuthatswana, the UCDP gained just 11.1% of the seats (not winning any wards but 2 seats as per centage of votes). There were similar results in Lehurutshe (Mangope's home region) and the huge Central District (including parts of the Stadt). The UCDP results hardly registered a significant protest vote against the ANC and also clearly failed to manipulate the ethnic vote. However, it should be pointed out that the turn out in rural areas was particularly low, below 40% in most cases and 38% in Mmabatho. The low rate of participation could probably be attributed to a combination of the ineffectiveness or inadequacy of voter education and a failure to explain the purpose of the elections following so soon after the general elections. Furthermore, the opposition of some chiefs to registration, and perhaps a degree of dissatisfaction with the ANC (but with the UCDP as an unlikely substitute) were additional factors. These factors notwithstanding, the provincial and local election votes appeared to emphatically illustrate the defeat of Mangope's particular

47 Phlhardy, op. cit.
interpretation of ethnicity:

'I am a Motswana myself, and it is a fact that you can not change, no matter who comes next, you can not change. Mangope was trying to emphasise this obvious fact (of ethnicity), so much that it became boring to us. We don't want to be told we are Tswanas because we know this. Maybe other people wanted to know like those from Rhodesia (Cronje) who were here but we knew they were not Motswana So I don't think that appealed to a lot of people, what I can rather say is that because most of the leaders at the time did not have a lot of exposure and if people believed him at the time it was because they thought only Tswana's can live. But they have realised that it is secondary to be a Motswana'.

These reflections on 'Tswanaism', by an ANC activist with experience of organisation around Bophuthatswana, capture the contradictions of Mangope's ethnic discourse; the failure to inculcate a specifically loyal and popular Bophuthatswana identity. Did Bophuthatswana ethnic identity 'fail' and if so why?

The thesis has provided examples of Mangope's state-led efforts to politicise ethnic and cultural differences in Bophuthatswana. Culture and values were contested and commandeered by the state in order to instil homogeneity and the 'sameness' of ethnic identity. However, Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' always popular legitimacy because most of the time the state failed to popularise these differences. Bophuthatswana's short lived 'national' identity is contrasted to the spectacular mobilisation of ethno-nationalism in Kwa-Zulu and elsewhere. How are Bophuthatswana's differences explained?

Undoubtedly the existence of Botswana as a Tswana state diluted Mangope's use of symbols and the impact of 'Tswanaism', not unlike the relationship between the Qwa Qwa bantustan and Lesotho. More generally Bank suggests that perhaps the

48 Phlhardy, op. cit.
role of the state in promoting ethnicity has been over emphasised. Instead Bank calls for renewed focus upon the local level 'in-group dynamics' of identity formation rather than state and elite-led constructions of boundaries between different ethnic groups. Whilst a very important observation, it can be argued that Bophuthatswana did have a degree of 'success' exactly when attempts were made to create inter-ethnic conflict. This mobilisation of ethno-nationalism was particularly acute in areas of Bophuthatswana where competition for resources and jobs from the state were most pronounced. It should be remembered that Bophuthatswana's promotion of Tswana commonality took place within a population of which over 33% were classified as 'non-Tswana' (unlike Bank's example of Qwa Qwa). At different times some groups in Bophuthatswana did overcome 'internal/local' differences in order to mobilise as an ethnic group. This tendency therefore suggests that additional factors must be sought to further explain the failure to popularise ethnic nationalism in Bophuthatswana.

Bophuthatswana identity should not be confused with Batswana identity. The bantustans signified and intensified, for the majority of black South Africans, the struggle to reclaim their birth right as South African citizens. The anti-apartheid struggle, although based upon a range of different strategies and discourses emphasising either class, race and nation, to a large extent subsumed these ambiguities and, in doing so, sharpened the question of loyalties in apartheid South Africa. Nation-building in Bophuthatswana was subordinated to the role and function intended for the bantustans; to form a political and racial trench between 'white' and 'black' defined South Africa.

Mangope's emphasis upon 'nation-building' and the enactment of modernisation simply exacerbated the contradictions. His attempts to rejuvenate 'traditional structures' and mobilise ethnic identity were contradicted by the impetus towards modernisation and its implicit emphasis that Batswana culture should be modified, adapted, updated. Apartheid policy spoke deeply, intimately and violently so.

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50 See Lawrence, M and Manson, A. (1994) op.cit.
51 See Marx's interesting article on discourses of opposition in South Africa, Marx, A. W. (1991) "Race, Nation, and Class Based Ideologies of Recent Opposition in South Africa, Comparative Politics, April, pp.313-327."
to the relationship between modernity and identity. Bophuthatswana’s experiences reflect the need to keep in view both local detail and more global structures/discourses. Bophuthatswana's manipulation of tradition and attempts to create a viable 'national' identity and modernise, rapidly became incapable of posing an anti-modernist challenge to the dominant eurocentric ideas shaping the bantustans as separate and different from 'white' South Africa. As a consequence, culture and tradition were detached from these communities and became a political and authoritarian tool for the Bophuthatswana state. Hettne suggests that the damage inflicted on communities in the pursuit of the abstractions of 'National' development or the 'National' economy can be mitigated by emphasising the local/territorial, ethno and environmental scales.

The contemporary post-apartheid context and the shifting role of competing identities raise interesting and important questions for ethnic identity in South Africa. The contradictions of Bophuthatswana 'nation-building' should not obscure the popular impulses towards ethnicity which have been historically detectable in the region. The manipulation of these impulses through the bantustan system should not invalidate or deny the existence of 'different' identities. Bophuthatswana was sustained by ethno-nationalist and modernisation discourses. Furthermore, the regional demarcation process outlined in section 8.3.3, appeared to place ethnic and regional identity at the centre of South African political agenda. The creation of a Bophuthatswana identity failed ultimately to nurture popular loyalty and to reach peoples daily experiences. However, it has been shown how Mangope made many references to the Batswana being swamped by other ethnic groups. The constant vulnerability of the Batswana as a minority group had been the initial justification for the creation of an 'independent' Bophuthatswana. Within this scattered entity, the

52 King, A (1992) “Rethinking Colonialism”, puts this as the need to undermine master discourses by prioritizing the particular whilst also specifying the colonizers own particularisms, in "Forms of Dominance, Alsayyad, N. (ed.), Avebury.

Batswana became the majority, whilst within the 'new' South Africa the Batswana once again revert to being a minority group. The scales of competing identities is once again in realignment. The old grievances, fears, concerns and the poverty which regional discourses of Batswana ethnicity addressed, remain. There are also pressing material concerns. In the North West Province alone, 53% of all households live below the poverty line and there is 'extensive' poverty. There is an existing backlog of approximately 190,000 housing units and only 49% of the region's labour force is formally employed. Considerable efforts must be made to put South Africa back into Africa and to embrace multi-culturalism without this simply becoming a meaningless hegemonic term. To reiterate Sharp's challenge for South Africa:

'We have to ensure that our society offers all its members the opportunity to participate in, and draw benefit from, mainstream political and economic activity, as well as the opportunity to proclaim their difference'.

Only then can we hope to avoid the return to the margins.

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54 Figures given at the Local Government, Housing, Planning and Development conference, Mmabatho, 18th June, 1994.
56 Sharp, J. in Democracy in Action, 31.8.94.
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