Introduction: Achieving objective, policy-relevant intelligence [The Image of the Enemy: Intelligence Analysis of Adversaries since 1945]

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Introduction: Achieving Objective, Policy-relevant Intelligence*

By Paul Maddrell

Thirty years have passed since Ernest May published his influential collection, *Knowing One’s Enemies*, which examined how well intelligence services and policy-makers assessed intelligence on their adversaries before the outbreak of the two World Wars. Since the Second World War all the Great Powers have understood the importance of intelligence to their security. During the Cold War immense intelligence communities in both East and West, spending unprecedented sums of money, collected vast quantities of intelligence and reported on it to their political leaders. *Knowing One’s Enemies* was published when the Cold War was still being waged; indeed, the editor’s aim was to draw lessons from history which might help prevent a third World War.¹ Since the waging of the Cold War relied so heavily on intelligence, the time has come to consider how well this intelligence was analyzed by analysts and understood by policy-makers.

Two key issues: analytical error and the reception of intelligence by policy-makers

As far as analysts are concerned, the key issue which persistently arises is how to prevent analytical error and so maintain policy-makers’ confidence in the analysts’ reports. The US intelligence community (IC)’s efforts to avoid mistakes long predated May’s book. The end of the Cold War spurred a further wave of reform. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc in 1989-91, confounding expectations of only a few years previously, and analysts’ discovery, after the Gulf War of 1991, of their underestimation of Saddam Hussein’s project to develop an Iraqi atomic bomb,
encouraged the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in 1993-94, to review the analytical methods of its Directorate of Intelligence (DI). Analysts tried to make their analyses more convincing and transparent. Misjudgements in the late 1990s, such as the DI’s failure to warn of India’s nuclear tests in 1998, increased concern that US intelligence analysts made avoidable mistakes and were too unimaginative. They made false assumptions, relied too much on slender evidence, failed to consider sufficiently alternative interpretations of the conduct and intentions of foreign states and often assumed that they would behave as the United States did. The attention that analyses receive from the Congressional oversight committees and, when leaks occur, from the media as well may also encourage excessive caution.²

Al-Qaeda’s attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, in September 2001, and the IC’s gross overestimation of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities, in 2002-3, led to further reform of intelligence analysis. The attacks heightened awareness of how easily and naturally misjudgement arises from human beings’ cognitive shortcomings and encouraged the use of analytical techniques designed to compensate for them. The 9/11 Commission was critical of a lack of imagination on the part of analysts and poor sharing of intelligence between agencies.³ Proper analytic standards were set out in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 2004 (IRTPA). The US intelligence community now stresses even more than before that analysis is a task that should be performed collaboratively, so that alternatives to a leading hypothesis are considered. Analysis is structured, thoroughly footnoted and made transparent, so that it is open to criticism.⁴ Collaborative analysis is intended to guard against “groupthink” by ensuring that alternative interpretations are thoroughly considered.⁵ All this may amount to no more than a heightened emphasis on cooperation and the need to consider
alternatives. It is open to the objection that, faced with a mass of ambiguous and often contradictory information, every analyst needs a mental model to make sense of it.\footnote{6} Attempting to undermine these mental models may either be impossible or may lead to analyses too indecisive to be useful. Moreover, collaboration depends on groups and so may encourage, rather than undermine, “groupthink.”

There has been much research into the causes of mistakes in analysis. Richards Heuer’s *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, published in 1999, has proven influential in prompting efforts to develop better analytical methods. Heuer’s findings, which chiefly concern intelligence analysts and rely heavily on cognitive psychology, confirm those of May, which relate to both policy-makers and analysts and are based on the historical record. The two men stress the same flaws in human beings’ cognitive processes: the tendency to make evidence more coherent and rational than it is; the tendency to overestimate one’s enemy, considering him to be more rational than he is; and the tendency of the human mind to look more for evidence that confirms existing beliefs than evidence that conflicts with them. Both men regard the chief cause of misjudgement to be the application of inappropriate mindsets, or mental models, to the evidence (May uses the term “presumptions”).\footnote{7} Both men stress the need to keep presumptions under review. Both point to the consistent failure, on the part of both policy-makers and analysts, to see a situation as the target state sees it.\footnote{8} Robert Jervis reached the same conclusions about policy-makers in his book *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*.\footnote{9}

Another persistent issue is the failure of policy-makers to understand or make use of intelligence. The present collection addresses this issue as well. Richard Betts has argued that the main instances of surprise result from the failure of policy-makers, not analysts, to understand intelligence. “Intelligence failure is political and
psychological more often than organizational,” he wrote in a famous article in 1978. However, he did not in that article examine instances of this; nor has anyone yet undertaken a thorough study of the Cold War looking to see how well policy-makers understood intelligence. This collection does that and finds much support for Betts’ argument.

Raymond Garthoff, opening the collection, shows how Soviet leaders, during the Cold War, were more swayed by their ideological convictions about the United States, their contacts with American Presidents, pressure from bureaucratic interests and their own traits of character than by intelligence. Indeed, the Soviet political system discouraged any proper analysis of the United States. Turning to the United States, Ben Fischer demonstrates that the authors of National Intelligence Estimates, in the last twenty years of the Cold War, set themselves high standards of objectivity in their analysis of the Soviet Union’s international behavior but lacked much-needed information and tended to mirror-image Soviet policy in ways that reflected American policy.

The division of Germany contributed to the outbreak of the Cold War; the country’s reunification helped to end it. How well the leaderships of the two German states understood intelligence on one another is, therefore, an important theme of Cold War history. Paul Maddrell examines both the analysis—or, more accurately, the Communist substitute for it, which was mere reporting—of intelligence on West Germany by the East German Stasi’s foreign intelligence service (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, HVA: Main Intelligence Directorate) and the reception of that intelligence by East Germany’s Communist leaders. Matthias Uhl then studies the West German Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND)’s
analysis of intelligence on the GDR and the Soviet Bloc in four key Cold War crises. All four chapters rely on important new sources, chiefly declassified records.

Alongside the Cold War ran bitter regional conflicts in Israel-Palestine, the Indian sub-continent and Northern Ireland. Two of these continue to this day; the communal strife in Northern Ireland also continues, though in less grave a form. The time has also come to consider how well these threats--chiefly terrorist ones--have been understood. Eunan O’Halpin analyzes the attitudes of British policy-makers to the Troubles in Northern Ireland in their early years, including their attitude towards intelligence. Tamir Libel and Shlomo Shpiro consider both Israeli Intelligence’s understanding of Palestinian terrorism since 1948 and Israeli leaders’ reception of intelligence. Julian Richards concentrates on policy-makers, examining the mentality of Pakistan’s military rulers and Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate since the state’s foundation in 1947. Finally, Mark Stout turns attention back to intelligence analysis, as he studies the understanding of Al-Qaeda and jihadist terrorism which has developed in the US intelligence community since 1989.

The present collection is timely because historians have much better access to the records of many intelligence services than they did thirty years ago, though they still have no access to the archives of others. The collection exploits important sources which have only become available since the Cold War ended. It breaks new ground in the case studies it employs, many of which are very difficult to research into and little discussed in the academic literature. The need for a study of intelligence analysis since 1945 is great since leading writers on intelligence bemoan how small the academic literature on analysis is. The existing literature also concentrates, as far as the Cold War is concerned, on case studies of analytical error, the outstanding ones being American analysts’ failure to warn of the deployment of Soviet nuclear
missiles in Cuba in 1962 and various instances of surprise attack, such as North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950 and the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. The present collection also answers calls for a comparative study of the performance of the intelligence communities of East and West.

The collection goes beyond the works of Jervis, May and Heuer in stressing the role of ideology in generating misperceptions of other states (Jervis and Heuer were concerned with the influence of cognitive psychology on perceptions, while ideology was a minor theme of May’s book). While histories of the Cold War abound with discussions of the influence of ideology on the decision-making of the two sides’ leaders, its interaction with intelligence is a neglected topic. Owing to the size of the subjects they consider, and sometimes severe restrictions on access to government records, all nine authors in this collection have been selective in their approach to their chosen topics.

“A” “Politization”

Intelligence estimates have to consider both an enemy’s capabilities and his intentions (or “proclivities,” as Ernest May more generally described them). May suggested three tests of an intelligence estimate’s quality. Firstly, in relation to both matters it should ask the right questions, which he defined as “the questions, right answers to which could be useful guides to action.” The most important estimates needed to ask the big questions, on which key presumptions depended. Secondly, estimates should be accurate. Thirdly, they should reach conclusions acceptable to policy-makers since they would be useless if they could not influence their readers.

The main point the collection makes is that since 1945 most of the intelligence agencies discussed here—though not all—have tried to produce assessments which
meet all three of these criteria. The intelligence services of Communist states did not ask the right questions because they were not allowed to.

The collection makes clear time and again that the character of a government inevitably affects the nature and quality of its intelligence agencies’ reporting. It is necessary to distinguish here between intelligence analysis in most Western states, where analysts are expected to be objective, and Communist states, whose intelligence agencies were not permitted to report objectively.

In the former, a mild form of “politicization” is natural since analysts have to make their information acceptable to policy-makers. To do so, they have to show that their conclusions are significant for policy-making. The more significant their analyses become, the more they will be seen as “politicized” by groups within the decision-making process. The simple fact of significance for policy can cause an analysis to be seen as “politicized.” As this collection shows, analysts are also influenced to some extent by the views, policies and military doctrines of the decision-makers they serve, as well as by the interests of the government of which they are a part. Seeing relations with the target state from the policy-makers’ viewpoint, analysts can come to share their mindset (or part of it). Lawrence Freedman calls this a shared “adversary image,” which he defines as “a set of coherent views over what can reasonably be expected” from an adversary. He made the point about the relationship between the United States Government and its intelligence analysts, but it also applies to the Communist regimes. Teamwork tends naturally towards “groupthink.” It may be a sub-conscious process. Since the military prizes teamwork and hierarchy so much, the pressure towards “groupthink” is particularly strong in military intelligence organizations. Analysts, whether civilian or military, do not want to present intelligence which policy-makers will reject out of
hand because it conflicts with the rationale for existing policies. This collection demonstrates that policy-makers have a persistent tendency to discount intelligence they receive. They do so because it conflicts with fixed assumptions about their enemies, personal experience or the rationale for policy. They also do so because they regard the intelligence analyses as reflecting bureaucratic self-interest or as ways of influencing them to pursue particular policies.

Analysts are also prone to the same cognitive errors as policy-makers. The most important of these, as writers like May, Jervis and Heuer have explained, are the tendency to regard one’s enemy as more rational and centralized than he is and a tendency to overestimate rather than underestimate him.

In these circumstances, “ politicization” is a misnomer. “Governmentalization” might be a better term. What really takes place is that policy and the government’s thinking color intelligence as the latter seeks to make itself relevant to the former. This can occur without the analysts’ objectivity being compromised. It falls far short of deliberate distortion of intelligence so that it supports a particular policy. The most strident allegations of politicization have been made about analyses which related to political issues of the highest importance, such as Soviet strategic objectives (in the mid-1970s) and whether Iraq, in 2001-3, represented a threat to the United States.

More was unacceptable to Communist leaders than to those of democratic states. Their intelligence agencies could therefore not report objectively; politicization became severe. Communist leaders had difficulty tolerating information which criticized their policies or challenged their legitimacy. Criticism could not be constructive; it was deeply subversive since it implied that Marxism-Leninism was wrong and not as “scientific” as it claimed to be. They could not even tolerate independent thinking. Consequently, analysis was degraded to mere reporting of
intelligence. The Communist intelligence services did not achieve the independent thinking expected of American analysts. Raymond Garthoff demonstrates that the reporting of the principal Soviet foreign intelligence service, the First Chief Directorate of the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti: Committee of State Security) was deliberately cautious and intended to give no support for policy change. Information that the Soviet leader would not like was withheld from him. As leader, Leonid Brezhnev was supplied with flattering exaggerations of the impact of his speeches. The intelligence provided served the interests of the intelligence agencies concerned and of their ally, the military-industrial complex. The military intelligence supplied consistently made the case for further weapons development and high defense spending. Mikhail Gorbachev was so incensed at this biased and self-serving intelligence that he rebuked his intelligence chiefs for submitting it to him and discounted their reports.

Paul Maddrell shows that the HVA was more willing than the KGB to supply unpalatable information to the German Democratic Republic (GDR)’s leaders. However, this information was reported as having been spoken by West German politicians or contained in West German government reports; the HVA refrained from providing its own analysis of foreign developments. The information it supplied was largely factual in character and the leaders were left free to disregard it or impose their own analysis. They usually did one or the other. The HVA made no attempt to challenge their misperceptions, which were often severely deluded. Indeed, the HVA’s own reporting on foreign economic developments was distorted by a crude, mistaken Marxist understanding of economics which can only have encouraged the leaders’ belief that the Western economies had profound problems and Communism would ultimately triumph.
Intelligence “analysts” in Communist states were not analysts at all, but newsmen. They did not try to achieve an understanding of foreign events independent of that of the Communist regimes they served. Nor, as a rule, did they make forecasts or prepare long-term analyses of trends. Instead, they summarized incoming information. In American terminology, they provided current intelligence (even though they were well-suited to providing estimative intelligence since they obtained numerous policy documents from ministries and international organizations). As a rule, they only supplied an analysis of a long-term trend or a forecast if one were contained in the information they were summarizing. They passed on news rather than understanding.

Intelligence performed better in the democratic states than the Communist ones. One reason for this was that analysts were expected to think for themselves. This automatically gave them more weight in government; the government leaders were presented with ideas with which they had to engage. Most is known about the performance of intelligence in the United States. The US intelligence community tried harder than the Communist intelligence services to turn intelligence into a usable understanding of foreign developments. The principal Soviet foreign intelligence service had a very small intelligence assessment staff during Stalin’s rule; its main task was to pass on information. As Raymond Garthoff shows, for intelligence assessment the Soviet leadership relied heavily throughout the Cold War on bodies outside the intelligence community, particularly the Party Central Committee, the Foreign and Defense Ministries and academic institutions. These academic institutions, in the USSR, were, in practice, emanations of the Communist Party. The fact that the Party played such a prominent role in assessment guaranteed ideologically-biased conclusions. Yuri Andropov expanded the KGB’s intelligence
assessment staff in the 1970s, partly to exert influence over Soviet policy. However, in the 1970s and 1980s the ratio of analysts to operations officers in the KGB was 1:10, whereas in the CIA it was 1:1.

American intelligence analysts also had a wider responsibility than their Communist counterparts. Firstly, they considered the significance of new developments for national policy and pointed out opportunities for action. Secondly, they gave warning of attack and of dangerous situations. Lastly, they prepared longer-term analyses of important political, economic, scientific and military trends. As Ben Fischer emphasizes, their job was very much to forecast Soviet international behavior. They followed Sherman Kent’s prescription that the job of intelligence was to “perceive the statics, the dynamics, and the potentials of other countries; … [to] perceive the established things, the presently going-on things, and probable things of the future.” They were scholars who tried to convey understanding.

Consequently, intelligence analysis in the United States was far more sophisticated than in the Soviet Bloc. May, Heuer and Jervis all agree that a common cause of misperception in international affairs is the tendency of political leaders to see what they expect to see and to interpret information consistently with beliefs they already hold. They argue that the job of intelligence agencies is to present policy-makers with alternative interpretations. During the Cold War, the United States’ intelligence agencies did this far better than their Communist counterparts. They frequently presented policy-makers with viewpoints with which they disagreed. For example, the Nixon Administration thought CIA assessments of the aims of Soviet anti-ballistic missile development too moderate. The Carter Administration considered CIA analyses of Soviet policy towards Poland and Afghanistan too alarmist.
Moreover, in the United States an effort was made to reconcile conflicting perceptions and form them into an agreed view. That is what National Intelligence Estimates represented. By contrast, in the Communist states’ perceptions and practices were confused and contradictory. The West’s ("imperialism’s") capabilities were both over- and underestimated. It was seen as the cause of all dissent in the Communist world; its subversive capability was greatly overestimated. However, its economic vitality was underestimated because capitalism’s tendency towards self-destructive crisis was exaggerated. Despite the appeal of the West German lifestyle for East Germans, Hermann Axen, the SED Central Committee Secretary responsible for international relations, insisted in the 1980s that the GDR wielded more influence over the Federal Republic than the latter did over it. The US intelligence community achieved both more diversity of view and more agreement.

Overall, intelligence assessment was better in the democracies. National Intelligence Estimates may have had no effect on policy but at least they asked the right questions, pointed out opportunities for action and gave policy-makers the assurance of an agreed view.24 They reflected thinking shared between policy-makers and intelligence officials about what they should be thinking about. Moreover, they were only one intelligence product; there were many others. Richard Kerr, a former Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA, considers that US Intelligence has “provided American presidents and their foreign affairs teams with the broadest and most comprehensive information of any government on the planet.” Successes have greatly outnumbered failures. His firm belief is that:

What the record shows is that CIA’s analysis has helped to reduce the inherent uncertainty surrounding many foreign events, raise the level of understanding of the policy debates conducted by national security teams, and alert decision
makers to many critical issues that they would otherwise have missed or judged unimportant.25

The US intelligence community avoided the mistake made by the Communists; it did not maintain that every development which conflicted with the United States’ interests was the work of the USSR. Both the KGB and the Stasi had this tendency. KGB officers knew that their assessments would be acceptable to decision-makers if problems and reverses were simply blamed on the “Main Adversary.”26 Conspiracy theory prevailed over any proper analysis of intelligence. At the root of this were the expectations of the Communist Party, the regime’s insistence on the “scientific” nature of Marxism-Leninism and the KGB’s terrible fear and suspicion of their adversary in the bipolar context of the Cold War. The psychological tendency to overestimate one’s opponent affected the Communists, but the KGB’s obsession with a Western conspiracy against them was more ideological invention than psychological exaggeration. It was imposed on them by the Communist Party and followed naturally from the Marxist-Leninist belief that the world was divided into two camps, the one progressive and the other reactionary, and that the former was destined to prevail over the latter.27 As Raymond Garthoff relates, where the KGB embellished Marxism-Leninism was in believing that this conspiracy was directed by the Western secret services. The Stasi’s leaders also believed this; they regarded the Western intelligence services as inspiring all the opposition to Communism in the Soviet Bloc.28 In part, this was an extreme example of the psychological tendency to overestimate an adversary; the reason for it was fierce competition with the US intelligence community. In part, it reflected the projection of their own character on to their enemy. Conspirators themselves, they judged their enemy by the people they knew best—their own.29 Ideology underlay both psychological tendencies.
American statesmen had their own ideological beliefs, of course, but these were vaguer and less prescriptive, amounting to little more than the wish that the world become more “free.” Consequently, they were less at odds with reality. In the American case, the cognitive barriers to acceptance of intelligence were psychological rather than ideological.

US intelligence analysts understood the Soviet Union’s military capabilities better than its military or political intentions. This was natural since most intelligence was collected on military capabilities, as the principal threat to the United States. Furthermore, intentions are, by nature, more obscure. They therefore tended to be inferred from capabilities. The expansion and modernization of the USSR’s nuclear missile force were assessed “reasonably well.” Ben Fischer’s chapter provides much evidence of the discrepancy. The Soviet Union’s formidable military power long attracted too much of analysts’ attention. Alongside a good understanding of it ran a weaker understanding of political change in the Soviet Union. In the mid-1980s, entrenched views about the Soviet political system made analysts skeptical of the view that Gorbachev offered real change.

The CIA’s assessments of Soviet economic performance relied chiefly on sophisticated recalculations of official Soviet economic statistics. Its estimates of the USSR’s economic growth were good and have consistently found favor with economists. From the mid-1970s it increasingly brought attention to the USSR’s economic malaise.

Richard Kerr and Roger George argue that what US analysts did worst was give warning of imminent danger. They failed to warn of the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. They thought that they understood the situations
concerned and discounted evidence which did not fit this understanding. As Raymond Garthoff shows, both these decisions were taken by a tiny number of leaders and without asking the KGB to report on the United States’ likely reaction. Awareness of the United States’ likely reaction was one reason why American analysts considered aggressive moves by the USSR unlikely in 1962 and 1979. As Ben Fischer demonstrates, analysts did not understand the Soviet leaders well enough, did not understand the Soviet foreign policy-making process and relied too heavily on presumptions about Soviet international behavior. They assumed that the Soviet leaders calculated the harm aggressive action would do to the USSR’s interests better than they in fact did. This accords perfectly with the conclusion of May, Jervis and Heuer that analysts and policy-makers overestimate their foes because they are loath to underestimate them. Consequently, they perform badly when they try to put themselves in their enemies’ shoes. Richard Kerr’s view is that analysts’ understanding of the USSR’s leaders and politics was always poorer than its understanding of military capability or the economy.

How politicized was US intelligence during the Cold War? Its politicization was far milder than was the case with intelligence reporting in the Communist Bloc. Politicization is a “complicated phenomenon,” as Richard Betts has rightly observed. Gregory Treverton argues that there are five forms. The first is pressure on analysts from policy-makers to reach conclusions which support particular policies. An example is the pressure put by the Nixon Administration on US intelligence analysts in 1969 to present the Soviet Union as seeking a first-strike nuclear missile capability as this would provide justification for the Administration’s policy of developing anti-ballistic missiles. Tamir Libel and Shlomo Shpiro, in this collection, provide another good example of this, showing that Israeli analysts have
told policy-makers in intelligence briefings what they wanted to hear and have sought to protect themselves from criticism by keeping reports with more sensible conclusions on file, should the matter be the subject of an official investigation.38 The second is a “house view” within an analytic group which causes other views to be suppressed or ignored (the Iraqi WMD affair provides a good example of this: analysts were reluctant to underestimate Iraq’s WMD programs a second time, having done so prior to the Gulf War). The third is “cherry picking” by policy officials (or intelligence officials) of preferred views from a range of analyses (Iraq’s WMD programs again provide a good example: the George W. Bush Administration had decided for several reasons on war with Iraq and favored intelligence estimates which concluded that Iraq had, and was continuing to develop, WMD). The fourth is the asking of questions which steer analysis towards particular answers (a good example is the repeated questioning of the IC by the Bush Administration in 2001-3 over whether Saddam Hussein’s regime was in cahoots with Al-Qaeda since, as the IC advised, there was inadequate evidence of collaboration to justify such relentless questioning). The last is “mindsets” or presumptions which policy-makers and intelligence analysts share and which strongly influence their attitude towards incoming information on the subjects concerned (both the underestimation of Al-Qaeda prior to September 2001 and the overestimation of Saddam’s WMD programs in the years prior to the Iraq War of 2003 are good examples of this). As Treverton observes, the last is very much a borderline case for such politicization as does exist is imposed by the analysts on themselves.39

While the American experience demonstrates other forms of politicization at work during the Cold War, the main problem, certainly as far as assessments of the Soviet Union were concerned, was that of shared mindsets. Ben Fischer demonstrates
that for most of the 1970s both analysts and policy-makers held views of Soviet conduct which represented severe “mirror-imaging” of Soviet policy; this “mirror-imaging” underpinned both the US Government’s policy of détente with the USSR, and analysts’ favorable assessments of détente. Such “mirror-imaging” was possible owing to the lack of high-grade intelligence on the Soviet leadership’s thinking. Heavy reliance on technical intelligence, chiefly on the USSR’s military capabilities, meant that analysts tended to infer Soviet intentions from them. Nuclear capabilities were inevitably very menacing; this led to menacing assessments. The “Team A/Team B” dispute in 1976 between intelligence community analysts and outside experts over Soviet strategic objectives shows how much all involved relied on inference.

Analysts presented the Soviet leadership as reassured by the USSR’s achievement of strategic nuclear parity with the United States, as likely to moderate their international behavior in consequence, as pursuing “rough parity” rather than superiority in strategic missile forces, and as vulnerable to American pressure to stay within reasonable limits if they were minded to act aggressively. These presumptions made a policy of détente easier to pursue. They were undercut by what were seen as aggressive Soviet moves, beginning with the USSR’s expansion and modernization of its strategic missile force and its support for national liberation movements and Marxist regimes in the Third World. This Soviet course culminated in the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. By the early 1980s, when the Carter Administration gave way to the Reagan Administration, a new shared mindset prevailed in both Washington and Langley. Intelligence analyses now stressed the threat posed to American interests by Soviet interventions in the Third World and argued that American support for allies and resistance movements was containing Soviet expansion.
By contrast, all five forms of politicization severely distorted the intelligence reporting of the intelligence services of the Communist Bloc. The very concepts of a malign “imperialist” conspiracy and of a “Main Adversary” represented pressure on intelligence reporters to keep their reporting factual and to pass on intelligence which supported these ideas. Raymond Garthoff shows that there was a “house view” within the KGB’s assessment staff in the 1970s: the analysts believed in the regime’s anti-Western conspiracy theory and their analyses contained views more anti-American than those of the Communist Party’s leaders. The leading KGB officers were among the most anti-American elements in the entire regime. During the crisis over the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, in 1968, the KGB Chairman, Yuri Andropov, deliberately supplied the Politburo with biased intelligence assessments which supported the case for military intervention. He also withheld from the Politburo evidence which undermined his argument that the West was trying to stage a coup in Czechoslovakia. The KGB’s Washington station (its “residency”, in Soviet parlance) had obtained US government documents showing that the US government had neither anticipated the reform movement nor was controlling it; Andropov had them destroyed. This represents “cherry picking” of intelligence. It was part of a general practice: as Raymond Garthoff demonstrates, in the 1970s and 1980s much intelligence was sent daily by Soviet intelligence agencies to the Central Committee General Department, but it forwarded only a small fraction on to the leadership. It withheld information the Soviet leader would not like. Tellingly, the HVA and KGB were not given specific questions to answer; rather, they were required to collect intelligence which presupposed a grave Western threat. Their mindset was as hostile to the West as that of their regimes.
On the present state of the evidence, neither the Communist intelligence agencies nor their political masters were able adequately to comprehend or exploit either political or economic intelligence on the Western world. As John Lewis Gaddis and Vojtech Mastny have both argued, despite plentiful intelligence on the West, Soviet diplomacy under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev was remarkable for its clumsiness; time and again the Soviet leaders took initiatives which either harmed their relations with the West or even played into the West's hands. Intelligence on political and economic developments was ignored more often than was the case in the United States. The only information that seems to have benefited the USSR was military intelligence and scientific and technological intelligence (S&TI). The military intelligence would have greatly benefited it in war. The S&TI enabled it to develop weapons which were broadly comparable in quality with those of the United States and the other NATO powers. However, the barriers the Communist command economies put in the way of innovation and greater productivity prevented the Communists from exploiting S&TI to revive their sclerotic civilian economies. Indeed, so bad was the information the Communist leaders received on their own economies that they believed late in the Cold War that the free-market economies had greater problems than their own. Even Mikhail Gorbachev, when he spoke to the Twenty-seventh Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1986 on the need for "new thinking" in foreign policy, maintained that the crisis of capitalism was continuing to get worse.

For the most part, the intelligence cycle worked better in the democracies than in the Communist states. The major steps in it are: tasking; collection; analysis and production; and dissemination. Analysis has already been discussed. Both sides were proficient at collection (though the Soviets' Humint collection was better than that of
the United States, and the USA’s Techint collection better than that of the USSR). As regards tasking and dissemination, the democratic states were, again, clearly superior.

The Communist regimes did not ask the right questions. Such was the party leadership’s power that it tasked the intelligence services as it wished. In the Soviet case, tasking depended very much on the leader himself. Time and again the Soviet leader did not bother to task his foreign intelligence services to consider and report on the probable Western reaction to key initiatives. He judged the likely reaction himself—and severely misjudged it. The Berlin crisis of 1958-62, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Soviet support for national liberation movements and Marxist regimes in the Third World in the 1970s, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the Reykjavik summit of 1986 are all examples. Stalin probably did not request, either, an intelligence assessment of the likely reaction of the United States to his decision to give his consent to North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950. By contrast, a fundamental principle of American policy-making during the Cold War was that policy-makers needed analysts’ advice on the likely Soviet reaction to their initiatives.

The same weakness is visible in the case of the GDR. There the Russians had the last word on the tasking of the foreign intelligence service. They consistently gave preference to their own interests. The HVA’s tasking in the 1970s and 1980s was too military in character; this did not suit the GDR, which fell to a popular revolution, not a military attack.

The East German Communist leadership also had a large say in the Stasi’s tasking. It also tasked it badly. Like all faiths, Marxism-Leninism was hostile to unbelief and disliked whatever encouraged it. In the late 1950s, the GDR’s leaders, chief among them party leader Walter Ulbricht, disliked the intelligence reports they
received on the situation in East Germany because they passed on public criticism of the regime. The leadership laid down rules for the reporting of the Stasi and its foreign intelligence service with the aim of making it less critical. Thenceforth, the Stasi’s reporting was principally on the outside world, not on the GDR. In addition, the Stasi’s reporters only provided information on particular matters of interest. They could not ask themselves whatever questions they wanted and they did not ask the right ones. They consistently reported on “hostile activity” (Feindtätigkeit), which assumed that particular forms of political activity were meant to be hostile to the GDR and that they, rather than the Communists’ own illegitimacy and misrule, were the main cause of popular dissatisfaction. The Stasi’s reports could not be too critical. They were short information reports. They never examined a subject comprehensively.

Dissemination of intelligence within the US intelligence community has been criticized in recent years. Poor dissemination of intelligence between intelligence agencies contributed to the success of Al-Qaeda’s surprise attack on the United States in September 2001. However, a more important matter is the dissemination of intelligence to policy-makers. They cannot respond to perspectives which are not presented to them, or act on information they do not have. Intelligence was very poorly shared and discussed in Communist states. This was partly because it was very sensitive, partly because the regimes were extremely centralized. Little intelligence was supplied to most members of the Soviet Communist Party’s Politburo. As Raymond Garthoff stresses, most of them knew little about the Western world. They received no more information about it than was printed in the Party’s newspaper, Pravda. Even the top leaders received little. The GDR’s Politburo could not discuss intelligence, firstly because it was secret and secondly because there was no
intelligence report, akin to the United States’ Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, which was sent to all Politburo members. People received intelligence reports on particular subjects according to their expertise. Only the General Secretary knew the full list of recipients of the Parteiinformationen. Once the recipients had read the reports, they had to give them back and could not discuss them. Thus the reports did not serve as a basis for collective decision-making.49

The only respect in which the Communist states were clearly superior to the democracies was security. Strict Communist security influenced the intelligence collection of the Western intelligence agencies and thus affected their understanding of the Soviet Union and its Bloc. There was very little high-grade political intelligence. Well-placed human sources could have provided it but, as the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction conceded ten years ago, decades of effort by the CIA and other services to recruit human agents yielded only a few good sources reporting on the Soviet Union.50 American successes in decrypting high-grade Soviet ciphers were evidently rare. The only known successes are the decryption of cables sent to Moscow during the Second World War by Soviet intelligence offices in the United States (codenamed “Venona”) and, in the late 1970s, the decryption, thanks to the advent of the supercomputer, of high-level Soviet political, diplomatic and military communications.51

The secrecy of military, economic and scientific developments in the Soviet Union was severely diminished by the advent of American satellite reconnaissance of the Communist Bloc in 1960. Thereafter, both sides had greater security against surprise attack. Each also had a good understanding of the other’s military capabilities, though the United States’ National Intelligence Estimates tended to
overestimate the future capability of the Soviet armed forces (Soviet intelligence analysts may well have done the same). The tendency to produce “worst-case” estimates inevitably fueled the arms race. Nevertheless, from the early 1960s on no Soviet weapons system took the United States by surprise. It was thanks to confidence in satellite reconnaissance that the arms limitation treaties of the 1970s were signed and Cold War tension moderated.

Nevertheless, there remained serious gaps in understanding of the Soviet Union’s military capability. For example, knowledge of its nuclear weapon production complex, though good, was not complete. Another is Soviet missile technology. Some of the most serious disagreements between Team A and Team B arose from uncertainties over the accuracy of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Team B assumed that Soviet missile technology and engineering were as good as American, which Team A criticized as unjustifiable “mirror-imaging.” Team B therefore exaggerated the threat to the United States’ own ICBM force (its “counterforce” capability).

Good security also harmed the West German government’s understanding of the GDR. The poor quality of the BND’s analyses undermined its government’s confidence in them. Matthias Uhl’s chapter in this collection indicates that the service’s successes against the GDR were small ones. It was able to monitor the popular uprising in East Germany in June 1953 and gave the government some forewarning of the Berlin border closure of August 1961 and the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In the late 1980s, it also demonstrated to the Federal Government that there was probably still strong support for reunification among East Germans. However, it did not grasp the full extent of the GDR’s economic crisis. West Germany’s political leadership was deceived by the GDR’s
claim that it was one of the world’s ten leading industrial economies and did not realize in the late 1980s that the East German economy was on the point of collapse.56 Political intelligence collection on the GDR was also poor. So far as is known, in the last twenty-five years of the Cold War the BND failed to recruit any high-grade human sources in the GDR.57

The United States’ intelligence collection on its friends was inevitably poor and led to grave misjudgements. One example is the IC’s view of the Shah of Iran, whom it regarded as secure from overthrow until a few months before his flight from Iran. As before Pearl Harbor in December 1941, poor intelligence collection enabled flawed presumptions—the “Pahlavi Premise” that the Shah’s position was strong, that his army and security police could keep him in power, and that religious fundamentalism would not win mass support—to prevail.58

Cognitive errors

The collection provides much evidence of well-known cognitive errors. Mirror-imaging was common among American analysts during the Cold War (they should not be censured too much for it: it shows that they were thinking for themselves, at least, which the Soviet and East German foreign intelligence services were not). The lack of high-grade political intelligence on the Soviet regime encouraged it. The misjudgements of the Soviet Union to which it led have been referred to above. Another cognitive bias is the tendency to assimilate new information into an existing understanding. This was encouraged by analysts’ practice, to which Ben Fischer refers, of using precedents of Soviet conduct to predict trends in the USSR’s internal politics and foreign policy. The reliance on precedent made Gorbachev a very hard
target. Understandably, the intelligence community did not predict the end of the Cold War until it had already begun.\textsuperscript{59}

In the Soviet Union, the lack of high-grade political intelligence gave free rein to the influence of Marxism-Leninism, the personality of the party leader, and bureaucratic interests pushing for hostility to the West and a continuing arms build-up. Of course, the conviction that the West was hostile to the Soviet Union was so entrenched in the Soviet mind that it might have overcome top-quality intelligence on American policy. It was entrenched within the Soviet government itself. The International Department of the Communist Party’s Central Committee was a strong influence in favor of ideological orthodoxy. As a result, intelligence was usually ignored. The absence of evidence that the United States planned to make a nuclear first strike on the USSR was discounted and the quest for such evidence continued.

The Marxist-Leninist assumption of Western hostility took disregard of intelligence--and disregard of the lack of it--to an extreme. However, this was an extreme form of a mental model of suspicion and mistrust which existed in the United States as well and distorted American perceptions of the Soviet Union. One example is Team B’s worst-case estimate, in 1976, of Soviet strategic objectives. Team B regarded the USSR as trying to develop an offensive nuclear missile capability, backed up by an effective civil defense system, which would enable it to make a successful first strike on the United States, absorb any American second strike, and thus win a nuclear war.\textsuperscript{60} Actually, the USSR is believed then to have been pursuing only an effective retaliatory capability.\textsuperscript{61} Another example is the conviction of President Lyndon Johnson and his successor, Richard Nixon, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, disregarding the lack of evidence to this effect, that the Soviet Union, China and Cuba were orchestrating worldwide protest against the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{62}
The latter is an example of the common mistake of attributing to an adversary more coordination than he has.

The Cold War provides resounding confirmation for a maxim which Ernest May distilled from the studies collected in Knowing One’s Enemies: that presumptions which influence how intelligence is interpreted need to be carefully examined.63 These presumptions are very often policies or part of the rationale for them; they reflect “mirror-imaging.” Intelligence will always be incomplete and therefore attitudes and presumptions will always seep deeply into its interpretation. The failure of US intelligence analysts to understand Iraq’s WMD programs in the years between the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003 is a classic example of this. Very flawed presumptions were applied to weak intelligence, resulting in huge overestimation of the ambitions and capabilities of Saddam Hussein’s regime.64

However, the collection shows that ideological thinking leads to graver, more persistent errors than “mirror-imaging.” Marxist-Leninist ideological axioms were written on tablets of stone and could not be challenged by the intelligence services. One was that capitalism had an inherent tendency to crisis and would collapse; Communism would triumph and become the leading social system in the world. A related belief was that, as capitalism’s crisis deepened, the capitalists would try to escape from it by waging war on the Soviet Bloc; this belief prompted Yuri Andropov’s decision, in 1981, to order a worldwide intelligence operation to look for signs of an American first strike on the USSR. A further ideological bias was the belief of the Soviet leadership that the global “correlation of forces” was bound to turn in its favor; this caused it, in the mid-1970s, to overestimate the significance of the United States’ defeat in Vietnam and the success of Marxist national liberation movements in the Third World.65
The US intelligence community’s failure to prevent the attacks by Al-Qaeda on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted, not from overestimation, but from underestimation. As Mark Stout shows, the Cold War cast a long shadow over intelligence analysts. To their way of thinking, until September 2001 the gravest threats to the United States had to come from states and weapons of mass destruction. Al-Qaeda, not being the one and not having the other, was not regarded as a threat of the first rank. The number of people it could kill without WMD was also underestimated. Again, that demonstrates how important it is to challenge presumptions. Stout’s conclusion, that understanding is a social process, is entirely in accord with the IC’s current attitude towards analysis.

It is a well-known phenomenon that human beings overestimate the extent to which others are responding to their initiatives. Raymond Garthoff and Ben Fischer show that this mistake was made by both the United States and the Soviet Union during the détente period. The USSR’s leaders regarded the United States as having been forced into détente by their country’s strategic strength. Ben Fischer shows that, for their part, American policy-makers and analysts overestimated the influence the United States had over the Soviet Union’s international conduct.66

The academic literature stresses that error arises when the human mind follows its natural tendency of assimilating new information into knowledge it already has. This tendency makes it resist new interpretations. However, the lack of such knowledge is also a danger: the new information is simply not understood at all. Raymond Garthoff shows that Soviet leaders’ assessment of the international situation was affected by the fact that they could not understand the US political system, having had no experience of it or anything like it.
The Cold War provides much evidence in support of two more of May’s maxims in Knowing One’s Enemies: that prudence generally causes intelligence analysts and policy-makers to overestimate their enemies’ capabilities, understanding and skill; and that policy-makers should rely on their intelligence services more for tactical warning and short-term predictions than long-term predictions (though the US analysts’ poor performance, mentioned above, in predicting aggressive moves by the Soviet Union and other states should be borne in mind).

There are numerous examples of each side overestimating the other. Even as South Vietnam was being conquered by the North Vietnamese in 1975, for instance, KGB chairman Yuri Andropov thought that a new American invasion of the country was possible. The same prudence made the CIA’s intelligence analysts, in the late Cold War, slow to understand how much change Mikhail Gorbachev was willing to make to Soviet foreign policy to end the Cold War. President Reagan was persuaded to respond to Gorbachev’s overtures, not by the intelligence community, but by Gorbachev’s own concessions. The State Department, under George Shultz, was quicker to see the opportunity presented by Gorbachev’s new foreign policy than was the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence.

This has continued into the post-Cold War era. Directly after the 9/11 attacks, as Mark Stout explains, the CIA was too willing to regard cooperation between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime as possible. It never concluded that the two were cooperating, but it saw this as possible because it did not want to be too complacent.

The Soviet regime presented the US intelligence community with the difficult task of monitoring the decay of Marxism-Leninism. Such a long-term trend is inevitably mysterious. The USSR began the Cold War as a highly ideological actor.
Stalin was, at root, an ideologue who merely supplemented his ideological goals with pragmatic initiatives. He never ceased to believe in the international class struggle and the irreconcilability of Communism and capitalism. For him, there were no universal human values uniting the Communist and capitalist worlds. By the 1970s ideology and pragmatism were contending more as equals in the Soviet policy-making system. Each had its institutional champions. Pragmatism won out when Gorbachev became Soviet leader in 1985; he saw that the Cold War was not merely unwinnable but was holding the Soviet Union in backwardness. His policy became to end it. The US intelligence community was slow to see this because, to quote Christopher Andrew, “scarred by forty years of Cold War” it was reluctant to let its guard down.69

The obscurity of intentions

Propensities remain very obscure and hard to divine. Attempting to divine them commits an intelligence community not merely to obtaining secrets but also to comprehending mysteries. Ernest May pointed out in Knowing One’s Enemies that the governments of the 1930s found one another harder to understand than those of the 1910s because they were more diverse and their workings more complicated and obscure. By contrast, the governments of the period before the First World War had resembled a gentlemen’s club.70 This trend continued in the Cold War era and continues today. The chapters in this volume demonstrate how, despite large intelligence communities and assessment staffs, the governments of West and East had a poor understanding of one another from 1945 to 1990 and, in the 1990s, were slow to grasp the rising threat of sub-state actors like Al-Qaeda.

The Cold War provides much evidence that US intelligence analysts performed capably in alerting policy-makers to problems. However, owing to the
Cold War’s astonishingly rapid end, they have been criticized for focusing too much on the Soviet Union’s military and economic strength and not studying it sufficiently in the round. Examining it as a totality would have helped analysts realize the full significance of its weaknesses, and particularly that of the ethnic tensions within it.\textsuperscript{71}

This collection also stresses that, to estimate how security threats will develop, it is essential to study them comprehensively. Tamir Libel and Shlomo Shpiro demonstrate that Israeli analysts have examined Palestinian terrorism too narrowly; they have focused too much on giving warning of attack and have neglected the political development of Palestinian terrorism. Concerned, as they have been, with attacks by terrorist organizations, they have neglected “the street.” The West German Federal Intelligence Service made the same mistake, as Matthias Uhl shows: its practice, in the early 1960s, was to analyze political and military intelligence separately, which made the construction of the Berlin Wall harder to predict.

An urgent challenge for analysts and policy-makers now is to understand youth. The youth of the Muslim world have been the motor behind Palestinian and jihadist terrorism and the uprisings, since 2011, which have made up the so-called “Arab Spring.” Tamir Libel and Shlomo Shpiro point to the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate’s lack of collection capabilities on social and economic developments in the Palestinian community. Since such developments radicalize youth, they need to be monitored.

The need to see the situation and oneself as the target state sees them, and the difficulty of doing so, emphasize the importance of diplomats as sources of insight into the outside world. For security reasons, intelligence analysts spend little or no time in the countries they study. By contrast, diplomats are posted there and come to understand them well. In this collection, Eunan O’Halpin shows how much better
than their political masters in London. British ambassadors in Dublin understood the political situation in the Republic of Ireland and in the Irish Republican Army in Dublin. Raymond Garthoff demonstrates how, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Foreign Ministry played a large role in intelligence assessment and regarded itself as the regime’s best source of information on international affairs. When Ronald Reagan was President of the United States, his wife’s astrologer was also a rival. She provided the President with horoscopes of Gorbachev purporting to explain his character and his likely behavior. All four of Reagan’s summit meetings with Gorbachev took place on days considered by the astrologer to be astrologically suitable.

The collection also underlines the weakness of intelligence in comparison with personal experience. Raymond Garthoff considers personal contacts to have been the most important influence on Soviet leaders’ understanding of the United States. Intelligence is now growing in importance in decision-making since political leaders have no contact with terrorists.

Most fundamentally, intelligence cannot influence policy if policy-makers refuse to let policy give way to it. This point is made by Eunan O’Halpin in his chapter. He shows that Britain failed to take loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland seriously enough early enough, even though it was the root of the problem. Britain focused too much on the Provisional IRA (PIRA). The main reason was policy, though PIRA’s attacks on targets in mainland Britain were a further factor. Britain’s commitment to the Union of Britain and Northern Ireland doomed it to handling republican terrorism in Northern Ireland with a mixture of insensitivity and lack of self-understanding. Cultural affinity with republicanism was important; Britain’s
Conservative Party lacked it, though Celts in the Labour Party, like James Callaghan, did not.

Reorganization and self-understanding

May put forward two further maxims: that re-organization offers little in the way of improved performance (certainly less than good working procedures) and that any analyst has to have a good understanding of his own country’s strengths and weaknesses and of who its enemies are. Both are very relevant to today. Mark Stout shows both that the US intelligence community was, prior to September 2001, slow to realize how dangerous an enemy of the United States Al-Qaeda was and that the US intelligence community’s post-9/11 reorganization has had no effect on its understanding of the jihadists. The terrorist threat increases the need to understand one’s own society since, as an asymmetric threat, to do harm it relies on exploiting its enemy’s weaknesses. SOVA analysts, at the time of NATO’s “Able Archer” exercise in 1983, did not know of the many “psy ops” the Reagan Administration was undertaking against the USSR and so did not know the full extent of the threat which Soviet leaders thought they saw.

This collection also provides evidence of crude cognitive errors which have distorted understanding of foes. The US intelligence community’s failure, analyzed by Mark Stout, to understand the importance of religion to jihadists prior to September 2001 was a profound cognitive error. It resulted from a lack of imagination and from political correctness. Analysts did not fully realize how fanatically religious their foes were (or how secular American society was, which created an imaginative gulf between them). The same lack of imagination made analysts slow to grasp during the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 that the Shah would be replaced by an Islamic
fundamentalist regime. As Gary Sick, then the National Security Council staffer responsible for Iran, commented later, “The notion of a popular revolution leading to the establishment of a theocratic state seemed so unlikely as to be absurd.”

Likewise, Julian Richards shows that the Pakistani army officers who have so often dominated their country’s government have regarded their people as superior to Indians. This crude religious and ethnic prejudice has caused them to exaggerate their own strength and start wars with India which they have lost.

This collection underlines that the roads to error are many. The authors’ hope is that it makes those roads harder to travel.

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7 These are terms used to refer to the understandings of particular problems which intelligence analysts and policy-makers have; they are ways of making a very complicated reality comprehensible to the human mind. Most analysts use the term “mindset.” Heuer and Pherson prefer the term “mental model,” arguing that such understandings are natural and inevitable and that the term for them should not have a negative connotation, as “mindset” has (see their Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, 5).

8 May, Knowing One’s Enemies, 537-42; Richards J. Heuer Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999).


11 The Communist party was known as the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED).

12 On the sources now available on Soviet and US intelligence during the Cold War, see Raymond Garthoff, “Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 22-29. The thousands of
records declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency and transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration are held in Record Group (RG) 263. An overview of the contents of RG 263 is available online at: 

As later chapters in this book explain, there have been no declassifications of intelligence records in Israel and Pakistan.


14 See James G. Blight and David A. Welch, eds., *Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (London: Frank Cass, 1998) (also published as a special edition of *Intelligence and National Security* 13, no. 3 (Autumn 1998)); Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning* (Brookings Institution Press, 1982). For a broader view of analytical error, see Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 13. The US intelligence community has tried to correct this focus on analytical error by publishing collections of declassified intelligence analyses. They are listed in Garthoff, “Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War,” 24, n. 3 (see note 12 above). Analyses of the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence were the subject of a conference on “CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991,” which was held at Princeton University in March 2001. These documents were not only released to the National Archives and Records Administration, but were also made available online at:


15 Michael Herman, “Intelligence Effects on the Cold War: Some Reflections,” in Michael Herman, J. Kenneth McDonald and Vojtech Mastny, *Did Intelligence Matter
in the Cold War? (Oslo, Norway: Institutt for forsvarsstudier, no. 1 (2006)), 10; Garthoff, “Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War,” 41.

16 Two recent studies of the influence of ideology on Soviet policy are: Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (University of North Carolina Press, 2007) and Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011). Recent studies of its influence on American policy are:


17 May, Knowing One’s Enemies, 503-4.

18 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, 185-87.


20 On the Team A--Team B dispute over Soviet strategic objectives, see US Congress, Senate, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sub-committee on Collection, Production and Quality, The National Intelligence Estimates A--B Team
Strategic Threat; John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and
Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial Press, 1982). For claims that, in 2001-3,
the Bush Administration put pressure on analysts to reach conclusions supportive of
the Administration’s policy of war on Iraq, see James Bamford, A Pretext for War:
9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies (New York: Doubleday,
2004); John Prados, Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a
21 Richard J. Kerr, “The Track Record: CIA Analysis from 1950 to 2000,” in George
and Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence, 36.
22 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1949), 7. That forecasting future developments is, in
particular, the purpose of National Intelligence Estimates is emphasized in Harold P.
Ford, Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence
23 Kerr, “The Track Record,” 41-42.
24 For a call for National Intelligence Estimates to contribute more directly to the
policy process, see Treverton, “Intelligence Analysis: Between ‘Politicization’ and
Irrelevance,” in George and Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence, 102.
26 Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in
27 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics, revised ed. (New

29 Herman, “Intelligence Effects on the Cold War: Some Reflections,” 17.


31 Indeed, the Cold War ended with the claim that the West’s ideology had been vindicated: see Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

32 Kerr, “The Track Record,” 38.


37 J. Kenneth McDonald, “How much did intelligence matter in the Cold War?,” in Herman, McDonald and Mastny, *Did Intelligence Matter in the Cold War?*, 53-54.

38 The WMD Commission and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence make express findings in their reports on the Iraqi WMD affair that American analysts did not adjust their findings in response to pressure from the George W. Bush Administration to conclude that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction. However, analysts would be loath to admit that they did succumb to pressure. They were strongly minded, anyway, not to underestimate Saddam’s WMD programs again, as they had done before the Gulf War. The pressure from the Administration may have increased their inclination to be prudent, but in a way so subtle that the analysts themselves were unaware of it.


43 The German courts which tried spies of the HVA who supplied intelligence on NATO referred in their judgements to the advantage their information would have given the Warsaw Pact if there had been a war in Europe: see Georg Herbstritt, *Bundesbürger im Dienst der DDR-Spionage: Eine analytische Studie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2007), 303-6.

45 Garthoff, “Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War,” 35.

46 See Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 5.


52 Garthoff, “Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War,” 37-38.

53 McDonald, “How much did intelligence matter in the Cold War?,” 48-49.


55 Cahn, Killing Détente, 144-47.


60 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, 197-98.


62 Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, 335-36, 354-55.

63 May, Knowing One’s Enemies, 541-42.


68 Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, 495-500.

69 Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, 499.

70 May, Knowing One’s Enemies, 528, 530-32.

71 See Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War, 101; see also John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 283-84.

72 Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, 498.

73 On this, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, chap. 6.

A recent study which makes the same point is Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

74 May, Knowing One’s Enemies, 532-34, 538-39, 541.

75 Treverton, “Intelligence Analysis: Between ‘Politicization’ and Irrelevance,” in George and Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence, 97.

76 On these “psy ops”, see Thomas C. Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War (New York: Presidio Press, 2004).

77 Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Fateful Encounter with Iran (London: Tauris, 1985), 164-65.