The relationship between ideology and changing family policies in France, the United Kingdom and Spain

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND CHANGING FAMILY POLICIES IN FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SPAIN

by

Peter T. Welsh

A Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

September 1999

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Abstract

This thesis presents a comparative analysis of the relationship between party political ideology and changing family policies during the 1980s and 1990s in France, the UK and Spain. It explores theoretical perspectives on political ideology, policy analysis and policy change. Different disciplinary approaches to the analysis of public policy are reviewed in relation to policy change and ideologies. The thesis tests theories of ideology by applying them in three substantive case studies of family policy change in France, the UK and Spain. Each case study analyses the manifestos of the major political parties in relation to eight family policy instruments, pro-family statements and their position in relation to the opposing state intervention dimensions of public/private and family/individual. The policy measures are further considered within two dimensions: regulatory and support. Family policies in the three study countries are examined from their origins to the late 1970s. The study continues with a parallel thematic analysis of changing family policies and political ideologies as expressed in party electoral manifestos. Sixty-one manifestos from the main parties of each country are compared cross-nationally and in relation to changing family policies. The findings are then studied with reference to the theoretical framework. The thesis concludes that family policies have evolved in line with changing political ideologies and that there is some evidence to support cross-national convergence in these areas. It remains difficult, however, to establish a strong causal link between the two dimensions. In addition, the conclusions consider the review of scientific research into family policies and make some observations relating to the distinct development of research in each national context.
Keywords

Ideology
Family policy
Political party
State intervention
Cross-national
Manifesto
Convergence
France
United Kingdom
Spain
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACT       Automatic Credit Transfer
AF        Allocations familiales
AFEAMA    Aide à la famille pour l’emploi d’une assistante maternelle agréée
AGED      Allocation de garde d’enfant à domicile
ALF       Allocation de logement familiale
ALRA      Abortion Law Reform Association
AP        Alianza Popular
APE       Allocation parentale d’éducation
API       Allocation de parent isolé
APJE      Allocation pour jeune enfant
ARS       Allocation de rentrée scolaire
ASF       Allocation de soutien familial
CAF       Caisse d’allocations familiales
CCOO      Comisiones Obreras
CDS       Centro Democratico y Social
CES       Conseil économique et social
CF        Complément familial
CGT       Confédération générale du travail
CIS       Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
CNRAF     Caisse nationale des allocations familiales
CNRS      Centre national pour la recherche scientifique
CPAG      Child Poverty Action Group
CREDOC    Centre de recherche pour l’étude et l’observation des conditions de vie
CSA       Child Support Agency
DSS       Department of Social Security
EU        European Union
FN        Front national
FPA       Family Planning Association
FPSC      Family Policy Studies Centre
IDF       Institut de l’enfance et de la famille
INED      Institut national pour l’étude de la démographie
INSEE     Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques
IU        Izquierda Unida
IVG       Interruption volontaire de grossesse
MCA       Married Couple’s Allowance
MIRE      Mission recherche et expérimentation
MMA       Married Man’s Allowance
MRG       Movement Radical de Gauche
NHS       National Health Service
PCE       Partido Comunista de España
PCF       Parti communiste français
PM        Prime Minister
PP        Partido Popular
PR        Parti radical
PS        Parti Socialiste
PSOE      Partido Socialista Obrero Español
RPF       Rassemblement du peuple français
RPR       Rassemblement pour la République
SFIO  Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière
SMP  Statutory Maternity Pay
TMR  Training and Mobility of Young Researchers
UCD  Unión de Centro Democrático
UDF  Union pour la démocratie française
UDR  Union des démocrates pour la République
UNAF  Union nationale des associations familiales
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Chapter 1 - INTRODUCTION

Political interest and state intervention in the family sphere are themes that have been addressed since the time of Plato or Aristotle (Barker, 1962). The inseparable link between the family and its foundational role in society has also provided a central theme in political thought, as demonstrated by Jean-Jaques Rousseau's affirmation, 'la plus ancienne de toutes les sociétés et la seule naturelle est celle de la famille' (The oldest of all societies, and the only natural one, is the family) (1966: 41).

In twentieth century Europe, this political concern with the family became a policy reality through the introduction and development of a number of instruments by political parties and governments aimed at regulating families, for example through measures relating to marriage and divorce, birth control, relations between parents and children. Families have also been targeted by governments as primary groups through measures such as child benefits, tax relief and service provision, thus placing family policy within the wider question of the relationship between the state and citizens. Whereas some states pursued highly visible and institutionalised family policy strategies, others developed welfare policies which were not, in name, specific to families. The thesis examines three European Union (EU) member states that are representatives of the above categories: France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Spain.

France is an example of a country with a statist tradition and consequently a long history of state intervention in the family sphere. Although financial support for families originated in the private sector (in the form of family wage schemes), French political parties, notably of the right, progressively developed family policy measures during the 1920s and 1930s. These initiatives led to the introduction of the legislative
foundation of subsequent French family policy, the Code de la famille (Family Code) in 1939. In the following decades, through the Vichy régime and into the Fourth Republic, the Code de la famille was built upon, and the period to 1958 became known as the 'Golden Age' of French family policy (Lenoir, 1985). During this period state support for the family, also included pro-natalist objectives, reflecting the political ideology of the right, which characterised family policy in France at that time.

From the 1960s, transformations in family sociology and population in Europe began to be reflected in the concerns of policy makers. The 'baby boom' of the 1950s and 1960s initially allayed the fears of pro-natalists. Later, changing patterns of family life, resulting from an increase in women's paid work and changing social mores, presented new challenges to party political conceptions of the family as well as family policies. In addition, the economic impact of the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 led governments to re-evaluate public spending. By the beginning of the 1980s the effects of socio-demographic transformations (resulting from divorce law reforms, equality of parental authority and a growth in diversity of family forms) challenged the ideological foundations of the 'Golden Age' system of family support. In addition, the growing influence of monetarism brought state intervention into question. Thus during the 1980s and 1990s, this package of family policies became increasingly threatened. Because of these pressures, family policy remained a key aspect of French social policy and party political debate into the second half of the 1990s.

The term 'the family' is used intentionally to reflect the normative objectives of family policy at the time.
The origins of the modern welfare state in the UK date back to the second world war and the, so-called, Beveridge Report\(^2\) which was, in part, based upon assumptions about family life and the division of labour between the sexes. While measures to support families have been present in UK social policy, there has never been a coherent set of family policies, as in France, largely due to the fact that the UK had a tradition of suspicion in matters of state intervention in the private sphere. The lack of what some authors (notably Kamerman and Kahn, 1978: 3) have called 'explicit' family policies in the UK has not, however, resulted in the absence of the family as a theme of party political ideologies. Indeed one of the most striking features of social debate amongst UK political parties was the increase in family themes from the late 1970s, to the point where, by the mid-1990s, both right and left wing parties were openly claiming to represent the interests of the family.

The case of family policy in Spain is intrinsically linked with the fundamental political and institutional changes which have taken place since the 1930s. The radical social policies of the Spanish Second Republic (1932-36) were brought to a dramatic end by the Civil War (1936-38) and the subsequent victory of the reactionary forces under the command of General Francisco Franco. The ensuing authoritarian regime introduced strict control of family life in the Penal and Civil Codes which were enforced for over forty years. The family under Franco's ideology was firmly based upon the principles of patriarchal authority, religious (Roman Catholic) marriage and pro-natalism. After Franco's death in 1975, however, Spain entered a new democratic era in which similar, but less marked, social and demographic changes to those that were taking place in France and the UK were faced by policy makers. In addition, this

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\(^2\)Social Insurance and Allied Services (Beveridge, 1942).
radical break saw the emergence of new parties of left and right, each of which had their own conceptions of the relationship between the state and citizens and the role of the family in society. Since the late 1970s, a number of sweeping reforms, introduced largely by left wing parties, have impacted upon family life in Spain, notably in relation to gender equality, divorce and abortion. However, as in the UK, explicit family policies have not been developed.

In addition to wide-ranging socio-demographic transformations, family policies in France, the UK and Spain have evolved within changing political climates. The number of studies examining the impact of socio-demographic trends on family policies has been growing in parallel with them. Equally, research activity in the three countries in this area has reflected trends and the concerns of policy makers.

The visibility of the family in party political debate has been accompanied by a growing body of literature. In France, authors including Jaques Commaille (1991a, 1991b) and Rémi Lenoir (1987, 1991) have addressed questions relating to the relationship between family policies and politics and political ideas. While this work represents only a small proportion of the vast body of family policy literature in France, interest in the theme continued to develop during the 1990s (Commaille and Claude Martin, 1998). In contrast to France, the Spanish literature on family policy and party political ideologies appears limited, although growth in the study of Spanish family policies gained impetus in the 1990s. The study of the impact of party politics on families and family policies has, however, become a significant focus within this developing literature, notably in Spain, where political scientists have sought to redress the imbalance (see Valiente, 1995c, 1997; Madruga, 1996).
In the UK, authors began examining the relationship between politics and the family from the 1980s. Some, notably Diana Gittins (1985), looked at the family as a means of social control and investigated how it affected the behaviour of individuals. While others (such as Muncie and Whetherell, 1995; Lister, 1996), particularly from the mid-1990s, began to examine the family as a theme in politics with special reference to the Conservative party and Thatcherism. This growing research interest in the family as an element of party political thought and discourse can be tracked through the increasing use of the terms 'ideology' or 'ideological' in the literature. Indeed, it has become relatively common for authors to refer to ideology in the context of family policy (Barrett and McIntosh, 1991; Harding, 1996; Jones and Millar, 1996) or to speak of 'family ideology' (the central theme in Gittins, 1985), 'ideological positioning' (Lister, 1996: 11) and 'ideological assumptions' (Reynolds, 1996: 189). This increase in the number of references to ideology in relation to family policy in the UK is highly significant, given that the term 'family policy' has not been used by British governments, and that numerous authors (Land and Parker, 1978; Abbot and Wallace, 1992: 117; Ringen, 1997) have commented on the fact that family policy has been largely implicit in the UK.

The growing focus on politics and, in particular, party political ideology in the context of changing family policies has, however, neglected two key considerations. First, it is unclear from the family policy literature what exactly is understood by ideology. Second, there has been no substantive examination of what, if any, relationship exists between political ideology and changing family policies. This thesis is therefore an exploratory study that attempts to contribute to the existing literature and to unravel the relationship between party political ideology and changing family policies through
the comparative analysis of France, the UK and Spain up to the late 1990s. The following sections define the key terms and introduce the hypotheses, research questions and methods employed in the thesis. The chapter concludes with the presentation of the structure and content of the thesis.

Defining terms
Since both ideology and family policy are disputed concepts, it is important to clarify how these two key terms as used in the thesis.

Ideology
The focus of the literature on ideology has largely been divided between two approaches. This distinction is made in the present study by referring to ‘ideology’ and ‘ideologies’ (for example, party political ideology, family ideology, right or left wing ideology and so on).

First, ‘ideology’ has been studied as a process or structure which seeks to explain the role of ideas and beliefs in social and political change, especially by Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels (1975) and by Marxists and neo-Marxists such as Vladimir Lenin (1960, 1971), Georg Lukács (1923), Louis Althusser (1965, 1971a, 1971b) and Antonio Gramsci (1971). These authors have addressed key issues such as the nature of ideology, its role in the power struggle between classes and, of particular relevance to the thesis, the relationship between state and citizen (Marx and Engels, 1986).

Second, the term ‘ideologies’ has been developed as a label for the classification of largely coherent systems of political thought, such as Fascism, Communism, Nationalism, Feminism, Environmentalism or that of political parties (Eagleton, 1994; Funderburk and Thoebaben, 1994; Vincent, 1995).
According to Marx, the ruling class not only controls the means of material production, but also the means of intellectual production. When combined, these two elements, he argues, serve to maintain the dominance of the ruling class. The control of the means of intellectual production is the focus of Marx’s theory of ideology. In this context, ideology is the process and structure which determines society’s system of norms, beliefs or ideas, in particular those relating to the legitimacy of the political and economic systems. In this way ideology serves to maintain the interests of the ruling class. Ideology is thus fundamental to political stability and is intrinsically conservative. Following from this, if any fundamental change in the political system is to take place, such as that which occurred in Spain during the late 1970s, then a different political ideology must displace that of the ruling class. By so doing, a new ruling ideology serves to legitimise a new set of political norms. This concept of ideology can be adapted to the study of changing family policy in the following illustration: the basic ideological premise that state intervention in the family sphere is necessary or desirable determines the nature of any policies which seek to achieve objectives therein, such as regulation of relationships and material support. Thus, in states in which an ideology serves to legitimise state intervention, it is probable that family policies are more visible and have a greater impact than in states which do not.

The term ‘ideologies’ also has its roots in Marxist thought (Fiske, 1991) and is complimentary to the concept of ideology as a process insofar as it identifies those sets of beliefs intrinsic to stability or change in political and social terms. In the case of family policy change, political ideologies can be seen in shifts in the nature of policies, for examples in the debate surrounding the payment of child benefits to the first child in France (see Chapter 6). While this debate centred on opposing party political ideologies, the fundamental principle of child benefits was not questioned, solely details relating to the type, value and means of payment. Thus party political ideologies may be in conflict but remain within the limits of an ideology, represented in this example as the level of state intervention in the family sphere. Changes in
family policies may, therefore, occur as a result of conflict between party political ideologies (for example shifts between right and left at elections). Central elements of the present study are thus continuity and change in both party political ideologies and family policies.

In the context of the family policy literature examined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, ideologies, as a set of beliefs, are referred to in references to 'family ideology' or 'family ideologies'. In this sense, family ideology is specifically a set of beliefs that makes assumptions about the legitimacy of state intervention in the family sphere, the role of the family in society, relationships between family members and the definition of what does or does not constitute a family.

While ideology thus defined is valuable as a descriptive tool and serves to classify different beliefs about the family, it has been criticised as having limited analytical value. However, the identification of political ideologies and their position in relation to the family, the relationship between the family and the state and the nature of any political intervention in the family sphere is a necessary exercise if the role of ideology and its function in changing family policies is to be examined. This thesis argues that, if party political ideologies are not first identified and defined, then it may not be possible to examine the nature and extent of change therein.

In the family policy literature outlined above, Janet Finch's (1996) contribution provides a valuable clue to the relationship between ideology and family policies. She (1996) suggests that policies are often ideologically driven and are based on assumptions about what families should be doing. Finch thus echoes the concept of ideology as a process which provides the basis for a framework for the substantive examination of the relationship between party political ideology and changing family

\^Gann (1995) has criticised studies which examine 'ideologies' (e.g. Fascism, Nationalism, Communism) on the grounds that any political statement may be construed as ideology, and she stresses the value of studying ideology as a concept.
policies, first, by conceptualising the function of ideology and, second, by identifying policy change as a possible indicator of this function. Ideology in the specific context of the thesis is understood as a process in which changes in party political ideologies precede, and are essential for, changes in family policy.

**Family policy**

When compared to the study of ideology, family policy appears to be a relatively modern field of inquiry (Kamerman and Kahn, 1997: 6). Much of the debate has focussed on either the explicit/implicit classification of family policies across countries (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978: 3), or across different disciplinary boundaries (Hantrais and Letablier, 1996). In addition, the definition of family policy is fundamentally dependent upon a definition of ‘family’. Linda Hantrais and Marie-Thérèse Letablier (1996) have explored the wide variety of definitions of the family as defined for statistical purposes by national and supra-national institutions, by policy makers or by sociologists. The authors highlight the difficulties of defining the family in the context of increased diversification of family forms. These definitions do not always correspond to traditional nuclear family definitions based upon the heterosexual married couple of breadwinner and housewife who live together with their biological children. Increased instances of lone parent or reconstituted families in EU countries have limited the utility of family as a concept. In spite of this, political parties have regularly referred to ‘the family’ or ‘families’ and policy measures have contained family in their titles (family credit, *allocations familiales*, *plus de cargas familiares*).

Differing political definitions of the family can be said to reveal differing party political ideologies. Given the specific focus in the thesis on changing family policies, as opposed to changing family forms, it is necessary to take account of variations in institutional definitions across time and space. Of the three countries, only Spain
defines the family in its Constitution, and this definition has been interpreted as being intentionally vague and therefore flexible (Valiente, 1995c). Indeed, as a flexible definition of the family is convenient for political parties, it is also useful for the purposes of this thesis. Adopting a rigid definition of family policy would, at best, limit the scope of the present study to a very specific set of measures, as suggested by Brin (1991), or, at worst, call into question the inclusion of both the UK and Spain in the analysis given the lack of 'family policy' as an official term during the case study period. If a flexible definition of the family allows for married or cohabiting couples, lone parents with children and reconstituted families, then family policy would refer to any deliberate state action which targets families whatever their form. This action may include measures which seek to regulate relationships between partners or parents and children, which provide material support for families (in cash or kind). In addition the thesis considers abortion and contraception which, while not strictly targeted at families, provide additional significant indicators of party political ideologies containing themes of pro-natalism and anti-feminism. For the purposes of the thesis, family policy is defined as consisting of measures which seek to regulate or support either couples, or a parent, or parents and their dependent children.

Since each policy measure within family policy may be based upon distinct party political ideologies, it is important to examine those themes of party political ideologies associated with each of the family policy measures examined in the case studies. Two advantages of this approach are: first, the focus on individual policies allows for cross-national comparison to be made of countries which do not claim to have a coherent family policy; and second, this approach is not affected by institutional changes (for example changes in the departments which are responsible for each policy measure) or changes in name (such as 'family allowances' being renamed 'child benefits'), either or both of which may prove significant indicators of changes in party political ideology.
The study of the relationship between party political ideology and family policies thus focuses on distinct family policy measures as opposed to 'family policy' as an overarching concept. The measures selected for study all fit the above definition of policies which aim to regulate or support families and are, henceforth, collectively referred to as family policy or family policies.

Hypothesis and research questions

It has been stated above that scientific interest in the relationship between politics and family policy has grown in the 1990s in France, the UK and Spain. Within this growing body of research, ideology has been identified as a recurring theme, most commonly in the UK literature. In the context of the thesis ideology is understood as a process which focuses on the relationship between party political ideologies and changing family policies. According to this theory of ideology, changes in family policy are the product of changes in party political ideologies.

The thesis contests the argument that only changes in the ideology of political élites bring about changes in policies, on the grounds that other variables, including minor parties, lobbies, economic conditions or legislation from supra-national bodies such as European Union directives, also play a role. The thesis investigates the hypothesis that, whereas changes in party political ideologies may be translated into changes in family policies, any changes in family policies resulting from any other variable may in turn bring about changes in party political ideologies.

The concept of 'change' is central to the understanding of the relationship between party political ideology and family policies. In seeking to examine such a relationship, change or continuity in both family policies and party political ideologies must be identified. The thesis thus seeks to answer the following key questions across the three countries studied:
1. To what extent have family policies changed?
2. To what extent have family policies converged/diverged across the countries?
3. To what extent have party political ideologies relating to the family changed?
4. To what extent have party political ideologies relating to the family evolved in terms of the political left and right and across the countries?
5. Has the relationship between family policies and party political ideologies evolved along similar lines?
6. Is it possible to demonstrate a causal relationship between changing party political ideologies and family policies?
7. Do changes in family policies result from changes in party political ideologies, does the reverse relationship exist or do both processes act interdependently?

Methods
The key methods are a case study approach to the dimensions of changing family policies and party political ideologies and cross-national comparison of the results of the national case studies. First, changes in family policy, in each country, are examined through the longitudinal analysis of primary and secondary documents relating to eight family policy measures from their origins to the end of the study period. The approach to changing party political ideologies is based upon the thematic, qualitative analysis of the election manifestos of the main political parties of each country from the late 1970s to the late 1990s. Party ideologies are examined in relation to the same eight variables presented above plus pro-family statements. The ideological presentation of the relationship between the state and families or individuals is also a significant element which runs through the case studies and conclusions and is of particular relevance to the discussion of ideology and Althusser’s concept of Ideological State Apparatuses. The results of these two stages are then compared in each national case study focusing on convergence and divergence between both dimensions.
The results of the national case studies are then compared cross-nationally in order to observe convergence or divergence between the following phenomena: the development of family policies across the three countries; the development of party political ideologies in relation to the family across countries in terms of political left and right. Through the comparison of the findings from the national case studies an attempt is made to draw broader conclusions about trends in family policy change and party political ideologies given that the three countries are all Western European liberal democracies. The results are also considered in relation to the theory of ideology and the relationship between the state and citizens therein, in an effort to unravel the central question of the relationship between party political ideology and changing family policies.

Structure and content

The thesis begins with a critical review of family policy literature. Chapter 2 thus looks at the development of the study of family policy change with special reference to works that have examined questions of ideology, party political ideologies or politics in relation to the family. The chapter first considers the contribution of single-country studies carried out in France, the UK and Spain. The review is dominated by references to France since this is the country where the largest body of literature exists. Second, cross-national comparative studies of family policy are evaluated, taking particular note of methodological approaches that may be applied to the thesis.

Chapter 3 reviews the concept of policy change in the Anglo-Saxon policy analysis literature, with particular reference to the work of Paul Sabatier (1988), whose concept of belief systems (and their classification in terms of relative resistance to change) provides a valuable starting point for the methods used in the empirical case
study analysis. Chapter 3 provides a critical re-appraisal of Marx's theory of ideology and later interpretations, notably that of Louis Althusser, and his contribution to Marx's original concept. These contributions to the study of ideology and the relationship between the state and citizens are then considered in relation to national contexts for ideology, themes of the family and the ideologies of the political parties.

Chapter 4 presents the methods employed in the remainder of the thesis and examines John Clayton Thomas' approach to the study of party manifestos in the analysis of ideological change. The chapter develops a framework for the substantive case studies of changing family policies and party political ideologies. The eight family policy measures which form the basis of this framework are contextualised in relation to traditions of party political ideologies in France, the UK and Spain. In addition, these measures are categorised in terms of their objectives relating to state regulation or support for families and family life. This distinction adds a further analytical dimension, making it possible to examine whether regulatory or support measures and the party political ideologies which inform them are more or less resistant to change following Sabatier's model. In combination with the approaches outlined in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 thus presents the framework for the case study analysis and includes case study design, as well as highlighting the advantages and pitfalls of a cross-national comparative approach, country selection and the choice of manifestos as indicators of party political ideologies in relation to the research questions and the hypothesis.

Chapter 5 presents the statistical background to family policy change in the three countries through indicators of population trends and family behaviour. The core of the chapter consists of a historical study of the eight family policy instruments (as
identified in Chapter 4) and the theme of the family in the evolution of political ideologies of left and right. This development is presented for the three countries, thus providing the necessary context for the analysis in the national case studies.

The first country study, Chapter 6, examines changing family policies in relation to changing party political ideologies in France from 1981-97. Over this period the previous stability of French family policies became increasingly threatened in the context of a series of economic crises and questions of state intervention. As with each national case study, Chapter 6 first presents the political context; second, it examines the development of each party and its ideology, with special reference to the family and the relationship between the state and the citizen; third, it explores changing party political ideologies through the thematic, qualitative analysis of the evolution of each of the eight family policy instruments and pro-family statements in the election manifestos of the main political parties, and concludes by comparing policy change with party ideological change over the case study period.

The case study of the UK from 1979-97 in Chapter 7 pays particular attention to the impact of Thatcherism, and its opposition to the ‘nanny state’, on both family policy change and the political ideologies of the other political parties. The UK case study examines the impact of Thatcherism of upon the family in political ideologies across the parties and examines how some family policies and party ideologies may have changed as a result.

The final national case study in Chapter 8 examines the radical effects of Spain’s Transition to Democracy upon party political ideology and family policy change
through the shift in the ideological foundation of the state. Further, it explores the impact of radical political changes in Spain from 1977-96. Finally the chapter reviews the regulatory measures and the major transformations they underwent in the early part of the study period in spite of opposition from within right wing party political ideologies.

Chapter 9 returns to the seven research questions and provides a cross-national comparative analysis of the three case studies and draws comparative conclusions about the relationship between party political ideology and changing family policies. Comparative analysis is thus used to reveal changes in national family policies and to examine whether a relationship can be established between political ideologies and family policies, and whether such a relationship helps to explain cross-national policy divergence or convergence. It examines the ideological change observed in the party manifestos across the countries in order to examine the extent to which there is evidence of converging/diverging trends and whether family policies, although different, may also be converging across the three countries. A final level of comparison explores the nature of state intervention in the family sphere through a focus on the key themes of left and right wing party ideologies in relation to the four dimensions: 'public' (state intervention), 'private' (responsibility), individuals (women, children, workers) and the family. The comparison of national party political ideologies over timeseeks to demonstrate whether parties in their election manifestos in France, the country that has the greatest level of institutionalisation of family policies in this study, changed their ideological focus during the study period. In direct contrast, the analysis of the UK manifestos examines whether a developing cross-party consensus can be found in relation to the privatisation of the family as a
theme in cross-party politics. In Spain, parties appear to remain divided across traditional party ideological boundaries of left and right in relation to family policies. A comparison of the findings is used to demonstrate to what extent family policies have evolved in line with party political ideologies. It remains difficult, however, to establish a strong causal link between the two dimensions.

Although it is clear that a dynamic relationship exists between party political ideology and changing family policies, the chapter further suggests that a policy measure's relative resistance to change may be related to the degree of change in the party political ideologies it embodies. In addition, given the exploratory objectives of the thesis, reflections are made relating to the limitations of the present study that may benefit future research into the questions and themes examined.
In this chapter, family policy as a field of scholarly inquiry since the 1960s is examined. It looks at the approaches that have been adopted to identify and track changes in family policy, and investigates how the study of family policy has developed and changed in France, the UK and Spain through a critical review of key works in this field. In identifying the questions and methods that have dominated the study of family policies from the 1960s to the 1990s, the chapter examines the extent to which the study of party political ideology has been present in the existing body of both national and comparative literature.

Although the family has long been linked with the foundations of party political ideology (see Elstain, 1983), it was not until the second half of the twentieth Century that concern with 'family policy' as a distinct sub-category of social policy became the source of widespread party political and academic debate (Kamerman and Kahn, 1997: 6). In addition, this growth in interest in family policy coincided with or, perhaps more especially, was stimulated by a range of socio-demographic transformations which have taken place in the industrialised world over the period from the 1960s to the 1990s, a fact which is reflected in the large number of sociological and demographic studies of the family during this period. The sections below focus on the national literature of France, the UK and Spain, followed by a review of cross-national studies.

**Family policy research in France**

France has a strong tradition of research into a wide range of issues affecting the family domain, as a result of its long 'obsession' with the family (Brin, 1991), which can be traced back to the private 'family wage' schemes of the late nineteenth Century (see Chapter 5). This tradition is further underlined by the important role
played by French experts and their approaches in the growth in cross-national comparison of family policies within the EU. The study of family policy in France has been further facilitated by the nomenclature of benefits, services and even institutions which have traditionally included a range of clear references to the family or families (Questiaux and Fournier, 1978; Laroque, 1985; Brin 1991; Bussat and Chauvière, 1997).

The contribution to the study of family policy and its evolution that has been made by authors from within France can, in some instances, be seen to mirror the changing concerns of national policy makers. Examples of this parallel development can be seen in studies of population trends during the 1930s, family income during 1960s or enquiries into lone-parent families in the 1980s and 1990s. The reasons for this almost certainly stem from a high level of institutionalisation not only of family policies, but also of research and may be linked with Althusser's concept of Ideological State Apparatuses (see Chapter 3).

As in the UK and Spain, a number of specialist agencies carry out, or provide, funding for research into questions relating to changing family policy issues, although concern with the family is generally more explicit in France. In political terms, the most significant research producers on family issues, given their direct links with policy makers, are the Ministère des affaires sociales (Ministry for Social Affairs) and government think tank the Conseil économique et social (CES). In 1985 the Ministère des affaires sociales published a major study of post-war French family policy: La politique familiale en France depuis 1945 (Laroque, 1985). Pierre Laroque's study brings together experts from the fields of history, law, demography, sociology, public administration and service provision. Taking the 'Golden Age' (1938-58) of French family policy as the historical foundation, the study focuses on the

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4 Pierre Laroque was the director general of Social Security in the Ministry of Employment in the early 1980s, as well as the honorary president of the social section of the Conseil d'État (the government advisory committee).
demographic questions raised by the evolution of family forms into the mid-1980s and examines the legal status of family members, benefits, fiscal measures and the role of the Caisse nationale des allocations familiales (CNAF) (national child benefit fund) and the regional Caisse d'allocations familiales (CAF). By comparing family transformations with developments in family policy (notably financial measures) and demonstrating possible links between policy change and family behaviour, Laroque explicitly seeks to stimulate debate as well as providing a rigorous appraisal of post-war family policy change.

Hubert Brin (1991), in a report to the CES, uses a historical and sociological approach to family policy change along similar lines to those of Laroque (1985). After a brief examination of the evolution of intervention in the French family sphere since the Middle Ages, Brin (1991) focuses on the relationship between socio-demographic change, public opinion in relation to family issues and the evolution of family policies. A notable addition to Brin's report, reflecting the burgeoning interest in cross-national comparison, is the inclusion of a European dimension, largely based upon the findings of another report published by the Haut conseil de la population et de la famille under the direct responsibility of the President of the French Republic (Tabah and Maugué, 1989).

In his observations about cross-national comparison of family policies, Brin (1991) notes: 'comparer l'effort fait en faveur des familles dans les différents pays européens n'aura validité que sur la base d'une identification de transferts non nécessairement classifiés dans la rubrique des aides aux familles' (the comparison of family policy initiatives taken in different European countries can only be rigorous if based upon the identification of re-distributive measures which are not necessarily classified under the heading of family policies) (Brin, 1991: 65) such as through tax relief. Brin thus highlights a major pitfall encountered by researchers examining family benefits using a comparative approach. He argues that cross-national comparison ought to be
based upon comparability of measures as opposed to comparability of terms. This approach is central to the selection of policy measures which are examined in the substantive case studies in the thesis.

While examining the context of family change and family policies in Europe from a specifically French perspective, Brin (1991) identified an important methodological consideration which is of special relevance to the present study: the problematic nature of comparing policies which may not appear immediately comparable due to linguistic and/or cultural distinctions.

This theme is developed further by Jean-Claude Barbier (1990, 1994, 1996) who stresses the importance of the 'symbolic' nature of family policies in different national contexts. Barbier argues that purely symbolic measures may play an important role in the longer term legitimisation of new arenas for public intervention (such as the family in the present study). For example the appointment of a Minister of the Family who does not have real powers may represent a symbolic effort towards the legitimisation of family policies in countries where family policies have previously been implicit (Barbier, 1996: 104), such as Virginia Bottomley's appointment as Minister for the Family in the UK in 1994 (see Chapter 7). The creation of a ministry without portfolio thus, on the one hand, represents the symbolic value of the family for the government, but on the other hand, the lack of any real financial support indicates either a lack of commitment to family policies or the possible existence of ideological conflict surrounding state intervention in family life. In the latter instance, the symbolic measures may, over time, indicate a political will to implement family policies as a first stage in incremental change (see 'Incrementalism' Chapter 3). Through the examination of the symbolic value of the term 'family' in social policies, Barbier argues that:

In countries which do have a family policy, state intervention is only acceptable if it rests upon social representations that lend it legitimacy. In the same way, a measure
such as maternity leave (implying paid maternity leave) is only acceptable if it is set in the context of the normative belief that it is fair and legitimate for working mothers to take a temporary break from employment to look after their children (Barbier, 1996: 104).

Barbier's conceptualisation of the symbolic effects of policies is clearly based on the seemingly abstract elements of 'social representation' and 'normative belief'. In addition, he also uses the term 'dominant imaginary representation' (Barbier, 1996: 104). Through the use of the above terms, Barbier focuses upon the key function of abstract elements in changing family policies. His conclusion that 'not enough attention is given, in the construction of Europe, to the collective social processes which could lead to change' (Barbier, 1996: 105), when taken in the context of those social processes identified above, further supports the need to pursue a range of variables affecting policy change including party political ideology. Both Barbier (1996) and Brin (1991) therefore highlight the need for researchers to look beneath official terminology for the effective comparison of family policies.

In addition to the Ministère des affaires sociales, the CES and the Haut conseil de la population et de la famille, the CNAF is a further high profile family agency which plays a key role in the production, commissioning and funding of research in a broad range of issues affecting families. Since its foundation in 1945, the CNAF’s principal function has been to administer child benefits, provide services and carry out and disseminate research (Laroque, 1985) into a broad spectrum of issues surrounding family policies and family change.

In addition to in-house research and commissioning, funding or publishing outside projects, the CNAF publishes a quarterly journal entitled *Recherches et prévisions* which had reached over 50 editions by 1999. Research commissioned by the CNAF is often related to the agency's functions of benefit administration (Rassat, 1995; Afsa, 1995; Math, 1996; Fagnani and Rassat, 1997) and service provision for families (Strobel, 1995; Dubois and Retour, 1995; Debordeaux, 1996), although support for
comparative research also has been provided (Lefaucher and Martin, 1995; Hantrais and Letablier, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996a, 1996b; Bussat and Chauvière, 1997, Jenson and Sineau, 1997; Martin and Hasssenteufel, 1997). In addition to the research commissioned by the CNAF, research into matters of family policy is supported and carried out by the Ministère de l'emploi et de la solidarité Mission recherche et expérimentation (MIRE) which has published conference proceedings comparing social welfare systems in Europe, including family policies (for example MIRE, 1994; 1997).

This wide-ranging and active research community in France provides the expertise in terms of demographic, economic and sociological approaches, upon which policymakers can, in theory, consult to inform their decisions. The results of this activity often find their place in party political debate and the media (Commaille, 1997). In 1981, the new Socialist President, François Mitterrand set up the Institut de l'enfance et de la famille (IDEF) which has funded major family and family policy change research, the most significant of which was entitled La famille: l'état des savoirs (de Singly, 1991). This publication represents a major multidisciplinary review of the French family policy debate, bringing together contributions from over forty experts from the social sciences (demography, law, economics, ethnology, history, psychoanalysis, psychology, political science, sociology) in an attempt to provide an exhaustive appreciation of the questions facing families and policy makers in France at that time. Within these objectives, La Famille, edited by François de Singly (1991), provides a valuable addition to the literature through its examination, in the five main sections, of family formation, family life, intergenerational exchanges, the family in politics and society and the family as viewed by the social sciences.

The fifth part of the book, ‘Le regard des sciences sociales sur la famille’, identifies nine distinct methodological approaches to the study of the family. Sociological, historical and demographic approaches are presented, and it is upon these three
disciplinary pillars that the overwhelming majority of family policy research in France has been based (de Singly, 1991). This trend is reflected in the family policy research in other countries including the UK and Spain (see below). In addition to these approaches, however, economists, psychoanalysts, psychologists, lawyers and political scientists are given the opportunity to outline their particular perspective on family policy issues. Of special relevance to the present study is the chapter focusing on political science approaches in which Jaques Commaille (1991b) emphasises the central position the family has occupied in politics and political ideas in France such as the Vichy motto of 'Patrie, Famille, Travail' (fatherland, family, work).

Commaille (1991b: 413) suggests that this ideological role for the family is a defining part of right wing thought, although this theme is not developed in detail, other than by examining the possibility that political opinion or affiliation may be transmitted from one generation to another along ideological lines (1991b: 417-19). It is, however, curious that Commaille (1991b) appears to consider the transmission of political ideologies or party affiliation as having a specifically right wing nature rather than being generally applicable to all political ideologies. In spite of this, his argument does highlight an important element of the relationship between ideology and family policy, namely that state support of the family as a social institution may represent an attempt to maintain the status quo through ideological means, echoing a central theme of Marx’s theory of ideology (see Chapter 3).

A further aspect examined by Commaille (1991b: 414-15) is the use of the family as a metaphor for political systems. The family as metaphor has been employed to describe two levels of the political. The first of these has been the description of the king as ‘father’ in absolutist regimes or, indeed, in totalitarian regimes, such as the description of Lenin and other Communist leaders as ‘father of the people’.

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5 Commaille and Martin (1998: 126) later note that this often synonymous relationship between the family and right wing ideas stems from the 20th century obsession of right wing politics with the family.
The second use of the family as a political metaphor has been the description of the ‘political family’, made up of party members and activists. The latter distinction also rests upon a notion of the party leader as father and members as ‘wives’ or ‘children’. Both of these examples of family metaphor rely heavily on patriarchy as the ‘natural’ order of (political) society. Given this strong symbolic value of the patriarch in wider political thought in France and elsewhere, the notion of patriarchal authority as a central element of the family in political ideology and discourse may be interpreted as, first, a reflection of political thought generally and, second, an attempt to legitimise patriarchy through the statutory support of paternal authority in family policies, for example during the Vichy regime in France and Francoist Spain (see Chapter 5).

In spite of the chapter title, Commaille’s (1991b) contribution fails to present the possible advantages of a political science or political theory approach to the study of family policies. While this may appear as a major oversight, it merely reflects both limited inquiry into political questions of the family by family policy researchers, on the one hand and, on the other hand, the lack of family policy oriented research carried out by political researchers in any of the countries included in this study. Commaille (1991b: 421) is aware of this fact and makes a plea for further research centred on political discourse concerning the relationship between state and families in the context of the public/private debate. This latter point is central to this thesis in the national case studies of France, the UK and Spain (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Indeed, Commaille, has followed his own suggestions as co-author (with Claude Martin) of *Les enjeux politiques de la famille* (Commaille and Martin, 1998). In this study, the authors seek to further debate in the growing concern of social sciences with the politics of the family in France. In a continuation of Commaille’s earlier theme (1991b), they argue for the further study of the family in the context of politics. Their approach is based upon a shift in perspective: ‘la famille ne nous intéresse pas pour elle-même: elle nous intéresse dans la mesure où elle constitue un révélateur
privilégié du politique et de ses mutations’ (our interest is not in the family for its own sake: the family is of interest only insofar as it represents a privileged indicator of politics and political evolution) (Commaille and Martin, 1998: 9). Through a focus upon what the authors term ‘la crise de la démocratie’ (the crisis of democracy) (Commaille and Martin, 1998: 9) the relationship between the political and the family is developed. This development places great emphasis on the threat posed to social order by the individualisation of society which has taken place in much of Europe since the 1960s. It is in this context that the authors make numerous references to ideology and changing family policies. As with other studies, no clear definition of ideology can be discerned from the text, and it is not clear whether ideology is used to refer to a theoretical approach or as a synonym for political beliefs, ideas or doctrines. Both of these dimensions play a key role in this study. Significantly, the authors describe party political ideologies as an explanatory factor in continuity of family policies through different political regimes (Third Republic, Vichy, Fourth Republic) (Commaille and Martin, 1998: 137-8) the echoing the theory of ideology as a process.

Further analysis of party political ideology focuses on the distinctions between left and right in terms of the family. Commaille had earlier identified this distinction by describing left wing family policies as aimed at reducing inequalities and social exclusion through welfare transfers, whereas the right conceptualised the family in relation to social order and the good of the nation (Commaille, 1991a) thus highlighting a central distinction between the two, namely on the one hand targeting individuals, and on the other protecting the family unit as a primary group. Given Commaille’s earlier work (1991a), a notable contribution of Commaille and Martin (1998) to the analysis of the family within party political ideology is the theme of the preservation of the family as a building block of social stability. Traditionally this had been almost exclusively associated with right wing party political ideologies, but Commaille and Martin (1998) argue that this concern appears to be crossing party political boundaries of left and right from both French and cross-national perspectives.
The ownership of the family as a part of right wing political ideology is therefore blurred. Commaille and Martin (1998) thus suggest the possible convergence of party ideological positioning around the theme of the family in France and other European countries.

While Commaille and Martin make interesting reflections concerning the relationship politics and the family, and ones which are central to the present study, it is not made clear on what basis they draw their conclusions. Indeed, a lack of clarity in the methodology and inconsistent data sets are major failings of this study. The historical examination of political thought and the family followed by the analysis of a range of political documents (including inconsistent use of party manifestos) appears to be the central methodological approach in this study. The further incorporation of a cross-national dimension is also somewhat inconsistent with the major reference country being the UK, and to a lesser extent Belgium, Southern Europe and the EU.

The comparative dimension does, however, enable the authors to draw further conclusions. The most significant of these, for the present study, is that a right/left split no longer sufficiently covers the complex construction of positions in relation to the family either in France or other European countries (Commaille and Martin, 1998: 128). This convergence, if demonstrated would provide an important indicator of an ideological shift between left and right and is therefore explored further in this thesis.

While the work of Commaille and Martin (1998) is open to the above criticisms, their insights into the relationship between political ideology and the family represent an innovative contribution to the study of family policy which had, at that point, largely been based upon the analysis of socio-demographic change and financial transfers.

Analysing family policy change from the perspective of socio-demographic transformations has remained central to major studies of France, in spite of growing
interest in the contributions of alternative approaches suggested in by Commaille (1991b). One notable exception appears in John Ambler's (1991) analysis of the French welfare state in the context not only of changing society but also changing ideologies (Ambler 1991). In Chapter 5 of the book, Rémi Lenoir (1991: 144-86) examines the development of societal pressures facing family policy makers, such as the depopulation of France, changing moral codes, and perhaps most significantly, the growth of women's paid employment from the 1950s. Although much of his work is based on a historical description of French family policy and changing socio-demographic trends, Lenoir's contribution comes from his critique of political ideologies and their place in the broader debate on family policy change. Particular to the French case, are two positions which are generally referred to in French language literature as 'familist' and 'natalist' (Brin, 1991; Lenoir, 1991; Bussat and Chauvière, 1997). Lenoir identifies both familist and natalist thought as having had an impact on the evolution of family policies during the inter-war years (1991: 144-48). He further identifies a shift in the dominant ideas from a familist position (generally the welfare of families founded upon moral concerns) towards that of the natalists (scientific responses to scientifically identified problems, exemplified by economic measures to combat demographic pressures) based upon the shifting emphasis of family policies in the post-war period (Lenoir, 1991: 146-47). In this way Lenoir appears to suggest a causal link between political ideas and family policy change, although, as with Martin and Commaille (1998), this theoretical question is not pursued further.

The further historical development of family policy is also presented by Lenoir as having been influenced by the 'nationalist-meets-patriarchalist' right wing ideology of the Vichy regime (1940-44) which significantly placed the family above the State in its iconography, blaming the French military capitulation to Hitler's forces in 1940 on France's failure to renew generations (Lenoir, 1991). In the post-war period, Lenoir (1991) describes how, in contrast to earlier opposition, French parties of the left and the Confédération générale du travail (CGT) (Communist-led worker's union) came
to support the idea of an integrated, state-run family fund which had been traditionally been supported by the French right. This shift by the left suggests that ideas in favour of family protection had crossed traditional political divides and lead to some level of consensus (Lenoir, 1991: 152). In spite of this, ‘rifts clearly emerged, less between formal political parties than between movements, regarding the preferred type of family and moral values’ (Lenoir, 1991: 153).

Of particular interest for the French case study in the thesis is Lenoir’s (1991) conclusion that in spite of financial pressures threatening the continuity of French family policies since 1981 (see Chapter 6), the legitimacy of family policy as a target of social action was maintained (Lenoir, 1991: 183-85). Although far from conclusive or exhaustive, Lenoir’s examination of the possible influence of political ideologies on family policy change in France may provide an important starting point for the present study.

The contributions of Commaille (1991b), Commaille and Martin (1998) and Lenoir (1991) have, on the one hand, pointed to the possible value of a political analysis of family policy change and, on the other, revealed the lack of a political/ideological dimension in existing French research. Mass media interest and coverage in France provides the family policy debate with a certain legitimacy and constant presence in the French polity (Commaille and Martin, 1998: 7). This, combined with a number of regular conferences, has lead Martin and Hassenteufel (1997) to conclude that initiatives such as the 1994 International Year of the Family, which helped stimulate debate in other countries6, are unnecessary in the French context of active research and regular, high profile, political debate surrounding changing family policy issues (Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997: 110).

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6 Such as in the UK with appointment of the first Minister for the Family (Cronin, McGlone and Millar, 1995: 169) and Spain as revealed by major state-funded research initiatives (for example Alberdi, 1995).
The family within social policy study in the United Kingdom

In the English-speaking world, study of family policies has been growing rapidly since the late 1960s and some studies from the United States have been instrumental in the development of comparative, cross-national approaches, providing influential precedents in both methodology and analysis (for example Kamerman and Kahn, 1978). In the UK, Margaret Wynn’s *Family Policy* (1971) broke new ground by advocating that governments should pursue family policies, focusing on families with young children. Her work can also be seen a setting a precedent for family policy research in the British context by developing prescriptive and critical family policy analysis. A further influence on approaches to family policy in the UK has come from a focus upon continuity (for example Laslett, 1972, 1980; Laslett and Wall, 1972; McFarlane, 1978) or change and diversity of family forms (Ariès, 1962; Shorter, 1977; Stone, 1977; Anderson, 1980).

The strongest advocate of the family continuity theory has been Peter Laslett (1972, 1980; Laslett and Wall, 1972) who argued that family forms in Western Europe have remained basically the same over several hundred years. He cites the two-generation family as the most common family form and argues that this ‘nuclear family’ predates industrialisation rather than being a product of it (Laslett and Wall, 1980).

In the literature that has interpreted the family through an emphasis on change the central argument has been the increasing privatisation of family relationships. One of the earliest contributions was by the French author Philippe Ariès\(^7\) (1960) who focussed on change in the perception of children and childhood. Ariès saw childhood as having developed from the Middle Ages perception of children as small adults through the Renaissance vision of childish innocence. This transition he argues has had a profound effect upon Western Society and has informed the development of

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\(^7\) Although Ariès was French, his work in translation (notably 1962) has been influential and widely cited in the British literature (Fox Harding, 1996: 91).
both child protection (based upon innocence) and education (based upon control) (Ariès, 1960). It has, however, been argued that emotional links between parents and children were in evidence before the period identified by Ariès (see Pollack, 1983).

In spite of criticisms, the theme of change central to Ariès' work is developed in relation to families by other authors (Shorter, 1977, Stone, 1977, Anderson, 1980). Edward Shorter (1977) and Lawrence Stone (1977) both argued that family relationships became increasingly based upon emotional links rather than economic ties. This was identified, in particular, by Stone (1977) who maps the development of families based upon open lineage through the patriarchal nuclear family to the closed domesticated family. This latter category of family, which Stone identifies as early as the seventeenth century, was characterised by spouses choosing each other and investing more love and time in children than previously. This transition thus implies a move towards the greater independence of families within society and thus, increased privatisation of the family sphere.

Further work on continuity of family types has looked the negative aspects of patriarchal continuity from the feminist perspective (see Jeffreys, 1985; Walby, 1990). The feminist critique cites the family as the locus of continued division of labour, and some authors have interpreted women's sexual emancipation as further compounding inequalities between the sexes (see Barrett and McIntosh, 1991: 71-6).

Although much work on family continuity has been based on long-term historical analysis, Robert Chester (1985) argues that continuity can also be identified in post-1960s family relationships. While family life in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s became increasingly characterised by divorce, cohabitation and women's paid employment, Chester (1985: 185) argues that these trends represent what he terms the 'neo-conventional family'. While this may seem contradictory when compared to longer-term historical trends, he argues for the study of the life-cycle of families which
demonstrate patterns of continuity (notably the continued dominance of parent-children households) which may not be identified by short term studies of family life.

While references to ideology are largely missing from the work on family continuity and change\(^8\), the dominance of the theme of continuity in the literature, most significantly in analyses of modern family types, points to a key element of the dynamic theory of ideology: the role of ideas in maintaining the status quo.

Family literature in the UK has been largely concerned with the sociology of the family, work in relation to family policies has been largely produced within the broader field of social policy study. Family policy research has thus been situated in the long Anglo-Saxon tradition of social policy which has focused on issues affecting individuals, effectively children and women, such as poverty (for example Abel-Smith and Townsend, 1965; Cole-Hamilton, 1991), health (for example Townsend et al., 1988; Baggot, 1994), gender (including Fraad et al., 1994; Goode, 1998) and housing (such as Niner, 1989; Malpass and Murie, 1990).

For reasons, perhaps most notably identified by Hilary Land and Roy Parker (1978: 332-3), the term ‘family policy’ has proven problematic when applied to the UK. While in many ways the UK can be seen as a pioneer of post-war social security and provided inspiration for other developing welfare states (Hills et al., 1994), policies which explicitly seek to regulate or support family life have been relatively underdeveloped (Ringen, 1997). The high level of official visibility of family policies seen in France has remained relatively absent from UK policies. It is in this context that the family policy debate has developed in the UK and, as a result, the number of studies that have been carried out explicitly concerning families has been far greater in France than in the UK. In the same way that UK family policies may be considered

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\(^8\) Michèle Barrett and Mary McIntosh (1991) include ideas as a variable in their analysis but do not develop a theoretical role for ideology.
'implicit', that is to say any policies which affect families in the UK are rarely called 'family' policies, the majority of research which is relevant to the objectives of the present thesis has been 'implicit' in terms of the family.

Research impetus and funding in the UK family sector has come from the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) (over 100 published titles), the Family Policy Studies Centre (FPSC) (for example Bernardes, 1995), the Institute for Public Policy Research (Coote, et al., 1990) among other policy studies groups. In addition the Economic and Social Research Council and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation have funded many projects by these groups that, although generally focusing on poverty-related questions affecting the UK, have become increasingly geared towards European comparative research into family policies (for example McRae, 1995; Millar and Warman, 1995, 1996). It is interesting to note that UK family/social policy research has been largely based upon private initiatives which contrasts with the dominance of public institutions in French research support and production.

While much of the literature with a family focus in the UK has largely targeted specific groups and issues which are not directly applicable to the objectives of the thesis, there are some exceptions, one of which is Diana Gittins' *The Family in Question: changing households and familiar ideologies* (1985). The subtitle suggests a concern with the relationship between changing social behaviour and ideology. Taking as her starting point as the preoccupation of the early 1980s New-Right ideology which claimed the family for politics, Gittins goes on to challenge ideological assumptions about the 'ideal' form and function of the family within society through a historical examination of family forms in the UK from the late eighteenth Century to the 1980s. She situates family forms firmly within the perspective of change, but interprets this change within the continuity of ideology. Gittins argues that while family forms have changed the relationships within families continue to be based upon beliefs of control and patriarchy. She goes on to examine
contemporary issues of gender divisions within families. Gittins thus suggests that the gap between the 'ideological family' and the reality of family life, or more appropriately 'families', has become more pronounced given the increased diversity of family forms. While Gittins (1985) does not claim to examine family policies, her conclusions lead to the questioning of state intervention in family life as the central means of social control, claiming that, 'family ideology has been a vital means - the vital means - of holding together and legitimising the existing social, economic, political and gender systems', (Gittins, 1985: 168). Such a firm assertion of the role of family ideology in social control in the UK clearly demands further empirical research in order to establish the extent to which political ideologies about the family can be identified in policies.

A further publication which looks at political ideologies in relation to families is *The Family Way: a new approach to policy-making* (Coote et al., 1990). While this document is clearly political in intent, indeed one of the authors, Harriet Harman, later served as Secretary of State for Social Security in the Blair government, it does address the importance of the family in the political debate of the UK. The left wing nature of this publication results in a firm critique of Thatcherite ideology and family issues and identifies the important influence of the economists Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek and the 'underclass' theory of Charles Murray (see Lister, 1996) upon the Conservative party of the 1980s and 1990s. While this critique provides a view of the development of the family in the political debate in the UK, its political objectives limit its analytical contribution.

Two further contributions to the analysis of the importance of the family in UK political ideologies point to a growing trend in the study of the relationship between politics and families (Lister, 1996; Muncie and Wetherell, 1995). The first of these contributions is Ruth Lister's (1996) examination of the family in post-Thatcher, Conservative rhetoric. Her analysis of family policy objectives during the first half of
the 1990s rests heavily on the role of ideology, notably the continuation by the Major government of the Thatcherite family ideology in his 'Back to Basics' speeches (Lister, 1996: 28). Lister (1996: 11) significantly refers to 'ideological positioning' and 'the ideological terrain' in relation to the right wing of UK politics in her introduction and conclusion respectively. While not claiming to examine the role of ideology within family policy change, Lister (1996) makes an important contribution to the study of UK family policies by demonstrating the frequency and extent to which political parties and governments have continued to pursue normative assumptions about families and their role in society through what Sheila Kammerman and Alfred Kahn (1978: 3) have called 'implicit family policies'.

The second contribution to the study of the politics of family policy in the UK is provided by John Muncie and Margaret Wetherell (1995) who look at the evolution of Family Policy and Political Discourse through an examination, first of the historical development of post-war social policies in the UK to the 1980s and, second, political ideologies and political discourse on matters of the family. Muncie and Wetherell (1995: 60-3) underline the particular importance of the Conservative party’s claim to be the ‘party of the family’ and the relative lack of difference between the Labour party’s position on the family. By highlighting the political battle for the family in UK politics, they point to the possible symbolic value of the family therein. This observation also echoes the French literature’s claim that traditional divisions of right and left have been blurred in relation to issues concerning family policies (see Lenoir, 1991: 152; Commaille and Martin, 1998: 124-6). Muncie and Wetherell’s approach to ideology, however, relates to ideology as sets of political beliefs, as opposed to process, which may clarify questions relating to both the nature and timing of changes in family policy.

The study of family policies in the UK has largely been contextualised within broader social policy studies, which may, in part, reflect the fact that family policies in the UK
are firmly situated within social policy rather than occupying a distinct policy arena as in France. The literature on continuity and change in family forms revealed consistent trends including the dominance of the parent-children household and patriarchy on the one hand, and a move towards the privatisation of the family on the other. These patterns of continuity and change are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the long-term approach to change has been necessary because change has been incremental over a number of centuries. Such incremental change supports a certain continuity and indicates the resistance of political ideologies to change (see Chapter 3). This continuity in family life appears to represent social stability which, taking Marx’s theory of ideology, may be founded upon certain beliefs about family and their relationship with the state. Study of political ideologies relating to families has been shown as a limited area of inquiry in the UK literature. However, as in France, this aspect has been increasingly addressed in the 1990s, although such work has so far under-developed a consistent methodological approach or data source.

Developing family policy study in Spain

The family policy of Spain had, until the 1990s, barely been studied either by Spanish or foreign researchers. Some of the reasons for this, such as the legacy of the Franco era in Spanish political culture (Valiente, 1995b) are examined in Chapters 5 and 8. Spanish family policy research began to develop in the context of cross-national studies (for example in European Observatory studies), although some major national studies have begun to stimulate further interest and research, such as the report published by the Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales (ministry for social affairs) to mark the United Nations’ 1994 International Year of the Family (Alberdi, 1995). The study edited by Inés Alberdi (1995) is a significant contribution to the study of Spanish family policy in the post-Franco period and examines changing family demography and sociology as well as the legal framework of family relations in contemporary Spain.
The literature on Spanish family policy reflects the relative institutional invisibility of family policies since the 1970s, although the comparatively late legalisation of divorce (1982) has led many authors to examine either the resulting legal issues or the socio-demographic effects of changing family forms (for example, Campuzano Tomé, 1986; Iglesias de Ussel, 1988; Borrajo, 1990; Flaquer and Soler, 1990).

Few studies have examined questions of politics or ideology in relation to the family, although some references are made by Salustiano del Campo (1995). Del Campo’s work examines the development of the family during the Authoritarian years of Franco through to the radical changes introduced during the Transition to Democracy and the first Socialist government. This study is largely based on the analysis of family and family policy issues in official documents including constitutions, Penal codes and Civil codes. In addition, he also examines statements of beliefs about the role of families in Spanish society notably from leading Catholic clerics. Through the study of the Franco regime, del Campo identifies the family as theme of fundamental importance in Spanish politics and society and one which underwent radical re-evaluation in the late 1970s and early 1980s (del Campo, 1995: 149).

Perhaps the most significant contribution from Spanish authors in terms of the thesis has come from Celia Valiente (1995) who proffers the theory that Spanish family policy of the democratic era (that is from 1977) can be understood in terms of the rejection of the family policy and inherent patriarchal ideology of the Franco regime (Valiente, 1995: 82-3). Valiente identifies six characteristics of post-Authoritarian family policies in Spain: low levels of public spending, institutional invisibility, contributory benefits, the central importance of tax relief, measures for large families and the overall fragmented nature of family policies (1995: 84). These characteristics show Spanish family policy as an underdeveloped area of public intervention. Valiente argues that this situation arises from the effects of the legacy of Authoritarianism:
The only advocates of strong public policies, family organisations, were too unimportant to play a significant role in the policy-making process. The other actors wanted, at any price, to be seen as distant and opposed to the pro-natalist and anti-feminist Francoist family policies, and therefore, avoided policy-making in this area (Valiente, 1995: 92).

This analysis provides a significant contribution to the understanding of Spanish family policies. Through her application of the concept of 'historical memories' to the case of post-Authoritarian Spanish family policies, Valiente suggests a change in the dominant ideas is a necessary factor for family policy change.

Cross-national comparative approaches to family policy change

The production of family policy research within France, Spain and the UK has been shown to have developed differently along national lines and in parallel with the predominant concerns and objectives of policy makers in each country. While these nation-centric approaches provide valuable and detailed insights into families policies in one country, comparative approaches can reveal many disparities not only in terms of type and availability of data, but also in terms of methodological approaches, culture and language. Interest in comparative research into family and family policy change has undergone rapid growth since the late 1970s with a new impetus in Europe arising from EU concerns with questions of demographic and social policy change in the 1980s and, internationally, since the General Assembly of the United Nations declared 1994 the International Year of the Family in December 1989. The remainder of the chapter considers the development of comparative studies of family policy change giving special consideration to those studies that examine France, Spain or the UK, including the research of the European Observatory on National Family Policies from 1990 to 1996.

The first major international study of family policy change was the landmark work of Sheila Kamerman and Alfred Kahn, *Family Policy: Government and Families in*
Fourteen Countries (1978). The Kamerman and Kahn (1978) study sought to stimulate the family policy debate in the United States, which had been gaining momentum since a US Senate report into families in 1974, through comparison of family change and family policy measures in fourteen countries across North America, Western and Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. The study brought together national experts to report on each country and in so doing laid down the methodological blueprint for later studies (such as the European Commission studies edited by Wilfried Dumon, 1990; 1993; 1994).

A major contribution of the Kamerman and Kahn study (1978), and one which has had long-lasting influence on comparative study of family policies, was to establish criteria by which the study countries could be classified. The relative terms ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’, formed the basis for this classification. Kamerman and Kahn (1978) further refined this categorisation by including two sub-categories of explicit family policy which they termed ‘explicit family policy a)’ and ‘explicit family policy b)’ (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978: 3).

The first of the three distinctions, ‘explicit family policy a)’, is defined as, ‘specific programs and policies designed to achieve specified, explicit goals regarding the family’ (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978: 3). This category identifies family policies in terms of both the target of the policies and the normative effects of those policies. The inclusion of these two elements thus assumes, first, a ‘desire’ or objective on the part of policy makers, for example to encourage an increase in the birth-rate, and, second, the policy makers’ belief that a given policy is an appropriate means to the desired end, such as policies providing financial incentives for larger families.

The second sub-category, ‘explicit family policy b)’, is distinct from the first with regard to policy objectives: ‘programs and policies which deliberately do things for the family, but for which there are no agreed-upon over-all goals regarding the
family' (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978: 3). While the emphasis continues to be placed upon the family as a clear or legitimate target for state intervention, this category of family policy assumes general political consensus over the policy measures/instruments, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, potential conflict or confusion over policy objectives amongst policy makers. This category, taking the earlier example of child benefits, may result in consensus over the need for universal financial support for families within a community of policy makers, and conflict over the objectives of the policy, such as either encouraging the birth-rate or seeking to combat poverty in young families.

The authors define the third category, 'implicit family policy', as, 'governmental actions and policies not specifically or primarily addressed to the family, but which have indirect consequences' (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978: 3). This definition is intrinsically problematic in the context of the thesis on three counts:

1. Identifying implicit policies may lead to forming arbitrary conclusions as to the objectives of a given policy measure for example, is the term 'child benefits' merely a synonym of 'family allowances'? The nomenclature of a range of policy measures is a result of the policy-making process, and distinctions in the naming of what appear to be concordant policies across two or more countries in terms of the implementation of a given policy may prove to be highly significant concerning the political objectives of that policy.

2. It is difficult to distinguish the exact point at which government policy ceases to have 'indirect consequences' on the family, thus making further demands on the researcher to 'construct' the limits of family policy in those countries which do not employ the term 'family', or its plural, to designate either a policy field or individual policy measures.

3. Kamerman and Kahn's (1978: 3) use of 'implicit' family policies solely examines the policy measures themselves (for example financial transfers or services for families). While this may be appropriate to their objectives, this position, if
applied to the present study, would not take account of family issues in the broader political debate. A consequence of a focus on implicit family would therefore be an underestimation of the symbolic value of the family within a national polity, an aspect which has been identified (Barbier, 1996) as a significant element of both the study of changing family policies and comparative study.

The third pitfall of the implicit family policy category for the thesis is presented in the following example: If country A is presented as an example of explicit family policy and country B is cited as an example of implicit family policy, to conclude that in country B the family represents a low priority for policy makers or politicians without first examining the extent to which family issues and concerns are expressed in the broader political debate would be to ignore the ‘symbolic’ (Barbier, 1996: 104) value of the family within the study area. It becomes necessary to examine this debate in more depth in order to contextualise or identify ‘implicit’ policies.

In addition, examples of explicit and implicit family policy countries may only reflect the political ideology of the dominant policy-making forces, such as a single party or overall majority government, which would ignore family ideology present in opposition parties. While this would demonstrate family policy change, which is only one dimension of the thesis, it is necessary to analyse the political ideologies of opposition parties in order to identify any changes therein. To overcome this pitfall, it becomes necessary to examine the policy alternatives presented by all the major parties within a national polity as opposed to solely concentrating on implemented policies.

While recognising the second of the three pitfalls associated with the use of categorising family policies as implicit, Kamerman and Kahn (1978: 4) barely address the two further pitfalls, although they state that the use of the implicit family policy
category may serve 'to underscore the pervasiveness of government activity with regard to the family in those societies which deny having any family policy at all' (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978: 4). Thus, the identification of implicit family policies may prove an important factor in the study of the impact of political ideologies upon family policy change. Indeed, it may be possible to make a link between explicit and implicit categories and concepts of state intervention.

While reference to implicit family policy is found in later work by Kamerman and Kahn (1997: 9), it is absent from the central methodological role to which the term was assigned in the earlier study (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978), which may suggest the authors' acknowledgement of its limitations. In spite of this, however, the grouping of countries in the later comparative study (Kamerman and Kahn, 1997), the UK, Canada, the United States and New Zealand, suggests that reference to implicit family policies has continued to influence choice of countries for international comparison given that three of these countries (UK, Canada and US) were categorised as 'implicit and reluctant family policy' in the 1978 study (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978). Further volumes (forthcoming) in the same series as the 1997 Kamerman and Kahn study also maintain the classification of the 1978 study. The continued use of Kamerman and Kahn's 1978 framework has clearly been influential in other studies (for example Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997) and has played an important role in the development of cross-national comparison of family policies.

One effect of the influence of the implicit classification of family policies can be seen in later works, notably the comparative study of family associations by Claude Martin and Patrick Hassenteufel (1997). Their analysis of the UK is based upon the assumption, 'la famille n’est pas une catégorie d’intervention publique' (the family is not a category of public intervention) (Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997: 5). While this position may be defended on the grounds that the UK does not have coherent public policy area which is represented by the term 'family', it underestimates
transformations which have taken place in family policies and family policy debate in the UK since the late 1970s. This approach, thus, fails to consider the third pitfall of Kamerman and Kahn's classification of family policies, identified earlier in the chapter, as well as a growth in the appreciation of the symbolic impact of the family in the political debate in the UK (see Cronin et al., 1995; Lister, 1995; Muncie and Wetherell, 1995; Clarke and Henwood, 1997).

A further significant development in the study of EU family policy was the founding of The European Observatory on National Family Policies in 1989. The European Observatory has carried out studies in a similar way to Kamerman and Kahn (1978; 1997), and has relied upon reports from national experts as the basis for its publications. Whereas the Kamerman and Kahn (1978) study claimed a comparative element, the Observatory reports have been intended as annual snapshots of family policy at a given time. While the first set of reports introduced the historical development of family policies in the EU, subsequent reports have provided valuable updates on developments in family policies (social and economic measures, material and non-material infrastructure and family law) and demographic and social trends (European Commission, 1994: 41). Although the reports do not strictly represent comparative studies, they are based upon a framework of questions and focus on coherent data related to family topics and are thus methodologically coherent. These reports are then co-ordinated and published either as volumes of national surveys (for example Dumon, 1990) or consolidated comparisons of family policies (such as Ditch et al., 1996a).

The Observatory reports further raise the question, first examined by Kamerman and Kahn (1978), of how to define family policy in those countries which do not include 'family' in social policy nomenclature. In his introduction to the 1990 volume, Dumon defines family policy as, 'any action by governments having particular objectives for the family' (Dumon, 1990: 1). Such a definition is open to broad
interpretation due to the many ways in which both 'action' and 'family' can be defined. By employing the singular form, as opposed to 'families', it may be argued that this definition does not take questions of diversity of family forms into account, or given the problems of 'explicit' and 'implicit' family policy categorisation discussed above, this definition may lead researchers to neglect policies which may not state the family as an objective but may be analogous with 'family policies' in other countries (an exhaustive comparison of definitions of the family can be found in Hantrais and Letablier, 1996).

The extent to which cross-national comparison can be rigorously maintained in a study comprising many different researchers or teams of researchers from many different countries can be very limited and problematic. Such studies (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978; Dumon, 1990, 1994; Ditch et al., 1996b; Kaufman et al., 1997) benefit from a wide selection of data collected by national specialists, but are often restricted by the limitations of linguistic, epistemological or geographical differences within the research group. Given the possible pitfalls of such ambitious projects, comparative research which either focuses on a much smaller number of countries or is carried out by a small research team (for example Ditch et al., 1996a) can lead to more detailed examinations of questions of family policy change while avoiding the restrictions of a single country study.

Bilateral cross-national comparisons of France and the UK, in particular, have been relatively common, although studies examining family policies only began to appear in the 1990s (Pedersen, 1993; Bussat and Chauvière, 1997). Susan Pedersen (1993) carries out a highly detailed study the development of family policies within the context of changing demography, social trends and the growth of the welfare state in France and the UK from 1914 to 1945. In addition, Pedersen also examined ideas which have impacted upon family policy from writers, such as Émile Zola and his obsession with the redeeming power of a strong, fertile family life, and H. G. Wells'
view that women's emancipation grew out of their dependence upon responsible husbands (Pedersen, 1993: 26-32). Pedersen also examines the pioneering feminism of Eleanor Rathbone, the pro-natalism of the French Third Republic and William Beveridge's family wage and social insurance plan (1993). In spite of the range of policies examined by Pedersen (1993), it is her analysis of the ideas or 'logic' behind family policies which is of greatest significance to the present study. She bases her explanation of the distinct development of family policies on the impact of changing beliefs about state welfare provision and its links with family life. That Pedersen does this in two broadly similar (in terms of economy, demography and administration) countries, further suggests the importance of ideology as a basis for comparative research into the development of family policies.

Exploring the relationship between ideology and family policy change

While the number and scope of comparative and national studies of family policy has been growing during the 1990s, specific questions relating to either family ideology or the politics of family policy remain understudied. Gittins (1985) has demonstrated that the patriarchal ideology of the nuclear family played a significant role in the political thought of the British Conservative party during the late 1970s and 1980s. This theme has also been developed in the UK by Lister (1996) and Muncie and Wetherell (1995). Significantly, Gittins argues that, through a rejection of family ideology, it is possible to bring about a change in the dominance of patriarchy in the British context (Gittins, 1985: 168) and, by so doing, she implicitly suggests a need to change ideological preconceptions before it is possible to change family behaviour. The need to bring about a change in ideology in order to change either social behaviour or public policies is central to the theories of ideology examined in Chapter 4 of the thesis.

In the case of France, Commaille (1991b) underlines the need for the link between ideas and family policies to be examined further. His later collaborative work with
Martin (1998) has followed this path further. While the authors raise some points which clearly correspond to the aims of the present study, the lack of a clear methodology or coherent body of data invites further development of these themes. In addition to Commaille and Martin, other authors have pointed towards the possible value of studying political ideologies and the impact of ideology on changing family policies in France (Lenoir, 1991), the UK (Muncie and Wetherell, 1995; Lister, 1996), Spain (Valiente, 1995) or from a comparative perspective (Pedersen, 1993).

Growth in family policy study since the 1960s has produced vast amounts of important data and analysis centred on demography, sociology, family economy and legislation, which have, to a large extent reflected the concerns and priorities of policy makers and social actors. This body of literature has, however, led to an imbalance in research methodology or in disciplinary approaches, which is exemplified by the very limited number of political science/policy analysis studies of family policy in France, the UK and Spain.

Equally, however, political scientists and theorists have neglected study of the family and family policies due to their concerns with the 'big' questions of democracy, legitimacy or institutions, as highlighted by Jean Bethke Elshtain (1982). If, as Elshtain (1982) claims, the family has been a central pillar of political thought and history, as well as forming what has been commonly referred to as 'the foundation of society, indeed, of civilisation itself' (Gittins, 1985: 1)\(^{10}\), it is surprising that it has not been more widely studied in the context of politics and political thought.

The chapter has examined the existing bodies of literature which have taken families or family policy as a central theme for analysis. It has been demonstrated that an important link exists between the level of national approaches to state intervention and the family on the one hand, and the quantity and focus of research interest and

\(^{10}\) See also the analysis of party manifestos in Chapters 6-8 of the thesis.
output in each of three study countries on the other hand. The review of existing approaches to family policy study has also revealed disparities in the objectives and quantity of research across France, Spain and the UK. One common element was, however, the research disciplines which have focused on the family field which has been dominated by the study of family sociology (for example Chester, 1985; de Singly, 1991; Alberdi, 1995) and policy analysis (for example Kamerman and Kahn, 1978; Laroque, 1985; Alberdi, 1995). The least represented of the social sciences in family policy study has been shown to be political science/theory and, specifically in the thesis, a focus on political ideologies in relation to changing policies.

The review of the development of the political in family policy study has revealed some significant contributions to the relationship between political ideologies and family policies, continuity and change in ideologies and family forms and the relationship between political right and left and family themes. Many authors across three countries have referred to the possible influence of ideology within the family policy domain (for example Gittins, 1985; Brin, 1991; Commaille 1991a, 1991b, 1998; Barrett and McIntosh, 1991; Jones and Millar, 1995; Valiente, 1995b; Hantrais and Letablier, 1996; Kamerman and Kahn, 1997; Flaquer, 1998). Yet, at the time of writing, little work has been published which examines this common, and seemingly, significant element of family policy.
Chapter 3 - ANALYSING PUBLIC POLICIES: RATIONAL ACTORS AND IDEOLOGUES

The present chapter examines approaches to the study of public policy, with special emphasis on the role of ideology therein. The aim is to evaluate the extent to which these different approaches may be applied to the study of the relationship between ideology and family policy change in France, the UK and Spain.

The chapter begins by examining chronologically four major schools of public policy analysis in Anglo-Saxon literature: rationalism, incrementalism, networks and styles. The approaches are studied critically, and conclusions are drawn about the possible contribution each has made to the study of the relationship between party political ideology and family policy change. Particular reference is made to the work of Paul Sabatier and his concept of 'belief systems' (1988) within networks of actors, and the extent to which his approach may be applied to the classification of political beliefs relating to the family as analysed in the empirical case studies. Sabatier's work provides policy analysis with an empirical tool in what is an almost wholly theoretical field and is, therefore, examined as a possible starting point for the empirical case studies of family policy change in France, the UK and Spain (Chapters 6, 7 and 8).

After examining methods of policy analysis, the remainder of the chapter focuses on the development of concepts of ideology as tools for the analysis of changing family policies. Conclusions based on different approaches to policy analysis indicate some possible common themes with classical Marxist theories of ideology, a link that is explored in the context of the themes addressed in the present study, most notably the relationship between the state and citizens (families or individuals). Further, neo-marxist interpretations, notably the contribution of Louis Althusser, of ideology and its role within the state are examined as key developments which contribute to the
aims of this thesis. The chapter concludes with a presentation of the national context for ideologies in each of the three countries. This highlights the nature of ideologies of state intervention thus establishing the key themes for the case studies.

**Public policy analysis in cross-national research**

As with the study of family policy (see Chapter 2), interest in public policy analysis and the policy process has grown rapidly since the end of the Second World War. A major characteristic of this growth is the emergence of distinct schools of thought which can be categorised in terms of the methods they have proposed. Given the range and number of approaches to public policy analysis, the present study is limited to those which have become influential in Anglo-Saxon literature.

The approaches examined below have been selected not to provide an exhaustive review of policy analysis, but because their basic structures, hypotheses or methodologies offer a possible foundation for the examination of the relationship between ideology and family policy change in the three case study areas.

In their introduction to *The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State*, Christopher Ham and Michael Hill (1984: 2) present policy analysis as a product of an intellectual tradition which has developed from the work of Marx, the Webbs and Keynes. Although, as Ham and Hill (1984) suggest, it is possible to follow the historical thread back to the founders of the social sciences, the emphasis on 'policy' only grew during the 1950s and 1960s, notably in the United States. The work of American political scientists, in particular Charles Lindblom (1959, 1965), later became particularly influential in the UK (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992).

Whilst remaining a sub-discipline of political science, policy analysis can be considered as a distinct discipline due to the emphasis it places on '...finding out what governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes' (Dye, 1975: 26), rather
than the more traditional focus in political science on the role and importance of institutions and structures of governments. Methods of policy analysis seek to describe and explain the processes whereby policies are formulated, implemented and/or evaluated. Policy analysis, however, may also be seen as a tool at the disposal of actors in the policy process, serving more than a merely descriptive function: '[Policy analysis] is an attempt to apply social science knowledge to the problems of government and to influence the activities and decisions of governments...' (Ham and Hill, 1984: 2). Policy analysis can therefore be considered as serving both descriptive and prescriptive functions.

The theme of the descriptive and prescriptive roles of policy analysis is also developed by Ian Gordon et al. (1977). Their schema attempts to clarify these two possible objectives of policy analysis and their respective characteristics, thereby dividing policy analysis into what Ham and Hill (1984) describe on the one hand 'as an academic activity concerned primarily with advancing understanding', and on the other hand 'as an applied activity concerned mainly with contributing to the solution of social problems' (Ham and Hill, 1984: 4). This schema is presented thus:

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Due to its dual function, policy analysis may thus be defined in terms of the research objectives of each analysis.

The present research project is primarily concerned with the descriptive approach, termed 'analysis of policy' (Gordon et al., 1977: 26). Through the analysis of the relationship between ideology and family policy change in the case-study areas a
better understanding of those policies is developed. In addition, this analysis evaluates
the impact of ideology and leads to the possible explanation of convergent/divergent
trends across the three countries. If, however, the ‘analysis of policy’ brings certain
factors to light enabling the possible improvement of the existing policy-making
process, these factors should be considered valuable contributions in their own right
as Thomas Dye (1976) and Ham and Hill (1993), amongst others, have suggested.

Approaches to policy analysis

In this section different stages in the development of approaches to public policy
analysis are presented chronologically as follows: rationalism, incrementalism,
networks and styles. The work of Paul Sabatier (1988) provides a central focus for the
section due to its special relevance to the study of the relationship between ideology
and family policy change through its development of the concept of ‘belief systems’.

The rational approach

The first approach to policy analysis in the Anglo-Saxon literature has become known
as the ‘rational choice’ approach or ‘rationalism’. The rational approach to policy
analysis developed along with interest in rational choice theory in both sociology and
economics (Elster and Hylland, 1986). The rational approach is the simplest and most
commonly criticised method of policy analysis reviewed here, indeed the majority of
publications which examine it choose to attack its simplicity and limitations.

Herbert Simon’s (1957) influential work Administrative Behaviour is generally cited
(for example by Ham and Hill, 1984) as having made the first important contribution
to the rational approach to decision making. Simon (1957) applies this approach to the
analysis of organisational decision-making based on ‘goals’, suggesting that the
decision-maker should choose the alternatives which are most likely to achieve the
goals which have been set. The choice of alternatives is made following
comprehensive, rational analysis of each in order to arrive at the ‘best’ or optimal solution (Simon, 1957).

William G. Scott (1971) described the process of rational decision-making following four criteria: a search process to discover goals, the formulation of objectives after search, the selection of alternatives (strategies) to accomplish optimal objectives and the evaluation of outcomes (Scott, 1971: 19). This process, which follows on from the work of Simon (1957) is, in essence better suited to a normative, prescriptive approach, or as Amitai Etzioni states: ‘rationalistic models are widely held conceptions about how decisions ought to be made’ (Etzioni, 1967: 385) (italics added). Given the rational approach’s reliance upon subjective evaluation as to what is ‘best’ or ‘optimal’, many of the assumptions made in the context of the rational approach have been dismissed as ‘utopian’ (Smith and May, 1980: 149); for example the possibility of measuring costs against benefits, the availability and comparability of data, and the possibility of establishing causality.

As a descriptive approach, rationalism simply does not represent a ‘real world’ picture of how policy is made, examples of which include its failure to make provision for ‘external’ elements to the process, such as pressure to adapt policies in line with other associated policy decisions, the personal objectives of individual policy-makers (which may be interpreted as ideology), or simply that rationalism assumes politics is the pursuit of the ‘optimal’ solution (see Etzioni, 1967; Lindblom, 1979; Smith and May, 1980).

**Incrementalism**

Perhaps one of the most vociferous critics of the rational approach has been Charles Lindblom (1958, 1965, 1979). Much of his critique has been directed at rationalism being too abstract and divorced from the real world of decision making. Lindblom...
(1958) has contested that policy can be decided upon in the way that the supporters of rationalism advocate. Through his criticism, Lindblom came to develop his own approach to the question; an approach that has since been widely regarded as the natural opposite of rationalism (Smith and May, 1980; Ham and Hill, 1984; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Dowding, 1995).

In his work with David Braybrooke (1963), Lindblom set out an eight-point critique of the rational approach, which they prefer to term the ‘synoptic ideal’ (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963: 12). Braybrooke and Lindblom present the main reasons why the rational approach can be seen as lacking in realism, such as the limits of man’s problem solving capacities, financial limitations to analysis and the myriad forms of policy problems. As a consequence, Lindblom proposes a different approach which he initially termed ‘the science of muddling through’ (1959: 73), and later as ‘successive limited comparisons’ or ‘disjointed incrementalism’ (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963: 18).

Lindblom’s approach differs fundamentally from rationality on the grounds that policy success is to be judged according to whether the policy secures agreement of the interests and actors involved, as opposed to striving for an ideal ‘set of values in a futile attempt at superhuman comprehensiveness’ (Lindblom, 1959: 88). Lindblom held the view that proceeding through incremental changes allows the decision-makers to work through policy decisions whilst constantly being able to evaluate expected outcomes. In this way, they are able to return to individual problems as and when they arise and, as a result, be in a stronger position to solve these problems. The objectives of given policies can be adjusted in line with available means and situations, as opposed to striving for an unattainable ideal future state (Lindblom, 1959, 1979; Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963).
Lindblom argues that this approach is both descriptive and prescriptive. As a descriptive approach, ‘muddling through’ was defended as an accurate description of the decision making process in the United States at the time (Lindblom, 1959: 73). As a prescriptive approach, it has the advantage of allowing for constant evaluation and adjustment of policy outcomes. He argues that it is probable that policy-making in other modern democracies can be described as exemplifying a certain level of incremental change, whether this is the case for the family policies of France, Spain and the UK will be examined later.

Lindblom’s later work *The Intelligence of Democracy* (1965) continued to develop this approach, clarifying two types of adjustment a decision maker can make: ‘adaptive adjustments’, in which decisions are adapted in response to decisions made elsewhere; and ‘manipulative adjustments’, undertaken in order to elicit a desired response from other decision makers (Lindblom, 1965: 31). In order to perform these adjustments methods such as consultation, negotiation or bargaining could be used, Lindblom terms these ‘partisan mutual adjustments’ (Lindblom, 1965: 33).

In contrast to reactions to rationalism, incrementalism seems to have been received with less hostility, an attitude summed up by Ham and Hill: ‘there is a large measure of agreement in the literature on decision making that disjointed incrementalism is a good description of how decisions are actually made’ (Ham and Hill, 1983: 83). As a prescriptive model, however, incrementalism has received a certain amount of criticism due, in part, to ‘real world’ consequences of examples of incremental decision making, one infamous example being the gradual engagement of the United States in the Vietnam war (Hill, 1993a: 196). However, examples of actual incremental decision-making may be identified in many countries where policy is decided as a result of constant evolution through debate.
Due to the possible shortcomings of incrementalism as a prescriptive model, combined with the rational approach’s lack of scope as a descriptive tool, some analysts have attempted to find a middle ground in what Smith and May came to term ‘the artificial debate between rationalist and incrementalist models of decision making’ (Smith and May, 1980: 147).

Smith and May (1980) chart the split between rationalist and incrementalist models, concluding that both approaches may prove equally ‘costly’ (Smith and May, 1980: 150), in terms of their ‘real world’ consequences, when used prescriptively. However they argue that incrementalism tends towards ‘conservatism’ in decision-making suggesting that it may barely succeed in changing anything, or as Hyderbrand puts it: ‘the question remains whether incremental change is only a form of adaptation which leaves basically intact what ought to be changed’ (Hyderbrand, 1964: 164).

Yehezked Dror (1964) is similarly critical of incremental change, describing it interestingly as an ‘ideological reinforcement of the pro-inertia and anti-innovation forces’ (Dror, 1964: 153). Dror’s criticism provides an important clue as to the possible use of incrementalism in this research project. If the incremental approach can be considered as a tool for the defence of a dominant ideology, then its existence (and policy consequences) in a given country’s decision-making process may provide an indicator as to the nature of that dominant ideology.

Dror advocates an approach which incorporates both rational and extra-rational elements to combine ‘realism and idealism’ (Dror, 1964: 157). In brief, whilst accepting the descriptive value of Lindblom’s ‘muddling through’ thesis and appreciating, to some extent, the prescriptive intentions of the rational approach, Dror (1964) feels that the latter could be improved via the incorporation of extra-rational elements such as judgement, creativity or ‘brain storming’. Dror sees the inclusion of abstract processes as a more real world description of how policies are decided upon.
If 'judgement', for example, is identified as a key element of the decision making process then elements that may inform, blur or lend bias to judgement, notably ideology, must also be considered as having an impact upon any policies arrived at. Neither Dror nor his contemporaries used the term ideology to describe elements which may have a tangible impact upon the decision making process or its outcomes.

The continuing debate surrounding rational and incremental models shows the extent to which 'analysis for' and 'analysis of policy' are not considered as being entirely separate activities, as Gordon et al. (1977) claimed. The descriptive analysis of policy inevitably reveals the flaws or strengths in a given decision-making process. Rationalism has been shown to go some way to providing an ideal, albeit abstract, model of decision-making. However, this does not mean that it may not be used as a descriptive approach, until rationalism has been applied to all policy processes in every country, it cannot be dismissed as speculation and probability as Lindblom has argued.

Incrementalism has been shown as embodying a certain amount of descriptive value. However, the key element of the incremental approach in the context of this thesis is its intrinsic tendency towards conservatism. Incremental changes to policy largely fail to address fundamental issues indeed they seek not to do so. This approach thus leaves the core of any policy measure or political system intact. It is this aspect which may prove of value in the present study of party political ideology and family policy change. If ideology serves to maintain the status quo of one group's dominance over another, then the system supported by it must also remain stable. Any change must therefore be gradual as revealed through incremental policy analysis. If incrementalism in policy change can be identified in the case studies, this may provide a valuable indicator not only of the existence of political ideology, but may also lead to the identification of the defining characteristics of the party political
ideology in each case allowing its relative impact upon family policies to be examined.

Policy Networks, Sub-Systems and Iron Triangles

Whilst the debate surrounding the rational/incremental approach was developing, a different approach to the analysis of public policy was also emerging in the United States (Jordan, 1990), one which went on to influence the core of the policy analysis debate in the UK. This approach was first adopted by John L. Freeman in The Political Process (1955) in which he suggests that the analysis of public policy should be approached by emphasising the importance of what he terms 'sub-systems' (Freeman, 1955: 11). According to Freeman a sub-system is made up of bureaucrats, politicians and interest groups. Policy decisions are seen as being the result of the three-way, interdependent relationship of the actor groups or organisations. Freeman suggested that the policy decisions which arise from the sub-system, although previously considered as being insignificant, have a much wider reaching influence to the point where it may be possible to see the whole of public policy as the sum of the smaller decisions of the sub-system (Freeman, 1955).

A development of the sub-systems or 'sub-governments' literature, which has become one of the best-known labels for the policy process of the United States within the literature is the 'iron triangle' (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). The iron triangle develops the idea of the sub-system by incorporating the notion of a symbiotic relationship between three parties (for example central government, parliamentary committee and dominant interest group). All members of the iron triangle share similar interests and, in order to succeed, must act interdependently (Peters, 1986).

However, iron triangles were criticised for being too rigid in their description of the relationships between actors, as well as being too specific to the political context of
the United States. As a response, terms such as ‘policy communities’ (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974) or ‘issue networks’ (Heclo, 1978) were proposed in order to make provision for freer relationships between the various actors. Although often grouped together, there are some differences between the sub-system/iron triangle approach and the policy communities/issue networks approach. The main one being that the community/network approach adopts a much looser framework than, for example, the rigid structure of the iron triangle. Instead of focusing on just three groups of actors, the networks/communities allow for varied and changing numbers and types of actors.

According to Keith Dowding (1995: 136), the terms, ‘sub-systems’, ‘iron triangles’, ‘policy communities’ and ‘issue networks’ are merely ‘metaphors’ which serve to identify and describe the links between various public and private actors and their respective roles within the policy process. Dowding (1995) questions whether the policy network approach can be anything more than a system of classification, and concludes that the approach is flawed because the independent variables are not characteristics of the network itself, but characteristics from within the network (Dowding 1995: 158).

Although the network approach, through its emphasis on actor groups may appear of limited importance for the analysis of the relationship between ideology and family policy change, it may help explain the pervasive nature of state intervention in the family as it may reveal policy measures which may impact upon families in countries which do not claim to have family policies. For example, in countries classified as exemplifying implicit family policies (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978), study of the relationships between actors in the policy process may reveal the extent to which individual actors or groups of actors hold influence across policy areas. It may be possible to identify and demonstrate the extent to which the same actors operate in different networks whilst maintaining a given ideological position. In the UK for example, policies which may be considered as forming ‘family policy’ are not formulated within a coherent family policy framework (such as a Ministry or other
institution) and thus cross the boundaries of different policy networks. In this situation
the identification of the networks and their actors may be a useful means of
identifying a pervasive ideology with an impact on policy areas such as divorce,
abortion, child support, employment, education and direct taxation, all of which may
be considered as implicit family policy instruments in terms of their relative impact
(Kamerman and Kahn, 1978).

Policy ‘styles’
The approaches to policy analysis discussed this far have all shared one thing in
common, namely a tendency to focus on a single geographic area. In Europe in the
late 1970s, however, a novel approach began to gain favour, that of ‘policy styles’.
The policy styles approach developed from a desire to broaden the single country
analysis of policy in order to examine the extent to which political processes and
policy outcomes in different countries could be seen as converging/diverging.

In the preface to Policy Styles in Western Europe, Jeremy Richardson (1982)
identifies the key questions of the policy styles approach as follows: ‘[Are] the
problems and policy responses, and the political processes adopted in formulating
those responses, converging in Western Europe? Do Western European democracies
have a particular ‘way of doing things’, and ‘...is it possible to identify the primary
characteristics of the policy processes in individual countries with a view to
classifying them according to a simple typology of policy styles?’ (Richardson, 1982:
4) (original emphasis).

Richardson’s questions provide the basic outline of the policy styles approach,
namely the classification based on the way in which policy is decided upon or the
nature of the policy outcome. This approach can be identified in other areas of the
social sciences such as the study of welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and,
notably, family policy (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978). From the point of view of a cross-national inquiry, it is easy to see the possible advantages of studying a particular ‘way of doing things’. However, this approach has proved problematic in its application due, in no small part, to the vast area it addresses. In order to be able to identify the policy style of a single country, all national policy must be studied, otherwise false conclusions may be reached. This rigour must in turn be applied to however many countries have been chosen for comparison, if, as Richardson (1982) suggests, Western European policy styles are to be examined, then at the very least all EU member states must be included. Such a vast undertaking is, in purely practical terms, problematic, although increased availability of data from EU-wide research programmes may facilitate such an approach in the future.

The concept of policy style may be interpreted in a different way. The same approach may be adapted to change its focus from the style of a nation - how all policies are made in one country - to the style of a policy area, in effect posing the question can separate areas of policy - for example defence, education, welfare - be considered as embodying a ‘style’ within a single national context? If so, how far is this style consistent through the same policy area in different countries? This may provide a useful comparative indicator of family policy change and its possible convergence across France, the UK and Spain.

Taken further, this concept may be valuable in the study of national contexts for ideology. Following the discussion of ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (below) the concept of national ‘style’ is re-visited to establish the national context for state intervention in each of the countries. Whereas Richardson sought to examine convergence/divergence of policy making styles, the application of his concept to the present study seeks to explore the extent to which the national styles or contexts for state intervention can be seen to have converged/diverged over a period of two decades.
The limitations of policy analysis

The case-studies in Marsh and Rhodes (1992), and Hill (1993a) suggest that policy styles may exist, not in terms of national boundaries, but in each different policy area as outlined above. The study of policy networks has spawned the use of adjectives, such as professional networks, territorial networks, inter-governmental networks, among others. This may well point to how different approaches can be combined in order to develop a more comprehensive approach to policy analysis, although the identification of policy styles is not made explicit.

The review of approaches to the analysis of policy points to some initial conclusions as to how existing methods may be used to study the relationship between ideology and family policy change. For the purposes of the thesis, the first contribution comes from incrementalism which proffers an approach to the study of policy making and change. Change, or more accurately limited change, is intrinsic to the incremental approach, however, incremental change, whether adaptive or manipulative, can lead to or demonstrate conservatism on the part of decision-makers. This conservatism allows for the maintenance of the status quo and may indicate the presence of a dominant political ideology within a policy area. Incrementalism may thus prove a valuable concept in the present study.

A focus on policy networks may prove useful towards a better understanding of which actors (and their beliefs) can be seen to shape family policies. However, the complex and often ‘invisible’ nature of actor networks requires a far more detailed study than the limitations of the thesis can accommodate. In addition, the identification of the political beliefs of actors within policy networks is highly problematic. Interview methods may be used to help understand actors’ beliefs, however such methods would only be appropriate for the study of change if interviews were carried out over a sufficient number of years as beliefs may change over time (this is explored further in Chapter 4).
The final element of policy analysis which may contribute to the objectives of this research project is revealed in the cross-national comparative ambitions of the policy styles approach as discussed above. The literature suggests that it may be possible to examine the extent to which either a national style exists for each of the three countries\footnote{Although this would be limited to the area of family policy rather than a general, national policy style as suggested by Richardson (1982).}, or the extent to which a policy style exists across countries, revealing in effect a ‘family policy style’ which is common or otherwise to France, the UK and Spain.

\textit{Sabatier's concept of belief systems and advocacy coalitions}

While many methods of policy analysis have been applied to empirical case studies, family policy has not been the focus of such studies. Such a lack of study of family policy may result from the relative invisibility of the family as a target of a coherent policy area in the US and the UK as demonstrated in the previous chapter. In addition, while elements of the above approaches can be used in the context of family policy, their application could not account for the possible impact of political ideology on policies thus limiting their value in the present study. One possible exception to this is the approach presented in Sabatier’s article ‘An advocacy coalition model of policy making and change and the role of policy oriented learning therein’ (1988).

Sabatier’s (1988) work is of interest to the present study on two major counts: first, he includes ‘belief systems’ as a variable in his analytical approach to policy, a concept which may prove analogous to ideology or ideologies; second, the focus of the analysis is on change and ‘policy learning’. These two elements suggest that Sabatier’s model and objectives correspond to the focus of this thesis, although his empirical case study, anti-air pollution policy, does not. Sabatier’s model attempts to develop the US policy communities approach, although he criticises the effectiveness of short term analysis. He acknowledges that short-term analyses result from the need
for short-term policy solutions. In addition, Sabatier underlines the importance of the interests of actors, which may not always be simply to find the best solution, as rationalism would argue. Interests may include actors' beliefs or ideologies concerning the objectives of policies and the means used to meet them. Sabatier sets out a framework for the analysis of policy change which rests upon three criteria:

1. understanding policy change requires a time perspective of a decade or more;
2. the most useful way to think about policy change is through a focus on the interaction of actors from different institutions interested in the policy area;
3. public policies can be conceptualised as sets of value (or ideological) priorities and causal assumptions about how to realise them. (Sabatier, 1988: 131)

Sabatier terms actor groups within the policy network 'advocacy coalitions', which he describes as groups within the sub-system which share the same beliefs. These beliefs he sees as acting as the political 'glue' uniting the members of the sub-system (Sabatier 1988: 141). Through a central focus on political beliefs, Sabatier's theory of policy change is clearly much closer to including the impact of ideology on policy making than any of his peers. In addition, his use of the term 'glue' is also compatible with one of the key characteristics of ideology, namely to maintain the unity and stability of groups or even society as a whole (see Marx and Engels, 1975; Scarborough, 1984; van Dijk 1998). Sabatier does not however use the term ideology. While it is not possible to provide conclusive proof as to Sabatier's use of terms, his use of belief rather than ideology may be a result of the 'End of Ideology' school which devalued the analytical function of ideology in the US (Gann, 1995). The description of processes in Western liberal democracies as ideological was deemed inappropriate simply because such political concepts were considered as 'not ideological' (Larrain, 1979).
Actors’ beliefs, according to Sabatier (1988) can be seen as falling into three categories:

1. deep core beliefs: those beliefs least susceptible to change;
2. near core beliefs: beliefs associated with the policy area which are open to but resistant to change;
3. secondary aspects: policy-specific elements that are open to change (Sabatier, 1988: 145).

Examples of deep core beliefs may include subjects such as the nature of man, freedom, human rights or the fundamental relationship between the state and citizens which are highly resistant to change and may be present whatever the policy area. Near core beliefs, on the other hand, are specific beliefs relative to the policy area, such as orientation of substantive policy conflicts, identification of policy target groups, choice of policy instruments (coercion versus persuasion) and so on (Sabatier, 1988: 145).

Secondary aspects are understood by Sabatier as being non-ideological because they are related to policy-specific questions, which are highly susceptible to change, as a result of fluctuating budgets, administrative rules or short-term political priorities (Sabatier, 1988: 145). If change is identifiable in secondary aspects alone, Sabatier argues that ideologies are not the motors for change as change is the result of practical, material or pragmatic concerns. This may not be entirely the case, indeed deep core beliefs about the economy may override other beliefs such as those pertaining to the family thus leading to ideological conflict or paradoxes within one political group, examples of which can be seen throughout the case studies in the impact of monetarism on right, and in some cases left, wing parties (chapters 6, 7 and 8).
Identifying these three levels of belief complements the incremental approach by identifying not only whether incremental changes to policies are made, but also the level of beliefs that are most susceptible to incremental change. If, as Sabatier (1988) suggests, deep core beliefs are very difficult or difficult to change, it is improbable that incremental change will impact upon such beliefs. If policy change within a given country can be identified as being incremental, it may then be possible to either demonstrate the persistence and level of impact of political ideology within a specific policy area (thus identifying the existence of consensus therein) or simply political inertia or the prioritisation of policy change.

Sabatier's concept of belief systems has been questioned in relation to his classification of the three types of belief shown above. Alison Hann (1995), while suggesting that the approach provides a 'new and potentially powerful explanatory framework' (Hann, 1995: 20), criticises Sabatier's approach by suggesting that, rather than classifying beliefs in terms of their resistance to change, it may be possible to divide beliefs into the following two categories: 'empirical beliefs about the world; values, norms and wants' (Hann, 1995: 23).

Hann (1995) suggests that both categories may be resistant to change to varying degrees, thus dispensing with the need for deep core, near core and secondary aspects. In the context of Marxist interpretations of ideology, it may be possible to suggest that Hann's 'empirical beliefs' are not, in fact, beliefs in the true sense at all because they are based on scientific proof. Science and scientific proof are the antithesis of ideology (Althusser, 1971a; Marx and Engels, 1975). Further, it is unclear whether 'values', suggesting deeply held beliefs and 'wants', perhaps only short-term in nature, can be grouped in the same category.

Certainly, Sabatier (1988) feels confident that policy makers are not merely driven by their short-term interests, although this too is questionable, but that they are driven by
commonly held beliefs. Hann (1995) also objects to the thesis that policy makers seek short-term solutions and asks: ‘if it is shown empirically that individuals (or groups) within an advocacy coalition do not share core values, then surely this seriously undermines Sabatier’s second hypothesis namely, actors will demonstrate consensus pertaining to the policy core?’ (Hann, 1995: 24). If this is the case, as Hann (1995) suggests, then it is in part thanks to Sabatier’s innovative approach that such questions come to light. Indeed, as Hann also states interest in the role and impact of beliefs on policy change had been virtually absent previous to Sabatier’s work (Hann, 1995: 19). In spite of her objections, Hann remains optimistic about the possible development of Sabatier’s approach.

In addition, Hann points to the possible utility of the classical Marxist approach to ideology in relation to the concept of ‘belief systems’, as stated above. Hann suggests that in spite of the conflict between the various advocacy coalitions, they are all members of the political elite and as such they share certain deep core beliefs or ideology resulting in policy outcomes which reinforce the ruling class’s dominant position (Hann, 1995).

Further, Hann also suggests that feminist theory could, along similar lines, point to male domination although this may prove weaker given possible political or ideological conflict irrespective of gender issues, which may result in some areas of highly gendered policy (notably abortion, equal rights, single-parent benefits) being affected.

In addition to the impact of beliefs, Sabatier (1988) identifies further influences on policies which may be external or ‘non-cognitive’, such as socio-demographic change or the internal dynamics of actor groups (Sabatier, 1988: 135-9). The influence of external factors (Sabatier, 1988: 145) does not constitute the central core of Sabatier’s analysis. However, the particular relevance of socio-demographic change in the
family policy sphere, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, supports the need to examine such influences on political ideologies in the context of the present study (see Chapter 5).

Although flawed, Sabatier's approach highlights the importance of the study of political ideology and its impact on policy change. Combined with elements of the incremental, network and style approach to policy analysis it may be possible to develop an approach to the question of the relationship between ideology and family policy change. In addition, Sabatier's reference to the possible effects of socio-demographic influence suggests that the combination of the approaches examined above may provide the theoretical basis for the empirical case studies of family policy change in contemporary France, the UK and Spain.

**Ideology: defining analytical tools**

One of the major ambiguities present in Sabatier's work lies in his use of the term 'belief system' (Sabatier, 1988). It has been suggested above that this term may be considered analogous to ideology, and that due to the pejorative connotations ideology has acquired, most notably in the US, the term has lost some of its place as a descriptive or analytical tool for social science research (Larrain 1979; Gann, 1995). What follows is a brief examination of the development of the term ideology and its use in the social sciences. This section aims to re-appraise the analytical utility of ideology and evaluate its application to the case of family policy change through an examination of its evolution as a concept within Marxist and neo-Marxist theory, which may, as Hann (1995) suggests, helps 'sharpen-up' the aims of Sabatier's model (1988). The central aim of this section is to examine concepts of ideology in their explicit application to the aims of this thesis. As a consequence, the focus is upon the role of ideology in the relationship between the state and citizens.
The term *idéologie* was first coined by the French thinker, Antoine Destutt de Tracy in 1798 (Head, 1985). Since that time the concept of ideology has been transformed and developed many times, with each development adding its own particular connotations. Initially a expressed by de Tracy as the 'science of ideas' (Head, 1985) ideology rapidly became used as a pejorative term to describe any political doctrine or 'belief system' (Funderburk and Thoebaben, 1994: 1). Napoleon Bonaparte was instrumental in this transformation in the meaning of ideology. Bonaparte had once figured in the ranks of the *Idéologues*, a group who had sought to further the cause of the 'science of ideas' (Eagleton 1994), but later became a highly outspoken critic of the movement, referring to them as 'windbags' (Eagleton, 1994: 5) and painted them as being politically impotent, idealistic and the instigators of political unrest. As a result, ideology was discredited and fell into a period of disuse.

**Marx, Engels and ideology**

By the mid-nineteenth century, the term ideology was adopted by a new generation of thinkers who were to have a much wider influence on the world than de Tracy and many of his contemporaries. The works of Karl Marx (1818-83) and Friedrich Engels (1820-95) and the vast number of publications devoted to them have undoubtedly had an enduring impact on the development of political science, economics, sociology and thought. The influence of their theories can still be discerned in the day-to-day political life of many regimes throughout the world.

Perhaps their most important contribution, and that upon which their many works were founded, was the concept of historical materialism. The key doctrine of historical materialism is clearly a development of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's dialectic, and is based on a process of historical development through conflict. Whereas Hegel saw development as taking the form of change in terms of the metaphysical *Geist*, Marx and Engels (1975) saw both conflict and change as being
firmly rooted in society and, crucially, the way in which a given society creates and redistributes its wealth. The basis of this conflict is that of ‘opposing’ classes, one dominant, through its control of the means of production, and the other subordinate, due to its dependence on the financial rewards for labour. It is in this conflict between the oppressors and the oppressed, that, according to Marx and Engels, ideology becomes an important factor (1975).

The term ideology is prominent from early in the works of Marx and Engels, with The German Ideology (1845-46) being particularly representative of the growing importance of the term to both writers. In spite of this, it is difficult to identify clearly the principles of a theory of ideology from Marx’s work, an aspect which has fuelled debate among Marxist scholars to the present. In the introduction to Marx’s Theory of Ideology (1982), Bhikhu Parekh suggests that ‘Marx did not offer an unambiguous statement of his theory of ideology’ (Parekh, 1982). Terry Eagleton does not go quite so far, suggesting that ‘Marx and Engels never produced a fully-fledged theory of ideology’ (Eagleton, 1994: 23), but he goes on to stress that some of their work contains ‘suggestive ideas in this direction’. In Marxism and Ideology, Jorge Larrain (1983) writes in detail about the problems concerning Marx’s theory of ideology:

...there is no general definition or systematic treatment of the concept in his writings which provides a definitive version. Of course, Marx gives numerous clues by using the concept in a certain way and by describing some of its essential features in the context of concrete analyses. But on the whole it is necessary to accept that the concept of ideology is not satisfactorily elaborated in Marx’s writings and that in consequence it must be reconstructed and theoretically elaborated from the various scattered elements provided by the texts. (Larrain, 1983: 7)

Given the difficulties suggested above, it is not surprising to find discrepancies in the various definitions of Marx’s theory of ideology. However, whether Marx and Engels produced a concrete theory of ideology or not has not discouraged later theorists from pursuing this line of inquiry (for example Lukács, 1923; Gramsci, 1971; Althusser, 1971a). Nor does it detract from the key importance of their contributions to the wider debate surrounding ideology.
Marx's definition of ideology

Perhaps the most misleading aspect of Marx's use of the term ideology can be traced back to his early tendency to criticise, often strongly, the ideas of Hegel and the Young Hegelians. From his earliest writings, and in letters to his father (Parekh, 1982: 1), Marx had been openly critical of many aspects of Hegel's work, but it was Hegel's idealism that attracted the brunt of the criticism. In *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (1843), Marx subjects Hegel's idealism, defined by Marx as Hegel's view of consciousness and its duality, to 'ridicule' (Parekh, 1982: 1). In later works (*The Holy Family*, 1845; *The German Ideology*, 1845-46) however, this critique is developed, but with a major difference, namely the displacement of the term idealism by 'ideology'.

From this point in Marx's development, it seems that the terms idealism and ideology became synonymous, appearing to be interchangeable. In this context, it is possible to say that ideology was, originally, merely another, albeit derogatory, term for Hegel's idealism. This view is upheld by Parekh (1982), and is elaborated upon in Chapter I of his book, *Marx's Theory of Ideology*.

Although ideology in the works of Marx and Engels has had many connotations, it is the role played by ideology in the maintenance of a ruling class position which, as identified in Hann's reappraisal of Sabatier's approach to policy learning (1995: 26), is of greatest interest in the context of the present study. As outlined earlier, the Marxist concept of ideology is closely linked with historical materialism. For Marx the ruling class holds the means of material production and thus controls the economic base of society and the key to redistribution. In Marxism, the economic base in any society generates social formations known as the superstructure. The superstructure consists of social activities including politics, religion, morality, art and science, all of which are determined by the economic base. In this context, ideology is
both the ‘beliefs’ which supply the justification and framework for the economic base and its superstructure, and the ‘process’ by which they become accepted as such.

Similarly, Larrain (1982) suggests that ideology controls the means of ‘mental’ production. This is to say that the ideology of the ruling class becomes the ideology of society as a whole (Larrain, 1979; 1982) or, as Marx puts it, the ruling class ‘is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interests as the common interest of all members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give ideas universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones’ (Marx and Engels, 1975b: 43). In this way, ideology plays a core role in the determination of the relationship between the state and its citizens.

In contrast any ideas developed by the dominated class are not considered by Marx as ideology because they do not serve the function of maintaining the dominance of the ruling class. While this latter point has been the source of conflict within Marxist circles (for example Marx never considered his thought as ideology) (Larrain, 1982), it is important for the purposes of the thesis to stress that such a concept of ideology, by justifying and maintaining the dominance of the ruling class, serves a socially reproductive role. Ideology thus maintains the status quo, the ideology of the dominant class becomes the norm, the ideology of society as a whole, and therefore remains unchallenged. In this sense ideology can function to maintain the patriarchal family model, for example, as shown in Chapter 2 (Gittins 1985; Barrett and McIntosh, 1991) by expressing such a family model as ‘natural’, ‘normal’ or ‘desirable’.

This element of the concept of ideology is of great importance to the thesis insofar as it provides a possible basis for an analytical tool for the comparative study of family policy change in France, the UK and Spain. Ideology defined as ideas which serve to maintain the dominance of the ruling class (or policy élites) allows a wide spectrum
of dogma (in the form of legislation and policy, party manifestos, religion, education, the arts, the media and the sciences) to be examined with a view to showing how, and to what extent, these dogma, and any changes in them, shape the society in which they are contextualised (Parekh 1982).

By comparing changes in family policies with expressions of party political ideology it may be possible to analyse the extent to which policy changes are the result of any changes in party political ideology. Equally it may be possible to demonstrate that although policies change, the ideological assumptions upon which they are based remain static, any examples of such change may be revealed through incremental policy making (see above).

**Neo-marxist contributions to Marx’s concept of ideology**

After Marx’s death, controversy surrounding the concept of ideology formed an important source of debate among his intellectual descendents with both positive and negative concepts finding favour (see Larrain, 1982 or Eagleton 1994 on the contributions of Vladimir Ilich Lenin, Karl Kautsky, Antonio Labriola, Franz Mehring and Georgii Plekhanov, Georg Lukács and Edouard Bernstein). The debate covered a wide range of interpretations of ideology which led, in many cases, to a number of contradictory definitions and interpretations. Given the wide variety of neo-marxist interpretations of ideology, the present study examines the work of two key theorists who have made fundamental contributions to the relationship between the state and citizens and role of ideology.

The first of these two contributions was elaborated by Antonio Gramsci (1971). Gramsci employed the term ‘hegemony’ to describe, not the ideological domination of subordinate classes by the political élites, but a situation in which subjugated classes in modern society willingly accept their exploitation. In the context of this
thesis, hegemony sets the ideological context for the relationship between the state and its citizens, and may be represented not in the acceptance of the family as the social norm by polities, but by families themselves. Family policies would therefore be seen by the electorate as an acceptable, indeed necessary, sphere of state intervention. As such it may be expected that in societies in which family hegemony exists, such as in France, the theme of the family and family policies would be present in political debate, notably during election campaigns. Equally, a situation of hegemony may exist in a society which does not consider the family as a legitimate field of state intervention, as in the UK. In either case the identification of hegemony may further understanding of the ideological nature of family policy evolution and the role of ideologies of state intervention.

The second development of Marx’s concept of ideology, which may prove important for the objectives of the thesis, is the contribution of Louis Althusser, one of the most influential Marxists of recent times (particularly in his native France). Althusser’s work in this area focuses on the two uses of ideology examined above and helps clarify the duality of Marx’s use of ideology by making the distinction between structural ‘ideology’, and historical ‘ideologies’. According to Althusser, ‘Ideology is a ‘representation’ of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their Real conditions of existence’ (original italics and punctuation) (1971a: 241) and is the ‘structure’ in which changing representations, or ideologies, function. In effect ideology is a constant whereas ideologies change as they serve to uphold transformations in political systems or dominant groups in society. It is thus, according to Althusser, through the study of changing ideologies that other change (social, economic, political) may be examined.

Althusser’s use of ideology contributes to the aims of this thesis in three further ways. First, in the essay Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (1971a), Althusser, unlike Marx, accepts that the exploited class expresses an ideology which acts as a
unifying force and, as such, forms a central role in revolutionary theory (Althusser, 1971a). While this does not correspond directly to the possible ideological nature of family policy change, it hints at the nature of ideology as a unifying force in bringing about this policy change (such as the role played by feminist groups in Spain in the legalisation of abortion), and thus echoes Sabatier’s (1988) concept of a ‘glue’ which holds policy advocacy coalitions together.

Althusser’s second contribution (1971a) is to state that the opposite of ideology is ‘science’. Although Marx had also suggested that ‘science’ appeared to be the opposite of ideology, this was never made explicit. If science, as Althusser (1971a; 1971b) proffers, is the opposite of ideology, then it may become possible to distinguish between what is ideological and what is not. Any ‘beliefs’ which may be proven scientifically are, according to Althusser, not ideology. Without this contribution to Marx’s original outline of a concept of ideology, the validity of results from any analysis of ideology would be devalued. It must be possible to define what is not ideology in order to clarify that which is (Althusser, 1971a). In addition this also removes arguments which may state that everything, or indeed nothing, is ideology. In the light of this single aspect of Althusser’s work, it is not surprising that the essay *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (1971a) has been heralded as ‘the most influential exposition of ideology in the last two decades’ (Bottomore, 1983: 223) and ‘the key text in ideology for our time’ (Eagleton, 1994: 87). This element of the concept of ideology also under lies the need for the critical analysis of the use of ‘truths’ in political rhetoric. Any examples of this may be distortions for the purposes of justifying an ideological position. This type of ideological distortion is found throughout the analysis of the FN manifestos (Chapter 6).

The third contribution to the theory of ideology, and most important in terms of the aims of this thesis, rests in Althusser’s understanding of the relationship between the state and citizens. The state, according to Althusser (1971a), is coterminous with
capitalism as the former exists to protect the interests of the latter. Following this, it is possible that democracy, as a political ideology and a system of government, may also be coterminous with capitalism, insofar as democracy provides the illusion that all people are equal and hence hides relations of economic exploitation or dependency.

Althusser mentions two mechanisms that serve to maintain this relationship between state and citizens. The first he terms 'Repressive State Apparatuses' through which the state has the direct power to enforce behaviour, most clearly demonstrated, for example, by the criminal justice system, the police and the prison system. The second and most significant in the context of this thesis, he terms 'Ideological State Apparatuses' (1971a).

I ideological State Apparatuses

Althusser's concept of Ideological State Apparatuses attempts to explain how individuals within society internalise and, subsequently, act upon ideologies. Ideological State Apparatuses are institutions that generate systems of beliefs and values which may cover any area of society and social interaction which individuals and/or groups either believe or not. Examples of these Apparatuses include institutions or organisations such as schools, religions, political parties, legal systems, arts, sports and, significantly in the present study, the family (Althusser, 1971a: 239). Through this concept Althusser identifies specific means by which ideology maintains the status quo, as in Marx's means of intellectual production and Gramsci's hegemony. The family, is thus identified as an Ideological State Apparatus which serves to maintain or justify a model of society, and the relationship between the state and individuals. This link between ideology and the relationship between the state and citizens is further echoed in social policy literature. While Althusser presents democracy as coterminous with the ideology of capitalism, Nicole Questiaux and Jaques Fournier (1978) contextualise the historical development of state intervention.

12 Althusser uses upper case letters throughout his work, this stylistic trait is maintained in this examination of his study of ideology.
through social policies within the development of capitalism. This link is of central importance to the examination of the relationship between party political ideologies and changing family policies insofar as it highlights the importance of ideological representations of the relationship between the state and its citizens.

**Analysing ideology**

The above review of the development of concepts of ideology has identified some valuable contributions to the aims of the present study by Marx (1975) and Althusser (1971a):

- ideology is the structure within which ideologies maintain the dominance of the ruling class within a society;
- ideology is also the process by which ideologies become accepted as dominant or are challenged and undergo changes and transformations;
- ideologies are systems of beliefs relating to the nature of society and the relationship between the state and citizens;
- ideologies, although most strongly embodied in the ‘dominant’ ideas of society, can be any system of ideas which seeks to shape society;
- ideologies are generated within Ideological State Apparatuses, an example of which is the family;
- the opposite of an ideology is ‘science’.

The above elements of the concept of ideology when applied to the review of approaches to policy analysis, Sabatier’s (1988) approach to policy change and Hann’s subsequent critique (1995), support the following premises:

- Sabatier’s concept of deep core and near core ‘belief systems’, due to their resistance to change and their unifying function, can be considered as ‘ideologies’ for the purposes of the thesis;

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13 For the purposes of the present study the ruling class is synonymous with the political party in power.
• deep core ideology may be seen as synonymous with the Marxist concept of superstructure insofar as it are the structure that determines the fundamental nature and limitations of all other assumptions, norms and beliefs within a state, for example the political system. In cases where the deep core ideology is transformed, change may be expected to occur in ideologies and policies within the same structure, context or state. This can be seen in the changes which took place in Spanish family policy after the demise of Franco’s authoritarian regime;
• near core ideologies may be considered as synonymous with the Marxist concept of ‘ideologies’, the beliefs which are fundamentally linked with, but are open to change within the limitations of the deep core ideology of a state. To illustrate this, if the family is presented as a legitimate sphere of state intervention (deep core) the measures employed to support the family (near core) may change, even radically, over time without questioning the deep core ideological assumption of state intervention in the family;
• cases of incremental policy making, because of its inherent conservatism, may help reveal ideological policy making, insofar as small adjustments are most likely to leave deep core and near core ideologies unchanged. Incremental policy making is most likely to change what Sabatier terms secondary aspects, the practical details of policies such as changes in the value of benefits as reactions to fluctuating economic conditions. It is important to note, however, that in cases where secondary aspects remain unchanged in the face of strong practical arguments (for example maintaining high child benefit payments during budgetary crises) this may be a significant indicator of the relative strength of ideologies.

In addition to the contributions of the Marxist theory of ideology to the aims of this thesis, the review of policy analysis approaches also allows for the identification of dominant policy actors and the extent of their influence (based on the network approach), as well as the cross-national comparison of convergent/divergent trends
(policy styles). The combined contributions of the approaches discussed above form the foundation of the methodological approach of the thesis.

National contexts for ideologies of state intervention

Earlier, in the discussion of the concept of policy ‘styles’ it was suggested that France, the UK and Spain may be understood in terms of national styles or contexts for ideologies of state intervention. If this theme is considered within a development of Althusser’s concept of Ideological State Apparatuses, it becomes possible to go further and situate each country within the ideology in which state intervention has been conceptualised. In order to analyse these contexts, this thesis considers each country and its political parties in relation to four ‘thematics’, to use the postmodern jargon, based upon the opposition of public/private and family/individual.

In Chapter 1, each country was briefly presented in order to examine its appropriateness for inclusion in this study. These presentations are explored further below to provide an explicit context for ideologies of state intervention in each case.

Of the three countries, France has the strongest traditions of state intervention. This statist tradition has its roots, like much of French public life, in the Revolutionary and Post-Revolutionary period. By the time of the case study period, state intervention had become a founding characteristic of the nation and could be seen in a number of Ideological State Apparatuses. In terms of social and family policies, a situation of heteronomy developed, represented by high taxation and a highly developed safety net of vertical and, for families, horizontal redistribution. Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses can be seen in the level of institutionalisation of the family in
French public life in bodies such as the CNAF or the UNAF (see Chapters 2, 5 and 6). While the French statist tradition may be considered as the deep core ideology within which family policy is situated, there is some conflict across political parties when these are situated in relation to the four thematics.

The French parties of the right have traditionally sought to preserve the family through public intervention. While right wing ideologies generally have a traditional obsession with the family, largely as a result of the influence of the Catholic Church, public intervention is not considered as a defining characteristic of ideologies of the right. Consequently, this interventionist tradition gives French right wing parties a national style.

Equally, while the parties of the French left have pursued interventionist public policies based on the rights of individuals, they have also targeted the family as a primary group. Thus, the ideologies of the left may be considered as being situated in the broader French ideology of state intervention. In spite of this, the French left and right have been polarised over issues within the deep core ideology, notably in relation to pro-natalism (see Chapters 5 and 6).

Polarisation of left and right has been largely absent in the British polity. As in France, the national context for ideologies has determined the limits of party political ideologies in relation to state intervention. The UK has been characterised by a general consensus based upon privacy, responsibility and autonomy. As a consequence, families have not generally been an explicit target for state intervention. Social and economic policies have been based upon the ideological backdrop of
individual responsibility/autonomy. This broad cross-party consensus was, however, brought into question in the 1970s by the emergence of New Right/Thatcherite ideology and its focus on the themes of privacy and the family. The impact of this ideological development on the cross-party consensus in the UK is explored further in Chapter 7.

The case of Spain is distinct from both France and the UK, and traditions of state intervention are of special interest due to the radical break in political and ideological continuity which took place in 1975. Previous to the case study period, Spanish state intervention mirrored that of the French right, being based upon pro-natalism and the teachings of the Catholic Church. The left did not have an official voice. Thus Chapter 8 explores the emergence of party conceptions of state intervention on both the left and right in the light of the political legacy of Authoritarianism.

The three countries therefore stand as examples of legitimate state intervention, suspicion of state intervention, and an emerging polity which has no explicit context for state intervention. The case studies explore the evolution of party political ideologies not only in relation to changing family policies, but also in the national contexts for ideologies of state intervention.
The previous two chapters have examined different approaches to family policy change: comparative approaches, approaches to policy analysis and the place of ideology. This chapter develops an analytical framework for the study of family policy change in contemporary France, the UK and Spain based on the core elements of the concept of ideology (see Chapter 3), combined with Sabatier's belief system approach to analysing policy change.

The chapter begins with a review of the methods used in the case studies in Chapters 5-8 and includes a critical review of John Clayton Thomas' (1975) attempt to analyse party political ideology and change. The case study design is then presented with a focus on the rationale behind country selection, the choice and limits of the time span for the analysis and the criteria for and limitations of data selection. In addition, this chapter considers some advantages and disadvantages of cross-national comparison with special reference to problems such as language barriers which are particularly relevant to the thesis given the centrality of original documents in French and Spanish in Chapters 6 and 8 respectively.

The review of family policy analysis in Chapter 2 revealed that the existing body of literature has largely neglected the potential impact of party political ideology on family policy change, or where this has been a focus of research, it has been limited and solely applied to single-country studies. While this can be explained in part by the scientific development of the field in France, the UK and Spain, which has been dominated by demographic, sociological and economic studies, it may also result from the wider neglect of political ideology as an analytical tool in the social sciences (Beardsley, 1980) and the potential difficulties and contradictions of concepts of ideology as demonstrated in Chapter 3. In addition, the study of the political
dimension of family policies has been a limited objective of family policy research to date (Elshtain, 1982; Commaille and Martin, 1998).

Case study design
The case study approach and structure adopted in the thesis relates directly and systematically to the research questions (see Chapter 1). The following sections present the structure, the methods used and some of the pitfalls encountered during the research.

Country selection
The first stage in the case study design was the choice of study countries. In the selection of the countries for a comparative project conducted by a lone researcher, language is an important consideration. This factor was fundamental in the choice of the countries which are analysed in the case study section of the thesis (Chapters 6-8).

It has been argued (Hantrais and Ager, 1985) that problems (including lack of translated sources, delays in dissemination of research, underestimation of culture and context or translation interference) arising from the linguistic elements in cross-national study can be overcome by greater co-operation between linguists and social scientists, or in better language training for the social scientist or vice versa.

Countries which may have provided a deeper understanding of the questions examined in the thesis include Germany (Christian-Democratic political tradition) and the Scandinavian countries, which have been the focus of family policy study since the 1940s. However, it was not possible, given practical, language or logistical limitations, to include these countries in the present study. France, the UK and Spain were chosen for the present study on account of the language expertise of the author. Analysis could thus be carried out on the original documents to overcome the
numerous disadvantages of working in translation which the Thomas (1975) study encountered (see below).

While the language proficiency of researchers may, to a certain extent, guard against linguistic or cultural subjectivity, this alone does not provide sufficient justification for the choice of countries to be compared. Other factors such as knowledge of the countries, comparability and availability of data all play a role. In the case of the present study, the countries are all member states of the EU and they display certain similarities in terms of their political and socio-economic development. In addition, the countries present interesting choices for case study in relation to their distinct traditions of state intervention. If language was the sole variable, any combination of countries in which French, English and Spanish are spoken could have served as cases, such as, Senegal, New Zealand and Bolivia, three states which do not share similar political and social characteristics. While knowledge of the languages and familiarity with the countries selected made the study feasible and practical, this selection also has its limitations. A different mix of countries would be expected to produce different results. Selection of three countries is supported by Nick Manning (1993: 15) who argues that this number provides the case study method with a comparative dimension without sacrificing depth.

In addition to the researcher's knowledge of the languages and the countries in the cases studies, the selection of the countries in this thesis is significant within the field of family policy study. In Chapter 2, France was shown to be a pioneer in the practice and study of family policy leading to it being classified as an example of 'explicit' family policy. In contrast, the UK stood as an example of 'implicit' family policy. Study of Spanish family policy was demonstrated as a relatively recent development in both single-country and cross-national studies. Where Spain has been studied, it has been described as distinct from Northern European countries in terms of gender division (Abrahamson, 1991), demographic change (Roussel, 1992; 1994) or family
values (Guerrero and Naldini, 1996), and is generally considered within the Southern European model of family life and family policy (Guerrero and Naldini, 1996).

The final consideration in the selection of the three countries was the research expertise, funding and resources available to the author. The majority of the research project was supported both financially and materially by a research studentship in the Department of European Studies at Loughborough University (UK). The fieldwork carried out in the thesis was made possible by the EU-funded Training and Mobility of Young Researchers (TMR) programme ‘Family and the Welfare State in Europe’ co-ordinated by the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). The author was awarded a TMR fellowship for the duration of six months each in Barcelona (January-June 1997) and Paris (July-December 1997). While working as an assistant to senior researchers, it was possible to collect the majority of the data in support of the case studies of France and Spain.

**Time span**

The centrality of the concept of change to the research design implies the need for a longitudinal study. It is also helpful to examine how other authors have approached the same issue. Sabatier (1988) studied political beliefs in relation to policy change. Thus his approach to length of study period offers an appropriate starting point. In terms of the nature of data to be analysed and, indeed, the mechanics of the analysis itself, Sabatier’s approach (1988) remains vague, one element of his argument which is made very clear, is the need to examine policy change over a period of at least a decade. Building on the work of Carol Weiss (1977a; 1977b) and Charles Lindblom and David Cohen (1979), Sabatier argued against short-term policy evaluation on the grounds that such approaches underestimate influences on policy and do not allow for a complete formulation/implementation/reformulation cycle. Although the central objective of such an approach is policy evaluation, the argument for a sufficient time
The thesis argues that in the context of family policy, an area intrinsically linked with demographic trends, a much longer period of time (two or three generations) is required. It is for this reason that Chapter 5 examines family policy change over a period from the 1930s to the mid-late 1970s to provide the necessary historical context for the substantive national case studies. This time span represents a period of dramatic change in social attitudes, demography and the economy in all three countries, and in political institutions in France and Spain in particular.

The case studies of changing party political ideologies focus on a shorter period for two reasons: first, the size limitations of the thesis; and second, and more significantly, the need for comparability across the three countries. This second consideration is necessary because Spain before 1975 was not a democratic state and did not have any legal political parties. The importance of the political context to the case studies is further underlined by the selection of different dates for the beginning of each national case study. For ease of comparability, it may be argued that a common start date, such as 1980, would have provided a solid foundation for the analysis. In terms of developing parallel chronological analysis, such an approach might have proved convenient. It was decided, however, that basing the analysis on a common start date would be arbitrary and would deny the specificity of the social and political context of each country, a factor which is central to the comparative aims of the thesis. It is for this reason that the national case studies cover a different time period. Each examines a time period based upon the relative consistency of political leadership in each country. The focus on election manifestos (see below) delimits the end dates for the three case studies to the most recent general elections at the time of writing, which were in 1997 for France and the UK and 1996 in Spain.
The French case study (Chapter 6) begins in 1981, a year which marked the election of the first left wing majority in the Assembly and the first Socialist President of the Fifth Republic (founded in 1958) and an important break in family policy traditions. The period of Socialist dominance of the presidency, in the person of François Mitterrand, continued until 1995, although there were numerous shifts between left and right wing majorities in the Assembly during that time.

The starting point for the case study of UK family policy change (Chapter 7) is 1979 on the grounds that the election of the Conservative party under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher represented an ideological break with the period of 'consensus' which had exemplified British politics since 1945 (Kavanagh, 1988). The period saw the Conservative party under Thatcher, and later John Major, dominate British politics until 1997 and was a period of great change in political ideologies and the place of the family therein.

The political context of the Spanish case study (Chapter 8) is not merely identified in terms of the dominance of political leadership. Rather post-1977 Spain represented a new era in the history of the nation. The events following the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975 led to the birth of democracy and represent a fundamental shift in deep core ideology of the state. The first elections were held in 1977 and are thus taken as the starting point of the study of Spain. As with France and the UK, the period covered in the national case study largely corresponds to the dominance of a single political party, namely the Socialist PSOE and their leader Felipe Gonzalez, from 1981-96.

**Analysing family policy change**

Family policy change is examined longitudinally, and conclusions are drawn in relation to the key concept of change. The study of changing family policies covers Chapters 5-8. Chapter 5 is a key element of the case study section as it provides the
historical context for the national case studies in Chapters 6-8. Family policies (defined below) are studied from their origins in each country to the start of the study period (see above) in the later chapters. While it may be argued that this structure (Figure 4.1) breaks the continuity of the study of family policy change, there are a number of advantages in relation to the objectives of the thesis as a whole:

**Figure 4.1: Case study structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family policy change in France, UK and Spain to late 1970s</th>
<th>Parallel study of FP and PPI change</th>
<th>Results of national case studies of FP and PPI compared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>FP across countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>PPI across left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>PPI across right</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*FP = family policies, PPI = party political ideologies.*

First, the changes in family policy which are of greatest interest to the present study are those which can be related to changes in party political ideologies. This is best clarified through the parallel study of these two dimensions in the national case studies (Chapters 6-8); second, if family policy change was a separate focus to changing party political ideologies, it would still be necessary to cross-reference both dimensions in order to maintain balance and context, this would result in substantial repetition; third, the study of family policy change in Chapter 5 serves to contextualise the central case studies of the thesis and is not intended as an analytical chapter. Failure to contextualise the case studies sufficiently would lead to a lack of understanding of significant long-term trends/traditions which may have had a significant impact upon party political ideologies and family policies in the study period. Longer study periods which would cover the origins of family policy were rejected on the grounds that practical limitations would result in insufficient depth of study, consistent collection of data would be hindered and, as shown earlier,
comparative parameters would be lost in relation to political regimes, notably Vichy in France and Franco’s Spain.

The three national case studies thus focus on the extent to which family policies have changed in each country in parallel with party political ideologies during the study period and describe the direction of change in each case in relation to the thematics of public/private and family/individual. Given the problems of defining family policy (Chapter 1) and the potential pitfalls of equivalence of terms in cross-national comparisons (see Figure 4.2), eight family policy measures were selected to form the basic structure of the analysis.

Figure 4.2: Framework of family policy measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulatory measures</th>
<th>Support measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>abortion</td>
<td>child benefits$^{14}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contraception</td>
<td>fiscal measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>divorce</td>
<td>maternity leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parental authority</td>
<td>childcare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 2 reviewed existing national and cross-national approaches to the study of family policy and showed the potential for confusion in the cross-national transference of terms. While one country in this study, France, has a long tradition of explicit family policies this is not the case for the UK and Spain (see Chapters 5). To overcome problems of definition and comparability, the thesis examines a range of eight key family policy measures as opposed to family policy as a whole.

$^{14}$ The term child benefits is used here to mean cash benefits paid to parents with dependent children. The choice of this term, as opposed to family allowances, has been dictated by the working language. While there may be conceptual differences between countries, this kind of benefit can still be identified in each case (Brin, 1991).
While neither the UK nor Spain has an official body of policies called 'family policy', there are implicit policies which seek to either regulate or support family life. This approach has been adopted following Brin's (1991) conclusions that a focus upon policy measures helps reveal family policies in those countries which do not explicitly target families as a primary group (see Chapter 2).

Regulatory policies are represented by laws (either civil or penal) and are thus not primarily a burden on a country's finances, although there are exceptions (see below). The primary function of regulatory measures is to create the framework for family life and may be represented in legal measures relating to marriage (for example consent and contract). Regulatory measures may be considered as ideological, embodying certain normative beliefs about the relationship between the state and citizens and 'ideal' family forms and is thus of value to the objectives of this thesis.

Support measures may represent considerable financial commitment for governments in the form of direct financial transfers or provision of services. Given the economic implications of such measures, their nature and relative support may indicate the relative strength of ideologies relating to specific policy objectives. For example, a substantial provision of childcare services may, on the one hand, indicate commitment to providing mothers with the choice to take up employment or bring up their own children, or on the other hand, it may be interpreted as pushing mothers into work, particularly poorer mothers who are seen as a 'burden' on the state. The nature of financial transfers is also an important indicator of party political ideology with vertical transfers generally pursued by the left and horizontal ones by parties of the right.

The analysis of both family policies and political ideologies in the case studies is therefore structured around eight family policy measures which are found in each of the three countries. The eight measures, shown below, represent four regulatory
measures and four support measures all of which have been addressed in the party manifesto samples for each country at various times. While there may be some crossing over in the objectives of each measure (for example, maternity leave may serve regulatory ends, just as free provision of contraception may be considered as support for families), they have been classified in relation to their position within political debate rather than their ‘real-world’ impact upon families for the purposes of this study.

**Regulatory measures**

The first of the regulatory measures, abortion, continues to be highly controversial and has been strongly opposed on religious (notably by the Catholic Church) or moral grounds, as well as within the context of pro-natalist arguments.

Abortion is supported in the context of women’s freedom of choice and its legalisation has been interpreted as a sign of modernisation (Guerrero and Naldini, 1996). Such a controversial issue reveals the strength of ideologies in relation to these two positions. Where abortion has been legalised and freely provided by health services, it has required some financial commitment by the state. However the moral nature of abortion debate situates it firmly within regulatory measures. In addition, opposition to abortion is clearly a strong element of right wing party political ideology and is, therefore, of particular interest to this study.

Contraception is closely linked with the themes of the abortion debate and it has been opposed both by pro-natalists and by the Catholic Church. In some instances, however, contraception has been seen as a way of reducing the number of abortions. In recent times, contraception has been generally supported in the context of women’s choice and family planning, although its earlier development in the UK was associated with Malthusian fears of over-population.
Divorce is a measure of central importance in the context of the diversification of family forms and individual choice. Its legalisation in Southern European countries has been interpreted as an indicator of modernisation. As with abortion, divorce is generally opposed by right wing ideologies which support ‘traditional’ nuclear families, and those who consider the breakdown of families as a source of social disintegration leading to crime and other anti-social behaviour. This position has famously been expressed by the American, Charles Murray (1989) who became influential on the ideological position of the Conservative party in the UK from the late 1980s. In France the Front National has also interpreted divorce as a sign of social breakdown.

The fourth of the regulatory measures, parental authority, is associated with both gender equality and the public/private debate. The term ‘authority’, as used in the context of the present study, may also be understood in terms of ‘responsibility’ to which a shift has been noted in recent years (Millar and Warman, 1996: 22-3). The loaded term ‘authority’ is maintained for the present study as it primarily holds connotations of patriarchy and thus highlights parental authority measures as a means of regulating gender relations within families. Equally, reform of patriarchal measures generally support equality between the sexes. In a second instance, the authority and rights of parents may be subject to state intervention such as in cases of parental neglect where the state becomes guardian, thus indicating the relative ‘value’ of parents or the family in bringing up children. This is largely the case in the context of the UK. Such policy measures may indicate deep core ideology, in the relationship between the state and individuals, as well near core ideologies relating to patriarchy.

Support measures

Child benefits represent the most significant of the four support measures examined below. Financial support in the form of universal child benefits is a significant
indicator of state support for the family as a central component of society. Both the
deal-term value of allowances, eligibility for payment (from the first or second child)
and the person to whom payments are made (mothers or fathers) may indicate state
commitment to the family, pro-natalist objectives or the rights of women. Further,
given the demands such allowances may make on state budgets, the defence of this
universal benefit in times of economic crisis may indicate the persistence of pro-
natalist right wing ideologies.

Fiscal measures in the form of income tax allowances have generally considered
either marital status or number of dependent children. Respectively, such measures
may indicate support for marriage, or pro-natalist or familist ideologies on the right.
Given their relation to income tax, such measures have little impact upon poorer
families. Use of tax relief to support families is difficult to analyse because of the
complexity and range of taxes in each country. In France tax relief for families is
highly visible, in the UK income tax relief has focused on married couples but has
had little impact, whereas in Spain, tax relief for families is very difficult to identify
but may, in fact, have a significant impact on family budgets (Fernández Cordón,
1995)15.

Maternity leave and child-care, although distinct measures, may be considered
together in terms of their objectives which are either to protect or support the rights of
women in paid employment, guarantee rights on return to work and provide pre-
school child-care. Parental leave is also examined under the banner of maternity leave
as it may indicate support for family ties by enabling both parents to play a part in
child-rearing. The lack of such measures may indicate anti-feminist ideologies by
limiting women’s choice and encouraging mothers to raise their children at home.

15 At the time of writing Lluis Flaquer is conducting research into the vast number of tax measures in
Spain and points to a far greater impact on families than has been previously believed (personal
communication, 1999).
Anti-feminist ideologies relating to women’s work may also be indicated by the lack of guarantees on return to work after giving birth to a child.

While it may be argued that the above family policy measures do not represent what may be termed family policy as a coherent whole, they have been selected with the specific objective of examining the relationship between party political ideologies and family policy change. The range of measures covers ideological issues including the themeatics of public/private and family/individual, pro-natalism, pro-life stances, patriarchy/anti-feminism, limits of state intervention, gender equality, poverty and the role of families in society, providing the context and framework for the analysis of political ideologies.

In addition to the policy measures discussed above, the case studies also focus on general pro-family statements in the manifestos (see below). Such statements may prove revelatory of the symbolic value of the family in the ideology of a given political party. Any change revealed through the analysis of this variable is considered in relation to the ideological position as represented by the analysis of the eight policy measures.

It is through the focus on pro-family statements that it may be possible to explain the absence of certain policy measures in the manifestos as follows: where a party expresses no position in relation to abortion, for example, in a state where abortion is legal, this may be interpreted as either acquiescence or silent disapproval. The examination of this single variable, however, does not provide sufficient information in support of either position. If, however, pro-family statements, such as those typical of right wing ideology, are present in the manifesto, it may be possible to interpret the absence of the measure as silent opposition, notably in states where abortion is more socially acceptable and therefore opposition to it may risk alienating a proportion of the electorate. If no such pro-family statements are present but a general left wing, or
liberal, ideological position is clear from the other measures, then the absence of abortion may be interpreted as stemming from acquiescence, in effect, legal abortion is a stable and accepted component of the party ideology in relation to the family.

**Analysing political ideologies**

The analysis of the impact of political ideologies on policy change has been largely neglected (Chapter 3) by political scientists in spite of the ubiquitous use of the term. The following section examines two notable examples of the substantive study of political ideologies and their impact.

John Clayton Thomas (1975) sought to examine ideological change in a cross-national context. The objective of Thomas' research was to examine the extent to which the impact of party political ideologies had declined in the context of the 'End of Ideology' debate which claimed that ideological conflict was no longer present in the West (see Bell, 1960; Larrain, 1979; Gann, 1995). In a different study, Elinor Scarborough (1984) examined party political ideology and its impact upon voter behaviour in Britain and concluded that ideology plays a role in shaping wider society (Scarborough, 1984). Both of these studies differ from the vast majority of work upon ideology insofar as they seek to explore measurable manifestations of ideology and ideologies rather than examining the concepts from a wholly theoretical perspective.

Thomas' (1975) approach was to collect data in the form of party manifestos and, using thematic, qualitative analysis, to codify the respective ideological position of each party in relation to ten issues which he had identified as providing indicators of ideology. These issues included nationalisation, secularisation, provision of social welfare or constitutional change (Thomas, 1975: 8-11). Political parties from eleven countries were examined over a period of between thirty to eighty years depending on the availability of data. The ideological position of each issue was scored qualitatively within a ten point range (from -5 to +5). Two independent coders
determined the position of each party in relation to the extremes of each scale with results being presented in tables for each country (Thomas, 1975). Thomas’ analysis showed that certain issues were more resistant to change than others across the eleven countries. In addition, his results revealed that some issues proved to be more resistant to change over time than others, although these were not always the same issues in each country, suggesting a ‘national’ character to political ideologies as discussed in Chapter 3.

In the work of Scarborough (1984), ‘ideology’ was used as a means of classification, rather than as a process. The study was based upon the quantitative analysis of voter’s opinions in relation to what Scarborough considered as defining elements of each party’s ideology. Typologies of party ideology (for example Conservative ideology, Labour ideology) were developed and results were based upon questionnaire respondents’ support or not of given policy issues. While this approach was a useful means of examining voters’ perceptions of party ideology and any possible links with voter behaviour (Scarborough, 1984), it did not seek to explain policy change and is thus not directly applicable to the objectives of the thesis. In addition, Scarborough’s (1984) work only examined Britain and therefore did not seek to draw cross-national conclusions.

In contrast, Thomas’ (1975) primary objective was to examine the evolution of ideology in a cross-national context. The element of Thomas’ (1975) approach which may be most appropriate to the aims of the thesis is his system of ideological issue codification. As stated earlier, Thomas used independent coders in the analysis of the data. Results were synthesised and presented numerically in tables. The final analysis was both cross-national and longitudinal. From this, the author drew his conclusions as to the extent and nature of ideological change for the study sample.
While this approach was innovative, any conclusions drawn are problematic for four reasons: first, Thomas’ statements of extremes of opinion, although informed, may be criticised as being arbitrary; second, the interpretation of these statements is carried out by the coders who may, in turn, interpret the statements differently either from one another, or from Thomas; third, the coders worked on translations of the original documents which may have resulted in involuntary distortion either by the different translators or the coders; fourth, as a result of the large number of countries studied (11), the very long time span (up to 80 years) and the fact that only two researchers carried out the coding, the study was open to the possibility of misinterpretation of data due to a lack of knowledge of both, or either, the cultural or historical context in which the manifestos were written (see below).

The first and second of the above limitations to Thomas’ approach are perhaps the most problematic if applied to the thesis. Thomas attempted to avoid subjectivity in classification by using independent coders, a method which cannot be used in the present study and may ultimately result in subjectivity of conclusions. The third and fourth limitations are less problematic in the present study than in Thomas’ work given the linguistic competence and experience of the author. As a result, while Thomas’ work provided a revelatory contribution to the study of ideology, the specific method of codification and subsequent quantitative analysis are open to criticism on the grounds of subjectivity.

The above limitations do not, however, necessitate a complete rejection of Thomas’ work. On the contrary, Thomas demonstrated that it may be possible to measure the impact of party political ideologies and thus provides a valuable starting point for the exploration of the hypothesis posited in this thesis. It is possible to apply Thomas’ basic method of comparing party manifestos cross-nationally and over time in order to provide an indicator of any relationship between party political ideologies and family policy change. In addition to the study of party political ideology it is also,
therefore, necessary to study changing family policies in order to compare the two and draw conclusions about any relationship. This relationship has not, at the time of writing, been the focus of research. Perhaps the most useful contribution of Thomas's approach, for the aims of this study, however, was his selection of party manifestos as an expression of 'ideological position'.

**Criteria for data selection**

One of the most problematic questions to arise in the present study relates to the selection of sources to provide an indicator of party political ideology. A wide range of data sources were examined and considered in the methodological development of this thesis. These included minutes of party conferences, transcripts of political debates, survey/questionnaire data, interviews with key actors and secondary analyses of party political manifestos.

The minutes of party conferences, while providing a useful insight into the debate leading to policy development by the parties, have the disadvantage of not being fully representative of the party as a whole due to the fact that the individualised nature of some debate may lead to further distortion of position. If further examination of specific elements of party ideology is required, notably in relation to specific points, historical analysis of the debate upon which the party's position was originally decided may prove highly valuable. The detailed and measure specific nature of such an exercise may point to potential future research projects.

Transcripts of the debate among policy makers were rejected as they may reflect individual actors' views as opposed to the ideological position of the party they may represent. While continuing to pose some problems, both of these sources can prove valuable for a micro study of the debate surrounding one policy dimension.
Survey data in the form of questionnaires and interviews with influential actors in the process of family policy formation are also highly problematic for a number of reasons. The most fundamental pitfall in the use of questionnaire or interview techniques to examine the concept of ideological and policy change relates to the reliability of memory. Interviews can only provide reliable indications of ideological position relating to the time of the interview; as the respondent’s beliefs may have changed over the time period, their recollection of past events may thus be distorted. Additional problems associated with these techniques included: the possibility of ‘leading’ answers through use of unintentionally loaded questions, this is of especial importance in relation to identifying ideologies; the practical problems associated with establishing contact with key actors from the 1970s and 1980s; practical difficulties in arranging interviews with a large number of individuals as representatives of twelve parties across three countries; the reliability of an individual’s interpretation of the ideology of a political party. Information collected in the form of interviews may have the advantage of providing particular insight into the background of particular questions, and, if combined with the other sources discussed here, would form the basis for a highly rigorous study. As with the other potential sources, interviews could be employed in future research projects seeking to examine micro questions.

Given the rejection of the above potential indicators of party political ideology, the utility of manifestos was examined, notably in light of their centrality to the Thomas (1974) study of change and political ideologies. Party manifestos were considered as representing an indication of party political ideologies. They are generally debated, voted upon and agreed democratically either at a party congress or by a party ‘cabinet’/elite. Although there may be conflict over content among individual party members, manifestos can be considered as representing the party’s ideological position at a given point in time or, according to Martin Rosenbaum, they serve as ‘an authoritative proclamation of party policy issued at election time’ (1997: 210). It is,
however, important to underline the rhetorical nature of election manifestos, they may be either a consistent ideological expression, or a transient reaction to short-term issues that are perceived as being populist responses to the wishes of the electorate.

The use of party manifestos in the present study thus relates directly to ideology and the key concept of change. As outlined above, establishing a longitudinal analysis is fundamental to the aims of this thesis. The examination of party manifestos make it possible to situate ideological positions, through statements, declarations and policies in manifestos, firmly in relation to dates of publication thus allowing the key concept of change to be studied.

In addition, all of the parties examined in the case studies published manifestos during the time period, allowing for consistency in the sources to be analysed, a necessary consideration for cross-national comparison and the drawing of any conclusions relating to convergent/divergent trends in party political ideologies. Further, the use of election manifestos had the practical advantage that the researcher was able to collect a complete set of original documents for all of the parties in the three countries over the time scale allowing for consistency in the case study analysis.

There are, however some pitfalls to basing analysis of political ideologies on party manifestos. In certain cases, the electoral ambitions of parties may lead to a ‘watering down’ of party position in order to present a more attractive package for voters. The extent to which policy statements in manifestos are turned into real policies after electoral success is also unclear, although studies such as the present one may further understanding in this area through the comparison of the manifestos with documented policy change, although this is not an objective of this thesis. In addition, the use of manifestos may have distorted any findings in the present study as a result of the presence or absence of themes. Use of a broader data set may have helped to explain better any ‘absent’ measures. Although manifestos are becoming less important
indicators of party position in the context of a media culture which has increased the importance of the 'sound bite', they served an important communicative function during the study period.

Party manifestos were selected in preference to these other sources as the most appropriate data for the analysis of changing party political ideology. Manifestos represent a consistent indicator, both cross-nationally for the countries in the thesis and historically, of (generally agreed) party political ideologies. The manifestos in this study were collected directly from party offices during field work visits to France and Spain or from libraries in the case of UK manifestos. The parties selected represent the main (more than an average of 5 per cent of the vote at general elections) national political parties over the period studied.

**Analysing party political ideology in manifestos**

Political ideologies are studied in longitudinal national case studies within the conceptual framework of the eight family policy measures. General election manifestos of the main political parties for each country provide the basis for the analysis and are examined qualitatively in relation to the eight core measures/themes of the framework and pro-family statements. The presence or absence of each of the eight family policy measures is examined according to the criteria discussed above.

The data set of sixty-one hard-copy party manifestos was translated into machine-readable form using scanning equipment and software. This method was initially chosen with a view to carrying out computer-based qualitative content analysis. The programmes Atlas and Nud*st were evaluated in relation to the machine-readable manifestos. While these packages included some useful thematic mapping features, it was felt that the time taken entering analytical parameters was excessive relative to
their benefits in the specific context of the present study. However, based upon this experience, a simpler approach to coding the documents was developed.

All of the party programmes were converted into Microsoft Word word-processing form. The ‘find’ feature was used to carry out key word/thematic (phrase) searches of the documents\(^\text{16}\). Any key words found were highlighted in bold type and entered into an index. The result was that documents could be consulted thematically following criteria selected specifically by the author in relation to the thematics of public/private, family/individual as well other core questions such as state intervention and pro-natalism. This approach was particularly beneficial in accommodating cultural as well as linguistic differences in terminology: for example in the case of ‘abortion’, although the literal translations avortement and aborto exist in French and Spanish respectively, the more common term in legal texts and manifestos is interruption volontaire de grossesse or, equally commonly, IVG\(^\text{17}\) in French. In Spanish, although aborto is used in legal documents, one manifesto (PSOE, 1986: 84) significantly contained the euphemism, métodos quirurgicos anticonceptivos\(^\text{18}\). Without this approach, significant cultural differences and data would have been ignored. The converted and coded/indexed documents were consulted more effectively than the original documents during the analysis stage as cross-referencing was possible and efficient, either in machine readable or hard copy form, using in the first instance the ‘find’ function, and in the second instance, the page numbered index and bold type.

However, some drawbacks were encountered during the scanning process. First, some of the older manifestos, in particular the Spanish ones, were of poor quality in paper form which led to numerous scanning errors. This was overcome simply by the

\(^{16}\) The broadest range of key words/themes possible was used and were based upon the eight family policy measures.

\(^{17}\) Literally, ‘voluntary termination of pregnancy’.

\(^{18}\) Literally, ‘methods of surgical contraception’.
manual entering of the problematic sections. In spite of this, the majority of the text was scanned correctly. One common error in the scanning of the foreign language documents was the misreading by the scanning software of accented characters. Other scanning errors resulted from the wide range of formats and fonts used in the original documents. The most common error of this type was the failure of the software to recognise column breaks. In spite of the initially time-consuming exercise of scanning the sixty-one party manifestos, and the subsequent indexing process, the benefits in time gained and accuracy of analysis clearly outweighed the earlier disadvantages.

Identifying the relationship between ideology and changing family policies

If only national case studies were used it would not be possible to answer more than two of the seven research questions: To what extent have family policies changed? To what extent have political ideologies relating to the family changed? As the objective of the thesis is to examine the extent to which common factors can be identified in the relationship between party political ideology and family policy change, it was necessary to do more than consider these cases in parallel. The final analytical stage of the thesis therefore employs cross-national comparative methods to examine convergence/divergence across the parties and policies over time, across ideological boundaries and across the three countries in order to address the research questions (Chapter 1).

The cross-national comparison of countries facing similar problems in relatively similar social, political and economic contexts, such as OECD countries (Rose, 1986) may suggest either positive or negative policy lessons (Heidenheimer et al., 1990) as well as shed light on the relationship between party political ideology and changing family policies. Thus, comparing the different ways in which different countries address similar problems may identify parochial assumptions or phenomena which would not have become clear from a single-country study (Rose, 1986; Heidenheimer et al., 1990), although a three country study cannot make claims to universality.
A second aim of comparative study reflects the cross-national nature of some areas of public policy. On questions such as the environment, immigration and supra-national institutions, the problems faced by policy makers are themselves cross-national, thereby highlighting the benefits of comparisons for policy learning. Although this was not the case for family policy during the study period, increasing worker mobility in the EU and the subsequent need to transfer entitlement to contributory or other benefits has future cross-national implications.

The third reason for comparing policies cross-nationally relates to developing a greater understanding of questions about political systems, the policy process and policy change (Heidenheimer et al., 1990). This aim is clearly less of an applied undertaking than those presented above, and is generally limited to theoretical research. It is, however, applicable to the present study given its objectives of understanding political ideologies and policy change.

The major issues of cross-national comparison include conceptualisation of research, selection of countries, selection of data and language barriers. All of these issues have been addressed above. The results of the national case studies are compared in the following ways:

- Policy change over the study is compared across the three countries. This level of comparison reveals the extent to which family policies have evolved across three countries.
- Changing political ideologies are compared across national boundaries, right and left wing parties are compared separately to identify the role of 'the family’ in each party’s political ideology through a focus on public/private and family/individual.
- The third level of comparison brings together the results of the family policy and party political ideology dimensions in order to examine the extent to which change in each can be seen to represent convergent/ divergent trends. Here the distinction
between right and left provides an indicator of which political ideologies may have had the greatest, if any, impact upon family policy change.

• Finally the thesis concludes (Chapter 9) with the examination of causality in the relationship between changing family policies and political ideologies and relates the results to the discussion of concepts of ideology (Chapter 3).
Chapter 5 - CHANGING FAMILIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY POLICIES

The present chapter sets out the context for the substantive case study approach of the thesis through a focus on statistical indicators of population and family change and a historical analysis of the origins and development of the eight family policy framework measures (Chapter 4) and the nature of state intervention therein (Chapter 3). The descriptive approach to changing family policies also reveals the central themes of family policy debate in the three countries in preparation for the analysis of political ideologies in Chapters 6-8. The statistical analysis covers the case study period from the 1970s to the second half of the 1990s, whereas family policy change is studied up to the start dates of the national case studies, thus providing a clear context for the parallel analysis of changing family policies and party political ideologies in France (Chapter 6), the UK (Chapter 7) and Spain (Chapter 8).

Socio-demographic change and families

The following section focuses on statistical data which examine trends in population growth, family formation, divorce and family/household types. This approach serves to highlight the key statistical indicators within which political debate evolved during the study period. It may be argued that, given the centrality of the concept of abstract ideologies in the present study, statistical data or 'facts' may bear little relation to the policy concerns of the parties. However, the analysis of the party manifestos has revealed sufficient references to population and family statistics to warrant their closer examination. The following study of statistical indicators provides a control against which it is possible to measure those quoted by political parties in order to demonstrate any distortion of facts to meet political ends.

If the above objective is to be met, it is necessary to examine 'reliable' data sets. In addition, the comparative dimension of this study requires that data be as harmonised
as possible across the three countries. It is for these two reasons that this study is based predominantly on data compiled by Eurostat. The advantages of these data are numerous. They are collected using similar techniques for all EU member states and are regarded as reliable and comparable sources. Eurostat has collected a wide range of data which examine population trends and family forms. The studies are regularly updated either in the periodical *Demographic Statistics* and major publications such as *Recent Demographic Developments in Europe* (1996) from which the majority of the data in this section were taken. In addition, the vast majority of cross-national comparative studies of EU member states consulted during this research project have used Eurostat data, thus developing them as a standard reference point within the field.

In spite of the relative merits of the data sets examined below it is important to remain objective in their interpretation. In addition to cautionary notes in Eurostat publications, Christophe Lefranc has warned against over-reliance on this type of data stating that, 'as with all findings produced from theoretical constructs, statistics always contain an element of subjectivity, and they are therefore far from representing the whole truth' (1996: 9). Statistical indicators are often used by the political parties in this study as representations of 'truths'. Their use as such, given Lefranc's argument, must be interpreted with caution. Indeed where parties do employ 'statistical truths' in defence of their position great care must be taken to situate them in their proper ideological context before any observations may be made. This is exemplified in the highly loaded and out-of-context use of statistics by the Front national (see Chapter 6). In spite of the pitfalls of using statistics, such data can play an influential role in the formulation of policy and opinion, although establishing any kind of causal link may prove impossible (Hantrais and Letablier, 1994: 8).

The socio-demographic transformations examined below are represented in a polarisation of opinion about families. On the one hand, these transformations, which
have resulted in the development of alternative family forms (Millar and Warman, 1996: 6), have been defended notably by the political left and feminist commentators, many of whom have identified the traditional, nuclear family as, ‘a primary site, if not the primary site, of women’s oppression’ (Barrett and McIntosh, 1991: 20) (original emphasis). On the other hand, the supporters of the family and the political right have pointed to the relationship between the breakdown of the ‘traditional’ or ‘natural’ family order and the collapse of society or the nation, as exemplified in an address to the European Parliament Committee on Social Affairs and Employment by Mrs M. L. Cassanmagnago Cerretti quoted in The Anti-Social Family:

It is striking that the widespread disintegration of the concept of the family as the nucleus of society, the increasing instability in family relationships reflected by the spread of cohabitation and divorces, the new position of women in society and their wish to work, the crisis in traditional moral values, the falling birth rate, which is now approaching or even falling below the rate required for the population to renew itself, are trends common to all the countries of Europe, even if they vary in intensity. Thus the future and the very survival of these countries are at risk. (Barrett and McIntosh, 1991: 11-12)

The above two positions form the opposing poles of debate surrounding the family. The extent to which these positions have been support by the political parties is the focus of Chapters 6-8, the following section examines the extent to which statistical indicators reveal the increased diversification of families in France, the UK and Spain.

Population trends

Study of the historical origins of family policy is intrinsically linked with questions of population policy and policies to combat poverty (Dumon, 1990). The concern with the growth or decline of the population has left its mark on family policies relative to trends in each country. For example, countries which have identified falling birth rates and stagnation of total population as a problem might be expected to pursue

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19 'The family' is used here intentionally because of its normative undertones in the debate.
some form of pro-natalist policy, as in the case of pre-1980s France. Conversely policies to control the population through various measures, such as the introduction of free contraception or better sex education, may be expected in countries fearing over-population. Table 5.1 shows the total population for each country and highlights similarities between the populations of France and the UK, although the stagnation of the French population during the first fifty years if the twentieth century helps explain the prominence of pro-natalist arguments in early family policy debate. The population of Spain can be seen to have grown steadily, as can that of the UK.

Table 5.1: Population size (in thousands) 1900-96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>38,451</td>
<td>36,554</td>
<td>18,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>38,798</td>
<td>42,769</td>
<td>21,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>39,848</td>
<td>48,854</td>
<td>27,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>49,655</td>
<td>53,979</td>
<td>33,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>54,029</td>
<td>56,341</td>
<td>37,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>56,893</td>
<td>57,684</td>
<td>38,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>58,265</td>
<td>58,697</td>
<td>39,242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Total population size does not fully reveal the extent of growth or stagnation, Table 5.2 thus presents natural increase data which take into account the dimension of population renewal, a concept used widely in pro-natalist contexts.

Table 5.2: Rate of natural increase (excess births over deaths) 1970-95(%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat, 1996: 25

The most striking feature of the data in Table 5.2 is the rapid fall in natural increase in Spain notably during the 1990s. The highest in the comparison rate was recorded for
1970 during the Franco regime. Natural increase in both France and the UK has declined over the period although 1990 stands out an exception to this trend in the UK.

Total fertility rates are also widely cited by politicians in the context of pro-natalist arguments. Table 5.3 shows a common decline in fertility across the three countries. While decline in France and the UK is very similar, the rate for Spain falls sharply after 1980 dropping to the lowest rate in the comparison by 1995. As with natural increase trends, this acceleration of fertility decline is record in the post-authoritarian period.

Table 5.3: Total fertility rate 1970-93

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat, 1997: 116-17

The above data reveal a common decline in fertility and natural increase which is not revealed by the focus on total population size. Of additional importance it the existence of internal disparities in fertility. Variations within countries may be understood in terms of regions, socio-economic groups or ethnicity. These factors are significant in terms of the political debate, notably in relation to the nationalistic stance of the FN in France, but are difficult to examine statistically especially in France where collection of data relating to ethnic origin is highly problematic.

A further issue within the population debate which also raises questions of diversification of family forms is the number of births outside marriage. These data have been identified as being generally easy to record and are thus reliable (Hantrais, 1999: 20).
While similar trends were observed for the three countries in total population, natural increase and fertility, the extramarital birth data reveals Spain as a distinct case. Although the rate of extramarital births has been much lower in Spain than in France or the UK, it has grown relative to that of the other countries.

Table 5.4: Births outside marriage (per 100 live births)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat, 1997: 110-11

As with the decline in fertility this trend is accentuated significantly after the Transition to democracy. Extramarital births in both France and the UK represent a notable portion of all births which suggests a combination of trends including decline in marriages, an increase in cohabitation, a greater proportion of lone-parent families, growing divorce rates and the general diversification of family types. All of these trends have significant implications on family policy and are thus examined below.

Diversification of family forms

During the period examined in Chapters 6-8, debate relating to questions of population size became increasingly marginalised in the light of what has been interpreted as a crisis in the traditional family. In all three countries studied the common indicator of family formation had long been marriage. Marriage has been a key element of official recognition of the family. Indeed, the definition of a family for statistical purposes at the time of writing continued to be, ‘a married couple without children or a married couple with one or more never-married children of any age or one parent with one or more never-married children,’ significantly ‘married’ in this definition includes consensual unions (United Nations Statistical Commission, 1986:
and thus underlines the symbolic value of the term in relation to family life. Table 5.5 shows a steady decline in marriage rates across the three countries since 1970. While trends are broadly similar, a generally higher rate is recorded for the UK. This decline appears as a common feature of the study period for all three countries and may signify a trend towards de-institutionalisation of the family. This indicator may, however, not relate the full story, as the decline in marriage in Spain coincides with a delay in the age of first marriage. Indeed Flaquer (1998) has argued that, notably among the Spanish middle classes, marriage has continued to dominate family formation. Falling marriage rates are thus explained in terms of limited access to housing, increased time spent in higher education and the subsequent continuation of economic dependence of adult children on their parents.

Table 5.5: Crude marriage rate (per 1,000 population) 1970-95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.9*</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1993 data
Source: Eurostat, 1996: 33

Accurate data for rates of cohabitation would be valuable in clarifying disparities in marriage rates across countries. In France for example it is illegal to ask couples if they are cohabiting and therefore it is difficult to find reliable comparative data (Hantrais, 1999: 20). Two comparative studies have examined the question of cohabitation, the first (Eurobarometer, 1991) examined cohabitation among young people. In a survey of 15-24 year olds, it found that 14 per cent of French and 9 per cent of UK young people were cohabiting. In Spain this figure was 1 per cent. Although such data may be unreliable, the very small figure for cohabitation in Spain appears to support Flaquer’s (1998) analysis. Further the much higher rate for France and the UK may also shed light upon disparities in extramarital birth rates. The second set of data which may help clarify issues of diversification of family forms
and extramarital births comes from *Europeans and the Family* (Malpas and Lambert, 1993). Table 5.6 provides an indicator of the breakdown of national populations by marital status.

Table 5.6: Distribution of the population by marital status(%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married without having lived as a couple before</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married after living as a couple before</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarried</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single, never having lived with a partner before</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single, having lived with a partner before</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowers/widows</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Malpas and Lambert, 1993: 14

While cohabitation is not specifically addressed, possibly as a result of legal restrictions in France, the number married or single people having previously lived with a partner is significantly higher in France and the UK than in Spain. The 1.1 per cent of respondents who did not specify their marital status in France may also be explained by the legal restrictions on surveys of cohabitation. In addition the relatively large number of Spaniards who, whether married or single, had never lived with a partner before further suggests consensual unions represent only a small proportion of families in Spain.

The larger proportion of those having previously lived with a partner in France and the UK can also be understood in relation to divorce rates. Table 5.7 reveals further differences between, on the one hand France and the UK and, on the other hand, Spain. In this case the divorce legislation of each country is a significant explanatory
factor. Both France and the UK legalised divorce before Spain. In addition, divorce in Spanish a two-stage process preceded by legal separation, which is not considered in the Eurostat survey. The differences in divorce legislation are also significant when compared to the dominant political ideologies in each country (Chapters 6-8).

**Table 5.7: Crude divorce rate (per 1,000 inhabitants)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>n/a (see note)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2.0*</td>
<td>0.8*</td>
<td>2.9*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* denotes provisional data
Note: Before 1981 divorce was illegal in Spain
Source: Eurostat, 1997

In this case national data are of great value. Although not presented in the same form, Spanish indicators of legal separation and divorce reveal legal separation to be a significant form of marital status. In 1991 39,758 legal separations were recorded, which is significantly higher than the number of divorces, 27,224 (Alberdi, 1995: 91).

Data in Table 5.8 focus on a further aspect of family diversification: the proportion of lone parent families, as well as the number of children in families, which brings this study back to issues of population size and pro-natalist arguments. Negative ideological conceptualisation of lone parent families has been a central theme in UK family policy debate.

In spite of disparities in the number of extramarital births and divorce rates, the number of lone parent families in Spain is relatively similar to that of France and not as far from the UK as in other indicators of family diversity. In terms of policy implications the data in Table 5.8 highlight the wide gender disparities of lone parenthood in all three countries.
Table 5.8: Proportion of families by type and number of children in 1990-91(%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Type</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Couples without children</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples with children</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 child</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 children</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 children</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 children or more</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lone-parent families</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fathers with children</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 child</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 children</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 children</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 children or more</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mothers with children</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 child</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 children</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 children</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 children or more</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat, 1995: 10-11

In the context of pro-natalism, the table reveals differences between the countries in relation to large families. Although up to two children appears to be the most common family type in all three countries in all types of family with children. Again, these data do not distinguish between married, cohabiting or reconstituted families and as such may underestimate changing family forms.

Family transformations and policy implications

The data relating to population and family diversity have revealed the socio-demographic nature of families in France and the UK to be broadly similar, characterised by falling fertility and marriage rates, increases in the number of extramarital births and divorce. Lone parenthood across the three countries is similar although proportionately higher in the UK. Identifying consensual unions and reconstituted families was shown to be problematic, although the available indicators suggest growth in both of these family types.
In terms of their implication for family policy, this section has noted the low rates of natural increase which may be translated into worries about renewal of the population and indicated in support for family policies with pro-natalist objectives. Indicators of diversity of family forms and increased extramarital births have posed new challenges to family policy in all three countries. Growth in lone parenthood, extramarital births have implications of parental rights and responsibilities, as well as on financial contributions in the context of the public/private debate.

In symbolic terms, the statistical indicators point to a privatisation or de-institutionalisation of families, most notably in France and the UK. This trend is conceptualised in terms of ‘family breakdown’ in ideologies, notably on the political right, where diversity is perceived as a social problem. Given the symbolic nature of such political statements (notably by the Conservative party), it is unlikely that these are developed into policies, although elements of these arguments may shape policy reform.

Citation of statistical data in political propaganda has also been highlighted as significant in the context of the analysis of political ideologies. Their use as ‘truths’ may be understood in terms of Sabatier’s classification of beliefs and the ideological acceptance of norms by society. Reliance upon empirical evidence in defence of beliefs serving an ideological function is a common feature of FN discourse and their use (or abuse) by the other parties may prove significant.

In the following sections the eight framework family policy measures are examined from their origins in each country in relation to the political debate in which they evolved. In addition, key historical legislation is examined where it is significant in the development of family policies examined in Chapters 6-8, such as the Code de la famille and the Beveridge Report. The study of policy change and debate begins with France, which, compared to the other countries in this study, can be considered as a
pioneer of family policy and an example of the statist tradition. Following the examination of the eight family policy measures in France, the history and evolution of family regulation and support in the UK and Spain complete the background to the central analysis of changing family policies and political ideologies.

**France: the prehistory and history of family policy**

While the origin of some central themes of French family policy, such as concern with dwindling fertility rates and providing support for large families, date back to, or before, the French Revolution (Brin, 1991: 35), the most significant period begins with the formal institutionalisation of the family as a target for policies, the Code de la famille of 1939. Although the Code de la famille was an important move towards the institutionalisation of family policies in itself, and is therefore discussed in more detail below, the broader period from 1939 to 1946 has been identified as the point at which modern family policies began to emerge in France (Questiaux and Fournier, 1978: 117-18).

The debate surrounding family policies since 1939 can be understood in terms of shifting objectives between, on the one hand, the generally left wing ideology of vertical redistribution of wealth, rights of individuals and social assistance, and on the other hand, the generally right wing ideological concern with the renewal of generations, family, population and, in the case of the FN, national identity. For the purposes of the thesis, the former position is termed 'social action', whereas the latter position is referred to by the French term ‘familism’.

According to Laroque (1985: 9), the threat of another German invasion of France in the late 1930s was a key factor in the emergence of the Code de la famille. The old concern with the de-population of France was again highlighted by the threat of war.

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20 The terms ‘familism’ or ‘familist’ are taken from the French ‘familisme’ ‘familiste’ and refer to political concern with the moral and social sole of the family, which is, implicitly, a family based on marriage and, often, paternal authority (see Lenoir, 1991).
The Code de la famille was explicitly pro-natalist and introduced regulatory and, most significantly, selective support measures to encourage population growth.

The Code de la famille was a reinforcement of the legitimisation of state intervention in the family sphere in France. A significant element of the Code de la famille was its introduction of institutions which explicitly targeted the family which may be considered as examples of Ideological State Apparatuses (CNAF, UNAF).

Since the late nineteenth century France has seen a steady rise in the level of institutional integration of the family and family interests. In a tradition stretching back to 1789, tensions between the State and the Church led to the statutory separation of the two in 1905 (Néant, 1991: 25). The significance of this separation in family terms has resulted in an increasing role for the state in the regulation or moral ‘guidance’ of the family which had been traditionally the role of the Church. The first manifestations of state intervention in the family sphere came with the group of social laws, many of which had a family focus, introduced during the period 1900-14 (Brin, 1991: 37). It was, however, the law of 29 July 1939 (Code de la famille) that marked the beginning of the process of institutionalisation of French family policy, notably with the creation of the post of a junior minister for the family (Bussat and Chauvière, 1997: 83).

The concept of the family was further institutionalised in the Constitution of the Fourth Republic (1946), while the Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1958) continued to underline the nation’s duty towards the family (Brin, 1991: 37). Other than government institutions such as ministries (which have been inconsistently devoted to family issues since 1939) and the Caisse nationale des allocations familiales (CNAF) (the agency which administrated family policy spending as well as supporting research), the French family sphere counts a large number of family institutions which
serve as primarily as lobbying groups but also as service providers (see Bussat and Chauvière, 1997 and Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997).

Family associations in France have strong historical foundations originating in the 'right to association' law of 1 July 1901 (Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997: 79). Even before the formal acceptance of family associations, mobilisation of family interests began to fall into two broad categories: those concerned with the demographic stagnation of France, and those who feared for the moral welfare of the family in the light of growing anticlericalism, which culminated in the legal separation of the state from the Church in 1905.

These two burgeoning trends in family interest groups came to dominate thinking and debate surrounding family policy in twentieth century France and are referred to as 'natalism' and 'familism' respectively (Bussat and Chauvière, 1997). Along with the older trends in family association mobilisation, an increase in the number of 'special' interest associations (focusing on lone parents, adoption, families with handicapped children) developed in the 1960s (Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997: 82-6). Although there are many different associations which claim to represent family interests, the overall importance of the family and its representation in the public sphere is underlined by the existence of a national body which continued to bring together all family associations in France at the time of writing.

While the first half of this century saw the birth of French family associations, the institutional acceptance of their role was galvanised with the creation of the Union nationale des associations familiales (UNAF) in the law of 3 March 1945 which was written into the Code de la famille (UNAF, 1977). Its main function is to advise policy makers and to provide families with official representation. The UNAF was, however, a development of the earlier Loi Gounot which had been adopted under the Vichy government on 29 December 1942. The family was highly symbolic in the far-
right wing Vichy government, which translated the Republican revolutionary motto of Liberte, egalite, fraternite, into Patrice, famille, travail (Fatherland, Family, Work) which thus emphasised not only the central role of the family in the Nation, but also implied the patriarchal nature of the state as political metaphor, as has been identified by Commaille (1991b) (see Chapter 2). The Loi Gounot continued to play a part in the institutionalisation of family associations even after the fall of the Vichy regime. In the immediate post-war years, the basic objectives of the law were maintained. However, the heavy financial burden of managing family services was transferred to the state, thus becoming an Ideological State Apparatus, and it was, in effect, ‘recreated’ to become the UNAF which continued to be the representative of all member associations at government level. One significant difference between the UNAF and its predecessor in terms of the conceptualisation of the family, is its acceptance of a plurality of family ‘types’ and an openness to change: its members include groups which represent families founded in marriage with biological or adopted children, married couples without children and all those who exercise parental authority or guardianship of one or more children in their temporary or permanent care. Thus, although founded upon a tradition of pro-natalism, ‘traditional’ family values and anti-feminism, the UNAF adapted to the changing nature of French families.

The UNAF is adhered to by one million families in 7,800 local groups making up more than sixty national movements or federations of which the eight largest play an active managerial role in the national body. Such support provides the UNAF with a powerful mandate to push for family measures in the French polity. Despite the potential power of the UNAF, its role remains simply to provide its opinion about proposed texts or measures, making, in theory at least, the attitudes of the families it represents known to decision makers. This role, clearly ends once a proposal becomes law. The legal, institutional status of the UNAF prevents it from opposing measures
become law, therefore it functions as a permanent advisory commission as opposed to a lobby (Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997: 113).

**Family Policy Measures in France**

By the late 1940s the family was firmly established as a legitimate primary group for state intervention in the French polity and public life. The remainder of this section focuses on the framework of eight family policy measures, their evolution and the origins of those political ideologies most strongly associated with them.

**Abortion**

Given the strength of the pro-natalist movement in the late 1800s and first half of the 1900s in France, it is not surprising to find that debate surrounding abortion was influenced by demographic concerns as well as moral ones. While abortion in France was associated with prostitution and adultery (Accampo *et al.*, 1995; Ranum and Ranum, 1972) pro-natalists such as Paul Strauss spoke out against illegal abortion as an important cause of France's demographic crisis (Pedersen, 1993; 366). While the crime of abortion or infanticide was outlawed under Christian law, this took on an institutional guise in Article 317 of the 1810 Napoleonic Penal Code. Under this law, women who had sought an abortion were liable to imprisonment, although the greatest penalties were reserved for the abortion practitioners who were subjected to longer sentences with hard labour (Accampo *et al.*, 1995: 183). Article 317 of the 1810 Code remained unchanged until the 1920s when increasing concern with France's failure to renew its population led to the law being amended on 23 July 1920 to make it easier to prosecute abortionists. The motion was passed by 500 votes for, to 50 against (Bouchardeau, 1992). By 1939, anti-abortion measures became an integral part of the Code de la famille (Pedersen, 1993) and each brigade of the police mobile had a special section charged with targeting abortionists (Bouchardeau, 1992). These penal measures are also a clear demonstration of the althusserian concept of
Repressive State Apparatuses (Chapter 3). Under the Vichy regime abortion took on the status of a crime against National security. The law of 15 February 1942 regarded abortion as treason and was punishable by the death penalty (Offen, 1991). On 30 July 1943 a laundry woman was guillotined after having been found guilty of carrying out 26 abortions (Boucharadeau, 1992).

After the Liberation, French attitudes towards abortion became increasingly liberal following campaigns by women's rights groups, such as Association Choisir (1973), and politicians such as François Mitterrand (Boucharadeau, 1992). The great change in attitudes came in 1972 following the highly publicised trial of a 17 year-old girl who had an abortion after becoming pregnant as a result of being threatened and coerced into having sexual intercourse (Association Choisir, 1973; Gouazé, Mouillaud, Serverin and Tetu, 1979). Abortion, or *Interruption volontaire de grossesse* (IVG) (voluntary termination of pregnancy) was legalised under strict conditions on the 17 January 1975. The law allowed for voluntary abortion to be performed by doctors up to the end of the tenth week of pregnancy and was adopted in the first instance for a period of five years. The law of 17 January 1975 was voted definitively on 30 December 1979, significantly, under the right wing government of Jacques Chirac (Boucharadeau, 1992) although it was not free as part of the health service in spite of its being predominantly justified on medical grounds.

Abortion in France has been a highly controversial issue and debate has been sharply polarised, with both sides appearing steadfast in their position. In ideological terms the right has traditionally opposed abortion on moral and pro-natalist grounds while the left has sought decriminalise it in the context of policies aimed at supporting women's rights. Its legalisation resulted from strong campaigning and a change in the dominant ideological position dating from the Napoleonic period. However the

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refusal of the state to finance terminations may represent a reluctance to cause further conflict with anti-abortion lobbies. Although equally, this may be interpreted as not going far enough by pro-abortionists.

**Contraception**

In social terms, contraception had long been considered the equal of abortion either in terms of defiance of God or 'Nature' (Ranum and Ranum, 1972), its threat to population growth (Pedersen, 1993) or its associations with prostitution, adultery and immorality (Accampo et al., 1995). Further, the political left and right were, up to the post-war period, largely divided on the issue of contraception as they had been over abortion. While the left were largely in favour of the liberalisation of contraception, the right wing parties opposing contraception on the grounds morals and national security. However, while abortion was legislated against under the Penal Code, methods of contraception, notably condoms, were available from tobacconists and brothels from the mid-1800s although they were relatively expensive, at approximately half a woman’s daily wage (Accampo et al., 1995: 179). After the first world war they became cheaper and more widely available in spite the Law of 23 July 1920 which criminalised the advertising of birth control methods and techniques (Pedersen, 1993: 131-2). The most outspoken critic of contraception was Fernand Boverat who saw the falling birth rate as a direct result of the use of contraceptive methods (Boverat, 1924) and likened the voluntarily childless man to a traitor who should be ashamed to walk by a soldier’s tomb or cry, ‘*Vive la France*’ (Boverat, 1923: 284). Expressing the extremely deep core ideology of the value of children to the French nation.

By the late 1950s France was entering the ‘baby boom’ and family planning had becoming increasingly acceptable in the light of decreasing concerns with depopulation and a growth in the women’s movement. In spite of this, the
advertisement of contraceptives remained under strict control (Bouchardeau, 1992). During the period up to 1981 availability of contraceptives became increasingly widespread and there is little evidence of political opposition. The change in attitudes towards contraception in France is closely linked with the diminishing concern with population renewal. In this case empirical evidence about fertility was instrumental in a change in attitudes which eventually brought about policy reform.

**Divorce**

The origins of French political attitudes towards divorce are intrinsically linked with the development of Bourgeois revolutionary thought. The separation of state and Church was a central strand to this thought and the logical result was the introduction of civil marriage in the constitution of 3 September 1971 (Copley, 1989). Divorce became justifiable under one of the founding principles of the Revolution, *Liberté.* This was on two distinct grounds; first, marriage was merely a 'contract' and as such was not indissoluble; second, by liberating couples from an unhappy or unproductive relationship, divorce would encourage reproduction by allowing individuals a second chance. This second argument was contextualised in the revolutionary 'right to happiness' (Copley, 1989), but does, however, echo the recurrent obsession with the fertility of France in legislation seeking to regulate the family.

This liberal attitude resulted in a divorce rate of the eighteenth century resembled that of the late twentieth century, with one in three marriages in Paris of 1793 ending in divorce (Copely, 1989: 22). Although such a high rate may be explained by an initial high demand from couples taking advantage of the new legislation (see also Chapter 8 in relation to Spain).

By 1803 divorce was opposed under Napoleonic law and stricter controls relating to the length of separation before divorce proceedings (from one to three years) and
more restricted grounds for divorce were introduced. By 1816 divorce was abolished and a system of separation, which presumed the eventual reconciliation of couples, was introduced (Copley, 1989: 89). In spite of campaigns during the 1830s to reintroduce divorce (Phillips, 1991: 130), it was not until the Third Republic that divorce based upon matrimonial fault returned to the statute books in the form of the Naquet law of 27 July 1884 (Copley, 1989:113). Over the 1920s-30s, the Naquet law was gradually liberalised in relation to grounds for divorce. By 1940, however, the highly conservative objectives of the Vichy regime resulted in a tightening of the criteria for divorce. According to Roderick Phillips (1991) it is difficult to examine the statistical effects of the Vichy divorce reform, however the intentions of the legislation were unambiguous given the pro-family/pro-natalist objectives of Vichy family reforms (Phillips, 1991: 203-4).

Divorce legislation changed little during the Fourth Republic and the early part of the Fifth Republic (1946-75), although its character was closer the laws of the Third Republic rather than those of the Vichy regime (Copely, 1989). This changed following the student protests and general strikes of May-June 1968, and by 1975 divorce laws were liberalised (law of 11 July 1975) to include a wider range of grounds including mutual consent and a shorter period of separation, although this was not to the satisfaction of women’s groups, and, indeed, men’s groups who opposed the predilection of judges to award custody of children to the mother (Copely, 1989: 204-215). By the end of the 1970 legal divorce was an established part of French family law, although controversy in some area remained (see Chapter 6).

Parental authority

No element of state intervention into the family sphere is a greater indicator of gender inequalities than the regulation of the authority of parents. Commaille (1991a; 1991b) examined the use of the family as a metaphor for the state and outlined the lineage of
the legitimacy of the patriarchal state from fathers, through the head of the state and ultimately to God (Commaille, 1991a: 265). It is within this idea of patriarchy that the stability of the family as an institution is conceptualised as the key to the maintenance of social order. The question of authority within the ‘private’ domain of the family is a common element of the policy dimensions examined in the thesis (see Chapter 6). Questions such as the recipient of family benefits, discrepancies between husbands and wives in divorce cases or the relative value of women’s employment in relation to maternity leave or childcare provision.

The dominance of the patriarch was well established across Europe from the middle ages (Mendras, 1997) and became most clearly represented in inheritance practices of the aristocracy which were generally based on transmission of property from father to eldest son, with daughters and younger sons being effectively disinherited through dowries or becoming established in a profession (Mendras, 1997: 154-5).

Post-revolutionary France saw no major changes in parental authority, the head of the family remained the father with the only exception to this being widowed mothers (Brin, 1991: 36). By the inter-war years, and as a result of the growing strength of feminist movements, measures were taken to increase women’s rights to participate in matters of parental authority concerning issues such as consent to their children’s marriage and educational decisions. By 1942, the advice of the mother became equal to that of the father in all matters relating to children (Offen, 1991), although it was not until 1965 that full equality between spouses on all matters was legally introduced (Rubellin-Devichi, 1990). Evelyne Sullerot clearly interprets this as a case in which ideas preceded policy change (Sullerot, 1992) given that political ideologies changed over twenty years before legislation was introduced. The full reforms were finally voted into the civil code in 1970. As a result of this legislation mothers were increasingly awarded custody of children in cases of divorce, a development which has also been interpreted as shift away from the dominant right wing, patriarchal
ideology: 'Cette législation n’est pas le résultat de la réflexion perverse d’un technocrate en délire: c’est le fruit de la nécessité sociale, à la suite de siècles de désintérêt des pères pour les enfants légitimes, de difficultés des mères célibataires ou divorcées, de rancœur des enfants abandonnés' (This legislation is not the result of the perverse reflections of a delirious technocrat, it is the fruit of the social necessity which comes from centuries of disinterest from fathers’ about their legitimate children, the difficulties of never married or divorced mothers and from the rancour of abandoned children) (Dekeuwer-Défossez, 1988: 111)

Child benefits

When examining the level of public spending on the family in France, it is important to distinguish between prestations and allocations. Prestations (literally ‘benefits’) familiales is used in the French context to refer to the range of financial and support measures which target the family including housing benefits, lone parent benefits, benefits for disabled children and so on. Allocations (literally ‘allowances’) familiales refers to a single policy instrument, which comes under the umbrella term prestations familiales, and is a payment to families with children from the contributory scheme which seeks to redistribute resources horizontally from families without dependant children to those with children and is understood in the thesis as ‘child benefits’. Perhaps the most concrete indicator of government commitment to a given policy area is provided by the level of financial resources allocated to it. In the context of French family policy, the most consistent financial support measure has been child benefits. The origins of the family benefits can be found in the sursalaire familial (a wage supplement for employees with children) initiatives of the late nineteenth century. The earliest moves towards a family wage came in the armed forces, most notably the Navy in 1860 (Brin, 1991: 53), perhaps not surprising given the strong ties between a large population and national security. These early initiatives later spread to other areas of the public sector, such as the railways in 1890 and 1892, culminating in the
law of 7 April 1917 which introduced the family wage for all civil servants (Brin, 1991: 53).

In spite of early family wage initiatives, such as those taken by Léon Harmel in 1891 for the workers in his Val de Bois textile mills (Brin, 1991: 53), the private sector was relatively slow to follow the example of the state. By the end of the first world war however, an increasing number of private employers began to introduce family funds, in part, as a result of the campaigning of Emile Romanet in the region of Grenoble (Dreyfus, 1965), but also as a result of the growing support of employers for Social Catholicism which sought to consolidate capitalism with the social theories of Pope Leo XIII (Pedersen, 1993: 63). Although the commitment of private employers to the family fund has been interpreted either as Christian inspired benevolence or patriotic pro-natalism. Pedersen (1993: 63) suggests that the motivation behind the potentially costly family wage lay in the possibility of allowing employers to restrain wages during the boom years of the 1920s. Another negative consequence of the family wage is highlighted by Brin (1991: 53) who notes that market pressures may have resulted in discrimination against employing fathers.

Whatever the motives of private employers, their efforts led to a comprehensive (if voluntary) system of family benefits which, according to Questiaux and Fournier (1978: 135-45), paved the way for a full state controlled and compulsory policy by 1932. Pedersen (1993) goes further, suggesting that the work of the private employers did not ‘influence’ the state, they replaced it; their caisses could extract voluntary contributions from businessmen that the Ministry of Finance could only dream of’ (Pedersen, 1993: 288) (original emphasis). Indeed she concludes that the subsequent central role of family policy in the French welfare state is a direct result of the private family wage schemes and their importance in industrial relations (Pedersen, 1993: 288), as well as the ideas upon which they were founded, which have proved highly
resistant to change as demonstrated by the widespread political support of child benefits up to the 1980s.

Child benefits were reformed in 1938 (décret-loi 12 novembre) in an attempt to resolve the confusion which resulted from the disparate ‘family wage’ system (Laroque, 1985: 9). Benefits were calculated as a percentage of an average fixed salary for each département and were relative to the number of children; 5 per cent extra for the first child, 10 per cent for the second and 15 per cent for the third or subsequent children. The introduction of the Code de la famille in 1939 saw these benefits target pro-natalist objectives, favouring large families of three or more children. The first Code de la famille reform was to abolish benefits for families with one child, although in order to encourage the birth of a first child a bonus was payable to couples who had their first child within the first two years of marriage. The benefits system clearly favoured larger families and payments were calculated at 10 per cent for two children, with three or more children receiving 20 per cent (Laroque, 1985: 10). Although the demographic indicators allayed depopulation fears during the 1950s and 1960s, the child benefits system remained intact. By the early 1970s a new generation of politicians began to examine the possible reform of child benefits to target poorer families. Over the period 1970-72 a number of minor reforms with vertical re-distributive aims were introduced. This initiative was, however, short-lived and the remainder of the 1970s was characterised once again by right wing population fear which Laroque (1985: 25) terms ‘neo-natalism’ and which culminated in greater child benefit support for large families in the reforms of 17 January and 17 July 1980.

**Fiscal Measures**

The Code de la famille introduced fiscal measures as a further pro-natalist tool for state intervention in the family sphere. Unmarried people and married couples who had not had a child before the third year of marriage were penalised, whereas the tax
burden on families with three or more children was lessened. Tax relief based upon the number of dependent children was further developed up to 1980 and became a characteristic measure of French family policy. The most notable legislative reform was the law of 12 July 1977 with the *complément familial* (CF) or family tax allowance which was means tested and had the effect of discouraging women’s paid work as the household budget was considered as a whole. The CF can be considered as incorporating minor elements of pro-natalism and discrimination against women’s work. In addition, being a tax credit it serves very limited re-distributive ends given that poorer families pay little or no income tax, and is therefore characteristic of right wing ideological expressions of family support.

*Maternity leave*

Maternity leave in France developed in line with an increase in women’s work during the 1960s. However, the first significant measures were conceptualised in the context of right wing pro-natalism (Fagnani, 1994: 26), rather than the left wing protection of working mothers’ rights, and was thus consistent with the neo-natalist approach to family policies in France of the 1960s and 1970s. Increases in women’s work was identified as a cause of falling fertility rates, thus the introduction of 16-week paid maternity leave in 1977 (Law of 12 July) and the *congé parental* (parental leave) guaranteed full re-instatement for up to two years after the birth, although this was not paid or covered by social security (Renaudat, 1993). Maternity leave was reformed in November 1979, also in line with neo-natalist objectives, significantly with the introduction of 26-week leave for the third or subsequent child (Laroque, 1985: 26-7). Maternity leave was thus conceptualised within fears about population renewal, but, significantly given the growing proportion of women in the workplace, policy makers did not attempt to discourage working mothers.
Childcare

French state intervention in the field of childcare developed from the early 1970s (Norvez, 1990), in similar a political context to maternity leave. A number of different types of collective day care centres were introduced generally gathered under the blanket term of 'crèches' (see Math and Renaudat, 1997). In the 1977 initiatives to develop assistance for working mothers, *assistantes maternelles* (childminders) were eligible for professional status after a registration process which included medical checks and a 'morality' survey (Math and Renaudat, 1997: 6). The measures introduced in the 1970s set out the framework for the future evolution of French childcare policies which had originally been intended to serve the objectives of both neo-natalism and support for the family-employment mix. The neo-natalist element of support for working mothers reveals a certain consistency in family policy objectives in France to 1981 which is characterised by the influence of socio-demographic indicators on political ideologies. This tradition had been well-established since the early 1900s obsession with the 'scientific' conceptualisation of state intervention. This emphasis on science recalls Althusser’s observations on the ideological and non-ideological (Chapter 3). While scientific data may be non-ideological in the Althusserian sense, their subsequent use as 'truths' is open to distortion by political ideologies. This distortion may be revealed in the 'conscious' use of inappropriate data to justify policy reform, or in conclusions based upon misinterpretations of short term trends. Equally, the institutions which have produced much of this research may be considered as further examples of Ideological State Apparatuses in the context of French state intervention in the family sphere.

UK family policies: Beveridge and the post-war consensus

As with the case of France (Code de la famille, 1939), and, to a lesser extent, Spain (reform of the Código Civil in 1982), contemporary family policies in the United Kingdom can be considered as having evolved from a major legislative reform,

In her detailed biography of Sir William Beveridge, Jose Harris (1977) describes the origins of the Beveridge Report as a ‘tidying-up operation’ initiated by the treasury in order to bring together the many confusing elements of inter-war social security provision in a coherent package (Harris, 1977: 386). By the time of its publication on 2 December 1942, however, Social Insurance and Allied Services (Beveridge, 1942) had evolved into a major policy document of almost three-hundred pages calling for wide-ranging and integrated welfare reform. Testimony to the Report’s perceived importance comes in the form of the unprecedented, for a technical, government publication of this kind, sale of half a million copies (Hills et al., 1994: 18) and the report of an alleged mile-long queue at the government book shop in London (Beveridge, 1954: 114). Although very much a document of its time serving almost as propaganda to war-torn Britain, the Beveridge Report is the most commonly cited historical document in UK social policy debate (Hills et al., 1994: 56) and remained significant to social policy debate of the 1980s and 1990s. The impact of the Beveridge report on social policies of the post-war consensus was such that the social policies and values of the period have been referred to as ‘beveridgism’ (Hills et al., 1994) and the subsequent welfare state as ‘beveridgian’ (Pedersen, 1993: 333-53).

The Beveridge Report’s contribution to family policies and family policy debate rests on two of Beveridge’s fundamental assumptions; first, the role of the social security system (Beveridge did not use the term ‘welfare state’) and second, the nature of citizenship which is of particular relevance to the present study. Beveridge’s ideas had developed during a period of mass unemployment in which millions of able workers found themselves subjected to what he considered the humiliation of means-testing. In Beveridge’s view, state social welfare was closely linked with the economy and the
market, and as such he saw effective social provision as an important tool for the maintenance of a healthy economy (Hills et al., 1994: Chapter 3). The role of social security was, therefore, to maintain an effective labour force, and act as a deterrent to the 'idleness which destroys wealth and corrupts men' (Beveridge, 1942: 170). This latter statement, by employing the term 'men', reflects Beveridge's belief that men ought to be breadwinners and women mothers or housewives. Beveridge expressed state intervention in terms of establishing the conditions within which individuals took responsibility for themselves and their families commensurate with the UK context for ideologies of state intervention.

Beveridge's first task in the development of the social insurance system was to identify the different target groups and their needs, and it was here that the beveridgian concept of citizenship proved a stumbling block to proposed social security reform. He placed a high value on the married, working man, seeing him as an essential building block for a healthy economy and the foundation of a stable society (Beveridge, 1942). In Beveridge's view, giving individuals the opportunity to work in the conditions of full employment was the only true test of their right to benefit from the social insurance scheme (Pedersen, 1993: 338) a theme which continued to be central to UK political ideologies in the study period (Chapter 7). His core assumption was that a man's wage should be sufficient to cover not only his own needs, but also those of his wife. Beveridge's ideas, however, reflect the social norms of the times namely, female dependence and the ideal of the male breadwinner rather than deep core patriarchy as in France and Spain. As a result of this assumption, any benefits payable to married working men were calculated to cover, not only, their needs but also the needs of wives as dependants. In addition, Beveridge did not consider employment outside the home as the 'normal' state of married women (Pedersen, 1993: 340), and consequently any benefits due to women in dual-earner families were less than those paid to single working women. This position was
defended on the grounds that married women had the support of their husbands and therefore had lesser needs than single women (Beveridge, 1942: 7-8).

The reasons for this apparent penalising of the married working woman may, more significantly, rest on the role which Beveridge ascribed to housewives, namely giving birth to and bringing up children, summed up in his pro-natalist assertion: ‘in the next thirty years housewives as mothers will have vital work to do in ensuring the adequate continuance of the British race and of British ideals in the world’ (Beveridge, 1942: 53). While such a statement may seem nationalistic to the contemporary reader, the historical context in which the report was written, perhaps the lowest ebb in Allied fortunes during the second world war, must not be underestimated in the interpretation of Beveridge. Janet Beveridge (1954) and Susan Pedersen (1993) suggest that by valuing and recommending the provision of support, albeit through gendered dependence, for the unpaid work of ‘housewives’, the Beveridge report contains elements of egalitarianism although these may be ‘merely rhetorical flourishes’ (Pedersen, 1993: 339).

The result of this conception of the dependency of the wife on the husband was a curious relationship between male and female citizens and the state. The contract between the working man and the state was both direct and public. Whereas women’s contracts with the state were indirect and private, only coming into effect if their husbands became dependant on state support. Married women’s paid employment was discriminated against in the insurance system as men’s wages were deemed to be sufficient to cover the needs of both spouses and women’s unpaid work in the home was considered as private (Pedersen, 1993: 340). The central contribution of Beveridge to family policies was the introduction of universal family allowances (later child benefits) which served horizontal re-distributive aims. In addition, his assumptions about the role of family members has had a significant effect upon the
development of political debate about family issues in the UK and their impact upon the political ideologies in the study period is examined in Chapter 7.

**Policy measures for families in the UK**

The lack of a coherent system of family policy in the UK is a common theme of comparative studies (Chapter 2). However, as discussed earlier, the implicit nature of family policy in the UK may be a reflection of the national context of suspicion of state intervention in ‘private’ matters. The following section examines the development of government intervention in family life within the framework of the eight support measures identified in Chapter 4.

**Abortion**

The abortion question in the UK was contextualised in similar terms as that in France. Abortion was considered as a ‘deadly’ sin by the Catholic Church and traditional Anglicans and was opposed accordingly (Leathard, 1980:128). In spite of the general belief that the UK was facing over population rather than under population (Wicks and Chester, 1990: 110) demonstrated by the absence of pro-natalist policies (Land and Parker, 1978: 331) abortion has received opposition in demographic terms. In contrast to both France and Spain, the anti-abortion debate was limited to the short period of population panic during the late 1930s (Leathard, 1980: 60-2) rather than over a longer period. Pro-natalism is thus not a characteristic of right wing ideology in the UK.

Abortion was illegal under the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act although custodial sentences for abortionists were far less severe than those in France. In 1928 for example, Annie Bolton and the Reverend Francis Bacon were sentenced to six and fifteen months imprisonment respectively for administering abortificant drugs (Simms, 1980:3). It was, however, not for demographic reasons that attitudes towards
abortion began to change. Deaths resulting from illegal abortions became a central question, and in 1929 the 1861 Act was amended to allow for 'therapeutic' abortions although this was ambiguous and difficult to regulate as the definition of therapeutic included the patient's mental health based upon doctors' 'good faith' (Leathard, 1980: 127).

By 1967 lobbying from pressure groups such as the Abortion Law Reform Association (ALRA) and increased concern about world over-population heralded a change in the law (Leathard, 1980). The Abortion Act received the royal assent on the 27 October 1967 and permitted abortion for social reasons up to the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy and required the consent of two doctors (Le Faou and Blum-Boisgard, 1992). The evolution of abortion law reveals differences in the primary concerns of family policy makers in France and the UK. Public health concern appears as a primary concern in the legalisation of abortion which faced little opposition within political ideologies about pro-natalism or religious/moral, although the latter was the stronger source of opposition

**Contraception**

Under UK law it has never been an offence to distribute or use methods of contraception although the advertising of contraceptives was, theoretically, subject to the 1857 Obscene Publications Act (Leathard, 1980). Controversy began to increase after W.W.I. when voluntary birth control clinics began to supply information on contraceptive methods, such as Marie Stopes', Society for Constructive Birth Control and Racial Progress (Stopes, 1927). In 1922 government policy was made clear in a statement by the Home Secretary which said that a court would not consider a publication obscene simply because it addressed questions related to contraception (Leathard, 1980). In spite of this growing acceptance of contraception and relentless lobbying by the Family Planning Association (FPA), the state did not take full
responsibility for family planning until 1974, seven years after the legalisation of abortion, when contraception became free on the NHS (Leathard, 1980). Contraception in the UK quickly lost any immoral connotations. Even British Roman Catholics defied Vatican disapproval with 74 per cent practising birth control, of which 43 per cent used oral contraception in 1971-72 (Peel and Carr, 1975: 83-4).

**Divorce**

In contrast to the debate surrounding divorce in France and Spain, the case of the UK does not rely upon the judgements of the Roman Catholic Church. In addition, it is also important to distinguish between Scotland on the one hand and England and Wales on the other in relation to the development of divorce law. Divorce in Scotland was legalised in 1563 in cases of adultery and was reformed to include malicious desertion for up to four years in 1573, remaining little changed until 1938 (Phillips, 1991: 17).

In England and Wales it is popularly believed that Henry VIII divorced some, if not all, of his six wives. This is, according to Roderick Phillips (1991), erroneous. For any number of reasons including adultery and incest, Henry VIII chose to annul his marriages in spite of the separation of the Anglican Church from papal control, and while other reformist countries such as Germany, Switzerland or the Netherlands had legalised divorce, the Catholic principle of the indissolubility of marriage was maintained in England until 1858 (Phillips, 1991: 120-7). The divorce law remained relatively strict requiring proof of adultery as the sole grounds. The law was gradually liberalised to reflect demands of the women’s rights movement and later to include mutual consent as sufficient grounds for divorce (Phillips, 1991: 189-95). The 1969 Divorce Reform Act marked a significant point in the development of UK divorce laws by introducing irretrievable breakdown as grounds for divorce. Stein Ringen,

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22 The 1969 Act became effective from 1 January 1971.
(1997: 41) cites the 1969 Act as having had a profound impact upon UK family relations as represented by the increase number of divorce decrees per 1,000 population from 2.1 in 1961 to 12.7 in 1987. The first section of this chapter demonstrated a higher divorce rate in the UK (2.9) than France (2.0) or Spain (0.8). The higher divorce rate in the UK has been presented by the parties as a problem and has resulted in much political debate on issue of family breakdown and the negative consequences of alternative family forms (see Chapter 7). This theme permeates much of Thatcherite family ideology.

**Parental authority**

The inherent patriarchy of the Beveridge report was shown above to have compounded gender differences in the family sphere. While mothers had long been seen as the parent 'naturally' responsible for the up-brining of children, as demonstrated in the 1940s child benefit debate (Pedersen, 1993: 345-6), questions of parental authority had been largely absent from political debate in the United Kingdom. In practice, British parents have exercised equal authority over their children since around the second world war, this equality was only given legal status in 1973 (Dewar, 1989). As a result, parental authority in the UK case is understood in terms of the public/private debate and state intervention in family life, rather than an issue of gender equality.

**Child benefits**

Child benefits were introduced in 1945 based on the recommendations of the Beveridge report (Land and Parker, 1978: 345). The child benefits debate in the UK began with conflict over the recipient (see Pedersen, 1993: 343-50). Mothers were, however designated as the recipient of the benefits after the second reading of the White Paper on child benefits on 8 March 1945 (Pedersen, 1993: 349). In spite of Beveridge's view that child benefits (payable from the second child) should
compensate families, the value of the benefit remained far behind real term subsistence levels, and up to 1975 the benefits were increased on only five occasions (Land and Parker, 1978: 346). The Child Benefit Act of 1975 reformed the previous system most notably with the introduction of benefits for the first child at a lower rate and an increase in their value (Ringen, 1997: 64). The principle of child benefits as non-contributory, universal, non-means-tested allowance was maintained over this period.

**Fiscal Measures**

While child benefits have been criticised for failing to compensate families sufficiently (Land and Parker, 1978: 346), fiscal measures were considered in 1978 (Land and Parker, 1978: 345) as the most generous form of family support, through the Child Tax Allowance that considered children in the calculation of income tax liability (Ringen, 1997: 60). This system was reformed in 1975 along with child benefits, which had been introduced to offset loss of income through the abolition of the Child Tax Allowance (Ringen, 1997: 60). This reform was contextualised in debate which centred on the recipient of financial transfers as with child benefits. The shift from fiscal measures to child benefits resulted in a shift from the 'wallet to purse' (Land and Parker, 1978: 347) as male workers were the *de facto* recipients of tax reductions.

**Maternity leave and childcare**

Policies to support working mothers have traditionally been extremely limited in the UK in line with limited state intervention in the private family sphere. Maternity leave before the case study period was largely neglected in public policies. Rights for pregnant workers were introduced by the Labour government of 1975 (Ringen, 1997: 50). These rights included reinstatement after pregnancy although there was no statutory right to paid maternity leave (Ringen, 1997: 51). Childcare provision has
also been underdeveloped. While public day nurseries have provided places for the under-fives, only 3 per cent of pre-school children were cared for in nurseries in 1974 (Land and Parker, 1978: 359). The low provision of support measures for working mothers in the UK contrasts with the proliferation of childcare and maternity leave measures in France in the 1970s. Married women’s employment grew in the 1960s and 1970s although, perhaps as a result of limited childcare places, part-time employment has been much greater than in France. Beveridge’s assumptions about the role of women may also be considered as having influence in this area. The Beveridge Report explicitly encouraged married women’s dependency on their husbands as an ideal state. This deep core ideology about gender division of work may help explain the inactivity of governments in providing support for working mothers up to the late 1970s, although it is possible that the national suspicion of state intervention in family life also influenced this situation.

Spanish family policies and political conflict

The political history of twentieth century Spain has been characterised by, often traumatic, change. Five political regimes have governed Spain from the Restoration Monarchy (1876) to the liberal democracy installed after the death of the dictator General Franco in 1975 (Gilmour, 1985). During this period, despite ‘varied ideological tendencies’ (Guillén, 1992: 119), the fundamental institutions and even philosophy behind social policy were preserved from one regime to the next (Guillén, 1992), suggesting homogeneity of political ideology in relation to social questions across political left and right. While this may have been true about social policy as a whole, radical changes were introduced during the Second Republic (1931-36) and their focus was significantly upon the family. The most notable reforms were in defiance of the Catholic Church as demonstrated by the introduction of Article 26 (passed in January of 1932). Article 26, along with Article 323, was the Second Republic’s attempt at secularisation, and introduced divorce for the first time in

23The legal separation of Church and State (Jackson, 1972).
Spain. Although there is some disagreement among researchers as to the uptake of divorce by Spanish couples\textsuperscript{24}, divorce legalisation was, at the very least, a symbolic attack on the authority of the Church which saw the Republic move from one extreme, ‘a marriage which only death could dissolve’, to the other, ‘one [a marriage] which the two conjoints might dissolve by mutual consent after a paltry [sic] two years of conjugal experience’ (de Madariaga, 1961: 405). Further reforms included the highly controversial right to contraception, abortion, the introduction of civil marriage and the removal of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children (Iglesisas and Flaquer, 1993).

While it is not the objective of this chapter to speculate about the reasons for the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) it is important to highlight the symbolic weight of the 1932 reforms and the speed with which the Catholic Church’s authority was reinstated after the victory of the Francoist forces in March 1939. The significant role of the Second Republic social reforms in increasing the conflict which led to the Civil War is underlined by Isabel Madruga (1996: 42).

The importance of the Catholic Church on the family policies of the authoritarian period cannot be under-estimated. Franco explicitly declared that his state would follow the ‘ley de Dios según la doctrina de la santa Iglesia Católica, apostólica y romana, única y verdadera fe inseparable de la conciencia nacional que inspirará su legislación’, (Law of God, according to the doctrine of the Holy, Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church, the one, true and inseparable faith of the national spirit which will inspire the country’s legislation)\textsuperscript{25}. The mix of Church authority and isolationism of Franco’s regime has led to his ideology being termed ‘National Catholicism’ (Madruga, 1996: 42).

\textsuperscript{24}Gabriel Jackson writes of the ‘relative infrequency of divorce (Jackson, 1972: 56) while Salvador de Madariaga reports on a ‘long line of ill-assorted couples waiting for the day when the courts would at least be empowered to grant them their longed-for liberty’ (de Madariaga, 1972: 405).

\textsuperscript{25}Article 2 of the \textit{Ley de Principios del Movimiento Nacional}, 17 May 1958.
The importance Franco placed on support of the family was clear in the amount of Social Security spending devoted to it, more than half of the total welfare budget in the early 1960s (Meil, 1994). This concern stems from a fundamental belief about state intervention the family sphere and its role in Spanish society. Referred to by Ana Guillén as ‘Social Catholicism’ (Guillén, 1992: 122), the Francoist view of the family is described in the Law of July 18 1938 as one of the pillars of the regime within a ‘tradition of Christianity, perfect natural society and the cement of the nation’ (quoted in Gilmour, 1985). The underlying implications of this and other such statements, patriarchalism, pro-natalism and antifeminism, were enforced in practice with an array of Repressive State Apparatuses in the form of civil and criminal laws (Del Campo, 1995). Family policy was so important to the Franco regime that it has become regarded as one of the regime’s defining features, a factor which has been central to interpretation of the post-Franco development of both family policies and the presentation of the family in party politics (Valiente, 1995).

The evolution of Spanish family policies

Intervention in the family sphere was highly visible under the Franco regime. The following section focuses on the eight framework measures from the Second Republic to the end of the Authoritarian era.

Abortion

The influence of the Catholic Church upon Spanish attitudes towards abortion cannot be underestimated. Official links between the state and the Church have been openly accepted in Spanish political history, most notably during the forty years of General Franco’s regime. As such canonical law was considered as the inspiration for the Spanish law as set out in the law of 12 March 1938 and Article 2 of the law of 17 May 1958 (Del Campo, 1995: 120). Further to religious and moral concerns, Franco’s
National Catholicism was explicitly concerned with the fertility of Spain (Valiente, 1997) to which abortion was clearly seen as a threat.

Abortion, and contraception had been permitted during the Second Republic (Iglesisas and Flaquer, 1993). After the Nationalist victory of Franco’s forces in the Civil War however, women seeking abortions and abortionists were punishable under section VIII Chapter III of the Penal Code of 13 January 1945. The various articles relating to abortion recommended a range of custodial sentences for those women who sought out abortion, with the heaviest penalties being reserved for abortion practitioners, as in France, especially in cases where threats, violence and intimidation were used to gain the consent of women (Del Campo, 1995: 144-6). This strict control of abortion continued into the 1970s and became a source of ideological conflict in the democratic era (Chapter 8).

**Contraception**

In the eyes of the Catholic Church contraception by any means signalled the supremacy of pleasure over the sanctity of canonical marriage which considered reproduction as the only valid motivation for sexual intercourse (Tarancón, 1958: 29-30). This position was reflected in Spanish legislation under which no legal distinction was made between methods of contraception and methods of abortion. Article 416 of the Penal Code of 13 January 1945 outlaws the possession, manufacture, sale, demonstration or marketing of methods, drugs or objects which are used for abortion or preventing conception (Del Campo, 1995: 139).

**Divorce**

Divorce had been controversially introduced under the Second Republic (1931-36) (see de Madariaga, 1961) and was, at that time, the most liberal divorce legislation in Europe (Phillips, 1991: 201-2). Attitudes towards divorce were polarised along the
lines which separated the two opposing sides of the Civil War which began four years later. The divorce law of the Second Republic was in clear defiance of the Catholic Church and the Nationalists of Franco and was quickly repealed at the end of the Civil War by the Law of 12 March 1938 which adopted canonical law as the basis of Spanish law, there was, thus, no place for divorce during the Franco years (Del Campo, 1995: 120). By the beginning of the Transition period political attitudes to divorce were changing, although, as with abortion, opposition to divorce remained deep core on the right of the Spanish polity.

*Parental authority*

The question of parental authority is intrinsically linked with that of gender equality or differentiation and can also be equated to the metaphor of the patriarchal political system as expressed by Commaille (1991b). The patriarchal nature of the Franco regime was reflected in the role of the father as *jefe de familia*, the head of the family as analogous with Franco as the father of the nation. Although women were highly valued as mothers or potential mothers, authority in family matters clearly rested with married, working fathers (Del Campo, 1992; Nash 1991). The institutionalised gender differences of the Franco period were to become an important target for left wing parties during the Transition and the reform of laws relating to parental authority was a priority for the growing women’s movement (Threllfall, 1985) which was to play a key part in the development of left wing social policies in Democratic Spain.

*Child benefits*

Perhaps the key policy instrument for the legitimisation of paternal authority and power during Authoritarianism was the system of financial support for families. If pro-natalism was represented in the regulatory measures intended to banish threat of birth-control thus combating declining birth rates, then familism based upon patriarchy formed the foundations of support measures. The *subsidio familiar* (family
subsidy or child benefit) was introduced as early as 1938 and was significant in terms of the criteria used to select those eligible, the amount paid to beneficiaries and the means of payment. Child benefits were highly selective of family types (Nash, 1991; Madruga, 1996). Firstly, the benefits were calculated on a sliding scale in relation to the number of children in the family and secondly, only legally married couples and their legitimate children were targeted by the benefits (Nash, 1991). In addition, patriarchy was reinforced as the benefits were paid directly to fathers, as were additional family bonuses (*plus de cargas familiares*) (Del Campo, 1995). Both child benefits and family bonuses were thus clear products of Francoist family ideology. The beliefs were founded on three objectives of state intervention: strengthening the nation through population growth; maintaining social and moral stability through support of the family; reinforcing male hierarchy within the family.

**Maternity leave and childcare**

Policies relating to maternity leave and childcare provision were considered unnecessary under the Franco regime due to the role assigned to women. Married women's participation in the labour market was not only frowned upon, but actively discouraged first through legislation relating to child benefits, under which married women were not entitled to the bonuses or allowances which were paid to male colleagues and second by a number of measures restricting women's labour market activity either by the type of employment or the marriage bar by which married women were required to seek their husband's permission before taking on employment outside the home (Valiente, 1994: 159-64). Again, public intervention in the family is the clear ideological foundation for the family policies of Authoritarianism.
Contextualising changing political ideologies and family policies

The development of family policies and party political debate up to the late 1970s in the three countries reveals certain fundamental beliefs about the role of families, their relationship with the state, state intervention and the purpose of family policy measures. In political terms, these beliefs can be understood both in relation to traditional divisions between left and right and as reflections of the socio-political evolution of the three nation states studied.

French policies over the period examined in this chapter developed in the context of the dominant right wing ideology. This position was based upon pro-natalism and neo-natalism with measures to encourage larger families dominating the agenda. Significantly policies to protect and support working mothers evolved in the neo-natalist context which, while accepting the increase in women’s employment as an irreversible trend, sought to support the dominant right wing ideological position that held motherhood and large families in high regard. The family has been highly valued and institutionalised in France and the legacy of this ideological position continued to be an influential element of the social protection agenda into the period examined in the case study (Chapter 6).

In the UK the family was not presented as a significant target for state intervention through social policies. Indeed, in terms of party political ideology, the family has rarely had the same impact as in France or Spain. This is not to say, however, that families have not been the focus of political intervention. Families have been the subject of a number of legislative and political reforms, but where this has taken place, politicians and their parties have spoken of individuals as targets for intervention as opposed to the family unit even, in some cases, on the right. The ideological position of governing parties has been reflected to some extent in policies which may be considered as family policies, for example, the development of child benefits represented horizontal redistribution as a key element of post-war social
insurance. The lack of increases in benefits, however, diminished their impact. In terms of family regulation, the UK introduced abortion and relatively liberal divorce laws before France and Spain suggesting a more liberal ideological position surrounding these issues. Other than through the tax and benefits system, there is little to suggest patriarchy as an element of right wing party ideology up to the late 1970s. In terms of the family it appears that the UK has had little ideological polarisation across left and right, other than in cases of measure-specific conflict (such as in the debate as to whether mothers or fathers should be paid child benefits).

The evolution of family policies in Spain over the same period is intrinsically linked with the political system and its inherent ideological conflicts. Liberal family policy reforms introduced under the left wing Second Republic were instrumental in the build up of political conflict leading to the Civil War. The right wing ideology of the Franco era institutionalised patriarchy, pro-natalism and Catholic family values. The symbolic value of the family in National Catholicism was such that it became a defining feature of Spain at that time. No opposition to this ideology was tolerated, and left wing parties were outlawed. Family policies in Franco’s Spain stored up the cross-party ideological conflict that emerged when a democratic system was reinstated in Spain in the late 1970s. This is examined in Chapter 8.
Chapter 6 - FRANCE: RE-EVALUATING TRADITION

Two significant programmes of social reform serve as the beginning and the end of the time scale covered in the analysis of the relationship between ideology and French family policy change presented in this chapter. In each case, the traditions of state intervention family in France are brought into question. The first came into effect shortly after the historic victory of the Socialist party (PS) in 1981; the second, was introduced under the right wing Prime Minister, Alain Juppé in 1995. The 1981 reforms have been identified as marking the end of the political consensus on family policies (Commaille and Martin, 1998: 140) and heralded as a new social package, accompanied by large public spending increases, most significantly on child benefits. In contrast, the ‘Juppé Plan’ was a programme of far-reaching spending cuts aimed at reducing the endemic social security deficit. This chapter examines these reforms, as well as those from the intervening period and asks the questions and compares these evolutions with the political debate over the period.

During the sixteen year period covered in this study, family policies continued to be an important element of French state intervention (see Chapter 5). However, in the context of seemingly insurmountable economic crises and endemic unemployment, the French state’s commitment to defending the family as a primary group was placed under increasing pressure. The extent to which the political parties of France defended the family in spite of dwindling resources provides an important indicator of the strength of their ideologies in relation to the family. The role of ideology as a dynamic factor in policy change, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4 is applied to French family policy from 1981 to 1997. By comparing each of the eight family policy measures of the parties, as expressed in their election manifestos, with the concrete reforms implemented over the same period, this chapter draws conclusions relating to the evolution of party political ideologies and the extent to which these have impacted upon changing policies (see Chapter 4).
By the end of the 1970s, the character of French family policy had begun to change. The post-war 'baby boom' had subsided and fertility levels had begun to fall from the late 1960s (Ray et al., 1988). While supporters of natalist family policies had attributed the 'baby boom' to the success of policy instruments implemented under the 1939 Code de la famille and the global family policy of 1946, others (Ray et al., 1988) have supported the hypothesis that the 'baby boom' was a natural consequence of the Liberation and subsequent economic growth, which represented an exception rather than a long-term demographic trend.

The Socialist breakthrough and 'cohabitation'

Whether natalist policies as supported in the ideology of the right wing parties were, in reality, responsible for the growth of the French population or not is not the focus of this chapter, nor, it may be argued, is this possible to demonstrate. What is significant, however, is the fact that by the mid-1970s, the burden on all sectors of the social security scheme was increasing. Governments were being faced with the need to combat the drain on social spending resulting from a rapidly ageing population and falling contributions resulting from growing unemployment (Lenoir, 1991a). Consequently all elements of the social security scheme, including the prestations familiales, came under increasing scrutiny from the middle of 1982 (Brin, 1991) (see Table 6.2). The economic crisis in France continued throughout the case study period and, by the early 1990s, economic indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) had fallen four points lower than during the 1960s to 1.2 per cent, with 11.1 per cent of women and 14.6 per cent of men unemployed (Eurostat, 1995). The effects of the growing economic crisis through the period 1981-97 saw the initial increase in spending on family support measures (1981-82) (Table 6.3) quickly abandoned with the remainder of the period (1983-97) being characterised by a constant struggle to maintain the traditions of the family policy scheme in the face of diminishing resources. This fight to maintain support for the instruments of family policy came to a head on the return of a right wing government in 1995 (Table 6.1). The Prime
Minister, Alain Juppé, introduced sweeping reforms to the social security system, including family policy, over the period 1995-97 (Table 6.3) in an attempt to reduce the deficit incurred by social security funds. The so-called ‘Juppé Plan’ (Table 6.3) of reforms has been identified (Fagnani, 1996) as a significant shift in French family policy under which the founding principles of French public intervention in the family were threatened by new ideas of private responsibility.

Table 6.1: Changing political power in France 1981-97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 May 1981</td>
<td>François Mitterrand elected as the first Socialist President of the Fifth Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 June 1981</td>
<td>Socialists (PS and MRG) gain an absolute majority for the first time in the Fifth Republic. Pierre Mauroy becomes Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 July 1984</td>
<td>Mauroy resigns and is replaced by Laurent Fabius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 March 1986</td>
<td>First period of ‘cohabitation’, right (RPR/UDF) wins legislative elections; Jaques Chirac is Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 1988</td>
<td>Mitterrand wins a second term of office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June 1988</td>
<td>The Socialists regain a slender parliamentary majority at the legislative elections; Michel Rocard is named Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 1991</td>
<td>Edith Cresson replaces Rocard as Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 April 1992</td>
<td>Pierre Bérégovoy replaces Cresson as Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 March 1993</td>
<td>Right returns to power with a landslide victory with Prime Minister Edouard Balladur (2nd cohabitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 1993</td>
<td>Bérégovoy commits suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 1995</td>
<td>Jaques Chirac (RPR) is elected President; Balladur is subsequently replaced by Alain Juppé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 January 1996</td>
<td>Mitterrand dies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 June 1997</td>
<td>Socialists return to power in legislative elections after Chirac’s failed attempt to regain the support of the Assembly by dissolving parliament early; Lionel Jospin becomes Prime Minister (3rd cohabitation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While it may be argued that the Juppé Plan is of great significance in the history of family policy in France (Fagnani, 1996), this chapter demonstrates that, in spite of the controversy which came from the plan’s introduction, the seeds for such reforms were sown during the early days of the first Socialist government (1981-86) and that the traditional divide between the French left and right wing parties over family policy.

26 Political cohabitation arises when the President and parliamentary majority are of different political wings. A president’s period of office lasts seven years ‘septenat’, whereas new legislative elections must be held after five years.
diminished over the period as suggested by Commaille and Martin (1998). Policies relating to the family, and most notably expensive support measures, have consistently been put under increasing pressure since the early 1980s, in spite of five swings in parliamentary majority, suggesting the diminishing impact of different party political ideologies.

**Changing family policies**

Horizontal redistribution had characterised much of French financial assistance to families since the Code de la famille of 1939 (see Chapter 5), and was largely seen as being pro-natalist in its objectives. The fact that the system of allowances was more generous for couples with two or more children indicates the natalist intentions of the *allocations familiales*, and in spite of the principle of horizontal redistribution, allowances were only paid from the second child, even though economists (Ray *et al.*, 1988) generally agree that the greatest financial costs are incurred with the first child.

An economic analysis of the family benefits system has identified a shift in policy objectives (Ray *et al.*, 1988) which coincides with the election of the first Socialist President and parliamentary majority in 1981 (Table 6.1). Commitment to the family had been a prominent element of the 1981 electoral campaign across the parties, with the PS and PCF clearly moving towards individuals (women and children) as the target of social policies rather than families as the traditional unit of redistribution (PS, 1981; PCF, 1981) thus becoming more consistent with ideologies of the left outside France. With the first Socialist government of 1981 came reforms to the system of French family policy across regulatory and support measures which, although initially radical, were quickly reformed (Laroque, 1985). This change resulted in the partial return to pre-Socialist family policy, but, according to Ray *et al.* (1988) is attributable to the worsening economic crisis which faced France and thus may not be the result of a fundamental change in party ideology.
Regulatory measures

This fight against economic pressures can, thus, be seen to characterise much of the family policy change over the period of this study. It is in this context that the ideal of family policy in France becomes challenged in the party political arena. The following section examines the evolution of those policies which attempt to regulate family life (abortion, contraception, divorce and parental authority).

The question of abortion, in spite of the ratification of the law of 17 Jan 1975 in 1980 (see Chapter 5), remained problematic during the case study period. The abortion debate had been based upon three themes; mothers' health, social morality and abortion as birth control. While the first two themes appear common to the abortion debates of the three countries examined here (see Chapters 5, 7 and 8), the third has been identified (Fournier et al., 1989) as central to the explanation of the intensity of the debate in the French context. Natalism, as part of right wing ideology, continued to be an important element of family policy debate into the 1980s, but in the context of the abortion debate, this argument became increasingly difficult to justify after the legislation had been passed. The strongest arguments in favour of the legalisation of abortion came from the left in the form of medical and moral arguments and the rights of women, particularly after the Bobigny affair of 1973 which saw the acquittal of a fourteen year old rape victim who had been put on trial after having had an abortion (Association Choisir, 1973). The natalist anti-abortion case was, however, lost given the strong medical justification in the 1975 and 1980 laws. Abortion was presented as a surgical operation, which could only be practised in hospitals or licensed clinics, and as such, was just like any other medical act and therefore ought to have been reimbursed under the social security system. This was the position defended by the Socialist party, which they implemented under the law of 31 December 1982 (Lenoir, 1991).
The abortion debate was thus still a topical issue at the 1981 legislative elections and is reflected most notably in the PS manifesto (see *Abortion* below). After 1982, however, the question of abortion disappears from the electoral campaigns of all the parties examined below with the exception of the far-right FN who continued to oppose abortion up to the end of the study period. It is important to note that while abortion may seem to be a closed question in contemporary France, the law states that abortion should remain a last resort. Some authors (Fournier *et al.*, 1989) have interpreted this as a normative position which presents abortion as a last resort not a means of birth control. In spite of such ‘official’ positions, public opinion has maintained some measure of objection to the existing abortion legislation (Fagnani, 1996). On 23 November 1995 over 30,000 representatives of feminist associations and trade unions demonstrated against the inadequacies of abortion provision (Fagnani, 1996). In contrast, January 1996 saw the imprisonment of anti-abortion campaigners who had occupied a hospital (Fagnani, 1996). This appears to indicate that in spite of the political parties’ (except the FN) abandonment of abortion as an electoral theme, such a position does not reflect the beliefs of certain sectors of the population.

Given the underlying ideological conflict surrounding abortion as a means of birth control, it is not surprising that parties, in particular those of the right, have been wary to oppose contraception as it provides a more acceptable alternative to the termination of pregnancy. Indeed, the two major political groups of left and right, the PS and the RPR/UDF respectively, have encouraged sex education and free methods of contraception (see below). Even the natalist and Catholic elements of FN ideology do not go so far as to call for a ban on contraception. Consequently, no significant changes to contraceptive legislation were recorded during the case study period.

A further indicator of social change, which has been contextualised in the dénatalité obsession of French right wing parties (Collange, 1983), is divorce. Since the 1975
reform to the divorce law (see Chapter 5), the subject of divorce has been absent from all but the FN’s manifestos (see *Divorce* below). Although the FN does not call for the abolition of divorce, rising divorce rates are cited as indicative of moral decline and as a cause of falling birth rates. While this position may appear justifiable if the traditional family is taken as the sole source of family formation, Christine Collange (1983) speculates about a possible long-term rise in birth rates as couples in second marriages ‘consolidate’ their union with children, thus suggesting the possible pro-family ideological nature of persistent opposition to divorce.

In spite of the reforms of 1965 and 1970 relating to parental authority and women’s rights the major parties of both left and right, again with the exception of the FN, have sought to appeal to women voters through a commitment to defend women’s through full gender equality in the public and private domains. As with abortion, however, most of the key reforms had already been adopted before the start of the study period, although this theme remains prominent suggesting its importance within the parties’ ideologies. Exceptions include measures to support the parental couple by awarding joint custody in divorce settlements (Lenoir, 1991a). Further, the RPR/UDF government of 1986-88 brought in a reform relating to the rights of unmarried fathers who had previously been in a weak legal position given that unmarried mothers had primacy of parental authority. The law of 22 July 1987 (loi Malhuret) sought to defend the status of unmarried fathers although, according to Sullerot (1992: 130-1) this has not happened in practice. The principle of equity in parental authority after divorce is reaffirmed by the law of 8 January 1993.

**Support measures**

The examination of support measures over the case study period reveals much about party ideologies. The necessary financial commitment required by such measures may help underline the strength of party political ideology in the light of budgetary
constraints. Over the case study period, there has been almost continual reform to the package of financial assistance to families, either in the form of financial transfers, tax relief or provision of services. The thesis does not examine all such reforms in detail, however the more significant reforms (summarised in Table 6.3), in effect those which relate to the objective of examining the role of party political ideology in family policy change are examined in the remainder of this section.

**Table 6.2: Allowances making up the French system of *prestations familiales* in 1996**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allowance Description</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Allocations familiales</em> (AF): paid to families with at least two dependent children</td>
<td>paid to families with at least two dependent children with higher rates paid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with higher rates paid for children above 10 years and 15 years</td>
<td>for children above 10 years and 15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Complément familial</em> (CF): means-tested benefit paid to families with at least three</td>
<td>means-tested benefit paid to families with at least three children aged 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children aged three or more years</td>
<td>or more years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Allocation de rentrée scolaire</em> (ARS): means tested benefits paid annually to</td>
<td>support back-to-school costs for school children aged 6-18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>back-to-school costs for school children aged 6-18.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Allocation de soutien familial</em> (ASF): paid to lone parents with one or more children</td>
<td>paid to lone parents with one or more children in cases where the absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in cases where the absent parent does not or is not able to pay maintenance.</td>
<td>parent does not or is not able to pay maintenance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Allocation de parent isolé</em> (API): temporary benefit paid to lone parents or</td>
<td>temporary benefit paid to lone parents or expectant lone mothers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expectant lone mothers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Allocation de logement familial</em> (ALF): means-tested housing benefit targeting</td>
<td>means-tested housing benefit targeting families or young couples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>families or young couples.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Allocation pour jeune enfant</em> (APJE): universal benefit paid from the fourth month</td>
<td>universal benefit paid from the fourth month of pregnancy to the third</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of pregnancy to the third month after the birth or (subject to means test) up to</td>
<td>month after the birth or (subject to means test) up to three years for the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>three years for the first child.</td>
<td>first child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Allocation parentale d’éducation</em> (APE): benefit paid when one parent ceases to</td>
<td>benefit paid when one parent ceases to work in order to care for two or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work in order to care for two or more children one of which is under there years.</td>
<td>more children one of which is under there years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Aide à la famille pour l’emploi d’une assistante maternelle agréée</em> (AFEAMA):</td>
<td>allowance and employer’s contributions paid in cases where parents employ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allowance and employer’s contributions paid in cases where parents employ a registered</td>
<td>a registered child minder to provide care for a child of under six years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>child minder to provide care for a child of under six years outside the home.</td>
<td>outside the home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Allocation de garde d’enfant à domicile</em> (AGED): system under which the CAF pays</td>
<td>system under which the CAF pays employer’s contribution for childcare in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employer’s contribution for childcare in the home.</td>
<td>home.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Afsa, 1996: 68*

The first wave of reforms which were brought in by the left wing government were presented as targeting individuals (children), thus representing and ideological break with the previous administration’s neo-natalist policy objectives (Commaille, 1990) as well as attempting to stimulate the struggling economy by increasing consumers’ disposable income (Laroque, 1985). Benefits were increased in order to combat discrimination based on family size and income. The ideological shift away from neol-
natalism was exemplified by increasing the monthly benefit rates for two children (from 25.5 per cent to 32 per cent) and cutting the rate for a third child from 46 per cent to 40 per cent (Laroque, 1985: 283).

By the summer of 1982, however, the Socialist government was facing an ever-worsening economic crisis and sought to inject 10 thousand million Francs into the economy, 30 per cent of which was to come from the family fund (Laroque, 1985). This financial drain resulted in a major reform of the family benefits system. Child benefits were capped in the reform (21 July 1982) (Table 6.3) by an annual increase of 6.2 per cent, less than half that of the then retail price index (14.1 per cent) (Ray et al., 1988: 91). The increase in housing benefit was limited to 6.8 per cent (Laroque, 1985). Plans to reform child benefit spending were put on hold until 1983 and from 1 November 1982 the payment of all new benefits claims were to count from the first day of the following month. Further reforms from January 1983 included cutting the postnatal benefit for a third child by 50 per cent (Laroque, 1985). In addition, a number of reforms initially planned during 1981-82 were dropped by the time the completed text was presented to Parliament in 1983: extension of the benefit age of the eldest child in two-children families and increases in income tax relief for dual earner families (Laroque, 1985).

Dual-earner cohabiting couples had been seen to fare better than their married counterparts under the income tax system which led to growing concern over the study period, notably from the RPR/UDF, about discrimination. It was not, however, until the Juppé reforms of 1995 that this situation was changed. Cohabiting couples effectively became treated as 'married' for tax purposes (Fagnani, 1995). This reform is clearly an economic measure as it is based upon the highest common taxation denominator thus increasing the amount of income tax paid to the state. This reform has also been interpreted as an anti-marriage move by the FN insofar as it makes no legal distinction between marriage and cohabitation.
From 1985, the most regularly reformed, and often perceived as the most confusing (Strobel, 1996), family policy measures have related to childcare. Three major childcare reforms were introduced. The first (1981-85) of these sought to assist women in gaining employment outside the home. The second (1985-89) wave of reforms saw the diversification of childcare. By 1990, however, childcare policies began to take on an employment creation function by making it easier to employ nannies or child minders (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.3: Key French family policy reforms 1981-97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1981-June 1982:</td>
<td>‘Questiaux’ reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AF increased by an average of 25%; housing benefit increased on average by 50%; all other benefits automatically increased to 14%; <em>quotient familial</em> capped at 7,500 francs per child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1982:</td>
<td>‘Béragovoy’ reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>budgetary crisis leads to cutting the base rate for benefits calculations to 6.2%; payment of new benefits to start from first day of the month following the claim; pre and postnatal benefits are cut; benefits paid upon the birth of the third child is cut by half.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1982:</td>
<td>31 December 1982:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>abortion is reimbursed 100% by social security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1983:</td>
<td>January 1985:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>postnatal benefit for third child halved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AJE replaces pre and postnatal benefits and CF; APE introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986:</td>
<td>Plan famille includes widening of the APE’s scope, transformation of AJE into APJE, AGED created for dual-earner parents employing a child minder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987:</td>
<td>AJE abandoned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1987:</td>
<td>22 July 1987:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘la loi Malhuret’ seeks defend the status of unmarried fathers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1990:</td>
<td>April 1990:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RMI includes provision for the third; AFEAMA created for dual-earner parents paying for outside childcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1993:</td>
<td>January 1993:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>equality of parental authority after divorce reaffirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1993:</td>
<td>27 January 1993:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>all persons who are dependent on another party who pays social security contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1994:</td>
<td>25 July 1994:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>law relating to the funding of child benefits: any deficit to be made up by state budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1995:</td>
<td>‘Juppé’ plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November 1995:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>freezes APJE, CF and ARS, until January 1997; cohabiting couples to be treated as married couples for tax purposes from 1996; introduction of service vouchers for the full-time employment of child minders, with tax reductions to follow in 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Laroque, 1985; Fagnani, 1996; Math and Renaudat, 1997

Measures introduced during the early 1980s focused on the creation of municipal crèches funded by the CNAF. This approach has been identified (Math and Renaudat, 1997) as prioritising collective childcare. From the mid-1980s these initial policies
were widened along with new measures such as the reform of maternity leave in 1984 under which the duration of leave was extended from 12 months to two years, as well as giving the father the option to take leave (Math and Renaudat, 1997). Following this, the *allocation parentale d’éducation* (APE) was introduced to provide income support for those parents completely or partially giving up work to care for children. The APE only concerned families with three or more children of which the youngest was aged under three years (Afsa, 1996). At this point childcare in France was characterised by heteronomy.

By 1987 the right wing government introduced a shift in the nature of childcare. The *allocation de garde d’enfants à domicile* (AGED, law of 29 December 1986) was a scheme under which dual-earner parents received a monthly allowance (in 1987) of 2,000 francs to meet some of the costs of employing a child minder (Math and Renaudat, 1997). The nature of this allowance, combined with increased professional status for child minders has been identified as the turning point in French childcare policies (Math and Renaudat, 1997), with further reforms including the AFEAMA (see table 6.2) and the *chèque emploi service* (vouchers to pay for domestic help, not specifically childcare, which simplified employer’s contributions) continuing to develop childcare policies as instruments of job creation and encourage autonomy.

**Party Politics**

The major political parties of France can be considered as occupying three categories, the left wing parties, Parti socialiste (PS) and Parti communiste français (PCF) (although these parties are not officially allied there has been some cooperation, such as ministerial posts for PCF députés during PS majorities), the centre-right alliance of Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) and Union pour la démocratique française (UDF) and the far right, Front National (FN).
Since the major breakthrough of the left in 1981, which saw the election of a Socialist government and president, François Mitterrand, control of the majority of the Assemblée Nationale (the lower house) has changed hands between left and right on five occasions, creating in 1986, 1993 and 1997 the constitutional dilemma known as ‘cohabitation’ where the President is obliged to name and ‘cohabit’ with a Prime Minister of a different political party (Table 6.1). Although de Gaulle (Gildea, 1996) had suggested that this situation would prove impractical and any President faced with a ‘hostile’ assembly should resign, those politicians who found themselves in the reality of the situation (including Gaullists) agreed to cohabit in order to limit any possible constitutional crisis (Gildea, 1996). Despite the possible difficulties of such an unorthodox situation, government has continued to function without any major crises.

In terms of family policy objectives, the political ideologies of the French left and right have been categorised by Commaille (1990: 74) who focuses on the key themes of state intervention and the relationship between the state and citizens as defining elements of party ideology in relation to the family:

La dominante dans les positions des partis politiques de gauche ou syndicats est bien entendu l’accent mis sur ce qu’ils considèrent devoir être la finalité des transferts sociaux: la réduction des inégalités sociales, le soutien matériel, financier prioritairement aux familles en difficulté. La dominante dans les positions courantes de droite est l’accent mis sur l’importance de la famille du point de vue de l’ordre sociale et des intérêts de la nation. (The predominant feature of the left wing political parties or unions is naturally the emphasis on what they consider to be the aim of welfare transfers: the reduction of social inequality, material and financial support, primarily to families in difficulty. The predominant feature of the right wing political movements is the emphasis placed on the importance of the family from the point of view of social order and the good of the nation.) (Commaille, 1990: 65)

While this position was generally representative of the 1980s, parties during the 1990s had to address family support measures, whatever their traditional ideological position, due to economic pressures upon the social security budget.
The left wing of the French political spectrum is primarily represented by the Socialists (PS) and the Communists (PCF), both of which have strong Marxist traditions. Considered as being, until recently, the most Marxist of Western European Socialist parties (Borella, 1990), the PS was the largest single party in France in 1997, a year in which it held the majority in the assembly with its leader, Lionel Jospin, occupying the post of Prime Minister. In spite of the Socialists’ notable impact on French politics and policy of the 1980s, the party had been the main party of opposition during the first 23 years of the Fifth Republic.

The historical roots of French socialism can be traced back to the French Revolution, an event which Socialists have always considered as foundational, upholding the revolutionary principles liberty, equality and fraternity (Hazareesingh, 1994). The Socialists, like left wing parties in other countries, have been influenced by the writings of Marx and Engels, but also by domestic thinkers such as Proudhon and their founding father, Jaurès. Social action has been central to Socialist party principles, with the party identifying its central objective as the ‘transfer [of] resources to the underprivileged sections of the community, and [to] create a society in which power was exercised in the interests of the working people’ (Hazareesingh, 1994: 232). The PS has, therefore, sought to target individuals, notably the poor, women, children, the unemployed as primary groups for its social policies, and has maintained an ideological position in which state intervention to assist these groups has been considered as legitimate. The family has, traditionally, only been targeted indirectly in PS social policies.

In terms of its organisation, the modern Socialist party was born in 1905 as the Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière (SFIO) under the leadership of Jean Jaurès and Jules Guesde. Despite early electoral success (1.4 millions votes in 1914) the SFIO suffered two serious setbacks: first, Jaurès, then leader of the party, was
assassinated on 31 July 1914 and second, at the party congress in Tours, 25-30 December 1920, conflict between the supporters of the Second International and the Bolshevik Third International (Komintern) led to a definitive split in the SFIO (Borella, 1990: 154). Over a thousand delegates voted to support the original principles of the party and remain with Léon Blum. In contrast, 3,208 voted to form a new party based on Lenin’s 21 principles which became the PCF (Néant, 1991: 62-3). Since this split, the French left has seen varying degrees of consensus and conflict between the Socialists and the Communists with the share of the left wing vote gravitating to one or the other party. Two notable periods of relative consensus in the history of the French left have been the 1936 Front populaire alliance government which united the left allowing ‘the working class to pass from gross exploitation to an entirely different social partnership’ (Hincker, 1997) and the dominance of the PS as the major party of the left from 1981.

The development of the modern Socialist party, the PS, is intrinsically linked with the rise of François Mitterrand. In disarray, the Socialists were united under the title PS in June 1971 with Mitterrand being elected First Secretary on 16 June 1971 (Borella, 1990). The arrival of Mitterrand as leader of the newly unified Socialists signalled a new era of electoral success during which the Socialist vote rose from 16.5 per cent in 1968 to 20.7 per cent in 1973, which although representing an increase of a little over 4 per cent, represented a net gain of 45 seats (57 seats in 1968, 102 seats in 1973) (Borella, 1990: 248-51).

The steady rise in Socialist fortunes reached its zenith in 1981 with a double victory in the presidential and legislative elections. On the 10 May, Mitterrand was elected as the first Socialist President of the French Republic with 51.75 per cent of the vote in the second round. This was consolidated on the 21 June when the party gained 285 seats in the assembly and 37.8 per cent of the vote, the highest result in the party’s history (Borella, 1990). Mitterrand remained President for the majority of the case
study period, occupying the position for two septenats (seven-year terms of office) the first from 1981 to 8 May 1988, and the second until 23 April 1995 at which point he retired from politics (Gildea, 1996).

The PS’s position in terms of the family is characterised by its support of the rights of women and children as individuals (Commaille, 1990: 65) by means of restricted intervention, and during the early 1990s the PS moved steadily towards a social policy based on reducing inequalities through vertical redistribution, which is shown below, and consequently away from the French tradition of horizontal, universal family policies. In terms of the thematic classification of party ideologies outlined in Chapter 3, the PS sits between the dimensions of public and individual, although, as a result of the French context, the party has sought to intervene in the family sphere to a greater extent than may be expected of left wing parties in other countries.

Parti communiste français

The PCF has a history which dates back to the Russian revolution of 1917, but developed its own identity after a split in the SFIO. Being founded on the Marxist-Leninist principles of class struggle, the party continued to make explicit reference to Marx, Engels and Lenin until 1979 (Borella, 1990: 195-6). While being a constant of twentieth century French politics, the PCF has never held an overall majority in the Assembly, but has played an important role as part of left wing coalition governments, notably the Front populaire (Borella, 1990: 177-8). In recent times, however, the PCF has become the ‘second’ party of the left in coalition with the PS, in terms of its number of seats, share of the vote and subsequent influence, which has been dwindling since the 1970s. In 1981, the Communists won 35 seats in the Assembly to the Socialists’ 285, only seven years later, in the second Socialist government, the PCF share of the seats had fallen to 27 compared to the PS’s 278 seats (Borella, 1990: 250).
In common with the PS, the Communist party over the period 1981-93 was relatively stable in terms of its leadership, namely Georges Marchais, being replaced by Robert Hue in the 1995 presidential elections. In line with the Communist tradition, PCF social policies have focussed on the worker rather than the family as a primary group. PCF political ideology expresses the state in an interventionist role, which targets individuals, as in the PS ideology. However, the family is commonly cited as a target for social policies in the earlier manifestos, although family policies are targeted at the poorest families in society and are thus distinct from the French universalist tradition.

The centre-right alliance

The two major parties on the right of French politics the RPR and the UDF have, unlike the PS and PCF, formed a close political alliance, and shared electoral manifestos during the study period. In contrast to the two main parties of the left however, the RPR and UDF had a much more even share of the vote and seats in the Assembly. In 1981, for example, the share of the vote was 20.9 per cent for the RPR (88 seats) and 19.1 per cent for the UDF (63 seats) (Borella, 1990: 250). In subsequent years, the RPR have consistently held more seats in the Assembly (Borella, 1990: 250).

The RPR/UDF dominance of the right of French politics has, however, been under increasing pressure since the early 80s. The far right, FN has been steadily gaining support since its dramatic breakthrough in the European parliamentary elections of 1984, receiving 10.9 per cent of the vote as opposed to 0.4 per cent in the previous general elections in 1981. In 1986, the FN won its first seats in the Assembly equaling the 35 seats of the PCF (Borella, 1990: 250).
The RPR and the UDF, in spite of their close co-operation, have developed from two, distinct political traditions: Gaullism and liberal republicanism. The Gaullist RPR was founded in 1976, but had evolved from the Union des démocrates pour la République (UDR) which itself had evolved from earlier Gaullist parties since the creation of the (RPF) in 1947 (Petitfils, 1994). As the name suggests, Gaullism is based on the political ideology of General de Gaulle, which is itself a notoriously elusive body of thought including nationalist, authoritarian tendencies and a traditional view of society mixed with strong commitment to modernisation (Hazareesingh, 1994: 261-3). While de Gaulle saw his politics as corresponding to neither left nor right, indeed the early support for de Gaulle transcended class distinctions due to his popular appeal, the Gaullist electorate has increasingly come to fit the profile of a conservative electorate since the General’s death in 1970 (Hazareesingh, 1994: 279-81).

The UDF was formed as a union of non-Gaullist centre-right parties in 1978, evolving from movements spearheaded by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (President of the Republic 1974-81). Occupying a centre-right position, the UDF was in fact made up of many factions ranging from the Centre des démocrates sociaux which had evolved from the Catholic centre party, the secular Parti radical (PR) and dissident Socialists who had abandoned Mitterrand (Wright, 1994: 200-1). The eclectic makeup of the UDF has led to in-fighting such as disputes over abortion, divorce and gender equality (Wright, 1994: 203). In spite of the non-Gaullist stance of the UDF, the party has formed a stable alliance with the RPR, most notably since the PS victory of 1981, with general consensus over policy objectives reflected in the publication of joint manifestos and co-operation between candidates at election (candidates from either party concede to the one with the greatest chance of victory as reflected in the first round of voting) (Borella, 1990: 107-8).
Given the distinct traditions of the RPR/UDF, they have generally supported a pro-family or natalist approach to family policies based on the idea of the family as, ‘le point d’ancrage le plus solide, aussi bien de l’individu que du corps social’ (the most solid anchorage point for, both, the individual and the social body) (RPR/UDF, 1981: 9) a sentiment which remained present in 1997: ‘la famille est le lieu où s’exercent la solidarité entre générations, l’autorité et le respect mutuel’ (the family is the place where support between generations, authority and mutual respected are practised) (RPR/UDF, 1997: 3). The family is thus responsible for the transmission of values, education and care. In this way the family is considered as being a ‘private’ concern, a position which has increased in importance over the case study period.

*Front national*

Occupying a unique far-right position in French politics, the FN has seen its support grow steadily since its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, first stood for the presidential elections in 1974 in which he won less than one percent of the vote, to over 18 per cent in the first round of the presidential elections of 1995 (Frémy and Frémy, 1998). In the legislative elections, the FN has made slower progress, but consistently receives above 10 per cent of the vote and has become the fifth major party in French politics achieving similar or better electoral results than the long-established PCF.

Due, in large part, to the spontaneous oratory style of Le Pen, the party has relied mainly on speeches and media debates to get across its electoral message, and did not publish electoral manifestos before 1985. In all of the party’s manifestos, the family is of great importance and is considered as having private responsibility for education, care and support. The FN makes no secret of its position concerning the family which it sees as central to the well-being of the state and in the fight against the decline of French morality, national identity and population (Le Pen, 1985; 1993; 1997).
The family and party political ideology in the manifestos

The following analysis examines each party in relation to the policy themes outlined in Chapter 4: abortion, contraception, divorce, parental authority, child benefits, fiscal measures, maternity leave and childcare.

Abortion

By 1979 the issue of abortion had been seemingly settled (see Chapter 5). The legalisation of abortion was, however, only the first step. The legislation did nothing to erase opposition on moral grounds or the issues of social security reimbursement from the agenda of the major political parties. If the legalisation was to be justified on grounds of medical necessity, then its reimbursement on the contributions-related was the next step.

In the election manifestos of the 1981 campaign, there is little evidence of any political debate concerning abortion. The RPR/UDF alliance, while expressing views on health and the family, made no mention of abortion (RPR/UDF, 1981). The PS, which had supported the pro-abortion lobby during the 1970s, did not express a clear position. A significant part of policy relating to the family, however, did show clear support for women’s rights, one of which being, ‘leur droit à la maitrise de leur vie personnelle’, including ‘régulation des naissances’ (right to control their personal life and birth control) (PS, 1981: 3). The term régulation des naissances, although standard, was ambiguous insofar as it may have included any method which controls birth (as opposed to conception) according to the dictionary definition of the contemporary period (Dubois, 1979: 1598). The PS manifesto did not oppose abortion, simply stating, ‘les conditions d’obtention de l’I.V.G. seront révisées’ (conditions for access to abortion will be reformed) (PS, 1981: 6) although the nature or extent of these reforms were not elaborated upon.
On the far left, the PCF took a clearly pro-abortion stance, a question contextualised within women’s rights, and states its intention to, ‘rembourser l’IVG à 100 p. cent’ (to reimburse 100 per cent of the cost of abortion) (PCF, 1981: 13).

The 1986 legislative elections saw the first major campaign by the FN. The party had been given new legitimacy and impetus at the 1984 European Parliament elections with its result of 10.9 per cent (Borella, 1990: 250). The FN programme for the 1986 legislative elections was overtly natalist in stance, and cited abortion as a major cause of France’s falling birth rate (Le Pen, 1985: 127). The state was blamed for France’s demographic problems:

L’État finance la mort. Il le fait doublement: d’abord en remboursant l’avortement, ensuite en apportant des moyens de financement considérables aux associations malthusiennes comme le ‘Planning Familial’ qui donne une image négative de la vie, de la naissance’ (The State finances death. It does so in two ways: first by paying for abortions, second by providing considerable financial resources to groups, such as ‘Family Planning’ which presents a negative image of life, of birth). (Le Pen, 1985: 133)

Later the programme calls for all of the laws which liberalised abortion from 1975 to 1982 to be repealed, further underlining the ‘injustice’ of the state’s provision of free abortion whilst neglecting the fight against sterility (Le Pen, 1985: 133)

In contrast with the general nature of the 1981 manifesto of the RPR/UDF, that of 1986 explicitly addressed France’s hiver démographique (demographic winter) (RPR/UDF, 1986: 10). Further, the manifesto supported measures to encourage the birth of a third child (RPR/UDF, 1986: 10). The manifesto did not, however, address the question of abortion. No causes for France’s low birth rate were cited, the manifesto merely stated that depopulation is an important issue (RPR/UDF, 1986). Such a position may suggest an implicit anti-abortion stance. However this is unlikely as the law was passed by the RPR/UDF government of Chirac.
The parties of the left did not mention abortion. It may be assumed that since the 1982 law making abortion available and free under social security, the question is considered as closed. Indeed, since the 31 December 1982 law, only the FN has continued to include abortion in their electoral campaigns and remains consistent with a pro-natalist ideology. In 1993, the FN called for the abolition of free abortion and sought to implement policies to help and advise those seeking abortion (Le Pen, 1993: 63-4). It does not, however, go so far as seeking to repeal the legalisation of abortion as it did in 1985. The manifesto of 1997 (Le Pen, 1997) while maintaining a pro-life stance, was less explicit in its position against abortion than the manifestos of 1985 and 1993 stating, ‘un ensemble de solutions alternatives sera mis en place pour décourager le recours à l'avortement’ (FN, 1997: 36) (a package of alternative solutions will be put in place in order to discourage those seeking abortion) which is clearly a less controversial position than in previous manifestos suggesting a relative liberalisation of FN position.

**Contraception**

As with the question of abortion, contraception appears within the context of women’s rights or family health. The 1981 manifestos of the PS and PCF called for better sex education, more availability of methods of contraception and for contraception to be fully reimbursed through social security (PS, 1981: 6; PCF, 1981: 13). The RPR/UDF made no reference to contraception in 1981.

In 1986, the RPR/UDF continued to make no mention of contraception. However, the manifesto made a clear commitment to addressing the demographic situation in France, notably by encouraging and supporting large families (RPR/UDF, 1986: 10). As contraception is in conflict with this pro-natalist position this may suggest the RPR/UDF’s implicit disapproval of contraception. From the 1986 election campaign to the end of the study period, issues surrounding contraception were absent from the
PS and PCF manifestos. The major objectives of PS and PCF policy towards contraception such as free contraception and increased availability of sex education had been implemented in 1982 under Pierre Mauroy’s PS and PCF government (Fournier et al., 1989).

The FN’s position in relation to contraception was consistent with its stance on the family and demography generally, as well as its opposition of abortion. Large families were valued over those which, according to the FN, ‘choose’ to remain small (Le Pen, 1985: 129-131), and while it did not call for contraception to be outlawed in the same way as abortion, it opposed the free provision of contraception (Le Pen, 1985: 133).

The 1988 PS election campaign rested upon the strength of the re-election of Mitterrand as President, as a result the electoral programme took the form of Mitterrand’s open letter Lettre à tous les Français (Mitterrand, 1988). Although the family and family policies were given a low profile in the 54-page document, the question of population growth, and more significantly, a population based upon families, is raised. ‘La France sera forte de ses familles et s’épanouira dans ses enfants. Les générations nombreuses sont les générations créatrices’ (France will find strength in her families and fulfilment in her children. Generations with many children are creative generations) (Mitterrand, 1988: 45). Such statements may be interpreted as containing natalist overtones and, therefore, appear out of step with PS ideology. In addition he adds ‘Aussi ai-je encouragé...ceux qui...ont compris qu’aime la famille n’était pas rétrograde’ (I have therefore encouraged those who have understood that love of the family is not a reactionary position) (Mitterrand, 1988: 45) a statement which may have been included to combat any possibility of criticism of a natalist stance from within the party or elsewhere. It is however significant that Mitterrand seems to contradict his party’s position in relation to the family and may suggest a political ‘generation gap’ on the theme of the family.
While in 1985 the FN message relating to contraception was one of disapproval, the 1993 manifesto declared contraception ‘un choix de la vie privée, où l’État n’a pas à entrer’ (a private choice in which the State has no right to interfere) (Le Pen, 1993: 63). This is a clear FN ideological position in relation to the themes of contraception, pro-natalism, and, perhaps most significantly, the relationship between the state and the family. The FN explicitly sees the family as private and beyond the state. This is however inconsistently represented through the eight measures (see below). By 1997 contraception was absent from the FN’s manifesto, although it may be one of the ‘alternative solutions’ proposed to combat abortions (FN, 1997).

There is clearly both a correlation between the themes of abortion and contraception and the parties’ relative ideological positioning. A focus on abortion and contraception has revealed the traditional ideological split between left and right in relation to family values and population growth.

On the left, both PS and PCF openly support these measures and seek to maintain and, in some cases, extend their availability as part of the social security system. This position remains consistent with themes of choice for individuals, in particular women, and liberal moral ideology.

The right wing parties are also consistent in their positions to these two measures. There is possible disapproval from the RPR/UDF especially as birth control methods conflict with population growth and may be interpreted as threats to the family. The centre-right alliance does not, however, openly oppose abortion and contraception which may suggest that any opposition would be unpopular with the electorate. More significantly, however, is the growth of the theme of private responsibility for families in right wing party ideology. This growth can be seen in the types of support measures proposed by the RPR/UDF (below).
The FN position in relation to these two measures is explicit and consistent with the party’s right wing, pro-natalist, Catholic ideology. Abortion is clearly unacceptable and is perceived as a threat to population growth and morality. Contraception is also frowned upon, but by the late 1990s its criticism is less evident suggesting an ideological shift in relation to this measure.

Divorce

While divorce legislation had been liberalised in 1975 (see Chapter 5), women’s groups had campaigned for the further simplification of the legal process. In line with its pro-family stance, the RPR/UDF manifesto of 1981 did not make a statement on divorce, and while it may be inferred from the text that the general position is one of moral opposition to divorce, nowhere does it state that the family is founded upon marriage, although, again, this appears implicit (RPR/UDF, 1981).

Both the PS and the PCF called for financial support of lone, divorced mothers through specific child benefits and benefits for job seekers or periods of vocational training (PS, 1981: 6; PCF, 1981: 9).

The FN’s strong ideological links with Catholicism as shown in the party’s position on birth control is also evident in its statement about divorce. In 1985 the question of divorce was criticised by the FN by constructing its arguments in the context of France’s ‘demographic winter’ as well as the decline in France’s moral values (Le Pen, 1985: 126). The FN clearly valued the married couple as the basis of the family and, indeed, society and developed this stance to include measures to support ‘legitimate’ couples and encourage marriage through regulatory and support measures (Le Pen, 1985: 131-2). Here, it seems that the FN supports state intervention in order to support its ideal model of the family.
The FN attacked divorce as a cause of society’s problems, a phenomenon which
traumatises children, destablises the country and leads families into poverty (Le Pen,
1993: 54). Divorce was further criticised as a manifestation of a moral crisis of ‘une
société qui n’a pour religion que l’égoïste succès individuel, fondé sur l’argent’ (a
society for which selfish individualism based upon money is the only religion) (Le
Pen, 1993: 54). In spite of the negative portrayal of divorce, the FN did not propose
any reforms. By 1997 the theme of divorce was absent from the FN manifesto
although the family remained highly valued (FN, 1997).

None of the other parties addressed the issue of divorce during the remainder of the
study period, although the RPR/UDF alliance (RPR/UDF, 1986: 10) clearly valued
marriage as demonstrated by its proposals to reform the tax system.

Parental authority

Carefully situated within emphatic support for women’s rights, both the parties of the
left seek to, ‘établir la pleine égalité du père et de la mère’ (to establish full equality
between the father and the mother) (PCF, 1981: 13). The RPR/UDF alliance, while
less explicit; support the ‘liberté de choix entre les parents’ (parents’ freedom of
choice) (RPR/UDF, 1981: 9) in relation to women’s paid work. While not directly
linked with parental authority, this position may suggest general support for equity
between mothers and fathers.

While in 1986 the parties of the left and the RPR/UDF alliance continued to support
women’s rights in all areas, the FN criticised official and media discourse which
claims gender equality (Le Pen, 1985: 134) on the grounds that ‘cette attitude
utopique revient à nier la réalité biologique et culturelle qui donne à la femme une
responsabilité particulière dans la procréation et l’éducation des enfants’ (this utopian
attitude denies the biological and cultural reality which gives women a special
responsibility in procreation and the bringing up of children) (Le Pen, 1985: 134). The FN thus proposed ideological measures to encourage mothers to stay at home or facilitate part time or temporary work (Le Pen, 1985: 135) which supported its position of opposing 'le lobby soi-disant féministe' (the so-called feminist lobby) (Le Pen, 1985: 128) and encouraging mothers to reject state childcare provision. From 1986 the question of equality of parental authority was absent from the manifestos of the parties included in this sample thus suggesting the existence of consensus relating to this issue or that it was a low priority for parties' election campaigns.

Child benefits

While support of the family was a clearly defined theme of the 1981 RPR/UDF manifesto, it did not develop any concrete policies as to how this support could be achieved, other than general statements such as, 'tout doit être fait pour soutenir la famille' (everything must be done to support the family) (RPR/UDF, 1981: 9).

The PS called for the reform of the system of child benefits, through the introduction of allowances payable from the first month of pregnancy and, more significantly, from the first child, which was against the natalist tradition of only paying child benefits from the second child (PS, 1981: 6). In addition, the PS called for the value of allowances to be raised by 50 per cent in two stages (PS, 1981: 5). In contrast, the PCF supported child benefits as an instrument to combat family poverty thus marking a change from the traditional horizontal redistribution to vertical transfers to help the poorest families in society (PCF, 1981: 9). In addition, as with the PS, the PCF also pledged allowances to be paid from the first child (PCF, 1981: 9). In the French context, the payment of benefits from the first child, while clearly in support of the family, is considered as a step away from pro-natalism. Within the pro-natalist party ideologies of the right, child benefit payments had traditionally only been paid from
the second child in the belief that this would discourage couples from having only one child (see Chapter 5).

By the 1986 election campaign, the RPR/UDF manifesto openly proposed child benefits as an instrument to meet natalist ends: ‘le système des prestations doit ainsi clairement garantir le libre choix par les familles d’un troisième enfant’ (the benefits system must provide families with the guarantee of a free choice to have a third child) (RPR/UDF, 1986: 10). In spite of this apparent commitment, the RPR/UDF neo-liberal economic policy targets the burden of employer contributions to the child benefit fund as an obstacle to the economy and to job creation, and called for this burden to be lessened (RPR/UDF, 1986: 4). It did not state, however, where the shortfall to the family fund was to be found. This demonstrates the beginning of the RPR/UDF move towards mere rhetoric in relation to the family, with the traditional pro-family/natalist ideology of the right becoming increasingly lost within the parties’ growing neo-liberal economic policies. It is important to note that under the Chirac administration (1986-88) the alliance introduced the allocation parentale d’éducation (APE) which encouraged mothers to stay out of paid employment to bring up children. This is a significant reflection of RPR/UDF ideology as it can be linked directly with FN policy in this area.

In line with its strong commitment to the family, the FN saw horizontal redistribution towards families as an important policy instrument. The 1985 manifesto systematically criticised reforms to the child benefits system and the real-term drop in their value since 1959 (Le Pen, 1985: 127). Le Pen calls this ‘la politique anti-familiale dangereuse’ (dangerous anti-family policy) (Le Pen, 1985: 127). The document went on to propose support measures such as the revenu maternel (maternal wage) of 5,000 francs per month (Le Pen, 1985: 137) for mothers choosing to stay at home to bring up their children. This wage was, however, dependant on two conditions first: in line with natalist objectives, the wage was targeted at those
families with three or more children; second, in line with the FN’s nationalist/anti-immigration platform, the wage would only be payable to ‘French families’ (Le Pen, 1985: 137). The *revenu maternel* was seen as an additional support for families, as well as child benefits which the FN pledged to re-value (Le Pen, 1985: 137-9) and was in direct opposition with the growing range of policies to help pay for childcare (see Table 6.2, AFEAMA, AGED).

The PCF’s position in relation to child benefits had, by 1986 moved more towards a greater level of vertical redistribution, and was further confirmed in the manifesto of 1988, which proposed a ‘treizième mois d’allocation’ (an extra month’s benefits per year) (PCF, 1988: 11) for families whose income is under three times the monthly minimum wage.

The question of child benefits was conspicuous by its absence from the 1986 manifesto of the PS. Although the party did underline its commitment to social protection in general, it did not make clear how this is to be achieved nor does it mention child benefits as a part of social protection (PS, 1986). The 1988 *Lettre à tous les français* also failed to address explicitly policies for families, preferring to make general statements of commitment to the family and to the value of the family in French society (Mitterrand, 1988: 45).

In contrast, the PCF prioritised increasing child benefits from the first child, consistent with its aims to target child poverty, as well as supporting the ARS and calling for an increase in the API (PCF, 1988: 11). In 1993, the PCF proposed to target the poorest families in society although child benefits are not mentioned which, given the fact that child benefit was a universal, horizontal benefit, appears inconsistent with PCF ideology. The reluctance of the PCF to call for the abolition of the universal child benefit in favour of means testing may result from the party shying away from what would be highly unpopular with much of the electorate (PCF, 1993: 11).
In 1997 no explicit statements were made concerning any family policy instruments, although the manifesto did call for the 'Juppé Plan' to be repealed (PCF, 1997: 51).

In the programmes of 1993 and 1997 the PS no longer made reference to the family, although, as the PCF, the 1997 manifesto criticised the 'Juppé Plan' (PS, 1997: 8). In line with measures brought in during the RPR/UDF government of 1986-88, child benefits were replaced by proposals to assist dual-earner families further and were absent from RPR/UDF manifestos with the exception of the 1997 manifesto which proposed raising the maximum age of dependant children for the receipt of child benefits (RPR/UDF, 1997).

The FN in 1993 and 1997 continued to support the principle of universality for child benefits and called for them to be increased in order to combat the financial disparities between those with and those without children (Le Pen, 1993: 63; 1997: 36).

Fiscal measures

One area in which the RPR/UDF manifesto of 1981 was clear was in its support of family policies was in its fiscal measures. The manifesto proposed two reforms of the taxation system which directly targeted families. The first of these policy measures called for the ‘allègement de l’impôt sur le revenu pour les familles modestes’ (RPR/UDF, 1981: 8) (income tax burden on less well off families to be lowered), which suggests re-distributive objectives. The second tax reform measure called for value-added tax to take into account poverty with reference to family policy (RPR/UDF, 1981: 8). The objective of both of these proposed reforms is more in line with left wing than right wing ideologies, insofar as they target poorer members of society. However, the use of income tax to achieve these aims is questionable as the low paid, poorer families pay less tax and therefore would be less likely to feel any
financial benefits. For the same reason, income tax relief for poorer families would be less likely to have any great impact upon state coffers. It would appear, therefore, that RPR/UDF policies to target poorer families are based more in rhetoric than in reality, but are a significant indication of a shift towards vertical rather than horizontal redistribution.

In common with its centre-right rivals, the PCF called for the tax burden for the less well-off families to be lowered based on deductions in relation to the number of children. In addition, the PCF pledged a reduction of the *impôt local* (council tax) for families of this category (PCF, 1981: 9). It is important to note that PCF fiscal measures are part of a total package including direct financial transfers, and not ‘stand alone’ policies for the poor as in the case of the RPR/UDF.

The PS took a different stance from the other parties in terms of fiscal measures for families. Instead of using taxation to help families, the PS called for the scrapping of tax reductions based on number of children (PS, 1981: 5). Such a measures appeared in line with the general party position of using family policies to meets re-distributive ends. As outlined above, those families which benefit the most from reductions in tax bills are, indeed, families which have the highest income, whereas the poorest families in society, may not pay income tax and therefore receive no help through fiscal measures. By introducing a flat-rate allowance, poorer families would feel the greatest benefits in relation to their budget.

The RPR/UDF manifesto of 1986, however, supported the income tax allowances for families, which the PS had failed to reform in spite of their 1981 election promise. In line with its general commitment to a liberal economy and lower taxes (RPR/UDF, 1986: 4), the alliance thus supported a reform of the system under which unmarried couples were to pay less income tax than married couples (RPR/UDF, 1986: 10) thus somewhat in contradiction with party pro-family ideology. In addition the manifesto
outlined plans to lower the burden of employer contributions to the child benefit fund (RPR/UDF, 1986: 3). Later manifestos, however, ceased to address fiscal measures relating to the family in line with moves towards a position supporting greater private responsibility.

The FN programme of 1986 did not consider tax allowances for families as an appropriate measure. Indeed the party called for the complete abolition of income tax which it saw as playing a minor role in financing the state (Le Pen, 1985: 81). The programmes of 1993 and 1997 made no mention of the CF (Le Pen, 1993; FN, 1997).

The parties of the left, perhaps due to their focus on the poorest families, did not mention fiscal policies in the context of providing support for families except for the PCF in 1988, which called for the abolition of taxes for families with a budget below the minimum wage (PCF, 1988: 14). While this objective was present in later manifestos, the term family was no longer used, further indicating a shift towards the individual as a target for social assistance and consistent with left wing ideology. The PCF manifesto of 1988 (PS, 1988: 14) and the PS manifesto of 1997 proposed the abolition/lowering of VAT on basic commodities, such as food, (PS, 1997: 7) which can be seen as a measure to target the poorer members of society.

**Maternity leave**

The parties’ positions in relation to maternity leave focus on both paid and unpaid maternal and paternal leave. The PCF manifesto of 1981 called for maternity leave of six months (PCF, 1981: 13), the PS supported maternity leave, and stipulated the rights of either mother or father to this leave with guaranteed remuneration and reinstatement on returning to work (PS, 1981: 6). Without stating explicit policy details, the PS continued to support women’s work and reiterates its commitment to measures enabling women to reconcile family life and paid employment (PS, 1986). From 1988
the question of maternity leave was absent from PS manifestos. The PCF continued to call for six-month maternal leave in 1988 (PCF, 1988: 24) in spite of a change in legislation in 1984, this theme was not, however, included in later manifestos. The general position on the left was in support of both gender equality and women's right to paid employment.

Without stating any explicit policy intentions, the 1981 RPR/UDF manifesto supported measures to reconcile work and family life as well as the social status of 'la mère de famille' (RPR/UDF, 1981: 10) (literally, 'mother of the family') the use of which suggests the symbolic image of women in right wing party ideology at that time. In the 1986 manifesto, the natalist/pro-family stance supported parents to choose a larger family but did not outline any specific policies relating to maternity leave. In later manifestos, no explicit maternity leave policies were outlined although the support of policies to assist dual-earner families were prioritised in line with RPR/UDF concerns with the economy and moves towards neo-liberalism.

The FN’s position in relation to maternity leave for the 1986 elections fell within the party’s general ideological vision of family life: notably that it is preferable for mothers not to work outside the home while bringing up children, a situation for which there was provision in the proposed revenu maternel (Le Pen, 1985). The objective of encouraging mothers to remain at home through the provision of a maternal wage and rights to social protection and pensions is maintained in 1993 (Le Pen 1993: 61-2). By 1997, however, the party changed its position and proposed a parental wage, which while functioning in the same manner as the maternal wage, and seeking to meet the same objectives, was open to either parent rather than only the mother (Le Pen 1997: 36). While this may be understood as a shift towards gender equality, it is important to note that within FN party ideology, any policy relating to maternity leave was considered as being redundant as parents (de facto mothers) would be given the full status of worker. It is possible that this shift in rhetoric may be
an attempt to render FN policies more popular with the electorate in the late 1990s. This does not, however, bring the fundamental nature of FN pro-family intervention into question.

Childcare

A further policy instrument which features in statements relating to the themes of reconciliation of work and family life and gender equality, is childcare provision. The campaign manifestos of 1981 for the RPR/UDF and the PCF did not include explicit measures relating to childcare, but they did make general statements relating to the support of mothers who choose to seek employment outside the home (RPR/UDF, 1981: 9; PCF, 1981: 13). In addition, the PS made clear its commitment to ‘un vaste programme d’équipements collectifs’ (a vast programme of state provision) (PS, 1981: 6) which included the prioritisation of 300,000 places in crèches (PS, 1981: 6). The 1986 manifesto stated its opposition to the maternal wage schemes proposed by the right, notably the FN, and affirmed its support of women’s right to work. No childcare policies were proposed, although such measures may have been considered as instruments for the support of mothers’ right to employment (PS, 1986: 2). From 1988, no policies relating to childcare/women’s work were presented in the PS manifestos, although this was an area of wide reform at the time (see Table 6.2).

Childcare provision was a major theme of the 1986 RPR/UDF manifesto. A significant element of its family policy was dedicated to the reconciliation of work and family life, and the manifesto expressed its commitment to providing the choice for working parents to either state or municipal childcare in crèches of the expansion of the APE (Table 6.2), which is an allowance for mother who choose to bring up their own children rather than seeking paid employment (RPR/UDF, 1986: 10). Future provision of state-run crèches and other childcare measures was also a key theme in 1988, 1993 and 1997 and represented the most significant objective of the
family life was the sole focus of family policies outlined in 1993 (RPR/UDF, 1993: 18). These later measures were distinctive as they enabled families to make private decisions about childcare requirements.

As with maternity leave, state provision of childcare was not an objective for the FN. Indeed, state childcare was cited as having a negative effect on the development of children who, according to the FN (Le Pen, 1985) rely on their mother for their future development and well-being (Le Pen, 1985: 128-9). The FN’s position relating to state provision of childcare is maintained through the study period with the maternal/parental wage policy taking the place of maternity leave (Le Pen, 1993; 1997).

Conclusions

Family policy has clearly been a central feature of post-war French politics. A well-established group of policy measures were in place by the time of the landmark election victory of the Socialists in 1981. This chapter has shown that, in spite of initial reforms to the system of child benefits by the PS, they were soon dropped with a return to traditional French family policies. Economic constraints forced the Socialists to abandon their plan of targeting the needs of poorer families resulting in a return to the previous administration’s inherently neo-natalist, allowances. During the remainder of the study period, child benefits became increasingly threatened in the face of growing moves towards privatisation of the family from the RPR/UDF. This came to a head in 1995 with the implementation of the Juppé Plan.

From 1981-97, family policy in France appears to have changed. However, these changes have taken place to different extents in relation to each of the eight family policy measures examined here. The regulatory measures (abortion, contraception,
divorce and parental authority) were shown to have been largely established by 1981, and thus did not feature prominently in the party manifestos.

To some extent this is true for the PS, PCF and RPR/UDF manifestos, with the exception of 1981, due to proposed changes in the funding of abortion. The wider exception to this trend has been shown to come from the FN, which has shown great resistance in its opposition to abortion and has criticised free contraception and divorce. Taking Sabatier’s (1988) classification of beliefs (Chapter 3), the FN’s party ideological position in relation to these regulatory measures, can be described as deep core as it has been demonstrated to be highly resistant to change. However, even the FN’s position on abortion is made less explicit in 1997, which suggests that even such a deep core ideology may be susceptible to change in the context of a state which has supported free abortion for almost two decades. Although it is probable that the FN has simply watered down its expression in order to achieve broader electoral appeal, while retaining an implicit core party ideological position.

Little ideological conflict has been found between the left and the RPR/UDF in relation to regulatory measures, which, combined with the very limited legislative reforms in these areas, suggests their broad acceptance and stability. Such stability and consensus may also be interpreted as representing a common ideology of French family policy insofar as these measures are not questioned and are consequently not the subject of reform. In such cases, deep core party ideologies are based upon women’s rights to have an abortion, freedom of choice in family planning and the right to divorce (based upon the Revolutionary principle of ‘contract’).

It may thus be possible to conclude that the stability and relative cross-party consensus surrounding regulatory measures results from their being based upon deep core party political ideologies and that even deep core ideologies in opposition, such
as those of the FN, may decline, change or even converge with that of the dominant political parties, over time if such a strong consensus is maintained.

The central deep core belief in the French polity has long been the legitimacy of the family as a primary group in terms of state intervention, most notably horizontal child benefits. It is, however, in this area that the greatest transformations have been identified. By 1997 family policies were barely present in the party manifestos (with the exception of the FN see Table 6.4). The PS manifesto did not even contain the word ‘family’ which is in stark contrast to its 1981 manifesto (see Table 6.4) but is consistent with left wing party ideologies outside of France. In the same way, the PCF had totally abandoned a family dimension to its social policies, which, while perhaps not surprising for a Communist party in another country, indicates a significant shift in policy for the French Communists. This PCF shift may also result from a general move away from the family as a primary group within French social policy.

Support measures for the RPR/UDF have been significant of a changing ideological position. While traditionally, French right wing ideology has strongly supported universal child benefits with natalist objectives, the RPR/UDF of the 1980s and 1990s has scarcely mentioned this theme. In its place the RPR/UDF have developed childcare policies which serve two principal objectives: first, these policies seek to encourage mothers to take employment outside of the home, thus increasing the family budget; second, they serve a job creation function as they create posts in the childcare sector. This results from economic pressures felt by policy makers during the study period, which is further reflected in the RPR/UDF’s reform of income tax which did not benefit dual-earner families as may have been expected in the light of the above initiatives. In addition, a general ideological shift towards neo-liberal economic policies has also brought state intervention and redistributive policies into conflict with the theme of privatisation.
While by 1997 family policies appear to have been abandoned in the ideologies of the
two major parties (Table 6.4), the majority of measures were still functioning as part
of French social welfare.

Table 6.4: Family policy measures in French election manifestos 1981-1997

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Key: 1 abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6
fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave; 8 childcare; 9 pro-family statement

It is significant, that while the parties did not pledge any new measures, neither did
they seek to abolish those that were already in place. In this case, what the parties do
not say is perhaps more significant than what is said. This possible reluctance to
reform costly measures such as the CF or abolishing horizontal benefits in favour of
means-tested, vertical ones, may indicate the strength of deep core family ideology in
the French polity. It also certain that threats to the traditional child benefit system would be perceived as highly unpopular with the electorate.

Family policies in France have changed. This change has concentrated on the support measures studied. The extent of this change, however, may not be as great as the economic climate may have suggested. Where changes have taken place, they appear to have been incremental. Two attempts at far-reaching changes in 1981 and 1995 were highly controversial and resulted in a U-turn in the first instance, and the collapse of the Juppé government in the latter. In these examples, it appears that legislative change which may, in theory, be economically justifiable, comes under fire, because it threatens deep core ideology.

Returning to the concept of ideology discussed in Chapter 3, the case of French family policy demonstrates clear examples of dynamic change between party political ideology and family policies. The impact of left wing ideology on family policies during the first half of the case study period may have been limited by traditional deep core family ideology. However, change was demonstrated over the period which may have resulted from the increased influence of the left while in government. The result of this change has seen not only the PS and PCF rejecting the family as a primary group for state intervention in policies presented at elections, but also, and more significantly, the RPR/UDF. Only the FN has maintained its traditional family ideology, although there is evidence to suggest the beginnings of change, notably in relation to contraception and divorce.

In the French case, however, this change in party ideology is not conclusive. When the regulatory measures are examined, notably abortion, which is by far the most controversial theme of deep core ideology examined here, there is some evidence to suggest that a legislative change may also precede an ideological change. This may be seen in the FN’s ‘liberalisation’ of its anti-abortion position. Indeed, the FN’s position
in relation to all of the regulatory measures is less outspoken in 1997 than in 1985. While it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to establish whether this change is the result of deep core ideologies being transformed over time, it does suggest a strong relationship between policy change and shifts in party political ideology.

A further significant finding from the French case relates back to the concept of explicit family policy and Ideological State Apparatuses. While change in family policies and political ideologies has been demonstrated, it is important to underline the institutional visibility of the family in France. The Ideological State Apparatus, the CNAF, has not been questioned or threatened by any of the parties, and as long as this situation is maintained, the national character of French social policy will include a strong family focus.
Chapter 7 - THE UNITED KINGDOM: PRIVATISING THE FAMILY

The election victory of the Conservative party in 1979 did not only mark the coming to power of the first female Prime Minister (PM) in British history, it also heralded the arrival of a new body of political thought and the end of the post-war consensus which was built upon the foundations of Beveridge's welfare state (see Chapter 5). From the end of the second world war to the late 1970s, Beveridge's vision of the family had become increasingly challenged by the economic effects of successive governments' failure to maintain the pre-requisite of full-employment. On a social level, traditional conceptions of the family were questioned in the face of evolutions in social mores reflected in the diversification of family types as demonstrated in Chapter 5.

The arrival of Margaret Thatcher as leader of the Conservative party in 1975 signalled a challenge to the system of social policy based upon the Beveridge Report (1942). Thatcher's predecessor, Edward Heath (PM 1970-74) had represented the left wing or 'wet' branch of the Conservative party and had developed policies in tune with the ideals of the consensus era such as limited interventionism and state welfare provision. Thatcher and her supporters, notably Sir Keith Joseph, saw Heath and the 'Wets' as having abandoned all true Conservative beliefs and sought to redress the balance by returning to what she saw as true Conservative values. In so doing, however, Thatcher's Conservatism came to embody a number of paradoxes in both her political thought and its application to family policies in the UK.

Thatcherism and the 'sea-change' in British politics

Thatcherism is based upon the twin foundations of the neo-liberal economic ideology of Milton Friedman and Freidrich Hayek, monetarism, (Goodwin, 1992: 175-6) and 'traditional' family values (Gittins, 1988). The economic basis of monetarism requires
the liberalisation of monetary control and reducing state intervention which led to the systematic privatisation of the nationalised industries including such sectors as heavy industry, mining, energy production and finance. This move towards privatisation also included social assistance, and over the two decades of the study period people became increasingly dependent on private pension and health insurance schemes (Muncie and Wetherell, 1995: 60-1). With the diminishing role of the state in social welfare, Conservative party ideology encouraged families and individuals to take responsibility for themselves thus increasing the importance of private networks of support (Ringen, 1997: 91).

The paradox of Thatcherism arises in this latter element. If a monetarist policy is pursued, then state intervention must be limited to a minimum. However, encouraging families to take responsibility for themselves requires a given level of state coercion in order to influence practices. Thus government policies became normative in intent, families and individuals were encouraged to provide certain services for themselves resulting in the privatisation of families. In order to minimise the influence of the state at the level of the economy, it thus became necessary to expand state action in another area, social policy (Goodwin, 1992: 175-7). In addition to the purely economic reasons for encouraging the privatisation of care, the normative objectives of Conservative family policy may have broader implications about ‘ideal’ family types.

The objectives of social policy within the Thatcherite or ‘New Right’ ideology were to reduce or limit benefits expenditure, particularly on universal benefits, thus reducing dependency on state provision of benefits and services and encouraging private welfare scheme (notably through private and occupational pensions). These
objectives were put into operation over the first ten years of Thatcher’s premiership and culminated in the Children Act of 1989.

While a focus on family policy has long been the source of epistemological debate in relation to the UK (Wynn, 1970; Land and Parker, 1978; Wicks and Chester, 1990; Cronin et al., 1996; Ringen, 1997), public policies do have an impact on family life in the UK. While some authors, such as Land and Parker (1978) have referred to UK family policy as being ‘implicit’, the present study’s focus on the eight regulatory and support measures: abortion, contraception, divorce, parental authority, child benefits, fiscal measures, childcare and maternity leave, reduces the need for distinctions between ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ notions of family policy, although this distinction can be used as a useful reference point in the comparison of the three countries. Indeed, the British ideological suspicion of state intervention may be an explanatory factor in the implicit nature of family policies.

While no government or party in the UK used the term ‘family policy’ during the study period, these eight measures are collectively referred to in this chapter as ‘family policy’ or ‘family policies’, in the interests of brevity and for the purposes of cross-national comparison (see Chapter 4). The following section presents the Conservative, Labour and Liberal (Liberal Democrats from 1989) parties in terms of their electoral impact on government, the place of families and social policy within their respective ideologies and their position in relation to the thematics public/private and family/individual. The final section contains the analysis of the party ideologies in the manifestos for the general elections from 1979-97, a period dominated by the Conservative Prime Ministers Thatcher (79-90) and John Major (90-97).
Evolving family policies

In spite of the argument that the UK lacks coherent family policy (Wynn, 1970; Land and Parker, 1978) the framework of eight family policy measures, as examined in the thesis, are present in UK legislation during the study period. At the beginning of the study period the majority of legislation relating to regulatory measures (abortion, contraception, divorce and parental authority) had been in place for a decade or more, which suggests these elements of UK family policy were pioneering at the time, notably on issues such as abortion, in relation to France and Spain, which may also result from the more liberal religious attitudes in the UK. Given this factor, any developments in regulatory measures over the study period may prove significant indicators of any possible evolution of party political ideologies, in particular resulting from the influence of Thatcherite thought.

In contrast, support measures have undergone considerable change since the electoral victory of Thatcher and the Conservatives in 1979. Two key factors in this evolution can be identified: first, the impact of the paradoxes of Thatcherite economic liberalisation and social control; and second, the influence of the EU social chapter during the 1990s, notably in relation to maternity leave. The significance of regulatory legislation cannot be underestimated in the context of the relationship between party political ideology and family policy given the explicit intentions of such measures to provide the framework for family life. Abortion and contraception legislation have a direct impact upon issues of population, gender equality and moral/religious attitudes. In a similar way, divorce legislation may embody certain normative attitudes towards the value of family life, economic dependency and parental/custody rights. In some countries legislation relating to parental authority has
been the locus for shifting attitudes about gender equality. This is, however, only a secondary element of such legislation in the UK case study. The question of the limits of state intervention into the family sphere provided the dominant focus for debate in the UK. The following section thus provides the context for the analysis of the electoral manifestos by presenting the major reforms to the four regulatory family policy measures: abortion, contraception, divorce and parental authority.

Regulatory measures

Abortion in Britain up to the time of writing had been set within the framework of the 1967 Abortion Act. The most significant element of the Abortion Act (1967) in terms of political ideologies is the centrality of medical justification which, as in the other countries examined in the thesis (Chapters 6 and 8), can serve as a means to counter moral or religious arguments. Abortions in Britain require a medical judgement, 'to the effect that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk of life, physical or mental health of the pregnant woman greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, or that there is a 'substantial risk' that the child will be born handicapped' (Dewar, 1989: 44) and is clearly not expressed as a means family planning. Concordant with its primary medical justification, abortion is freely available on the National Health Service (NHS), it may be paid for in private clinics, but continues to be a source of controversy on moral grounds with the maximum number of weeks of pregnancy providing the main focus of concern for religious and pro-life groups. In contrast to other countries examined in the thesis any objection to abortion is solely contextualised in relation to the rights of the unborn child rather than pro-natalist objections. Indeed it has been suggested (Wicks and Chester, 1990) that 'no-one
argues in the UK that abortions are wrong because they decrease the potential population' (Wicks and Chester, 1990: 110).

As with abortion, the relative lack of pro-natalist arguments in Britain has seen contraception become widely acceptable from the 1960s in particular since its free introduction on the NHS under the Family Planning Act (1967) (Ringen, 1997). No reforms affecting contraception were introduced during the study period suggesting stability and political consensus in this area. Given the relative stability of both abortion and contraception in legislation, there is little ground upon which to defend the existence of a pro-natalist stance during the study period, indeed the opposite may be argued in relation to 'New Right' thinking on eugenics.

Table 7.1 Developments in UK family policy 1979-97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Act</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Social Security Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Family Law (Scotland) Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Social Security Act; Family Law Act; Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Family Law Review Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Finance Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Social Security Act; Children Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Social Security Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Child Support Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Children (Scotland) Bill</td>
</tr>
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</table>

As with abortion and contraception, divorce had been legalised before the study period (in 1858) with the legislation being further liberalised in 1969 (see Chapter 5). However, the relatively, liberal legislation was reformed further in the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act of 1984. The 1984 reforms to the divorce law saw the reduction of the minimum period of marriage before the filing of divorce proceedings from three years to one (Ringen, 1997: 36). In addition, the notion of a 'clean break'
was introduced, which resulted in long-term income transfers becoming rarer breaking with the common law tradition of husband’s eligibility to maintain their wives (Land, 1995). A consequence of the clean break was that in cases where children were involved, maintenance settlements were inconsistent and difficult to enforce (Ringen, 1997: 42) which had significant effects on the lone-parent, often resulting in increased benefit dependency and poverty. Such increasing pressure on state welfare was an important motor in the development of perhaps the most significant family policy reform since the Beveridge report (1942): the Child Support Act (1991).

Perhaps the single most significant and controversial legislative development during the study period came in the form of the 1991 Child Support Act (Millar and Warman, 1995). As a consequence of the growing trend in divorces, which resulted in the highest proportion of lone parent families in the EU at that time (Roll, 1992, see also Table 5.9), the Conservative government sought to shift the financial burden of supporting lone parent families from the state (public) to ‘absent fathers’ (private) (Lister, 1996a) in line with Thatcherite ideology. The seeds of the Child Support Act had been sown in the 1990 White Paper *Children Come First* in which it was argued that parents would be responsible for the maintenance of their children, incentives to work would be maintained and benefit dependency would be reduced (Department of Social Security, 1990). These aims became effective under the Child Support Act (1991) and were implemented from April 1993 by the Child Support Agency (CSA) which was given responsibility for calculating and collecting private maintenance payments (Lister, 1994). From its introduction the Child Support Act was highly controversial with over a thousand absent fathers joining an action group in the first
six months after its implementation (Lister, 1994: 211), with controversy continuing under the Labour Government at the time of writing. Criticism centred on the calculation of the amount of maintenance to be paid by absent fathers. If payments were not forthcoming, the CSA had powers to seize assets or take further legal proceedings that, in theory, could lead to imprisonment (Millar and Warman, 1995: 391).

A further criticism of the Child Support Act has focused on the effectiveness of the maintenance payments in combating poverty for lone parent families, given that any such payments are tax deductible resulting in 'benefit penalties' (Lister, 1994: 220). The Act also prioritises the 'first' family over a 'second' family which suggests a normative element which considers 'first' families as more 'valuable' or socially desirable than second families which may be considered negatively within Thatcherite thought. The financial impact of CSA calculated maintenance payments may, in some cases, lead to incidences of poverty in 'second' families (Lister, 1994: 220). The apparent priority of first families in maintenance payments may result from the value the Conservatives have placed upon the stability of the traditional family and may be further considered as a means of discouraging the formation of second marriages, although this is not expressed explicitly.

A further, normative element of the Child Support Act, which has been noted by Ruth Lister (1994; 1995), is also linked with the primacy of the first family. Lister has pointed to the possible reinforcement of women's economic dependency upon the absent father as a result the maintenance payment's inclusion of an allowance for the mother and the subsequent necessity of maintaining contact between the lone-parent
and the absent parent which may not always be appropriate\textsuperscript{27}. Although this aspect of the Child Support Act has been a lesser source of criticism (Lister, 1994: 220) than the financial impact on fathers, it corresponds to the traditional, patriarchal family model within Thatcherite ideology and is a result of the increase in private responsibility in family life.

The Child Support Act has thus embodied in the 1990s the principle of transferring support of the family from the state to individuals in line with the dominant theme of socio-economic rhetoric of 1980s Thatcherism, namely 'responsibility'. In addition, by prioritising 'first' families over the second ones, and increasing women's dependence of the absent fathers of their children, it contains normative elements of Thatcherite family values ideology, women's role as carers and negative portrayal of alternatives to the 'traditional' breadwinner family model.

In 1995 the divorce law was reformed further under the Family Law Bill (1995) which dispensed with the need for spouses to provide proof of irretrievable breakdown, replacing it with a period of reflection to last eighteen months from the initial statement of marriage breakdown (Cronin \textit{et al.}, 1995: 173). While this measure clearly facilitated the initial filing of divorce proceedings, the inclusion of the period of reflection may be interpreted as an attempt to reconcile couples and therefore families.

\textsuperscript{27}In cases where there is a history of abuse or domestic violence the lone Parent may object to such contact but it is not possible to object on grounds of 'personal choice' as the absent parent has a legal duty to maintain his/her children within the terms of the Act.
The fourth regulatory measure analysed in this study, parental authority, is closely linked with divorce, the relationship between state and citizen and issues of women’s rights. Any controversy which has evolved in the area of parental authority has arisen in relation to two situations: first, custody cases in which the parents are unmarried (with mothers most commonly receiving sole guardianship) and second, in relation to the state’s role when acting as guardian (Dewar, 1993) in the context of the public/private debate on state intervention in family matters. While some gender issues are present in UK parental authority legislation, such as prioritising the mother’s right to custody, the question of enforcing patriarchal authority is not a significant issue during the study period. Some aspects of maternity leave and childcare legislation may be interpreted as reinforcing the ‘breadwinner’ family model favoured in Conservative ideology of the period.

Support measures

In contrast to the relative stability of regulatory family legislation during the study period, support measures were under constant evolution. While this is largely the result of the economic objectives of Thatcherism, some elements of these policy measures (for example tax reforms for poorer families examined below) may also be considered as having evolved in line with socio-economic trends during the period. The British ‘child benefit’ replaced ‘family allowances’ in 1977 (Chapter 5) but continued to be a universal, non-contributory benefits for parents with children (Ringen, 1997: 63-9). Initially the benefit was paid at a lower rate for the first child and a higher rate for subsequent children. From 1978-91, child benefit was a flat-rate

In the British case it is more common to use the term ‘parental rights’ (Dewar, 1993: 66-76), thus suggesting a slightly different relationship between parents, children and the state than the term ‘parental authority’. In the interests of cross-national comparison, the term ‘parental authority’ is taken as a de facto synonym of ‘parental rights’.
payment for all children (Ringen, 1997: 64). In 1984 three methods for receiving child benefits payments became available: weekly payment book, four weekly payment book or four weekly direct payment into a bank account by Automatic Credit Transfer (ACT) (Bradshaw and Stimson, 1997). Since 1991, however, the 1977 payment rate was reversed, with the first child becoming eligible for a higher rate than any subsequent children (£8.25 for eldest child, £7.25 for further children per week in 1991) a measure which was maintained by the Labour government from 1997 and continues at the time of writing (£14.40 and £9.60 respectively from April 1999). Child benefit is paid on a weekly basis (although it may also be collected in four weekly intervals) to the parent with care of the child, in the majority of cases the mother (Bradshaw and Stimson, 1997). In addition, the 'One Parent Benefit' is a top-up of child benefit paid to lone parents, which stood at £6.50 at the end of the study period, but is considered as taxable income if further means-tested benefits are claimed. For the purposes of Child Benefit children are considered as ‘dependent’ up to the age of 16 if working or 19 if in secondary or equivalent education. In a Department of Social Security commissioned review of twenty years of Child Benefit, Jonathan Bradshaw and Carol Stimson (1997) conclude that, whatever criticisms may be levelled against the rate of Child Benefit, it remains a vital addition to the family budget.

Under Thatcher's Conservative party the tax reforms relating to the separate assessment for married couple's earnings in the early 1970s (see Chapter 5) became increasingly criticised (Ringen, 1997: 60-2) on the grounds of lack of privacy for women and discrimination against marriage. In 1988 the Finance Act abolished the aggregation of married couple's incomes and allowed dual-earner couple to be taxed
as individuals (Millar and Warman, 1995: 380-1). Further reforms saw the Married Man’s Allowance (MMA) replaced by the Married Couple’s Allowance (MCA) (in 1990) although this was de facto set against the earnings of the husband. In 1992, the option of allocating the MCA to either partner was introduced, although the personal allowance for a non-earning partner was not transferable, an aspect which is criticised by Stein Ringen (1997: 62) as failing to live up to the rhetoric of the Thatcher governments. Both Ringen (1997) and Jane Millar and Andrea Warman (1995) point to the significance of the MCA since it has not been increased in line with inflation since the early 1990s. Millar and Warman have suggested that it is likely to be phased out (1995: 381), although minor increases have been made to the allowance since the Labour election victory of 1997 (approx. £70 per annum) (Inland Revenue, 1999).

Over the study period, the Conservative government amended maternity rights in 1980, 1982 and 1986. These amendments allowed employers to require women to provide written confirmation of their intention to return to work after giving birth. Failure to comply could endanger their right to return. In, addition, women in firms with six or more employees could be given posts other than those which were occupied before maternity leave at the employers discretion. On the implementation of the EC Pregnant Worker’s Directive of 1994 (92/85), the rights of pregnant women in the UK were among the worst in the EU (Ringen, 1997: 50). Up to 1994, no statutory maternity leave existed in the UK, although in practice contracts between employers and employees contained provision for maternity leave.

Since 1994, however, pregnant employees have a right to a minimum of 14 weeks’ paid maternity leave (Ditch et al., 1996: 45) and those with 6 months service are
entitled to Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) payable at 90 per cent of earnings for full-time employee with a minimum of 26 week’s service for the first 6 weeks and a further (up to) 18 weeks of lower rate SMP are payable (DSS, 1999). For unemployed or self-employed mothers SMP at the lower rate for up to 18 weeks (DSS, 1999). The UK does not, however, have statutory maternity leave (Ditch et al., 1996) although this has since been changed in line with EU directives to become effective from October 1999. This shift results from the direct influence of supra-national institutions on party ideologies within a national context. It may also signal the beginnings of convergence based upon the implementation of supra-national legislation.

Education in the UK is free and compulsory from the age of 5. The care of children under 5 years of age is thus provided by parents if they are not working, or by relatives and public or private childcare facilities if parents are working. Public provision of childcare has traditionally been low in the UK, in 1985, for example, less than 1 per cent of pre-school children were in Local Authority day nurseries (Ringen, 1997: 70). In line with the Thatcher era ideology of diminishing state intervention in the family sphere, childcare provision since the late 1980s has become the private responsibility of parents. In addition, Conservative governments have pursued policies to encourage private employers to provide childcare in the form of crèches, although in 1990 3,000 children received workplace nursery care (Ringen, 1997: 71) a low figure when compared to France. The British Social Attitudes Survey of 1990 revealed that relatives (notably grandmothers) were the dominant providers of pre-school childcare at 64 per cent, compared to 17 per cent for day nurseries (Witherspoon and Prior, 1991: 139). In the mid-90s the Conservative government moved towards a scheme of childcare vouchers to help parents pay for private
childcare for four year-olds, the scheme however (implemented in February 1997) has been identified as failing to cover the average cost of one year's private pre-school care (Cronin et al., 1996: 177).

The family in party politics

The following section presents the three main political parties of the UK. Each is considered in relation to its evolution, electoral results, and ideological representations of the family and the relationship between the state and citizens based upon the thematics of public/private and family/individual.

The Conservatives

From her victory in the Conservative party leadership elections in 1976, Margaret Thatcher used her image as a housewife for political campaigning purposes, and her concern with the family resulted in a change of direction in party political ideology.

Having been heavily influenced by Keith Joseph, who caused controversy in his highly ideological 'Edgebaston' attack on single mothers during the 1970s which resulted in him being infamously labelled a 'mad eugenicist' (Thatcher, 1995: 262), it is not surprising that the views expressed by Mrs Thatcher and her advisors were, if less extreme, particularly reactionary in the context of UK social debate: '[The family] possesses strength and resilience, not least in adversity. Loyalty to the family ranks highest of all, higher even than loyalty to the State. It is no accident that dictatorships, whether of the Left or the Right, seek first to devalue and then to destroy the family.' (Jenkin, 1977 quoted in Coote, et al., 1990: 4). Such statements clearly situate the family in relation to the state within Conservative party ideology. In the same year Mrs Thatcher proclaimed, 'we are the party of the family,' a statement
that, according to Malcolm Wicks was ‘...echoed across the political spectrum’ (Wicks, 1987: 78). Thatcherism thus contained the paradox of increasing the visibility of the family within UK party politics while, at the same time, decreasing political intervention and encouraging private responsibility for families. The family was predominantly a symbolic element of UK right wing party ideology during the 1980s and 1990s.

The most significant step towards the symbolic politicisation of the family by the Conservatives took place during the government of Thatcher’s successor, John major (PM 1990-97). For the first time the Conservatives appeared to provide substance to the family rhetoric when Virginia Bottomley was named as Minister for the Family in December 1994 (Jones and Millar, 1996). In reality however, the Minister for the Family (Stephen Dorrell in 1995) was merely an advocate of increased private responsibility supported only by residual state intervention when absolutely necessary (Jones and Millar, 1996: 1) as exemplified in legislation such as the Child Support Act.

The overt politicisation of the family during Major’s leadership can also been seen in the election manifesto of 1997 which states that, ‘the family is the most important institution in our lives. It offers security and stability in a fast changing world’ (Conservative, 1997: 30). It is significant that the family is equated to social stability given that ideology is a means of maintaining status quo. The Conservative ideology thus links protection of the breadwinner family with the protection of its ideal of society as a whole.
By overtly politicising the family, it can be said that debate surrounding the family in British politics of the 1980s and 1990s was instigated by Mrs Thatcher, and it is important to be aware of the extent to which policy, proposed policy and cross-party political ideology have been shaped by the ideologies of Thatcherism and the 'New Right'.

**Table 7.2 Major political events-UK 1979-1997**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 May 1979</td>
<td>Conservatives make significant gains and see Margaret Thatcher become first female Prime Minister of the UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March 1981</td>
<td>A number of Liberal and Labour MPs break away to form SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 June 1983</td>
<td>Thatcher and Conservatives win general election but with weakened majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 June 1987</td>
<td>Third consecutive Conservative electoral victory, this time with a strong majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March 1988</td>
<td>Liberal Party and SDP merge as the Social and Liberal Democrats, becoming the Liberal Democratic Party (Lib Dem) from Oct 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Nov. 1990</td>
<td>Margaret Thatcher steps down as PM and leader of the Conservative party after failing to secure an overall majority in a party leadership election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Nov. 1990</td>
<td>John Major wins Conservative party ballot becoming leader of the party and PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 April 1992</td>
<td>Narrow Conservative election victory, Major returned as Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 1994</td>
<td>Tony Blair becomes Leader of the Labour Party following the death of John Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Major challenged as leader, eventually winning a vote of confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 1997</td>
<td>New Labour wins a general election landslide, Tony Blair becomes Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*The Labour Party*

Despite the fact that, traditionally, Labour voters and members were most likely to be found in strong working class communities (Kavanagh, 1990: 122-3) which were, in themselves, held together by family ties, the party has rarely looked to family issues in order to gain support. Provision of welfare and social protection have, of course, been high on the agenda, but direct appeal to the family did not appear to be
necessary, perhaps due to the Beveridgian assumption that appealing to the breadwinner was appealing to the family as a whole (see Chapter 5) or the left wing ideological focus on individuals as primary groups rather than families. However, due to the various factions within the Labour party, the lack of rhetoric concerning the family may also stem from conflict based upon interpretations of the family such as the Marxist critique of the nuclear family as a tool of Capitalist oppression or the Feminist view that the family is the locus of the subordination of women (Elshtain, 1982: 7). Though the reasons may be varied, it remains the case that Labour had made little use of the family in political rhetoric before the 1990s. Exceptions can, however, be discovered, such as the significant statements dating back to the last Labour Term of office when Prime Minister Callaghan spoke of the family as being ‘...the most important part of our community...that is why for the first time in our country, our Government is putting together what amounts to a national family policy’ (Callaghan, 1977: cited in Coote et al., 1990: 4). The explicit use of ‘family’, however, is perhaps better seen in this case as a defensive reaction to the growing usage of the theme in the Conservative ideology at that time.

Throughout the 1980s, Labour party ideology had little recourse to the family, and it was only towards the end of the decade and Mrs Thatcher's decline, that the theme makes a strong renaissance in the discourse of the left. For example a 1989 Labour policy review placed the emphasis on facilitating work with family life, giving women the chance to work and have a family thanks to 'career breaks' and 'returner programmes'. The fact that the family was a low priority for Labour during the 1980s may also be the result of the party's seemingly permanent position in opposition and the relative instability of its leadership.
By the early 1990s, possibly as a result of sustained use of the family in Conservative rhetoric, the Labour party began to propose family-oriented policies. In 1990 the Left's strongest statement to date on the family was published under the title *The Family Way: a new approach to policy-making* (Coote *et al.*, 1990). One of its authors, Harriet Harman was named Secretary of State for Social Security in the first Blair cabinet. *The Family Way* (Coote *et al.*, 1990) was highly critical of the normative elements of Conservative policies for families and proposed measures to address diversification of family forms, family poverty and the reconciliation of women's employment and family life. The 1990s later saw 'New' Labour, particularly after the election of Tony Blair as party leader, increasingly voicing its support for the family.

This increased concern for family issues is demonstrated in the 1997 manifesto which outlines Labour's opinion of the family as follows:

> We will uphold family life as the most secure means of bringing up our children. Families are the core of our society. They should teach right from wrong. They should be the first defence against anti-social behaviour. The breakdown of family life damages the fabric of our society (Labour, 1997: 13)

Such explicit support for the family and its role in society is similar to much of the Conservative party's ideological presentation of the family during the 1980s containing elements of private family responsibility. When this is compared to the Conservative manifesto's statement (see above) on the family of the same year, there appears little difference between two parties. If this statement, however, is compared to the Labour party of 1979, it is almost unrecognisable as the same party suggesting a major ideological shift on the British left.
Differences appear, however, in relation to deep core beliefs about the relationship between the state and the family. Significantly this statement is followed by a clear assertion that families and the state are not rival providers of social services (Labour, 1997: 13), suggesting a partnership between the two rather than the Conservative’s commitment to privatisation and responsibility.

*The Liberal Democrats*

As the third party of British politics, the Liberals have had varying electoral fortunes over the study period, and, in spite of good percentage results (for example 25.4 per cent in 1983) have failed to turn this into seats (Kavanagh, 1990). The liberals have played a minor role in policy formation over the period, although their ideological position in relation to family policies has often been distinct from either the Labour or Conservative parties with a greater emphasis on gender equality and combating poverty more traditionally associated with the left.

As with both the Conservatives and Labour, the Lib Dem’s 1997 manifesto is their most explicit in terms of the family during the study period. Their statement is distinct from the other parties in its acknowledgement of family diversity:

> Families, in all their forms, are a basic building block of society. But the nature of families is changing. This has brought new stresses which must be addressed. But it has also brought new attitudes, such as the sharing of family responsibilities, which should be encouraged (Lib Dem, 1997: 55).

Thus all three parties gave a high priority to the family and its social function during the 1997 election campaign. This open support for the family came after almost two decades of Thatcherite rhetoric and is significant in relation to the evolution of the place of the family within British political ideologies over the study period.
The family in the manifestos

The following analysis examines the party electoral manifestos of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democratic parties for the elections 1979-1997. As with the other case studies in the thesis, the analysis is structured in relation to the four regulatory (abortion, contraception, divorce, parental authority) and four support measures (child benefits, fiscal measures, maternity leave, childcare) as well as pro-family statements and the position of the parties in relation to the thematics of public/private and family/individual.

Abortion

The question of abortion had been largely resolved before the start of the study period and is consequently absent from most of the manifestos analysed, the theme is almost completely absent from the election manifestos, suggesting that the parties either supported the existing legislation or did not see it as a priority issue. Where abortion is mentioned (Labour, 1983: 2) the position is for further liberalisation of the abortion laws. In the sections concerning women's rights and health care the Labour Party pledged to remove any barriers which existed in the abortion legislation, although the manifesto did not state what these barriers were. In addition the manifesto proposed increased counselling for women seeking a termination (Labour, 1983: 2).

Contraception

Contraception had been liberalised and freely available on the NHS since the 1970s and was consequently a low priority for the parties during the study period. The Conservatives party made no references to contraception or family planning in the study sample. Labour, however, pledged to support NHS provision of family planning

29 UK manifesto page numbers refer to scanned documents due to inaccuracies in the originals.
in both its manifestos of 1979 and 1983, no further references are made in later manifestos. The Liberal Democrats pledged to improve family planning services as part of its programme to support women's choice (Lib Dem, 1997: 50). In all cases where contraception is mentioned it is a measure which is supported, contraception is not opposed on either moral or pro-natalist grounds remaining consistent with party political ideology in those areas during the UK study period.

**Divorce**

One of the major areas of concern in Conservative party ideology during the study period is the notion of family breakdown and the possibility of an increased number of poor, lone-parent families and the subsequent negative impact upon society as a whole. As a consequence, it may be expected that the Conservative party should reform divorce legislation as an obstacle to family breakdown. The debate surrounding divorce has continued over the study period in spite of the approval of the Divorce Act of 1969 (see Chapter 5). The major issues arising in the debate surrounding divorce related to custody, maintenance and pension rights. Indeed, according to Lister (1995) the theme of the 'breakdown of the family' has provided a significant focal point for Conservative family politics, rhetoric and legislation during the 1980s and 1990s (Lister, 1995). In spite of a 'moral panic' (Lister, 1994: 214) concerning the longer term effects of increasing numbers of lone parent families, divorce legislation has in fact been liberalised.

Despite the significance of family breakdown to the family debate during the study period, the theme of divorce is barely addressed in the party manifestos. Labour made only two references to divorce over the period. In the 1983 manifesto, Labour pledged
to ‘review the whole question of divorce and maintenance’ (Labour, 1983: 4) although it did not state in which direction reform may be envisaged. Divorce reappeared in the Labour manifesto of 1997 in relation to pension splitting reforms after divorce (Labour, 1997: 17).

Given the Conservatives normative rhetoric relating to lone-parent families and family breakdown, it is perhaps surprising that that pledges to reform divorce legislation appear only once in the study period, although the planned reform seeks to, ‘offer further protection to children, and to secure fairer financial arrangements when a marriage breaks down’ (Conservative, 1983: 22). Such a statement seems paradoxical in the light of Conservative ‘family breakdown’ rhetoric, as it appears to clarify the framework for divorce proceedings rather than introducing stricter legislation to discourage marriage breakdown. Reference to increasing lone parent benefits also appeared in 1983 (Conservative, 1983) but this theme was absent in 1987 and 1992. In 1997 the Conservatives outlined plans to support lone parents, notably in their search for work (Conservative, 1997). In addition, the manifesto included a normative reference to the value of marriage; ‘Good preparation for marriage can be an important aid to a successful family.’ (Conservative, 1997: 34) and a pledge to allow pensions to be split as part of divorce settlements (Conservative, 1997: 37). As the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats made no reference to any reform of the divorce laws, although all of the manifestos from 1979-97 call for lone-parent benefits and support measures to be increased and improved.

Given the high visibility of divorce reform and family breakdown as an element of UK family policy of the 1980s and 1990s, the subject was barely touched upon by the
parties in their campaign manifestos which, given the gradual liberalisation of legislation over the period, may suggest that Thatcherite/‘Back to Basics’ ideology is considered out of step with the expectations of the electorate by the parties themselves. However, where divorce is mentioned, it is firmly situated in the context of private responsibility.

**Parental authority**

Full equality of parental authority was formalised by legislation in 1973 (Chapter 5). Given this, the parental authority/responsibility debate over the study period has been less one based upon gender equality than one of the limits of state intervention in questions relating to responsibility for children and is thus revelatory of party political ideology. As has been shown above, the limits of state intervention has been a dominant theme of post-1970s Conservative ideology, a position clearly expressed in the 1979 manifesto: ‘the balance of our society has been increasingly tilted in favour of the state’ (Conservative, 1979: 19). Parents responsibilities were seen as their having a right to choose in matters of the education of their children (Conservative, 1979: 19), although in reality this claim sought to defend ‘public’ (independent, privately-funded) schools as part of the party’s aim of diminishing state intervention, although this may also be interpreted as apologia for elitism in the British education system.

The Conservative manifesto of 1983 made no explicit references to parental authority, although reference is made to legal protection of children in cases of divorce, suggesting possible, last resort, state intervention or more stringent guidelines for custody allocation (Conservative, 1983: 22).
References to the family in the 1987 manifesto were solely limited to the area of benefit payments and, therefore, questions of parental authority are not addressed other than through explicit support for the direct payment of child benefit to the mother (Conservative, 1987: 24). Privatisation of social policy reappeared in the 1992 manifesto with a clear statement of Conservative ideology: ‘Conservatives believe that a healthy society encourages people to accept responsibility for their own lives. A heavy-handed and intrusive state can do enormous damage’ (Conservative, 1992: 28). Significantly such Thatcherite sentiment was expressed more explicitly under the leadership of John Major than under that of Margaret Thatcher herself, which may suggest that this element of Thatcherite ideology required time in order to become accepted, and has had a lasting impact upon post-Thatcher Conservatives. In spite of this opening comment, the manifesto went on to state that ‘some families need help to cope with their responsibilities. For them, Social Services play a vital role. They help with children where parental care has failed’ (Conservative, 1992: 28), suggesting that in some cases it is preferable for the state to take responsibility for children, although this again is seen as a last resort. In all cases the defence of the rights of the child remains the dominant concern (Conservative, 1992: 28-9).

The theme of responsibility and diminishing state intervention in family life is unequivocally expressed in the 1997 manifesto: ‘the family is undermined if governments take decisions which families ought to take for themselves. Self-reliance underpins freedom and choice’ (Conservative, 1997: 30). In addition, in the paragraphs relating to the limits of state intervention where parents fail, the statement cited above - ‘Conservatives believe that a healthy society encourages people to accept responsibility for their own lives. A heavy-handed and intrusive state can do
enormous damage’ (Conservative, 1992: 28) - appears word for word (Conservative, 1997: 32) further underlining the significance of this theme in Conservative social thought.

Support for parents was also developed in the 1997 manifesto which warns that ‘when the state goes too far, it is often the children who suffer. They become victims of the worst sort of political correctness’ (Conservative, 1997: 34). This was bolstered by ideological statements relating to the value of marriage, further underlining the Conservative belief that parental authority and responsibility ought to lay in the hands of parents. State intervention in this ‘private’ sphere is, thus, only considered as a last resort measure for the protection of children.

The Labour manifestos examined for the period 1979-97 contained no explicit references to policies relating to parental authority although during the early period (the manifestos of 1983 and 1987). The manifestos supported women’s equal rights in the family sphere. In the manifestos of 1992 and 1997 a shift takes place which sees the Labour party supporting ‘parent’s’, rather than women’s, freedom of choice in family matters.

The Liberal Democrats’ manifestos for the study period included no statements relating to parental authority, although there is a clear and consistent commitment to defending women’s rights in all walks of life throughout the study period (Lib Dem, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997).
Child benefits

The term 'family allowances' meaning a non-contributory, universal benefit paid with the objective of compensating for the financial disadvantages of raising a family does not appear in the policy terminology of the study period. The family allowance was replaced by the Labour government of 1978 by 'child benefits', signifying a move towards individuals.

Child benefit is addressed by all of the parties in each on the manifestos examined in this case study and as such represent an important element of UK family policy during the study period. The Conservatives, although largely seeking to diminish state spending on cash benefits, support child benefits in the majority of their electoral manifestos, a seemingly paradoxical stance which may be explained by the Conservative desire to support all families with children or a 'traditional' family model. In 1979 the Conservatives noted the difficulties of the future expense of the child benefits scheme while supporting the objectives of the benefit (Conservative, 1979: 20), thus expressing the key paradox of Conservative family policy in the 1980s and 1990s. By 1983, Conservative support of child benefits appeared stronger with pledges to raise the value of the benefit to its highest ever in real terms (Conservative, 1983: 21-22). In addition, the manifesto also pledged to provide further financial assistance to lone parent and poorer families (Conservative, 1983: 21-22) thus including vertical redistribution as an element of family policy, which, while seemingly contradicting monetarist objectives of reducing benefit dependency, may result from a desire to reduce poverty which is expressed as a factor leading to crime and juvenile delinquency (Conservative, 1983) and thus remains consistent with Conservative normative views of society and commitment to law and order.
Child benefits continued to receive support in the Conservative Party manifesto of 1987, although no pledge to increase the benefit was made (Conservative, 1987: 24). In contrast, benefits targeting poorer families and lone parents are given strong support although the proposed introduction of the ‘family credit’ scheme suggests that the party sought to move away from cash benefits as a means of tackling family poverty (Conservative, 1987: 24) and thus the 1987 manifesto appeared to support the economic aim of reducing expenditure on benefits.

Child benefit is a theme which is conspicuous by its absence from the 1992 manifesto, although in 1997 the Conservatives pledged to ‘protect the value of Child Benefit and Family Credit which help with the cost of bringing up children’ (Conservative, 1997: 35). By 1997 however, support of lone parent families had become ‘privatised’ through the Child Support Act and as a consequence, the high profile of lone parent benefits in the Conservative manifestos of the 1980s was absent (Conservative, 1997). Thus the objective reducing child/lone parent benefits which had been expressed during Mrs Thatcher’s governments became translated into policies during the five years of Major’s leadership further suggesting that Thatcher’s objectives required over a decade of incremental change before they became accepted even within the Conservative party.

Having introduced the child benefits system in 1978, the Labour manifesto of 1979 pledged to support the system it had introduced (Labour, 1979: 1). Child benefit was further given a high profile in the 1983 manifesto which pledged to increase it by £2 per week, link it to inflation and support its real term value for the future (Labour, 1983: 6). In addition, the 1983 manifesto pledged: ‘extra help for families with
children’ (Labour, 1983: 8) and marked the beginning of Labour’s move towards vertical redistribution. While child benefit was absent from the 1987 manifesto, the theme returned in 1992: ‘we will increase child benefit for seven million families’ (Labour, 1992: 11). The manifesto went on to state ‘The most effective way to reduce poverty is to increase child benefit’ (Labour, 1992: 12), although the benefit was a flat-rate universal benefit which did not specifically target poor families. The support for child benefit is maintained in 1997: ‘we are committed to retain universal child benefit where it is universal today - from birth to age 16 - and to up-rate it at least in line with prices’ (Labour, 1997: 14).

The Lib Dems also show consistent strong support for child benefits, prioritising increases in child benefits in 1979 (Lib Dem, 1979: 40), and further still in 1983 promising ‘help for families with children by increasing child benefit by £1.50 per week; increasing the child allowance in supplementary benefit...and...extra child allowance for one parent families’ (Lib Dem, 1983: 42), thus targeting poorer families as well as all families through the universal benefit.

The 1987 Lib Dem manifesto contained a whole subsection devoted to child benefit in which the party pledged to ‘increase child benefit by £1 per child a week in the first year and by a further £1 per child a week in the second year’ (Lib Dem, 1987: 47) thus maintaining support for the universal benefit, although increases for those receiving income support with dependent children, and lone parents were also outlined (Lib Dem, 1987: 48). The 1992 and 1997 manifestos made no pledges relating to child benefit, although the 1997 manifesto expressed commitment to supporting the family (Lib Dem, 1997: 55).
Fiscal measures

From the 1979 election manifesto, the Conservative party gave a high profile to tax reduction measures for families such as the ‘tax credit scheme’ (Conservative, 1979: 20), which aimed to end cases where poorer families have their benefits included in income tax. This scheme is not, however, linked to the number of dependent children in the family and can thus be interpreted as an instrument to combat poverty rather than a pro-family measure. In the 1983 manifesto, however, the Conservatives proposed ‘improving the tax treatment of married women, whether or not they go out to work’ (Conservative, 1983: 22) suggesting fiscal measures as family support instruments.

Fiscal measures for families are absent from the manifestos of 1987 and 1992. In 1997, however, the Conservative pledge major reform of the way the income tax system treats families: ‘The next Conservative government intends to reform the tax system so that it gives substantially more help to families’ (Conservative, 1997: 30). This statement was backed up by plans to allow single taxpayer families with dependent children or care responsibilities to benefit from the transference of personal tax allowance. As with proposed fiscal reforms in 1983, this plan did not consider the number of dependent children and was a further step towards the privatisation of care responsibility commensurate with Conservative party objectives over the study period. In addition, tax incentives are seen as an alternative to childcare provision: ‘For those who wish to be full-time parents, our proposals to transfer their unused personal allowance to their spouse will be worth up to an extra £17.50 a week’ (Conservative, 1997: 20). Being related to income tax, however, such a measure provides little real incentive for low-earning families.
While the Labour manifesto of 1979 did not include taxation in its family support measures, it did appear in all other manifestos taken from the study period. In 1983, Labour saw reform of the tax system as an integral part of assisting poorer families and included the phasing out of the married man’s tax allowance (Labour, 1983: 6). While tax policies for families were absent in 1987, the 1992 manifesto contained detailed pledges to reform taxation and its effects on the family budget. The major objective of the reforms was to raise tax allowance thresholds in order to help low-income families who may be taxed on benefits (Labour, 1992: 13). In addition plans to allow married couples to split the married person’s allowance as they chose, thus allowing single-earner families to benefit, or dual earner families to maximise the allowance for person earning the greater wage (Labour, 1992: 13). While fiscal family support measures were not given the same high profile in the 1997 manifesto, the party continued to support taxation as a means of combating poverty (Labour, 1997: 14).

As with the Labour party, the Lib Dems did not include taxation in their family support measures in 1979 (Lib Dem, 1979) and the theme was also absent in 1992 with only a passing mention in 1997, although this relates to childcare. During the 1980s, however, taxation was given a high profile in the context of family support. The 1983 manifesto pledged to phase out the ‘married man’s tax allowance’ (Lib Dem, 1983: 43-44). In 1987 the Lib Dems pledged to restructure the tax system (Lib Dem, 1987: 47) and introduce independent tax allowances for married women (Lib Dem, 1987: 48). In 1992 no specific tax reforms targeted towards the family (Lib Dem, 1992), although in 1997 tax reform was supported as an instrument to combat families in poverty (Lib Dem, 1997: 55).
Although fiscal measures were supported relatively consistently by all three parties, the policies were aimed at combating situations in which poorer families are taxed upon the benefits they receive, as opposed to on the number of dependent children in the family. This position is thus consistent with family policies as vertical redistributive measures rather than pro-natalist measures.

**Maternity leave**

No policies relating to parental or maternity leave (paid or unpaid) were included in the Conservative party sample (Conservative, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997), which is consistent with the party’s limited action in this area whilst in government and supports the ideological view of individual responsibility in family matters. Any policies relating to maternity leave would contradict the deep core ideological position which portrays the family as ‘private’. The lack of Conservative action in this area may equally be interpreted as stemming from fiscal prudence and liberal economic policies. Maternity leave therein would be interpreted as both costly for government and disruptive to industry and the free market.

The first references to maternity leave in the Labour sample came in 1983 although these are not explicit: ‘The Conservatives refuse to accept the wide variety in the type and size of families. Their policies restrict the choice for members of families - in particular they reduce freedom for men and women to choose whether to work or to stay at home and look after their families’ (Labour, 1983: 4). Maternity leave was an explicit objective in the 1987 manifesto as expressed in the pledge to ‘provide better-paid leave for parents when their child is born’ (Labour, 1987: 11) a statement which was significant in its use of ‘parents’ as opposed to solely ‘mothers’ given that the legislation at the time related to ‘maternity’ leave. The theme returned to the Labour
manifesto in 1997, although in this example the maternity leave is unpaid and is seen as providing 'a valuable underpinning to family life' (Labour 1997: 14), a statement which clearly demonstrates the new found position of the family as part of 'New Labour' ideology and points to a greater acceptance of state intervention than in Conservative ideology.

Support for maternity leave in the Lib Dem sample was only explicitly outlined in the 1987 and 1997 manifestos, although support for women's employment is a strong theme in all manifestos in the sample. In 1987 the Lib Dems pledged 'to promote measures that give employees with family responsibilities rights to parental and family leave' (Lib Dem, 1987: 46). Additionally the manifesto proposes maternity grants. In 1997 the Lib Dems called for the introduction of statutory maternity leave and maternity benefits (Lib Dem, 1997: 55) which were also largely in line with the party's support for women's equal rights both in the home and the workplace as expressed in all manifestos of the Lib Dem sample, and echoed Labour objectives at that time.

**Childcare**

The Conservative manifestos did not include childcare policies up to 1997, although in 1992 reference was made to social security vouchers for the purchase of 'certain services' (Conservative, 1992: 29) which may have include pre-school childcare, although such vouchers were solely aimed at poorer families. The Conservative manifesto of 1997 expressed strong support for women's equality in the work place, and their right to work, identifying some problems:

many women, and some men, face a particular problem: how to juggle job and family. For those who need or want to work, we will seek further ways to minimise barriers to affordable, high quality childcare (Conservative, 1997: 20).
The above statement is vague in terms of whether the provision of childcare is a public or private sector responsibility, although a pledge to ‘minimise barriers to affordable childcare’ suggests state regulation of the private sector rather than state provision of services, therefore remaining consistent with Conservative ideology. The 1997 manifesto thus made the most explicit pledges to help working mothers in the Conservative sample, although proposed policies are far from actively encouraging mothers to work outside the home. Indeed, the same paragraph offered tax incentives for those who wished to be full-time parents (Conservative, 1997: 20).

Labour party commitment to providing childcare is limited to the 1983 and 1997 manifestos. The former pledged ‘an integrated system of childcare with priority for children in the most deprived areas. Our aim will be to introduce, as soon as possible, a statutory duty on local authorities to provide education for all pre-school children whose parents wish it’ (Labour, 1983: 4). By prioritising children in deprived areas Labour’s objective may have been to allow mothers to take on full-time employment thus reducing the burden on the benefits system. However, the latter half of the statement suggests that all families should have the choice of pre-school childcare. In the 1997 manifesto childcare was presented as part of ‘welfare to work’, which sought to reduce benefit dependency by providing the services to allow mothers to take on full-time employment: ‘Labour’s national childcare strategy will plan provision to match the requirements of the modern labour market and help parent, especially women, to balance family and working life’ (Labour, 1997: 14), echoing the objectives of the 1983 manifesto’s childcare plan and maintaining the high profile of the family through targeted state intervention.
The Lib Dem's consistent support of women's right to work is also reflected in its childcare policies. Although childcare was not explicitly addressed in 1979, the manifesto did pledge support for working mothers (Lib Dem, 1979). In the 1983 manifesto, the party proposed two childcare measures: 'We will encourage the development of supportive care in the community for children through a wide range of facilities including pre-school play schemes and nursery centres, and will support training for child-minders' (Lib Dem, 1983: 45). A different measure was proposed in 1987: 'We will offer a tax allowance to help with the costs of childcare and remove the tax on the use of nurseries in the workplace' (Lib Dem, 1987: 46), suggesting a possible shift towards a privatisation of childcare facilities as advocated by the Conservatives.

Less detailed statements relating to childcare policies appeared in the 1992 manifesto which simply pledged to 'improve childcare' (Lib Dem, 1992: 51) and in 1997 the Lib Dems proposed to 'extend tax relief on workplace nurseries to other forms of day nursery care. We will develop a national childcare strategy, drawing on public and private provision' (Lib Dem, 1997: 55). In common with the Labour party, the Lib Dems proposed state childcare and were thus not totally committed to private responsibility in family issues.

Conclusions
On 1 May 1997, 18 years of Conservative government in the UK came to an end. Tony Blair's New Labour won the British General Election with a majority of 179 seats, a result which represented a bigger electoral shift than that of Labour's 1945 landslide. Such an emphatic victory appeared to express a loss of confidence in the Conservative leadership of the previous two decades, but to what extent had New
Labour's position on the family developed over that time, and what was this position relative to that of the Conservatives?

The thesis argues that party political ideology and incrementalism are significant elements of policy change. Further, it is argued that for policies to become an accepted part of legislative framework of society, the party political ideologies which inform or shape those policies must also become accepted. From 1979-97, the family became an increasingly high profile theme of Thatcherite/New Right rhetoric on both economic liberalisation and social freedom. In order to judge the extent of the impact of such thought and policies, it is necessary to examine the extent to which Labour and Liberal Democrat family policy converged towards that of the Conservative party in relation to the eight family policy measures examined above.

While is not possible to conclude from the present study that, from 1979-97, UK family policy as a whole underwent a significant transformation: indeed certain family policy measures, abortion and contraception, did not change at all, notable transformations did take place in relation to six of the eight policy measures examined above. That six measures were subject to change and two were not provides a significant indicator of both the character and extent to which Thatcherite ideology came to shape UK family policy of that time.

Table 7.3 shows which of the policy measures are addressed by each party in their election manifestos, as well as highlighting the appearance of significant pro-family statements. Out of the 15 manifestos examined in this study, only one, Labour 1983, contains references to all eight policy measures, whereas 10 out of 15 contain three or fewer references to the eight policy measures. Such a limited representation appears to indicate a low priority of family policy issues in UK party manifestos. However,
what is significant is not whether all of the measures are addressed by the parties, but which measures have received the most consistent coverage over the period.

The most common theme in the manifestos is child benefits, which appears in 11 manifestos and it is only absent from one Conservative manifesto (1992) and one Labour manifesto (1987) (Table 7.3).

Table 7.3 Family policy measures in UK election manifestos 1979-97

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Key: 1 abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6 fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave; 8 childcare, 9 pro-family statement.

The second most common policy measure is fiscal policy (Table 7.3). This is perhaps not surprising in light of the strength of neo-liberal economic thought as part of the Conservative party ideology of the period. The consistent appearance of these two support measures suggests the relative importance of family support measures in the UK during the study period, although there has been resistance to both maternity...
leave and childcare by the Conservative party. Where changes can be identified they have been largely influenced by Thatcherite objectives of encouraging individual/family responsibility and the privatisation of care, most significantly with the introduction of the Child Support Act.

The most significant result of the party manifesto analysis is, however, the appearance of pro-family statements in all of the 1997 manifestos. At the beginning of the study period commentators (Land and Parker, 1978: 331) had noted the difficulties of studying family policy in the UK, the family was not seen as a legitimate target for state intervention before the arrival of Mrs Thatcher. This did not, however, change significantly during the case study period. Where change is demonstrated, it is within party political ideologies. During the three Thatcher governments, however, the manifestos do not make explicit pro-family statements. It is only after almost two decades of consistent family-oriented rhetoric that the parties openly express their view of the family as a basic or central unit of society. Consequently, the 1997 manifestos contain the most detailed proposals in terms of family policy of the sample.

The case study has revealed growth in the use of the family as a component of party political ideology, the gradual politicisation of the theme over the 1980s and 1990s, the increased number of family policy proposals from all parties in the 1990s, and even the growth in UK family policy research in the 1990s (for example Coote et al., 1990; see also Chapter 2). Conclusions could be drawn that in UK party political ideologies, indeed deep core ideologies about the family, have changed significantly during the case study period. It appears that these ideological changes have preceded
or family policy change. Perhaps the most conclusive indication of this can been seen in the Child Support Act, which came to embody the ideology of the Conservative party in its vision of the private responsibility of families (and therefore state/citizen relations), normative ideas about the nature of the family (as the traditional married/breadwinner model) and neo-liberal economics. This change can also be seen in relation to the implicit description of family policies in the late 1970s becoming far more explicit, in party political ideologies at least, by 1997.
Chapter 8 - SPAIN: NEW DEMOCRACY, OLD IDEOLOGIES

The case of Spain occupies a unique position among the countries examined in the thesis. Whereas French and British politicians were acting within a situation of relative political continuity and stability, their Spanish counterparts were faced, not only with the challenges of social modernisation, but more significantly with the task of constructing a new democracy after the death of General Franco. The transition to democracy is central to the evolution of family policies in Spain and is examined in relation to the emergence of new political parties and ideologies, conflict with the past and the creation or development of policies for families.

The present chapter introduces the political climate and ideological positions of the major post-authoritarian political parties. This is followed by an examination of family policy evolution in relation to the eight key family policy dimensions examined in Chapter 4 and the French and UK case studies (Chapters 6 and 7). The manifestos of Spain's political parties are then analysed in relation to these eight measures and the variable of pro-family statements in order to develop a greater understanding of the evolution of political ideologies from the first elections, of democratic Spain in 1977 to 1996, the date of the last general elections at the time of writing (Table 8.1).

Political transition: denial versus pragmatism

General Franco died on 20 November 1975 after a lengthy illness. Like Franco the man, his regime had also been in its death throes for some time (Garcia Parody, 1990). His death, however, was the event which gave rise the dawn of the transition to democracy. Although the moves to democracy began in late 1975 (Table 8.1), it took three years of negotiation before the Spanish Constitution, approved by referendum on 6 December 1978, marked the official end of Authoritarianism with its disposición
derogatoria, a clause revoking the Fundamental Laws of the previous regime, significantly including those relating to abortion, contraception, divorce, differentiation between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' children, 'parental authority', and wives' right to paid employment (Gómez, 1990; del Campo, 1992; see also Chapter 5)\textsuperscript{30}.

Table 8.1: Major political events in Spain 1975-96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Nov. 1975:</td>
<td>General Franco dies</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Dec. 1976:</td>
<td>Political reform law is ratified by referendum</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Jan. 1977:</td>
<td>The laws relating to democratisation are passed</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 June 1977:</td>
<td>The first general election is held</td>
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<td>4 July 1977:</td>
<td>Adolfo Suárez (UCD) forms the first government</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Dec. 1978:</td>
<td>The Constitution is approved by referendum</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 March 1979:</td>
<td>General elections are held, Suárez returns as Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 May 1979:</td>
<td>The Constitution is inaugurated by King Juan Carlos I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Feb. 1981:</td>
<td>Following a period of instability Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo replaces</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suárez. Attempted coup d'état lead by Lieutenant Colonel Tejero</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Oct. 1982:</td>
<td>The PSOE wins and overall majority in the general elections under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the leadership of Felipe González (named Prime Minister 1 Dec. 1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Feb. 1983:</td>
<td>The UCD is dissolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June 1985:</td>
<td>Spain signs treaty to become a member of the EEC becoming a full</td>
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<td></td>
<td>member on 30 October 1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 June 1986:</td>
<td>PSOE wins an overall majority in the general elections González</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>remains as Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Oct. 1989:</td>
<td>PSOE under González wins its third successive general election with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a majority of one seat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June 1993:</td>
<td>General elections. PSOE victory but needs support of Basque and</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catalan nationalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March 1996:</td>
<td>PP wins largest share of vote but needs support of minority parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to form government. José María Aznar invested as Prime Minister in</td>
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<td></td>
<td>May</td>
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The basis of Spain's public life is laid down in its Constitution. Given the earlier high profile of the family Francoist ideology, the Constitution is analysed in order to

\textsuperscript{30}Notably Article 32: equality between men and women and Article 39 addressing more general aspects of family law and the protection of children (see Alberdi, 1995).
examine the extent to which it can be considered as marking a turning point in official representation of the family.

The Spanish Constitution was drafted following the first, post-Franco, democratic election in 1977 by 'the fathers of the Constitution', an all-male, cross-party committee of seven. The aims of the Constitution were to set out the basis for the future of Spanish democracy. It is, therefore, not surprising that the emphasis was placed on the establishment of the institutional framework for smooth transition. During the period of transition (1977-82) many of the newly elected deputies were anxious to ensure that nothing should jeopardise the political process and, as a result, consensus became the order of the day (Heywood, 1995). While the constitution pays little attention to the family when compared to its previous high visibility in foundational documents (Chapter 5), the two articles which are directed towards the family are significant in terms of their ideological impact (Gómez, 1990).

Perhaps the most overt break with Francoist control of the family in the 1978 Constitution is set out in article 32 (out of a total of 169): 'El hombre y la mujer tienen derecho a contraer matrimonio en plena igualdad jurídica' (men and women have the right to marriage in full, legal equality). This first treatment of family issues in the Constitution brought an official end to the anti-feminist nature of the marriage contract of Authoritarianism, under which wives were allowed few civil rights, being, for example, obliged to 'obey' their husbands or requiring their permission to sign an employment contract, known as the 'marriage bar' (Valiente, 1994: 158-63).

Whilst article 32 appears to be based on the principle of gender equality, the fine details of the 'rights and obligations' of spouses, as well as other regulations concerning eligibility to engage in a marriage contract, are not developed. However the statement that these, 'will be regulated by law' is included. The regulation of marriage by law effectively brought an end to the canonical control of marriage, as
had been the case under Franco. The statement in article 16, allowing ‘ideological and religious freedom’, further reinforces the break from the dominance of Catholicism and the obligation for those baptised as Catholics to marry in the Catholic Church whether they still considered themselves as Catholics or not. According to Inés Alberdi, (1995: 378), the Constitution established a marital system ‘governed by pluralism, freedom and respect for the religious and ideological privacy of the individual’.

However, the appearance of support for equality between the sexes in the body of a Constitution drawn up by men, the majority having held posts under Franco (Preston, 1986), may be the result of a desire to avoid controversial issues, which could possibly jeopardise both the transition and the credibility of individuals, rather than being the product of a radical, ideological break with the past. This is demonstrated by the examination of conflict within the parties (see UCD below), which suggests that, in spite of the Constitution, deep core Francoist beliefs about the family continued to find political support well into the democracy. The extent to which parties of all persuasions outline issues of gender equality prior to the publication of the Constitution helps shed some light on this theme, although the principles of article 32 remain highly significant in the political and social development of official Spanish treatment of the family.

The second of the Constitution’s articles which target the family is largely made up of generic statements about the protection of the family and children. The article is subdivided into four statements outlining the major concerns:

1. Los poderes públicos aseguran la protección social, económica y jurídica de la familia. (The public authorities will guarantee the social, economic and legal protection of the family.)
2. Los poderes públicos aseguran, asimismo, la protección integral de los hijos, iguales éstos ante la ley con independencia de su filiación, y de las madres, cualquiera que sea su estado civil. La ley posibilitará la investigación de la paternidad. (The public authorities will likewise guarantee the full protection
of children, who are to be considered equally regardless of their filiation, and the protection of mothers whatever their marital status. The public authorities will make provision for investigation of paternity.)

3. Los padres deben prestar asistencia de todo orden a los hijos habidos dentro o fuera del matrimonio, durante su minoría de edad y en los demás casos en que legalmente proeda. (Parents must give all types of assistance to their children, regardless of marital status, as long as they are legally minors.)

4. Los niños gozarán de la protección prevista en los acuerdos internacionales que valen por sus derechos. (Children will be granted the protection afforded them in international treaties which aim to support their rights.)

Statement one is perhaps the vaguest of the four, and is open to a wide range of interpretation. While it may be interpreted as a step towards greater social protection, it still focuses clearly on the family. Although removed from the family ideology of Authoritarianism, the high visibility accorded the family suggests the continuance of beliefs which hold the family as one of the ‘pillars’ by which society is supported. The inclusion of such terms as ‘economic protection’ may signal a desire to shift from the universality of child benefits towards a re-distributive system more in line with a social democratic approach. Statements two and three point towards what may be a development in the official perception of the family. The Franco regime supported the model of a patriarchal, married (canonically), heterosexual couple and their (numerous) biological children. The Constitution, however, sets out what may be considered a clear break with the previous family model.

First, statement two assumes state intervention in the family domain by guaranteeing the protection of children and mothers. Whilst this notion of state intervention is in common with aspects of Francoist ideology, rather than being legitimised by a pronatalist and anti-feminist ideologies, intervention targets all children and mothers in need, whether they are ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ married or unmarried, suggesting principles of social protection based on equity.

A key feature of statement two is the clause concerning the investigation of paternity. Again, the relative blandness of the clause leaves it open to a range of interpretations.
In stating that the law will allow the investigation of paternity, support for the primacy of the biological family may be inferred, again suggesting that total denial of the past may not have taken place. Equally, the role of the father in the upbringing of children may be emphasised, as proof of paternity may inevitably lead the pursuit of the absent father (statement 3), this may also result in regular contact with the mother raising questions of choice and independence for women. Furthermore, this may be evidence that, despite legal developments, the social perception of ‘fatherless’ children may continue to carry a stigma.

Statement three reinforces the end of distinctions between ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ and married or unmarried mothers in the eyes of the law. In this case, however, it is done in the context of the rights and obligations of both children and parents. Parents are obliged to ‘assist’ all of their children, which further underlines the primacy not only of the two parent, but also the biological family in the well-being and upbringing of children.

Statement four is official recognition of supra-national treaties such as article 16 of the *International Declaration of Human Rights* (Paris, 1948) or articles 16 and 17 of the *European Social Charter* (Turin, 1961). The inclusion of statement four is also significant insofar as the Spanish Constitution puts an end to the isolationist trend in the National Catholicism of Franco. Whatever conclusions are drawn from articles 32 and 39, it is clear that the family and family policy are considered of sufficient importance to be included in the founding document of Spain’s democracy. This is given extra credence considering the possibility for conflict in the transition process (and the possible confrontational issue of the family) and the overwhelming desire by all parties to establish the institutions of democracy first, and address policy issues later.
The Civil Code and the new framework for family policy

The fundamental breaks with Francoist family policies laid down in the 1978 Constitution. This break was reinforced with the reform of the Civil Code in 1981 (Table 8.1) which included the liberalisation of divorce. Abortion was decriminalised in 1985. Both of these reforms represented important ideological breaks with the previous regime and echoed, to some extent, the reforms introduced by the Second Republic in the early 1930s (see Chapter 5). In spite of these reforms, Spanish family policies maintained a low profile during the Transition and successive governments, which according to Celia Valiente (1995: 92) can be attributed to 'historical memories' and the desire for actors 'at any price, to be seen as distant and opposed to the pro-natalist and anti-feminist Francoist family policies'. Such was the symbolic value of the family that measures which target the 'family' as an explicit recipient of support, were open to interpretation as reactionary, an element which may explain a trend, most notably on the left, towards the individualisation of social policies to target primary groups such as children, women or the poor.

The remainder of this section examines the major developments in the Civil Code and family policies, from the Transition to the 1996 general election, which impacted upon the ideologically charged areas identified in the Constitution covering rights and obligations of spouses, equal civil rights for women, rights and obligations of parents and the primacy of the biological family (legal separation, divorce and paternity investigation).

Regulatory measures

The criminal law governing abortion was abolished in 1983, although this was, and remains, a highly controversial area. Despite the liberalisation of abortion, the law was not applied for a further two years and was surrounded by emotive debate at both

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31A thorough analysis of the Civil Code can be found in Alberdi, (1995) and Picazo and Gullón (1997).
ends of the spectrum. First, the Catholic Church filed immediate protests on the grounds that abortion was the legalised ‘killing of innocents’ (Del Campo, 1995: 160). Second, feminist groups objected to the restrictive number of ‘conditions’ under which abortion could be authorised: danger to the life or health of women, pregnancy as a result of rape or cases of foetal ‘malformation’. The abortion bill had been referred to the Constitutional Court after an appeal by the right wing AP. The Court eventually agreed that the bill was constitutional but stipulated conditions. Abortion was to be permitted under one of three conditions which had been in the original proposal; therapeutic, ethical and eugenic. In addition, the court specified further conditions: a doctor must assess the consequence of completion of pregnancy. This assessment should take place before any operation and abortions could only be carried out in state licensed clinics or hospitals (Barreiro, 1999). While these objections to the abortion legislation received some support, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) polls suggested that the law largely reflected public opinion on the matter in 1983 with 62 per cent in favour of abortion for reasons of safety of women and in cases of foetal malformation, 56 per cent in favour in cases of pregnancy following rape, whereas 27 per cent of men and only 21 per cent of women were in favour of voluntary abortion (Alberdi and Del Campo, 1986: 76). These statistics suggest that, while attitudes seemed to have changed, abortion remained an issue where the traditional Catholic/right wing ideologies held sway with large sections of the population, particularly in cases where there is no medical justification for termination.

The abortion legislation had remained unchanged for a decade when, in 1995, the PSOE government proposed a further liberalisation. The proposed amendment sought to introduce abortion for social reasons, in cases of personal, family or social conflict. The most up to date contributions (Barreiro, 1999) underline the highly controversial nature of the abortion debate. Juan Antonio Fernández Cordón (1996: 56) has suggested that conflict over the proposed abortion reform led to the PSOE losing the
support of the Catalan nationalists, thus necessitating the general elections of 1996 which resulted in victory for the right (PP) and signalled the end of 14 years of Socialist government. No element of family policy, it seems, is more representative of conflict in family ideology in Spain than abortion.

Improvements in the freedom of choice for women were introduced even before the Constitution or the Civil Code. Article 316 of the Francoist Penal Code banning the use, sale and distribution of methods of contraception was repealed under the disposición derogatoria, although sterilisation remained a criminal offence until 1983 (art. 418).

Articles 66-68 of the Civil Code set out the basic rights and obligations of spouses, guaranteeing equality of partners before the law as stated in the Constitution. The Civil Code, however, provided for the ‘regulation by law’ of marriage referred to in article 32 of the Constitution. Article 66 reinforced the constitutional principle of equality stating, ‘the husband and wife have equal rights and obligations’. These equal rights and obligations were developed in articles 67 and 68 and included the obligation to live together in the domicilio conyugal (marital home), to remain faithful, to assist each other and ‘act in the interest of the family’. Acting in the ‘interest’ of the family was not, however, fully developed and is open to interpretation as to what a family is as well as what its interests are. The family remained, as implied in its the usage in the context of article 67, based on the marriage of a heterosexual couple. Despite the development of the civil rights of wives (equality, the right to freely partake in paid employment), the perception of what a family is appears to have changed little since the death of Franco: a married couple and their children.

Divorce had already existed in Spain during the Second Republic (1931-36) but was abolished by Franco at the end of the Civil war in 1936. However the possibility of
separación legal was available. Up to 1981 separación legal was based on blame and
the concept of ‘guilt’. The admission or attribution of ‘guilt’ carried with it the
consequence of losing the right to receive custody of children or alimony (Alberdi,
1979). Act number 30 (7 July 1981) established divorce in Spain and put an end to the
use of the concept of ‘guilt’ as grounds for either separación legal or divorce. The
consequences of the reform on the role of both parents and their obligations as stated
in article 154 of the Civil Code and article 39-2 and 3 of the Constitution is treated in
article 92 of the Civil code: ‘la separación, nulidad o divorcio no eximen a sus padres
de las obligaciones con los hijos’ (separation, nullity or divorce do not exempt parents
from their obligations towards their children). This position concerns what may be
considered ‘true’ parental authority, such as legal representation or the taking of
major legal decisions, as opposed to ‘guard and custody’, in effect, making the day­
to-day material and care decisions. The partner who does not live with the child(ren),
is, generally, required to pay child support (established by the courts according to the
needs of children and the capacity of the parent without custody to make
contributions). A failure to maintain payments is punishable under criminal law in the
form of a fine or imprisonment. The latter is, however, very rare with only two fathers

It is also important to note that, in order for a divorce to be granted by the family
courts, at least one year must have passed since the deposition of legal separation
(Alberdi, 1995: 385-92). This two-stage divorce proceeding has been identified as the
major explanatory factor in the low divorce rate in Spain, notably as a result of the

Rights and obligations towards children are established through biological parenthood
and through legal adoption in article 108 of the Civil Code. As a result of this link,
differences between what were, under Franco, termed ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’
children were abolished (Del Campo, 1992). The exact nature of the rights and
obligations of parents towards their children, *patria potestad* (paternal authority) is outlined in article 154 of the 1982 Civil Code: to look after children to the best of their ability; to provide material support according to the abilities and means of parents, not merely the minimum for subsistence; to provide them with an education. Parents are obliged to provide children with mandatory education at least between the ages of 6-16, and to represent them legally. Whereas article 154 heralded no real changes from the parent/child relationship in pre-democratic Spain, the authority is clearly ‘parental’ as opposed to ‘paternal’ and is thus a significant ideological change in relation to gender equality.

The articles of the Constitution and Civil Code examined above do not clarify the consequences of remarriage on the administration of *patria potestad*. It is, therefore, implied that the absent, biological parent retains parental authority except in cases where step-parents legally adopt children thus entailing a transference of parental obligations as stated in article 108 of the Civil Code (Diez-Picazo and Gullón, 1997: 284).

**Support measures**

A significant aspect of Spanish family policy is the relatively low level of child benefits. In spite of the Constitution’s aim to ‘guarantee the...economic...protection of the family’ (Art. 39), child benefits have had negligible economic effects on the family budget, with the annual allowance per child remaining frozen at 3,000 (approximately £12) Pesetas from 1971-1990 (Fernández Cordón, 1996: 52). A long over-due increase in child benefits was introduced in 1990. The benefit was increased to 36,000 Pesetas (approximately £142) per annum, an increase of twelve times, but this was still considered too low to compensate for the reduction in the value of the allowance since 1971 (Fernández Cordón, 1996: 52). In addition to the low value of the allowance, it was frozen on its introduction, and by the end of 1995 had lost 27
per cent of its real-term purchasing power (Fernández Cordón, 1996: 52). In addition, the allowances had also been subject to means-testing since 1990 (Valiente, 1997) in line with the Socialist party's objective of targeting poorer families.

Table 8.2: Evolution of family policies in post-Transition Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Dec. 1978:</td>
<td>Constitution guarantees equality between spouses and state support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for the family (Articles 32 and 39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July 1981:</td>
<td>Divorce is legalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982:</td>
<td>Civil Code reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Nov. 1983:</td>
<td>Abortion is legalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Dec. 1983:</td>
<td>Abortion legislation is suspended pending an appeal lodged with the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutional Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May 1985:</td>
<td>The abortion law is passed after the inclusion of modifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>recommended by the Constitutional Court (published as article 417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bis of the Penal code 12 July 1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990:</td>
<td>Child benefit re-valued for first time since 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994:</td>
<td>Child benefits to be up-graded annually, definition of 'large family'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>changes from four or more to three or more children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995:</td>
<td>Reform of maternity leave, becoming 'parental' leave; government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>proposes controversial amendment to abortion law</td>
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</table>

While child benefits have had a limited impact on the economic situation of families in Spain, some commentators (Fernández Cordón, 1996; Valiente, 1997) point to fiscal measures as a more significant instrument of family support. Tax relief for families was based upon the number of children and, before 1987, also required parents to be married in order to receive the tax relief (Valiente, 1997). The state budget law of 1995 introduced progressive tax deductions relative to the number of children, with the rate remaining unchanged for two children but being increased for the third child and further still for the fourth and subsequent children (Fernández Cordón, 1996: 51). This reform favoured large families, and was not to be unexpected given the resurgence in political concern with very low fertility (see Table 5.3) as expressed by both right and left in their 1996 manifestos (PP, 1996: 5.5; PSOE, 1996: 78) (see below).
The law relating to maternity leave in Spain was reformed in March 1990 and extended the statutory period of leave from 14 to 16 weeks (Del Campo, 1990: 344). From 1994 maternity leave became considered under the Social Security system in the same way as any other temporary employment break, such as sick leave, and during the leave payments of 75 per cent of the base reguladora (the base rate for benefit calculation). Up to 1995 parents had been entitled to unpaid maternity leave of up to one year (only one parent may take the leave if both are employed) with a right to return to the same position under the same contractual terms. Since March 1995, however, when the law was reformed in line with the EU Pregnant Worker’s directive, maternity leave became available for up to three years. However employers may fill any vacancies created with short-term contracts which benefit from reduced employers’ contributions. The objective of this reform sought to combat any objections employers may have had to hiring married women of childbearing age (Fernández Cordón, 1996: 54).

It is perhaps significant to note that the extension of maternity leave to three years (unpaid) is in a context where public provision of childcare for 0-3 year olds is almost non-existent. While post-authoritarian Spain has seen an total increase in women’s work, from 17.7 per cent in 1970 to 33.1 per cent in 1991 (although the increase has been up to three times as much for women of child bearing age) (Alberdi, 1995: 137), very little has been done to help young mother’s in terms of childcare. Constanza Tobío (1994) suggests that this may result form the continuing implicit belief that domestic work, including childcare, is the responsibility of women. This lack of state childcare is also coupled with limited regulation of expensive private sector nurseries (Escobedo, 1998). Some parents are, however, eligible for a means tested tax allowance to help with childcare, but this remains limited measure and given the relatively high costs of a largely unregulated childcare sector has had little impact (Escobedo, 1998).
According to Celia Valiente (1995) the relative lack of public intervention in family policy since the death of Franco can be attributed to 'historical memories' and the desire for actors 'at any price, to be seen as distant and opposed to the pro-natalist and anti-feminist Francoist family policies' (Valiente 1995: 92). This conclusion is reached after the examination of the significance of family policy measures and statements. However, the existence of certain specific elements of family policy outlined above suggests greater continuity than Valiente (1995) appears to argue, thus requiring closer examination of the influence of party political ideologies in order to establish the extent to which the political rejection of Francoist family ideology shaped Transition and post-transition family policies in Spain. It is clear, given the radical break in political continuity, that no assumptions about the national context for ideologies should be made in relation to Spain. The following section, therefore, considers the ideological position of each party in relation to the new democracy. The potential impact of historical memories as described above is, however, central to the discussion.

The political parties of Democracy

The legacy of the ideology of Francoist dictatorship is central to the understanding of contemporary right wing parties in Spain. The wider implications of this legacy on Spanish politics can provide an important line of enquiry, especially in terms of its effect on family policy. However, many political taboos arose from the all-consuming desire, at least amongst the political elite, to appear completely disassociated from the previous regime and as a result, the right wing parties which did gain ground in the democratic era, were more 'centrist' in approach, either from a genuine rejection of the past, or a reluctance to develop fully their stance for fear of being branded apologists for Franco (Valiente, 1995).

The political parties of Spain are a clear product of the political and social development of the nation since the 1930s, but particularly since the end of
Authoritarianism and the Transition to democracy when political parties became legal (Martínez, 1990). While the ideologies of the individual parties can be understood in terms of right and left, along with other parties in Europe, the continuing effects of the dictatorship on the party political ideologies of Spain cannot be underestimated (Valiente, 1995).

Unión de Centro Democrático and Centro Democrático y Social

A centrist position was initially highly popular with the electorate, and played a key role, in the form of Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), as the cornerstone of the new democracy (Table 8.1). Like the other Spanish Parties, UCD emerged from the general confusion caused by Franco’s death, and was made up of many small, factionalised groups. Despite the unstable base of the party, the desire to carry Spain through the delicate process of transition provided initial unity, and consensus became the order of the day. Under the leadership of Adolfo Suárez, UCD won the first two elections in 1977 and 1979 with 36.4 per cent and 35.0 per cent of the vote, respectively (Table 8.1). Although these victories did not provide an overall majority, they did allow UCD to control the early years of modern Spain. Perhaps more important was the majority which UCD members had on the committee which drew up the constitution (three out of seven members).

The collapse of UCD came about largely because the unifying force of the party and the desire for a smooth transition without the dominance of the left had dissolved by 1980. It was then that a rift between ‘the party’s four main ideological factions’ began to impose itself (Ross, 1997: 54). The factions which began to appear at the heart of UCD can be classified into the following categories:

- Christian Democrats: this group, while advocating a German-style ‘social market economy’ had close links with the Catholic Church and consequently proved to be conservative on issues of social reform;
Liberals: advocated a greater degree of social change, which brought them into conflict with the Church;

Social Democrats: in broad agreement with the Liberals on social change, but sought a greater degree of economic planning;

ex-Francoist Bureaucrats: this was largely a group of personalities, including Suárez, for whom the sole aim was a peaceful transition, avoiding any potentially volatile reforms.

The final breakdown of UCD resulted from disagreement in the area of the family, notably during the negotiations in the regulation of a divorce law which was contested by the Christian Democratic and Francoist elements of the party. After the disastrous result of the 1982 election UCD became a minor party overnight. Suárez's splinter party, the right-of-centre Centro Democrático y Social (CDS), only took two seats and so was by no means a beneficiary of UCD ideological in-fighting.

Alianza Popular

The most notable success at the cost of UCD's demise was demonstrated in the results of Alianza Popular (AP). Over the period 1977-82, the party developed from a cluster of tiny right wing groups, which advocated the transition to democracy along the lines of ideologically charged incremental change, to a fully fledged voice for the political right. The year 1982 signalled what was effectively the birth of the right as a force in Spanish democracy and began a period during which AP became the 'natural' party of opposition. Helped by defections from the crumbling UCD, AP went on to increase its share of the vote from 6.0 per cent in 1979 to 26.5 per cent in 1982, effectively transforming AP into the major voice of the Spanish right (Heywood, 1995).

The poor, early election results (8.3 per cent in 77 and 6.0 per cent in 79) show that the original, implicitly anti-democratic image of AP was out of line with the vast majority of the electorate, and the party, under the leadership Manuel Fraga Iribarne,
set about modelling itself on the ideologies of more moderate right wing parties, most notably the British Conservative party. This is reflected in its view of family matters as the private responsibility of families. It was Fraga’s wish to see AP become the ‘natural’ party of government.\(^{32}\)

Whilst the parties of the right were at great pains to find a voice within the new democracy, the left, thanks to their ‘outlaw’ status during Authoritarianism, were not under such pressure to show their commitment to the Transition. There were, however, doubts about the Communists’ support of a peaceful transition (Gilmour, 1985). Despite having held strong electoral appeal in the industrial regions of Spain during the 1920s and 1930s, the Socialist and Communist parties had suffered the loss of organisational structure and experience during the 40 years they spent as banned organisations. Rather than operating on a national level, the underground parties of the left functioned as factionalised, secret cells.

*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*

Unlike its right wing and centre-right competitors at the first elections, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), had solid historical roots, having been founded in 1879 upon the rigid Marxism of the founder Pablo Iglesias. During the Franco era, the PSOE was driven underground, where, unlike the Communists, its leadership did little to oppose the dictatorship actively. This stance became the focus of discontent for a growing number of its younger, better-educated members. In 1974 a change of leadership was to transform the party and, eventually, Spain itself. Felipe González was elected as leader at the Party’s 25th congress. The role of González in Spanish politics of the 1980s and early 1990s can be compared with that of François Mitterrand or Margaret Thatcher in France and the UK respectively, insofar as his personality became synonymous with his party and its policies.

\(^{32}\) In the analysis of the manifestos the Coalición Democrática (CD), Alianza Popular (AP) and Partido Popular (PP) are all different names for the same party as it evolved.
In terms of the PSOE's approach to family policy, the election manifestos from 1977-96 are consistent in terms of policies and position. The term 'familia' rarely appears as a major concern in PSOE manifestos as the party remains consistent with traditional Socialist conceptions of state support for the needs and rights of individuals. When the framework family policy measures are mentioned, they are most commonly be found under general social security or welfare headings, or headings which refer specifically to women and women's rights. The PSOE is thus situated in close relation to the thematics of public and individual.

Partido Comunista de España/Izquierda Unida

Izquierda Unida (IU) is the third largest party in Spain and is an alliance of smaller left wing parties and independents, its largest component is the Communist party (PCE). The most characteristic element of the PCE/IU has been its failure to live up to general expectations. The PCE was a powerful and unified body of resistance through the Franco regime with strong support from both the largest worker's union (Comisiones Obreras-CCOO) and many young educated Spaniards who supported its opposition to Authoritarianism. Observers and PCE members believed that the party would prove the major post-Franco political force. However, this optimism was not reflected at the ballot for three possible reasons: first, internal divisions had begun to become apparent between traditionalists and the advocates of Euro-communism; second, once considered as the strongest opponent of Franco, the PCE lost some of its appeal in the democracy, with many supporters of the left opting for the more moderate (or even 'democratic') pledges of the PSOE; third, the PCE also suffered from the effects of political legacy as the Communists had been blamed for many atrocities during the Civil War (1936-39) in Francoist propaganda. These claims were not entirely unfounded and some on the left were damning of Communist participation in the war. Whatever the reasons, the PCE and its later incarnation, IU,
have remained little more than the largest of the minor parties with its share of the vote barely making double figures, suggesting an electoral ceiling (Amodia, 1993).

In keeping with the low profile of PSOE family policies, the PCE/IU manifestos make few explicit references to the family, with policy measures targeting social inequalities based on individuals rather than on the family unit. This latter fact, combined with the relatively limited influence of the PCE/IU at government level, diminishes the party’s impact on the general area of family policy in Spain.

The family in the party manifestos

The following section analyses the eight policy measures, abortion, contraception, divorce, parental authority, child benefits, fiscal measures, maternity leave, childcare and pro-family statements as they appear in the party election manifestos of the major national parties of Spain from 1977-1993.

Abortion

Abortion had been the single most contentious element of family policy since the 1930s. With the Transition came the desire on behalf of the more radical left to introduce measures that would bring Spain into line with its European neighbours. In addition, the growing women’s movement on the left became an important pro-abortion lobby. Given the power of the Catholic Church and the pro-natalist ideology of Franco, the first years of the Transition did not herald a radical break in political attitudes towards abortion from the parties of the right.

The UCD manifesto of 1977 was unequivocal in its position on abortion. Although the family was only treated in a short paragraph, the UCD states, ‘[el partido] es contrario al aborto y postula una protección suficiente a la madre soltera’ ([the party] opposes abortion and demands sufficient protection for lone mothers) (UCD, 1977:
13). The UCD is clearly in line with the family interventionist and anti-abortion position of right wing political ideologies by offering support for lone mothers who are discouraged from seeking abortions. In the same year the PSOE did not mention abortion, or indeed the family in any way, but strongly advocated an improvement in women’s rights (PSOE, 1977).

In spite of a clear anti-abortion stance in 1977, no mention of abortion was made in 1979 after the first UCD government. The question was not, however, completely abandoned by the right. The democratic coalition of Alianza Popular and Partido Democrático Popular set out a ‘right to life’ position based upon ‘el desarrollo de la Constitución en defensa de los principios cristianos’ (the evolution of the Constitution in line with the defence of Christian principles) (CD, 1979), an ideological position which summed up the delicate balance of the Transition and the potential for conflict over deep core beliefs on questions of family regulation and especially abortion.

On the left, while the PSOE continued to leave abortion out of its electoral programme, the PCE addressed the possibility of its legalisation (PCE, 1979). The Communists pledged the introduction of abortion legislation similar to that of other European countries, as a measure to combat what it estimated as 300,000 ‘back-street’ abortions per year, thus situating the abortion debate firmly within the context of women’s health (PCE, 1979).

The elections of 1982 resulted in a PSOE majority and government and the first steps towards the legalisation of abortion. In spite of the importance of the proposed bill, the question of abortion, including the nature of future legislation remained absent in the PSOE manifesto of 1982 (PSOE, 1982). Equally abortion had disappeared from the text of the PCE manifesto (PCE, 1982). On the right, AP made no mention of a position in relation to abortion, although it did recommend measures to protect lone mothers and the introduction of ‘family centres’ to ‘ilustrar a la familia sobre las
consecuencias de sus decisiones' (illustrate to the family the consequences of their decisions) (AP, 1982: 136) which may have been intended as an anti-abortion strategy. In contrast with all of the above parties, the centre-right CDS took an explicit anti-abortion stance (CDS, 1982: 63). Indeed, rather than calling for the relaxation of the law, the CDS proposed reforms to the penal system to take into account different types of abortion based upon the circumstances of individual cases (CDS, 1982: 63-4). Thus, the year before the introduction of the abortion bill, only one of the four major parties stated a clear position, an anti-abortion position.

By the time of the 1986 elections, the abortion law had been in force for a little over a year. The law was based upon strict criteria for which an abortion could be performed and the control of establishments where operations could be carried out. The governing party, the PSOE, stood by its legislation, and explicitly addressed abortion for the first time in its manifestos (PSOE, 1986). In addition the PSOE proposed better education about abortion as well an increase the number of clinics authorised to carry out the operation (PSOE, 1986: 84). The Communists (now Izquierda Unida (IU)) attacked the government and the abortion bill suggesting that the law was merely a means of appeasing its opponents rather than a modern abortion bill (IU, 1986: 27). AP had lodged the appeal against the abortion bill which resulted in the legislation being delayed by over a year and a half, and continued to defend the rights of the unborn child by advocating a pro-life stance in its 1986 manifesto (AP, 1986: 100-101). The renamed Partido Popular (PP) manifesto for the 1989 general election contained no references to abortion. Indeed, relative to the previous high profile, the family in general was virtually absent as a general party focus on neo-liberal economic policies came to the fore in a similar way as in France and the UK.

Perhaps as a reaction to the governing party's seemingly increasingly liberal attitude towards abortion, the theme reappeared in the PP manifesto of 1993. A full subsection is dedicated to 'Defensa de la Vida' (defence of life) (PP, 1993: 75-6) in which the PP
outlined moral and philosophical arguments stating why abortion is unnecessary in a modern society. Alternatives to abortion were supported and included sex education, the creation of advice centres for women, labour reforms, adoption reforms and other alternatives to abortion (PP, 1993: 75). In addition, the manifesto states that ‘la solución no está sólo en la legislación penal, sino en la educación en el respeto y protección de la vida’ (penal reform is not the only solution, but also education about the respect and protection of life) (PP, 1993: 76). In stark contrast to the previous ideologically charged manifesto, that of 1996 made no references to abortion at all. There are no clear reasons as to why the theme absent in 1996. However the liberalisation of social attitudes in the electorate may have been an influential factor. As with other parties, ideological issues that may be damaging to electoral campaigns are ignored. This does not represent conclusive proof of a shift in PP ideology.

On the centre-right, the CDS, although it did not openly support abortion, ceased to oppose it in its electoral manifestos from 1986. In contrast to earlier manifestos, a high profile is accorded to gender equality (CDS, 1989; 1993). In both of the PSOE manifestos of 1989 and 1993, the party calls for the broadening of the terms of the abortion law notably relating to the freedom to choose to have an abortion (PSOE, 1993: 59). As discussed earlier, the question of abortion has been highly controversial in spite of the modernisation of Spanish society. Abortion became absent from the manifestos of the right in the late 1980s, as the left moved towards further liberalisation. In the 1990s there was a return to the old distinctions between the pro-abortion left and the pro-life right. A further indicator of this split can be seen in the importance PSOE moves towards liberalisation played in bringing about the dissolution of parliament in 1995 which led to the electoral victory of the Partido Popular and José María Aznar (Fernández Cordón, 1996: 57-8). In 1996, however, the PSOE continued to defend its pro-abortion position and openly blamed the right for the failure to introduce the reforms: "proponemos una despenalización más amplia de la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo a través de una Ley que contempla diversos aspectos sanitarios, sociales y"
jurídicos. Esta Ley no ha podido ser aprobada por la actitud obstruccionista de los partidos que representan a la derecha de nuestro país. Entendemos que la mujer debe decidir de manera autónoma y responsable sobre su maternidad. (we propose further liberalisation of voluntary termination of pregnancy through a Law which considers a number of health, social and legal aspects. This Law has not been introduced as a result of the obstructionist attitude of the right in our country. We understand that women have the right to make individual and responsible choices about their maternity.) (PSOE, 1996: 64).

The explicit pro-abortion ideology of the PSOE, most notably in 1996, represents strong commitment. The deep controversy surrounding abortion made it politically sensitive for parties to take a clear stance, even as late as 1996. Indeed the PP, whose opposition led to the collapse of the 1995 reform bill, did not make any references to divorce in their 1996 manifesto. The defence of the liberalisation of abortion laws by both parties of the left suggests the importance of this issue and women’s rights within their political ideologies.

Contraception

During Authoritarianism, the penal code made little or no distinction between abortion and contraception (see Chapter 5). Since the death of General Franco, however, a distinction has become clear, indeed after the disposición derogatoria of the 1978 Constitution, the ban on contraceptives was effectively lifted. Thus it may have been expected that the parties of the right in particular would have seized upon contraception as a tool with which to fight the pro-abortion lobby. This did not happen.

Neither the UCD nor AP mentioned family planning in their manifestos before 1982, the year that saw the PSOE abortion bill gaining impetus. AP called for the creation of a network ‘family orientation centres’ in 1982 (AP, 1982: 136), although it was not until 1993 that the party openly advocated alternatives to abortion, but even then it did not explicitly advocate the use contraceptive methods (PP, 1993: 75). In the same way, contraception is not addressed in any of the CDS manifestos during the study period.
In contrast, the PCE manifesto of 1979 promoted contraception, through improved sex education and family planning centres, as an alternative to abortion (PCE, 1979: 12), although in later manifestos its more radical pro-abortion stance took precedence. In the same year the PSOE called for family planning centres to be set up for the distribution of contraceptives (PSOE, 1979: 21), a theme that was maintained in later manifestos (PSOE, 1982: 29, 1986: 82-3, 1989: 66, 1993: 59, 1996: 64) and was developed along with support for abortion.

Explaining right wing ideologies’ apparent reluctance to address contraception is less evident than in the case of abortion. However, given that both abortion and contraception may be categorised together within ideologies of the Catholic Church, pro-natalism or apologists for Franco, it may be that what the right wing parties do not say about contraception may prove as significant as what is said by those on the left. Indeed it may be that the right did not wish to alienate themselves from an electorate which had clearly become favourable to contraception, the liberalisation of which, as John Hooper (1993) argues, had a far reaching impact on post-authoritarian Spanish social attitudes as represented in the growth of women’s movements and sexual liberalisation in the media.

**Divorce**

The first major legislative changes to have immediate impact on the family came in 1981 with the introduction of the divorce law. As with abortion and contraception, marriage, particularly religious marriage, had been one of the cornerstones of the family ideology of Franco. Divorce had been introduced during the Second Republic (see Chapter 5) and had been a highly controversial measure. With the Transition, however, and the desire to modernise Spain, it was perhaps inevitable that a divorce law would be passed.
The first governing party, the UCD, did not mention divorce in its 1977 manifesto, although it did support the introduction of civil marriage within the secular state (UCD, 1977: 13). By 1979, however, it was clear that the UCD sought to introduce divorce legislation but under strict conditions, ‘no se admitirá divorcio por mero acuerdo de los cónyuges. Las causas de separación y disolución a efectos civiles han de ser tasadas y graves para los supuestos en que los matrimonios estén definitivamente rotos y en todo caso se protegerán especialmente los intereses de los hijos’ (Divorce by mere mutual consent of the partners will not be allowed. The reasons for separation and civil dissolution of marriage must be restricted and serious, based on the assumption the marriage has broken down definitively, and in all cases the interests of the children will be especially protected) (UCD, 1979: 27). Such strict conditions reflect the deep-rooted opposition to divorce that had dominated Spanish family ideology during Authoritarianism.

The PCE, in contrast, called for the introduction of divorce by mutual consent in 1979 (PCE, 1979: 11). Although, in the manifesto following the introduction of divorce, the question was completely absent (PCE, 1982) which is perhaps surprising given the parallel high profile moves towards divorce legislation by the party. By 1986, IU called for the reform of divorce laws and, notably, the abolition of the statutory period of legal separation as well as the inclusion of tighter controls of maintenance payments (IU, 1986: 28). After this date, however, the question disappeared from IU manifestos in spite of the lack of divorce law reform. As with the PSOE manifesto, it is difficult to explain the absence of divorce measures in the IU manifestos especially given the central role the measure plays within left wing and feminist ideologies associated with the party.

The theme of divorce was almost entirely absent from PSOE manifestos during the study period (PSOE 1977, 1979, 1982, 1989, 1993, 1996) with only the 1986
manifesto proposing laws to guarantee maintenance payments and just inheritance to divorced women (PSOE, 1986: 85). No statements to either reform or support of the contemporary legislation were present. In the same way, the centre-right CDS did not address the question of divorce in its manifestos (CDS, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993).

The only party which stood out against divorce was the right wing AP/PP. The CD manifesto of 1979 made clear its support of Christian values and the indissolubility of marriage (CD, 1979) as central to the political ideology of the party. After the introduction of the divorce law, the party did not propose to repeal any divorce legislation, although it did make promises to support the family and 'separated women' (as opposed, significantly, to divorced women) (AP, 1982: 136-38). Indeed in 1986 a clear pro-marriage position was defended, in which marriage was presented as the foundation of the family suggesting a negative opinion of alternative family forms (AP, 1986: 99). In contrast, the PP manifestos of 1993 and 1996 proposed measures for divorced women by setting up a special fund to support lone mothers (PP, 1993: 74, 1996: 5.5).

While the majority of the parties’ ideologies appear to support divorce, only the UCD (the party under which the law was introduced) and the Communists make explicit pro-divorce references in their manifestos. The low visibility of divorce in PSOE manifestos, notably during the late 1970s, seems a curious omission from a progressive party. The PP’s original negative view of divorce changed slightly into one of tolerance as demonstrated by the proposition of support measures for divorced women in the 1990s. The changes in the PP position shows a shift in the party’s political ideology about divorce, a theme which became more socially acceptable after the introduction of the law.

While the AP/PP openly spoke out against divorce before the legislation was introduced, the party has maintained a pro-family/marriage position which suggests
that divorce continues to be viewed negatively in Spanish right wing party political ideology. The PSOE’s lack of propositions to reform the two-tier Spanish divorce laws seems out of line with its liberal, pro-abortion and feminist ideological stance.

Parental authority

In Francoist ideology, parental authority was synonymous with paternal authority, and was expressed as such in law (see Chapter 5). The dominance of the patriarchal family model has been commented on as an important defining factor of Spanish culture by outside observers such as Ian Gibson (1992) and John Hooper (1993). Challenging such a deeply entrenched ideology became a major objective for the parties of the left in democratic Spain. This objective is reflected in the high visibility of policies for women and equality in the manifests examined here which generally greatly outnumber strictly family policy questions or substitute the ‘family’ as the heading under which family policy instruments are presented.

Across the time period, there appears to be a broad consensus relating to the equality of partners in the application of parental authority. The first and most explicit comes, perhaps surprisingly from the right. The CD manifesto of 1977 set out its support for equal rights between parents, although parental authority was phrased as the Spanish patria potestad that in literal translation relates primarily to the father (as represented by the etymology of the term patria, from ‘father’) (CD, 1977). The only other party that addressed this theme in 1977 was the PSOE, although its statement generally called for legal equality between men and women (PSOE, 1977: 20). In spite of the message in the 1977 CD manifesto, AP/PP barely addressed the theme of parental authority or equality in the family environment with the exception of vague, almost cursory, statements relating to gender equality in 1982 (AP, 1982: 137-38) and 1993 (PP, 1993: 74).
The UCD manifesto of 1979 supported ‘la igualdad jurídica entre los cónyuges’ (legal equality between spouses) (UCD, 1979: 25) and equality in the exercising of ‘patria potestad sobre los hijos al padre y a la madre’ (parental authority between the father and the mother) (UCD, 1979: 26), again the ideologically loaded term *patria potestad* was used. The term *patria potestad* was also used by the Communists in 1979 relating to equality in parental authority (PCE, 1979: 11), although this notion was opposed, in line with PCE ideology, in the 1982 manifesto in the ‘supresión del concepto de cabeza de familia y de cláusulas discriminatorias por cuestión del sexo en los convenios’ (abolition of the concept of head of the family and of clauses which discriminate between the sexes) (PCE, 1982: 21).

In 1986 the Communists attacked patriarchalism, and called for no legal loss of parental authority or custody for mothers in cases of adultery or lesbianism (IU, 1986: 28), as had previously been the case.

The CDS before 1986 made no reference to equal parental rights. In the 1986 manifesto, however, the CDS called for joint responsibility between men and women in the education and development of their children in accordance with UN directives relating gender discrimination (CDS, 1986: 92-3). The party underlined the fact that women were still unequal in family life in spite of the changes that had taken place since 1977. Thus suggesting that statutory anti-discriminatory measures were insufficient (CDS, 1989: 57) although this was later dropped from the 1993 electoral programme (CDS, 1993).

Undoubtedly the most consistent support for gender equality in the family comes from the PSOE. The 1979 programme calls for true equality of opportunity, rights and responsibilities in family life (PSOE, 1979: 29). In 1982 the Socialists continued to demonstrate their ideological position through support for equality in ‘responsabilidades cotidianas de la vida familiar’ (daily responsibilities of family life) (PSOE, 1982: 29). In 1986 there were no specific family measures, but the party
supported gender equality in all areas (PSOE, 1986: 81-5). In 1989 the PSOE raised themes such as difficulties of equality in family life (PSOE, 1989: 65) and addressed attitudes towards equality through education policies from early age (PSOE, 1989: 66). Both of the latter were present in 1993 (PSOE, 1993: 58-9) and 1996 (PSOE, 1996: 66-7) and represented the commitment of the PSOE to the rights of women.

Child benefits

The ideologies of the parties of the right and centre-right examined in this chapter have made clear their support of the family which they see as ‘una de las instituciones más básicas de la sociedad’ (one of the most basic institutions of society) (AP, 1982: 135), ‘la institución básica del conjunto’ (the basic institution of the community) (UCD, 1977: 13) or ‘el principal soporte afectivo de las personas’ (the principal source of emotional support for people) (CDS, 1982: 62). For these and other reasons the parties have defended policies to support the family. Perhaps the clearest indicator of commitment to families is the amount of financial resources that are directed towards them. During the study period Spain spent relatively little, in fact the lowest in the EU according to Eurostat (1998: 68), on family policy. Child benefits were not increased in line with inflation between 1971 and 1990 and thus had a negligible impact on family budgets for the greater part of this study.

The relatively low impact of child benefits is reflected in the party manifestos. None of the parties included child benefit pledges in the 1977 manifestos. In 1979, child benefits were proposed by the UCD and the left as a means of vertical redistribution. The UCD outlined proposals for benefits targeting the most needy (UCD, 1979: 25), which was echoed by the PCE 1979, and sought to assist poor families (PCE, 1979). In addition to targeting the poorest families, the PSOE further pledged allowances for single mothers (PSOE, 1979: 29), commensurate with left wing concepts of state intervention.
This aim of combating poverty through child benefits was maintained by the PSOE in 1982 in a pledge to reform the child benefits, notably as a means of assistance for the unemployed with dependant children (PSOE, 1982: 23). The CDS manifesto of 1982 also pledged reforms to the child benefit system, but, whilst it sought to assist poorer families, it also focused on large families which may suggest pro-natalist objectives (CDS, 1982: 63). Prior to the re-valuation of child benefits in 1991, the then party of government, the PSOE, outlined their intention to reform allowances, 'incrementándola significamente' (increasing them significantly) (PSOE, 1989: 27).

In 1993, after the allowances were increased, the theme returned to the party agenda of the CDS and the PP. Whereas the CDS called for benefits to paid from the first child (CDS, 1993: 5), a measure which in France (see Chapter 6) may be considered as a demonstration of opposition to pro-natalism, the PP explicitly defines its pro-natalist objectives: 'En función de la política demográfica, el establecimiento de ayudas económicos directas a las familias con tres o más hijos' (in line with demographic policy, the establishment of economic assistance for families with three or more children) (PP, 1993: 74). Although it is later added that this assistance will be based upon the level of family income (PP, 1993) it is still clear that pro-natalism continues to play a central role in PP ideology. In 1996, however, neither the PP nor the PSOE addressed child benefits.

There appears to be general consensus among the Spanish parties that direct financial transfers ought to be targeted towards poorer families, even for the parties of the right, which, whilst favouring large families, clearly do not defend benefits for all large families irrespective of income as may be expected of right wing pro-family ideologies, notably in France. This picture of the parties contrasts with the universal nature of child benefits in Spain. It may be argued that these allowances have a relatively limited impact on the family budgets of wealthier families on the one hand,
and on the other hand they fail to meet the aim of sufficiently assisting poorer families.

Fiscal measures

Tax relief for families, either based upon number of children (cuota familiar) or indirectly (or implicitly) through mortgage relief, have perhaps had more impact on family budgets than any other policy measure examined here (Fernández Cordón, 1996: 51). Since 1992 the economic impact of tax relief has had a greater effect on family budgets than other transfers, although in an economic study of the relative impact of these measures, Gerardo Meil (1994: 976-79) concluded that, even taking tax relief into consideration, financial support of the family in Spain fell behind that of other EU countries.

The analysis of tax relief in the party manifestos reveals an ideological split across left and right. The PSOE made no reference to tax relief for families during the study period before 1996. This was reflected in the analysis of the Communist party programmes with only the exception of 1986 manifesto calling for the reform of the system of joint declarations that effectively discriminated against married, dual-earner fiscal households (PCE, 1986: 28). This latter objective was also addressed by the CDS (1982: 62) although tax relief appeared a low priority in 1986 and 1989. In the 1993 manifesto, the only reference made to tax measures concerned the reduction of the definition of large families from four to three or more children (CDS, 1993: 5). The reluctance of the left to use fiscal measures as a means of redistribution is directly linked with the concept of targeting state intervention at poorer individuals who would be less likely to feel the impact of tax relief on household budgets.

On the right, the UCD pledged to increase fiscal benefits for families (UCD, 1979: 25), although it was AP/PP which prioritised fiscal measures as a means of assistance to families. In 1977 the CD manifesto stated, 'las leyes fiscales deben ser modificadas
si se quiere proteger verdaderamente a la familia’ (fiscal laws must be reform in order to provide tangible protection of the family) (CD, 1977) and called for dual earner couples to be considered separately for tax declaration purposes (CD, 1977). This theme is presented consistently in later manifestos with the addition, in 1993 and 1996, of greater family tax deductions for families with three or more children (PP, 1993: 74) which was ideologically consistent with the demographic policy objectives presented in the 1993 and 1996 manifestos (see child benefits above). This position is consistent with right wing ideological support for neo-liberalism as well as privacy and responsibility.

Unlike the uniformity of parties’ positions in relation to child benefits, there is a clear commitment on the right, notably AP/PP, to tax relief as a means of family support. In spite of the complete absence of family tax reductions as a part of PSOE family/social policy elections pledges. It is significant to note that the reforms sought by the other parties were implemented by the Socialist government over the study period.

**Maternity leave**

A further split between left and right party ideologies can be observed in maternity leave policies. Maternity leave is an important policy instrument for the reconciliation of family and employment commitments and consequently figures prominently in the left’s drive towards combating gender discrimination. In spite of the high visibility of gender equality/employment policies, the PSOE did not outline any measures relating to parental/maternity leave until 1989. Even the 1989 manifesto only made vague statements relating to assisting mothers to reconcile work and family life (PSOE, 1989: 66). In 1993, however, a clear commitment was made, with a pledge for maternity leave to be considered as any other sick leave and eligible for full salary (PSOE, 1993: 59), a policy which was introduced by the González government in 1994.
The Communists also supported maternity leave within a package to encourage women into the labour market and thus went further than proposing maternity leave. Their pledges included a yearly quota of leave, for either parent, to care for young or sick children (PCE, 1982: 21). The 1986 PCE manifesto called for the full reinstatement on the return to work of either parent taking paid leave for the care of young children (PCE, 1986: 28). Later manifestos did not mention maternity leave largely as a result of the 1994 reform.

While the CDS made general statements about reconciling employment and family life (CDS, 1989: 57), none of the parties of the right specifically addressed maternity leave policies in their manifestos, although this may result from the prioritisation of childcare measures, notably a maternal wage and social security contributions for mothers who choose to bring up their children. It may, however, result from the ideological underpinning of patriarchalism which assumes mothers would remain as housewives or, in the context of private responsibility, within the family sphere.

**Childcare**

The provision of childcare is also a significant indicator of both support for the family and commitment to encouraging women to enter the labour market. In spite of the great amount of rhetoric related to encouraging female participation in the work place, particularly, although not exclusively, from the Socialists and Communists, childcare has remained underdeveloped, provided largely by the private sector and unregulated. The theme of childcare is relatively visible in the manifestos of all of the parties during the first half of the study, although there is a clear distinction between public and private care for young children between the left and right wing ideologies respectively. With the exception of the PSOE, none of the parties included policies directed at the care of pre-school children after 1986.
Childcare provision by the state was advocated by the parties of the left, consistent with left wing interventionist ideology. The PSOE pledged the creation of nurseries to help encourage mothers into the labour market (PSOE, 1982: 29). The PCE also expressed commitment to public sector childcare as a measure to encourage working mothers into the work place (PCE, 1979: 12, 1982: 21). The CDS manifestos of 1982 and 1986 outlined plans to develop nurseries and pre-school places with assistance for working mothers (CDS, 1982: 63, 1986: 92) thus echoing both the Socialists and Communists. In 1989 no specific mention was made of pre-school places, although a general commitment to assisting mothers and to reconciling employment and family life was included (CDS, 1989: 57). In addition to the further development of pre-school places the PSOE manifesto of 1993 pledged the introduction of measures to help working mothers to pay for childcare (PSOE, 1993: 59). Although this is not developed further, this may suggest a move towards the French AGED or UK childcare vouchers system (see Chapter 6) which would suggest a break with traditional state intervention policies. In 1996 childcare measures are absent from the PSOE manifesto.

On the right, the AP/PP echoed the left’s policy of creation of nursery places to assist working mothers (AP, 1982: 136), as a distinct policy instrument which was outlined by both AP/PP and the UCD. In support of mothers choosing to stay at home to bring up their children, both AP/PP and the UCD called for the ‘ama de casa’ (housewife) to be granted a social status to include a maternal wage equivalent to the minimum salary and social security and pensions contributions (UCD, 1979: 26; AP, 1982: 138). These measures can be criticised as anti-feminist, being reminiscent of the housewife’s status under the Franco regime (see Chapter 5). The 1986 manifesto proved an exception by pledging pre-school grants to assist parents with young parents (AP, 1986: 101). In contrast to the other manifestos in the sample, the PP manifesto of 1996 outlined policies to develop day care centres (1996: 5.7). In the case of childcare, the right is clearly in favour of public policies for families, which
contrasts with the theme of privacy in other areas. This is likely to be a result of the persistence of pro-family ideology on the Spanish right.

Conclusions
The Transition to Democracy brought about many changes in Spanish party political ideology that had impacts upon both politics and daily life in Spain. The family was a highly potent symbol of Spanish identity during the time of Franco, and consequently ideology surrounding the family must be considered as being highly resistant to change, and with a potential for not only political conflict in cross-party debate, but also physical conflict, as happened during the Civil War (see Chapter 5).

The regulatory measures examined above are, perhaps, the most indicative of the strength of family ideologies at the Transition. Of these, abortion and divorce have been shown to be on-going sources of party political conflict. The legalisation of divorce and abortion was orchestrated by the left wing PSOE, the party which dominated the study period. While the PSOE can be seen as being progressive, the reforms have been criticised by IU as not having gone far enough. Divorce legislation has also been slower in its liberalisation than may be expected in a state dominated by progressive left wing ideology and continues, at the time of writing, to be an expensive and time-consuming two-stage process. Abortion continues to be highly regulated and is still the source of controversy, exemplified by the PP’s renewal of its opposition to abortion based upon its right wing ideology. Given the continued controversy surrounding many aspects of regulatory reform, it is possible to conclude that, in spite of the legislative changes, family ideology, notably in relation to questions which have been condemned by Franco and the Catholic Church, has remained strong in Spain.
### Table 8.3 Family policy measures in Spanish election manifestos 1977-1993

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**Key:** 1 abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6 fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave; 8 childcare, 9 pro-family statement.

A characteristic of the Socialist era of Spanish politics has been the limited expenditure on support measures. Little has been spent on child benefits or childcare, in spite of rhetoric to the contrary, most notably in relation to assisting mothers to find employment. Valiente (1995) argues that this may result from the Socialists wishing to avoid intervention in the family sphere, which it considers as being inherently...
linked with the ideology of Francoism, although this contrasts sharply with the basic premise of state intervention in the ideology of the left.

However, had the PSOE explicitly targeted child benefits at poorer families and abandoned universal child benefits, such criticism could have been contested. It is, therefore, possible that by failing to increase the value of allowances while doing little to provide financial support for poorer families, the PSOE government was following financial prudence in relation to family policies.

While the family has not been a totally absent theme in the party manifestos (Table 8.3), it has become less common over the study period, significantly since the 1982 Civil Code reforms. The greatest changes have been in the regulatory measures which because of their links with deep core ideology, had to change as fundamentally as Spain’s political institutions if Spain were to become a modern democracy. The fact there is still the potential for conflict may indicate that deep core ideology about the family is not as potent as that relating to the stability of Spanish democracy.

At the beginning of this chapter, the definition of a national context for family ideology was avoided. This was justified by the break in the political (ideological) continuity of the state. The national ideological context was developed in this context through the analysis of the parties. The key elements of this context have been found to be disparate and contradictory. The left wing parties have given much rhetorical significance to a public/individual position, but in real policies, these parties, notably the PSOE, are limited by the strength of traditional Spanish family values.

Interestingly, the right has not been able to pursue policies based upon these family values for fear of being associated with the Authoritarian past. Consequently, the impact of the past and the Transition on party political ideology and family policy has been such that both left and right wing parties have not been able to develop their full,
potential ideological position. This lack of a definite position has also resulted in the disparate and implicit nature of family policies.
Chapter 9 - CONCLUSIONS: THE DYNAMICS OF IDEOLOGY AND CHANGING FAMILY POLICIES

The present chapter brings together the results of the national case studies and compares them cross-nationally. The chapter is structured so as to address each of the seven core research questions:

- To what extent have family policies changed?
- To what extent have family policies converged/diverged across the countries?
- To what extent have political ideologies relating to the family changed?
- To what extent have political ideologies relating to the family evolved in terms of the political left and right and across the countries?
- Has the relationship between family policies and political ideologies evolved along similar lines?
- Is it possible to demonstrate a causal relationship between changing political ideologies and family policies?
- Do changes in family policies result from changes in political ideologies, does the reverse relationship exist or do both processes act interdependently?

The first stage of the comparison focuses on the dimension of family policy change across France, the UK and Spain. Following this, political ideologies of left and right are examined through the comparison of the parties across national boundaries. The purpose of these two dimensions of comparison is to demonstrate the extent to which first, national family policies and, second, political ideologies have been evolving along similar lines across France, the UK and Spain. Further conclusions relating to the concept of ideology are drawn based upon the comparison of these two dimensions. Although neither the family policies nor party political ideologies studied
in the thesis have evolved in direct parallel for the three countries, the direction of change can be considered as being similar. Thus the present chapter concludes by analysing the results of the cross-national analysis within the theoretical framework, in relation to the thematics of public/private and family/individual and returns to the hypothesis asking the question: to what extent have changes in political ideologies impacted upon changes in family policies? In addition, this chapter re-examines the exploratory objectives of the thesis and addresses questions which have remained unanswered, the limitations of the methods employed and the possibilities for future research in this area from a methodological and thematic perspective.

Comparing changing family policies

Chapter 5 examined the eight policy measures of which four (abortion, contraception, divorce and parental authority) were conceptualised as sharing the common objective of regulating family life and four (child benefits, fiscal measures, maternity leave and childcare) as providing material support for families. It was argued in Chapter 4 that regulatory measures were linked with deep core political ideologies and were therefore expected to prove highly resistant to change. Support measures were identified as being more likely to be based upon near core beliefs and secondary aspects, thus less resistant to change. Secondary aspects relating to support measures, such as financial prudence, were identified as being particularly susceptible to change. It was therefore argued that greater changes were to be expected in support measures than in regulatory ones because of the relative resistance to change in the political ideologies which informed them. The following section seeks to answer the key research questions: To what extent have family policies changed and, to what extent have family policies converged/diverged across the countries?

Changing trends in regulatory measures

By the end of the 1970s, the regulatory measures of France and the UK were largely in place. Over the study period these measures, with the exception of abortion in
France, which was reformed in 1981 to resemble closely the UK legislation, were identified as having undergone little or no change. Abortion, and to a lesser extent divorce, continued to prove ideologically controversial on the French far right, but by the end of the study period regulatory measures were characterised by a general consensus across the main parties in both France and the UK. Thus changes in policies relating to abortion, contraception, divorce and parental authority have evolved along similar lines in France and the UK. Equally, the legislation relating to these measures demonstrates general converging trends over the study period.

At the beginning of the Spanish case study, regulatory measures were shown to be sources of controversy and political conflict. Measures such as abortion, contraception and divorce had previously been illegal and legislation relating to parental authority had been inherently anti-feminist. During the Transition to Democracy, however, the regulatory measures of Authoritarianism were rejected by changes to the Constitution and the Civil Code, although this was not without its difficulties (see Chapters 5 and 8). A growing political desire from the left to pursue policies based on the rights of women resulted in transformations in parental authority legislation and the liberalisation of contraception in the early 1980s. Right wing opposition to abortion and divorce continued to be strong, as represented in the court cases brought against the government during the early 1980s (see Chapter 8).

However, largely as a result of left wing persistence, a desire to modernise Spanish society and PSOE dominance, first divorce and then abortion were legalised in spite of the opposition. Both of these measures, however, remain more tightly regulated than in either France or the UK. Although explicit political criticism of abortion and divorce dwindled during the 1990s, failure to liberalise them further in line with France and the UK may indicate an underlying deep core objection, possibly stemming from the strength of the right wing ideology of National Catholicism, to abortion and divorce in the Spanish polity.
In spite of the controversy surrounding regulatory measures in Spain, the potential for deep core ideologies to change over time may lead to future liberalisation. A possible condition for this may come in the form of greater EU harmonisation and integration of these measures. Although a backlash in right wing party political ideology may occur, it is unlikely that the measures will be repealed for fear of comparisons with the authoritarian regime, as has argued Valiente (Chapter 8).

Comparing family support

Family support measures in the three countries have evolved at a different pace and in different ways to the end of the study period. Support measures in the three countries can be considered as having undergone incremental changes over the period as a whole. In the French case, attempts to implement relatively radical reforms in 1981 and 1995 failed in the first instance due to fiscal prudence in the context of a growing economic crisis, and in the second instance because of the possible effects of deep core ideologies. The French child benefit system was seen to embody the core concerns of party ideologies in relation to the family (see Chapter 6). Any threat to it has met with widespread public and political opposition. The fact that the system remains in spite of convincing economic arguments to reform or abolish it, suggests the underlying ideological (in effect the opposite of scientific) nature of this measure in France.

Perhaps the greatest reforms in French family policy came in relation to child benefits and childcare. Early in the study period, an allowance (APJE) was paid from the first child thus reversing the pro-natalist ideological tradition by which payments were made from the second child, although this was a one-off payment not, strictly speaking, child benefit. The question of payments to the first child in France is however open to a number of interpretations. While, traditionally, pro-natalist ideological arguments have suggested that payment from the second child encourages larger families, it may be argued that the first child constitutes that greatest financial
burden. Payments to the first child may also be considered as pro-natalist as they seek to assist or encourage couples to have children. These different interpretations blur the distinctions between the left and right in France. It may be argued that payments to the first child are of greatest benefit to poorer families and therefore are more in line with left wing re-distributive aims rather than right wing pro-natalism.

Later in the study period (from the mid-1980s) childcare policies from the right came to dominate the package of support for families through a proliferation of different measures that were based on the principle of private family responsibility. Maternity leave was also reformed as in the UK and Spain, while fiscal measures were expanded to take account of the growing number of cohabiting couples, although tax relief relating to the number of children has remained unchanged suggesting the persistence of one element of right wing ideology although change can be seen in its inclusion of unmarried couples which may reflect France’s relatively high rates of cohabitation and births outside marriage (see Chapter 5).

In the UK of the 1980s and 1990s the fundamental nature of social protection and state intervention came under increased scrutiny. Child benefits remained universal and were paid to mothers, and were subject to minor reforms over the study period. Both maternity leave and childcare remained under-developed. Working mothers received only limited statutory protection before 1994 and the application of the EU pregnant worker’s directive. Fiscal measures, in line with neo-liberal ideology, underwent the greatest reforms with the Married Man’s Allowance being replaced by the Married Couple’s Allowance. Poorer families were also targeted by fiscal reforms which sought to combat the benefit trap by reducing the amount of income tax payable on benefits received. This latter development is representative of the Conservative government’s desire to reduce benefit dependency by making employment more economically viable and further encourage the privatisation of the family.
While the evolution of support measures in France and the UK could largely be expected to have undergone incremental change, a more radical shift in support measures may have been expected in Spain given the fundamental institutional transformation of the country after Franco’s death because of the very limited nature of these measures at the time and the left’s desire to address family poverty. However, unlike the regulatory measures, material support for families has evolved little in Spain since the late 1970s. The same system of universal child benefits which was in place at the end of Authoritarianism was maintained and continued to have a negligible impact on family budgets in spite of revaluation in the early 1990s. As in the UK, working mothers have continued to have little in the way of statutory protection, with state provision of childcare remaining undeveloped. Maternity leave, again as in the UK, was reformed in line with the EU directive of 1994. The most notable support measure in post-Authoritarian Spain is the family related tax relief package, which, while representing an implicit family policy measure, has been identified as providing greater financial transfers to families than the child benefit system.

**Identifying trends**

When comparing trends, the distinctions between regulatory and support measures reveal different evolutions in family policies across the three countries. If regulatory measures are compared, France and the UK appear to be converging over the case study period. Both countries had free availability of contraception, parental equality was shared by both fathers and mothers, divorce was legal and established and, by 1981, abortion was freely available in public clinics and hospitals.

In contrast, abortion and divorce were illegal in Spain into the early/mid 1980s and have remained tightly controlled. While contraception and parental authority had been reformed in the early days of the Transition, to closely resemble the legislation of
France and the UK, the reform of divorce and abortion laws proved far more problematic. Despite the legalisation of divorce (1982) and the decriminalisation of abortion (1985), both measures are more restrictive in terms of access and cost than in France and the UK, with neither the two-tier divorce law nor the complex process of seeking the termination of pregnancy the subject of proposed reform by any of the parties at the time of writing. However, there is a will on the Spanish left, to pursue modernisation which, if combined with increased EU harmonisation of family and social policies, may result in greater convergence with France and the UK in the future.

From the perspective of support measures, a number of similarities can be seen between the UK and Spain. Neither country has an integrated or explicit family policy, and both have demonstrated limited efforts to develop childcare or maternity leave. In relation to child benefits, all three countries pay benefits for the first child, although it is important to make the distinction between the one-off payment (APJE) in France and the universal benefits in the UK and Spain. French fiscal measures are distinct from those of both the UK and Spain insofar as they consider family income and the number of dependent children. In the UK marriage was the only criteria for family-related income tax relief during the study period. In Spain, the complex range of tax relief measures has been suggested by Lluis Flaquer\(^{33}\) as having a greater impact on family budgets than child benefits, and is a highly implicit and largely under-estimated family policy measure. The impact of fiscal measures upon family incomes in Spain is, at the time of writing, a significant new area of research in Spanish family policy, the findings of which may further understanding not only of this topic, but also other family policy measures related to it, notably child benefits and childcare provision.

\(^{33}\) Personal communication, 1999.
Overall, even when the slow process of liberalisation of regulatory measures in Spain is considered, family policies appear to be converging across the three countries. France and the UK are largely similar, at the time of writing, and Spain may only be considered as lagging behind the other two countries as a direct result of the relatively recent, in historical terms, demise of a far right authoritarian regime. Indeed, moves towards social modernisation have been steady throughout the study period and show no sign of slowing down at the time of writing. In addition, the growth in the privatisation of the family based on neo-liberal economics is also beginning to have an impact.

Comparing changing political ideologies
The second main focus of the thesis is changing political ideologies as identified from the analysis of the election manifestos and the broader political framework of the main political parties of France, the UK and Spain. This section therefore focuses upon the third and fourth of the seven research questions: To what extent have political ideologies relating to the family changed, and to what extent do they represent converging/diverging trends across left and right and the countries?

The case studies revealed how various political parties have aligned themselves with the family. This section examines the family as an element of party political ideology that crosses both traditional ideological and national boundaries based on the findings of the national case study analysis of the manifestos.

Parties of the right
One of the central findings of the empirical case studies has been the importance of the family in the political ideology of right wing parties in all three countries. Over the study period, parties of the right were shown to have defended the family as a primary group, the foundation of society. Statements such as the UK Conservative party’s ‘we are the party of the family’ sum up this position and this can be seen in
the commonplace occurrence of pro-family statements in the manifestos of all of the right wing parties examined (see Table 9.1).

Parties of the right across the three study countries appear to see themselves as the representatives of the family within the political sphere. This 'natural' relationship between the right and the family stems from one or more of the following sources for each country;

- first, parties of the right largely seek to maintain social order and continuity, the family is seen as embodying social stability and high moral values and is therefore a valuable component of society in right wing ideologies. Indeed, the survival of the family has been linked with that of the state itself;

- second, parties of the right are generally associated with the dominant, if not official, religion of the country (Catholicism in France and Spain, Anglicanism in the UK) and are to some extent influenced by religious teachings. In this case however, divergence may be attributable to different 'official' religions (as demonstrated by the cases of divorce and contraception in the UK);

- third, parties of the right have been generally patriarchalist;

- fourth, parties of the right are generally associated with pro-natalism, although the UK Conservative party is divergent from its counterpart in France and Spain on this point as a result of traditional fears of over-population. It is important to note, however, that the Conservative party, rather than focussing on the quantity of individuals in society, has been explicit in its pursuit of quality through eugenics, as revealed in the 1970s controversy over lone parents and social/family breakdown;

- fifth the right wing parties have presented the family as a private concern that embodies the notions of responsibility for care, education, transmission of values and support.
These five elements of right wing family ideology were also demonstrated as having been manifested in the policies; in effect, the Ideological State Apparatuses of the authoritarian regimes of France and Spain. Under the Vichy government (1940-44) in France and the Franco regime in Spain (1938-75), family policies became increasingly concerned with regulatory measures which had both moral and pro-natalist aims through the criminalisation of abortion, birth control and divorce, as well as measures which placed parental authority firmly in the hands of fathers. In addition, support measures also sought to encourage the birth rate through financial benefits for large families, as well as limiting mothers’ rights and opportunities to find employment.

At the same time as these policies were developed in France, the UK did not have a right wing authoritarian government. However, British Conservatism did share similar views about abortion and contraception and, most significantly, the role of men and women in the family.

The parties of the right have developed their family ideology based upon the themes and traditions outlined above. The study of the manifestos helps reveal the extent to which these party ideologies have persisted in the study period, and, perhaps more significantly, the extent to which the parties are prepared to defend any policies, as represented in the financial commitment they may require, or whether the parties continue to oppose any policy which conflicts with their ideology.

The right and regulation

Chapter 4 showed that regulatory measures, given their inherent normative objectives as well as the lesser financial commitment they require, provide an indicator of moral beliefs of parties. Table 9.1 shows the four parties of the right examined across the three countries. The most significant inclusion in this sample is the French Front National, which is the only far-right party in the sample. Neither the UK nor Spain has a far right political party which has had any notable impact on political life. While
it may be argued that the inclusion of the FN is not appropriate in this comparison given the lack of any counterparts in the UK and Spain, its inclusion serves, first, to highlight the centrality of the family in right wing ideology, second, to help explain the position of the RPR/UDF, and third, to demonstrate the extent to which such an ideological position is expressed, if at all, by the right in the UK and Spain.

The first of the regulatory measures examined in the case studies was abortion, an issue which was opposed by the FN in all of its manifestos. The Spanish PP/AP was the only other right wing party in the sample to address abortion, opposing it in 1979, 1986 and 1993. Neither the RPR/UDF nor the Conservatives oppose or indeed, mention abortion in the sample. While the FN has openly and vehemently stood against abortion, which significantly, in terms of the resistance of its ideology, had been fully legalised at the time of publication of all of the FN sample documents. The PP/AP has inconsistently opposed abortion, in 1979 before legalisation, and in 1986 and 1993 after legalisation, perhaps revealing either internal party conflict over this issue, or, more probably, reflecting the conflict between the party’s ideology (anti-abortion) and its fear of alienating sectors of the electorate in Spain.

The opposition to an existing measure by the FN and the PP/AP demonstrates the deep core nature of opposition to abortion. Both the FN and the PP/AP have links with the Catholic Church and thus oppose abortion on moral grounds. In addition, the FN opposes abortion on pro-natalist grounds commensurate with its nationalist/racist ideological stance which sees family policy as an Ideological State Apparatus to strengthen the French nation and its ‘indigenous’ people.

It is perhaps significant that the RPR/UDF does not address abortion in its manifestos. This absence can be explained by:

- first, the RPR/UDF, although a party of the right, was instrumental in the development of legalisation of abortion in France before the case study period, and thus does not oppose the law;
second, the RPR/UDF as the dominant party of the French right, distinguishes itself from the FN and, thus, avoids such a potentially controversial issue. However, nor does the RPR/UDF openly support abortion, most significantly in its 1981 manifesto, which was published during the debate on free abortion within the contributory health scheme. By not supporting abortion, the RPR/UDF manifestos may represent either the existence of internal party conflict or an attempt to not lose potential voters to the FN.

In the case of the UK, abortion was legalised, as in France, before the study period. While this alone may explain the lack of this issue from Conservative manifestos, it may also represent a similar position to the RPR/UDF in relation to either internal party conflict, or a possible desire not to alienate a portion of its potential support, although in the UK no other right wing party provides the same electoral threat as the FN in France.

Although contraception may be closely related to abortion in terms of both moral objections or pro-natalism, none of the right wing parties opposed the legalisation of contraception, perhaps, again, as a reflection of changing attitudes of the electorate. As with abortion, the RPR/UDF and Conservative party do not address the issue (Table 9.1). Where contraception is addressed by the PP/AP, it does so in a positive way, and presented it as an alternative to abortion, further suggesting that the deep core nature of opposition to abortion, which may be seen as one potentially controversial position (contraception had been illegal under Franco) is surpassed by another. The fact that the PP/AP suggests alternatives to abortion in manifestos that do not address the issue reveals the relative strength of an anti-abortion position in the party’s ideology.

In similar terms, the FN’s opposition to contraception is not based upon purely moral grounds and may represent alternative measures to abortion in the 1997 manifesto.
Where opposition to contraception is expressed however the FN further diverges from the other parties in this sample. In both 1985 and 1993, the FN opposes the use of contraception within the context of its pro-natalist/nationalist ideology, a position which is not represented by the other three parties in relation to this measure.

Table 9.1: Family policy measures and the parties of the right

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Key: 1 abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6 fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave; 8 childcare; 9 pro-family statement

Divorce is a further issue which has been opposed by the Catholic Church and consequently some right wing parties in France and Spain. In the UK a longer tradition of divorce may explain the lack of any opposition within Conservative party ideology, which has been more concerned with the economic effects of divorce in its
manifestos, although the perceived negative social effects of divorce were an ideological concern for the party in the 1990s, especially in the UK.

While the RPR/UDF made no mention of divorce in their manifestos, the FN criticised divorce in the context of both pro-natalist and social arguments which supported the nuclear family as the optimum environment for child-rearing, although the party did not call for the abolition of divorce, suggesting that any such opposition is not related to deep core ideology. In Spain divorce has been highly controversial and the PP/AP explicitly opposed the proposed divorce law in its 1979 manifesto. After the divorce law was introduced in Spain, however, the PP/AP ceased to oppose it, and commented on support for marriage and for divorced mothers. The Spanish case thus represents a situation in which the introduction of a policy measure has resulted in the abandonment of opposition suggesting the near core nature of divorce in PP/AP ideology.

The question of parental authority has been shown to be an indicator of gender inequality, which was at its most prevalent in the ideology of Franco’s Spain. While in France and Spain the parental authority debate has been contested in relation to gender issues, the UK stands apart as a case where the lines between the state and the individual have become disputed in relation to parental rights. Privatisation of care and greater individual responsibility during the 1980s and 1990s in the UK are reflected in the Conservative manifestos which support a situation in which the family is firmly situated in the private domain, with the state as a last resort for the care of children in need.

In France and Spain, debate has centred on the role of the parents. While the legal equality of parents in France was in place before the study period, the FN ideology highlights what it termed ‘biological differences’ between men and women and thus sought to maintain an anti-feminist breadwinner model of the family. While the FN
does not go so far as suggesting that fathers be given legal authority, its position on support measures (such as child benefits) and lack of childcare or maternity leave serves to create further inequalities between parents.

In contrast, the RPR/UDF offers support for equality in the exercising of parental authority, although this is only a minor theme (Table 9.1), it is significant as the only regulatory theme in the RPR/UDF sample. Parental authority may be considered as being far less controversial than abortion, contraception or divorce which may further suggest that the lack of an RPR/UDF position on these three issues represents an attempt to avoid conflict on potentially deep core issues. It does, however, highlight the centrality of the principle of the private responsibility of the family in the ideologies of the main right wing parties.

Perhaps largely as a result of the legacy of Authoritarianism, the PP/AP does not address the question of parental authority in the sample other than through vague statements in 1982 and 1993 (Table 9.1), which are supportive of gender equality. This to be appears a minor concern in the ideology of the Spanish right in spite of the significance of this area during the Franco years.

*The right and family support*

Perhaps the most significant result of the content analysis of the right wing parties can be seen in column 7 of Table 9.1. None of the right wing parties offers a position relating to maternity leave for the whole study period. While this lack of policy statement stands as a potentially convergent element of the analysis of the right wing party ideologies, there are two possible explanations (below), both of which relate to other measures in the study.

The RPR/UDF stands out in the sample in relation to its commitment to childcare policies (Table 9.1). Over the study period, the RPR/UDF has defended women’s employment and, whilst in government, implemented childcare measures. While the
RPR/UDF does not address specific maternity leave measures, its support for women's employment suggests a largely egalitarian position which may not require reforms to the existing maternity leave measures. Further, the inclusion of such a wide-ranging childcare position, combined with support for gender equality contrasts sharply with the FN.

The FN supports neither maternity leave nor childcare measures in the context of its argument that mothers should remain at home to rear their children. Any such measures were therefore deemed unnecessary. This position reflects deep core ideology not only about the role of the family in society, which is valued for its childrearing function, but also about the roles of men and women. The FN clearly sees women's primary function as mothers. This ideological position is strongly defended throughout the study period in spite, or perhaps because, of growing women's employment and increased childcare facilities.

While the Conservative party's position in relation to maternity leave and childcare may appear from the table as similar to that of the FN in France, the lack of such measures may be explained by an entirely different political ideology. Any lack of childcare or maternity leave in the Conservative manifestos results from the central theme of privatisation in Thatcherite and post-Thatcherite ideology. The Conservatives do not oppose the principle of maternity leave or childcare, they merely see it as a matter of private concern, to be negotiated with the employer in the first instance or paid for by parents (de facto working mothers) in the second. This further reflects Conservative attitudes towards state intervention in the private sphere as opposed to any possible anti-feminist attitudes, although it may be argued that the lack of such measures may reflect a negative vision of women's work within the ideology of the right.

The PP/AP's ideological position in relation to maternity leave and childcare may, at first, be interpreted as the continuation of anti-feminism as exemplified by Franco's
ideology. While nothing relating to maternity leave is included in the PP/AP manifestos, possible anti-feminist measures (notably the lack of measures to support working mothers) relating to the child-rearing role of women are present and are similar to FN proposals. That such measures are not developed further than one or two sentences may suggest the potential for conflict over this position, notably in the context of the legacy of Authoritarianism.

The family in right wing political ideologies

The parties of the right have traditionally supported the family as a primary group in society with private responsibilities. Often this conception of the family has been synonymous with the defence of patriarchy and pro-natalism, although the latter has not been a feature of the British right. These themes are reflected both in the regulatory and support measures analysed. The FN and PP ideologies have been open in their opposition to both abortion and divorce. In addition these parties have done little to further the cause of gender equality, indeed the FN has based its anti-feminist position upon what it has described as biological truths. The FN has also been explicit and steadfast in its defence of the traditional (French) family. The PP’s position has gradually become liberalised over the study period converging with the RPR/UDF and Conservative parties. While originally opposing abortion and divorce, it has ceased to do so in its manifestos since legalisation. Equally, the PP has developed support for gender equality exemplified in the 1996 manifesto. The theme of the depopulation of Spain is maintained in the PP policy pledges, which are made more explicit in the 1990s.

The FN has also weakened its opposition to abortion and divorce over the study period, although this only relative to the position expressed by the party in 1985, and continues to diverge from the other right wing party ideologies in the study.

The RPR/UDF manifestos provide an ambiguous picture of the party’s ideological position in relation to the family. The RPR/UDF does not pursue the same family
policy agenda as the FN and makes few clear references to regulatory measures. While this may be interpreted as an attempt to avoid controversy, it must be remembered that abortion was legalised during an RPR/UDF government. The family is clearly valued as with all of the right wing parties, but the 1980s appear to represent a period of transition, during which concern with population decline is overtaken by the problems of France's economy and policies of fiscal prudence. Family policy measures are closely linked with employment creation objectives, as demonstrated by the growth in childcare measures which both create employment in the care sector as well as assisting mothers to seek paid employment.

The RPR/UDF's commitment to developing childcare policies stands in contrast to the almost complete lack of any such policies in the Conservative party's manifestos. Indeed, the Conservative party did little over the study period to either regulate or support families in the UK. The most significant policy introduction of the period (the Child Support Act) was a clear product of the dominant element of Thatcherite ideology: the privatisation of welfare.

Left wing parties

The main left wing parties of France, the UK and Spain have had a different impact upon the governments of their respective countries. In France, the PS has experienced its most consistent period of electoral success during the study. Although the PS did not govern France uninterrupted from 1981-97, its presence has been almost constant in the presidency. In stark contrast, the Labour party in the UK was in opposition for the whole study period, and its influence on family policies is thus limited. The PSOE has been the most successful party in the new Spanish Democracy and has had the greatest impact upon family policies, although the reforms introduced by the Socialists were not as far reaching as may have been expected from a left wing party.
Family policies and support of the family, have not traditionally been a left wing issue indeed all of the left wing parties can be characterised by their commitment to vertical redistribution and gender equality rather than the family.

The PS, however, supported the family in the early 1980s as may be expected in the context of French politics and the close relationship between the family and the state. The manifesto analysis has, however, revealed a trend which has resulted in the complete absence of the family as a theme in the manifestos of the 1990s.

Similarly, the PSOE has traditionally focussed on the needs of individuals as the target of social policies rather than families. However the 1996 manifesto stands out from previous ones due to the inclusion of a chapter on the family, thus diverging from the PS. In addition to the explicit family focus, the concern with falling fertility rates echoes traditional right wing ideological concerns rather than those of Socialist ideology. This move towards seemingly right wing family policy objectives by the PSOE may also be observed in the Labour party. Throughout the study period the Labour party has targeted social policies towards the poor, women and children as have the PS and PSOE. However the 1997 manifesto is influenced more by Thatche...
restrictive. These measures have been identified in Chapter 8 as indicators of the deep core nature of political ideologies in relation to these measures in Spain. This is further supported by their distinct position in relation to left wing parties in France and the UK. Table 9.2 shows the inclusion of the eight family policy measures and pro-family statements in the manifestos of the left wing parties. It is clear when the manifestos are compared, that the PS in France had largely abandoned family policy as an electoral issue after 1981. The evolution of PS ideology has been away from family policies and the associated horizontal redistribution, towards individuals and vertical redistribution. This trend corresponds to the results of the Labour party and PSOE manifesto analysis with the exception of the 1997 and 1996 manifestos respectively.

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Key: 1 abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6 fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave; 8 childcare; 9 pro-family statement
Diverging visions of the family

The reasons for the divergence between, on the one hand, the PS and, on the other hand, Labour and the PSOE in the second half of the 1990s are of central importance to the objectives of the thesis and reveal distinct trends which appear to distinguish between left wing ideologies across national boundaries. It is interesting to note that the development of a family focus has been revealed in relation to the left wing party ideologies of the UK and Spain, two countries which do not have a tradition of explicit, coherent family policies as has the PS in France. The existence of an established family policy structure in France may negate any need on the part of the PS to argue for the social protection of families, whereas the opposite may be the case in the UK and Spain. This is examined in more detail below.

The minor parties

While the impact of the minor parties on family policy change is limited due to their, often, secondary role in government, their portrayal of the family has revealed some significant findings. In terms of their ideologies, the minor parties have changed to a far lesser extent than the major parties largely due to the fact that their function in opposition is to challenge the status quo.

The PCF is a clear product of the French national context for ideologies. While the PCF is highly interventionist (public), this is commensurate with its communist ideological foundation. However, during the early part of the study period, the PCF manifestos included references to intervention in the family sphere which may stem from the highly legitimated traditions of the family as a primary group in France. Later in the study period, this stance is abandoned in favour of policies for individuals, thus returning to a more traditional left wing position.
The PCE, largely due to the clean slate of Spanish politics in the late 1970s, has maintained a consistent left wing ideological position based upon public policies for individuals.

**Table 9.3: Far left parties**

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Key: 1 abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6 fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave; 8 childcare; 9 pro-family statement.

The ideologies of the centre parties have also had a very limited impact on policy change during the study period with the exception of UCD in Spain. UCD was the first party of government in the new Spanish democracy and expressed an explicit family interventionist stance, although this was based upon the family as a primary group for redistribution and support rather than a continuation of Franco's pro-family/anti-feminist ideology.

Neither the Lib Dems, in the UK, nor the CDS in Spain, have had a notable impact upon family policy change. It is interesting to note, however, that the Lib Dems have occupied a more traditional left wing position in the UK than the Labour party in relation to family policies. In common with the Labour party, Lib Dem manifestos of
1997 have followed the Conservative obsession with the privatisation of family responsibility further suggesting cross-party convergence in the UK.

Table 9.4: Centre parties

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Key: 1 abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6 fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave; 8 childcare; 9 pro-family statement.

The parties over time

This section explores the dynamics of party ideologies and the family over the study period and provides further insight into the question: To what extent have party political ideologies about the family evolved in terms of left and right and across the countries? Figure 9.1 illustrates the direction of change in party ideologies in relation to the family and state intervention. The study of the place of the family in party political ideologies revealed distinctions between left and right. Figure 9.1 locates each of the parties in relation to the four key thematics that have traditionally distinguished the parties' ideological representation of family policy measures. The four themes are based upon two opposing ideological conceptions: family/individual and public/private. These four themes broadly represent the distinguishing characteristics of the parties examined in this study. Traditionally, parties of the left have targeted family policy measures through public (intervention) policies towards
individuals. The right have traditionally sought to provide the framework within which the family remains private.
Figure 9.1 Dynamic change in the party political ideologies and public intervention in the family sphere

Late 1970s

Mid 1990s
Clearly the left wing parties have favoured policies that generally seek to target the
needs of individuals. However, the PS, PSOE and Labour ideologies have all
occupied positions which have shown some degree of concern with both the family
and individuals. In the mid 1990s both Labour and the PSOE were more explicit
about families although the two were distinguished by privatisation and intervention.
Relative to the national context, the Labour party appears interventionist. The
inclusion of the cross-national dimension, however, reveals that, in relation to the
other left wing parties, Labour party ideology in the late 1990s reflects traditional
right wing concerns, namely a lack of state intervention and general support for the
family as an important part of society.

The right wing parties of Spain and the FN have remained relatively static, although
their positions have become slightly less family-oriented during the 1990s. The far
left parties have also remained relatively static and in similar positions when
compared across national boundaries. The RPR/UDF had maintained an element of
family support but has evolved along similar lines as the Conservative party through
its pursuit of market-led, economic solutions to perceived family issues.

Whereas, at the beginning of the case study period there was a clear split between left
and right, the situation in the 1990s shows cross-party ideological convergence within
countries and less clear distinctions, notably among those parties who serve in
government or as the main opposition. These findings support Commaille and
Martin's (1998: 128) argument that a right/left split no longer sufficiently covers the
various party political positions in relation to the family either in France or other
European countries. This this convergence supports the hypothesis that each national
context embodies a distinct, deep core family ideology, which may result in a national
'style' of family policy. Within each context there is some cross-party ideological
conflict but this is limited by the boundaries of the national context for ideology.
Political ideologies and family policy change: a fluid relationship

The existence and impact of ideology on family policy change emerges from the analysis in the thesis of evolving family policies and party political ideologies in France, the UK and Spain. The multi-method approach adopted for the case studies in the thesis has made it possible to look beyond abstract theories of ideology, and to explore the phenomenon of changing family policies from a new perspective. The conclusions of Chapter 2, reviewing the development of family policy study, support the view that the possible impact of party political ideology on changing family policies has not been sufficiently addressed. It has also revealed the possibility of a link, not only between party political ideology and changing family policies, but also with research activities. This is in itself an interesting finding of the thesis, which was not anticipated in the hypothesis and which merits further study. However, the chapter also highlights the value of multi-disciplinary and cross-national methods in the study of family policies, methods that have been shown to be valuable for the greater understanding of such elusive policies.

The core theoretical elements of the thesis have been shown to be the source of long-running debate among authors, and the conclusions of the review of this debate demonstrated the need to apply such theoretical work to further empirical study or vice versa. While it was shown that no single existing approach sufficiently addressed the data set, time span and theoretical approaches in the thesis, it was concluded that a combination of these methods provided a framework for empirical analysis. The elements of ideology outlined in Chapter 3 made it possible to go some way in examining party political ideologies by identifying the function of ideology in the relationship between state and citizens through Ideological State Apparatuses.

Family policies in all three countries were revealed as having undergone considerable change since their origins. Changing populations and social attitudes were highlighted as key motors to the evolution of family policies. The classification of policy
measures as either regulatory or support helped to identify the similarities and differences between the family policies of each country as well as the party ideologies.

The national case studies in the thesis demonstrated, through the analysis of election manifestos, how each policy measure and the role of families within the state were conceptualised within different party political ideologies. Analysis over time also helped to demonstrate the extent and nature of the evolution of each party's ideological position in relation to each of the eight measures. The national case studies concluded that party political ideologies, as present in the manifestos, preceded changes in family policies in relation to some measures and thus supported the theory of ideology as process. It was, however, also shown that some party ideologies changed as a result of the implementation of policy change as suggested in the hypothesis (Chapter 1). It is therefore not possible to identify a causal relationship between party political ideology and family policy change either way from the national case studies and data sources examined. However, the study has revealed some possibilities for the further development of this inquiry (presented below).

Although the main objective of the thesis has been to explore the existence of a relationship between party political ideology and family policy change, it did not set out to prove that policy change can be explained solely through a focus on party ideologies. Rather, the aim was to explore the hypothesis that changing party political ideologies play a role in the formation and transformation of family policies in addition to other factors, such as economic concerns, population change or influences from supra-national sources, for example EU directives or international treaties (Hantrais, 1994). Although evidence from the case studies demonstrates that the dynamics of changing party political ideologies and changing family policies are indeed linked in term of their evolution, the evidence does not support the causal element, as suggested in classical Marxist theories of ideology and the state. This
theory when applied to the present study would claim, for example, that that a change in party political ideology is a necessary precursor to a change in family policies. However, for some issues, the reverse was found to be the case, notably in relation to deep core ideologies and regulatory measures in France and Spain (for example abortion and divorce). While this phenomenon was anticipated in the hypothesis, it may still be argued that such a change only takes place as a result of a political power shift (such as a change in parliamentary majority) or external forces (economic concerns, population change or influences from supra-national sources) within the national context. From the Marxist perspective this would represent a change in the control of the means of intellectual production. It would therefore be logical to expect a change in opposing party political ideologies on the grounds that, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, the function of an ideology is to become those of society (or a polity) as a whole.

In addition, there has been evidence to show that national ideologies may converge even further as a result of supra-national policy harmonisation (such as the EU or UN directives). When this variable is added, the above findings may point to the end of ideology in cross-party political debate in France, the UK and Spain.

A final conclusion which was not anticipated in the hypothesis, but which is linked with the core theme of national contexts for ideologies, brings the discussion back to the fundamental subject of this study. The three countries examined in this thesis represent what have become widely accepted, in family policy study, as examples of 'explicit' (France) and 'implicit' (UK and Spain) family policy. While these terms have been used descriptively, they have not been fully explained. Through the focus on the national context for ideologies, and the concepts of state intervention, it was revealed that France had a statist tradition, the UK context was highly suspicious of state intervention in private matters and the Spanish context unclear in the era of the
recent Transition. Is it therefore a result of each national context and their ideologies of state intervention that the labels explicit and implicit have been applied?

**Questions for future research**

While the strict application of the theory of ideology would appear to support the above direction of causality, further research than has been possible within the limitations of the present thesis is required in order to establish the extent to which ideology impacts upon the broader party political context. Exploring the relationship between changing party political ideologies and family policies has revealed certain limitations to the methods employed in the present study. These elements may help to show a way forward for further research into the questions addressed in this thesis.

The greatest limitations to the present study relate to the analysis of party political ideology. As discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of ideology is highly complex and has eluded influential scholars for more than two centuries. It was never the intention of this study to unravel all of the strands that cross the concept of ideology. This study was an attempt to further the study of party political ideology within the study of family policies. The case studies have revealed the highly ideological nature of the family and family policies, but it is clear that the findings of the research merely scratch the surface in this area. While much valuable research relating to questions of family policies has been undertaken, as outlined in Chapter 2, very little has been published which relates to the specific questions addressed above. In addition, the focus on election manifestos has been shown to be of limited utility to the aims of this study (see Chapter 4). While the manifestos represent a consistent and comparable corpus for the analysis of expressions of party political ideology, any conclusions based thereon must be considered as limited. The rhetorical nature of the manifestos both revealed and disguised party ideology in relation to family policy themes. However, given the elusive and abstract nature of party political ideologies, any source may be open to similar criticism. In the light of these observations, a much
wider corpus may provide a more solid foundation for the further analysis of the relationship between party political ideology and family policy change. Future research in the areas addressed in this thesis may include:

- Micro studies of specific issues, such as the relationship between neo-natalist ideology and the legalisation of abortion in Spain. This approach would allow researchers to examine a vast range of sources other than manifestos (as discussed above and in Chapter 4).

- Cross-national micro-studies. This would allow broader conclusions to be drawn about convergence/divergence of ideologies and their impact upon policy change.

- The symbolic value of the term 'family' may be analysed as a theme within the ideology of individual parties, again focussing on a variety of source data.

Any of the above approaches would be expected to address the questions raised in this study in greater detail. However, if such studies were to include cross-national comparative dimensions, this would make substantial demands upon a lone researcher. If these micro-studies were conducted by a team of national researchers, employing the same methods and examining comparable data sources, it may be envisaged that more substantive and detailed conclusions than have been possible in this study would drawn on both the national and cross-national level.
ANNEX 1: PARTY MANIFESTOS

Listed below are the party manifestos which were used in this study.

France

Front national 1985-97
Parti Communiste français 1981-97
Parti Socialiste 1981-97
Rassemblement pour la République/Union pour la démocratie française 1981-97

UK

Conservative 1979-97
Labour 1979-97
Liberal Democrats 1979-97

Spain

Alianza Popular/Partido Popular 1977-96
Centro Democrático y Social 1982-93
Izquierda Unida/Partido Comunista de España 1977-93
Unión de Centro Democrático 1977-79
Partido Socialista Obrero Español 1977-96
Annex 2: Personal contacts

Many of the ideas contained in this thesis were developed as a result of informal meetings and discussions in the three countries including:

Archivists the RPR/UDF (Paris) and the FN (St Cloud).

Representatives of the Spanish parties assisted in difficult task of finding the electoral programmes of the Transition period, many of which had been lost. Individual party members were generous in offering me photocopies of their personal archives in order to complete the data set.

Antoine Math of the CNAF in Paris.


Lluís Flaquer, Department of Sociology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona.

Celia Valiente, Centro de Estudios Juan March, Madrid.

Laurie McGarry and the staff of the Pilkington Library, Lougborough University.

Ruth Lister of the Department of Social Sciences, Lougborough University
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Department of Health and Social Security (1990) Children Come First, Cm 1264, London, HMSO.


Lenin, V. I. (1975) *What is to be done?*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press.


Norvez, A. (1990) *De la naissance à l’école. Santé, modes de garde et préscolarité dans la France contemporaine* (Cahier no. 126), Paris, PUF-INED.


