The changing nature of security in post-Cold War central and eastern Europe: predicaments, perceptions and policy responses

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY
THE CHANGING NATURE OF SECURITY IN POST-COLD WAR CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: PREDICAMENTS, PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY-RESPONSES

by
Gábor Stojanovits

A Doctoral Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

25th September 2001

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Abstract

In the wake of the Cold War, a complex transition process began in Central and Eastern Europe that has engendered immense change not only in the political, economic and social situations in the countries of the region, but also in their security situation. The aim of the thesis is to explore the changing nature of security in post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on some pertinent features of traditional and new schools of thought in International Relations, it sets up an analytical framework, which is applied to an analysis of security in the Central and Eastern European region and to Hungary more particularly. The premise of the study is that the issue of security in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe requires the deployment of an analytical framework that can accommodate its multifaceted and multi-dimensional nature. This framework focuses on three main centres of interest: predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses. The thesis applies this framework to Central and Eastern Europe with a particular focus on Hungary. Conclusions are drawn both about the utility of the framework and about the nature of security itself.
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### 1 INTRODUCTION

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### 3 CHANGING SECURITY PREDICAMENTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

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<td>ANMR</td>
<td>National Association of the Romanian Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Annual National Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>BALTBAT</td>
<td>Baltic Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>BALTDEFCOL</td>
<td>Baltic Defence College</td>
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<tr>
<td>BALTNET</td>
<td>Baltic Air Surveillance Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACKSEAFOR</td>
<td>Black Sea Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>Polish Central Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSS</td>
<td>Council of Baltic Sea States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>CEEn</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European</td>
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<td>CEFTA</td>
<td>Central European Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>CEI</td>
<td>Central European Initiative</td>
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<td>CENCOOR</td>
<td>Central European Nations Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FIDESZ-MPP</td>
<td>Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége - Magyar Polgári Párt (Alliance of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKGP</td>
<td>Független Kisgazdapárt (Independent Smallholders' Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPDM</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Decision Making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVG</td>
<td>Heti Világgazdaság (Weekly World Economy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>Keresztnény Demokraták Néppárt (Christian Democratic People's Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSH</td>
<td>Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Central Statistical Office)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTM</td>
<td>Long Term Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>Magyar Demokraták Fórum (Hungarian Democratic Forum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIÉP</td>
<td>Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Party of Hungarian Justice and Life)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPFSEE</td>
<td>Multinational Peace Force South East Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Co-operation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>Operational Capabilities Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARP</td>
<td>Planning and Review Process</td>
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<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PG</td>
<td>Partnership Goal</td>
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<td>SEEBRIC</td>
<td>South-eastern Europe Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Free Democrats)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TÁRKI</td>
<td>Társadalomkutatási Intézet (The Tárki Social Research Centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WM</td>
<td>Working Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>Warsaw Treaty Organisation</td>
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Maps

Map 1: Central and Eastern Europe

Map 2: Hungary before 1920 and after

- Kingdom of Hungary before 1920
- Hungary after Trianon
1 Introduction

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolutions of 1989-90 in the Central and Eastern European (CEEn) countries, a complex process of transition was initiated in the region, which is still ongoing. This process involves not only changes at the political, economic and societal levels, but also in issues related to foreign and security policies as well as defence. Most analyses of these processes concentrate on the political, economic and societal transformations, that is the shift from authoritarian systems of governance towards more democratic ones, the reform of post-communist economies and questions of how societies and their citizens cope with the pressures arising from newly established and fragile market economies, democratic institutions and new, more open political structures.¹

But where is security placed in this complex transition process? The aim of this thesis is to focus on this aspect of the transition process and to describe, to investigate and to explain the changing security issues confronting post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in general and Hungary in particular. Thus, the work in this thesis is interdisciplinary in that it combines an analysis of security issues with a detailed comparative study focusing on the constituent states of a particular geographical region, that of CEE. The disciplines of International Relations (Security Studies), Area Studies and Comparative Politics are all relevant in this context. In pursuing this combined task, some fundamental developments must be considered that seem to be highly relevant in the CEEn security context.

Firstly, the proximate cause of the transformation of security issues is clearly the collapse, after more than forty years, of communist rule behind the 'iron curtain'. The rapid break-up of the Soviet Union, and the consequent sudden decline of one of the world's superpowers, brought an end to bi-polar military confrontation and necessitated a re-thinking of the traditionally political-militarily dominated European

¹ Ralf Dahrendorf has referred to the multiple transition in CEE as the 'double conundrum' of economic marketisation and political democratisation. This has been extended further by Claus Offe, who argues that, in addition to the political and economic issues, countries within the region face a further transition, that is of late nation-building and identity related issues. See Dahrendorf, Ralf (1990) Reflection on the Revolution in Europe. London: Chatto and Windus; Offe, Claus (1991) "Capitalism
security agenda. During the Cold War period, security was mostly defined in terms of the military confrontation of the two competing blocs. However, with the collapse of communism and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, less obvious and less tangible challenges and risks have appeared in CEE, which require a revision of traditional concepts of security. It is now widely accepted that security can no longer be defined solely in military terms. In order to do justice to the changed circumstances, the concept of security has to be 'widened' and 'deepened' as well as freed from its traditionally state-centric focus. Beside the military component of security, other, new factors including political, economic, societal or environmental indicators have to be considered. In addition, a range of new political actors has arisen alongside states, operating on different levels (European, regional, state, inter-state and individual).

Secondly, geopolitics and identity appear to be crucial in the transition process, particularly in the security context. From the debris of the artificial grouping that comprised the Soviet Union and its satellite states in CEE, new, relatively small nation-states have emerged which are looking for a role in Europe and in the world. As regards nation building in post-communist CEE, Michael Clarke has stated that

four states have ceased to exist, and 22 new ones have come into existence; the eight countries of the communist bloc have become 28, and will possibly become 30 if Montenegro and Chechnya gain independence. Thus a multiplicity of political actors has replaced the communist system.

As for the definition of the CEEn region, it has to be acknowledged at the outset that there is no unique or straightforward geographical or political statement of where the boundaries of CEE lie. In contrast to Clarke's inclusive definition of CEE, some observers define the region in a more minimalist manner and consider only the so-called Visegrád-states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary as its


constituent states. Similarly, the Czech writer, Milan Kundera described CEE in 1984 as "an uncertain zone of small nations between Russia and Germany". For the purpose of this thesis, we adopt an intermediate position, which corresponds with Pál Dunay's understanding of the region. Accordingly, CEE is defined as the conglomeration of ten countries that includes the former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) member states, the three Baltic states and Slovenia. All of these countries share the common feature that they are currently involved in accession negotiations with the European Union (EU).

Finally, it appears to be a general phenomenon throughout the entire CEEn region that the development of security issues and the consequent re-formulation of the security and defence policies of the CEEn countries differ markedly in character from the transformations occurring in the political and economic spheres. Whilst political and academic elites were quick to devise suggestions and concepts for restructuring political and economic systems, their response to the new security challenges has been, as the thesis will demonstrate, less decisive and more ambiguous. More than a decade after the breakdown of communist rule and the demise of the WTO in 1991, new NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) member Hungary, to cite one example, has only recently started to reform the overall structure of its armed forces and to develop and enact appropriate security and defence legislation.

In light of the fundamental developments in post-Cold War CEE, this thesis will attempt to analyse security in a comprehensive manner. In order to equip ourselves for this, chapter two reviews some pertinent theories of International Relations (IR) and develops the analytical framework employed in the ensuing case study chapters. This analytical framework is organised around three main concepts, security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses, which also serve as the three distinct centres of gravity of the overall thesis. Chapters three, four and five utilise the analytical framework in the CEEn context and highlight mostly general trends with regard to security in the states of the region.

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Thus, chapter three explores security predicaments, that is the risks and vulnerabilities that confront the post-Cold War CEEn region. By doing so, it attempts to delineate a regional security complex, in which various real and potential risks and vulnerabilities are systematised according to the categories set out in our analytical framework.

Chapter four is devoted to the analysis of security perceptions and highlights the attitude of the CEEn publics and their political elites towards risks and vulnerabilities. In this vein, the chapter approaches security in a more subjective way and considers a number of imagined or misperceived threats that, for a variety of reasons, appear to perturb the publics and their politicians. It also throws light on some cognitive factors that contribute to the emergence of some of the security predicaments outlined in chapter three.

Chapter five highlights the policy-responses of CEEn politicians that attempt to remedy security predicaments in a manner consistent with the security perceptions of the CEE publics and their elites. It has to be acknowledged that the focus here is mainly on the first stages of the policy-making process, that is the formulation of policy objectives. Detailed considerations of the implementation of individual foreign and security policies of single CEEn states are beyond the scope of the present study. Moreover, since the implementation of most policies is currently ongoing, it is too early for a properly considered analysis of policy-outcomes.

Chapter six is devoted entirely to security in the case of post-Cold War Hungary. As a result of its history and its unique geopolitical situation close to the Balkans and Ukraine, Hungary offers an interesting case for the study of security in CEE. This chapter retains the analytical framework set out in chapter two, with its threefold focus on predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses, and illustrates these with the help of numerous concrete examples from post-communist Hungarian politics and with insights obtained from interviews conducted in Budapest by the author in 1998-

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Thus, chapter six provides both a detailed analysis of security in Hungary and an illustration of the framework in a narrower geographical context.

In the concluding chapter, chapter seven, we return to the issues and questions raised in chapter two and attempt to evaluate the utility of our analytical framework for examining security in post-Cold War CEE and in particular in Hungary. We also collate the findings of the chapters on CEE security with those of the case study on Hungary and draw some final conclusions on CEE regional security.

It is indeed a challenging task to investigate an area as contemporaneous and as unsettled as post-communist CEE. It would, therefore, be misleading to claim that this thesis can faithfully capture all aspects of security of the CEE region. What it can do, however, is to document some important developments that have taken place in the last decade and to point out some perturbing tendencies that might challenge the security of the region in the future. Thus, this thesis contributes to the ongoing debate on security in CEE and, indirectly, one hopes, makes a small contribution to strengthening the stability of the region.
The time has come to transcend the classical dialectic between Realist and Liberal theories of international politics. Each has something to contribute to a research program that increases our understanding of international behaviour. Perhaps work in the 1990s will be able to synthesize rather than repeat the dialectic of the 1970s and the 1980s.

Joseph S. Nye

2 Framework for Security and Foreign Policy Analysis in Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe: Predicaments, Perceptions and Policy-Responses

This chapter aims to develop an analytical framework for investigating the process of security and foreign policy-making in contemporary CEE. It considers this process as a comprehensive one, requiring the clarification of security challenges, of their perception by CEEn publics and their political elites as well as of the actual policy-response of different political actors. In order to arrive at a set of useful common indicators of security in the region of our concern, it is not sufficient to highlight current insecurities and vulnerabilities; we also have to look at the practical implications that is, how those issues are perceived by the public and its political elite and the nature of their policy-responses.

By applying this comprehensive perspective, we will construct our analysis on a threefold footing: In the section on predicaments we seek to expound a comprehensive framework dealing with a number of factors, incorporating traditional as well as new dimensions of security. The second section on perceptions aims to highlight different theoretical approaches, which can help analyse cognitive processes, such as perception/misperception as well as interpretation/misinterpretation. Finally, under policy-responses we recall the main approaches of foreign and security policy-making, which seem to be relevant in the subsequent case study sections on CEE in general and on Hungary in particular.

Each of the three sections aims to frame a number of research questions, which help formulate a critical method for use in the later case study and generate a more critical and comprehensive debate on security in practice. As the opening quotation of Joseph

S. Nye suggests, our intention is to transcend the methodological differences currently prevalent in the discipline of IR and to form a synthesis of those aspects of the existing schools of thought that, together, allow a wide analysis of current security issues in CEE. Thus, our intention here is to develop a tool appropriate to the analysis of security in post-Cold War CEE.

2.1 Introduction

In order to better understand security and foreign policy issues in contemporary CEE, it is necessary to consider some theoretical concepts, in order to analyse common trends and distinctive characteristics within the region. It is evident that in a transitional region like CEE, long established Western theoretical approaches might not capture international politics and security matters with the same effectiveness as in consolidated democracies. The region is characterised by economic, political and social uncertainties resulting from recent changes of regime type from authoritarian to democratic. Thus, states in the region clearly face different challenges to those states with a long established liberal democracy and market economy.

It should also be acknowledged that since the end of the Cold War, the field of IR and its subfields, security and foreign policy studies, have come under immense pressure to rethink and reformulate some of their basic principles. Consequently, we have to question the dominance of Cold War theoretical approaches in a changed world and determine whether these best describe contemporary international relations in our specific geographical context. CEE has been experiencing fundamental structural changes since the end of communist rule and, as a result of an emerging new world order with new challenges, established IR theory has increasingly become the target of criticism. The disappearance of the bipolar world order has suggested the need for new explanatory models and has also challenged the validity of dominant constitutive theories. The end of the Cold War has, in fact, set off a debate in IR, which addresses fundamental methodological as well as substantial issues. Steve Smith has argued that

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8 Fred Halliday argues: "A new theorization of International Relations may, therefore, be needed, to deal with what may be a long period of intra-hegemonic peace". See Halliday, Fred (1995) "The End of
the distinction between constitutive versus explanatory theory is "the main meta-theoretical issue facing international theory today". In light of these challenges to IR theory, the current debate between different schools of thought has focused on the following issues.

Firstly, in the light of a changed world order, the epistemological foundations of the discipline have once again been questioned. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish here between established traditions (realism/neo-realism and liberalism/neo-liberalism) and post-positivist theories (critical, post-modern, constructivist approaches). It has to be admitted, however, that the collective term 'established traditions' does not imply any kind of theoretical agreement between the two established traditions. It is used here rather to illustrate a further dimension of the debate. Indeed, in general, it can be argued that the gap between realism/neo-realism and liberalism/neo-liberalism has deepened further in the wake of the Cold War.

Secondly, leading on from the first point, in accounting for the end of the Cold War, the empirical validity of existing theories has come under attack, something which has led to a critical reassessment of the analytical content of the discipline. In this context we can distinguish between those who are in favour of retaining a rather narrow perspective of IR and Security Studies and those, who plead for an adjustment of the discipline to the changed conditions of post-Cold War Europe and, thus, who favour a wider analytical conception. This distinction is, again, very much linked to


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11 It has to be mentioned, however, that there are some undertakings to bridge the gap between the two established traditions. Ole Waever, for instance, has argued that a "dominant neo-neo synthesis became the research programme of the 1980s. No longer were realism and liberalism 'incommensurable' - on the contrary they shared a 'rationalist' research programme, a conception of science, a shared willingness to operate on the premise of anarchy and investigate the evolution of co-operation and whether institutions matter". See Waever, Ole (1997) "Figures of International Thought: Introducing Persons Instead of Paradigms", in Neumann, Iver B. and Ole Waever (eds.), The Future of International Relations. Masters in the Making. London: Routledge, pp. 18. ff; Similarly, John R. Ruggie has elaborated on the 'convergence of the neos' and introduced the term 'neo-utilitarianism' labelling both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, which, in his view, "share very similar analytical foundations", See Ruggie, Gerard John (1998) Constructing the World. Essays on International Institutionalization. London and New York: Routledge, p. 9.
12 See, for example, Gaddis, John Lewis (1992/93) "International Relations Theory and the End of the
the first point of worldviews and constitutive theories; however, it represents a different dimension of the debate. Since in our case study we will touch upon the debate between narrow and wide security conceptions on several occasions, this dimension will be treated in this chapter with especial attention.

Thirdly, as already mentioned above, the current debate in IR has a clear methodological dimension. In the 1950s and 1960s, the methodological debate between behavioralism (rather scientific) and traditionalism (more humanistic) dominated the discipline. Since the end of the Cold War the objectivist methods of behavioralism (later called 'positivism') based on scientific research techniques have been contested by the so-called post-positivistic approach. Although this emergent methodology, like all theoretical approaches, consists of somewhat different competing and often controversial voices, its basic assumption is common: positivist theory is limited and cannot capture the complexity of a world made up of human individuals and therefore that a normative, value-based, humanistic analysis is required. What is the usefulness of this third dimension in our context? This question can be answered simply by referring back to the very nature of international politics during the Cold War era. Then, power politics and military confrontation based upon the principles of realist balance-of-power, characterised world politics and its analysis. Thus, positivistic principles such as data observations and mathematical calculations proved to be useful for describing realities and creating strategies. Since the end of the Cold War, the emphasis has clearly shifted from strategy and deterrence towards maintaining peaceful relations via cooperation, and positivist methods have proven to be insufficient for explaining all the new realities. Post-positivist approaches focus on individuals (as the smallest unit) or communities (as a larger unit), instead of retaining a purely state-centric focus; on the identity based construction of the social world; and on issues of international ethics. All these seem to have a striking validity in contemporary CEE, therefore they will be considered in the following security framework for analyses.

The fundamental changes in world politics and IR demand a new approach to the analysis of security. Thus, this chapter will try to set up a model of security and

foreign policy analysis, which can then be employed in our specific geographical context. Suffice it to say that the exclusive application of one approach, theory or methodology cannot capture the entire security complex of today's world. What we need is a comprehensive analytical framework that attempts to incorporate different schools of thought and capture as many issues as possible. Our analytical framework as well as the latter case study is organised around three major problematiques, which constitute the centres of gravity in our security analysis: Predicaments, Perceptions and Policy-Responses. The benefits of this comprehensive approach are that it transcends the pure acknowledgement of predicaments by considering some cognitive issues and pursues also practical issues generated by the actual policy-makers. This comprehensiveness in itself is less relevant in theoretical terms; however, it is highly relevant on analytical grounds, since our framework allows for an inclusive analytical perspective in our later case study. Furthermore, our analytical framework makes it possible to consider security and foreign policy-making as a cyclical process, rather than a static or horizontal one.

The central question is how security can be defined in this changing world and what do the main approaches of IR contribute to our attempt to better explain and understand the nature of CEEn security predicaments? In this connection, the first part of this chapter will highlight the main trends in IR and offer a comprehensive framework for analysing a variety of security challenges in CEE, which then can be employed in the subsequent empirical study. To this end, we attempt to look for the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches in order to derive a more complex understanding of security that offers meaningful and up-to-date concepts for the analysis of security in contemporary CEE.

Furthermore, to understand the complexity of security and foreign policy issues in general, it is not enough simply to look at security predicaments from a mainly abstract point of view that is, purely acknowledging the broad nature of security in post-Cold War CEE. Whilst the security model can describe the existing predicaments sufficiently accurately, it can tell one little, however, about the manner in which such phenomena are perceived in the minds of the public and the decision-makers themselves. Thus, the practitioners', the actual decision-makers' perspective ought to be included in the analysis. The crucial question here, therefore, is how information
and images of the world are perceived (or misperceived) by the public and by politicians, and how these processes influence the emergence of predicaments and policy formulations. Consequently, theories of cognitive structure, perception and interpretation will be at the centre of the second part of this chapter. Again, special attention will be paid to the fact that, in the CEEn region, we are dealing with transitional countries, which might show patterns different to those characteristic of consolidated liberal democracies.

The last part of this chapter still deals with the 'practitioners' theory' and looks at how policy-responses of decision-makers to predicaments can be conceptualised best in the CEEn context. How does the process of foreign and security policy decision-making (FPDM) work in this specific part of Europe? What are the main models of FPDM and which are the most applicable in CEE?

2.2 Predicaments

Following the historic patterns of change in IR theory it is not surprising that after the end of the Cold War, discussion among theorists has intensified with respect to the relevance of established schools of thought. With the decline of communism and the subsequent commitment of most CEEn countries to a democratic, western style of liberal democracy, security theorists and analysts came to realise the necessity of a response to these historical developments. One common characteristic can be observed in the immediate post-Cold War period: none of the leading theories in IR could adequately encompass the new challenges caused by the sudden decline of the bipolar world order. On the one hand, realists concentrated too heavily on the superpower confrontation in the past and were rather sceptical about compromising their basic theoretical principles. They have maintained the argument with regard to the validity of the Waltzian assumption, according to which bipolar systems are more stable and are more likely to bring order and peace than multipolar systems.13 Prominent neo-realist John Mearsheimer, for instance, argued at the beginning of the 1990s:

The West has an interest in maintaining peace in Europe. It therefore has an interest in maintaining the Cold War order, and hence has an interest in the continuation of the Cold War confrontation; developments that threaten to end it are dangerous.\textsuperscript{14}

On the other hand, neo-liberal institutionalists and other reformists seemed to be overwhelmed by the pace of change. The rather cautious euphoria of most of western politicians about the events in the East as well as the reserved response of several international organisations suggested that the idea of a united Eastern and Western Europe was, for many, inconceivable at the time. Beside the early eastward extension of the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, formerly CSCE), and the partial enlargement of NATO in March 1999 (which could only be materialised under immense diplomatic pressure coming from the United States), the doors of important Western organisations, NATO and the EU, have, so far, remained closed for their Eastern European neighbours. This clearly suggests the limitations of institutionalist prescriptions in a pan-European context. However, one should admit that, at the same time, the values of neo-liberal institutionalism have become increasingly successful in the Western European integration process. This growing contrast between the deepening integration within Western Europe on the one hand and the disintegration and the isolation of CEE on the other hand poses a security challenge not only to the region but even to the entire continent.

Before we proceed further it is necessary to define the concepts that underpin this section and the case study chapter, namely predicaments and security. The term predicament is not widely used in IR theory, which tends to employ terms such as 'security vacuum' or 'security dilemma'. These terms, however, do not cover satisfactorily the focus of our analysis. The term 'security vacuum' is commonly used in the context of security alignments (or non-alignments) as a result of international co-operation. A 'security vacuum' can occur, when a country loses its old allies and does not or cannot join another alignment in order to cover its national security needs. The term 'security dilemma' was traditionally used in the context of the Cold War, where superpowers and their allies went into an arm race in a spiralling effort to

counter-balance each other's military capabilities. Some analysts employ the term 'security dilemma' in a new analytical environment, describing something, what we call in our study security predicaments. In today's international politics, both 'security vacuum' and 'security dilemma' have become contentious due to their limitations in describing complex security issues (beside the military aspect of security) and also due to their historical legacies. While the terms 'vacuum' and 'dilemma' refer mainly to military-political security issues in a bipolar system of states, the word 'predicaments' conveys the comprehensive nature of security in a multipolar world. This term is also intended to stipulate that security in contemporary CEE is a potentially problematic issue. Thus, here under security predicaments we understand precarious, insecure situations generated by a range of factors, which can jeopardise security. Security is considered here in the sense of Arnold Wolfers's definition, according to which security,

\[ \text{in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. In both respects a nation's security can run a wide gamut from almost complete insecurity or sense of insecurity at one end, to almost complete security or absence of fear at the other.}^{15} \]

Predicaments and those factors, which generate them, are the main objects of our analysis and the region of CEE is our analytical category. Owing to the diverse nature of CEE, states in this region find themselves in a variety of situations as regards security and face a range of different challenges; hence the use in the plural of the word predicament. Mohammed Ayoob has analysed security predicaments in a different context, namely in that of the states forming the Third World. Ayoob has argued that

\[ \text{The security predicaments of Third World states are generated largely by the twin pressures of late state making and their late entry into the system of states.}^{16} \]

By extrapolating this observation to our specific geographical context, we recognise a similar pattern. Some of the CEEn states are freshly created nation-states, which were

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founded (or re-founded) after the end of the Cold War. The other states of CEE, although formally nation-states for a more extended period of time, regained their de facto sovereignty after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a world superpower. Further, the countries of CEE, although diplomatically recognised and, thus, ipso jure, members of the system of states, have experienced a late, or, indeed, no entry into the various organisations of states. In other words, the doors of significant international organisations have remained closed to them. In the context of political economy, Robert Gilpin defined the 'statehood' and the 'market' as the "two organizing principles of social life".\textsuperscript{17} Predicaments can occur, when one or both of these factors are menaced. In other words, when a state has difficulties coming to terms with its identity, the translation of juridical sovereignty into effective statehood, and/or when it cannot integrate itself into the international market.

This, however, is a very general survey of the circumstances that generate predicaments. Although it has already been implied that security predicaments can arise through various factors on different levels (domestic and global), little has been said about the specific nature of those factors. What are the other factors that constitute current security predicaments in CEE and how can they best be conceptualised? By looking at the established traditions in IR, there is one commonality, which strikes the observer almost immediately; none of them alone can describe or explain the current complex security situation. Therefore, in the following, we will undertake a critical reassessment of the main theories and trends of IR (realism, liberalism, constructivism and the 'widening' conception) with the purpose of picking out those elements, which can be used in our integrative model for describing security predicaments. This will provide a comprehensive framework, which will then be utilised in our general case studies on CEE and in our specific case study on Hungary. Admittedly, the idea of a comprehensive security framework in IR theory is not new. A number of researchers have raised their voices in the 1980s and 1990s in favour of broadening the definition of security, among them Ullmann, Nye

and Lynn-Jones, Brown, Buzan, Haftendorn, Waever et al. Furthermore, in 1989, an entire issue of Survival was dedicated to the subject of 'non-military aspects of security'. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever have offered the most thoroughly developed 'wide' conception of security, a conception now known as the 'Copenhagen School Framework'. Thus, it can be acknowledged in anticipation that our complex security framework will borrow much of its ideas from Buzan and Waever. The application of a wide security framework can, however, run the methodological risk that the boundary between national security and normal day-to-day challenges or regular competitive interplay becomes blurred. Buzan has tried to overcome this controversy by concluding that the decision whether a threat is serious enough to be qualified as a risk to national security "is a matter of political choice rather than objective fact". His statement is reinforced by Waever's definition of security, where he compared 'security' with the linguistic theory of the 'speech act'. Waever has claimed that the utterance itself was the act, "by saying 'security', a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development". Similarly, Buzan has distinguished between vulnerabilities that are "fairly concrete" and objective or subjective threats that are "much harder to pin down". This apparent ambivalence supplies most of the grounds for controversy in contemporary IR theory, which will be discussed below in separate sections highlighting major trends in IR.


2.2.1 How Much Realism Do We Need?

In IR the notion of realism can be summarised as follows: broadly speaking, realism is concerned first and foremost, with the military security problems of sovereign states as rational unitary actors in a system of international anarchy and, secondly, with the problem of international order. The main object of its observation is, therefore, the sovereign nation-state. States are independent, selfish authorities, they act in their own interests, without regard for normative concerns. Thus, they have to be handled as actors of primary importance in the international system. Based on the dramatic experience of two World Wars in the 20th century, realists take the view that there are no effective authority structures above the state, that is no effective system of world government. States are consequently forced to look after themselves and their own interests. Their conclusion is that international politics is characterised by 'domestic order', which is embedded in a world of 'international anarchy'. The international system is a 'self-help system', where states are concerned with ensuring their own survival by protecting themselves against others. These factors clearly limit the cooperation of states. International order can be best maintained via a 'balance-of-power', the preservation of which is the absolute goal of great powers. That said, the 'balance-of-power' theory is probably the most disputed realist argument in contemporary European order. What can the balance-of-power theory tell us about the nature of international politics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union? First of all, realists had to acknowledge that with the end of the Soviet Union and its alliance the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, one of the great powers disappeared. Yet, Waltz insists that "bipolarity continues because militarily Russia can take care of itself and because no other great powers have yet emerged". He also admits, however, that the nature of bipolarity has changed:

With the waning of Soviet power, the United States is no longer held in check by any other country or combination of countries. (...) Balance-of-power

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theory leads one to predict that other countries, alone or in concert, will try to bring American power into balance.\textsuperscript{28}

When we highlight the actual security predicaments in CEE, we have to look at the current validity of the balance-of-power theory more closely. The most striking question is, whether there is an emerging great power in Europe, which might threaten the CEEn countries that were historically often located in a buffer zone between great powers? Similarly, in response to potential threats, are the CEEn states 'balancing' or 'bandwagoning' by formulating their security and defence priorities and alliances? In other words, are they forming alliances in order to minimise the source of danger (balancing) or are they rather allying themselves with the dominant side, which poses, in relative terms, the biggest threat to their security (bandwagoning)?\textsuperscript{29}

This leads on to realists' rather pessimistic view of security and peace in an emerging new multipolar order. Mearsheimer argues that

\textit{...the prospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly if the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds. The next decades in Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years.}\textsuperscript{30}

In the wake of wars in the Balkans, this assertion, about the more violent nature of the post-bipolar world, however pessimistic, has a certain validity when applied to the CEEn context. With regard to military security concerns of states, the existence of a certain 'security vacuum' has been raised by many observers.\textsuperscript{31} To what extent this realist issue is a legitimate security predicament in contemporary CEE, will be analysed in the following chapter.

Following on from this, realists consider the permanent possibility of war as one of the key issues of security. In order to avoid it, they concentrate predominantly on military security. In the Western European context, Charles L. Glaser distinguishes

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Mearsheimer (1991), p. 142.
three types of current or future war the West might face. The first danger is of
deliberate attack from a major power in the East - a resurgent Russia. The
second is a war in the East, including wars that begin in Central Europe but
could draw in the West. The third is war within Western Europe, possibly
exacerbated by war in the East.32

One characteristic that appears to be common to all three types of war is the direction
from which they draw: the East. Are certain parts of CEE really still so dangerous that
they might draw the rest of the region and Western Europe into war? This is the
decisive issue for many realist analysts, when they speak about dangers and crises
stemming from the East and the solutions they offer are organised around more
efficient military capabilities and defence strategies, preferably within the framework
of NATO. These analysts seem to miss, however, the very heart of the problem, that
is, how certain crises that might lead to war can be avoided. They concentrate
primarily on 'hard' solutions to security challenges (i.e. armed deterrence) and neglect
other approaches, which could help avoid the appearance of crises (i.e. preventive
diplomacy). Furthermore realism has earned a great deal of criticism for its emphasis
on traditional causes of security predicaments and its neglect of 'soft security' issues.

Paradoxically, in CEE both the strength and weakness of realism lies in its
concentration on 'hard' military security issues. First, its strength is that it reminds us
of the permanent possibility of conflict in a volatile region, regardless of the
predominantly democratic type of the new regimes. Realists dismiss the 'liberal claim'
that democracies do not fight democracies and remind us of the two setbacks, which
followed previous waves of democratisation.33 Mearsheimer develops the same
argument further by using a more fundamental, ideological explanation and
concluding that even democracies cannot transcend the anarchical nature of the
international system and

the possibility always exists that a democracy will revert to an authoritarian
state. This threat of backsliding means that one democratic state can never be
sure that another democratic state will not change its stripes and turn on it
sometimes in the future.34

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
However, realism's clear weakness lies in its neglect of issues beyond the military realm. Furthermore, it is a static theory emphasising the importance of maintaining the power of states and therefore the international status quo. Thus, it is pessimistic about the implications of any change in the balance of international power politics.

Also, realism's state-centric perspective seems to be highly contentious in today's CEE. On the one hand, it appears to be a backward-looking view offering little perspective in times characterised by strong integrationist tendencies, on the other it proved to be highly relevant when many CEEn countries asserted their sovereignty after the end of the Cold War. Thus, however controversial and disputed, realism still seems to offer some guidance within our complex security framework.

2.2.2 Liberalism: The Winner of the Cold War?

In the wake of World War I and II, liberalism seemed clearly 'defeated' by the realist approach. However, at the end of the 20th century the international situation appears to provide fertile ground in which liberalism can flourish. To what extent have CEEn countries moved towards liberalism in their current international affairs? In other words, can security predicaments in the CEEn region be described generally in terms of liberal values?

To answer these questions, we need firstly to outline the core assumptions of liberal thinking. The most significant difference between liberalism and realism is a disagreement over the role of the state and international institutions as well as over the focus on peace and war in international politics. Liberals consider 'individuals plus various collectivities of individuals' as fundamental actors, first and foremost states, but also other smaller (e.g. corporations, interest groups) as well as larger (e.g. international organisations, multinational corporations) units. Policy-makers then define state preferences on behalf of a wide range of actors, 'societal ideas, interests

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and institutions' and pursue them in world politics.\textsuperscript{36} Although contemporary liberalism is divided into various strands of thought (sociological liberalism, interdependence liberalism, institutional liberalism, republican liberalism), there are some common assumptions throughout these different explanations.\textsuperscript{37}

First, they hold an optimistic view of international affairs and believe in the positive tendency of human nature. Therefore, they maintain that not only conflict and war, but also cooperation and peace can prevail in international politics. Since traditional liberalism grew hand in hand with the emergence of the modern liberal state, its theory is based upon a strong belief in the momentum of human progress within modern civil society and capitalist economy.\textsuperscript{38}

Second, liberals believe in the strong power of liberal democracy and its immense contribution to security and peace. This view was best theorised by republican liberalism supported by the late eighteenth century Kantian formula, according to which liberal democratic states do not go to war with each other.\textsuperscript{39} Therefore, the most important task for transition countries should be the consolidation of liberal democracy. The emphasis is here on the word 'consolidation', since liberals acknowledge the uncertain character of a fragile, infant democracy and plead for its pragmatic and rapid consolidation.

Third, while realists consider state-centric inter-governmentalism as the only way of practising international politics, liberals believe in communitarian values and in cooperation via international institutions. In their view, as a result of the creation of a web of international organisations, with sufficient influence to unify and represent states, the 'logic of anarchy' can be modified or even replaced by the 'logic of

\textsuperscript{36} In a somewhat individual approach, Andrew Moravcsik has recently (1997) reformulated liberal international relations 'in a nonideological and nonutopian form appropriate to empirical social science'. As Moravcsik has put it: 'Liberal IR theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations – the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded – have a fundamental social purpose underlying the strategic calculations of governments. For liberals, the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics - not, as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities and not, as institutionalists (that is, functional regime theorists) maintain, the configuration of information and institutions'. See Moravcsik, Andrew (1997) "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics", \textit{International Organization}, 51:4, p. 513.

\textsuperscript{37} See Nye (1988)

\textsuperscript{38} See Jackson and Sorensen (1999), p. 108.
Closely related to this assumption with regard to the notion of common security via international society, Martin Wight argued back in the 1960s that

*if there is an international society, then there is an order of some kind to be maintained, or even developed. It is not fallacious to speak of a collective interest, and security acquires a broadened meaning: it can be enjoyed or pursued in common. Foreign policy will take some account of the common interest. It becomes possible to transfer to international politics some of the categories of constitutionalism.*

Realist analysts, on the contrary, are highly critical about the role and importance of international institutions and cooperation in world politics. They support their argument by underlining the dominance of 'relative gains', which appear - for them - as the most significant catalyst for state action.

Liberal theorists Keohane and Martin, however, explain the role of 'relative gains' from a different perspective and conclude:

*Realists interpret the relative-gains' logic as showing that states will not cooperate with one another if each suspects that its potential partners are gaining more from cooperation than it is. However, just as institutions can mitigate fears of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge, so can they alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation. Liberal theory argues that institutions provide valuable information, and information about the distribution of gains from cooperation may be especially valuable if the relative-gains logic is correct. Institutions can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are evenly divided over time, for example by disclosing information about the military expenditures and capacities of alliance members.*

Today, as a result of modernisation, the process of interdependence is regarded as the most important driving force for this thinking, which results necessarily in the emergence of transnational actors and the weakening of states' power. In a world of

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'complex interdependence' the use of military force becomes less useful and the relevance of military security less important.\textsuperscript{44} Hence, this will produce a shift in international politics moving away from the 'high politics' of national security towards the 'low security' of welfare. Nye has summed up the concept of 'complex interdependence' in three points:

\begin{enumerate}
\item states are not the only significant actors - transnational actors working across state boundaries are also major actors;
\item force is not the only significant instrument - economic manipulation and the use of international institutions is the dominant instrument;
\item security is not the dominant goal - welfare is the dominant goal.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{enumerate}

This concept of complex interdependence appears to be of particular relevance in the post-Cold War era of CEE; it reveals much about the goals of foreign and security policies as well as about the instruments of those policies. The establishment of economic and social welfare is now high on the agenda in CEE in order to leave behind predicaments and work towards peace, which can be utilised via transnational cooperation. Translating this claim into the context of security predicaments, it is a clear plea for the widening of the security agenda towards new, non-military issues. The problem today is not, as many realists still think, the threat of an external aggressor, but 'the new challenge of transnational interdependence'.\textsuperscript{46} Thus, beside the threat of military conflict, the same degree of attention should be paid to environmental degradation that poses global threat to all nations' security. As a result of global economies, trade and environmental issues do not 'recognise' borderlines. In other words, national security and the factors that challenge it, must be seen in a broad international context. Similarly, Cooper speaks about the 'growing irrelevance of borders'.\textsuperscript{47} An even wider concept of security has also been developed by other scholars, which will be given a special treatment below.

Fourth, following on from the previous points, liberals consider war as a futile policy instrument in current international affairs. Looking at the three classical functions of military confrontation, states went to war with one another to seize territory, to hold it or to defend it against an external aggressor. Today, the possibility of the first and the second options is limited, only the third option represents a viable utility for the acquisition of military power. Therefore, in the view of liberal critics, the new strategic and security doctrines should adapt to this fundamental change in post-Cold War international relations. In general, this assumption might be relevant in the international context, but says little about the possibility of intra-state war or civil war. As recent tragic events in certain parts of CEE have shown, the possibility of internal conflict and, indeed, intra-state war cannot be entirely excluded from our security framework. In a region, which is characterised by a highly mixed ethnic composition, the possibility of ethnic tension, especially during the post-communist transitional period is very much apparent.

Finally, and connected to the historical utopian idea of morally driven foreign and security policy, liberal analyses suggest that liberal democracies work at preventing conflicts from becoming humanitarian tragedies, even if their own national security is not at risk. The motivation for this is twofold: on the one hand, liberal states are less tolerant of genocide or starvation, on the other, it is more cost effective to solve problems of this kind locally than to be obliged to pick up the bill for the tragic consequences of conflicts, for instance the influx of refugees. During the war in the Balkans, many CEE states, especially those neighbouring ex-Yugoslavia, became asylum countries for the first time in their recent history. It is, therefore, interesting to look in chapter three at, how the CEE governments and societies had coped with this new issue and what implications it had on their security.

Since liberalism is a dynamic theory advocating change, modernisation and mutually beneficial cooperation among states, it seems to be more appropriate to describe the current international politics of CEE. By projecting liberal theory onto the current

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49 Grudzinski and van Ham have argued similarly: "...the Liberal-institutionalist approach is now more effective in grasping the key trends in European security. Although the Realist school has certainly been right in its scepticism about the fluffy new political post-Cold War security vocabulary (...), it has
CEE debate, we can see some plausible cases. For instance, liberalism's wide approach to security is extremely relevant, especially its identification of a close connection between economic welfare and stability. In addition, the focus on actors below the state level can help explain certain processes in a region where, because of historical developments, the term state does not necessarily correspond with the term nation. In fact, as mentioned above, most of the CEE states are ethnically mixed. In spite of repeated criticism from the realist camp, the liberal theory about the strong impact of democracy on security seems to have paid off in most of the countries in CEE. Similarly, the willingness of most of the CEE states to join major international organisations even at the cost of pooling their sovereignty gives strong evidence for the relevance of liberal institutionalism in current international affairs.

2.2.3 Constructivism: Critical Approach to Security Predicaments

Within the critical, post-positivist voices of IR theory, constructivism appears to offer a wealth of material for explaining certain aspects of contemporary international politics in CEE; thus we shall look at it here in more depth. The major difference between established schools of thought and constructivism is that the latter perceives world politics as socially structured, rather than materially constituted. In other words, constructivist theorists reject the existence of a definite, objective world, and propagate an intersubjective, dynamic and meaningful world of the people and for the


people, who created it for their own purposes and who can adjust it to their needs.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, this dynamic approach to IR allows a more up-to-date and efficient method for handling security challenges and tackling predicaments. Another core assumption of constructivist theory is that the structures of the socially constructed world and, consequently, of international politics "shape actors' identities and interests, rather than just their behaviour (a claim that opposes rationalism)".\textsuperscript{52} Those social structures and relationships and their constituents are the main focus of constructivism. Thus, the nature of the relationship of international political actors, whether cooperative or conflictual, is influenced by their "shared understanding, expectations, or knowledge".\textsuperscript{53}

To project these constructivist assumptions onto the CEEn region, we shall have to address the following questions: Which are the dominant social structures that exist in contemporary CEE and how can they help overcome security predicaments? To what extent do 'shared knowledge', 'understanding' and 'common identity' play a role in shaping the region's international affairs? These questions seem to have particular relevance in understanding cooperation both within the region (regional formations) and outside it, i.e. the quest of CEEn governments for membership of main international organisations, such as NATO and the EU. The constructivist explanation of this issue is based on common values and interests, for which these institutions stand. One constructivist analyst of NATO enlargement has argued, for example, that

\begin{quote}
a constructivist approach – the international socialization of states to the basic norms of an international community of values – offers a parsimonious explanation of the enlargement process.\textsuperscript{54}
\end{quote}

It has to be mentioned, however, that there has been an extensive debate especially outside the Anglo-Saxon area, with regard to the negative effects of NATO enlargement and the values that the organisation represents. Czempiel, for one, has argued that the enlargement of NATO would create more problems than solutions

\textsuperscript{51} See Finnemore (1996), p. 3f; Finnemore has argued that "rather than taking actors as given, constructivist approaches problematise them, treating them as the object of analysis. (...) States are continually evolving".
\textsuperscript{52} Wendt (1995), p. 72.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, p. 73.
and, most importantly, it would not solve the core issue, namely maintaining security in Europe. The main reason for this pessimistic view is the value system, which Czempiel associates with NATO. For him, and for many other observers, NATO is a defence community with strong self-interests and not an inclusive security community in the Deutschian sense. Thus there has always been and there will always be disagreement in the field of values and interests between states, and the constructivist approach will hardly be able to transcend this dichotomy in the practice of international politics.

Constructivists have a fundamentally different approach to anarchy in the international arena than the realist school. "Anarchy is what states make of it" is an often-quoted statement from Alexander Wendt, which again reinforces the basic assumption of the social construction of world politics. Anarchy is not a necessary feature of international relations between states, on the contrary, states' relations to each other depend on their interaction, thus they can influence and construct international anarchy. As regards actions of or interactions between CEE states, they can have a great deal of impact on the security predicament, in which the countries find themselves. If, to give a pertinent example, some CEE states join NATO, this can be perceived by others in the region as a hostile policy targeted against them. It can lead to the creation of a security dilemma, something that characterised the highly militarised years of the Cold War. This can only be overcome via mutual trust and actions of reassurances, which finally moves towards a security community of shared values and norms.

Finnemore has argued that internationally approved common values and norms often play a more important role in defining state interests than explicit or implicit external threats. Therefore, in order to prevail over existing security predicaments in CEE and to avoid future ones, we have to address the question, of how interaction can

56 See Wendt (1992)
58 See Finnmere (1996), p. 3.
change conflictual social structures that shape actors' identities and, ultimately, their policies. Similarly, we will examine, how internationally held norms and values can change state behaviour in the context of security predicaments in contemporary CEE. Here, the role of history, as one of the most important generators of identity has to be pointed out, since it seems to have a major impact on contemporary CEE international affairs. However, constructivist theory appears to be rather prescriptive in this matter, and offers little real solutions to the problem at stake.

2.2.4 The 'Widening' Conception

'Wideners', in common with the liberals, have adopted a broad definition of security by opening up the agenda toward new issues and, at the same time, re-formulating the role of the state in the international arena. These voices appeared in the early 1980s and became more explicit when the bipolar confrontation evaporated and new challenges, such as transnational crime and identity-related issues moved into the political spotlight. The details of the analysis and the schools from which the different researchers derived were indeed very different. Their basic assumption was, however, the same: security cannot be defined by realist military terms exclusively.

'Wideners' can hardly be classified by one single philosophical trend, indeed, their proponents describe themselves in the most 'adventurous' ways. The two founding fathers of the so-called 'Copenhagen School', Barry Buzan and Ole Waever describe themselves as 'liberal realist'\(^\text{59}\) and 'post-modern realist'\(^\text{60}\) respectively. The co-author of Buzan's and Waever's book from 1998, Jaap de Wilde is a 'self-defined liberal-pluralist'.\(^\text{61}\) Despite the diversity of their backgrounds, they are unified by one common analytical starting point, namely a desire to widen the definition of security.

These three scholars have come up with a new security framework, which appears to be of particular relevance in the CEE context and will, therefore, be considered here in more depth. The reasons for the particular attention given to this specific model are

\(^{60}\text{Buzan et al. (1998), p. 2.}\)
\(^{61}\text{Ibid.}\)
threefold: first, this is a model that follows a comprehensive method for security analysis. Second, it supplies a clear, well-developed and comprehensive framework for security analysis, which seems to be easily applicable for analysing security predicaments and those factors that generate them. Third, and more fundamentally, its aim is clearly not another theoretical discourse on security but to support empirical research into security analysis.

The most obvious new element in the Copenhagen School's approach is its revised definition of security: "in this approach, security is understood not as the content of a particular sector (military), but as a particular type of politics defined by reference to existential threats and calls for emergency actions in any sector."\(^{62}\) Contrary to the claims of some critics, Buzan, as a former neorealist, did indeed worry about the central role of the sovereign state in the international system and, in fact, he maintained its dominant position.\(^{63}\) On the other hand, he included new levels of analysis, which lie above, alongside or below the state level; thus the state is clearly less important in the new agenda. Some critics of the Copenhagen School have argued that the comprehensive security framework retains the main neorealist point, asserting the importance of a state-centric perspective, and thus, it fails to offer a new analytical basis.\(^{64}\) Buzan has tried to transcend this obvious controversy by reiterating the realist distinction between domestic order and international anarchy, however, at the same time, he argues that, as the system evolves and stronger states arise, the system moves towards a 'mature anarchy'.\(^{65}\) This type of stable international anarchy can then enhance international security as well. Stressing the ever-growing global character of the international system, Buzan and his colleagues speak about international security, instead of simply narrowing the focus to national level.

Another new aspect in this approach is the multidimensional definition of security and threat: in order to do justice to the new security environment, the militarily described concept of threat has been replaced by a more general one and also security has been

\(^{62}\) Ibid.
\(^{63}\) Buzan (1991), p. 27 and 54.
\(^{64}\) Bill McSweeney has argued that "not only is the state the primary object of security; the conception of security which drives the argument allows no place for any other (sub-state) object. They are relegated to the status of 'conditions' for state security". See McSweeney, Bill (1999) Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 55.
defined by different sectors. This point is clearly the most contentious part of the new theory. Traditionalists did not wait long with their critique and accused 'wideners' generally and the Copenhagen School specifically of destroying the field's 'intellectual coherence'. By opening up the term security to other than military issues, 'wideners' run the risk of extending the term easily to any other sector. This can lead to an unnecessary confusion of political and military issues, or, in other words, the boundary between 'politicised' and 'securitised' relations will be mixed up. Liberal demands, for instance, in the economic sector for as little political intervention as possible, mean that intervention to promote economic security is destructive to the workings of a free market economy. But, if we stick to the initial definition of Buzan and Waever, according to which security is a "kind of stabilisation of conflictual or threatening relations, often through emergency mobilization of the state", it is obvious that they restricted the scope of observation to the 'conflictual or threatening situations'. The final aim is in fact, as Waever argues, to reach the process of 'desecuritization': "the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere". In any case, the decisive factor by the designation of an existential threat is, whether it requires emergency action or any other special countermeasures and, importantly, if the political elite and a significant part of the public perceive it as a threat. In this context, two different relations must be paid special attention. First, given the broad definition of security, what is the nature of security predicaments, in other words, what kind of threat or vulnerability is jeopardising national security? Second, from a premise that there are other levels beside the state, whose existence is threatened (who are the referent objects for security)?

The Copenhagen School distinguishes between five different sectors of threat and vulnerability, which can affect the security of states, societies and individuals: the military, the political, the economic, the societal and the environmental. This systematic sectoral analysis of various threats and vulnerabilities helps to define factors that generate predicaments, thus, it will be applied in our later case study.

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69 See, for example, Buzan (1991), p. 19f.
The military sector in the interpretation of the Copenhagen School corresponds to the focus of the traditionalist view of national security and concerns securing the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states. Therefore, the most significant referent object is the state. Here the focus of analysis is, in the first instance, on the possibility of external attack, which might jeopardise the state's sovereignty and its citizens' survival. Because an external military attack can damage all components of both strong and weak states swiftly and substantially, military security is regarded as the principal threat to national security. But unlike traditionalists, the Copenhagen School includes the possibility of armed attack on smaller units within states (e.g. armed forces or police forces in case of a coup, an armed uprising, a regional militant organisation within a state or an even lower level, armed criminal activity, terrorism, etc.), which is of particular relevance in transition countries, such as a number of CEEEn states, which are characterised by high internal instability. They also acknowledge that military action does not necessarily have to do with the maintenance of national security (in the traditional understanding), it is increasingly used for peace-making and peace-keeping purposes, that is in situations, where the intervening country's security is not existentially threatened. The perception of external military threat can lead to the appearance of a severe security predicament, that is states get involved in disputes where the use of the armed forces are not excluded. Those disputes can create a great deal of uncertainty, however, they do not necessarily end in actual military confrontation or war. In fact, security predicaments caused by military insecurities can differ very much in their scale. They can occur in forms of tensions, crises, conflicts and indeed in wars.

Security predicaments can also occur in the political sector, when the sovereignty of political institutions is threatened. This can arise at different levels, generated by various factors originating either inside or outside a state. At the state level, the

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70 As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde have argued: "in the military sector, the state is still the most important - but not the only - referent object. This situation exists not only because states generally command far greater military resources than other actors but also because governing elites have evolved legally and politically as the prime claimants of the legitimate right to use force both inside and outside their domain". See Buzan et al. (1998), p. 49.
organisational stability of the state, the acceptance of the constitutional order by a broad cross-section of society guarantees national security. Political security can be perturbed also by outside pressure; when, for instance, states deny a country diplomatic recognition, they question its legitimacy and sovereignty. Consistent with the idea of political security, Catherine Lalumière and Daniel Tarschys, former Secretary Generals of the Council of Europe, have introduced the concept of 'democratic security'. They argue that stability stems from the acceptance of basic democratic values such as the nature of political systems; a commitment to pluralism, human rights and the rule of law and tolerance and respect for others. Above the state level, the authority and political security of supranational organisations can be existentially threatened as well. Looking at the different kinds of international organisations and their institutional mechanisms, the political unwillingness of some of their members to cooperate can pose an existential threat to the goals and even to the authority of the organisations. There are innumerable examples for this, but in the post-Cold War security environment, two rather impotent international organisations, the former Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) illustrate this problem best. Also below the state level there can be referent objects, whose security can be at stake, for example the existence of self-governing bodies, non-governmental interest groups and so on. Trans-national crime also falls primarily into the political sector, since organised crime can undermine government authority and institutional stability, but it can also generate predicaments in the economic and societal sectors. Given that the entire CEEn region faces not only a political and societal but, at the same time, an economic transition as well, organised crime (e.g. corruption, Mafia activity etc.) is high on the policy agenda.

In the economic sector the picture is certainly more complex, since there is a wide range of vulnerabilities that can contribute to the rise of a security predicament, each of which can impact on a different set of referent objects. Military confrontation is usually just the 'tool' of other insecurity factors; the cause for rearmament and declaring war is, historically speaking often the precarious economic situation of a state. Thus, there is a close relationship between economic stability and national security. Additionally, economic welfare secures high and up-to-date military

capabilities, consequently, there is a close relationship between state power and economic power. At the state level, the fate of national economies can depend crucially on the international system (e.g. exclusion from markets, trade embargo, access to resources etc.). The fundamental issue is, however, whether a state is able to provide for the basic needs of its citizens and sustain an acceptable level of welfare, which is essential for the survival of the population. This appears to be particularly relevant to transitional countries, such as the countries of CEE, where negative consequences of economic transition challenge democratic consolidation. Within the state, economic policy-makers must secure a stable working environment for firms, so that they are not existentially threatened by changes to the law. As the result of financial and economic turmoil in the past have borne witness, economic security and national bankruptcy are increasingly linked to the economic welfare of other states and must therefore be seen in a wider international context. Also in the economic sector, the liberal formula that 'his security is my security' has gained in importance.

The societal sector includes, in the first instance, culture and identity related issues, such as "traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom", which can be threatened mostly below the state level. While military security is primarily concerned with the sovereignty of states, the subject matter of societal security is made up by the identity of nations. As already mentioned in the case of liberalism, this is a highly relevant sector in those areas of the world, such as CEE, where the term 'state' does not correspond with the term 'nation'. It is seldom the case that a whole state's national identity is threatened by another state, except the argument of many who believe that the uniforming character of Western culture has a significant negative effect on other cultures. In the most common case, however, a sub-unit within the state is the referent object. The majority can threaten the existence of national minorities or other religious and sexual subcultures (these can be called in general as collective identities). As Buzan claims, the "ability to maintain and reproduce a language, a set of behavioural customs, or a conception of ethnic purity

76 Waever's and Buzan's concept of societal security and their approach to identity has often been the target of, sometimes unjustified, criticism. McSweeney has argued, for instance that "their concept of society loses all touch with fluidity and process, resulting in a near-positivist conception of identity". See McSweeney (1999), p. 70.
can all be cast in terms of survival".\footnote{Buzan (1997), p. 17.} McSweeney has elaborated on the issue of distinct identities and has taken a somewhat critical position as regards identity as a cause of insecurity. He has come to the conclusion that the

*security problem is not there just because people have separate identities; it may well be the case that they have separate identities because of the security problem.*\footnote{McSweeney (1999), p. 73.}

We will look at the issues of separate identities in the contexts of security predicaments and perceptions in CEE, which seem to have gained in importance during, and, in the wake of the Yugoslavian crises. Yet, identity related tension has caused severe security concerns not only in ex-Yugoslavia, but in other parts of the region as well.\footnote{Jeszenszky, Géza (1997) "More Bosnias? National and Ethnical Tensions in the Post-communist World", *East European Quarterly*, 31:3, p. 285.} With the advancement of European integration in political and economic areas, the need for the construction of a common European identity has been raised as well. Therefore, identity has increasingly become a relevant issue above the state level, especially in the context of globalisation and integration, which are seen as diluting national identities. Also, similar concerns have recently been discussed on different regional levels, for instance the existence of a common Central European identity. On the societal level, security predicaments can also occur as a result of human migration, leading for instance to shift in ethnic compositions of states.\footnote{For more on this issue see Waever, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre (1993) *Identity, Migration and the New Security Order in Europe*. London: Pinter.}

In the **environmental sector** a wide range of possible referent objects can be observed. There is substantial effort made at the global international system level to facilitate discussion of certain alarming environmental issues, a real presentation of those issues as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde call this process 'securitization')\footnote{See Buzan et al. (1998), p. 23ff.} has however failed so far. The Commission on Global Governance produced a document in 1995 for promoting 'global security', in which it argued for the application of certain immediate global
'precautionary principles' as regards ecological security.\textsuperscript{82} The political power of the international environmental community is, however, limited. Thus, there is a clear differentiation between a scientific agenda of the environmental epistemic community and a political one, of how these issues will be translated into national policies. Hence, the crucial question is, whether the globally recognised goals will be embraced locally. Ecological threats can damage the territorial foundation of states and jeopardise societies' basis for living. Thus, the struggle of human beings against the power of nature can be considered as a security issue. Severe security predicaments can arise as a result of natural disasters and in the case study sections we will see that this has been the case in CEE on several occasions in recent years. Weak states with feeble economies face an even more serious challenge, since their resources are often very limited for remedying the ecological damage caused.

The contemporary security agenda in CEE is far more complex than it was during the Cold War. A wide range of threats and vulnerabilities, for which classification the Copenhagen School offers a useful model, can cause security predicaments. As Buzan has concluded

\begin{quote}
\textit{as the military security agenda has become more static, those for economics and the ecology have become more dynamic and more central to day -to-day concerns.}\textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

2.2.5 \textit{Can Theories be Reconciled?}

There is anything but conceptual clarity and harmony in contemporary IR and Security Studies. A wide range of distinct, often fundamentally discordant conceptions characterise these fields, of which the most relevant trends were highlighted above. The aim here has been to look at the strengths and weaknesses of different conceptions in the contemporary CEE security environment, and to formulate a set of research questions, which can then be used to rationalise the contextual treatment in the following chapters. In other words, our overall objective has been to utilise distinct theoretical approaches in order to locate factors that


\textsuperscript{83} Buzan (1991), p. 133.
contribute to the appearance of security predicaments in a specific geographical area. After having dealt with the different theoretical approaches, the following concluding issues appear to be relevant in the specific CEEn context:

Firstly, and most obviously, clear preference has been given to the 'widening' approach, and specifically to the security concept of the Copenhagen School. Nevertheless, this is not meant to imply that the other approaches are considered redundant, nor that the wide concept captures all the issues at stake. Yet, the inclusive approach of Buzan and Waever is unique in its ability to capture the complex nature of current CEEn security predicaments, by bringing different, highly relevant trends together and integrating them into one single concept. Thus, one could argue that the realist/statist conception of the traditionalist school is covered by the military and political sectors of the wide concept and the critical and constructivist approaches are represented by its societal sector. The liberal school of thought has the most common grounds with the wide concept, since both adopt a comprehensive concept of security based upon many factors that can cause predicaments and different actors on different levels, who can be involved in predicaments as referent objects. This 'synthesis' of the different approaches in the wide concept does not, however, do full justice to the main features which characterise the CEEn region. Can, for instance, economic or environmental security be treated on an equal footing with the military sector in contemporary CEE? Which of the previously highlighted factors (military, political, economic, societal and environmental) are more likely to trigger security predicaments in a transitional region such as CEE?

Secondly, as experience has shown in post-Cold War CEE, the total eradication of military confrontation has not taken place. The term 'geopolitics' still seems to be of some relevance, something, which suggests the utility of realist/statist thinking. Thus, we will examine to what extent geopolitical considerations have been trigger factors for security predicaments in post-Cold War CEE?

84 The realist approach is closely linked with the term 'identity' as well, since newly founded or 're-founded' nation-states often pursue realist steps for enforcing recognition. It has to mentioned, however, that 'identities' and 'interests' are the main concerns of constructivism, rather than that of realism.
Thirdly, and closely related to the previous argument, the strength of liberal, constructivist and widening theories lies in both their global and individual approaches towards security. Thus, these theories seem to supply a useful basis for answering the following questions: Can we target the focus of observation with regard to security predicaments exclusively at the level of nation-states in a region, where small states highly depend on each other (trade, economy, environment, etc.)? Also, is the use of the term nation-states legitimate in a region with a highly mixed ethnic composition? Certainly, the utility of the critical constructivist approach can and must be acknowledged in this context.

Fourthly, the question remains, whether the wide approach captures the liberal view of international cooperation adequately? This, again, seems to be an extremely relevant issue in CEE, since all the states of the region have sought to integrate into international institutions, economically and politically as well militarily. The question is to what extent does a partial enlargement of relevant organisations, such as the EU or NATO, enhance security in the region as a whole? Does it rather contribute to the creation of rivalry and tension between post-communist states and thus generate new predicaments? Also, the liberal assumption that regime type affects the prospect of war and cooperation provides a handle for investigating the cases in the following chapters. In addition, we will analyse, what the constructivist adaptation of the 'security community' can say about CEE security predicaments, in other words, is that concept rather prescriptive than normative? Following on from this, we will examine which are the existing structures (security communities) that could offer a useful solution for overcoming current CEE security predicaments?

Given the ambiguous character of the term security in today's international politics in general, and the diversity and complexity of threats and vulnerabilities in contemporary CEE in particular, no adequate security analysis can be done by applying a single approach to the exclusion of the others. Even if mainstream IR theory has so far failed to develop a new paradigm to describe realities of a changing world order more adequately, security analysis can nonetheless prove useful by a 'melting' of existing theories. The Copenhagen School offers the best route in this respect and it will be applied in chapters three and six.
2.3 Perceptions

As the preceding section on predicaments has shown, an influential part of the academic discipline of IR is based on traditional realist/statist theories, which, to a great extent, ignore the social and cognitive elements of security and foreign policy-making. Those advocating such theories construct their premises purely in rational terms and disregard the fact that images of other (either allied or hostile) actors of the international arena are actually created by human beings. Therefore, they apply an objective method ignoring the possibility of misperception, misinterpretation, distortion and subsequent error in the policy-making process. This 'vacuum' is a major analytical weakness. As Neta C. Crawford has argued, about the nature of threat perception in a recent research project on the role of emotions and emotional relationships in world politics,

individuals are biased toward threat perception, whether or not a threat exists, though threats are also cognitively processed and their meaning is socially constructed. (...) Institutionalised tension as for example during cold wars and arms races, may heighten the tendency to perceive threats even though in the natural world some "threats" seem obvious much of what is considered "threatening" in the social world is cognitively processed and socially constructed. 85

Moreover, many academic theories of IR give little information about the complexity and uncertainty of the manner in which decisions are made under real-word conditions. For the sake of complexity we should therefore highlight some important 'practitioners' theories' in this section, which deal with important cognitive elements of perception and decision-making in the specific context of foreign and security policy analysis.

One of the early attempts to incorporate a cognitive element in the analysis of foreign policy-making was undertaken by Sprout and Sprout. 86 They distinguished between the psychological and organisational environments, in which decision-makers operate and stressed the importance of the actors' beliefs and perceptions of conditions and

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events. In a similar way, Robert Jervis, one of the most important scholars of the first-generation political psychological scholarship has pointed out in his book *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, "(...) it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others". Similarly, in a more recent study, Charles S. Taber has come to the conclusion that "the initial problem representation strongly constrains subsequent behaviour". In other words, errors occurring at the stage of cognitive processing, i.e. misperception and misinterpretation of information can carry over to the subsequent stages of the decision-making process.

This section looks at the initial stages of the foreign policy-making process, namely how information is perceived and interpreted by political actors. It also highlights those factors that influence the cognitive processes of perception and interpretation. This short theoretical overview of the cognitive elements of foreign policy decision-making will subsequently help in our analysis of foreign policy processes in the CEEn region and Hungary. Since the perception of the current international situation and the influence of prior knowledge can have an immense impact on the final policy-output, including the cognitive element in our observation appears to be highly relevant in our specific geographical context. The most obvious reason for the need to include these components in our analysis is the simple fact that most of the CEEn decision-makers were socialised and educated in a different political system than the one they currently inhabit and, therefore, acquired a different belief and value system, which cannot be expected to change overnight with the introduction of democracy. Experience, memory and prior knowledge seem to play a key role in the process of perception and interpretation of new information, therefore they can lead to bias in a changed international environment.


The cognitive perception and interpretation process takes place on different levels such as the individual, domestic and systemic, which all can have an impact on the processing of incoming information. The individual level of analysis considers single policy-makers' way of information procession, while the domestic and the systemic levels refer to organisational dimensions of perception and interpretation. Although bodies, such as ministries, intelligence services, security councils or international security organisations, are made up of individuals with different value systems and beliefs, these organisations can develop ingrained patterns of behaviour over time, which results in a kind of 'organisational memory', which can determine the flow of information. This type of information processing is also present in the subsequent stages of decision-making and is often referred to in the literature as the 'organisational process model', based on 'standard operating procedures'. Given the complex nature of the system of decision-making, distorted information produced by an individual actor can often be filtered by other actors of the organisation involved. But this is valid in the converse sense as well: individual perception and interpretation can often be heavily constrained by organisational standard procedures and institutional pressure.

As already mentioned above, there are two main cognitive processes in the early stage of policy decision-making: perception and interpretation of information. In general, in order to understand the external world we use two sources of information: either we receive new inputs from the environment or we work with prior knowledge and previous experience stored in the Long Term Memory (LTM). This process is either driven by top-down influences, which is a mainly conceptual process with emphasis on the role of stored knowledge retrieved from the LTM. Or it is a bottom-up process, with new, incoming data from the outside world dominating the processing. Therefore, the process of perception is a permanent interaction of external stimuli and internal knowledge, thus it is an inferential process with the possibility of error caused by heavy reliance on past knowledge. Consequently, inference can result in biased perception, especially in those cases when our prior experience is not sufficient

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89 See Jervis (1976); Taber (1998)
enough to answer new challenges in new situations, or even if our past knowledge is simply faulty. Misperception can also occur due to imprecise or deficient inputs, which can lead to inappropriate policy-outputs. This is highly relevant especially in those cases, when a decision has to be made promptly under time pressure and no multiple explanations can be constructed in advance, from which one with the strongest disposition will be selected.

The actual conscious processing occurs in the Working Memory (WM), which responds to external stimuli by constructing an understanding of the external world. The WM handles the process of interpretation in a linear way, which means that it relies on information stored in the LTM. This information is retrieved by the WM, which happens in a serial way (the data following one another sequentially). Although the overall process of perception and interpretation is a cyclical one, where permanent feedback and readjustment takes place, single transfers between the two memories happen linearly and slowly due to the limited capacities of our WM.

In the context of foreign and security policy-making, prior knowledge stored in the LTM is linked, to a great extent, to a specific actor's beliefs and images of other policy-makers in particular and world issues in general. As these beliefs are major sources of policy-behaviour, they help explain and predict human action. Therefore, it appears to be important to analyse, how beliefs are constructed, structured and what their impact is on behaviour. By applying a cognitive approach, first one should focus on the content of individual policy-makers' beliefs. This is, to a great extent, a particularised matter, since different individuals have different belief systems at their disposals, based on their prior education, socialisation and so on. Thus, it is hardly possible to draw up one single pattern of constructing beliefs on the level of the individual. As mentioned earlier, institutions can develop certain models of response to predicaments, which can be quite consistent. In contrast to this, there is little guarantee that individuals will stick to their personal belief system in every single case of processing new information. Most of the cognitive theories claim that central beliefs are consequential, "although they differ about the level of coherence and

interconnectedness between beliefs". Social cognition theory and scheme theory tends to favour a far less coherent belief system, while cognitive consistency theory argues in favour of a more lucid structure of beliefs.

Moreover, belief-analysis can adopt a narrow as well as a wide perspective. It can focus on an individual policy-maker's beliefs about general issues in world politics. This method is best described by the so-called operational code approach, which distinguishes between philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Philosophical beliefs are those that determine an individual's fundamental understanding of world affairs (historical, current, future), nature of politics, one's opponents etc., while instrumental beliefs affect the actual process of response (strategy, tactics, etc.), course of action and so. In general, philosophical beliefs deal with substantial issues stored in one's LTM, whereas instrumental beliefs supply the methodological information for information processing and response. Thus, in our context of cognitive analysis, we concentrate on philosophical beliefs and look at individual policy-makers' information processing and the impact of their philosophical beliefs on that process. The other type of belief analysis will be operationalised in the subsequent section (2.4), where actual policy-responses will be analysed.

Another important cognitive approach in foreign and security policy analysis is the more traditional and historical images of the enemy method, best reflected in works of Ole Holsti. Although this concept was created in a generally hostile international environment during the Cold War period, it seems to have some legitimacy in the post-Cold War international relations of CEE as well. As described in the previous section, predicaments are still often driven by realist/statist approaches to security. In order to explain the source of this realist thinking in current world affairs in general and lower scale conflictual situations in contemporary CEE in particular (disputes between neighbouring countries, the negative image of Russia, etc.), the images of the enemy concept can offer some helpful explanations. Here again, the legacy of history

93 Ibid, p. 61.
94 Ibid, p. 56.
can play a determining role in shaping the picture of one's opponents and can no doubt lead to misperception and misinterpretation. This is certainly an important point in the CEE context and can help explain the nature of specific policy-outputs. That said, we ought also to include policy-makers' self-images in the analysis here, since the understanding of others is very much influenced by one's self-understanding. In recent years, a new field of study has emerged, which concentrates on this fundamental assumption and stresses the importance of cross-cultural/inter-cultural communication and behaviour.\textsuperscript{96} In some academic disciplines it has already gained a distinct position, very much so for instance in linguistics, specifically in psycholinguistics and foreign language acquisition, where cognitive elements (paralinguistic, extra-verbal factors) represent an important focus.\textsuperscript{97}

There is no doubt about the importance of cognitive approaches in foreign and security policy analysis. Either they are employed to explain certain patterns of information processing or to construct analogies, in order to better predict likely policy-response of individual actors. They can also say a lot about policy-makers' behaviour. On the individual level, belief analysis offers a good starting point for examining perception and interpretation, whereas on the organisational or systemic level, rules and institutional memory have to be considered as well. The role of prior knowledge, specifically historical analogies can, to a great extent, influence the process of perception and interpretation. The question is, therefore, whether they are used to shape the conscious interpretation process, or to justify certain patterns of behaviour in the later stages of decision-making. The process of constructing an understanding of the external world (in our case the perception of factors generating security predicaments in CEE) is a process of building a subjective understanding of world events. It is an inferential process, prone to error and thus, it can lead to misperception and misinterpretation. Some factors, however, make it difficult to apply a cognitive approach in policy analysis: the importance of specific situations makes it

\textsuperscript{96} In this context, see, for example, Valerie K. Hudson's book on the impact of culture on foreign policy: Hudson, Valerie K. (ed.) (1997) \textit{Culture and Foreign Policy}. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

\textsuperscript{97} For instance in the field of psycholinguistics in general and in foreign language acquisition analysis in particular, an inter/cross-cultural approach has gained in importance in the 1980s. In Germany, for example, a new discipline called 'Interkulturelle Kommunikation' (Intercultural Communication) was first institutionalised at the University of Bayreuth by Alois Wierlacher, which was followed by different other institutions. Their basic assumption is that, since language is a part of our culture, language teaching must have a distinct focus on cultural peculiarities, in order to better understand cultural differences and foster cross-cultural understanding.
almost impossible to draw any conclusions, which could be used as a recipe for future problem solving. Also, different individuals have diverse philosophical and instrumental beliefs, so they interpret similar situations differently. The consistency of one single individual's belief system is questionable as well, since one is always in process of acquiring new information that can influence previously stored knowledge in one's LTM. Thus, cognitive theory is not an approach, which can exclusively give an answer to all questions at hand, but it certainly can contribute to a more differentiated picture of the impact of information and how decisions are arrived at.

In light of this discussion of perceptions, the following research questions arise relevant to our case study: To what extent can cognitive processes generate security predicaments in our specific geographical area that have no real basis in material reality? In other words, to what extent do biased perceptions and interpretations of CEE policy-makers lead to insecurities and tension between states and within states? Additionally, what are the main factors (belief analysis of individuals as well as governments) that contribute to policy-actors' distorted perceptions? Specifically, the role of history will be highlighted in this context.

2.4 Policy-Responses

New security predicaments can occur at any time, providing fresh challenges to policy-makers. In the first instance, new information is processed on a cognitive level, where perception and interpretation take place. This, however, does not mean that the eventual policy-response is, in every case, based exclusively on an individual political actor's will. Perception and interpretation can be considered as early stages of a complex process of foreign and security decision-making; hence, they represent only one part of the entire procedure. Their analysis can help put light on the nature of decisions, but say little about the actual mechanism of decision-making and other organisational factors influencing it.

To appreciate this complexity, it is therefore essential to look at successive stages in the decision-making process. How is the perceived and interpreted information processed and what kinds of response do they trigger? Are there any clearly definable
mechanisms, which can help understand policy-response in our specific geographic context? If so, are they different from procedures in more established democracies?

The last question already stipulates the specific nature of the political environment, which is characteristic for the CEEEn countries. Here we deal with relatively new transition countries, where the success of democratic consolidation and the durability of new political as well as economic structures cannot yet be reliably judged. As we know from previous examples of regime transition from authoritarian towards democratic rule, in some cases the attempted transition was followed by a setback. There is certainly no guarantee of the permanence of democracy in a transition country and this uncertainty is one factor that can have an impact on the foreign and security policy-making process. This will be highlighted in chapter five in more detail.

Policy-response to a new situation is given life with the help of a decision. There are different models, which attempt to describe the way in which decisions are reached and implemented. One of the most prominent theorists of foreign policy decision-making, Graham Allison distinguished between three distinct models: the rational actor model, the organisational process model and the government bargaining (or bureaucratic politics) model. Although Allison's main priority in 1971 was to search for meaningful models in order to describe the decision-making procedures during the Cuban missile crises, his work also offers more far reaching explanations of general processes in the study of foreign and security policy behaviour.

The most commonly adopted model for analysing decision-making is the rational actor model, which derives its theoretical justification from an assumption of rationality in the decision process. This type of decision-making goes hand in hand with established realist IR theories and gives priority to the achievement of absolute goals and gains. In this view, rational decision-making rules out the possibility of choice, it only allows one possible (rational) response to challenges. At first sight, this

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observation somewhat contradicts the realist assumption favouring 'rational choice'. This is, however, purely a definitional confusion. According to realism, choice is not a variety of possible options, from which decision-makers will decide for one. In their view, there is only one possible solution for a problem and that is the rational one. This leads us back to the very nature of realism, which is characterised by a closed, statist and rational understanding of world politics, where the actors' main objective is to maximise power and ensure survival. By extrapolating general realist assumptions to the process of decision-making, rational actors "calculate the costs and benefits of each possible course of action, then choose the one with the highest benefits and lowest costs".¹⁰⁰

Another important realist postulate is the state-centric nature of world politics, where individual members of a state's executive body act on behalf of the state, in order to pursue the best possible policy-response. In the context of foreign and security policy-making, this process includes, firstly, the formulation of challenges and the identification of predicaments. Secondly, it involves the clarification of goals and alternatives, which help best remedy the predicaments, thus, achieve the goals. Thirdly, rational actors investigate the probable consequences of different alternatives, and consider possible risks. Finally, the most rational, thus, most beneficial alternative will be selected. It must be said, however, that the process of decision-making is not a linear one. It is rather a cyclical process, containing a permanent possibility of steering and monitoring, according to new incoming information from the outside world. New challenges and new information can provoke an adjustment of previous decisions, and also, negative feedback of old decisions can lead to policy re-formulations. This is likely to happen in a situation, when decisions were taken under a high level of uncertainty. This might be caused by insufficient information about the outside world or, in a very different case, when decision-makers consciously accept a more risky alternative hoping that gambling might pay off. Beside elements like insufficient information or hardly measurable risks, the lack of consideration of the time factor points to the shortcomings of the rational actor model as well.

Critics have claimed that the above described model illustrates an ideal world and fails to consider real world situations, where decisions must often be taken promptly under immense time pressure. Since foreign and security decision-making often involves crisis management and conflictual situations, the rational actor model cannot capture the process entirely. As Zelikow has pointed out:

*Experts have concluded that the machinery does not work mechanically. Theorists long ago showed that decision-making processes do not match stylised or economic models of synoptic, efficient, and utilitarian choice.*

In order to gain a wider picture of the process of decision-making, ultimately, we need to consider other models, which offer a meaningful alternative to the rational actor model. According to Allison's classification, the organisational process model considers decision not as a result of rational choice, but as the product of organisational routines and standard operating procedures. There are undoubtedly a number of decisions in foreign and security affairs, which do not go through a highly labour intensive process of defining goals and alternative responses, but rely on a standard pattern. This is probably more often the case in the process of low-level day-to-day decision-making and less for decisions taken on a higher level by top leaders. The organisational model was also predominant for describing foreign and security decision-making processes in the communist countries during the Cold War era, when most of the decisions were subordinated to and actually driven by single party interests and doctrines. In those countries, national Foreign Ministries implemented standardised decisions, which were in line with the policy directions dictated by the communist parties. The communist parties (with the exception of Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania) made sure that in foreign and security affairs, the hegemonic superpower interests of the Soviet Union enjoyed the highest priority and accepted the fact that in those policy areas they had to obey their Soviet colleagues entirely.

It is interesting to look at, to what extent the decision-making mechanisms of post-Cold War CEE are still influenced by this old fashioned thinking of standard operating procedure and foreign influence? We shall look at this question in chapter

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five and examine, whether the keen willingness of the CEEn countries to integrate into Western organisations is, to a certain extent, to keep up the certainty of an external reference and a way to replace old Soviet foreign influences by the West. In other words, the West, giving the direction does, what the Soviet Union cannot offer anymore: defines key foreign and security policy objectives at a supranational level and, in return, offers 'protection' to loyal partners. The issue of an external reference stems mainly from policy actors' perceptions of world affairs, which is not necessarily a rational decision with regards their countries' interests. Therefore, we shall look at this particular issue, whether desired NATO and EU membership of CEE is partly influenced by a biased view of external reference, in our case study on perceptions.

The government bargaining model (or bureaucratic model) offers an evocative alternative to both the rational actor model and the organisational process model. It defines the process of decision-making as a bargaining game between various governmental and non-governmental actors with differing interests. According to Allison, this model considers "no unitary actor but rather many actors as players" interacting with each other.103 Hence, a decision is not the result of a rational monolithic process, but the product of compromise, negotiated at various bureaucratic levels. In this sense, foreign and security policy decision-making can be influenced by a number of other domestic interests. Probably the most prominent motive for intervention in foreign affairs is shaped by economic factors, when interests of the national economy interfere with political decisions. This can be best illustrated by the interference of an ethical dimension of foreign policy-making conflicting with the clear economic interests of a country's arms industry. The government bargaining model can certainly capture some types of decision-making more competently. It can be assumed that day-to-day decision-making without time pressure and little lobbying interest is more likely to be taken at lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, where only a few actors are involved.104 By contrast, important and urgent decisions made under crisis conditions are more likely to be dealt with at a high level with the involvement of various executive and advisory actors. This is certainly the case in well-established democracies as well as in weaker transitional countries, so it can be

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said that in this specific situation, regime type does not seem to matter. A slightly different foreign policy decision-making mechanism can occur, however, in those countries, which have a professional diplomatic service, where well-trained bureaucrats are employed, and who are in the position to take more important decisions at a relatively lower level. Obviously, this is not yet the case in transitional CEE.

During the period in which Allison analysed the foreign and security policy decision-making process, supranational actors were of far less relevance than today. However, the post-Cold War situation is far more complex: it is no longer sufficient to keep the level of analysis at the individual and domestic levels, we have to consider supranational entities as well. In the context of contemporary foreign policy-making, we can clearly distinguish between two different levels or environments, one of which stands for the domestic or internal, the other one for international or external inputs.105

Dave Allen has focused on the complex nature of the foreign policy system and concluded that

*although the legal distinction that marks the division between the two environments remains clear, it is now generally accepted that even the most powerful and relatively autonomous of states are vulnerable to 'penetration' of one sort or another from outside. In other words, the neatness and absoluteness of the distinction between the environments is lost because governments can no longer exclusively control the flow of information and the ideas across the boundaries that mark out their areas of authority.*106

Ultimately, governments and other domestic actors involved in the policy-making process have to come to terms with the ever-growing global character of world politics. They are increasingly forced to cope simultaneously with issues resulting from globalisation and within the constraints of their own domestic environment. Integration into supranational organisations requires a considerable transfer of some

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104 See Rosati (1995)
competencies to the governing international body. In some cases this could mean that national governments would no longer be explicitly responsible for taking certain decision that might have a direct impact on their citizens.\textsuperscript{107} In other cases, the level of dependence on external actors can be lower and the national veto still in place. In the view of the European integration process, the trend is certainly an increased co-operation in the fields of foreign and security policy and the strengthening of the competencies of the EU in these two fields. This kind of co-operative foreign and security policy-making marks undoubtedly a new challenge for the CEEn region, since the prior co-operation among the CEEn countries under communism was of a very different character. Constructive co-operation is clearly one important feature of current world politics, which has to be acquired by the countries of CEE, if they want to become fully accepted members of the EU and other international organisations.

Another issue, which is certainly important in the CEEn context is, who is actually accountable for policy-outputs? If we have a wide range of actors involved in a rather bureaucratic type of decision-making, can the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister be held responsible for the decision made? Many critics have argued that the application of the bureaucratic politics approach removes responsibility and reduces transparency within the decision-making process, and thus weakens democratic accountability.\textsuperscript{108} As Krasner has put it forcefully: "if the bureaucratic machine escapes manipulation and direction even by highest officials, then... elections are a farce".\textsuperscript{109} This point needs certainly to be addressed in the CEEn context later on.

What is the role of politically appointed foreign and security policy advisers attached to ministries and offices of prime ministers in the decision-making process? Similarly, the impact of regime type (presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary) on the foreign and security policy decision-making process needs to be analysed. Are competencies of presidents and governments with regard to foreign and security issues clearly defined in the constitutions of CEEn states?

\textsuperscript{107} This is already the situation in the European Union, where the so-called 'Schengen countries' have for instance a common visa policy.


\textsuperscript{109} Krasner, Stephen D. (1972) "Are Bureaucracies Important? (or Allison Wonderland)", \textit{Foreign Policy}, 7, p. 160.
2.5 Conclusion

It has become apparent throughout the analysis that none of the main existing theories alone can explain the issues at stake. In the part on predicaments it was obvious that challenges and vulnerabilities can no longer be fully captured by either neo-realist, neo-liberal or constructivist approaches. The application of wider approaches, however, runs the risk that terms like security and risk become too vague. Similarly, the section on policy-response has tried to point out that decision-making is more than rational-realist theories often describe it. Since the foreign and security decision-making process is operated by human beings, the often-overlooked social and cognitive elements will enjoy a prominent position in the analysis of the ensuing case study.

It has been emphasised on several occasions that the aim of this theoretical overview has been less to contribute to the ongoing debate on the future of IR as an academic discipline. In the sense of the opening quotation by Joseph S. Nye, instead of concentrating on major arguments between different schools of thought, we have rather attempted to look for features, which are complementary to each other, and to synthesise rather than divide existing theories. Our main objective has therefore been to develop a heuristic tool, which is appropriate for application in the CEEn regional context and the narrower Hungarian context.

This chapter has attempted to establish an analytical framework appropriate to the description of security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses in the post-Cold War CEEn region. The next three chapters (three, four and five) are devoted to the application of this framework and consider the illustration of predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses respectively. This sub-division of the analysis has been adopted for the sake of the theoretical and analytical coherence of the thesis, though it has to be acknowledged that the three categories cannot always been rigorously separated. Finally, in chapter six, the thesis concludes with an in-depth study of the application of the framework to the case of Hungary.
3 Changing Security Predicaments in Central and Eastern Europe

This chapter extends the typology set up in chapter two to the regional security complex and investigates, which risks and vulnerabilities generate security predicaments in contemporary CEE. The analysis will follow the five-sector security framework developed by the Copenhagen School, that is the division into the military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors. The application of this wider analytical framework allows a comprehensive treatment of a set of security predicaments faced by the CEE region.

In addition, leaning on the theoretical expositions of chapter two, the current chapter looks at security predicaments not only beyond the military sector, but also on levels other than that of the nation-state. In order to be able to capture the security complex of the region more fully, this chapter investigates a number of risks and vulnerabilities on different levels, such as 'Europe as a whole', 'regional', 'state', 'sub-state' and 'individual'. This multi-sectoral and multi-level analysis allows the incorporation of a set of new security issues that appear to be highly relevant in contemporary CEE. In addition, the analysis draws attention to the interconnectedness of many of the risks, sectors and levels, which allows a risk to impact across levels and sectors.

The chapter demonstrates, through numerous concrete examples from the post-cold War CEE region, the ways in which risks and vulnerabilities may ignite security predicaments in the five sectors and on the five levels as well as across sectors and levels. Selected examples show that many of the risks and vulnerabilities are indeed very real (that is they have already escalated into a concrete predicament), whilst others contribute to the emergence of predicaments latently.

3.1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War has had a stronger impact on the security debate in CEE than in the West. After more than forty years of Soviet dominance, it opened up discussion
about national security within political and academic elites ('re-nationalisation' of security and defence), and this led, in turn, to calls for a new, wider and more inclusive concept of security. This complex picture of security in post-communist CEE cannot consequently be analysed simply by applying traditionalist military-political theories. Thus, this chapter extends the typology outlined in the previous chapter to the CEE regional security complex and gives priority to the five-sector security framework (military, political, economic, societal and environmental) of the Copenhagen School. This differentiation appears to have a strong practical footing in the CEE context, and is redolent of how CEE politicians themselves view security, as we will see in the next chapter on security perceptions.

In this chapter, the risks and vulnerabilities facing contemporary CEE will be highlighted in these five sectors, as these relate to different levels of the international order (see figure 3-1 below). The consideration of levels, which are above, alongside or below the state level is in full accordance with the 'wide' security framework developed in the previous chapter. Thus, we distinguish between five levels of analysis: Europe as a whole, regional, state, sub-state and individual.

Figure 3-1 Schematic diagram of levels and sectors in the analysis of security predicaments

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The treatment of the 'Europe as a whole' level deals with the effects of all-European (pan-European) developments on the security of the CEEn region. The 'regional level' is concerned with the impact of risks and vulnerabilities emanating specifically from within the CEEn region. The analysis of the 'state level' focuses on a set of insecurities facing the CEEn state, including a range of traditional as well as new risks. The 'sub-state level' deals with risks arising from below the state level, for instance from certain parts of a country (e.g. regional divides, etc.) or from specific parts of a society (minorities, foreigners, etc.). As indicated in the preceding chapter (2.2.3), security in the post-Cold War environment is increasingly defined in terms of the subjectivity of individuals. Therefore, we include an 'individual level' of analysis, where we examine individuals' security concerns and their impact on the CEEn region's security. For a comprehensive presentation of risks and vulnerabilities see figure 3-2, in which we have identified the specific factors that arise at each of the five levels and in each of the five sectors delineated above. These factors will be discussed in greater detail in sections 3.2 - 3.4, which follow.

Our differentiation between traditional and new dimensions of security does not mean that we ignore the fact that non-military insecurities can also lead to military confrontations (e.g. ethnic problems). Its purpose is simply to clarify the priorities within the actual CEEn security debate and draw attention to the ever-growing challenge of non-military insecurities.

It has to be acknowledged too, that the rigidity of our framework must be somewhat relaxed in order to allow for the interconnectedness between types of issues (sectors) and levels. In fact, some of the factors generating security predicaments can crop up in more than one sector with diverse destabilising effects. As figure 3-3 shows below, as an example, minority problems (figure 3-3, risk A) can lead to instability equally in the political, military or societal sectors. Other risks, for instance environmental disasters may arise initially in one sector (in this case in the environmental one), but their consequences subsequently spill over into others. This kind of serial propagation of insecurity across sectoral boundaries is shown in figure 3-3 (risk B).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels:</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Societal</th>
<th>Environmental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a whole</td>
<td>Limited cooperation (East-West)</td>
<td>Limited cooperation (East-West)</td>
<td>Economic gap (East-West), Globalisation</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Energy Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slow integration</td>
<td>Slow integration</td>
<td>Slow integration</td>
<td>Influx of refugees</td>
<td>Environmental disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hegemonic interests</td>
<td>'Fortress Europe'</td>
<td>Restricted market access, Migration</td>
<td>Globalisation</td>
<td>Problem of nuclear waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europeanisation</td>
<td>Ecosystem crisis, Climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Food safety problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Border disputes</td>
<td>Weak political cooperation</td>
<td>Weak cooperation</td>
<td>Religious conflict</td>
<td>Transborder disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minority problems</td>
<td>Instability in neighbouring states</td>
<td>Negative effects of Balkan wars</td>
<td>Minority and ethnic conflict</td>
<td>Pollution of air, rivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening of nation states</td>
<td>Influx of refugees</td>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>Severe historic legacies</td>
<td>Environmental disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technology gap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Ethnic tensions</td>
<td>Weak institutions</td>
<td>Dependent economies</td>
<td>Weak civil societies</td>
<td>Pollution of air, water, soil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak defence forces</td>
<td>Constitutional ambiguity</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Search for identity</td>
<td>Unsafe nuclear power stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of public resources</td>
<td>Minority discrimination</td>
<td>Tight environmental budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invasion/division</td>
<td>Strengthening of extremist parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decaying infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delayed reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of environmental concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-state</td>
<td>Internal instability</td>
<td>Minority separatism</td>
<td>Bankruptcy</td>
<td>Human rights violations</td>
<td>Decaying infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Militant separatism</td>
<td>Political extremism</td>
<td>Growing gap between public-private sector</td>
<td>Intolerance</td>
<td>Lack of environmental awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development gap</td>
<td>Disillusionment with democratisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extremism</td>
<td>Little environmental friendly technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armed criminal activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Xenophobic tendencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activity (Mafia)</td>
<td>Organised crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Personal insecurity</td>
<td>Lack of participation</td>
<td>Financial insecurity</td>
<td>Weak personal autonomy, high suicide rate</td>
<td>Little individual environmental awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victim of armed criminal activity</td>
<td>Disillusionment</td>
<td>Lack of opportunity</td>
<td>Weak articulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Food and health problems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition, some factors can arise on different levels, as for instance organised crime can be regarded as a factor generating security predicaments on almost all five levels (see figure 3-4, risk C), or political extremism can crop up on both state and sub-state levels (figure 3-4, risk D). Furthermore, environmental issues are intrinsically difficult to apply to levels in a clear-cut manner, given that the environment is an essentially borderless matter.

As a result of this interconnectedness between different sectors and levels, some overlaps and recurrences are unavoidable in our subsequent analysis. In order to keep these overlaps and recurrences on a minimum level, factors that can crop up on different levels will be considered together (e.g. minority problems, environmental issues etc.), followed by the discussion of factors that occur on one level only (e.g. division/invasion).
3.2 Traditional Dimension of Security: Military Sector

Challenges resulting from external military aggression have declined significantly in post-Cold War CEE. When the Brezhnev doctrine was overturned, the CEEn governments' interest was no longer the defence of the unity of the 'communist camp' and the maintenance of its ideological and military unity, but rather the rapid build-up of national sovereign structures. This included the reorganisation of armies as well as the reformulation of national security and defence doctrines. Political sovereignty, as the most elementary national interest, became after 1989/90 the most widely accepted principle in terms of international relations in the CEEn region. During the communist period, the CEEn countries' ally was the Soviet Union, even if this was not a free choice and not an equal partnership. Paradoxically, however, the Soviet Union posed at the same time the biggest threat to CEE in military terms. The brutal Soviet-led military interventions in the 1956 Hungarian and the 1968 Czechoslovakian revolutions cost those countries more suffering and human lives than the entire Cold War military confrontation. These memories are still alive in CEE and attitudes towards Russia are still determined, to a great extent, by this negative historical experience. This rather sentimental element has to be considered in any analysis of the military component of CEEn security and will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter on perceptions.

In general, it can be argued that the danger of an external military threat has declined significantly and has been, to great extent, supplanted by threats stemming from conflicts within states. An OSCE document of 1999, the Charter for European Security has defined the sources of military threats in a similar manner: "threats to our [OSCE area] security can stem from conflict within States as well as from conflicts between States".¹

As to specific risks and vulnerabilities in the military sector, we identify the lack of cooperation or limited cooperation, exclusion and slow integration on both 'Europe as

a whole' level as well as on the 'regional' level as potential factors generating security predicaments in CEE. In the post-Cold War era the emerging security vacuum in CEE has not, or only partially been filled by international security organisations. In terms of military security, the major issue for CEE appears to be a rather realist one, namely the defence of the state via security guarantees. For various reasons, the OSCE could not offer and NATO and the WEU appeared reluctant to offer any real security guarantees to the CEEn region (except to the three new members of NATO after March 1999). With regard to the WEU, as Hyde-Price summed it up, it is "in no position to offer credible security guarantees", thus it is unable to solve the CEEn countries' security predicaments (since November 2000 WEU is defunct). Similarly, CEEn politicians consider the OSCE with its concepts of 'cooperative security' and 'comprehensive membership' a rather weak body without real power and security guarantees. Although NATO granted membership to three former Warsaw Pact countries and has developed some structures for cooperation with the CEEn countries, at present, it has not extended any security guarantees to its other partner countries. Instead, in order to appease inpatient applicant partner countries, NATO officials speak about security assurances. The selective nature of NATO's eastward enlargement has inevitably generated a deep existential fear in some countries and the feeling of exclusion has increased further.

It has to be acknowledged, however, that in the wake of NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis in 1999, there is some hope for non-NATO member CEEn states that

the Madrid Summit divided the applying countries among four major groups: the "invited" (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic); the "considered" (Romania and Slovenia); the "mentioned" (the Baltic Republics); and the "unmentioned" (among them Bulgaria). This classification of the applicants, correct or not, has contributed to an increasing sense of uncertainty and insecurity, especially in the last group of countries.5

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3 For instance, Klaus Wittmann, a member of the German NATO representation, acknowledges NATO's duty to enter consultation with any of its active PfP partners, in case their territorial integrity, political autonomy or security is under threat; See Wittmann, Klaus (1999) "Gewandeltes Selbstverständnis und Erweiteretes Aufgabenspektrum: Der Weg zum neuen Strategischen Konzept der NATO", Europäische Sicherheit, 8/99, p. 17. (Changing Self-understanding and Broadened Spectrum of Tasks: Route to the New Strategic Concept of NATO)
the Alliance would stand up for their national security, should it come under external threat. As Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga put it,

*Kosovo is not a member of the NATO alliance, and yet the alliance was able to take action when it felt that, according to the principles on which it is founded, action and intervention were necessary. (...) I would expect it to do no less anywhere else in Europe.*

This assumption however is a further element that contributes to current CEEn security predicaments, especially with regard to Russia, which is rather nervous about any involvement and role of NATO in Russia's former sphere of interest.

Similarly, on the 'regional' level, the lack of powerful region-wide military organisations or cooperation and the lack of political will among the CEEn elites to embark upon such projects, contribute to the uncertainty and support the endurance of a widely perceived security vacuum. Although, as we will see in the later analysis of policy-responses there are some sub-regional initiatives, these are by no means well equipped to solve the hard security predicaments of the countries involved.

In addition to the above described limited cooperation and slow process of integration, we define the potential of hegemonic interests as a further cause of security predicaments on the 'Europe as a whole' and, to some extent, on the 'regional' levels. Although the likelihood that a country could rise and threaten the continent's security, is today very slim, the possibility cannot be excluded entirely. The 20th century produced two major world wars and a long lasting highly confrontational Cold War, all of which originated from and were played out mainly in Europe. Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter on security perceptions, there is still a great deal of anxiety among Europeans concerning the possibility of an emerging hostile entity.

Equally on the 'regional', 'state' and 'sub-state' levels, minority related problems appear to represent major risks and vulnerabilities that can possibly escalate into

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military conflicts, as it had happened in former Yugoslavia. These include border disputes, strengthening of nation-states, ethnic tensions, internal instability and possible ethnic militant separatism. These issues are not new to CEE, since as a result of the post-First and Second World War settlements, borders in CEE were redrawn and nations torn apart. Nationalistic sentiments and revanchistic politics were kept under control in the communist era, during which 'communist internationalism' tried to create a uniform society regardless of nationality and ethnic origin. Although minority problems did exist during Communism, they were not allowed to be openly articulated. Similarly, the repressive communist system cemented the existing borders in CEE and rejected any consideration of adjustment. However, in the post-communist period, issues such as the rightness of borders and the treatment of minorities have become highly explosive in many regions of CEE. The notion of the strengthening of the nation-state has proved increasingly incompatible with liberal rights for national and ethnic minorities that could, in the eyes of many nationalistic CEEn politicians, jeopardise national unity. As a possible consequence of this, one observer from the region has asked the following question:

What would have happened if Yeltsin, imitating Milosevic, had said that 'all Russian must be kept united in one state', or, worse, if a victorious Zyuganov [the leader of the Russian Communist Party] would adopt such a line?

Border disputes, minority problems as well as the desire to strengthen nation-states in CEE could be counterbalanced via regional cooperation. Yet, as described above, there is only a limited number of regional formations, and most of them are rather weak. Additionally, these initiatives do not comprise cooperation in defence and security matters; these issues are covered through bilateral agreements between individual countries of the region, without the inclusion of mutual defence.

The concern that ethnic tensions can be a source of security predicaments can also materialise at the 'state' level. As various examples have shown, minority conflict is a

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very real threat, which can easily escalate into an armed military crisis or even a civil war. As one analyst from the region has argued:

There was also a fear of the Balkan crisis multiplying when almost simultaneously with that two other federations, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, came to disintegrate. (...) Unfortunately, there are many more fires burning in the formerly communist-ruled countries, and so far all of them had been ignited by national or ethnic conflicts. (...) Undoubtedly the components for new Bosnias exist in even more places: wherever there are ethnically-varied and mixed populations, unscrupulous politicians and the legacy of a communist dictatorship.\(^{10}\)

On the 'sub-state' level, all countries with a great proportion of national or ethnic minorities, such as Romania, Slovakia and all successor states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia face the possibility of internal instability and the emergence of militant sub-regional or sub-state separatism (in a manner analogous to the rise of the militant Basque separatist movement ETA), even if these do not always end in military conflict. In general it can be argued that the more stable a democracy is, the more minority rights are respected by the majority, the less the likelihood of the emergence of militant separatism is. As Jeszenszky summed up the main reason for the war in the Balkans: "the war was caused by majorities bullying minorities, who then took up arms against the intolerant majority".\(^{11}\)

Additionally, on the 'state' level, security predicaments can be triggered in the military sector by the following factors: invasion/division, weak and under-funded defence forces, lack of strategy and delayed reforms. Invasion and division are still fears causing some insecurity in CEE. It is hardly surprising that countries, which have been victims of foreign invasion and division on several occasions throughout their history, cannot free themselves from these risks and vulnerabilities easily. This is, what Grudzinski and van Ham call the 'TYM syndrome': "In most Central European countries, the ghosts of 'Trianon', 'Yalta' and 'Munich' still haunt the political elite".\(^{12}\)

Whether these fears are objective or rather legacies of history will be analysed in the next chapter on security perceptions.

\(^{11}\) Ibid, p. 288.
\(^{12}\) Grudzinski and van Ham (1999), p. 64.
The rather poor material, financial and moral state of the armed forces throughout the entire CEEn region can trigger security predicaments as well. These problems have to do with the general economic hardship and scarce resources in all former Warsaw Pact countries.\(^\text{13}\) Posts in CEE armed forces cannot offer competitive salaries and modern working conditions. This has a twofold effect on the military profession. First, it is hard-pressed to attract young well-trained individuals with sufficient competencies in Western languages that would be inevitable for both taking parts in NATO operations via PfP as well as preparing for NATO membership, where the command language is English. One of the recommendations of a study, prepared for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on the three new members of the Alliance in 1999 has acknowledged the importance of this issue and concluded:

\[\text{To attract the right young people for the military service and retain them in the military profession, it is of utmost importance to improve the quality of life of the soldiers as well as their reputation in society. (...) Young officers must be provided with clear and reasonable career prospects.} \(^\text{14}\)\]

Second, low salaries and sometimes also their delayed payment demoralise members of the armed forces. This is, in turn, translated into a disappointment with democratic development and thus into discontent within the military leadership, which can pose a real threat to the stability of a country, if it leads to the military's interference in everyday politics. As the Spanish example of the failed military coup of February 1981 has shown, the consequences of slow reform of the armed forces, the survival of numerous military appointees of the previous regime and serious financial difficulties can limit political sovereignty.\(^\text{15}\) So, for instance, the establishment of the National Association of the Romanian Military (ANMR) in early November 2000 has caused much turmoil in the country's military political sphere, since this association of mainly retired, but also partly still serving officers has proclaimed to deal directly with issues which, in their view, have an impact on the nation. Members of the


ANMR have claimed in a memorandum that "military personnel cannot and must not indifferently witness the humiliation or ignorance of the national values or the continuous decay of living standards." Additionally, Romanian army Chief of Staff, General Mircea Chelaru, made public political statements about potential threats to the country's security and unity and urged for rapid response. After his sweeping political statements Chelaru, under pressure from domestic political parties and from the critical international reaction, in particular from NATO, had no option other than to resign. After his resignation, the freshly formed ANMR nominated Chelaru as its honorary president. This Romanian example illustrates the widespread disappointment within the armed forces in the entire region and the lack of confidence of the citizens and parts of the political elite in the military.

Despite the fact that after 1989/90 most of the CEEn countries reformulated their national security and defence principles, the lack of a military strategy, i.e. the codification of the role and size of and control over the armed forces has mainly remained a factor causing insecurity. Outstanding issues, such as cuts in personnel and the closure of army camps, coupled with a lack of long-term transparent and secure financial guarantees, have often been subject of party politics and election campaigns. This has led to the postponement of unpopular, but urgent decisions. Delayed reform of the armed forces, lack of strategy and, as a result of serious under-investment, the miserable state of military equipment all complicate CEEn security predicaments.

Although on the 'sub-state' and 'individual' levels the majority of risks and vulnerabilities are of a non-military nature, there are few factors causing security predicaments that fall into the military sector. Accordingly, the appearance of armed criminal activity (Mafia) and the consequences of the widening development gap can be identified here.

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Criminal (Mafia) activity within one state is a challenge that, because of its methods, often takes a militant form, even if it remains usually on a lower scale. Nevertheless, certain criminal groups have a wide range of weaponry at their disposal, which they are ready to employ when their 'business interests' are threatened. Bloody score settling between various Mafia groups are a part of many CEEn countries' everyday life that can not only undermine the constitutional order, but also create an ongoing instability and personal insecurity on the 'individual' level, as ordinary citizens often become victims of armed criminal activity. The Polish Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), a special police unit for combating organised crime claimed to have liquidated the so-called Pruszkow Mafia (a large mafia group active in Poland) in September 2000. But, as RFE/RL Newsline reported, the same day the "gangsters have issued death sentences for some CBI officers involved in the clampdown on the group".19

Although less likely to escalate into a military problem, the consequences arising from the widening development gap within the state cannot always be predicted. The impoverishment of certain parts of the population, for example people working in the drastically declining agricultural sector, are contrasted with a powerful 'minority' of the so called 'new rich'. Similarly, countries that are unable or unwilling to pay salaries to public sector employees for months face the possibility of some sort of spontaneous armed uprising, if not a civil war. And violent protest against economic and political mismanagement is not unprecedented in the CEEn region, since in some countries the in 1989/90 overthrown communist governments faced mass militant protest, which often started as regional protests, but escalated into revolutions, e.g. in Romania in winter 1989. There are some more recent examples in CEE for this kind of security predicament: following a period of peaceful protest in Bulgaria in late 1996 and early 1997, hundreds of demonstrators stormed the Socialist-led national parliament in Sofia and threatened to overthrow the post-communist government. The situation got out of control and escalated into a violent siege, with hundreds of protestors and MPs injured. Finally, the police and other armed forces of the Interior Ministry managed to break up the demonstration with the use of excessive violence and restored constitutional order. The chief of Bulgaria's General Staff ruled out the

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involvement of the military in the conflict, since, according to the constitution, the military is not entitled to take part in the settlement of internal problems. One opposition politician described the events of January 1997 "as being provoked by the deep economic crisis and the despair of people brought to total impoverishment." In the wake of the constitutional crisis, the President and the Speaker of the Parliament had to announce early elections. As another example, Albania in 1997 faced similar nation-wide uprisings expressing widespread discontent about the economic hardship of the majority of the population. Similarly, the removal of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000 was a result of popular, partly militant protest, also generated by the impoverishment of large parts of Serbian society.

3.3 New Dimensions of Security

3.3.1 The Political Sector

In the political sector, limited cooperation, slow integration and as a result, the exclusion of CEE countries of Western European institutions can generate security predicaments on the 'Europe as a whole' as well as on the 'regional' levels. In particular, two major organisations' involvement in the CEE region will be considered here, although it has to be acknowledged that a clear cut division between military and political sectors is impossible, since some organisations are actively involved in various fields. Therefore, we do not disregard the fact that, for instance, NATO or OSCE membership does contribute to the political stability of a country, or, even if not implicitly, to the strengthening of economies (it can boost foreign investors' confidence). However NATO's primary goal is to integrate the countries' militaries in a supranational body and to provide security via military means. Similarly, the OSCE is an organisation that can help defuse security predicaments in various sectors beside the military one, yet, its primary goals are security related, such as early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. In the political sector two main organisations on the system level ('Europe as a whole') have been playing major roles in securing post-Second World War Europe; The Council of Europe

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20 Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 13/01/1997, Source: http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/bta/97-01-
(CoE) and the EU. Whilst the CoE opened up its doors for new members from CEE swiftly after the end of the Cold War, the EU has remained cautious with regard to admitting new post-communist countries. The CoE's contribution to stabilising and securing the continent should not be underestimated; however, its impact is limited to only certain areas (e.g. advice in political and human rights issues), which do not include any kind of formal security guarantee. As suggested in chapter two, the CoE focuses mainly on the establishment of 'democratic security'. That is assistance via political advice in specific matters (e.g. advice on democratising administrations; formulating new laws; settling disputes between neighbouring states; etc.), in order to help build and strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law. Thus, through its inclusive policy, the CoE has played a major role in securing post-communist CEE. 21

The European Union has established numerous bilateral agreements with most of the CEE countries, in order to regulate political as well as economic relations. These relations have deepened since 1990. However, in specific areas the EU has remained highly exclusive. It has also appeared extremely reluctant to open up its organisation for new members from the CEE region. The main argument is that the EU requires such a high level of economic competitiveness from its members that insufficiently prepared countries' economies would not be able to stand the pressure. Over and above the economic issue, the EU has always been an important stabilising agency in the political field throughout its history. Thus, its reluctant and cautious handling of the issue of eastward enlargement is a factor that can generate political insecurity, whose impact on the continent's security is widely overlooked. The EU has tried to exert a stabilising political influence in the CEE region through the accession criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 (hence the designation 'Copenhagen accession criteria'), yet, only one of the four criteria actually addresses the issue of political requirements of membership. According to the first point, candidate countries need to develop stable political institutions before qualifying for membership, that is the guarantee of democracy, rule of law, human rights and

minority rights. The other three criteria deal with various aspects of the candidate countries' economies and their state of readiness for the Common Market as well as with the adoption of the EU's acquis communautaire. As the current status of the enlargement process shows, for most of the candidates the fulfilment of the minimal political conditions has been much more readily achieved than overcoming the EU's procrastination over specifics of the economic conditions. In other words, the future of the enlargement process seems to hang on economic rather than political conditions, which clearly casts doubt on the EU's commitment for furthering stability and peace in CEE.

On the 'regional level', despite some initiatives, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Central European Initiative (CEI), and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA, based on the Visegrad initiative), there is a lack of powerful organisations, that are aimed at strengthening CEE's political security. As in the regional military sector, this shortcoming is primarily to be blamed on the lack of interest in most of the CEE countries and their clear preference for EU and NATO membership, instead of deep regional integration.

Political instability in neighbouring countries is a factor that has contributed to a great extent to security predicaments on the 'regional level' in post-Cold War CEE. As former Hungarian Foreign Minister László Kovács has argued "instability in any country in Europe can destabilize not only its own environment but also the region and Europe as a whole". As the 'domino effect' swept through CEE in 1989 and helped trigger popular protest against communist rule even in the most hard-line states (e.g. in Romania and East Germany), political instability in post-communist CEE could spill over to neighbouring countries in a similar way. As a result of military, political and economic instability in parts of CEE, migration has become a burning issue and during the wars in the Balkans, an influx of refugees in neighbouring countries reached critical dimensions. These countries feared that a suddenly unbalanced ethnic composition could pose a threat to national security, as well as

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imposing a financial burden upon deprived transition economies. There have been some examples of fights between refugee groups from different ethnic backgrounds, destabilising the receiving countries' security, as for example in Macedonia in 1999. In Törö's view, the possibility that initially domestic conflicts of both political and military nature, can spread over to neighbouring countries, is even higher, when, for instance, the neighbouring countries have a strong interest in supporting their national minorities, e.g. Hungary or Russia.24 This support can take various forms, the participation of volunteers and strong political and moral support in national media and in various international fora.

On the 'state level', weak institutions, constitutional ambiguity and the strengthening of extremist parties can generate security predicaments in the political sector.

With the exception of Hungary, all CEEn states have seen immediate post-communist governments collapse prematurely, before reaching the end of their elected terms. This political disruption is different from the political instabilities evident in well-established liberal democracies, which is contained within reliable constitutional parameters. In CEE, the legal framework of democratic political institutions, liberal economies and open societies has had to be established anew. There are numerous examples of weak institutions or constitutional ambiguity creating security predicaments in CEEn politics. One often cited example is the power struggle that took place between former Polish President Lech Walesa, the parliament (especially the lower house the 'Sejm') and Polish governments, which could not be entirely resolved until after the adoption of the new constitution in 1997.25 But also in countries with a stronger parliamentarian system and prime minister and weaker president, the occurrence of a power struggle has not always been avoided. For instance, relations between former Slovak Prime Minister Vladimar Meciar and former President Michal Kovác were constantly strained, and culminated in 1997 in a


constitutional crisis, when, after Kovác's end of office, the Parliament failed to elect a new president. In fact, during the ongoing absence of a president, Meciar and his allies tried to abuse the authority temporarily transferred to them by the constitution and appointed their protégés to key positions. For instance, in 1998 Meciar and his close ally the speaker of the Slovak Parliament Ivan Gasparovic replaced the army's Chief of Staff by his candidate, by ignoring the candidate of the then Defense Minister (who was a member of a junior coalition partner). This was regarded as an attempt by Prime Minister Meciar to control the army.26

Also, the strengthening of extremist parties can contribute to security predicaments in the political sector on both 'state' and 'sub-state' levels. As the results of elections in Romania in November/December 2000 have shown, ultra national and ex-communist parties can exploit the serious difficulties that result from multiple transition processes. The ultra-nationalist Romania Mare (PRM-Greater Romania) headed by Corneliu Vadim Tudor gained a large proportion of the votes of angry, increasingly impoverished masses, so that it has became an important force in Romanian political life, even if it is not a part of the coalition government. As Traian Basescu, the mayor of Bucharest has commented: "This is the vote of empty stomachs".27 Tudor's statements, such as "Romania can only be run with machine-guns", and "traitors who must be liquidated" contribute to political insecurity in the entire CEEn region.28 Similarly, political extremism in parts of a country can trigger political insecurity and, in more severe cases, undermine the constitutional order.

The issue of ethnic and national minorities related conflict, already mentioned, is an example for the interconnectedness between various risks, sectors and levels. It can also crop up in the political sector on the state and sub-state levels, not necessarily in a form of violent conflict, but more as an internal risk challenging the political legitimacy as well as the constitutional and geographical sovereignty of states. Minority separatism can destabilise a state politically, especially if demands aim to undermining the territorial integrity of the state. Normally, if minorities enjoy all rights to exercise their cultural autonomy with regard to the use of their language in

26 See RFE/RL Newsline, 14/07/1997.
28 Ibid.
everyday life and education, receive public money to maintain their cultural heritage and are represented in national and local governments, they do not seek political autonomy. If, however, the majority violates these rights, minority separatism increases too. It is therefore in the interest of any CEEn countries to comply with international norms regarding the protection of ethnic minorities, in order to maintain peaceful co-existence between the majority and minority. The proportionally high Roma population in many CEEn countries can pose a threat to national security, if governments fail to integrate them into the economic and social system of the states. At present, they are not adequately represented in national politics, but once they get organised, they may pose a challenge to the states.

In addition, disillusionment with democratisation, lack of participation and organised crime can be identified as factors triggering security predicaments on both 'sub-state' and 'individual' levels in the political sector.

Disillusionment with the process of democratisation is a major political destabilising factor in contemporary CEE. The switch from a communist centrally planned economy toward a liberal market economy has inevitably generated inequalities within society, and as a result of this transformation process some parts of society have been on the losing side. Mass disappointment and disillusionment within significant parts of society can not only pose a risk to the state, but also question the legitimacy of democracy as a fundamental value. Furthermore, the lack of political participation can be identified as a factor triggering political insecurity. The fact that many people do not participate in elections and referenda shows that many societies still suffer from the effect of the 'de-politicised' communist past, or are disillusioned and use non-participation as political protest.29

Like minority conflict, organised crime is another factor that can crop up in more than one sector and on more than one level and can pose insecurity in many distinct ways. As it has been mentioned above, in its more extreme form, it can pose a threat to the existence of individuals. In the political sector, organised crime has been brought into connection with the political leadership of many CEEn countries. This kind of
political and economic corruption seems to be far greater than in established market economies. This is partly because of the massive privatisation programmes that have been taking place in post-communist CEE, where some people became extremely wealthy and powerful overnight.

3.3.2 The Economic Sector

On the level of 'Europe as a whole', the most urgent risk in the economic sector is that of the tremendous gap in economic development between Western and Eastern Europe. Additionally, economic development in CEE shows varying results. While Central Europe seems to have overcome the worst economic impediments, some Eastern and South Eastern European countries still find themselves in serious difficulties. Novák has pointed out that a partial enlargement of the EU would widen the gap between developed and less developed countries in CEE. The economic dissimilarities in CEE and the emergence of a 'multi-speed' Europe, and within that a 'multi-speed' CEE, can be obvious sources of tensions and instability.

Under the current circumstances, it is inconceivable that any parts of CEE could catch up economically with Western Europe. As Dunay has pointed out, even if the average annual growth of the GDP in CEE is at present the double of the EU average, the gap between CEE – EU economic development is growing, simply because the basis of the growth in the EU is more than the double of that in CEE. It is very unlikely that this economic insecurity will diminish without substantial international assistance in the short or medium term. As a recent report produced by the Commission of the EU suggests, the economic and social cohesion of the twelve candidate countries with the average level of the EU member states would take at least twenty to thirty years.

31 See HVG, 7/10/2000, p. 59.
Other phenomena within the economic sector that can contribute to the emergence of security predicaments on the level of 'Europe as a whole' are the negative effects of globalisation, slow economic integration and restricted market access for CEE in Western Europe, and economic migration. Whilst the process of globalisation can create a range of business opportunities, it also challenges all economies of the world; yet, weaker, less developed systems, such as the CEE ones, are more vulnerable to this challenge. This is underpinned further by partial unavailability of extensive markets in Western Europe, those which are protected by the shield of the EU's borders. The economic hardship in CEE in general has triggered a migration process, whereby many highly qualified and talented professionals leave their countries for better pay, high-tech working environment and higher living standards.

Weak cooperation also appears on the 'regional level' as one of the main factors triggering economic insecurity. In general, CEE governments often consider regional economic cooperation, such as CEFTA counter-productive to their efforts of joining the EU. However, some less developed CEE countries consider CEFTA a provisional test of cooperation, which can help prepare them for EU membership. Bulgarian President Petar Stojanov has argued in 1997, a year before Bulgaria's admission to the organisation that "CEFTA membership is our nation's current strategic goal, a milestone on its road towards the European Union".33 For those CEE countries, who are likely to be become members of the EU, CEFTA is designed to offer a forum for coordinating their policies to the EU and lobby the organisation jointly. This, however, has proven illusionary, since CEE governments prefer to handle the issue of their EU integration strictly in a bilateral manner.

Beside insufficient cooperation, factors, such as the negative effect of the wars in the Balkans, the isolation of some countries and the technology gap have fed regional security predicaments in the economic sector. During and after the wars in the Balkans, neighbouring countries, especially those, for whose trade-arrangements Yugoslavia has been an important transit country, have suffered severe economic losses. According to indicators of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, losses to the Romanian economy during the eleven-week NATO bombing campaign against

33 Cited in Grudzinski and van Ham (1999), p. 70.
Serbian targets amounted to $245 million and, by the end of 1999, total losses did rise to some $915 million. A more detailed analysis conducted for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 1999 has revealed even more devastating facts:

Expected growth rates in six countries surrounding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Bulgaria, Romania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Albania) have been reduced by 3-4 percentage points this year as a direct and indirect consequence of the conflict. This has increased these countries' combined balance of payments shortfalls by $1 billion, of which the financing for an estimated $450 million remains to be found. One estimate is that the war will shave almost $8 billion, or 5.4% off the Balkan region's GDP in 1999. A 1.6% growth rate for the region was forecast prior to the war.

An additional problem has been the barring of the Danube by bridges destroyed by NATO bombing. Romania and Bulgaria in particular have suffered from an inability to transport goods to key markets in Western Europe and other countries in the region cannot send goods by river in the other direction. Yugoslavia under President Milosevic refused to remove the debris after the war, unless other countries, especially those that conducted the air raids, would rebuild them. As a result, many Romanian and Bulgarian shipping businesses went bankrupt. Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov urged the Budapest meeting of CEFTA leaders in October 1999 to set up a special CEFTA committee to coordinate talks between the eleven states through which the Danube flows. Indeed, all CEFTA leaders signed a joint declaration, demanding the earliest possible solution of the problem.

On the 'state' level, individual countries face a range of economic factors that can have an impact on their national security. Weak, fragile and highly dependent economies, as most of the CEEn economies are to varying degrees, have little freedom in economic and financial issues and are strongly influenced by foreign credit institutions and investors. Thus CEEn national economies operate under a dual pressure. First, they suffer from serious difficulties arising from the economic transition process. Second, as a result of their relative weakness and lack of

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34 See Reuters, 14/7/1999.
autonomy, they are vulnerable and often defenceless in the face of global challenges. Furthermore, as a consequence of a lack of domestic resources after 1990, significant parts of the national economies of CEE were sold to foreign investors during the privatisation process. This included key sectors, such as telecommunication and energy. While the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) initially helped to consolidate highly indebted national budgets, a reverse trend, that is, the profit repatriation of multinational companies from CEEn countries back to the country of origin or new target countries has now begun. Additionally, large-scale corruption cases in numerous CEEn countries trigger economic insecurities as, for instance, they affect foreign investors' confidence.

On the 'sub-state' level, the following factors can generate insecurity in the economic sector: The growing gap between the public and private sectors and the consequences of bankruptcies. There is a growing gap between public and private sector salaries, which the rather poor CEEn treasuries cannot close. As a consequence, the major parts of CEEn populations employed in the public sector (teachers, nurses, social workers, etc.) live below the official level of minimum subsistence. As it has been illustrated through examples from CEE in the military and political sectors, impoverishment of large parts of the populations can have an immediate effect on a country's security. Furthermore, it can also have serious medium and long-term consequences. Underpaid public sector employment opportunities are not attractive for young people, thus certain professions will experience serious labour shortage, once the older labour forces retire.

On the 'individual' level, three main causes of security predicaments can be identified that fall in the economic sector: unemployment, financial insecurity and lack of or unequal access to opportunities. The latter one is nothing out of the ordinary in a capitalist society, where not everybody can benefit from economic success and not all citizens have equal access to capital. In CEEn transition economies, these inequalities have intensified further through a lack of adequate industrial relations, coupled with an underdeveloped business culture and poor civil society. Financial insecurity of
individuals is not found uniquely in CEE, but all over Europe and the world. Nonetheless, defects resulting from the economic transition can worsen this predicament. For instance the unexpected bankruptcy of some already privatised banks in CEE has deprived thousands of people of their savings. Moreover, although on a slow downward trend, high inflation rates keep many CEEn societies in permanent financial insecurity.

Unemployment was virtually non-existent in centrally planned command economies. This was less a victory of the employment policies of the communist countries, than a consequence of wasteful economic mismanagement, which resulted by the late 1980s in all countries of the region facing total economic and financial collapse. After 1990, unemployment has risen significantly across the region. Certain parts of individual countries have been hit more, especially those, where heavy industry and mining were concentrated. Also, significant parts of the CEEn population, who were employed by state-organised agricultural associations, have been made redundant.

3.3.3 The Societal Sector

As noted in chapter two, various identity related issues are considered to fall within the societal sector. This again, can relate to different levels, i.e. it spans issues affecting and sometimes threatening the existence of collective identities (e.g. European, Central European or Baltic identities) as well as smaller units, such as state, sub-state and individual identities. It has also been pointed out that some risks and vulnerabilities can equally arise in different sectors and this is clearly valid for matters related to various forms of identity. While in the military and political sectors our analysis has focused mainly on the effects of minority related tensions on the military security and political stability and integrity of nation-states, here we will consider, how current trends can affect the existence of nations (not states) and other smaller collective identities.

On the 'Europe as a whole' level, factors, such as migration, influx of refugees, globalisation and Europanisation can be identified as vulnerabilities effecting identity. It is estimated that post-Cold War CEE generates up to one million illegal migrants a
year, of whom some 400,000-500,000 people have Western Europe as their destination. With the abolition of travel restrictions to Western Europe by CEE government and the easing of Western Europe's visa policies towards many CEE states, mobility has increased in Europe. Massive flows of migrants from CEE to Western Europe, forecasted in the early 1990s, however, did not occur. In a similar vein, the improving economic conditions in CEE attract thousands of illegal immigrants from the Soviet successor states and the Far East. In addition, globalisation in the cultural field that is the rapid expansion of mainly North American popular cultural and language poses a real challenge to smaller nations. Moreover, it is feared in the European context that with the advancement of the European integration process, national identities and smaller European languages will be diluted.

Minority and ethnic related risks and vulnerabilities are perhaps the most pertinent societal challenges that post-Cold War CEE face. They can appear on 'regional', 'state' and 'sub-state' levels and can, as for instance the wars in the Balkans have proved, easily spill over into the political and military sectors. In addition, an initially sub-state (local) societal problem can ignite a chain reaction and expand to a state wide or even regional conflict. Religious and ethnic motivated tensions might lead to the rivalry and clash of different religious communities and identities, which is also aggravated by the burden of similar historical events in CEE.

The fact of CEE's highly mixed ethnic composition has already been noted. In today's CEE, there are many people living outside of the country whose language and traditions they share. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, some 27 million Russians live outside the borders of the Russian Federation: nine per cent of the population of Lithuania belongs to the Russian minority, and 30 per cent of Estonia's and 33 per cent of Latvia's population are Russians. 40 The disintegration of Yugoslavia also contributed to the creation of new, ethnically diverse nation-states as

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in Bosnia. The key issue that can contribute to the emergence of security predicaments, is, how the majority treats minorities, so that their cultural survival is secured. Discriminatory laws with regard to language and education (including the right to record names in birth registries in the minority language and the right to bilingual signs of town and village names), as well as laws regulating questions of nationality and citizenship in many CEEn countries (e.g. Baltic states, Romania and Slovakia) have threatened the existence of national and ethnic minorities. Thus, despite the fact that, for instance, Latvia adopted a more liberal language law in September 2000, it remains reluctant to allow the use of Russian in public. This is partly a consequence of the country's struggle to come to terms with its Soviet legacy and current identity as well as the consolidation of its regained sovereignty and independence. It appears to be a general phenomenon in CEE that minority rights are further undermined by a rather weak civil society.

On the 'state' level, factors, such as the declining number of the population, search for identity, weak civil societies can be identified as causes of security predicaments in the societal sector. Mainly as a consequence of economic and social hardship and large-scale migration, there is a general decreasing trend in the size of CEEn populations. Although in the short term it does not represent a main challenge to the survival of the nations, it can have serious long-term consequences. Most shockingly, in Latvia, official figures from November 2000 revealed a ten per cent drop in the country's population over the last decade. Similarly, Bulgaria has experienced a continuously declining trend in the number of its population:

From a high of more than 8.9 million in 1985, the Bulgarian population (following the forced, mass exodus of more than 300,000 ethnic Turks in 1989) fell to 8.3 million at the end of 1996 and is projected to decline to 8 million by the year 2000, to 7.5 million by 2010, and to as few as 6.8 million by 2020.

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On the 'sub-state' level, the following factors in the societal sector contribute to security predicaments: human rights violations, intolerance, extremism, and xenophobic tendencies. There is a close relationship between these four issues; in fact the latter three phenomena are often to be blamed for human rights violations. The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Democracy found various cases of human rights violations in CEE in its '1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices'.\(^5\) In its studies on Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Poland and Hungary large-scale discrimination against women, the disabled and religious minorities were noted. Moreover, in some CEEn countries, some anti-Semitic incidents occurred, including the vandalism of graves in Jewish cemeteries. It is true that these kinds of incidents take place also in Western Europe, yet, CEEn societies and governments seem in general to be less tolerant toward ethnic, religious or sexual subcultures. Since the victims of human rights violations, intolerance, extremism and xenophobic tendencies are often members of (national, ethnic, religious or sexual) minority groups, their existence and survival is directly threatened. For example the exclusion and oppression of the Roma population in many CEEn countries by the majority puts the cultural survival and the national identity of a large ethnic group at serious risk.\(^6\)

On the 'individual' level, the following factors occur as potential threats to security in the societal sector: weak personal autonomy, weak articulation and high suicide rates. Although generally, personal autonomy and personal articulation are protected by the constitutions, in practice there is still little practice of them. This is partly due to the legacies of the communist past, where individualism was suppressed by collectivism and its articulation subjugated to the needs of the communist party. Another factor that shows alarming trends regarding personal insecurity among CEEn individuals, is the relatively high number of suicide cases throughout the region. The suicide rates, especially among males in Hungary (51.1 per 100,000), Estonia (59.4), Latvia (59.8)


Lithuania (73.7) compared to Sweden (20.0), Austria (30.0) or the United Kingdom (11.0), are shockingly high.47

3.3.4 The Environmental Sector

Following a dramatic appeal by the then UN Secretary General U Thant in 1969, which drew the world's attention to the rapidly declining state of the environment, the issue of environmental security has gained more and more importance. As a consequence of his appeal, the first UN environmental conference took place in Stockholm. It has easily been acknowledged that the pollution of the environment is not an issue that can be confined within a nation's borders, since it can cross boundaries in the air or in rivers. Thus, to some extent, environmental protection has become an issue of foreign and security politics, since it can be carried out best in the form of coordinated international action.48 As noted above, environmental issues are inherently problematic to apply to levels of analysis, given their essentially borderless nature. Although most of the factors generating security predicaments in the environmental sector relate equally to different levels across the board (e.g. air pollution threatens Europe's, the CEE region's, CEE states' as well as individuals' existence), we attempt a more specific categorisation of issues on various levels.

On both 'Europe as a whole' and 'regional' levels, we identify the following factors that can effect environmental security: energy crisis, environmental disasters, transborder disasters, pollution of air and rivers, problem of nuclear waste, ecosystem crisis, climate change as well as food safety problems. The last issue, for instance, has gained in importance in the late 1990s, with the outbreak of the BSE crisis. The crisis of the ecosystem and the climate change causes extreme weather conditions, e.g. the flooding of rivers in various parts of Europe. The Chernobyl disaster in April 1986 has also illustrated how geographically widespread is the impact of nuclear disasters and has pointed to the catastrophic state of nuclear power stations in CEE. In addition,

the use of nuclear power stations unavoidably produces radioactive waste that is increasingly difficult to be disposed safely.

On both 'state' and 'sub-state' levels, factors like the pollution of soil, unsafe nuclear power stations, decaying infrastructure, lack of environmental concepts, tight budgets and little environmental friendly technology can contribute to the emergence of predicaments in the environmental sector. In the CEEn context, a lack of resources to rehabilitate closed-down industrial areas (e.g. former communist heavy industries, mines etc.) and former military sites has created precarious ecological situations. In general, CEEn countries lack environmental concepts, action plans and Green parties are virtually non-existent. Without increased spending in the environmental sector as well as foreign assistance, the gap between the ecologically conscious Western European states and the weak CEEn states will widen further.

Furthermore, the introduction of environmentally friendly technology, again, requires matching funding that is not always available in CEE. For instance in the case of waste disposal, the employment of environmentally friendly technologies has been rare. This is partly caused by the lack of resources at local level (counties and towns), but also by the lack of an environmental awareness among the CEEn populations.

This latter factor is also valid for the 'individual' level. There is far too little individual environmental awareness present in most of the CEEn populations. On the one hand, CEEn societies seem to be willing to mobilise protest against larger issues affecting their environmental security, as they did, for instance, in Hungary in 1988 over the issue of the building of a Danube dam, or, more recently, over the issue of cyanide pollution. On the other they seem to care less about environmental issues in their everyday life. The already mentioned problem of weak and underdeveloped civil societies coupled with scarce resources in CEE contributes to the marginalisation of the environmental agenda further. As Adam Fagin has noted with regard to predicaments faced by Czech environmental civil organisations,

*by far the greatest constraint on the development and efficacy of environmental associations throughout the entire post-communist period has been the absence of sufficient funding. (...) Local environmental associations,*
campaigning on a more radical agenda will simply find it impossible to attract the funding necessary to maintain their campaigns.49

Additional factors that can trigger predicaments in the environmental sector are food and health related issues, e.g. health risks caused by the poor quality of food production.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has extended the typology developed in the previous chapter to the CEEn regional security complex, that is the five-sector security framework of the Copenhagen School. The clear advantage of this framework is that it allows a comprehensive analysis of contemporary security predicaments, i.e. the risks and vulnerabilities that generate them. Firstly, through its sectoral approach, it offers a useful analytical reference for classifying risks and vulnerabilities beyond the traditional military sector (political, economic, societal and environmental). Secondly, it extends the traditional state-centric security analysis to other levels of the system, such as 'Europe as a whole', 'regional', 'sub-state' and 'individual' ones. The weakness of this framework is that it seems to disregard the fact that some risks and vulnerabilities may crop up in more than one sector or on more than one level. In order to resolve this analytical gap, this chapter has supplemented the Copenhagen framework with the presumption of interconnectedness between risks/vulnerabilities, sectors and levels (see figures 3-3 and 3-4 above). This interconnectedness accounts for the fact that some risks/vulnerabilities arise in more than one sector or on more than one level as well as the fact that some might propagate in a serial manner across sectoral boundaries.

In constructing a cross-sectoral and multi-level synthesis of the findings of this chapter, the following conclusions can be drawn:

In general, it can be argued that in the wake of the Cold War, CEE faces a widened set of security predicaments. The widening of the security agenda is in part the result of

49 Fagin, Adam (1999) "The Development of Civil Society in the Czech Republic: the Environmental
the disappearance of the authoritarian communist control over various aspects of life, including politics (foreign and domestic), the economy and the societies. Additionally, the multiple transition process towards political democracy, market economy and open society has ignited a number of processes, which can contribute to the emergence of security predicaments.

The majority of risks/vulnerabilities discussed in this chapter do not cause an imminent military threat to the region, to its states or to its publics. They rather pose a latent insecurity to various aspects of the functioning, existence or even survival of states, societies, collective identities and individuals. Thus, it would be either insufficient to relate security in contemporary CEE exclusively to the level of the nation-states, or it would be inadequate to narrow down its content to the military sector.

With regard to the essence of security predicaments, they can be generated by a variety of external and domestic risks/vulnerabilities, whereby the dimension of domestic sources of insecurity clearly extends beyond the external ones.

With regard to external factors, issues, such as the exclusion from major international organisations (mainly NATO and the EU), slow integration into these institutions and instability in neighbouring countries play a more prominent role in the emergence of security predicaments than actual external military threats (for instance invasion/division). In addition, the ever-expanding gap in economic development between Western, Central and Eastern regions of Europe and the challenge of globalisation may contribute to the exacerbating of security predicaments.

As regards domestic factors, ethnic or minority related conflict represents one of the most pertinent insecurities in CEE that has, for various mainly historic reasons, challenged the region's security for centuries. As numerous regional examples cited above have shown, this type of conflict can crop up in the political, military or in the societal sectors and can indeed cross boundaries by spilling over from sub-state to state and to regional levels. Thus, the issue of 'identity', whether it is related to the

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Sector as a Measure of Associational Activity", *Journal of European Area Studies*, 7:1, p. 104ff.
region, the nation-state, sub-state units (ethnic or national minorities, religious groups etc.) or individuals continues to be a major generator of security predicaments in CEE across all these levels.

Furthermore, various types of criminal activity can generate security predicaments on different levels in CEE, from which probably the newly emerged organised crime poses the greatest challenge to the region and its states. Like ethnic conflict, organised crime can arise in more than one sector and can pose a threat to various aspects of security, including the political, economic or even the military ones.

Additionally, CEE's security is further challenged by factors arising from the complex transition process that the entire region is currently undergoing. These factors can emerge in various sectors, such as the political, economic, societal or the military. Clearly, there is a close interconnectedness between transitional risks/vulnerabilities and sectors, as some of the factors may arise initially in one sector, but may subsequently spill over to others. This serial propagation of risks/vulnerabilities bears a further challenge, as it makes risks/vulnerabilities difficult to forecast and address, as will be shown in chapter five.

Finally, as the above examples in CEE have shown, ecological issues can generate very real security predicaments in some parts of the region. However, given the borderless nature of environmental risks/challenges, they are essentially less suited to a single-level analysis.

To what extent does the CEE public at large and its political elite perceive ecological challenges as insecurities? This and the perceptions of many other risks and challenges will be the subject of the next chapter.
4 Security Perceptions of Central and Eastern European Publics and their Political Elites

This chapter analyses attitudes of CEEn publics and their political elites towards risks and vulnerabilities. The main focus is on objective and subjective factors, that is, on real and imagined factors that cause insecurity among the public at large and the political elite. Thus, this chapter covers a range of insecurities that are perceived by the CEEn populations, regardless of whether they pose an imminent threat or a remote one.

The first part of the chapter concentrates on perceptions of external military threats, which appear to be generated by a combination of cognitive and concrete factors. As it has been argued in chapter two, cognitive factors, such as the belief systems of individuals, how they view the world and classify their partners/enemies, the role of historical analogies and nations' self-understanding can have an impact on security perceptions. These factors appear to be highly influential in the ways, in which CEEn populations perceive external military threats, for instance those engendered by Russia and Germany.

Meanwhile, the second part focuses on the perception of new, non-military risks and vulnerabilities (in accordance with the typology of the previous chapter, political, economic, societal and environmental). Here, attention will be paid to four major types of threat that, to varying degrees, seem to be judged significant by the CEEn populations and their elites. First, attitudes towards risks generated by the complex transition process (political and economic) will be highlighted, which prove to cause much apprehension in the region. Second, the public's and their political elite's perception of conflict related to minority and ethnic groups (societal) will be analysed, wherein special attention will be given to cognitive factors, such as the importance of national identity in shaping hostile public and elite attitudes towards minorities. Third, the more recent issue of escalating migration (societal) will be highlighted in the context of security perceptions, which seem to concern large parts of the CEEn populations and their elites. Finally, the extent to which ecological
factors (environmental) are perceived as risks and vulnerabilities to security will be examined.

4.1 Introduction

As outlined in chapter two, cognitive processes, such as perceptions and the interpretation of security and foreign policy related issues can have an impact on the emergence of security predicaments. Exactly which factors the political elite and the public at large perceive as challenges to their country's or to their individual security, can be greatly influenced by beliefs, i.e. how people understand world affairs, how they classify their opponents, enemies, etc. Chapter two also suggested that the role of prior knowledge in CEE, especially the role of history and historical analogies can shape the images policy-makers and the public at large hold of the contemporary world and, in turn, can result in misperceptions. It is shown that biased security perceptions can generate tensions and insecure situations between countries of the CEEn region. Since here we are dealing with countries with relatively recently regained sovereignty (political, economic, military and cultural), we will consider the political elites' and the populations' self-understanding in our analysis, and examine, how their national identity and self-perception influence their understanding of other nations and their relations with neighbours.

As suggested in chapter two, some, mainly realist, analysts argue that many perceived risks and vulnerabilities do not represent an imminent danger to the 'hard' security of states, and thus are not true causes of insecurity. Here, on the contrary, it is argued that all factors, which are conceived by the public and the political elite as risks and vulnerabilities, have to be taken into consideration, regardless of their nature, and whether objective or subjective. If they are subjects of public and elite concern, they need to be identified, addressed and finally resolved. It has to be acknowledged, however, that these kinds of perceived, as opposed to concrete, threats require very different remedies than real risks and vulnerabilities. For instance, notwithstanding

the obvious difference in scale, the rather subjective perception of Russia as a major source of external threat that is still prevalent in CEE, needs to be approached in a different way from concrete security predicaments, such as, for example, the spill-over of ethnic war from Kosovo to the territory of neighbouring countries. In both cases, however, the crucial issue is, how policy-makers can improve public security perceptions. This will be considered in our subsequent chapter on policy-responses.

In the following, we will examine post-Cold War security perceptions in CEE. More specifically we will concentrate on threats and risks, which, to a large extent, manifest themselves through biased prior knowledge (e.g. history), organisational memory, distorted information and subjective self-understanding.

Firstly, we will analyse the potential source and nature of external military threats perceived in post-Cold War CEE. Leaning on the findings of a cross-national research project on 'Public Perceptions of Threats to Security in Post-communist Europe' in 1997 by Christian Haerpfer, Claire Wallace and Richard Rose and the updated version 'Old and New Security Issues in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Results of an 11 Nation Study' in 1999, perceived external threats can be classified first as traditional ones. Here, the label 'external' refers to the source or direction of threat, implying that it stems from a foreign entity, while the term 'traditional' indicates that these threats have already been experienced by a significant portion of the population of CEE in living memory. Thus, we will concentrate on the question of how contemporary CEE countries perceive Russia, Germany and the United States as potential sources of insecurity. We will also address the question of how the political elite perceives security threats and risks. This can be answered by analysing basic documents, such as national security and defence doctrines of individual CEE countries and other official publications. Furthermore, we will highlight perceptions of neighbouring countries as external sources of threat. For many, this constitutes a continuing military threat across CEE, even if its perception shows a steadily declining trend.

Secondly, we will highlight the public's and the elite's perception of new non-military threats to security. These more recent sources of threat seem to concern both the public at large and the elite to a greater extent than external threats. As Haerpfer et al. have concluded, "internal sources of threat are increasing whilst external ones have declined". In the context of internal threats, perceptions seem to be shaped by concerns arising from the severe economic and political difficulties and their social consequences, minorities and ethnic groups, escalating migration and - mainly local - ecological issues.

In a study on CEEn security perceptions, Gießmann uses different classifications for similar processes. He distinguishes between two major groups of risks: structural and regional risks to stability. In general, structural risks correspond to the aforementioned internal risks, i.e. predicaments generated by the political consequences of the socio-economic crisis. This can lead to the decline of the legitimacy of state authority, but in more severe cases, it can also cause the collapse of internal national security (which is what happened in ex-Yugoslavia). Perceived regional risks on the other hand, are those, which mainly stem from recent alarming economic and political developments in Russia and other Soviet successor states. Furthermore, many CEEn citizens have perceived the developments in the Balkans as risks pertinent to their national security. This perception of danger has intensified through the cautious and manoeuvring approach of various international organisations and states to the bloodshed in ex-Yugoslavia and recalled deep-seated historic misgivings. Perceptions in CEE are still conditioned by vivid memories of events in the countries' recent history, in which Western European governments gave their blessing to major decisions about the fate of CEEn countries against their will (e.g. during and after WW2), or declined to help, when it was specifically requested (e.g.

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52 Ibid, p. 1007.
Hungary 1956 or Czechoslovakia 1968). Huge majorities in the Baltic countries (Estonia: 76%, Latvia: 81% and Lithuania: 72%) believe that they could not defend themselves effectively in the event of an external military aggression and they also think that "the West would be unlikely to help them in the event of such an attack".56

4.2 The Phantom of an External Military Threat?

The question mark already indicates the ambiguity of the term 'external military threat'. There is a basic question, as to whether in post-Cold War CEE it is still relevant to speak about perceptions of inter-state military threats. This question affects the discourse concerning NATO enlargement and the overall future of European security provision. Are there any existential military threats in contemporary CEE perceived by the public at large, or are they purely products of the imagination of a military-political and academic elite?

As we have implied earlier, threat perceptions can be objective as well as subjective, thus the perceived risks do not necessarily pose an imminent danger to the security of a country and its citizens. As a result of this ambiguity, threat perception can also be the subject of manipulation. Politicians draw a picture of threats and insecurities, depending on which groups' interest they intend to attract. As one observer has stated,

*it is easy to get the impression that different threats are presented to different audiences, depending on the circumstances. One day the audience is confronted with a vision of domestic anarchy and foreign aggression. Another day the same politicians describe their country as exceptionally stable and surrounded by peaceful neighbours (...) the latter vision is usually presented to Western bankers and investors; the former to security experts.*57

This ambiguous relationship is particularly apparent in the area of external military risk perceptions. Although all studies and opinion polls on CEE's security perceptions emphasise that immediate inter-state military threats are virtually non-existent in the

region, they also register the perception of some latent or potential external risks.\textsuperscript{58} Thus, the public, when asked about current security priorities in general terms, seems to register little concern about military security issues. This position is supported by the findings of an empirical study conducted in the Czech Republic in 1995, which showed the population to be far more worried about other security related issues (e.g. personal security issues, social security or ecological security etc.) than any external military threat such as that posed by Russia.\textsuperscript{59} In this study, respondents classified military security as a matter of low importance, ranking it seventh out of eight issues considered.\textsuperscript{60} When, however, people are asked about their perception of particular external risks (originating, for example, from Russia, Germany or conflicts in nearby countries) they seem to hold more apprehensive views.

CEEn political and military elites perceive the potential of a major inter-state military conflict as highly unlikely, which is expressed most apparently in the countries' post-1990 security doctrines and military strategies. At the same time, they perceive the possibility of local crises and conflicts that could pose potential risks to their respective countries' national security. For instance, a Polish document acknowledges that the country "is not jeopardised by direct military aggression" and stresses the importance of NATO membership that "has diminished the threat of aggression against our country [Poland] chiefly by multiplying the deterrence factor".\textsuperscript{61} The same document, however, expresses concerns about the likelihood of local conflicts in Poland's 'close vicinity'. In addition, the document articulates worries about neighbouring countries stationing considerable military potential near the Polish border, especially the excessive military concentration in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad (that might have a direct impact on the country's national security). As it states, "in a deteriorating situation they could constitute a threat to Poland's security, not necessarily in the form of organised aggression".\textsuperscript{62} Romania's Strategy of National Security also recognises that "the danger of a major military confrontation has been

\textsuperscript{59} See Blasek (1998), p. 90f.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid, section 2. 3.
considerably reduced". At the same time, however, it stresses the existence of "tensions and military conflicts that may spread". Similarly, the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic appreciates the "considerable reduction in the possibility of a global war breaking out". Furthermore, it also acknowledges that "the potential has increased of certain partial risks and low-intensity risks to materialise, which, however, may transform into a massive threat when combined".

Although all these documents perceive the likelihood of potential threats to individual countries, none of them specifies the nature or direction of these threats in greater detail. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, these documents deal not only with concrete and imminent risks but also with potential threats and, secondly, they are drafted in the general terms appropriate for their intended long-term application and not as a response to particular situations at specific times. Also, one could argue that it could be diplomatically unwise and indeed counter-productive if the political elite codified potential external security risks in publicly accessible documents. Thus, while the public's perceptions of external risks to national security cover a range of potential issues, the political elite tends to avoid debating specific latent risks.

4.2.1 The Perception of the Russian Threat

The perception of Russia as a potential source of insecurity is highly contentious among the CEEs' political and academic elite. On the one hand the majority of the CEEs' population and elite believes that Russia does not pose an immediate military threat to their countries, whilst, on the other, the same people fear the possibility of some kind of instability emanating from Russia. They do so despite the fact that, with the exception of the Baltics and, to a limited extent, Poland, which has a border with the highly militarised Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, CEEs states no longer border directly on Russia. A Hungarian observer has summed up the nature of the Russian threat in the following way:

65 Ibid.
Contrary to the generally held perceptions, the real threat may come not from a strong fundamentalist leadership (in the context of security, the concrete forms, directions, ideologies and slogans of fundamentalism are irrelevant) but from the lack, or shortcomings of, a stable state structure and from a weakening discipline of the armed forces.  

As far as Soviet/Russian domestic political and economic developments are concerned, the CEEn countries' trust has been heavily shaken by a series of events. The Soviet coup in August 1991 showed that the central government's and the military's power can be overthrown overnight. The electoral success of the leader of the extreme nationalist Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the December 1993 parliamentary elections increased the power of radical political actors and made Russian foreign policy more unpredictable. For instance in Poland, in the wake of Zhirinovsky's electoral success, the number of people who perceived a threat to their country's independence from Russia, increased from 22 per cent in June 1993 to nearly 40 per cent in February 1994. As Haerpfer et al. have concluded:

Although Russians themselves may be unwilling to re-create the military ambitions of the former Soviet Union, demagogic politicians such as Zhirinovsky have the power to stir up popular feelings.

Russia's struggle to achieve stability as a democracy and as a market economy has proven to be extremely difficult since 1991 and there can be no assurance that it will not revert to an imperial and expansionist state. The Russian claim to have some exclusive rights to police conflicts in the post-Soviet space (the concept of 'near abroad' - 'bliznie zaruzhznie'), was perceived in Poland in the context of Russian veto to NATO's eastward enlargement as a kind of 'Pax Russica' for continuing influence in CEE. The major dilemma that CEEn countries face, is, as former advisor to Czech President Vaclav Havel, Jacques Rupnik has put it:

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68 Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 996.
What is Russia without an empire? This is the first element of the Russian apprehension of the idea of Central Europe. This is the origin of the feeling of insecurity that is not shared by the West, especially in France, but which is felt in Central Europe, not only because of the local experiences, but also because of the great uncertainty that looms over the very future of post-imperial Russia.  

Indeed, the view held by the top political and military leadership in Russia, that NATO enlargement is aimed against Russia and its national interests, was received in CEE with great reservations. Events, like the brutal handling of the ongoing Chechnyan problem or the attempt to exert military-political pressure in areas of the 'near abroad' (Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan) have intensified the suspicion among the CEEEn public and elite of the intentions of the Russian government. As an example, Czech politicians also expressed their concern regarding the possibility of a new Russian threat to the CEEEn region. As President Vaclav Havel suggested it in 1995:

...we have already lived through one Soviet occupation. As a result of this experience it is natural that we react to certain alarming signals sensitively, which appear in current Russian politics and which could lead to the return of old times in a somewhat more modern form. This is valid, for instance, for the attempt to bind us into the concept of 'near abroad'.

Havel's concern articulates adroitly the complex nature of the Russian threat as perceived by a large proportion of CEEEn populations. On the one hand, it draws attention to the seriousness of certain 'alarming' processes in post-communist Russia. On the other, it also acknowledges the existence of a substantial cognitive element that shapes the perception of Russia as a threat in contemporary CEE, namely the role of negative historic experience with Soviet-Russia after WW2. Owing to its temporal proximity, the majority of the CEEEn population has enduring memories of the period of Soviet domination of the region. People and governments blame the more than 40 years of Soviet rule for the economic misery that is currently prevalent in their countries. This, largely negative, historic image has a damaging impact on the perception of post-Cold War Russia.

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Another factor that is often perceived in CEE and in Western countries as potentially dangerous, is the apparently lax control and security of the nuclear arsenal of Russia. Though Russia might have declined as a political and ideological superpower, it continues to be a nuclear superpower. Uncertainties stemming from possible breakdowns of control systems, as a result of political disputes or the lack of available resources, are concerns not only of the neighbouring CEEn states, but of the entire world. Dunay has concluded as regards the nature of the Russian threat perceived by the CEEn countries as follows:

*In general the Central Europeans do not perceive a concrete military threat but rather an abstract danger with military component. The real fear is that the West will give in, and recognise certain special Russian prerogatives in Central European affairs.*

For all these reasons, it is not surprising that in 1998 Russia was perceived by 62 per cent of Poles, 48 per cent of Czechs, 45 per cent of Slovaks, 42 per cent of Romanians and 13 per cent of Hungarians as a threat to peace and security (see figure 4-1). Although the overall trend since 1990 in CEE has shown a slightly declining tendency, in some countries the fear of Russia has increased during the last decade. So, for instance in the Czech Republic it increased from 39 per cent in 1992 to 48 per cent in 1998 and, likewise, in the traditionally Russian-friendly Slovak Republic the fear coefficient grew from 26 per cent to 45 per cent over the same period.
More differentiated surveys conducted in the three Baltic states between 1995 and 2000 have revealed deep anxieties among the countries' populations with regard to Russia as a source of threat. In 1995, 32 per cent of Estonia's indigenous population considered that the Russian state was 'definitely' a threat to peace and security of the country, while 49 per cent of the population believed that such a threat was 'possible', as opposed to barely 15 per cent of the population, who regarded the level of threat rather 'improbable'. In Latvia and Lithuania, the number of those who regard Russia as a definite threat was somewhat lower, 16 and 15 per cent of the respondents, respectively. However, the number of those, who believed Russia posed a possible threat to peace and security was very high in both countries, 54 per cent in Latvia and 53 per cent in Lithuania, whilst only 18 per cent of respondents in both countries considered such a threat 'improbable'. A more recent survey conducted in 2000 showed that there has been little change in the Baltic populations' perception of Russia as a threat since 1995. 33 per cent of respondents in Estonia consider Russia a 'definite' threat, 45 per cent a 'possible' threat and 20 per cent an 'improbable' threat.

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79 See Rose (1995), p. 34.
For Latvia in 2000, the corresponding figures were 19 per cent, 47 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. Lithuania represents the exception under the Baltic states, as it is the only country, whose population has developed a less fearful attitude towards Russia by 2000 (12 per cent: definitely, 38 per cent possibly, 34 probably not and 17 per cent: definitely not). The most obvious explanation for this trend is offered by the fact that Lithuania (unlike Latvia and Estonia) no longer shares borders with mainland Russia, with the exception of the Kaliningrad enclave in the southwest.

The same surveys conducted in the Baltic states revealed some deep anxieties among the populations over hardline nationalist politicians in Russia. Whilst in 1995, only 7 per cent of indigenous respondents in Estonia, 7 per cent in Latvia and 9 per cent in Lithuania thought that hardline nationalist politicians in Russia definitely posed a threat to peace and security of their respective countries, answers to the same question in 2000 showed a much deeper level of concern, 33, 23 and 23 per cent respectively.

4.2.2 The Perception of the German and the US Threats

The perception of contemporary Germany as a potential risk to CEEn military security appears to be another example of the strong influence of historical images and prejudices in the region. This is particularly apparent in Poland and, to a lesser extent, in the Czech Republic, where the negative perceptions of Germany as a potential military threat are far higher than in the rest of CEE, where these attitudes are generally low (see figure 4-2).
In 1998, 42 per cent of Poles and 37 per cent of Czechs expressed some anxiety of a Germany threat. These results, compared with relatively low indicators measured in Romania and Hungary, where only 14 as well as 3 per cent of the populations expressed some fear of Germany respectively, seem to mirror old historic analogies and sentiments, rather than any real military threat. As Starzynski explains:

> many Poles are familiar with the German phrase 'Drang nach Osten' and do not believe that German people have abandoned a desire that they have shown repeatedly over centuries.

However, in Poland, the 1998 figure of 42 per cent compared with 70 per cent in 1992 shows a significant decline of the perceived German threat. The reasons for this lie first in the weakening of old forms of historic threats, and second, and perhaps more importantly, in the improvement of the relationship between post-Cold War Germany and Poland, culminating in the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border line. Furthermore, Polish and Czech membership of NATO as well as the advancement of EU accession negotiations may have helped to overcome old historic grievances. German financial support and massive German investment in CEE contributes further to the alteration of the country's perception in the region.

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84 See Haerpfer et al. (1999), 1000f.
The generally rather positive perception of Germany is characteristic of all three Baltic states as well. In 2000, the overwhelming majority of respondents thought that Germany posed definitely no or probably no threat to their respective countries peace and security (Lithuania 95 per cent, Latvia 89 per cent and Estonia 94 per cent) and only a small minority believed in the possibility of such a threat (4, 3 and 5 per cent respectively).  

In addition, the CEEn political elite's attitude towards contemporary Germany is generally positive. While post-1991 Russian foreign policy in general and Russian reaction to NATO enlargement in particular, has provoked some concern among CEEn politicians, no evidence can be found among the CEEn elite for a perception of Germany as an external military threat.

![Figure 4-3 Perception of US threat 1992-1998](source: Haerpfer et al. 1999, p. 1003.)

The public's perception of threat from the USA is relatively low in the entire CEEn region (see figure 4-3). Yugoslavia represents a clear exception here, since the image of the USA held by the population suffered tremendously during the NATO air strikes. In 1998, 85 per cent of the population in Yugoslavia believed that the USA

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86 See Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1002.

posed a threat to peace and security, compared to 7 per cent in Bulgaria, 13 per cent in Romania, 4 per cent in Hungary, 15 per cent in Poland and 16 per cent in the Czech Republic.\(^8\) In a similar vein, only a minority of the populations of the Baltic states perceive the possibility of a threat posed by the USA (Lithuania 5 per cent, Latvia 3 per cent and Estonia 6 per cent).\(^9\) These figures are very low, considering the fact that until 1990, the USA was projected by the Soviet-influenced CEEn governments as the number one enemy and chief threat to national security.

4.2.3 The Perception of Threat from Neighbouring Countries

Neighbouring countries seem to be perceived by parts of the CEEn population as a threat to their respective country's security. The extent, to which people feel threatened by one or more of their neighbours, however, differs markedly from country to country. Thus, it cannot be interpreted as an alarming region-wide phenomenon. Opinion polls reveal that in 1998, 30 per cent of the population of Slovakia, 27 per cent of that of Romania, 23 per cent of that of Hungary, 20 per cent of that of Poland, 19 per cent of that of Bulgaria, 11 per cent of that of Slovenia and 8 per cent of that of the Czech Republic perceives some threat from their neighbouring countries (see figure 4-4).\(^90\) Again, it has to be acknowledged that the figures from 1998 show in all countries, with the exception of the Balkans, which were then engaged in conflict, a significant decline compared to those of earlier polls in 1992 and 1996.

The reasons for the perception of neighbouring countries as potential sources of military threat vary from county to country. In countries neighbouring former Yugoslavia, this threat perception has been largely generated by the war that took place on their doorstep. The fear that the war could spread was felt by substantial parts of the neighbouring countries' populations.

\(^8\) See Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1003.
\(^90\) See Haerpfer et al. (1999), 1004.
The perceived threat of the hostile neighbour in Slovakia, Romania and Hungary is mainly a product of negative past experiences, coupled with more contemporary clashes over the treatment of national minorities. Both issues seem to have declined in importance with the settling of neighbourly relations via basic treaties between the respective countries, which recognise the inviolability of existing borders and regulate the rights of national minorities. In addition, favourable political processes in Slovakia and in Romania (except for some extremists tendencies discussed in chapter three) and the strengthening of democracy in all three countries in the late 1990s have contributed to the more positive attitude of the population to their neighbouring countries. Indeed, the perception of this risk has dropped significantly during the 1990s in all these countries (in Slovakia from 46 per cent in 1992 to 30 per cent in 1998, in Romania from 67 per cent in 1992 to 27 per cent in 1998 and in Hungary from 64 per cent in 1992 to 23 per cent in 1998). 91

Whilst some parts of the public remain worried about the possibility of a threat emanating from a neighbouring country, the political elite seems to be less concerned. The most plausible explanation for this is that the political elite is far more aware of the significance of diplomatic achievements and favourable processes in the region's...
international politics than the public at large. All CEEn countries cooperate with each other in various international and regional organisations and NATO's PfP programme and seek membership in the EU and NATO: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary became members of NATO in March 1999, nine countries have applications pending for NATO and ten CEEn countries are involved in accession negotiations with the EU. Therefore, the CEEn political elite knows that any kind of armed conflict would go against their countries' vital national interests, consequently, cooperation with their neighbours has no alternative. In addition, most CEEn countries do not have sufficient military capabilities at their disposal either to initiate a war or alone to deter an external aggressor. The national security doctrines of CEEn countries reflect this view, i.e. they do not consider any of the countries' neighbours as a threat to national security.

4.3 The Perception of New Non-military Threats

Although most internal issues that are perceived by the population as risks do not present a direct military threat to the state, they can have a negative effect on individuals' security and welfare. There is a wide range of mainly 'new' internal risks that are perceived by the public and the political elite in CEE. In chapter three, we have categorised these non-military threats as political, economic, societal and environmental. Here, we will look at threat perceptions in selected issue areas, which, mainly correspond with the sectoral analysis of the previous chapter. Thus, in the following, we will concentrate on four major issues that seem to be uppermost in the concerns of the public and the political elite. First, we will look at the perception of vulnerabilities generated by the difficult political, economic and societal transition processes, including the rise of petty as well as large-scale organised criminal activity. Second, we will highlight public and elite attitudes towards national as well as ethnic minorities. Third, we will concentrate on risk perceptions generated mainly by the escalating migration in the region. Finally, we will analyse, how important ecological risk perceptions are in contemporary CEE.

4.3.1 Risks Generated by the Complex Transition Process

The public at large and the political elite alike are worried about possible political and societal insecurities emanating from the transitional nature of their political systems, economies and societies. For example, as Blasek has stated in the context of the Czech Republic, "a majority of the Czech population consider social and economic risks (threats) as priority concerns in the security field". This is not necessarily of serious concern in countries, which face a complex transition process, on condition that the majority of their populations believe in the rightfulness of the existing democratic constitutional order. However, this is where opinion polls reveal some worrying attitudes of the public in many CEEn countries. According to the 'Central and Eastern Eurobarometer' published by the European Commission, only 42 per cent of respondents in the countries seeking EU membership are satisfied with the way democracy is developing and working in their countries. This survey also exhibits substantial regional variations in CEE, including Poland with the highest result of 54 per cent and Bulgaria with 21 per cent only (see figure 4-5).

![Figure 4-5 Satisfaction with democracy](source: Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 1998, Annex figure 72)

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94 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer - Public Opinion and the European Union (10 Countries' Survey), No. 8, March 1988, European Commission, Annex figure 72.
The more recent 'Gallup International Millennium Survey' shows that only 12 per cent of Eastern Europeans believe their countries are governed by the will of the people, which is the lowest response in the world (compared to, for instance, 37.5 per cent in Western Europe).\(^5\) The same survey reveals even more alarming disparities between attitudes of the population in Eastern and Western Europe. It suggests that only 25.8 per cent of Eastern Europeans think elections in their countries are free and fair, compared to 73.3 per cent in Western Europe.

Even if it can be said that the negative response of the majority of the CEE population is often the result of transient political events and harsh transitional economic and social conditions in their respective countries, the general trend of widespread dissatisfaction with democracy and the way in which politics is run in the region raises some serious security concerns. These concerns are also perceived by the political elites in CEE and are articulated in most national security concepts/strategies. 'Romania's Strategy of National Security' states, for instance, that "the prolongation of domestic economic, financial and social difficulties that critically and vitally affect the functioning of the Romanian society" poses a risk to national security.\(^6\) In a similar vein, the 'National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria' reveals similar concerns with regard to risks generated by the county's difficult transition process, as it states:

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\textit{The economic factor is decisive for the guarantee of national security. Only the stabilisation, re-establishment and growth of Bulgarian economy are in a position to satisfy the interests of the Bulgarian citizens, society and state, to solve the problems concerning the deficiency of resources, to improve the living standard and increase the degree of social protection.}\(^7\)
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Similarly, 'The National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia' acknowledges in a section on 'new security threats' that

\[
a \textit{number of factors with a potential to influence Estonia's domestic security stem from the great economic and social transformation that the region is}
\]

\(^7\) See National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria, approved by the National Assembly in April 1998, Source: http://www.md.government.bg/_en_/national_security_concept.html [01/11/2000].
undergoing. The speedy pace of change brings with it the danger of a widening socio-economic gap. This, in turn, increases social problems such as crime and substance abuse.\(^9\)

This observation already highlights the close relationship that exists between socio-economic difficulties and the rise of criminal activity in post-communist CEE. Furthermore, the level of crime influences the perceived social and economic security of the population.\(^9\) Whether it is concerned with petty crime, such as burglaries, thefts or larger scale organised crime, including Mafia activity in the trafficking of drugs, weapons or humans, there is a "mounting public anxiety" in CEE.\(^10\) It is feared in many states of the region that their strategic position as transit countries between East and West and also between North and South, could make them the favoured targets of international organised criminal activity.\(^10\) As Boguszakova et al. have noted, the CEEn public also fears that the police and border guards are neither sufficiently well trained nor suitably equipped, nor have they adequate experience for combating organised criminals.\(^10\) This again shows some considerable difference in the public's attitude in Eastern and Western Europe. According to the 'Gallup International Millennium Survey' already quoted above, 86 per cent of the respondents in Eastern Europe believed that their government did not handle crime well and only 10 per cent believed that the government tackled crime well.\(^10\) In Western Europe, on the contrary, 29 per cent of the respondents believed that their government handled crime well, while 67 per cent thought that it did not.

Similarly, the political elite in CEE seems to perceive crime in general and international organised crime in particular as newly arising matters that pose a serious challenge to the countries' national security. All CEEn states' national security concepts/strategies point out the seriousness of risks stemming from all kinds of criminal activity. The Polish national security document notes that "the threat of terrorist acts against citizens and institutions in Poland is increasing".\(^10\)

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100 See Boguszakova et al. (1996), p. 37.
103 See Gallup International Millennium Survey (2000)
Romanian security strategy, meanwhile, reveals an even more comprehensive elite-perception of crime as a security risk:

*the expansion of terrorist networks and activities, of trans-national organised crime (economic-financial crime, illegal cross-border trafficking of persons, drugs, radioactive and strategic materials, weaponry and ammunition etc.)*\(^{105}\)

4.3.2 Minorities and Ethnic Groups

The public in CEE perceives national and ethnic minorities as sources of potential destabilisation of their national security and unity. However, according to Haerpfer et al., this kind of risk perception has experienced a notable decline since 1992 (see figure 4-6).\(^{106}\) Whilst in 1992, 40 per cent of the population of all eleven CEE countries on average expressed a fear of minorities and ethnic groups, this figure dropped in 1998 to 29 per cent. But when the findings for individual countries are inspected, the data suggests some considerable differences. Large parts of the populations of Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria (43, 32 and 29 per cent respectively) seem to express serious concerns about minorities and ethnic groups.\(^{107}\) All three countries' populations have comparatively large proportions of national minorities ('dominant minorities'), in Slovakia and Romania the Hungarians and the Romany and in Bulgaria the Turks and the Romany. Mainly as a consequence of this mixed ethnic composition, all countries have recently been involved in conflicts with their neighbours, the scale of which has ranged from all-out war in the Balkans to serious diplomatic disputes between the other countries. This can explain the population's subjective anxieties about risks engendered in the existence of dominant national and ethnic minorities.

\(^{105}\) See Romania's Strategy of National Security

\(^{106}\) Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1003.

\(^{107}\) Ibid, p. 1005.
Surveys of public attitudes conducted in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania show similar trends. In 1994, 46 per cent of the Latvian population and 42 per cent of the Lithuanian saw a 'possible future conflict between ethnic groups' in their respective countries, while as many as 69 per cent of Estonians regarded such an event as being possible.\(^{108}\) Meanwhile, other studies have found that the Russian-speaking minorities in the three Baltic countries are less oriented towards conflict than the indigenous populations.\(^{109}\) The difference between Russophones and Estonians is the greatest with 31 per cent, compared with 12 per cent in Latvia and 19 per cent in Lithuania. As more recent surveys have revealed, Estonians are becoming less conflict oriented, however, as regards this issue, the difference between Estonia and the other two Baltic states is still considerable.\(^{110}\)

In many countries of Eastern and Western Europe, the public at large perceives that, to some extent, the Romany minorities pose a danger to the majority. In CEE, there are numerous examples of manifestations of this anxiety and subsequent action.

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against the Romany populations. In the Czech town of Usti nad Labem, for example, a wall was erected in 1999 to segregate a Romany neighbourhood from a Czech neighbourhood, the action being commissioned by the town's leaders.\(^{111}\) Similarly, the Romany minority is often the subject of large-scale discrimination, sometimes even of violence, in Slovakia, Romania and Hungary, which is currently one of the most significant sources of social conflict in these transition countries.

The vast majority of the political elite does not share these rather extreme views about the Romany population held by substantial parts of the public in CEE. There are, however, few exceptions. In Hungary, for instance, the ultra-nationalist Hungarian Justice and Life Party, led by the populist István Csurka and in Romania, the Party of Greater Romania, headed by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, try to boost public resentment against minorities. The European Union has declared on several occasions that the just treatment of minorities, including the Romany population, is one of the political preconditions of membership. Thus, governments in CEE are keen to assure their Western colleagues of the lengths to which they are going to try to improve the life of minorities, something, which appears to be difficult at a time, when the number of Roma families fleeing their home countries in CEE and asking for asylum in EU countries is increasing. Since 1998, Britain, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark and Finland have re-imposed visa requirements on Slovakian citizens, in response to an influx of Romany asylum seekers from the Slovak Republic. In addition, the Czech Republic and Hungary were warned that they could be the subject of similar restrictions, should its government fail to address the issue of the Romany minority.

The political elite of CEE does recognise the potential of minority- and ethnic group-related conflicts and their threat they pose to national security. To varying degrees, most national security concepts/strategies reflect these concerns (e.g. Estonian, Latvian, Romanian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech documents). It has to be acknowledged, however, that beyond simply voicing their concern over this issue, some recognise the importance of finding solutions for reducing ethnic tensions. For example, the 'National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia' states that

\(^{111}\) See Hill, Don (1999) "Czech Republic: Deputy Minister Faces Sharp Questions on Roma", \textit{RFE/RL}
Estonia shares the understanding well rooted in today's Europe that the state must guarantee minority rights and assist the integration into society of various ethnic and social groups.\footnote{National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2000), section 1. 4.}

According to opinion polls conducted among the political elite in the three Baltic states in the 1990s, the Estonian elite was most oriented towards a possible ethnic confrontation, the Lithuanian elite thought that such a conflict was rather unlikely, while the Latvian elite took a middle position. Since 1994, the proportion of those elites who saw a possible ethnic confrontation has shown a declining tendency. Steen explains the confrontational character of the minority-majority relations in the early 1990s in Estonia through the "country's lack of multi-ethnic integration and its harsh experiences during the occupation period, with severe deportations and a big influx of Russian settlers after the Second World War".\footnote{Steen (2000), p. 76.} It has to be acknowledged, too, that most of the respondents among the political elite believed, conflict would be more oriented towards aggressive rhetoric than open and massive violence.

The major challenge that governments in CEE face with regard to the integration of national and ethnic minorities into society, is, that in many cases there is little support for these initiatives from the majority. The example of the Romany minorities in many countries of the region illustrates, how little government programmes alone can achieve, if there is a lack of a strong civil society, upholding values, such as tolerance and the respect of individual and human rights.

4.3.3 Escalating Migration

Migration is a new issue, which was virtually non-existent during the communist period in CEE. Whilst the authoritarian nature of the CEEn regimes generated migration, with thousands of people fleeing their countries of origin to go to the West, migrants or refugees did not target the CEEn countries. After opening up their borders post-1989/90, CEEn countries have increasingly became popular destinations for economic immigrants from the Far East and from Russia and the CIS. This situation
intensified during the war in the Balkans that triggered a massive influx of refugees into many CEEn countries. Thus, migration has created some very real problems in some of the region's countries that were neither experienced nor financially prepared for handling this challenge.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the public in some CEEn states perceives immigrants and refugees as threats to peace and stability in their respective countries (see figure 4-7). This kind of risk perception was fairly high in Poland in 1992 (41 per cent), then it declined in 1996 (14 per cent), and since then it has shown a tendency to increase again (24 per cent). Due to its geographical situation, Poland is an attractive destination or transit route for illegal immigrants, "fleeing turmoil, conflict and disasters". Probably for similar reasons, these threat perceptions are on the rise in Slovakia and the Czech Republic since 1992, reaching 40 as well as 38 per cent in 1998 respectively. Likewise, people in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary appeared to be more anxious about the consequences of escalating migration in 1998 than in earlier years (14, 22 and 35 per cent respectively). The main reason hereof is clearly the war in the Balkans.

Figure 4-7 Perception of the threat posed by immigrants and refugees 1992-1998
Source: Haerpfer et al. 1999, p.1006.

114 See Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1006.
117 Ibid.
To varying degrees, the populations of the three Baltic states perceive some kind of threat to their peace and security generated by refugees and immigrants. This type of threat perception is most clearly manifest in Estonia, where in 2000, in the surveys carried out by Rose, 13 per cent of respondents among the indigenous population thought refugees and immigrants were definitely a threat to peace and security, whilst 33 per cent perceived a possible threat of this kind.\textsuperscript{118} These figures show a significant increase since 1995, when the same threat was perceived by 4 per cent and 15 per cent of the population respectively.\textsuperscript{119} Similarly, the indigenous population in Lithuania expressed a somewhat more apprehensive view with regard to refugees and immigrants in 2000 than in 1995, but the increase was consistently less than in Estonia (in 1995, 1 per cent said 'definitely' and 20 per cent 'possibly', compared to 6 per cent and 20 per cent in 2000, respectively). In contrast, the indigenous population in Latvia seemed to be less worried about the consequences of the influx of refugees and immigrants in 2000 than five years earlier. Whilst in 1995, 7 per cent of the population perceived a definite and 28 per cent a possible threat from refugees and immigrants, these figures decline somewhat by 2000 to 4 per cent and to 22 per cent, respectively. According to the same surveys from 1995 and 2000, respondents among the dominant Russian minorities in all three countries perceive refugees and immigrants as less significant threats to peace and security.\textsuperscript{120} An obvious explanation for this is offered by the fact that the majority of the so-called 'economic immigrants' seeking refuge in the economically comparatively more developed Baltic states originate from Russia and the CIS.

The political elite perceives similar risks that can be generated by migration and the mass influx of refugees. Most CEEn security concepts/strategies are concerned with the consequences of illegal migration, the upsurge of economic immigrants and refugees, caused by conflicts and ecological disasters in the region. The Polish document concludes that the "present scale of economic migration poses a serious challenge to state structures and services".\textsuperscript{121} The Czech security strategy registers similar concerns as it states that "massive migration waves, the advance of which onto

\textsuperscript{118} See Rose (2000), p. 36.
\textsuperscript{119} See Rose (1995), p. 34.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid; Rose (2000), p. 36.
the country's territory may develop into violent actions on the part of the immigrants". Also, Estonia and Latvia's security concepts mirror some kind of risk perceptions triggered by illegal migration and refugees. The Latvian document suggests a treatment of illegal migrants and refugees under the same provisions, a rather biased view that is often held by parts of the population in CEE:

_In order to prevent the mass influx of refugees and illegal migrants across the nation's borders, effective national borders are insured, territorial water and airspace control is provided..._123

4.3.4 Ecological Issues

Perceptions of environmental risks do not seem to preoccupy the security concerns of the majority of the CEEn population. As Kobotzef has concluded, the "environment has become less than a secondary concern for Central and Eastern European voters". This impression is supported by the findings of the 'Gallup International Millennium Survey', which suggests that the majority of the CEEn citizenry believes, economic growth was more important than environmental protection. The same survey reveals some interesting differences between the environmental risk perception of Eastern and Western European publics. When asked, the majority of the CEEn population appeared to be more worried about basic or traditional pollution problems (drinking water and industrial pollution), while the population of Western Europe seemed to be concerned about comparatively abstract issues (ozone layer, rainforests, species, wildlife and global warming). Both Eastern and Western Europeans seem still to be highly apprehensive of potential nuclear accidents.

With regard to the public perception of environmental security in the Czech Republic, ecological risks rank fifth out of eight different security issues, and, as Blasek found,
it is "primarily the younger generation who take ecological risks seriously". Nevertheless, it is very likely that some recent environmental catastrophes, such as serious floods in a number of CEEEn countries and the subsequent pollution of drinking water sources, large-scale pollution of rivers will increase the populations' perception of environmental risks in the near future.

The CEEEn political elite identifies in their countries' security concepts/strategies the preservation of the environment as a principal objective of national security. The Polish document devotes an entire section to 'The Natural environment' and states,

"efforts to protect and improve the quality of the natural environment must be regarded as closely linked to the question of national existence. Natural disasters as well as catastrophes caused by human activity can constitute a serious threat to state security. Particular concern surrounds the question of safe nuclear power in Europe, particularly in our close vicinity. The experience flowing from the Chernobyl disaster inclines us to devote the greatest attention to the matter as a potential threat to the life and health of societies."

As we can see, the 'Chernobyl syndrome' seems to shape the elite's perception of a potential nuclear risk to a great extent. Almost all countries' documents identify this specific source of risk. The Czech Republic's Security Strategy lists ecological risks as the number one security issue and points out that the matter of their unpredictability makes them difficult to avert:

"Natural disasters, industrial and environmental accidents, emergence and spreading of epidemics: This risk remains highly topical at all times, with a catastrophe of a hardly predictable scope imminent in hours or days, and with a potential of turning into a threat of an as yet unknown character."

4.4 Conclusion

In general it can be argued that the risk perceptions of the CEEEn populations and their political elites reflect a wide range of factors, which include traditional (already experienced) as well as new types of insecurities. This widened set of perceived risks

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and vulnerabilities underlines the analytical utility of the comprehensive security framework employed in the previous chapter. The sectoral approach to the analysis of security predicaments of the Copenhagen School is broadly in line with the way in which the political elite perceives security in some CEEn countries. This view, for instance, is most clearly expressed in the 'Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland', as it declares that

*Poland approaches security in a comprehensive manner, taking into account the significance and influence of diverse political, military, economic, social, environmental, energy-related and other factors.*\(^{129}\)

In addition, the Copenhagen framework is also of considerable use in analysing the attitudes of individual CEEn countries' populations towards "such issues as national security, security risks and potential threats", as Blasek has argued in the context of the Czech Republic.\(^{130}\)

This chapter has found that the CEEn populations and their political elites perceive a range of objective and subjective risks/vulnerabilities. The latter are often influenced (or biased) by cognitive processes, i.e. by beliefs held by the public and the members of the political elite. Among these beliefs, the most influential ones appear to be historical analogies that shape security perceptions in post-Cold War CEE. Vivid recollections of past events and, often, historical grievances can, to a great extent, contribute to the endurance of negative hostile images. These are partly responsible for the apprehensive attitudes of parts of the CEEn public towards Germany and, more significantly, towards Russia. As Haerpfer et al. have put it,

*history still plays a very important part in shaping attitudes of some Central and Eastern Europeans. The prejudices and alliances created during World War II and even the period preceding it still affect the attitudes of Central and Eastern Europeans today and are likely to continue to do so.*\(^{131}\)

Yet, the perceptions of external military threats are not merely products of biased images, prior knowledge and historical interference. So, for instance, in the case of

\(^{130}\) See Blasek (1998), p. 90.  
\(^{131}\) Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1009.
Russia, apprehensive attitudes in CEE are shaped by both negative historical analogies (e.g. occupation, hegemony etc.) and a set of contemporary developments (e.g. instability, handling of the Chechen crisis etc.) originating from Russia. In a similar vein, the perceptions of neighbouring countries as risks to national security, held by parts of the CEEEn populations, are fed by historical processes (e.g. occupation, war, local conflict etc.) and current developments (e.g. war in the Balkans etc.). A succession of surveys of public attitudes demonstrates that, to varying degrees, the CEEEn public at large is still concerned about the possibility of an external military threat, whilst the political elite generally does not perceive any concrete external threats.

Thus, it has been noted in this chapter that the risk perceptions of CEEEn populations and their political elites seem to be more dominated by new (mainly internal) types of threats than by external military ones. Indeed, the perceptions of a wide range of risks generated by various, mainly new, issues in CEE have increased since the early 1990s. Both CEEEn populations and their elites are concerned about the possible security implications of the complex transition process that the region is currently undergoing. These involve instability in the political, economic and societal spheres, which can each affect the security of the state, regions or individuals. Socio-economic difficulties have also intensified criminal activity in the region, most importantly in the appearance of international organised crime. The CEEEn populations fear that their respective governments either cannot or else lack the will to fight organised crime effectively.

Another important new source of insecurity as perceived by parts of the CEEEn publics and their elites is represented by minorities and ethnic groups, although it has to be acknowledged that, to lesser extent, this kind of threat perception existed already during communist times. Evidently, anxieties of minority- and ethnic-related conflict are primarily held by the populations of CEEEn countries with a large proportion of minority or ethnic groups ('dominant minorities'). Like external military threat perceptions, cognitive processes, such as historical analogies or sentiments, often influence the populations' attitudes towards minorities and ethnic groups. Additionally, in many of the region's recently 'reincarnated' nation-states, identity related issues play a distinct part in the process of defining statehood and nationhood,
as we will see in chapter six in the Hungarian context. Thus, the indigenous populations and their elite's self-understanding and definition of national identity can have an impact on their understanding of others, in this case the national and ethnic minorities living in their territory. National and ethnic minority related problems have often been triggered by nationalistic politicians and by the insufficient application of democracy in the fragile transitional societies in CEE. Also, the public's attitudes towards minority and ethnic groups have often been the subject of elite manipulation, as happened for instance in the Balkans during the 1990s. Another issue that raises widespread concern among parts of the CEEn populations is the accommodation of the Romany minorities. In general, surveys reveal that this ethnic group faces hostile attitudes in many CEEn countries and numerous recent incidents suggest that these views may even deteriorate in the short term.

Escalating migration is another relatively new issue that has raised security concerns among the CEEn public at large and their political elite. These fears intensified in countries bordering ex-Yugoslavia, which faced a massive influx of refugees during the war. The major apprehension was that the ethnic balance and tranquillity of those societies could be endangered and the relative political and economic stability threatened. In addition, it was feared that the conflict might spread to neighbouring countries through mass migration. Apart from migration ignited by the war in the Balkans, the economic hardship in Russia and the CIS and in some countries in the Far East generates illegal migration into some CEEn countries. In recent years, public and elite concerns generated by escalating illegal migration have increased in all the more developed CEEn states (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary).

It will take probably decades, until ecological challenges will occupy a prominent position in the minds of inhabitants of CEE. CEEn populations seem to be far more worried about immediate challenges caused by the socio-economic difficulties, identity related issues and migration than about the longer-term and more subtle effects of environmental degradation. In addition, as surveys have revealed, the majority of the CEEn population ranks economic growth and development as being of higher importance than environmental protection. The exception to this occurs when individuals' existence is threatened by catastrophic natural disasters, such as the severe flooding and pollution of rivers that have lately afflicted some countries in the
region. Future EU membership would have a positive effect on raising public and elite awareness for environmental issues, as it represents an important part of the EU's policy.

This chapter has analysed security perceptions held by the CEEn publics and their political elites. It has also attempted to explain, how cognitive processes can contribute to the emergence of some security predicaments. The next chapter will examine, how the CEEn political elite responds to security predicaments and perceptions.
5 Foreign and Security Policy-responses in post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the main policies, which CEEn governments formulate in order to address the variety of security predicaments and perceptions, described in chapters three and four. It deals mainly with the first stages of the policy-making process, that is, the initiation and formulation of policy objectives, whilst the implementation and evaluation phases are treated in less detail. What matters here, in the first instance, is, which policies CEEn governments chose to embark on in order to tackle a widened set of risks and vulnerabilities, rather than the details of the implementation processes and the matter of their success or failure.

Just as security predicaments can crop up in a range of sectors (which we referred to as 'interconnectedness' in chapter three), their treatment requires action coordinated across various domains (e.g. foreign policy, defence policy, economic policy, social policy, environmental policy etc.). Regarding the risks requiring foreign policy action, the chapter highlights three main initiatives pursued by the majority of CEEn governments. These include the pursuit of integration into and cooperation with supranational organisations and the fostering of regional cooperation and of good-neighbourly relations.

Within the field of domestic policy, the chapter analysis four main areas: defence, economic, internal security and environmental policies and their utility in combating security predicaments. It will be shown that in many cases it is not the lack of appropriate institutions and their initiatives, but rather the scarcity of resources and lack of adequately trained staff that prejudice the effectiveness of security policy-responses.
5.1 Introduction

In the previous two chapters, we highlighted security predicaments that the CEEn states face in the post-Cold War era. We also examined the differing security perceptions, held by the public at large and by the political elite. This chapter considers the CEEn governments' responses to real and imagined (objective and subjective) security predicaments. It analyses the ways, in which governments respond to security predicaments and perceptions and addresses the following questions: What are the major security policy objectives of the CEEn countries and to what extent can these policies offer useful remedies to combat existing and to prevent the emergence of potential security predicaments? Are there any common parameters, which characterise various CEEn countries' security policies? In order to limit the scope of the analysis, at the centre of the analysis will stand, primarily, the first phases of the policy-making process, that is, the initiation and formulation of policies (objectives), whilst the implementation and evaluation phases (how policies are implemented and with what degree of success) will be paid less attention here. Thus, in the first place, this chapter investigates, whether the perceived and identified security predicaments are followed by any response on the part of the political elite, and what is the nature of the response. Detailed elaboration on the effectiveness and outcome of a single policy initiative would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, in many cases, policy-responses are still in progress (or not yet implemented), thus it would be too early to evaluate their success and draw any conclusions here.

As far as common security policy objectives are concerned, there are some clear similarities between different CEEn countries' policy-responses to insecurities. This is certainly not a result of some coordinated approach among CEEn governments, it is rather a consequence of the similar nature of most of the risks and challenges that these countries face. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that most CEEn governments attempt to remedy their security predicaments in similar ways. Many of the national security policies reflect the transitional character of the respective states. Thus they have evolved in parallel with the political, economic and social transformation. In this
respect, a number of major CEEn national security policy objectives appear to be more fluid or transitional than the ones of consolidated democracies. This rather transitional character of security policy-making is even more apparent in those states that have no or very limited defence capabilities after the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. So, after having become independent sovereign states, Slovenia and Slovakia, for example, have been struggling to build up their armed forces from scratch, whilst other CEEn states have been working hard to establish civil-military control over their formerly Soviet-trained and commanded People's Armies.

The CEEn governments understand that the wide range of distinct post-Cold War risks and challenges can only be dealt with through a comprehensive approach, including a number of foreign and domestic oriented policies. Consequently, with regard to the government's security policy, the Czech Security Strategy acknowledges that

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\text{the Czech Republic seeks to provide for its security by exercising its foreign, defence, internal security and economic policies, which are mutually cohesive, supportive, and on an equal footing.}^{132}
\]

Similarly, the Latvian document calls for "co-ordinated and simultaneous action in all spheres of threat prevention".\(^{133}\) The Romanian Strategy of National Security assigns an even more inclusive system of security policy interests, including "foreign policy, economic and financial, national safety, law enforcement and national defence fields".\(^{134}\) In a similar manner, the Polish Security Strategy recognises that the country's security should be maintained "through national efforts as well as through further integration and co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance and with the European Union".\(^{135}\)

Leaning on these rather general accounts and the more specific framework for foreign and security policy analysis set out in chapter two, in the following we will examine, which particular policy objectives CEEn governments pursue in two distinct policymaking environments, foreign and domestic. Thus, leading on from the point raised

\(^{132}\) Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), section II.
\(^{133}\) Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia (1997), section IV.
\(^{134}\) Romania's Strategy of National Security (1999)
by the aforementioned Polish Security Strategy, objectives stressing integration into and cooperation with NATO and the EU appear to be major security policy goals of all CEEn governments. In addition, all CEEn governments identify the following foreign policy objectives aimed at the strengthening of their respective countries' security: enhanced regional cooperation and further development of good-neighbourly relations.

In the field of domestic activities, CEEn governments identify a wide range of security policy objectives. With regard to the maximisation of military security, defence policies enjoy priority, including policies to reform the armed forces and to establish better-organised, smaller and more efficient national armies. In addition to the quality and size of the armed forces, the gradual switch to civilian control is another main security policy objective of the CEEn governments, which is aimed at curtailing the possibility of a military praetorian threat. Beside the domestic defence policy objectives, major attention is given to economic policies and a range of internal security policies (combating crime, illegal migration, environmental security etc.) as major stabilising factors.

5.2 Foreign Policy-responses

5.2.1 Integration and Cooperation

Without exception, all CEEn governments regard their countries' integration into the North Atlantic Alliance as a security policy objective of the utmost importance. Furthermore they all acknowledge that their 'hard security' situation will only be regarded as more secure, when the countries become full members of NATO and are then, as a result, protected by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As the 'Foreign Policy Priorities of the Republic of Slovakia' states, the pursuit of NATO membership "is the only real, politically and economically justified response to the requirements" of national defence.\footnote{Foreign Policy Priorities of the Slovak Republic (2000), section II.} NATO's eastward enlargement of March 1999 has shown that

\footnote{Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2000), section 3.}
the Alliance is willing to grant membership on political grounds to ex-communist countries and this has boosted the expectations of the remaining nine CEEN candidate countries. Although the main objective is full membership of NATO at the earliest possible date, in the interim period candidate countries seek to increase their security via enhanced political-military cooperation with the Alliance and its member states. After the breakdown of communism in CEE, this cooperation has materialised through a number of channels. The Rome Summit of NATO in 1991 established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in July 1997. Furthermore, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme was launched in January 1994, in order to establish direct military contact between NATO members and CEEN candidate countries. The 'Study on Enlargement' outlined NATO's expectations in September 1995, which were decisive for the preparation and subsequent admission of the 'first wave' new members. In addition, NATO's IFOR/SFOR programme in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo enjoyed contributions from CEEN countries and operation Allied Force received the support of most CEEN states. As a result of the Washington Summit in April 1999, the 'Study on Enlargement' document was supplemented by the 'Membership Action Plan' (MAP). Learning from the difficulties that arose during the first round of enlargement negotiations, the MAP gives more detailed guidance for the nine CEEN aspirant countries as to what they need to achieve to be eligible for membership and offers assistance in "developing forces and capabilities that could operate with NATO under its new Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC)".137 NATO will review the preparation process of the candidate countries at its 2002 summit and it is likely that the Alliance will then invite new members.

It is important to highlight briefly, what actions the CEEN applicants need to undertake within the MAP, as, even if indirectly, these actions are aimed at stabilising the countries. Aspirants need to submit an Annual National Plan (ANP) to NATO that covers "political, economic, defence, resource, security, and legal aspects of

137 Simon, Jeffrey (2000a) "NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) and Defense Planning: A Preliminary Assessment", Paper as a Result of a Conference Hosted by INSS, the George C. Marshall Center (Garmisch) and the Bulgarian Defense Ministry Held in Sofia, Bulgaria, on 12-13 June 2000, p. 2, (personal communication).
Candidate countries also need to establish enhanced defence planning that includes the implementation and revision of agreed Partnership Goals (PGs). Therefore, it can be argued that the NATO integration process triggered a set of security policy objectives in the CEEn countries that have, generally speaking, two distinct aims. Firstly, they are aimed at strengthening security in the region through indirect channels, e.g. through the democratisation of the defence establishments or through the launch of enhanced cooperation. Secondly, these new policies intend to prepare the grounds for full membership in the Alliance, via attaining interoperability of strategic planning, command and military structures.

As the Latvian Security Concept sums up one of the main security policy aspirations of most non-NATO member CEEn countries:

Maximum co-operation with NATO, its member states, as well as with other friendly nations is supported in order to develop closer ties and facilitate the fastest possible integration of Latvia into NATO.

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, although legally full members of NATO since 12th March 1999, acknowledge that they need to pursue policies with the aim of further integration within the Alliance. The 'Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland', for instance, sets out a number of policy objectives at the legislative and executive levels, which "serve to strengthen the defence capability of the state". These include organisational issues related to the achievement of the required level of interoperability of the Polish Armed Forces with the forces of other NATO states and appropriate "training of personnel for work within the Alliance's structures". Furthermore, policies target matters in the "economic-financial sphere", including the adoption of the defence budget to NATO standards, guarantee of "stable, long-term financial resources for defence, (...) skilful application of NATO's Security Investment Programme (NISP) to expand infrastructure in Polish territory" and the adoption of the "economic-defensive infrastructure to the Alliance's requirements".

The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic identifies similar defence policy objectives in the wake of NATO membership:

...the Czech Republic's priorities include full-fledged integration within NATO; further development of Czech armed forces; and the State's ability to make adequate defence resources available.  

Another main foreign and security policy objective of all CEEn countries is represented by their attempts to gain full membership in the European Union. Since the late 1990s, the EU has embarked on the development of an autonomous foreign and security policy, most distinctively through the launch of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999. Nonetheless, CEEn governments are, to a great extent, guided by 'soft security' considerations in their attempts to join the EU, rather than pursuing 'hard security' motivations. As Webber has argued, "for political reasons (...) they [the CEEn states] ought to be seen to back ESDP", since they seek to become members of the EU, yet, their major security policy priority is to enjoy collective defence through NATO membership. This notion is clearly expressed in the 'Foreign Policy Priorities of the Republic of Slovakia', which states:

We perceive the building of more efficient European security capacities as a means of strengthening the North Atlantic Alliance, which is the crucial element of the European security system.

Membership of the EU is regarded rather, in the first instance, as a major policy for stabilising the political and economic systems of the CEEn countries. The Czech Security Strategy confirms this view by stating that the "fundamental pillars of the European security system include (...) the European Union as a grouping for economic and political integration".

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Also, the governments of the four Visegrad states have associated EU membership with their countries 'return to Europe'. It is, therefore, increasingly difficult for CEEn politicians at home to justify politically any further delay in accession to their impatient electorate. The EU is considered by many as an exclusive club of wealthy nations, a kind of 'fortress Europe', in which egotism has a greater weight than solidarity.\textsuperscript{145} Despite some clear achievements between the countries of CEE and the EU since the early 1990s, CEEn leaders have often felt ill-treated by their Western colleagues. Former Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn remembers many of those meetings with a great deal of bitterness and characterises them in his memoirs as 'time-wasters'.\textsuperscript{146} For instance, he described that at the 1995 Cannes EU summit, after having waited for hours in a small room with his CEEn colleagues for the EU leaders, they had a one-hour meeting, where their opinions were as good as irrelevant, because most of the EU leaders were either resting or did not even attend. At the end of the meeting, French President Jacques Chirac, its chairman, turned to Chancellor Kohl and said in front of all CEEn leaders: "I kept my promise. It did not take more than sixty minutes".\textsuperscript{147}

Because of the complex nature of EU activities, membership for the CEEn applicants requires that they adopt and implement a wide range of policies. The main objective is the adoption of the EU's 'acquis communautaire'. For this, the European Commission first invented the so-called 'Europe Agreements' and then entered into Accession Partnerships with each individual candidate country, outlining the major goals that the country has to achieve on its path to membership. In response, each individual country set up a so-called 'National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis', delineating in detail how the acquisition of EU legislation will be carried out.\textsuperscript{148} This includes details of available financial and human resources and indications of main problem areas that could lead to transitional arrangements. Currently, there are ten CEEn countries involved in accession negotiations with the EU, including the first applicant, Hungary, (March 1994) and the latest one, Slovenia (June 1996). Overall, it

\textsuperscript{145} Interview with Bronislaw Geremek, Die Zeit, 30/07/98, p. 7
\textsuperscript{146} Horn, Gyula (1999) \textit{Azok a Kilencvenes Évek...} Budapest: Kossuth, p. 323f. (Those Years in the Nineties)
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid. (quotation translated from the Hungarian by the author)
\textsuperscript{148} Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate countries, November 8, 2000, Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/index.htm [01/12/2000], section II. 1.
can be argued that the EU integration process represents one of the most important policy-responses of the CEEn governments to post-Cold War 'soft security' challenges, thus its realisation enjoys high priority in the countries concerned. As former Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek put it back in 1998,

the EU means higher level of security for an independent, democratic and sovereign country. Together with Hungary and the Czech Republic we hope to become soon members of the NATO in some months and believe that NATO will give us the feeling of security we need. The European Union however seems to offer a special kind of security. At the end of the century we should envision the security issue not only as a question of defense, of military structures, but also as something which includes democracy, the rule of law, and prosperity. (...) Our feeling is that the EU can provide this sense of security because it combines prosperity, security and democracy.149

5.2.2 Enhanced Regional Cooperation

Official documents of CEEn countries confirm that regional cooperation represents one of the main lines of foreign and security policy, in order to ensure the respective countries national security and the overall region's stability. However, it is interesting to note that the policy of enhanced regional cooperation does not seem to relate to the entire CEEn region. It seems to be understood much more in a rather narrow sense, i.e. governments stress the importance of cooperation and good relations with the countries in their immediate neighbourhoods. So, for instance, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania appear to concentrate primarily on policy options regarding the security of the Baltic subregion. The 'Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia' states, that the

security of Latvia is aimed toward fully co-ordinated and joint activities of the Baltic states in averting an external threat. Particular attention is paid to the development of practical joint defence and security projects and programs, such as the Baltic peace-keeping battalion, the joint Baltic navy training unit, the regional airspace initiative and other regional projects.150

Similarly, the 'National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia' expresses the strong desire for cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Beside its impact on regional

security, all three Baltic republics regard strong regional cooperation as means of promoting their integration into European and transatlantic structures. The most comprehensive regional initiative is the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), including the five Nordic states, the three Baltic states, Germany, Poland, Russia and the EU Commission. Cottey has argued that, in spite of the CBSS's limitations resulting from "the diversity of its members and lack of resources, it has made a positive contribution to cooperative security in the Baltic subregion". It provides a consultation framework for Nordic and Baltic leaders as well as the EU Commission to coordinate their economic, environmental and social policies and support the process of democratisation in the transitional CBSS member states. In addition, when Russian-Baltic relations were troubled in the mid-1990s, the CBSS offered a neutral forum for ameliorating tensions, as, for instance, the CBSS commissioner on democratic institutions and human rights helped defuse tensions over the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia. In addition to the CBSS, the three Baltic states have also agreed to establish trilateral political cooperation, such as the Baltic Assembly (meeting of national parliaments), the Baltic Council of Ministers (meeting of ministers) and the Baltic Council (meetings of parliaments and ministers), all of which are designed to maximise regional security via political and economic cooperation. In the area of military cooperation, there are a number of joint initiatives in the Baltic region, including the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) and the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL).

A strong desire to cooperate on the regional level cannot be assumed, to the same extent, of the other CEEn countries. Although officially, all countries proclaim, to varying degrees, the importance of regional cooperation, they seem to expect far less from it than the Baltic States. It is striking how little attention the four Visegrád countries' security strategies/doctrines pay to the matter of regional cooperation and regional organisations. The otherwise well-drafted and detailed Polish document

151 See, for example, National Security Concept of Estonia (2000), section 1.1.
153 Ibid, p. 25f.
treats this issue in a very short paragraph and does not elaborate on further policies directed towards such regional initiatives.\textsuperscript{155} The Czech document suggests that regional cooperation plays a minor role in the country's security policy and Slovakia's Foreign Policy Priorities for the period of 2000-2003 forecast no special policy objectives in this area. Similarly, the 'Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary' contains little evidence of concrete policy objectives in the field of regional cooperation. Consequently, all four countries pursue separate national strategies on their way to joining the EU and, in general, there is no or little coordination of their security policies on a regional level. This can be explained simply by the fact that the politically and economically more advanced Visegrád countries seem to be less keen on joining regional formations with weaker states, because of a fear that this could undermine their prospects in the race for EU membership.

It is fair to acknowledge, however, that there are some military cooperation initiatives in CEE, yet, these do not and cannot offer hard security guarantees to any of the countries involved. These regional formations involve rather ad-hoc multinational military units, such as the \textit{Multinational Peace Force Southeast Europe/South-Eastern Europe Brigade} (MPFSEE/SEEBRIG), the \textit{Black Sea Force} (BLACKSEAFOR), and the \textit{Central European Nations Cooperation} (CENCOOP). Additionally, there are some trilateral formations, such as the \textit{Italian-Slovenian-Hungarian Land Force}, the \textit{Romanian-Hungarian-Ukrainian Engineering Unit}, and the \textit{Romanian-Moldavian-Ukrainian Unit}, as well as bilateral ones such as the \textit{Polish-Ukrainian Battalion}, the \textit{Romanian-Hungarian Battalion}, and the \textit{Romanian-Ukrainian Battalion}. The reason, why these regional military initiatives are rather weak, lies mainly in the attitude of some of their members. A Romanian scholar has summed up the attitude of different CEEn governments in the following way:

\begin{quote}
Broadly speaking, countries, which are full NATO and/or EU members, or those who have begun EU accession negotiations, tend to ascribe less importance to subregional arrangements. "Neutrals" and countries that have no immediate prospects or intention to join the Euro-Atlantic organizations tend to view subregional arrangements more seriously.\textsuperscript{156}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{156} See Pop (2000), p. 10.
There are also some, albeit weak, initiatives for political and economic cooperation in the region. The Central European Initiative (CEI), for instance, has developed a fairly low-scale political cooperation, but its documents are not legally binding and it is up to the member states to decide whether they sign up to a document or rather abstain from it. So, for instance, the 'CEI Instrument for the protection of minority rights' acknowledges

\textit{that respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, as part of universally recognised human rights, is an essential factor for peace, justice, stability and democracy in the States,}^{157}

but, by focusing too much on the level of the nation-state, it fails to elevate the minority issue onto the level of a regional security concern. Nevertheless, the CEI, like the CBSS in the Baltic region, has a comprehensive membership, gathering most countries of the region (16 states), therefore, it offers a useful consultation forum for promoting subregional peace and security.\textsuperscript{158} Additionally, the CEI could play an important role in preventing divisions within the region caused by a partial enlargement of the EU and further enlargement of NATO. Indeed, at their 1997 Sarajevo Summit, the CEI Foreign Ministers stressed that

\textit{one of the main tasks of the CEI, as a forum for cooperation including both, candidate and non-candidate countries, should be to reduce the impact of existing and possible emerging new differences and disparities between CEI Member States and to avoid the creation of new barriers and divisions in Europe.}^{159}

The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) came into effect in March 1993, initially between the four Visegrád states. Since then it has granted membership to Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria and is currently considering other applications from countries including those of the Baltics, Croatia and Ukraine. According to its founding document, CEFTA's main objective is to establish a free trade area no later


\textsuperscript{158} See Cotcey (2000), p. 32.

\textsuperscript{159} Final Document of the Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Central European Initiative, Sarajevo 1997, Source: \url{http://www.ceinet.org/meetings/findoc.htm} [02/02/2001].
than January 1, 2001, via the liberalisation of trade of industrial and agricultural products among its members.160 The member countries' activity in CEFTA has been, however, subordinated from the very beginning to their efforts to join the EU. They considered the Agreement, alongside the Visegrad Declaration of 1991, merely as "an additional element designed to facilitate Central Europe's integration with the Union [EU]".161 It is therefore not surprising that, so far, efforts to expand the scope of cooperation have failed, as have attempts to make CEFTA more institutional. Currently, it is run by a Joint Committee on a mainly ad-hoc basis that lacks clear powers and competencies.162 In addition, when CEEn states join the EU, they will have to leave CEFTA, since the EU's common external trade policy prohibits membership of separate trade blocs. It is, therefore, likely that with some more developed countries joining the EU well before others, CEFTA's role in the region will diminish substantially (if not completely), by preventing less developed CEEn countries freely accessing the regional trade market.163

Similarly, the medium-term future of the formerly influential Visegrad cooperation between the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia is not clear. Whilst at the beginning of the 1990s, Visegrad cooperation proved to have sufficient political weight that its concerted pressure on the Soviet Union persuaded the latter to agree to the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and to withdraw its troops from the region, by the mid-1990s, it has become largely inactive. Although the leaders of the four member states decided at their Summit in Bratislava in 1999 to revitalise their cooperation to 'its full capacity' in agreeing to cooperate in meeting EU accession criteria, promoting cross-border ties and calling for Slovakia's membership of NATO, in terms of real policy-outputs there has been little done to improve the region's security. As Cottey has argued, with the Visegrad-four joining the EU and Slovakia being admitted to NATO, "the rationale for cooperation between these four states,

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160 Central European Free Trade Agreement, concluded by the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on December 21, 1992, article 1, Source: http://www.cefta.org/agreement/engtreaty.htm [15/01/2001].
162 Ibid.
distinct from that with their other NATO/EU partners and neighbours, may diminish".164

5.2.3 **Development of Good-neighbourly Relations**

Pursuing good-neighbourly relations seems to be a more successful policy objective of most CEEn countries than regional cooperation. This is the area where, not only on paper but also in practice, much has been achieved. On the official side, security strategies/doctrines of all CEEn states emphasise the importance of good relations with their neighbouring countries. This is one of the main foreign and security policy objectives of all CEEn states. Estonia seeks the "continuation and further development of good-neighbourly relations"165 and, similarly, Romania seeks to ensure its national security "by promoting good neighbourly relations".166 The document on 'Foreign Policy Priorities of the Slovak Republic' declares the recent policies of the government towards its neighbours, coupled with the progress achieved in the country's EU integration process to be "the basic successes of Slovakia's foreign policy".167

Certainly, the importance of agreements between neighbouring countries should not be underestimated in a region that had experienced great disputes over territorial and minority related issues in its recent history, as discussed in chapters three and four. By the late 1990s, most of the former Warsaw Pact countries concluded bilateral basic treaties that were aimed at regulating cooperation and good neighbourly relations between countries, that has involved respect of existing borders and minority rights.

Admittedly, the driving force behind these treaties was not only the CEEn governments' recognition of the historic opportunity for reconciliation. They were often influenced by international organisations, notably the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the EU and NATO, as, for example, the conclusion of these treaties were declared a precondition for EU and NATO accession. As Wohlfeld has argued

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164 ibid, p. 29.
167 Foreign Policy Priorities of the Slovak Republic (2000)
the emphasis that both EU and NATO place on good-neighbourly relations among candidate countries is a step in the right direction, as it accentuates the relevance to the process of integration of bilateral issues.168

The EU had its part in promoting good-neighbourly relations in the region, via its Stability Pact, which was initiated by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur in April 1993 and integrated into the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at the December 1993 European Council in Brussels. Although the Stability Pact failed to live up to its euphoric goals and turned out to be an EU foreign policy fiasco, it did manage to gather representatives of CEEn countries and to initiate a debate on the security of the region.169 An additional shortcoming of the Stability Pact was that it considered only those nine countries of CEE (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary), which had applied for EU membership at that time. Neither Ex-Yugoslavia nor the CIS states were included in the process. Thus, as some observers have argued, it appeared that the target group of the Stability Pact included those countries, on which the EU could exercise its greatest external influence; the already relatively secure states of CEE.170 It is, therefore, not surprising that very little was achieved within the framework of the Stability Pact. Apart from the ceremonial signing of a bilateral treaty between Hungary and the Slovak Republic at the closing conference of the Stability Pact in Paris on 20th March 1995, no significant result could be presented.171 Partly in order to avoid additional embarrassment, the EU passed on the future administration of the Stability Pact to the OSCE. More about the circumstances accompanying the negotiations and the signing of the Basic Treaty between Hungary and Slovakia will be presented in chapter six in our detailed case study on Hungary.

170 Ibid, p. 322.
171 See Oplatka, Andreas (1996) "Vermittler wird gesucht", Europäische Rundschau, 7:2, p. 31. (Mediator sought)
Overall, bilateral relations in general and neighbourly relations in particular have developed positively in the period after 1990 and have had a stabilising impact on the region's security. Most disputes have been settled by diplomatic means, for which the framework was supplied by the newly concluded basic treaties between individual countries. The Romanian Ambassador to NATO and the EU assessed the importance of these treaties in the following way:

*Throughout history we have striven for the creation of a community, in our part of Europe, where good neighbourly relations can be developed. Based on this sentiment, important political treaties have been signed with Hungary and Ukraine, thus avoiding territorial claims and ensuring the protection of national minorities.*

The 'Regular Report of the European Commission on Latvia's Progress towards Accession' has also found that "Latvia strives to contribute to regional stability through a policy of good-neighbourly relations and regional co-operation". It concluded border agreements with its neighbouring countries and eventually cleared up its outstanding problems regarding borders. The relationship between the Baltic States and Russia seems to be the exception, which, especially as a result of the Baltic troika's efforts to join NATO and the EU, continues to be somewhat problematic.

5.3 Domestic Policy-responses

5.3.1 Defence Policies

An important challenge that the first democratically elected CEEn governments faced after 1990 was the non-existence of democratic control over their armed forces. By the mid-1990s, all CEEn states identified the principle of civilian control of the military as a major policy objective and developed strategies for its achievement, in

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order to avert the possibility of a military intervention in domestic politics. A recent study confirms that since this period, the CEEn countries "have made some substantial progress in establishing democratic control of the armed forces". Amended or re-written constitutions ensure that the democratically elected president and/or government controls the armed force, and further, this process is overseen by the national parliaments. New laws on the armed forces and new security and defence strategies/doctrines have been developed, underpinning the absoluteness of civilian control and political neutrality of the armed forces. 'The Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland' states uncompromisingly that the armed forces "maintain their political neutrality and are subject to civil and democratic control". In a similar manner, the 'National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia' states that "Estonia has established civil-military relations in accordance with the traditions of other democratic states". Likewise, 'The National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria' reinstates that the "civilian control upon the state policy for security and the bodies performing it is guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the country".

Nonetheless, as Joó has pointed out, there have been some major obstacles to the evolution of civilian control in CEE, on both the civilian as well as military sides. On the civilian side, there has been a lack of expertise in security and defence matters. In addition, widespread anti-military feelings in most CEEn societies have hampered the smooth development of civil-military relations. On the military side, there has been a lack of experience in working with civilians from the ministries of defence and the national parliaments. Furthermore, the sudden subordination of the military to civilians, most notably the integration of general staffs within civilian ministries of defence, and the criticism from the arising democratic media has generated some problems.

Yet, as Cottey et al. have argued, "in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, securing democratic control of the defence policy has proven to be more problematic than securing democratic control of the armed forces (...)". Thus, the above-mentioned problems on the civilian and military sides emanate from the difficulties of the civilianisation of the overall defence establishment, rather than from questioning the basic principle of civilian control of the armed forces.

Also, it can be argued that in the context of defence policy-responses, problems connected to the state of the CEEn armed forces and their reform appear to be as pertinent as the issue of civilian control of the armies or defence policies. After 1990, all CEEEn governments have embarked on a complex reform of their armed forces. The general goal is to establish better-organised, smaller, more efficient and more cost effective national armies that are interoperable with the armies of NATO member countries. This is a medium- as well as long-term objective, since the overall reform of the armed forces requires substantial financial resources, which often exceed the potential and actual socio-economic capacities of the CEEEn states. As Simon has found, in general, there are some serious shortcomings in CEEEn military planning, as CEEEn governments "have been unable to provide long-term plans and to guarantee resources to build military capabilities". This criticism might be valid in general terms, yet, it overlooks the national endeavours of CEEEn governments for reforming the armed forces. Most states have developed some medium- or long-term modernisation programs, for which they have received substantial assistance from NATO within PfP and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) as well as via the Membership Action Plan. As a result, some NATO aspirant CEEEn countries set out medium- and long-term reform packages for transforming their armies, for instance Romania adopted the future 'Romanian Army Restructuring Programme FARO 2005-2010', starting from the premise that the country can join NATO by 2005 and the EU by 2010. The Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic also produced a reform plan, called the 'Concept of the Defence Department Establishment of the Slovak Republic Reform by 2002 (with an outlook up to 2010)'. On the basis of its military and security doctrines, Bulgaria has also drafted a 'Program for the Reform of the

Bulgarian Armed Forces'. New NATO member Poland adopted a reform programme of its defence establishment as well, the 'Programme for Integrating and Modernising the Polish Armed Forces for the Years 1998-2012'. Similarly, the Czech government approved a future plan called the 'Concept for the Development of Forces 2003-2008', outlining the modernisation of the armed forced. The document on the 'Long-term (2000-2010) transformation of the Hungarian Armed Forces' adopted by the Hungarian Parliament, cleared the way for the launch of a comprehensive reform programme.

In addition, the CEEn national security doctrines/strategies emphasise the governments' firm commitment to reform their armed forces. The 'Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland' states rather generally that the "process of upgrading the Polish Armed Forces (...) calls for radical decisions and action with regard to their functioning, management and technological modernisation". 184 'Romania's Strategy of National Security' identifies the following ways of action in the defence area for ensuring national security: "modernising, streamlining and restructuring the armed forces in agreement with the requirements of the new security environment and available resources". 185 Similarly, the 'Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia' affirms that the "National Armed Forces must be small, mobile, well-armed, well trained and interoperable with NATO military structures (...)"). 186

In the matter of downsizing their national armed forces, CEEn governments have already achieved some considerable progress (see figure 5-1). For instance, the strength of the Czech defence establishment has been reduced between 1993 and 1999 by ca. 40 per cent, in Poland the reduction between 1988 and 1999 was ca. 30 per cent, in Romania between 1990 and 1999 almost 50 per cent. 187 Bulgaria lags behind the other countries of the region in reduction of its defence establishment. In the years 1991 to 1999, only a small-scale reduction took place, yet, more significant re-scaling of the defence establishment is planned by 2004 (by ca. 60 per cent). In contrast, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the three Baltic states needed to build up their armed

forces almost from scratch after independence. Despite that, by 1995, Slovakia had a somewhat oversized armed force of 47,000, which was reduced to 35,000 in 1999 and is projected to decline to 25-30,000. The Baltic states are currently increasing the overall size of their armed forces and Slovenia is expected to maintain an army of ca. 8,200-9,400, variations depending on the number of conscripts.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Past</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>Projected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HUNGARY</strong></td>
<td>155,700 (1989)</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>45,000 (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLAND</strong></td>
<td>400,000 (1988)</td>
<td>285,000</td>
<td>150-180,000 (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BULGARIA</strong></td>
<td>117,000 (1991)</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>45,000 (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ROMANIA</strong></td>
<td>320,000 (1990)</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>140,000 (2003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 5-1 Comparative trends in the strength of CEEn defence establishments

Source: Simon 2000b, p. 3.

The scarcity of public resources is a major problem facing all CEEn countries and this is reflected in the financial constraints that plague their national armies. As figure 5-2 shows, there is a huge gap between the per capita defence expenditure of the three new NATO member states and the total per capita defence expenditure of all NATO member states. Although, it has to be mentioned, that NATO membership exerts an upward pressure on defence spending. According to projections of national defence budgets, it is uncertain, whether the ambitious reform plans can be carried out in full length. Insufficient funding can jeopardise the defence capabilities of the individual countries as well as hamper the fragile reform process. Furthermore, as Simon has forecast, as a result of harsh decisions (e.g. closure of army bases and dismissal of military personnel), taken during the transformation period, "CEEn governments and societies are likely to experience civil-military tension". 

188 Ibid, p. 4.
189 Ibid.
5.3.2 Economic Policies

All CEEn security strategies/doctrines deal extensively with security policy-responses in the economic field. This demonstrates both how important the issue of economic security is in post-Cold War CEE and how concerned politicians about its treatment are in the region. As noted earlier, the matter of state intervention in economic security issues is even more pertinent in a region, in which countries face a complex transition process than in consolidated democracies. Thus, CEEn economic policies show, to a great extent, a transitional character, that is, they deal with the establishment and strengthening of a stable legal and institutional framework, in which state and private economic and financial activities can be carried out. In addition, the safeguarding of these newly created laws and institutions require more attention in transitional economies than in long established market economies. Although by the turn of the century, many CEEn countries have achieved remarkable progress in the performance of their economies and financial markets, there is still a long way for them to go to reach the average level of development of the EU. As the 'National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia' summed it up, the main goals of economic policy-making are:
To ensure sustainability and social stability, Estonia must continue structural reforms and implement macroeconomic policy measures along the principles of liberal trade and the free movement of capital. A short-term goal is to increase the competitiveness of Estonian production in markets of developed states and to harmonise legislation with the EU acquis.\(^{190}\)

The concentration on fundamental policies of economic stabilisation and growth as important strategic tasks of national security policy is even more apparent in economically less developed CEEn countries. So, for instance, the 'National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria' establishes a direct link between the issue of economic development and the satisfaction of citizens' interests and indicates the risks, which the absence of economic stability poses:

*The economic factor is decisive for the guarantee of national security. Only the stabilisation, re-establishment and growth of Bulgarian economy are in a position to satisfy the interests of the Bulgarian citizens, society and state, to solve the problems concerning the deficiency of resources, to improve the living standard and increase the degree of social protection.*\(^{191}\)

In parallel to the economic policies stemming from the transition process, CEEn governments also have to respond to a set of issues effecting their economic security that emanate from the competitive and open nature of the globalised world economy. In addition, the current situation in CEEn countries, in which, the provision of strategic energy supplies still depends heavily on Russian imports, requires "diversifying energy import sources".\(^{192}\) This entails policy action aiming at the connection of CEE national electricity, gas and oil supply systems with Western European energy networks and "ensure independence from imported energy resources to the greatest possible extent".\(^{193}\)

The 'Security Strategy of the Czech Republic' devotes an entire section to economic policy relevant to the country's national security. It sets out a system of economic measures that are designed for the handling of crisis situations. These include

*...emergency economic measures; provision of the country's strategic supplies; economic mobilisation; development of the necessary infrastructure;*

\(^{190}\) National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2000), section 3.3.
\(^{191}\) National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria (1998)
\(^{193}\) National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2000), section 3.3.
and regulatory measures. The purpose of such measures is to ensure that the economy has the required material resources available and to provide services to the population and armed forces, armed security units, rescue corps and emergency services in situations that pose danger to the country's security.¹⁹⁴

5.3.3 Internal Security Policies

According to the national security doctrines/strategies in CEE, there is a wide range of areas in which governments undertake policy action in order to preserve, develop or strengthen internal security. Amongst these, there are three areas in particular, which seem to be of major importance in all CEEn countries: combating crime, reducing illegal migration and, to a somewhat lesser extent, handling issues related to environmental security. In all three areas, there is an urgent need for developing a national legal framework as well as strengthening law enforcement. In addition to domestic policies, it is necessary to cooperate with other countries in combating organised crime, illegal migration and cross-border environmental degradation.

In the area of combating crime, governments' policies generally subscribe to a coordinated approach of various domestic and international actors. The 'Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland', for instance, states that

while initiating and organising efforts to prevent crime and crime-breeding phenomena, including those of a cross-border character, Poland's police cooperate with state and self-government organs and social institutions in the Republic of Poland, as well as with police forces of other states and their international organisations.¹⁹⁵

More fundamentally, internal security policy-response attempts to promote a more active participation of citizens' organisations in the fight against crime. It is generally the case in CEE that there is a wide gap between the police forces and the public at large that need to be closed. Also, it is one of the legacies of the previous authoritarian regimes that the public's confidence is fairly low in the police forces. The Czech government tries to tackle this problem mainly "through emphasis on the police

members' correct behaviour to citizens and their professional, consistent and speedy action and bearing". 196

Policy-response also includes the modernisation of the judicial systems "on the basis of a unified strategy for combating criminality and corruption". 197 In the case of organised crime, it requires the creation of new national institutions that have the task of liaising with national and international organisations. For instance, the 'National Anti-Crime Strategy' of Bulgaria adopted in July 1998 develops a number of policies for combating crime, one of which is the establishment of the 'National Service for Combating Organised Crime'. 198 A report of the Ministry of Interior on organised crime in the Czech Republic in 2000 found that an inter-ministerial body to combat organised crime had not yet been established, a serious shortcoming of national security policy. 199 As the Polish example shows, however, the creation of institutions alone cannot solve the problem of crime. Poland has established a 'Bureau of Organised Crime' within the Ministry of Justice, dealing with a wide range of issues, including drugs, forgery, financial frauds, money-laundering, car theft, arms trafficking, terrorism etc. Yet, the 'Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's Progress towards Accession' in 1999 revealed some serious systemic shortcomings. It concluded that

there is a lack of sufficiently motivated, experienced and adequately paid staff, lack of management continuity, lack of co-ordination, lack of modern 'intelligence' methods and technology and an overall absence of strategy for combating organised crime. 200

Leading on from the issue of organised crime, the fight against illegal migration requires a coordinated national and international policy-response as well. Illegal migration is a serious security problem in post-Cold War CEE and the security
doctrines/strategies of all countries reflect some serious policy-outputs in this area. The 'Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia' states that "methods and legislation for the detaining and deporting of illegal immigrants are being developed (...)". Action is required on the one hand for the national security of individual CEEn countries, on the other sufficient policing of illegal migration is also urged by the EU, as CEEn countries seek membership in the EU and once they become members, they need to subscribe to the 'Schengen Agreement'. This necessitates, in the first instance, effective control of national borders, territorial waterways and airspace. Additionally, CEEn governments will need to devise a concept for the modernisation of their "visa granting process and personal checks at national borders" and will need to harmonise their "visa policy with the EU countries".

But, the 'Regular Report from the Commission on the Czech Republic's Progress towards Accession' exposed a wide disparity between policy formulation and actual results: "border guards remain understaffed, badly equipped and bound by inefficient communication procedures with national police headquarters". The Commission's overall assessment of the situation in the fields of 'justice and home affairs' in CEEn applicant countries was, nevertheless, more balanced:

"Steady progress has been made in most candidate countries in the field of justice and home affairs. New legislation has been introduced in several countries on visa policy, asylum and rules of admission of third countries' citizens. Nevertheless, more attention should be paid, on the one hand, to border management where much remains to be done to ensure that the future EU's external borders will be managed according to the Union's standards."

As regards environmental issues, CEEn policy-makers recognise their importance to overall national security and some noticeable progress has been made in this area. Again, this is motivated partially by the EU integration process, since EU regulations cover a broad range of environmental issues, and partially by some recent tragic environmental disasters, which have afflicted the region (e.g. floods, pollution of

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202 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), section II. 3. B.
204 See Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries (2000), section III. 3. c.
drinking water and cyanide pollution of rivers). Nonetheless, environmental protection does not seem to be at the top of CEEn security policy-makers' agenda. Although almost all security doctrines/strategies have some concessions on policy objectives in the environmental field, they fall short compared to other policy areas. Policies involve the establishment of control systems "to reduce the possibility of a disaster and its consequences" and the adoption of effective "crisis management and measures for civilian emergency planning", to make sure that the government agencies can respond to crisis situation. 'Romania's Strategy of National Security' recognises the threat emanating from the environment, yet, it does not elaborate on any policy objectives to remedy them. Similarly, the 'National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria' does not go beyond the mere identification of some challenges stemming from environmental problems and does not offer any policy-response in this field. Also, the 'Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland' suffices itself with the simple acknowledgement of environmental risks to national security and disregards the discussion of policy-responses.

Among the CEEn countries, Estonia devotes the most space to environmental policy in its National Security Concept. It sets out a wide range of objectives, such as the

- **Stimulation of environment awareness and environment-friendly consumption patterns;**
- **Promotion of environment-friendly technologies;**
- **Reduction of the power sector's negative effect to the environment;**
- **Improvement of the quality of air, more efficient handling of waste and protection of the sea, surface, and subsoil waters;**
- **Liquidation of the pollution originating from the past (in connection with earlier industrial and military activities);**
- **Preservation of landscape and biological diversity;**
- **Improvement of living and working environment according to the need of the people and requirements of environment protection.**

In the economically rather weak CEEn countries, environmental protection is not high on the political agenda. Although to the international community, CEEn countries acknowledge the importance of the issue, the lack of resources prevents them from taking concrete action. A more concerted response has only become apparent in the

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206 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), section II. 3. E.
immediate aftermath of ecological disaster, such as that which occurred in February 2000, following an accident in a Romanian gold mine, when a large quantity of cyanide flowed into the river Tisza and, subsequently into the Danube, causing irreversible ecological damage in Hungary and Yugoslavia. Mainly as a result of the Tisza-disaster, the Hungarian government appealed to other CEEn states for more cooperation in the matter of environmental security within the existing regional and sub-regional organisations and launched the so-called ‘Regional Environmental Initiative’ in June 2000. The document states that

*stopping the environmental degradation which causes common concern and restoring the damaged environment could promote the prevention of potential economic and political conflicts arising among the nations of the region* (…)

The Government of the Republic of Hungary calls on the international, regional and sub-regional organisations having an interest in the security of the Central, Eastern, and Southeast European region and in deepening co-operation amongst the countries of the region, as well as other institutions of international co-operation, to consider the possibilities of embracing and supporting the Hungarian initiative and show themselves to be receptive to an implementation of environmental co-operation with a fresh content.*

The document also acknowledges that regional cooperation in the field of the environment could be a catalyst for the environmental dimension of European integration, that is, the implementation of regional measures could enhance the individual countries’ chances for membership in the EU. But even the most developed CEEn countries, those likely to become members of the EU first, have asked for substantial temporary derogations in the environmental sector. The Czech Republic is requesting derogations in 10 environmental areas, Hungary in 4. With regard to Poland’s compliance with EU environmental regulations,

*the major derogations cover: municipal sewage treatment, agricultural sewage treatment, drinking water standards, waste controls, oil and diesel oil quality, waste materials and packaging.*

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An EU report from 2000 acknowledges the progress made in a number of candidate countries, but, at the same time, it pointed out the deficiencies of "both acquis alignment and implementation capacity (...) in particular in the areas of water, industrial pollution control, chemicals and nature protection". It also urged candidates to accelerate the "ongoing work to prepare specific implementation programmes with corresponding financial plans".212

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the majority of CEEn governments have devised broadly similar responses to security predicaments and perceptions, they face. This is not because they conduct a region-wide mutually cohesive security and foreign policy, but more because they all face very similar risks and vulnerabilities. Indeed, there is a lack of a regional organisation, unifying all CEE in a single framework. Instead, there exist a number of subregional organisations, which are, to varying degrees, involved in the treatment of mainly 'soft security' issues. This is especially valid for the Baltic region, where subregional cooperation (with the participation of the Nordic states, Russia and the EU) offers a valuable and successful forum for reducing tensions and preparing the three Baltic countries for membership of the EU and NATO.

The other CEEn states seem less keen on establishing strong subregional cooperation, under which the existing frameworks clearly suffer (they lack substance). One explanation for the unwillingness to further subregional cooperation is offered by the negative impact of history, that is, because of diverse historical grievances, there is not yet sufficient level of trust for genuine partnership conducted in a purely subregional framework, in which Western countries are not represented. Another, probably more conclusive, argument is that some CEEn governments hold the view that their vital national interests and foreign and security policy priorities can be better achieved, if they are pursued in a unilateral, as opposed to collective-regional manner. This is certainly true of the approach of some governments towards EU and NATO enlargement, where the more advanced CEEn countries especially advocate an

212 See Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries (2000), section III. 3. C.
individualistic approach. There is a danger that the EU enlargement process could turn into a race of rationally acting individual countries negotiating their terms of membership with the EU on a one-to-one basis, with the weaker candidates lagging behind or even dropping out.

As argued in chapter three, security predicaments can occur in a number of sectors (military, political, economic, societal and environmental). Similarly, security policy in post-Cold War CEE is conducted through the combination of mutually supportive action in various domains, including foreign, defence, internal security, economic and environmental policies.

With regard to foreign policy-responses to security predicaments and perceptions, all CEEn governments consider vital for their national interest the integration of their respective countries into NATO and the EU (in CEE often called the Euro-Atlantic integration process). It is generally hold in CEE that NATO is the sole organisation that can fully guarantee the hard security of its members. Since the collapse of the Eastern bloc, NATO has already conducted one round of enlargement into former Warsaw Pact territory in 1999, with the admittance of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. It also offers substantial assistance to the other CEEn aspirant countries on their way to meet the membership criteria. In order to qualify for membership, CEEn governments have embarked on a complex reform of their armed forces, including the downsizing (with the exception of the Baltic states), the restructuring and the modernising of their defence establishments, as well as making them NATO interoperable. This is a long and costly process, for which all CEEn governments, with the help of existing NATO member states, set up detailed national action plans.

The question has been raised in chapter two, whether the rather psychological issue of retaining an external reference has played a role for CEEn countries in their vigorous pursuit of NATO membership. Is NATO membership, to some extent, the means to replace old Soviet influences by Western ones and maintain (or restore) the 'comfortable certainty' of an external reference? With NATO membership, the West sets the rules (as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War) and offers protection for 'loyalty'. To some extent, NATO's reaction to the attitudes of its new members during the Kosovo intervention in 1999 has revealed some evidence that supports this
presumption: Hungary and Poland were praised for their unconditional support of the NATO action, while the Czech Republic received criticism for its initial reluctance. In addition, the fact that after 1989/90, all CEEn governments opted for the quest of NATO membership, instead of establishing neutrality or a non-aligned status, suggests that there is some validity of the external reference thesis in the regional context. Yet, from a consideration of the details, it has to be acknowledged, that the future status of CEEn governments as members of NATO can, by no means, be regarded as equivalent to their former status as members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Whatever their main motivations are, it is their own wish to become members of NATO, something that could have not be assumed for their membership of the WTO. Also, for Hungary and Czechoslovakia, their membership of the WTO created more suffering for their citizens than security, given the ruthless interventions of the Soviet Union and its WTO allies in 1956 and 1968, respectively.

As regards the treatment of 'soft security' issues, the pursuit of EU membership constitutes the major foreign policy initiative of all CEEn governments. As in the case of NATO membership, here also there are some cognitive issues that seem to play a distinct position in the argument advocating membership. Some CEEn countries (especially the Visegrad four) regard EU membership as a matter of restoring historical justice, that is, the return of their countries to the European mainstream, from which they were artificially removed by the Soviet Union after WW2. Beside this rather sentimental element, the CEEn countries' pursuit of EU membership represents a rather rational policy of vital national interests. Ten CEEn governments are currently (August 2001) engaged into negotiations with the EU about the terms and conditions, upon which they can enter the Union. These membership negotiations form a highly rational process, driven by the national interests of the candidate countries and the collective interests of the EU member states.

Both the EU and NATO expect candidate countries to settle their neighbourly relations before they can enter the organisations. This conditionality of membership has proven to be an efficient means of exerting pressure that has helped stabilise relations in the region. All CEEn countries, often with the assistance of international organisations, have embarked on policy initiatives to normalise their relations with their neighbours and to stabilise the region.
As to domestic policy-responses to security predicaments and perceptions, some of the policies are, just as are some of the predicaments, of a transitional nature. These include a set of policies in the area of defence, establishing modern, civilian-controlled and NATO interoperable armed forces. Similarly, a number of economic, social and internal security decisions have been taken to remedy security predicaments generated by the complex transition process. Often, new institutions and agencies needed to be established, in order to tackle the newly arisen predicaments, for instance those of organised crime, corruption and illegal migration. Today, it is not predominantly the lack of institutions that hampers successful treatment of predicaments, but the lack of expertise, resources and often public support, to make those institutions work effectively. It is valid for all countries in CEE that only the establishment of stronger civil societies and more proactive participation of the citizenry can help implement policies successfully and reduce predicaments effectively.

In the last three chapters we discussed security *predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses* in the post-Cold War CEE region as a whole. In the one which follows, we narrow the geographical focus to the case of a single country, Hungary, in order to test our analytical framework against detailed, concrete examples as opposed to broad generalities.
6 The Case of Hungary

This chapter looks at security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses in the case of the Republic of Hungary. The main objective of this chapter is to analyse to what extent security matters in Hungary can be considered typical of the CEEn region and what are the specific features that appear to be unique to Hungary. In addition, it also represents a test case in a narrower geographical context for the analytical framework outlined in chapter two.

For the sake of the theoretical and analytical coherence of the thesis, this chapter retains the five-sector security framework for the investigation of Hungarian security predicaments. Thus, in the first part, a set of risks and vulnerabilities, in the military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors, that post-Cold War Hungary faces, will be examined. Again, as in the case of the CEEn region at large, attention needs to be paid to the interconnectedness between various sectors and the occurrence of some risks and vulnerabilities at more than one level.

The second part of the chapter investigates how the Hungarian public and its political elite perceive security issues. Emphasis will be put on the discrepancy between real and imagined threat perceptions. In addition, it will be highlighted, to what extent cognitive processes can generate new, revitalise old and reinstate existing risks and vulnerabilities in the Hungarian context. The role of prior knowledge, that is historical processes such as grievances, occupation, the fate of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries etc., seem to play a distinct role in both the Hungarian public's and its political elite's security perceptions.

The final part of this chapter deals with the policy-responses of post-Cold War Hungary, which have been aimed at providing remedies for security challenges. The achievement of full membership of NATO is arguably the most important success of post-communist Hungarian foreign and security policy that has direct and indirect stabilising effects for the country's security. This chapter will highlight the path taken to NATO membership, which, along with Hungary's relations with other international
organisations, appear to be imperative in the security context. Furthermore, Hungary's relations with the CEEn region as well as those with its neighbours will be analysed. Among domestic policy-responses, three major areas will be investigated: firstly, defence policies, including the reform of the Hungarian defence forces; secondly, economic policies that have had security implications in post-Cold War Hungary and thirdly, internal security policies, including undertakings to combat crime and tackle environmental challenges on the national level.

6.1 Introduction

In order to better understand contemporary Hungarian security matters, it is essential to draw attention to some important events in the country's history. The Hungarian nation, founded by King Stephen I. in 1000 in the Carpathian Basin, is one of Europe's oldest nation-states. The history of the Hungarian Kingdom and later the Hungarian Republic was, however, overshadowed by century-long occupations. In the 13th century, troops of the Mongol Empire invaded Hungary ripping it from its independence for a short period of time. Then, in 1526, the defeat of Hungary by the Ottoman Empire was followed by more than 150 years of occupation. In the late 1600s, Habsburg forces drove the Ottomans out of Hungary and consolidated their control over the country until 1918, the end of World War I. As a result of the WW1 peace settlement (Treaty of Trianon), Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its territories to its neighbours, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Austria and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later called Yugoslavia). Between the two World Wars, Hungary formally became a monarchy, but was, however, ruled by a regent as head of state. In March 1944, Nazi-Germany occupied the unreliable ally Hungary and set up a Nazi puppet-government. In late 1944, the Soviet Union invaded Hungary and by the late 1940s, it had set up a communist dictatorship, in line with the Soviet model. Hungary became a part of the so-called Eastern bloc and, with the exception of a very short period in 1956, during the popular revolution against communist rule, it was a single-party state until October 1989, when the democratic and free Republic of Hungary was proclaimed. Multi-party elections were inaugurated in April 1990. By July 1991, all Soviet troops had left the territory of Hungary, putting an end to a long succession of foreign invasions and occupations.
Historical experience of foreign invasion and occupation coupled with the fear of division of the state's territory has had significant security implications in the country's past and present alike and has contributed to the emergence of post-communist security predicaments and biased security perceptions. In addition, some of the post-communist Hungarian political elite's responses to predicaments suggest that the role of historical analogies and identity related issues play a significant role in shaping foreign and security policy decisions.

Yet the role of history is only one factor, however important, that can help explain contemporary Hungarian security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses. Following on from our analytical framework introduced in chapter two and employed in the CEEn context in chapter three, this chapter too will utilise a comprehensive approach to the analysis of security. This will ensure the theoretical and analytical uniformity of this thesis and offer a coherent basis for a comparison of the CEEn region at large with the case study specific to Hungary.

Thus, for the analysis of Hungarian security predicaments, the Copenhagen School Framework with its five sectors will be employed. Most of the CEEn security predicaments discussed in chapters two and three are also valid in the Hungarian context. Therefore, in order to avoid a simple reiteration of threats and vulnerabilities, this chapter will focus on those factors that appear to be either unique or particularly powerful in the Hungarian case. The issue of interconnectedness between different sectors and levels that has been illuminated in more detail in chapter two applies also for the classification of threats and vulnerabilities in the context of Hungary. For instance, an initially minority related problem, that would, according to the Copenhagen School Framework, fall into the societal sector, could engender serious internal political insecurities (political sector) and may even escalate into an armed conflict requiring a military response (military sector). Furthermore, a military conflict could provoke serious economic security predicaments (economic sector) and, in a given case, cause environmental damage (environmental sector). This example demonstrates that the issue of serial propagation of insecurities from sector to sector and from level to level makes a clear-cut systematisation of threats and vulnerabilities difficult. This challenge needs to be borne in mind in the analysis of
Hungarian security predicaments as well. The principal sources for the analysis of the security predicaments affecting Hungary were a number of publications of Hungarian defence and security experts, academics, and, in particular, information provided to the author by researchers at the Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies in Budapest.

The second part of this chapter investigates security perceptions of the Hungarian public at large and its political elite. For the analysis of the latter, articles from the Hungarian media and journals are drawn on, in addition to interviews with Hungarian politicians conducted by the author in Budapest between 1998 and 2000. These include interviews carried out in 1998 with Géza Jeszenszky, Hungarian Foreign Minister in the first democratically elected conservative government between 1990 and 1994, since 1998, Hungarian Ambassador to the USA; Imre Mécs, President of the Parliament's Defence Committee between 1994-1998; Zoltán Rockenbauer, then Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, since 2000 Minister of Cultural Heritage. The last interview was carried out in April 2000 with Péter Siklósi, Senior Security Advisor to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, now Head of the Defence Policy Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence. The analysis of the Hungarian public's attitude towards security issues relies on various surveys conducted by international research institutes as well as by various Hungarian media and research organisations.

The final part of this chapter investigates, the policy-responses that post-Cold War Hungarian governments have developed and deployed for the remedy of security predicaments. As in the CEEn context, the handling of insecurities in the Hungarian case requires action coordinated across various foreign and domestic policy domains. Thus, we will highlight efforts of post-1990 Hungarian foreign policy that have been aimed at improving the country's security, such as integration into major international organisations, enhancement of relations with neighbouring countries and the improvement of the situation of the Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries. In addition, we will elaborate a set of domestic policy-responses, which either directly or indirectly deal with the country's security. In this vein, we will examine Hungary's security and defence policies, including the formulation of basic documents, such as basic principles, doctrines and strategies, and the reform of its
defence establishment. The latter process is a complex one that is driven by the democratisation and civilianisation of controlling institutions over the armed forces that had hitherto been tailored to WTO requirements. Furthermore, the reform process has been accelerated by Hungary's accession to NATO and the consequent requirement for full interoperability of the Hungarian armed forces with the armies of other NATO member states. Beside defence policies, we will look at economic and internal security policy-responses, such as organised crime, illegal migration and environmental insecurities.

6.2 Hungarian Security Predicaments

Most Hungarian security experts agree that the likelihood of an external direct military threat has diminished significantly in the wake of the end of the Cold War.\(^{213}\) Zellner and Dunay have concluded that the importance of the military factor has receded and non-military risks are now more pertinent.\(^{214}\) In a similar vein, Gyarmati has argued that "the 'high risk - high stability' situation has been replaced by a 'low risk - low stability' one".\(^{215}\) In line with this observation, Szemerkényi has maintained that security challenges still exist, their nature having merely transmuted, becoming fragmented into various domains, military and non-military.\(^{216}\) These conclusions of Hungarian security and defence analysts support the utility of the analytical framework outlined in chapter two, and therefore, in what follows, we will examine Hungarian security predicaments across the five sectoral boundaries: military, political, economic, societal and environmental.


6.2.1 The Military Sector

Although the majority of Hungarian observers generally dismiss the possibility of a direct military threat, at the same time, they seem to share the view that the possible occurrence of a traditional or conventional military threat cannot be ruled out completely. It can therefore be argued that in post-Cold War Hungary there has been a lack of direct military threats, but that there have remained or arisen some clearly identifiable potential risks and vulnerabilities in the military sector.

It can be argued that some of these potential security predicaments in the military sector have been more potent in post-communist Hungary than in other parts of the CEEn region, which can be explained mainly by the geopolitical situation of the country. First and foremost, Hungary has a common border with three of the successor states of former Yugoslavia: Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia, which makes, as Joó put it, "for a unique and quite uncomfortable geopolitical position on the European continent". Second, in addition to former Yugoslavia, Hungary witnessed in the early 1990s at its northern borders the break-up of Czechoslovakia, and at its north-eastern borders, the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Although the re-emergence of the Ukrainian and Slovak nation-states, in contrast to the fragmentation that has occurred in former Yugoslavia, took place without the use of force, these newly created or re-defined nation-states have posed some threat to Hungary. Upon achieving independence, Ukraine became a nuclear power with defensive and offensive capabilities. Furthermore it also inherited a large conventional military capability. As Webber has put it, "this inflated military capability has created concerns not only in Russia but also amongst East European states...". This predicament diminished in importance with the conclusion of the 'Basic Treaty' between Hungary and the Ukraine in December 1991 and evaporated eventually in

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1996, when Ukraine, under immense pressure from both Russia and the USA, disposed of its nuclear capabilities and became a non-nuclear weapon state.\textsuperscript{220}

With regard to Slovakia, there have been some serious tensions overshadowing relations with Hungary, which were mainly generated by the quarrel over the construction of the hydroelectric power system along the Danube, the treatment of ethnic Hungarians by the Meciar governments and Hungary's initial unwillingness to dismiss the possibility of peaceful alteration of the post-WW1 borders (these will be discussed below in detail). Concern over the escalation of tensions between Slovakia and Hungary was expressed by the EC as well, as Schöpflin has put it: "there was a growing recognition within the EC that poor Slovak-Hungarian relations would be a source of continuing instability in Central Europe..."\textsuperscript{221} Although, at times, diplomatic controversies have become heated, from Slovak side, the frailty of the independent military establishment could not make a military action against any state possible. Instead, the Slovak-Hungarian military security predicament intensified with Hungary's acquisition of 28 MIG-29 fighter aircraft in 1993, which, partly as a result of the military imbalance between the two countries, prompted the Meciar government to reach the controversial conclusion, that Hungary was instigating a revisionist foreign policy via enhanced military build-up.\textsuperscript{222} It has to be acknowledged, however, that the changing minority policies of the post-Meciar government, the conclusion of the Basic Treaty between Slovakia and Hungary in 1995 and the resolution of the issue of the Danube hydroelectric development at the International Court of Justice in 1997 have all contributed to the significant lessening of tensions between the two countries.

As regards military security predicaments emanating from post-1989/90 Romania, given the strength of the country's military establishment, the proposition of an armed conflict between the two nations could have been more realistic than in the Slovakian case. In 1990, Romania maintained one of CEE's largest defence establishments with


a total strength of 320,000 personnel (compared to 155,700 of Hungary in 1989) and, as a result of the bloody revolution in December 1989, there has been a remote likelihood of a military conflict spiralling beyond the boundaries of the Romanian state. Such a situation could perceivably have arisen as a consequence of the involvement of Hungarian armed forces in the delivery of humanitarian aid and in supporting the Romanian armed forces fighting against the Securitate in 1989. Military security predicaments from Romania intensified with the violent clashes between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in the Tirgu-Mures area of Transylvania in March 1990 that, at least for a short period of time, raised the possibility of a Hungarian involvement in the conflict.223 In addition, the not too distant historic precedent of 1919, when Romanian troops invaded large parts of Hungary, including the capital city of Budapest, kept the spectre of a military security threat from Romania alive.224 This will be discussed in the section (6. 3) on security perceptions at length. However, as in the Slovak case, relations between Romania and Hungary have improved considerably with the signing of the Basic Treaty in September 1996 and after the change in government in Romania later in the same year.

Security experts in post-1990 Hungary often refer to another external security predicament in the military sector, which, unlike the concrete threat from Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1999, represents a much more latent and remote risk, that is, the possibility of military action from the former Soviet Union in general and from Russia in particular. Attention is drawn to the difficult transition process in Russia and the possibility of a coup followed by the imposition of an authoritarian or military order, which could revive expansionist Russian tendencies.225 Furthermore, during the 1990s, the strengthening of both Russian Communists led by Gennadi Zyuganov and ultra-nationalists led by Vladimir Zhirinovskii sent alarming signals and raised the possibility of a renewed military threat and Soviet/Russian hegemonic interests.226 The failed August 1991 coup showed that this scenario is not too remote and Hungary took it with great relief that the withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary had been completed two months before the coup took place. In addition, during the negotiations of the Soviet-Hungarian Basic Treaty in 1990-1991, the Soviet side

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wanted to retain some kind of control of Hungarian sovereignty, for instance in the form of having a say in Hungary's future alliance formations.\textsuperscript{227} Some eight years later, after Hungary's accession to NATO, some influential Russian generals, most notably General Leonid Ivasov, leader of the Department of International Military Cooperation in the Russian Ministry of Defence, threatened to deploy harsh countermeasures, should NATO decide to station nuclear weapons on the territory of Hungary.\textsuperscript{228}

The most significant military security predicament for post-Cold War Hungary has been the bloody civil war that took place in the neighbouring successor states of the former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{229} Indeed, this is the only major concrete threat, as opposed to the above described indirect or latent risks, that Hungary was confronted with throughout most of the 1990s. As Zellner and Dunay have argued, unlike other European countries, which intervened in the conflict, Hungary had a number of vital interest that were only partially or not at all safeguarded by the actions of the UN and NATO in the region: the maintenance of its territorial integrity, the protection of the ca. 341,000 strong Hungarian minority in former Yugoslavia and the internal security and economic consequences of an influx of refugees.\textsuperscript{230} In order to safeguard these interests with the greatest possible effect, Hungary tried to keep itself out of the conflict and, at least nominally, attempted to maintain good relations with both the West as well as with the government in Belgrade. Thus, an official statement by the Hungarian government from the 31\textsuperscript{st} May 1992 commenting on the introduction of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro stated that the

*Hungarian Prime Minister has outlined his stand in several international talks, (...) that Hungary's participation in the sanctions would be determined by international solidarity and support for UN, CSCE and EC efforts on the one hand, and good-neighbourly ties, the situation of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina and Serbian attitudes on the other.*\textsuperscript{231}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{226} See Zellner and Dunay (1998), p. 449.
\item \textsuperscript{227} See Dunay (1993), p. 132.
\item \textsuperscript{228} Petőfi Rádió, 3/12/1999.
\item \textsuperscript{230} Zellner and Dunay (1998), p. 345.
\end{itemize}
Hungary's relations with Belgrade had already been strained, after it became public in January 1991 that Hungary, with the approval of then Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky, had sold some 10,000 guns and 20 million munitions to the Croatian militia, a transaction that has become known as the 'Kalasnikov-affair'. In this already hostile climate, the military threat from Yugoslavia materialised in two different ways. Firstly, there were numerous violations of Hungarian airspace and border territories by the Yugoslav army, which culminated in the apparently accidental bombing of the Hungarian town Barcs near the Serbian border in October 1991. Secondly, through various provocations, the Yugoslav government attempted to force Hungary into the conflict, for instance through false accusations that Hungary was pursuing a revisionist foreign policy with the aim of annexing Serbian territories, inhabited by the ethnic Hungarian minority. Furthermore, there were various threats of Serbian terrorists to attack key Hungarian industrial installations and businesses, such as Hungary's nuclear power station in the town of Paks and Hungarian Airlines MALÉV.

Despite deep reservations about its unpredictable consequences, in October 1992, the Hungarian government approved the deployment of NATO-manned AWACS reconnaissance flights in Hungarian airspace, which were supposed to control the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia. However, Hungary's military security predicament intensified in spring 1994 with UN/NATO's air strikes on Serbian positions in Bosnia.

The issue of a possible escalation of the military conflict in former Yugoslavia to Hungary revived at the end of March 1999, when NATO, without the approval of the UN Security Council started an air campaign against Yugoslavia. This military predicament, however, compared to the previous ones between 1991-1994 had a very different qualitative characteristic. On the one hand, the possibility of a Yugoslavian retribution on Hungary or on the ethnic Hungarians could not be excluded, on the other, Hungary's freshly granted full membership of NATO put an end to the controversial issue of security guarantees. NATO's Article 5 collective defence guarantee applied fully to Hungary, which functioned as a sufficient deterrent to

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Belgrade. Yet, suffice it to say that because of its geopolitical situation and the presence of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina, Hungary found itself militarily vulnerable during the 1999 NATO campaign against Yugoslavia.

All of the above discussed military security predicaments have been generated by external influences. As for internal influences that have contributed to the emergence of security predicaments in the military sector, there has been very little evidence of the likelihood of a large-scale military confrontation in post-Cold War Hungary; the country's transition process towards democracy has been peaceful and has enjoyed the full backing of the military establishment. The only major internal conflict that could have escalated into a military confrontation took place in October 1990 in the wake of the Antall government's decision to increase petrol prices by 65 per cent. A large crowd of taxi drivers gathered in front of the Parliament's building and demanded the withdrawal of the measure. After the government rejected their demands, they set up barricades on roads throughout the country, bringing the country to a stand-still for three days. This so-called 'taxi drivers' blockade' quickly attracted wide support and there was a real danger of the country slipping into chaos, which the government tried to avert through the deployment of force against the movement.234 The then President Árpád Gőncz alleges that heavy armaments of the Hungarian armed forces were already moving towards the capital with the aim of clearing the blockade and that he, exercising his constitutional power as Head of the armed forces, acted promptly to annul the orders of the government, by ordering the tanks back to their barracks.235 The conflict was eventually resolved by political means, yet the occurrence of a military confrontation was only narrowly avoided.

In addition, the increased activity of armed criminals has generated security predicaments throughout the 1990s and beyond. Most of these activities took place during the socialist-liberal coalition government's time in office between 1994-1998. These activities started in autumn 1995 with the assassination of a foreign national,

235 See Népszabadság, 24/10/ 2000, p.4.
who made his living from the illegal exchange of currencies, continued throughout 1996 and 1997 and reached their peak in February 1998, when media mogul János Fenyő was brutally assassinated.\textsuperscript{236} Most of these killings were aimed at settling scores between competing organised criminal gangs, yet, often innocent people fell victim. As a Hungarian newspaper put it in the wake of the Fenyő incident: "Nowadays, anybody can at any time be killed in public".\textsuperscript{237}

\subsection*{6.2.2 The Political Sector}

In line with the above mentioned military security predicaments generated by factors from neighbouring countries and Russia, there has been a possibility of the spill-over of external political insecurity to post-Cold War Hungary as well. It has to be stressed, however, that this class of insecurity has remained only a theoretical possibility and in reality, there is little evidence for its materialisation.

Nevertheless, there has been a likelihood of negative political effects from some of the surrounding countries, which have experienced a particularly troublesome transition process. This is true of Slovakia during the Meciar years and Romania until November 1996, when Emil Constantinescu was elected president and the democratic course was strengthened. In addition, political turmoil and instability in neighbouring Ukraine in 2001 bears the remote possibility of exerting a political security predicament in Hungary.\textsuperscript{238}

There was also some evidence in early 2001 that the Russian Intelligence Services may exert some negative political influence on Hungarian domestic politics with the especial aim of retarding or even halting Hungary's already advanced process of accession to the EU. The London-based security and defence journal \textit{Jane's Intelligent Digest} claimed in an article in February 2001 that events surrounding the asylum claims of numerous members of the Hungarian gypsy community in Strasbourg have

\textsuperscript{236} See \textit{HVG}, 21/2/1998, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{237} See \textit{Der Neue Pester Lloyd}, 18/02/1998, p. 2. (quotation translated from the German by the author)
been "to a large extent engineered by Russian operatives". The report claimed that the gypsies have been encouraged to plead persecution and violation of human rights before the EU bodies and even request political asylum so as to make Hungary look much worse than it is during the crucial EU accession negotiations which are currently taking place. This perhaps is one of the most damaging methods employed by Moscow of late, one that was tried in the aspirant Czech Republic first and subsequently transplanted to Hungary. Commenting on the Jane's article, a Hungarian security expert, Gorka L. Sebestyén has argued that it is not in Russia's interest to hinder Hungary's accession to the EU, however, it has important commercial interests in the slowing down of the process. A standing committee of the Hungarian Parliament is currently investigating this matter.

As regards political security predicaments generated by internal processes, it has to be acknowledged at the outset that, in political terms, post-Cold War Hungary has proved to be one of the most stable transitional countries in the CEEn region. Since the first fully democratic elections held in April 1990, there have been two subsequent parliamentary elections, in 1994 and 1998, both of which took place under peaceful and democratic conditions (see figure 6-1).

Furthermore, Hungary passed the so-called 'two-turnover test', that is the swinging of the political pendulum from right to left and back, a factor that, according to Huntington, indicates successful democratic consolidation. Although in the 1994 elections, a single party, the Socialists gained an absolute majority in Parliament, they invited the liberal SZDSZ party to form a coalition government, with the intended aim of strengthening democracy. In addition, following the German example, a powerful Constitutional Court was set up in 1989, to which all citizens can have

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240 Ibid.
access. Although Hungary has not yet drafted a new post-communist constitution, the text finalised in 1989/90, as a result of a complete overhaul of the 1952 text, fulfils its democratic functions satisfactorily.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM OF OFFICE</th>
<th>COALITION PARTIES</th>
<th>PRIME MINISTER</th>
<th>FOREIGN MINISTER</th>
<th>DEFENCE MINISTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988 - 1990</td>
<td>MSZMP</td>
<td>Miklós Németh</td>
<td>Gyula Horn</td>
<td>Ferenc Kárpáti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 - 1993</td>
<td>MDF, KDNP, FKGP</td>
<td>József Antall†</td>
<td>Géza Jeszenszky</td>
<td>Lajos Für</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 - 1994</td>
<td>MSZP, SZDSZ</td>
<td>Péter Boross</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 - 1998</td>
<td>FIDESZ-MPP, MDF, FKGP</td>
<td>Gyula Horn</td>
<td>László Kovács</td>
<td>György Keleti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 -</td>
<td></td>
<td>Viktor Orbán</td>
<td>János Martonyi</td>
<td>János Szabó</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ABBREVIATIONS:
FIDESZ-MPP: Alliance of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Party
FKGP: Independent Smallholders' Party
KDNP: Christian Democratic Peoples' Party
MDF: Hungarian Democratic Forum
MSZMP: Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party
SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats

Figure 6-1 Hungarian governments since 1988

Notwithstanding this evident progress, the strengthening of right-wing nationalism could have some destabilising impact on Hungarian politics. Shortly after the 1990 parliamentary elections, some ultra-nationalist fractions became vocal in the ruling conservative MDF Party, which culminated in the publication of a highly controversial anti-Semitic rhetorical tract on the situation of the country in August 1992. The author of the tract, one of the MDF's vice-presidents, the playwright István Csurka, who had already been known for his xenophobic and anti-Semitic views, blamed in the tract the "world-wide Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy" for the economic difficulties of the transition process. Fearing the MDF's unity and consequent inability to remain in power, Prime Minister József Antall did initially try

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to cover up the Csurka-affair. Following domestic and international pressure, some ten months after the publication of the tract, however, he had no option left but to expel Csurka from the MDF. Also in 1992, the rise of the ultra-nationalist right and the inadequacy of the government action to stop it, became apparent, when a group of skinheads and members of a fascist movement prevented, by booing and whistling President Göncz from delivering his speech on 23rd October, the day of remembrance for the 1956 Revolution.\textsuperscript{248} Csurka and others expelled from the MDF formed in June 1993 the MIÉP Party, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, which can be classified, as Nagle and Mahr put it, "as anti-democratic, and a possible future danger in a crisis situation".\textsuperscript{249}

Since the 1998 parliamentary elections, Csurka's Party has its own 14-vote strong faction in the Parliament, which de facto supports the conservative Orbán government. The prospect is therefore a real one that MIÉP might join a future coalition government, should FIDESZ-MPP win the elections and need its support in order to be able to form a majority. Notably, just as Prime Minister Viktor Orbán refused to join the EU-wide ostracism of Austria's government incorporating Haider's Freedom Party, he also refuses to rule out the possibility of a future FIDESZ-MPP - MIÉP coalition.\textsuperscript{250} Thus, a future shift of Hungarian politics towards far-right nationalism is not inconceivable, and such move could certainly pose a serious challenge to the future of Hungarian democracy and to political security.

6.2.3 The Economic Sector

A post-Cold War Hungary that lost its markets with the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and faced an almost total collapse of its state run and uncompetitive industry and agriculture, has found itself in a severe economic security predicament. With the country's GDP growing slightly throughout the 1980s (except for 1985 and 1988, when in both years the GDP suffered a slight decline by -0.1 per cent) the country's macroeconomic stability faced a watershed in 1990 and especially

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid, p. 50f.
\textsuperscript{249} Nagle and Mahr (1999), p. 214.
in 1991, in which years GDP declined by 3.5 and 11.9 per cent, respectively (see Table 6-2). In the same years, the inflation rate spiralled up to 28.9 and then 35 per cent on an annual basis, respectively. Economic collapse brought about a sharp rise in unemployment, which itself was something that was virtually non-existent until the late 1980s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP Growth (%)</th>
<th>Inflation (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment (%)</th>
<th>Gross Foreign Debt*</th>
<th>Current Account Deficit*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>+4.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-11.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>+2.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>+1.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>+1.3</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>+4.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>+5.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>+4.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>+5.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*as a percentage of GDP

Figure 6-2 Main Hungarian macroeconomic and fiscal indicators 1987-2000
Source: Central Statistical Office (KSH) and Ecostat, Hungary.

In addition to the economic and fiscal misery of the early 1990s, Hungary's economic security predicaments have intensified further with Russia's shift in 1992 from barter trade to world market prices for its energy exports.\(^{251}\) Since Hungary was heavily dependent on Soviet/Russian crude oil and natural gas as well as electricity supplies, there were growing fears during the period of the 1991 Moscow coup that the Soviet Union might cut back its supplies. This potential economic security predicament has continued to the present day, because Hungary remains heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies. Furthermore, the fact that the Moscow coup coincided with the outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia, which caused the severing of supplies from the

\(^{251}\) See Nagle and Mahr (1999), p. 103.
so-called 'Adria pipeline', Hungary's only alternative oil supply, intensified economic security predicaments.252

Unlike Poland, the Czech Republic and Russia, the first post-communist government opted for a gradualist approach to economic transformation. The Antall government believed that such an approach would be more appropriate to avoid social hardship, yet, as it turned out by 1994, the lack of a larger-scale 'shock-therapy'-type adjustment of economic and fiscal processes brought the country to the edge of bankruptcy.253

The resumption of growth in 1994 was followed by rising and ultimately unsustainable imbalances in the current and trade accounts as well as by spiralling inflation and gross foreign debt.254 This happened at the time, when the Mexican financial markets collapsed and IMF officials hinted on several occasions that Hungary might face a similar economic security predicament of the same scale.255

The Horn government introduced harsh economic and fiscal austerity measures in 1995 that helped prevent fiscal collapse, however, it could only happen at the price of slowing down economic growth. It is only since 1996 that Hungary has managed to reduce the possibility a large-scale economic security predicament significantly and improved all its economic and fiscal indicators.

In the wake of the breakdown of communism, economic security predicaments have been experienced by many individual Hungarians as well. The high inflation rate, the rise in unemployment and the continuous decline in living standards have been evident in Hungary, just as in other post-communist CEEn countries. The financial insecurity of many increased further through the fragility of some of the freshly privatised banking institutions. For instance, in February 1997, rumours circulated about the financial mismanagement and dubious investment projects of Hungary's second largest bank, Postabank. In March and on several subsequent occasions, the government had to inject public money into the troubled bank to avoid its collapse, which might have had a devastating effect on thousands of its customers.256

256 See HVG, 27/12/1997, p. 79f.
Although Hungary has been particularly successful in post-communist CEE in attracting FDI, by the late 1990s, a reverse trend started to take shape. For example the German company Mannesmann is transferring its production of car radios from Hungary to China, claiming that the "cost squeeze for aftermarket products had forced it to transfer production to a country with much lower wage costs"\textsuperscript{257} and General Motors is closing its automotive production line. With 80 per cent of Hungarian industry in private hands, most of which is owned by multinational companies, including key parts of the service sector, such as the telecommunications (62.8 per cent) and energy supply industries (21.4 per cent), the ability of the Hungarian state to intervene in crisis situations has become marginal.\textsuperscript{258} This became apparent in April 2001, when the French Danone Consortium decided to close down its successfully operating Hungarian biscuit factory, which it had purchased only a year previously, thereby dissolving a company, which had more than a hundred years of tradition.\textsuperscript{259}

**6.2.4 The Societal Sector**

Hungary, in contrast to some of its neighbouring countries, does not have any dominant national or ethnic minorities, with the exception of the Roma population, a factor that has given little scope for the emergence of security predicaments in the societal sector. However, as previously discussed, in the wake of WW1, a large number of ethnic Hungarians became citizens of other countries (see Table 6-3).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Romania} & \textbf{Slovakia} & \textbf{Serbia} & \textbf{Ukraine} & \textbf{Croatia} & \textbf{Austria} \\
\hline
1.604.000 & 567.000 & 341.000 & 156.000 & 22.000 & 6.800 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{The number of ethnic Hungarians in the surrounding countries of Hungary in 1999}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{257} See Hungarian Econews, 7/7/2000, Source: http://gm2.interware.hu/econews/e7/eco130.htm \[2/12/2000].
\textsuperscript{258} See Andor (2000), p. 83f.
\textsuperscript{259} See HVG, 21/4/2001, p. 119.
It is certainly true that in terms of national destiny, the clauses of the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920 constitute some of the most catastrophic and irreversible turning points in modern Hungarian history. Not only did Hungary lose two-thirds of its territories, but it was also deprived of a large proportion of its citizenry.\(^{260}\) But how strong is the legacy of Trianon in contemporary Hungary? Although during communist rule the issue of Trianon and its implications for national identity was suppressed, after 1990 when the freedom of expression was reinstated, it became an important matter both in the public domain and in intellectual circles in particular. As Schöpflin put it, "in Hungary, the Treaty of Trianon is still regarded as a major catastrophe for which France is held responsible as the patron of the Little Entente (…)".\(^{261}\) In this respect, the greatest societal security predicament in post-Cold War Hungary is generated by the legacy of a historic event more than 80 years past, something that created a painful precedent for severe societal damage caused by external influences.

In recent years, the legacy of the Trianon Treaty has had an impact on the security of Hungary's neighbours: it is not surprising that after 1990, nationally minded conservative politicians ignited a debate about the meaning of the Hungarian nation, the boundaries of state responsibilities and the re-definition of Hungarian identity and self-consciousness, a debate that still burns fiercely (this will be discussed in more detail below in the section on security perceptions). As it has been suggested earlier, security predicaments can arise in combined manner across different sectors. This is certainly valid for this societal security predicament. As Griffiths has argued,

\[
\text{despite Hungarian assurances that no effort will be made to change borders by force in an effort to solve the minority problem, anxiety about Hungarian intentions has risen (...), especially about whether politicians might resort to the 'nationalist card' if the country becomes engulfed in political and economic turmoil.}\]^{262}

Thus, the presence of large groups of ethnic Hungarians created a societal (and to some extent even military) security predicament for Hungary's neighbours, which also has a negative impact on the security of Hungary itself. Thus, after 1990, Hungary

\(^{260}\) See Király (2001), p. 42.
itself became increasingly embroiled in protracted diplomatic quarrels with Romania and Slovakia, the countries that have proportionally the largest ethnic Hungarian groups, over the treatment and rights of the Hungarian minority populations.

Within the territory of Hungary, the situation of the Roma population has become one of the most complicated social problems of the post-communist years and arouses some serious societal security concerns, such as the outbreak of inter-racial conflict, wide-spread inequality in education and employment and the destruction of the indigenous Roma culture. In contrast to the generally ageing and declining Hungarian population, the Roma population shows a growing (see Table 6-4) and significantly younger trend.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1990 POPULATION CENSUS (PERSONS)</th>
<th>ESTIMATED FIGURE 1999 (PERSONS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>142 683</td>
<td>400 000 - 600 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Figure 6-4 The number of Roma living in Hungary

Yet, both, the employment and education levels of Roma lags far behind the national average (see Table 6-5). Furthermore, they are subjected to widespread discrimination by the Hungarian majority.

A report on the situation of Roma in Hungary from 2000 has found, that "Roma students suffer discrimination deriving from segregation and the inappropriate teaching methods employed in classes", and that "the Roma also suffer from discrimination in police procedures". Similarly, another study investigating Roma lives in post-communist Hungary has found that the regime change brought a

\[\text{tragic setback in the fortunes of the gypsy population(...)}.\] One it is accepted - and the fact is hard to dispute - that the greater mass of gypsies in Hungary are now living at the barest level of subsistence, forming the stratum that

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265 Doncsev (2000)
society at large is most prone to despise and regard as superflous, then if what now amounts for centuries of co-existence between gypsies and the Hungarian majority population is to remain on a peaceful course, there is an urgent need for well considered change.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NON-ROMA</th>
<th>ROMA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMPLOYED</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEMPLOYED</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INACTIVE</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN SECONDARY EDUCATION (1994)</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Doncsev; Kállai and Törzsök

Figure 6-5 Employment among the Roma and non-Roma population in 1993 and their participation in secondary education

Furthermore, as in recent years, many Roma became victims of offences of violent and sometimes even fatal attacks by some members of the Hungarian population, a larger scale emigration of the Roma has begun, many successfully claiming asylum in Western Europe and Canada. Describing the extent of disappointment among the Hungarian gypsies, a leader of the Hungarian gypsy community argued that the Hungarian government should be pleased that the Roma population has opted for emigration, rather than for arming itself.

6.2.5 The Environmental Sector

With the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986 in the then Soviet Union, the issue of environmental security became a matter of importance to Hungary. As a result of the lack of environmental consciousness within former communist regimes, many of post-1990 Hungary's abandoned industrial plants and former Soviet military sites are ecologically in a disastrous state. The most prominent example of environmentally ignorant communist central planning is the case of the country's largest river, the

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Danube, which suffered some irreversible damage in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1977, Hungary and Czechoslovakia agreed to build a hydroelectric power system along the river, which involved re-routing a part of it and thereby destroying the eco-system along the original bed. Hungary, responding to the public outcry, decided unilaterally to halt the building works in 1989 and to annul the contract in 1992. However, it was already too late to prevent much of the ecological damage. Slovakia's decision to continue with the building work led Hungary to take the case to the International Court of Justice, as, in its view, the environmental impact was too severe.

Furthermore, the unique hydro-geographical situation and climate of Hungary confronts it with the severe ecological challenges of flood and drought. A great part of the country's territory is situated in the lowest parts of the Carpathian Basin, where severe rainfalls often cause floods or, as a result of water scarcity and extreme dry, there is drought. The temporal variation in rainfall in Hungary is extreme, during summer time, dry periods of 70-80 days are no rarity. The majority of the sources and water supply areas of Hungarian rivers fall on the territory of neighbouring countries, thus on annual average, some 96 per cent of the surface water supplies stem from abroad. Consequently, the regulation of rivers and their water levels can only partly be controlled by Hungary. In addition, after 1990, scarce resources prevented the appropriate maintenance of the existing system of dykes and the building of new ones in danger zones, thus currently, only two-thirds of the dykes are in an acceptable condition.

As a result of heavy rainfalls, coupled with the sudden melting of snow in the Carpathians Mountains and the general impact of global warming, in 1999 and 2000, Hungary experienced wide-scale flooding. Figure 6-6 demonstrates the steady rise of the water level of Hungary's second biggest river, the Tisza between 1962 and 2000 and the sharp increase in recent years.

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In 2000, as eight rivers reached record water levels, the government was forced to introduce a state of environmental emergency in the entire eastern part of the country.\textsuperscript{272} Overall, 15 villages had to be evacuated, 75 houses collapsed, 147 were deemed life threatening and, as a result, 366 people lost their homes.\textsuperscript{273}

The spring 2000 floods were followed by extreme drought with temperatures reaching record levels (38.8 Celsius), which destroyed much of that year's harvest.\textsuperscript{274} In addition to floods and drought, in February 2000, Hungary had to face another large-scale environmental disaster: the cyanide pollution of the Tisza and its numerous tributary rivers, which was described by the BBC as the "greatest environmental trauma in the region for a decade".\textsuperscript{275} The ultra-nationalist Hungarian politician István Csurka called the incident in a parliamentary debate an attack against the Hungarian nation and compared the cyanide pollution with a 'war without arms'.\textsuperscript{276} The cyanide spill originated from a decaying Australian-Romanian owned goldmine near the Hungarian border in Northern Romania, which travelled down the river Tisza, destroying 80 per cent of the fish, plankton and other micro-organisms in the bed and in the water. This ecological disaster caused irreversible damage to the ecosystem of

\textsuperscript{273} See \textit{HVG}, 23/12/2000, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{274} See \textit{HVG}, 24/6/2000, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{275} See \textit{BBC News Online}, 14/2/2001.
the Tisza, as some rare fish spices were wiped out.\textsuperscript{277} Since the hazardous goldmine has not been closed in the wake of the accident and continues to use poisonous cyanide, the reoccurrence of a similar accident of this kind is a distinct possibility.

6.3 Security Perceptions of the Hungarian Public and its Political Elite

In general, the Hungarian public and political elite hold similar attitudes to security predicaments as the public and elites elsewhere in CEE. As is typical for the region, the clearly identifiable trend in Hungary is that the public is much more concerned about non-military aspects of security than military aspects.\textsuperscript{278} However, given the unique geopolitical situation of Hungary bordering as it does on both the Balkans and Ukraine, there are some public and elite perceptions that differ considerably from the rest of the CEE region. Furthermore, problems arising from the large number of ethnic Hungarians living outside of the country's territory, a unique phenomenon that in Europe is only shared by Russia, causes some security concerns among the Hungarian public and elite, which are generally atypical of the region as a whole.

The fact that non-traditional security issues can arise in a wide range of sectors beside the military one have been acknowledged also by the Hungarian political elite. Resolution 94/1998 of the National Assembly on the 'Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary' states:

\textit{The Republic of Hungary takes a comprehensive approach to security. Besides the traditional political and military factors it comprises other dimensions of comprehensive security as well, such as economy and finances, human and minority rights, information, technology, environment and international law. In a world of global challenges, political and economic interdependence and of technological progress, the security of the Euro-Atlantic region has become indivisible.}\textsuperscript{279}

\textsuperscript{276}See Népszabadság, 21/3/2000.
\textsuperscript{277}See Der Neue Pester Lloyd, 23/2/2000, p.1f.
By outlining the official security perceptions of the Hungarian political elite, this resolution further acknowledges that Hungary's security is influenced by domestic political, social and economic processes, which have partly been generated by the ongoing transition and consolidation processes. On the other hand, there is a range of global risks that can challenge the country's security and its citizens' lives. The above mentioned document lists the following factors as sources of insecurity:

The transitory or permanent controversies between countries and groups resulting from differences in social development, economic, financial and social crises, ethnic and religious tensions, terrorism, organised crime, illicit drug and arms trafficking, demographic tension, mass migration and intense environmental problems constitute a growing risk. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and the possibility of attacks on information systems present an increasing challenge and danger. Besides, tensions between and armed conflict within states are ever persisting in Europe. Instability and unpredictable resulting from transformation and the fragility of democratisation are specific sources of danger in our region.

In the following, we will outline some concrete security perceptions of the political elite and the public, which can be categorised in two blocs. Firstly, we will highlight security perceptions of external threats including Russia, the Balkans and other neighbouring countries. Secondly, we will analyse attitudes towards new, non-military factors, such as democratic stability, minorities and the environment.

6.3.1 Are Hungarians Afraid of External Military Threats?

Contrary to expert opinions and surveys conducted in other CEEn countries (see chapter four), the clear majority of the Hungarian public does not perceive Russia as a threat to peace and security. Although after the strengthening of Russian extremist forces, surveys recorded a higher level of insecurity among Hungarian respondents, this proved to be a temporary phenomenon (see figure 6-7).

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280 Ibid, section 2.
This public perception seems to be in some disharmony with the post-1990 political elites' perception of Russia. Former Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky, speaking about the Antall government's perception of Russia, acknowledged that between 1990-1994, Russian domestic political development's and potential risks stemming from them, caused some serious concern among the government.²⁸² Although the long-term occupation of Hungary did not generally arouse widespread hatred of the Russian people, nonetheless, there were serious misgivings and, to some extent, an apprehension about the intentions of Russian politicians.²⁸³ These fears intensified during the Soviet-Hungarian financial negotiations surrounding the withdrawal of Soviet military troops from Hungary, when the Soviet partners used blackmailing techniques in order to achieve a more favourable settlement. The particulars of these negotiations were not made known to the general public, thus, they could not influence the public's threat perceptions. Furthermore, as Jeszenszky pointed out, misgiving about Soviet/Russian intentions arose during the negotiations of the Soviet-Hungarian Basic Treaty, when the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister wanted to retain a Russian veto over Hungary's ability to enter into future alliances. Also, subsequent experiences of the Hungarian government proved that Russian thinking concerning its right to impose its will over what it considered to be its sphere of interest had not entirely diminished with the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Prime Minister Antall

expressed his perception of Russia back in 1992 metaphorically, 'once the Russian bear has had enough sleep, it might return'. Zoltán Rockenbauer, former chief foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has pointed out that the 'Russo-phobia' in Hungarian political circles has decreased somewhat with the emergence of Ukraine.  

The perception of Russia as a potential source of threat diminished significantly during the Socialist government's term in office between 1994-98. This is not surprising, in view of the fact that many of the members of the Horn government had a communist past (including Horn), in contrast to the Antall government that grew out of a strong anti-communist and anti-Soviet tradition, many of its members having participated in the 1956 revolution. Thus, it can be argued that much of the 'Russo-phobia' of the early 1990s was generated mainly by historical legacies and ideological factors. By the late 1990s and especially in the wake of NATO membership, the fear of Russia among the political elite has diminished considerably. Although the perception of a direct threat from Russia is declining, there is an increasing perception of an indirect threat exerted via the intensifying Russian influence on Ukraine. This surfaced on the occasion of Prime Minister Orbán's visit to Washington in April 2001, when he voiced concerns about the future of Ukraine's independence with regard to Europe's security. He argued, "without the guaranteed independence of Ukraine, the whole post-Cold War security architecture of Europe is in danger".  

Also processes taking place in some of Hungary's neighbours have prompted the emergence of some apprehensive attitudes among the Hungarian elite and public. As Horn, who was Foreign Minister in 1989, recounts in his memoirs, in 1989, the fear of hostile Romanian intentions against Hungary intensified among members of the last communist government as well as among members of the emerging opposition parties. These fears deepened in the summer of 1989, when news emerged of the intention of Ceausescu's Romania to develop atomic weapons and medium-range missiles. With the disappearance of the Ceausescu regime and the emergence of a democratic system, these fears have diminished substantially. However, as Imre Mécs...
pointed out in 1998, the fact that a genuine post-Cold War downsizing of the Romanian army has not yet materialised, raises some security concerns in Hungary. Furthermore, Jeszenszky referred to the fact that the post-1990 Romanian military press has published virulently anti-Hungarian articles, which have raised concerns among the Hungarian elite especially at times of elections and political and economic turmoil in post-communist Romania. Yet, it has to be acknowledged that the perceived Romanian threat, along with the above described Russian one, is mainly a subjective feeling of a potential hostility, in both cases generated, to a great extent, by negative historical experiences, most notably by the experience of Russian and Romanian occupations of Hungary in the 20th century and the fear of their possible reoccurrence.

By contrast, as has been pointed out in the previous section on predicaments, the military threat from former Yugoslavia has been a more direct danger. This has also been clearly expressed by the Hungarian public and elite. Various surveys collated from amongst representative samples of the population confirm that the perception of threats from neighbouring countries, specifically from the successor states of Yugoslavia, were very marked in Hungary in the 1990s. In 1992, 64 per cent of Hungarians expressed their concerns about such a threat. Furthermore, the 'Gallup Kosovo Poll' revealed that during the 1999 NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, some 55 per cent of the overall Hungarian population feared that the conflict might intrude into Hungarian territory, although there was a notable disparity in the level of threat perceived by males and females. In the largest Hungarian town near the Serbian border, this figure reached 61 per cent (see figure 6-8). Subsequent surveys conducted in 1997 and 1999 revealed that, whilst in February 1997, only a minority of the Hungarian public expressed some serious worries about a potential attack against Hungary, this anxiety increased substantially in March 1999.

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288 Ibid; this has also been confirmed by Rockenbauer; In author's interview with Zoltán Rockenbauer, 2/4/1998.
291 See Hann (1996), p. 82.
In addition to the public apprehensiveness, the political elite feared that, by tying itself too strongly to NATO's actions, Hungary could make itself a target for Serbian revenge either in the form of a direct attack on Hungarian territory, or in the form of retributions on the ethnic Hungarians in the Vojvodina region. However, with Hungary's entry to NATO in March 1999, the perception of this fear declined substantially among the political elite. The importance of Hungary's NATO membership during the air strikes was echoed by all politicians on a daily basis, so, for instance, Prime Minister Orbán maintained that, "although the possibility of incidents or malicious steps cannot be excluded, a military attack against a Hungary, that enjoys the full protection of NATO, would have no chance of success". Furthermore, Foreign Minister János Martonyi commented in a German newspaper interview on Hungary's freshly achieved NATO membership in the context of the Alliance's action against Yugoslavia as "Glück im Unglück", that is, loosely, that the 'cloud has a silver lining'.

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296 Quoted in Der Neue Pester Lloyd, 14/4/1999, p. 1. (translated from the German by the author)
297 Quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21/5/1999.
6.3.2 Non-military Security Perceptions

As in most CEEn countries, the greatest potential non-military threat perceived by the public in post-Cold War Hungary is represented by the destabilisation of the internal political and economic situation.\(^\text{298}\) Although, according to a 2001 survey, the Hungarian public's satisfaction with the democratic system has overall improved between 1991-2001 (see figure 6-9), the majority still believes that, overall, life was better during the communist Kádár-regime.\(^\text{299}\) As regards financial security, an ECOSTAT opinion poll from April 2001 found that 56 per cent of the population regards its financial situation as average, but two-thirds does not believe that it will improve in the near future.\(^\text{300}\) Another survey revealed that two-thirds of the Hungarian population believed in 2000 that its real term income declined, furthermore, 60 per cent found that the level of inflation was 'unacceptable'.\(^\text{301}\)

![Figure 6-9 Percentage of respondents pronouncing themselves 'satisfied with democracy' in Hungary by year](image_url)


With regard to the population's perception of public security and order, diverse set of surveys have revealed that, since the mid-1990s, the clear majority of respondents

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\(^{299}\) In *HVG*, 30/6/2001, p. 60.

\(^{300}\) In *Korridor*, 29/4/2001; Source: [http://www.korridor.hu](http://www.korridor.hu)

judged public security in Hungary to be either average or worse.\textsuperscript{302} After 1990 there was an improvement in public optimism, yet, after a series of incidents in the mid-1990s, this process reversed and stabilised at an intermediate level. Perceptions of public security in Budapest, however, where most of the organised crime related incidents and bloody reckonings have taken place, show a clearly worsening tendency between 1994-1998 (see figure 6-10).

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure6-10.png}
\caption{Figure 6-10 Perception of public security in Budapest by year}
\end{figure}


Also the political elite had to acknowledge that the public security in post-Cold War Hungary had serious shortcomings. In the wake of the above mentioned Fenyő assassination, Prime Minister Horn conceded in a press conference that "today in Hungary there is no public security".\textsuperscript{303} Rockenbauer described Hungarian public security as catastrophic and compared it with circumstances characteristic of Chicago in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{304}

Furthermore, the rising level of xenophobic, anti-Semitic, anti-refugee and anti-Roma tendencies in post-1990 Hungary constitutes a particularly severe example of a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{302} In \textit{News from the Ministry of Internal Affairs}, 25/1/1999; Source: http://www.b-m.hu
\item \textsuperscript{303} Quoted in \textit{HVG}, 21/2/1998, p. 9. (translated from the Hungarian by the author)
\item \textsuperscript{304} Author’s interview with Zoltán Rockenbauer, 2/4/1998.
\end{itemize}
phenomenon that is prevalent not only within CEE but Europe as a whole (see figure 6-11).

Figure 6-11 Fraction of respondents admitting to a 'dislike' of Roma and Jewish populations by year

Source: Gallup Hungary Ltd, Management Consulting and Public Opinion Polling in Hungary and in Central Europe: http://www.gallup.hu

An annual population survey into perceptions of refugees has revealed that the number of those, who categorically oppose Hungary's acceptance of refugees, is on the increase (see Figure 6-12). 305

Figure 6-12 Attitudes of Hungarians to reception of refugees by year

Source: TÁRKI (Tárki Social Research Centre Hungary): http://www.tarki.hu

This group of people are also characterised by the surveyors as 'openly xenophobic'. At the same time, the number of those, who would welcome all refugees, the so-called 'super-liberals', is diminishing.

Meanwhile, a Hungarian survey conducted in early 2001 in selected schools revealed that 25 per cent of respondent teachers were of the opinion that Romany pupils should be taught in segregated classes and 25 per cent of teachers also believed that the low average performance of Romany pupils had genetic causes. The same survey has also found that one out of four teachers believed, the Roma problem should be solved through displacement of the Romany population. Another survey conducted in December 2000 confirmed that the 'societal distance' between the majority Hungarian population and the gypsy minority is large. Some 66.7 per cent of the respondent Hungarians believed that the growing gypsy community poses a threat to societal security and 82.7 per cent agreed with the assumption that gypsies should be taught to live like the Hungarians. Official political attitudes towards the gypsy minority are more reserved, none of the interviewed politicians shared the anti-gypsy or anti-refugee views of the general public. However, a controversial statement of Prime Minister Orbán, in which he recommended the Hungarian gypsies to "learn more and work more", reveals some biased attitudes and an ignorance about the actual root causes of the gypsies' problems.

As various analysts point out, environmental security issues ranked very highly in the perception of Hungarian society in the 1980s. This enabled the foundations of an environmentally conscious 'Green' politics to be laid for the coming years. In the 1980s, environmental security concerns were reinforced by the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986 and also by the communist government's plans for the construction of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric power system along the Danube. In 1984, the Danube Circle, the first significant environmental pressure group was founded, which at its peak had around 10,000 supporters. In 1989, after the 'Law of

308 Quoted in Magyar Nemzet, 10/8/2000, p. 2. (translated from the Hungarian by the author)
Association' was passed, the Danube Circle and some other organisations became legally recognised bodies. However, during the 1990s, as economic issues have become high on the political and personal agenda, the Hungarian public's interest in the environment has diminished substantially (see figure 6-13).\(^3\)

Furthermore, the clear majority of the Hungarian public would not accept financial sacrifices at the cost of the economy or its own financial welfare (see figures 6-14 and 6-15). Rockenbauer confirmed the rather indifferent attitude of the Hungarian public, and claimed that society on the whole did not appreciate the importance of environmental security issues.\(^4\) A similar indifference seems to characterise the post-1990 political elite's attitude towards environmental security. Whilst the 1998 document on the 'Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of Hungary' acknowledges the perceived environmental security risk, it fails to elaborate on the issue.

In addition to the aforementioned security perceptions, we will discuss in the following, how Hungarian politicians perceive and define the boundaries of the Hungarian nation. Although the direct link between this issue and security perceptions in general might not, at first sight, be apparent, a brief discussion here is worthwhile, since it provides valuable background information of the context in which foreign and security policy-outputs arise.

After the April 1990 election victory of the conservative opposition forces, the Antall government did not waste any time in seeking to revive the national self-consciousness of Hungarians. Amongst issues, such as the replacement of the communist coat of arms by the traditional Hungarian one featuring the crown or the decreeing of national holidays marking major national historical events, the glorification of Hungarian history began.

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As Attila Ágh put it, "the first freely elected government produced some return to the past, to the Golden Age that never was in Hungarian history". In the debate on Hungarian history and identity, the re-definition of the boundaries of the Hungarian nation played a central role. In this vein, Antall, claimed in his prime ministerial inauguration speech that, 'in spirit', he felt responsible for ca. 15 million Hungarians,
including the ca. 4.5 million ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries in addition to the ca. 10.5 million population of Hungary proper. In his explanations, Antall referred to the Constitution, which indeed does have some provisions concerning Hungarians living outside the country's borders, yet the extent to which this constitutional duty should be pursued by the respective governments, is not defined further (see figure 6-16).

**CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY,**

**CHAPTER I, PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE 6**

*The Republic of Hungary recognises its responsibilities towards Hungarians living outside the borders of the country and shall assist them in fostering their relations to Hungary.*

Figure 6-16 Constitution of Hungary, Ch. 1, Art. 6, Para. 3.

It is not surprising that Antall's rather broad interpretation of this constitutional provision sent alarm signals to those neighbouring countries with large Hungarian minorities. Members of Antall's government shared his interpretation of the Constitution and managed to confuse their international partners with their nationalistic views. So, for instance, Defence Minister Ernő Raffay reasoned in 1992 that

> the Hungarian nation lives in Hungary and seven adjacent countries, altogether in eight countries. This is a unique situation in Europe (...) It also means that (...) this dispersed entity of the Magyars does influence Hungarian foreign policy and Hungarian defence policy.

In 1994, when Socialist Horn became Prime Minister, the tone of government rhetoric changed considerably. With reference to Antall's controversial statement, he sent a clear message to the neighbouring countries, acknowledging, that his new government will be "the government of ten and a half million Hungarian citizens, but of course it will feel responsible for the fate of the ethnic Hungarians outside the country's

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Foreign Minister Kovács confirmed the new government's shift in the perception of the historical past and of the boundaries of the Hungarian nation and argued that

*we have to acknowledge that Hungary's borders are permanent ones - the country's area is hardly more than 93,000 sq. km and that its population hardly more than ten million. Anyone who thinks in terms of other conditions is simply chasing illusions. We have to accept that querying those borders or even using intentionally vague or mysterious language about them places Hungary in mortal danger and is therefore quite impracticable.*

Since 1998, the conservative Orbán government has, to a great extent, returned to the glorification of Hungary's historical past and, also, with regard to the meaning of the nation, revived sentiments about a Hungarian nation that go beyond the country's post-1920 borders. In a speech delivered at the 'Conference of the Association of World Hungarians' in 2000, Orbán summed up the idea of his government as regards the future of the Hungarian nation as follows: "We proclaim a national re-unification without the actual changing of the borders".

The two competing perceptions represented by Hungarian national-conservative politics on the one hand and social-liberal politics on the other, demonstrate, how divided post-1990 Hungarian politics and society on the issue of the nation is.

### 6.4 Foreign and Security Policy—responses in post-Cold War Hungary

As our analyses of Hungarian security predicaments and perceptions have demonstrated, insecurities can occur in a range of military and non-military sectors. In line with this, the document on the 'Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary' highlights a number of foreign and domestic policy areas in which responses need to be taken, in order to safeguard the country's security. In the

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following, we will look at a number of security policy-responses in two distinct areas, that is, in foreign and domestic policies.

6.4.1 Foreign Policy-responses

Already under Jeszenszky as Foreign Minister (1990-1994), the three major pillars of Hungarian foreign policy, which prevail up to the present, were defined. Accordingly, Hungarian foreign policy pursues three equal aims: firstly, the integration of Hungary into the Euro-Atlantic community, secondly, the establishment of good relations with its neighbours and, last but not least, support for the Hungarian community beyond national borders.

The security implications of the first two objectives are obvious, since NATO and EU membership functions as a stabilising factor. NATO membership with its security guarantee constitutes a concrete improvement of security and it also increases the subjective security perception of the public. Indirectly, NATO membership can also boost foreign investors' confidence and attract more FDI, and thus facilitate economic recovery. Meanwhile, Hungary's membership of the EU would help defuse, in the first instance, non-military security predicaments ('soft security' issues), although with the advancement of the EU's security and defence policy, the ESDP, the military security dimension ('hard security') has increased in importance as well. By considering "transatlantic co-operation a cardinal factor of European security" non-EU member Hungary has already expressed its support for ESDI/ESDP "within the framework of inter-Alliance cooperation" in the 1998 document on the Principles of the Security and Defence Policy. In addition, EU conditionality (the Copenhagen criteria for membership) impacts on Hungarian foreign policy as well, as it requires Hungary to stabilise its relations with its neighbours, as well as to adopt the EU's restrictive visa regime.

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The security implications of the second foreign policy objective are apparent too: good-neighbourly relations clearly contribute to stability within Hungary's close vicinity.

The intensity, however, with which the last objective is pursued, can have simultaneously stabilising and de-stabilising effects, as numerous examples of post-Cold War Hungarian foreign policy have shown. Furthermore, as Zellner and Dunay pointed out, quite legitimately, the set of three foreign policy objectives bear amongst themselves a fundamental contradiction. The pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration can, for instance, clash with the wish to support ethnic Hungarians, as Hungary's future membership of the EU might require the imposition of a visa-regime against some of Hungary's neighbours. Equally, the intensive support of ethnic Hungarians in surrounding countries could jeopardise good-neighbourly relations with the countries concerned.

The greatest challenge to the realisation of these foreign policy priorities was represented by developments in former Yugoslavia: Hungary had to reconcile its major objective of NATO/EU membership with the maintenance of reasonable neighbourly relations with Yugoslavia and its successor states as well as with the commitment to support ethnic Hungarians in the Vojvodina. Thus, with the outbreak of war in the Balkans, post-1990 Hungarian foreign policy found itself in a delicate position, which posed a great challenge to, and required difficult decisions from, a politically and diplomatically inexperienced team. Firstly, after the June 1991 dissolution of the WTO, Hungary formally became a non-aligned country and had to rely on its crumbling defence establishment to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Although as early as in 1990-91, the desire of Hungary for NATO membership was raised by various politicians across party lines, Prime Minister József Antall acknowledged during a visit at the North Atlantic Assembly in November 1990 that the pursuit of full membership was, at that time, an unrealistic undertaking. Although the option of neutrality was on the agenda for a very short time (many referred to Hungary's declaration of neutrality during the revolution in

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1956), two major events in 1991, the Moscow coup and the outbreak of war in neighbouring Yugoslavia proved that neutrality would not guarantee Hungary's security.  

Secondly, while Hungary embarked on a NATO-friendly foreign policy with the clear aim of attaining full membership of the alliance at the earliest possible date, it had to ensure for its own sake and the sake of the ethnic Hungarians in the Vojvodina that it maintained reasonable relations with Yugoslavia and its successor states. In the wake of the 1991-93 border violations, Hungarian Defence Minister Lajos Für proposed the initiative of 'open barracks' in the close vicinity of the borders, that is to open all military barracks within 50 kilometres of the border for mutual inspection. More importantly, however, in March 1993, Prime Minister Antall asked the then NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner for security guarantees to remedy the security predicament generated by the employment of AWACS planes over Hungarian territory. This happened at a time, when the Milosevic-regime in Belgrade expressed, on several occasions, its dislike of the presence of AWACS planes in Hungarian airspace. Also in March 1993, Foreign Minister Jeszenszky reiterated the government's position in a speech at the Hungarian Parliament: "it is our firm intention to refrain from taking part in military actions (...), because we consider this would jeopardise our security and the Hungarian minority living in the countries concerned". Although NATO granted no formal security guarantees at this stage, at the same time, it sent a clear signal to Budapest. As Wörner put it in May 1993: "It would be inconceivable that the international community would remain passive if a country suffered from aggressive action because of its support for UN-mandated operations".

After Prime Minister Antall's death in December 1993, his successor Péter Boross advocated a harder line with regard to Hungary's role in the conflict and maintained that no AWACS flights should be allowed over Hungary while UN/NATO air strikes were taking place. Boross' main argument was to keep Hungary out of the conflict and

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14 Author's interview with Imre Méc, 2/4/1998.
to avoid ethnic Hungarians being taken hostage. He argued with regard to the UN/NATO action that "Hungary will not take part. We have to live with Serbia and the Serbian people for hundreds more years." A similar debate ignited some five years later with regard to then full-NATO member Hungary's role in the bombing campaign against Serbia.

For the sake of national security, the Horn government between 1994-98 followed a similar approach, manoeuvring to maintain a stance of Hungarian policy that was consistent with both Western policy and also with good-neighbourly relations with Serbia. Foreign Minister Kovács declared in September 1995 that Hungary sought to maintain an impartial position in the Balkan conflict.

The fear of a possible retaliation by the Serbs and of an escalation of the conflict to Hungary intensified in 1999, during the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia. Clearly, Hungary as a full member of NATO was, this time, drawn into conflict as an 'enemy' of Yugoslavia, as it allowed NATO allies to use its air bases not only for the AWACS planes but also for fighter aircraft starting bombing missions against Yugoslavia. The Orbán government acknowledged on several occasions that the national interests of Hungary dictated that it should not take part in the conflict. Yet, the duties arising from the country's freshly granted membership of NATO required full Hungarian backing of and participation in the NATO actions.

As opposed to the official government line, members of the socialist opposition took a somewhat differing view on the degree of Hungary's participation in the NATO actions. Party leader and ex-Foreign Minister Kovács proposed the drafting of a 'positive message' addressed to the Serbian people, stating that the war was not fought against them, but for the enforcement of a political settlement of the conflict. This request was rejected by all other parliamentary parties. By the beginning of May, however, the great majority of the parliamentary fraction of the Socialist Party proposed another resolution, according to which no bombing action would be

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19 Quoted in Denton, Nicholas "Hungary Bans NATO Overflights by Awacs", in Financial Times, 12/2/1994.
21 See HVG, 17/4/1999, p. 8
permitted to originate from Hungarian soil. This was a direct answer to the government's decision, which, with the effect of 24th March 1999 (two weeks after Hungary joined NATO), handed overall control of Hungarian airspace and of its airfields to NATO (including the country's sole International Airport 'Ferihegy' near Budapest), creating a legal basis for the launch of attacks against Yugoslavia from Hungarian airfields. One of the main defenders of the Socialist Party's resolution, former State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, Csaba Tabajdi commented on Hungary's role in the conflict as follows: "We have reached the limit. We cannot take on any further roles in the conflict against Yugoslavia". This proposed resolution of the Socialist Party, like the earlier one, was rejected by all other parties in parliament. After these incidents, there were no further attempts in Hungary to distance itself from the NATO action in Yugoslavia and Hungary remained a faithful ally until the end of the campaign.

As has been mentioned above, the war in Hungary's close neighbourhood, coupled with alarming political signals from Russia, represented important triggers for an energetic pursuit of NATO membership for the Antall government. As a result of NATO's procrastination to extend concrete security guarantees to its partner countries and the purely consultative role of NACC, by 1993, the desire of full membership of NATO became one of the most important foreign and security policy objectives of Hungary. This had been officially proclaimed in the 1993 'Parliamentary Resolution on the Principles of the National Defence of the Republic of Hungary', which stated: "The aim of the Republic of Hungary is to become a full member of existing international security organisations, such as NATO and the WEU". During the parliamentary debate of this resolution, Horn, who was then the leader of the socialist opposition, raised, perhaps somewhat thoughtlessly, the need for a referendum in the matter of NATO membership, something that caused much anguish for his

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22 See Népszabadság, 31/3/1999, p. 3.
25 Quoted in Die Zeit, 12/5/1999, p. 5. (translated from the German by the author)
government in 1997. In principle, Horn was in favour of NATO membership, indeed, back in February 1990, in his position as Foreign Minister of the last non-democratic government, he was among the first politicians who raised the possibility of NATO membership. In the 1993 parliamentary debate he reasoned that, given the weight and the implications of NATO membership, the issue deserved a popular vote. Indeed, it was the Horn government between 1994-1998, which prepared, negotiated and practically achieved Hungary's admittance to NATO, even if official accession took place in 1999 during Orbán's premiership.

In general, the three post-1990 governments have agreed on the main principles of foreign policy, yet, they disagreed on the prioritisation of these goals. Whilst the Antall government paid special attention to Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration, it pursued a confrontational foreign policy with its neighbours, in particular with Romania and Slovakia over the issue of ethnic Hungarians. At the peak of the resulting controversy, Hungary, which had already been a member of the Council of Europe since 1990, indicated that it intended to block Slovakia's and Romania's accessions to the organisation in 1993, until these countries improved their treatment of their Hungarian minorities. Only after Slovakia and Romania promised to comply with two recommendations of the CoE, did Hungary abstain from the vote, permitting Slovakia and Romania to join the council. It is not surprising that Hungary's confrontational foreign policy between 1990-94 did not achieve any of its proposed goals. The Euro-Atlantic integration of Hungary was still a distant prospect, Hungary's relations with Slovakia and Romania were anything but 'good-neighbourly' and, as the evidence clearly shows, the situation of the ethnic Hungarians worsened. It is very unlikely that, should Hungarian foreign policy have remained unchanged after


1994, Hungary would have qualified for NATO membership. NATO laid out its membership requirements in the 1995 'Study on Enlargement', which included:

commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means.34

The Horn government between 1994-98 realised that Hungary's security could only be enhanced and its main foreign policy objectives achieved, if the government changed its rhetoric and its conduct of foreign policy. In general, Foreign Minister Kovács declared that the new government considered "other means and methods appropriate for attaining (...) foreign policy objectives than the ones favoured by the last government".35 In particular he condemned the use of pressure and argued "it would be hopeless to try and force things on them [Slovakia and Romania]".36 Referring to the Antall government's poor diplomatic record, during the mandate of which no prime ministerial meeting took place between Slovakia and Hungary, Kovács maintained that the Horn government would pay special attention to constructive dialogue with all of its neighbours.

Indeed, the new approach to conducting foreign policy proved to be successful on all fronts. During the Horn government's four years in office, substantial progress was achieved in relations with Slovakia, which was marked by the signing, in March 1995 in Paris, of the 'Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation'. In addition, relations with Romania were normalised with the signing of the 'Treaty on Understanding, Co-operation and Good Neighbourhood' in September 1996 in Timisoara. Kovács and his team managed to incorporate some favourable clauses on the situation of ethnic Hungarians in both treaties, in return, they agreed to the statement that Hungary did not have any territorial claims on Romania and Slovakia and it would not raise any such claims in the future (Article 3 and Article 4 in treaties with Slovakia and Romania respectively).37 Even if these treaties could not improve

36 Ibid.
37 Treaty Between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourhood, Timisoara, 16th September 1996 (copy obtained from the Council of Europe); Treaty Between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic on Good-neighbourly Relations and
the strained relations between the countries overnight, they provided for a framework, in which controversies could be resolved by peaceful means. Thus, the conclusion of these treaties has undoubtedly had a stabilising impact on Hungary's security.

Furthermore, NATO decided at its Madrid Summit in July 1997 to invite Hungary, along with the Czech Republic and Poland, to start accession negotiations with the prospect of an expedited progression to full membership. After this positive signal from NATO, the socialist government had no other option than to return to Horn's 1993 assurance of a referendum on the matter of Hungary's NATO membership. This caused serious concerns not only among politicians in Hungary, but also in NATO member countries.38 Whilst all parliamentary parties clearly supported Hungary's accession to NATO, the public appeared ambivalent. Indeed, the March 1997 'Central and Eastern Eurobarometer' revealed that the Hungarian public was fairly divided on the issue: 32 per cent in favour, 17 per cent undecided and 23 per cent against.39 In addition, some non-parliamentary forces, most notably the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the so-called Alba-Circle and the Foundation for a Neutral Hungary, opposed, for various reasons, Hungary's entry into NATO and fought a strong negative campaign.40 Furthermore, NATO members feared that a potential negative outcome or a very tight 'yes'-vote might have an unfavourable impact on the attitudes of other CEEn countries.41 Eventually, on 16th November 1997, to the surprise and relief of the government and NATO politicians, the overwhelming majority (some 85 per cent) voted in favour of Hungary's accession to NATO, although the turnout was low at 49.24 per cent (see figure 6-17). The day after, Foreign Minister Kovács sent a letter of intent to Brussels, which enabled the launch of the official process of Hungary's NATO accession.42

38 See Juhasz (1999), p. 34.
In July 1997, the European Commission confirmed in a statement that Hungary was capable of meeting the requirements of European Union membership and was prepared to start accession negotiations to this end.\textsuperscript{43} Furthermore, Hungary's economic security was stabilised further with the country's admittance to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as the second member from CEE after the Czech Republic.

After 1998, the Orbán government completed Hungary's accession to NATO successfully and thus realised the greatest achievement in post-Cold War Hungarian foreign and security policy. In the other main foreign policy undertaking, Hungary's goal of EU membership, there has been some substantial progress made in the last few years. By July 2001, Hungary, which is widely considered a frontrunner for EU membership amongst the candidate countries, had provisionally closed 22 out of the 31 negotiating chapters, the highest number among all CEEn applicant countries, and it was ready to complete the negotiation process by the end of 2002.\textsuperscript{44} It is therefore very likely that the next Hungarian government (parliamentary elections are due in spring 2002) will complete Hungary's goal of Euro-Atlantic integration and will lead the country into the European Union.


\textsuperscript{44} See Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungary on Hungary's EU Integration; Source: http://www.mfa.gov.hu/euint/accneg_d.html [19/6/2001].
With regard to its foreign policy towards the ethnic Hungarians beyond the country's physical border, the conservative Orbán government returned to the historically biased 'nation-focused' approach, which was previously practiced by the Antall government. With NATO membership achieved and EU negotiations well under way, strategically speaking, Orbán has been in a more favourable position for concentrating on policies with regard to the ethnic Hungarians. In June 2001, the Parliament adopted an 'Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries' (widely known as the 'Status Law'), which has caused some serious turbulence in relations with the governments of some of the surrounding countries, in particular with Romania and Slovakia. The general purpose of the Act is to provide some concessions to ethnic Hungarians when they visit Hungary and, at the same time, to provide support, mainly in cultural fields, within the country of residence. In order for ethnic Hungarians to take advantage of these concessions, they will be provided with a so-called 'Hungarian-card', an official document to be issued by the Hungarian government. Both Romania and Slovakia oppose the use of such cards on their respective territories. In addition, they maintain that utilisation of concessions for the ethnic Hungarians in their country of residence would be discriminatory towards the majority populations. It is to be feared that the debate on the 'Status Law' in Slovakia and Romania may whip up nationalistic tendencies in the respective countries and could have an adverse effect on Hungarian and CEE security.

6.4.2 Domestic Policy-responses

As the 1994 Foreign and Security Policy Programme of the Horn government stated, the "size and strength of Hungary's armed forces are insufficient" to guarantee national security. Although since 1994 the situation of the defence establishment has changed substantially, it is still far away from being a modern, efficient force. It is important to stress, however, that the current major shortcomings lie not in the control structures of the armed forces, but mainly in its management, the scarcity of its

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46 See The Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad; Source: http://www.htmh.hu/law.htm
47 In Magyar Nemzet, 30/7/2001, p. 9.
resources and its decaying infrastructure. According to the constitution, the president is commander-in-chief of the army, the government (via a civilian Minister of Defence) exercises oversight of the day-to-day running of the armed forces and, since 1990, the parliament exerts control over defence policies, the long-term development of the armed forces, the defence budget as well as the deployment of the military at home and abroad.\(^{49}\)

In general, this control structure is in accordance with the democratic civil-military structures of Western democracies, with one major exception that appears to be a uniquely Hungarian phenomenon: the status of the Defence Staff as an independent institution, not subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. The separation of the Defence Staff from the Ministry of Defence took place in 1989 and was ordered by the last communist government in order to prevent a potentially dangerous concentration of the controlling power over the military. Since then, despite a general agreement of all parliamentary parties on the issue, none of the three governments has yet managed to achieve the merger of the Defence Staff with the Ministry of Defence.\(^{50}\) It has to be acknowledged, however, that the current Orbán government has pursued this issue more rigorously than its predecessors. In 1999, it practically removed the anti-integrationist Chief of the Defence Staff Ferenc Végh, and appointed a replacement, General Lajos Fodor, who subsequently committed himself to carrying out the government’s programme regarding the merger.\(^{51}\) By August 2001, the merger has still not taken place, yet a parliamentary resolution in the preceding June ordered the achievement of the Defence Staff’s integration into the Ministry by the end of 2001, in order to abolish parallel structures and establish full democratic control.\(^{52}\)

In addition to the failed merger of the Defence Staff with the Ministry of Defence, both the Antall and Horn governments fell short of developing a coherent strategy for the institutional reform of the armed forces.\(^{53}\) Although they carried out substantial


\(^{52}\) See *Magyar Hirlap*, 19/6/2001.

reductions in the size of the defence establishment from 155,700 in 1989 to 60,000 in 1999, they failed to develop the basis for the creation of modern, well-trained and effective forces that can provide for the country's security. In addition, the lack of political attention to the crumbling military infrastructure and ageing equipment (including the air force, to which remained only 27 MIG-29 non-NATO interoperable fighter aircraft) left Hungary virtually defenceless throughout the 1990s.

The arrival of the Orbán government brought fresh impetus to the deadlocked reform process of the defence establishment in many ways. First, Orbán set up a National Security Government, which was designed to ensure high level coordination of national security and defence policies between the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defence Staff and last but not least, Orbán's powerful empire, the Prime Minister's Office. In fact, two separate defence staffs were established, each attached to the Prime Minister's Office, whose strength and high competence was supposed to counterbalance the striking weakness of the Ministry of Defence that, according to the coalition agreement between Orbán's FIDESZ-MPP party and its junior partner the FKGP - Smallholders' Party, was headed by an FKGP Minister, an agricultural lawyer without any knowledge of security and defence matters. 54

The Division of Security and Defence Strategy within the Prime Minister's Office, headed by Péter Siklősi, was in charge of drafting a document on 'Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary'. Although the Parliament did approve a similar document in April 1993, Hungary's outstanding NATO accession and other important changes in its security environment required a complete overhaul of the 1993 document. Siklősi's team embarked on the drafting in September 1998 and in December 1998, the document was approved by Parliament.55 In addition, also in December, Parliament approved the government's 'NATO legal package' (Washington Treaty and other basic NATO documents, status of force agreements as well as amendments to laws), which legally prepared Hungary for NATO membership. 56

54 Author's interview with Péter Siklősi, Senior Security Advisor to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, 20/4/2000.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
After laying the foundations of a comprehensive security and defence policy, Siklósi and his team started to draft a National Security Strategy in January 1999, a detailed executive framework document. The finalisation of this document was held up by the launch of a comprehensive Strategic Defence Review in mid-1999.

The launch of the Strategic Defence Review was triggered by the realisation after the Kosovo conflict that the Hungarian defence forces, due to their technical and human resources are incapable to respond to conflicts rapidly. This became apparent, when Hungary struggled for six weeks to provide a 300-man strong contingent for KFOR. The Strategic Defence Review resulted in the launching of a complex transformation process of the Hungarian Defence Forces to occupy a ten-year period between 2000-2010 (see figure 6-18).

![Phases of force modernisation and restructuring process](image)

**Figure 6-18 Phases of force modernisation and restructuring process 2000-2010**

*Source: Transformation of the Hungarian Defence Forces, Ministry of Defence, Hungary*

This process will be implemented in three stages: first, between 2000-03, restructuring, redeployment and reduction of forces will take place. Second, between 2004-06, the building of a capabilities-based force will be completed and NATO training structures introduced. Third, between 2007-10 the modernisation of military assets and equipment will be carried out and other outstanding issues resolved. With the introduction of this extensive reform process, the Orbán government demonstrated

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its commitment to the establishment of modern, efficient and fully NATO-compatible
defence forces.

Whilst the Horn government placed less emphasis on the reform of the defence
establishment, it proved to be successful in treating Hungary's mounting economic
security predicament in 1995. In March, Horn appointed a well-known banker, Lajos
Bokros, Minister of Finance. He immediately introduced a set of austerity measures,
which later became known as the 'Bokros-package'. These measures included drastic
cuts in social security expenditure, an acceleration of structural reforms, in particular
privatisation, a strengthened income policy, an immediate devaluation of the national
currency by 9 per cent and the introduction of a continuous monthly devaluation of
the currency, a pre-announced crawling peg regime. In addition, a temporary 8 per
cent surcharge was introduced on imported goods.59 This set of stabilisation measures
was compounded by continued fiscal retrenchment in the coming years and thereby
managed broadly to achieve its short-term aims. The fiscal deficit and the deficit of
the current account were reduced substantially by the end of 1996. Furthermore, the
Horn government managed to reduce the gross foreign debt sharply and restore
foreign investors' confidence in the country's fiscal and economic management. Thus,
Hungary's most difficult economic security predicament since the regime change was
treated successfully. In addition, in February 1998, the Horn government managed to
repay all its liabilities to the IMF. This was an important act, as, since Hungary joined
the IMF in 1982, it was the first time that it was not indebted to the organisation.
Consequently, as Prime Minister Horn put it, Hungary's long-enduring dependency
upon the often harsh conditions of the IMF was abolished.60

As regards internal security, the policies of the Horn government in combating crime
were anything but successful. The consequences of the 'Bokros-package' worsened the
already precarious financial situation of the police forces and border guards in the
mid-1990s. In 1995, the US State Department opened its International Law
Enforcement Academy in Budapest, the so-called FBI-Academy, which was designed
to train CEEEn policemen in issues, such as combating terrorism, drug-related

60 See Népszabadság, 17/2/1998.
criminality, international economic crime etc.\textsuperscript{61} The Horn government and leaders of the Hungarian police warmly welcomed the opening of this school. In order to combat organised crime, the Horn government decided in 1998 to allow the tapping of mobile phone networks.

Nevertheless, tough effective policies against crime were not introduced until mid-1998, when the Orbán government took office. One of the major election pledges of Orbán was to rid the country of organised criminal groups and to stop the escalating cycle of violence, assassinations and occasional bomb attacks affecting Hungary and Budapest in particular. Indeed, since 1998, both his Interior Minister and Minister of Justice have pursued a tough line against crime. The legislation punishing drug possession and drug trafficking was tightened and cooperation with Europol intensified.\textsuperscript{62} After two years of intensive negotiations, Hungary will become a full member of Europol in autumn 2001.\textsuperscript{63} Whilst the Horn government failed to introduce appropriate measures for safeguarding Hungary's eastern borders, the Orbán government made funding available for the deployment of a thermal-imaging system. The financial situation of the police force has also been improved in the last three years, which has already borne fruit with more police in the streets providing for better public security.

In the matter of improving the situation of the Roma population, all post-communist governments have produced substantial articles of legislation and embarked on implementation of the new policies. However, there have been few immediate results. A main legislative breakthrough was the approval of the 'Act on the Rights of the National and Ethnic Minorities' of 1993, which actually allows in some areas 'positive discrimination' in favour of the minority groups. This law set up a system of minority self-government at local and national levels giving the minority groups limited self-determination in managing their social, educational and cultural affairs. A report of 2000 has concluded that

\textsuperscript{61} See Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7/1/1999.
\textsuperscript{62} See Die Presse, 10/3/2001.
\textsuperscript{63} See Népszabadság, 17/3/2001.
the minority self-government system in Hungary is a functional, efficient means of interest representation, guaranteeing the minorities wide-ranging participation in local and national affairs that affect them.\(^6^4\)

However, the full-scale implementation of this regulation was hindered by bureaucratic incompetence and by a lack of adequate resources. Although by 1997, some 400 Roma councils had been established, scarce resources and a lack of cooperation from local and national governments have limited their effectiveness.\(^6^5\)

Additionally, the 'Act on the Protection of Cultural Goods' of 1997 introduced important legislation on the preservation of the cultural traditions of the national and ethnic minorities and provided better funding to this end. In accordance with the Constitution and an Act of 1993 on the Parliamentary Commissioner for civil rights, the office of the parliamentary commissioner for the protection of national and ethnic minority rights was established. The minorities' ombudsman is in charge of investigating any kind of abuse of the rights of national or ethnic minorities and of initiating general and individual measures for its remedy.

Despite the legal framework now in place, the situation of the Roma population has not improved substantially. The major challenge to any post-communist government is how to implement legislation adequately and to diminish latent and institutional racism. Also triggered by mounting criticism from the EU, the Orbán government adopted a medium-term Roma action programme in April 1999 that aims at improving the societal security of the Roma by providing specific support in education, culture, housing, employment health and anti-discrimination. For the implementation of this programme, ring-fenced budgetary resources of 19 million euro were made available, however, as the EU Progress Report on Hungary (2000) pointed out, "concrete results from the action programme can only be expected in the medium term. In the meantime, the situation of the Roma population continues to be difficult."\(^6^6\)

\(^{64}\) See Doncsev (2000)


In the area of enhancing environmental security, much has been achieved through the improvement of the institutional and legal framework of Hungarian environmental policy. In this respect, the greatest legislative achievement was in 1995, when Parliament passed Hungary's new environmental framework law. This embodies the general principles for developing environmental protection legislation, in accordance with EU environmental standards. Parliament set a 1998 deadline for the completion of all additional legislation. Consequently, in 1996, the Hungarian Parliament approved the laws on regional development and physical planning, in 1997 on animal protection, man-made environmental issues and nature conservation and in 1998, on the handling and storage of dangerous substances, accident prevention and contingency planning. In order to comply with EU regulations, Parliament approved a 'National Environmental Programme' in 1997, which aimed at focusing on the most problematic areas, such as improving water quality, air quality and handling waste management. Despite the advanced legal framework, in 1998, out of the four Vistgräd states, Hungary spent the smallest sum, 1.1 per cent of the GDP, on the environment. The European Commission's 2000 'Regular Report on Hungary's Progress Towards Accession' acknowledged that some progress was achieved in the alignment of environmental legislation with EU policies, however, overall, Hungary had not yet met this criteria in 2000. This is not surprising, as the Ministry of Environmental Protection, which is in charge of aligning Hungarian environmental legislation with that of the EU, became the battlefield of party politics and in 2000, it was headed by three different ministers. Foreign Minister Martonyi maintained in February 2001 that this negligence would be corrected by the end of March 2001. Indeed, by June 2001, Hungary managed to close provisionally the chapter on environment, whilst four of its derogation requests were approved by the EU.

Although more stringent environmental legislation has been put into place since 1990, the question remains, as to whether the Hungarian public and the political elite will be willing to provide the resources necessary for its implementation. In addition,

67 Ministry of Environmental Protection, Hungary.
70 Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi's Press Briefing on the State of the Accession Negotiations and on the Hungarian Positions (in Hungarian); Source: http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Szovivoi/2001/MartonyiI0228EU.html [05/08/2001]
adequate implementation will depend on the building of an administrative and monitoring capacity, which does not yet exist. Progress is unlikely in either domain, until the general public and the political elite have developed the necessary environmental consciousness.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses in the case of post-Cold War Hungary. In doing so, it has focused primarily on those issues that appear to be unique for Hungary within the wider CEE context. Thus, many of the security issues that Hungary has in common with other CEE states, have not been repeated here, so that, in order to gain a fuller picture of the Hungarian security situation, the conclusions of this specific case study should be complemented by the general findings of chapters three to five.

In general it can be argued that Hungarian post-Cold War security predicaments have been dominated by a mixture of military and non-military challenges, in which the military element has been more strongly emphasised here than in other parts of CEE, with the possible exception of the Baltic states. It has been pointed out that Hungary's geographical situation, its proximity to the war in former Yugoslavia, generated a real military security predicament throughout the 1990s. This was clearly perceived by the majority of the public and its political elite. The pursuit of NATO membership and the preceding nervous requests for security guarantees from the Alliance all suggest that the military security issue has prevailed in post-communist Hungary. Since Hungary's admittance to NATO, both the military predicament and the perception of military insecurities have diminished significantly.

Whilst the general public has not perceived a major threat from Russia, the political elite proved to be more apprehensive in this respect. This was especially true during the first four years of democracy in Hungary, when the conservative Antall government, prompted partly by sentiment and the burden of history and partly by alarming political developments in Russia, expressed some 'Russo-phobic' feelings
and anxieties. Since then, these feelings have declined substantially and have, to some extent, been replaced by apprehension about a new Russian threat via Ukraine.

The large proportion of ethnic Hungarians resident in former Hungarian territories in neighbouring countries generates a uniquely Hungarian security predicament. As it has been explained, post-Cold War Hungarian politics and society is engaged in a debate on the definition of the Hungarian nation in general and on the borders of the nation in particular. This debate and its consequences have generated serious confrontations with Slovakia and Romania in addition to the argument about the treatment of the Hungarian minority in these countries. Although the conclusion of basic treaties has lessened tensions considerably, this issue will remain a major factor of insecurity in the near future. The simultaneous integration of all countries concerned into the European Union would provide a solution for the minority issue, yet it is very unlikely that this would happen.

Many of the domestic security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses of post-communist Hungary are identical with those of other CEEn states. Challenges generated by the complex transition process, including political instability, economic insecurity and internal/public insecurity dominate the agenda. At the same time, environmental security issues are paid less attention. In general it can be argued that environmental security issues dominate the public domain only when there is a major catastrophe, as exemplified by the floods in 1999 and 2000 and the cyanide pollution of the Tisza in 2000. Although the establishment of legislation conforming to EU norms is under way, its implementation is hampered by the scarcity of financial resources and the lack of appropriate administrative expertise.

This observation is certainly valid for the situation of the Hungarian defence establishment, which lacks substantial resources. However, up until 1998, a lack of political commitment and inadequate institutional structures also delayed the implementation of comprehensive reform initiatives for the reform of the armed forces. With the launch of a ten-year reform programme in 2000, the current government is determined to establish efficient, modern and fully NATO-compatible armed forces.
Rising intolerance towards foreigners and the Jewish and, in particular, the Roma populations creates a real societal and political security challenge for both majority and minority populations in post-Cold War Hungary. Although the problem has been identified by the political elite and much has been achieved in providing an appropriate legal framework for minority rights in recent years, the scarcity of resources has again hampered the successful implementation of the policies. Thus, more has to be done to alter the Hungarian majority's attitude towards the Roma minority and to combat every-day racism, before it escalates into a major conflict.

The effectiveness of the policies introduced by the various post-Cold War Hungarian governments aimed at improving the country's security has been mixed. All post-communist governments have treated Hungary's integration into NATO and the EU as important stabilising measures and thus pursued these policy goals vigorously. Hungary's admittance to NATO in 1999 marked both a success of post-Cold War foreign and security policy and a new era in the country's national security. Similarly, successive governments have achieved much progress towards Hungary's full membership of the EU, which is regarded mainly as an important stabilising measure in the areas of 'soft security'. As explained above, successive post-cold War Hungarian governments employed highly contrasting policies towards Hungary's relations with neighbouring countries, some of which had an adverse effect on the country's security. Nonetheless, by the late 1990s, Hungary stabilised its previously often severely strained relations with both Romania and Slovakia and, thus, contributed to the improvement of security in the CEEn region.

As regards domestic policies, the gulf between the establishment of legislation and its effective implementation is more apparent. Issues, such as the improvement of the situation of the Roma population, the fight against organised crime and environmental security, amongst others, are identified as important stabilising measures. Policies can, however, only be effective, if Hungarian governments and the society they serve are willing to provide appropriate resources for their successful implementation.
7 Conclusion

The thesis has attempted to describe, to investigate and to explain the changing character of security in post-Cold War CEE in general and in Hungary in particular. For the pursuit of this complex task, an analytical framework was developed in chapter two, focused around three main aspects: predicaments, that is the set of objective risks and vulnerabilities; perceptions of security held by the CEE publics and their political elites; and policy-responses to real and perceived threats. It is only right to acknowledge here that, at times, it has proven to be difficult to draw a clear division between these three areas, since predicaments are interconnected with both perceptions and policy-responses and perceptions have an impact on both predicaments and policy-responses. Yet, the threefold division has appeared to be useful for a variety of reasons: firstly, it offered a systematic frame of reference for the study of the complex phenomenon of post-Cold War security that has proven equally well-suited to the analysis of the CEE region as a whole as well as to the geographically narrower case of Hungary. Secondly, its comprehensive definition of security has permitted the opening up of the analysis to a range of military and non-military factors and has proven to be adequate for capturing post-communist realities. Thirdly, the inclusion of the cognitive dimension of security into our study, that is the perception of risks and vulnerabilities by the CEE publics and their political elites, has attempted to demonstrate that security is not only about objective realities but also about the subjective attitudes of individuals (publics and policy-makers). In other words, as we have argued throughout the thesis, insecurities can arise from objective, concrete sources of danger (e.g. the spread of war from the Balkans to neighbouring countries), but they can also be generated by more subjective feelings (e.g. the acquired picture of a historically hostile Russia). Hence, there is the need for the analysis of perceptions over and above the consideration of predicaments. Finally, the last dimension of the framework, that of policy-responses, has allowed the extension of the analytical perspective to the practitioners and permitted a consideration of the impact of the policy-makers in tackling security issues.
In order to summarise the findings of the thesis, we shall now return to the research questions raised in chapter two and address them in light of the outcome of the study on CEE and of the Hungarian case study.

This study has attempted to demonstrate that a synthesis of various IR schools of thought is indeed possible and, moreover, useful for the study of security predicaments in CEE. We have attempted to reconcile distinct features of the realist, liberal, constructivist and widening schools and developed a comprehensive framework that is broadly based on the premises of the Copenhagen School. In our view, the main advantage of this framework is that it is able, without being caught up in ideological debates, to meld military and non-military or traditional and new factors of security. The division of the analysis into military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors underlines the significance of new security issues beside the military one. In addition, the inclusion of new levels of analysis, which are either beyond or below the traditional state-level, has expanded the scope of the analysis. It has to be acknowledged, however, that the rigidity of the five-sectoral and multi-level framework has, at times, proven somewhat restrictive. This has been the case especially at times, when there has been an interconnectedness between sectors and levels. Thus, admittedly, this framework is less suited to the examination of global phenomena, such as, for example, borderless environmental issues, where a unique level of impact is difficult to determine. Equally, a rigid sectoral analysis can disregard the fact that some insecurities can spill over from one sector to the other, as, for instance, minority problems that can initially crop up in the societal sector, can however, spill over to the political and military ones. We have attempted to remedy these shortcomings in chapter three by discussing factors that can appear on different levels together and by cross-referencing phenomena that can crop up in different sectors.

A clear advantage of the utilisation of the comprehensive analytical framework has been also that it allows for an equal consideration of security predicaments in all five sectors, without prioritising any of them over the others (unlike realism, which, in general, focuses on military security or constructivism, which addresses mainly identity related issues). This does not mean, however, that security predicaments in all five sectors are of the same magnitude in post-Cold War CEE. Indeed, as we have
demonstrated in chapter three, in the transitional region of CEE, military predicaments, although still present, are diminishing, while non-military predicaments, such as minority problems economic instability, political turmoil and so on, are rising to the fore. Whilst geopolitical thinking contributed to the emergence of security predicaments not only in the Balkans but also in other parts of CEE throughout the 1990s, its importance appears to be diminishing in the 21st century and the region is now governed by peaceful democratic regimes.

Whilst major parts of Western Europe are characterised by deepening political and economic integration, post-communist CEE has experienced disintegration and the revival of nation-states. As a result, insufficient cooperation and a lack of integration into subregional formations with adequate competences have contributed to the emergence of security predicaments in CEE. This anti-integrationist trend within the region has inhibited the joint prevention of global economic and environmental challenges and the neutralisation of regional diplomatic and ethnic tensions. However, these predicaments too have diminished significantly in recent years. Also, the advancement of the CEEn countries' integration into the EU and NATO and their membership of the CoE and the OSCE have contributed to the decline of isolationist tendencies within the region, even though a 'security community' in the constructivist sense has not yet emerged in CEE. In fact, as Andrew Cottey has argued, in security terms, there is no common region in CEE, but there are many "fuzzy and hardly settled sub-regions".  

states, will contribute to the overall stability of CEE. On the other hand, the disappearance of authoritarian rule has also opened up CEE states for new non-military security predicaments, such as organised crime, drug related crime, drug trafficking, economic corruption to name a few, which are sadly commonplace in long-established democracies.

As regards security perceptions, the utilisation of cognitive analytical factors in our framework has proven to be very useful in explaining and understanding the emergence of apprehensive attitudes in CEE. These often neglected factors have helped elucidate some of the current security predicaments, which have deep-seated historical roots and are often generated, to a great extent, by biased prior knowledge, rather than by material reality. We have demonstrated, for example, that many of the post-Cold War minority related tensions are consequences of long lasting historical controversies between countries in CEE. In other words, CEE is still haunted by its historical legacy of occupations and division throughout centuries. We have referred to the fact on several occasions that the post-WW1 and WW2 peace settlements not only redrew Europe's map, but also made many nationals citizens of states that were previously foreign to them. Consequently, in parts of CEE, the term 'nation' does not correspond with the term 'state'. We have expounded in the Hungarian case study, the impact of the Trianon Treaty of 1920 on Hungary, which resulted in its losing two-thirds of its territories to its neighbouring countries, together with a large proportion of its ethnic Hungarian population. The evaporation of communist rule, which rigorously suppressed ethnic tensions and neighbourly disputes, has reopened old disputes between some CEE states and placed the contentious debate about the definition of nation and state in the public domain.

The negative impact of historical legacies is also prevalent in the apprehensive perception of Russia held by major parts of the CEE public and its political elites. Post-WW2 Russian occupation and the brutal crushing of the revolutions in 1956 and 1968 in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia, respectively, are vivid memories of many in contemporary CEE and these past experiences clearly impact on current images and attitudes. For similar reasons, substantial parts of the Polish and the Czech publics still express some resentment towards Germany, which only demonstrates that historical grievances heal slowly and that their impact on current perceptions can be
strong. In light of these historical events, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's words in 2001 concerning the impact of the 20th century on his country's fate are not surprising: "Hungarians are happy and optimistic exactly because the past is over, the twentieth century is finally over. This was a tough century on us".72

The deployment of the cognitive analytical dimension has also helped explain some of CEEn politicians' security perceptions and their subsequent policy-responses. Biased interpretation and manipulation of historical legacies by nationally minded politicians led to the outbreak of civil war in the Balkans and also generated severe security predicaments in CEE. As we have argued, much of the foreign policies of the first post-communist democratic government in Hungary towards its neighbours were overshadowed by the burden of history and indeed, led to the emergence of some security predicaments. Belligerent demands of the Hungarian government concerning the improvement of the situation of the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania produced a greater level of instability in the relations between Hungary and the respective countries than any tangible positive results. The subsequent MSZP-SZDSZ coalition government between 1994-98 broke away from the tendency to the glorification of a great Hungarian past and managed successfully to defuse most of the tensions between Hungary and its neighbours. In changing Hungary's attitude towards its neighbours, the Hungarian public and, first and foremost, its political elite needs to come to terms with the country's history and its present identity, in other words, as the then Foreign Minister László Kovács put it in 1995, "Hungary needs to learn how to be small".73 The conservative Orbán government since 1998 has returned to a more comprehensive definition of the Hungarian nation, particularly through the draft of the Status Law in 2001, and has attempted to revive some historical images of a glorious Hungary. Their long-term effects on neighbourly relations and, consequently, on the stability of the region remains to be seen.

As regards foreign and security policy-making, the governments of CEE need to adopt an approach based on constructive cooperation and mutual understanding. As we have argued earlier, some of the security predicaments could be defused via strong

regional and subregional collaboration. This is particularly important, since it is now very unlikely that all CEEn applicant countries will be admitted to the EU simultaneously and the EU Association Agreements are insufficient to cushion the disadvantages of a delayed full membership. NATO, on the contrary, has its PfP and EAPC frameworks, which appear to be valuable platforms of cooperation with those CEEn countries, which were excluded from the first wave of enlargement and, indeed, function as stepping-stones to full membership. Thus the consequences of an exclusion from the first round of NATO enlargement have not been as severe as consequences of a potential exclusion from EU enlargement could be. Indeed, a partial enlargement of the EU will only increase the already strong developmental differences between individual countries in CEE, which could lead to a further fragmentation of the region and the emergence of non-military security predicaments.

It has to be acknowledged that the first steps towards the creation of a more stable CEE have been achieved with the establishment of a number of subregional organisations. But if they are to be more than pro forma institutions, they need to be allocated appropriate funding and endowed with meaningful and responsible roles in order to be able to address security predicaments effectively. In future, these subregional organisations could also play an intermediary role between those countries, which get into the EU first and those that will be excluded from the first round of enlargement.

We have also argued that the security and foreign policy-making mechanisms in post-Cold War CEE are still largely influenced by top-down processes, whereby a small group of elected and non-elected politicians determine most policy outcomes. This results partly from the continuation of 'traditional' practices, whereby policy-making had been the 'privilege' of the elite and society at large had been 'de-politicised', and partly from the fact that the CEEn countries have not yet managed to install a civil service that is competent enough and sufficiently trained to take decisions on a lower level. Although the process of civilianisation of CEEn Defence Ministries has largely been completed, there is a lack of available security and defence expertise with NATO-compatible thinking and satisfactory foreign language skills. As we have seen, this is also valid for new NATO member Hungary, which, partly as a result of the lack of expertise and funding, has only recently (in fact a year after it gained membership
of NATO) started to reorganise its defence establishment and to draft fundamental legislation, such as a national security strategy and a defence doctrine.

The Hungarian case study has also demonstrated that established decision-making procedures can be supplemented and indeed by-passed through the strengthening of the competencies of the Prime Minister's Office, which is run by mainly non-elected government advisors. On the one hand, this centralised agency can, admittedly, speed-up the production of overdue reform legislations, as it happened under Orbán's premiership on several occasions, but, on the other, it raises serious concerns about accountability. Furthermore, an overly strong Prime Minister's Office can undermine the authority of the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff and cause ambiguity in the defence control mechanisms. In addition, constitutional ambiguity concerning the allocation of presidential and governmental competencies caused some uncertainty in some countries of post-Cold War CEE, these, however, were resolved with the adaptation of new or the amendment of existing constitutions.

At last, we shall conclude with some basic observations, which, in light of the studies on CEE and Hungary appear to be particularly relevant in our context. Firstly and most strikingly, the end of the Cold War represents everything in CEE but the end of history that had been forecast by Francis Fukuyama in 1989.\textsuperscript{74} Indeed, as Hyde-Price has argued, for CEE it has rather meant the rebirth of history.\textsuperscript{75} The rebirth or re-invention of history has had severe security implications in post-Cold War CEE, which resulted in all-out war in the Balkans and significant diplomatic tensions in other parts of the region. Secondly, as a result of the appreciation of history, minority and ethnic related conflict has become a real security predicament in large parts of post-communist CEE. Thirdly, the Balkans aside, despite the tremendous challenge posed by the complex transition process, the CEEn countries have remained peaceful since the collapse of communism. Although there have been apprehensions of an external military threat among parts of the CEEn publics and their political elites, these have not materialised. Fourthly, in terms of regional cooperation, CEE may well be characterised by fragmentation and isolationism. It is, however, unified by the


common foreign and security policy aspirations of the individual countries: the desire to become a part of the Euro-Atlantic integration process, that is full membership of the EU and NATO at the earliest possible date, furthermore, to maintain good-neighbourly and peaceful relations. Finally, with direct military challenges diminishing, a range of non-military security predicaments have intensified in post-Cold War CEE, many of which can be treated more efficiently in a joint regional and pan-European manner. Therefore, it is not only the CEEn countries' responsibility but also that of established democracies to use the historically unique opportunity and build a stable Europe within the framework of existing institutions, such as the EU and NATO.

It is only natural that a thesis of this kind, which is limited in scope and time, cannot capture an issue as complex as post-Cold War CEE security in all its details. Indeed, we have tried to limit the perspective of our analysis in chapters three, four and five to the application of our analytical framework and to determine general trends in CEEn security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses. Even though the Hungarian case study in chapter six elaborated on a number of pertinent issues in greater detail, it has been impossible to encapsulate all concerns and to answer all questions. Indeed, a fast moving target, like the security situation of a transitional region raises new concerns and questions on a daily basis. This is a challenge that all scholars investigating contemporary political issues face.

There are a number of issues that could be pursued in future research projects. On the theoretical level, this could involve the further systematisation of the interconnectedness between sectors and levels of security predicaments. Since, as our analysis has demonstrated, this is a weak point of the Copenhagen School framework, some theoretical work would be desirable to accommodate this challenge effectively. Similarly, to the knowledge of the author, there is, at present, no modern theoretical work done on the significance of cognition on security perceptions and policy-making in the CEEn context. On the analytical level, a number of studies would follow on logically from this project. Because of the constraints on space, we could only pursue the case of Hungary in more detail; other country case studies could be carried out along the lines laid out in the analytical framework and their findings compiled in a comparative work.
Appendix

Resolution
94/1998. (XII. 29.) OGY
of the National Assembly

on the Principles of the Security and Defence Policy
of the Republic of Hungary

The National Assembly hereby

1. approves the Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary;

2. invites the Government to report to the National Assembly on the implementation of the tasks relating to security and defence policy at least once a year.


Principles of the Security and Defence Policy
of the Republic of Hungary

During recent years a fundamental change has taken place in the external security situation of Hungary, essentially because of the achievements made in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration. By attaining NATO-membership and the advancement of the process of accession to the European Union, the country has become a part of the institutional framework of the community of democratic, developed and stable countries of the Euro-Atlantic region. These factors require the review of the security and defence policy principles of the Republic of Hungary.

1. The Republic of Hungary takes a comprehensive approach to security. Besides the traditional political and military factors it comprises other dimensions of comprehensive security as well, such as economy and finances, human and minority rights, information, technology, environment and international law. In a world of global challenges, political and economic interdependence and of technological progress, the security of the Euro-Atlantic region has become indivisible.
2. Compared to the period of the bipolar international system, the threat of a global armed conflict has been reduced to the minimum. At the same time, however, the scope of risks and sources of danger have significantly increased and grown more complex. Hungary's security is being influenced primarily by the security trend of the Euro-Atlantic region and the political, social and economic processes taking place in that part of the world, but the country cannot exempt itself from the sources of global dangers. Its engagement in an alliance system creates greater responsibility and expanded possibilities in the management of these sources of dangers.

The transitory or permanent controversies between countries and groups resulting from differences in social development, economic, financial and social crises, ethnic and religious tensions, terrorism, organised crime, illicit drug and arms trafficking, demographic tension, mass migration and intense environmental problems constitute a growing risk. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and the possibility of attacks on information systems present an increasing challenge and danger. Besides, tensions between and armed conflict within states are ever persisting in Europe. Instability and unpredictability resulting from transformation and the fragility of democratisation are specific sources of danger in our region.

It is a peculiarity of our security environment that new and traditional challenges often surface simultaneously and amplify each other.

3. The main objectives of the security policy of the Republic of Hungary are:
   - to guarantee the independence, sovereign statehood and territorial integrity of the country;
   - to create appropriate conditions for enforcing the principles laid down in the Constitution, to promote the predominance of the rule of law, the unperturbed functioning of democratic institutions and market economy and to contribute to the internal stability of the country;
   - to promote the full respect of civil and human rights and the rights of national and ethnic minorities in the Republic of Hungary;
   - to create appropriate conditions for the assurance of personal, material and social safety of people living on the territory of the Republic of Hungary and the preservation of national assets;
   - to contribute to the implementation of what has been laid down in the North Atlantic Treaty and to the security of its Allies;
   - to facilitate the preservation of international peace and the enhancement of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region, Europe and its neighbourhood;
   - to contribute to the assurance of appropriate conditions for the international economic, political, cultural and other relations and co-operation of the Republic of Hungary.

4. The Republic of Hungary wishes to realise the above objectives in accordance with the Constitution, the norms of international law, with special respect to the principles and obligations enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation, in the documents of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe, in the North Atlantic Treaty and, furthermore, in compliance with
its obligations undertaken in other relevant international documents, regional and bilateral agreements.

5. The Republic of Hungary considers no country an enemy and it treats all actors of the international politics who abide by the principles of international law as its partners. Hungary intends to settle disputes in accordance with international law, taking into account the European practice.

6. The Republic of Hungary builds its security on two pillars: its national resources on the one hand, Euro-Atlantic integration and international co-operation, on the other.

7. The Republic of Hungary intends to permanently provide for its security, the prosperity of its citizens as a member of the democratic community of Euro-Atlantic states.

The Republic of Hungary could maintain its security most effectively as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter the Alliance), as an integral part of the political and military structure of the Alliance, Hungary assumes all the tasks deriving from the common defence. Hungary considers its constructive participation in the consultative and decision making system of the Alliance as the means that allows for its contribution to the enforcement of the Euro-Atlantic region's security and stability as well as to the effective assertion of its national interests. Hungary considers transatlantic co-operation a cardinal factor of European security in the long run as well. In the framework of intra-Alliance co-operation, Hungary supports the development of a European security and defence identity which constitutes a major element of Hungary's integration policy.

Since its inception, European integration (and the European Union being its most important frame) has established the economic and political bases of the security of its member states. It is a realistic goal of the negotiations pending with the European Union for the Republic of Hungary to become, while watching to its national interests, a full member of the European Union and to take part in the shaping and implementation of the Union's common foreign and security policy.

As a part of its Euro-Atlantic strategy, Hungary strives to achieve full membership in the Western European Union as well, which it considers an important tool in dealing with regional challenges of the future.

8. The Republic of Hungary continues to assume an active role in the activities of the United Nations Organisation, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, as well as of international arms control and non-proliferation regimes. These organisations and forms of cooperation serve as important frameworks of the implementation of the goals of Hungarian security policy in the field of establishing norms and standard, security and confidence building, conflict prevention and management, as well as the permanent monitoring of the implementation of international obligations. Hungary attaches great importance to regional and
subregional as well as traditional bilateral forms of co-operation in guaranteeing the security of the Republic of Hungary.

9. International co-operation can only be productive if backed by an effective national participation. For this reason, national efforts will continue to play a very important role in guaranteeing the country's security. The active participation, support and generosity of citizens is a factor of crucial importance in guaranteeing the security of the Republic of Hungary.

Hungarian security policy and its set of institutions shall function in a way to enable it to timely realise and assess in a continuous and reliable manner the factors threatening the country's security. On this basis, it should be able to take the decisions required for the anticipation and prevention of dangers and to implement the measures arising from them in due time.

10. The Republic of Hungary asserts its security policy goals principally through the foreign, economic and defence policy.


Hungary is a stable point of the Eastern Central European region and it takes an initiative role in extending security in the region. Hungary thrives to maintain good-neighbourly relations with all countries in our region and to develop regional and subregional co-operation. The enhancement of co-operation between the countries of the region in the fields of economy, culture, human rights (including minorities) is of utmost importance from the point of good-neighbourly relations.

The Republic of Hungary wishes to build its relations with other countries in the region on the basis of Euro-Atlantic values, norms and standards of international law and on mutual interests. It is interested in seeing its neighbours themselves become members of the Euro-Atlantic organisations as soon as possible, provided they comply with the criterion of membership. Hungary lends an active support to their respective endeavours and to the maintenance and reinforcement of their Euro-Atlantic commitment.

The Republic of Hungary pays distinguished attention to the situation of Hungarians living abroad and to the assertion of their rights in accordance with the norms and standards of international law. By the same token, Hungary attaches crucial importance to the full implementation of the rights of national minorities living in the territory of Hungary. Hungary believes that assertion of the rights of national minorities is a factor contributing to security, while intolerant and aggressive nationalism, endeavours for assimilating national minorities and forced alteration of the ethnic composition of the population are contrary to these rights.

Human rights and thus the situation of national and ethnic minorities cannot be considered an exclusively internal affair of any country. In Hungary's view, the issue of national and ethnic minorities is an organic part of good-neighbourly relations and
Euro-Atlantic integration should be settled in conformity with the standards of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and of the Council of Europe, and on the basis of European practice.

12. The aspirations of the Republic of Hungary in the field of security policy can only be realised on the basis of a sound and advanced market economy. National economy should be able to provide the economic foundations necessary for the achievement of the security and defence policy objectives of the Republic of Hungary.

The Republic of Hungary intends to pursue an economic policy that observes the requirements of balance, stability and European integration, purposing a sustainable, society and environment friendly economic growth, based on permanently improving competitiveness and creating employment and thereby (parallel to the dominance of economic and social cohesion and solidarity) steadily assures the prosperity of the country's citizens and the continuous improvement of living standards and quality of life.

Preparing the economy for defence is a government duty. In the process of its realisation it is of great importance that the functioning of the market be perturbed to the least extent possible.

13. The Republic of Hungary will further need armed forces providing reliable defence and contributing to the common security of the Alliance, and the conception permitting the effective use of such armed forces as a device of its security policy. The defence policy of the Republic of Hungary is based on the unity and interlacing of alliance, co-operation, prevention and defence.

The Republic of Hungary considers national defence a common national affair based on the display by the citizens of their common responsibility. The national defence system has been built on the unity of rights and obligations arising from the North Atlantic Treaty, the self-respect and responsibility of citizens consciously accepting the defence requirements of the Alliance, an economy capable of satisfying the material needs of the armed forces and defence, a government structure prepared for defence, armed forces capable of managing the military tasks of the defence, democratic and civil management and control of the armed forces, a civil defence safeguarding the population and the material assets, as well as on the support from the widest strata of society.

14. Hungary identifies itself with the principles of collective security and defence of the Alliance. It maintains and develops its ability to repel military attacks in conformity with the principles enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty. The main task of its armed forces is the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Hungary and (pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty) contribution to the Alliance's collective defence. It is further assigned to contribute to other jointly perceived allied missions, engage in peacekeeping and humanitarian actions carried out under the auspices of international organisations and in the elimination of major industrial, man-made and natural disasters. In all these fields the Strategic Concept of the
Alliance is authoritative in the drafting of which Hungary has been actively participating.

The Republic of Hungary realises the fact that there is a continuing need to preserve the Alliance's credible defence capabilities in order to counter the challenges to security evolving in the Euro-Atlantic region. This capability is based on the full scope of defence capacities displayed by the member countries and on the adequate distribution of these defence capabilities in the territory of the Alliance. In compliance with its obligations undertaken, and in the interest of common defence, Hungary is ready to make available the required military force and will contribute to the other missions of the Alliance to the extent of its possibilities.

15. The structure of organisation and disposition, the strength, the proportion of internal complement, weaponry and equipment of the armed forces of the Republic of Hungary will be established in agreement with the Alliance, in conformity with the realistically anticipated dangers, the defence needs of the country, the obligations undertaken in the Alliance, as well as in conformity with the material and financial resources. Hungary will assure the harmony between the objectives set, and the armed forces, as well as the resources designated for their operation and development, respectively.

16. The new challenges, risks and dangers has the specific feature of surfacing in a complex manner and have transboundary effects. Countering these challenges requires close international co-operation beyond the areas of foreign, economic and defence policy. To that end, the Republic of Hungary actively participates in both the bilateral and multilateral framework in international efforts aimed at the prevention and handling of these challenges and risks, with special regard given to the field of justice, interior affairs, customs, protection of the environment and disaster relief, as well as to the activities of other bodies.

17. The National Assembly of the Republic of Hungary will ensure the conditions pertaining to the implementation of tasks arising from this document. The Government of the Republic of Hungary assumes responsibility for the development of the national security strategy and of the national military strategy, and for their revision as required, as well as for the implementation of the tasks arising from them.

(Sgd) Dr. ÁDER János
Chairman of the National Assembly

(Sgd) HERÉNYI Károly
Clerk of the National Assembly

(Sgd) MÁDAI Péter
Clerk of the National Assembly

This is NOT an official translation!
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