Social class differences in the framing of interchanges by mothers for their infants

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SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENCES IN THE FRAMING OF INTERCHANGES
BY MOTHERS FOR THEIR INFANTS

by

David Young

A DOCTORAL THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of

Ph.D. of the Loughborough University of Technology
October 1978

Supervisor: Derek Edwards
Department of Social Sciences

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Chapter 1: Introduction to this thesis

1.1 Introduction

1.2 The 'action research' approach and the organisation of this thesis

1.3 The approach to be used in this research contrasted to a 'social problems' approach
1.1 **Introduction**

This chapter will introduce this thesis and provide the reader with an orientation to the research reported herein. The chapter considers the designation 'action research' that could be used to describe the research reported here. Also, the organisation of chapters that is suggested by this 'action research' approach is explained.

This chapter also considers the aspects of this research that could be related to a 'social problems' approach to doing science. This is contrasted with the emphasis on the 'understanding' of the effects of social class on behaviour which is, broadly speaking, the aim of this research.
1.2 The 'action research' approach and the organisation of this thesis

Over recent years there have been, increasingly, attempts to undertake a conceptual analysis of theories in the social sciences and relate them to the 'images of man' (Shotter 1975) they implicitly contain. The work of Shotter is probably the most influential in this area; he writes: 'Explicitly, then, as a behavioural science, psychology may work to reveal what follows at a practical level when men choose to go on in one way rather than another. But besides work of this kind, modern psychology may be thought of as having something to do with what I want to call image replacement. That is, instead of working to clarify and help in the practical realization of our already 'given' but admittedly rather vague image of ourselves as persons, it works to bring in new notions to replace such everyday ideas. But it does this implicitly rather than explicitly, for it does it only incidentally in the course of conducting itself as science, not as part of its professed aim at all' (Shotter, 1975). It is this process that some psychologists are becoming aware of and as a consequence are explicitly locating their implicit philosophical assumptions and the 'model of man' that appears in their work. (1)

(1) This is supplemented by philosophers increasingly becoming involved in social science issues. Beyeleveld and Wiles (1977) for example, philosophers who have turned their attention to sociology and to criminology, write: 'In rejecting structural functionalism and logical positivism the new criminologies have re-voiced suppressed issues. But in attempting to resurrect old ghosts, have the new criminologists successfully countered the spells which were used to exorcise them? We will suggest not. The new criminologies have not even begun to systematically tackle the issues involved. Since we share the evangelical faith, we will attempt to show that the exhortations of the criminologists are empty electioneering promises. We do not really know what it means to follow their banner. We will, however, attempt to make good the deficiency. In the process, we will argue that inasmuch as it is possible to glean any analytical sense from their writings, the model of man espoused by the new criminologies is incompatible with their vision of a criminology as a social theory; Since we share that vision we will try to present the necessary model of man'. Beyeleveld and Wiles (1977).
This, of course, is not limited to theories in the social sciences; methodologies also, must come under similar scrutiny. The methods of social science research provide ways of linking the development of theory to observations of the real world. However, the precise relation between theory and observation is a matter of dispute among social scientists who may be of different (sometimes implicit) philosophical orientations, and who operate from within different philosophical 'paradigms'.

1 Kuhn (1962) rejects the view that science has advanced by the careful accumulation of data leading to an ever more refined picture of the way things are. Instead of this cumulative view, Kuhn argues for the central importance in the history of science of the emergence of new paradigms which allows the redefinition of the nature of the reality being considered. The history of science then becomes, 'the history of competition between different paradigms referring to the universe of entities that do or do not exist, the nature of admissible problems, and the standards by which a problem - solution should be judged as adequate' (Silverman, 1970). Thus one paradigm is rejected and is succeeded by another as it becomes clear to scientists working within it that the paradigm is incapable of explaining a novel problem.

2 Whatever the precise definition of a 'paradigm' it is clear that there are within the social sciences at least two paradigms which may be said to provide the researcher with a framework for understanding social phenomena. The mainstream, established paradigm is a mechanistic, often implicit, 'logical positivist' philosophical approach to doing social science research.

3 The existence of 'paradigms' is of course an assumption implying a pragmatic philosophical stance.

4 Assuming, of course, that all other things are equal. They rarely are, and scientists may for example, become emotionally attached to one paradigm despite mounting contradictory evidence.
A newer and alternative paradigm is an explanatory 'hermeneutical' philosophical approach\(^{(4)}\) to doing social science research. Gault and Shotter (1977) suggest that there are 'two broad traditions of thought with regard to the explanation of human action, viz the mechanistic and the hermeneutical. The mechanistic tradition, which accords so well with the practices and presuppositions of modern science, has been generally predominant, and never more so than in the decades since the Second World War..... despite optimistic proposals that mechanistic and hermeneutical explanation function at separate and non-conflicting 'levels of discourse', the two sorts of explanation are incompatible, and that furthermore in the event of conflict between them, mechanistic explanation is bound to give way to hermeneutical'.

Although there are major differences between various hermeneutic approaches,\(^{(5)}\) they might be considered to share, after Bernstein's (1975b) discussion of the 'newer sociologies' some common features:

1. A view of man as creator of meanings.
2. An opposition to macro-functional sociology.
3. A focus upon the assumptions underlying the social order, together with the treatment of social categories as themselves problematic.
4. A distrust of the forms of quantification and the use of 'objectiva' categories.
5. A focus upon the transmission and acquisition of interpretative procedures.

The methods of social scientists of a mechanistic 'logical positivist' orientation, are seen by those of a hermeneutic orientation to be limited by a concentration on the testing and verification of theories.

\(^{(4)}\) The term 'hermeneutical' comes from the Greek 'hermeneutical' to interpret, explain, make clear.

\(^{(5)}\) The main hermeneutic approaches could be considered to be: Marxist, Phenomenological, Symbolic-Interactionist, Ethnomethodology and Ethogenic. This list is, of course, not all inclusive.
according to the 'scientific method'. The logical positivist philosophy of science considers social and natural phenomena to be the same, subject to the same natural laws of determinate universe. The behaviour of matter is regarded as a necessary reaction to a stimulus. Human matter cannot understand its own behaviour, the analysis of self consciously self directed behaviour is not a valid area for scientific activity. The logic of human behaviour is understandable by the observation of that behaviour by an external observer. Hermeneuticists are aware of the implicit philosophy of the 'scientific method' and argue that a priori assumptions about the 'objective' characteristics of social situations, which are often made at early stages in the research process (in the form of hypotheses and operational definitions) serve to 'smuggle in' a specific philosophy about the nature of 'reality'. What seems to unite schools of thought within the hermeneutic philosophy is above all a rejection of logical positivist philosophy and its emphasis on 'the scientific method'.

One variant of a hermeneutic philosophy of science is the 'action

(6) To a logical positivist, metaphysical disputes are wholly pointless. The meaning of any proposition they suggest, lies in its method of verification (suggests Passmore (1957)), and also, Newton quoted in Shotter (1974b): 'The best and safest method of philosophising seems to be, first to enquire diligently into the properties of things and to establish these properties by experiments, and to proceed later to hypotheses for the explanation of the properties of things themselves. For hypotheses ought only to be applied in the explanation of the properties of things, and not made use of in determining them'.

(7) Some of the schools of thought within the hermeneutic philosophy have adopted the principle of 'Indeterminism' or 'free will'. Beyleveldt and Wiles (1977) warn that: 'we are repeatedly told that the fact that human beings make choices have purposes, will outcomes, intend actions and in general attach meaning to their situations shows that determinism is false'. They suggest that it is not obvious that the 'only coherent alternative to determinism is indeterminism'. They write: 'The key to our denial of the exhaustive nature of the determinism/Indeterminism dichotomy is the suggestion that it is by no means obvious, without presupposing determinism to be true, that to explain is necessary to cite material causes. If we can show that some explanations do not cite material causes then it will follow that the goal of providing explanations can be maintained without adhering to determinism'. The authors then go on to elaborate the principle of 'determinism' or the 'Principle of Universal Explainability' and distinguish it from the principle of determinism. They argue 'the thesis that the scientific investigator must assume that every event has an explanation (determinism) does not entail that we must assume that all events have material causes, and that to explain them is to cite these causes (determinism). Determinism would appear to be a necessary presupposition in the scientific enterprise'. The opposite of determinism is 'indeterminism'.


research' approach. This, while it involves some meta theoretical philosophical assumptions, can most usefully be seen as a method of analysis rather than a theory. It offers a frame of reference from which can be derived a series of related questions about social life and a mode of doing social science research that does not rely 'scientific methodology'. Action research adherents argue that a logical positivist philosophy of science fails to recognise the way in which research may be used to generate theory, rather than collect data to test an already 'existing theory. Research, it is suggested, can be used to generate 'grounded' theories rather than forcing data into a preconceived 'objective' reality. Grounded theory can be considered to be of two types, 'grounded substantive theory' which concerns the nature of social relations in one setting, and 'grounded formal theory', the study of many settings that would seek to generalise about the recurrent characteristics of an aspect of social life. The research reported here, stands within the action research perspective. Those doing action research would argue, as suggested above, that it is a characteristic of social life that individuals themselves can and do interpret reality. The action researcher considers this valid data and places these interpretations into the context of academic theories and an academic discipline. However there are aspects of social life upon which the actor himself or herself reflects very little, for example on the taken-for-granted meanings associated with his or her own behaviour. This would be especially true of the analysis of intersubjectivity with which this thesis is concerned. Therefore the research method to be used in this research is participant observation, in detail, of mother-child interaction. This is described in Chapter 3. From this observation a 'grounded substantive' theory is developed in Chapter 4, and from this the first steps toward a 'grounded formal' theory are taken in Chapter 5. The aim in this study is to understand the nature of the intersubjectivity between mother and child, and between mothers and their children of
different social class groups. While the individual mother often thinks
her actions are entirely unique to her as a person, the aim here is to
interpret the typical acts of typical mothers, by the development of
a grounded theory of framing including the identification of types of
metacommunication between the mother and the child. The actual theory
of framing presented in Chapter 4 and developed in Chapter 5 arose out
of the data, but the data was not entirely viewed without preconceived
ideas of things to look for. In this instance the idea of this research
grew out of an interest in Bernstein's sociolinguistic codes and his
concepts of 'classification' and 'frame'. Consequently, Bernstein's
concept of 'frame' is one of the bases of the theory of framing
developed in Chapter 4.

Chapter 2 discusses the existing literature on Bernstein's work,
including language, socialisation and social class; as well as a
discussion of the literature on the child's development of language,
'intersubjectivity', and mother-child interchanges, and some of the
uses of the concept 'social class' in social science research. The
discussion of this literature could be considered to form the background
to the study before the data collection began, and provides reasons
for the method of approach to the problem area. This chapter also
contains a discussion of the literature on 'frame'. The actual order
of presentation of material in the first part of the chapter is: firstly,
the mother-child interaction literature and then secondly, language,
socialisation and social class and thirdly the discussion of some uses
of the concept 'social class' in social science research. The
presentation of this material in this order might be thought to involve
a specific view of the relation between individuals and the society
within which they exist, in that the focus here is initially on
mother-child interchange which secondly is put into a wider social
context. Put crudely, this approach might be taken at first glance
to be of a 'psychological determinism', where for example the
explanation of social behaviour is the expression of a 'gregarious instinct' or an 'instinct of imitation', or in the acceptance of a postulated trait of suggestibility as the basis for responsiveness to propaganda (examples from McCloed, 1958). The organisation of this chapter could have been the other way round with consideration of social class and socialisation first, and then mother-child interchange secondarily. Again, put crudely, this approach might be taken at first glance to be of a 'sociological determinism'. This involves the acceptance of the structures and processes of society as defined by the sociologist as the true co-ordinates for the specification of social behaviour and experience. From this point of view the political party for example in which the individual possesses membership is regarded as an institution of society, possessing the manifold properties and functions which a many sided sociological investigation reveals, rather than as the political party as it is apprehended and reacted to by the individual. The process of social adjustment, of socialisation or of attitude formation and so on thus becomes defined in terms of a set of norms which have reality for the scientific observer, but not necessarily for the individual concerned (example from McCloed, 1958).

While agreeing with Coward and Ellis (1977) and Volosinov (1975) for example, that the 'human' can be analysed as a 'socially constituted process which plays a material role in society' (Coward and Ellis) and that 'the study of ideologies does not depend on psychology to any extent and need not be grounded in it ..... it is rather the reverse; objective psychology must be grounded in the study of ideologies'. It is felt that this is not the place to develop ideas towards a materialist analysis of the 'subject'. How this might look, and its ramifications on existing theories, and how the work presented here would (or would not) contribute, would be a rather lengthy project and would perhaps be out of place here. The recently started journal 'Ideology and
Consciousness' (1977-) sets out to explore these ideas.

In defence of the criticism of 'psychological determinism' it should be stated that emphasis in this thesis is on the interchanges between human subjects and how this 'subjectivity' comes about. In a sense it is 'not the dancers but the dance' that is considered important in this thesis, and how the dance is regulated by structural (and social structural) principles. The title of this thesis could have involved the 'Framing of Transactions between Mothers and their Infants'. The usual descriptive term is 'Interaction'. This term, Pearson (1974) suggests, 'refers to the effect upon each other of organised, detached entities such as behaviour of billiard balls or gas molecules. The notions of classical physics such as the Newtonian Laws of Gravity are based on interaction concepts. So is the term 'Interpersonal relations', insofar as it describes the effects upon each others behaviour of discrete personalities. Transaction ...... describes the interpretation of reverberating and reciprocal effects of processes ...'. In this sense the focus of the analysis in this thesis is on the events between people, as for example, a 'double bind' always binds both parties who should not be considered just 'binder' and 'bound', but also two victims each bound in a paradoxical system of communication.

Consequently the emphasis in this thesis is not on traditional 'psychological social psychology' concerns but on the 'pragmatics of human communication'; on the dynamics of the communications between people, producing changes within people as the communications proceed over time. It is felt that the word 'Interchanges' in the title 'Social Class Differences in the Framing of Interchanges by Mothers for their Infants' sums this up probably as adequately as 'transaction' (the word 'Interchanges' is from Shutter (1974a): 'I say Interchanges rather than Interactions, as only things which remain unchanged in their encounters interact'.)
1.3 The approach to be used in this research contrasted to a 'social problems' approach

An academic interest in the 'social problem' of social class differences in language and socialisation probably dates from the work of Irwin (1943a and 1943b). Since then probably the most attention has been devoted to this area in the United States, during the late 1960's. Specifically here, emphasis was given to the problems of 'poor' children (usually black). It could be considered that one unintended outcome (it could be argued - intended outcome) of this research was to head off Ghetto revolt and turn a 'social problem' into an Individual psychological problem. The 'blame the mother' trend of this research will be mentioned later. The actual outcome of much of this research was to produce 'remedial' programmes whose own unintended consequences (again it could be argued - intended consequences) was to try to integrate the working class with the norms and conventions of middle class society. (This is an argument made for example by Dittmar (1976) returned to in section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2). In this thesis this research will not be discussed in detail, although some of it may be thought to be relevant. Ginsberg (1972) provides a detailed discussion of this literature in his analysis of the 'myth of the deprived child'. Dittmar (1976) also reviews some of these studies. There is no doubt that poor (working class) black children in the ghettos of the United States; New York and Los Angeles, or in Great Britain; in Birmingham or Bradford face numerous difficulties of the sort induced by poor housing, unemployment, racial discrimination and an overall political climate in Great Britain fostering the growth of the National Front. Their condition is an obvious social problem, but is it a scientific problem? Shottier (1974b) comments that social problems are often not scientific problems at all, but political ones, and as such are more amenable to political
solutions than to technical ones: 'Now there is clearly pressure at the moment for a more socially responsible (or is it socially relevant?) science, especially of course, in the social sciences themselves. But here, I think, scientists must be careful; for science may find itself embracing or saddled with problems which, as I have already mentioned, have little or anything to do with science; academic psychologists may concern themselves or be pressed to take on problems as part of their intellectual responsibility which are, in fact, not within that sphere at all. Now it is not surprising that this is a real tendency just at the moment: it is part of the whole technocratic tendency of our times to see all problems, including social problems as amenable to technological solution: they are not to be seen as problems to be solved by a change in values and interests, and thus by understanding our situation in a new way by changing its meaning; they are to be accepted as what they seem, *prima facie* and solved by discovering a suitable technique of control - all problems are to be seen in this light, and if they cannot, then they must be reformulated so that they can' (Shotter, 1974b). This research is not to be seen in this way, as adding to the technology of psychological control whereby powerful people can control others, powerful social classes can control the less powerful social classes. The aim of this research is the understanding of what goes on between mothers and children of different social classes, so that ultimately mothers themselves may have greater understanding of their own behaviour. Rather than prediction and control, then, this research will seek understandings 'so that by understanding more clearly what we are and the situation or 'position' we occupy, we may be able to describe explicitly the possibilities available to us all for what we might do next, for what we might make of ourselves and our world'. (Shotter, 1975).
This discussion is considered important in that it is considered, following Shotter, that the scientist has a moral responsibility not only to genuinely pursue some sort of scientific enquiry, but to deal with the uses to which the research is put.

The organisation of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 contains a discussion of the literature that provides a background to the 'problem area' and a reason for the method of approach chosen. Also, Chapter 2 contains a discussion of the literature on 'frame' that provides the background to the grounded 'theory of framing' developed in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the research method, the sample, and the problems of data collection by videotape in a participant observation situation. Chapter 4 contains the discussion of a 'grounded substantive theory of framing'. Chapter 5 seeks to generalise, develop and apply the theory of framing to the social class differences between the three groups of mother-child pairs to firstly, develop a 'grounded formal theory of framing' and secondly, comment upon any social class differences found. Chapter 6 summarises the outcomes of previous Chapters, and discusses the major conclusions.
Chapter 2. Review of the literature relevant to this study

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2.2 The child's development of language, 'intersubjectivity', and mother-child interchanges

2.2.1 Introduction

2.2.2 Early child language and the study of mother-child interchanges

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2.3 Language, socialisation and social class, with reference to the work of Basil Bernstein

2.3.1 Introduction

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2.4.1 Introduction

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2.6 'Frame' and 'Framing': a review of the literature

2.6.1 Introduction

2.6.2 Uses of 'frame' in the literature

2.6.3 Conclusion

2.7 The literature on the concepts 'symmetry' and 'complementarity'

2.7.1 Introduction

2.7.2 Symmetrical and complementary interaction

2.7.3 Conclusion
2.1 Introduction

This chapter contains a discussion of the existing literature relevant to this thesis. Firstly, the literature on mother-child interchanges will be considered, along with the concept of 'Intersubjectivity' that may be said to exist between the mother and child, that enables the infant to develop and express meanings nonverbally, and then accomplish, it is thought, the transition to language. One of the major criticisms made of the literature concerning mother-child interchanges is that researchers have failed to take 'context' of the interchange seriously. The 'theory of framing' developed in Chapters 4 and 5 is an attempt to describe the dynamic nature of the context provided by the mother for her pre-language child, so secondly, the literature on 'framing' will be considered.

To some extent the theory of framing developed in this thesis involves examination of the 'taken for granted' elements in the mother's behaviour with her child. This could be considered to be within the sociological 'school' of ethnomethodology. However, one of the more important criticisms of the 'phenomenological' sociologies such as ethnomethodology is that this approach to the analysis of the process of social life makes the social structure an 'idealist construction, the creation of men's minds' (Sharpe and Green, 1975). Clicourel (1973), for example, seems to equate people's sense of social structure with the social structure itself. In other words, phenomenological sociologies seem to take the negotiation of meanings between 'creative knowing subjects' in 'the social construction of reality' to be central and do not recognise the existence of meanings derived from elsewhere in the social structure. An adequate explanation of social processes must allow for the constructed character of the social world as a product of human agency, but at the same time recognise that 'the negotiation of social order is not a free one,
and is limited by a structured set of constraints (Hargreaves 1977). Hargreaves continues 'the (ethnomethodological) idea of emergent situations through the free negotiation of meanings is founded upon an implicit notion of interpersonal relation as informal and symmetrical, and subsequently of the world as a democratically negotiated reality. On the occasions when ethnomethodologists have analysed conversation in the context of asymmetric relations, this has necessitated a sharp break from the central principles of ethnomethodological analysis.

In this case, conversational analysis is made possible through an a priori recognition of the stronger interaction rights which attach to some membership categories in society. To avoid this criticism, this thesis will attempt to put the study of the processes of mother-child interchange and its 'taken-for-granted' into a wider social content by considering social class differences in the framing of interchanges between mothers and their infants. Consequently a third section in this chapter contains a discussion of language, socialisation and social class, with reference to the work of Basil Bernstein. This section contains a discussion of the sociolinguistic codes thesis as well as Bernstein's attempts to analyse the transmission of culture and symbolic systems of different social classes, from generation to generation, via the concepts 'classification' and 'frame'.

A fourth section in this chapter considers some of the uses of 'social class' in social science research, including Bernstein's use of social class.

The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 contains a discussion of the literature on the child's development of language, 'intersubjectivity', and mother-child interchange. Section 2.3 contains a discussion of language, socialisation and social class with reference to the work of Basil Bernstein. Section 2.4 will consider
some uses of 'social class' in Social Science Research, and section 2.5 summarises previous sections.\(^{(1)}\) As stated in chapter 1, this research may be seen as an attempt to develop a grounded theory of framing. Consequently, sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 contain a discussion of the literature that could be considered to form the background to the study before the data collection began, and provide reasons for the method of approach to the problem area. Also, as suggested in Chapter 1, the actual theory of framing arose out of the interpretation of the data, but the data was not viewed without any preconceived ideas of things to look for. In this instance the idea of this research grew out of an interest in Bernstein's sociolinguistic codes and his concepts of 'classification' and 'frame'. Consequently, Bernstein's concept of 'frame' is one of the bases of the theory of framing developed in chapter 4. Section 2.6 of this chapter considers the literature on 'framing', and section 2.7 the concepts 'symmetry' and 'complementarity' used in chapter 4 to characterise the mother-child meta-communication system.

2.2 The child's development of language, 'Intersubjectivity' and mother-child interchanges

2.2.1 Introduction

This section will consider the existing literature on firstly, early child language and the study of mother-child interchange, and secondly, the study of mother-child interchange from the perspective of a hermeneutic psychology, including the analysis of 'Intersubjectivity'.

2.2.2 Early child language and the study of mother-child interchanges

Much of the recent research on 'language acquisition' has transferred its focus of attention away from the child's 'acquisition'...\(^{(1)}\) The reader is referred to the discussion in section 1.2 of chapter 1, relating to the organisation of these sections.
of language as a system of formal rules (after Chomsky 1957 and 1965), to the analysis of the development of language closely related firstly to the social and cognitive skills which children have acquired in the 'prelinguistic' phase, and secondly to the language they hear— all in an ongoing communicational context. Thus emphasis has changed from the order of acquisition of transformational rules (Slobin 1970) and the analysis of semantics of grammar in terms of deep and surface structures (Fillmore 1968) to the development of language to regulate joint activity and joint attention in a mother-child interchange context (Bruner 1975). This approach to language 'acquisition' has led to a detailed analysis of the mother-child communication system, and the skill of the mother and child in developing a network of nonverbally expressed meanings. This trend in the study of language 'acquisition' is to 'see children as learning to talk in a communicative situation which is well developed before the 'first word' is uttered...' (Lieven and McShane 1976). These authors suggest that there is no one point at which it is meaningful to describe children as 'having' or 'not having' language, when it is their linguistic and communicative behaviour that is considered. Thus the use of the term 'acquisition' is in itself revealing, it reveals an approach to language that implies that language is an extraneous object of knowledge for children which is first 'acquired' and then 'used'. They suggest that many of the issues that characterise language development debates are not conducted at the level of specifics within a generally accepted theoretical framework but are at the level of how to conceptualise the process.

The conceptual approach prior to Chomsky (1957) was largely quantitative and normative in character. Using large samples of children, this research, suggest Lieven and McShane (1976), attempted to describe group differences on various measures of language such as 'number of words used', 'age at which a particular construction was
first used'. Later studies approached language with an emphasis on structure due largely to Chomsky's (1959) review of Skinner's 'Verbal Behaviour'. Chomsky suggested that in learning to speak, children do not simply learn a repertoire of sentences but must acquire a set of rules which is capable of generating an infinite number of sentences. This approach had as its goal, a description of the proposed rules of transformational-grammar children were thought to use in constructing their utterances. The rules of transformational grammar operate on 'deep structures' which have a complex relation to 'surface structures'. Consequently, children have no direct exposure to the transformation rules and it does not 'seem reasonable to argue that they would arrive at the rules by guided inference' (Lleven and McShane, 1976). It was proposed by Chomsky (1965) that children have an innate 'language acquisition device' which enables them to construct a grammar of their language. The main argument for this 'language acquisition device' was that the speech that children hear is mostly 'unsystematic' and 'ungrammatical' and consequently it would be impossible for children to construct a grammar of their native language in such a short period of time from this 'degraded input'. Lleven and McShane (1976) suggest that this line of argument began to collapse, because of the negative argument that, because an adequate theory of language learning does not exist is not a sufficient reason for claiming that language is unlearnable and therefore innate. Also, the premises on which this conclusion was based were found to be unsound. Snow (1972) and Phillips (1973) for example demonstrated that mothers speech to children was far from 'unsystematic' and 'ungrammatical'. This research led to a more detailed consideration of the characteristics of mother-child interchanges during language learning. Alternative theories of language structure
emerged, many of which involved fewer assumptions about the process of language learning. These alternative theories all included semantics as a basic structural component. Bloom (1970) and Schlesinger (1971) for example, argued that children learn language by learning how to encode their semantic intentions in appropriate syntactic forms. They proposed that a child's early utterances represent a lack of syntactic development rather than a lack of semantic sophistication... (Lieven and McShane 1976). By offering a semantic characterisation of children's speech attention was focused on the origins of the meanings encoded in speech, but essentially, Lieven and McShane suggest; 'the nature of the enterprise was still the same: to characterise the structure of children's utterances.' It was argued that certain semantic relations were 'universal' in children's early utterances and were related to the 'universals' of cognitive development as outlined by Piaget. Brown (1973) suggests:

'The first sentences express the construction of reality which is the terminal achievement of sensory motor intelligence. What has been acquired on the plane of motor intelligence (the permanence of form and substance of immediate objects) and the structure of immediate space and time does need to be formed all over again on the plane of representation. Representation starts with just those meanings that are most available to it; propositions about action schemes involving agents and objects, assertions of non-existence, recurrence, location and so on.'

Thus meaning was seen to derive from the mental representation of experience and children begin to use a given linguistic form only when their cognitive abilities enable them to do so. Piaget's account of the development of sensory motor intelligence was seen as providing a theoretical framework within which to understand the cognitive
pre-requisites for the mastery of language structure. "Thus the emergence of concepts such as object, action and agent in cognition and language were now seen as being closely related" (Lieven and McShane 1976). Edwards (1973) for example is concerned with the 'interface between universal semantic relations and universal sensory-motor cognitions which meet in the content and process of language acquisition at the beginning of syntax in two word utterances'. In this paper it is argued that 'the nature of sensory-motor intelligence severely constrains the range of relational meanings expressed, including even the child's notions of possessive relations between persons and objects, of attributes of objects and his use of apparently "experiential" verbs.' Most of the accounts of language development so far have been attempts to characterise the language structure of children who were at least 18 months old and producing at least some 2 word utterances. Such studies it could be considered have shed a considerable amount of light on language development, or at least its structural aspects. As Lieven and McShane (1976) comment: 'to ask only structural questions about any developmental phenomenon is not likely to prove a successful procedure for explicating the process of development because, in development, structure and function are intimately related. Undue attention to structural considerations has led to a neglect of what children are trying to accomplish in using language'. Consequently the most recent approach to language learning has considered that, by being embedded in a system of social interaction that structure and function interrelate in language development. 'In learning to request, greet, protest, refer, inform, children learn both the conventions of communication and its most effective medium: language' (Lieven and McShane 1976). Consequently children use language to participate in social activities, and in participating they learn the conventions for the management of verbal
exchanges and the role of language within these exchanges. Bruner (1975) sums up thus:

'It follows from this that research on the onset of language must examine the prerequisite sensory, motor, conceptual, and social skills whose co-ordination makes language possible. To do so, alas, we must abandon in large part the grammar-writing procedures of the developmental linguist. For it is no longer sufficient to collect a corpus of spoken language for which successive grammars may be written, though these grammars may yield valuable hypotheses about the psychological processes. Instead one must find ways of investigating the constituent skills involved in language. And typically one begins well before language begins, following the communicative behaviour of particular children...' Bruner (1975) then goes on to explore in detail the relation of aspects of pre speech communication to more advanced linguistic forms of expression. Consequently this leads again to consideration of mother-child interchange in that the child's language development takes place within a social environment, where, for example increasing mastery is demanded from the child as a participant in social interchanges. Lieven and McShane (1976) suggest that 'the successful realisation of one's cognitions - thoughts, meanings or intentions in speech is a considerable social skill'. For language to express thoughts it must do so within a system of conventions about how much information it is appropriate to give, what the speaker can legitimately presuppose of the hearer, how to introduce a topic of conversation (see for example Ram metveit, 1974). Successful communication is not always easily achieved as Lieven's (1975) examples of mother-child conversations make clear. Lieven and McShane (1976) continue:

'We hypothesise that the ease with which any language structure is mastered, given an appropriate level of cognitive development, is
critically dependent on how well a child has already mastered the social conventions of conversation and how sensitive his audience is to his initial attempts to introduce new structures into conversation'. Thus, the emergence of structure and its appropriate use, it is thought according to this approach, takes place against the background of conventions and shared assumptions about the roles that language plays in daily life. To be able to use a language successfully involves the 'initiation of the child into a system of conventions about what speakers and listeners expect of each other in the joint regulation of social activities, the exchange of information and the day-to-day pleasantries that make up the use of language' (Lieven and McShane 1976).

Edwards (1975) suggests that 'face-to-face relationships are inherently communicational. From birth onwards an infant becomes increasingly able to engage in social exchanges with his caretakers, getting his needs met and out-of-reach objects handed to him through reaching, smiling, looking, crying and vocalising. The infant's caretakers talk to him throughout, and it is within this context that the child's first linguistically realised messages come to be expressed. Children learn language as a means for the expression of messages in the mediation of ongoing social relationships, so that nearly all early language tends to serve some social-communicational purpose...' Edwards considers that cognitive and social relational competence overlap to the extent that the child's involvement in social relationships requires 'cognition of what persons are, of what they can do, of oneself as a person, and of the general world of persons, objects, space and time within which the social relationships take place'. Similarly the child's cognitions of the immediate physical world include 'some understanding of the social world
and of who particular persons are, what kinds of actions they can be requested to perform and so on. Further, as Snow (1972 and 1976), Phillips (1973), and Conghurst and Stepanich (1975) and Lieven (1975 and 1976) argue, far from being 'degraded input to a L.A.D.', the speech of a mother to a younger child is modified as compared with speech to an older child or to an adult, in that it is syntactically simpler and more redundant. Longhurst and Stepanich (1975) suggest that the mothers of language learning children consciously or unconsciously employ these strategies to train their children in language skills, which have a direct bearing on subsequent language acquisition.

In a later paper Edwards (1977) suggests that the mother is not only a source of specially adapted language input to the child, but a person 'who is able to take into account the infant's intentions, read significance into his actions, anticipate him and engage him in reciprocal interactions out of which the infant is able to learn how language codes messages that already occur in the mother-child discourse'. The mother sets up the context for the child; she sets up the parameters of the discourse, supplying the structure and its meaning, commenting on the child's actions and their consequences, providing linguistic expressions to code these and other objects of the child's attention. She participates in the child's actions using language integrated with looks and delictic gestures which both follow and guide the child's actions and visual attention, supplying them with structure and meaning. The mother provides, in the words of Shutter (1974a) 'instructions in the course of play ... in the possible meanings and uses to which the child himself may put his own states of feeling and patterns of action'.

It is suggested here that one major criticism that may be aimed at the above studies and many others in the social sciences is that
they have failed to take the content of the mother-child interchange, or the context of use of a specific linguistic construction seriously. Wilden (1972) in his discussion of Piagetian theory, for example, suggests that 'Piaget defines the environment of the child basically as 'psychobiological'. This term makes manifest the confusion Piaget shares with many others in social science, a confusion of levels of organisation, specifically between the child as a biological organism, the child as a 'psychological' person, and the child as a socioeconomic being. Nowhere in this conceptualisation of the child is there adequate recognition that the child is born into a social and economic ecosystem, to say nothing of the fact that under our present system, it is necessary to compete with others to sell one's labour potential and hence, one's 'self' in order to survive .... Where do we find it explained, for example, why some children must learn to be better commodities than others? On a different level, Hargreaves (1977) for example, suggests that 'with the notable exemption of Dittmar (1976), alternatives to Bernsteins conceptualisations of language have embraced very limited notions of "social context"'. Hargreaves comments that 'Dramaturgical interactionists' have substituted the notion of 'setting' for 'context'. A setting Hargreaves suggests constitutes 'the collection of artfully managed stage props or scenery which acts as the backdrop for the presentation of the interactional drama'. Many sociolinguists and psychologists view the 'situation', Hargreaves continues 'as a constellation of properties (such as topic, message-form, relationship between speakers) whose relationships are established in terms of correlations. Correlations often trivialise the variables they analyse'. Also, Hargreaves suggests, 'ethnomethodological analysis treats the social context as pure situationism. Despite the fact that speech and meaning are bound up with the situation of their
occurrence, situations are characterised only by their uniqueness in the sense that they are seen to be emergent from, at the same time as they provide a context for, interactional meanings! Hargreaves then goes on to develop a critique of ethnomethodology. Bowers (1973) also critically analyses the 'current tendency' to 'account for human behaviour in terms of the situation in which it occurs'. One of the few authors to treat the context seriously is Edwards (1975 and 1977) who argues in the former paper that 'studies of early language acquisition should treat 'contexts of use' more seriously, as less 'contextual' and more as the central object of study'. In the 1977 paper Edwards argues that 'language develops in a richly, social-relational context, and this is no passive context serving merely to provide appropriate (grammatical) linguistic input to some language acquisition device. Rather, the 'context' is itself the central nexus of interactions, meanings and messages which determines the semantic and pragmatic nature of children's early language. However, we are concerned not merely with the 'situational context' of particular individual utterances, as recorded by an outside observer. The context is cognitive-and social-psychological; it is the child's own growing social-relational competence, involving some implicit understanding of the structure and function of interactions and messages in which she or he is involved. The context of early language development is the context as perceived and interpreted by the child - the child's own understanding of his world and of his social relationships' (Edwards, 1977). In this thesis the 'context' is not the 'context as perceived and interpreted by the child' but the intersubjective context as perceived and interpreted by the mother-and-the-child as the dialogue proceeds. This is not the physical surrounds, although this may be important, but the 'context' that is the immediate past history of the current interchange in terms of the words, gestures and so on of the mother and the child prior to the present interchange.
One way of characterising this dynamic intersubjective context is developed in this thesis where it is suggested that the mother provides a 'framing' for the child's activity, and constructs (and instructs) the child's activity within this framing of the situation. The concept of 'framing' has the advantage of describing the context of the interchange, the situation and the roles of the participants within it as defined by the mother (initially at least) for the child. Also, the concept of framing has a temporal dimension in that any frame has a past history, and at any one moment in time it has a future - there is more of it to come. This theory of framing is developed in chapter 4 and 5. Finally, a detailed consideration of the intersubjective context has methodological implications as Edwards (1977) suggests:

'Clearly, in order to understand such processes, we need to have records which describe in some detail the situational and communicational contexts of early language, not only for each isolated utterance but for a variety of similar utterances, and indeed for interactions in which the child may utter nothing recognizably linguistic, and we need to consider the kinds of meanings that the child does not express as well as those that he does. Moreover, we have to consider the language and behaviour of those with whom the child interacts, and how and by whom such interactions are structured and initiated'.

Such considerations would point to the usefulness of videotape filming as a data collecting technique, as opposed to the traditional tape recorder. This is returned to in chapter 3.

2.2.3 The study of mother-child interchanges from the perspective of a hermeneutic psychology.

Although the study of mother-child interchanges from the perspective of a hermeneutic psychology overlaps considerably with the recent trend in research into the child's development of language considered
In the previous section, there is some difference in that the concern of a hermeneutic psychology as outlined by Gauld and Shotter (1977) is with wider issues: '... the problem perhaps most central to an hermeneutical psychology is the problem of how, within an extraordinarily brief period, a helpless and superficially inert neonate is transformed, or transforms himself, into a being which acts, has and implements intentions, and desires, is capable, up to a point, of rational thought; and continually attempts to interact and communicate with other beings similarly endowed...'

As suggested in section 2.2.2, Gauld and Shotter (1977) consider that it is through the mother that the child is able to become a partly autonomous being with complex intentions of his own. Through the mother, Gauld and Shotter (1977) suggest, the child is gradually inducted into the customs and practices of his or her society. Through her 'he discovers which is categorically to be done or not to be done, what may always be done or sometimes to be done, and which of the events going on in his vicinity are likely to concern him'. Gauld and Shotter (1977) argue that instead of looking at this process as a mechanical system of selective reinforcement of responses and stimuli, the interplay of mother and child should be viewed from a hermeneutical perspective 'in essentially the same terms as the mother herself regards it'. The mother regards her infant, Gauld and Shotter (1977) write: 'as to some extent an intelligent agent, having feelings, wishes, intentions, hopes, fears, thoughts of his own, and in her endeavours to influence his activities she treats him as such. She applies to him not necessarily self-consciously simplified versions of techniques one might apply to an adult who did not understand one's language if one had to attempt to make him grasp the concepts, customs or rules of one's culture. She establishes a 'dialogue', she seizes...
upon shared foci of attention and marks significant events, she likewise marks such of the infant's actions as she considers appropriate to his situation; she discourages inappropriate behaviour; having established appropriate behaviour, behaviour intelligible to her, she tries to enlarge the infant's grasp of why it is appropriate, and she looks for signs that he is beginning to grasp its significance'. For example, Gauld and Shotter (1977) quote the work of Macfarlane (1974) to suggest that from the moment of birth babies are treated by their mothers as 'partners in a personal relationship', and Newson and Newson (1975) to suggest that the infant's 'action sequences are temporally organised so that they can mesh with a high degree of precision' with similar patterns of action produced by the human caretaker. Gauld and Shotter (1977) quote Trevarthen (1974) and Schaffer (1974) to suggest that the 2 month old infant's 'pre-speech' and hand and arm movements are developmentally related to the gestures of adults involved in animated conversations, and that these 'synchronised' communicative gestures tend to occur in rhythmic sequences so that the mother and infant can engage in 'dialogues' as: 'the infant will for a while listen attentively to the mother, and, when the mother halts expectantly will 'reply' with the vocalisations, mouthing and gestures of pre-speech'. Gauld and Shotter (1977) suggest a fundamental feature of such dialogues as they develop is described by Newson and Newson (1975) as follows:

'Within the two-way interaction games which ordinary mother spontaneously play with their babies, a very large number of actions which the baby makes are interpreted as communication gestures in the sense that they are incorporated into the dialogue. From the baby's standpoint, these particular actions are apparently rendered significant by the quality and timing of the mother's gestural and vocal reciprocations. The effect is to highlight
or 'mark' certain events as having special significance, and hence to punctuate the contribution which the baby is making according to a pattern of meaningfulness which is, to some extent, being imposed by the more sophisticated partner...

Gauld and Shotter (1977) suggest that in most early mother-child 'dialogues' it is common to find the mother 'marking' certain of the baby's gestures by imitating them, which it is thought, leads to the development of 'turn-taking games' and 'the innumerable kinds of "give and take" games involving role reversal. And further, Gauld and Shotter (1977) suggest that 'mothers are able to "mark" objects to which the infant transiently attends by in some way or another incorporating them into the ongoing dialogue'. Some infants of 4 months old, and most infants of 9 months, can follow the mother's line of regard when she looks at some spot which is not near either of them and Gauld and Shotter (1977) suggest 'once this is established further possibilities are opened up for the mother's 'marking' - even unconsciously marking - objects and events of significance to her infant...'. Gauld and Shotter (1977) continue: 'further methods of 'marking' come into play when the mother wishes not merely to show the child some object or event of potential significance, but to induce him to perform some object-related action. In such instances mothers not merely mark the object by looking at it, pointing to it, manipulating it etc.; they may put the baby through the correct movements, model the required behaviour themselves, etc...'. 'Furthermore', Gauld and Shotter (1977) emphasise, 'mothers are not satisfied merely with extracting a correct response from their infants. They test the character of the child's responses to see if he has any knowledge of the significance of what he is doing, to see, as it were, whether he did what he did because he understood that that was what he was supposed to do'. Gauld and Shotter (1977) here quote the observations reported
In Shetter and Gregory (1976), in this paper it was suggested that mothers 'instruct' their children in the course of their play with them, 'in the possible meanings and uses which the child himself may put on his own states of feeling and patterns of action' thereby making determinate what was previously indeterminate. These authors describe an incident during an experiment in which a mother was attempting to show her child (aged 11 months) how to place shaped pieces on a formboard. The mother, having just helped the child to a 'success' said:

'Oh, clever girl ... (pause) ... Aren't you clever!'

What is unusual here is, the authors suggest, that after a short pause the mother bent forward to catch the child's eye and repeated her 'marker': 'Aren't you clever!' but with the emphasis which suggested 'look, I really am telling you that you are a clever girl'. The trouble was, the authors interpret, that the child had not 'replied' to her mother's vocalisation as the mother required. The mother expected a reply of some kind, she expected her infant to 'stop the flow of her activity, turn to look at her and smile; she expects, perhaps, to see her child visibly relax, to cease for a moment her concentration on the board and to sense that peculiar state of being which we may have with another person when they require us neither to be agents or patients; she wants her child to know that by her action she has succeeded in doing something which is socially significant, that her action is one which in this situation makes sense'. Gould and Shetter (1977) comment: 'Mothers, then, are not just satisfied with their children doing the tasks that they require of them. The children must also indicate that their actions were based in some knowledge of the socially defined requirements of the situation - the child must indicate that she 'sees' the situation as the mother sees it'.

One further point here is that, as Gauld and Shotter suggest, children fairly quickly come to appreciate that adults expect such signs of understanding, and they develop generalized ways of giving them. A 'directed smile or a moment of shared gaze' may serve this purpose but in older but still pre-linguistic children, Gauld and Shotter suggest that what Bruner (1975) calls 'proclamative' functions may serve the same function. Thus at this point the interests of hermeneutic psychologists (Shotter and Gauld) coincide with students of language development (Bruner). Shotter and Gauld quote Bruner who says that proclamative vocalization:

'occurs at two points during joint action sequences: first, at a point where the infant is about to undertake his part of a jointly attended action, seemingly as an accompaniment to intention; second, when the act is complete. The vocalized babbling may be coincident with the child looking back at the mother or may precede it. The vocalization, in short, appears to be initiating or compleative with respect to an act embedded in a jointly attended task. In this sense, it may be considered as a 'candidate-comment' on an implicit topic'.

Gauld and Shotter comment in summary: 'We have proposed that it is because mothers treat their children to some extent as if they were purposeful, concept possessing and social creatures that children come to have concepts and purposes and to be socialised', which is one of the central points of the hermeneutic psychology they outline. The authors do attempt to put the hermeneutic study of mother-child interchange into a wider social context, in that they suggest that 'styles of mothering' are of considerable importance in determining the nature of and the development of the mother-child 'dialogue' and the child's 'capacity to develop and implement
Intentions'. Gauld and Shotter (1977) then refer to Hess and Shipman (1965) and Tulkin and Kagan (1972) to suggest that there may be social class differences. It seems reasonable to agree with Gauld and Shotter that 'mothers are participants in social institutions which have a long history, and they act in a way that seems to them the only 'natural' way to act. And as 'carriers' of the institutional practices they have 'inherited', they pass on their ways of going on'. However, Dittmar's (1976) review of studies related to 'class specific socialization' suggests that these studies may not support Gauld and Shotter's point because of various inadequacies.

Also, the more recently published work of Bernstein (1975) for example, and Bourdieu (1977) and Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) would suggest that this topic of 'class specific socialization' is more complicated than the psychological studies of Hess and Shipman and Tulkin and Kagan would suggest. This is returned to in section 2.3.

2.2.4 Intersubjectivity

Newson and Newson (1975) conclude their article in very much the same vein as Gauld and Shotter quoted above; they summarise their argument '... the basic human ability to structure knowledge in such a way that it can be shared - the ability to commune with others - derives initially from mother's 'natural' inclination to treat their babies as if they already had understanding. The term 'Intersubjectivity' has recurred throughout this paper. In using it, attention is being drawn to a fundamental proposition: that the origin of symbolic functioning should be sought, not in the child's activities with inanimate objects, but rather in these idiosyncratic but shared understandings which he first evolves during his earliest social encounters with familiar human beings who are themselves already steeped in culture'. And further, Newson and Newson suggest 'the general
proposition that the child's knowledge has its roots in his early social ability receives striking support from yet another source.

"Any function in the child's cultural development appears on the stage twice, on two planes, first on the social plane and then on the psychological, first among people as an intermental category and then within the child as an intramental category". (Vygotsky 1962). It is of particular interest that Vygotsky invokes the term 'intermental' which is hardly distinguishable from the term 'intersubjective' as we have used it in this paper. The notion of 'intersubjectivity' is of central importance to a 'theory of infant understanding'. (Hewson 1974)

Newson and Shotter (1974) explain the notion of intersubjectivity by way of the following illustration:

'Two people meet a third. Earlier, Jack and Jill had been discussing Ermindrude - 'She's such a name dropper. It's Larry Olivier's just told me this, and I just told Mick Jagger that. 'What a pain' " And now she stands before them. 'Oh, hello, there," she says, 'I've just told Mick Jagger that ..." and Jill catches Jack's eyes, and he flickers his eyelids so slightly in response. Jill has to look away to avoid laughing right then and there in Ermindrude's face, as that would be just too embarrassing.'

The authors comment that the flicker of the eyelids has a powerful effect - but it is a flicker with a history. The authors use the illustration to comment on a number of points: First, 'as a communicative act, it transmits no 'information' in the technical sense of sending a coded message from a source (Jack) to a receiver (Jill). The 'message' comes neither from Jack nor Jill; the act 'merely 'indicates' an understanding already shared between them'. Secondly, 'the flicker is opaque to Ermindrude (or any other observer) who does not know that history'. Thirdly, the meaning of the flicker
Is not based on a conventional system of gestures, utterances, or expressions, for there was no prior agreement between Jack and Jill that he would use an eyelid flicker as he did. But Jill, facing the same circumstances as Jack, and recalling his attitude from her earlier conversation with him, requires the merest hint of confirmation from him that they share that attitude now. And fourthly, 'the timing of the response suggests to Jill that they do share the attitude. 'Thus, feeling that they understand one another, they then deal with Ermintrude, interpreting one another's actions through their shared understanding'.

To return to a point made in section 2.2.2, it is the shared interpersonal context that is important, in this discussion of intersubjectivity, in enabling the two participants, precisely because they share it, to reach agreement on 'the taken for granted' for the present situation. The mother and child have, over a period of many months developed a shared network of 'understandings' between them and it is this context that enables the infants activities to be 'understandable' to the mother. As Newson and Shotton (1974) observe, while making a methodological point: 'the identification of the significant events must remain the province of the empathic human observer. Indeed it may even be the case that at the proverbial level of communication, the mother herself will sometimes be the only person who can identify certain communication gestures which her baby is currently making, because only she shares a history of common communication experience with that baby'.

Also, the central importance of the interpersonal context is illustrated in the episode outlined above where an understanding of the eyelid flicker comes from an understanding of the previous events, in this case the dialogue, between Jack and Jill. Thus Jack and Jill feel that they understand one another because of their interpretations of the intersubjective context of the incident.
This concept of 'intersubjectivity' is essentially the same as that of Rommetvelt (1974), who examines the 'architecture of intersubjectivity' from, for example, the perspective of Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. Rommetvelt uses the following example to illustrate aspects of his analysis of intersubjectivity. It will be used here to indicate the importance of the intersubjective context to an understanding of interchanges. Rommetvelt uses (1974, p. 90) the idea of the 'battleships game'. An object is located in one of the cells of a square of 16 cells (see figure 2.1). One person knows where it is located, but the other does not. The task for the second person is to locate the appropriate cell.

The dialogue might then proceed as follows:

1. "Is it in the right half?"   "No"
2. "Is it in the upper half of the left half?"   "Yes"
3. "Is it in the right half of the upper half?"   "No"
4. "Is it in the upper half of the left half?"   "No"

Rommetvelt comments that there is in operation a 'tacitly endorsed contract' whereby the assumption is made that the participants are talking about the same square which then 'constitutes the initially shared, or free information on to which (the) first question is rested or bound'. Consequently the word 'square' does not enter our dialogue at all despite the fact that message transmission at every single stage is based upon this assumption that the two of us have the same
particular square in mind. And, of course, any third party entering the room at this point and not sharing therefore the 'free information' of the 'tacitly endorsed contract' would not understand the conversation just as Ermintrude would not understand the eyelid flicker, if she saw it, in the Newson and Shottter example. This third party would not understand because they would not share the intersubjective context of the interaction.

A second point of interest in this illustration is the 'progressive reduction in the initial state of uncertainty' as the dialogue and the situation progresses. Rommetvelt comments 'notice thus, how my answer at every successive stage is rested on to what at that particular stage has already been established as a shared social reality (or unquestioned, free information). Notice, furthermore, how my answer at stage \( n \) is tacitly presupposed in your question at stage \( n + 2 \). Both of us know - and know that the other knows - after stage (1) that the object is located somewhere in the left half of the square (in figure 2.1). This shared knowledge is a prerequisite for what is made known at stage (3) even though at that stage tacitly taken for granted by both of us'. The relevant point here is that the 'free information' grows as the dialogue and situation progresses. The 'context' therefore is not to be considered as static in terms of a fixed amount of information intersubjectively shared at the start of the dialogue. A related methodological point here is that the dialogues and mother-child interchanges need to be observed over a period of time, such that the 'free information' of the taken for granted aspect of the mother's behaviour can be observed, and analysis of the intersubjectivity proceed. The discussion of 'time' as an important variable is returned to in section 4.4.5 of chapter 4.

(2) This could be thought to be imposing limited capabilities on people's understandings of intersubjectivity and what is going on in interaction. If Ermintrude caught the eyelid flicker between Jack and Jill, she might not understand its full significance in that she does not share its specific intersubjective context. She might however think something is going on here concerning her that she, intersubjectively, does not share and may look for further clues in Jack's, Jill's, or her own behaviour.
2.2.5 Conclusion

To conclude this section, it is suggested that one of the important points made in the discussion of mother-child interchanges in this section is that the recent trend in the study of the child's language development has been to focus on the network of intersubjectively shared meanings between mother and child. It is this, it is thought, that enables the child to develop and express meanings nonverbally and then accomplish the transition to language. However, these studies have failed to take seriously the 'context' of any interchange. By 'context' is meant the social psychological context provided by the mother for the child as the interchange proceeds over time. Also, it is suggested that this 'intersubjective context' cannot be considered static, but increases as an amount of free information during the interaction.

Also, related to the analysis of the 'intersubjective context' the mother provides for the child are two methodological points. Firstly, mother-child interchanges and dialogue must be observed over a period of time so that analysis of the 'taken-for-granted' of the intersubjectivity can proceed. Secondly, it is important to be able to consider interchanges where the child may 'utter nothing recognisably linguistic', where in fact the interchange proceeds on a nonverbal level. Both of these points lead to the use of a videotape film data collecting technique.

Finally, researchers working in the area of intersubjectivity and mother-child interchange have failed to consider social class differences (apart, that is, from the brief and perhaps inadequate discussion in Gould and Shuttle 1977 mentioned earlier). The literature on social class and socialisation is discussed in the following section.
2.3 Language, Socialisation and Social Class, with reference to the work of Basil Bernstein

2.3.1 Introduction

This section will consider the work of Basil Bernstein on language, socialisation and social class to place the study of the intersubjectivity of mother-child interchanges and its 'taken-for-granted assumptions' into a wider social context. This section will consider firstly, in section 2.3.2, the sociological and sociolinguistic analysis of social class differences, that is, the sociolinguistic codes thesis. Secondly, in section 2.3.3 consideration will be given to Bernstein's use of the concepts 'classification' and 'frame' to analyse 'the transmission of symbolic systems in society', within social classes, between generations.

2.3.2 Sociolinguistic codes

Most of Basil Bernstein's work since 1954 has been directed to the analysis of the socialisation of working class children and middle class children into their respective social class groups. His theory of sociolinguistic codes involves elaborated and restricted language codes that are said to result from middle class and working class experience and lifestyle. These linguistic codes in turn perform a role in the continuation of the social class differences. The elaborated code, for example, is said to contribute to the success of the middle class in terms of educational achievement and restricted code is said to lead to the lack of 'success' of the working class. A restricted language code is said to arise where the form of social relations is based on an extensive range of shared expectations and a range of common assumptions, where the culture raises the 'we' above the 'I'. Here the use of a restricted code reflects social solidarity at the cost of verbal elaboration of individual experience. This is said by Bernstein to be generally true for working class culture. The elaborated code arises
where the culture emphasises the 'i' over the 'we', where the intent and experience of the other person cannot be taken for granted and therefore the speakers are forced to elaborate meanings and make them both explicit and specific. This is said by Bernstein to be typical of middle class culture. Consequently, Bernstein suggests different positions in the social structure create different speech codes and therefore differences in the planning procedures used in the preparation of speech and the orientation of the listener. Bernstein's (1961) version of the sociolinguistic codes can be found in Table 2.1. Bernstein quotes Sapir, Whorf, Luria, Vygotsky, Plaget, Head amongst others, including Durkheim and Malinowski to suggest that 'the social structure shapes the developing child's psychological reality by the shaping of his or her acts of speech'. Thus, children who have access to different speech codes, because of their different positions in the social structure, and related patterns of experience, family life and so on, may adopt quite different social and cognitive procedures and may consequently have very different experiences in the education system. In one of his more recent essays, Bernstein (1971a) refers to Durkheim and Marx, in order to trace the reproduction of the class structure to the influence of different 'symbolic systems'. In his opinion 'access to, control over, orientation of, and change in critical symbolic systems, according to the theory, is governed by power relationships as these are embodied in the class structure'. Thus Bernstein attempts to unite aspects of the work of various authors of different social science orientation in order to support his theory of the existence of the two different speech codes and their social and psychological implications. Bernstein (1972) has surveyed the most recent state of the distinctions relevant to the speech codes. He suggests therein that the term 'range of alternatives' can be
Table 2.1  Restricted and Elaborated Language Codes  
(from Bernstein 1961)

The characteristics of a 'restricted code' are as follows:

1. Short, grammatically simple, often unfinished sentences with a poor syntactical form (stressing the active voice).
2. Simple and repetitive use of conjunctions (so, then, because).
3. Little use of subordinate clauses to break down the initial categories of the dominant subject.
4. Inability to hold a formal subject through a speech sequence; thus a dislocated informational content is facilitated.
5. Rigid and limited use of adjectives and adverbs.
6. Infrequent use of impersonal pronouns as subjects of conditional clauses.
7. Frequent use of statements where the reason and conclusion are confounded to produce a categoric statement.
8. A large number of statements/phrases which signal a requirement for the previous speech sequence to be reinforced; 'Wouldn't it? You see? You know?' etc. This process is termed sympathetic circularity.
9. Individual selection from a group of idiomatic phrases or sequences will frequently occur.
10. The individual qualification is implicit in the sentence organisation: it is a language of implicit meaning.

The characteristics of an 'elaborated code' are as follows:

1. Accurate grammatical order and syntax regulate what is said.
2. Logical modifications and stress are mediated through a grammatically complex sentence construction, especially through the use of a range of conjunctions and subordinate clauses.
3. Frequent use of prepositions which indicate logical relationships as well as prepositions which indicate temporal and spatial contiguity.
4. Frequent use of the personal pronoun 'I'.
5. A discriminative selection from a range of adjectives and adverbs.
6. Individual qualification is verbally mediated through the structure and relationships within and between sentences.
7. Expressive symbolism discriminates between meanings within speech sequences rather than reinforcing dominant words or phrases, or accompanying the sequence in a diffuse, generalized manner.
8. It is a language use which points to the possibilities inherent in a complex conceptual hierarchy for the organizing of experience.
regarded as a central concept or link between role systems, types of
social control, planning strategies and speech forms. Codes are
elaborated or restricted, according to whether it is difficult or
easy to predict their linguistic alternatives; role systems are open
or closed, according to whether they permit or reduce range of
alternatives for realization of verbal meaning; families are person
oriented or positional, according to whether decision making is based
on the psychological (individual) qualities or formal (socially
defined) status of persons, implying a greater or lesser range within
which decisions are open to discussion. Communication systems are
open or closed, according to this last dimension (openness of decisions
to discussion); family type and communication system jointly entail
another important dimension, that of role discretion - in the person-
oriented, open type there is greater role discretion, i.e., greater
range of alternatives of the role in different social situations, while
in the positional, more closed type, there is less role discretion.
With modes of social control, matters are somewhat more complex;
personal and positional modes are both subtypes of appeal, itself
contrasted to the Imperative mode; but the basis of all three
distinctions is again role discretion (the range of alternatives accorded).
Two further dimensions multiply the range of alternatives within the
theory itself. With regard to role systems, two orders, or areas, of
meaning are noted, those of object and person, with respect to each
of which a role system might be open (encouraging novel meanings, hence
alternatives) or closed. There thus may be 'object' or 'person'
oriented codes, either elaborated or restricted. Later, two variants
for each type of code are suggested, considering whether the code is
used to explore (primarily) means or ends' (Bernstein 1972). Table
2.2 reproduces the possible combinations. On the basis of this,
Bernstein considers the specific code of a group, a family or an
Individual can be determined.

To do justice to Bernstein's theoretical work, and to his critics would involve a lengthy and detailed argument which would not be wholly relevant here. Dittmar (1976) provides what seems the most detailed and inclusive discussion of Bernstein's work. Dittmar suggests that there are weaknesses in Bernstein's thesis, of these the most important will be mentioned here. Dittmar considers that between 1958 and 1972 Bernstein has published over 30 essays on the sociolinguistic code thesis, in which can be found considerable variation in his attempts at definition and in the empirical material quoted in support. In fact Bernstein's early formulations were supported by only one empirical investigation. Thereafter his concerns were mainly theoretical; his followers (including Coulthard, Creed, Hawkins, Henderson, Lawton, Gahagan, Turner, Robinson and Cook-Gumperz) concentrated on empirical attempts at investigating the sociolinguistic code thesis. Dittmar suggests that in all of Bernstein's works, the definitions are imprecise and metaphorical and the terminology - as suggested above -

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<th>Table 2.2</th>
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P = person orientation; O = object orientation; E = elaborated; R = restricted; (e) = ends; (m) = means.
is altered from one essay to another. Consequently, Bernstein's conception of the sociolinguistic codes should be considered as a hypothesis that has never been clearly formulated. This causes considerable problems for its verification. The fact that the theoretical formulation of Bernstein's hypothesis is so inexplicit leaves considerable space for ideological padding. Because Bernstein's thesis is unsystematic, 'it allows a considerable degree of arbitrariness in the determination of the measurable characteristics that are to verify the differences postulated in speech behaviour on the sociological, psychological, and linguistic level of analysis' (Dittmar 1976).

Dittmar makes the point that 'restricted code' can easily be taken to mean, from Bernstein's work, 'linguistic deficit'. 'Linguistic deficit' can from Bernstein's work, and has been, equated with cognitive deficit. The linguistic characteristics of restricted code produces 'deficiencies in the working class person's ability to organise experience, and the restricted code has been considered less adequate than elaborated code to deal with certain aspects and modes of thinking. The acceptance of this view led to the development of several compensatory education programmes for example, Project Headstart in the United States. These projects, considered 'institutionalised racism' by such authors as Baratz and Baratz (1970), were aimed at black working class children, who were then trained to use an 'elaborated' language code. Bernstein considers this 'cognitive deficit' idea to result from a misinterpretation of his early work. In this claim he is supported by Grimshaw (1976):

'It seems to me that the radical and/or critical sociologist philosophers start rather with awareness of poverty and affluence (and exploitation and expropriation) in the aggregate and have then sought to delineate only the macro-institutional forces - failing to see, as Bernstein has, the ways in which...
those forces are constantly supported through the operation of the transmission agencies in producing populations with limited aspirations, organising skills etc. They further fail to see the reflexive influence of language on social structure. Marx and his followers have not been unaware of the hortatory power of words or of the uses of language in suppression and oppression (for domestic as well as colonial population), it is curious that they have not attended, in any systematic way, to the role of individual language abilities in the subordination of social categories. This theme, while frequently misunderstood and sometimes turned, Hegel like, upside down as in 'deficit theory' has been a consistent one throughout Bernstein's work.

However, an anti working class bias has been detected in Bernstein's work by Rosen (1972), Labov (1972) and Trudgill (1974). Trudgill re-interprets Bernstein's 'codes' as, less contentiously, 'style variations'. This idea does not suggest that the working class are linguistically deprived, linguistic styles should be considered to be equivalent ways of saying the same thing, although it may mean that working class children have a narrower range of stylistic options open to them than perhaps, the middle class child. This 'variability hypothesis' is considered in detail in Dittmar, who suggests this is more adequate than Bernstein's sociolinguistic codes. Even so, this does not mean equality of educational opportunity for the working class child (Hall,(1977), Keddie (1976) and Bowles and Gintis (1976)), or that teachers will desist from 'labelling' children in terms of Bernstein's sociolinguistic codes (Shafer 1978).

To return to Bernstein's work, Bernstein (1970) does seem to blame the family role system for the inferior verbal and intellectual performance of lower class children in comparison with middle class
children. Bernstein, as suggested earlier, considers the family as a network of interactions which leads to definite role constellations. Bernstein regards this role system as the social stage which brings about restricted and elaborated speech codes. A status-oriented family role system prevents the individual and communicational development and therefore orients the child to the use of a 'restricted code'; a person-oriented role system promotes behaviour determined by the individual and therefore orients the child to the use of elaborated speech forms. Bernstein takes the view that status-oriented and person-oriented role system are related to the lower class and the middle class respectively (after Bott (1957), but despite evidence that does not support this, see for example Platt (1969)). This formulation of Bernstein's thesis has led to psychological studies of socialisation of the child into social class groups that have concentrated their attention on mother-child interaction. Olim (1970), for example, suggests:

'The behaviour which leads to social, educational, and economic poverty is learned; it is socialised in early childhood. This socialisation takes place in large measure by way of language. Since the mother is the primary socialising agent in most instances, the learning takes place in the context of the mother-child communication system. The deprivation that leads to poverty is a lack of cognitive meaning and cognitive and linguistic elaboration in this communication system. The family control system of the socially deprived is one in which appeals to status and role predominate and this type of system, by offering the child predetermined solutions and a narrow range of alternatives of action and thought, limits the child's cognitive development'.
Lower class mothers, therefore, are said to 'elaborate their speech less than middle class mothers; they determine their child's behaviour to a great extent by appeals to status and give their child little stimulation for a rational and cognitive development of thought'. However, Dittmar (1976) critically reviews the following studies: Bernstein and Henderson (1969), Hess and Shipman (1965 and 1967), along with Gray and Kleus (1968), Robinson and Creed (1963), Deutsch (1967), Schatzmann and Strauss (1955), Templin (1957), Loben (1963) and Oevermann (1969), and others, and concludes: 'Overall, Bernstein's hypothesis finds little confirmation'. Dittmar continues that if there are some differences in maternal behaviour they are 'frequently insignificant, sometimes small, or even trivial'. Dittmar suggests that the studies reviewed 'do not attach enough value to the process of interaction. It is not enough merely to count the actual utterances of the mothers; what we really need is more information about the reciprocal communicative reactions of mother and child'. Dittmar also says 'none of the investigations are able to explain what influence maternal behaviour has on the cognitive development of the child. It is not even clear whether there is a strong influence at all. It is remarkable that there should be absolutely no proof of these correlations when one considers that all these studies presuppose a close relation between mother and child behaviour and even intend to make it the basis of compensatory programmes'. Dittmar suggests that the majority of these studies on the 'deficit hypothesis' are founded on 'normative methodological principles determined by middle class values. The middle class bias shows in that differences are not analysed in a functional sense but according to preconceived valuations. Such a procedure must support our supposition that research into class differences, as it is
promoted by society, is intended not so much to emancipate the lower class as to integrate it into the existing hierarchical structure of society. This process is called 'acculturation' of working class children into middle class culture by Keddie (1976).

The research engaged in by the students of Bernstein, where maternal attitude represents the major causative factor, typically take as their starting point the measurement of maternal attitude differences; questionnaires, rating scales and interviews are used to obtain data on social class differences in maternal views or practices and these are subjected to statistical analysis to yield major components. The resulting dimensions, suggests Salmon (1970) 'form the antecedents in the model and consequents are then looked for in child behavioural differences. Any associations found are built into the model and hypotheses advanced to account for the processes linking the two dimensions, these normally being expressed in some kind of reinforcement terms'. This can be considered psychologically, very naive, as the discussion in section 2.2.3 of this chapter suggests. Also, Salmon considers the methodological problem here is that the focus of the procedure is on individual differences measured first in the mother's attitudes or behaviour and then in the child's attitudes or behaviour, and the process whereby these two are argued to be linked, inevitably comes post hoc. Cook-Gumperz's (1973) research on the techniques of social control used by mothers and their children illustrates this point. This research was a unit within a larger study undertaken by the Sociological Research Unit at the Institute of Education, London University, under the guidance of Basil Bernstein. A total of 236 mother-child pairs took part in Cook-Gumperz's research, 120 pairs from a 'working class area' and 116 from a 'middle class area'. The
mothers were asked six 'probe' questions as part of a wide ranging, open ended questionnaire. Their children were asked questions, which were the same in content as, and similar in structure to, those asked of the mothers¹ (Cook-Gumper z's emphasis). These questions were asked of the children in 1966 and 1967 when they were 7 years old. The mothers had been asked the 'social control' questions two years earlier.

Cook-Gumper z grouped 24 maternal and child strategies of social control in terms of their predominant mode of control. This research, Cook-Gumper z claims, has uncovered a pattern of social class differences in the mothers presentation of social class rules to their children. It has, according to Cook Gumper z, shown that 'class differences are transmitted to children through class related parental perceptions of control relations, and it has shown some of the consequences of these differences...' for the 7 year old child. This study, it is considered, is typical of the whole of Bernstein's school of research in that it does not follow through the analysis into the child's cognitive processes. Henderson (1973) for example, examines social class differences in maternal reports of various contextual usages of language and one of her hypotheses is as follows: 'Middle class mothers would talk more frequently for cognitive reasons', but nowhere are the 'cognitive' reasons explained or any attempt made to integrate this with the literature of cognitive psychology. Also in the above study, Cook-Gumper z (1973) uses such terms as 'parent oriented cognitive-affective and cognitive complex appeals' where 'cognitive' is defined as 'this is where the mother offers an objective explanation of the consequences of the child's misdemeanour'. Again this can be considered psychologically, very naive. Richards (1971) points out that as long as the infant is considered to be passive, it is acceptable to look for correlations
between mothers attitude to child rearing, and therefore it is implied her maternal behaviour, and the behaviour of the infant. In fact, Richards suggests that very few convincing correlations have been found. Ginsberg (1972) for example, quotes Goldschmidt (1968) who computed 84 correlations of mother-child behaviour, 14 'conservation' scores with each of 6 parental measures. 74 of these were essentially nil, and 10 were statistically significant but these significant correlations were very small, for example a correlation of -.21 between the child's ability to conserve discontinuous quantities and the extent to which the mother is dominant. Ginsberg in fact points out that the number of significant correlations (10 out of 84) does not differ significantly from what is expected on a chance basis. This lack of correlation is not surprising, because the role of the infant in patterning the mother's behaviour is ignored. Apart from the large amount of research within the Piagetian tradition that would suggest that the infant is far from passive, Gauld and Shottler (1977) consider it might be less misleading to say that the infant is born striving and experimenting. By this we mean that however inchoate the infant's cognitive and conative tendencies they involve his striving to subdue the complexity of the world by categorizing its contents so as to handle them more easily; they involve his striving to participate in or to interact with that world, particularly that all embracing part of it constituted by the mother. Richards (1971) suggests that maternal behaviour can be thought of as having two major determinants. Firstly, the mother's general attitude, formed from experiences of her own mother, the social world in which she grew up and also contact with other people's children. This is the area that Bernstein and his

(3) There need not, of course, be any link between having an attitude and behaving in accordance with that attitude (Heritage, 1974
students have attempted to explore.\(^{(4)}\) Secondly, the mothers own experiences as a mother with her own unique infant or infants, each one with his or her own personality, characteristics, and signalling system negotiated with the mother. This determinant of the mother's behaviour, Bernstein and his students, because of their 'sociological determinism' have ignored. As Dittmar suggests, as quoted above, research is required on social class differences in mother-child interchanges that does not involve normative assumptions, but is aware of the complexity of the issues discussed in section 2.2, of this chapter.

2.3.3 'Classification' and 'Frame', and the 'transmission of symbolic systems in society'

Bernstein considers that only one strand of his work since 1954 Is concerned with the attempt to clarify the sociolinguistic codes.

\(^{(4)}\) It should be stated that there are alternatives to Bernstein's formulations of the relation between language, socialisation and social class. Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) for example suggests that each of the social classes have a 'cultural arbitrary', a deep structure 'habitus', which he considers to be the typical mode of interacting and acting on the world and other people that is associated with each social class, because of its relation to the means of production. The one 'cultural arbitrary' that is legitimised and imposed in any one society is that supporting the position of the dominant, politically ruling class. This imposition is a form of 'symbolic violence'. 'Every taxonomy, even the categories used to judge works of art refers back in the last resort, to the opposition between classes .... the classification struggle is one dimension, but doubtless the best concealed one, of the class structure'. Bourdieu suggests 'the manner of enquiring perpetuates itself in what is acquired, in the form of a certain manner of using the acquirement, the mode of acquisition itself expressing the objective relations between the social characteristic of the acquirer and the social quality of what is acquired'. So it is in the relation to language, Bourdieu suggests, that one finds the principle underlying the most visible differences between 'bourgeois language' and 'working class language'. 'Rhetorical devices, expressive effects, nuances of pronunciation, the uncoding of interpretation register of diction or form of phraseology by no means solely express the conscious choices of a speaker pre-occupied with the originality of his expression, all these stylistic features always betray, in the very utterance, a relation to language which is common to a whole category of speakers because it is the product of the social conditions of the acquisition and use of language'. Bourdieu suggests, echoing Bernstein's earlier work, that the working class are concerned with the mastery of practice (In the case of language) whereas the middle and upper classes are concerned with mastery of a relation to practice. Bernstein and his students, then, in Bourdieu's terminology, could be considered to be exploring the surface features of working class and middle class 'habitus'. 
The sociolinguistic thesis 'focuses upon the reproduction of class relationships as these shape the structure of communication, and its social basis in the family'. The other strand of Bernstein's work considers the 'underlying principles' expressed in the distribution of the sociolinguistic codes. This interest Bernstein considers, started in 1964, and should be taken along with the sociolinguistic codes for a full picture of Bernstein's work to emerge. Bernstein (1972) states 'what I am tentatively putting forward is that imbedded in culture or subculture may be a basic organizing concept, concepts or themes whose ramifications may be diffused throughout the culture or subculture. The speech forms through which the culture or subculture is realized transmits this organizing concept or concepts within their gestalt rather than through any one set of meanings'.

In this work Bernstein develops the notions 'classification' and 'frame', initially from an educational context in relation to 'implicit learning', and applies them to the analysis of 'how social class affects mental structures'. Hargreaves (1977) comments, cynically: 'However, his concern to unify the disparate, generative concepts employed in earlier papers (e.g. restricted/elaborated codes, the classification and framing of knowledge, positional and person-oriented families, mechanical and organic solidarity, implicit and explicit meanings etc.) with this most recent concern (invisible pedagogies) leads not only to inconsistencies between his articles but also within this most recent instance of his theorizing'.

In Bernstein (1975a) there is a detailed discussion of implicit learning (or as it became - 'invisible pedagogy') in schools, and of the concepts 'classification' and 'frame'. These concepts are used by Bernstein to examine how social class relationships are reflected on a symbolic level. Initially, Bernstein's analysis is concerned with recent changes
In the educational context, Bernstein's central concern is with the transmission of knowledge, and what counts as knowledge in schools. He uses the concept 'classification' to refer to the nature of the relationship between contents in the school curriculum. 'Frame' refers to the way in which the content of pedagogical knowledge classified as legitimate is transmitted and received. Bernstein's concept of 'classification' comes from Durkheim's (1963) anthropological concept of 'primitive classification' which Bernstein has modified for use not between societies but within societies to analyse categorisation differences created by social class differences. The concept of 'frame' is presumably an analogy with a picture frame. The origins of this concept are not clear from Bernstein's writings. However, Bernstein is only partly concerned with classification and frame as such, he is also concerned with the Durkheimian notion of boundary strength.

(5) Durkheim's original notion of classification was explained as follows: 'When the Ethnographer visits a strange people he carried with him such concepts as 'god', 'power', 'debt', 'family', 'gift', and so on, and however thorough his professional preparation he will tend, first to look for and identify what his own culture denotes by these words to interpret the statement of the people in terms of them. But gradually he learns to see the world as it is constituted for the people themselves, to assimilate their distinctive categories. Typically he may have to abandon the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, relocate the time between life and death, accept a common nature in mankind and animals. He cannot pretend to perceive the phenomenon involved in any entirely new way, but he can and must conceptualise them in this foreign context; and what he learns to do in each instance is essentially to classify. Learning the language teaches him to do this in practice, but the language cannot in itself identify the key categories for him or present him with the principles by which they are related. His analytical task, consequently, is first of all to apprehend a mode of classification'. Bernstein notion of classification is developed with the aid of Douglas, who for example, in Douglas (1970) uses 'classification' in her anthropological analysis of religion and ritual. Also, finally, Bernstein's use of 'classification' has elements in common with Bourdieu and Passeron's (1977) analysis 'the classification struggle is one dimension, but doubtless the most concealed one, of the class structure'. (see footnote 2)

(6) Picture 'frame' analogies are considered in section 2.6
which he applies to both of these concepts. 'Strong classification' for example indicates strong boundary maintenance between contents. Where classification is strong, contents are well insulated from each other by strong boundaries. Where classification is weak, there is reduced insulation between contents, for the boundaries between contents are weak or blurred. Classification thus refers to the degree of boundary maintenance between contents' (Bernstein 1975a). The implicit rule here is 'things must be kept apart', and Bernstein considers, the apartness of things is the major means whereby repetition takes place. Although the criteria of membership of one 'class' of content are highly specific and explicit, socialization into the apartness of things, Bernstein considers, renders these criteria taken for granted, and therefore they are less likely to be experienced as problematic. Strong classification reduces the power of the socialising agent (mother or teacher) over what is transmitted in that boundaries between contents may not be overstepped, contents must be kept strictly apart. 'Weak classification' indicates weak boundary maintenance between contents. The implicit rule here is 'things must be put together'. Here the fundamental principle of order, Bernstein suggests, will rest upon an explicit ideology which directs the putting together of things. Thus the ideological basis of weak classification is verbally elaborated and explicit. Weak classification allows the socialising agent a large amount of discretion in choice of contents, and puts the socialising agent into a powerful position.

Frame refers to the 'degree of control teachers and pupils possess over the selection, organising and pacing of knowledge transmitted and reviewed in the pedagogic relationship'. Framing may have strong or weak boundaries. Strong frames enhance the 'apartness of things' and reduces the power of the pupil over what, when and how he or she receives 'knowledge' and increases the socialising agents power in the relationship. Weak frames enhance the 'togetherness of things' and (supposedly) increases
the power of the pupil over what, when, and how he or she receives 'knowledge' and decreases the power of the socialising agent in the relationship. The stronger the classification and framing the more the socialisation relationship tends to be 'hierarchical and ritualised, the socialised seen as ignorant with little status and few rights'.

Grimshaw (1976) represents the interaction of strong and weak classifications and frames, in relation to education as follows (Table 2.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>'Progressive education'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Interdisciplinary lecture courses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grimshaw suggests cell entries reading from left to right should invoke a sense of a hardening of boundaries between subjects. Cell entries reading down from top to bottom should invoke a sense of a hardening of boundaries between teacher and taught. Bernstein sums up his use of classification and framing as follows:

'so far then, I have been suggesting that we can go into any education institution and examine the organisation of time in terms of the relative status of contents, and whether the contents stand in an open or closed relationship to each other. I am deliberately using this very abstract language in order to emphasise that there is nothing intrinsic to the relative status of various contents, there is nothing intrinsic to the relationship between contents. Irrespective of the question of the intrinsic logic of various forms of public thought, the forms of their transmission, that is, their classification and framing are social facts' (Bernstein 1975a).
Bernstein goes on to use these concepts in the analysis of invisible pedagogy in infant schools. 'Invisible pedagogy' takes place where classification and framing are weak. This is seen, by Bernstein, to be the trend in infant schools where the child re-arranges and explores, structuring his or her own activities and movements. 'Visible pedagogy' on the other hand is characterised by a more formal chalk and talk situation with strong classification and framing. In Bernstein's words, the basic difference between visible and invisible pedagogies is the manner in which criteria of assessment are transmitted and the degree of specificity of the criteria. The more implicit the manner of transmission and the more diffuse the criteria the more invisible the pedagogy, and the more the control is in the hands of the teacher. The more specific the criteria the more explicit the manner of their transmission, the more visible the pedagogy. The invisible pedagogy is characterised, suggests Bernstein, 'by the observation of the whole child in terms of theories of the child's inner development' such as those of Piaget, amongst others. Bernstein sees infant school pedagogy as possessing the following characteristics:

1. Where the control over the child is implicit rather than explicit.
2. Where, ideally, the teacher arranges the context which the child is expected to rearrange and explore.
3. Where within this arranged context, the child apparently has wide powers over what he or she selects, over how he or she structures, and over the time scale of his or her activities.
4. Where the child apparently regulates his own movements and social relationships.
5. Where there is a reduced emphasis upon the transmission and acquisition of specific skills.
6. Where the criteria for evaluating the pedagogy are multiple and diffuse and so not easily measured.
The covert nature of the process of social control in such an 'invisible pedagogy' features centrally in Bernstein's work: 'control ... is implicit rather than explicit', 'the child apparently has wide powers', 'the child apparently regulates his own movements'. This pedagogy represents a mode of socialisation which is said to have been appropriated by the 'fraction of middle class' who control 'the transmission of critical symbolic systems'. Bernstein writes: 'what interested me was that fraction of the middle class which controlled not capital but dominant and dominating forms of communication. The latter group's power lies in its control over the transmission of critical symbolic systems; essentially through control over various forms of public education and through control over what Bourdieu calls the symbolic markets ... This has created a vast range of occupations dedicated to the symbolic shaping and reshaping of the population. With this increase in the division of labour of symbolic control, I suggest there has also developed a change in the emphasis in the form of socialization; from the creation of strongly bounded but specialized individual to more weakly bounded but specialized person'. Bernstein presumably means by the 'fraction of the middle class' the section of the middle class (hereafter called the 'newer middle class') that does not necessarily have ownership but have control over important means of symbolic reproduction, that is, the mass media, education and the advertising industry. This new middle class is seen by Bernstein, along with its sponsored pedagogy, as an 'interrupter' (these reproduction/interruption terms derive from Bourdieu) of modes of class reproduction through its emphasis upon the development of the unique person rather than the abstract individual. Such a process represents, at the most general level, a shift from individualised to personalised forms of organic solidarity, and at the institutional level this interrupter system is seen as a 'progressive' or a 'revolutionary force'. Bernstein refers to it as an interrupter system presumably because it interrupts the existing power relationships as experienced in education, between 'older middle class' or even 'upper
class' and the working class, both presumably with strong classification and frames. This Interruptor system, Bernstein considers, is a mode of socialisation, an invisible pedagogy, that is not shared with other classes, and its principles are not understandable to the 'unconverted'. Smith (1976) interprets: 'To oversimplify, the emergence of the collection curriculum (the embodiment of strong classification and frames) must be understood in terms of a highly successful rearguard action by the gentleman rulers of English society to neutralise potential challenges from either captains of industry or the lower classes'. Although it would appear that the role of the working class in terms of educational change is undefined by Bernstein.

To summarise, Bernstein argues that the 'older middle class' and the 'younger middle class' each has their preferred 'educational knowledge code' which is realised in their preferred classification and framing of educational knowledge. The educational knowledge code, Bernstein suggests, is a 'deep structure' underlying the pedagogic relations that appear on the surface, realised through a specific arrangement of classification and framing. Because of the 'older middle class' has been dominant, its deep structure 'educational knowledge code' and the resulting strong classification and strong framing of the curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation systems have ensured the success of this class in the education system. The 'younger middle class' are now, suggests Bernstein, challenging this in terms of power and control in society and in, also, symbolic reproduction with their weak classification and weak framing.

This analysis is continued by Bernstein in the introduction to 'Class Codes and Control Volume 3' (1975a) where the ideas formulated in the original 'classification' and 'framing' paper 'On the Classification and Framing of Educational Knowledge' (1971b) are applied to a wider socialising context. Bernstein here tries to make more explicit the
effect of social class on mental structures, by reference to diagrams such as the following (Page 21 of Bernstein 1975a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
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<tr>
<td>Division of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Strong C's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong F's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic realizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this introduction, Bernstein suggests an underlying cluster of 'ground rules' in the deep structure of interactions, from which are derived classification and framing relationships, which enter into and shape mental structures. Thus Bernstein's analysis here leans towards ethnomet hodology, and following Cicourel, he uses the surface structure - deep structure model. Bernstein sums up thus:

"... variations in the strength of boundaries are only the surface realizations of continuities and discontinuities which are generated by underlying rules .... It then becomes important to understand the different forms of socialization into distinctive underlying rules. For these underlying rules are not learned as a consequence of any one practice, but they are somehow inferred by the socialized from a range of social relations. In this sense, the socialized is always active in his own socialization. He both acquires the ground rule and he responds to it; I think that these underlying rules give rise to coding procedures. The process of cultural reproduction is accomplished by the controls on the selection and institutionalizing of these underlying rules, which create ways of experiencing, of interpreting and telling about the world. I believe that the structure of socialization is not a set of roles, but classification and framing relationships. It is these, I think, that shape the mental structures, by establishing coding procedures which are
predicated upon distinctive rules. These rules are acquired in the process of exploring the classification and framing relationships. However, and it is a big however, behind any given classification and framing, are the power relationships and the fundamental principles of social control. Thus from this point of view, power and control are made substantive in the classification and framing which then generate distinctive forms of social relationships and thus communication, and through the latter initially, but not necessarily finally, shape mental structures. Bernstein (1975a)

In this formulation Bernstein seems influenced by the work of Levi Strauss and his analysis of symbols, in that 'classification' and 'frame' could be considered to be concepts related to the organisation of symbols. Levi Strauss's structuralism, suggests Coward and Ellis (1977), shows that 'the human subject is not homogeneous and in control of himself, he is constructed by a structure whose very existence escapes his gaze. The self presence of the human is no longer tenable, instead the subject is seen as subject to the structure and its transformations (in the form of myths). To see the subject as subjected, constructed by the symbol, is the most radical moment of this structuralism. However, by following this deep structure competence - surface structure performance model from the ethnomethodology of Cicourel (1971), derived from the work of Chomsky (1957); Bernstein and the ethnomethodologists that subscribe to this model are open to the same criticism aimed at Chomsky's original formulations. The deep structure and language acquisition device was postulated to account for observations in the form of the child gaining knowledge of speech rules in a relatively short period of time (the major part of language is developed in children between ages 2 years to 5 years old). Similarly a deep structure competence and 'interpretive procedures' are postulated by Cicourel to
account for the child developing knowledge of social rules, many of which are implicit and not clearly formulated by the parent. Cook-Bumperz (1973) states:

'The way parents help the child to gain this essential skill (language) shows us something of their ability to socialize the child into other taken-for-granted competencies. For we suggest that parents do not explicitly formulate the learning tasks of child rearing but use their own daily lives as an implicit model of social competency for their children. We suggest that a special characteristic of 'rules' of child-rearing in that they are only brought into being explicitly, after the fact. After the child had done something the parent thinks is 'not right' a rule is seen to be infringed and is given or explained by the parent, but for the most of the child's daily life the rules remain implicit in activities.'

This formulation seems plausible, and at least the child is allowed the ability to develop 'interpretive procedures' which is an advance over Bernstein and his students earlier work. But with reference to the brief discussion of Chomsky's work in section 2.2.2 of this chapter, the argument is basically a negative one. That, because an adequate theory of language learning or social learning does not exist, this is not sufficient reason for claiming that language or social learning is impossible without this 'deep structure', 'language acquisition device' or 'interpretive procedures' and so on. Also, the original theory of Chomsky was seen to be inadequate and was replaced by other theories that entailed less dramatic assumptions. One of these is Rommetvelt's (1974) analysis of message structure which for example makes no 'deep structure' assumption. This theory has been touched upon in section 2.2.3 of this chapter, in the discussion of the 'architecture of intersubjectivity',

- 68 -
and specifically the increasing amounts of 'free' to 'bound' information as interchanges and dialogues progress over time. This idea is taken up in chapter 4, in the 'development of a theory of framing'. It is important to note here that the model of language structure from the work of Chomsky, that underlies Bernstein and the ethnomethodologists deep and surface structures, is replaced in this thesis by the model of language use and message structure from the work of Roemtevait. Finally, before leaving this topic, it is interesting to note that Chomsky may in fact, in the end, be right. It cannot be ruled out that there is, for example, an innate language acquisition device. Bruner (1974) for example, states 'what may be innate about language acquisition is not linguistic imuteness, but some special features of human action and human attention that permit language to be decoded by the uses to which it is put'. This point is also made by Rose (1973), that the 'fundamental capacity to acquire and utilize complex patterned sequences, expressible in tool manipulation, in gesture language, and later, in speech is the 'deep structure' Chomsky really should have been writing about and that in the long course of hominization, it is the evolutionary growth of this kind of syntactic capacity that has been so important, and not its separate manifestations in technology and language.'
2.3.4. Conclusion

In considering Bernstein's work it is important to remember, as Dittmar points out, that Bernstein's work should be considered to be hypotheses, although not clearly formulated. It is clear however that one of the important criticisms of the sociolinguistic codes thesis is the failure to consider mother-child interchanges as a process, with the mother's attitude as measured by Henderson, Cook Gumperz et al as only one potential determinant of her behaviour.

In the discussion of the 'transmission of symbolic systems' in society, Bernstein does provide a set of hypotheses that may be of relevance in the consideration of social class differences in mother-child interchanges. Bernstein's use of 'social class' in the sociolinguistic codes thesis is, as the next section indicates, unreliable. However, in considering the 'transmission of symbolic systems' thesis, perhaps because of the influence of Bourdieu, the social groups to whom Bernstein refers is fairly clear. Consequently, the hypotheses are as follows:

1. Strong classification and strongly framed relationships are found in the interchanges between working class mothers and her child (or children).

2. Weak classification and weakly framed relationships are found in the interchanges between 'newer' middle class mothers and her child (or children).

3. Strong classification and strongly framed relationships are found in the interchanges between 'older' or 'established' middle class mothers and her child (or children).

4. Strong classification and strongly framed relationships are found in the interchanges between upper class mothers and her child (or children).

However, the precise definition of 'classification' and 'frame' in mother-child interchanges is not available from Bernstein's work. Also, these concepts are defined by Bernstein, in relation to an educational context with reference to 'boundary maintenance'. What this would mean
In the mother-child interchange context is again unclear. This is returned to in chapter 4, where a theory of framing, in the mother-child interchange situation, is developed, based in part on Bernstein's notion of frame to the relationship between 'pupil' and the 'teacher'...

2.4 Some uses of the concept 'social class' in social science research

2.4.1 Introduction

This section will continue the examination of Bernstein's thesis as to the relation between 'language, socialization and social class' by considering how Bernstein, and his students, use the concept 'social class'. This is then compared with some other definitions of the concept 'social class'.

2.4.2 Bernstein's and Bernstein's students' use of the concept 'social class'

Bernstein claims: 'I have tried to show how the social class system acts upon the deep structure of communication in the process of socialization' (Bernstein 1971a). Rosen (1972) comments 'whatever else he has done, Bernstein has not done that, simply because he has not examined the class system. By implication only we are provided with a system consisting of two classes, called working class and middle class'. In one of Bernstein's early papers (1950), 'middle class and associated levels' are defined as 'where the father is likely to have received grammar school education, or some further education or certified training for a skill; or one in which the mother is more likely to have received something other than elementary schooling, or before marriage to have followed an occupation superior to that of the father, or a non manual occupation'. Such a family may be found, Bernstein says, among some wage earning manual workers, who therefore must be considered middle class, but generally the 'middle class and associated levels' are the occupational hierarchy above this base line. The working class, then, for Bernstein includes all members of semi-skilled and unskilled occupations below this line. This version of 'social class', comments Rosen, makes no attempt at differentiation whether in terms of history, traditions, job experience, ethnic origins, residential patterns,
level of organisation in terms of trade union or professional association, or collective class consciousness. 'No attention has been paid to that vast area of critical working class experience, the encounter with exploitation at the place of work and the response to it; nor to the ways which take workers beyond the 'particularistic' circumstances of day-to-day work experience and move them on to explore the theory and practice of how to change society'. Rosen (1972). Throughout Bernstein's work the specification of the specific social groups to which he refers is firstly unclear, and secondly inconsistent. Such a confusion exists because, as Rosen says, there is in Bernstein's work no discussion of the class system despite his reference to Marx in his more recent work. This, Rosen considers, 'is surprising - Bernstein as a Professor of Sociology is content with the popular term 'middle class' (and 'working class') to cover varied strata whose relationship to the class system varies widely and whose class position has important and different influences on their language'. For example, it is not simply a matter of dividing the working class into 'skilled' and 'unskilled', in that this classification seems to bear little relation to level of skill required in the job, and to have more to do with their power to win the grading of 'skilled' from their employers. (Especially with the 'job assessment' studies carried out under the introduction of 'Measured Day Work', see Cliff (1970)).

Rosen suggests that strangest of all in Bernstein's work: 'the ruling class does not figure at all'. Bernstein's original and only experimental work was completed using a sample of G.P.O. day release students, messenger boys aged between 15 - 18 years in the 'young postman' grade, coming from 'unskilled' and 'semi-skilled' backgrounds and receiving general non vocational education. These were attending a London Technical College, and were compared to a matched sample of pupils at 'one of six major public schools'. Bernstein characterises the
public school pupils as 'middle class' in a 'popular definition', they perhaps would be more accurately be characterised as upper class in the Index such as Stacey's (1960) to be described later in this section. To be fair to Bernstein, he has attempted to delineate the sections of the population to which he refers in his more recent work, the 'newer middle class' can be fairly precisely determined as the discussion in section 2.3.3 of this chapter indicates. However, Rosen sums up the use of social class in Bernstein's earlier work as follows:

1. It is based on an inadequate concept of class which lacks theoretical support.

2. Arising from (1), he presents a stereotyped view of working class life in general and its language in particular.

3. He attributes to middle class speakers in general certain 'rare and remarkable intellectual virtues, but there is inadequate examination of the way in which their language is affected by their class position'.

To turn to Bernstein's students, There does not appear to be a concrete definition of social class in Lawton (1960), but later students of Bernstein have constructed a social class index to meet their requirements. This index is used in the studies reported in Bernstein (1973). The index is described in Brandis and Henderson (1970) and Cook-Gumperz (1973). In the latter it is claimed that their index is an advance of the 'Hall-Jones Scale' (see Reid 1977) in that it included a rating of education as well as occupation, of both parents instead of just the father. In Brandis and Henderson (1970) there is a complex statistical discussion of how their index was worked out. But the statement of the problem at the outset is limited entirely to 'occupational status' and 'educational status'. Again, echoing Rosen's criticism, there is no discussion of social class as a system.

2.4.3 Some other uses of the concept 'social class' in social science research

Any discussion of social class tends to awaken a kind of cautious prejudice because, suggests Levitas (1974), 'achievement orientations, political dispositions and ideological set - all forms of social consciousness - are immediately wakened. No one can be completely free
from interest, completely 'value free' in this matter because no one is without group membership! Very widespread throughout the academic literature is an a-historic view of social class, such as the one of Bernstein and students, which Levitas says 'manages to combine configuration with apparent analysis by using the term stratification. What is achieved in the use of a geological analysis is more than figurative speech. Here the existence of social classes and their importance is allowed, but the permanence of the relationship between them is resoundingly asserted'. The labelling of social class usually follows the 'Registrar Generals' classification (see Reid 1977). One example amongst many is Newson and Newson (1965): 'Our use of fathers occupation to determine social class was based upon the Registrar Generals classification of occupations, modified somewhat to meet our own special requirements'. Because of the many anomalies in the Registrar Generals Classification, despite modification over the years as described by Reid (1977), greater precision is often claimed for the Hall-Jones scale (Hall and Jones (1950), and Reid (1977)) as used by Bernstein's students. But these frameworks for the organisation of understanding of social class have in common that they 'do not adequately or accurately reveal the class interests at work in this society and yield explanation for various phenomena largely conducive to maintaining social relation as they are' Levitas (1974). Levitas makes his point clear by stating that 'what needs to be grasped is that modern Britain is a capitalist society with a ruling capitalist class, and that indices commonly used to examine social class obscure this fact'. Evidence for this argument comes from, for example, Bernstein's use of the popular definition of the term middle class. In the 19th century 'middle class' was understood to be capitalist class or bourgeoisie between the 'working class' and the 'aristocracy'. By using the term 'middle class' in more recent times reference is made to members of a broad range of occupations including especially professional employees. By the substitution of 'middle' for 'capitalist' leads to
the suggestion of some sort of 'meritocracy'. Instead of, as Levitas suggests, 'laissez-faire capitalist society' and exploits from the situation meanings without which the situation cannot be understood, Anderson (1969) and Giddens (1973) have suggested how this came about historically, and the effects of this on modern British culture.

Giddens (1973) for example, suggests that: '... in modern society, in contrast to previous types of social order, there is a strong pressure upon members of the upper class to deny the operation of the 'class principle', and thereby to deny their own distinctiveness as separate and isolatable class. The 'invisibility' of the upper class is not, however, to be understood as a production of conscious artifice, as the 'visibility' of the aristocracy in prior times to some extent can be understood; rather it is the natural expression of whatever degree of monopoly the upper class maintains over access to elite positions in a form of society in which an ideology of political and economic 'equality of opportunity' prevails'. The existence of social classes is, in Marxist terms, connected with the practice of exploitation (the extraction of surplus value from labour power) and therefore an underlying antagonism of interests must persist. However, this could be considered too crude a categorisation to be of use in social science research.

Thompson (1963) comments:

'By class I understand a historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material of experience and in consciousness. I emphasise that is a historical phenomenon. I do not see class as a 'structure', nor even as a category, but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships.

More than this, the notion of class entails the notion of historical relation. Like many other relationships it is a fluency
which evades analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomise its structure. The finest meshed sociological net cannot give us a pure specimen of class, any more than it can give us one of defence or of love. The relationship must always be embodied in real people and in a real context. Moreover we cannot have two distinct classes, each with an independent being, and then bring them into relationship with each other. We cannot have love without lovers, nor defence without squires and labourers. And class happens when some men as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs. The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born - or enter into involuntary. Class consciousness is the way these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value systems, ideas and institutional forms. If the experience appears as determined, class consciousness does not. We can see a logic in the response of similar occupation groups undergoing similar experiences, but we cannot predicate any law. Consciousness of class arises in the same way in different times and places, but never in just the same way.

There is today an ever-present temptation to suppose that class is a thing. This was not Marx's meaning. In his own historical writing, yet the error permeates much latter-day 'Marxist' writing. 'It', the working class, is assumed to have a real existence, which can be defined almost mathematically - so many men who stand in a certain relation to the means of production. Once this is assumed it becomes possible to deduce the class consciousness which 'It' ought to have (but seldom does have) if 'It' was properly aware of its own
position and real interests. There is a cultural superstructure, through which this recognition dawns in inefficient ways. These cultural 'lags' and distortions are a nuisance, so that it is easy to pass from this to some theory of substitution: the party, sect, or theorist, who discloses class-consciousness, not as it is, but as it ought to be.

But a similar error is committed daily on the other side of the ideological divide. In one form, this is a plain negative. Since the crude notion of class attributed to Marx can be faulted without difficulty, it is assumed that any notion of class is a pejorative theoretical construct, imposed upon the evidence. It is denied that class has happened at all.

If we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes but simply a multitude of individuals with a multitude of experiences. But if we watch these men over an adequate period of social change, we observe patterns in their relationships, their ideas, and their institutions, class is defined by men as they live their own history, and, in the end, this is the only definition'. (Thompson 1968)

The above necessarily long quotation from Thompson gives a definition of social class that involves an important historical dimension. Unfortunately, it is not possible in the confines of this research, to observe families 'over an adequate period of social change' so that social class designation may be made with a degree of confidence, and mother-child pairs sampled on that basis. Consequently, this research reported here must rely on previous attempts to stop the movement of history at one point in time and analyse the class structure. And, of course, any supposedly objective classification of 'working class' 'middle class' or 'upper class' may include people of widely different subjective experience and attitudes under any one category. Also, of course, this is especially true if people living in different geographical locations are to be considered; as Thompson says: 'If the experience appears as
determined, class consciousness does not'. Coulson and Riddell (1970) make the same point: 'the workers structural position constantly reinforces their collectivist consciousness at least in some aspects, but many other influences, notably those of the employer controlled mass media are much more individualistic in orientation, so that each generation of workers has, to some extent to relearn the experience of former ones, and the degree to which collective consciousness exists varies markedly from worker to worker and from factory to factory' and also it is suggested, from area to area. These are obviously points to be taken into account in considering any social class classification scheme.

The classification scheme to be used in this study is that developed by Stacey (1960). This classification scheme is a picture of the social class structure of Banbury developed by Stacey and her co-workers by extensive interviews of the inhabitants of that town. Stacey comments 'this scheme is a considerable abstraction in the sense that this is not the way any one person in the town thinks of it. Furthermore, the characteristics given are those possessed by an 'ideal type' at the centre of the group. Not everyone in the group necessarily possesses all of them'. Stacey's classification involves consideration of education, occupation, source of income and degree of integration with the local community, type and location of housing, and style of living. These are grouped into 12 status groups and then three social classes. The classification scheme is reproduced in Table 2.4, where the Hall-Jones Index is included by Stacey for comparison purposes. For the purposes of this research 4 variables have been eliminated as not being, it was felt, reflective of 1976 circumstances (the fieldwork of this research was completed during 1976 and 1977). These are, in Stacey's original list, 'standard of life' (ownership of car or telephone), political affiliations, and religious affiliations; although it is realised for other purposes these may be important they were not considered relevant here. Stacey's
classification scheme is discussed by her in detail in Stacey (1960) and Klein (1965). It is considered that the scheme captures the 'essence' of social class as described by Thompson, and was applicable to the area in the East Midlands where this research was conducted.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Status Groups</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Hall-Jones Class</th>
<th>Source of Income</th>
<th>House Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Speech, grammar, accent</th>
<th>Style of living</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>Public school and Oxford, Cambridge, or Sandhurst</td>
<td>Various, with directorial authority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Inherited means, profits and fees</td>
<td>Large on 1° O.S. Map</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Accurate 'U'</td>
<td>Connoisseurship, entertaining at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentry</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>Various, inc. retired service officers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Accurate 'U'</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Upper</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Owner, director, large-scale industry outside Banbury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Profits and fees</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Accurate, poss. some local accent</td>
<td>Luxurious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Frontier</td>
<td>Public school and Oxford or Cambridge</td>
<td>Professions, especially doctors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Profits and fees, salary</td>
<td>Various inc. ranks 1 and 2</td>
<td>Nearby village or Banbury</td>
<td>Accurate 'U'</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banbury Senior Directors and Managers</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Director or senior manager large-scale industry in Banbury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Profits and fees, salary</td>
<td>Large or rank 2</td>
<td>Rural or nearby village</td>
<td>Accurate, poss. some local accent</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle</strong></td>
<td>Grammar (prob. State and Univ. (prob. Prov.)</td>
<td>Metallurgists, &amp;c., grammar sch. teachers, senior exec. civil servants</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newer Professions</td>
<td>State secondary, some elementary only</td>
<td>Proprietor or manager large shop or factory in Banbury</td>
<td>2, some 1</td>
<td>Profits and fees, salary</td>
<td>Rank 2</td>
<td>Outskirts of town</td>
<td>Reasonable, some solemnisms common</td>
<td>Domestic comfort, taste standardized to group, small-scale entertaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>State secondary</td>
<td>Manager of branch shop, shopkeeper on own account, some skilled men</td>
<td>3, 4, 5</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Ranks 3, 4, and 5</td>
<td>Council estate or town centre</td>
<td>Less than reasonable, local accent</td>
<td>Houseproud, little independence of taste, little home entertaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Frontier</td>
<td>Elementary, some State secondary</td>
<td>Technical or cler. in industry, junior exec. and clerical-civil servants</td>
<td>3, 4</td>
<td>Salary, wage</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>Outskirts town, council estate, town centre</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working</strong></td>
<td>Respectable</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>Skilled manual, some clerical, some semi-skilled manual</td>
<td>5, 6</td>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>Ranks 4, 5, and 6</td>
<td>Council estate or town centre</td>
<td>Inaccurate, local accent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectable</td>
<td>Respectable</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>Skilled manual, some clerical, some semi-skilled manual</td>
<td>5, 6</td>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>Ranks 4, 5, and 6</td>
<td>Council estate or town centre</td>
<td>Inaccurate, local accent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>Semi-skilled manual, some skilled and some unskilled manual</td>
<td>5, 6, 7</td>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rough</td>
<td>Rough</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>Unskilled manual, some semi-skilled manual</td>
<td>6, 7</td>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>Ranks 5 and 6</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.5 Conclusion

This section will review, briefly, the conclusions arrived at in sections 2.2 to 2.5. The conclusion to section 2.2 suggested that researchers in the area of 'intersubjectivity' and mother-child interchanges have failed to take the 'context' of any one interchange seriously, that data collecting by a videotape film technique is necessary, and finally, researchers in this area have failed to consider social class differences.

The conclusion to section 2.3 suggested that Bernstein while supposedly considering social class differences in socialisation fails to consider the process of mother-child interchanges; his work could be considered to be an example of sociological determinism. Also, Bernstein's work contains no clear analysis of what he means by 'social class'. However, despite this there are some hypotheses concerning social class differences in the 'transmission of symbolic systems' from generation to generation, that can be drawn from Bernstein's more recent work. Bernstein's concepts 'classification' and 'frame' were originally defined in relation to 'boundary maintenance' procedures, in an educational context and may not be directly applicable to a child socialisation context.

Finally, section 2.4 considered some of the inadequacies of some uses of 'social class' in social science research, including the use of this concept by Bernstein and his students. It was suggested in that section that Stacey's (1960) classification was probably the most adequate for the purposes of this study.

This concludes the discussion of the literature that could be considered to form the background to the study before the data collection began. The next sections of this chapter consider some of the literature on 'framing' that is the background to the theory of framing developed in chapter 4.
2.6 'Frame' and 'Framing', a review of the literature

2.6.1 Introduction

This section will consider some of the literature on 'frame' and 'framing'. As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, the idea of this research grew out of interest in Bernstein's work, and the theory of framing outlined in chapter 4 could be considered a development of Bernstein's work. Bernstein's notion of frame has already been introduced in section 2.3.3, consequently this is not considered here. Discussion in this section will revolve around other uses of the concept 'frame' encountered in the literature. Most of these uses of 'frame' and 'framing' use the 'frame' idea as an analogy with a concrete, physical, picture 'frame', however implicit this may be. In the literature it is possible to find the most implicit picture frame analogy occurring where for example mention is made of a 'frame of reference'. The following is an illustration of this where, perhaps, 'frame of reference' is used more reflexively than is usual, where implicit picture frame analogies are used:

'The usual state of consciousness is characterised by the mobilisation of a shared and structured frame of reference in the background of attention, which supports, interprets and gives meaning to all experiences.' Shor (1969).

Other implicit picture frame analogies refer to, for example, how a statement or a question is 'framed'. This usually implies more than the selection of words that make up the statement or question, but the selection of words to make some metalinguistic effect. This is returned to in the following, where reference is made to the work of authors who have made the picture frame analogy explicit (for example Cona 1968), and have explored its psychological and communicational implications (for example Bateson 1972, Hinsky 1975, and Weiss, 1976), and its 'existential' implications (Coffman 1975). Also, in the following reference will be made to authors who have considered 'frames' in
Interchanges between persons (Shields, 1976).

Before leaving this introduction, it may be relevant to comment on the status of the concept frame as, in reality, an assumption—a heuristic. Bateson (1972), in commenting on his use of the concept makes this clear: "We assume that the psychological frame has some degree of real existence. In many instances the frame is consciously recognised and even represented in vocabulary ('play', 'movie', 'interview', 'job', 'language'). In other cases, there may be no explicit verbal reference to the frame, and the subject may have no consciousness of it. The analyst, however, finds that his own thinking is simplified if he uses the notion of an unconscious frame as an explanatory principle; usually he goes further than this and infers its existence in the subject's unconscious." Bateson continues: "...the actual physical frame we believe, is added by human beings to physical pictures because these human beings operate more easily in a universe in which some of their psychological characteristics are externalised. It is these characteristics which we are trying to discuss, using the externalization as an illustrative device." Bateson's concept of 'frame' is returned to in the following section.

2.6.2 'Picture frame' analogies and their psychological and communicational implications

Many theorists have used 'frame' as a conceptual tool, in such diverse subjects as artificial intelligence (Minsky) and musical appreciation (Cone). A typical definition, from Cone (1968) for example, is as follows, using an explicit analogy with a picture frame.

The frame of the picture is the 'Intensification of the edge'. It works in two directions: 'marking the limits not only of the picture, but of the real world around the picture, of the wall on which the picture hangs. In the same way theatrical conventions, the lowering of the lights, the
curtain, act as frames; and the typographical layout of a book, a story, or a poem implies a frame. In every case its function is two fold. Firstly, it separates the subject chosen for treatment from its own imagined surroundings (what I call the internal environment), secondly, it protects the work from the encroachment of what I call its external environment, that is, in this instance, of the real time and space in which the perceiver lives. The frame announces: here the real world leaves off and the work of art begins - here the work of art ends and the real world takes up again (Cone 1968). Consequently the frame can be considered, according to Cone as a bracketing device to 'punctuate' reality. This punctuation is a function of the frame, to make the world understandable in terms of its 'structure' divorced from 'contents' contained within the frame as the frame of a building is part of the structure of the reality separating its internal environment (rooms and so on) from the world outside.

Minsky (1975) has used the concept of frame in his analysis of artificial intelligence and cognitive functioning. The following is taken from Wilks (1976) description of Minsky's work and incorporates Minsky's definition of frame: 'A frame is a data structure for representing a stereotype situation, like a certain kind of living room or going to a child's birthday party. Attached to each frame are several kinds of information. Some of this information is about how to use the frame. Some is about what one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if these expectations are not confirmed. One can think of a frame as a network of nodes and relations. The top levels of a frame are fixed and represent the things that are always true about the supposed situation. The lower levels have many terminals, 'slots' that must be filled by specific circumstances or data. Each terminal can specify conditions assignments must meet'. Minsky (1975) himself sums up his use of the concept 'frame' thus: 'Here is the essence of the theory. When
One encounters a new situation (or makes a substantial change in one's view of the present problem) one selects from memory a substantial structure called a frame. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary. Thus Minsky uses the term 'frame', in a structural way, similarly to Cone, as a way of separating the figure from the ground in a gestalt pattern. As Neisser (1976) puts it:

'... Minsky .... has come to believe that adequate recognition and description of scenes in the real world will never be possible on the basis of momentary input patterns alone. He proposes that the computer must be ready for each new scene with a frame, or a hierarchy of frames that anticipates much of what will appear. If the computer is examining a room, it should expect to find walls, doors, windows, furniture and so forth; only in this way will it be able to interpret the otherwise ambiguous information available to it. He supposes that such a system will make 'default assignments' in the absence of information, hypothesizing the existence of a right hand wall, for example, even if it has not yet received any relevant evidence'. Because of this structural conception of frame, Minsky has, suggests Neisser, a static notion of frames as places to put information rather than as places for obtaining more of it. This is perhaps due to Minsky's 'classical mechanistic approach' (Shottar 1972) to human psychology, an approach Neisser cannot himself be considered to be emancipated from. The assumption is, in Minsky's work of a frame 'room' having doors, windows, furniture and a certain number of walls. While the frame 'room' helps the mind to discern the logical type 'room' from 'house' or 'hotel' on one level or 'chairs' or 'carpet' on another, the computer frame system has places for accepting new information at the lower levels only, once the frame has been established. If the frame 'room' is applied to a space having 3 walls and no furniture or windows it is
unclear as to how the decision is to be made to amend frame 'room' to incorporate these features or have the frame 'room' rejected in favour of another frame.

Bateson (1972) has a more dynamic conception of 'frame'. His primary concern is with the dynamics of communication and the evolution of the human mind. For Bateson 'mind' is 'a network of interactions relating the individual with his species, and 'ideas' develop and evolve according to the same laws as control natural phenomena'. Consequently Bateson's conception of 'frame' has psychological and communicational aspects. Bateson considers psychological frames are exclusive, by including certain messages (or meaningful actions) within a frame, certain others are eliminated. Psychological frames are inclusive, by excluding certain messages certain others are included. 'The frame around a picture, if we consider this frame as a message intended to order or organise the perception of the viewer says, “Attend to what is within and do not attend to what is outside”. Figure and ground ... are not symmetrically related .... perception of the ground must be positively inhibited and perception of the figure (in this case the picture) must be positively enhanced'. Bateson therefore considers that the psychological frame not only has a structural component, but also has an evaluative component. The frame may 'assist the mind in understanding the contained messages by reminding the thinker that these messages are mutually relevant and the messages outside the frame may be ignored, or the frame is 'involved in the evaluation of messages which it contains'. Bateson goes on to suggest that a frame is meta-communicative: 'Any message, which either explicitly or implicitly defines a frame ipso facto gives the receiver instructions or aids in his attempt to understand the messages included within the frame'. Also 'every metacommunication or metalinguistic message defines, either explicitly or implicitly the set of messages about which it communicates, that is, every metacommunication is or defines a
psychological frame. Bateson uses as an illustration his analysis of animal communication and the 'play frame': when one animal playfully nips another, the animal signals that the nip does not mean the bite that it refers to. The communication thus comes with a message which contradicts it or 'frames' it, and the symbolic meaning of the communication is a synthesis of the contradictory aspects of the message. Bateson comments, 'If we speculate about the evolution of communication, it is evident that a very important stage in this evolution occurs when the organism gradually ceases to respond quite automatically to the word-signs of another and becomes able to recognise the signal as a signal. That is, to recognise that other individuals and its own signals are only signals which can be trusted, distrusted, falsified, denied, simplified, corrected and so forth. When organisms discover that their signals are signals, "not only the characteristically human invention of language can then follow, but also the complexities of empathy, identification, projection and so on. And with these comes the possibility of communication at the multiplicity of levels of abstraction ...."

Bateson considers that even quite simple communicative exercises must be understood as multivariate and embodying contradictory aspects; and often Bateson suggests the contradictory relationships between elements in the communication are not explicit to either speaker or listener. Bateson's 'double bind' theory of schizophrenia is concerned with communicative interactions which are contradictory and painful because the unity of the message has broken down; the message is 'framed' by a contradictory metacommunication. Bateson sees the 'double bind' as a dramatic and "closed system" example of the contradictory relations within all communication. (7) Wilden (1972) contains a detailed analysis

(7) Pearson (1974) suggests that Bateson's 'double bind' theory of schizophrenia, has, as a 'system-transactional model' as a basic root the assumption that there is a consensus of interests between people, between transacting elements in the system, and that problems arise out of misunderstanding. Wilden (1972), has suggested that a double bind is a feature of numerous relationships because of the distorted nature of communication (including interpersonal communications) in a capitalist
of metacommunication and framing in relation to Bateson's psychological theorising and also mathematical set theory. (8) Mathematical set theory is used by Wilden (using Whitehead and Russell's (1910) analysis of logical types and paradoxes) to indicate that 'frames intrinsically involve paradox. They are always of a different logical type from that which they isolate'. (9) and (10) Bateson's work has been extended and applied to the mother - child context by Harris (1975). Harris suggests, after Bateson, that both mother and child send and receive messages of both linguistic and non-linguistic information in the form of signs, gestures, actions and silence. All are present and operative in the discourse between the mother and child. This discourse, Harris suggests, can be analysed using notions of 'analog' and 'digital' communication derived from General Systems Theory (see Wilden 1972). The analog mode of communication consists of 'virtually all non-verbal communication; posture, gesture, facial expression, voice inflection; the sequence, rhythm and cadence of the words themselves and any other non-verbal manifestation of which the organism is capable, as well as the communication clues unfailingly present in context. Analog communication is the area of relationship. Bateson has shown that vocalization, intentional movements

(8) Bateson mentions mathematical set theory as a possible basis for a 'frame' analogy. But whereas the picture frame analogy is thought by Bateson to be excessively concrete, the mathematical set theory is considered too abstract.

(9) Paradoxes, including paradoxical human communication (pragmatic paradoxes) are discussed, also, in Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1968).

(10) Wilden considers for example, that humour is a condensation of logical types and framing. What is amusing is the oscillation between the message and meta-message.
and mood signs of animals are analogic communication by which they define the nature of their relationships, rather than making denotative statements about an object' \textsuperscript{1} Wilden (1972). The analog mode of communication 'expresses information relationally, that is, in terms of more or less. It can signal refusal in terms of moving away from but not negation, which requires the syntax of digital communication'. Digital communication 'introduces discreteness and boundaries, and trades off the rich ambiguities of the analog system for substantive increases in precision and abstraction'.

Adult communication, suggests Harris, is both analog and digital, but the preverbal child has only analog communication. Therefore the two speaker-listeners are bound together in a 'complementary' relationship (from Bateson, who uses the term complementary to mean hierarchy in communication relationships).\textsuperscript{(1)} As Harris explains 'here the mother is initially the powerful figure, setting the frame for communication and controlling the organisation of information because she is the only participant in the system with a digital code'. Harris thus suggests that 'frames' are imposed by the mother as she introduces precision, discreteness and boundaries into the child's analog communication system as she is involved in interchanges with her child. Harris does not expand on the definition of 'frame' she employs, or expand on how the mother sets the frame for communication. She does, however, point to the importance of the work of Bateson in the consideration of the origins of symbolic activity. In Bateson's view, says Harris, symbols arise when a tension is established between a signal and the response it might trigger - as in the 'play frame' when the nip does not mean the bite that it refers to. In this sort of play, where the signal itself is referent, a frame is created for communication. This is illustrated with an example from pre-verbal childhood where in games the child must experience the tension

\textsuperscript{(1)} This is returned to in section 2.7 of this chapter.
between the frame, or comment, on a discourse and the discourse itself. Responses to 'threat games' like "I'm going to get you" that elicit laughter depend on the infant experiencing the dialectical tension in symbolic activity. The tension is dialectical because the elements in the system that is the message (threat) and the frame (the loving relationship before and after the game, and often signalled during the game by some of the mother's facial cues\(^{(12)}\) both deny and presuppose each other. This dialectical tension might be considered to be the motor driving the child to develop a synthesis at a higher level of cognitive organisation (see Riegel's (1973) addition of a dialectical dimension to Piagetian cognitive theory), so that the child himself or herself comes to metacomment on, or frame, the threat. Neisser (1976) briefly but approvingly mentions the use of the concept of 'frame' by Goffman (1975). Goffman's use of the term 'frame' is derived he claims, from the work of Bateson, and also Ditton (1976) suggests also, from Birchwhistle's technical metaphor imagery derived from a single section of cinematographic celluloid. Drawing on the work of Schutz, Wittgenstein, Austin, William James, Garfinkel, as well as Bateson, Goffman takes as his central concern the problem that an event may support a number of interpretations and possible realities - which of these is conferred the status of the real reality? Goffman defines his use of 'frame' thus: 'I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organisation which govern events - at least social ones - and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such

\(^{(12)}\) This is clear in some of my own data not reported here; where the mother's top half of her face indicated 'threat', especially the eyebrows; the lower half indicated the 'loving relationship', especially a smiling mouth.
of these basic elements as I am able to identify. That is my definition of frame. My phrase "frame analysis" is a slogan to refer to the examination in these terms of the organisation of experience. More straightforwardly, Goffman's aim is the isolation of 'some of the basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for making sense out of events and to analyse the special vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are subject'. Jary and Smith (1976) comment: 'broadly, 'Frame Analysis' is in keeping with the general trend of Goffman's work. His earlier writings were concerned primarily with the staging contingencies confronting the self. More recently these concerns have been overlayed with an awareness of the commitment, of the work done by the self in maintaining the social order of face-to-face interaction. The centrality of 'frame' to Goffman's current programme witnesses a new emphasis placed on the concept of the definition of the situation. Instead of a convenience being made of the definition of the situation, as was the case in Goffman's earlier work where it is a necessary (but sketched) preliminary to the more pressing problem of analysing staging contingencies, it now emerges at the forefront of his analysis. An interest in the technical problems involved is accomplishing encounters has been supplanted by neo-phenomenological concerns.

In 'Frame Analysis' Goffman is grasping the opportunity to relate to, while also seeking to restrict, the implications of phenomenological inquiries for his sociology. Indeed this aspect of the new work may well represent its author's major purpose in writing it....' (Jary and Smith, 1976).

Goffman states 'when the individual in our Western Society recognises a particular event, he tends whatever else he does, to imply in his response (and in effect employ) one or more frameworks or schemata of
Interpretation of a kind that can be called primary. I say primary because application of such a framework or perspective is seen by those who apply it as not depending on or harking back to some prior or 'original' interpretation, indeed a primary framework is one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful. Primary frameworks vary in degree of organisation: some are neatly presentable as a system of entities, postulates and rules, others, indeed most others, appear to have no apparent articulated shape, providing only a way of understanding, an approach, a perspective. Whatever the degree of organisation, however, each primary framework allows its user to locate, receive, identify and label seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms'. Goffman goes further: 'taken all together, the primary frameworks of a particular social group constitute a central element of its culture, especially insofar as understandings emerge concerning principle classes of schemata, the relations of these classes to one another and the sum total of forces and agents that these interpretive designs acknowledge to be loose in the world'. Primary frameworks may be seen as being of two broad types; natural and social, the second involves 'deeds' the former merely 'events' (the same distinction is made in the work of Shotter, see for example Shotter, 1974a). Goffman, however, is interested not in primary frameworks alone. He writes: 'I start with the fact that from an individual's point of view, while one thing may momentarily appear to be what is going on, in fact what is actually happening is plainly a joke or a dream, or an accident or a mistake, or a misunderstanding, or a deception or a theatrical performance and so forth'. Consequently social events are capable of being 're-read'. If these re-readings are successful, then other 'things' will 'really' be going on. Consequently Goffman introduces the idea of 'key', a musical analogy. 'Keying' is 'the process whereby a set of conventions
by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something else. Goffman also suggests that: 'participants in the activity are meant to know and to openly acknowledge that systematic alteration is involved, one that will radically reconstitute for them what is for them going on. Cues will be available for establishing when the transformation is to begin and when it will end, namely brackets in time within which and to which the transformation is to be restricted. Similarly spatial brackets will commonly indicate everywhere within and nowhere outside of which the keying applies on that occasion'. Multiple 're-keyings' are possible of an unkeyed 'core' of wholly untransformed reality. Ditton (1976) comments: 'the "core" (Imagine a set of concentric circles with a central core), may become progressively layered in successive "laminations", with the outer lamination comprising the frame's "rim". The second possible sort of reworking is through "fabrication": frames are always vulnerable to the activities of those who induce others to have a false belief in what is going on either playfully, (by those who model themselves on conmen), or exploitatively (such as that constructed by conmen who model themselves on the rest of us). Ditton (1976) comments, perhaps flipantly 'Thus the laminations, or layers, of a frame structure may be limitlessly extended. Refabrication may heap on fabrication, rekeying pile on key. However, excessive transformation of frame depth itself transforms frame-complexity into frame-confusion'.

However, having outlined the skeletal structure, Ditton (1976) comments that Goffman 'lapses into (for him) a familiar rhetorical device: definition and clarification through the examination of a pléthora of negative cases. In the rest of the book, we race through 'out-of-frame' activity (unofficially attended to minor involvements), 'frame anchoring'
(the mode of transformation - shaking hands - and not the transformation itself - the 'handshake' - is geared to, or embedded in the world), 'misframing' (frame ambiguities, errors, and disputes), 'frame-breaking' occasions (improper involvement), and the 'negative experiences' that occur between frames themselves'. Sharrock (1976) also elaborates a criticism of Goffman's methodology, centering around the idiosyncratic nature of Goffman's use of data, a theme taken up by Jary and Smith (1976) as the following illustration indicates:

Goffman's style of analysis, they comment, consists 'essentially of a quite radical version of unsystematic naturalistic observation (or 'observant participation' as he once perceptively termed it), stacred with a crypto-comparative method which in its search for typifications rather than facts, clarifying depictions rather than more formal evidence or proof, waggishly utilizes rigorous and quantified reports on an equal footing with the most transient of cultural trivia' (Jary and Smith, 1976). Sharrock (1976) comments that Goffman's failure to take seriously the methodological problems which he faces in his work is more questionable each time he refuses to face them. 'His failure to confront methodological issues squarely is especially heightened when he claims to be drawing his inspiration from the work of those like Schutz, Wittgenstein, Austin and so on. If there is one thing which distinguishes their work from that of Goffman it is that they all exhibit a serious and scrupulous concern for method and that they are all prepared to try to think through the difficulties which confront their own approaches'.

To conclude this discussion of Goffman's use of the concept 'frame', it should be stated that in many respects Goffman's work might be seen as constituting a core of 'existential statements' in sociology. This is suggested by Jary and Smith (1976) who go on to write: 'the widespread reference to Goffman's sociological works as sources of seminal influence and brilliant insight, as well as extensive use made of his
concepts further testify to this possible a priori and existential character. And further: 'It is concatenations of concepts which are on offer by Goffman in 'Frame Analysis' and concatenations of concepts can be seen, in fact, as Goffman’s normal offerings. These plainly represent an activity sharply marked off from folk wisdom or from creative literature. It must be emphasized, however, that the 'theory' involved remains theory that is 'conceptual', a logical elaboration of the implications of a particular form or forms, rather than a statement of empirical 'contingencies' in need of 'experimental' testing'.

Finally, in this section, Shields (1976) has used the concept 'frame' in her analysis of nursery dialogue. She suggests that: 'each speaker's potential for participation is structured by some conception, however elementary, that the perceptual and interactional field is shared, that previous experience can be remembered and brought into play and there is some agreement on what is here called the 'latent context' which frames a situation, from which rules for coherent behaviour in a given context are derived and within which options for action are chosen'. Shields continues 'this latent context is a series of embedded frames and includes the more diffuse socially derived rules of what behaviour goes with what in a given context, and how certain roles are played, and also very specific rules pertaining to the framework of the immediate setting, in this case the nursery, and the rules and customs concerning the roles and activities of its members'. Thus Shields has a dynamic notion of 'frame' as a 'frame of reference' that can be applied to any situation, and more importantly, modified in interactions with other people with different experiences and conceptions. Shields defines her use of frame to include what the participants bring with them into the encounter from knowledge of the world including the social world and its rule systems, it therefore includes 'all the discrepancies in knowledge and experience as well as what is shared. This is the main source of new information and new interpretation of the current context of action from the
experience of the interacting participants. Discrepancies in meanings can be ignored or over-ridden, Shields continues, but they can also be argued and sorted out so that each participant gains some understanding of the distinctive meanings of the other. This requires close attention to what is said, and what is meant, and an effort to grasp not only the general intent but the differentiated features of the frame of reference of the other. This close negotiation of meaning Shields comments 'is at the heart of cultural transmission between mature adults and immature members of the group. This is a two way process in which an inexperienced mind attempts to assimilate the meaning of the more experienced, and the more experienced probes for a foothold in the mind of the immature'.

2.6:3 Conclusion

This section has reviewed some of the uses of the concept 'frame' in the existing literature. Cone (1968) makes clear the structural element of the picture frame analogy; the use of 'frame' as a structural concept involving in some way the bracketing of some reality. Minsky (1975) also uses the concept as a structural device to improve upon previous concepts in the area 'artificial intelligence', so that computers can be programmed to locate the structure in patterns of stimuli rather than concentrate on discrete stimuli alone. Batesons (1972) use of 'frame' has structural and evaluative components, and his use of the concept has psychological and communicational aspects. Batesons concept of 'frame' is firstly that frames (boundaries) exist logically and psychologically, and these frames appear in communication as metacommunications: that frame a message. This use of the picture frame analogy, along with Batesons discussion of logical types and mathematical set theory, has led to the combination of 'framing' (as metacommunications) with the concepts of General Systems Theory (13).

(13) Some of these are considered in the next section, section 2.7.
In the work of, for example Wilden (1972), Harris (1975) and Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1968). Goffman (1975) has elaborated a 'frame analysis' that has some important insights, for example, the notion of 'keying' and is considered a conceptual, existential use of the concepts 'frame'. Finally Shields (1976) has a dynamic conception of 'frame' that has two distinct advantages, firstly it draws attention to the social psychological 'latent context' of any interaction and secondly, allows for frames to be modified in interactions. Finally, Bernstein's (1975) notion of 'frame' has not been considered in this section; Bernstein's use of the concept has already been discussed in section 2.3.3 of this chapter. The next section will consider two specific concepts that are used in Chapter 4 to characterise the mother-child metacommunication system, that is 'Symmetry' and 'Complementarity'.

2.7 The literature on the concepts 'Symmetry' and 'Complementarity'

2.7.1 Introduction

The material of this section is drawn mainly from the work of Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1968) and their discussion of interactional patterns, pathologies and paradoxes using some 'General Systems Theory' concepts. In this work the authors concentrate on 'the sender-receiver relation as mediated by communication', and note that: 'since this communicational approach to the phenomena of human behaviour, both normal and abnormal is based on the observable manifestations of relationship in the widest sense, it is therefore, conceptually closer to mathematics than to traditional psychology....' Watzlawick et al point to the basic 'property' of behaviour - that it has no opposite. In other words, 'there is no such thing as non-behaviour, or to put it more simply, one cannot not behave' and, furthermore 'all behaviour in an
Interactional situation, is communication. The authors go on to suggest that: 'any communication not only conveys information but at the same time it imposes behaviour'. These two aspects of communication have come to be known as the 'report' and the 'command' aspects respectively of any communication. The report aspect conveys information and is, therefore, the content of the message. The command aspect on the other hand, refers to what sort of message it is to be taken as, and, therefore, the authors suggest it frames (in Bateson's use of the term) the relationship between the communicants. 'All such relationship statements', the authors indicate, 'are about one or several of the following assertions: "This is how I see myself ... This is how I see you ... This is how I see you seeing me ..' and so forth in theoretically infinite regress'. The authors suggest that the more spontaneous and 'healthy' a relationship, the more the relationship aspect of communication recedes into the background. Conversely 'sick' relationships are characterised by a constant struggle about the nature of the relationship, with the content aspect of communication becoming less and less important. Thus, to summarise so far, Watzlawick et al suggest that human beings whether they are conscious of this or not, generate a constant stream of communication messages to others. Every communication has a 'content' and a 'relationship' aspect such that the latter 'frames' the former and is therefore a metacommunication defining the relationship an individual has with other people. Wilden (1972) has

(14) Thus these authors take a specific stance in relation to the study of nonverbal behaviour, a stance that can be compared to others. Wiener, Shannon, Rubinow and Geller (1972) for example, in their paper attempt to articulate some of the suppositions implicit in different approaches used to study non-verbal behaviour, and emphasise the conceptual distinction that can be made between nonverbal behaviours which can be considered as communications and those, these authors consider, that cannot.

(15) Watzlawick et al use the example: 'the stranger who ignores you must be 'answered' with, at least, ignoring behaviour'.
attempted to use these concepts in an analysis of social class differences in communication. Wilden suggests that (from the earlier work of Bernstein on the sociolinguistic code thesis): 'the working class child is induced to be sensitive to nonverbal or 'immediate' clues and cues in what one would call the digitally simple but analogically complex messages he receives'. The middle class child is 'induced to look for similar clues about his relationship with other people in the verbal message itself'. This distinction leads, suggests Wilden, to a non-instrumental relationship to words in the middle class child. This analysis echoes that of Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) mentioned in section 2.3.2 of this chapter. Wilden continues that this relationship with words of the working class child 'must be correlated with the fact that anyone in a social relationship which defines him or her as inferior must necessarily be much more concerned to discover what the relationship is about, rather than to communicate or receive any particular messages within it'. Wilden concludes 'he or she will be much more interested in messages which frame the communication, telling them 'where they stand', than in the communication itself, because an inadvertent step outside the frame may have disastrous consequences'.

To return to Watzlawick et al (1968), the authors introduce the idea of 'punctuation' (a term mentioned in this chapter but so far without explanation). Watzlawick et al (1968) suggests that if conventional learning experiments are viewed, it is possible to observe that:

'repeated trials amount to a differentiation of relationship between the two organisms concerned - the experimenter and his subject. The sequence of trials is so punctuated that it is always the experimenter who seems to provide the 'stimuli' and the 'reinforcement' while the subject provides the 'responses'. These
words are here deliberately put in quotation marks because role definitions are in fact only created by the willingness of the organism to accept the system of punctuation ..... The rat who said 'I have got my experimenter trained. Each time I press the lever he gives me food' was declining to accept the punctuation of the sequence which the experimenter was seeking to impose'.

The authors consider that, over a long sequence of interchanges between persons, people will in fact punctuate the sequence 'so that it will appear that one or the other has initiative, dominance, dependency or the like. That is, they will set up between them patterns of interchange (about which they may or may not be in agreement) and these patterns will in effect be rules of contingency regarding the exchange of reinforcement'. Thus: 'punctuation organises behavioural events. There are many shared conventions of punctuation which, while no more or less accurate than other views of the same events serve to organise interactional sequences; for example a person in a group, behaving in a certain way is called the 'leader' and another the 'follower', although it is difficult to say which comes first or where one would be without the other'. Disagreement about how to punctuate the sequence of events, suggest the authors, is at the root of countless relationship struggles; and this leads into a discussion of 'symmetrical' and 'complementary' relationships. Human beings, the authors state, communicate both digitally and analogically (these terms have been introduced earlier, in the discussion of Harris's (1975) use of the concept 'frame'). Digital language has a highly complex and powerful logical syntax to describe 'content' but lacks adequate semantics in the field of 'relationship'. Analogic language possesses the semantics but has no adequate syntax for the unambiguous definition of the nature of relationships, which, Watzlawick et al (1968) suggest, can be summed up by the concepts symmetrical and complementary.
2.7.2 Symmetrical and Complementary Interaction

These terms derive from the work of Bateson (1958) who used them to characterise the process of differentiation in the norms of individual behaviour, resulting from cumulative interaction between individuals. Bateson elaborates as follows: "When our discipline is defined in terms of the reactions of an individual to the reactions of other individuals, it is at once apparent that we must regard the relationship between two individuals as liable to alter from time to time, even without disturbance from outside. We have to consider, not only A's reactions to B's behaviour, but we must go on to consider how these affect B's later behaviour and the effect of this on A. It is once apparent that many systems of relationship, either between individuals or groups of individuals, contain a tendency towards progressive change. If, for example, one of the patterns of cultural behaviour, considered appropriate in individual A, is culturally labelled as an assertive pattern, while B is expected to reply to this with what is culturally regarded as submission, it is likely that this submission will encourage a further assertion, and that this assertion will demand still further submission. We have thus a potentially progressive state of affairs, and unless other factors are present to restrain the excesses of assertive and submissive behaviour, A must necessarily become more and more assertive, while B will become more and more submissive; and this progressive change will occur whether A and B are separate individuals or members of complementary groups.

Progressive changes of this sort we may describe as complementary schismogenesis. But there is another pattern of relationships between individuals or groups of individuals which equally contains the germs of progressive change. If, for example, we find boasting as the cultural pattern of behaviour in one group, and that the other group replies to this
With boasting, a competitive situation may develop in which boasting leads to more boasting, and so on. This type of progressive change we may call symmetrical schizophrenia (Bateson 1958). Watzlawick et al. (1968) state that these two patterns have come to be referred to without reference to the schizophrenia process, and are now called symmetrical and complementary interaction. These authors go further in their discussion, they suggest that 'symmetrical' and 'complementary' can be described as relationships punctuated so as to emphasise either equality or difference: 'In the (former) case the partners tend to mirror each other's behaviour, and thus their interaction can be termed symmetrical. Weakness or strength, goodness or badness, are not relevant here, for equality can be maintained in any of these areas. In the (latter) case one partner's behaviour complements that of the other, forming a different sort of behavioural Gestalt, and is called complementary. Symmetrical interaction, then, is characterized by equality and the minimization of difference, while complementary interaction is based on the maximisation of difference.' Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1968).

Watzlawick et al. (1968) suggest that there are two different positions in a complementary relationship: 'one partner occupies what has been described as the superior, primary or 'one-up' position and the other the corresponding inferior, secondary, or 'one-down' position. These terms are quite useful as long as they are not equated with 'good' or 'bad', 'strong', or 'weak'. A complementary relationship may be set by the social or cultural context (as in the cases of mother and infant, doctor and patient, or teacher and student), or it may be the idiosyncratic relationship style of a particular dyad'. Watzlawick et al. (1968) write that it is important to recognise the interlocking nature of both relationships and the fact that, Watzlawick et al. suggest, one partner need not necessarily impose, for example, a complementary relationship on the other, but rather each behaves in a manner which presupposes, while at the
same time providing reasons for the behaviour of the other. Watzlawick et al. (1968) go further, they suggest that to avoid misunderstanding symmetrical and complementary metacommunicative relationships are not in and by themselves 'good' or 'bad', 'normal' or 'abnormal', the two concepts refer to two basic categories into which all communicational interchanges can be divided. 'Both (symmetry and complementary) have important functions, and from what is known about healthy relationships, we may conclude that both must be present, although in mutual alternation or operation in different areas', Watzlawick et al. continue 'each pattern can stabilize the other whenever a runaway occurs in one of them, and also it is not only possible but necessary for two partners to relate symmetrically in some areas and complementary in others'. The pathologic condition associated with a symmetric relationship is 'symmetric escalation' or extreme competitiveness. Problems arise in a complementary relationship when P demands that O confirms a definition of P that is at variance with the way O sees P (this is termed 'rigid complementarity'). This places O in a dilemma. He or she must change his or her own definition of self into one that complements and thus supports P, for it is in the nature of a complementary relationship that a definition of self can only be maintained by the partner playing the specific complementary role.

Here Watzlawick et al. (1968) could be said, with their reference to the lack of correspondence of 'one-up' with 'good' or 'strong' and 'one down' with 'bad' or 'weak', to be displaying the same bias that they could be said to share with the 'phenomenological sociologies'. Hargreaves (1977) has pointed out, as suggested in the Introduction to this chapter, that the assumption here is that the participants in the interchange are free firstly to punctuate the interaction as they wish, and secondly compensate for 'one-downness' with subsequent 'one-upness' or at least symmetry.
As Hargreaves (1977) suggests, there do exist 'stronger interaction rights which attach to some membership categories in society' and therefore to be 'one-up' in one situation may mean being 'one-up' in other social situations. The quotation that follows perhaps makes this point clear: the complementary metacommunicative relationship is summed up by Humpty Dumpty as follows:

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things!"

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be the master that's all."

2.7.2 Conclusion

This section has considered the concepts 'symmetry' and 'complementary' drawn from the work of Bateson (1958) and Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1968). Watzlawick et al. suggest that human beings, whether they are conscious of this or not, generate a constant stream of messages to others; 'all behaviour is communication'. Every communication has a 'content' and a 'relationship' aspect such that the latter 'frames' the former and is therefore a metacommunication defining the relationship between the individual and others. The relationship between persons, which punctuates the communication between them, can be summed up by the concepts 'symmetry' that emphasises equality, or 'complementary' that emphasises difference. Watzlawick et al (1968) consider these interchangeable, but if the effects of the social structure on communication is considered, following Hargreaves (1977), to be 'one-up' in a complementary relationship in one situation may mean being 'one-up' in others.
Chapter 3  Research Method: Design of the study, collection and analysis of the data, and a discussion of the observer effects and other problems encountered in data collection using videotape.

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Design of the study

3.3 The sample of mother-child pairs

3.3.1 The three working class mother-child pairs

3.3.2 The three middle class mother-child pairs

3.3.3 The four upper class mother-child pairs

3.4 Analysis of the data

3.5 Observer effects and other problems of data collection using videotape in this study

3.5.1 Introduction

3.5.2 Some uses of videotape, and how videotape has been used in this study

3.5.3 Discussion of the problems involved in using videotape recording apparatus in 'participant observation'

3.5.3.1 Obtaining videotape film data

3.5.3.2 Transcription from videotape film to data books

3.5.3.3 Interpreting the data and developing a grounded theory

3.5.4 Summary and conclusion

3.6 Summary of the research method
3.1 Introduction

This chapter contains, in this section a brief summary of the discussion of the research methodology employed in this study and its theoretical background that is located in section 1.2 of chapter 1. Section 3.2 contains a description of the experimental design employed here; section 3.3 contains a description of the procedures whereby the temp mother - child pairs studies were obtained, and a description of the mother - child pairs themselves. Finally, section 3.4 contains a discussion of observer effects and other problems encountered, associated with participant observation data collection and data analysis using videotape.

In section 1.2 of chapter 1 it was suggested that one variant of a hermeneutic philosophy of science is the 'action research' approach. This, while it involves some meta theoretical philosophical assumptions, can be seen as a method of doing science that does not reify 'scientific methodology'. Action research recognises that research may be used to generate 'grounded' theories. Grounded theory can be considered to be of two types, 'grounded substantive theory' which concerns the nature of social relations in one setting, and 'grounded formal theory', the study of many settings that would seek to generalise about the recurrent characteristics of an aspect of social life. The research reported here, stands within the action research perspective. The actual research method to be used in this analysis of intersubjectivity between mother and child, is participant observation of the mother and child, in their own home, using a videotape film data collecting method. The utility of videotape filming as a data collecting technique has been indicated in sections 2.3.2 and 2.2.3 of chapter 2, where it was suggested that analysis of a videotape film made available the situational and communicational contexts of the mother - child interchanges, as the interchanges developed over time. This is returned to in the following.
This study then, will involve participant observation (1) via videotape of ten pairs of mother-child pair interchanges from which the grounded theory to be found in chapter 4 has been ultimately developed. While this removes some of the difficulties associated with a logical positivist philosophy of science, there are other difficulties. Some of these are more concerned with the use of videotape to capture the mother-child interchange data and are outlined in section 3.5. Mention will be made here of some of the difficulties specific to participant observation.

One of the most problematic of these is the difficulty of deciding how much it is advisable or appropriate for the observer to identify his or her true purposes. This is, it is considered, an ethical issue of great importance, and in this study the observer was entirely open as to the aims of the study with the mothers in the sample. This is returned to in section 3.5.3.1 of this chapter. Secondly, those subjects that the observer observes may be (or may become) unrepresentative of a total population. If the sampling is faultless and the sample is truly reflective of a total population than there may be social psychological factors that intervene to make the sample unrepresentative. For example, those subjects that the observer feels most ready to talk with and empathise with may be that subset of the total population that share similar backgrounds, opinions and so on as the observer. This problem in this research centered around the mother’s willingness to act naturally with the child in the presence of a ‘high status’ university researcher. This is returned to later in this chapter, and is a theme throughout chapters 4 and 5, and is returned to in chapter 6. Finally,

(1) The approach taken here is that the observer is never simply a passive observer of the social situation. Invariably the researcher is a participant in the social situation in many ways. This could be considered an underlying theme of this thesis, and is returned to in chapter 6.
participant observation will, because of the necessary qualitative analysis of the data, allow only a small number of mother - child pairs to be sampled. This then, would involve a consideration of the problem of generalisation from a small sample to a total population touched upon above. In this study, it is suggested that the various mother - child pairs in the sample of 10 have been carefully selected to be representative of their respective social classes. Therefore, the mother - child pair interchanges observed are thought to be typical of mother - child interchanges of the three social classes. Later research will no doubt determine whether this is so.

Finally, before moving on to the design of the study it is necessary to return to the discussion of why in the participant observation, data was collected by videotape recording rather than tape recorder or observational analysis 'on site'.

Generally, in the research area of 'mother - child interchanges and the child's acquisition of language', the traditional method of data collection has been to use a tape recorder supplemented by observer's notes and descriptions of mother - child nonverbal interchange (see for example Baldwin and Baldwin (1973)). Occasionally, looking back through the literature it is possible to find observational analysis 'on site' as a research method in which the observer counts appropriate behaviour he or she observes in terms of some coding grid. This latter method has been used more recently, for example, in Tulkin and Kagan (1972). In their study the observer carried a small battery operated timer which every 5 seconds, 'emitted a soft tone which the observer heard through an ear-phone. Code sheets each contained 30, 1x2 inch squares, and at the sound of the tone, the observer moved his pencil onto the next square. Presence of a particular behaviour during a 5 second interval was noted on the code sheet by a number or letter representing that behaviour ...'. This assumes
that mother - child interchanges is simple enough and consists only of the
discernable verbal and nonverbal communication that can be recorded in
this way; it assumes for example that mother-and-child behaviour does not
occur at the same time. It also assumes that the theory that informs the
drawing up of the coding grid, as suggested above, has been decided on
somewhere other than in relation to the data on which it is being used.
The coding grid is a theory of how the world is, that the world can be coded
in this way, and it therefore explains phenomena only in its own terms.
Often, as suggested above, the assumptions on which the coding grids have
been drawn up remain implicit.

The use of tape recorders for sampling of mother and child's speech,
usually with the observer present, has a history of use in relation to the
child's acquisition of language. In relation to the mother - child interchange
system this cannot avoid having some effect on the naturalness of the
mother-and-child’s behaviour. In some studies this is not important, in
others like the 'Bristol Project' (Wells 1976) it was thought to be crucial.
They, in this project, placed a high priority on 'obtaining uncontaminated
samples of spontaneous speech'. Consequently, they developed special
equipment to refine the tape recorder sampling method. Their refinement
consisted of a radio-microphone worn by the child under his or her top
garment. This transmitted the child's speech, together with the speech
of others within his hearing range, to a radio receiver and tape recorder
placed in a convenient and safe position in the house. The recorder was
pre-programmed to switch on and off for periods of 30 seconds at intervals
over the day ..... In order to compensate, as far as possible, for the
lack of contextual information, the tape was replayed to the mother by the
transcriber on the evening of the recording and she was asked to recall, in
as much detail as possible, the participants, location and activity for each
of the recorded samples. After transcription, the speech sample is analysed
and coded on computer data cards ...' In going to such lengths to preserve
the 'naturalness' of their data, these researchers seem to have missed
the point that context is often crucial to an understanding of an utterance,
and that the interpersonal intersubjective context that is most important
in determining what is going on in the interchanges and what specifically
is the child's meaning, may take more than 90 seconds to determine. Also,
here, to rely on the mother's recollections of specific utterances of the
child, up to 10 hours afterwards to provide such important data as the
context in which the child's utterance was made is to miss much useful
information on the detailed analysis of the interpersonal context that,
as suggested above, is crucial to understanding the child's meanings.
Finally, the point needs to be made that children develop and express
meanings nonverbally before they accomplish the transition to verbally
expressed meanings (Newson & Newson 1975). Therefore, to concentrate on
the verbal as a tape recorder must do, is to leave aside the earlier stages
in the child's development of meanings. Thus the authors of the 'Bristol
Project' preserve their 'expert' status as external observers, and their
'scientific objectivity' at the expense of distorting their data to fit
their conception of a 'scientific method'.

To turn to the use of videotape in this type of research. While it
is suggested that videotaping data overcomes some of the problems outlined
above, its uses pose other sets of problems, and these are discussed in
section 4.3 of this chapter. The usefulness of videotape in research on
mother-child interchange is that it enables the 'reality' of the mother-child
interchange to be captured and be available for as many repeats,
in slow motion if it is felt necessary, as the observer requires.
Consequently, it makes available as Elsler, Hersen and Agras (1973) suggest,
a much more detailed analysis of the data, on for example, eye contact
and eye gaze redirection that are important in terms of the analysis to
be presented here in chapters 4 and 5. The use of the videotape therefore
enables the data to be constantly reviewed in its entirety and 'as it
happened' and therefore allows the subtle double fit between theory and
observation to proceed more satisfactorily in the generation of grounded theory. Secondly the use of videotape allows the meaning of the child and mothers utterances to be related to their contexts and therefore a more detailed analysis of their meanings can be undertaken, especially here the child's nonverbally expressed meanings. 'Contexts' here does not mean the physical location of the interchange, it refers to the dynamic interpersonal context of the present interchange, as the participants develop a social psychological frame over time. Thirdly, following from this, use of videotape allows analysis of the interchange as it develops over a brief three or four minutes time period (or, of course, a longer or shorter period as required). The dimension of 'time' is therefore brought into the foreground of the analysis and can be treated realistically as a major variable. This is considered in detail in section 4.4.5 of chapter 4.

3.2 Design of the study

Ten mother child pairs were observed for between 10 and 12 months. The observations took place on two consecutive mornings or afternoons, depending on the mother's routines, every second month. The ages of the children involved are shown in Table 4.1. The ages of all the children with the exception of three of them, were between 14 months and 18 months at the start of the study, and 22 months and 27 months at the end. Three of the upper class children were slightly older than the rest, their ages were between 18 and 20 months at the start, and between 26 and 29 months at the end. Also, a further 'round' of data was collected from three children in the sample who had not provided 20 or more 'two-word' utterances after transcription of the data from round 5.

The first session of the two monthly visits were largely for the purpose of familiarisation of the mother and child with the presence of the observer and camera equipment, and of the observer with specific mother-child pairs. A videotape film of the mother-child interaction was
Table 3.1  The ages of the children during the rounds of data collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6 'rounds' of data collection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Alice</td>
<td>15 months*</td>
<td>17 months</td>
<td>19 months</td>
<td>21 months</td>
<td>22 months 2 weeks</td>
<td>25 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) James</td>
<td>15 months*</td>
<td>17 months</td>
<td>19 months</td>
<td>21 months</td>
<td>23 months 2 weeks</td>
<td>25 months 2 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Leslie</td>
<td>17 months</td>
<td>19 months*</td>
<td>21 months</td>
<td>23 months</td>
<td>24 months 3 weeks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Sally</td>
<td>17 months*</td>
<td>19 months</td>
<td>21 months</td>
<td>23 months</td>
<td>24 months 3 weeks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Stewart</td>
<td>14 months 2 weeks</td>
<td>16 months 2 weeks</td>
<td>19 months*</td>
<td>20 months 2 weeks</td>
<td>22 months 2 weeks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Geoffrey</td>
<td>17 months 3 weeks</td>
<td>18 months* 3 weeks</td>
<td>20 months 2 weeks</td>
<td>22 months 2 weeks</td>
<td>24 months 26 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Giles</td>
<td>19 months 3 weeks</td>
<td>21 months 3 weeks</td>
<td>24 months* 1 week</td>
<td>26 months 1 week</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Emma</td>
<td>19 months* 3 weeks</td>
<td>22 months 1 week</td>
<td>24 months 2 weeks</td>
<td>25 months 2 weeks</td>
<td>28 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Charlotte</td>
<td>20 months 3 weeks</td>
<td>21 months 3 weeks</td>
<td>24 months* 3 weeks</td>
<td>26 months 1 week</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Julian</td>
<td>17 months* 1 week</td>
<td>19 months</td>
<td>21 months</td>
<td>24 months 2 week</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates the age of each child when the data used in the analysis in chapters 4 and 5 was recorded.
obtained on the second and following session. During the time of the observers presence, which was between 2 and 3 hours on each occasion, the mothers were encouraged to continue with normal activities as far as possible. All of the mothers had been informed by the initial contact letter that the observer was interested in 'how children learn to speak'. No attempt was made to force the mother to interact with the child so that a videotape film could be made, consequently, for some sessions less than 1 hour of videotaped mother-child interchange data was obtained. It was felt that the naturalness of the communications between the mother and the child would be eliminated if the mother was encouraged into such behaviour. The observer tried to make the sessions as relaxing and as enjoyable as possible by occasionally engaging the mother in conversation or playing with the child where it seemed appropriate. The videotapes were transcribed into data books, and this record was used as a base for analysis.

Mothers and children were selected on the basis of their social class classification and the age of the children. Consequently, it was not possible to control other variables, that is, age of mother, number of children in the family, mothers experience of childrearing, and sex of child. The mother-child pairs are considered in the following section.

3.3 The sample of mother-child pairs

Because of the qualitative analysis of the data necessary in producing a grounded theory, only a small number, 10, of mother-child pairs could be sampled. The ones selected are described in this section.

To recall the discussion of social class in chapter 2, the index of social class used in this study is taken from Stacey (1960) (reprinted in Kline, 1965). In this classification scheme there is a description of three major social classes, being distinguished in various ways according to reference
groups, education, occupation, source of income, and degree of integration with the local community. Although Stacey's original classification relates to the class structure of Banbury, its relevance to the aims of this study, and to the geographical area of the rural East Midlands where this study took place, determined its use here. The reader is referred to the scheme, which is discussed in section 2.4.3 of chapter 2. The scheme can be found in Table 2.4 which also contains the Hall Jones Index of Social Class which Stacey includes for comparison purposes. The ten mother-child pairs included in the sample were classified following the Stacey scheme according to social class as follows; three were of working class designation, three of middle class and four of upper class designation.

3.3.1 The three working class mother-child pairs

The three working class mother-child pairs were selected from a list of 13 mothers and children of the appropriate age compiled from the National Register of Births and Deaths with the help of the Community Health Service. The list contained names and addresses of mothers and children in the East Midlands area. All of these mothers were visited, and 3 mothers and children asked to take part. The sample of 3 did not include any 'lower working class' mothers and children. (Lower working class children have traditionally been used in previous attempts to verify Bernstein's theories, because Bernstein's theory of 'restricted' sociolinguistic code and working class socialisation was developed with reference to lower working class children). This is because there were no 'lower working class' mothers with children of the appropriate age that appeared in the list of 13 from which the sample was drawn. The sample of 3 also did not include any children who were the youngest of large families of 5 or more children, although one family had four children living in the family home (the family of 'James' in section 5.2.2 of chapter 5 who also, it is considered, had aspirations to be upwardly mobile). It contained no mothers who went out to work, although
one of the mothers was a registered child minder. ('Alice' mother of section 5.2.1 of chapter 5). Consequently the three selected to take part in this study could be considered 'middle working class' or 'ordinary working class' to use Stacey's terminology.

3.3.2 The three middle class mother - child pairs

These were obtained with the help of a list of 7 mothers and children of the appropriate age obtained from a list of mothers attending National Childbirth Trust relaxation classes in the same geographical region. The list was compiled by the National Childbirth Trust representative. It contained names of mothers who had had children during nominated dates. All of the mothers were visited and the three 'most suitable' were asked to take part in this study. The main criterion of suitability for two of the mothers was that they were of 'new middle class' status or in Stacey's terms, members of the 'newer professions' to test expectations derived from Bernstein's work - discussed in section 2.3.3 of chapter 2. Both of these two families had strong university connections. In one family the mother had a B.Sc Degree in Linguistics ('Stewart' of section 5.3.2 of chapter 5) and in the other the father had a PhD Degree in Chemistry ('Sally' of section 5.3.1 of chapter 5). The criterion of suitability for the third of the middle class mother - child pairs was that the family were of 'older, established middle class' status again to test expectations derived from Bernstein's work. The third family stood, using Stacey's classification, on the frontier of middle and upper class, in that the father was a Medical Doctor from a family of Medical Doctors (the family of 'Geoffrey' of section 5.3.1 of Chapter 5). All three of these families could be considered to be geographically mobile to some extent as they all expected to move to other areas as they pursue their careers.
3.3.3 Four upper class mother - child pairs

These were obtained through the use of 'Kelly's Handbook' of the 'top 10,000 families' in Great Britain. Kelly's Handbook consists of entries for all 'Peers, Baronets, Privy Counsellor's; all Knights of the U.K. and most Commonwealth Knight's; 'Knights and Companions of the various Orders and a selection of C.B.E's'; 'Members of Parliament and members of the higher grades of the diplomatic, naval, military, air, clerical, legal and civil services of the State'; 'Deputy Lieutenants; and High Sheriffs of Counties of England, Scotland and Wales'; 'distinguished members of the stage, literary and artistic worlds' and finally, 'leading members of Commerce and Industry' (personal communication from the editor). One hundred and eighty letters were sent to names of people appearing in the handbook, who had addresses in the East Midlands. The letter contained a brief description of the research and what it would involve from the mothers point of view. It also contained a request for names and addresses of mothers in the extended family whose children were of the appropriate age and who might be willing to participate in this research. This yielded 13 possibilities, and after further investigation and cross referencing with 'Whos Who' and visits, 4 mother - child pairs were asked to take part. All 4 would be considered to be of 'old county families', in Stacey's classification. (2).

Upto this point the use of 'mother - child pair' has been unproblematic, but here and hereafter problems arise in that three of these four upper class families employed resident nannies whose main responsibility it

(2) This total of 13 was made up of mostly 'old county families'. This seems typical of the upper class of the East Midlands area, in that members of the 'Industrial Upper Class' in Stacey's terms are, generally, not to be found in this area.
was to look after the children. Gathorn-Hardy (1972) seems to suggest that 'nanny ing' has largely died out: 'This book remains quite simply as their history; a study of a unique and curious way of bringing up children, which evolved among the upper and upper middle classes during the nineteenth century; flourished for approximately eighty years and then, with the Second World War disappeared for ever'. The evidence here seems to suggest that nanny ing is still very much alive. However, it may be that the nanny, to which Gathorn-Hardy refers are 'career' nannies who thought of themselves as a 'child's nanny' and who rarely themselves married and had children of their own. The nannies in this sample were within the age range 10 – 28 years and considered nanny ing to be a job 'until they get married'. Of the nannies, two had been trained as nannies at the Princess Christian Colleges, Manchester, one of the most prestigious nanny training colleges. These two nannies knew each other on a social basis and via occasional children tea parties, as their respective families knew each other also. These were the families of 'Giles' of section 5.4.1 and 'Emma' of section 5.4.2 of chapter 5. Both of these nannies could be considered of 'lower middle class' designation. The third nanny, also of lower middle class designation, was untrained. This nanny-child pair is discussed in section 5.4.3 of chapter 5, the 'Charlotte' data. All of these nannies lived on the premises, looked after the children and carried out some domestic duties mostly concerned with the children. They felt they could resist attempts to make them carry out other domestic duties. All of these three families lived in large 'Hall' type houses with accommodation for the nannies in the form of bedroom and living room, and with one room set aside as a nursery.

The fourth mother, although seemingly being able to afford a nanny and having the facilities for a nanny, chose not to employ one. She chose to look after her children herself, she employed a 'daily' domestic to perform various household cleaning operations. This is the data of 'Julian', discussed in section 5.4.4 of chapter 5.
The existence of these nannies is a feature of the upper class child-rearing situation that needs some discussion in terms of Bernstein's theories of the transmission of symbolic systems in society, and this is considered in detail in chapter 6. It is acknowledged here that in the existing literature on mother-child interaction the terminology has changed from mother-child interaction to caretaker-child interaction in recognition that any adult or elder sibling can be a 'mother' to a child. In this thesis, 'mother-child interchanges' will be used to cover all cases of mother and child and nanny and child interchanges, but wherever possible an attempt will be made to be specific as to which is referred to.

3.4 Analysis of the data

The preliminary organisation of the data proceeded as follows. The data was scrutinised for instances of prolonged mother-child interchanges where negotiations between the mother and child took place. Several of these occurred naturally in all the mother-child pairs unprompted by the observer. The situation selected for the detailed initial analysis was one in which the mothers played with their children with a 'ball and shapes' game. (3) This game involved the slotting of solid geometric shapes - hexagon, triangle, star and so on - into their respective holes in the ball. Five of the mother-child and nanny-child pairs in the sample played with this toy sometime during the 10 to 12 months of observation. With reference to table 4.1 most of the data used in this analysis was recorded in the earlier rounds of data collection. Five of the mother-child and nanny-child pairs in the sample played with this toy at some time during the period of observation. One nanny-child pair played with a 'box and toys' game; and one other mother-child pair played with a 'pillar box and toy' game. All of these toys involved the same principles. Of the remaining 3 mother and nanny-child pairs one mother was observed in playing with her child in a 'construction' game with toy building blocks.

(3) This was not supplied by the observer.
Two of the nanny-child pairs were involved in a 'jigsaw completion' activity. All of these games involved a series of interchanges during which the intersubjectivity could be examined and analysis of both the verbal and nonverbally expressed meanings developed in the regulation of joint activity could take place. These were, typically, 2 or 3 minutes long. It was felt that a grounded theory could be developed from the 'core' of the data involving the 'ball and shapes' game and that this theory could then be strengthened and extended with reference to the other slightly different play situations.

The data was transcribed in a degree of detail that involved description of behavioural factors such as gestures, body movements and eye contact and so on as well as the verbal dialogue. A phonemic transcription of the child's utterances at the morphemic level also took place. Thereafter the data was reviewed continuously in relation to the theories of Bernstein and the literature on intersubjectivity discussed in chapter 2. The resulting elements of a theory of framing are outlined in chapter 4.

3.5 Observer effects and other problems of data collection using videotape in this study

3.5.1 Introduction

To return to the discussion in section 1.2 of chapter 1 (summarised in section 3.1 of this chapter), there has been a shift in emphasis in research methodologies. In line with 'the criticisms of logical positivist science, there has been a shift from the standardized 'closed' questionnaires or experimental context to more informal and unstructured formats in line with hermeneutic thinking. The discussion in section 1.2 of chapter 1 suggested that the former 'older methodology' renders irrelevant the subjective meanings of those who are the 'object' of study. In so doing,
the researched offer their experience through the channels of the researchers own classification systems, concealed in for example, the formats of questionnaires (Roiser 1974). It was suggested in section 1.2 of chapter 1 that hermeneuticists consider such a method of studying people is derived from a method for the study of objects, and it is a denial of the subjectivity of people for them to be thus transformed via 'the experimental method' into objects. Further, the arguments of some critics go on to link logical positivist methods with the political control of people through the use of the technology of social science (see for example the radical psychology magazine 'Humpty Dumpty'). This was mentioned also in section 1.3 of chapter 1. Hermeneutic approaches also involve a 'newer methodology' in that they 'favour case studies of ongoing activities in which participant observation, the tape recorder and video machines play an important role ....'. Bernstein (1975b). Bernstein also suggests that this 'newer methodology' 'enables more of the researched to be visible, and its techniques allow a range of others to witness the spontaneous behaviour of the observed'. But, he argues, even if these public records of natural behaviour are treated as a means of dialogue between the recorded and the recorder, this dialogue is in itself subject to the 'disjunction between intellectual perspectives' which shape the communication. The self editing of the researchers communication is different from that of the researched, and this is invisible control1. Bernstein continues: 'On the other hand, paradoxically, in the case of a closed questionnaire, the privacy of the subject is safeguarded, for all that can be made public is a pencil mark which is transformed into an impersonal score. Further, the method of this transformation must be made public so that its assumptions may be criticized. In the case of the new methodology the principles used to restrict the vast amount of information and the number of channels are often implicit'. The central point that Bernstein makes is that
research methodologies in social science are themselves elements of culture'. While disagreeing with Bernstein that the assumptions behind the 'older methodology' are made public, it seems reasonable to think that in the 'new methodology' much remains implicit, and this could be seen to be the 'invisible control' of the researcher. This section will explore the implications and problems of the researchers 'invisible control' in using a 'new methodology', videotape in a participant observation situation in this study.

3.5.2 Some uses of videotape and how videotape has been used in this study

In this section, the use of videotape as a method doing action research, in this study, will be contrasted with uses of videotape reported by two other researchers. In this way, the distinctions between Bernstein's 'older methodology' and 'newer methodology' may be clarified. In the 'older methodology' videotape has been used in a laboratory situation to firstly, solve problems of experimental design or data collection. One example here is reported by Rutter (1977) where videotape is used in an analysis of eyecontact, gaze and mutual gaze over distance, as a means of eradicating distance cues from a set of observers who rated independently the subject's behaviour. Secondly, videotape has been used to achieve either a slow motion replay or to continually review the material in a post experimental analysis in a laboratory situation. This entails, typically, a static camera and a formal experimental situation with the camera, wires, microphones and so on visible to the subjects along with the usual paraphernalia of an experimental laboratory. An example of this would be the use of videotape as described by Cook (1977) where in this research, he used a video tape to obtain a record of adult male 'Mental Defectives' nonverbal behaviour before and after a removal to a new hospital. Here the video record was obtained of the adult 'mental defective' alone, from a camera positioned above the nurse's head. Dr. Cook reports that the nurse operated the camera by remote control, but he found the subject was more often out of the camera's range than in.
Here there are two obvious criticisms: firstly that the camera would perhaps have been better in a position to see both nurse and the subjects behaviour. This would have allowed seemingly irrelevant behaviour when analysed alone to be related to the interaction between the nurse and the patient in which the subjects behaviour may be seen to be well co-ordinated and relevant. Dr. Cook in fact reports that the eye contact avoidance behaviour associated with a 'classical case of autism' was discovered only after the experimental sessions had ended, and in a way unconnected with the research. The second criticism is that such a static arrangement of the camera did not allow for the subject's movement. One of the undoubted advantages of a videotape recording unit and camera is that it is portable and allows access to more natural environments than the artificial experimental situations described here.

Both of these two uses of videotape have stayed closely to the canons of 'correct scientific method' according to logical positivism. Both I would suggest, by staying within this paradigm, fail to exploit the flexibility of the videotape technology as a means of data collection. It was suggested in section 1.2 of chapter 1, that the 'action research' variant of a hermeneutic philosophy of science involves the use of research to develop 'grounded theories' rather than forcing data into a preconceived 'objective' reality. Within this perspective videotape has been used as a 'new methodology' in the realm of naturalistic observation under the heading of 'human ethology' (after Bruner 1974 and also Richer 1976). Here, typically, the researcher takes a portable videotape recorder unit and camera onto the site to watch human behaviour 'in its natural habitat'. Here the observer asks questions of the sort 'what is going on here?' which demand a qualitative answer compared to the predominantly quantitative methods of data analysis used in the 'older methodology'. This present investigation is one in this tradition, where a portable
 videotape apparatus has been used to gain data in a natural situation, on (initially) the effects of social class on the structure of mother - child interchanges and the child's development of language. The use of videotape, as suggested in section 3.1 of this chapter, enables the 'double slit' process between data and theory to be elevated to more sophisticated levels. It enables the data to be captured and reviewed in its entirety to a theoretically infinite degree to enable this process to proceed. In the research reported here the use of videotape in an action research perspective has enabled a full appreciation of the context of the mother - child interchange to be made. As stated in section 3.1 the 'context' is defined here not simply in terms of physical surrounding but also the interpersonal intersubjective discourse that has just occurred relating to the establishing and development by the participants of a social psychological 'framing'. From this work the illustrations given are drawn.

Finally, there are problems as Bernstein suggests of implicit control by the researcher. The following sections are offered as an attempt to clarify the problems and make some of the 'implicit control' of the 'new methodology' explicit. It could be considered 'participant observation of a participant observer'.

3.5.3 Discussion of the problems involved in using videotape recording apparatus in participant observation

The problems can be categorised as follows:

1. Obtaining videotape film data

   (I) Problems associated with the presence of an observer.

   (II) Problems associated with the presence of an observer, and the observers use of the camera equipment.

   (III) Problems associated with the presence of an observer and camera equipment on each subject (in this case the mother and the child) individually.

   (IV) Problems associated with the presence of an observer and camera equipment on the interchanges between subjects (in this case mother - child interchange).
2. Transcription from videotape film to data books

3. Interpreting the data and developing a grounded theory

This section will deal with these problems individually, pointing to research findings where relevant. The fact that there is so little research, as yet, in this area is testimony to the new arrival of videotaping as a means of obtaining data in the research methods area. The fact that some of these problems may appear to be unresolvable should not allow the dismissal of these problems out of hand. Rather they should be stated and re-stated until those researchers over enthusiastic in their use of videotape or in their claims for research generally (within both logical positivist and hermeneutic paradigms) are made aware of the limitations of videotape and of the scientific enterprise itself.

3.5.3.1 Problems of obtaining videotape film data

(i) Problems associated with the presence of the observer

The fact that the experimental situation is a potent one in terms of behaviour change from what would be considered 'normal' is well established (see for example Israel and Tajfel 1972, Mixon 1972, Rowan 1974 or Orne 1962). Rowan (1974) for example suggests, the researcher must be considered to be a 'change agent', intervening in the experimental situation to change the subjects behaviour in various subtle ways. It is important to consider here the suggestion of Bourdieu (1977) that '... the ............ outside observer, who, in his preoccupation with interpreting practices, is inclined to introduce into the object the principles of his relation to the object, as is attested by the special importance he assigns to communicative functions ...... The "knowing subject", as the idealist tradition rightly calls him, inflicts on practice a much more fundamental and pernicious alteration which, being a constituent condition of the cognitive operation, is bound to pass
unnoticed: in taking up a point a view on the action, withdrawing from it in order to observe it from a distance, he constitutes practical activity as an object of observation and analysis ... for the observer himself and, for the mother. Thus her taken for granted practice becomes reflected upon by the observer and by herself. The researcher then, has an obligation to acknowledge this. In the context under consideration here the researcher has an ethical obligation to discuss the subjects behaviour as seen on videotape film with them, in a post experimental de briefing session. Here the details of the nature of the enquiry and its results can be discussed. Ethically, then, the subjects should be shown the videotape film at the end of the experiment. However to indicate this before or during the course of the experiment may alter the whole nature of the social situation being videotaped. In such instances, for example, mothers may if they were not doing so already, begin to show off the capabilities of their children. Also here, in relation to the ethics of the research enterprise, if the videotapes are not to be wiped clean and some of the data is to be used for demonstration purposes, subjects permission should be sought.

In all research situations the subjects must be conceived of as active problem solvers, looking for patterns in the observers behaviour so that the researcher's expectations can be met and the joint enterprise completed successfully. The full extent of this, and the implications for research methodology has not been fully explored, but they must, as Nixons (1972) reanalysis of Milgrams (1963) experiments suggest, be very profound. Orne (1962), in his work on the 'demand characteristics of social psychology experiments', develops the idea that subjects come to a session anticipating it to be an 'experiment' that is being done in the cause of 'science'. Although subjects may be vague about the experimental sessions purpose they have some idea about 'scientific experiments' and their purposes.
Without knowing specifically what this specific experiment is for, subjects, one considers, invariably count it valuable and important so they seek guidance in their performance so as to help make the experiment worthwhile. 'To accomplish such extra-experimental and tacit projects, subjects will search a sessions features to learn what is being demanded of them, and will extend themselves to satisfy these demands'. Garfinkel's comments on Labov (1966) are relevant:

'Did you give any thought to the suggestion that your subjects might have been making an attempt to help you out? Is there any important sense in which we could say of your results that they would have been better even if you had told your subjects specifically what you were looking for and then asked them straight out to please talk in a fashion to make it possible for you to write a publishable paper? I'm speaking quite seriously. In Sociology interviews a respondent is frequently treated as if he were a judgemental dope about the conditions of the interview'. Garfinkel (1966)

11 Problems associated with the presence of an observer; and the observers use of the camera equipment

In this section attention will be focussed on the observers use of the camera.

(a) Selection of situations sampled

The observer is a participant in the situation and he or she selects which aspects of it are to be videotaped. This selection is inevitable in that there are inevitable time limits to videotape filming because of the nature of the technology. All videotapes at present have one hour as a total time limit. Therefore if the observation session lasts anything above an hour some selection of what is to be videotaped is necessary. Various time sampling techniques have been employed, as in the 'Bristol Project' discussed in section 3.1 for example. But if time
is not to be an experimental controlled variable than the judgement of when to switch the camera on is left to the participant observer and is therefore highly subjective. To illustrate this two trends were observed in the data gathering period of the research outlined in this thesis: firstly potentially embarrassing moments of mother–child interchanges were at first not filmed out of consideration for the mother's feelings. Later on in the 10–12 months of data collection, these were filmed. It was only as the researched progressed and I knew the mothers and nannies better that I felt I was able to keep the camera on during these occasions. These occasions were, typically, when the mothers lost their temper with the children. Thus my experience over 5 or 6 'rounds' of data collection indicated a variation to some extent in the types of situations videotaped. Secondly, there took place, without my realising until all the data had been collected and transcribed, variations between 'rounds' of data collection in the total time spent filming. The pattern was as follows:

(1) Initially, a full half hour videotape was taken in each session. (The videotape unit I was using could only take ½ hour tapes).

(2) A drastic reduction took place when I found that I was unable to transcribe all the data in the time available between recording sessions. The actual transcription rates were about 50, National NV-30206 VTR Units per hour or about 2 full days transcribing per tape. A reduction in total time of filming to, on average 2/5 total (or 12 minutes of filmed interaction) took place for the next 'round' of data collection.

(3) After this, for the next 2 'rounds' of data collection the total time of filmed interchanges built up and levelled out at about 18 to 24 minutes of filmed interaction per session.

(4) During the final 'round' of data collection, a full 30 minutes of filmed interchanges was obtained.
(b) Physical constraints due to the nature of the videotape equipment

Although the camera and tape recorder unit is nominally portable, its bulk and weight make it less than ideal for following mothers and children around. Also, in this research there were problems concerning access to sensitive places such as bedrooms, and also problems related to light conditions and camera angles. Because of these factors, when I stipulated in my first contact letter to the mothers during the selection of the sample that I would want them to carry on as normal, this was sometimes unable to be achieved in practice. For example, on 2 occasions when different mothers, early in the data collecting 'rounds', suggested that we went out for a walk with the child, one of which involved a lengthy walk around the farm, I considered the situation and the weight of the equipment - and abandoned the equipment. On other occasions I tried to resist any suggestions about going for walks unless the child became more and more restless to go outside.

(1) The equipment

The equipment was as follows: J.V.C. NIVICO PV - 4500 Portable Videotape Recorder Unit, and G.S. 4500 camera, hand held. The following noises were made by this equipment, the camera on/off switch produces an audible, pronounced, click and the portable tape recording unit hums, sometimes loudly depending on the state of the battery, when recording is taking place. As noted above, the mother child interchanges must be sampled if the recording session lasts, in the case of the above equipment, more than half an hour. The sessions in fact lasted between two and three hours, with the observer selecting behaviours to be filmed on the criterion of what was thought 'typical' and therefore useful to the purposes of the research. One consequence of this was that the clicks and hums occurred throughout the period of observation. The consequences of this, it might be suggested, are as follows.
(iii) Problems associated with the presence of an observer and camera equipment on each subject (in this case mother and child) individually

(a) Mother's behaviour

As noted in section 3.4.3.1 (i) the mother must be considered to be an active problem solver. The clicks and hums described above possibly gave the mother a clue as to what the observer was doing. It is not, therefore, unreasonable to expect her to locate 'successful' behaviours and reproduce them for the observer. 'Successful' here defined in the mother's terms, a behaviour is a 'success' because the observer filmed it, it enabled her to satisfy the observer and also enabled her to consider herself a 'good mother' or at least a 'good experimental subject' and achieve a satisfactory end to the experiment.

Also here, it is important to comment that of the working class mothers in the sample, two were sensitive to my presence in that they at some time in the periods of observation removed piles of washing. The third mother collected the children together in one room for the filming to take place. The middle and upper class mothers and also the nannies in the sample did not appear to be that concerned about the appearance of the home. They appeared to have a more 'take it or leave it' attitude in relation to the observer. Finally, it was noticed that the observer showed more empathy and was perhaps able to talk more freely with the two 'newer middle class' mothers in the sample in that the university backgrounds provided overlapping experiences and interests.

(b) The child's behaviour

The children in this sample invariably got to know when the camera was operating. This was because of the clicks and hums as described above. Also, despite attempts not to give the children the impression that the observer was always looking in their direction or the camera was always directed at them, when they glanced at the observer or were attracted by the clicks of the camera, the camera was nearly always looking in their direction. The children's reactions to the camera were varied, some
children showed no interest apart from a glance to see where the noise was coming from (see for example the data of section 5). Other children looked at the camera with interest and came to the equipment to explore the clicks, hums and movements of the tape spool. Some children, realising that they were getting a larger than usual share of attention began to show off. This behaviour was usually followed by a mild rebuke from the mother or nanny (see for example the 'Charlotte' data of section 5.4.3). Occasionally the children treated the camera as part of a game, one child produced his own toy camera and started taking 'pictures' of me. Overall I found the most suitable way of dealing with this was to treat the child's activity as a definite attempt to communicate with the observer that should be accepted. I attempted to play with the child, distract him or her by going into a 'naming game' of 'where are your eyes' and so on while the camera was operating. Switching the camera off and putting it down was the last resort. I felt that much interesting information could be obtained by allowing the camera to run on and capture data, how the situation developed with the participation in it of the child, the mother, myself and the camera. This specific data has not yet been analysed, so I cannot comment further here.

(iv) Problems associated with the presence of an observer and camera equipment on the interchanges between subjects (in this case mother - child interchanges)

(a) Presence effects on the mother - child interchange system

Simply because of the presence of the researcher in the situation, the mothers may have felt they had to play with the children more than they might otherwise have done. Zeglob, Arnold and Forehand (1975) have studied the effects of an observer's presence on maternal interactive behaviour. They observed 12 white (American) 'upper middle class' mother - child pairs in a laboratory setting under 'informed' and 'uninformed' (that they were being observed) conditions. Their results indicated that mothers played with their children more, were more positive in their
verbal behaviour and structured the child's activities more during the informed than uninformed conditions. And in this study, one mother, as stated overleaf, gathered her children into the one room for the period of my presence. I had no idea of this in that it usually happened before I arrived, I gathered an idea of what was going on once, when I heard the gathering process being completed as I waited for admittance on the doorstep. Another mother, after a period during which I had not operated the camera, gave an audible sigh, stopped what she was doing and started playing with the child when she might not otherwise have done. In both of these instances, by the presence of the observer, the observer had created a situation of more frequent communication with the children than might otherwise happen. But does the presence of the observer change the mother's behaviour quantitatively, 'more of the same' or is there a qualitative change involved?

The effects of the observer's presence, with camera and equipment, on the mother-child communication system, it is usually assumed, changes the mother's behaviour quantitatively, that is not qualitatively. This, however, is only an assumption and if the researcher is considered to be a change agent as discussed in section 3.5.3.1 (1) then it is equally possible that qualitative changes in the mother's behaviour with her child may occur due to the presence of the observer. Frequently during the time of my presence, the children did something that I found highly amusing and at these times I found it difficult not to laugh or at least chuckle. Given that, as Rowan (1974) suggests, the mother learns a response from my behaviour, then by this inadvertent behaviour I created a model for her with my 'childrearing can be fun' attitude. And also, on analysis of the tapes it was found that on some occasions my reaction to the child's behaviour came before the mothers, thus perhaps providing some evidence for this argument.

To conclude, it is only an assumption that the mother's behaviour with her child in the presence of the observer and a camera induces her
to provide more of her normal mode of interchange with her child. By instances such as the one described here, the researcher may provide a model of a completely different mode of behaviour, that may contain an implicit evaluation of the mother's previous behaviour. Also relevant here is that although the observer's physical presence is common across all of the ten mother and nanny-child pairs, how they actually perceived the researcher and his intervention may differ greatly. As mentioned in section 3.5.3.1 (ii)a, the degree of empathy with the observer between the various mothers or nanny's or indeed children varied to some extent.

(b) Camera and videotape equipment as illegitimate objects of the child's attention

The camera and videotape equipment was considered to be, by the mothers and nannys as an illegitimate object of the child's attention. The mothers and nannys invariably redirected the child's attention away from the camera, and stopped the child looking into the camera lens when the camera was operating. However, this data has yet to be considered in detail and there may be crucial differences between the mothers and nannys in how they redirected the child's attention or indeed whether they incorporated the child's interest in the camera in other games.

3.5.3.2 Transcription from the videotape film to data books

In this research, no 'sophisticated' equipment was available except a National TV - 3020 E VTR Unit and Pye 22" Monitor, so whatever is included in this section must be seen in this context.

Assuming that a coding system is not to be used, and the aim is to develop a grounded theory, a series of decisions needed to be made regarding the degree of detail required in transcription. Should a detailed analysis of body posture, eye contact, facial expression, be required or will larger descriptive units suffice? Factors to be considered here are obviously the area of the research and the general aim of the research. The researcher does not enter the research situation with a 'blank mind' but with some ideas, however general and however much they
might be changed. These obviously determine to some extent the degree of detail required in the transcript. However, a tendency appeared in the transcription of the data discussed here to relate the detail of the transcription to the time available to transcribe the tape. There was an absolute limit of 10 hours per half hour tape in this research, otherwise a backlog of untranscribed tapes would have built up. This raises other problems, of course, apart from the booking of equipment viz should the transcription be done during or after the observation sessions have been completed? If transcription takes place during the experimental sessions because of, for example, time constraints, what knowledge does the researcher take back to the experimental situation and how does this affect the researcher's behaviour? Should the transcription be done by a naive assistant? In an action research context, these decisions are perhaps not so crucial in that it is the researcher's involvement with the data rather than dispassionate observation, that motivates the development of the grounded theory.

There are also more mechanical problems relating to the transcription. How complex can a transcription be before it becomes unreasonable to read in its totality? In this research a two dimensional layout was used to describe the interchange filmed, with the time dimension going down the page and participants' verbal and nonverbal behaviour described across the page. This system was found to be useful as a basis from which to work but inadequate for dealing with small time differences in that many gestures and behaviours can be encompassed in a short utterance so that the transcription became very cumbersome to read with two participants. Also the importance of some features, such as eye contact and eye redirection did not stand out from the transcript. At one of the experimental sessions there were 6 active participants in the situation excluding the observer and
camera, the transcript then became extremely difficult to interpret. A two minute section of this transcript, not used in this thesis, is presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Participants verbal and nonverbal behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John (Henry's friend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jane (Emma's friend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E &amp; H's Mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nanny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;give him a biscuit&quot; (to E glancing at H. on 'him' holding Jane's arm)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;go on&quot;!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;can I have a biscuit please?&quot; looking at H</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;thank you very much&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;do you want a biscuit?&quot; looking into Jane's face</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I think you much&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A two minute section of this transcript, not used in this thesis, is presented below.

**From: Henry's brother (E's):**

- Puts head right back to drink from cup - then looks round to look at H's friend /biswits/ looks back down to Jane's hand /ics/ takes biscuit offers to H takes biscuit moves forward to John, offers him biscuit reaches across to biscuit tray takes one - gives to E's friend /edu'edju:/ stands up reaches across lifts up teapot, looks down moves away to L.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Henry (E's brother)</th>
<th>John (Henry's friend)</th>
<th>Jane (Emma's friend)</th>
<th>E &amp; H's Mother</th>
<th>Nanny</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;give him a biscuit&quot; (to E glancing at H. on 'him' holding Jane's arm)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>&quot;go on&quot;!</td>
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<td>&quot;can I have a biscuit please?&quot; looking at H</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;thank you very much&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;do you want a biscuit?&quot; looking into Jane's face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I think you much&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**From: John:**

- Turns head away from E, looks at H giggles taps E's hand with her hand holding a biscuit out to E

**From: Jane (Emma's friend):**

- Takes biscuit
- Moves forward to John, offers him biscuit
- Takes biscuit
- "I think you much" takes biscuit

**From: Emma:**

- "I think you much" takes biscuit
- "I think you much" takes biscuit

**From: Nanny:**

- "I think you much" takes biscuit

Table 3.2 Videotape transcript with 6 participants, excluding the observer.
The above transcript demonstrates the difficulty of reading a complicated transcript. It also indicates some of the difficulty in transcribing the exact sounds of children's speech. There are, it should be added, large equipment differences in the presentation of these sounds. The researcher had to swap to a Ferguson monitor half way through one tape and found considerable differences in the sound quality reproduced on the new monitor. In the interests of standardisation of transcription this is obviously important, especially where the sounds of children utterances for example, may be crucial.

3.5.3.3 Problems involved in interpreting the data and developing a grounded theory

The problems here centre around the question of how the data should be read so that the categories of analysis may arise from the data. The advice offered to this researcher of 'live with the data, read it and re-read it until things begin to stand out' may have been adequate in this research, but how in the data to be read? Does this vary with each researcher's cognitive style as Pask (1976) suggests it might? And if so, what are the effects of this on the end result of the grounded theory? This section can be nothing more of a statement of the problems, to which there as yet no clear answers, but it is important here, it is felt, to acknowledge that these problems do exist.

3.5.4 Summary and conclusion

It is important to point out here that although the discussion above may be put down to bad experimental design or inexperience as a camera operator, this criticism, it is felt, misses the point. This section, 3.5, has attempted to consider some of the difficulties of using a videotape data collection technique in a participant observation situation. An attempt has been made to explore the 'implicit control' of the researcher associated with a 'new methodology' related to a hermeneutic approach to doing social science. In so doing it is recognised that there are problems of implicit control, that if the researcher is
considered to be a change agent, that even if a 'dialogue' takes place between the observer and the observed, the researcher still imposes a large degree of control on the channels by which the 'dialogue' proceeds and, as this section has indicated, may change the nature of the dialogue by this intervention.

3.6 Summary of Research Method

This chapter has contained a discussion of the research methodology of this thesis, and theoretical and philosophical background. Following Kuhn's view of the development of science two paradigms 'logical positivist' and 'hermeneutic' approaches to doing social science research were outlined. It was stated that the research outlined here follows an 'action research' format whereby the data is used to generate 'grounded theories'. A participant observation method with data collection by videotape film was thought to be best suited to the aims of this research. The problems of generalisation from the small sample was considered and in this study, it is suggested that the sample of ten mother-child pairs were carefully selected to be representative of their respective social classes (working class, middle class and upper class).

The ten mother-child pairs were observed every second month for between ten and twelve months, by the observer visiting their home and obtaining a videotape of 'natural' mother-child interchanges. The data was analysed by looking for instances of prolonged mother-child interchange in the videotaped data, where negotiations between the mother and child took place. These were used as a basis for analysis with the aim of developing a grounded theory. The final section in this chapter considered the observer effects and other problems of data collection using videotape in an attempt to explore the 'implicit control' exercised by the researcher using the 'new methodology'.
Chapter 4  Outline of a theory of framing

4.1  Introduction

4.2  Metacommunicative and content dimensions of framing, and the relationship between them

4.3  Metacommunicative dimension: Complementary and Symmetrical

4.3.1  Complementary metacommunication outlined

4.3.2  Complementary metacommunication illustrated

4.3.3  Summary

4.3.4  Symmetrical metacommunication outlined

4.3.5  Symmetrical metacommunication illustrated

4.3.6  Summary

4.4  Content dimension: Introduction

4.4.1  Outline of intersubjective boundary maintenance on the child's activity

4.4.2  Illustration of intersubjective boundary maintenance

4.4.3  Behavioural constraints on the child's activity

4.4.4  Weak and strong framing and patterns of behavioural constraint

4.4.5  Sequential constraints involved in frame construction over time

4.5  Discussion and Summary
4.1 Introduction

In this chapter it is intended to review, briefly, some of the outcomes of chapter 2 and develop an outline of a grounded substantive theory of framing. The two basic dimensions of the framing, 'content' and 'metacommunicative' are introduced in section 4.3; this section containing a discussion of complementary metacommunication (section 4.3.1) and symmetrical metacommunication (section 4.3.4). The 'metacommunicative' dimension arises from the mother's use of her power and authority in offering a framing of the situation for the child. The 'content' dimension of framing, discussed in section 4.4, is divided for analysis into 'intersubjective boundary maintenance' (section 4.4.1) and also 'behavioural constraints' exercised by the mother on the child's activity (section 4.4.3). Also considered important here is the 'sequential constraint' imposed by the development of the framing through time (section 4.4.5). The analysis of the content level of the framing serves to build up a picture of the interchange as either strongly or weakly framed by the mother, implicit in which is the metacommunicated relationships. The relationship between content and metacommunicative dimensions of the framing is considered in section 4.2.

Complementary and symmetrical metacommunication is discussed in relation to the analysis of the mother-child interchange data of mother-child pairs who approximate, it is considered, the 'ideal types' of complementary and symmetrical metacommunication. It is important here to emphasise that the 'key features' isolated are very much inter-related; thus to isolate any one key feature for analysis, as in the preliminary description of a theory of framing that follows, must therefore be somewhat artificial. After considering symmetrical and complementary metacommunication, the analysis moves on to the content dimension of the framing where illustrative data from other mother-child pairs is included. These elements of a theory of framing are discussed and
summarised in the final section of this chapter, section 4.5. They are then used in the analysis of social class differences in the framing of interchanges between mothers and their infants in the following chapter, chapter 5.

This section reviews some of the outcomes of chapter 2, and forms an introduction to the analysis that follows. In chapter 2, with reference to Shields (1976) use of the concept 'frame' as described in section 2.6, it was suggested that meaning need not be taken to adhere to an isolated utterance, but can be considered to arise from the tacit knowledge of the participants in an exchange, which they use to attribute meaning to what is said. Different participants bring different bodies of knowledge to the interchange, and at different moments treat one or other subsystem of knowledge as relevant to the understanding of what is being communicated. These subsystems are called in the following 'frames' because these theoretical constructs provide for each participant the frame of reference within which their own and other peoples communications are assigned relevance and meaning. Calling up a subsystem of knowledge and applying it to the present situation, with implications for future behaviour can be considered, it is suggested, adult competence in 'framing'.

In the mother-child interchange context, the mother as an adult charged with care of the child, has a fully developed 'frame' system and in the course of her negotiations with her child in which the 'superficially inert neonate is transformed or transforms himself into a being which acts, has and implements intentions and desires, is capable, a point of rational thought...' (Gauld and Shottor, 1977), she must invariably intersubjectively frame interactions with her child. By this is meant that the mother supplies the dynamic intersubjective context for the child's meanings in which the child can learn meanings for his or her actions. Once these are developed and expressed nonverbally, the child
Is able to accomplish, it is thought, the transition to language (see section 2.2.2 of chapter 2). Therefore, in framing interactions with her child, the mother selects a frame from her own tacit knowledge and uses it to supply the context in which the child's (and her own) actions can be interpreted as meaningful. The mother, therefore, is the primary introducer of the preconceived aspects of the framing.

But in describing how mothers frame situations for their children, the emphasis on the mother tends to suggest the interchange is one-sided and that the mother imposes her framing onto the child. It might be argued that this imposition is the result of the mother using her power and authority in a certain way according to situational or individual factors, or social and cultural (or subcultural) factors; as the discussion of Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson's (1968) concepts of symmetry and complementarity in section 2.7 might indicate. However the child obviously has some capacity to structure the situation, and the framing of any situation is better described as being negotiated as both mother and child construct a framing for their joint activity. The mother seeks to establish her framing as intersubjectively shared, that is, the infant has to spontaneously operate in terms of it, as well as the mother. This then is the end point of a developmental process whereby the mothers framing becomes shared. This requires learning and negotiation with the infant as the mother, by her reactions to and interpretations of the infant's behaviour and by her own initiated actions, integrates the infant's behaviour into a sequence meaningful in terms of her own framing. Thus the mother's framing becomes intersubjectively shared, as the mother 'offers' a framing for the child's activity. The framing may be 'strongly' or 'weakly' offered depending on the strength of the imperative to accept the mother's framing that is communicated to the child, as outlined in
section 4.4.4 below: This 'strong' and 'weak' terminology as well as the 'boundary maintenance' terminology derives from the work of Bernstein, discussed in section 2.3.3 of chapter 2.

The framing, then, develops during the interchange for both participants in offering a framing for the child's activities, making them determinate by supplying them with context in which they can be interpreted as meaningful, the mother is also making her own meanings determinate. However, generally, the mother's physical and social competence, inherent in her role as agent of socialisation, may mean that she will naturally take the leading role in the framing of situations.

To summarise so far, when the mother speaks, her utterances carry with them a frame of implicit relevant knowledge of the 'more diffuse socially derived rules of what behaviour goes with what ... how certain roles are played, and also very specific rules pertaining to the framework of the immediate setting .... and the rules and customs concerning the roles and activities of its members' (Shields, 1976). In framing a situation for the child this frame of implicit relevant knowledge is brought into operation. A shift in the framing implies a shift in the area of tacit knowledge needed for understanding the interchanges, and therefore a shift in the 'content' of the framing.

But furthermore, along with this 'content' dimension of the framing offered by the mother there is an implicit 'metacommunicative' dimension being offered in the same interchange as the mother's framing implies something about the relationship the mother has with the child. This metacommunicative dimension 'frames' (this is Bateson and Watzlawick et al's use of the concept 'frame' - as discussed in section 2.6 of chapter 2) the content dimension. It includes for example the mother's attempts to guide the course of the immediate interchanges as well as her implicit long term relationship with her child. This is returned to in section 4.2.
Finally, in this introduction, the use of the concept 'frame' enables analysis of the joint, negotiated and shared development of frames in mother-child interaction. Once frames have been established between the mother and the child, they can be internalised and become part of the child's psychological processes as suggested by Vygotsky's 'general genetic law of psychological development' (mentioned in section 2.2.4 of chapter 2, in the analysis of 'Intersubjectivity'). Secondly the concept 'frame' enables analysis of the different interpretations - implicit knowledge - of words or sequences of events held by different participants in any interchange. Thirdly, it allows analysis of the tacit knowledge that supplies the context for the subject matter of any interchange. To conclude this introduction, then, frames refer to participant's implicit expectations about what it is they are conversing about, the content of the conversation, and also their immediate and long-term relation to each other. The following is a more detailed discussion of the metacommunicative and content dimensions of the framing - along with a discussion of the relationship between them, to prepare the way for the more detailed analysis of these theoretical constructs in sections 4.3 and 4.4.

4.2 Metacommunicative and content dimensions of framing, and the relationship between them.

4.2.1 Metacommunicative dimension

A feature of the metacommunicative dimension of the framing offered by the mother will be, it is suggested, the mothers use of her power and authority inherent in her position as adult in charge of children. Specifically, it is considered important to analyse how mothers use their power in offering a framing of a situation to the child, that is, how they use their power to regulate the relationship they have with their children. Analysis of the mother's use of her power will, it is suggested, in the final analysis be summed up by the concepts 'symmetrical' or 'complementary' metacommunicative relationship, drawn from the work of
Bateson (1958) and Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1968) discussed in section 2.7 of chapter 2. It is suggested that the metacommunicative relationship is an implicit relationship that can be 'teased' out of the analysis of the interchange as it progresses. In the data that follows it is the picture of the interchange that is built up as being strongly or weakly framed by the mother that provides evidence for this metacommunicative relationship. The metacommunicative dimension is an overall aspect of the interchange, individual utterances by themselves do not provide evidence for complementariness or symmetry (1). If, for example, the mother points to a specific hole in the ball (of the ball and shapes game) and says 'in that one', this would not in itself be an example of 'strong framing'. It would be strong framing only if part of a context in which the mother was imposing her will and accepting no alternative and imposing sanctions if not obeyed and so on. The utterance by itself may be an activity and attention directing delictic utterance and therefore be a 'content' feature. Weakly framed interchanges of a symmetrical metacommunicative relationship would obviously allow for suggestions and directive utterances by the mother, but these would not be part of a context where the mother was imposing her will.

Also, in that complementary and symmetrical metacommunication are 'ideal types' they may be conceptualised as occupying positions at opposite ends of the metacommunication dimension. It may be that in discussing the data in chapter 5 some mother or nanny - child pairs may be allocated positions between these ideal types, as being either predominantly symmetrical' or 'predominantly complementary' depending on the picture that is built up as the interchange progresses. However, in this chapter, symmetrical and complementary metacommunication will be discussed in relation to the data, as ideal types.

(1) I am grateful here, for the comments of Derek Edwards, who brought this to my attention.
4.2.2 Content dimension

Analysis of the content dimension of the frame offered by the mother involves the consideration of what is actually said and done - the nature of the joint activities engaged in by the mother and child, including words and actions, and the toys and objects involved. Key features would be (I): the framed intersubjectivity that exists between the mother and the child, controlled (in the data to be presented) largely by the mother as she has control of the 'here and now' and as primary introducer of preconceived aspects of the situation, she chooses which particular aspect of the intersubjectively shared social reality is selected for attention. (II) Behavioural constraint imposed by the mother on the child's behaviour (where, for example, the mother offers a strong framing of the situation and is unwilling to negotiate, and the child infringes framing boundaries and the mother has to actively and sometimes physically constrain the child); (III) Finally, sequential constraints on both mother and child's activity, because of their joint involvement in frame construction over time must be taken into account.

4.2.3 Relationship between 'content' and 'metacommunicative' dimensions

In considering the relationship between content and metacommunicative dimensions of the framing offered by the mother, Table 4.1 is put forward as a model. From Table 4.1, it is considered that the metacommunicative level determines or frames to a large extent the nature of the negotiations on the content level. If the mother offers a framing (strong or weak) that is by and large accepted by the child, negotiations take place within the framing 'boundaries', and the metacommunicative relationship between the mother and the child remains implicit and is taken for granted by both the mother and the child. As the mother and child construct the framing, the metacommunicative relationship will not - or need not - be elaborated and thus has to be extracted from the data by detailed analysis of the nature of the interaction as it develops through time.
### Table 4.1

**Relationship between content and metacommunicative dimensions of a framing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Content dimension of the framing offered by the mother</th>
<th>Child can either:</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>Reject the framing offered by the mother</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weakly offered or Strongly offered</td>
<td>Acceptance of the content of the framing offered by the mother</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rejection of the content of the framing offered by the mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakly offered or Strongly offered</td>
<td>Negotiations within frame 'boundaries'</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transgression of frame 'boundaries' lead to:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Metacommunicative dimension of the framing offered by the mother</th>
<th>Interaction relationship between mother and child implicit and taken for granted by both mother and child.</th>
<th></th>
<th>Elaboration of the interaction relationship between the mother and the child; mothers use of her power to regulate this relationship becomes explicit.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complementary framing = force child back into frame related activity.</td>
<td>Symmetrical framing = change frame; still framing.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Therefore, the child's rejection of the framing is only temporary - and is, sooner or later, stabilised. Therefore:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The acceptance by the child of this framing may be a result of past frame construction activities on behalf of both participants in the interaction - they may in the past have negotiated elements and agreed on them as a sort of 'ground rules' and now these form part of the taken for granted of the situation. This will be returned to in the consideration of 'sequential constraints' in section 4.4.5.

If, however, the child rejects the context of the framing offered by the mother and challenges or threatens to challenge frame boundaries, this leads to the elaboration of the relationship between the mother and the child. The mother may use her power to assert her framing, or alternatively change her framing in accordance with the child's new intentions. Thus the mothers use of her power to regulate the relationship she has with her child becomes explicit - as either symmetrical or complementary metacommunication. However, the child's transgression of frame boundaries must be considered to be temporary only; the situation must sooner or later be stabilised as the mother changes her framing - or forces the child back into her existing frame and induces the child to accept it (or else!).

After this brief introduction to the various features of the framing process, they will be considered in greater detail in the following sections, in relation to illustrations drawn from data sequences.

4.3 Metacommunicative Dimension: Complementarity and Symmetry

It has been suggested that, in the final analysis there are two types of metacommunicative relationship between the mother and the child, and which determine aspects of the content dimension of the mothers framing. These types of metacommunicative relationship could be considered to be part of the 'mother's' overall style of communication with her child. Descriptions of 'typical' complementary and symmetrical metacommunicative relationships are presented overleaf - analysis of which will revolve
around: (1) the initiation of activities, the assumption of power, authority and responsibility for the content of the framing. (2) The degrees of freedom allowed to establish or change the context of the framing, for example, the degree of freedom allowed to the child to renegotiate her role within the framing offered by the mother - or to change the frame completely. (3) Related to (2), the degree of freedom allowed to the child to end the framing of the situation and go onto the next.

4.3.1 Complementary metacommunication outlined

The features of a complementary metacommunicative relationship are as follows:

Feature (a). The mother strongly frames the situation for the child from the start, including the child's role within it, and allows the child little discretion to allocate a role for herself. For example, the mother may strongly offer a framing of the situation to the child as one where the child is not competent to carry it out to a 'successful' conclusion. Here 'success' is defined in the mother's terms. Consequently, a division of labour takes place with the mother taking the dominant position, controlling the child's activity.

Feature (b). The mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within the strongly offered framing. The mother and child do not jointly negotiate to construct a shared frame, the mother imposes her framing onto the child and if the child does not accept this, the mother may use her power and authority to re-assert her domination over the child. The child may be thus reduced to a relatively passive role as the mother one-sidedly constructs the situation for the child. The mother has to work to ensure that the child complies with the strongly offered framing.

Feature (c). The mother does not allow the child to terminate the frame
without attempts to contain the child's activity within the framing she offers. If the child persists and challenges boundaries of the framing imposed by the mother, angry exchanges or tears may follow as both the mother and the child display irritation or frustration. More importantly, the frame may then end abruptly, with no apparent link between the present activity the mother and child are engaged in, and the next one.

**Feature (d).** By her comments (perhaps) and by her behaviour, the mother places the child in a subordinate position. She frames, and continually reinforces by her behaviour a subordinate role for the child and consequently a dominant role for herself, which the child is then constrained to adopt.

These features are illustrated in relation to mother-child interaction data in the following section.

4.3.2. Complementary metacommunication illustrated

From the above section, the features of a complementary metacommunicative relationship are:

**Feature (a).** The mother strongly frames the situation for the child from the start, including the child's role within it, and allows the child little discretion to allocate a role for herself. In the example that follows the mother offers a framing of the situation to the child as one where the child is not competent to carry it out to a 'successful' conclusion in the terms of the ball and shapes game. 'Success' is defined in the mother's terms, viz all of the shapes into the holes in the ball (perhaps to demonstrate the mother's capabilities as mother to a 'high status' university researcher). Consequently, in the following, a division of labour takes place with the mother taking the dominant position, controlling the child's activity.
Sequence 4.1(2)

Alice and mother are sitting on the living room floor, facing each other; the child is looking down on the floor for the geometric shapes, the mother is holding the ball and looking down and around on the floor also.

Child's age: 15 months.

Videotape recording begins

**Alice (C.)**

Picks up a shape - and offers it to the ball

**Mother (M.)**

Moves the ball around, glances at the shape C holds

"wheres' at go?"

C. offers the shape to holes in the ball in quick succession; when the shape does not fit, moves it on to the next hole - aided by the mother who turns the ball around rapidly

Moves the ball around looking for \( \checkmark \) hole, then stops, with \( \checkmark \) hole on top of ball

Offers shape to hole on side of ball - manipulates shape in \( X \) hole

\[ / \text{ewa} / \]

"No ..... in there ..... in that one"

Commentary

The features that demonstrate the strongly offered framing in this illustration are as follows. Although Alice is motivated within the framing in that she initiates activity, her activity is overruled by the

(2) Notation used in these illustrations are as follows:

1. videotape recording begins = start of filmed sequences
2. videotape recording ends = end of filmed sequences
3. \( \ldots \ldots \ldots \) follows on from other sequences/sequence is continued
4. M. mother
5. C. child \( \leftrightarrow \) child's vocalisations (for explanation of phonemic symbols, see Appendix)
6. X. incorrect hole or shape \( \leftrightarrow \) incorrectness will be taken from the mother's perspective
7. \( / \checkmark / \) correct hole or shape \( \leftrightarrow \) correctness
8. \( / \text{slashes} / \) = child's vocalisations (for explanation of phonemic symbols, see Appendix)
9. \( / \text{quotation marks} / \) = mother's vocalisations
10. Underlining of words indicates the placement of focal stress.
11. Intonation contours have been added to individual utterances where relevant.
mother. The mother offers a framing for the child's activity; she adopts a division of labour perhaps determined by past negotiations with the child - that simplifies to the extreme the actions required of the child. The mother moves the ball around so that the 'correct' hole is always on top of the ball and the child need only put a shape in the correct orientation to it. In the above illustration the mother moves the ball around to locate the correct hole, glances at the shape the child has picked up - perhaps to identify it - and at the same time asks the question 'where's' at go?'. However, the child offers the shape to holes in quick succession and when it does not fit, moves it quickly on to the next hole; aided by the mother who turns the ball round very quickly - looking for the correct hole. As the ball stops - the mother having identified the shape and the correct hole - the child offers the shape she holds to a 'wrong' hole ('wrong', that is, from the mother's perspective). The child vocalises /aër/; and the mother responds with 'No ... in there in that one'. The prohibition and the coupled deictic locatives, the second associated with the pointing gesture, serve to build onto the child's utterance, to incorporate the child's word as part of the conversation. In doing so the mother assumes that the child was making some sort of comment about the situation; the mother assumes that the child accepts her definition of the situation and the presuppositions associated with this - that the conversation should be about pushing the shapes through the 'correct' holes.

In sum then although the child may initiate activity, thus demonstrating that she is interested and motivated within the framing that the mother has offered, the child is forced into a semi-passive role within a division of labour initiated by the mother and controlled by the mother. The mother frames the situation initially for the child as one in which the child is not competent to carry it out to a 'successful' conclusion.
she defines the situation as one in which she must share a division of labour with the child for the shapes to be slotted into the ball. Once this division of labour has been established it becomes part of the shared frame, embodied in the sequence of events in the interchanges of the mother and child with the ball and shapes.

Feature (b) The mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within the framing. The mother and child do not jointly negotiate to construct a shared frame, the mother imposes her framing onto the child and if the child does not accept this, the mother may use her power and authority to re-assert her domination over the child. Thus, as indicated above, the child is reduced to a relatively passive role as the mother one-sidedly constructs the situation for the child. The mother has to engage some considerable effort to ensure that the child complies with the framing offered. Consider the following: (again from the 'Alice' data, and following on from the above).

Sequence 4.2

Alice (C.)

C continues to manipulate shape against X hole

drops shape - it falls to floor /ΖΛ'θ'/
waves hand (crossly)
looking at the shape on the floor
looks up at M

reaches forward, looking at shape, takes shape, looks down to √hole - moves shape to √hole.

Mother (H.)

'No ... In there in that one' pointing to the √hole, glancing at C.

‘No - won't go in that one' said loudly with head/ear movement on first word - which is also stressed for emphasis - glancing across at C

reaches down, picks up shape

receives the eye contact looking across into C's face 'that one ...' offering shape to C, 'in there', chuckling - glancing down to hole - and pointing to, tapping √hole
Commentary

In Sequence 4.2, the mother directs the child's activity with the coupled deictic locatives and the associated gestures pointing out to the child the correct hole for the shape the child is holding. However, the child continues to manipulate the shape in the same 'wrong' hole. Although the child is motivated within the frame, she is not operating to the mother's satisfaction. The mother's strongly offered framing of the situation is indicated as she increases her authority in the situation by repeating the prohibition and the deictic locative, but this time referring to the child's chosen hole. 'No - won't go in that one' is said loudly, and emphasis is given to the prohibition on the child's current action with the stress on the first word and the accompanying head and hair movement (abrupt movement). Here the mother initially corrects the child's behaviour with constructive encouragement to the child to try the 'correct' hole, assuming in the process that the child is not interested in other aspects the game - the feel of pushing the shape into the 'wrong' hole for example. Thus the mother assumes that the child like herself is oriented to the 'successful' completion of the game. Alternatively the mother may have seen by her glance into the child's face that the child may be exploring other alternatives. In either case, the mother does not see the child's present activity as being legitimate (that is, continuing to push the shape into the 'wrong' hole) and prohibits it with her second utterance and associated nonverbal cues.

Also of interest here is that, as the mother glances across at the child to monitor the child's intent and 'cue in' the child's response, the child drops the shape. She waves her hand crossly and looks down at the shape on the floor. The mother picks it up - ensuring that she has the initiative in the framing of the situation. Here the child's arm movements and vocalisation could be an embryonic request to the mother for assistance - as part of an intersubjective communication system negotiated between the mother and child as described by Lock (1972). There could
also be no intended communication here; the arm waving and vocalisation
could simply signal the mood state of the child - one of irritation or
frustration.

Finally, as the mother picks up the shape, the child looks up and
across at the mother - and the mother reciprocates, meeting the child in
eye contact. Here the child could be responding to the success of her
request for assistance, perhaps, with a more personal contact with the
mother. A second explanation could be that the child is responding to
the mother's movements in reaching for and retrieving the shape - perhaps
anticipating her own. (3) The mother's strong framing is again demonstrated
as she uses the eye contact, the more personal contact with the child
to redirect the child's attention back down to the ball and shapes with
'that one ....' holding out the shape to the child and, as the child takes
the shape '.... in there' looking at the hole and pointing to it - then
tapping the 'correct' hole. Thus the mother simplifies the task for
the child - constructing the child's activity with the simple deictic
phrases closely associated with her deictic gestures in the immediate
context of the ball and shapes game. The mother expects the child to
respond, creating a vacuum into which the child's behaviour is drawn.
She concentrates the child's attention on the appropriate place in the
ball and the child responds - by moving her shape to the 'correct' hole
in the ball.

Also, the mother, as part of the enforcement of her framing, constructs
the child's activity in a direct way; the mother not only picks up the

(3) At this point it is worth noting that despite the principle of
determination, it is important not to be dogmatic about the analysis of
the child's behaviour; there must be numerous causes, intentions, meanings
and consequences that the observer cannot hope to interpret fully. This
would be less true for the mother's behaviour.
shapes the child drops - as in sequence 4.2 - but also jostles the child's hand to get her attention. In the following illustration the mother physically moves the child's hand back to the 'correct' hole when the child does not perform in the required way. The mother's construction of the situation for the child has thus become very complicated, she seems 'trapped' in her framing of the situation and in her attempts at simplifying the situation for the child to achieve a 'success'.

Sequence 4.3

Alice (C.) offers shape to hole, manipulates, then moves back to another hole

Mother (M.) turns the ball around then holds it, pointing to the hole on top of the ball. Glances into the child's face.

'C moves hand away and the shapes falls to the floor

Feature (C) The mother does not allow the child to terminate the frame without attempts to contain the child's activity within the framing she offers. If the child persists and infringes boundaries of the framing imposed, or at least strongly offered by the mother, angry exchanges or tears follow as both the mother and the child display irritation or frustration. More importantly perhaps the specific frame the mother and child are engaged in may end abruptly, with no apparent link between the present activity the mother and child are engaged in, and the next one. This, however, is built up over a number of exchanges as the child begins to re-negotiate roles within the framing offered and only when this degree of freedom is denied does the child challenge the mother's authority by rejecting her framing. The following illustrates this - when the child
changes shapes, making the mother re-adjust rather hurriedly. (Again from the 'Alice' data)

Sequence 4.4

Alice (C.)

Looks across, takes shape M
holds, transfers it to other
hand, puts her own shape
to the hole the mother
indicates

Mother (M.)

H is holding the ball so that the
\[\text{hole for her shape is nearest to}
\text{the C and easiest for C to reach.}
\text{Glances at shape C moves to hole.}
\text{'No ... you got that one'}
\text{turns the ball around then holds it}
\text{pointing to the correct hole for the}
\text{shape C is holding; glances into}
\text{C's face}

offers shape to hole H indicates -
manipulates

Commentary

Here the child has picked up another shape, and is looking at it. The
mother jostles the child's hand to get her attention; it is her construction
of and definition of the situation that the child is impelled to accept.
The child takes the shape the mother offers, but transfers it to her other
hand and moves her own shape forward. The mother then has to retreat
several steps and locate the 'correct' hole in the ball for the shape the
child moves forward. She vocalises 'No ... you got that one' which is an
instruction or comment to herself, as to what she should do next - because
the child has an unexpected shape. Although her vocalisation is a comment
on what the child has done it is not linked in any way the the child's
cognition of events; it is more likely a metacomment to the child indicating
her disappointment or irritation with the child's behaviour. Thus the child
begins to attempt to renegotiate the role allotted to her in the mother's
framing of the situation - essentially perhaps because of its rigidity as demonstrated above, when the mother has to halt the child's activity to maintain the division of labour. Having had to allow the child some degree of freedom, the mother still maintains her authority over the total situation - the sequence continues as follows - in sequence 4.5.

Sequence 4.5

Alice (C.)

moves her hand away, and the shape falls to the floor

looks at the ball, moves head forward looks into the ball; moves head back, lifts hand with shape forward. The shape falls to the floor as it knocks against the ball. Reaches down to pick up shape

picks up another shape, nearer to her

offers shape to a hole in the ball, retracts hand and shape - watches - holding shape.

Mother (M.)

reaches down, picks up the shape, holds it in her hand, glances at the other shape C is holding and points to another hole 'in there' glances at C's shape

Reaches across (in direction of fallen shape)

notes this, retracts hand

moves hand to ball, picks it up, turns the ball around looking for hole

Commentary

The child drops the shape and it falls to the floor; the mother again picks it up and perhaps to eliminate one of the possibilities in the situation, she does not return it to the child. She glances at the other shape the child is still holding and points to another hole with
the deictic locative utterance 'in there' again assuming that the child is motivated towards the end she has defined, and creating an expectancy of the child's behaviour. Here the glance at the child's shape could be decoded as the unsaid 'put that shape' which would go in front of the mother's actual utterance.

The child, however, looks at the ball, then looks at the ball closely, moving her head forward to do so. This might signal to the mother that the child is getting restless with either the game - or the constraint imposed upon her by the mother (or both). The child moves her shape to the ball but drops it as it knocks against the ball. She reaches down to retrieve it as does the mother; but the mother removes her hand as the child chooses to pick up another shape which is nearer to her. The mother turns the ball around, looking the correct hole for the new shape - and whereas the child had offered the shape to a hole, she is forced to watch and therefore assume a passive role as the mother turns the ball.

The frame ends as follows; the mother tries to locate the 'correct' hole in the ball, following the child's interests in a new shape; but the child offers the shape to the hole on top of the ball while the ball is still revolving. The shape slips from the child's grasp while the ball is revolving and spins off to the right. The mother retrieves it, releasing the ball.

Then:

Sequence 4.6

Alice (C.)

squeals, lifts up the ball in both hands, moves it around - looking at it

Mother (M.)

'There we are - look' holds the shape up in front of the child and reaches for the ball.....

squeals, lifts up the ball, struggles with M, pulls the ball away looks up at M.

receives the eye contact

'what about that one then' glancing at the shape, moving the shape up. '.... in there?' pointing to, glancing at, hole in ball they are holding between them - then looking
the ball.

struggles with M again, pulling the ball away looks up at M

looks down, frets

looks to left, moves to left, waving the ball.

Commentary

The features of this illustration that indicate the mother's strong framing are as follows. The child attempts to break out of the role imposed by the mother within the framing. However, the mother attempts to confine the 'revolt' within the boundaries of the frame, she attempts to re-stabilise the situation by directing the child's attention back to the shape and the 'correct' completion of the game. She does this with a succession of cues, of slowly increasing 'force' (this is returned to in section 4.4), as the child resists. She holds up the shape in front of the child, making quite clear her expectations for the child's behaviour and her assumption that the game will continue as before. She answers the child's initiation of eye contact by directing the child's attention back to the shape, and she constructs the child's activity in line with her expectations - with the vocalisation 'In there', pointing to the 'correct' hole and glancing down to the 'correct' hole. Thus she makes clear her

'Please ... Look' (sternly) looking across into C's face, holding up the shape, still

puts the shape she is holding to the ball held between M and C

receives the eye contact

'say' said with head movement down and glance down to the shape; eyebrows raised and a slight inclination of head forward. (nonverbal cues = threat. DV)

releases the ball

'No!' moves hand away

'You want to stop now then?' releases shape to floor

Videotape Recording ends
expectations for the child's behaviour and her assumptions that the game will continue as before. The mother expects the child to follow through the path defined by the mother to the end defined by the mother. Faced with the child's continued resistance, she utters the imperative 'look' trying to redirect the child's attention to the shape; at the same time adding emphasis with nonverbal cues to mark out firstly the child's immediate past activity as having significance (in this case the mother disapproves); and secondly her own vocalisation of 'look' as having significance (in the attempt to regain the child's attention). In this instance, because she is trying to control the child's activities, she communicates a threat by this nonverbal marking.

Finally, the child rejects the mother's attempts to re-assert her control; she breaks off eye contact with the mother, looks down and frets. The mother releases the ball and with the vocalisation of 'No!' implicitly acknowledges the frame has ended, the game is finished and her expectations (on this occasion) have remained unfulfilled, her definition of the goal of the situation for the child has not been confirmed as the child's goal. The mother explicitly accepts this with the comment to the child 'You want to mop now then?' as the child moves off with the ball.

Thus, to conclude, the mother here has not allowed the child to terminate the frame without attempts to contain the child's activity within the framing she offers. The child has persisted, and has broken the boundaries of the mother's strongly offered framing - leading to angry exchanges between the mother and the child.

**Feature (d)** By her comments, as well as by her behaviour, the mother places the child in a subordinate position; she frames a subordinate role for the child. Numerous examples of the mother - by her behaviour - framing a subordinate role for the child have been given in the above commentaries on the mother-child interaction data. Attention here will be focussed on
the vocalisations of the mother - the comments made by the mother on the child's behaviour or character that may be considered to be evidence of the mother's meta-communicative relationship with her child.

In section 4.2 it was suggested that, from the work of Watzlawick et al (1968) disagreements between the mother and child over the mother's framing of the situation at the content level lead to definition and/or re-assertion of relationships at a meta-communicative level as either symmetrical or complementary. In the illustrative data presented so far, the mother in her negotiations with the child has meta-commented on their relationship as follows:

(1) In data sequence 4.2 the mother says: 'No ... it wont go in that one', said loudly with a head and hair shake, with the first word stressed for emphasis; said after the child has ignored her last instruction of 'No ... in there .... in that one' pointing to the correct hole. Thus her definition of herself offered to the child (and it must be added, to the observer) as an instructor has been disconfirmed; and the mother re-asserts a complementary relationship with the child subordinate by the above utterance.

(11) In data sequence 4.4 the mother says 'No ... you got that one' said after the child had put her own shape to the hole, leaving the mother exposed - having prepared herself for a different shape. With this utterance the mother displays her irritation or disappointment with the child's activity in the frame. The child has not taken her instructions associated with the other shape and the mother's offered

(4) The reader is referred to chapter 2, section 2.7, for a discussion of being 'one down', that is, being in a subordinate position.
definition of herself as instructor has again been disconfirmed. The above utterance and the way it is stated (sternly) puts the child into a subordinate position.

(iii) In unreported data (to be found in Appendix section 1.1) referring to the same sequence of Alice - mother interchange as the other illustrations in this section, the mother says 'goin to try another one now' and then 'goin back to that one now are we'. This is said when the child has initiated activity - choosing a shape and causing the mother to re-locate the 'correct' hole, leaving her temporarily exposed and again disconfirming the mother's definition of herself as instructor. Both of the above utterances, it may be suggested, put the child in a subordinate position.

(iv) In dataset sequence 4.6, the final comment of the mother is perhaps the most illustrative. She asks the child 'You want to mop now then?' as the child has rejected her framing of the situation and is moving away. The child's rejection of the total situation is countered with this utterance, placing the child very firmly in a subordinate position.

4.3.3 Summary

To summarise, the following criteria would have to be met for an analysis to suggest evidence for a complementary metacommunicative relationship between the mother and the child:

(i) The mother defines the situation for the child from the start as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful' conclusion - and here 'success' is defined in the mother's terms.

(ii) The mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within her strongly offered framing; she imposes on the child a passive role, defining the situation for the child by constructing the child's activity from its elements.

(iii) The mother does not allow the child to terminate the frame without attempts to constrain the child and re-impose her authority and
her definition and expectations of the situation.

(iv) By her metacommments the mother places the child in a subordinate position in relation to the mother. Consequently, the child is forced to adopt a 'one-down' position in relation to the mother; the child is treated as one who receives what the mother gives. In this particular case of mother-child interchange between Alice and her mother, it is suggested that the above criteria have been adequately met and the conclusion is drawn that a complementary metacommunicative relationship is a feature of this mother's style of communicating with her child.

A final note should be made that the intermediate level of analysis between the content and metacommunicative dimensions, that is, the strength or weakness of the imperative for the child to accept the mother's framing has not been analysed separately in the above. While discussion of this will be left until later - it needs to be pointed out that in the data presented above the mother's framing has been, universally, strong.

4.3.4 Symmetrical metacommunication outlined

The features of a symmetrical metacommunicative relationship are as follows:

**Feature (a)** Although the mother may offer a framing of the situation and the child's role, the child is not forced to accept the mother's framing. The mother allows the child the freedom to choose to involve himself with her framing.

**Feature (b)** The mother allows the child considerable freedom to renegotiate roles within the framing he or she has accepted. The mother's framing is demonstrated to be flexible, expanding to incorporate different aspects of the child's attention.

**Feature (c)** There may be ultimate boundaries to the framing that has been accepted, in that the mother's framing of the situation for the child may not be infinitely flexible. Infringement of these boundaries by the child need not necessarily bring some form of sanction. If the child does not
continue to accept the mother's framing, instead of continuing with her taken for granted assumptions and enforcing them more directly by using her authority, the mother may put her assumption up for negotiation between her and the child; she need not attempt to assert her authority over the child. Once the child has indicated rejection of the mother's framing, which she had previously accepted, the mother does not attempt to impose sanctions or draw the child back into her framing. Consequently the child is free to create the next situation for herself with the advantage that the mother is still involved with the child (and vice versa) and can provide continuing support - as she herself has not been rejected, only the frame for the child's activities. Alternatively here, the original accepted framing may be renegotiated and in consequence become the 'new' frame. The original accepted framing having been found 'wanting' by the child, may not be thrown out but reworked in negotiation with the mother thus forming a 'new' frame. This tension between 'frame' and 'framing' will be discussed in relation to mother - child interaction data in a following section, section 4.5.

Feature (d). Overall, the child's motivation, interest and readiness to engage in activity is focused on by the mother and recognition given to these as negotiations with the child proceed. This is an approach that accepts that the child may have interests that can be seen to be legitimate and that may differ from her own. The mother does not impose her framing onto the child; she tries to anticipate and articulate a meaningful frame for the child's actions as they happen. However, if this is contrary to her wishes, she negotiates with the child rather than using her power to impose her framing of the situation and the child's role within it, onto the child.
4.3.5  Symmetrical metacommunication Illustrated

The four features of a symmetrical metacommunication that have been outlined may be illustrated as follows.

Feature (a)  Although the mother may offer a framing of the situation and the child's role initially, the child is not constrained to accept this framing. As illustrated in the following, the child is allowed to choose to involve herself with the mother's framing:

Sequence 4.7

Sally and her mother are sitting in the garden, on the grass, facing each other. Child age: 17 months 2 weeks. Sally has just been playing with a spoon.

Videotape Recording begins

Sally (C.)

Mother (M.)

offers C a shape (from the ball and shapes game)
looks across into C's face
reaches forward, takes shape, looking down at it.

moves body forward, reaches forward and puts the ball in front of the child; then looks across into C's face

looks at the ball - puts shape down /eh /

'No?'
takes ball away from in front of the child, puts it down in front of herself, still holding it.

looks down - picks up shape /e kape/
looks at shape closely - looks at ball, reaches across and offers shape to hole on top of the ball /ba ba da gaba/

points to another hole - glances into C's face

Commentary

The features of this illustration that indicate weak framing are as follows. The mother sets up the situation by offering the child a shape and then the ball and encourages the child into activity by looking across into the child's
face to monitor the child's activities and 'cue in' the child's response - to encourage her to take up the role of agent in an activity she must have taken part in many times on previous occasions. The implicit question the mother has asked 'do you want to play this (ball and shapes) game?' receives as negative answer as the child looks at the ball and puts the shape down, vocalising /eh/. The child's response to the total situation is decoded by the mother as 'No!'. The mother then takes the ball away from in front of the child and puts it down in front of herself. Thus the mother's initial setting up of the frame and invitation to the child to take part is weakly framed, she does not force the child into accepting her framing. Following this action of the mother of taking the ball away, the child looks down, picks up the shape, looks at the shape closely, then looks at the ball, and then reaches across to offer the shape to a hole in the top of the ball. Thus the child indicates the acceptance of the offer to participate in the mother's framing after all. (5) It may be of interest here to note that the mother does not use the child's vocalisations /emk/pə/ and /bædɪgəb/ as part of a conversation commenting on the child's activity in the situation - she does not attempt to engage in a verbal conversation with the child; the child's vocalisations are not expanded upon and used - the conversation that takes place does so at a nonverbal level, with only clearly delineated delictic utterances on the part of the mother.

Feature (b) The mother allows the child considerable freedom to negotiate roles within the framing offered. The mother's framing is demonstrated to

(5) It is possible that the child is here deliberately not operating in terms of the total situation, so teasing the mother by 'playing hard to get'. Consequently the child's own 'punctuation' of the situation may be very different from the mother's. If this interpretation is correct the child's definition of the situation includes the mothers in that it involves 'successful completion of the operation of putting shapes into the ball' and also a comment on this framing: 'choosing not to play on the mother's terms'. If this is so, then the opening negotiations are even more crucial in that the mother only invites the child to take part (weak framing), and does not force the child into activity related to her framing. The mother takes the ball away when she perceives a negative response to her invitation - and only then when the frame seems to the mother to be on the verge of being terminated does the child commence frame related activity, picking up the shape and offering it to the hole on top of the ball.
be flexible, expanding, for example, to incorporate objects of the child's attention - as the following illustrates:

Sequence 4.8

**Sally (C.)**

points to hole

'In that one' glances into C's face

/leŋə/ pushing shape into X hole

mother (M.)

'that one' points again to hole.

Looks across into C's face.

'.... in that one'

takes hand away from ball

/əbədən/ looks at hole in ball

/siː aɪ/ squeals, lowers her head and looks round side of ball into a hole for the spoon

reaches across to the ball, lifts up the ball, takes spoon out, puts spoon and ball in front of the child

looks at spoon

'spoon'

looks round the ball, picks up the spoon, offers it to another hole

/luː pən/ 

**Commentary**

The mother here is initially participating in the interchange to guide the child's behaviour and visual attention with the perspective of the future completion of the task; she does not comment on what the child is doing - but on what the child will have to do. The 'that one' associated with the mother's pointing gesture and glance into the child's face - along with the repeat of '.... in that one' leaves unstated the assumption 'If you want to push the shape through its 'correct' hole, you must put it ....'In that one'. Of interest here is that the mother eliminates the verb 'push' from her utterance. Perhaps she notices the child's present activity and takes the child's motivation for granted - assuming that it simply needs redirection.
That the child does not immediately follow the mother's directions, may indicate that the child does not accept the mother's assumption - that she does want to push the shape through the 'correct' hole in the ball. Thus far it seems, the child is only partly accepting the mother's definition of the situation for her.

The child utter 'tlza/>, fingers a hole in the ball, then moves a spoon held in her other hand forward and drops it into the ball. Thus the nature of the game has now changed, the mother had only partly obtained the child's consent for the game to continue on the mother's terms - and the child drops the spoon into the hole changing and extending the focus of interest in the interaction. The mother's weak framing is demonstrated as she acknowledges that the child has taken control of the situation and she retracts her hand. The child pursues her interest in the spoon inside the ball, she vocalises /d:].J.:J.l/., looks at the hole through which the spoon has disappeared, squeals and lowers her head round the side of the ball looking down into the holes for the spoon. The mother follows the child's interest by lifting the ball up, and taking the spoon out. She puts the spoon and the ball down on the floor in front of the child, and noting the child's continuing interest provides the linguistic label 'spoon'. Throughout, the mother does not employ any gestural or linguistic constraint on the child's activity or perceived intention. The putting of the spoon into the ball is seen, although not part of the mother's 'punctuation' in terms of manipulative success, as legitimate as an item of interest for the child - and therefore for the mother. Consequently she supplies the label 'spoon' to code linguistically, the item of the child's present attention.

The child continues with her interests without direction from the mother - she offers the spoon to a hole in the ball. The mother offers no
sanction or constraint on the child's actions; and the child vocalises /ɛəˈpəʊn/ attempting, perhaps, to say the word indicated by the mother. The mother again does not correct the child's version - or incorporate the child's vocalisation into a conversation.

Of interest here is that no sanctions follow as the child drops the spoon inside the ball - the mother sees this as a legitimate activity for the child. Instead of focusing on the child's actions and urging her into frame related activity in terms of 'successful' completion of the task, she takes the opportunity to attach a linguistic label to the object of the child's attention. By not attempting to reintroduce the shapes she allows the child to continue her interest in the spoon and for a time being control the framing.

Feature (c) There may be ultimate boundaries to the frame that has been accepted, in that the mother's framing of the situation for the child may not be infinitely flexible. Infringement of these boundaries by the child - when the mother chooses to maintain boundaries, that is, does not necessarily bring some form of sanction. In other words, the mother may offer a stronger framing of the situation - when she perceives that the situation demands it - but this stronger framing is not in any way a universal feature of the mother's style of interaction with her child. This is illustrated by the following example:

The child is distracted by voices and movements off to the right. In attracting the child's attention back to the game, the mother takes the opportunity to reassert her definition of the situation. The child's interest in activities off to the right do not on this occasion constitute a legitimate aspect of the frame from the mother's point of view.\(^{(6)}\)

\(^{(6)}\) Perhaps the presence of the observer is a factor here.
The child's interest in extraneous events is countered with an interesting noise; the child's attention is thus redirected back to the ball and shapes game.

Sequence 4.9

**Sally (C.)**

Looks at the ball, offers spoon to hole (Noise off to right) looks to right retracts hand looks back and down in front of her

**Mother (M.)**

Looks after C's gaze - to right turns back, looks to left. reaches for object, rattles it, turns back to right, looking after C's gaze

If the child however, does not accept the mother's framing, the mother instead of continuing with her taken - for granted assumptions and enforcing these more directly by using her authority, may put her assumptions up for renegotiation between herself and the child. That is, she may reduce the strength of her framing depending on how she saw the situation. An example of this is given in data sequence 4.10 where, once the child has indicated non acceptance of the mother's framing, the mother does not attempt to impose sanctions or draw the child back into her framing or in any way attempt to re-assert her authority over the child. Thus the child is free to initiate the next framed situation with the advantage that the mother is still involved with the child (and vice versa) and can provide continuing emotional or instructional or whatever support necessary. The following transcript data follows on from data sequence 4.9.
Sequence 4.10

**Sally (C)**

looks back and down in front of her, then up into the mother's face.

looks down at the ball, manipulating spoon, then digs ground with spoon.

takes shape, offers it to hole on side of ball/\o\w/ then to hole on top.

/\m /

**Mother (M.)**

receives the eye contact, turns head to meet C's gaze, 'In there ....' said very softly, pointing with finger and glancing down to hole.

'.... go on' then looks across into the child's face.

'Do this one then' said softly, picks up another shape - moves ball away from C slightly in the process, holds up the shape to the C and glances at C.

'that's better'

'In that one' points - glances at C.

moves hand away - scratches - with hand moves hair over ears.

'goin to put it in?' glances at C.

points to hole - taps it looking across into C's face, with head lowered.

'No?'

Lets go of ball - sits upright watching C from a distance.

receives eye contact, chuckles.

looks down at camera - then round at observer - then carefully finishes the getting in operation and sits down looking at camera and smiling.

**Videotape Recording Ends**
Commentary

The features of this illustration that are of importance are as follows. In the first half of this illustration the mother offers a framing for the child's activity, and actively constructs the child's behaviour in line with her expectations for that behaviour. In the latter half of the illustration she allows her assumptions concerning the child's behaviour to be renegotiated by the child; and, once the child terminates the negotiations, ending the mother's framing, she makes no attempt to constrain the child's activity within her framing. Initially the mother constructs the child's activity by redirecting the child's attention back to the ball and shapes game, making clear her expectation for the child's behaviour with this, coupled to her vocalisation 'in there ....' and at the same time pointing to the ball. She encourages the child into activity within her framing with the vocalisation 'go on' and the look into the child's face. The soft tone of the utterance indicates a degree of intimacy, 'I want you to do it' etc. But do what here is not made clear in the mother's vocalisations; her vocalisations rest upon implicit assumptions about the shared field infront of the mother and child, what has gone before in the interaction and what it is suggested that the child should be doing now, putting shapes into the ball.

The child looks down at the ball while manipulating the spoon, then digs the ground with the spoon, indicating her disinterest in the mother's framing. The mother intervenes again, still attempting to get the child moving within her framing of the situation with the utterance 'this one then' said softly to indicate intimacy. She offers the child a shape, glancing across into the child's face to monitor intention and 'cue in' her response. The child takes the shape and offers it firstly to a hole of her choice on the side of the ball and then, when it does not fit, offers it to a hole on the top of the ball, vocalising /ɔw/. The mother, seeing that the child is now working in terms of her preferred frame comments 'that's better'.
The child takes the shape away from the hole, uttering /beggarmon/. Although the mother has contained the child's activity within her framing, the child has not accepted the framing completely. She moves the shape away from the hole without trying to make it fit. The mother continues with her framing - she continues to structure the child's activity with 'in that one' pointing to a different hole and then looking into the child's face. Thus the mother creates an expectancy of the child's future behaviour - that she should engage in frame-related activity.

At this point the mother moves her pointing finger away to scratch, and then to put her hair behind her ear. A possible constraint on the child to follow the mother's directions is thereby removed; and the child looks down to pursue her interest in the spoon, manipulating the spoon and digging the ground. From this moment on, however, the discourse changes. The mother seems to have acknowledged that the child's interest in the spoon is as equally legitimate as her interests in getting the child to complete the game. Previously the child had been given less choice, for once the framing had been initiated and the child was seen to be acting within its terms, the child's motivation had been assumed by the mother. The mother in this case asks the child to re-assert her support for this assumption, but she does it 'un rhetorically' in that the child does seem to have a choice of how to respond to the mother's question; 'goin to put it in?'. In asking this question the mother seeks more explicit confirmation of the child's motivation - which previously she had assumed. Notice here also the assumptions contained within this question - it assumes quite a lot of the child's ability to decode the utterance. Although the recipient of the message is not located in the utterance it is clear who this must be, but the referent of 'it' and the location of 'in' are not made explicit; thus the question is built onto the shared immediate context of the ball and shapes game, and the prehistory of the current frame.
The child's response /pænd/ could be an attempt to reproduce the stress placed on the 'put' of the mother's last utterance. The child also glances at the ball— which encourages the mother to continue the question nonverbally. She does this by pointing to the hole in the ball, tapping the ball and then lowering her head to look into the child's face. The child responds with the vocalised /nɔw/ with emphasis, and looks away from the eye contact. The child then indicates her rejection of the situation and the mother's framing. The mother's repeat of the 'no?', this time as a question, could signal her own disappointment, or it could possibly be an attempt to continue the negotiations. However, the child ends the negotiations by going away. The mother accepts this and she lets go of the ball and sits upright. She makes no attempt to constrain the child's activity, she does in fact participate in the child's next activity, chuckling as the child engages her in eye contact.

Thus, the above has indicated the flexible nature of this mother's framing; in that when faced with dissent, instead of continuing with her taken for granted assumptions and enforcing them more directly by using her authority she chooses to put her assumptions up for renegotiation between herself and her child.

**Feature (d)** Overall, it is the child's motivation, interest and readiness to engage in activity that is focused upon and taken into account by the mother, rather than the mother allowing her preconceptions about what the child should do to dominate. This is an approach that accepts that the child may have interests that can be seen to be legitimate and that may differ from her own. The mother does not impose her framing onto the child; she tries to anticipate a meaningful framing for the child's actions as they happen. Or, if this is contrary to her wishes, she negotiates with the child rather than directly using her power to impose her framing.

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(7) Perhaps on previous occasions the child has signalled 'no' but has behaved as if a 'yes' was intended.
of the situation and the child's role within it, onto the child. She treats the child as a person in her own right that has, even at the age of 17 months, interests that may be legitimate and that may differ from her own. The picture of the interaction that builds up is one of an 'exchange between equals' rather than of 'subordination and domination'. The child has interests of his or her own and should be allowed the freedom to pursue them. This, it is considered, is the central feature of symmetrical metacommunication between the mother and the child.

In section 4.2 it was suggested that discrepant perception between the mother and the child over the framing of the situation at the content level may lead to the elaboration or re-assertion of relationships at a metacommunicative level. In the data from this particular mother-child pair, the mother has disagreements with the child on the following occasions:

(1) In data sequence 4.8, the mother attempts to redirect the child's activity with pointing gestures and delictic utterances: 'In that .... that one ..... in that one'. In doing so, she offers a definition of herself as a 'mother as instructor' that is not confirmed by the child. The child continues pushing a shape into the wrong hole and then fingers a hole in the ball and drops a spoon inside. The mother does not attempt to assert her power in the relationship to redirect the child back to the procedures of the ball and shapes game, instead she takes the spoon out of the ball and using the child's interest she labels it 'spoon'. Thus she participates with the child in the child's activity.

(11) In data sequence 4.10, the mother attempts to redirect the child's activity by pointing to a hole, and tapping it. The child vocalises /now/ shakes her head and looks to the right, signalling her rejection of the situation, and moving away. The definition of herself as 'mother as instructor' offered to the child has again
been disconfirmed, but again the mother does not use her power and authority to make the child continue the game - she accepts the child's decision.

In summary, the metacommunicative relationship elaborated is one of 'symmetry' between the mother and child. The mother treats the child as an equal, having interests of her own, and as a person who should be given the opportunity to pursue them. *(8)*

4.3.6 Summary

Criteria which would have to be satisfied if the data were to suggest evidence for a symmetrical metacommunication relationship between the mother and the child would be as follows.

(i) Although the mother offers a framing of the situation and the child's role initially, the child is not constrained to accept it. The child is allowed to choose to involve herself with the mother's suggested framing.

(ii) The mother allows the child considerable freedom to renegotiate roles within the framing offered. The mother's framing is demonstrated to be flexible, expanding to incorporate objects of the child's attention. She does not impose on the child her definition of what is 'correct' for the child to do.

(iii) There may be ultimate boundaries to the framing that has been accepted by the child, in that the framing of the situation for the child may not be infinitely flexible. Infringement of these boundaries by the child, when the mother chooses to maintain boundaries that is, does not necessarily bring some form of sanction.

(iv) Overall the child's motivation and readiness to engage in activity is focused on by the mother and recognition is given to them as she allows negotiations to proceed with the child.

*(8)* This need not be so in every situation - as suggested above, in some situations the mother may choose not to allow the child to pursue his or her interests on grounds of politeness perhaps, or to suit her taste in people; on these occasions strong framing of the situation is to be expected, along with rejection of the child's (short term?) interests.
Overall, in symmetrical metacommunication between the mother and child, the responsibility for events within the framing is shared and negotiated jointly between the mother and the child. In this particular case of mother-child interchange between Sally and her mother, it is suggested that the above criteria have been adequately met and the conclusion is drawn that a complementary metacommunicative relationship is a feature of this mother's style of communicating with her child.

4.4 Content Dimension: Introduction

In the last section examples of 'typical' complementary and symmetrical metacommunicative relationships were discussed. Earlier it was stated that the metacommunicative dimension determines aspects of the content dimension of the mother's framing. Consequently the discussion will now turn to a detailed analysis of the content dimension. The analysis will proceed by discussing firstly 'Intersubjective boundary maintenance', secondly 'behavioural constraints' exercised by the mother on the child's activity, and thirdly 'sequential constraints' imposed by the development of the framing through time. These will be illustrated with data from various mother-child pairs other than the two discussed so far.

4.4.1 An outline of intersubjective, boundary maintenance

In terms of Rommetvelt's (1974) analysis of the architecture of intersubjectivity — mentioned in Chapter 2 — definite restraints are exercised by the mother upon possible interpretations of the situation, possible roles within it, and the child's potential to express meanings. Which of the entire range of potential aspects of the situation is to be focused upon, and then intersubjectively taken for granted as the framing develops is proposed by the mother - and tacitly accepted by the child, the moment the child engages in reciprocal communication either verbally or nonverbally. Thus the mother has the control of the 'here and now' and the privilege of pointing out objects and events as she offers her framing of the situation to the child. She also has control of the presuppositions, that is, the taken for granted assumptions of what the
child comes to know about the 'here and now'. As part of the child's rejection of the content dimension of the frame offered, the child must challenge the mother's presuppositions implicit in that offered frame. How she handles the situation gives an insight into her metacommunicative style. To explore the 'framed intersubjectivity' controlled by the mother, in the data, attention must be paid to:

(i) The expectations that are created for the child's behaviour, that follow from the mother's taken for granted assumptions concerning that behaviour. Expectations are created for the child's future behaviour, so creating a vacuum into which the child's behaviour is drawn. Once the child behaves in accordance with these expectations, the child has tacitly accepted the premises on which they are based. The mother's presuppositions about the situation become the taken for granted of the mother and child.

(ii) The taken for granted assumptions that lie behind the mother's expectations are often not able to be articulated by the mother until perhaps the child explicitly challenges their basis by not complying with the expectations, consequently rejecting the content of her framing.

4.4.2 Illustration of Intersubjective boundary maintenance

Examples of the mother's taken for granted assumptions and expectations for her child's activity are contained within the discussion of most of the illustrations so far demonstrating how, as the framing progresses, the activities of the mother in her negotiations with her child are determined by her metacommunicative relationship with the child. The following are two further examples, the first from the 'Alice' data.
Sequence 4.11

Alice (C.)

manipulates shape in hole, but it will not go in. Looks to right, shape falls to floor. Looks back and down to floor, reaches for shape.

Mother (M.)

reaches forward to floor for shape 'Again?'
picks up shape - holds it above the hole, in orientation

Commentary

In the above, despite the child's manipulations, the shape will not fit the hole. The child looks to the right and the shape falls to the floor. Both the mother and the child reach for it - and the mother picks up the shape and asks 'Again?' Although it is not certain from the data whether she obtained a response from the child, she acts as if she received an affirmative reply. She assumes that the 'meta-contract' of completion of the game 'correctly' is still in operation - and continues to construct the task for the child by holding the shape above the 'correct' hole, in the 'correct' orientation so all the child has to do is push it down into the hole. Thus expectations are created for the child's behaviour that follow from the mother's assumptions; a vacuum is created into which the child's activity is drawn. Once the child behaves with these expectations, the mother's taken for granted assumptions or premises, become the taken for granted of both the mother and child.

This is demonstrated in the following, sequence 4.12, taken from the data of a not previously introduced mother - child pair. Here the mother - as above, in illustration 12, does not allow the 'ground rules' to come up for renegotiation when the child loses interest in the mother's framing. The mother assumes that they are set and accepted by both participants and therefore not negotiable. She treats the child's interests as of little relevance; she treats the child's manipulation of the 'wrong' shape as
only temporary, to be 'solved' with only minor difficulty. The motivation and readiness of the child to perform the task in a way defined by the mother is not questioned.

Sequence 4.12

Mother and child are sitting on the living room floor - facing each other, the child pushing a shape into a hole. Child age = 15 months 3 weeks.

James (C.)

/əː/h/ looks up at M.

receives eye contact

'Why go?'
turns to right and reaches into box for another shape - bangs and noises come from box

turns back to the child, reaches across to child with another shape from the box

looks to the right, after the H, then looks down and fingers shape. Reaches for ball with other hand

receives eye contact

'Look'

retrieves ball, puts in front of C

looks at what H is doing, while holding ball then looks at the shape the mother is holding, glances at H

re-orients herself to C, holding a couple more shapes - puts them onto floor - picks up one, moves ball around slightly - moves ball around again offers shape to C

ball slips away under C's weight

'I think you've lost some of the shapes haven't you?' looking down}

looks across into C's face establishing eye contact

looks at the various shapes on the floor in front of her - and in box

Then looks back at what H is doing; watches, holding shape to hole, glances up at H's face - as she re-orients moves - re-adjusts posture, as he finds he is no longer near to the ball

'try that one ..... try that one' holding the shape above the hole.

C watches H's movements

H holds up the shape above the hole.
reaches forward and pushes the shape home. 'good boy!'

Commentary

The mother, because of the shared intersubjective context, interprets the child's initial utterances as being in some way a comment on the situation from the child's point of view and in doing so she assumes that the child is motivated in terms of 'correct' completion of the game. She codes the child's utterance in language as 'wont go?' said with a similar intonation contour as the child's last utterance. The mother turns to the right, and reaches behind her into a box for more suitable shapes. The child meanwhile does not attempt to assert his own definition of the situation, he looks down - fingerling the shape and waiting. He then reaches for the ball. The mother reaches across to the child with another shape; and, as the child looks at the shape - and glances across into the mother's face - the ball slips away under his weight. Just as he, perhaps, was about to take control and play with the ball and the shape on his terms, the mother intervenes. The mother does not in this instance reply to his eye contact, she replies instead to the ball slipping away with the imperative 'look' - perhaps addressed to herself as a warning that the ball had moved away. She retrieves the ball and puts it in front of the child with the comment: 'now lets see what we can find'. The child still has his original shape in his hand - he puts it to the 'wrong' hole. The mother asks 'No?'; she assumes that the child is motivated within the framing towards the 'correct' completion of the task - she creates the expectation that the shape should fit and all it seems to need is a minor re-adjustment for the 'correct' completion of this part of the game. She looks into the box for more shapes the child could try, however, the child takes the opportunity to attempt a variant on the game. He bangs
the shape against the ball to make an interesting noise (a feature of this child's behaviour throughout this recording session). He looks up at the mother, still banging the shape against the ball, but stops on the first stressed word of the mother's vocalisation when the mother meets his gaze in eye contact. The mother comments, 'I think you've lost some of the shapes haven't you?', is largely her thoughts expressed out loud, or as a communication addressed to the observer - in that the child is not expected to understand it. The mother reorients herself to the game while the child watches her movements.

At last then, all the components of the game are assembled and the mother proceeds to construct the child's activity - in line with her expectations of the child's role in the game and in terms of the 'correct' completion of the game. She moves the ball around so that the 'correct' hole is on the top of the ball, so that the child can repeat the same 'winning strategy'. She offers the shape to the child to obtain his interest, puts the shape over the 'correct' hole, in the 'correct' orientation and invites the child to: 'Try that one .... try that one'. All the child has to do is to reach forward and touch the shape into the hole. He does this, and is rewarded with 'good boy!'.

Throughout the above illustration the mother acts as if the child's motivation was not a problem - she assumes that the child is motivated within her definition of the situation despite some contrary evidence concerning the child's interest in making noises. In both of these examples, the mother has the control of the 'here and now' and the privilege of pointing out objects and events as she offers a framing of the situation. Control of the 'here and now' is not negotiable, both of the mothers seem to assume it is theirs by the very fact that they are adult and are mothers. Consequently both mothers frame the child's role within the situation and define for him the end point of the framing - the 'correct' completion of the game.
The mother's also have control of the taken for granted assumptions of what she and the child 'know' about the here and now in that, as a result of past negotiations she may - as in the above example - 'know' that a particular shape is 'too difficult' for the child. All of this, of course, implies a set way of playing with the toy - a 'correct' way of playing with the toy. In both of the above examples expectations are created by the mother concerning the child's future behaviour. Once the child behaves in accordance with these expectations, the child has tacitly accepted the principles on which they are based - that there is a 'correct' way to play the game and his or her behaviour should be directed to this end. Thus, as said earlier, the mother's presuppositions about the situation become the taken-for-granted of the mother and child.

Finally, in the illustrations given so far (data sequences numbers 4.1 to 4.12), the taken for granted assumptions that lie behind the mother's expectations of the child's behaviour within the framing, have often not been articulated by the mother until the child explicitly challenges their basis by not complying with these expectations, and rejecting the content of the framing. How this is dealt with by the mother is one of the criteria of the metacommunicative relationship the mother has with the child (see for example, the discussion of sequence 4.6, on complementary metacommunication and sequence 4.10, on symmetrical metacommunication).

The point here is that the mother need not be fully aware of her assumptions and expectations concerning the child's behaviour, they may remain implicit until challenged by the child in negotiating or rejecting the content dimension of the frame.

4.4.3 Behavioural constraints on the child's activity

The intersubjective boundary maintenance exercised by the mother, because of her framing and thus her control of the 'here and now' invariably involves some sort of 'behavioural constraint' on the child's activity. This is necessary if the mother's expectations for frame-related behaviour are to be conveyed to the child. The mother's expectations for the child's
behaviour must be, generally, backed up with other more concrete cues for the child's behaviour.

The nature of the behavioural constraints can be considered to be as follows:

(I) Use of eye contact, eye movement and redirecting eye gaze

For an example of this, see sequence 4.6, where the mother tries to redirect the child's attention back down to the shape by allowing the child to follow her direction of gaze. Also, the many instances in all of the illustrations presented where the mother looks into the child's face to 'cue in' the child's response, so that she can frame the response as part of her framing of the situation.

(II) Gestures and deictic hand movements

Again there are numerous examples of these in all of the above illustrations. These are typically of the nature: 'mother points to shape child is holding and then to the correct' hole in the ball'.

(III) Proxemics and body movements

Instances of the mother's body movements and use of social space have not been particularly obvious in the above examples. In the following illustration, however, which concerns one of the mother-child pairs already introduced, the mother signals that one subsection of the major task has been completed by moving her body backwards. She then moves her body forwards and offers the next shape to the child. In so doing she focuses the child's attention on the next subsection with the question 'what about that then?'

Sequence 4.13

Alice (C.)

reaches forward, pushes shape into  
\( \text{hole in ball} \)

Mother (M.)

'\( \text{That's it!} \)

moves body back briefly, then forwards again.

'\( \text{What about that then?} \)
picking up another shape and holding it out to C.
A second illustration of the mother's use of social space to constrain the activity is provided in the following illustration. Here the mother uses physical proximity along with delctic locative gestures to constrain the child's actions. She swaps a position of undoubted authority - a chair looking down on the child - for one where more careful scrutiny and control of the child's behaviour is possible sitting next to the child. This also allows the possibility of two-way communication between the child and herself.

**Sequence 4.1b**

The mother is sitting on a chair, leaning over its side and looking down to the floor where the child is playing with a pillar box and shapes game. Child age is 18 months 3 weeks.

**Geoffrey (C.)**

picks up an object from floor (not a shape)

puts object to pillar box

**Mother (M.)**

'I didn't mean that!'

moves out of seat and round infront of the child.

offers C a shape from those on floor

**Commentary**

In the above, the mother tells the child 'I didn't mean that!' after the child has picked up an object from the floor different to that one intended by the mother. This negative comment, unaccompanied by any constructive delctic utterance related to the child's activity is ignored by the child, who puts this 'illegitimate' object to a hole in the pillar box. At this point the mother moves out of her seat and comes round to sit beside the child. Here the child has asserted his own definition of the situation in that he has picked up an object of his choice despite the mother's directives. The mother, perhaps to guard against any transgression of
the frame boundaries, has to move closer to monitor the child's activity. This enables nonverbal cues, such as looking into the child's face to 'cue in' his response as well as deictic gestures of pointing to construct the child's activity to be used more effectively. Although the child is motivated within the frame, he does not completely accept the role allocated to him by his mother. By picking up the object of his own choice, he on this occasion has brought about a sanction from the mother. The freedom he had to determine basic aspects of his role within the task can now be monitored more closely because of the mother's physical presence.

(iv) Deictic locative language, along with paralinguistic features
The mother's language, typically, consists of short, simple utterances with the key words stressed for emphasis, so that the information to be conveyed to the child is as clear as possible. There are numerous examples of this in the illustration presented so far, where the mother's deictic utterances are combined with deictic gestures. For example: data sequence 4.2 where the mother looks across into the child's face, and then says 'that one' offering a shape to the child, saying 'in there' chuckling and glancing down to the 'correct' hole and then pointing to and tapping that hole.

(v) Nonverbal markers of significance
These gesture clusters appear in the data where for example the mother is trying to constrain the child's activity within her framing - as in for example - data sequence 4.6. They also appear where the mother is trying to mark something that the child has done in terms of the completion of the task as being significant. The following is an example of this second type, taken from a different mother-child pair. Here the mother marks the child's completion of the whole task as being significant, and not only that but she marks the child's behaviour as being significant when individual 'successes' have been achieved.
Sequence 4.15

James (C.)

Mother (M.)

"Look, try that one'
holds shape above the top hole in the orientation

reaches across with palm outstretched, pushes the shape into the ball./æː ʰ/ and claps.
gets up - looking at M
steps away from M

receives the eye contact
'Good Boy!' full face towards C with eyebrows raised
'Good Boy!' looks back down with a head nod as she says it.

Commentary

Here, the mother gains the child's attention by saying 'look'. She invites the child to 'try that one', holding the shape above the 'correct' hole in the correct orientation so that the child has only to do a minimal action to achieve a success. The child accedes to the mother's expectation of his behaviour and pushes the shape into the hole. The child then vocalises /æː ʰ/ and claps, and also gets up from the floor looking at the mother. Here, the child, by looking across at the mother, clapping and vocalising, signals his own acknowledgment of the significance of his actions. The clap would have been associated with successful completions on previous occasions.

The mother marks the child's activity by meeting the child's eye gaze with 'good boy!', and the associated gesture cluster repeated twice, perhaps to retain the child's interest in her framing of the situation.

In the following illustration of the mother marking the child's activity as being significant, the mother demonstrates that the construction of goals and subgoals for the child's behaviour, within the mother's framing, is a social activity between the child and caretakers and others. This is a social activity that all should be involved in - and pleased about - as
the child gradually becomes responsible for his own actions.

Sequence 4.16

James (C.)

looks down at the hole, manipulates shape in the hole

Mother (M)

moves hand forward, then retracts it

moves hand away - shape is stuck in hole

reaches forward and bashers the side of the ball - the shape falls inside

'Good'

looks to left and onto floor - bangs toy car on floor (observer in conversation with C's brother: 'Tuesday is it .... Tuesday you go back to school?' 'Thursday' 'Is it Thursday?' 'Yes' 'Oh'

M reaches forward - and pushes the shape

'Good'

looks up at M briefly - on 'There' - then down, picks up dagger and sheath (toy) bangs them on floor

takes dagger from sheath - looks at M then looks at camera (smiling)

gets up and comes towards camera

Commentary

Between them the mother and child cause the last shape to fall inside the ball. The mother responds with 'Good!' to indicate that the child has now finished the activity. But at this point the observer initiates a conversation with James's brother who had entered the room. The mother intercepts this 'polite' conversation by asking a question related to the conversation topic - then as she has control of 'here and now' switches

Videotape Recording Ends
attention back to the child's accomplishment. She exclaims 'there, look!' and lifting the ball up making her meaning clear, and the marking more significant she repeats 'there, look .... I've finished!'. Here the mother takes the part of the child. It is not her that she means to be the 'I' but the child. She thus encodes for the child the goal of his activity and attributes to him the agency of arriving at that goal.

The child looks up briefly on the mother's stressed word 'there', but directs his attention to his toy and his interest in banging noises. The mother puts the ball down on her lap, and continues verbally to mark the child's recent activity as being significant by saying 'good boy!' This attracts the child's attention and he looks up and across at the mother. She responds to the eye contact by rattling the ball and saying 'that's better isn't it'. The frame ends with the child getting up and moving towards the camera. Finally, the point needs to be made that this marking for the child of what he has 'accomplished' is, possibly, not only for the child's benefit but also for the observer's - demonstrating how the child's increasing competence is a truly social thing that all interested parties can take delight in!

(vi) Physical constraints on the child's activity

An example of this, the direct use of physical constraint on the child's activity, occurs in data sequence 4.3, where the mother moves the child's hand back to the 'correct' hole after the child's hand had moved away. Also, in data sequence 4.4 the mother jostles the child's hand to gain her attention. This direct physical intervention as a constraint on the child's activity could be seen as almost a 'resort to brute force' when other attempts at containing or constructing the child's activity have failed. These examples concern gestural constraint. The more physical constraints of holding the child's hand, picking him or her up, facing him or her in an appropriate direction and so on were not apparent in the data reported here due presumably to sampling and observer effects.

(9) I am grateful here, for the comments of Derek Edwards who brought this to my attention.
(see Chapter 3 for a discussion of these). Body contact and physical manipulation of the child must occur at other times, during preparation for bed, feeding, nappy changing and at these times the nature of the physical contact might be important in the framing process. One example of this that does occur in the data reported here is as follows, where a nanny physically re-orient the child's body.

**Sequence 4.17**

The child, having picked up a jigsaw walks to a chair, the nanny then joins him. Child's age: 24 months, 1 week.

Giles (C.)

```
tips jigsaw pieces out of board
```

Nanny (M.)

```
'can I .... sit down .... and then you....'
takes some pieces away from chair
to make some space for her to sit down
```

```
'come around here .... look' puts
all pieces of jigsaw into one hand,
puts the other around C's waist and
brings him forward '...... isn't it'
```

```
lifts up board
```

```
takes board, moves it around on her
knee, then moves pieces of jigsaw in
her hand forward - offers to C.
```

### 4.4.4 Weak and strong framing and patterns of behavioural constraint

In this section an attempt is made to indicate typical patterns of constraints on the child's activity that may be expected in strong and weak framing - and consequently in the complementary and symmetrical metacommunicative relationships between the mother and the child.

**1) Strong framing**

A feature of strong framing is the imposition of the mother's framing
of the situation onto the child. Here there may be some sort of progression in the use of behavioural constraints to keep the child within the boundaries of the strong framing or negotiate only within the frame boundaries.

Firstly, if the child is motivated within the strongly offered frame, then the intersubjectively understood restraint exercised by the mother because of her control of the 'here and now', may be all that is necessary to direct the child's behaviour. This would be accomplished by delictic gestures and delictic language or even, as the following illustration indicates, by verbal encouragement and praise, and use of eye contact to redirect the child's eye gaze and therefore his attention.

Sequence 4.18

The child is kneeling on the floor infront of the mother, who is sitting on the floor. They have the ball and shapes game between them. Child's age 22 months 2 weeks.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Stewart (C.)} & \quad \text{Mother (M.)} \\
\text{reaches forward, puts shape through \checkmark hole} \quad \text{\textit{That it!} said softly} \\
\text{looks round to right, on floor} \quad \text{receives eye contact raises eyebrows to meet C's gaze} \quad \text{then} \\
\text{picks up next shape, glances up and across at H} \quad \text{glances down, nods her head at same time.} \\
\text{lifts up shape and looks at it} \quad \text{(= You do it)}
\end{align*}
\]

Consequently, increasing use of gestures, delictic hand movements, verbal imperatives, nonverbal markers of significance and finally physical restraint on the child's activity may be used when the child infringes the boundaries of a strongly offered frame - when the child loses interest in the mother's framing. The progression is illustrated through the data examples presented earlier in the consideration of a complementary metacommunication relationship - in data sequences 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 of this chapter.
Thus, these behavioural constraints may be typically brought into operation in the progression from: eye contact and eye gaze redirection, through deictic gestures and verbal imperatives, and then nonverbal markers of significance and then ultimately, physical restraint. This sort of progression may be evident in the following sorts of situations:

(i) When the mother has to get the child motivated to accept her strongly offered framing of the situation. The mother has allocated a role to the child and therefore has to encourage the child into it - against the child's wishes.

(ii) The child tries to renegotiate the allocated role to a degree not allowable by the mother.

(iii) When the mother has to stop the child from infringing strongly offered frame boundaries, or terminating the frame or in any other way engaging in 'illegitimate' activity according to the mother's definition of the situation.

This sequence would obviously be more typical of a complementary metacommunication relationship rather than a symmetrical metacommunication relationship.

Also, the progression could happen the other way round. A framing could be established by sanctions such as physical restraint and subsequently be maintained by gesture alone. So far, this discussion of the two opposite sequences (physical→gestural→intersubjectively understood restraint) has concerned the situation where a preestablished frame is being challenged (or not accepted) by the child. Thus the emphasis here has been on the progression from the 'intersubjectively understood' to the 'physically overt'.

However, the sequence physical constraint→gestural→intersubjectively understood may be more typical of the establishment of new frames (for example, where the mother actually sits the child on the floor and puts things into his or her hand and so on). To the extent that the data here
concerns established routines between the mother and child the expected progression would be from intersubjectively understood to gestural constraint to physical constraint. (10)

(11) Weak framing

A feature of weak framing is the elaboration of the framing around the child's interest and motivation. Consequently the more 'powerful' (11) of the external constraints - direct physical intervention - would not be evident. As an 'ideal type' weakly offered framing would rely on eye contact and gaze redirection down to whatever the child is currently doing - as in the above, in sequence 4.18. Ideally then, there should be no problem of motivation, or of keeping the child's activities within limits. The child would largely control the interaction. If the mother begins to negotiate limits or construct the child's activity to some end then she is moving to a less weak and more strongly framed situation.

4.4.5 Sequential constraints involved in frame construction over time

In any discussion of framing, framing through time is implied. Time is here considered to be an important dimension. The philosophical stance taken is that the social world is an 'undetermined world - a growing world in which things pass into existence and out of it again through time and, through time there is always more to come of a growing system' (Shotter 1974). Therefore, framing in an indeterminate world makes meanings determinate

(10) I am grateful here, for the comments of Derek Edwards.

(11) On a scale of 'powerfulness' or 'forcefulness', the use of eye contact to redirect eye gaze would rank fairly low and direct physical intervention would rank fairly high; with the other external constraints described above would be located in between. This notion, of course, decontextualises the use of external constraints in that in some situations as the text above indicates, eye gaze redirection may be all that is required to 'control' the child's behaviour - and may therefore be, in the appropriate situation extremely 'powerful'. But the idea of an increasing degree of 'powerfulness' of the external constraints from eye gaze redirection to physical intervention - in strong framing especially - is of relevance.
within specific framings of specific situations. For example, words are fully meaningful only when used by persons in specific, framed situations. In Sequence 4.19 that follows, the child and mother engage in an 'embedded framing' within the overall framing. The child places a shape in all of the 'wrong' holes before ending in the 'correct' hole. Therefore, in a sense, the last hole is fully determined by the 'incorrectness' of all the rest. There is a 'redundancy' about the final hole as all the others are tried and found 'incorrect' - a sort of 'it can be seen coming' that seems inevitable in the order of trying the holes, as 'degrees of freedom' are gradually narrowed down. This sense of inevitableness was evident in the previous section, in the discussion of behavioural constraints in section 4.4.4. In this section the progression from 'less powerful' to 'more powerful' behavioural constraint on the child's activity was considered where the mother strongly offers a framing, but the child does not share her definition of the situation. Here, it may be considered that the direct physical intervention 'can be seen coming'.

Framing, then, would be considered a form of spatial and temporal 'chunking', introducing boundaries into the child's activities. Spatial chunking because of the boundaries of the frame offered by the mother in terms of what the child is allowed to do within the framing. Temporal chunking because the end of the embedded frame described in data sequence 4.19 - the placing of the shape in the 'correct' hole after trying incorrect ones, and then the framing itself - the placing of all the shapes into their holes, is fully determined by what has gone before in the frame. The end of the mother's framing or the end of one embedded frame is therefore inevitable given the development of the framing and in a specific point in time cut off from the next frame. Thus discreteness and boundaries are introduced both spatially and temporally into the
child's activity. This chunking may be more typical of a complementary metacommunication relationship; in a symmetrical metacommunication relationship the activities of the child - and mother - would be a more or less continuous flow as the mother elaborates frames around the child's interests. This will be returned to in section 4.5.

Finally, before moving onto the illustration - the mother's framing of the situation is also a framing of the situation for herself. Frames as shared structures develop for both participants even if the mother may impose her preconceptions from the start, mothers have to learn to be mothers. Consequently this implies a commitment to her framing for her own behaviour. Initially framed exchanges are a 'temporary shared social reality' that may be taken for granted later on as the frame develops. What is intersubjectively framed between mother and child is built up slowly over a number of exchanges, made determinate over time as options for behaviour of both parties are reduced - as discussed above. Thus the taken-for-granted and agreed on part of the frame may slowly grow as the frame progresses - as an intersubjectively shared context for the present communication. In the examples of data already presented, sequences 4.1 to 4.6 and also 4.12, are instances where the mother has initiated the framing of the situation and maintains the child's activity within boundaries; she is in a real sense 'trapped' within the framing she has initiated - she has a degree of personal investment in the child's 'successful' completion of the activities. Also, once the situation has been set up in line with previous instances of the mother's framing - expectations created by past frame related activity may come into play. In the instances under consideration (sequences 4.1 to 4.6 and 4.12) the mother adopts a division of labour originating in past activity; she for example locates the 'correct' hole for the shape the child is presently manipulating. Thus the child is freed of this function and therefore is available to do other things - to assert his own classification of events
During the time the mother takes to locate the 'correct' hole - and also the child has to be induced to take over the role of agent from the mother within her framing. The mother, then, is 'trapped' within her framing in these sequences. Sequence 4.20 is a particularly clear example of this.

Thus, once the parameters of the game have been set up and the framing established, the mother may be 'trapped' within it, and be obliged to follow the frame through to some sort of conclusion. An analogy may be appropriate here, in that in painting - and any form of 'do-it-yourself' the initial steps are the most crucial, they entail the greatest degree of uncertainty. Once the exercise has been commenced and the situation framed, the uncertainty is progressively reduced until a conclusion is reached. Progression within the frame in 'do-it-yourself' at least is motivated by the relative costs of stopping!

Some of the above points are illustrated in the following, taken from a nanny - child pair (child age is 19 months 3 weeks). The game here is a box and shapes game - the box has appropriately shaped holes in its top.

Sequence 4.19

Emma (C.)

bangs shape on top of toy, into hole it does not fit
/adjadj/ looks up and across at N
takes hand away, leaving shape ontop of box, next to hole

reaches across, takes shape, manipulates shape in X hole, the hole next to the √ hole

Nanny (N)

receives eye contact

moves in quickly
picks up shape - drops it then retrieves it - looking down 'goes in there' said with a head nod down to hole
'. . . . . . like this' puts shape to √ hole in √ orientation

'Does . . . . . All right . . . .
does it go in this one?'

glances into C's face - reaches across puts shape to another X hole - wiggles it in hole.

'No?'
reaches across, takes shape

manipulates shape in hole N just pointed to

puts shape to hole N points to, scrabbles

puts shape to hole - it fits
looks up at N
shape still half in hole

reaches forward, pushes shape into hole

points to hole (another X hole, working clockwise around the top of the box)
'In there?' looks across into C's face

'No?'
'Try this one' pointing to another hole, and glancing at C

'Now!'
points to another hole
'This one' glances at C

'Yes' looking across, smiling
receives eye contact
'good girl!'
'push it in!' taps shape with little finger, using no force.

Commentary
Here the child bangs a shape down into a hole on top of the box. It does not fit; and the child vocalises and looks up and across at the nanny. The nanny does not reply to the child's vocalisation in terms of encoding the child's comment; she replies instead by picking up the shape and putting it onto the box in the correct orientation for putting into the hole with the vocalisation 'goes in there ... like this'. Thus the nanny directs the child's actions from the future perspective of completion of the task. The child replies with a vigorous /nˈjoʊ/ while reaching across, taking the shape and putting it to the hole next to the correct one as pointed out by the nanny. The nanny responds with a reply to the child's vocalisation 'does' then signals her agreement with what she perceives as the child's interest in an embedded framing by herself taking up what she perceives as the child's intentions by structuring the situation
with 'does it go in this one'. She glances across into the child's face to monitor the child's intentions and 'cue in' her response, then reaches across and puts the shape into the hole she has indicated, providing a model for the child's behaviour. She moves it around in the hole and provides the answer to her question 'No?' - in question form as she expects the child to join in. The child does join in; she reaches across and takes the shape. The nanny continues to structure the child's activities, she points to another hole, working clockwise around the top of the box. She asks 'in there?' and looks across into the child's face. The child manipulates the shape in the hole; the nanny provides the verbal answer to her question and moves onto the next hole.

After trying another wrong hole, the child puts the shape to the hole the nanny has indicated and this time it fits. The nanny answers her question of 'this one' with 'Ye-es' looking across at the child, smiling. The child looks up and across to meet the nanny's eye gaze; the nanny rewards the child with 'Good Girl!' said with emphasis and then continues to construct the child's activity.

In this example, once the embedded framing has been embarked upon, it is inevitable that all the holes will be tried, working clockwise around the top of the box, until the 'correct' hole is located. Therefore the location of the 'correct' hole, and the end of this framing is determined in advance by the incorrectness of the rest. Also, of course, the nanny is constrained to follow through the framing to its conclusion - once she has directed the child's attention to the 'wrong' hole working round the top of the box in a pattern - she must direct the child's attention to all of the 'wrong'holes - and complete the pattern narrowing down the 'degrees of freedom' as to which is the 'correct' hole as she does so.

To illustrate this last mentioned aspect of sequential constraint a second example will be considered here from another mother-child pair where the mother initiates a variation in her framing, using the child's
Interest in the geometry of the shapes. After initiating this embedded framing, however, she becomes 'trapped' within it as the child asks for the name of a shape that she does not know.

Sequence 4.20

Stewart (C.)

'looks to left and round on floor. Picks up a shape, puts it to X hole

moves the ball around with the shape in his hand, looking down at the holes

reaches forward, puts shape through √ hole

looks to right and round on floor. Picks up next shape, glances up and across at M

Lifts up shape - looks at it

looks up and across at M moving shape up close to C's eye, near to line of sight

moves shape forward to ball

/Is It/

Observer chuckles

moves shape around, manipulating it against ball

Mother (M.)

'You know what that is .... that a triangle isn't it?

reaches across, moves ball 'where has the triangle gone?'

looks down at the ball, holding it steady, looking for the correct hole

'that it!' said very softly

receives eye contact eyebrows raised to C

receives eye contact glances down, nods down

'that's a .... oh dear .... I've forgotten what they're called'

'manipulation?'

Observer chuckles

'geometry isn't it!!'
said to observer chuckling again

Commentary

The child picks up a shape and puts it to the 'wrong' hole; the child utters /pʊˈənɪˈeɪdə/. The mother replies to his utterance with 'You know what that is', assuming that the child does know and that he has the competence to realise that the hole is the wrong one for his chosen shape.
She then supplies the answer to her question - and labels the shape as 'that's a triangle isn't it?'. She thereby introduces a new level into the ball and shapes game, the exact identification of the shapes and their corresponding holes in the ball.

The child moves the ball around with the shape in his hand, looking down at the holes. From the data it is unclear as to whether the child shows any understanding of the meaning in the mother's speech - the mother however, obviously thinks the child has the understanding of shapes and their names. The mother intervenes in the child's activity, she reaches across and moves the ball and pursues the 'labelling subroutine' with the question 'where has the triangle gone?' She looks down at the ball and holds it steady, looking for the correct hole. The child reaches forward and puts his shape through the 'correct' hole. The mother rewards the child's activity with 'that's it!' said very softly. The child demonstrates his interest and motivation in the framing by looking around, on the floor, and picks up the next shape. He glances up and across at the mother. The child's meaning here may be that he requires the mother to label the shape - as she had done previously. The mother does not respond verbally; she refers the child back down to the ball with eyebrows raised (to receive the eye contact) and then a glance and nod downwards to indicate to the child, nonverbally, 'you do it'. The child lifts up the shape - looks at it - then looks up and across at the mother, moving the shape up closer to his eye, nearer to the line of sight - the line of eye contact between mother and child. Thus the child makes his meaning very clear in that he requires the name of the shape.

The mother replies to his nonverbally expressed question with the attempt to label the shape. She responds 'that's a .... ow dear .... I've forgotten what they're called' then suggests 'trapezium' doubtfully.
child moves the shape forward to the ball and responds to the mother's utterance with /Is It/. This utterance could be a word used by the child perhaps meaningfully - but more likely a response used by the child where the child has asked a question, the mother has replied with a degree of uncertainty - and the child in turn asks 'Is it?'. Thereby he seems to be challenging the mother's authority and taking the upper hand in the interaction. This, in this situation, creates some amusement; the observer chuckles and the mother also chuckles. The mother turns her head to the observer and, as the child continues frame-related activity, comments to the observer 'Geometry isn't it!', indicating that she has some idea of the names of the shapes but finds the exact labelling of some of the shapes very difficult. Here she is 'trapped' within the labelling subroutine initiated by her and continued by the child. Of course, the mother could have responded with anything and the child would probably have been satisfied, but there is presumably some imperative for the mother, as agent of socialisation, to be as correct as she can be in these things.

This illustration is included to indicate that, once a framing or in this instance an embedded framing has been initiated, the mother may become constrained within it and as it develops the options for her behaviour become more restricted and it may be that the demands placed upon her increase as she is called upon to be more exact in her behaviour.

4.5 Discussion and Summary

In this chapter an outline of a theory of framing has been developed; as a theory with three levels. The first and third of which are the two

(12) It is difficult here to estimate whether the observer 'cued in' the mother's response, or if she would have responded in this way if the observer had not been present.
basic dimensions of the framing 'metacommunicative' and 'content'.

The first level is the *metacommunicative dimension*. This has been classified as either 'complementary' or 'symmetrical' metacommunication, depending upon the mother's use of her power and authority in offering a framing of the situation for the child. This classification is arrived at after building up a picture of the mother-child interchange as being, typically, either strongly or weakly framed.

The second level, of strong or weak framing is a level of analysis that is an abstraction drawn from the components of the third level, the 'content' dimension of the framing. The content dimension has been divided for analysis into 'intersubjectively understood restraint' exercised by the mother on the child's activity because of her control of the here and now; 'behavioural constraints' on the child's activity and also 'sequential constraint' imposed by the development of the framing through time. These, it is suggested, serve to build up a picture of the interchange as either strongly or weakly framed by the mother, implicit in which is the metacommunicated relationship.

The metacommunicated relationship, it is considered, is part of the mother's 'style' of mothering - and any comments about this must be restricted to the context where the present data has relevance, that is in the 'instructional context' of the ball and shapes game. It is not suggested that if the mother has a 'complementary' metacommunication relationship in this context it is a feature of her total style - this must remain an empirical question. The attempt here is to start with this level of analysis and locate patterns due to structural factors in her interchanges with her child. To some extent this must be considered to be successful - as the discussion of the behavioural constraints in sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 indicate. Thus the theory of framing as outlined here has the possibilities of being able to unite structural and interactional
levels of analysis; especially if the mother's metacommunicative relationship with her child and maternal style, can be related to the mother's social class related philosophy and attitudes to child rearing (Cook 1973). This will be considered in the next chapter where the theory of framing is developed and applied to social class differences. It must be re-stated here that this is only an outline of a theory of framing and as such must be seen to be a first attempt at a grounded substantive theory of framing, to be supplemented by the data to be considered in the next chapter and also further research work.

However, to return to the discussion of this chapter it is considered that in the discussion of complementary and symmetrical metacommunication the dimension 'time' is important. In complementary metacommunication, and strong framing, time is essentially the mother's time as she constructs and therefore paces the child's activity according to her own preconceptions. Also, of course, the chunking of the child's activity referred to in section 4.4.5 is more evident in a complementary metacommunication which may have a definite end point. In symmetrical metacommunication the child himself or herself is able to control and therefore pace his or her own activity; time is the child's own time, he or she is allowed to take as much time or as little time as he or she wants.

Following on from this is a matter of some importance in that in this chapter so far, 'frame' and 'framing' have been used interchangeably which in some instances has led to a lack of clarity. For example in the discussion of sequential constraint in section 4.4.5, in the discussion of the 'end' of the mother's framing, there is some conceptual difficulty arising from the use of words. In complementary metacommunication no difficulty arose in that there seems to be a definite 'end point' to the frame, and the frame therefore could be considered to be unitary. However, this may be misleading in that in considering symmetrical metacommunication it is more a process of framing that is implied; the mother's framing is
flexible and fluid as the mother elaborates a framing around the child's interests. That is, it ideally would be a continuous process with little in the way of definite end points. Here, in the consideration of 'frames' or 'framing' it might be a small leap from here to a consideration of cognitive styles. If discrete frames are internalised by a child as opposed to a process of framing then it might be reasonable to expect their 'cognitive styles' to be different.

Whether discernable frames follow each other or the frames merge into each other in a process of framing is, in considering symmetrical metacommunication at least, a question that may have to be returned to in other studies. But here, to illustrate the general process of framing that is considered to be characteristic of symmetrical metacommunication, one last illustration is included.

**Sequence 4.21**

Stewart (C.) reaches forward and pushes shape into hole looks at the ball

"that's right" said softly

Mother (M.) looks across into C's face 'you got them all dun?'

said with a head shake reaches forward and rolls the ball around, then takes hand away, glancing across into C's face

/re.../ /ka.../ /get.../ /get.../ /get.../ /get.../

(13) This is probably too extreme a statement, more applicable to play sequences as illustrated in this chapter perhaps. As mentioned earlier the mother will undoubtedly rule as illegitimate some of the child's interests in some situations.
moves back
watches M.
/ nursewuef...von /

reaches across for the ball -
but the ball rolls past C
laughs
retrieves ball, puts between feet
/jæt...kɪæt/ tries to kick it, rolls it away a bit, then kicks the ball back to M

watches ball
moves foot forward to ball - kicks it back

Videotape Recording Ends

Commentary

The point of interest in this illustration is as follows. The mother empties the shapes out of the ball and rolls it back to the child so that he can continue putting the shapes into the ball, if he wants. Note here the complete absence of constraint or attempt at construction of the child's activity. The ball rolls past the child as he reaches forward. He retrieves the ball, puts it between his feet and manages to kick it back to the mother. The mother, noting the child's attempts to kick the ball while sitting down, comments, 'You can't kick it when you are sitting down can you?!' and by tapping the ball back to the child she participates in the child's activity - continuing her framing as a process from the last set of activities. She makes no attempt to restrain the child or impose her framing onto the child, she offers a framing involving her definition of the situation and the child's role within it. She encourages the child 'can you stand up and kick it?'. The child watches the ball as the mother taps it closer to him, indicating her expectation of his behaviour in the 'new' frame.
Thus this discussion has indicated that the process of 'framing' is continuous from situation to situation as something that mothers (all mothers) do; but within this are more specific frames with boundaries more or less strong. The less strong the boundaries, the more the 'flowing' nature of the framing, the more it is a process. Each frame, however, must have its own norms or rules of behaviour that are characteristic of it and may or may not be carried over to the new frame.

Finally in this chapter, Table 4.2 is a summary of the 'key features' of the mother's metacommunication relationship with her child as discussed in this chapter.
Table 4.2  Summary of the key features of the mother metacommunicative and content dimensions of framing

Key features of the analysis of the metacommunicative dimension are:

1. If:
   (I) Mother frames situation from start   all features of
   (II) Allows the child little discretion to strong framing
        renegotiate roles
   (III) Does not allow child to terminate frame
   Then: COMPLEMENTARY METACOMMUNICATION

2. If:
   (I) Child is not forced to accept the mother's all features
       framing of weak
   (II) Mother allows child considerable freedom to framing
        renegotiate roles
   (III) Infringement of boundaries does not bring sanctions, as the child's motivation and readiness are centred on
   Then: SYMMETRICAL METACOMMUNICATION

Key features of the analysis of the content of the framing are:

(1) The framed intersubjectivity - controlled by the mother

(II) Behavioural constraints

   Use of eye contact, eye movement and redirecting eye gaze
   Gestures and delicate hand movements
   Proxemics and body movement
   Language - delicate locatives
   Nonverbal markers of significance
   Physical restraints

(III) Sequential constraints

   Strong and weak framing call out different patterns in the use of these constraints

These features will be used, and developed further in the analysis of the social class differences in the framing of interchanges between mothers and their infants that follows in chapter 5.
Chapter 5  Social class differences in the framing of interchanges between mothers and their infants - the development and application of a theory of framing

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Working class mother - child pairs
   5.2.1 Alice
   5.2.2 James
   5.2.3 Leslie
   5.2.4 Discussion and summary

5.3 Middle class mother - child pairs
   5.3.1 Sally
   5.3.2 Stewart
   5.3.3 Geoffrey
   5.3.4 Discussion and Summary

5.4 Upper class mother - child pairs
   5.4.1 Giles
   5.4.2 Emma
   5.4.3 Charlotte
   5.4.4 Julian
   5.4.5 Discussion and Summary

5.5 Discussion and Summary
   5.5.1 Overall pattern of social class differences in the framing of interchanges
   5.5.2 The development of a grounded formal theory of framing
5.1 Introduction

The analysis presented in chapter 4 involved a tentative outline of a theory of framing and used data from various mother-child pairs to illustrate aspects of this. In this chapter, the data from the ten mother-child pairs is considered in detail in relation to; firstly, their social class designation, and secondly; the application and development of the theory outlined in chapter 4. In considering each individual mother-child pair, an attempt will be made to characterise the type of metacommunication between mother and child in each instance in terms of the discussion in chapter 4 of complementary and symmetrical patterns of communication and metacommunication. The overall pattern of framing, according to social class, will be considered in section 5.5. The three working class mother-child pairs are considered in section 5.3. The four upper class mother-child pairs\(^{(1)}\) are considered in section 5.4. The complete data for each mother-child pair can be found in the Appendix.

5.2 Working class mother-child pairs

5.2.1 Alice

A large part of the data for this mother-child pair has already been presented in chapter 4. These data sequences, along with the one sequence discussed in this section (sequence 5.1), constitutes the total data for this mother-child pair. Sequences 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 in section 4.3.2 of chapter 4 are illustrations drawn from this mother-child pair data used in the discussion of the metacommunicative dimension of framing, in particular complementary metacommunication. Also, sequences 4.11 and 4.13 in section 4.4 of chapter 4, are examples drawn from this data to illustrate features of the content dimension of the mothers framing. Commentaries on this data can be found in these sections; here the data will be summarised only.

The data suggests a complementary metacommunication between the

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\(^{(1)}\) Only one of the data sequences involve mother-child pairs; the remainder involve nanny-child interaction. The reader is referred to section 3.3.3 of chapter 3 for a discussion of this.
mother and child, and strongly offered framing by the mother. All four of the criteria of complementary metacommunication apply:

(i) The mother defines the situation for the child from the start as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful' conclusion - and here 'success' is defined in the mother's own terms.

(ii) The mother allows the child little discretion to re-negotiate roles within her strongly offered framing; she imposes on the child a passive role, defining the situation for the child by constructing the child's activity from its elements.

(iii) The mother does not allow the child to terminate the strongly offered framing without attempts to constrain the child and re-impose her authority and her definition and expectations of the situation.

(iv) By her meta comments, the mother places the child in a subordinate position in relation to herself.

It was suggested in section 4.3.3 of chapter 4, that these criteria have been adequately met and it is concluded that a complementary metacommunicative relationship is a feature of this mother's style of interacting with her child. The mother strongly frames the interaction for the child from the start; she gives the child the ball and the shapes, moves the ball around to 'simplify' the task for the child and constructs the child's activity around the 'correct' completion of the game. The 'correct' completion of the game is the putting of all of the shapes through their holes - rather than, for example, expanding the child's interest in and understanding of the geometry of the shapes. The mother actively constructs the situation for the child, tapping the 'correct' hole, picking up a dropped shape and offering it to the child, and jostling the child's hand to get her attention. The child is constrained to adopt a passive role with the only
movement allowed being the carefully channelled one of pushing the shape into the 'correct' hole, (where the mother has already located the correct hole and the correct orientation of the shape). The mother's expectations of the child's behaviour predominate; her expectations concern the child demonstrating how competent she is at the 'correct' completion of the task and also, following this, how competent she is as a mother-teacher - all perhaps for the benefit of a high status university researcher. (2)

During the development of the frame, the child tends to lose interest in what is essentially the mother's play expectations. She accepts to some extent the passive role the mother has framed for her, watching on a couple of occasions and waiting for the mother to stop her activity before moving a shape forward. Once, however, she makes some attempt to negotiate a greater degree of freedom - although she still appears to be motivated within the mother's framing - she is 'forced' into a challenge of the mother's strongly offered framing. The frame ends as the mother, having perceived a challenge to her authority, attempts to re-assert it, causing the child to reject the situation and end the frame by moving away. The mother's framing is very strongly offered and once the child begins to challenge this, the progression from gestures, delicate hand movements, verbal imperatives to nonverbal markers of significance, to physical restraint on the child's activity (as discussed in section 4.4.4 of chapter 4) are all demonstrated through the data sequences 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6.

No negotiations take place throughout the interchanges here, the mother's strongly offered framing of the situation leads to the imposition of her framing whether the child is motivated within the framing or not.

(2) It must be noted that this sequence of mother-child discourse was recorded on the first visit of the observer to the home, and this undoubtedly would have affected the mother's behaviour as she searched for meaning and pattern in the observer's behaviour with the camera.
The child is reduced to a semi-passive role; the end-point of the game is designated by the mother and also the means to that end are selected and enforced by the mother. During the mother-child discourse only one of the child's utterances is built onto and incorporated into the stream of verbal communication between mother and child. In sequence 4.1, in section 4.3.2 of chapter 4, /ænə/ was replied to by the mother with 'No .... in there in that one' thus demonstrating the mother's concentration on the child's actions rather than vocalisation(3).

The following illustration is offered as an example of some of the above points. This section of video tape transcript has not been presented in chapter 4, and is the only remaining sequence of data from this mother-child pair. With it all of the 'Alice' data has been presented and discussed.

Sequence 5.1

Alice (C)                                             Mother (M)

moves shape forward to a hole in
the ball, manipulates shape in
the hole /tænə/

looks up at M.

meets the child's gaze in eye contact
- looking down at C, moving head
forward in an 'effort to understand'
'what?'

looks down at hole

locks down, offers shape to hole
again /po:nəm/

but it right ... look

watches

takes shape from C, turns it round
in her hand, puts shape to hole
in orientation, partly in hole
Glances at C

'Ey Ar'

reaches forward and pushes shape
home

'Put it in then'

looking across into C's face, with
a head nod on 'p'it'.

'Thats it'

(3) The child in fact uttered on 6 'words' in the total sequence. Consequently much of the interchange between mother and child took place nonverbally and would therefore have been inaccessible to a tape recorded sampling method. This demonstrates the usefulness of videotape recordings in this research tradition.
Commentary

This sequence is an example of how this mother strongly frames the interaction for the child. Instead of responding to the child's vocalisations, the mother here responds to the child's actions, indicating her orientation to the 'correct' completion of the task, and actively constructing the situation for the child towards that end. She, for example, offers the instruction 'put it right ... look', deciding after the first part of the utterance to intervene physically. 'Look' is a command to the child, pushing the child into a passive role, that of watching, as the mother takes the shape from the child. She turns it around and puts it to the 'correct' hole in the 'correct' orientation. She then invites the child to finish off the operation by glancing across at the child with the vocalisation 'Ey Ar'. This is followed up with the more precise instruction 'put it in then', said while looking across into the child's face to monitor the child intentions and to 'cue in' the child's response, 'forcing' the child to respond. The child complies with the mother's expectations, she reaches forward and pushes the shape home. The mother then rewards the child with a brief 'that it', a reward in terms of the task, rather than, for example in terms of the child's personal skills and attributes which might be conveyed by an alternative utterance such as 'Clever Girl!'

As suggested above, this illustration is also of interest in that the mother does not expand upon or incorporate the child's two utterances or use them in conversation. As the child offers a shape to the hole on top of the ball and it does not fit, she vocalises /[u] said angrily. She looks up at the mother, for assistance. The mother receives the child's initiation of eye contact by moving her head forward to the child and asking 'what?' said crossly. Here the mother does not expand on the child's vocalisation as a request or comment associated with the situation, such as 'won't fit?'. She instead replies with a question, a request for clarification. It is unlikely that the child would understand such a verbal request although the mother's head lowering to the child and the nonverbal cues associated with an 'effort
to understand' (a questioning, earnest look into the face, with eyebrows raised and head moved slightly to present an ear to the speaker,) may have been communicated to the child. More likely, however, the cross tone of the mother's voice is communicated to the child. The mother terminates this exchange by redirecting the child's attention back down to the ball and shapes. As the child offers the shape to hole again the child vocalises /əm/. Again the vocalisation is not commented upon by the mother or used in conversation.

Thus, the mother strongly frames the situation for the child. She takes the child's shape, re-orientes it and puts it to the 'correct' hole, constructing the situation for the child around the 'correct' completion of the task. The child is reduced to a passive role, being allowed only the carefully channelled act of pushing the shape into the hole to achieve a 'success'. The mother's expectations here predominate. It is she who controls the end to which the interaction is directed and carefully constructs the child's activity to achieve that end.

Summary and Conclusion

Much of the data of this mother - child pair has been presented in chapter 4, in the discussion of complementary metacommunication in section 4.3.2, and also in the discussion of the 'typical' content dimension of complementary metacommunication in section 4.4. Here the conclusion is summarised only; the data suggests a complementary metacommunication between the mother and child, and strongly offered framing by the mother. All four of the criteria of complementary metacommunication apply. It was suggested that the mother, in offering a strong framing of the situation, imposes this onto the child. The child is reduced to a passive role; the end of the game is designated by the mother and also the means to that end are selected and enforced by the mother.
5.2.2 James

Some of the data from this mother-child pair has appeared in chapter 4, section 4.4.3 to illustrate aspects of 'behavioural constraint'. The termination of the mother's framing and the accompanying marking for the child that he has accomplished something significant is discussed in sequence 4.16 and the following commentary. The data sequences considered in this section are selected as being typical of this mother-child pair.

The evidence here suggests strongly offered framing by the mother and complementary metacommunication between the mother and the child. The three relevant criteria are as follows:

(1) The mother defines the situation for the child from the start as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful' conclusion - and 'success' is defined in the mother's terms.

(11) The mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within her strongly offered framing; she imposes on the child a passive role, defining the situation for the child by constructing the child's activity from its elements.

(III) The mother does not allow the child to terminate the framing without attempts to constrain the child and re-impose her authority and her definition and expectations of the situation.

As regards the other criterion, criterion (iv) of the criteria of complementary metacommunication laid down in section 4.3.3 of chapter 4: 'By her metacomments the mother places the child in a subordinate position in relation to the mother', there does not appear to be any metacommments in this data that the mother makes, that may place the child in such a position. This will be returned to in section 5.2.4. Also here, as regards criterion (11), and the mother imposing a passive role onto the child, the child in this data adopts a subordinate position allowing the mother (or it could be argued, often forcing, the mother) to adopt a dominant position. This, it is considered, is an aspect of the intersubjective understanding between the mother and child, as a result of past interchanges.
To turn to the data, in this sequence of mother - child discourse, the mother sets up the framing and directs the child to comply. She does not allow the child any choice other than to accept her strongly offered framing.

**Sequence 5.2**

James and his mother are sitting on the living room floor, facing each other. The mother has just put the ball and shapes in front of the child. Child age: 15 months, 3 weeks.

**Videotape Recording Begins**

*James (C.)*

C picks up a shape .... hesitates then .... looks up and across at N

/jɛːj/ looks down at ball following N's point

offers shape to a hole

*Mother (M.)*

receives C's eye contact with 'in there' pointing down to a hole

'Will you try and put it in there then, for mummy please?'

looks behind her, reaches behind her into box

Commentary

The mother initiates the framing by providing the child with the ball and the shapes. The child picks up the shape and looks across at the mother. The child here displays his expectation of his and the mother's role in the activity - by picking up a shape, hesitating and looking up at the mother. The mother receives the eye contact and takes the opportunity to direct the child's activity, by providing the verbal instruction 'in there' accompanied by a delicate gesture. Thus the mother assumes the child is motivated and ready to take part in the game. By her instruction she directs the child's activity and at the same time creates the expectation that the child's activity will follow. She goes on to expand her utterance with the instruction 'will you try and put it in there then, for mummy please?'; an instruction phrased as a question but not allowing the child the freedom to answer as he chooses. The child's vocalisation of /iːɛːʃ/ is not
commented upon or expanded by the mother, or incorporated in any way into
the interaction. The question the mother asks could be considered to be
above the level of the child's present competence to understand, but aspects
of the statement and the associated context may serve to 'cue in' some
previously established framing shared by mother and child.

Thus, the child is propelled into the mother's strongly offered framing
with a clearly specified role determined by the mother's division of labour.
The mother tries to locate the shapes she knows the child can do, she moves
the ball around so that the 'correct' hole is always on top of the ball
and all sources of possible confusion for the child are eliminated. The
task for the child becomes predominantly manipulative. This is illustrated
in the following, where the mother removes the 'wrong' shape from the
child's hands and constructs the successful activity for the child out its
basic components, and by rewarding appropriate actions. This illustration
is fairly lengthy, but it does illustrate a number of these points.

Sequence 5.3

James (C.)

'**try that one ..... try that one
...) In there'" reaches forward and touches the shape C
holds

looks down at shape he is holding

then touches the✓ hole, then again
touches shape
'that one' with a small push — then
touching hole .... 'In there' said
with a look into C's face, moving head
lower to look into C's face more

'Good Boy!'"

Mother (M.)

looks up and across at C
'oooh ... that's it!' then looks down
to floor.
'Good Boy!'"

moves shape to✓ hole

then touches the✓ hole, then again
touches shape
'that one' with a small push — then
touching hole .... 'In there' said
with a look into C's face, moving head
lower to look into C's face more

then touches the✓ hole, then again
touches shape
'that one' with a small push — then
touching hole .... 'In there' said
with a look into C's face, moving head
lower to look into C's face more

'Good Boy!'"

pushes shape home with a clatter

'Good Boy!'"

moves another shape to X hole

Moves ball around — 'Now then lots
have a look for .... take that away' said softly to C, pushing C's shape
away, moves ball round then looks on
floor

smiles waves arm /œkœ/
takes shape away, bangs shape against ball - offers shape to hole now on top of ball - does not fit; bangs shape against ball

/æ h/ draws back

takes shape M offers
puts to hole on top of ball, does not fit - manipulates - still does not fit looks up /æ 'dɔw/
lifts both arms, offers shape to H

looks down - breaks off eye contact then looks at shape. Moves hand to shape, then away as H moves shape to ball. Then bangs ball with palm of hand

/ɪh 'dɔw/

fingers hole in ball, putting fingers through hole

watches

reaches forward with palm outstretched to push home the shape - just too late as H lets go

/æ h /

'There's some missing' reaches for shape in C's hand holding another shape out to C

takes shape from C, offers C another, holding it between 2 fingers near C's hand 'try that one'

points to hole 'in there'

receives C's eye contact, looking down at C with head lowered slightly to C, and slightly on one side 'No?' shaking head

'Try again?' half taking the shape, then offering it back to C, then moving it to ball holds shape out for C

'Yes it does' holding onto centre rod of ball to steady it with one hand touches C's hand with other 'Let me show you' moves C's hand away; holds shape over hole re-orients it holding shape between 2 fingers, lets it drop into ball; '... in there ... like that'

'... in there ... like that'

reaches forward with palm outstretched to push home the shape - just too late as H lets go

/æ h /

Commentary

Features of this illustration that indicate the mother's strong framing are as follows. The mother, having framed the situation for the child and allocated the child a specified role within her framing, constructs the child's activity from its elements in accordance with her expectations of his behaviour and the 'correct' completion of the game. In the initial exchanges, the mother constructs the child's activity with the delictic
locative utterances and associated gestures, repeated when the child does not respond. On the second occasion she gives the child's shape a small push to reinforce her meaning. She not only glances into the child's face to 'cue in' his response but moves her head lower to look more directly into the child's face to ensure that the child is 'forced' into activity within her framing.

A related point here is that the mother depending upon her perception of the situation rewards the child's frame-related actions as well as individual 'successes'; she uses the utterance 'Good Boy!' for example to reward the movement of the shape to the ball after she has 'forced' the child into activity as described above. The mother, therefore, rewards the child as he demonstrates his willingness to complete the task on the mother's terms.

The mother not only rewards and constructs the child's frame-related activities and demonstrates her orientation to the child's 'correct' completion of the task by looking for the shapes that the child 'can do', she also directly physically intervenes in the child's activity to disqualify any of the child's activities that hamper the achievement of this end. This happens three times in this illustration:

(1) After the first 'success' has been achieved, the child moves another shape he holds to a 'wrong' hole in the ball. The mother, as the child moves the shape forward, looks down to the ball and then moves the ball around to locate the 'correct' hole for a shape, vocalising her intentions: 'Now then, let's have a look for ....'. She then pushes the child's shape away, softening this rejection.

(4) Perhaps to impress the observer with the child's competence.

(5) The shape the mother has in mind here is not the child's shape in that after pushing the child's shape and hand away, she looks down onto the floor for another shape.
with the utterance 'take that away', said softly to the child. She
then moves the ball around and then looks onto the floor. Thus the
mother indicates that the child has gone further than his allocated
role, and she is prepared to use physical sanctions to control his
activity.

(II) After looking down onto the floor, for a specific shape as indicated
by her vocalisation 'there's some missing', the mother reaches for a
shape in the child's hand. She takes it away from the child, despite
the child's resistance, while holding out another shape more preferrable
to her, to the child.

(III) While trying to encourage the child into frame-related activity in
the exchanges of the illustration, the mother firstly holds onto the
centre rod of the ball to stop the child who is fingerling it from
moving the ball away. Secondly she directly intervenes to move the
child's hand away from the ball so that she can put a shape to a
'correct' hole - with the accompanying utterance 'let me show you'.

Thus the mother uses the most 'forceful' of the behavioural constraints on
the child's activity to enforce her framing. The mother in this data
sequence has selected the end point of the framing and intervenes physically
in the child's activity to ensure that she controls the means to that end
point. She assumes, in the second of the above instances, that she has the
right to take a shape away from the child even against the child's wishes.
Consequently the child seems to be learning that not only does there exist
a complementary metacommunicative relationship between himself and the mother,
but also the mother will use force to maintain this when the child does not
behave in accordance with the mother's expectations.

Finally, to summarise here, the mother's strong framing is evident, her
language and actions are closely related to the child's 'successful'
completion of the task. The mother does not allow her ground rules to come
up for negotiation, she assumes that they are set and accepted by both
participants and therefore not negotiable. The mother controls the end point
of the framing therefore, and the means to that end.

Initially, within the mother's framing, the child is happy to comply with the mother's definition of the situation and his role within it, but he does seem to have his own interests to pursue concerning the making of noises, or in movements or other parameters associated with noises, which he asserts intermittently as the mother releases temporarily her control of his activity. The above illustration contains two examples of the child pursuing his interest in noises, or the movements resulting in noises. In the following sequence the child picks up the ball and shakes it to make an interesting noise, resulting in the immediate re-imposition of the mother's authority.

**Sequence 5.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>James (C.)</th>
<th>Mother (M.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>reaches forward, picks up the ball, and shakes it</td>
<td>points to a spot infront of her - looking at the child, with a head movement slightly forward and ending abruptly, and eyebrows raised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>looks up at mother, meets M in eye contact</td>
<td>'put it back please'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>looks down</td>
<td>reaches across, brings the ball back, turns it over and offers C a shape from those on the floor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>looks to right at the ball</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Commentary**

The child in the above sequence attempts to assert his own interests, revolving around the making of noises. The mother, however, refuses to allow this. She points to the place infront of her and looks into the child's face with an abrupt head movement forward and eyebrows raised nonverbal cues that could be seen to indicate 'threat'. Thus the mother indicates that she expects the ball to be put back where it was so that her framing can continue. She also hints at the possible consequences of the child persisting. As the child looks up the mother expresses her wishes
verbally, with the imperative utterance 'put it back please'. When the child does not immediately do so the mother, again, intervenes directly and brings the ball back so that the game can continue on her terms. Thus again she indicates her willingness to use force to control the child's activity when the child transgresses her framing boundaries. Thus, with strongly framed complementary meta-communication relationships, the frame is defined by the mother alone, the child can only accept it. Overall, the child's attempts to pursue his own interests are countered by the mother with the re-imposition of her authority. In some instances, of course, the mother is able to redirect the child's activity back into her framing fairly easily, by redirecting the child's attention and constructing his activity as in data sequence 5.3. This is aided by the child's apparent interest in some aspects of the game. Generally, however, the imposition of the framing maintained by the mother gets harder to continue as the frame progresses and the child's restlessness increases. The mother persists with her framing until the 'correct' completion of the task is reached\(^6\) and all of the shapes have been successfully slotted into their holes by the child. At this point the mother's framing of the situation for the child is also ended. The child is free to commence other activity. The social marking of the child's completion of the task, and the mother's redirection of the observer's attention back to this is discussed in chapter 4, section 4.4.2, sequence 4.16 and the accompanying commentary.

**Summary and Conclusion**

The mother strongly offers a framing of the situation for the child, her expectations of the end result of the child's activity concern the 'correct'

\(^6\) A major factor here may be the presence of the observer and camera in that the mother may perceive the observer's apparent framing here - starting the camera at the initiation of the ball and shapes game - and continuing. Therefore the mother takes her cue from the pattern in the observer's behaviour and provides the observer with data by persisting with her framing of the situation for the child when otherwise she might terminate it. This might also account for her redirecting the observer's attention back to the completion of the game as illustrated in data sequence 4.16 in section 4.4.2 of chapter 4.
completion of the ball and shapes game, and she carefully controls the child's activity to reach that end. The mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within her framing or to renegotiate the mother's framing of the total situation. The mother and child do not jointly negotiate to construct a shared framing, the mother imposes her framing onto the child. The mother uses her power and authority to re-assert her domination over the child and her expectations of his behaviour. The mother sees direct physical intervention and the use of force as a legitimate means of controlling the child's activity.

To conclude, the evidence suggests strongly offered framing by the mother, and a complementary metacommunication between mother and child maintained by force when the child does not behave in accordance with the mother's expectations. Three of the four criteria of complementary metacommunication apply; criteria (iv) 'the mother, by her metacommments places the child in a subordinate position' was not seen to be relevant. It was suggested that the mother, in offering a strong framing of the situation imposes this onto the child. The end point of the game is designated by the mother, and the means to that end are selected and enforced by her.

5.2.3 Leslie

The data here suggests evidence for characterising the mother–child metacommunication as complementary. The mother strongly offers a framing of the situation for the child, but the game is in this case not the 'ball and shapes' game, but a 'construction' game with wooden blocks. This involves more scope for negotiation between the mother and child in that the nature of the game does not call out specific ways of playing with the toy, as does the 'ball and shapes'. The three following criteria are relevant; but it is expected that some amendment of these might be necessary because of the slightly changed nature of the situation. This will be considered in section 5.2.4.
(I) The mother defines the situation for the child from the start as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful' conclusion, and here 'success' is defined in the mother's terms.

(II) The mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within her strongly offered framing; she imposes on the child a passive role, defining the situation for the child by constructing the child's activity from its elements.

(III) The mother does not allow the child to terminate the strongly offered framing without attempts to constrain the child and re-impose her authority and her definition and expectations of the situation.

As regards criterion (iv) of the criterion of complementary metacommunication laid down in section 4.3.3: 'By her metacommments the mother places the child in a subordinate position in relation to the mother', there do not appear to be any occurrences of this in this data.

The following data sequences are selected as being typical of this mother - child pair. The mother initially offers a strong framing of the situation for the child. She constructs the child's activity within her framing, allowing the child little discretion to renegotiate roles. The mother defines the means to the end she has selected for the child's behaviour. In the following illustration the mother typically, controls the interchange and strongly offers a framing of the situation for the child. This sequence also indicates the typical use of behavioural constraints, as discussed in section 4.4.4 of chapter 4, to encourage the child into activity within her framing. In this data sequence the mother sits throughout on a settee above the child, who is playing on the floor in front of her. Child age is 19 months 0 weeks.

Sequence 5.5

Leslie (C.)  
Mother (M.)

'put that car in there .... then'  
glances across into CS face

manipulates car, looking down  
'you puttin that one in there?'
reaches down infront of C and touches the car he is holding - then points to 'garage.'
'put that one in there then .... now put that in there ...'
reaches down and touches the car again and points to 'garage'. Looks down and across into C's face with head moved lower

manipulates car, pushes it forward to garage /æːh/ 'That's it .... now that'll go in there...'

Commentary
The mother in this illustration enforces her strong framing with the following sequence of behavioural constraints. She firstly invites the child to 'put that car in there, then' creating the expectation of the child's behaviour by verbal means, accompanied by a glance into the child's face to monitor his intentions and 'cue in' his activity. The mother's deictic utterance is not on this occasion backed up with deictic gestures. She relies upon the intersubjectivity of the past history of the interchange to convey to the child what she expects the child to do. She is here just encouraging the child into activity. The child however, manipulates the toy car on the floor, looking down at it. The mother then steps up her enforcement of her framing. She asks 'You puttin that one in there?' and reaches down infront of the child to touch the car on 'that' and constructs the child's activity by showing him exactly what he has to do by pointing to the 'garage' on 'there?'. Thus the mother is slowly increasing the 'power' of the behavioural constraint on the child's activity. The question here is rhetorical; the illocutionary force of the utterance is one of a command. The mother then, perceiving the child's indifference and lack of response continues with an utterance, dropping the question form and making the command clear, especially with the word 'now' in the second half of her utterance: 'put that one in there then ...... now put
that in there'. She again touches the car and points to the garage, and to
again emphasise her point and increase the 'power' of the behavioural constraint
further, she lowers her head and looks down and across into the child's face,
to 'cue in' the child's activity. The child then complies with the mother's
expectations of his behaviour, he pushes the car forward to the 'garage'.

As the framing proceeds, with the child encouraged into activity within
the mother's 'car-garage' frame(7), the child puts a block to the top of the
'garage' but it falls off. This gives the child the idea of a 'tower building
and pushing over' game, and he pushes the 'garage' over. The sequence of
events is as follows:

Sequence 5.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leslie (C.)</th>
<th>Mother (M.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>puts block on top of 'garage';</td>
<td>Reaches for another block from those</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>it falls off and clatters to the floor</td>
<td>on the floor, gives it to C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/brum'brum/</td>
<td>'hoops!' puts another block down on top</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>looks at the block, then swipes at the 'garage'. It falls over</td>
<td>of the 'garage' in front of C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>looks up at M.</td>
<td>moves back to an upright posture,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>looks down at blocks on floor</td>
<td>receiving the eye contact, smiles,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>watches</td>
<td>'oh dear!'. Locks down onto floor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| watches - bends head down to look under settees | 'where have they gone?'
| /dʌm/                          | reaches forward and down to the floor     |
|                                | in front of the C.                       |
|                                | 'build it up again' puts one block onto another as the start of a 'tower'. |
| lifts head - looks across to what M is doing | 'Don't you want to build it up' looking across into C's face - at the same time puts another block to the new 'tower', then reaches across in front of C for the next block |
| /əʊoʊ /                        | 'woops', knocks block off accidentally - puts it back |
|                                | 'put that block up on there' holds block out to C, looking into C's face |

(7) The mother does in fact supply this 'frame label' of 'building a garage'
for her and the child's joint activity.
looks at tower and the shape, reaches forward /æ t æ ə r / takes shape, puts onto tower

'another wun'
holds another block out to C, looking into C's face

Commentary

Of interest here is that the mother does not attempt to re-impose her framing by re-asserting her authority over the child once she perceives her framing is being challenged and her definition of the situation has not been accepted by the child. The child, having been encouraged into activity in the 'car-garage' frame initiated and controlled by the mother, gets the idea of pushing the 'garage' over. He treats it as a 'tower' and therefore initiates a new framing of the situation. The child at this point looks up and across at the mother, to mark his own achievement of doing something significant (as a result of past markings of significance by the mother associated with the child intentionally knocking over the 'tower'). At this point the mother moves her posture back into an upright position and receives the child's eye contact, vocalising 'oh dear!'. Thus, by her change of posture, the mother signals the end of her 'car-garage' frame. However, she continues framing the child's activity by regaining the control of the here-and-now, looking down onto the floor, thereby guiding the child's attention back to the blocks and initiating a new task for the child of 'building it up again'.

The mother then proceeds to build up a 'tower' from the blocks while the child watches. Thus although her framing of the total situation for the child is strongly offered, in this instance the mother does not immediately 'force' the child into frame-related activity. She begins to build the 'tower' herself to indicate, perhaps, to the child her expectations of his activity and her willingness to accept the new
proposals for their joint activity. By accepting them she bestows legitimacy upon them, she regains control by giving them her seal of approval. The mother's strong framing is indicated clearly however as she disqualifies the child's interest in the underneath of the settee as being 'illegitimate'. Her vocalisation to attract the child's attention 'Don't you want to build it up' contains the assumption that the child should want to build it up in line with her expectations for the child's behaviour. To redirect the child's attention, the mother also looks across into the child's face to 'cue in' his activity and then reaches across for a block infront of the child. Finally, having gained the child's attention she begins to construct the child's activity with the instruction 'put that block up on there' holding a block out to the child and looking into the child's face to monitor his intentions and 'cue in' his activity. The child takes the block and puts it to the 'tower' - indicating his acceptance of the mother's new framing and her expectations of his behaviour.

The mother here does not immediately 'chastise' the child for frame breaking activity. She does not attempt to reimpose her authority once her framing has been challenged and her definition of the situation has not been accepted by the child. However, the mother's strongly offered framing is still evident in that she (temporarily) jestlsons the 'car-garage' frame to move onto a 'tower building and knocking over' frame, but in each case she controls the child's activity to the end she has determined and legitimated.

Once the child has been initiated into the new activity and is perceived by the mother to be operating in terms of her assumptions, as to the end point of the game, the construction of a tower, she tries to get the child to take the role of the agent and complete the tower building by himself(8).

(8) The presence of the observer could be a factor here in that the mother could be attempting to 'show off' the competence of the child.
Within her framing of the total situation the mother tries to expand the child's role\(^{(9)}\); she encourages the child to take over the means to the end she has framed. She encourages the child to practice his skill at tower building. The child, however, wants the mother to continue building the tower so that he can knock it over. The mother uses the opportunity, having failed to make the child take over the role of agent, to construct a 'garage' type structure with the bricks. Perhaps here she reverts to her original framing. Thus she treats the child's initiation of the 'tower building' game as an interlude only, with which she is happy to go along with until the opportunity arises to re-assert her expectations and framing in terms of how she originally framed the situation for the child. This is illustrated as follows.

**Sequence 5.7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leslie (C.)</th>
<th>Mother (M.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>moves hand forward and pushes the tower over</td>
<td>'wooh!'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>laughs, looks up at M</td>
<td>meets the eye contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>still looking up, reaches up to M</td>
<td>'you build it up this time',</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>looks across, pulls at her skirt, glances down</td>
<td>with a head nod on 'you' for added emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pulls at M's skirt - looks up at M</td>
<td>'You build it up'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/mʌmʃ/</td>
<td>receiving the eye contact - with a head nod on 'you'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/mʌmʃ/</td>
<td>'Hummy what?'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pulling himself closer to M</td>
<td>head lowered slightly to C in an effort to understand. Looks down - reaches down to stop C pulling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>looks down</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{(9)}\) Note here the ambiguity in the theory between 'framing of the total situation' and 'framing of specific roles'. Both seem appropriate here, the mother does frame the total situation and frame a specific role for the child. This is returned to in section 5.5.
/ahm'gan/  'Hummy agen?.......'
looks down reaches forward and down
'...... oh dear!'
/picks up blocks
'You keep on knocking it down tho'.
Picks up more blocks.
Makes a 'garage'.
/kar'kar'kar/ reaches down on floor for a
car
'put the car in then .....' glances across into C's face, and
points to the car and then taps the
top of the 'garage'.
/pushes the car forward
'put the car in then'
/jæθθ'tæθ/ . . . . . .

Commentary

In this sequence the mother initially tries to encourage the child
to expand his role and expand his skill by taking on the tower building
activity himself. She does this by responding to the child's eye contact
with the utterance 'You build it up this time' repeated twice and with
head nod on the 'you' to make her meaning clear and give added emphasis
to her utterance, making it clear that she expects the child to build the
tower. The child however resists, he persists in his request that the
mother builds the tower that he can then push over. Of interest here is
that the mother at this point does not escalate proceedings further or risk
a confrontation with the child by imposing her authority more directly.
She instead suggests that she will desist in her requests if the child
asks 'properly' that she builds the tower, a sort of negotiated exchange.
She asks 'Hummy what?' with her head lowered slightly to the child in an
'effort to understand'. Here, perhaps, the mother has traded an image
of herself presented to the observer as 'a good child manager' for the
child demonstrating his linguistic competence. The child vocalises
/ahm'gan/ and the mother supplies the expansion of his utterance
'Hummy agen?'. Thus the mother's attempts to make the child take a more
active role has been traded for the child's verbalised request, cued in
by the mother.
The mother then commences to pick up the blocks - commentimg 'You keep knocking it down tho' which perhaps indicates her irritation with the 'tower building' game. Then she builds a 'garage' instead of a 'tower'. The child recognises this and exclaims /kar 'kar 'kar/. This is interpreted by the mother and utilised as behaviour relating to her new, or original, framing. She encourages the child into activity with her vocalisation of 'put the car in then', repeated twice. She glances across into the child's face to 'cue in' his activity and constructs his activity by pointing to the car and tapping the top of the garage, making her expectations of the child's behaviour clear. Thus she initiates the child into frame related activity and commences to structure it according to the desired end she has framed.

The above illustrations have been examples of the mother's controlling of the framing. She has definite plans for the child's behaviour, that the child is constrained to pursue. But also of interest in this data, is the child's behaviour in that he may not connect the 'car' with the 'blocks' and with the 'garage' game. The child may not have made this cognitive connection and may be able to play with the 'car' or with the 'blocks' but in different games. Cars do not go with blocks that build towers. The 'car and blocks - as - garage' framing is initiated by the mother not by the child. He changes the framing by forgetting the car and concentrating on the 'blocks - as - tower'. Overall the mother is very much interested in constructive purposeful activity that can be used to structure the child's interest and activity. 'Deviant' uses for different objects are not allowed, that is, the mother does not expand the child's perception of the uses of objects in this sense. This discussion is illustrated in the following where the child instead of putting the car, as directed by the mother, into the 'garage' puts it on top of the 'tower'. He uses the car as a building block. To the mother the car is a 'car - to - be - put - in - the - garage' and not to be used as a building block. She takes it off the 'tower' and
puts it into the 'garage' (10). Thus the child is restricted to what the mother sees as being the 'correct' use of objects.

Sequence 5.8

Leslie (C.) Mother (M.)

'put that car in then'

reaches forward and puts the car to the top of the tower 'put that one on the top?'

lets the car go - it almost falls off

reaches forward 'woops a daisy'

puts the car into the garage 'there we are'

Summary and Conclusion

In terms of the criteria of complementary metacommunication, the data suggests that the mother defines the situation for the child from the start as one where the child must conform to the 'correct' way of playing with the toys. 'Correct' is defined in the mother's terms. The mother's play expectations predominate, structuring and constructing the child's activity to the end she defines, although she does allow the child to terminate her framing of the 'car and blocks-as-garage' without immediate attempts to reimpose her authority. However, she does maintain a strongly offered framing of the situation and the child's role within it. There are, in this data, no metacommentary on the child's character. The data does suggest some amendments to the theory of framing. These will be discussed in the next section, section 5.2.4. The picture of the interchange that is built up is one of complementary metacommunication between mother and child, and strongly offered framing by the mother.

(10) The 'tower' is built by the mother with two 'feet' and then a single pillar; the 'garage' here is between the two 'feet'.
5.2.4 Discussion and Summary

The overall pattern is clear. All three of the working class mothers have a complementary metacommunicative relationship with their children. The first two of the mother-child pair data presented here, both of which involve the 'ball and shapes' game fit easily within the complementary metacommunication classification in relation to the criteria laid out in section 4.3.3 of chapter 4. In both of these cases the mother imposes her will onto the child and accepts no alternative, insisting on her framing of the situation for the child. Thus she controls the end point of the framing and the means to that end. An additional point of interest that arises in this data in relation to the theory of framing is the relevance of the fourth criterion of complementary metacommunication viz: 'By her metacommments the mother places the child in a subordinate position. The 'James' data did not contain any metacommments on the child's character, although this was noted in other observations on other occasions. Here it may be that the mother's framing although strongly offered, is not as strongly offered as in the 'Alice' data. James's mother to some extent negotiates with the child to maintain her strongly offered framing until the conclusion of the game is reached. As suggested in footnote (6) the presence of the observer could be an important factor here, in that it could be suggested that if it was not for this, the mother might not have continued her framing but would have allowed the child to pursue some other activity. The nature of the events at the end of the data sequence also provides some evidence for this interpretation. Following on from this, this mother may not feel that her definition of herself as a 'mother - teacher' has been disconfirmed. She may simply be providing the observer with data, so that any sort of metacommment is inappropriate. The situation, of course, must deteriorate considerably before metacommments of the sort discussed in section 4.3.2. of chapter 4 are made about the child's character. The mother must have some strongly held emotional reason for
her strongly offered framing and some attachment to the definition of herself offered. The child also must have some strongly held reason for rejecting the mother's framing. Then, the mother's 'strongly held emotional reason for her strongly offered framing' could become transferred to the child as a metacomment on the child's character.

No metacommnts on the child's character appear in the third mother-child pair data, but here the situation is complicated by the fact that the game is not the 'ball and shapes' game but a game involving building blocks. Although the game still involves negotiations between the mother and the child, here the nature of the game does not, as suggested in section 5.2.3, call out such specific ways of playing with the toy as does the 'ball and shapes'. It is suggested here that the criterion of symmetrical and complementary metacommunication are too restricted to the ball and shapes context and consequently they require some slight amendment in the light of the data presented in section 5.2.3. Firstly, as regards criterion (i) of complementary metacommunication: 'that the mother defines the situation for the child from the start as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful' conclusion - and here 'success' is defined in the mother's terms' it was suggested in section 5.2.3 that the mother also defines the 'correct' way of playing with the toys. Secondly it seem reasonable to supplement the main criterion of complementary metacommunication with a 'control of means and ends' dimension of strongly offered framing. in section 5.2.3 the discussion has moved in that direction, so that this needs to be formalised. The amended criteria, then, would be as follows:

Amended criteria (11) for complementary metacommunication

(11) The mother defines the situation for the child from the start as one

(11) These 'amended criteria' will be further amended in section 5.3.4. In the discussion of the data, however, the criterion that will be referred to in the first instance is that as outlined in chapter 4 section 4.3.3 - that is the original un-amended criterion of complementary metacommunication.
where the child is not competent to carry it out to a 'successful' or 'correct' conclusion—and here, 'success' or 'correct' is defined by the mother. The mother, in other words, controls and defines the 'end' to which the game or interchange framed by the mother is to be directed.

(i) The mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within her strongly offered framing; she imposes on the child a passive role, defining the situation for the child by constructing the child's activity within her framing. The mother, therefore, controls and defines the 'means' to the 'end' to which the mother's framing is directed.

(ii) The mother does not allow the child to terminate the framing without attempts to constrain the child, and re-impose her authority and her definition and expectations of the situation.

(iii) By her metacomments, where they occur, and by her behaviour, the mother places the child in a subordinate position.

Note here that the criterion (iv) involving 'metacomments' is included. Despite the reservations outlined above, it is felt that metacomments are important and do indicate the existence of the mother's framing. The criterion has been modified in acknowledgment of the above discussion. Also, finally, the addition of the 'control of means and ends' dimension, it is felt, may introduce greater applicability of the theory.

In summary, in relation to the social class theme, it is suggested that all three of the working class mother-child pairs have complementary metacommunication relationships.
5.3 Middle Class mother-child pairs

5.3.1 Sally

The complete data for this mother-child pair has already been presented in chapter 4. Sequences 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 in section 4.3.5 are illustrations drawn from this mother-child pair data in the discussion of symmetrical metacommunication. The data was presented there because of its usefulness as an example of symmetrical metacommunication. Consequently the reader is referred to that section for an analysis of the data in detail, here it will be very briefly summarised.

The data suggest a symmetrical metacommunication between the mother and child, as the interaction proceeds the picture that emerges is one of weak framing by the mother. All four of the criteria of symmetrical metacommunication apply:

(i) Although the mother offers a framing of the situation and the child's role initially, the child is not constrained to accept it. The child is allowed to choose to involve herself with the mother's suggested framing.

(ii) The mother allows the child considerable freedom to renegotiate roles within the framing offered. The mother's framing is demonstrated to be flexible, expanding to incorporate objects of the child's attention. She does not impose on the child her definition of what is 'correct' for the child to do.

(iii) There may be ultimate boundaries to the framing that has been accepted by the child, in that the framing of the situation for the child may not be infinitely flexible. Infringement of these boundaries by the child, when the mother chooses to maintain boundaries that is, does not necessarily bring some form of sanction.

(iv) Overall the child's motivation and readiness to engage in activity is focussed on by the mother and recognition is given to them as she allows negotiations to proceed with the child.

It was suggested in section 4.3.6 of chapter 4 that these criterion
have been adequately met and it is concluded that a symmetrical metacommunication relationship is a feature of this mother's style of interaction with her child. The mother here accepts that the child may have interests that can be seen to be legitimate and that may differ from her own. She does not impose her framing onto the child, she tries to anticipate and articulate a meaningful frame for the child's actions as they happen. The mother does not attempt to assert her power and authority to implement a strongly offered framing, when for example, her definition of herself as 'mother-as-teacher' has been disconfirmed by the child. Also, as mentioned in section 4.4.4, the more 'forceful' of the external behavioural constraints are not evident in this interaction sequence.

5.3.2 Stewart

Some of the data from this mother-child pair has appeared in chapter 4 to illustrate aspects of 'behavioural constraint' and 'framing as a process'. (sequences 4.18, 4.20 and 4.21). These, along with the sequences presented for discussion in this section are the total data for this mother-child pair.

The data here suggests evidence for a symmetrical metacommunication between the mother and child. As the interaction proceeds the picture that emerges is one of weak framing by the mother. All four of the criteria of symmetrical metacommunication apply:

(1) Although the mother frames the situation and the child's role within it initially, the child is not constrained to accept it. The child is allowed to choose to involve himself with the mother's suggested framing.

(2) The mother allows the child considerable freedom to renegotiate roles within the framing offered. The mother's framing is demonstrated to be flexible, expanding to incorporate objects of the child's attention. She does not impose on the child her definition of what is 'correct' for the child to do.
(iii) There are ultimate boundaries to the framing that has been accepted by the child, in that the framing of the situation for the child may not be infinitely flexible. Infringement of these boundaries by the child, when the mother chooses to maintain boundaries, that is, does not necessarily bring some form of sanction.

(iv) Overall, the child's motivation and readiness to engage in activity is focussed on by the mother and recognition given to them as she allows negotiation to proceed with the child.

The actual procedures the mother has adopted in setting up the framing, or indeed the child setting up the situation are unknown. In this instance they happened before the camera was switched on. Initially, the mother offers a framing of the situation, but does not 'force' the child into frame-related activity. Once the child does conform to the mother's expectations of his behaviour and is participating actively in her framing, the mother allows the child considerable freedom to determine his behaviour for himself, and control the nature and course of the interchange. The child can select alternative ends, and the means of achieving these. The encouraging of the child into activity is illustrated as follows. Once the child is acting in terms of her framing or, alternatively a jointly negotiated framing, the mother is happy to allow the child to continue his problem solving without close direction.

Sequence 5.9

The child is kneeling on the floor in front of the mother, who is sitting on the floor. They have the 'ball and shapes' game between them. Child age is 19 months 1 week.

Videotape Recording Begins

Stewart (C.)

looks up and across at M holding shape

receives eye contact

'"do that one?'

Mother (M.)

glances down at the shape C is holding
then at the ball
'where's the hole for that one?'
glares back across into the C's face

reaches forward and points to a
hole in the ball
/̪sɛnts/ then points to another hole in
the ball
/,...ɛnɡɜ/ looks up and across at N
/hmm/ moves shape forward holds
it next to ball looks at it, looks
at ball, moves ball around.
looks down at shape again
puts shape to a hole, presses it
in
/n'naːw/ looks at shape again
/daɪts 'dɑt$, 'dɑt$ /
puts it to another hole,
lifts it out and re-orientes it
puts it again to another hole

Commentary

Here the child looks up and across at the mother, holding a shape, perhaps indicating to her his interest in the ball and shapes game. This, however, is unable to be determined because of the camera being switched on at this point, the antecedents of the situation are not available for analysis.

The mother perceiving the child's interest, perhaps, asks for confirmation with the question 'do that one?' which puts the child's activity open for negotiation. The mother follows this up with the question 'where's the hole for that one' which assumes the child's motivation and creates an expectation of the child's behaviour. The question here also could be taken over by the child and used to structure his activity - establishing intermediate goals for his own activity. The mother follows up the verbal utterance with a glance down at the shape the child is holding, which redirects the child's attention to the task. She then glances back into the child's face to 'cue in' his activity and monitor his intentions. Thus the child is allowed to choose to involve himself within the mother's suggested framing. The mother does not impose her authority on the child
to control his activity, although in this data sequence the child has taken over the mother's framing and made it his own.

Also of interest in this example is the child's use of deictic locative utterances to control his own activity within the framing. (12) A feature of this sequence is that, after perceiving that the child has made the frame his own, the mother only rarely intervenes. Even when the child is obviously having difficulty, she lets the child take an active role in the problem solving and discover the answer for himself. Thus her framing could be considered to be 'latent' in that the child controls his own activity as a result of past intersubjective framings. An example of this is the following illustration where the child is allowed to try several holes and may be on the point of being distracted by the camera before the mother intervenes:

Sequence 5.10

Stewart (C.)  Mother (H.)

looks down to left, picks up shape /shuwwuw/  reaches across, 'that's right!'
puts shape to hole /wɪdɪnɪsdom/  moves ball round so that C has orientation
moves it to another hole manipulates shape in hole - moves it to another hole
and manipulates shape in hole.

Turns head away - looks at camera, still pushing shape in hole

looks at shape - and then at hole  'turn it round a bit more'

puts shape into hole - it falls inside  'that's it!'

looks down on floor, to right, for
more shapes

(12) In terms of later events in this data sequence, the child here could be thinking about the shape that goes through the hole. The missing words therefore for the child's first utterances might be /ʃeɪts/ a triangle that goes / ...ɪn ʃɪr / but the child has not mastered the concepts relating to 'shape' - thus the look up to the mother might be interpreted as a request for help. Evidence for this interpretation is also contained in the discussion of sequence 4.20 in section 4.4.5 of chapter 4.
Thus the mother intervenes after a series of unsuccessful attempts by the child, and he shows signs of boredom or frustration or breaking off his activity for other reasons. The mother thereby indicates that her framing does have boundaries. When she does intervene, she participates in the child's activity rather than directly imposing her authority, as the following sequence indicates.

**Sequence S.11**

```
Stewart (C.)
pushes shape into X hole

Mutter (M.)
lifts shape up out of hole
turns it round, puts it down on floor looking at it

glances up at M

pushes the shape away -
it collides with the ball,
the ball rolls away

Commentary

Of interest in this data sequence, is that the mother participates in a problem solving activity that the child faces. After trying a couple of holes the child lifts the shape he holds up out of the last hole he has tried, turns it around examining it and puts it onto the floor. The mother comments 'Yes, I had trouble with that one as well' indicating a degree of sympathy with the child's frustrated efforts. The child glances across at the mother
because of, perhaps, his activity has been interrupted by the mother's utterance, and he looks across to her to ascertain her meaning, his attention being caught by the sound of the mother's voice, the tone or the length of the utterance, or the stressed words. The mother meets the child's eye contact, but here the child takes the initiative(13) and utters /dʌniː/. The child pushes the shape away, at the same time making contact with the ball, that also rolls away. The mother, watching the child's activity and its consequences, recognises the 'correct' hole for the child's shape and explains 'oh! It's the blue one,' makes her meaning clearer with her second utterance and begins to structure the situation again for the child's activity.

Here it is possible that the mother perceives the child's pushing of the shape away as a signal of potential frame breaking intent on the part of the child, and she takes the opportunity to locate the 'correct' hole for the difficult shape thereby solving the problem they face and initiating the child's activity within her, or their framing.

Summary and Conclusion

Although the mother frames the situation for the child, and actively participates in the framing to maintain her expectations of the child's behaviour (demonstrating the existence of framing boundaries) and occasionally to help out the child in his problem solving behaviour, she is happy to allow the child a large degree of self determination of his behaviour. The mother does not impose her framing onto the child, she utilises the child's interest in the ball and shapes game, aided of course by the child who is motivated within the framing. The jointly constructed framing becomes his own framing of the situation. The child has a great deal of discretion to change the framing and construct 'ends' for his and the mother's joint behaviour.

(13) On most other instances of eye contact in the data reported here, upon eye contact the mother has taken the initiative and, typically, has redirected the child's attention or commented on the intersubjective situation - and so on.
Perhaps he does so, initiating an 'embedded framing' of 'looking at the shapes to identify their features' to which the mother adds a second 'labelling of the geometric features' embedded frame in which she becomes 'trapped' as discussed in sequence 20 in section 4.4.5 of chapter 4.

The mother generally does not intervene by directing the child's activity but allows the child to construct his activity for himself. She does however, intervene to help the child on the child's terms.

Finally, sequence 21, in section 4.5 of chapter 4 discusses the ending of this data sequence, and the mother process of framing, demonstrated by her encouraging the child to use the ball of the 'ball and shapes' game as a football.

To conclude, the data here suggests evidence for symmetrical metacommunication between the mother and child, and as the interchange proceeds the picture that emerges is one of weak framing by the mother. All four of the criteria of symmetrical metacommunication apply.
5.3.3 Geoffrey

Some of the data from this mother-child pair has appeared in chapter 4 to illustrate aspects of 'behavioural constraint' in section 4.4.3 (Sequence 4.14). This, along with the sequences presented for discussion in this section are the total data for this mother-child pair.

The data suggests evidence for characterising the mother-child metacommunication as complementary. The picture that emerges is one of strongly offered framing by the mother. The following criteria are relevant:

(i) The mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within her strongly offered framing; she imposes on the child a passive role, defining the situation for the child by constructing the child's activity.

(ii) The mother does not allow the child to terminate the frame without attempts to constrain the child and re-impose her authority and her definition and expectations of the situation.

As regards the first criterion of complementary metacommunication as laid out in section 4.3.3 of chapter 4, that the mother defines the situation for the child from the start as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful' conclusion, where 'success' is defined in the mother's terms, the initial negotiations took place before the camera was switched on. However, the mother defines the situation for the child, as one where the child is not competent to carry the task to a 'successful' conclusion, and in her negotiations with the child she allows only a restricted role to the child. Also, there are no metacommentary apparent in these data sequences.

In the two sequences that follow the mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within her framing. The mother controls the 'end' to which the interaction is to be directed and directs the child in the 'successful' achievement of that end, reducing the child to
an almost passive role within the framing she has established.

**Sequence 5.12**

Mother sitting on the chair, in the 'play room', looking down to the floor, where the child is playing with a 'pillar box and shapes' game.

Child age is 18 months 3 weeks.

Videotape Recording Begins

**Geoffrey (C.)**

C bends over the pillar box trying to get a shape into a hole

bangs shape with hand

looks at the hole to which M is pointing

looks into the hole, then offers a shape to a hole

pauses - looks up at camera

releases the shape and it falls inside the pillar box

**Mother (M.)**

'No .... it doesn't go in there ..... does it?'

'Try that one ....' pointing down

'This one ....' touching the hole for the shape C is holding

'in there'

'Try that one'

removes finger

'hm - keep going .... keep moving it down .... that's right'

'Good Boy!' - and there's another one - look - to post!

Commentary

In the above, the mother has already established her framing, given the child all the components and established the child's motivation within the framing, prior to the camera being switched on. But of interest here, is the strong control the mother exercises over the child's activity. The child demonstrates his motivation within the mother's framing, he pushes a shape into his chosen, but incorrect, hole. The mother responds with the utterance 'No, it doesn't go in there .... does it' said looking down at the child from above, from her position in the chair. By this utterance the mother is assuming that the child does know which of the holes is the correct one for his shape and therefore the child is not behaving up to her expectations and 'to the best of his ability'. Thus the mother instead of allowing the
child to explore the problem he faces, simply controls his 'incorrect' activity by prohibiting it. She then constructs the child's 'correct' behaviour with the deictic utterances and gestures: 'try that one' pointing down to the hole, 'this one', said while touching the correct hole for the child's shape, and also 'in there' and 'try that one' as she points to the correct hole.

Also of interest here is that, after the mother removes her pointing finger, and thereby some of the imperative for the child to act, the child takes the opportunity to vary his behaviour. He looks into the hole, offers a shape to the hole and then looks up at the camera. The mother interrupts at this point and redirects the child's attention back to the completion of the task. Thus the child's interest in the camera is not seen as 'legitimate' by the mother. The child releases the shape and it falls inside the pillar box. The mother indicates her orientation to the completion of the task by rewarding the child only briefly before constructing the child's activity again by directing his attention to the next shape.

In the following sequence, the mother reduces the child's freedom to act within his role even further, as she demonstrates what actions 'successful' completion of the task within her framing of the situation involves. Again this illustration indicates the mother's close control of the child's behaviour.

**Sequence 5.13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geoffrey (C.)</th>
<th>Mother (M.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>looks up at the camera</td>
<td>M. offers C. a shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>looks down on 'that'</td>
<td>'Have that Geoffrey .....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>watches M's actions</td>
<td>put it in there' points to a slot in the pillar box, puts shape in pillar box</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'There it goes look ..... in there'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'You do it now'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>holds shape out to C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
picks up another shape, manipulates 'it does go in ... let me tilt it up a bit', tilts the pillar box

puts to hole, manipulates 'All-right'

takes shape away

offers shape to hole again, 'Let me show you ... look'
it does not go in

/"w/ looks up at camera
briefly then down
/E' / talks

manipulates shape - pushing into
hole, then shakes head

'there - you push it'

/əwəˈdɛdʒ/ holds the shape above the hole for
reaches forward and pushes.

The shape still won't go into
'this' the pillar box

'push'

Commentary

In this sequence, the mother constructs the child's activity within her framing of the situation, ruling the child's interest in the camera as 'illegitimate' and reducing the child to the role of a passive observer as she demonstrates the activity required in the 'correct' completion of the task. Also of interest in this illustration is the mother's direct physical intervention into the child's activity, as she tilts the pillar box to aid the child and then perceiving the child is still having difficulty in achieving a 'success', she takes the shape away from the child, orients it correctly and then encourages the child back into activity. Thus the mother sees It to be legitimate to intervene physically to redirect the child's activity - to the 'correct' completion of the task.

Generally, the child demonstrates his motivation within the mother's framing, and his acceptance of the mother's assumptions of his behaviour. However, there is one occasion when the child attempts to negotiate a more active role for himself and this results in a more severe restraint on his
activity. This is illustrated in the following, where the mother's movement out of her chair and onto the floor has been used in section 4.4.3, of chapter 4, in the discussion of 'proxemics' as a behavioural constraint. Thus the mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within her strongly offered framing. The child's attempts to renegotiate roles here lead to closer control of his activity and the re-imposition of the mother's authority.

**Sequence 5.14**

- Geoffrey (C.)
  - points across C to a shape on the floor
  - follows M's point with eyes
  - reaches across
  - picks up a different shape
  - looks at it
  - puts shape to pillar box
  - looks up at camera briefly and then back down

- Mother (H.)
  - 'That one, near the horse'
  - 'Go and get it'
  - reaches down and steadies pillar box
  - 'I didn't mean that!!'
  - moves out of seat and round in front of the child - then offers C a shape
  - 'Have that Geoffrey ...... put it in there'
  - points to hole, puts shape into slot
  - 'There it goes look .... in there'
  - holds shape for C, glances into C's face

Thus the child's attempt at self-directed activity has been countered by the mother with closer control of the child's behaviour, from a position closer to the child where more behavioural constraint in the form of eye contact, eye movements, and looking into the child's face and so on, is possible - as concluded in section 4.4.3. Also, there are instances in this data where the child engages in potential frame breaking activity, that is looking at the camera. On two of these occasions the child himself looks back down to the task. On the other two, the mother immediately intervenes to
redirect the child's attention back to the task in hand, re-imposing her authority and her definition and expectations of the situation. Of interest here is that, when the child has the opportunity to engage in other frame breaking activity towards the end of the videotaped sequence, he does so. When the mother takes the top of the pillar box to empty out the shapes to restart the game, the child takes the opportunity to drop an object directly into the box (14), to the mother's surprise. This is illustrated as follows:

Sequence 5.15

Geoffrey (C.)
looking down - pushes at shape
shape still will not go into pillar box
/ e /
looks to right onto floor. Shape clatters into pillar box
drops object directly into pillar box - then looks inside
looks to the right and onto floor, reaches to floor and picks up a shape moves it to pillar box

Mother (M.)
'push'
'shall we take them out, and put them in again?'
'yes'
lifts lid off pillar box - then points to it
'take them out'
'ow!' chuckles
'ow!' chuckles
picks up pillar box - moving it away from C. Takes object out and replaces the top.

Videotape recording ends

(14) Here, Geoffrey may have been involved and motivated in this particular game because of an interest in the positions, orientations, presence and absence, and disappearance of objects. In Piagetian terms he may be developing a schema for 'object conservation'. From the child's point of view the slotting of shapes into their 'correct' holes is only tangential to this. Thus the child may be practicing and learning about basic cognitive and manipulative skills as well as social intersubjective skills and the construction of goal hierarchies for his activity. In this thesis so far, the emphasis has primarily been on the latter two at the expense of the former two. This speculation about 'object conservation' is supported in the data presented here by only this one instance of the child putting a shape directly into the box, but is supported by observational data, and on other children in this sample, piling objects into a container and then emptying them out. The child doing this seems not to be interested in the objects as such, but in the process of hiding the objects from sight and then retrieving them. This is repeated many times.
Commentary

Here, the child looks down and pushes his shape into the pillar box, encouraged by the mother. As the shape clatters into the pillar box, the mother asks the child 'shall we take them out and put them in again?'. Here it seems the game has reached its conclusion and the mother, by this utterance seems to be putting the ground rules up for renegotiation, asking the child if the framing is to be continued on a similar basis. However, the illocutionary force of the utterance, associated with the mother's activity of lifting off the lid of the pillar box suggests the ground rules are not in fact to be questioned. The mother assumes the framing will continue according to her wishes and her expectations of the child's behaviour. The mother instructs the child to 'take them out'. Thus her strong framing of the situation is demonstrated. However, the child picks up an object and drops it inside the pillar box and looks inside it. The mother is clearly surprised at this. The child looks to the right and picks up another shape and moves it to the pillar box. The mother removes the pillar box and takes the object out before replacing the top; thus she, by her actions here, classifies the child's activity as illegitimate. She insists, by her direct physical intervention, that the child must play 'properly' on her terms, and again demonstrates her strong framing.

One final point here, is one that has been made earlier in relation to other mother–child pairs, the verbal aspect of the dialogue between the mother and the child takes place with unequal participation. The mother responds to the behaviour of the child with 19 utterances; during the whole data sequence the child has a total of only 4 utterances.
Summary and Conclusion

The mother here strongly frames the situation as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a successful conclusion. 'Success' is defined in the mother's terms that is the 'posting' of all of the shapes into the letter box. The mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles. She allows only a restricted role to the child, the child's activity is carefully channelled into fulfilling the mother's expectations of frame related behaviour. The mother intervenes directly when the child is not perceived by her to be performing satisfactorily. There are no metacomments in this data sequence.

To conclude, the data here suggests evidence for a complementary metacommunication between the mother and the child. As the interchange proceeds the picture that emerges is one of strongly offered framing by the mother.
5.3.4 Discussion and Summary

The overall pattern here indicates that two of the middle class mothers have a symmetrical metacommunication relationship with their children. These are the two 'newer' middle class mothers. The third mother - child pair have a complementary metacommunication relationship; this mother - child pair belong to the 'established' middle class. This finding is of obvious importance for the theories of Bernstein as outlined in section 2.3.3 of chapter 2.

As regards the development of the theory of framing, the criterion of symmetrical metacommunication applied to the two mother - child pairs is adequate and needs no amendment. As regards the complementary metacommunication criterion applied to the third mother - child pair, it was suggested that the first was not strictly applicable. This criterion is: 'the mother defines the situation for the child from the start as one where the child is not competent to carry it out to a successful conclusion' - and here 'success' is defined by the mother. It was stated in the discussion of the data in section 5.3.3 that the initial negotiations took place before the camera was switched on. But, as suggested in that section the mother continually 'defines the situation for the child as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful' conclusion'. Thus it is suggested here that to prevent an over literal reading of the original criterion, while recognising and re-affirming that the initial negotiations, or lack of negotiation, may be crucially important in determining the classification of symmetry or complementary metacommunication, the following amendment is necessary.

Amended criterion (1) of complementary metacommunication

(1) The mother defines the situation from the start, and continues operating with this definition of the situation, as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful' or 'correct' conclusion, and here 'success' or 'correct' is defined by the mother. The mother, in other words, controls
and defines the 'end' to which the game or interaction framed by the
mother is to be directed.

Finally, here, returning to the social class theme it is suggested
that the two 'newer middle class' mothers have a symmetrical metacommunicative
relationship with their children. The third mother - child pair, the
'established' middle class representative in this sample has a complementary
metacommunicative relationship with her child.

5.4 Upper Class mother - child pairs

5.4.1 Giles

Some of the data from this mother - child pair has appeared in Chapter
4 to illustrate aspects of 'behavioural constraint' in section 4.4.3
(sequence 4.17). This, along with the sequences presented for discussion
in this section are the total data for this mother - child pair.

The evidence here suggests a predominantly complementary
metacommunication between the nanny and the child. The picture that is
built up is of strongly offered framing by the nanny. The three relevant
criteria are as follows:

(i) The nanny defines the situation for the child from the start as
one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful'
conclusion - and here 'success' is defined in the nanny's terms.

(ii) The nanny does not allow the child to terminate the frame without
attempts to constrain the child and re-impose her authority and
her definition and expectations of the situation.

(iv) By her metacommunications the nanny places the child in a subordinate

position.

As regards the other criterion, the situation is complicated by the
fact that the child here is motivated within the nanny's framing. It is
in fact the child that sets up the situation initially, in the data
reported in this section.
Criterion (11) as outlined in section 4.3.3 of chapter 4 is as follows: 'the mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within her strongly offered framing; she imposes on the child a passive role, defining the situation for the child by constructing the child's activity from its elements'. The criterion was drawn from the 'Alice', data and was relevant in the consideration of the 'ball and shapes game'. Difficulties, however, arise in applying this criterion here, in that although the nanny strongly offers a framing of the situation, the nanny does relinquish momentary control of the means, to the end framed by the nanny, to the child. She does not impose a passive role onto the child. She incorporates the child's immediate interests into her overall framing of the situation. However on occasions, when she sees it to be necessary, she does construct the child's activity in line with her expectations of the child's behaviour. She does on these occasions, control and define the means to the end she has selected, demonstrating her overall strong framing. Thus the nanny - child metacommunication is classified as 'predominantly complementary'.

In the following sequence the framing is initiated by the child carrying a jigsaw to a chair. The jigsaw is a toy he has selected. However the nanny intervenes immediately in his activity and controls the situation.

**Sequence 5.16**

The child and nanny are in the kitchen; the child having picked up a jigsaw walks to a chair. The nanny then walks across to his side from the other side of the kitchen.

**Child's age: 24 months, 1 week**

Videotape recording begins

---

**Child (C.)** tips jigsaw pieces out of board and onto chair

\[ /dəd\ a\ w\ t/ \]

---

**Nanny (N.)** looks down at board

\[ /d@j/ \]

---

watches - waiting - holding board

's can I ... sit down .... and then you ...' takes some pieces away from chair to make some space for her to sit down
This illustration is an example of how the nanny uses the child's interest, but controls the framing of the situation according to her own expectations of how to play with the jigsaw and jigsaw pieces.

The child tips the jigsaw pieces out onto the chair seat, utters /u'daʊt/ and looks down at the board. The nanny, however, re-organises the situation saying 'can I ..... sit down ..... and then you.....' and makes some space on the chair, taking jigsaw pieces away so that she can sit down. The child utters /dæj/ and, watches holding the board. Both of the child's utterances
are not responded to by the nanny, who instead organises the child's activity, guiding him to her. The child is forced into the passive role of watching and waiting. Thus the child's initiative has in a sense been disqualified. The nanny has re-organised the complete situation, and has directly intervened in the child's activity by taking the jigsaw board from him and pulling him forward. Then she continues her strongly offered framing, by constructing the child's activity by offering him a jigsaw piece.

Of interest here, is that the child points to a jigsaw piece other than the one the nanny has offered. The nanny holds out the jigsaw piece and glances into the child's face, and asks the child 'was that one?'. Perhaps here she sees an opportunity to take up the child's interest and encourage him to speak. This could be for the observer's benefit, the nanny had been told by the observer that the observer was there 'to listen to children learning to speak'.

Finally, the nanny's strong framing is demonstrated by her verbal attempts to control the child's activity. The child does not comply with the nanny's instructions. He moves his head back still looking down at the jigsaw board. This is perhaps perceived by the nanny as a signal that she must intervene more directly. She exclaims 'ow! you're hopeless' indicating her perception of the child's 'hopelessness' at performing the task appropriately on her terms. The nanny 'chucks' the child under the chin, and looking into his face comments, 'You did it all alright last week didn't ya' - again indicating her orientation to the 'correct' completion of the task. (15) The child moves forward and reaches down to the jigsaw and continues to manipulate the jigsaw piece, and the nanny continues her strong framing with her instructions to the child 'turn it round' and intervening directly. She reaches forward and turns the jigsaw

(15) Also indicating perhaps, her attempts to show off the child's competence, and therefore her own competence as a nanny, for the benefit of the observer.
piece around, leaving it next to the correct place in the correct orientation. She then 'cues in' the child's activity with her glance into the child's face.

However, the child is perhaps more interested in the elements of social exchange contained in the jigsaw game. He initiates an 'embedded framing' containing a reversal of roles with himself controlling the interaction and putting the shapes to various locations. This is done in a similar way to the (different) nanny in sequence 4.19, in section 4.4.5 of chapter 4. In as much as the 'embedded framing' is directed at the end of the game as framed by the nanny, she is happy to go along with this, as sequence 5.17 indicates. But, note the nanny's activity in reaching forward and pressing home the jigsaw piece at the appropriate time. It is she who controls the direction in which the negotiations are going. Intervening thus, she does reimpose her authority and her definition and expectations of the situation.

**Sequence 5.17**

---

**Giles (C.)**

- pushes jigsaw piece into location, lifts hand away
- looks at piece - takes it - puts to one place in jigsaw. Hesitates then puts it to another place

---

**Nanny (N.)**

- selects another piece - gives it to C - holding it out
- "Noww"
- "that's it"

---

- puts to another hole
- hesitates with hand over top of piece
- looks at it - takes it - puts to a place in the jigsaw

---
'Now' 
moves hand forward

takes piece away - puts to another place

/ 3 C r /

takes hand away


This interchange ends as follows in sequence 5.18. This data sequence is of interest because of a number of points. Firstly the nanny metacommends on the child's character as 'lacking in patience' perhaps here she has misunderstood the nature of the social exchange the child has engaged in, in his control of the here and now of his embedded framing. Secondly the child changes his behaviour during the illustration from the above embedded framing, to putting the shapes directly into their 'correct' position with no hesitation. Thirdly the sequence is of interest in that the mother enters the kitchen in conversation with her secretary. This interchange is thought to be typical of the exchanges between the child, the mother and the nanny during the time of the observers visits.

Sequence 5.18

Giles (C.)
takes hand away

Nanny (N.)
'turn it round'
moves hand forward, turns the jigsaw piece around and presses it down into place. Looks up and across at C - then down holding her palm open

'You're lackin in patience Giles'

'that's it ..... that's better'
moves palm forward, holding next jigsaw piece out to C, glancing into C's face, and taps a place on the jigsaw board with her other hand
looks at piece being held out - takes it and puts to jigsaw board. Looks to left

(H. enters in conversation with secretary)

Mother: 'matches for candles'

Secretary: 'mm'

Mother: looks back down puts jigsaw piece into the position

Secretary: only this box has run out' 'I just put one up there'

Mother: looks across at N's movement

Secretary: 'can you put the one up there ... actually ... onto the side-board'

Mother: moves forward to retrieve it. Picks it up - looks back at N, then at board. Puts piece to place on board

Secretary: 'clamps' off to right

Mother: moves back, hand in air, smiling at N

Secretary: 'That's it!'

Mother: 'Clever clogs!' receiving eye contact and smiling

Secretary: receives eye contact with: 'Where's all those multitude of hankies? .... here you are .... reaching forward to C's nose, pulls C to her, wipes C's nose

Videotape recording ends
Commentary

In the above sequence the nanny demonstrates her strongly offered framing by again directly intervening in the child's activity, pushing him into a passive role in this instance so she demonstrates what he should have done to achieve a 'success'. She also offers a metacomment on the child's character 'You're lacking in patience'. This is a metacomment, putting the child 'one down', on the child's performance according to the nanny's standards and expectations of his behaviour. And also she constructs the child's activity by offering jigsaw pieces to the child, taps the appropriate place in the jigsaw board, and glancing in the child's face to 'cue in' the child's activity.

Also of interest in this sequence is the child's behaviour in putting three pieces to the jigsaw board, into their correct positions without hesitation. The child here could have been surprised by the tone of the nanny's metacomment. He demonstrates his ability to do the jigsaw 'satisfactorily' thereby suggesting that the 'embedded framing' was undertaken for other reasons, the social exchange or the practising of control of the 'here-and-now' for example.

At this point in the sequence the mother enters, and the child stops his activity and greets her. The mother does not however reply to the child. She is in conversation with her secretary about a dinner party, and the nanny responds to the child's greeting of the mother, 'saving face' without being too committal. Also here, the nanny's 'mm' has the effect of covering the possible break by the child into another area of interchange. The child's greeting of the mother is acknowledged by the nanny. It could be that she perceives what is necessary here is, in her role of employee, to keep the child out of the mother's way. Thus the nanny saves the mother from having to deal with an interruption. During this videotape sequence there were no interchanges between the mother, and the nanny or the child. The child, perceiving the mother's lack
of interest, looks down to the jigsaw board and fits the jigsaw piece immediately into the board without hesitation.\(^\text{(16)}\)

Thus the framing is terminated by both participants on the 'successful' completion of the task framed by the nanny, aided to some extent by the child's motivation within the nanny's framing.

**Summary and Conclusion**

The evidence here suggests a strongly offered framing by the nanny of the child's activity and a predominantly complementary metacommunication between the nanny and the child. Three of the four criteria of complementary metacommunication are relevant. However, the picture of the interchange that is built is complicated by the fact that the child initiates the game and is motivated within the framing of the situation offered by the nanny.

The nanny controls the framing of the situation, she controls the end to which the negotiations are directed, but she does not, and need not, impose a passive role onto the child, although she does take steps to constrain the child's activity within her framing. Of interest in the data is the child's initiation of an 'embedded framing', within the nanny's framing of the total situation, where the child takes control of the here-and-now.

To conclude, the picture that is built up of the interchanges is of strongly offered framing by the nanny, and a predominantly complementary metacommunication between the nanny and the child.

\(^{\text{(16)}}\) In Goffman's (1975) analysis of 'framing', the child by this activity could be said to have 'keyed in' a framing of his previous performance with this display of the ability to do the jigsaw correctly.
Some of the data from this nanny–child pair has appeared in chapter 4 to illustrate aspects of 'sequential constraint' in section 4.4.5 (sequence 4.19). The following data sequences are selected as being typical of this nanny–child pair. The evidence here, suggests a predominantly complementary metacommunication between the nanny and the child, in that the picture that is built up is of strongly offered framing by the nanny. The two relevant criterion are as follows:

(1) The nanny defines the situation for the child from the start as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful' conclusion, and here 'success' is defined in the nanny's terms.

(2) The nanny does not allow the child to terminate the frame without attempts to constrain the child and re-impose her authority and her definition and expectations of the situation.

With reference to the introductory section of section 5.4.1, the discussion of the 'Giles' data, this nanny here also does not impose a passive role on the child. She incorporates the child's interests into her overall framing in the form of 'embedded frames'. Thus the child is motivated within the nanny's framing, the nanny's skill at devising 'interesting' embedded framings ensures this. Examples of this has already been given in chapter 4, section 4.4.5, where in sequence 4.19 this nanny's embedded framing was discussed in relation to the development of the framing over time. However, as with the nanny in the 'Giles' data, the nanny here, when she sees it to be necessary, constructs the child's activity in line with her expectations of the child's behaviour. She does on these occasions, control and define the means to the end she has selected, demonstrating her overall strong framing. Thus, as in the 'Giles' data the nanny–child metacommunication is classified as 'predominantly complementary'.

5.4.2 Emma
In the following illustration the nanny initiates the game and involves the child within it. She intervenes in the child's existing activity to get her interested in this game using the gestural constraint of eye contact, gaze redirection, and delictic utterances and gestures to construct the child's activity and channel it along the lines of her expectations of the child's behaviour.

**Sequence 5.19**

The child and nanny are both kneeling on the floor in the living room. The nanny has put the components of the game, a wooden box with holes in the top, and its associated shapes in front of the child. The child is pushing a toy train forwards and backwards.

Child's age: 19 months 3 weeks.

Videotape recording begins

**Emma (C.)**

looks across at N.

looks down to shape, picks it up, puts shape to hole N has indicated, manipulates /c. wh' /w /

looks up at N

looks down - continues to manipulate

shape eventually falls inside the box C reaches for another

pauses /ch /

looks up at N

/ ch /

looks down and picks up shape

**Nanny (N.)**

'come on then' looking across at C, pointing to a hole in the top of the box 'in this one then .....'

tapping the hole - with a head movement down on 'this' and a glance down, then back across to C., watching C's movement

receives eye contact

'you can'

head nod on 'can' and glances down to hole

'that's right'

'good'

receives eye contact

'yes? ..... more?'

'Put ..... that one in as well'

head nod on 'that'

... ...
Commentary

Here the nanny strongly frames the situation for the child, she intervenes in the child's already ongoing activity and invites the child to participate in the 'box and shapes' game, encouraging the child with 'come on then', and cueing in the child's activity by looking across into her face. She then begins to direct and construct the child's activity with 'In this one then' tapping the appropriate hole, and with a head movement down on 'this' to make her meaning clear. She redirects the child's eye gaze back down to the box with 'you can' - with a head nod down on 'can' to again reinforce her meaning. She thus in this instance anticipates what she perceives to be the child's thoughts with her vocalisation, encouraging the child in her activity and creating the expectation that the child can accomplish the task. Thereafter she rewards the child's motivation to complete the task with 'that's right' and the achievement of an individual success with 'good'. She also continues guiding and instructing the child's activity with the question 'more?' and the instruction 'Put that one in as well'.

Thus the nanny framing and expectations of the child's behaviour predominate, she controls the end point to which the exchange is directed. But she does encourage the child to take the role of agent an actively solve problems within her framing. Once the framing of the situation by the nanny has become the child's own framing of the situation, (17) once the child's competence in the game is adequate, and the child does not need motivating or continual monitoring to achieve 'successes', the nanny (or mother) can switch to a different level and introduce other elements into the situation. This is illustrated in the two sequences that follow. In the first, the nanny's attention has explicitly moved to aspects of social exchange. In the second, the nanny initiates an embedded framing to make the game more interesting, this embedded framing also involves emphasis on the social exchange.

(17) This implicitly assumes a developmental progression from the mother or nanny imposing a framing onto the child, to negotiating a framing with the child, to the child making the framing his or her own. This thesis has tried to point out that if there is a progression here, it is overlain with sub-cultural factors.
Sequence 5.20

Emma (C.)

looking down at box, manipulates it, turning it over to get shapes out to start the game again

looks across at N's hand.
Stands up - reaches for it and takes it - sits down

puts box upright
puts shape to top of box

\[ \text{\textit{K\textit{\textalpha} K\text{\textomega}}} \]
manipulates shape against hole

Nanny (N.)

'Emma - would you like this one' looking across into C's face and holding shape out to C

'Thank you'
looking into C's face - with a slight headmovement down

'Thank you'
looking lower into C's face, and with more emphasis on the word

'mm - I should think so'

Sequence 5.20 also demonstrates the strongly offered framing of the nanny as she wants a specific response from the child and persists, imposing her authority until she gets it. Thereby she indicates her expectations of what it is socially desirable for the child to do. The nanny initiates this activity and involves the child in social exchanges, as the child is displaying frame related behaviour.

In the following example the nanny mimics the child's utterance, which leads to a 'grunting competition' between the nanny and the child, which the nanny wins. Notice here the slow escalation of the reciprocal exchanges from the child looking down, to the child and nanny looking into each others faces while slightly varying the grunting, to the child breaking off the eye contact and looking back down to the 'box and shapes' game. The nanny here could be said to be imposing her authority by not allowing the child to 'win'.
Sequence 5.21

Emma (C.)

looks down, lifts up box on end, examines it, turns it over, picks up a shape, puts it into the bottom where the holes are much bigger.

Grunts.

looks up at N, smiling

Nanny (N.)

receives eye contact, chuckling, turns to camera 'If yer like ... yes ... well!

(observer chuckles)

squeals

looks up at N

receives eye contact by bending forward, full face to C, laughing

looks down

grunts

grunts looking across at C.

(observer chuckles)

manipulates box

grunts

looks up at N

grunts

meets C's gaze

grunts softly

still looking into N's face

grunts softly

still looking into C's face

looks down

'good!' yes!

laughs

/âôøt$}/

manipulates shapes in front of her, turns box over and puts hand inside.

bends head low to look over to see what C. doing.

'and another one?'...

Here the nanny perhaps sees herself as 'a good child manager' as she utilises the child's interest via the 'interesting' embedded frames outlined above. She is also, of course, demonstrating that 'childrearing can be fun'. Perhaps a comment could be made here about the position of the nanny as
paid employee whose job it is to bring up children, teaching them cognitive, manipulative and essential 'polite' social skills where, because of the position she is in, the polite social skills the children acquire would reflect favourably on her nannying. A second point related to this theme is the question of the nanny - child metacommunication system - could it ever be anything other than complementary? Because of her position as employed nanny it could be said that in relinquishing control of the situation to the child, especially with children of this age, the nanny 'would not be doing her job'.

Returning to the data the termination of the framing is of interest here in that the nanny asks to participate in the child's game. Thus she indicates to the child that even if the child has made the framing her own, and is acting in terms of it, that is not all there is to child socialisation, in that other people need to be taken into account. Other people have needs and motivations that must be taken into account in negotiating her own ends and means to that end for her activity. However, overall, it is the nanny's framing of the situation that predominates, her expectations of the child's activity that the child conforms to, and her assumption is that she can legitimately intervene in the child's activity and direct it to the end she has framed, and that she can involve the child in the various diversions. The frame terminates as follows, the nanny asks if she can join in the game; the child indicates how much she has made the frame her own by protesting. The nanny persists, and the child ends the frame as follows:
Sequence 5.22

Emma (E.)

manipulates shape on box top, then gives shape to N

Nanny (N.)

takes the shape 'thank you'
then, with head lowered, looks into C's face and reaches across, putting shape to hole

withdraws, looking across into C's face

'I'm sorry!'

reaches across again 'can I put this into this hole, in here?' glances down at hole, then looks across at C's face, head very low.
'Is it alright? still looking across into C's face

turns away from N picks up box 'no it's not!' /get it /
goes away behind table away to the right

Videotape recording ends

In this sequence the nanny's strong framing is indicated in that she provokes the ending of the framing, by initiating another variant and trying to involve the child in her activity. She looks closely into the child's face to monitor her intentions and 'cue in' her response, to enable 'negotiations' to proceed. It is her idea that negotiations are to take place and not the child's. The child protests at first, and when the nanny persists, asserting her authority, the child rejects the situation by moving away.

Summary and Conclusion

The nanny here defines the situation for the child as one where the child's activity must be constructed in line with her expectations of that
activity. The nanny controls the interactions, she feels that she can
directly intervene in the child's self directed activity. The nanny allows
the child some freedom to negotiate roles, she does not impose a passive
role on the child. She uses her skill as a 'child manager' to utilise the
child's interest and gain the child's motivation to reach the end she,
(the nanny), has determined, aided by the child making the nanny's framing
her own. One other point is relevant here, the nanny is teaching the child
that she must take into account other people who may have interests and
motivations of their own. Overall, however, the nanny controls the
interaction, and offers a strong framing of the situation. The evidence
suggests predominantly complementary metacommunication between the nanny
and the child.

5.4.3 Charlotte

Almost all of the data from this nanny - child pair is discussed in
this section. None of this data has been considered elsewhere. The
evidence here suggests a predominantly complementary metacommunication
between the nanny and the child. The picture of their relationship that
is built up during the course of the interchange is of strongly offered
framing by the nanny. The two relevant criteria here are as follows:

(I) The nanny defines the situation for the child from the start as
one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful'
conclusion and here 'success' is defined in the nanny's terms.

(iv) By her metacomments the nanny places the child in a 'one down' position.

The discussion of the other two criterion, criterion (II) and (III) of those
outlined in section 4.3.3 of chapter 4, is complicated by the fact that
the child is motivated within the nanny's framing. This discussion therefore
will largely echo that of section 5.4.1 in the discussion of the 'Giles'
data and section 5.4.2 in the discussion of the 'Emma' data.
As regards criterion (II) the nanny, echoing the discussions as referred to overleaf, does not impose onto the child a passive role. With the child motivated to some extent within her framing the nanny is happy to relinquish control of means to her designated end to the child. Criterion (III) that 'the nanny does not allow the child to terminate the frame without attempts to constrain the child and re-impose her authority and her definition and expectations of the situation' is not applicable to this data, as the discussion of the termination of the framing below will indicate. The nanny does, however, seek to re-impose her authority from time to time during the videotaped sequence, and control the child's activity by asserting her definition and expectation of the child's behaviour. Thus the nanny - child metacommunication is classified as 'predominantly complementary'.

Initially, the nanny does the minimum to control the child in that the child, when the camera is switched on, is motivated to complete the jigsaw puzzle. The nanny need only to use a minimum of behavioural constraint to direct the child's activity, and she does this throughout the sequence from a chair sitting away from the child thus indicating that she sees no need to intervene directly in the child's activity. The behavioural constraints she uses to direct the child's activity are clustered at the 'less powerful' end of the scale, typical of the pattern of gestural constraints that would be employed when the child is motivated within a strongly offered framing, as discussed in section 4.4.4 of chapter 4. In the following, the nanny imposes her authority onto the child by her emphasis on the child's activity, redirecting it once the child is perceived of as having begun to 'show off'. When she does this, she directs the child's activities from the perspective of the 'correct' completion of the task.
Sequence 5.23

Charlotte is sitting on the floor of the bedroom, looking down at a jigsaw puzzle. The nanny is sitting in a chair, watching the child from a distance of about six feet. Child’s age is 26 months.

Videotape recording begins

Charlotte (C.)

puts piece to jigsaw, presses it down, looks up and across at N, smiling

looks down, reaches forward
then takes pieces out of jigsaw one by one, then starts to put them back. Puts first piece to X place, then to √ place, puts rest to √ place immediately. Completes the jigsaw, takes hand away looks up at N, smiling

looks back down to jigsaw, takes pieces out - keeping them in one hand
/

Nanny (N.)

receives eye contact with ‘good girl!’ said softly

reaches forward to jigsaw

reaches down to the floor behind her - then rolls away across floor to cupboard

reaches down to the floor behind

chuckles ‘you old show off Lottey’

gets up, reaches into the cupboard, gets out another jigsaw, brings it back, puts it on the floor infront of N's chair

chuckles ‘yes ... I think so .... cum on Charlotte ... get your other jigsaw if that's too easy for you!’

kneels down, empties out jigsaw, manipulates jigsaw pieces infront of her

lifts up piece, turning to N
looking down at jigsaw pieces on floor
turns back to jigsaw, plonks piece down
sits in front of the jigsaw, looking down

'you don't ... for me, please'
'up the other way ...'
'It doesn't fit that way .... turn it up the other way'

Commentary

In the earlier part of this sequence the child demonstrates her motivation within the framing. The child has made the framing her own, and the nanny uses only a minimum of effort to intersubjectively maintain the frame boundaries, the rewards 'good girl!' and smiles as the child wants recognition for her 'successful' activity. So far in this sequence it is unclear whether it is the child or the nanny that controls the situation.

The child at this point, however, looks up at the camera, smiling, and rolls away across the floor. The nanny chuckles at the child's behaviour, commenting 'you old show off Lottery!'. This comment is more directed to the observer, perhaps, as a comment that according to Goffman's (1975) use of framing 'keys in' the framing by the nanny of the child's last piece of behaviour. Although this is a metacomment on the child's personality characteristics in the light of current behaviour of the child, it is said in a non aggressive way, especially with the endearment 'old'. The observer intervenes at this point and asks for clarification as regards the child's behaviour; the nanny replies and then demonstrates her strong framing of the situation for the child with her comment 'cum on Charlotte ... get your other jigsaw if that's too easy for you!'. By this comment the nanny frames her expectations of the child's behaviour - that the child should be concerned with learning about something new and expanding her
abilities rather than playing with something already mastered (in the sense of 'correct' completion of the task the jigsaw sets). Thus the nanny intervenes and directs the child's behaviour. (18)

The child obeys the instruction and brings out from the cupboard another jigsaw. She fingers one piece and comments /m'red/ lifting up the jigsaw piece and turning half to the nanny. Here she seems to be attempting to initiate an embedded framing involving the naming of colours. The nanny again demonstrates her strongly offered framing in that at this point she imposes her authority onto the child's behaviour and re-affirms her definition and expectations of the situation with her utterance 'you do what ... for me - please'. Thus she discounts the child's interest in colours, as 'not relevant' and 'illegitimate' and unrelated to her expectations of the child's behaviour. She then begins to construct the child's activity in line with her expectations of the child's behaviour with 'up the other way Charlotte' repeated when the child does not respond appropriately.

The above illustrates the nanny's strongly offered framing of the situation for the child, her disqualifying of the child's interest of the colours of the jigsaw pieces as 'illegitimate' and her construction of the child's activity in line with her expectations of the child's behaviour. The nanny's expectations leading her to closer control of the child's activity and the imposition of her authority are illustrated as follows; where the child wants to initiate some sort of exchange with the nanny. This is again disqualified by the nanny, who offers a model of the behaviour she wants, before encouraging the child into appropriate activity.

(18) It could be argued here that up to this point the nanny weakly frames the situation for the child - allowing the child to control her own activity. And only when the child shows off in the presence of the observer does she feel she has to step in and control and redirect the child's behaviour and move to a more strongly offered framing.
Sequence 5.24

Charlotte (C.)

Puts piece down onto jigsaw board, and slides it around. Turns to N, looks up and across, lifting up jigsaw piece

Nanny (N.)

\((19)\) moves to N, holding up the jigsaw piece

\(\text{"You don't .... the other way .... .... look let me show you".}\)

Takes the jigsaw piece from the \(\text{C, turns it round and puts it into the jigsaw.}\)

'Does that way'

Leaves jigsaw piece on the edge of its position.

Looks into \(\text{C's face}\)

'\text{Put in in .... that way ... can you?'}\ headnod down on 'put'

In the above sequence the nanny does re-impose her definition of the situation and her expectations of the child's behaviour. However, the nanny does not attempt to re-impose her authority on the child when the child terminates the frame. In terms of the third criterion of complementary metacommunication, that 'the nanny does not allow the child to terminate the framing without attempts to constrain the child and re-impose her authority and her definition and expectations of the situation' this is not here appropriate. The nanny does allow the child to terminate the framing of the situation, with the nanny imposing her authority only as much as the child's activity may have consequences for herself in the child unravelling a ball of wool or creating a mess for her to clear up. She does not impose her authority onto the child to control the child's activity in terms of her framing of the situation and the 'correct' completion of the task, the jigsaw here remains uncompleted when the child terminates the frame.

\((19)\) 'Golley' is the name of the children's pony.
Sequence 5.25

Charlotte (C.)

picks up a piece of the jigsaw, looks at it, stands up, bends down to the jigsaw and picks up the board. Goes off to the right to a chair. Plonks the board down on the chair, lifts up a jigsaw piece. Turns to window sill - puts jigsaw piece down on window sill; lifts off ball of wool and needles from windowsill

turns to N, looking across into N's face

puts needles down

/ əʊ əʊ /

comes across to N, holding up the ball of wool, looking across to N
kicks N's foot accidentally

runs back to the chair, then to window sill, pulls at ball on window sill; reaches over with other hand and pulls at bag

comes across to N, holding up the bag, looking at N

/ j u ə /

runs back to window sill

Charlotte' could have that please?

'could you bring it to Marlon?'

'aw ... that hurts - thank you'

takes wool

'we'll have the lot now!'

'Thank you'

takes bag

Here the nanny may value the preservation of the ball of wool intact above other aspects of the nanny-child interaction. Once this is assured she is happy to allow the child, temporarily at least, to follow her own interests. This illustrates the nanny's ambiguous position as an employee charged with childrearing. She has to control the child, the social situation and the mess the child makes otherwise she would not be seen to be doing her job. On the other hand she is expected to produce
self-confident, self-directed and self-aware upper class people. These aims of course, need not conflict. Finally, before leaving this nanny-child pair data the following is of interest, from earlier in the videotaped sequence, involving the incorporation by the child of the observer into the game.

**Sequence 5.26**

Charlotte (C.)

turns, reaching up with jigsaw piece, looking up at camera
/ S c r /
reaches up with other hand, exchanges hand holding shape, still looking at camera
Holds piece out - moves it to camera

Observer (O)

'Now ... you dowlt
Charlotte ... you dowlt',
with a head nod and glance down on 'you'.

Nanny (N.)

'turn it up the other way'

turns back, looks down to jigsaw
/ w s h /
puts piece into jigsaw

slides piece about in jigsaw then turns, looks up at camera reaches up with jigsaw piece

Charlotte dowlt!

'you' dowlt, Charlotte
(said softly)
'you dowlt'

looking up still

'go on! you dowlt'
takes piece - hands back to C

/ h a d w /
puts piece onto O's knee
turns back to jigsaw
then looks at piece
being held out
reaches forward and
takes it  'you do it'

looks down to jigsaw
then goes to left
/jigsw/ 
looks across at N

reaches forward takes
shape, puts to jigsaw

Commentary

The child initially turns and reaches upward with a jigsaw shape, looking up at the camera, and clearly expressing her request that the observer takes the jigsaw piece. The observer responds urging the child to put the piece to the jigsaw. The child turns back and puts the piece into the jigsaw, and the nanny directs the child with 'turn it up the other way' creating the expectation of the child's behaviour with the 'correct' completion of the task in mind.

The child slides the piece around in the jigsaw, and then again looks up at the camera and holds up the jigsaw piece, and persists with her attempts to involve the observer; to the extent of putting a jigsaw piece on the observer's knee. The child's invitations are rejected by the observer who encourages the child to complete the activity herself. The child eventually looks down at the jigsaw and then moves off to the left - only then does the nanny directly intervene. She reaches forward and down onto the floor and picks up a jigsaw piece, structuring the child's activity, and gaining the child's attention, with the utterance 'look .... what about this one .... in there'.

(20) It could be argued here that the content of the observer's intervention could be 'cuing in' the nanny's behaviour. It is more likely that on this occasion that, leaving aside the wider aspects of the observer's presence forcing the nanny into specific behaviours, in this instance the observer tried to copy the nanny and 'try out' child management techniques, and failing. This may, of course, reinforce the nanny's strong framing, she may think that, going from my attempts to direct the child's activity that this is what she is supposed to do, to please the observer. She also may feel that she has to intervene here to demonstrate how to do it properly.
In this exchange the obvious difference between the observer's and the nanny's responses to the child is that the observer only urged the child into activity, with 'dowit!' leaving implicit and unspecified what it was the child was expected to do. This may have led the child to persist in the invitation; it probably had the effect of almost making the child loose interest and move away. The nanny's utterance on the other hand was directly tailored to what the child had to do - she created the expectation of the child's behaviour that it should be directed to the 'correct' completion of the task. Thus the nanny retains the child's activity within her framing.

This sequence is of interest in that it indicates that the observer's active participation in the situation can be used as data. To recall the discussion in chapter 3, the approach taken here is that, if the observer's presence in the experimental situation is likely to change the situation it is honest to acknowledge this; and if the observer is called on to be a participant then he or she should participate. As illustrated above, it is felt this can be legitimately treated as data.

**Summary and Conclusion**

The picture of the interchange that is built up here is of strongly offered framing by the nanny, and a predominantly complementary metacommunication between herself and the child. However, the situation is complicated by the child's motivation within the nanny's framing, meaning that the nanny need not impose a passive role onto the child, the child has made the framing her own. The nanny does, however, direct the child's activity. It is her expectation of the child's behaviour and her control of the child's activity that is important, and she does re-impose her authority and her definition of the situation from time to time throughout the videotaped sequence. A second complication here, involves the ending of the nanny's framing. This is terminated by the child with no attempt being made by the nanny to assert her authority at this point and re-impose her framing.
Overall, the data suggests strongly offered framing by the nanny and a predominantly complementary metacommunication between nanny and child.

5.4.4 Julian

The analysis here, suggests evidence for complementary metacommunication between the mother and the child, and strongly offered framing by the mother. All four of the criteria of complementary metacommunication as outlined in chapter 4 section 4.3.3 apply:

(1) The mother defines the situation for the child from the start as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful' conclusion - and here 'success' is defined in the mother's terms.

(II) The mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within her strongly offered framing; she imposes on the child a passive role, defining the situation for the child by constructing the child's activity.

(III) The mother does not allow the child to terminate the strongly offered framing without attempts to constrain the child and re-impose her authority and her definition and expectations of the situation.

(iv) By her metacommunication the mother places the child in a 'one-down' position in relation to the mother.

In relation to criterion (II) of the above it must be stated here, that the child aids in this process in that he refuses to accept an enlarged role, even though the mother encourages this.

The following data sequences are selected as being typical of this mother-child pair. Initially the mother allows the child to end a jigsaw game and move on to the 'pillar box and shapes' game. Although the mother offers a framing for the child's jigsaw game activity, and tries to control the child's behaviour within it, with her deictic utterances, she does not actually participate in the child's activity to structure it. She sits away from the child, and offers verbal instruction from a distance. Consequently, the child has a great deal of freedom as to what he can do, the mother can control his activity by verbal means only. (This indicates
the importance of the physical distance between the mother and child as described under the heading 'proxemics and body movements' in the discussion in chapter 4 section 4.4.3, of 'behavioural constraints'. Despite the mother's attempts to impose her authority and control the child's behaviour, because of the distance she is from the child, the child is able to end the framing of the jigsaw game. However, once the child has selected the 'pillar box and shapes' game, the mother takes over more directly, strongly offering a framing of the situation by constructing the child's activity, tapping the 'correct' hole to engage the child's attention, pointing to the 'correct' hole to structure the child's activity around the successful completion of the task. This is illustrated as follows.

**Sequence 5.27**

The child is sitting on the floor of the nursery, with a jigsaw in front of him and with the mother kneeling about 7 feet away. Child's age: 17 months 1 week.

**Videotape recording begins**

**Julian (C.)**

puts piece into jigsaw

doesn't fit, C pauses

**Mother (M.)**

'do it gently...'

'that's right ... gently'

'sput it there'

points to a place in the jigsaw

sits back, looks down at jigsaw, then to left
crawls away to left

glances at M's jigsaw piece, stands up, walks past M to cupboard, looks onto shelf, lifts off 'pillar box and shapes' toy, turns glances at M, holding box out returns in the general direction M

frets - waves arms

moves forward, reaches for piece of the jigsaw on the floor, offers piece to C, holding it out. Glances into C's face

'You haven't tried this one'

looks into C's face, still holding jigsaw piece out. Puts jigsaw piece down and watches C

takes pillar box from C

'wait a minit then .... let me take the top off' does so
frets more excitedly
watching H's activity

/du/ reaches for a shape -
looks at it

moves shape to hole on top of
pillar box manipulates shape
in X hole

puts shape to √/hole, it won't
fit, puts shape down, picks up
another puts to X hole
manipulates shape in X hole

bangs shape down onto top of pillar
box (twice) then frets

chuckles, reaches forward and pushes
the shape home with palm of hand

The mother's strongly offered framing is indicated in the above on
the following occasions.

The mother constructs the child's activity in the original jigsaw
game in line with the 'correct' completion of the jigsaw. The child's
activity is to some extent constrained by the mother's utterances and
her delictic gesture of pointing to the 'correct' location for the jigsaw
piece. Also here, the mother does try to impose her authority over the
child in her attempt to control the child's activity within the boundaries
of her framing. When the child crawls away, she attempts to re-assert
her definition of the situation by attempting to regain the child's interest, picking up a jigsaw piece, holding it out and glancing into the child's face, along with her utterance 'you haven't tried this one'. The mother's putting of the jigsaw piece down signals the end of her attempt to constrain or direct the child's behaviour.

Also, the mother takes the pillar box from the child, assuming that it is 'legitimate' for her to do so and that the child wants her to take the pillar box top off, and at the end of the illustration takes a shape from the child to put to the correct hole. On both of these occasions the mother physically intervenes in the child's activity. Overall, the mother constructs the child's activity in line with her expectations of 'correct' completion of the game. The second of the physical interventions in the above illustration is to simplify the task for the child, imposing on the child a passive role except for the one carefully channelled movement required for a 'success'.

Thus the mother structures and constructs the situation according to her definition of what the interchange should be about. The child, however, seems to have another definition of the situation which he increasingly attempts to enforce. This has been hinted at in the above illustration, as the child frets as the mother encourages him to 'try that one'. The mother then intervenes directly and takes the shape the child holds and puts it to the top of the pillar box, to the correct hole and in the correct orientation and holds it there, with the instruction to the child 'look'. Then the child's frets turn to chuckles as he reaches forward and pushes the shape home. As the sequence progresses the child repeatedly frets when the mother attempts to get the child to do more, to expand his role, put the shapes into the 'correct' holes and sort out the problems that arise himself. In short, the mother having strongly framed the end point of the interchange and instructed the child in the means of achieving that end, encourages the child to make the framing his
own. The child’s frets, however, turn into chuckles as the mother temporarily relinquishes her expectations of the child’s behaviour and engages in the division of labour the child appears to want. This is illustrated in the following.

**Sequence 5.28**

**Julian (C.)**

- Puts shape down on top of the box, releases it, frets
- chuckles and small arm movements of waving, reaches forward and pushes the shape home.
- Looks down, reaches down and picks up another shape, puts on top of box with fretting noises, and arm waving sideways then downwards.
- then reaches forward and touches the shape, then looks up at M
- looks down - picks up shape
- offers to M, looking across into M’s face
- Frets
- chuckles as M takes shape
- moves palm forward, pushes shape home
- Picks up next piece
- puts on top of pillar box (with no attempt to fit the shape to a hole)
- reaches forward with palm outstretched and pushes the shape home

**Mother (M.)**

- picks up the shape, puts it to the / hole, in the / orientation
- receives eye contact with eyebrows raised slightly 'hm' nods down and glances down to the shape
- receives C’s eye contact
- takes shape
- Looking at C with full face to C: 'What are you asking me to do?'
- offers shape to / hole
- 'That’s lazy!'
- ‘... You’re just lazy aren’t you?’
- moves body back and then forward again, adjusting handkerchief in sleeve
- picks up shape, offers / hole
Of interest in this sequence is the child's persistence in enforcing a division of labour to complete the task 'successfully'. He is, perhaps, more concerned with the intersubjective social exchange with the mother and is therefore reluctant to expand his role in the activity at the expense of the decrease in the mother's role. The mother's metacomment on the child's character 'That's lazy' indicates here expectation that the child should want to make her frame his own and perform all that is required in the 'successful' completion of the task.

To explore the child's behaviour further, the child seems to have elaborated a 'fret language' along with gestures and actions to indicate requests for example, and to communicate his wants to the mother. As mentioned above the child seems more concerned with the social, intersubjective exchange of the division of labour than with the 'correct' completion of the task. This, it could be suggested, can be connected to the circumstances of the child's life. He is kept in the nursery, the mother reports, alone for an hour or so each morning while the mother and a 'domestic' she employs complete household cleaning jobs. They talk to him as they go past the corridor outside - so that the child can hear people talking to him but usually as they disappear up or down the corridor. The mother reports that he usually spends the first 10 minutes or so of each day crying for attention which, she says, she usually ignores. The video tape transcript data used in this section was obtained about an hour after the child's initial placing in the nursery, when the mother had finished some of her housework and had joined the observer and child in the nursery. Also of interest here may be the fact that during the period of data collection the mother and father left for an extended holiday leaving the child at home, in the care of a temporary nanny. This occurred between the observer's regular visits for data collection consequently an analysis of the interaction system between
the temporary nanny and the child is available for analysis. However, it must be assumed that to some extent the intersubjectivity and network of intersubjective meanings established between the mother and child was interrupted, disorganised and then re-organised during the first period of the mother's absence and then after the mother's return (21). The mother reported the child to be excessively 'clinging' (22) and this observer noted, more ready to play 'object conservation' games after the separation than before the separation but this, of course, may be due to normal cognitive development. The observations reported here, seem to demonstrate the profound effects of lifestyle and other social factors on mother-child interchanges. Finally, this discussion is of relevance here in that the sequence of mother-child interchange reported here was recorded after the mother's return from holiday. This may account for the child's persistence in continuing a division of labour with the mother, as a means of practicing the social exchange and may also account for the child's 'fret language'. The 'fret language' could be used by the child to re-establish the intersubjective relationship between mother and child, broken by the mother's holiday.

To return to the data, the mother strongly offers a framing of the situation in accordance with her expectations. This is clearly evident in her metacomment on the child as being 'lazy'. Although she offers a framing for the child's behaviour, the child's own definition of the situation, reinforced by emotional or cognitive factors as outlined above leads him not to accept the role the mother frames but to negotiate

(21) This assumes that the mother and nanny do not simply hand on to each other a developed intersubjective network of shared understandings with the child. There may be a considerable amount of shared understandings that are 'passed on', but invariably mother-and-child and nanny-and-child must take some time to adjust to each other, to establish or re-establish intersubjectivity.

(22) This is the mother's own terminology
strongly with the mother for their respective roles within the mother’s framing. This latter aspect is illustrated in the following where the child is induced by the mother, persisting in her attempts to get the child to take a more active role, to accidentally achieve a ‘success’ in something the mother takes to be beyond the child’s present competence. The mother ‘marks’ this success as being significant, as illustrated in the following. The ‘marking’ here resembles the data of Susan Gregory as discussed in Shotter and Gregory (1976). This ‘marking’ is also discussed in (v) of section 4.4.3 of chapter 4, and in greater detail in section 2.2 of chapter 2.

**Sequence 5.29**

Julian (C.)

frets

chuckles

reaches forward,

pushes shape down into pillar box.

lifts up the box, offers it to M., looking into M’s face

frets, reaches forward,
picks box out of M’s hand

lifts it up, frets,

plonks it back into M’s hands

frets, reaches forward, touches top of toy

frets

frets louder,

waves arms horizontally

accidentally knocks the pillar box, and the top comes off - shapes fly out

MOTHER (M.)

reaches down, picks up a shape,

puts it to hole, holding it above the hole in orientation

glances across into C’s face

receives the eye contact, takes pillar box looking down into the child’s face, head forward, full face to C in an ‘effort after meaning’

‘what do you want?’

‘please?’ looking down into C’s face, head forward and eyebrows half raised, holding toy

‘well, take the top off... then’ holds toy out to C
I/əːwɪl\h/ looks on floor for shapes

I/waː/ picks up two shapes, puts them into pillar box, takes box out of M's hand, puts to floor. Looks up at M, while putting a shape into box

reaches inside the pillar box, puts a shape inside, frets, brings shape out, puts it down. Reaches for another,

'You've done it!' with full face to C, eyebrows raised, following C's movements looking into C's face

'You've done it!' smiling across at C, looking into C's face for eye contact

'That wasn't what you meant at all ... was it?' looking lower into C's face, body moved forward slightly receives eye contact 'clever boy! .... You did it .... all by yourself!!'

'take them out first and then put them in again .... look' reaches forward, tips the pillar box over and empties out the shapes

In this illustration, to echo the analysis of Shotter and Gregory (1976), of interest was that after the child had accidentally completed the task the mother had set, that of taking the top off the pillar box, the mother marks the 'successful' although accidental activity of the child with 'You've done it!' repeated twice. But then she continues to look for eye contact with the child and again repeats 'clever boy! .... You did it ... all by yourself!!' when eye contact with the child was finally achieved. Thus, the child had not 'replied' as the mother required and she persisted until he did so. The mother wanted the child to stop the flow of his activity, and acknowledge the eye contact and the marking of his activity as significant. Thus in Shotter and Gregory's terms 'the mother wants an indication from her child which implies he appreciates the social value of his act'. The mother here wants an indication that the child knew what was happening here, that he knew what he was trying to do. She retrospectively 'reads in' intentionality into the accidental achievement
of the child, helping the child to retrospectively evaluate the consequences of his actions, and allowing the child to develop self-conscious behaviour. (This brief discussion hardly does justice to the analysis of Shotter and Gregory - which is discussed in detail in section 2.1 of chapter 2).

**Summary and Conclusion**

Overall, the data suggests a complementary metacommunication between the mother and child, and strongly offered framing by the mother. The mother's expectations of the child's behaviour lead to the control of that behaviour and the imposition of her framing. In imposing her framing onto the child and with the child resisting, a conflict situation is brought about and as suggested in Table 4.1 this leads to the elaboration of the metacommunication system, in this data evident in the mother's metacommments on the child's character as being 'lazy'.

In this data the mother, although defining the situation for the child as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful' conclusion, and actively constructing the child's activity in line with her framing, does not impose a passive role onto the child. She in fact offers a framing of the situation, in which the child is encouraged to expand his role and develop his competence. It is here that problems arise for the mother's framing, as the child resists and persists in enforcing a division of labour with the mother revolving around, it is suggested, the social exchange component. This leads to the situation as described above.

To conclude, the evidence suggests a complementary metacommunication between the mother and child, and strongly offered framing by the mother. All four of the criteria of complementary metacommunication apply.
5.4.5 Discussion and Summary

The overall pattern of metacommunication between these upper class mother - child, and nanny - child pairs is as follows: all four have a complementary metacommunication system between the mother or nanny and the child. Only one of these, however, the mother - child pair of section 5.3.4 (the 'Julian' data) have an 'ideal type' of complementary metacommunication in that all four of the criteria of complementary metacommunication as laid out in section 4.3.3 of chapter 4 apply. The classification of the metacommunication system of the other three nanny - child pairs is complicated by the fact that the child is motivated within the nanny's framing. Criterion (11) as outlined in section 4.3.3 of chapter 4 is as follows: 'The mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within her strongly offered framing: she imposes on the child a passive role, defining the situation for the child by constructing the child's activity from its elements'. This criterion is drawn from the 'Alice' data and their 'ball and shapes' game as described in chapter 4, section 4.3.2. Difficulties arise in the application of this criterion to other games as suggested in section 5.2.3 (the 'Leslie' data), and to situations where the child is motivated within the nanny's framing, as in sections 5.4.1 (the 'Giles' data), 5.4.2 (the 'Emma' data) and 5.4.3 (the 'Charlotte' data). In section 5.2.4 it was suggested that amendments were necessary to criterion (11) to generalise the criteria of complementary metacommunication from the ball and shapes game and incorporate a 'control of means and ends' dimension. Here it is suggested that given the data under consideration it is reasonable to classify the nanny - child pairs as 'predominantly complementary' in that the nannies do strongly offer a framing of the situation. This may be modified however when the nannies
perceive their child is motivated to attain the framed 'end' each nanny has selected. She need not in such circumstances impose a passive role onto the child. She may incorporate the child's immediate interests into her overall framing of the situation. This, it is considered, is the important point, that the nanny controls the 'end' to which the negotiations are directed and does not allow any alternative to the end point she has framed although she may be happy to relinquish 'means' of achieving that end to the child. The one exception here is contained in the 'Charlotte data' discussed in section 5.4.3. In this data the nanny does not attempt to constrain the child to reach the 'end' she has framed, because it was suggested in that section other factors intervene. Elsewhere in that data sufficient evidence is provided of strongly framed interchanges for a classification of the nanny - child metacommunication as predominantly complementary.

To summarise, in relation to the social class theme of this chapter, all four of these upper class nanny - child and mother - child pairs have a complementary metacommunication relationship.

5.5 Discussion and Summary

This section will consider in 5.5.1 the overall pattern of social class differences in the framing of interchanges between mothers and nannies and their infants. Section 5.5.2 will reconsider the criterion of complementary and symmetrical metacommunication laid out in sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 of chapter 4 in relation to the data from the ten mother - child and nanny - child pairs discussed in this chapter, in terms of the development of a grounded formal theory of framing.
5.5.1 Overall pattern of social class differences in the framing of interchanges

The pattern of social class differences is as follows, in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Pattern of Social Class Differences in the Framing of Interchanges between Mothers- and Nannys- and their Infants

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Upper class mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>'Established' middle class mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Working class mothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Upper class nannies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>'Newer' middle class mothers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is returned to in the next chapter, chapter 6, where the above pattern is discussed in relation to Bernstein's theory of the transmission of symbolic systems in society as discussed in section 2.3 of chapter 2.

5.5.2 The development of a grounded formal theory of framing

The criteria of complementary and symmetrical metacommunication have been found overall to be adequate in the description of social class differences in the framing of interchanges between mother's and their infants considered in this chapter. The criteria of symmetrical metacommunication needs no modification in relation to the data presented here. The four criteria were found to be relevant in the description of the two sets of mother-child pair data classified as having a symmetrical metacommunication relationship. Although, it should be borne in mind that these criteria were evolved from the consideration of the 'Sally' data in section 4.3.5 of chapter 4, and their ball and shapes game and will presumably need some small amendment - while retaining their essence - to make these criteria applicable to other settings. The
The criteria of complementary metacommunication have been examined more thoroughly in relation to the data in this chapter. Two sets of amendments have been suggested, firstly, to generalise the criteria in that they were evolved from the consideration of the 'Alice' data in section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4 and their ball and shapes game, and secondly to incorporate a 'control of means and ends' terminology. Also, footnote 9 of this chapter has drawn the reader's attention to the ambiguity in the theory between the 'framing of the total situation' and the 'framing of specific roles'. Here it is suggested that this can be resolved by defining the 'framing of the situation' as being the framing of the 'end to which the negotiations are being directed'. Then, the 'framing of specific roles' becomes the framing of 'the means to achieve that end'. Consequently, the amended criteria of complementary metacommunication is as follows in Table 5.3 a composite of the amended criteria proposed in section 5.2.4 and 5.3.4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(I)</td>
<td>Although the mother offers a framing of the situation and the child's role initially, the child is not constrained to accept it. The child is allowed to choose to involve herself with the mother's suggested framing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(II)</td>
<td>The mother allows the child considerable freedom to renegotiate roles within the framing offered. The mother's framing is demonstrated to be flexible, expanding to incorporate objects of the child's attention. She does not impose on the child her definition of what is 'correct' for the child to do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(III)</td>
<td>There may be ultimate boundaries to the framing that has been accepted by the child. In that the framing of the situation for the child may not be infinitely flexible. Infringement of these boundaries by the child, when the mother chooses to maintain boundaries that is, does not necessarily bring some form of sanction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IV)</td>
<td>Overall the child's motivation and readiness to engage in activity is focused on by the mother and recognition is given to them as she allows negotiations to proceed with the child.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 5.2: Criteria of Symmetrical Metacommunication |
Table 5.3 Criteria of Complementary Metacommunication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(I)</td>
<td>The mother defines the situation from the start and continues operating with this definition of the situation, as one where the child is not competent to carry it to a 'successful' or 'correct' conclusion. Here 'success' or 'correct' is defined by the mothers. The mother, in other words, controls and defines the 'end' to which the game or interchange framed by the mother is to be directed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(II)</td>
<td>The mother allows the child little discretion to renegotiate roles within her strongly offered framing; she imposes on the child a passive role defining the situation for the child by constructing the child's activity within her framing. The mother therefore controls and defines the 'means' to the 'end' to which the mothers framing is directed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(III)</td>
<td>The mother does not allow the child to terminate the framing without attempts to constrain the child, and re-impose her authority and her definition and expectations of the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IV)</td>
<td>By her metacommments, where they occur, and by her behaviour, the mother places the child in a subordinate position.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These criteria, it is considered, clarify the relationship of the 'predominantly complementary metacommunication' of the three upper class nanny-child pairs, to the 'ideal type' of complementary metacommunication as portrayed by the above criteria. As discussed in section 5.4.5 the nannies control the 'end' to which negotiations are directed, although they may be happy to relinquish the 'means' of achieving that end to the child, depending on the child's motivation.
Chapter 6  Summary and Discussion

This chapter will summarise the previous chapters to provide an overview of the thesis as a whole. It will then go on to discuss briefly two points arising from this overview.

6.1 Summary of chapter 1

Chapter 1 provided an introduction to the thesis. In chapter 1 it was stated that this investigation would be in the tradition of 'action research' within a hermeneutic philosophy of doing social science research. The aim of the investigation reported here is the understanding of the intersubjectivity between mothers and children of different social classes. From participant observation of ten mother-child pairs described in chapter 3, a grounded substantive theory is developed in chapter 4 and from this the first steps towards a 'grounded formal' theory is taken in chapter 5. The actual theory of framing of interchanges by mothers for their infants presented in chapter 4 and developed in chapter 5 arose out of the participant observation data; but the data was not entirely viewed without preconceived ideas of what to look for. In this instance the idea of this research grew out of an interest in Bernstein's sociolinguistic codes and his concepts of 'classification' and 'frame'. Consequently, it was stated that Bernstein's concept of 'frame' is one of the bases of the theory of framing developed in chapter 4.

6.2 Summary of chapter 2

Chapter 2 contains a discussion of the literature that provides a background to the 'problem area'. It was suggested here that the recent trend in the study of the child's language development has been to focus on the network of intersubjectively shared understandings between the mother and the child that enables the child to develop and express meanings nonverbally and then accomplish the transition to language. However, these studies have failed, it was suggested, to take seriously the intersubjective 'context' of any interchange. By 'context' is meant the
social psychological context provided by the mother for the child as the interchange proceeds over time. Bernstein's work on the 'sociolinguistic codes' thesis was considered in this chapter, along with the 'transmission of symbolic systems' thesis. It was considered that one of the more important criticisms of Bernstein and Bernstein students work is their sociological determinism, their failure to consider mother-child interchanges as a process. Several hypotheses were drawn from Bernstein's 'transmission of symbolic systems' thesis. These are as follows, in Table 6.1

Table 6.1 Hypotheses drawn from Bernstein's 'transmission of symbolic systems' thesis

| 1. Strong classification and strong framing is found in the interchanges between: |
| (a) working class mothers and their children |
| (b) 'established' middle class mothers and their children |
| (c) upper class mothers and their children |
| 2. Weak classification and weak framing is found in the interchanges between: |
| 'newer' middle class mothers and their children |

Criticism of Bernstein's work was continued by considering the inadequacies of Bernstein's and Bernstein's student's use of the concept 'social class', as well as the use of the concept 'social class' in other social science research. It was suggested in section 2.4 that of these Stacey's (1960) classification was the most adequate for the purposes of this study. Stacey describes three major classes distinguished in various ways, according to, for example, their reference groups, education, occupation, source of income and degree of integration with the local community. Also in this chapter, some of the uses of the concept 'frame' in the existing literature were discussed, along with the concepts of 'symmetry' and 'complementarity' used to characterise the mother- and nanny-child metacommunication system. These latter sections of this chapter serve as the background to the grounded
theory of framing developed in chapter 4.

6.3 Summary of Chapter 3

Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the research methodology. A participant observation method with data collection by videotape film was thought to be best suited to the aims of this research. A sample of ten mother - child pairs were selected as being representative of their respective social classes (working class, 'newer' and 'established' middle class, and upper class). These were observed every second month for between 10 and 12 months, by the observer visiting their home and obtaining a videotape film of 'natural' mother - and nanny - child interchanges. The data was transcribed and analysed by looking for instances of prolonged mother - child interchanges, where negotiations between the mother and child took place. These were used as a basis from which a grounded theory of framing was developed in chapter 4. This grounded theory of framing is an attempt to describe the dynamic nature of the context provided by the mother. The final section of this chapter considered the observer effects and other problems of data collection using videotape in an attempt to explore the 'implicit control' exercised by the researcher using this 'new methodology'.

6.4 Summary of Chapter 4

Chapter 4 develops an outline of a grounded substantive theory of framing. It was suggested that in framing interchanges with her child, the mother selects a frame from tacit knowledge of what behaviour, rules or norms and so on is relevant in the current situation and uses it to supply the context in which the child's (and her own) actions can be interpreted as meaningful. The basic dimensions of this framing are (1) 'metacommunicative' and (2) 'content'. (1) The metacommunicative dimension arises from the mother's use of her power and authority in offering a framing of the situation for the child. This is part of the mother's style of communicating with her child and is subdivided into, in the final analysis, symmetrical metacommunication and complementary metacommunication. Symmetrical and complementary metacommunication are 'ideal types' at opposite ends of a metacommunication
dimension. (2) The content dimension of the framing process is divided for analysis into 'intersubjectively understood boundary maintenance' and 'behavioural constraints' exercised by the mother on the child's activity. Also considered important is the 'sequential constraint' imposed by the development of the framing through time. The analysis of the content level of the framing serves to build up a picture of the interchange as being either strongly or weakly framed by the mother, implicit in which is the metacommunicated relationship. Complementary and symmetrical metacommunication is discussed in relation to the analysis of mother-child interchange data of 2 mother-child pairs who approximate, it is considered, the ideal types of complementary and symmetrical metacommunication. The theory of framing put forward in this chapter is then used in the analysis of social class differences in the framing of interchanges between mothers and their infants in the following chapter, chapter 5.

6.5 Summary of chapter 5

In chapter 5 the data from the ten mother-and-nanny-child pairs is considered in detail in relation to their social class designation and the development of a grounded formal theory of framing. In chapter 5 the criteria of symmetrical and complementary metacommunication were applied to the data from the ten mother-child and nanny-child pairs and was found overall to be adequate in the description of social class differences in the framing of interchanges by mothers for their infants. The criteria of symmetrical metacommunication needed no modification in relation to the data, while the criterion of complementary metacommunication needed some modification—while retaining their essence—to make the criteria clearer and more generally applicable. This modification in particular, it is considered, makes clearer the description of the nanny's framing of interchanges with the infant. The overall pattern of social class differences is as follows; from Table 5.1.
1. Strong framing and 'ideal types' of complementary metacommunication:
   (a) The one upper class mother
   (b) The one 'established' middle class mother
   (c) The three working class mothers

2. Overall strong framing and predominantly complementary metacommunication:
   The three 'upper class' nannies.

3. Weak framing and 'ideal types' of symmetrical metacommunication:
   The two 'newer' middle class mothers.

6.6 Discussion

From this overview, two points arise. Firstly in relation to the pattern of social class differences and Bernstein's 'transmission of symbolic systems thesis'. Secondly, in relation to the metacommunication dimension of the theory of framing outlined in this thesis. The pattern of social class differences as laid out above, where the two 'newer' middle class mothers have a symmetrical metacommunication and weak framing; the other mother-child pairs having a complementary metacommunication system (and the nannies having a predominantly complementary metacommunication) and strong framing, conforms with expectations derived from Bernstein's thesis concerning the transmission of symbolic systems in society.

Caution is needed, however, in making this conclusion in that Bernstein's concept of 'classification' has not been utilised in this investigation, and also the concept of 'framing' is only partly derived from Bernstein's work. Also, the sample size is necessarily small. This research does suggest, though, that there may be some empirical evidence for Bernstein's thesis concerning the transmission of symbolic systems within society.

Here it was found that, crucial to Bernstein's thesis as discussed in section 2.3.3 of chapter 2, the two newer middle class mothers in the sample both weakly framed interchanges with their children in contrast to the strong framing of other mothers and nannies. One complication unforeseen
by Bernstein, and others, is that many upper class mothers employ nannies. In such circumstances the 'transmission of symbolic systems' thesis would need to explain how upper class children developed a set of classifications and framings typical of their class, when for the large part of the time during their childhood these children had more contact with a nanny of a 'lower' social class. These nannies would have presumably, different sets of classifications and framings (or 'cultural habitus') to the parents. The three nannies in this sample for example, felt very strongly the differences in style of life, attitudes, expectations and so on of the upper class families who employed them to their own family circumstances and backgrounds. They were extremely careful to defer to the mother's wishes concerning the children, trying to conceal their own, very often strongly held opinions. Because of these tensions, and also because of the tensions created by the nanny's being full time employees 'living - in', the three nannies preferred to spend as much time as possible outside the houses and out of surveillance. Bernstein, in defending his 'social class differences in the transmission of symbolic systems thesis' could suggest that the child is still in an environment in which nanny - child interchange is only a part of a pattern determined by the life style of the upper class family. Also, Bernstein could point to the existence of the Public Schools. Two of these four upper class families had older children at fee-paying schools, all of the boy children were to go to Eton, and the girl children were to go to appropriate Public Schools. It is here, in these 'total institutions' that the specifics of upper class socialisation may be acquired. For example, the relation to language thought important by Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) may be acquired in a Boarding School, and may be built onto the work of the nanny in getting the children 'ready'.
Why these nannies should have a 'predominantly' complementary metacommunication relationship with their children as opposed to an 'ideal type' of complementary metacommunication is unable to be determined from the data. It could be the result of the nannies skill as child minders; it could be the result of them having less emotional involvement in showing themselves to be 'good child managers', and the children to be 'perfect children'. It could also, of course, be that they were more used to having their behaviour with their children scrutinised. This may mean that they did not feel the need to impose a framing onto the child and provide evidence for an 'ideal type' of complementary metacommunication found in other mother-child pairs. This is an important point in that, as mentioned in chapter 3 an alternative explanation for the patterning of social class differences in the framing of interchanges might be the observer sharing more empathy with the two newer middle class mothers. These mothers shared the same sort of university background as the observer and this may have meant the high status 'university researcher - expert' and the high status ethic 'pursuit of scientific truth' may not have held here. How these two mothers perceived the observer could therefore have been different from the other mothers and nannies in the sample. Thus, how the various mothers and nannies perceived the observer could have varied greatly. This may have affected how relaxed their behaviour with their children was, depending on how much for example they felt themselves as being 'on trial'. Consequently, it cannot be considered that the observers 'presence' across all mother-and-nanny-child pairs is uniform. The important theoretical point here is that the observer must be conceived of as being an active participant in the social situation, and not just a passive observer of it.
The second point for discussion relates to the theory of framing developed in this thesis. It is clear that, concerning social class differences, all mothers regardless of social class were skilled in framing situations for their children and for example, teaching them the skills required in any task. The 'ideal' teaching strategy was pursued by all mothers at some time during the videotaped interchanges. That is, they presented problems of controlled complexity to the child, monitored this and changed it according to the child's moment-to-moment success or failures in the task or boredom or restiveness outside of it as the mothers provided the context for the child's activity. However, while all of the mothers, and nannies, were capable of this, their preferred mode of communicating with their children, this research indicates, is determined by implicit conceptions of childhood, attitudes and so on summed up in the concept 'style', an important component of which is the metacommunicated relationship the mother has with her child. And it is here, this research has suggested, that social class differences exist in line with Bernstein's 'transmission of symbolic systems' thesis (bearing in mind, that is, the qualifications and alternative explanation discussed above). However, it could be suggested that in the attempt to find social class differences, which are assumed a priori to exist and finding none at a 'framing of content' level, a metacommunicative dimension has been postulated to ensure social class differences. This criticism cannot be argued against directly, there is nothing in the data reported here and the development of the theory that would eliminate such a hypothesis. It can only be stated that this research has located different conceptions of childhood and conceptions of the amount of control that should be allowed to children in determining their own behaviour that seems consistent with Bernstein's social theory. The never middle class mother's delegated control of the situation to the child. These mothers tried to anticipate the child's
activities and articulate a meaningful framing for them. They allowed the child to 'self actualise' at least in the play setting of the data reported here. In so doing, these mothers seem to have an implicit conception of the child as essentially social. The other mothers and nannies to a greater or lesser extent imposed 'ends' for the child's behaviour and 'means' of achieving those ends. Thus these mothers seem to be operating with a definition of the child as having to be socialised. In as much as it ties up with other research, and seems valid in itself, the metacommunicative relationship the mother has with the child is of use in the analysis of the intersubjectivity of mother - child interchange.
REFERENCES


Bruner, J. (1975). 'From Communication to Language - a Psychological Perspective'. Draft of a paper in preparation; parts of it were presented at the 'Social Context of Language' Conference, University of Sterling, 11th January.


Appendix

Transcript data for the ten mother–and-nanny–child pairs

This data is presented in the same order as that in Table 3.1, that is, firstly, the three working class mother–child pairs, secondly the three middle class mother–child pairs and thirdly the four upper class mother–and-nanny–child pairs. The following is a list of the phonetic symbols used to describe the children's utterances (1). This description is at the morphemic level in that interest is centred on the presence of or development of meaning in the child's utterances, rather than in, for example, the development of the phonological system. The children's utterances are therefore transcribed into corresponding adult phonemes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consonants</th>
<th>Vowels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b (voiced p) bat</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d (voiced t) dot</td>
<td>e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f fat</td>
<td>e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g (voiced k) get</td>
<td>ə</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h hat</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j yet</td>
<td>u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dɔ jump/Roger</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k kita/cat</td>
<td>ə</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l lice</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m nice</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n nice</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p pat/split</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r rat</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s sat/lince</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t top</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v (voiced f) vice</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w wife/however</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θ think (unvoiced)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ə that (voiced)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e measure</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʃ chair</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʃʃ share/cash</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʃʃʃ glottal stop</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Features

1. after a vowel
2. indicates prolongation, e.g. /kɔt/ = cat
3. /kaɪt/ = caught
4. /bɔːd/ = bird (in a Liverpool accent)
5. /puəl/ = pull
6. /pʊəl/ = pool
7. (raised dot) = a pause

(1) This was supplied by D. Edwards
1.0 Three Working Class Mother-Child Pairs

1.1 Tape transcript data for 'Alice' and her mother

Alice and her mother are sitting on the living room floor, facing each other; the child is looking down onto the floor for the geometric shapes, the mother is holding the ball and looking down and around on the floor also.

Child age: 15 months.

Videotape recording begins.

*Alice (C.)*

Picks up shape and offers it to the ball

C. offers the shape to the holes in the ball in quick succession; when the shape does not fit, moves it onto the next hole - aided by the mother who turns the ball around rapidly

offers shape to hole on side of ball manipulates shape in X hole /æwə/ C. continues to manipulate shape against X hole

drops shape - it falls to floor /ɪə/ waves hand (crossly) looking at the shape on the floor looks up at M.

reaches forward, looking at shape, takes shape, looks down to right, moves shape to hole. Manipulates shape but will not fit, Looks to the right, the shape falls to the floor. Looks down reaches down for shape

*Mother (M.)*

moves the ball around, glances at the shape C. holds 'wheres' at go?'

moves the ball around looking for √ hole, then stops, with √ hole ontop of the ball

'No .... in there .... in that one' pointing to the √ hole, glancing at C.

'No .... won't go in that one' said loudly with head/hair movement on first word - which is also stressed for emphasis - glancing across at C

reaches down, picks up shape reaches the eye contact looking across into C's face 'that one ....' offering shape to C. 'In there', chuckling, glancing down to hole and pointing to, tapping √ hole

reaches forward, picks up shape.
reaches down, picks up another shape looking down
looks across, takes shape M. holds, transfers it to other hand, puts her own shape to the hole the mother indicates
holds her (C's) shape
offers shape to hole M. indicates - manipulates - then moves shape back to another hole
C moves hand away and the shape falls to the floor
looks at the ball, moves head forward, looks into ball; moves head back, lifts hand with shape forward. The shape falls to the floor as it knocks against the ball. Reaches down to pick up shape
picks up another shape, nearer to her
offers shape to a hole in the ball, retracts shape and shape - watches - holding shape

moves shape forward to a hole in the ball, manipulates shape in the hole.

Again?
holds shape above the \check{\text{hole}}, in \check{\text{orientation}}
In here - look' reaching forward, holding a shape out to C, and jostling the child's hand to get her attention

M. is holding the ball so that the \check{\text{hole}} for her shape is nearest to the C. and easiest for C to reach. Glances at shape C moves to hole. 'No .... you got that one'
turns the ball around then holds it pointing to the \check{\text{hole}} for the shape C. is holding; glances into C's face

'No'
moves C's hand back to \check{\text{hole}}

reaches down, picks up the shape, holds it in her hand, glances at the other shape C. is holding and points to another hole. 'In there' glances at C's shape

Reaches across (in direction of fallen shape)
notes this retracts hand

moves hand to ball, picks it up, turns the ball around looking for the \check{\text{hole}} pushes ball back to C. with \check{\text{hole}} on top. Holds ball, points to \check{\text{hole}} with finger of the same hand. Glances into C's face

looks up at M.
looks down, offers shape to hole again.

/waim/

watches

reaches forward and pushes shape home.

/tah/ takes shape H. offers, watches ball being moved around.

moves shape to hole on top - manipulates.

Looks up into H's face.

/ow/ looks down to ball.

continues to manipulate. Lifts the shape away, turns it in her hands, puts it to the ball again. It falls off onto the floor, reaches down and picks up a different shape.

looks at the shape.

offers shape to hole on the ball, looks across and puts the shape into H's hands.

/mi/ reaches across on floor - for the first shape - picks it up.

meets the child's gaze in eye contact - looking down at C, moving head forward in an 'effort to understand' 'what?'

looks down at hole.

'put it right .... look'

takes shape from C, turns it round in her hand, puts shape to hole in orientation, partly in hole glances at C.

'Ey Ar'

'Put it in then'

looking into C's face, with a head nod on 'put?'

'That's it!'

moves body back briefly, then forwards again. 'What about that then?' picking up another shape and holding it out to C.

moves ball around, looking for hole holds ball steady.

meets C's gaze, smiles.

looks down.

'gon to try another one now.' moves ball around, looking for hole. Then holds ball steady.
offers the shape to the ball, to the hole on top. But the ball is still revolving, the shape slips from her grasp and falls of

squeals, lifts up the ball in both hands, moves it around - looking at it

squeals, lifts up the ball, struggles with M., pulls the ball away, looks up at M

turns to right, moves away to right crying, still pulling at the ball

/'mum/

struggles with M. again, pulling the ball away, looks up at M.

looks down - frets

looks to left, moves to left, waving the ball

'goin back to that one now are we' turns the ball around to locate the ∨ hole

reaches across for the shape, retrieves it, releasing the ball in the process

'There we are - look' holds the shape up in front of the child and reaches for the ball

receives the eye contact

'What about that one then', glancing at the shape, moving the shape up.

'... in there?' pointing to, glancing at a hole in the ball they are holding between them - then looking back into C's face

'Alice .... Look' (sternly) looking across into C's face, holding up the shape, still.

puts the shape she is holding to the ball held between M. and C.

receives the eye contact

'Look' said with head movement down and glance down to the shape; eyebrows raised and a slight inclination of head forward. (norverbal cues = threat. DY)

releases the ball.

'No?' moves hand away

'You want to mope now then?' releases shape to floor

Videotape recording ends
1.2 Tape transcript data for 'James' and his mother

James and his mother are sitting on the living room floor, facing each other. The mother has just put the ball and shapes in front of the child.

Child's age is 15 months and 3 weeks.

Videotape recording begins

James (C.)

C. picks up a shape ... hesitates then ... looks up and across at M

/ijə:j/ looks down at ball following M's point

offers shape to a hole
holding ball with other hand
/aː 'dædɑː;/ looks up at M

watches M. then looks down, fingerling a shape

looks at the shape
looks into M's face
ball slips away under C's weight

picks up shape from floor, puts shape to X hole

bangs shape against hole, looks up at M, at what she is doing, stops banging at sound of M's voice
looks into M's face on 'lost'
holds shape near to ball
watches M

holds shape near to ball
watches M

moves, readjusts posture as he finds his shape no longer near the ball

Mother (M.)

receives C's eye contact with 
'In there' pointing down to a hole

'will you try and put it in there then, for mummy please?'
looks behind her, reaches behind her into box
receives eye contact
'wont go?'
turns ball to box, reaches inside for another shape
reaches across, holds out to C another shape
receives eye contact
'Look' retrieves ball, puts in front of C.
'Now lets see what we can find', releases ball, and shape she is holding

'No?'
looks at various shapes in front of her and then in box.
'I think you've lost some of the shapes haven't you' looking into C's face

reaches into box
re-orient herself to C., puts the shapes onto the floor in front of C.
Moves ball round, picks up a shape, moves ball around again
Offers C. the shape
'Try that one .... Try that one .... In there' withdrawing the shape holding it above the X hole In
Reaches forward and pushes shape home

/æ æ h ə /
takes shape and hand away from H, reaches down with other hand, picks up shape, offers to a hole in ball

pushes shape in hole, then takes hand away
looks up at H.

bangs the two shapes, one held in each hand together

Looks down at the appropriate shape

moves shape to hole

pushes shape home with a clatter

Smiles waves arm /æ æ h ə / moves another shape to X hole

takes shape away, bangs shape against ball - offers shape to hole now on top of ball - does not fit; bangs shape against ball

'Good Boy!' 
reaches forward, tries to take away the shape C is still holding in his hands

moves ball slightly
'Try that one then ... my love'

receives eye contact
'There y'are look'
reaches down, turns ball round locates 

looks up, points to C's left hand with one hand, to the 

shape with her other hand.  'Try that one ... Try that one ... In there', reaches forward and touches the shape C holds touches 

hole in the ball, then again touches C's shape.  'That one' with a small push - then touching hole ... 'In there' said with a look into C's face, moving head lower to look into C's face more

'Good Boy!'

looks up and across at C.
'ooh ... that's it!' then looks down to floor

'Good Boy!' 

moves ball around - 'Now then let's have a look for ... take that away' said softly to C, pushing C's shape away, moves ball round then looks on floor
/æh/ draws back

takes shape H offers

puts to hole on top of ball, does not fit - manipulates - still does not fit
looks up /æ ˈdow/ 
lifts both arms, offers shape to H.

looks down - breaks off eye contact then looks at shape.
Moves hand to shape, then away as H. moves shape to ball. Then bangs ball with palm of hand.

/ɪ'hw/ fingers hole in ball, putting fingers through hole

watches

reaches forward with palm outstretched to push home the shape - just too late as H. lets go

/æh/ picks up another shape

offers shape to /\ hole. It falls inside.

/æiˈh/ looks down

reaches for a shape on the floor, then reaches for another

'There's some missing'

reaches for shape in C's hand holding another shape out to C

takes shape from C, offers C another, holding it between 2 fingers near C's hand
'try that one'

points to hole 'in there'

receives C's eye contact, looking down at C with head lowered slightly to C, and slightly on one side

'No?' shaking head
'Try again?' half taking the shape, then offering it back to C, then moving it to a ball

Holds shape out for C

'Yes it does'
holding onto centre rod of ball to steady it with one hand - touches C's hand with other.
'Let me show you' moves C's hand away; holds shape over hole

re-orients it, holding shape between 2 fingers, lets it drop into ball.
'... in there ... like that'

'There!'

'Now, you know this shape'
moves ball round so that /\ hole is on the top

glances at C's movements then moves the ball around

holds shape out for C
picks up the shape, offers it to a hole on the side of the ball, it falls inside looks at shape H still is holding out. Takes the shape, offers it to hole on top, it falls inside. Moves to left for another shape, picks it up and offers it to hole in ball, it drops inside. Picks up another shape - offers it to hole on top of ball, waits offers to hole now on top of ball manipulates shape in hole

'tGood Boy!' said quietly
'Good Boy!' whispered
moves ball round
moves ball round
reaches forward to help C
'keep goin'
takes hand away
moves hand to floor, picks up next shape, moves hand to ball to steady it
points to a spot in front of her, looking at the child, with a head movement slightly forward and ending abruptly, and eyebrows raised

'put it back please'

reaches across, brings the ball back, turns it over and offers C a shape from those on the floor.
'Look, try that one!' holds shape above the hole in orientation

receives eye contact
'Good Boy!' with open gesture, full face to C, with eyebrows raised.
'Good Boy!' looks back down with a head nod as she says it.

turns ball round

'How many more are there to go?' moves from side to side to count how many shapes are left. Looks down at C's activity. Reaches forward, bends forward to C.
t takes hand away as C is
intervenes

in the game

his hand grows to 

the size of a ball

moves round ball, takes shape

puts shape to hole on top of ball, slots it home

/woe:/he
looks up and across at H
moving hands in a silent clap

looks down for next shape

reaches forward for H's shape, then down, picks up a different shape, offers it to hole on top of ball

continues to manipulate the shape in the X hole

/da'blar/
offers his shape to M

Manipulates hole in ball with fingers, then reaches for the shape H is holding out. Offers it to hole on top of ball

C. manipulates shape but it will not go through the hole

/əe: h/
offers shape to M.

/ŋə'ŋə/ 

watches H's hand briefly
then reaches for the ball, rolls it around

'Like to turn it round?'
'Now ... hold it ... turn it round for you'
'Round here'
'There'
puts the ball in a different position so that the camera can see. Offers C. a shape, puts it above hole

'Good Boy!!'
sits upright

/isət/ for help
receives eye contact, shakes head, smiles.
\textit{ahw good!!}

moves hand forward, picks up another shape, then moves the ball around with her other hand

moves body back, then forwards again
'Try that one' offering C her shape

'Thank you' said brightly, lowers her own shape to C 'Try that one'

'No' reaches forward to ball, holds it. Points to hole on top of ball steadies ball so that C's shape goes to hole

reaches forward and takes shape
'No?'
exchanges shape with one held in her other hand
offers shape to C
takes shape

looks at H's hand

looks at the hand H has just touched, moves the shape it contains to the ball, then waves it, banging it against the ball twice.
Looks up and across at H

looks round at camera, briefly, then looks back

moves shape to hole, bangs it, moves hand away, waves arm, bangs ball with shape 3 times.
Offers shape to hole, pushes it down but the shape does not fit

partly releases the shape, partly has it taken from him, bangs down on the shape with palm of hand so that it jumps around in H's hands

reaches forward pushes down on shape before H finished orienting shape

reaches forward with palm outstretched and pushes the shape home

picks up shape from floor, offers to H, puts in H's lap.

looks down to floor manipulates shape with fingers

crawls to left

'in there' offering shape to C, then moves ball round to find hole

'where this one then'
locates hole, moves it to top position reaches forward and touches C's hand, whispers 'this one .... James'
looking into C's face, head lowered 'that one, in there' pointing to the hole

receives eye contact, looking at C, smiling

'what y' doin?'

points to hole

'Try it'

'Let mummy show you'
lifts C's hand off the shape

re-orients shape - offers it to hole on top of ball

removes shape glances into C's face

'Look. Let me show you'
re-orients shape, offers it to hole again

'takes shape

'put back?' looking across into C's face

'How many more have we to go?
Two? ' reaches down and moves the ball around
stops movement to left
looks back
reaches for shape, puts to \( \sqrt{2} \) hole
looks up at \( M \) as the shape falls inside the ball
and claps.

reaches for shape, takes

moves shape to a hole, manipulates shape in hole
continues to manipulate shape in \( X \) hole
resists the intervention
looks up at \( M \)
plonks the shape he is holding into \( M \)'s lap

reaches for the shape, takes it, offers to hole on side of the ball, pushes, then manipulates shape
looks up and across at \( M \)

looks down at the hole, manipulates shape in the hole
moves hand away, shape is stuck in hole
reaches forward and bashes the side of the ball, the shape falls inside

'There look' moving ball and shape towards \( C \), offers \( C \) the shape, tapping shape against ball.

moves ball around, looking down to locate \( \sqrt{2} \) hole. Locates hole, points to it, moves shape to \( C \).
'That one' whispers

receives the eye contact
'Good Boy!!' holds up another shape, leaning forward, glances into \( C \)'s face, full face up to \( C \). Holds shape up near the line of eye contact
'one more' offers shape to \( C \)

moves ball around
'let's have a look .... see if you can find it' said glancing across into \( C \)'s face

'Now' said slowly, with emphasis

'Wait a minit' reaches forward, tries to turn the ball around

receives the eye contact, reaches down, rotates the ball

'Must be around the other side' looking down at the ball, glances across at \( C \)
'Want mummy to do it?' picks up the shape, holds it up for \( C \) to take, moving it round to \( \sqrt{2} \) orientation

receives eye contact with very brief shake of head, head lowered to \( C \), eyebrows raised

moves hand forward, then retracts it

\( M \), reaches forward - and pushes shape

'Good!'
looks to left and onto floor - bangs toy car on floor

(observer in conversation with C's brother: 'Tuesday is it
..... Tuesday you go back to school?' 'Thursday' 'Is it
Thursday?' 'Yes' 'Oh!')

H. then talks to observer and brother:
'Is it Allister that goes back on Tuesday?
..... There look!'
lifts ball up ..... 'There look .... I've finished!'
waves ball up in air

looks up at H briefly - on
'There' - then down, picks up
 dagger and sheath (a toy)
 bangs then on floor

puts ball down on lap
'Good Boy!'

'that's better isn't it'

Video tape recording ends
1.3 Tape transcript data for 'Leslie' and his mother

The mother is sitting on a settee above the child, who is playing on the floor in front of her. Child's age: 19 months 0 weeks.

Videotape recording begins

Leslie (C.)

/ tæ ɹ /
pushing a car along the floor

/ʃi:/
watches M

/pɪkæɹ/  
manipulates car, looking down

/ðəɹ/  
pushing car backwards and forwards

Mother (M.)

'It's a car'
reaching down onto floor, putting blocks on top of others

'Put car in the buildin?'
'there, put in in there .... that's it...
'It's a garage isn't it?'
pushes a car into the 'garage' she has built

Yeah'
looks to right, reaches to right
'There's another one'
picks up another block, puts it in front of C.
Glances at C then picks up two more blocks. Holds one out to C - withdraws
'wait a minute, let's put a black one on there in front of that one ....'
reaches down, picks up another block, puts it to 'garage'
'Put that car in there then'
glances across into C's face

'you puttin that one in there?'  
reaches down in front of C and touches the car he is holding - then points to 'garage'
'Put that one in there then ....'
'now put that in there reaches down and touches the car again, and points to 'garage'. Looks down and across into C's face with head moved lower

That's it .... now that I'll go in there ....
looks to right, picks up block off settee.
Offers it to C.
/brum/ looks up, takes block, puts on top of 'garage'. /brum 'brum/

manipulates block on top of 'garage'. It falls off and clatters to the floor. /brum 'brum/

looks at the block, then swipes at 'garage'. It falls over, looks up at H.

'brum'

reaches for another block from those on floor to give to C

moves back to an upright posture, receiving the eye contact, smiles at C. 'oh dear!' looks down onto floor

'where have they gone?' reaches forward and down to the floor infront of C

'build it up again' puts one block onto another as the start of a 'tower'

'Don't you want to build it up' looking across into C's face - at the same time puts another block to the new tower, then reaches across infront of C for next block

'woops!' knocks block off accidentally - puts it back. 'put that block up on there' holds block out to C, looking into C's face

another wun' holds another block out to C, looking into C's face

/fm/ looks down at blocks on floor

watches

watches - bends head down to look under settee

/l/ lifts head, looks across to what H. is doing

/læh 'ow 'wɔ /

looks at tower and the shape, reaches forward /æt ər/ takes shape, puts onto 'tower'

takes, puts it to 'tower'
picks up another block, puts it on top of the 'tower'.

sits back moves hand forward and pushes the tower over

laughs, looks up at H

still looking up, reaches up to H. Looks across, pulls at her skirt, glances down

pulls at H's skirt, looks up at H.

pulling himself closer to H. looks down

'Hmmmy what?' head lowered slightly to C in an effort to understand. Looks down - reaches down to stop C. pulling

'Hmmmy agen? .....' reaches forward and down '..... oh dear!'

picks up blocks 'You keep on knocking it down tho'. Picks up more blocks. Makes a 'garage'.

put the car in then.....! glances across into C's face, and points to the car and then taps the top of the 'garage'

'put the car in then'

'oh, it missed!'

watches C's movements 'you want that car?'

reaches down, steadies tower

'there we are'

moves back on settee, leans elbow on knees, chin in one palm

'wooh'

meets the eye contact.

'You build it up this time' with a head nod on 'you' for added emphasis

'You build it up' receiving the eye contact - with a head nod on 'you'

'Hmmmy agen?'.......

'put the car in then.....!'

'put the car in then'

'oh, it missed!'

watches C's movements 'you want that car?'
/æˈtɑːr/ reaches forward and puts the car to the top of the tower
lets the car go - it almost falls off

reaches forward and slowly and deliberately pushes the construction over. Then knocks the remaining blocks over

'put that car in then'

'put that one on the top?'

reaches forward
'woops a dais'
puts the car into the garage
'there we are'
sitting on edge of settee steadies the garage then sits back

'you'll have to be more gentle than that ..... you keep pushin it down'.

Videotape recording ends
2.0 Three Middle Class Mother - Child Pairs

2.1 Tape transcript data for 'Sally' and her mother

Sally and her mother are sitting in the garden, on the grass, facing each other. Sally has just been playing with a spoon. Child's age: 17 months 2 weeks.

Videotape recording begins

**Sally (C.):**

reaches forward, takes shape, looking down at it

looks at the ball - puts shape down /tθ/ 

looks down - picks up shape /emekaro/ 

looks at shape closely - looks at ball, reaches across and offers shape to hole on top of the ball /baθeŋaŋ/ 

/emego/ pushing shape into X hole 

/elɛɡo/ with one hand fingers a hole - then drops spoon into ball 

/abadon/ looks at hole in ball /ɔiŋ/ squeals, lowers her head and looks round side of ball into a hole for the spoon 

looks at spoon

**Mother (M.):**

offers C. a shape 

looks across into C's face 

moves body forward, reaches forward and puts the ball in front of the child; then looks across into C's face

'No?' 

takes ball away - from in front of the child, puts it down in front of herself, still holding it 

points to another hole - glances into C's face 

'in that one' glances into C's face 

'That one' points again to hole. 

Looks across into C's face. 

.... in that one'

takes hand away from ball 

reaches across to the ball, lifts up the ball, takes spoon out, puts spoon and ball in front of the child 

'spoon'
looks round the ball, picks up the spoon, offers it to another hole

-listen-

looks at the ball, offers spoon to a hole

(Listens off to right)

Looks to right

retracts hand

Looks after C's gaze - to right turns back, looks to left, reaches for object, rattles it against another shape.

Turns back to right, looking after C's gaze

receives eye contact, turns head to meet C's gaze

'In there ...' said very softly, picks up another shape - moves ball away from C slightly in the process - holds up the shape to C and glances at C

'That's better'

'In that one' points - glances at C

moves hand away - scratches - with same hand moves hair over ears

'goin to put it in?'

glances into C's face

points to hole - taps it, looking across into C's face, with head lowered

'No?'

Lets go of ball - sits upright watching C from a distance

receives eye contact, chuckles

looks down at camera - then round at observer - then carefully finishes the getting in operation and sits down looking at camera and smiling

Videotape recording ends
2.2 Tape transcript data for 'Stewart' and his mother

The child is kneeling on the floor in front of the mother, who is sitting on the floor. They have the 'ball and shapes' game between them.

Child's age: 19 months 1 week

Videotape recording begins

Mother (M.)

receives eye contact
'do that one?'

Child: 'yes, didow... noin... ayes'

Mother: puts it to another hole.
lifts it out and re-orients it

Child: lifts it again to another hole.
moves

Mother: meets C's gaze

Child: 'oh! its the blue one.'

Mother: reaches forward and takes ball

Videotape recording begins

Stewart (C.)

looks up and across at M., holding a shape

Crek eases / reaches forward and points to a hole in the ball
Crek eases / then points to another hole in the ball
Crek eases / looks back up and across at M.

Crek eases / moves shape forward

Crek eases / holds it next to ball.

Crek eases / looks at it, looks at ball, moves ball around, looks down at shape again puts shape to a hole, presses it in

Crek eases / looks at shape again

Crek eases / puts it to another hole, lifts it out and re-orientates it

Crek eases / lifts it again to another hole.

Child: 'yes, didow... noin... ayes'

Crek eases / lifts shape up out of hole

Crek eases / turns it round, puts it down on floor looking at it

Child: glances up at M.

Crek eases / pushes the shape away - it collides with the ball, the ball rolls away
'It's one of the blue holes'
moves the ball around
"Here it is"
holds ball in position so that
hole is now on top. Lets go of ball.
Picks up shape from floor, holds out
to C

moves forward, takes shape,
puts it to the hole on top of
the ball.
It clatters inside.
Looks to left and round on
floor, picks up another shape,
puts to same hole
/put aeni: 'θi/

'You know what that is .... that's a
triangle isn't it?'

moves the ball around with
the shape in his hand, looking
down at the holes

reaches across, moves ball round
'where has the triangle gone?'
looks down at ball, holding it steady,
still looking for hole

'that's it!' said softly

receives eye contact
raises eyebrows to meet C's gaze -
then glances down, nods her head
at the same time

receives eye contact
'that's a ... oh dear ...
I've forgotten what they're called'
'trapezium?'

Lifts up shape and looks at it
looks up and across at H.
moving shape up close to C's
eye near the line of sight

observes shape

'Is it /
Observer chuckles

moves shape around,
manipulating it against ball
chuckles, then turns head to observer
'geometry isn't it?!
said to observer, chuckling

observer chuckles
again
puts shape to hole
moves it to another hole
manipulates shape in hole
manipulates shape in hole

- puts shape to hole
- puts shape to hole
manipulates shape in hole
- manipulates shape in hole
- turns head away - looks at camera, still pushing shape in hole
looks at shape - and then at hole
puts shape into hole - it falls inside

looks down on floor, to right, for more shapes.
Picks up a shape reaches forward and pushes shape into hole

looks at the ball.

/naw...karrnt/
said with a head shake

/karrnt/
/ah...get...oknowt /
/get /
reaches forward to ball

/reach across for the ball - but the ball rolls past C.
laughs
retrieves ball, puts between feet
/karrnt /
tries to kick it, rolls it away a bit, then kicks the ball back to M

watches ball

moves foot forward to ball - kicks it back

reaches across
'that's right!' moves ball right so that C has orientation
'turn it round a bit more'
'that's it!' 'that's right' said softly

looks across into C's face 'you got them all down?'

reaches forward and rolls the ball around, then takes hand away, glancing across into C's face

'you want me to empty it?' looking into C's face. Reaches forward, takes ball, empties shapes out, shapes fall to floor

manipulates ball, clicks the two halves back into place. Rolls ball back to C

laughs

'You can't kick it when you're sittin down can you?!
taps ball back to C 'Can you stand up and kick it?'
taps ball closer to C

Videotape recording ends
2.3 Tape transcript data for 'Geoffrey' and his mother

Geoffrey and his mother are in the 'play room', mother sitting on a chair looking down onto the floor where the child is playing with a 'pillar box and shapes' game. Child age is 10 months 3 weeks.

Videotape recording begins

**Geoffrey (C.)**

- C. bends over the pillar box trying to get a shape into a hole
- bangs shape with hand
- looks at the hole to which M. is pointing
- looks into the hole, then offers a shape to a hole pauses - looks up at camera
- releases the shape and it falls inside the pillar box
- follows M.'s point with eyes
- reaches across
- picks up a different shape, looks at it
- puts shape to pillar box

**Mother (M.)**

- 'No .... it doesn't go in there ... does it?'
- 'Try that one ...' pointing down
- 'This one ...' touching the \( \checkmark \) hole for the shape C is holding
- 'in there'
- 'Try that one' removes finger
- 'hm - keep going .... keep moving it down .... that's right'
- 'Good Boy! - and there's another one - look - to post' pointing across to a shape on the floor
- 'That one, near the horse'
- 'go and get it' reaches down and steadies the pillar box
- 'I didn't mean that!'
- moves out of seat and round in front of the child - then offers C a shape
looks up at camera briefly and then back down on 'that'. Watches M picks up another shape, puts to hole, manipulates takes shape away offers shape to hole again, it doesn't go in
'Have that Geoffrey ... put it in there'
points to hole, puts shape in slot. 'There it goes look ... In there?' holds shape for C, glances into C's face
'You do it now'
holds shape out to C
'It does go in .... let me tilt it up a bit'. Tilts the pillar box
'All right'

'Let me show you .... look'
takes shape from C, orients it
'There - you push it'
holds the shape above the hole for the C

'Shall we take them out and put them in again?'
Lifts lid off pillar box - then points to it. 'take them out'

'ow!' chuckles

Picks up pillar box - moving it away from C. Takes object out and replaces the top
Videotape recording ends
3.0 Four Upper Class Mother - Child and Nanny - Child Pairs

3.1 Tape transcript data for 'Giles' and his nanny

The child and nanny are in the kitchen; the child having picked up a jigsaw walks to a chair. The nanny walks across to his side from the other side of the kitchen.

Child's age: 24 months 1 week

Videotape recording begins

Giles (C.)

\( /\text{daj} / \)

watches - waiting - holding board

\( /\text{dowt} / \)

looks down at board

\( /\text{daj} / \)

lifts up board

\( /\text{waj}\text{'st} / \)

points to another jigsaw piece

\( /\text{st} / \)

manipulates jigsaw piece on the board

\( /\text{seit} / \)

moves head back, still looking down at jigsaw board

\( /\text{par} / \)

moves forward again - reaches down to the jigsaw, manipulates jigsaw piece

Nanny (N.)

\('\text{can l .... sit down .... and then you ...}' takes some pieces away from chair to make some space for her to sit down

\('\text{cum around here ..... look}' puts all of jigsaw pieces into one hand, puts the other hand around C's waist brings him forward

\('..... isn't it}'

\('\text{tak'es board, moves it around on her knee, then moves pieces of jigsaw in her hand forward - offers to C}

\('\text{that one?}' selects a piece - holds it out to C. Glances into C's face

\('\text{was that one?}'

\('\text{no the other way up}'

\('\text{turn it round}'

\('\text{ow! you're hopeless}' moves hand forward, chucks him under the chin, looking into C's face

\('\text{You did it all alright last week didn't ya}'
reaches forward and pushes jigsaw piece into location lifts hand away

looks at piece - takes it out - puts to one place in jigsaw. Hesitates then puts it to another place

puts to another hole

hesitates with hand over top of piece

looks at it - takes it - puts to a place in the jigsaw

takes piece away - puts to another place

with hand still on the piece

moves to another position

moves to another position

moves to another position

slides piece back to last hole, moves shape around in that position, then takes hand away

'Turn it round' moves hand forward, turns piece around. Leaves it next to place orientation 'like that .... Barry' glances across into C's face

selects another piece - gives it to C. - holding it out.

'Noww'

'that's it'

moves hand across on top of C's hand, presses it down, presses the piece home moves forward to C another piece

'now'

takes hand away

'now'

'yes .... turn it round'

moves hand forward

'turn it round'

'turn it round' moves hand forward again, turns piece around, presses piece down into place. Looks up and across at C - then down holding her palm open
moves hand forward, takes shape, puts to jigsaw board, presses it down into place without hesitation.

looks at jigsaw piece just put into position

looks at piece being held out - takes it and puts to jigsaw board.
Looks to left

"You're lackin' in patience Giles!"

\[ N. enters in conversation with secretary \]

Mother Secretary

matches for candles'

looks back down puts jigsaw piece into the position

'did you manage to get matches this morning?'

'mm'

'uh huh' moves palm forward to C, glancing into C's face

looks across at N's movement 'only this box has run out'

'did you manage to get matches this morning?'

'just put one up there!' drops piece of jigsaw onto floor, reaches after it. Looks down onto floor.

'matches for candles?'

'can you put the one up there ... actually ... onto the sideboard?'

'clops' off to right

'Clap's Clogs!'

receiving eye contact and smiling

receives eye contact with:

'where's all those multitude of hankies? .... here you are.... reaching forward to C's nose, pulls C. to her, wipes C's nose

Videotape recording ends
3.2 Tape transcript data for 'Emma' and her nanny

The child and nanny are both kneeling on the floor in the living room.

The nanny has put the components of the game, a wooden box with holes in the top, and its associated shapes infront of the child. The child is pushing a toy train forwards and backwards.

Child's age: 19 months 3 weeks

Videotape recording begins

Emma (C.)

'come on then' looking across at C, pointing to a hole in the top of the box

'in this one then ....' tapping the hole - with a head movement down on 'this' and a glance down, then back across to C., watching C's movements

looks at shape, picks it up, puts it to a hole N has indicated, manipulates /etc.
looks up at N

looks down - continues to manipulate

shape eventually falls inside the box C. reaches for another pauses /etc./ looks up at N

/et/ looks down and picks up shape

offers to hole, manipulates in hole

Nanny (N.)

receives the eye contact

'you can', head nod on 'can' and glances down to hole

'that's right'

'good'

receives eye contact

'yes? ..... more?'

'put ... that one in as well' head nod on that readjusts posture by turning more to C

'That's it'
shape falls inside, reaches down, picks up another, puts to hole

It falls inside

reaches down, picks up another shape, puts to a hole, manipulates shape in hole, bangs shape down into hole with palm of hand - it doesn't fit

/.../
lacks up and across at H takes hand away, leaving shape on top of box, next to hole

looks down to hole /.../
reaches across, takes shape and manipulates shape in X hole, the hole next to the \( \square \) hole

reaches across, takes shape

manipulates shape in hole H has just pointed to

puts shape to hole H points to, scrabbles

puts shape to hole - it fits looks up at H takes hand away, shape still half in hole

reaches forward, pushes the shape into the hole.

Tips box on side, looks up at H, smiling

That's it'

"Good!"

receives eye contact

moves in quickly, picks up shape, drops it then retrieves it - looking down goes in there! said with head nod down to a hole 'like this' puts shape to \( \checkmark \) hole, in \( \checkmark \) orientation

'Does ... All right .... does it go in this one?' glances into C's face - reaches across puts shape to another X hole, wiggles it in hole 'No?'

points to hole (another X hole, working clockwise around the top of the box).

'In there?' looks across into C's face

'No?'

'Try this one' pointing to another hole, and glancing at C

'How!'

points to another hole

'This one'

glances at C

'Yes.' looking across, smiling receives eye contact

'Good girl!'

'push it in!' taps shape with little finger, using no force
looks down reaches into holes in the bottom of the box.

/ E / looks up at N

looks down, manipulating in holes in bottom of box.

looks up and across at N, then down at shapes on the floor.

looks across at N's hand. Stands up, reaches for it, takes it and sits down.

puts box upright.

puts shape to top of box.

/ K a / \ \ \ manipulates shape against hole.

manipulates shape - it falls inside gives a shape she is holding to N.

/ i j \ \ \ A / takes the shape.

looks down, lifts box on end, examines it, manipulates turning it over, picks up a shape, puts it into the bottom where the holes are much bigger. Grunts.

looks up at N, smiling.

receives eye contact, chuckling, turns to camera. 'If yer like ... yes ... well!' (observer chuckles)

squeals.

looks up at N.

receives eye contact by bending forward, full face to C, laughing.

looks down, grunts.

grunts, looking at C. (observer chuckles)
manipulates box
grunts
looks up at N
grunts
grunts softly
still looking into N's face

looks down

manipulates shapes in front of
her, turns box over and puts hand inside

puts box upright, and puts shape to
top, manipulates, looks across at N

looks back down, continues to
manipulate. Shape falls inside.
Reaches across for the one given N.
Looking at it in N's hands

takes shape, puts to hole on top of the box and it falls inside

looks up to meet N's gaze then
back down, manipulates shape in
hole

ubodts/

meets C's gaze
bends head low to look over
to see what C doing.
'And another one?'

receives eye contact
'Yes, that's alright'
does not move the shape to C

moves shape to C

reaches across, lifts up box,
turns it over and taps shapes out.
PUTS box down in front of C. Looks round on the floor.
'Where's the other one?'
lowers head to look into C's face.
'Is there one missing'

meets C's gaze
'ah?'
takes the shape
'Thank you'
then, with head lowered, looks
into C's face and reaches across,
putting shape inside hole
"Iwa...iwa:V/

watches N's movements

turns away from N
picks up box
"get'it"
goes away behind table, away to the right

withdraws, looking across into C's face

'I'm sorry!'
reaches across again
'can I put this into this hole, in here?' Glances down at hole, then looks across at C's face, head very low.
'Is it allright?' still looking across into C's face

'No it's not!'

Videotape recording ends
Charlotte is sitting on the floor of the bedroom, looking down at a jigsaw puzzle. The nanny is sitting in a chair, watching the child from a distance of about 6 feet.

Child's age: 26 months 3 weeks

Videotape recording begins

**Charlotte (C.)**

puts piece to jigsaw, presses it down, looks up and across at N, smiling

looks down, reaches forward then takes piece out of jigsaw one by one, then starts to put them back. Puts first piece to X place, then to place, puts rest to place immediately. Completes the jigsaw, takes board away, looks up at N, smiling

looks back down to jigsaw takes pieces out - keeping them in one hand

receives eye contact with 'Good Girl!' said softly

Nanny (N.)

receives the eye contact smiles at C

puts them onto floor

reaches forward to jigsaw, then looks up at the camera, smiling chuckles

(receives the eye contact)

chuckles 'you old show off Lottey'

(this is what she's doing)

'Yes ... I think so ...... cum on Charlotte ..... get your other jigsaw if that's too easy for you!

gets up, reaches into the cupboard, gets out another jigsaw, brings it back, puts it on the floor infront of the N's chair.

Kneels down, empties out jigsaw, manipulates jigsaw pieces infront of her.

'lifts up piece, turning to N.
looking down at jigsaw pieces on floor

'You don't ..... for me, please'
turns back to jigsaw, plonks piece down
sits in front of the jigsaw, looking down

'up the other way ....'

'it doesn't fit that way ....
turn it up the other way'

turns, reaching up with jigsaw piece, looking up at camera
reaches up with other hand, exchanges hand holding shape, still looking at camera. Holds piece out - moves it to camera

Now ..... you dowit
Charlotte ..... you dowit'
with a head nod and glance down on 'you'

turns back, looks down to jigsaw
puts piece into jigsaw

'turn it up the other way'

slides piece about in jigsaw then turns, looks up at camera reaches up with jigsaw piece

'Charlotte dowit!' looking up still

'you dowit, Charlotte
(said softly)
'you dowit'

'go on!' you dowit'
takes piece - hands back to C.

turns back to jigsaw than looks at piece being held out, reaches forward and takes it

'you dowit'

looks down to jigsaw, then goes to left

reaches forward and down, 'look .... what about this one ....' picks up one piece from floor and holds it up to C., looking across into C's face, 'in there' pointing to the jigsaw
reaches forward, takes shape, puts to jigsaw

"hm?"
receives C's eye gaze

"look .... you put it in'
head nod on 'in'.

looks down, reaches down to jigsaw, manipulates jigsaw piece.
Sits back, looking down

'that's a horse'

lifts up piece, looks at it

'now that's not a horse ..... I don't know what that is ..... it peculiar'

puts piece into jigsaw board

'where's Golly Charlotte?'
receives eye contact

'there's Golly?'

turns back, looking on floor

'where's Golly Charlotte?'

picks up piece near to O

'is this it?'

holds up piece for C

looks up at piece O holds out

'You don't .... the other way ...
Look ... let me show you'
Takes the jigsaw piece from the C, turns it round and puts it into the jigsaw.

'Goes that way'
Leaves jigsaw piece on the edge of its position.
Looks into C's face

'put it in .... that way .... can you?
head nod down on 'put'.

moves to N, holding up the jigsaw piece
looks at the jigsaw piece, slides it around, turns it around.

sits upright

turns to N, looks to N holding up piece

watches N

reaches forward to jigsaw, picks up the jigsaw piece, looks at it. Stands up, bends down to the jigsaw and picks up the board. Goes off to the right to a chair. Plonks the board down on the chair, lifts up a jigsaw piece. Turns to window sill - puts jigsaw piece down on window sill. Lifts off ball of wool and needles from windowsill.

turns to N, looking across into N's face

puts needles down

comes across to N, holding up the ball of wool, looking across to N. kicks N's foot accidentally

runs back to the chair, then to window sill, pulls at bag on window sill; reaches over with other hand and pulls at bag

comes across to N, holding up the bag, looking at N

runs back to window sill

receives C's eye contact looks down at the piece, takes it from C, reaches forward 'there' puts piece next to place in jigsaw, in the orientation

'now Charlotte'

'could I have that please?'

would you bring it to Harlon?'

'aw .... the hurts .... thank you takes wool

'we'll have the lot now!'

'Thank you' takes bag

Video tape recording ends
3.4 Tape transcript data for 'Julian' and his mother

Julian is sitting on the floor of the nursery, with a jigsaw in front of him and with the mother kneeling about 7 feet away.

Child's age: 17 months, 1 week.

Videotape recording begins

**Julian** (C.)

puts piece into jigsaw

doesn't fit, C pauses

sits back, looks down at jigsaw, then to left

crawls away to left

glances at H's jigsaw piece, stands up, walks past H to cupboard, looks onto shelf, lifts off 'pillar box and shapes' toy, turns and glances at H, holding box out, returns in the general direction of H

frets - waves arms

frets more excitedly watching H's activity

/'du/ / reaches for a shape - looks at it

moves shape to hole on top of pillar box, manipulates shape in X hole

**Mother** (M.)

'do it gently'

'that's right gently' points to a place in the jigsaw

'put it there'

moves forward, reaches for a piece of the jigsaw on the floor, offers piece to C, holding it out. Glances into C's face

'You haven't tried this one' looks into C's face, still holding jigsaw piece out. Puts jigsaw piece down and watches C

takes pillar box from C

'wait a minit then ... let me take the top off' does so

looks across at C, puts pillar box in front of C, releases pillar box, chuckles and glances at C. 'now then ... tap them out' reaches forward and does so

puts top onto pillar box, puts pillar box onto floor

'Now then' looks across into C's face 'See if you can put them in' said with a head nod down on 'them'
"No it's not that one ..." taps another hole 'in that one .... try this one' looking down then across into C's face, tapping \( \checkmark \) hole

puts shape to \( \checkmark \) hole, it won't fit
puts shape down, picks up another
puts to X hole, manipulates shape in X hole

moves finger across and taps another hole
'here y're .... try that one'

bangs shape down on top of pillar box (twice) then frets

chuckles, reaches forward and pushes the shape home with palm of hand

Picks up another shape, and puts onto the top of the pillar box. Frets

reaches forward, picks up shape
bangs it down on top of box, and releases it. Frets

chuckles and small arm movements, of waving, reaches forward and pushes the shape home. Looks down, reaches down and picks up another shape, puts on top of box with fretting noises and arm waving sideways then downwards. Then reaches forward and touches the shape, then looks up at M

receives eye contact with eyebrows raised slightly
'hm' nods down and glances down to the shape

looks down - picks up shape, offers to M, looking across into M's face. Frets

chuckles as M. takes shape

receives C's eye contact, takes shape looking at C. with full face to C.
'what are you asking me to do?'/ offers shape to \( \checkmark \) hole
moves palm forward, pushes shape home.
Picks up next piece
puts on top of pillar box
(with no attempt to fit the shape to a hole)
frets and waves arms

reaches forward with palm
outstretched and pushes the shape home

looks down, picks up shape
plonks it on top of the pillar box
frets immediately

frets with arms outstretched
and waving

fretting, reaches for shape,
touches it on top of the pillar box. Looks up and across at H
frets, waving arms then picks up the shape, looks for H's hand,
lifts up the shape, moves it forward to H's hand

smiles, moves hand forward palm
outstretched and pushes shape home

looks down, picks up another shape
/Eh/
looks at it

'That's lazy!'
'. . . . You're just lazy aren't you?' moves body back and then forward again, adjusting handkerchief in sleeve
picks up shape, offers to ✓ hole

'I think these things are a bit too difficult for your age anyway' chuckles

'No . . . try that one' points to another hole, looking across into C's face

still pointing to hole, moves head forward and down to C, full face to C, eyebrows raised

receives eye contact
'oww!' with small head movement back

moves her hand forward and takes the shape, puts it to the top of the pillar box - in the ✓ hole, in the ✓ orientation

'You are a lazy boy'

'Now what?'
points to a hole
'What about that one . . . in there' looking across into C's face, with a glance down on 'there'
puts shape on top of pillar box
then puts it into a hole, lets it go, frets, waves arms, then frets louder
reaches for shape, retracts hand

watches frets

picks up shape, offers to X hole, it falls off. Looks down, picks up shape, squeals, waves arm, puts shape on top of pillar box - it falls off. Picks shape up again, puts back on top of pillar box. Frets

squeals then frets, picks up shape, frets louder, holds shape upright, presses it down into a hole

/akah akah/
shape falls into pillar box
waves arms slightly

picks up pillar box, lifts it up, and across, holds it out to H

/ihih/
/H/
waves arms

/H:/ waving arms
looks up and across at H

squeals, looks down at shapes

reaches down, picks up shape, puts on top of pillar box with no attempt to fit it to hole

still pointing to √ hole
reaches forward, turns pillar box around so that shape will fit hole nearest C. Shape falls off in the process. Picks it up, puts it back on top
'That hole'
'No .... that hole' points to √ hole

'hm' taps √ hole with finger 'try
that hole' takes finger away 'there'

'You've done it!!'
looking across into C's face

'Clever ...... what again?'
looking into C's face
takes toy

'Do it again?'
looking across into C's face

receives eye contact
'what again?' opens top of the pillar box - empties shapes out

puts top back onto pillar box
'wait a minit .... let me put the top on'
does so, puts box upright on floor.
'There you are'
glances across into C's face
looks at the shape, frets

reaches across picks up shape, throws onto floor

watches M's movements, frets

reaches forward, palm outstretched pushes shape into hole

picks up another shape, puts to top of pillar box

watches, frets, waves arms and kicks legs

increases fretting

reaches forward, picks up shape throws it down, looks after it, where it has fallen; points after it, reaches forward, squeals bends forward

looks past M's eye gaze - as if averting. Frets

chuckles, reaches forward, pushes shape down into the pillar box, Lifts up the box, offers it to M looking into M's face

turns toy round so that hole is nearest to C, looking into C's face. 'Try that hole' points to hole, glances down to hole

'No you do it' head nod on 'you'; eyebrows raised, looking into C's face

'Oh! you're loosing your temper with it, aren't you'

looks to right, reaches to right end retrieves shape, puts on top of pillar box, holding it in orientation in the hole. Glances across at C

'there you are!' looking into C's face

'You've got no patience have you?'

turns toy around so that hole is nearest to C, looks across into C's face

'Now ... you can do that one'

looks to where C reaches then back into C's face, eyebrows raised, face towards C, lowered slightly

looks down

reaches down, picks up shape puts it to hole, holding it above the hole in the orientation, glances across into C's face

receives the eye contact, takes pillar box, looking down into the child's face, head forward, full face to C in an 'effort after meaning'

'what do you want?'

frets, reaches forward, picks box out of M's hand, lifts it up, frets, plonks it back into M's hands

looks past M's eye gaze as if averting. Frets

chuckles, reaches forward, pushes shape down into the pillar box, Lifts up the box, offers it to M looking into M's face

frets, reaches forward, picks box out of M's hand, lifts it up, frets, plonks it back into M's hands
frets, reaches forward, touches top of toy, frets

frets louder waves arms horizontally, accidentally knocks the pillar box and the top comes off - shapes fly out

/a: wh/ looks on floor for shapes

/\wa: / picks up two shapes, puts them into pillar box, takes pillar box out of M's hand, puts onto floor

looks up at M, while putting a shape into box

reaches inside the pillar box, puts a shape inside, frets, brings shape out, puts it down. Reaches for another

'Please?' looking down into C's face, head forward and eyebrows half raised, holding toy

'Well, take the top off ... then' holds toy out to C

'You've done it!' with full face to C, eyebrows raised, following C's movements looking into C's face

'You've done it!' smiling across at C, looking into C's face for eye contact

'That wasn't what you meant at all .... was it?' looking lower into C's face, body moved slightly forward

receives eye contact 'clever boy! ...... You did it ...... all by yourself!!'

'take them out first and then put them in again .... Took' reaches forward, tips the pillar box over and empties out the shapes

Videotape recording ends.