The socialisation of Polish Members of the European Parliament 2004–2009: from national to European politicians?

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The Socialisation of Polish Members of the European Parliament 2004-2009
From National to European Politicians?

by
Melchior Szczepanik

Doctoral thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

26 August 2009

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Abstract
The aim of the thesis is to investigate how service in the European Parliament (EP) between 2004 and 2009 influenced the attitudes, identities and behaviour of the Polish members of the chamber. The study of the Polish contingent is carried out with a view to contributing to discussions of the phenomenon usually referred to as the "socialisation" of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). For the purposes of the present analysis, three aspects of socialisation are differentiated: institutional learning (MEPs learning to participate effectively in the work of the chamber), adaptation to the institutional culture of the EP (MEPs discovering the norms and codes of conduct characteristic for the EP) and attitude change (evolution of political views as a result of contacts with other MEPs).

The principal source of data for this thesis were interviews with 38 Polish MEPs, carried out first at the beginning of the term, in 2004, and then two years into the tenure. The findings suggest that service in the chamber and interactions with other MEPs have had little effect on the Polish MEPs' attitudes towards the issues related to European integration. In particular, there is no evidence that critics of integration modify their views as a result of contacts with the overwhelmingly pro-EU environment of the European Parliament.

The effects of service in the chamber are most visible in the domain defined as adaptation to the institutional culture of the EP. MEPs embrace parliamentary norms and codes of conduct and, as a result, modify the way in which they perceive EP politics and participate in it. MEPs' identity becomes more complex as they feel a stronger responsibility for representing all citizens of the EU. They pay more attention to the needs of their counterparts, are more open to compromises and refer more often to international processes in their analyses of politics. These conclusions do not apply in the same degree to all Polish MEPs. Generally, the effects of service mentioned above were manifest only in the case of individuals who came to the EP as strong supporters of integration. The influence of parliamentary norms was less significant among the moderate supporters of integration (Eurealists) and very weak among the Eurosceptics.

KEY WORDS: European Parliament, socialisation, MEPs, representative role, Poland, institutions.
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I am grateful to my “Loughborough friends”: Borja Garcia, Sophie Greger, Yogesh Gupta, Ana Juncos, Fotis Mavromatidis, Karolina Pomorska and Ulrike Waellisch – great companions for academic conversation and a night out. Thanks to them Loughborough felt like home.

I want to thank Polish MEPs who despite their busy schedules found the time to participate in this research project. I am particularly grateful to Lidia Geringer d’Oedenberg, Jan Olbrycht and Konrad Szymański who allowed me to follow them in their parliamentary activities for some weeks.

Research for this thesis would have been much more difficult without the help of Polish MEPs’ assistants who helped to deal with EP bureaucracy and were a priceless source of information regarding the chamber’s daily life: Mikołaj Budzanowski, Kasia Kwiecińska and Karolina Zielińska.

I am grateful to the academics who took their time to comment on my research and guide me through the world of doctoral research: Olivier Costa, Elżbieta Dydak, Julien Navarro, Aleks Szczerbiak and Richard Whitaker.

I am particularly indebted to my parents and Ania, my partner. Their love and support made me feel capable of completing this thesis.
# Table of contents

Abstract 2  
Acknowledgements 3  
Table of contents 4  
List of tables 6  
List of abbreviations 7  

Introduction 8  
  Research design and methodology 9  
  Overview of the thesis 18  

Chapter 1. The European Parliament: Historical development and internal dynamics 19  
  1.1 The European Parliament: A bastion of euroenthusiasm 20  
  1.2 Political groups and national party delegations: Principal actors of parliamentary life 25  
  1.3 The norms of EP institutional culture 34  
  Conclusions 40  

Chapter 2. Multiple Facets of Socialisation in the European Parliament 42  
  2.1 Research on socialisation in the EP and other EU institutions 43  
  2.2 Analytical framework and hypotheses 54  
  Conclusions 63  

Chapter 3. Polish political parties and MEPs 64  
  3.1 Polish political parties and European integration 64  
  3.2 Polish MEPs: Introduction 71  
  Conclusions 85  

Chapter 4. Socialisation as institutional learning: From novices to effective members 86  
  4.1 Euroenthusiasts and Eurorealists 87  
  4.2 Eurosceptics 99  
  Conclusions 101  

Chapter 5. Socialisation as adaptation to the institutional culture of the EP 104  
  5.1 Polish MEPs and the consensual culture of the EP 105  
  5.2 Polish MEPs and the European model of representation 113  
  5.3 Polish MEPs' identification with their political groups 124  
  Conclusions 130  

Chapter 6. Socialisation as attitude change: Comparing Polish MEPs' attitudes on chosen issues at the outset of the parliamentary term and two years later 133  
  6.1 The Left 134
6.2 The Democratic Party
6.3 Civic Platform
6.4 Law and Justice
6.5 Polish Peasant Party - Piast
6.6 Self-Defence
6.7 League of Polish Families
Conclusions

Chapter 7. Conclusions

7.1 Summary of findings
7.2 General conclusions regarding the socialisation process in the EP
7.3 Socialisation mechanisms and types of internalisation
7.4 Can the EP shape identities and attitudes?
7.5 Avenues for further research

Bibliography

Appendix 1 Questionnaire for Members of the European Parliament

Appendix 2 List of interviews
List of tables
Table 1 Principal sources for this study
Table 2 Overview of contacts with Polish MEPs
Table 3 Cohesion of the three main political groups in the EP between 1979 and 2001
Table 4 MEPs’ attitudes towards their representative role
Table 5 Results of the 2004 Polish elections to the European Parliament
Table 6 Polish MEPs by political experience
Table 7 Distribution of Polish MEPs by committee in the first and second half of the term
Table 8 Polish MEPs’ attitudes towards their representative role
Table 9 Euroenthusiasts’ beliefs regarding the institutional balance of power in the EU
Table 10 Eurorealists’ beliefs regarding the institutional balance of power in the EU
Table 11 Eurorealists’ beliefs regarding the combating of democratic deficit in the EU
Table 12 Eurorealists’ beliefs regarding deepening of European integration
Table 13 Eurosceptics’ beliefs regarding the institutional balance of power in the EU
List of abbreviations
ALDE – Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
AWS – Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (Solidarity Electoral Action)
CAP – Common Agricultural Policy
CDU – Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (German Christian Democratic party)
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
COREPER – Comité des Représentants Permanents (Committee of Permanent Representatives)
ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community
EP – European Parliament
EPP-ED – European People’s Party – European Democrats
EU – European Union
IND/DEM – Independence/Democracy
LPR – Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)
NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement
ODS – Obyčanská Demokratická Strana (Civic Democratic Party)
PD – Partia Demokratyczna (Democratic Party)
PDS – Partito Democratico di Sinistra (Italian Left Democratic party)
PES – Party of European Socialists
PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)
PO – Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform)
PSL – Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peasant’s Party)
SEA – Single European Act
SdPi – Socjaldemokracja Polska (Polish Social Democracy)
SLD – Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Alliance of Democratic Left)
UEN – Union for the Europe of Nations
UW – Unia Wolności (Freedom Union)
Introduction

"Parliaments are even better at indoctrinating their members with their own norms than are public schools or miners' lodges, as a whole list of angry firebrands who later mellowed into sage and gradualist parliamentary statesmen bears witness", claimed a scholar thirty years ago (Marquand 1979: 75). Does Marquand's assertion hold also for such a unique legislature as the European Parliament? What happens to new members of the European Parliament? To what extent do their attitudes and identities change, and what consequences may such changes have for their behaviour in the realm of EU politics? These are the questions that lay at the source of this thesis which, accordingly, has two main purposes. First, it documents the experience of the first group of Polish politicians elected to the EP, paying special attention to the effects of service for the evolution of their political beliefs and identities. By doing so, it seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge regarding socialisation processes in the EP, and assess to what extent this institution can be considered capable of modifying the identities and attitudes of its members.

To date most analyses devoted to socialisation of newly elected MEPs focused on changes in their views on integration (Franklin and Scarrow 1999, Scully 2002 and 2005). Those studies verified whether MEPs "go native", i.e. whether as a result of service in the chamber they become more supportive of European integration. This thesis follows that path and examines changes in attitudes of Polish MEPs towards the EU. Will Polish politicians who oppose the integration process, or support it with serious reservations, reassess their views once they start working in the very heart of ED politics and interacting with the overwhelmingly euroenthusiastic majority in the EP? But "going native" is not the only aspect of socialisation that this thesis wants to explore. It tests the assumption that socialisation of freshmen MEPs may bring about other important consequences than greater commitment to European integration. It analyses whether socialisation may affect how MEPs perceive the EU policy-making process, how they participate in this process and how they see themselves as representatives of various social groups and communities (such as their electorate, political party, all citizens of the EU). Turning attention to this aspect of socialisation, the thesis draws inspiration from analyses of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and working groups of the Council of the EU and the European Commission. Those studies revealed that members of these bodies, through frequent contacts with each other, developed a sense of allegiance to their institution and to European

1 I use the terms attitudes, beliefs and views interchangeably.
integration, which had a bearing on the way they negotiated with their counterparts from other member states and the way in which they perceived their own representative role (Beyers & Dierickx 1998; Egeberg 1999; Lewis 1998 and 2000; Trondal 2001). This thesis verifies whether similar processes occurred in the case of Polish MEPs serving in the European Parliament.

I argue that socialisation, understood in this thesis as a “process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2005: 804), in the European Parliament has multiple facets. Consequently, the analysis is framed along three main dimensions of socialisation. Institutional learning depicts the process of MEPs gaining knowledge about the rules of procedure and the tactics of effective action in the chamber. Adaptation to the institutional culture analyses whether contact with a particular set of norms and codes of conduct of the chamber results in MEPs’ modifying their perception of politics, behaving differently in the policy-making process and developing a more complex political identity. Finally, attitude change verifies whether MEPs’ preferences in various policy areas evolve. This approach permits us to differentiate and analyse the effects of socialisation in various aspects of MEPs’ activity and, at the same time, highlight the multiple facets of the process.

Research design and methodology

The choice of Polish MEPs as object of the investigation was dictated by a number of reasons. First, in order to analyse a national contingent that consisted entirely of MEPs elected for the first time, only representatives of the new member states were considered. Polish MEPs were chosen as they constituted the largest and most varied national contingent in the EP. 54 Polish MEPs represented 8 political parties and expressed very different opinions on integration. Among them were committed supporters of European integration, people who moderately supported integration, but formulated a number of criticisms towards it, and finally, die-hard opponents of integration, some of whom even called for a withdrawal of Poland from the EU. This variety meant that a study of the Polish contingent could show how service in the chamber affects people who arrive with very different views on integration.2

2 Also a number of reasons of logistical nature underpinned the choice of Polish MEPs. Possessing good knowledge of Polish political life, I felt best prepared to investigate compatriots. Such a choice guaranteed few problems with direct communication and enabled me to closely follow the news regarding MEPs, and their statements that appeared in the media. Such in-depth research concerning, for instance, Czech or Hungarian MEPs would have been much more difficult, due to linguistic problems.
The core of this investigation is a longitudinal comparison – it verifies whether MEPs' attitudes and identities evolved over time. Therefore, the data-collection process was organised around two focal points consisting of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 38 Polish MEPs. The first interviews took place at the outset of the parliamentary mandate (August-September 2004, referred to as T1), the second two years into the tenure (June-November 2006, T2). This made possible a longitudinal comparison based not only on proxy measures, such as voting records, but on information coming directly from MEPs.

Interviews are a standard method of gathering information of a qualitative character from political elites (Grant 2000, Seidman 2006). It would be difficult to retrieve a good deal of information sought in this thesis in any other way. A case in point is the question of MEPs' identities – only through direct contact with MEPs could information be gained about how they feel about representing various communities. The thesis also sought information about MEPs' behaviour in their daily contacts with colleagues from other member states. In this case as well, only accounts of their work provided directly by MEPs could yield the data needed.

The interviews were carried out in Brussels, Strasbourg and Warsaw in MEPs' offices or – on a few occasions – in the café of the EP. They usually lasted around 45 minutes. The interviews consisted of three parts corresponding to the dimensions of the socialisation process as defined above. Questions asked at T1 were asked again at T2. The same core questions were asked of all MEPs, whereas subsequent additional questions varied depending on the aspects of the socialisation process on which respondents focused when replying to the main questions. The semi-structured interview made it possible to focus on a number of common issues for all respondents and, at the same time, enabled a broad approach revealing various effects of the socialisation process.

Interviews were carried out in accordance with the Loughborough University ethical guidelines. Namely, interviewees were informed about the nature of the project and explicitly asked for permission to use the information that they provided in this thesis. They were guaranteed that their statements will be quoted anonymously. For the purposes of clear presentation, I differentiate between respondents using code numbers (e.g. MEP1 claimed X and Y, while MEP2 supported Z). If the context made anonymity impossible, I quoted MEPs only if they had agreed to it. The statements from interviews appear in italics to differentiate them from other, universally available statements (from newspapers, MEPs' websites, etc.). The respondents were also guaranteed that information gained during the interview would not be passed to third parties without their prior permission.
Following the interview, the MEPs were asked to fill in a questionnaire both at T1 and T2. The questionnaire was designed to provide information that would be more easily quantifiable than that of interviews. It focused on the main issues of integration (deepening, enlargement, balance of power between institutions) and the attitudes of MEPs towards representing various groups. The majority of questions asked MEPs to express their view on a numerical scale; the questionnaire also contained a number of agree/disagree questions. A copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1. Some questions overlap with those asked in interviews. This was done on purpose, anticipating that some MEPs, due to time constraints, may only fill in the questionnaire or only be interviewed. It also made possible the cross-checking of answers of those MEPs for whom both interview and questionnaire data were available.

Questionnaire data is used sparingly as only 15 MEPs returned questionnaires both at T1 and T2 (27%), thus making a comparison possible. This rate of reply can be considered low in comparison with other studies of this type. Questionnaire data is included mainly for representatives of Law and Justice and League of Polish Families as in the case of those parties the rates of reply were highest (3/7 and 3/10 respectively). Thus, the study has a mostly qualitative character.

Gaining information directly from MEPs presented a number of methodological challenges as well as advantages. It was impossible to ascertain whether MEPs filled in the questionnaires personally, and with appropriate attention. In interviews respondents sometimes say what they believe their interlocutors expect, rather than what they really think. They may also interpret their own actions with hindsight in a way that has little to do with their real motives at the time. To achieve a more complete and objective picture, information received directly from MEPs was supplemented by data coming from other sources. Between the two series of interviews and after the second interview the activities of MEPs were observed in order to contrast their opinions pronounced in interviews with statements given on other occasions (e.g. speeches in plenary or press articles written by MEPs), and to ascertain whether their declarations found reflection in deeds (e.g. voting record, behaviour towards other MEPs). The types of documentary sources used in the researching of this thesis are summarised in Table 1. These different sources of data ensure the necessary triangulation, making the findings more plausible (Yin 2003: 14).

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3 Twenty-two Polish MEPs participated in the 2006 MEP Survey carried out by the European Parliament Research Group (Farrell et al. 2006b).
4 According to parliamentary hearsay, many MEPs delegate the job of filling in the numerous academic questionnaires that they receive to assistants.
I also had recourse to participant observation as three Polish MEPs agreed that I follow them in their daily parliamentary activities for a month. These MEPs were Konrad Szymański (Eurorealist) in November 2005, Jan Olbrycht (Euroenthusiast) in January 2006, and Lidia Geringer (Euroenthusiast) in May 2006. While following them, I participated in EP committee meetings, EP plenary session, meetings of the UEN political group and their private meetings with MEPs from other member states, advisors from their political group and Commission officials. Participant observation yielded valuable information about MEPs' daily routine; it was also an opportunity to be in the EP on a daily basis and observe MEPs in various circumstances, from official committee meetings to informal conversations in the corridors.

Table 1 Principal sources for this study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary sources</th>
<th>Secondary sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verbatim reports of debates in the EP</td>
<td>Scholarly journals and books</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolutions of the EP</td>
<td>Chapters and contributions to collective books</td>
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<td>EP voting records</td>
<td>PhD theses</td>
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<td>Polish MEPs’ websites</td>
<td>Conference papers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dispatches of the European branch of the Polish Press Agency (Europap)</td>
<td>Reports of research institutes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electoral manifestos of Polish political parties</td>
<td>Newspaper articles</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

T2, when the second series of interviews was carried out, is the principal point of reference when the effects of service are discussed. The main conclusions regarding the evolution of MEPs' attitudes and identities are based upon comparison of data gathered at T1 and T2 and in the period between these dates. The T2 data are not, however, the end point of the study. The data-gathering process continued virtually until the end of the parliamentary term in May of 2009. The data gathered after T2 enriches the analysis and enables an assessment whether trends revealed at T2 find confirmation in statements and behaviour of MEPs that occurred later in the term.

The objective of the investigation was to carry out interviews on a sample that would include at least half of MEPs from each Polish political party present in the chamber. This objective was achieved for six out of eight political parties. Only one out of four Democratic Party MEPs, and none of the three Polish Social Democracy MEPs, could be contacted at T1.
and T2. In sum, 28 MEPs (52%) were contacted both at T1 and T2 (including 5 MEPs who were not interviewed, or interviewed only once, but only returned the questionnaire). Ten other MEPs were interviewed at T1, but could not be contacted again at T2 either because of lack of time on their part or because they had left the EP in the meantime. Table 2 on the following page presents an overview of the contacts with each MEP from the Polish contingent, a full list of interviews can be found at the end of the thesis. The main obstacle to contacting MEPs was their very limited availability, especially at T2 when the majority of them were already very much involved in their parliamentary duties. Some MEPs agreed to participate in the investigation, but due to their busy agendas arranging an interview proved impossible. Some MEPs ignored the request for interview and the questionnaire; a small minority declined to participate in the study.

Presenting the findings for each MEP separately would be too complex and repetitive. As political parties are the main form of organising group activity in the realm of politics, the results are presented with regard to the parties or – given the relatively large number of Polish parties present in the EP (8) and to generate a more synthetic view – clusters of parties. Three clusters were differentiated, depending on the parties' official attitude towards European integration. The first cluster, labelled Euroenthusiasts, consists of parties that strongly support integration and whose representatives belong to the major political groups in the European Parliament. These parties are: the Civic Platform (Group of European People's Party – European Democrats, EPP-ED), the Democratic Left Alliance, Polish Social Democracy (both Group of the Party of European Socialists, PES), and the Democratic Party (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, ALDE). The second cluster includes parties whose members express support for integration, but stress that it should encompass mainly economic matters and be managed by intergovernmental bodies. These parties usually describe themselves as Eurorealist and this label will be used in this thesis. They are: Law and Justice, Polish Peasant Party-Piast and the Self-Defence (all belong to the Union for the Europe of Nations Group, UEN). Finally, the third cluster – referred to as Eurosceptics – consists of representatives of only one party, the League of Polish Families. This party strongly criticises European integration, and called on its supporters to oppose Polish membership in the accession referendum of 2003. While Euroscepticism is an academic term (see Kopecky

5 The attitude towards the EU of different Polish parties is discussed at length in Chapter 3.
6 MEPs from the League of Polish Families were dispersed in the EP. Five belonged to the UEN Group, three were non-attached and two were members of the Independence/Democracy Group.
and Mudde 2002, Taggart 1998, Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004), the words Euroethusiasts and Eurorealists function mainly in journalistic parlance. In this thesis these words are used as labels and do not possess an analytical dimension. They are used to facilitate the presentation of findings and make the clusters of parties easily identifiable to the reader. The names of the clusters are capitalised, when the words euroenthusiasts or eurosceptics are used in another context, they are written without capital letter.
Table 2 Overview of contacts with Polish MEPs

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Party/cluster</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Interview</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Tomczak</td>
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⁷ Messrs Kuźmiuk, Podkański and Wojciechowski left the PSL during parliamentary term and created an independent faction called PSL - Piast.
| Polish Social Democracy/ | Rosati | - | - | - | - | - |
| Euroenthusiasts         | Pinior  | + | - | - | - | - |
|                        | Grabowska | - | - | - | - | - |
| Self-Defence/Eurorealists | Czarnecki R. | + | + | + | - | - |
|                        | Czarnecki M. | + | + | + | + | - |
|                        | Masiel  | - | - | - | - | - |
|                        | Rutowicz | + | + | - | - | - |
|                        | Golik   | - | + | - | + | - |
|                        | Kuc     | + | + | - | - | + |

**Key**

Names in bold are MEPs who were contacted at both T1 and T2 (either interview, questionnaire or both).

MEPs who left the chamber during term are in italics.
Overview of the thesis

Chapter 1 provides background information regarding the European Parliament, important from the point of view of this thesis. It shows how a large number of members of this institution have consistently called for closer European integration. It depicts the compromise-oriented negotiating style that prevails in the chamber and highlights how the majority of MEPs identify themselves as representatives of various groups (not only their voters and compatriots, but also all citizens of the EU). It is argued that these traits can be considered as parliamentary norms to which MEPs adapt or which they contest. Chapter 2 reviews previous research devoted to socialisation in the EP and other EU institutions (COREPER, European Commission and the Council of the EU), before introducing the analytical framework of this thesis, and the hypotheses that it will test. Chapter 3 provides background information on Polish MEPs. It depicts their past political experience and the main aims that they formulated on entering the EP. It portrays their attitude towards European integration, as well as that of the political parties that they represent. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the findings of this investigation. One chapter is devoted to each of the main dimensions of socialisation identified. Chapter 4 looks at institutional learning. Chapter 5 is devoted to adaptation to the institutional culture, and Chapter 6 deals with attitude change. Chapter 7 summarises the findings pertaining to the three dimensions and formulates some general comments regarding the socialisation process of Polish MEPs, discussing in particular the mechanisms through which Polish MEPs socialised, and offering explanation for particular outcomes of the socialisation process. It also confronts the findings of this investigation with those of previous studies, showing how this thesis contributes to our knowledge of socialisation in the EP.
Chapter 1. The European Parliament: Historical development and internal dynamics

Before examining the consequences of service in the European Parliament for Polish members' attitudes, identity and behaviour, some space should be devoted to the depiction of the institution itself and its characteristics. The objective of this chapter is to highlight the norms of the EP into which the new MEPs may be socialised, and the specific characteristics of the chamber that can have a bearing on the process of socialisation of new members.

The chapter consists of three parts. First, the history of the chamber is reviewed, showing how it developed from a consultative body into a co-legislator. An overview of the literature on this subject shows that views advocating further integration and strengthening of EU institutions have always prevailed in the chamber, and that the vast majority of MEPs who held the most important posts were committed pro-integrationists. Thus, it may be expected that freshmen MEPs will be exposed to views that are very supportive of European integration.

The second part focuses on the actors of parliamentary politics: the political groups, the national party delegations within them, and MEPs. The literature on this subject demonstrates that MEPs function in a very complex political environment, interacting with counterparts from many countries and political parties. Decisions in the EP are forged from a process of long negotiations between individual MEPs, national party delegations and political groups.

The third part presents two norms of the EP institutional culture that are of particular importance for the socialisation process. The first is the norm of consensus. A number of scholars argue that the EP differs from the majority of national parliaments by its consensual culture. One of the important features of this culture is the way in which MEPs behave while negotiating – they focus on achieving a wide compromise and are ready to make concessions in order to take a large number of colleagues "on board". The second norm concerns representation. The majority of MEPs arguably adhere to a representative role that combines activity in the name of national and party interest with attention paid to the needs of the entire EU. This multidimensional representative role is referred to as the European model of representation.
1.1 The European Parliament: A bastion of euroenthusiasm

The Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – the predecessor of the European Parliament – came as a “late addition” (Judge and Earnshaw 2003: 27) to the institutional framework of the Community. The Schuman Declaration of 1950 that led to the establishment of the ECSC mentioned only one institution – the High Authority which was to manage the coal and steel market in the name of the common interest. However, as France’s partners were wary of leaving this potentially very influential new body unbridled, in the institutional framework of the ECSC the High Authority was accompanied by the Council of Ministers and the Common Assembly, designed to enable national governments and parliamentarians to oversee the new enterprise (Rittberger 2001: 697-700). The Common Assembly, however, received practically no means to influence events (Abélès 1992: 32). Its 76 members were to meet once a year to assess the activities of the High Authority. They had the right to demand the resignation of its members, if they considered their work unsatisfactory. But except for this recourse to the “nuclear option”, the Assembly did not have other instruments that would enable it to influence the day-to-day functioning of the Community.

The Assembly was designed to operate on the periphery of the Community (Judge and Earnshaw 2003: 28), but its members quickly turned out to be bent on changing the status quo. Already on the second day of its existence the Assembly was asked to draft a Treaty establishing the European Political Community. It never came to life as the French parliament’s refusal to ratify the Treaty on European Defence Community shattered the projects of political union. However, the experience was “inculcated in EP’s collective memory” (Westlake 1994a: 13), and the Parliament acquired a conviction that participation in the processes of institutional change was its right.

In 1957, the member states of the ECSC decided to deepen their integration by creating the European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The Common Assembly was to act for all three communities. Its membership nearly doubled, reaching 142 members, but its competences remained almost unchanged. On certain legislative issues the ministers had to consult it, but they were not obliged to follow its advice. There could be little doubt that, just like in 1950, the role reserved for the Assembly by the governments was secondary. The real power belonged to the Council of Ministers and the supranational High Authority (which later became the European Commission). The Assembly was there mainly to bestow a more democratic image on the new political creation. Even
though the Treaties of Rome (establishing the European Economic Community) stipulated that the chamber would be directly elected, the governments of member states decided to delay the execution of this point, and for the two following decades, members of the Assembly were recruited from among the national parliamentarians.

According to the Treaty, the chamber itself was to prepare a proposal regarding its election by universal suffrage, which later would be subject to unanimous acceptance by the member states. The first proposal to this end was put forward in 1961, but with General Charles de Gaulle at the helm of the French state, the parliamentarians could have very little hope of it being accepted by the Council. The French President, adhering to a very intergovernmental vision of the Community, believed that elected assemblies had the right to exist only on the level of nation states (Abélès 1992: 34). The European Parliament – as the Assembly called itself from 1962⁸ – repeated its plea in 1963 and 1969, but the question was shelved and could be renegotiated only when Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, ready to move away from the Gaullist orthodoxy, took the French presidency. The introduction of elections by universal suffrage was agreed upon at a summit of heads of states and governments in Paris in 1974. Giscard was not enthusiastic, but accepted the change in the hope that the parliamentarians and their allies in the governments of certain member states would be satisfied with this concession and would not demand any additional powers for the chamber. Another report formulating suggestions concerning the electoral regime was prepared in the chamber in 1976 and in the same year approved by the Council. This paved the way for the elections to the EP which took place in 1979.

When it comes to the struggle for real competences, the EP won its first battle even before it became directly elected. Just as in the case of elections, France considerably delayed its success (Rittberger 2003). In 1965, the European Commission proposed a change in the Community finances consisting of the introduction of what became known as “own resources” from agricultural levies and customs duties. This move entailed changes in the budgetary procedure. Among other issues, the Commission proposed a greater role for the European Parliament, as national legislatures did not have any means to control the system of own resources. President de Gaulle objected to such empowerment of the chamber and the compromise was reached only in 1970 when Georges Pompidou agreed to a greater involvement of the Parliament, but only regarding the so-called non-compulsory expenses,

⁸ The name European Parliament was officially recognised in the Single European Act signed in 1986.
constituting around 5% of the budget. In 1975 these modifications were confirmed by Treaty changes that also gave the Parliament the right to reject the entire budget.

The following success came soon after first direct elections when in 1980 the European Court of Justice, in the so-called Isoglucose ruling, cancelled a decision made by the Council, claiming that the ministers had not waited for the Parliament’s opinion. The chamber’s position in the consultation procedure was thus strengthened. It could bargain with the Council; whenever the latter wanted a quick decision, the Parliament could speed things up provided that its amendments were accepted (Corbett et al. 2005: 200). Thus, the directly elected parliamentarians gained a new weapon, but some of them were already planning on going far beyond such piecemeal advances.

Among the newly elected members of 1979 was Altiero Spinelli, one of the leading figures in the Italian federalist movement. He had resigned from his post of European Commissioner, in order to fight for a mandate in the EP and focus entirely on attempts to enhance the integration process. In 1980, Spinelli sent a letter to his fellow parliamentarians urging them to start preparing a reform of the Community – the directly elected Parliament was in his view the appropriate institution to take the lead in these matters. With those who were the first to reply to his appeal he formed the so-called Crocodile Club and started lobbying the rest of the MEPs. In 1981, the chamber accepted Spinelli’s initiative to create a Committee on Institutional Affairs that was to work on the issue. The result of years of deliberations in the committee was a Draft Treaty on European Union that the chamber adopted in February 1984. The large majority that supported it (237 votes to 31) showed that Spinelli and his allies were successful at convincing their colleagues to embrace the idea of considerably speeding up the integration process (Corbett 1998: chapter 6). Corbett emphasises that a spirit of community, which came to life in the directly-elected Parliament, was an important factor for the success of Spinelli’s undertaking.10

Despite the positive reception that the Draft Treaty met in many EC capitals, it was not to be accepted by the governments of the member states. It constituted, however, an additional impulse for reform and a reference point in later negotiations between the governments. In 1984, the idea of a relaunch of the European integration had strong supporters in German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, French President François Mitterrand and his

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9 This part of the budget subsequently grew and today it constitutes around 50 per cent of the Community budget.
10 "The existence of the elected Parliament, with members of the main political parties working full time on European issues, frustrated with the failings of the Community and their own relative impotence, building a sufficient esprit de corps to work together across party and national divisions, was crucial to the whole exercise" (Corbett 1998: 160).
Economy and Finance Minister, Jacques Delors, who became President of the European Commission a year later. Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy were also in favour of the idea (Moravcsik 1991). An intergovernmental conference (IGC) was convened to discuss the possible reforms and its result was the Single European Act (SEA) signed in 1986. It entailed a much more modest deepening of integration than the Spinelli Draft Treaty, but the Parliament decided to accept it as a step in the right direction. The SEA created new opportunities for the involvement of the chamber in the decision-making process, introducing two new procedures: the cooperation procedure increased the EP’s role in the legislative process, while the assent procedure gave Parliament equal rights with Council in requiring Parliament’s approval for the ratification of accession treaties and association agreements.

Having only partially succeeded in introducing its priorities into the SEA, the Parliament remained a strong supporter of pro-integrationist initiatives, always trying to influence the negotiations between member states. As the idea of convening an IGC that could discuss the questions of economic and monetary union started circulating, the chamber argued that political issues should also be included. The Colombo/Martin report called for far-reaching reforms: introduction of a new legislative procedure that would strengthen the Parliament, more qualified majority voting, limited right of initiative for the chamber, extension of Community competences and greater parliamentary control over financial matters (Judge and Earnshaw 2003: 50). When the IGC on political union started its deliberations, the Parliament attempted to gain better access to it than to its predecessor that prepared the SEA. There were “monthly meetings between ministers of the member states, 12 MEPs and 4 Commissioners. Parliament’s President was able to address several ministerial level meetings of the IGC. Parliament’s delegation also toured the national capitals holding individual meetings with each head of government” (Corbett at al. 2005: 337).

The European parliamentarians had reasons to be satisfied with the Maastricht Treaty, which was the result of the IGCs. A new procedure (co-decision) was introduced that reinforced the Parliament’s position vis-à-vis the Council in the legislative process. The co-decision was to apply to legislation where cooperation was used before. Meanwhile, cooperation was extended to a number of issues where Council could make decisions by a majority vote. Thus, the chamber not only benefited from the introduction of new procedures, but also saw an increase in the number of issues where its opinion could make a difference. Finally, the Parliament gained influence over appointments. The Treaty granted it the right to express its opinion about the Commission president-designate and to vote on the Commission
as a whole. In the latter case, the vote was legally binding, i.e. the Commission could not take office without Parliament’s support.

After Maastricht, the chamber remained an active player in the area of institutional reform. When, in 1994, the heads of state and government decided to establish a “Reflection Group” in charge of preparing the work of another IGC, two representatives of the Parliament were allowed to participate in the meetings. While representatives of foreign ministries were reluctant to reveal their positions, Elmar Brok and Elisabeth Guigou – who were the EP representatives – came forward with parliamentary priorities and were able to set the agenda of the Reflection Group (Corbett et al. 2005: 338). During the IGC, the Parliament had fewer chances to make an impact as its representatives were excluded from the crucial sessions at the request of the UK and France (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999: 71). The situation changed in the chamber’s favour after the French and British elections of 1997 where the Parti Socialiste and New Labour emerged victorious, respectively. Both were more sympathetic to the Parliament than their predecessors. Elisabeth Guigou, who swapped her parliamentary seat for the post of Minister for European Affairs in French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s new government, was able to make the case for her former colleagues (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999: 68). In the end, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 was a victory for the Parliament enhancing its already significant competences (Hix 2002, Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999: 80-81). The co-decision procedure was modified in Parliament’s favour and its scope enlarged so that most non-agricultural issues became subject to it. Parliament’s vote on the candidate for President of the European Commission was made legally binding.

The chamber showed its pro-Europeanism again in the debates leading to the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty. Its delegation to the Convention almost in unison defended the federalist agenda (Costa 2004). Once the document had been adopted, the Parliament endorsed it by a strong majority. Members of the EP’s Constitutional Affairs Committee (e.g. Richard Corbett, Iñigo Mendez de Vigo, Joe Leinen), as well as leaders of the main political groups (e.g. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Hans-Gert Poettering, Martin Schultz, and Graham Watson), were actively extolling the Constitution’s virtues in the media. The parliamentary majority formulated a similarly strong endorsement of the Lisbon Treaty.

11 Jens-Peter Bonde and William Abitbol were the only eurosceptic members of the delegation.
12 The report prepared by Richard Corbett and Iñigo Mendez de Vigo (EP 2005d), positively assessing the document, was adopted by the plenary on 12 January 2005 by a majority of 500 in favour, 137 against and 40 abstaining.
13 The report on Lisbon Treaty (EP 2008c) was authored by Corbett and Mendez de Vigo, and it supported the Treaty. 525 MEPs voted in favour of it, 115 voted against and 29 abstained.
Over the fifty years of its existence, the EP has evolved from "fig-leaf to co-legislature" (Corbett et al. 2005: 3). Different explanations can be put forward for the parliamentary success in achieving a significant position in the EU’s institutional system (see Costa and Magnette 2003), but it is beyond doubt that a major driving force behind this evolution were the MEPs who relentlessly battled for influence that they believed was due to them as directly elected representatives of EC, and later EU, nations. Some of them – like Spinelli – came to the chamber already with the conviction that it should play a more prominent role in the EU affairs, others warmed to this view either out of frustration at their institution’s powerlessness or because service in the chamber made them reassess their opinion about the contribution that the EP could make – their cases will be discussed in the following chapter. Apart from promoting its own aspirations, the EP has also been a staunch advocate of more advanced integration and consequently exerted pressure on the heads of states and governments to speed up the integration process. Overall, the EP "maintained the reputation of a truly 'supranational' institution, in which petty national self-interest is secondary to the pursuit of broad 'European' ideological goals" (Kreppel 2002: 187).

1.2 Political groups and national party delegations: Principal actors of parliamentary life

The political life of the chamber is organised around political groups that unite national parties with similar ideological convictions.14 The groups have existed from the very beginning of the Parliament. Posts and speaking time are distributed first to the groups, which only later allocate them to national delegations that constitute them. Leaders of the Groups, meeting as a Conference of Presidents, make the most important decisions concerning the chamber’s functioning.15 Overall, political groups are key to posts, resources and influence in the EP (Bardi 2002: 65). This section presents the historical development of the groups and depicts some of their characteristics.

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14 The “political groups” are often referred to as “party groups” in academic publications. I decided to use the former term as it is this form that appears in the official documents of the European Parliament (Rules of Procedure, website, etc.).

15 The Conference of Presidents composed of the President of Parliament and the chairs of the Political Groups, proposes the membership and competence of parliamentary committees and delegations, adjudicates on disputes of competence between committees, authorises the drafting of reports and draws up the draft agenda of sessions (Corbett et al. 2005: 118).
1.2.1 Historical development of the political groups in the chamber

The number of members of the European Parliament grew steadily during five decades. When it was set up as the Common Assembly of the ECSC it had 76 members. After the adoption of the Treaties of Rome this number increased to 142. In the first direct elections in 1979, 410 representatives were chosen by member state electorates. This number rose with subsequent enlargements to reach 732 after the arrival of 10 new member states in 2004, and 785 after Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. The Lisbon Treaty decreased the number of MEPs to 751.

When the 76 members of the Common Assembly first met, they decided not to sit in national groups, as it was customary in international assemblies, but to function on the basis of ideological affinities through official Political Groups or parliamentary factions. By doing so, the representatives wanted to take a symbolic stance against nationalism – perceived by many as the principal cause for wars and conflicts, so rife in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century – and manifest their intention to go beyond the established mechanisms of international cooperation (Kreppel 2002: 186). Thus, three formal groups were created, reflecting traditional party families: Christian Democrat, Socialist and Liberal; they exist to the present day and have remained the major actors on the parliamentary arena. In the 6th EP (2004-2009), they were known as the Group of the European People’s Party – European Democrats (EPP-ED, thereafter referred to as EPP), the Group of the Party of European Socialists (PES), and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) respectively.

Over time other political groups appeared. Their fate was varied; some found their niche and now seem well-established, others were more ephemeral and either disappeared or joined one of the bigger entities. Among the former are the Greens and the Communists. The Communist Group was established in 1973. It split in 1989, but one of the new groups quickly disappeared after its main component, Italian Partito Democratico della Sinistra, decided to join the Socialist Group. Thus, after the 1994 election, there was again only one communist group called the Group of United European Left. Green parties had their representatives elected for the first time in 1984. Initially, they allied with parties representing regional interests in the so-called Rainbow Group, and it was only after the following election – in 1989 – that a separate Green Group was created.

On the right of the political spectrum, there were a number of conservative – often more or less eurosceptic – initiatives. British and Danish conservatives sat together in a European Conservative Group that later became the European Democratic Group. MEPs from Spanish
Allianza Popular were for a certain time after their arrival members of that group as well. French Gaullists and Fianna Fáil had their own group, and so did Forza Italia when its representatives entered the chamber in 1999. All those parties, except for Fianna Fáil, at some point decided to join the EPP group. The Spaniards did so after the 1989 elections. In the same year the British Conservatives applied for membership, but it was only in 1992 that the Christian Democrats agreed to accept the Tories in their ranks. The French Gaullists joined in 1999, and the (Forza) Italians in 2002.

The only survivor from the myriad of right-wing groups was the Group of the Union for the Europe of Nations. It was the inheritor of the Europe of Nations Group founded in 1994 by French anti-Maastricht MEPs and Danish eurosceptics. In 1999, Irish Fianna Fáil, orphaned by the Gaullists who went to the EPP, joined the Group, as well as Italian Alleanza Nazionale. This enlargement provoked the departure of the Danes who wanted a more eurosceptic entity. Most of the French MEPs left as well, and the newcomers from 1999 now constitute the Group’s core.

Parties that subscribed to a stronger euroscepticism created, in 1999, a political group called Europe of Democracies and Diversities. It had members from Denmark, France, Netherlands and the UK. After the 2004 elections, the group adopted a new name: Independence and Democracy.

1.2.2 Parliamentary duopoly

The political groups that were first established have also been the most influential in the history of the European Parliament. Two of them in particular – the Socialists and the Christian Democrats\(^{16}\) – dominated the institution. Not only have they always been the most numerous (with only one exception when Liberals surpassed the Socialists between 1959 and 1962), but they also greatly outnumbered the others. In the directly elected Parliament (i.e. since 1979) the two biggest groups combined constituted between 54 and 69 percent of its membership. This numerical domination translated into various benefits. Control of parliamentary posts was one of them. After the 1989 elections, the EPP and the Socialist group made a deal to share the chamber’s presidency, with the EPP supporting the Socialist candidate for the first half of the term, and the Socialists then returning the favour in the second half (Corbett et al. 2005: 116). This deal was repeated in the 1994-1999 term.\(^{17}\)

\(^{16}\) Not all parties that are currently members of the EPP-ED can be defined as Christian Democrats, but the Group is described as such for reasons of simplicity.

\(^{17}\) Eight out of eleven Presidents of the directly elected Parliament were members of the PES or the EPP.
fifth parliament (1999-2004) there was a change as the EPP – the largest Group at the time – decided to ally with the Liberals to share the Presidency. However, in the sixth Parliament the grand coalition of EPP and PES reappeared. The numerical domination of the two largest groups also granted them significant influence over legislation with the most important decisions of the chamber often representing a compromise negotiated between them (this question will be treated in more detail below). Hix, Kreppel and Noury describe the party system of the chamber as “two-plus-several” (2003: 318). The smaller groups sometimes carp about the dominance of the two big ones (Raunio 1999: 194), but it is difficult to argue that the latter attempt to take more than their numbers entitle them to. Granted, they get the most important chairmanships, but by no means attempt to control all committees. The posts in the chamber have always been proportionally distributed between political and national groups. As a first step the political groups receive their quota of posts (based on the d’Hondt method), which they later distribute between their members, trying to maintain a balance between national party delegations.

Another illustration of the importance of the two largest Groups can be found in the way they attracted the national delegations that initially sat separately. As mentioned in the previous section, Spanish and British Conservatives, French Gaullists and Forza Italia all after some time in the chamber applied to join the EPP. For these parties, joining forces with the Christian Democrats was an opportunity to gain prestigious posts and have a say in the decision-making within one of the EP’s leading groups (Attina 1998: 15, Jansen 1998: 110-120). Just how important it is for MEPs can be seen when the case of the British Conservatives is analysed. Members of the Tory Party from Britain every once in a while call for the withdrawal from the EPP Group which they consider too keen on federalist ideas. Such calls, however, always met with a determined opposition of the majority of UK Conservative MEPs.

1.2.3 Cohesive political groups

At the moment of their creation, sceptics might have believed that multinational and multiparty political groups would not be very cohesive bodies. There existed a number of

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18 There was a discussion about leaving the EPP after 1999 elections (Butler and Westlake 2000: 206-7). More recently, in autumn of 2005, while campaigning to become a leader of the Conservative Party, David Cameron supported the idea of withdrawal from the EPP Group.

19 According to parliamentary insiders and press articles on the subject, when the idea of leaving surfaced again in 2005 and 2006 the majority of Tory MEPs wanted to remain members of the EPP group.
factors that could undermine cohesion: in EU politics no executive existed, around which (or in opposition to which) the groups could coalesce; national solidarity could very well trump ideological affinities, especially in a situation where domestic party leaders were better equipped to control the MEPs than chairpersons of the political groups in the chamber (Raunio 1999: 190-194, Bowler and Farrell 1999: 208). However, studies of political group cohesion in the chamber demonstrated that from the very beginning groups generally achieved high levels of cohesion and managed to maintain them (Bardi 2002, Raunio 1999), i.e. members of the political groups in the vast majority of instances vote in the same way. The most recent study (Hix et al. 2007) analyses an impressive dataset of all roll call votes between 1979 and 2001. It confirms earlier findings, showing that the political groups have been very cohesive from the birth of the directly elected Parliament. Meanwhile, the cohesion of national groups has always been lower than that of political groups and it has been declining steadily. Situations where whole national contingents rather than political groups oppose each other in the political debate are rare. The principal lines of conflict in the Parliament are ideological, pitting one political family against another, rather than opposing national groups (Hix et al. 2007: 219, see also Fass 2003, Noury 2002).

The cohesive political groups that emerged in the first elected Parliament managed to withstand two major challenges: a series of enlargements and a significant increase in the competences of the chamber. It seemed probable that both of these factors would lead to falls in cohesion levels: the former because the arrival of parties from new member states with different political cultures was likely to render the political groups more ideologically heterogeneous, and the latter because greater significance of the chamber’s decisions increased the stakes and was likely to make compromises between parties more difficult to achieve (Hix et al. 2003). Even though the levels of cohesion of the three major political groups experienced some variation, they remained high (cf Table 3). In the case of the Socialists, a clear trend of increase can be discerned. Whilst the group was the least cohesive of the largest three in the first chamber, its cohesion later increased and since the third Parliament remained stable at a high level. The cohesion of the EPP reached a very high level in the second Parliament and then started to fall, which may be explained by the increasing

20 The average relative cohesion of each national group of MEPs declined from 0.667 in the first Parliament to 0.589 in the fifth (Hix et al. 2007: 129).
21 An example of such a situation can be the case of the Takeover Directive (the crucial vote on which took place in the EP in 2001) which was generally characterised as a confrontation of national models of capitalism. In this case, the Germans, the British and a number of other contingents voted as national blocks, but a number of other nationalities (the French, the Italians, the Dutch, and the Spanish) split along the left-right dimension (see Hix et al. 2007: 285).
ideological heterogeneity of the group as it opened itself to conservative parties. The Liberals had virtually the same level of cohesion in the four parliaments between 1979 and 1999. In the fifth parliament the cohesion of the group increased. Hix et al. also point out that if relative cohesion is considered – i.e. cohesion of the political group in relation to the cohesion of the Parliament as a whole – the increase in cohesion between the third and the fifth Parliament is clear in all three cases (2003: 219).

Table 3 Cohesion of the three main political groups in the EP between 1979 and 2001

The first figure describes absolute cohesion – the closer it is to 1, the more cohesive a political group is. The figure in brackets describes relative cohesion, i.e. cohesion of the group in relation to the cohesion of the Parliament as a whole. The higher it is, the more cohesive a group can be considered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>0.899 (1.775)</td>
<td>0.934 (1.683)</td>
<td>0.907 (1.575)</td>
<td>0.898 (1.664)</td>
<td>0.859 (1.721)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>0.757 (1.508)</td>
<td>0.869 (1.547)</td>
<td>0.900 (1.540)</td>
<td>0.901 (1.661)</td>
<td>0.904 (1.796)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELDR</td>
<td>0.849 (1.667)</td>
<td>0.849 (1.507)</td>
<td>0.847 (1.451)</td>
<td>0.861 (1.584)</td>
<td>0.909 (1.819)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hix et al. 2005: 218

1.2.4 The importance of the national party delegations

A number of factors explaining this high cohesion of political groups could be mentioned. One of them is ideological proximity between the group members. “Members of the same group do generally share similar values and ideals” (Kreppel 2002: 208), so it should not be surprising that they vote together on so many occasions. However, the results of statistical analysis applied to roll-call votes suggest that ideology has a marginal effect on cohesion. Neither can high cohesion be considered a result of discipline imposed by group authorities, because they simply do not have the means to sanction members who defect. Granted, notoriously rebellious MEPs may find it harder to be given speaking time on important issues in the plenary, or obtain prestigious reports or positions in committees (Hix and Lord 1997: 135-136, Raunio 1999: 192). The political groups’ leaders are, however, deprived of the most important tool of control: they have no means to influence an MEP’s electoral fortunes, as the candidate selection and organisation of campaigns lies within the exclusive competence of political parties.

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22 The term “national party delegation” is used in this thesis to talk about members of an EP political group from one political party (e.g. Labour MEPs in the PES Group), while “national contingent” is employed to describe all MEPs from a given country.

23 Hix et al. discovered that “when a party group becomes more ideologically heterogeneous, the group’s cohesion goes down by a small and only marginally significant amount” (2005: 226).
national parties. Thus, the leaders of national party delegations or national parties at home are arguably better equipped to discipline MEPs than leaders of political groups. In case of an important vote, they can always remind MEPs that re-selection may depend on the “correct” voting record. The importance of national party delegations is noticeable also during the process of the allocation of posts in the chamber. Posts are first allocated to political groups, but then national party delegations negotiate the final division between themselves. And these negotiations between national party delegations leaders are in fact more important for the division of posts than the preferences of political group leader(s).

It is the purposeful actions of national party delegations that, according to Hix et al. (2007), is the key to explaining high levels of cohesion. Faced with the multitude of different issues discussed by the Parliament, national party delegations find it beneficial to coordinate their activities (or – using the expression of Hix et al. 2007: 136 – “establish binding division-of-labour contracts”) with, broadly speaking, like-minded colleagues in order to divide the tasks and manage the information flow (see also Hix and Lord 1997: 147). Furthermore, members of a large political group who can produce a common position and then maintain a cohesive stance in a vote have a greater chance of imposing their views as the winning option against the ones advocated by other political families. Thus, maintaining cohesion of the political group is generally in the interest of all participating national party delegations. Following the common position of the political group in a vote may sometimes involve the necessity to support amendments with which the national party delegation does not entirely agree. Yet, usually it is a question of minor differences and it is preferable for a national party delegation to support the group line than to see a significantly different option win the vote.

Being members of national parties and EP political groups, MEPs are bound to experience, at a certain point in their career, a conflict of loyalties. On a large majority of issues, MEPs vote in the same way as the majority of their own national party delegation and the political group. However, when the two have opposing positions, MEPs are more likely to support their national party rather than the EP political group. Statistics from the fifth

24 As Donatella Viola asserts “[A]ncedotes flourish within the House on diligent MEPs who end up at the bottom of their parties’ lists or are even excluded as they neglected national party headquarters, whilst negligent MEPs who privilege their domestic contacts have better chances of re-selection” (2001: 20).
25 “On what basis do [political] group leaders decide how benefits will be distributed? The answer is quite simply that the group leadership does not decide. Although Rules of Procedure of the EP, the Rules of Procedure of the two largest groups and the bulk of the current literature suggest that the power to decide the allocation of such benefits as committee chairs and rapporteurships lies with the group leaders, the fact is that it does not. The unwritten norms of both party groups delegate this authority to the national delegations in their midst” (Kreppel 2002: 202).
Parliament provide a good illustration of this tendency. In almost 89% of votes, MEPs followed both their national party delegation and political group. On 6.5% of occasions they voted with party and against the political group, while the opposite situation took place only on 1.7% of occasions. This is hardly surprising. We can imagine that an MEP will have most in common with members of his/her national party delegation, while in relation to the political group some differences may quite naturally exist. But these figures may also be interpreted as a confirmation of the fact mentioned above that leaders of national party delegations are better placed to discipline “their” MEPs than are leaders of political groups.

1.2.5 Group membership as a constraint

As we have seen, for a national party delegation it pays off to be a member of a multinational political group. However, such membership also entails costs. The cohesion of a political group is achieved through long negotiations between national party delegations and usually every one of them has to make some concessions to reach compromise. If a national party delegation finds itself unable to adhere to the solution formulated by its partners, it can always vote differently than the majority of the group, but this is a strategy that can backfire if followed too often. The general rule within the major political groups is that MEPs are allowed to vote against the group line, but they are also expected to inform others of their intentions (Raunio 1999: 193). Thus, MEPs have greater freedom than their counterparts in most national parliaments, but they must also realise that too frequent defections can prove counterproductive. Undisciplined members will be considered unreliable by their colleagues and when they want concessions or look for support, their pleas may well fall on deaf ears (Hix and Lord 1997: 135-36). Each time individual MEPs and/or national party delegations consider breaking the group line, they must calculate the costs and benefits of such behaviour. These are of course different depending on the circumstances. The group will tolerate defections when it is assured that it will win the vote anyway. Meanwhile, in close votes, the pressure from partners on those who hesitate will be much greater. For a national delegation it is relatively harmless to follow the group line despite reservations when the vote is on issues of small importance; the situation becomes more complicated when the questions voted upon are salient and publicised in the country. Thus, when deciding how to vote, MEPs have

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26 Data quoted in this paragraph comes from Hix et al. 2007, Chapter 7.

27 Before the vote in which the EP was to confirm Jacques Santer as the President of the European Commission, the chairman of the EPP announced that those who would not support the Luxembourger would be removed from the group (Hix and Lord 1996).
to tread carefully in order not to antagonise their EP partners on the one hand, and their colleagues from national parties and voters on the other.

On the whole, in relation to the political group, MEPs “may have to accept constraints on their voting in specific cases, if they are to ensure the broad success of their political preferences over some long-term average of political choices” (Hix and Lord 1997: 135). In other words, by voting with the majority of the group, MEPs build a reputation as reliable colleagues, which will later help them gain support for their own initiatives. Conversely, the political groups, if they want to maximise their influence, may have to tolerate even off-defecting members. The British Conservatives, for instance, although frequently voting against the group line; are still welcome within the EPP Group simply because in the three quarters of votes when they support the group line their numbers can tilt the balance into the EPP’s favour. On the other hand, however, it is also worth stressing that members of the Tory delegation who are most vociferous in their criticism of EPP membership do not hold important posts, nor do they gain important rapporteurships.

1.2.6 Loose control from domestic parties

Having analysed relations between MEPs and political groups, it is time to consider the control that national parties try to exercise over “their” MEPs. Research shows that in the early days of the chamber the control was lax and European parliamentarians were left to their own devices (Raunio 2002, Westlake 1994b on British MEPs). Contacts between national party authorities and the EP delegation existed largely thanks to personal relations of MEPs with their colleagues back home (Featherstone 1979, Westlake 1994b). As long as the European Parliament could only express its opinion, national politicians largely ignored its activities, leaving to MEPs a considerable room for manoeuvre in what they could say and do (Raunio 2002: 105). Only with time, as the role of the Parliament continued to grow, did certain national parties establish more formal ways of maintaining contact with and control over their MEPs. The system designed by the British Labour Party is often mentioned as an example of such a scheme (Messmer 2003). Nonetheless, even though undoubtedly national parties now pay more attention to their MEPs, the control is still rather loose (Raunio 2002).²⁸

It is so for a number of reasons. Parties often lack resources to control how their MEPs behave in the case of every single piece of sometimes very technical legislation (Raunio 2005). Secondly, European elections still revolve mostly around national issues and parties

²⁸ Raunio, for example, discovered that only 10% of parties gave MEPs voting instructions on a regular basis, and just under one-third did so on issues of fundamental importance (2002: 105).
are unlikely to be punished by voters for their MEPs’ behaviour (Bardi 2002). Finally, and most importantly, as legislation in the chamber develops through a long process of negotiation, issuing strict instructions to MEPs may impair their effectiveness in the bargaining process (Hix and Lord 1997: 129, Scully 2002a). Constrained by instructions they lose flexibility and are unable to exchange concessions with others. It should be noted as well that control exercised by a national party can sometimes be difficult to pinpoint. Even in the absence of voting instructions and a liaising officer, a very effective control can be exercised by the head of EP national party delegation who can be either a member of the party’s governing body or in close informal contact with its members. All in all, however, “MEPs are still relatively independent from their parties, with national parties paying attention to the Parliament mainly when nationally important matters are on the EP agenda” (Raunio 2002: 105).

The multinational political groups gained such an important status in the chamber because their existence is beneficial to MEPs. By joining forces with similarly-minded colleagues, MEPs broaden their access to information and gain allies willing to work towards similar objectives. It pays off for MEPs when their groups are cohesive as it maximises their chances of beating ideological opponents in a vote. However, membership in a political group also entails certain constraints on MEPs’ behaviour. They have to be constantly ready to seek compromises and make concessions; they also have to avoid voting against the group line as defecting earns them a reputation as unreliable colleagues. Being attentive to establishing good relationships with partners in the political group, MEPs also have to maintain good contacts with their parties at home because the latter control their re-selection in future elections.

1.3 The norms of EP institutional culture

This section presents two important elements of the institutional culture of the EP. In this thesis they are treated as EP norms, i.e. "shared, collective understandings that make behavioral claims on actors" (Checkel 2001a: 30). First, the consensual nature of the policy-making process and its consequences for MEPs' behaviour are described. Then, the model of representation that can be treated as prevailing in the EP is discussed.
1.3.1 The EP as a consensual institution: two perspectives

A number of studies of the voting behaviour of European parliamentarians conclude that the chamber has become increasingly similar to national parliaments (Hix et al. 2003, Noury 2002). The researchers point out that as the EP gains more clout in the EU legislative process, the division between the Right and the Left has become more pronounced and there is a shift from co-operation to competition between the two major political groups (the EPP and the PES). Another string of research, however, emphasises the unique consensual nature of the EP (Benedetto 2005, Settembri 2006). Giacomo Benedetto questions the assumption that a decrease in occurrence of the grand coalition suggests "a new era of ideological competition in the Parliament" (2005: 6). He goes on to add that analyses of problems other than voting behaviour such as the division of posts, the appointment and censuring of the Commission and the Parliament’s activities during Intergovernmental Conferences highlight the consensual nature of the chamber.

A number of reasons can be mentioned for the durability of consensual politics in the chamber (cf Benedetto 2005: 7-29). A commitment to compromise-seeking is arguably the best way to reconcile the multiple cleavages that exist in the chamber. Most importantly, in the decision-making process, the Parliament interacts with the European Commission and the Council of the EU, and if its amendments are backed by a strong majority, they are more likely to be accepted by other institutions. The lack of a government-opposition dynamic in the EU system makes it easier for the major parties in the chamber to co-operate. The system of the proportional division of posts between political groups can also be interpreted as part of the consensual mechanisms. Distributing posts according to their numerical strength, the groups avoid confrontation from the very beginning of the new term, which then makes cooperation on policy issues easier.

1.3.2 Grand coalition

One of the most significant illustrations of the consensual style of the Parliament are relations between the two major political groups, the EPP and the PES. On seven out of every ten roll-call votes taken by the chamber, majorities of these two groups vote together (Hix et al. 2003: 318). Such frequent cooperation between the major left- and right-wing party is unheard of in most national legislatures. It could be argued that the reason is the character of the co-

29 Majorities of the EPP and the PES voting the same way in the subsequent legislatures: 1979-84 on 61% of all roll call votes, 1984-89 on 68%, 1989-94 on 71%, 1994-99 on 69% and 1999-2001 on 69% (Hix et al. 2003: 318).
decision procedure. In order to amend legislative proposals, the chamber has to muster strong majorities and the easiest way to create them is for the two largest groups to unite. However, this aspect seems to provide only part of the explanation, as big Right-Left coalitions are not limited to votes in the framework of the co-decision procedure. Another element that favours co-operation is that Parliament’s amendments stand a bigger chance of getting accepted by the Commission and the Council if they are backed by a considerable force. But this – as Amy Kreppel argues (2000, 2002) – is still only part of the story. In her view, the principal reason for the frequent grand coalition lies in the nature of the EU institutional system. European legislation is created through interactions between three institutions and only proposals that gain broad acceptance of all three have a chance of becoming law. For the Parliament, building oversized majorities around amendments is not enough to have them adopted. They have to be acceptable to other institutions involved in the process. Moderate amendments are more likely to be accepted by the Commission and the Council where there are representatives of different political parties. Deals made by the national parties members of the EPP and the Socialist groups in the Parliament have big chances of becoming law, as ministers from these parties dominate in the Council. Thus, for members of the two biggest EP groups coordination and reaching compromise provides a premium in terms of policy influence. “It is not the voting rules that require the EPP and the PES to cooperate” – Kreppel concludes – “it is the institutional system of checks and balances that requires ideological moderation for effective legislative influence” (Kreppel 2000: 347).

As was mentioned above, recent research noted that since 1994 there has been a decrease in the instances of the grand coalition, however the level of co-operation still remains high. Besides, the decrease visible in statistical data was provoked by votes on amendments. When final votes alone are considered, it can be seen that the PES and the EPP actually voted together more often (Hix and Kreppel 2003). The continuous importance of the EPP-PES cooperation is visible also in the most recent events; the two most important directives

30 “Under the second and third reading of the co-decision procedure, as well as under the second reading of the co-operation procedure and in the budgetary procedure, an absolute majority of all the MEPS rather than a simple majority of those taking part in a vote is required to amend legislation” (Hix et al. 2003: 319).

31 In September of 2008, 20 governments in the EU were run by parties whose representatives in the EP belong to the EPP or the PES.
considered by the sixth Parliament (2004-2009) – REACH and the services directive\textsuperscript{32} – were adopted by the majorities of both groups voting together.

The importance that forging moderate solutions carries in the chamber has its consequences on the level of individual behaviour and contacts between MEPs. The chamber is an area of dense contacts between parliamentarians. Compromises are born through lengthy negotiations first between national party delegations within a political group and then between political groups themselves (Hix and Lord 1997). The imperative of finding a compromise became an unwritten norm of the chamber. Most MEPs appreciate the value of consensus and are ready to make some concessions in the negotiations. Christopher Lord talks about a “process of decentralized consensus-building that has two key features: first, it attempts mutual adjustments of political positions across all possible sub-units of the parliament; second, it relies heavily (but not exclusively) on small face-to-face meetings” (1998: 203).

Thus, effective action in the European Parliament requires different attitudes and skills than those considered essential in national legislatures dominated by the government-opposition dynamics. “One measure of a good MP in a national context is someone who is a good debater, able to score points over his or her opponents. An effective MEP is someone who is good at explaining, persuading and negotiating with colleagues from 25 different countries” (Corbett et al. 2005: 9).

\textbf{1.3.3 Behaviour of rapporteurs as an example of the parliamentary consensual culture}

Another illustration of the parliamentary consensual culture can be found in the behaviour of rapporteurs. When a legislative proposal arrives from the Commission, a rapporteur is chosen by the EP committee in charge of a given piece of legislation in order to prepare the Parliament’s position towards the proposal. The report usually consists of a set of amendments to the proposal and an explanatory statement.\textsuperscript{33} Rapporteurs are well placed to significantly influence the final position of the chamber. Being in the very centre of negotiations between political groups they can suggest compromise solutions. Yet, their role entails some constraints as well. The outcome of their work cannot reflect just their views on


\textsuperscript{33} Non-legislative reports consist of a motion for resolution.
the subject or those of their political group. The report has to be acceptable to a majority that will later support it in the plenary vote. Through negotiations with their colleagues, rapporteurs have to be able to discern a compromise solution and then present it in the report - even if it is suboptimal in their view. “Even casual observation of the committees” - write Hix and Lord - “reveals that the role of the rapporteur is conceived as one of attempting to sum up a consensus” (1997: 124). Very partisan reports are not likely to be accepted by the committee and even if they win a slim majority there, they face rejection by the plenary. Not all rapporteurs bow to this logic, but it seems the only way of successfully completing the task. “On several occasions rapporteurs have lost the confidence of the committee and have been replaced by the chair or another member; on others, rapporteurs have chosen to resign when their basic line was rejected or their draft text was amended out of all recognition” (Corbett et al. 2005: 137). It happened as well that political groups chose to “remove rapporteurs rather than take the risk of allowing a narrowly partisan report to proceed to plenary” (Lord 1998: 210). The characteristics of rapporteurship provide another example that co-operative behaviour in the EP is more likely to bear fruit than sticking to a partisan position.

1.3.4 European model of representation

Apart from the consensual culture, a characteristic of the chamber, important for the socialisation process, is the model of representation that exists within it. The role conceived for MEPs in the EU framework is more complex that that of country representative. The Treaty establishing the European Community defines MEPs as representatives of the “peoples of the States brought together in the Community”. In reality, the vast majority of MEPs in performing their duties privilege the interest of their country of origin. This is understandable – MEPs have the most thorough knowledge about problems of their own country and, most importantly, voters in that country will decide whether MEPs are re-elected or not. Yet, the majority of MEPs do not limit their role to representing compatriots. There are examples from parliamentary life, which show that MEPs are on certain occasions ready to go beyond a narrowly defined national or party point of view and make decisions based upon concerns that relate to the entire Community:

34 Article 190, point I in the consolidated version.
35 MEPs on average attach greater importance to representing people in their constituency/country than all people in Europe (see data from Farrell et al. 2006a in this section).
36 There are cases of MEPs elected outside their country of origin, but they are very rare.
The UK Conservatives publicly dissociated themselves from the UK government’s attempt to veto the 1982 farm price package [...] Similarly, leading CDU MEPs recently wrote an open letter supporting the Commission against CDU ministers in Germany in a dispute over subsidies to Volkswagen, and SPD MEPs criticized the anti-EMU stance taken by [the Chairman of the party, Oskar] Lafontaine in 1995 (Corbett 1998: 69).

MEPs often push for more ambitious solutions than those supported by the Council of the EU or decisions that protect the EU interest. Looking at recent examples, the former was manifest in negotiations regarding the climate package, the latter in the debate on the financial perspective 2007-13 where the EP in negotiations with the Council of the EU opposed the trimming of the EU budget. Many reasons can be quoted for such behaviour. By promoting the Community interest, the MEPs often increase the role of the chamber (i.e. their own) in a given policy area. They can be more ambitious in the targets set for various policies as they are not so much constrained as national governments by the pressure from budgetary limitations or public opinion. But one of the reasons is arguably the very particular role conception to which the majority of MEPs adhere and which obliges them to adopt a broader outlook instead of acting solely as representatives of their own country or its government. The following statement made by Daniel Cohn-Bendit in a parliamentary debate epitomises this approach: “It is not our role, here in the EP, to kneel in front of our national parties, but to defend the European interest, the Community interest and not national interests” (EP 2008b).

The examples mentioned above demonstrate that the majority of MEPs do not limit their role to representation of their voters or compatriots, but try to find a balance between that activity and acting in the name of all EU citizens. The data from MEP 2006 Survey (Farrell et al. 2006b) shows that MEPs accord high importance to representing various groups. Authors of the survey asked MEPs to assess how important it was for them to represent different groups of people (see Table 4). “All people in my member state” and “all people who voted for my party” are the groups that have the highest mean importance, but “all people in Europe” are not far behind. As the authors of the survey conclude, “most MEPs have little problem in acknowledging that their representative role is one with numerous dimensions” (Farrell at al. 2006a: 11). Adaptation to this multidimensional representative role is an important element of new MEPs’ socialisation.
Table 4 MEPs’ attitudes towards their representative role

How important it is to you to represent the following groups of people in the European Parliament? (% of MEPS who assessed the groups as important, i.e. 4 or 5 on a 1-5 scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response category</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Mean importance (out of 5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All people in Europe</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All people in my member state</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>4.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All people in my constituency/region</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All people who voted for my party</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My national party</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>4.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My EP party group</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Conclusions

This chapter depicted two norms that are considered in this thesis as key norms of the EP institutional culture: the norm of consensus and the "European model of representation". It is expected that through socialisation process the majority of MEPS will assess these norms in a positive way and display behaviour that is in harmony with them.37 The chapter also emphasised the characteristics of the European Parliament that are significant for the study of socialisation in the chamber. Over more than fifty years of its existence, the Parliament developed from a consultative body into a powerful participant of the legislative process that in many policy areas is an equal partner for the Council of Ministers. One of the reasons for this evolution were the efforts of pro-integrationist MEPS who have always dominated the chamber, making it one of the most committed advocates of further integration.

Life in the chamber is organised around political groups uniting national parties of similar ideological beliefs. The groups are remarkably cohesive in votes, as national parties realise that co-operation with ideological allies is beneficial for them, and invest a lot of time and effort into negotiations leading to the creation of a common line of the political group. Thus, MEPS act in a complex and dense (in terms of intensity of contacts with others) political environment where the quest for consensual solutions through contacts between individuals and parties is of central importance.

Having presented the particular traits of the EP, which differentiate it from the majority of national parliaments, we can now turn to the issue that is the core of this thesis, namely the socialisation process of new members of the EP. The following chapter will review the

37 The hypotheses regarding the results of the socialisation process are presented in Chapter 2.
research devoted to that issue and then present how the socialisation of Polish MEPs will be examined, and how this analysis can enrich our knowledge of socialisation in the chamber.
Chapter 2. Multiple Facets of Socialisation in the European Parliament

Having presented the EP, it is time to analyse in detail the socialisation process that occurs within this institution. This chapter is the second stage of the introduction to the investigation of socialisation of Polish MEPs. It has a double purpose. First, it discusses research devoted to socialisation in the EP and other EU institutions, highlighting various mechanisms and effects of socialisation (part 1). Then, with reference to the literature, the main questions that will drive this investigation are presented, as well as the analytical framework adopted to provide answers to those questions (part 2).

It is argued that the focus of research that previously dealt with the issue of socialisation in the EP was on changes in attitudes towards European integration. The majority of scholars looked at whether MEPs developed a stronger sense of commitment to integration as a result of their parliamentary experience. In contrast, little attention was paid to the process of adaptation to institutional norms. That process can be considered as part of socialisation and can bring about — by way of example — changes in the ways in which MEPs interact with their counterparts, perceive their duties and themselves as representatives. Those effects of socialisation have been highlighted by scholars who studied socialisation in the COREPER and the working groups of the European Commission and the Council of the EU, and this thesis argues that by paying more attention to that dimension of socialisation we can learn more about the consequences of service in the EP.

The review of literature on socialisation in EU institutions shows that it is a multifaceted phenomenon and, accordingly, in this thesis the notion of socialisation in the EP is understood broadly as a "process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community" (Checke 2005: 804); this process may over time provoke changes in MEPs’ attitudes, identity and behaviour. In order to examine the socialisation of Polish MEPs three dimensions of the process are identified: (i) institutional learning, (ii) adaptation to the institutional culture and (iii) attitude change. These dimensions capture the three major areas in which socialisation occurs. Institutional learning refers to MEPs gaining information about the rules of procedure and the principal means of influencing the policy-making process in the chamber, for example becoming familiar with the negotiation process that leads to the creation of a common position of the political group. Adaptation to the institutional culture depicts the process of
discovering and abiding by the (usually unwritten) norms and codes of conduct that exist in the EP – such as the norm of consensual behaviour or of adopting a broad representative role, depicted in the previous chapter – and demand a certain type of behaviour from MEPs. *Attitude change* describes the phenomenon of MEPs modifying their views on various policy-related issues (e.g. powers of the EP or the Common Agricultural Policy) as a result of contacts with other members of the institution. All those processes can be referred to as the socialisation of new members of the EP. Separating them is a way of organising the knowledge of socialisation; it also facilitates both the analysis of the process and the presentation of our findings.

### 2.1 Research on socialisation in the EP and other EU institutions

This part of the chapter discusses research devoted to socialisation in the EP and other EU institutions in order to show which processes can be called socialisation and what effects they may have.

#### 2.1.1 Research on socialisation processes in the European Parliament

Research focused on the effects of the EP mandate was carried out even before MEPs were directly elected. Early studies were inspired by neofunctionalist assumptions that officials and politicians modify their opinion about integration as they discover all its advantages. Ernst Haas (1968), the founder of neofunctionalism, argued that people directly involved in European affairs will become advocates of integration. First of all, because more powerful European institutions meant higher profile and greater influence for those who served in them. Yet, more factors than just self-interest played a part. Neofunctionalists predicted that once representatives of states became aware of the mechanisms of integration and the benefits that it brought, they would wholeheartedly support it.

Guided by the desire to verify whether national parliamentarians who also served in the EP significantly reassessed their views on European integration, Henry Kerr’s study, based on interviews with MPs from France and Germany, revealed that those who served in the EP gained greater knowledge about Community affairs. They “rely much more extensively upon international sources of information, make finer distinctions among issues and perceive European questions as more central to their concerns” (Kerr 1973: 79) than their colleagues who were only national parliamentarians. However, Kerr did not discover greater support for closer integration among MPs with a European mandate.
The experience of service in the EP resulted in attitude change in the case of several British Labour Party representatives, initially wary of the Common Market project. Gaining a better insight through working on the European level and co-operating with colleagues from other countries, some of them saw the integration project in a more positive light. MEPs interviewed by Kevin Featherstone asserted that the Labour MEPs who opposed British membership became “noticeably more favourable to the Community idea” (Featherstone 1976: 102). Some of Labour representatives admitted that their views had evolved. One of the interviewed observed that: “I’ve good deal more respect for the idea of getting together than I had before. You are in continuous contact with eight other nationalities, and it broadens your respect for other people’s ideas” (Featherstone 1976: 102). Even though Featherstone’s research does not specify how significant these changes in attitudes were in terms of intensity of views or consequences for behaviour, it clearly shows that service in the EP and interactions with politicians from other countries led British representatives to reconsider their views on European integration. Were they active only in national politics, such an evolution of views most probably would not have occurred.

With the introduction of direct elections to the EP, the circumstances seemed more conducive to MEPs adopting a new allegiance to European integration and the Parliament. Being a European parliamentarian ceased to be an additional duty of certain national MPs and became a full-time job. Work in the European legislature could potentially become a genuine career. Some scholars predicted that MEPs, who were not national MPs anymore, would have greater interest in promoting integration and especially the Parliament’s role in the process. The greater the latter, the more influential they could be. Helen Wallace claimed that “the new European parliamentarians will have a vested interest in making the Parliament relevant” (quoted by Corbett 1998: 52). Louis spoke of a “Parliament of professionals whose primary allegiance will be European” (ibidem). Furthermore, a popular mandate gave the EP the much needed legitimacy to demand new competences and a powerful argument to support these demands: the only directly-elected EU institution should have a real influence on the decision-making process. Mauricio Cotta predicted that thanks to the introduction of direct elections, a truly European political elite would come to existence in the Parliament (1984: 126). The MEPs – determined to link their future to the supranational institution – were to become advocates of granting more competences to the community level. In line with those assumptions, the majority of MEPs over the 30 years of existence of the directly-elected chamber consequently advocated closer integration and a stronger Parliament (see Corbett 1998). However, the majority of scholars attributed this pro-integrationist activity of the EP to
self-selection rather than socialisation (see the description of Roger Scully’s research in this section). In other words, the Parliament called for further integration because the majority of politicians coveting a seat were committed supporters of integration, not because many MEPs adopted such views as a result of service in the chamber.

Putting Cotta’s theory to the test, Martin Westlake (1994b) studied the experiences of British MEPs between 1979 and 1992. Looking for shifts in attitudes towards the EU, Westlake analysed the voting patterns on a number of resolutions pertaining to the issue of institutional reform. Among both Labour and Conservative representatives he detected a decrease in opposition to the EP’s resolutions advocating further integration, which was replaced by abstentions and – less often – support. Westlake emphasised that in many cases abstention or absence during the vote could be treated as a strategic behaviour adopted by MEPs unwilling to vote against a resolution, but equally reluctant to break party discipline. Westlake concluded by stating that “membership of the directly-elected EP has led even those members who were initially opposed or sceptical to embrace the reformist camp or, at least, refrain from actively opposing it” (Westlake 1994b: 228). He identified the feeling of “institutional frustration” – a disappointment caused by the limited capacities of the EP to influence EU policy-making – as the main factor behind this change. The MEPs – even those who were not adamant supporters of European integration – wanted “their institution” to be able to influence EU politics, and because of that they were ready to support the chamber’s pleas for further integration. Westlake’s study shows that a pro-integrationist conversion of MEPs who were not entirely supportive of European integration had taken place and that its consequences were not limited to MEPs declarations. Changes in attitudes can be seen also in important decisions that MEPs make, for example when voting on resolutions pertaining to the institutional reform of the EU.

Similarly, Richard Corbett, a Labour MEP and author of a number of publications devoted to the EP (Corbett 1998, Corbett et al. 2005), in his overview of the history of the European legislature, stresses the importance of parliamentary experience for the pro-integrationist shift in the opinions of Labour MEPs in the 1980’s. Similarly, Greek MEPs representing the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) were, according to Corbett, one of the driving forces behind that party’s reorientation towards stronger support for European integration (Corbett 1998: 70).

A case study of Portuguese MEPs also presented conclusions that service in the EP may have important consequences for parliamentarians’ attitudes. Fernanda Pereira (1998) studied the careers of Portuguese MEPs between 1986 and 1995 and discovered changes in
their views and behaviour. Her analysis of oral interventions in the chamber showed that, with time, the interventions of the MEPs started addressing issues that were, in her view, less-directly related to Portuguese interests. MEPs also became more involved in the workings of the EP (as seen by decreased absenteeism) and, on an increasing number of occasions, voted with their respective political groups. Most importantly, several MEPs, when interviewed, admitted that their views evolved due to the experiences in the Parliament. They felt that their knowledge of EU affairs was richer, and some described themselves as more positively inclined towards the idea of closer integration.

A confirmation of the strength of parliamentary rules can be found in the recent study of Italian MEPs in the 1990's. Amy Kreppel (2004) draws attention to the experience of two parties created in the period of important changes on the Italian political scene: the Partito Democratico di Sinistra (PDS) and Forza Italia. On entering the EP, they decided to remain outside the three biggest political groups. Yet, with time, their position evolved and they joined the Socialist and the Christian Democratic/Conservative Groups respectively. Before this move, the Italian MEPs in question increasingly voted together with the groups to which they aspired, rather than with the smaller left-wing (in case of PDS) or (in case of Forza Italia) right-wing groups with which they initially co-operated. It is, of course, hardly unusual for MEPs to attempt to join the group which is the main power broker in the chamber. “What is surprising”, as Kreppel emphasises, “is the extent to which the Italian members seemed to have assumed the goals of the new party groups” (2004: 988). The conclusion from the experience of the Italian MEPs is that:

the norms and rules at the supranational level appear to effectively impose adaptation and change upon the domestic actors who learn to compromise and work with their European colleagues regardless of what occurs at the national level (2004: 988).

The evolution of MEPs’ attitudes as a result of interactions with colleagues was highlighted also in two studies that examined all MEPs, not only chosen national contingents. Donatella Viola’s research on the EP’s actions in relation to military conflicts in the 1990’s (Iraq and Yugoslavia) shows that, even in the very delicate domain of foreign policy, when MEPs had to choose between the position of their national government and the one of their

38 92% of the interviewed MEPs answered "yes" to the question “Did you change your attitude since you joined the European Parliament?” (Pereira 1998: 204). However, little was said by Pereira regarding what this attitude change consisted of.
39 A corruption scandal that erupted in Italy in 1992 resulted in the dissolution of the most important political parties in the post-war history of Italy.
political group, they usually decided to side with the latter. "Indeed a slow but steady process has started within the EP", agues Viola, "whereby perceived national interests and identities expressed by various MEPs are gradually overcome within the political groups" (1999: 260). Bailer and Schneider arrived at similar conclusions in their study of EP's action concerning the EU enlargement. "As other studies have shown", they state, "individual positions largely reflect the attitude of the home government. Yet, when the decision moves to the plenary, party group pressure starts to suppress national preferences" (2002: 140). Such outcomes may be the result of strategic action by MEPs who decide to vote with the Group to avoid consequences or in the hope of getting some concessions in exchange on another occasion. But they may also demonstrate that through discussions with colleagues MEPs' views evolve.

The studies presented above highlight a variety of ways in which service in the EP may affect attitudes and behaviour of MEPs. The effects of service can take the following forms: tactical adaptation to functioning in a multinational environment; gaining better knowledge of the integration process and other member states; changing one's opinion on a concrete issue as a result of interactions with colleagues; and becoming more supportive of supranational integration in general. The socialisation phenomenon thus has multiple facets and may manifest itself in many different ways. The analytical framework adopted in this thesis, presented in the second part of this chapter, will highlight this multidimensionality of the socialisation process.

Amongst the studies depicted above, those authored by Martin Westlake (1994b) and Fernanda Perreira (1998) suggested that parliamentary experience may lead MEPs to embrace views more supportive of European integration. Yet, this view – often referred to as the "going native" thesis – did not remain uncontested. Subsequent studies that tackled this issue questioned that thesis. A project carried out by Mark Franklin and Susan Scarrow (1999) focused on the different attitudes held towards the major aspects of the integration process by MEPs as compared to MPs from different countries. Using survey data, the scholars concluded that, within countries, MPs and MEPs hold generally very similar views. The only difference appeared when it came to the powers of the EP, MEPs being – rather unsurprisingly – more supportive of a strong EP than their peers in national legislatures. Yet, even on this issue the divergence of views was not considerable. Having established the lack

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40 It should be noted that Bailer and Schneider identify "the sanctioning mechanisms of the party groups" rather than interactions with colleagues and persuasion as the main reason for the evolution of individual preferences (Bailer and Schneider 2002: 156).

41 The sample consisted of 1367 MPs and 317 MEPs.
of a strong pro-integration bias among MEPs, Franklin and Scarrow conclude that “effects of socialisation are very small and make virtually no difference to the pro- or anti-European stance of those who enter the EP” (Franklin and Scarrow 1999: 57).

Similar conclusions are presented by the most comprehensive study of the "going native" phenomenon in the EP to date, carried out by Roger Scully (2005). He starts by pointing out that the belief that in the EP members become more committed to integration is based on weak premises. If we analyse the parliamentary context and the motivations of MEPs, argues Scully, our conclusions must be that there is a large number of factors that make a pro-European conversion difficult (2005: Chapter 4). First, the variety of views existing within the chamber makes it difficult to identify a bulk of values and norms which could be described as enjoying incontestable support of a clear majority and to which newcomers could be socialised. Secondly, entering the Parliament does not mean that MEPs become cut off from national politics and immersed into a supranational world of Brussels and Strasbourg. Most europarlamentarians maintain close links with their countries. 42 Finally, and according to Scully most importantly, it is hard to see the interest that MEPs could have in going native. None of MEPs' three main goals – office, policy and re-election – can be more easily achieved if they develop a strongly pro-integrationist attitude, he concluded. 43 Much the contrary, moving away from the position of their national parties may actually jeopardise re-election.

Scully's empirical analysis, based on surveys and voting record of MEPs, deals another blow to the going native hypothesis. Applying regression analysis to survey data, Scully establishes that “serving longer in the EP does not appear to make MEPs more favourable either to integration in general, or empowering the EP in particular” (2005: 100-101). Probing further, the influence of the parliamentary mandate on attitudes in other domains, such as strength of European identity or support for expanded EU competences in foreign policy and regulation, was studied. Again, there was no correlation between length of service and a pro-EU stance. The analysis of voting record yielded similar results – MEPs with longer parliamentary careers were not more likely to support integrationist resolutions. Scully then concludes that "MEPs do not tend to go native in the manner commonly assumed or asserted" (2005: 136). According to him, what is behind the integrationist drift of European

42 In the MEP Survey of 2000, 63% of European parliamentarians declared that they spend at least some time each week in their home country. Many also asserted that they maintained close contacts with national party authorities and national MPs (Scully 2005: 73-74).
43 Simon Hix, Tapio Raunio and Roger Scully identified three main types of MEPs' behaviour: re-election-, office- and policy-seeking, i.e. oriented on ensuring their re-election, gaining important posts in the EP and promoting EP decisions that would reflect their preferences (Hix et al. 1999).
parliamentarians is not socialisation in the chamber, but the fact that politicians generally favourable to the EU tend to covet a seat in the EP. Scully argues that:

evidence points to the importance of national and partisan ties among MEPs, and the significance of who is nominated and elected to the EP, as the major factors in explaining the high levels of Europeanist attitudes in the Parliament. [...] In large part, MEPs do not have to go native because their own beliefs, and the values of the national parties from which they come, already point firmly in this direction (Scully 2002: 126 and 130).

It can be seen from our overview that studies which tackled the socialisation issue brought different results. While the earlier ones, focused on single national groups (Westlake 1994b, Pereira 1998, Kreppel 2004), suggested that the chamber may indeed blunt the euroscepticism of certain members, more recent investigations (Franklin and Scarrow 1999, Scully 2002 and 2005) questioned that phenomenon. The examination of previous research also suggests that the analysis of socialisation in the EP should not be limited to verifying whether or not MEPs “go native”. We have seen from the research depicted above (especially Kerr 1973 and Perreira 1998) that experience of an EP mandate has a bearing on how MEPs approach the EU policy-making process, perform their duties and perceive themselves as representatives. Thus, besides the "going native" issue there is another dimension of socialisation that merits analysis. In order to present more thoroughly that dimension of the socialisation process, it will be useful to examine the research on socialisation in other EU institutions – also assumed to possess the power to transform the preferences and identities of their members – and see how the conclusions drawn by the authors can be used in this study, helping to fathom what the socialisation process consists of and what its consequences may be.

2.1.2 Socialisation in other EU institutions

The assumption that service in EU institutions may influence attitudes and identities of the individuals involved inspired research not only on the Parliament. This section will review studies devoted to the analysis of socialisation in the COREPER, European Commission and working groups of the Council of the EU. These studies highlight the way in which civil servants modify their approach to their role and identity as a result of interactions with actors from other member states in the context of an EU institution.
Jeffrey Lewis (1998, 2000) questioned the image of the COREPER as an institution where national representatives – focused primarily, if not solely, on the defence of national interest – engage in hard-bargaining. He characterised the COREPER as a “mechanism where Member States internalize and endogenize new ways of articulating, defending and representing their self-interests” (1998: 484-5). Through years of co-operation, a number of norms governing the negotiations within this body were forged (2000: 267-271). One of them is commitment to reaching a decision: rather than uncompromisingly defend their positions, Permanent Representatives try to accommodate them with those of their counterparts. They know that concessions made in one area will be returned in another. Negotiations in the COREPER are also characterised by mutual trust (forged through frequent informal contacts) between participants who show understanding for each others’ constraints and are willing to make efforts to accommodate even the most awkward positions. Permanent Representatives act as the interface between the Community and member states. They represent the positions of their governments, yet on certain occasions they find themselves explaining and defending the common decisions back home. Lewis’s interviews demonstrate that many Permanent Representatives (PRs) strongly identify with the COREPER and its decision-making system. Even though, according to Lewis, it cannot be described as a transfer of loyalties, “there is an identifiable secondary allegiance among the PRs to the collective arena” (2000: 274).

These observations led Lewis to formulate some general remarks concerning the negotiation process in the COREPER. He claims that the “consensus reflex and culture of compromise do not operate by the incremental approximation of exogenously given interests, but point to a decision-making style where interests are endogenous to interaction and can undergo evolution during the course of negotiations” (2000: 272). This shows that contacts between members of the COREPER and the particular working culture of this institution can play a crucial role in determining how they behave and what positions they adopt during negotiations and what actions they advocate when reporting back to their capitals.

It has also been suggested that on the level of working groups that prepare the work of Permanent Representatives and make some decisions too, negotiations develop in a different way than that in which intergovernmentalist accounts usually describe them (Moravcsik 1998). The representatives of member states who participate in working groups meetings are not diplomats, but technical experts. Rather than develop into bargaining exercises, their meetings are likely to take the form of deliberation aimed at elaborating the best possible

44 This point was stressed by Emile Noël, a French diplomat and later in life academic, whom Lewis quotes (1998: 486).
solution acceptable to all participants. The instructions that participants of working groups receive are usually general, leaving them room for manoeuvre (Beyers & Diericx 1998, Smith & de Mayard 2003). In fact, as emphasised by Lewis, national positions are often rather vague at the outset of negotiation, and take shape only gradually, through interactions with other representatives.

The works of Martin Egeberg (1999) and Jarle Trondal (2001) explore how officials involved in the debates of working groups of the European Commission or the Council of the EU adopt different role conceptions. Egeberg concludes that “national elites may shift their loyalty from a national to a supranational level owing to the effect of EU institutions” (1999: 470). Some officials interviewed by the scholar developed an allegiance to the supranational level. This new allegiance did not replace the allegiance to the home country, but rather complements it, remaining in most cases secondary. Trondal points out that depending on the institution and the intensity of contacts on the European level, an actor’s identity develops differently: “national officials attending Commission expert committees tend to evoke an ‘independent expert’ role more strongly than officials attending Council working parties” (Trondal 2001: 18). In the Council, where defending one’s national stance is much more acceptable, officials tend to evoke the role of “government representative”. Trondal also concludes that “officials participating within the above EU committees enact supranational role conceptions more strongly than officials devoting less time and energy to these committees” (Trondal 2001: 18). The work of these scholars strongly suggests that activity within a particular context of an EU institution influences civil servants’ perception of their role and identity. Those who are more involved on the supranational level develop a more complex identity that combines national and supranational allegiance.

All the studies quoted above describe important ways in which service in an EU institution may affect civil servants. Even if it does not lead them to adopt more pro-integrationist views, it still has a number of important consequences. Individuals involved are likely to develop a feeling of responsibility for and identification with the common enterprise. Their identity evolves and incorporates, besides national loyalty, an allegiance to their institution and to the European project as a whole. The nature of contacts between national representatives undergoes a transformation. They develop mutual trust and are ready to accept others’ arguments, if they are based on strong premises. The negotiations cease to be just a bargaining exercise and become increasingly based on discussion and persuasion, aimed at forging a solution that could gain universal approval. The examples of the COREPER and the Council working groups demonstrate that interactions are significant for the process through
which individuals define their country’s interest. The latter is rarely an immutable given, rather it is created and re-created through contacts with others.

The research reviewed in this section depicts an important dimension of socialisation—the influence of institutional norms and codes of conduct on identities and roles that individuals perform. The analysis is not centred on views held by the subjects in various policy areas, but more on the way in which they participate in the decision-making process and on how they conceive themselves as representatives. It is open to question to what extent conclusions formulated by the studies that examine civil servants may be treated as applicable to MEPs who are elected politicians. The latter are under the scrutiny of media, their party and the electorate, and thus may be less conducive to adopting—or at least admitting to having adopted—a more supranational identity. Yet, the above sections show that certain traits of the institutional culture of the COREPER and working groups of the Council—commitment to reaching a decision, importance of persuasion, mutual trust between participants—are very similar to those of the EP (see Chapter 1, part 3). As we have seen, research devoted to European Parliament focused much more on attitudes than adaptation to norms, but the studies which touched upon the latter issue (Corbett 1998, Kerr 1973, Perreira 1998) suggested that MEPs adapted to the working culture of the EP in similar ways that were spelled out in the research on COREPER and working groups of the European Commission: namely, they developed a growing loyalty towards other members; a functional identity and allegiance to the institution; and tended to go beyond a narrow nation state-oriented viewpoint. Thus, I will refer to the studies depicting the socialisation of civil servants in EU institutions, summarised in this section, when formulating hypotheses regarding the effects of socialisation of Polish MEPs, in the second part of this chapter.

2.1.3 Systematising the knowledge of the socialisation process in EU institutions

The previous sections, drawing upon research devoted to the EP and other EU institutions, discussed different ways of perceiving socialisation. Before moving on to present the analytical framework adopted in this thesis, this section will look at the work of Jeffrey Checkel whose aim was to formulate the conditions under which socialisation is most likely to happen and to depict the mechanisms and different effects of the process.

Jeffrey Checkel’s work is rooted in constructivism. This theoretical current emphasises that actors, when making decisions, rely not only on an abstract calculation of costs and benefits of every possible action. Their choices are strongly conditioned by the political culture, norms and rules of the institution or country of which they are part (see Jepperson et
Constructivists also claim that interactions between actors can result in changes in their attitudes and identities (Wendt 1992). Such interactions may take place, for example, when a group of individuals enters a new institution.

Aiming to make the constructivist claims more scientifically rigorous, Checkel formulated assumptions regarding the conditions in which persuasion in international environment is likely to occur, emphasising certain traits of the individuals who are subjects of persuasion, of the persuader(s) and the circumstances in which contact between them occurs. Persuasion, understood as a process through which one actor uses arguments in order to convince another to change their attitude, may be seen as a mechanism through which the socialisation process occurs. According to Checkel, persuasion is more likely to occur when the persuadee is a novice to the given subject area, interested in acquiring knowledge about it and harbouring few strongly ingrained beliefs on the subject (2001a: 27). The persuader's position as an important member of the group and her/his appropriate demeanour ("convincing rather than lecturing") also favour persuasion. When it comes to circumstances, small groups, composed of individuals who share common professional backgrounds, meeting repeatedly and deliberating in a de-politicised setting — "insulated from direct political pressure and exposure" (2001a: 26) — are conducive to persuasion. Those claims regarding persuasion and social learning will be used as a basis for hypotheses in this thesis.

In later work, Checkel further specified different modes in which socialisation can occur and the different effects that the process can have. He claims that successful socialisation leads to "sustained compliance based on the internalization of (...) new norms" (Checkel 2005: 804). The internalization of norms implies that individuals move from the logic of consequences to the logic of appropriateness. This means that they act in a certain way not only because they calculate that a given action will bring them concrete benefits, but also — sometimes primarily — because this is what is considered appropriate by the community of which they are members. The switch between the two logics may — argues Checkel — take two forms. Individuals may just play a role, acting in accordance with the rules (i.e. doing what is appropriate), but not necessarily embracing them. Checkel calls this socialisation Type I. Type II socialisation occurs when individuals perceive the norms and rules of an institution or community as "the right thing to do". This "implies that agents adopt the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of which they are a part of" (Checkel 2005: 804).

Checkel also identifies three mechanisms through which individuals socialise. The first one is strategic calculation. Even though it is not possible to claim that socialisation occurs when behaviour is guided by strategic calculation alone, on certain occasions activities
motivated by interest maximisation may, "because of various cognitive and institutional lock-in effects – later be followed by sustained compliance that is strongly suggestive of internalization and preference change" (ibidem: 809). In other words, certain behaviour that was motivated by the achievement of concrete benefits may with time become automatic and repeated even when it is not as beneficial any more.

Role playing is the second mechanism. Checkel argues that as it is impossible for agents to thoroughly analyse every single situation, they tend to follow certain models of behaviour that exist within a given institution. This usually occurs somewhat automatically, with agents resorting to a behaviour that is simply identified as natural in an organisation and potentially effective. This mechanism leads to Type I socialisation/internalisation depicted above.

The third mechanism is normative suasion. Checkel claims that frequently interests and preferences of individuals are open for redefinition. Through contacts and exchange of views with counterparts, agents can change their mind about "the right thing to do". Normative suasion leads to Type II socialisation/internalisation.

Jeffery Checkel emphasises that the effects of the socialisation process may be very different, ranging from calculated obedience, provoked by the willingness to avoid rejection by other members of the institution, to wholehearted acceptance of the norms characteristic for an institution. His work stresses that members' motivation to follow institutional norms vary as well. Checkel's approach to the mechanisms through which socialisation may occur and the effects that it may have provides a framework according to which findings may be clearly organised. In the concluding chapter, the findings of the present investigation will be discussed with regard to Checkel's systematisation in order to show which mechanisms were important in the socialisation process of the Polish MEPs, and to assess whether the internalisation of parliamentary norms can in their case be considered as lasting.

2.2. Analytical framework and hypotheses

Against the background of previous research devoted to the phenomenon of socialisation in the EP and other EU institutions, this part presents the main aims of the thesis, its research questions, analytical framework and the hypotheses that it will test.


2.2.1 Aims of the thesis and research questions

To recap our findings so far, Scully’s study (2005) demonstrated that a universal mechanism that could turn eurosceptics in the European Parliament into supporters of integration did not exist. However, this conclusion, as Scully himself admits, does not mean that service in the EP "has no impact upon members of the institution" (2005: 137). He goes on to add that "socialization is a multi-faceted phenomenon: all MEPs must presumably undergo very important learning experiences during their time within the Parliament" (Scully 2005: 137). The aim of this thesis is to shed some light on these learning experiences. We saw above that in the chamber MEPs may learn to pay more attention to the community interest, besides the one of their country (Pereira 1998). Thanks to parliamentary experience, they may gain insight into the preoccupations of their counterparts from other countries (Kerr 1973) and, as a result, adapt more conciliatory or pro-integrationist views on a given issue, different from those held by their colleagues back home (Corbett 1998: 69). Contacts in the chamber may even lead to more significant shifts of opinion, detectable in voting patterns (Kreppel 2004). The aim of this investigation is to categorise the different forms in which the socialisation process may manifest itself; in other words, we aim to discover what can be meant by saying that freshmen MEPs go through a process of socialisation, ascertain which of these processes occurred in the case of Polish MEPs and assess what were the consequences of the socialisation process for MEPs' political views, identity and behaviour.

Researchers who approached this subject focused their attention on attitudes towards European integration, investigating whether MEPs wanted greater Community competences and stronger institutions (Franklin and Scarrow 1999: 50-51, Scully 2002b: 119-127, 2005: 94-95). Such a focus is understandable as changes in policy preferences would be a spectacular proof of the power of the institutional context. However, it narrows down the analysis of socialisation to what is only one aspect of the process. Scully's book has been criticised for taking an excessively narrow view of socialisation in the EP and limiting it to the process leading individuals to become more pro-integrationist. "The analysis of parliamentary socialisation should focus on the relationship between parliamentarians and their peers and the institution itself, on the one hand, and on the modes of representation, on the other" (Navarro 2007: 96, my translation). Following this research path charted by the French scholar, this thesis broadens the focus and examines the realm of adaptation to norms and codes of conduct as well. In doing this it will draw inspiration from research on the COREPER and the working groups of the Council and the Commission, presented above in section 2.1.2, which highlighted that dimension of socialisation. It will tackle the following
questions: will Polish MEPs recognise the existence of a set of norms specific for the EP and adapt to them? If so, what consequences will this adaptation have in terms of political behaviour? Will the analysis of Polish experience provide corroboration of the claim that there is a particular model of European parliamentarian which the newly arrived MEPs tend to follow? To what extent will Polish MEPs feel that their identity has been transformed or enriched through service in the chamber?

"Saying that institutions matter is not enough, we should specify how they matter" is a call that appears in a number of scholarly articles examining how institutions influence its members (Checkel 2001b). Heeding this advice, this thesis will examine not only the results, but also the process of socialisation and factors that influence it. It will try to show in more detail how freshmen MEPs discover and accept, or reject, parliamentary norms and codes of conduct. Will Polish MEPs treat their more experienced colleagues from other countries as role models? How developed will the informal contacts between Poles and MEPs from other countries be? Is the socialisation process the same for all MEPs? What factors determine the results of socialisation process?

2.2.2 Analytical framework for studying socialisation in the European Parliament

The present investigation adopts a broad definition of socialisation – this notion is understood as the "process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community" (Checkel 2005: 804). After a review of research devoted to the phenomenon of socialisation in the EP and other EU institutions, three main dimensions of socialisation have been identified. They are: institutional learning, adaptation to the institutional culture and attitude change. In order to present the findings in a clear and structured way, the analysis in this thesis is organised around these three dimensions. This section depicts each of these dimensions in turn and presents the hypotheses related to them. Each of the three chapters (i.e. chapters 4-6) is devoted to one of the abovementioned dimensions.

I Institutional learning

When considering the notion of socialisation of new members of an organisation or institution what first springs to mind is the process of learning the rules and mechanisms by which the institution functions. Referring to this aspect, Feldman claims that socialisation transforms individuals from "organizational outsiders to participating and effective members" (Feldman 1976: 309, quoted in Scully 2005: 79). This definition encapsulates the first dimension of socialisation. The EP, like other institutions, possesses a number of particular traits that make
it, in some aspects, different from most national parliaments. These traits were described in Chapter 1. The permanent coalition-building process within and between political groups and the importance of *rapporteurs* can be mentioned as the most significant. On entering the chamber MEPs have to discover the rules of the parliamentary game and learn to play by them in order to – using Feldman’s words – “become participating and effective members”. Chapter 4, *Socialisation as institutional learning*, investigates how Polish MEPs gain knowledge about the particular mechanisms that govern the functioning of the chamber and how later they adapt their behaviour to achieve their aims.

Institutional learning constitutes the most basic aspect of socialisation. However, it deserves attention as Polish MEPs were in a very particular situation. Freshmen from old member states elected in 2004 had a number of compatriots who had already had EP experience, whereas all Polish MEPs were freshmen. Thus, adapting to the mechanisms that govern the policy-making process of the chamber may be a particular challenge for them. Looking at institutional learning is also important since this adaptation to the chamber on the basic level arguably determines whether socialisation in the other two dimensions occurs. Adaptation to the Parliament’s codes of conduct and attitude change are only possible if MEPs learn the basic mechanisms by which the Parliament functions and participate in its work. Those who do not participate are deprived of opportunities to discover unwritten parliamentary norms or exchange ideas with other MEPs (which can lead to attitude change).

The following hypotheses will be examined in Chapter 4:

**Hypothesis 1**

**H1:** Polish MEPs will successfully go through the process of institutional learning, becoming participating and effective MEPs.

As will be shown in Chapter 3, many Polish MEPs can boast long parliamentary and international experience; others had long been involved in Polish politics; those for whom the EP is the first political experience were successful in other walks of life. Thus, there are no reasons to believe that these individuals or a large fraction of them should fail to adapt to working within the EP.

**Hypothesis 2**

The only group of MEPs who may not reach the status of “participating and effective members” are the Eurosceptics. Aware of the fact that their strongly anti-integrationist views
make them a marginal force in the chamber dominated by euroenthusiasts, they may completely refrain from participating in the activities of the EP or try to disturb its work, hoping that by doing so they can contribute to the deterioration of the public image of this institution. The Eurosceptics' political record suggests that it is a likely outcome. When the Polish Parliament was invited to send observers to the EP, the League of Polish Families initially declined to name their representatives. Among the Eurosceptics elected to the EP in 2004 are politicians known for their tendency towards provocative behaviour. Witold Tomczak, for instance, destroyed a sculpture presenting Pope John Paul II flattened by a meteorite, which was on display in one of Warsaw’s galleries. He later claimed that the sculpture was an insult to his religious beliefs (Gazeta Wyborcza 2000: 2).

Another scenario would have the Eurosceptics decide that presence in parliamentary debates is politically more beneficial than absenteeism. Consequently, they would show some superficial respect for the proceedings of the chamber and get involved in them in a way that would not – in their eyes – compromise their anti-integrationist stance. They would try to mobilise opposition against the directives that entail closer integration or use the chamber as a forum where they can present the problems of the regions that they represent and their voters.

The two scenarios presented above can be expressed as two competing hypotheses:

H2a: The Eurosceptics will boycott the works of the chamber, either by refraining from participating or by trying to disturb the day-to-day activities.
H2b: The Eurosceptics will participate in the works of the chamber, presenting their criticisms of integration.

In short, the Eurosceptics can choose either an unequivocally confrontational approach or participation focused on disseminating views opposed to further integration.

II Adaptation to the institutional culture

While institutional learning referred to the more technical aspects of parliamentary activity (rules of procedure, political tactics in the chamber), adaptation to institutional culture focuses on norms and codes of conduct. This dimension of socialisation is best illustrated by the definition put forward by Alistair Ian Johnston who depicts socialisation as a “process by which social interaction leads novices to endorse expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting” (Johnston 2001: 493). Apart from the most general rules of procedure, institutions possess a number of norms (usually unwritten) that call for a particular behaviour from members. Those who ignore the norms and codes of conduct run the risk of behaving contrary to what others expect from them and thus weaken their position within the institution.
Findings related to this dimension are presented in Chapter 5, *Socialisation as adaptation to institutional culture*. The following hypotheses will be tested:

**Hypotheses 3-4**

H3: MEPs' declarations and behaviour will reveal their acceptance of the consensual culture of the chamber.

H4: MEPs' declarations and behaviour will reflect the adoption of a role of a "European representative".

In Chapter 1 devoted to the European Parliament, two traits in particular were highlighted as essential from the point of view of this study: the consensual institutional culture and the "European model of representation". It was emphasised that in the parliamentary decision-making process MEPs display behaviour that is oriented towards building a wide compromise. The example of rapporteurs in the EP shows this very clearly. Rapporteurs have to summarise the position of the main players in the chamber rather than try to push through their own views. Rapporteurs who excessively promote the point of view of their political family find it difficult to garner adequate support for their proposals (Corbett et al. 2005: 137, Lord 1998: 210). Assuming that MEPs indeed "endorse expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting", they should assess the consensual culture of the EP in positive terms and behave accordingly, i.e. show readiness to make concessions in order to "take others on board" and avoid adopting intransigent attitudes.

As shown in Chapter 1, there exist numerous examples from the EP, showing that MEPs when preparing their decisions are able to go beyond narrowly nation-centric positions and sometimes even to confront their government or political party back home (Corbett 1998, Bailler and Schneider 2002). Thus it can be concluded that the majority of MEPs in performing their role look for a balance between representing the interests of their country and paying attention to the needs of other EU citizens. This approach represents the "expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting" in the EP and is described in this thesis as "European model of representation" or a role of "European representative". Apart from the examples from the EP, hypothesis 4 is inspired by the research on the COREPER and Council working groups, which demonstrated how individuals' identities developed through participation in these organs (Beyers 2005, Egeberg 1999, Lewis 1998 and 2000). The hypothesis does not claim that the new identity of a European representative will replace the allegiance to the nation-state. Rather, in line with the conclusions of studies concerning other EU bodies, it can
be expected that MEPs' identities will be become more complex and multifaceted (Beyers 2005). In other words, it can be expected that Polish MEPs will pay more attention to EU-wide issues, probably understand better the particularities of other countries, but it is unlikely that they will start feeling primarily responsible for acting in the name of the citizens of the Union rather than for defending the interest of their voters.

Hypotheses 5

H5: The more supportive of integration MEPs are, the more likely they are to assess parliamentary norms positively and follow them in their actions.

This hypothesis expresses the assumption that the effects of adaptation to the institutional culture depicted in hypotheses 3-4 are unlikely to be the same for all Polish MEPs. Behaving according to the norms strengthens the individual's position in an institution. He or she becomes predictable (in the positive sense of this word) and reliable in the eyes of colleagues. Conversely, the attraction of norms comes from the fact that individuals who follow them are more likely to achieve positions of influence. However, MEPs have different incentives to seek the status of reliable parliamentarians — a safe pair of hands. While achieving such a status is crucial for MEPs who represent mainstream, Euroenthusiastic parties that want to influence the policy-making process, it may not be so for the Eurosceptics who, as mentioned above, in order to demonstrate their anti-European zeal may even want to — more or less conspicuously — contest parliamentary norms. Strongly critical of integration, the Eurosceptics will be equally suspicious of parliamentary norms. They also have little incentive to follow the norms on pragmatic grounds — it is not of primary importance for them whether they are considered reliable by the majority of other MEPs as ideological differences virtually exclude cooperation between them and the major EP political groups.

III. Attitude change

This dimension encompasses the aspect that was at the core of the majority of previous studies of socialisation in the EP — MEPs' views regarding integration. Here, Scully's definition of socialisation is most adequate. He approaches socialisation as the "idea that because of their experiences in the chamber, European parliamentarians become staunch advocates for closer European integration in general, and perhaps a greater role for the EP in particular" (Scully 2002b: 113). This is the "going native" thesis, but it does not exhaust the dimension referred to as attitude change. As a result of contacts with colleagues MEPs may develop more general support for integration, but they may also change their opinion on one
well-defined issue that may or may not be EU-related. Put differently, the EP is viewed not only as an institution where MEPs may pick up the integrationist zeal, but more generally, as an arena of intense exchanges of views on political matters. MEPs find themselves at the very heart of EU politics, start to deal with new issues, meet and exchange ideas with a multitude of actors from 27 member states. As a result, their views may evolve and this evolution may be considered as one of the effects of the socialisation process.

Thus, two subcategories can be differentiated within this dimension of socialisation:

a) a general attitude change from euroscepticism to euroenthusiasm – often referred to as “going native” – illustrated by statements like "I am not opposed to European integration anymore", "I understood the benefits of integration" or "I support the EP and the Commission more than when I came here".

b) an attitude change on a single, well-delineated issue (e.g. gay marriages) provoked by persuasion exerted by fellow members of the chamber.

Accordingly, Chapter 6, Socialisation as attitude change, analyses the development of Polish MEPs’ attitudes towards integration, but it also attempts to pinpoint concrete issues on which arguments put forward by other MEPs made Polish parliamentarians change their minds. The following hypotheses will be tested:

Hypothesis 6

**H6: Determined Eurosceptics are unlikely to change their position on the major issues concerning European integration.**

This hypothesis derives from the notion put forward by Scully, namely that any individual eurosceptic MEP would have too much to lose by a u-turn on European issues, as it would inevitably irritate their party colleagues and voters (Scully 205: 83-85). It is also based upon one of Checkel’s claims regarding socialisation and persuasion, namely that the latter is unlikely to take place if the object of persuasion holds many “prior, ingrained beliefs” on the subject (2001b: 5). As it will be shown in Chapter 3, the views presented by Polish Eurosceptics (League of Polish Families) are very strong and can be described as "ingrained" – in their view the European Union challenges the values that they describe as essential: the sovereignty of their country, the national identity and religious beliefs of Polish people. In other words, there are both extrinsic and intrinsic constraints on any change of position, one deriving from a more pragmatic consideration by the individual politician of the political
costs of a change, the other deriving from the psychology of political beliefs that sees the core values, internalised early in life, as entrenched.

Hypothesis 7
H7: If there are instances of attitude change towards greater support for integration, they will occur among the Eurorealists.

At the opposite end of the nationalist-Europeanist spectrum, a large number of Polish europarlimentarians are committed supporters of European integration. In their case significant attitude change – in terms of adopting a more pro-integrationist position – is unlikely as they are already among the chamber’s most euroenthusiastic members. Hence, if a general attitude change occurs, it should occur among the Eurorealists – MEPs who have mixed feelings about integration, who generally support it, but are at the same time critical regarding certain aspects of the process. In case of these MEPs, there is room for change – contrary to the Euroenthusiasts who can hardly become more pro-EU – and it is likely that they will become involved in the work of the European Parliament. This will create opportunities for contact with the more pro-integrationist MEPs – contrary to the Eurosceptics who may manifest their rejection of integration by boycotting the work of the chamber.

Hypothesis 8
H8: MEPs will identify more strongly with the EP, emphasising its importance and demanding more powers for it.

Organisational theories claim that members of an institution strive to enlarge its competences (see Hooghe 2001). This institutional patriotism is visible also among MEPs. European parliamentarians have consequently demanded a greater role for their institution in the integration process (Corbett 1998, Franklin and Scarrow 1999). Hypothesis 8 derives from those findings.

Hypothesis 9
H9: Instances of attitude change are most likely to happen in case of well-defined issues, rather than regarding the general “more integration versus less integration” question.

Examples from research of Corbett (1998), Baier and Schneider (2002) and Viola (2000), evoked in Chapter 2 (section 2.1.1), encourage students of attitude change to examine well-defined issues rather than focus on a loosely defined general support for European integration.
It seems that it is in this area that clear-cut instances of persuasion may be discovered. Such issues are debated in parliamentary committees where people often with similar professional backgrounds can debate in a setting that is not so politically charged as the plenary. These circumstances are relatively close to those assessed by Checkel as propitious for persuasion (2001a: 26). In such an environment, political considerations are most likely to give way to technical/expert arguments and persuasion may more easily occur. Moreover, for an MEP who has reservations about the extent of integration it will be easier to accept the increase of the Commission's or Parliament's powers on a well defined issue, as a result of arguments put forward by colleagues whom they consider competent, than undergo a general conversion towards a pro-integrationist position.

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to present a review of literatures relevant for the study of socialisation in the EP, main research questions of this investigation and the analytical framework through which the investigation in this thesis will proceed.

The literature review demonstrated that while studies of socialisation in the EP generally focused on MEPs' attitudes towards the EU, consequences of service may be important also in other areas, such as adaptation to parliamentary norms and codes of conduct. Consequently, this thesis adopts a broad definition of socialisation. The investigation of the experience of the Polish MEPs will be organised around three dimensions of socialisation: institutional learning, adaptation to the institutional culture and attitude change. First, it is verified how Polish MEPs adapt to the day-to-day workings of the EP and whether they become effective members or passive outsiders. Then we look at whether contact with a number of parliamentary norms and codes of conduct results in changes in the way in which Polish MEPs behave in the policy-making process and how they perceive themselves as representatives of different social groups and communities. Finally, it is ascertained whether service in the EP resulted in changes in attitudes towards various EU policies and EU-related issues.

Before we proceed to the presentation of findings regarding the effects of socialisation of Polish MEPs, some background information concerning the latter should be provided. This is the purpose of the following chapter.
Chapter 3. Polish political parties and MEPs

Jeffrey Checkel stresses the importance that “prior embededness” (2002: 10) has on the outcome of socialisation process. When actors enter a new institutional setting they bring with them a bulk of experiences that they acquired in their previous political and/or professional activities. These experiences may importantly influence the process of their socialisation in the new institution. Thus, presenting where Polish MEPs – politically – come from is necessary to place the analysis of their socialisation in a wider context. The factors that explain particular results of their socialisation process may very well be found in their political past. This chapter introduces rich background information about Polish MEPs and the political currents that they represent.

The first part gives an overview of the attitude of the major Polish political parties towards European integration and Polish membership in the EU, from the early 1990’s, i.e. the moment of political transition from communist authoritarian regime to parliamentary democracy in Poland, to 2003 when Polish accession to the EU was confirmed in a referendum. It is argued that Polish political parties could be divided into three broad camps: Euroenthusiasts, Eurorealists and Eurosceptics. These labels will be used in the following chapters to facilitate the presentation of findings regarding the effects of socialisation.

The second part of the chapter provides background information concerning Polish MEPs. It opens with a depiction of the 2004 European elections campaign in Poland. Then it presents the previous political experiences of Polish MEPs and the main objectives that they set for themselves on commencing their European mandate.

3.1 Polish political parties and European integration

In the time immediately following the democratic transition of 1989 the idea of joining the European Union was unanimously supported by Polish political elites (Neumayer 2003: 123). For former members of the democratic opposition joining the EU was part of a symbolic return to Europe, a natural consequence of the close ties that existed between Poland and the Western world. Meanwhile, for the post-communists backing the European project was a means of gaining legitimacy and creating an image of a modern and open Social Democratic party. With time, within this broad consensus, differences appeared between parties concerning the conditions of Polish accession and – above all – the desired institutional shape of the EU that Poland was to integrate. Opponents of the Union in the first years of the post-
1989 period were mostly lone voices on the margins of the political scene. However, as the process of economic and political reforms – some of which were socially perceived as imposed by the EU – disproportionately struck certain social groups, opposition to integration started to pay off electorally and by the end of the 1990’s the eurosceptic political parties became a force to be reckoned with. The following sections depict the development of Polish parties’ attitude in more detail, discussing first the resolute supporters of integration and Polish membership in the EU, then more moderate supporters who, while accepting the general idea of integration, formulated a number of criticisms regarding the way in which it proceeded, and finally unyielding critics of integration and opponents of Polish membership.

3.1.1 The Euroenthusiasts

The staunchest supporters of integration came from two political currents: the post-communist Social Democrats and the liberal strand of Solidarity. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) endorsed the idea of integrating the EU, trying to build its credentials as democratic and modern at home and abroad. As one columnist put it, “for the SLD pro-Europeanism was a way to escape its past” (Bachman 2000). The party consistently pursued this pro-European course. It was the SLD-Polish Peasant Party coalition government that officially applied for membership in 1994. In the electoral campaigns, the Social Democrats consistently put accession as their top priority (Sokół 2001, Szymański 2002). Their leader, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, during his 10-year double presidential mandate was actively involved in the country’s foreign policy and promoted the idea of integration. The SLD opted for a strongly integrated Union, not only economically but also politically. In 2001, leader of the party, Leszek Miller, who was to become prime minister six months later, declared his support for the evolution of the Union towards federation (Buras 2002: 61).

The idea of the EU developing beyond its economic core into high politics was also supported by the liberal-minded members of Solidarity. The Freedom Union with its leaders – Leszek Balcerowicz, Bronislaw Geremek, Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Janusz Onyszkiewicz – internationally known and committed to close integration was the main pro-integration force on the Polish right.45 The party had a clear commitment to advanced political integration based on strong community institutions. One of the party members, Piotr Nowina-Koropka,46

45 A very symbolic example of the commitment to cooperation with European partners can be found in the party’s electoral manifesto of 1997. EU accession is mentioned there as the main priority. It is followed by the pledge to develop cooperation with France and Germany within the Weimar Triangle. Strengthening cooperation with the US comes only as number three.
46 Deputy head of the Committee for European Integration (roughly equivalent to a ministry) between 1997 and 1998.
called for adding new competences to the community level, stating that "no state can now exercise sovereignty independently" (ibid: 62). Another Freedom Union member, Mikołaj Dowgielewicz, argued against weakening the European Commission and strengthening the intergovernmental element (ibid: 63). After the scission within the Freedom Union and the political demise of this party, it was the Civic Platform that became the main pro-integration player on the right.

3.1.2 The Eurorealists

Meanwhile, the conservative, national-catholic parties that emerged from Solidarity had a less enthusiastic attitude towards integration. Parties such as the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and later the Law and Justice accepted integration, realising the benefits that membership in the EU could bring. They were, however, against political integration and the evolution of the Union towards a federal or quasi-federal polity. One AWS member, Ryszard Czarnecki\(^{47}\) claimed that "federal union is weak, inflexible and built mostly on the opposition towards nation states" (ibid: 62). Politicians from this current usually described the Union that they wanted as Europe des patries, focused on economic integration, with nation-states as major players. The attitude towards European integration displayed by General de Gaulle was frequently evoked as inspiration by these politicians. Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of the Law and Justice, gave a good summary of this conception and the reasons for rejection of federalism in a press interview:

I am for the Union, but I will never support federal projects, which are starting to dominate in Europe. We do not want to give up our independence only fifteen years after we have regained it. Common foreign and defence policy, common money and passports – what will be left of our sovereignty?

The federal solution will be fatal if the Polish state loses all instruments with which it can defend the interest of its citizens. We will be new in the Union and treated as second category. If as a state we do not keep strong prerogatives, it will be our defeat.

The last argument against federalism is of economic nature. The economic policies that work well in France do not have to be appropriate for Poland. If the Union ties our hands here, it will have negative effects.

[Federal Union] will be in my view the instrument of the Franco-German superpower. The rest will be just pawns. It is in our interest to maintain a close alliance with the US – if only because of Russia – and this will be impossible with the CFSP in place.

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\(^{47}\) Head of the Committee for European Integration between 1997 and 1998 and currently MEP for the Self-Defence party.
I entirely reject the European identity as superior to national identities. I will not cease to be Polish in the EU, even though I can already see some people who want the free themselves from the burden of their Polishness and become Europeans (Gazeta Wyborcza 2003a).

The focus on national interest and protection of sovereignty translated into an intransigent stance in negotiations with the EU. In 2001, the AWS government of Jerzy Buzek could not find agreement with the European Commission on the issues of access to EU markets for the citizens of new member states and sale of Polish land to foreigners (Szczerbiak 2002). Politicians from the conservative current declared that they would only support membership if the conditions were adequate (Nalewajko 2003: 125). 48

Polish conservatives also criticised the EU for promoting excessive moral liberalism and drifting away from the Christian values on which it was founded. Marcin Libicki, member of the AWS and head of Polish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 49 claimed in 1998 that the promotion of Christian values should be the main objective of the Polish delegation. This promotion translated into fighting against abortion, pornography and gay marriage, as well as arguing in favour of the death penalty (Sielski 2001: 83). Jerzy Buzek, in his inauguration speech as prime minister, declared that "the respect for moral values would be our [Polish] contribution to the uniting Europe" (ibid: 81).

A similar position, based on making the acceptance of membership conditional upon its final formula, characterised the Polish Peasant Party. The PSL started off with a very critical stance towards integration with the West. Its candidate in the 1990 presidential election, Roman Bartoszcze, lambasted the process as a mechanism that would lead to a take-over of Polish land, agriculture and industry by foreign powers (Zukowski 2001: 173). Similar views, if in a slightly less radical form, have kept appearing until the present day, 50 nonetheless the majority of the PSL leadership gradually took a more favourable stance towards integration. In 1995, the party expressed support for Polish accession, but added that the time was not yet ripe for this to happen (Sielski 2001). In the electoral campaign of 1997 the party reiterated its support for accession, but stressed its opposition against the European tendency to "farmerise" agriculture and maintained support for the model of family holdings, common in

48 In 2002, for instance, the Law and Justice formulated the following conditions: 27 votes in the Council, full participation in the preparations of the financial perspective 2006-2012, protection of Polish land against acquisition by foreigners, achieving with only a brief delay full CAP subsidies, ensuring that Poland will not be a net contributor to the EU, organising effective protection of the sensitive branches of economy and Polish firms (Nalewajko 2003: 125).

49 Currently MEP for the PiS.

50 One of the PSL MEPs, for example, interviewed for this thesis claimed that the EU is based on the rich abusing the poor.
Poland (Żukowski 2001). The PSL also formulated the conditions under which it was ready to support accession. Most of them turned around agriculture, the major one being that Polish farmers be included in the CAP on the conditions equal to their western counterparts without any transition periods (Sielski 2001, Nalewajko 2003: 118-119). Should this not happen, the party would not hesitate to oppose integration. “Integration is not an aim in itself for us. If the negotiations result in negative outcomes, we will be with the people, not with the elites”, declared one of the MPs in 2002 (Nalewajko 2003: 118). On the issue of the institutional shape of the Union, the PSL was a firm advocate of Europe des patries model where, as the party leader declared in 2001, “the member states keep the possibility of using their own political instruments” (Buras 2002: 62). Finally, similarly to the right-wing parties described above, the PSL also tended to evoke the necessity to protect Polish identity, tradition and values (Szymański 2002).

The Self-Defence, the PSL’s rival in rural areas, started as a strongly eurosceptic party. European integration was condemned by the party leader, Andrzej Lepper, as a part of a wider process of capitalist expansion of the rich West, carried out at the expense of the poor East. In the electoral campaign of 2000, Lepper protested against “labelling the ordinary economic or political imperialism – conquering nations without sword – as economic assistance, integration and globalisation” (Nalewajko 2003: 105). The economic perils of integration, that was supposed to ruin Polish agriculture and industry, were central in the Self-Defence’s anti-EU propaganda. This resounding critique of entering the EU and the world of globalised economy was accompanied by few alternative solutions. Lepper usually limited himself to stressing the importance of maintaining strong economic relations with Poland’s eastern neighbours, mainly Russia.

The Self-Defence’s strong rhetoric was somewhat toned down in the electoral campaign of 2001. The formation attempted to broaden its electoral appeal by getting rid of the image of a party of firebrands. Giving up fervent anti-Europeanism was part of this strategy. In January 2001, the Self-Defence claimed that its attitude to Europe “could be qualified as ‘eurorealism’ i.e. judging the integration policy not from a point of view of an ideology, but from the point of view of hard facts” (ibid: 112). “If Poland is able to negotiate adequate conditions of membership, then the aspiration to join the EU is by all means the right thing” (ibid: 113), added the leader a few months later. However, even in the new guise of a eurorealist Lepper often reverted to his old views. In 2002, already as MP, he claimed that “we want to defend our production. Today it is a resounding ‘no’ to the Union because there is no partnership. We are on our knees; we have to crawl following the rules set by the Union” (ibid: 113). In view
of such statements, the Self-Defence’s switch to eurorealism looks more like an electoral ruse than a genuine change of stance. Indeed, Self-Defence and its leader continued to emit varying messages, sometimes declaring their support for the idea of integration, then, on other occasions, attacking the European Commission for imposing excessively severe conditions of Polish accession (see Nalewajko 2003).

The conservative post-Solidarity parties, as well as the PSL and the Self-Defence described their attitude towards the EU as “eurorealism”, thus differentiating themselves from the “euroenthusiasts” who, in their view, tended to ignore the costs of membership. Using the terms put forward by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003) such an attitude could be called soft Euroscepticism, i.e. “contingent or qualified opposition to European integration” (ibid: 212).51 The parties in question do not reject integration as such, but formulate a number of criticisms regarding the integration process and make their support for it dependent on the direction in which the Union will evolve.

3.1.3 The Eurosceptics

Meanwhile, hard Euroscepticism rejects the integration as inherently flawed. Such an attitude was present among the radical currents of Polish right – strongly nationalist (sometimes xenophobic), often linked to the Catholic Church. Until 2001 these groupings remained on the margins of Polish politics, representing around 3 per cent of MPs (Nalewajko 2003: 98). In 2000, seven MPs left the AWS parliamentary group and created their own – Polish Alliance. A strong critique of the EU formed the very core of their political programme. The grouping transformed into the League of Polish Families (LPR) and went on to achieve a surprisingly good result in the 2001 elections, gaining 38 parliamentary mandates (out of 460). Apart from accusing the EU of imposing an economically disastrous relationship on Poland, the LPR’s denunciation focused on the issue of values and morality. They perceived the EU as a cosmopolitan, bureaucratic and deeply immoral structure that would deprive Poland of its sovereignty and destroy the national identity of its citizens (Nalewajko 2003: 113-15; Piasecki 2005: 47 and 58-9; Szymański 2002). LPR members had a particular taste for comparing the EU institutional structure and functioning with those of the Soviet Union. In one of its official statements the parliamentary group warned against the

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51 Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003) include the Self-Defence in the group of hard eurosceptics. However, the author believes that the party’s current attitude qualifies as soft euroscepticism. Its anti-EU rhetoric has been considerably moderated and in the campaign preceding the referendum on Polish accession the Self-Defence did not call its supporters to vote no.
dangerous influence of post-communist and totalitarian ideas on the formation of the EU. There are reasons to believe that at the source of the perestroika there were agreements [...] made by the leaders of the Soviet communist party and the Socialist International, aiming at the elimination of sovereign nation states. [These agreements] may result in the establishment of the Soviet socialist system in the whole of Europe. The former Soviet secret services are actively involved in the carrying out of this project (Nalewajko 2003: 127).

Similarly to Self-Defence, the leaders of LPR, so profligate in their attacks on the EU, were much more laconic on the issue of alternatives. They advocated creating protectionist barriers against certain foreign products and diversifying Polish commercial contacts, building cooperation with the US, Eastern Europe, Middle and Far East. Some LPR leaders also evoked the idea of joining the North American Free Trade Agreement (ibid: 116).

3.1.4 The accession referendum

The European debate took centre stage in the run-up to the referendum (June 2003). The SLD, PO and UW actively campaigned in favour of membership emphasising the enormous economic and political advantages that it offered (Piasecki 2005). The Law and Justice, even though the leaders reiterated their opposition against any federal tendencies, also supported the yes vote. The executive committee of the PSL also called its supporters to vote yes, though a few prominent members manifested a different opinion. The Self-Defence maintained its ambiguous position practised since 2001. Lepper criticised the conditions of Polish accession and claimed that his party, if in power, would attempt to renegotiate the Accession Treaty. He did not, however, call upon his supporters to vote “no”, advising them only to ponder the question carefully. The LPR was the only significant party to campaign against Polish membership, spreading the darkest scenario of the consequences of membership. The party claimed that “prices would increase on average by 55 per cent, in the western parts of Poland Germans would buy most of the land and that the EU would oblige Poland to liberalise the abortion law, legalise euthanasia and cloning” (Gazeta Wyborcza 2003b). In their anti-integration fervour the LPR members ignored the generally positive

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52 The Law and Justice even decided to temporarily stop its attacks on the government and the SLD in the media in order not to distract the public from the crucial European question (Rzeczpospolita).

53 The national executive voted 58 to 7 in favour of the motion to support Polish accession. Zdzisław Podkasiński was the main opponent of accession claiming that negative consequences of membership will be visible in every gmina (the basic territorial unit in Poland). The former prime minister and leader of the PSL at the moment of writing, Waldemar Pawlak, also expressed his scepticism (Gazeta Wyborcza 12.5.2003).
opinion about accession expressed by the Pope whom they used to mention on numerous occasions as the highest authority on all issues.  

Overall, it can be said that membership in the EU was supported by the vast majority of Polish parties. What sparked controversies was the institutional shape of the Union that Poland was to join. Some Polish parties accepted the evolution of the Union towards a sui generis version of federalism, others opted for a more loosely integrated Europe des patries akin to that advocated by French Gaullists (until 1980’s) and British Conservatives. Finally, a eurosceptic current, initially relatively feeble, gained momentum at the end of the 1990’s and became a permanent feature of the Polish political landscape. Thus, three broad camps can be identified: Euroenthusiasts, Eurorealists or – using the terms proposed by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003) – soft eurosceptics, and Eurosceptics.

The positions taken by parties on the issue of integration were relatively stable. The post-communists and the liberal wing of Solidarity were decidedly pro-European from the moment that the issue appeared on the agenda and remained the strongest advocates of integration. Politicians from the conservative strand of the former democratic opposition, keen on cooperation with the West, but also calling for a strong, sovereign state, reconciled the two desires in the conception of Europe des patries and even with time did not warm to federalism. The party whose attitude to Europe evolved most was the PSL that started with apprehensions – if not hostility – and evolved towards a cautious acceptance of integration. In the case of the Self-Defence, the adoption of a less radical rhetoric was more a question of electoral strategy than of a genuine attitude change of its leader and prominent members.

3.2 Polish MEPs: Introduction

When embarking on a study of how members’ attitudes and identities may be transformed in a new institutional setting, it is indispensable to know who the individuals under study are and where they come from. This section presents the background information on Polish MEPs, which can have a bearing on the outcome of their socialisation process. It begins with the analysis of the 2004 European election campaign in Poland, describing the positions held by the major parties towards European integration and the priorities that the newly elected MEPs

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54 John Paul II, in his speech on the 19th of May 2003, stated that Poland was too important a part of Europe to decline participation in its institutions, concluding that “Europe needs Poland. Poland needs Europe” (Piasecki 2005: 65).
set for themselves on entering the chamber. In the following step, MEPs are divided into four categories according to their previous political experience. Finally, their distribution between political groups and parliamentary committees is described.

3.2.1 2004 European elections in Poland

European elections are commonly described as “second-order national elections” (Reif and Schmitt 1980): the electoral debate focuses on domestic rather than EU-related issues, turnout is low and the voters – well aware of the limited consequences of the elections for national politics – tend to punish the government party, supporting the opposition or smaller parties. This pattern is discernible if one analyses the first European elections in Poland in June 2004. At the moment of the campaign the country was in the midst of political turmoil. The post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), in power since September 2001, was quickly losing support in the polls mainly as a result of a series of corruption scandals involving members of the party, including the Prime Minister. The situation became even more unstable when a group of MPs seeking a fresh start left the SLD and founded a new Social Democratic party (Polish Social Democracy – SdPl) in March 2004, depriving the government of a stable majority in the parliament. The Prime Minister, Leszek Miller, resigned in May 2004 and Marek Belka – an economist close to the Left but not directly involved in politics – was put forward by the President as his replacement with a mission to salvage the Social Democracy’s dwindling popularity through efficient management. He failed in his first attempt to win the confidence vote and, with the second vote scheduled for 24 June, the European electoral campaign was taking place in a period of political uncertainty, with the prospect of a national election in the near future.

In view of the governmental crisis, the campaign became a trial-run before the national election and was dominated by discussions concerning domestic politics. The campaign also lacked intensity as “parties focused more on whether a new government would emerge or whether there would be an early parliamentary election, for which they wanted to conserve their energies” (Szczerbiak 2005: 204). “We are making economies because as soon as August we can have national election, much more important to us”, said one League of Polish Families candidate (Rzeczpospolita 4.6.2004). Newspapers informed their readers that in most
regions the campaign was very limited. The electorate also seemed rather indifferent to the campaign, one of the candidates, Bogdan Klich, complained that “voters are not interested in European issues. They become more involved only when the hot topics of national politics are being discussed” (Rzeczpospolita 4.6.2004).

For the purpose of the election Poland was divided into 13 electoral districts corresponding broadly to 16 provinces (województwa). An election committee could register candidates in a district provided that it collected 10,000 signatures. A number of election committees appeared in some districts, but the real contenders were only eight established political parties (Szczepanik 2005: 203): the SLD, the agrarian Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO), SdP, Catholic-nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR), conservative Law and Justice (PiS), the radical-populist agrarian Self-Defence, and the (non-parliamentary) liberal Freedom Union (UW).

The candidates represented a wide variety of backgrounds. Besides many well known politicians with long international experience, there were a number of people for whom the European elections were their very first contacts with politics but who held an established and respectable position in society – many parties offered places on their electoral lists to academics. Finally, there were candidates famous in other walks of life rather remote from politics, such as the rally champion Krzysztof Holowczyz (PO candidate) or a former athlete Marian Woronin (SLD). The PSL, with its weak position in the polls, on the brink of the 5 per cent threshold, decided to field most of its leaders in an attempt to mobilise the most faithful supporters. Thus, both the party chairman, Janusz Wojciechowski, and vice-chairman, Zbigniew Kuźmiuk, found themselves among the candidates. Given the division into electoral districts, many parties turned to people with high regional profile who were sometimes not even party members, but agreed to be candidates.

Some parties in their campaigns decided to highlight their international contacts and alliances. The SLD had the logo the Party of European Socialists (PES) on its campaign materials and Anders Fogh-Rasmussen, the PES chairman, visited Poland to boost the campaign effort. The PO hosted Angela Merkel, head of German Christian Democrats, at the electoral convention, while Hans-Gert Poettering, chairman of the EPP-ED Group in the

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55 Rzeczpospolita informed that in the region of Pomerania the campaign was “visible mainly on billboards” and quoted candidates who complained that the state television channels showed no interest in organising a debate (4.6.2004). “There has never been such a lacklustre campaign in the region of Lodz”, claimed the newspaper correspondent (7.6.2004). The campaign in the region of Lublin was described in the following way: “few posters, some leaflets and nervous candidates reading short declarations in front of cameras [...] From almost 150 candidates only a dozen can be seen campaigning in the region. Away from the region’s capital, the campaign is virtually invisible” (11.6.2004).

Even though domestic issues were at the centre of electoral debates, certain European themes featured in them as well. The problem of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty thereafter) for instance had already been in the spotlight a long time before the campaign began. The Draft Treaty prepared by the European Convention purported that a new voting system – the so-called double majority (of states and citizens) – was to replace the weighted votes.\(^5\) This was considered by most Polish experts and politicians as much less favourable for Poland. In December of 2003, the Polish government, in collusion with Spain, equally critical of the change, blocked the adoption of the Treaty. This intransigent stance met with unanimous approval from the opposition. Jan Rokita, leader of the generally pro-European PO, coined the phrase “Nice or death”, urging the government to oppose the Treaty if the double majority system was to remain part of it.\(^5\) In the months immediately preceding and following the December summit a heated debate raged in the Polish media between die-hard opponents of the system who argued that it considerably weakened the Polish position in the negotiations, and those who claimed that the ability to find and convince allies was more important than the voting system, and that the change to the latter was not a reason to reject the entire Treaty and thereby risk isolation. The Treaty was also an important reference point in the electoral manifestos that most parties presented during the 2004 European campaign.

Both left-wing parties campaigned on a very pro-EU platform. The SLD in its European Manifesto called for “a federal Europe – that is Europe integrated not only economically, but also politically” (Democratic Left Alliance 2004). The document also expressed support for the Constitutional Treaty, as after the departure of Leszek Miller, the party seemed more inclined to cede on the voting system issue in order not to find itself in isolation. Talking about the European Parliament, the Manifesto emphasised the importance of strengthening its role and control over other European institutions. The SLD also stressed its Social Democratic identity calling for a “Social Europe – based on the principles of solidarity and social justice” (ibidem).

\(^5\) The system of weighted votes was agreed upon by the summit in Nice in 2000.
SdPi issued a short and rather general declaration (the party was still at the very beginning of its existence) calling the voters to "make the most of the European opportunity".

The liberal Freedom Union (that became Democratic Party in 2005) had a very euroenthusiastic position as well, being the only non left-wing party supportive of the Constitutional Treaty. Absent from the national parliament, the party sought success in the European elections to re-establish its position on the domestic political scene. Its campaign was led by a well-known intellectual and a former minister for foreign affairs, Bronislaw Geremek.

The Civic Platform also took a clearly pro-integrationist position in its manifesto, calling for a stronger European Commission and Parliament (Civic Platform 2004). PO’s document was more detailed than the ones quoted above, with some clearly stated preferences for the future development of the EU. PO called for a strongly integrated Europe with powerful community institutions, but one that would be aware of national sensitivities and would not try to take control of every single policy area. This strongly integrated Union would dispose of a generous budget focused on moderating economic inequalities between member states. This Union should, according to the PO, try to build a greater presence in world affairs, provided that “none of the projects in this domain is detrimental to the transatlantic partnership” (ibidem: 2). The Union should also continue to enlarge, remaining open for its Eastern neighbours. Finally, it should be liberal in its approach to the economy, granting free movement of labour and leaving questions such as taxes and social policy in the area of member state competence, thus making competition in this domain possible. The only element that jarred with the generally pro-integrationist tone of the manifesto was the critique of the Constitutional Treaty. As already mentioned, the PO was determined in its opposition to the new voting system based on double majority; the manifesto reiterated this view, claiming that the system of weighted votes agreed upon in Nice would “protect optimally the principle of equality of states” (ibidem: 1).

The Law and Justice (PiS) produced by far the most exhaustive manifesto (Law and Justice 2004b). While recognising the benefits of EU membership, the manifesto formulated a number of critical remarks concerning both the state of the Union and the European policy of the Social Democratic government. In their opening statement, the authors of the manifesto called for a "more self-assured European policy", and declared that "restoring the thinking in terms of national interest was necessary" (ibidem: 1). Conservation of the Nice voting system was, according to PiS’s strategists, a crucial element of a new pro-active approach in European politics. Most ideas for how the EU should develop were quite similar to those
presented in the PO’s manifesto: the Union should focus on closing the economic chasm between old and new members, both through generous structural funds and through allowing the new members to benefit from their comparative advantage of cheap labour and low corporate taxes. In its international activities, the EU should go hand in hand with the United States rather than compete with them. PiS’s ideas for institutional changes, however, were in stark contrast with those of the PO. While, as stated above, the latter called for a stronger Commission and Parliament, PiS emphasised the importance of intergovernmental mechanisms. They argued that: “The main decision-making institutions should be the European Council and the Council of the EU. [...] The Commission cannot be a political centre of the Union. [...] Its competences should not be enlarged, only its functioning improved” (ibidem: 4). Meanwhile, the European Parliament, in the PiS’s vision of Europe, “should focus on controlling the Commission” rather than try to enlarge its influence over legislation. The section dedicated to institutions ended with a statement that the “best way to reduce the democratic deficit would be greater involvement of national parliaments in the European policy-making process” (ibidem: 4).

The PiS’s conception of the EU could be characterised as similar to the Gaullist ideal of a Europe des patries – a Europe where nation-states remain principal decision-makers and where defending the national interest is considered natural rather than out of place in the international system. Consequently, institutions where representatives of states sit are given a primary role.

The Polish Peasant Party – as one scholar noted – “produced a lengthy but fairly banal set of election theses” (Szczerbiak 2005: 205). Rather than discussing the future of the EU, the document described how and in which areas party candidates – if elected – would be defending Polish national interests. The official statement of the party Chairman (himself a candidate) opened on a rather nationalistic note:

In the first European election choose parliamentarians who will care about Poland and about our national interest. Choose parliamentarians to whom the flag of the Union will not block their national colours, who will not forget their national anthem, will not abjure our faith, culture and language (Polish Peasant Party 2004b).

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58 The party pledged, for example, to “act in order to ensure equal treatment for Poland and Poles” on the European arena and to fight against all negative aspects of the accession conditions such as transition periods, barriers to free movement of workers and smaller direct subsidies for Polish farmers (Polish Peasant Party 2004a).
The League of Polish Families focused its campaign on a resounding critique of European institutions. The party opposed Polish adhesion to the EU, and its candidates – just like in the debates preceding the referendum – propagated the idea that membership would be politically and economically disastrous for Poland. In the electoral manifesto presented “in defense of national interest, tradition and Christian values in Europe” (League of Polish Families 2004a) the candidates pledged that they would starkly defend Polish interests in the European Parliament. They condemned the European Constitutional Treaty and “the destruction of national ties”. Considerable emphasis was put on the necessity to protect traditional values stemming from the teachings of the Catholic Church. Thus, the candidates declared they would oppose abortion, euthanasia, legalisation of homosexual marriages, and secularisation in general. The LPR’s presentation of European institutions not as a common enterprise, but as foreign bodies where Polish interest had to be defended against hostile partners, was epitomised by the statement of one of the candidates, Maciej Giertych, who compared the future MEPs to Poles who were elected to Prussian and Austrian parliaments in the late 19th and early 20th century when Poland was partitioned (League of Polish Families 2004b).

The Self-Defence also stuck to the strategy from the campaign preceding the referendum, declaring that the accession treaty should be renegotiated.

Even though, as we saw above, the electoral campaign was rather lacklustre and focused on national issues, our analysis of the candidates’ electoral manifestos and declarations made by candidates yields a relatively rich image of the opinions with which the parties and MEPs entered the chamber. All principal parties defended a position in line with what they had been advocating for a number of years before. The three camps – Euroenthusiasts, Eurorealists and Eurosceptics – were well-established on the political scene.

Table 5 Results of the 2004 Polish elections to the European Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>MEPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Platform</td>
<td>1,467,775</td>
<td>24.10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Polish Families</td>
<td>969,689</td>
<td>15.92</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice</td>
<td>771,858</td>
<td>12.67</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Defence</td>
<td>656,782</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance</td>
<td>569,311</td>
<td>9.35</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Union</td>
<td>446,549</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasant Party</td>
<td>386,340</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Social Democracy</td>
<td>324,707</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.2 Political and personal characteristics of the Polish contingent in the EP upon arrival

On the election day only 21 per cent of the electorate decided to vote, which was the second lowest turnout in the EU (it was lower only in Slovakia where 17 per cent of the electorate voted). Just as the polls predicted, the Left fared miserably with the SLD gaining 5 seats and the SDPI only 3 (out of 54). The PO was a clear winner with 15 seats. The eurosceptics from the LPR came second and were to send 10 representatives to the EP. The PiS secured 7 seats, while the Self-Defence fared worse than predicted in the polls and won only 6 seats. The Freedom Union and the PSL also managed to get above the 5% threshold with 4 seats each.

The Polish contingent in the chamber was to be a rather varied one with representatives from 8 political parties. The Euroenthusiasts dominated. There were 27 of them from the PO, SLD, UW and SdPI. Three parties – PiS, PSL and the Self-Defence – and 17 MEPs constituted the Eurorealist camp, while all 10 Eurosceptics came from the LPR.

Polish MEPs varied also regarding previous political experience. The contingent counted a large number of people with rich political and international experience, including a former prime minister (Jerzy Buzek), two former ministers for foreign affairs (Bronislaw Geremek and Rosati), two former ministers for European affairs (Ryszard Czarnecki, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski), and a former chief negotiator in the accession negotiations (Jan Kulakowski). There was also a relatively high number of people with experience as members of government (11 MEPs) and/or national parliament (27 MEPs or 50 per cent of the contingent). It was also one of the most male-dominated contingents counting only 7 women out of 54 MEPs. Only 12 politicians who were previously observers in the chamber were re-elected as MEPs. This relatively small number can be explained by the political changes in Poland, which occurred in the years preceding the European election. Observers were chosen from among members of parliament elected in 2001 and dominated by the SLD which then lost public support and suffered a defeat in the European elections.

For the sake of the present analysis, with regard to their previous political experience Polish europarlimentarians could be divided into four categories. The first one – personalities – consists of well-known politicians with experience of the highest posts (prime minister and ministers). The second – front-line national politicians – includes people with experience in national parliament and/or government who played an important role in national politics. Second-line politicians – the third category – are those whose political experience

59 The large number of MEPs with parliamentary experience is characteristic of all new member states; 55 per cent of them are former parliamentarians, while only one in three MEPs from old member states (31.2%) was a member of national parliament before (Corbett et al. 2005: 51).
was mainly on a more local level or those who although present in national party politics remained in supporting roles. Finally, political newcomers are individuals for whom the European mandate was to be their first genuine political experience. Some of them were not even members of the party that offered them a place on the list of candidates (e.g. Lidia Geringer, Barbara Kudrycka, Miroslaw Piotrowski, Wojciech Roszkowski). As can be seen in Table 6, six out of eight Polish party delegations can be considered as internally varied, having members from at least three career groups identified above. The PSL where all members are “front-line politicians” and the Freedom Union with three (out of four) “personalities” are the two exceptions. This variety will make it possible to verify whether members of the same party (and thus people who should share broadly similar views) with different past political experiences will socialise in different ways.

The MEPs are relatively equally distributed between categories. Apart from “personalities” where there are fewer members, the three other categories count almost the same number of MEPs. This shows that the Polish contingent was an extremely varied one not only considering the attitude towards integration, but also MEPs’ past political experience. If political experience is a factor that determines the effects of parliamentary socialisation, then there should differences in how MEPs from particular career groups adapt to the chamber.
### Table 6 Polish MEPs by political experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party/Political group in the EP</th>
<th>Personality</th>
<th>Front-line politician</th>
<th>Second-line politician</th>
<th>Political newcomer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>League of Polish Families</td>
<td>M. Grabowski I, B. Pęc, M. Giertych I O</td>
<td>S. Chruszcz, K. Krupa, B. Rogalski, W. Tomczak O, W. Wierzejski O*</td>
<td>M. Piotrowski, F. Adwent*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Defence</td>
<td>R. Czarnecki I</td>
<td>M. Czarnecki</td>
<td>B. Golik, W. Kac, J. Masiel, L. Rutowicz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance/PES</td>
<td>Liberadzki O, Siwek I</td>
<td>A. Szejna, A. Gierka</td>
<td>L. Geringer,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasant Party</td>
<td>Wojciechowski O, Kuźniak, Podkański, Siekierski O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Union (Democratic Party)/ALDE</td>
<td>B. Geremek I*, J. Onyszkiewicz, J. Kułakowski I</td>
<td>Staniszewska</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Social Democracy/PES</td>
<td>D. Rosati I</td>
<td>G. Grabowska IO</td>
<td>J. Pinior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**

**Personality:** considerable international experience and/or ministerial position  
**Front-line politician:** government/parliament experience, member of party leadership  
**Second-line politician:** experience in politics on local level (member of local executive or legislature)  
**Political newcomer:** European mandate first direct involvement in (party) politics  

I denotes experience in an international institution  
O denotes observer in the European Parliament  
* marks MEP who left the chamber during the term
3.2.3 Polish Priorities

The parties that constituted the Polish contingent in the EP displayed a wide variety of views concerning European problems and accordingly called for different actions on the European level and declared different priorities. Yet, there was a number of issues on which virtually all Polish MEPs spoke in a very similar way. They could be described as "Polish concerns", common to all parties.

A large number of Polish MEPs called for a Union where "solidarity" was a guiding principle. The word solidarity evokes the memory of the trade union and the struggle of Poles against the communist regime in the 1980's. Polish MEPs were very keen to use this word, apparently convinced that it may add a symbolic punch to their argument. A Union based on solidarity, as presented by Polish MEPs, had several dimensions. First of all, it was a Union that would help to reduce economic disparities between the richer old members and the poorer newcomers. Even the radical Eurosceptics, who took every occasion to condemn EU institutions, spoke longingly of the first decades of European integration when the idea of the rich helping the poor was at the heart of the project (MEP 18). Polish MEPs deplored that a tendency to move away from such redistributive policy was manifest (MEP 2) and wanted to act against it. Their first priority was opposing any reduction of the EU budget — we cannot have a bigger Union for less money was a sentence pronounced by Eurosceptics (MEP 18) as well as Euroenthusiasts (MEP 4) — and making sure that a considerable part of it is allocated to structural funds. But the Union should also boost the economic development of the new member states in a less direct way: by encouraging the old member states to open their markets to workers coming from the East and by steering clear of competition-stifling laws, such as the introduction of a uniform corporate tax in all member states (MEP 20).

The economic dimension of the EU based on solidarity was complemented by the foreign policy dimension. In the opinions presented by a number of Polish MEPs, there was a noticeable fear that the largest countries of the EU will conduct foreign policy without attention to the demands and needs of the smaller countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We remember very well when Chirac told us to shut up (MEP 23). The spectre of the EU striking deals with Russia over Polish heads was often evoked. Such policies had to end, argued Polish MEPs. Advocating solidarity in foreign policy, the Poles called for a Union that

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60 After 7 countries from Central and Eastern Europe formulated an open letter supporting the US position on Irak in February 2003, Jacques Chirac stated at a press conference that they had missed a good opportunity to shut up (see European Voice 2003).
had a uniform position, shaped not only by the largest member states, but the smaller ones as well.

When talking about foreign policy, the majority of Polish MEPs stressed the necessity to intensify EU's contacts with its Eastern neighbours, especially Ukraine and Belarus. They declared that the best way of supporting stability and democracy beyond the Union's eastern border was to include Ukraine and, in the longer term, Belarus in the integration project – *Poland does not want to be the Union's eastern limit forever (MEP 2)*. Keeping the subject of Eastern enlargement on the agenda and promoting the development of various projects aimed at strengthening contacts between the EU and those countries was mentioned by MEPs as being amongst the principal Polish objectives in the chamber (see also Herranz 2005: 91).

The Trans-Atlantic relationship was another issue to which Polish representatives ascribed great importance. Many MEPs emphasised that the EU should not try to counterbalance the United States in world affairs. Even though some MEPs criticised certain aspects of American foreign policy, the United States were generally perceived as an ally and their actions in international affairs as a force for good. *American dominance is not one that we should be afraid of (MEP 2).*

An overview of what Polish MEPs depicted as their priorities on commencing their service in the EP shows that even though there existed huge differences within the Polish contingent regarding the optimal form that European integration should assume, the Poles very much agreed regarding a number of important questions. They entered the EP as a group that was economically liberally minded, Atlanticist and bent on maintaining the redistributive character of community policies. It was in the areas mentioned above that a considerable part of the Polish contingent was active and – as it will be shown in chapter 6 – they firmly stuck to their opinions despite sometimes being under considerable pressure from colleagues from their respective political groups.

### 3.2.4 MEPs' distribution between EP committees

The Polish priorities described above are reflected in the choice of committees made by Polish MEPs. The allocation of seats in committees is a complicated process. Presidents of political groups first agree on the size of committees, then political groups receive their quota of seats in each committee according to the d'Hondt method and, finally, the seats are allocated to MEPs within the political groups, through a process of negotiations between national delegations. Some committees are more desired than others and some MEPs cannot get a seat in the committee that is their first choice. Nonetheless, the distribution of MEPs
from a national contingent between committees can be treated as a rough indicator of the priorities and goals of this group.\textsuperscript{61}

Polish MEPs constituted 7.3 per cent of all europarlamentarians (6.8 in the second half of the term after the arrival of Bulgarian and Romanian MEPs).\textsuperscript{62} Thus, committees where they represent more than 9 percent of members will be considered as committees with Polish overrepresentation, and committees with 5 percent or less of Polish members as committees with Polish underrepresentation. In the former group are the following committees: Legal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Budget, Regional Affairs and Constitutional Affairs (see Table 7). Given the large number of Polish MEPs with long experience in international politics and the importance that the interviewed parliamentarians ascribed to international issues (Eastern dimension and relations with the US in particular), the abundance of Polish MEPs in the Foreign Affairs Committee is unsurprising. The strong presence in Agriculture, Regional Affairs and Budget Committees is also understandable in view of the emphasis that so many MEPs put on securing appropriate EU funds for Poland. Furthermore, two Polish parties (PSL and Self-Defence) represent above all the rural population.

Poles were under-represented in the following committees: Budgetary Control; Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON); Environment (ENVI); Fisheries; Culture and Education; International Trade (only in the second half of term), Civil Liberties (only in the first half of term), Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE); and Petitions. When it comes to the first two, the underrepresentation can probably be considered the consequence of the strong concentration on the Budget Committee. The underrepresentation of Polish MEPs in the Environment Committee – which is considered important in the Parliament as it gets the most legal acts adopted through the codecision procedure (Corbett at al. 2005: 132) – confirms the view that environment-related issues are considered as less important in the new member states. Meanwhile, underrepresentation in ITRE corroborates the opinion that even though interviewed parliamentarians frequently mentioned the importance of a modern economy based on technological innovations, they focused on issues with direct financial consequences for Poland (budget, structural funds and the CAP).

There were few changes in the committee distribution of MEPs between the first and the second half of the term. MEPs understandably tended to stick to the domain in which they started some activity. Two MEPs left the Budget Committee, probably because with the 2007-

\textsuperscript{61} This assumption seems justified in the case of Poland as most MEPs interviewed claimed they became members of their preferred committees.

\textsuperscript{62} Own calculations based upon data available on the website of the European Parliament.
2013 Financial Perspective agreed upon in the first half of term, the committee was considered less important. The Civic Platform also exchanged the post of chairman of the Budget Committee for chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

In a similar way, the distribution between parliamentary delegations for relations with parliaments of non-member states\(^{63}\) clearly reflects Polish focus in foreign policy. Forty per cent of Polish MEPs belong to delegations for relations with post-soviet countries, with the majority being members of delegations for relations with Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Chairs of delegations for Belarus and Ukraine are Polish (Konrad Szymański and Bogdan Klich respectively); there are also Polish vice-chairs in the delegations for Moldova and Ukraine (Zdzisław Podkański and Marian Zapalowski) (cf Herranz 2005: 88).

Table 7 Distribution of Polish MEPs by committee in the first and second half of the term

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Number of Polish members</th>
<th>Polish substitute members</th>
<th>Number of all members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st half/2nd half</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>9 (11%)/ 10 (11,6%)</td>
<td>5/6</td>
<td>78/86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>2 (6%)/ 3 (8%)</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>33/36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade (2)</td>
<td>2 (6%)/ 1 (3%)</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>32/33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (1)</td>
<td>5(10%)/ 3 (6%)</td>
<td>5/5</td>
<td>47/49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary Control (1)</td>
<td>0/2 (5%)</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>34/39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Economic and Monetary Affairs</td>
<td>1 (2%)/ 2 (4%)</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>49/51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>3 (6%)/ 3 (5,7%)</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>50/52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Environment</td>
<td>2 (3%)/ 2 (3%)</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>63/68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Industry, Research and Energy</td>
<td>2 (4%)/ 2 (3,7%)</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>51/54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Market</td>
<td>3 (7%)/ 3 (6,8%)</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>39/44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Tourism</td>
<td>4 (8%)/ 4 (7,8%)</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>51/51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Regional Development</td>
<td>5 (9%)/ 5 (8,7%)</td>
<td>3/5</td>
<td>52/57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>5 (11%)/ 5 (10,6%)</td>
<td>3/2</td>
<td>42/47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>1 (3%)/ 1 (2,6%)</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>35/38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Education</td>
<td>1 (3%)/ 1 (2,6%)</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>35/38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Legal Affairs</td>
<td>4 (15%)/ 4 (14%)</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>26/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Civil Liberties (1)</td>
<td>2 (3%)/ 3 (5%)</td>
<td>5/6</td>
<td>53/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Affairs</td>
<td>3 (10%)/ 3 (10%)</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>28/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2 (5,7%)/ 2 (5%)</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>35/40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitions</td>
<td>1 (4%)/ 1 (2,7%)</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>25/36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{63}\) Interparliamentary delegations are bodies responsible for maintaining contact with legislatures of non-members state countries. There are currently 36 delegations in the chamber (Corbett et al. 2005: 149).
Note: committees where Polish MEPs are overrepresented are in bold and marked with one or two if the overrepresentation pertains only to one half of the parliamentary term. Committees where they are underrepresented are in italics. The committees that in the 5th (1999-2004) term prepared the most legislative reports (Corbett at al. 2005: 132) are marked with *.
Source: own calculations based on the data available on the website of the European Parliament

Conclusions

Regarding their attitude towards European integration Polish political parties can be divided into three broad camps. The Euroenthusiasts support integration and its further deepening. The Eurorealists express a general support for integration, but accompanied by a number of criticisms. They call for integration based upon intergovernmental cooperation and are generally wary of political integration, claiming that the process should develop mainly in the realm of economic cooperation. The Eurosceptics oppose European integration. Some of them accept Polish membership as inevitable, but claim that it entails more costs than benefits, others go as far as calling for withdrawal from the EU. The views on Europe presented by Polish political parties have remained relatively stable. Once a party spelled out its views, it generally stuck to its outlook. The only exception is the Self-Defence which appeared on the Polish political scene as a radical critic of integration, but gradually evolved towards a more moderate attitude, characteristic of the Eurorealists.

The second part of the chapter has shown that Poles elected to the European Parliament in June of 2004 constituted a very diverse group, in terms of views on European integration and past political experience. Even though Polish MEPs had diverging views regarding European integration, the majority of them shared a similar view on what Polish priorities in the chamber should be. They called for economic liberalisation, big structural funds, close relations with the United States and a more dynamic cooperation with Eastern neighbours (especially Ukraine and Belarus).
Chapter 4. Socialisation as institutional learning: From novices to effective members

The fundamental aspect of becoming accustomed to a political institution consists of discovering the mechanisms through which this institution functions. This chapter analyses the first of the three dimensions of socialisation introduced in Chapter 2: institutional learning. It examines how Polish MEPs gain knowledge about the functioning of the EP, as well as about the tactics and strategies of effective action in this institution. Borrowing the words of Feldman’s definition of socialisation, this chapter verifies whether Polish MEPs undergo a transformation from "organizational outsiders to participating and effective members" (1976: 309, quoted in Scully 2005: 79).

We recall that the following hypotheses are tested in this chapter:

**H1:** Polish MEPs will successfully go through the process of institutional learning, becoming participating and effective MEPs.

**H2a:** The Eurosceptics will boycott the work of the chamber, either by refraining from participating or by trying to disturb the day-to-day activities.

**H2b:** The Eurosceptics will participate in the works of the chamber, presenting their criticisms of integration.

Referring to Polish MEPs' accounts of their parliamentary activities, this chapter presents the characteristics of the EP that MEPs identified as crucial from the point of view of effective policy-making. It also looks at their actions and assesses to what extent their learning process can be considered as successful. This is important as active participation in the decision-making process and contacts with other participants of this process are arguably necessary for socialisation to occur in the other two, more complex, dimensions (*adaptation to the institutional culture and attitude change*) which will be discussed in the following chapter. In other words, if Polish MEPs remain "organizational outsiders", it is highly unlikely that their beliefs or identities may change as a result of the socialisation process.

The first part of the chapter looks at the Euroenthusiasts and the Eurorealists together, as their institutional learning process is hypothesised to proceed in a similar way. The second part depicts the experience of the Eurosceptics. The analysis in this chapter is based on the data from the second interview (i.e. at T2) conducted with MEPs. MEPs were asked "what
should a newcomer learn to be effective in the chamber?" Then usually several further questions were asked depending on the answer given by the respondents. If, for instance, they stressed the importance of coalition-building, they were asked to give concrete examples.

4.1 Euroenthusiasts and Eurorealists

4.1.1 Coalition building and negotiating

On entering the chamber, Polish MEPs had to become accustomed to an environment that was in some ways similar, but in others entirely different from the national legislature. For starters, the EP was not a relatively ordered political universe, organised around a few political parties, but an enormously complex one, composed of hundreds of national party delegations divided into seven political groups. The necessity of permanent cooperation with party delegations from other countries, and all that this fact entailed in terms of political behaviour, was usually mentioned at the very beginning when MEPs summarised the process of learning the ropes of parliamentary politics.

Opinions voiced in interviews suggest that Polish MEPs realised that no single national delegation or even a political group can achieve much in the chamber on its own. Aware of this, they had to learn to look for allies who could support their initiatives (amendments or resolutions). The statement that if you want to win in the Parliament, you have to build a coalition appeared frequently in the MEPs' reflections on politics in the EP. One MEP stressed that:

> It is important to learn all the methods that relate to building coalitions and convincing people. You start in your own political group, where you are most likely to find allies, but usually the exercise does not end there. You have to try to reach other groups and national party delegations, often people who, at first sight, seem ideologically on the opposite pole (MEP 7).

Another explained how becoming familiar with the political panorama in the EP was a prerequisite for effective action. In our first months here we had to get to know the political winds that blow through the chamber. Learn about political groups and their influence, what is important, who is ideologically closest to us, with whom we can possibly strike deals, which initiatives can go through (MEP 3). Another MEP stressed how useful it was to learn about whom to talk to in a particular matter; who are the Groups' frontmen on the issues that are of interest to me (MEP 20).

The MEPs also emphasised that, unlike the Polish national parliament, coalitions in the EP were not permanent but issue-specific. Thus, as they stressed, the coalition building exercise is constantly repeated. Depending on the problem, MEPs have to look for different
allies, both inside and outside their political group. *In economic matters sometimes Socialists can be an ally for us; sometimes – when it comes to getting rid of red tape – Liberals. In the EP no coalition is forever* (MEP 21), explained one Eurorealist.

Despite this, Polish MEPs made attempts to institutionalise certain alliances, especially on the issues that appear on the parliamentary agenda often.

*We have established two informal groups: Friends of Cohesion and Friends of Services. The former was established to oppose the decrease of funds devoted to bridging the economic gap between old and new members. The latter focused on fighting for a liberal version of the services directive* (MEP 4).

*We have informal meetings, discuss issues over dinner, try to coordinate our actions, agree on amendments and then mobilise majorities around them* (MEP 7).

From the very beginning of their presence in the chamber, Polish politicians from different political parties also attempted to coordinate activities among themselves. The so-called Polish Club consisted of fortnightly or monthly meetings, open to all Polish MEPs. Their purpose was to identify the issues on which all, or at least a significant majority, of Polish representatives agreed and could coordinate their actions. Sometimes ministers or other government representatives were invited to the meetings to present the official position of Polish executive and brief the MEPs on the evolution of negotiations in the Council. Below, there is an account of a coordinated national effort:

*We have learned by observing the elaborate discussions and preparations that go on before voting [within national delegations]. Recently we agreed on common amendments with most other Polish MEPs, and then every Polish party delegation tried to get support for them in their political group. And in most cases we succeeded. This is how it works in the EP: if you want to win something, you have to build a coalition* (MEP 7).

Similar attempts at coordination were organised on a smaller scale, between individual MEPs. One MEP from the Regional Development Committee recounted that amendments agreed upon by Polish members of the committee were taken by the person who belonged to the same group as the rapporteur on a given issue – this person being deemed to have the easiest access to the rapporteur.

The perception that on a large number of major issues Polish interest overlaps with those of other states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was widespread among Polish

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64 For reference to the Directive see footnote 32.
europarlamentarians. Thus, MEPs from the region were often first approached by Poles and treated as natural allies.

Paying close attention to the views of other MEPs served not only the purpose of identifying potential partners, but also of discovering room for compromises with those who have different views. Negotiation, as one MEP stressed:

*is all about finding what I call negotiable fields, that is the areas where concessions are possible. Sometimes certain issues are too central, too important and there will be no compromise. Take the ethical issues in the negotiations of the 7th Framework Programme. All the compromise amendments that had been negotiated for so long failed because the problems at stake were simply too much of a key part of the identity of political groups (MEP 7). It is all based upon defining the others' red lines. The sooner you identify these red lines the better, because this way you can avoid wasting your time looking for concessions where they are not possible (MEP 10). Where you identify room for negotiation, you can try to convince your counterparts through arguments. If this does not work, you can always propose a deal: “if you support some of our demands on this issue or at least abstain, we’ll help you on another” (MEP 7).*

MEPs' accounts stressed that the process of convincing others and building coalitions largely developed through informal contacts between MEPs. The latter can be simply encounters in the corridors, working lunches and dinners, or meetings of MEPs particularly interested in a given question. It is then crucial to maintain developed contacts with the people who have an established position in their committee or reputation of experts in an area. These contacts must go beyond the committee room. They are useful not only as a means of promoting one's views, but also as a source of information. One MEP (29) recounted how he gained important information about the position of a Commission Directorate General thanks to his assistant who plays football with officials from that DG.

Knowledge of languages, as many MEPs stressed, is a prerequisite for such contacts. English and French are most often used and MEPs who do not have at least basic knowledge of these languages are cut off from a very important arena of deal-making and exchange of information. Some older MEPs, when trying to contact their counterparts from CEE countries,

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65 The 7th Framework Programme for research and development distributes EU funds for different projects related to advanced technologies. One of the domains concerned was stem cell research and it was in the context of stem cell research that the MEP quoted above mentioned “ethical issues”.
resorted to Russian. Equally important is the awareness of parliamentary etiquette: as one MEP put it, *whom to invite, when and to which café in the EP (MEP 25).*

It can be concluded that after two years in the chamber, Polish MEPs fully appreciated the importance of coalition building and they used various tactics to achieve their objectives. Multinational coalitions were built around a common preference, such as support for a liberalised market in services. On some issues Polish parties coordinated their actions and looked for support for common amendments, agreed beforehand, in their respective political groups. On yet other issues a coalition uniting the CEE countries was built. The evidence from interviews shows that some MEPs were active in building a large network of contacts in the EP, which they perceived as a key to effective coalition-building.

4.1.2 The importance of political groups

This section analyses whether Polish MEPs realise the importance of political groups in the parliamentary decision-making process. The issue of political groups will be returned to in Chapter 5 (part 3) in order to examine how strongly MEPs identify with their political groups and whether group membership provoked any changes of MEPs’ identity. This split is warranted by the analytical framework adopted in the thesis, the presentation of findings being organised around three dimensions of socialisation. One aspect of the relationship between MEPs and their political groups (this section) is discussed in the context of institutional learning, the other in the context of adaptation to the institutional culture that examines inter alia the potential transformations of MEPs’ identity.

The awareness of the importance of effective coalition-building goes hand in hand with the idea that the largest political groups are key players in this process. One Socialist MEP stated that:

*The political weight of an MEP depends to a large extent on the importance of [their] political group. My initiative can relatively quickly gain support of 200 colleagues. Once my group approves what I propose, it is then much easier to find subsequent allies. Coalition is built not around the idea of MEP X, but around the position of the PES. Meanwhile, amendments proposed by groups such as the IND/DEM and the UEN most often just end up in the bin (MEP 24).*

Many Euroenthusiasts and outside observers of parliamentary politics drew attention to the fact that the small Polish representation in the largest groups, in relation to many other countries, meant that the Polish potential to influence parliamentary decisions was limited (Szczepanik et al. 2007, Ćwiek-Karpowicz et al. 2007: 59). At the beginning of the term, only
57 per cent of Polish MEPs were members of the three largest parliamentary groups. By contrast, 92 per cent of Spaniards were members of the “big three”, 79 per cent of Germans, 75 per cent of French MEPs, 74 per cent of British MEPs, and 65 per cent of Italians.\footnote{Own calculations based upon data available on the website of the European Parliament.}

The Polish Peasant Party representatives were the only Eurorealists to sit in one of the largest groups - the EPP-ED. Given the party’s cautious attitude towards the EU, as well as its rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, this alliance seemed an odd match. However, the PSL representatives had already at the outset of the parliamentary term declared that the EPP, as the main player and creator of the EU policy, was their preferred partner.

Of course, we were tempted by others. “Join us, you will have total independence”, they said. But we concluded that only membership in a large political group gives us an opportunity to transform some of our ideas into policy. It is worth even to give up certain elements of our programme in order to remain in the EP’s biggest group (MEP 27).

Yet this determination did not last long, and in March of 2005, three (out of four) PSL MEPs left the EPP to join the UEN Group. In an open letter to party members they described the EPP as "too federalist" and dominated by German MEPs (Kuźmiuk et al. 2005). In interviews for this thesis, the PSL MEPs who left were clearly disappointed that the Group did not support their views regarding agricultural matters, especially in the case of the reform of EU regulations concerning the quotas for sugar beet. Their decision to leave the EPP and join the UEN went against the general trend in the chamber. As was shown in Chapter 1 (section 1.2.1), a number of national party delegations that initially created separate groups, after some time decided to join the largest ones – the opposite was almost unheard of. Moreover, as the statement above clearly shows, already at the beginning the PSL MEPs were acutely aware that membership in a large group offers greater opportunities to shape parliamentary decisions. The decision to join the UEN Group will be easier to understand if factors related to national politics are considered. The chairman and vice-chairman of the PSL, elected to the EP, lost their posts at the party congress. At odds with the new leadership, they decided to leave the PSL and set up a new party called PSL-Piast. In view of those events, their decision, taken against the advice of the new PSL leadership, may be interpreted as an attempt to provoke a split in the party and encourage some members to join the new Piast formation.

The Law and Justice initially co-operated with the EPP, but when Polish observers started participating in the works of the chamber in 2003, the party decided to join the UEN Group. This choice was, according to one of PiS MEPs, dictated by the evolution of the EPP group.
which now makes only a very selective reference to Christian Democratic values in its actions, as well as by the Group’s support for the evolution of the EU towards a federal state (MEP 23 at T1).

PiS members were aware that such a choice limited their ability to influence parliamentary decisions. One of the MEPs deplored that:

[F]orging majorities for my initiatives would be easier if I were a member of the EPP. My generally good relations with them [EPP members] are the result of my efforts and things could run even more smoothly if we were colleagues from the same group (MEP 20).

However, MEPs from this party also drew attention to some advantages of membership in a smaller political group. They stressed that this choice gave them greater freedom to speak their minds, without the necessity to adjust to the group line. They could also enjoy a relatively easy access to the group chair, which was a means of influencing the parliamentary agenda. Marcin Libicki, a Law and Justice MEP and chairman of the Petitions Committee, benefited from it when an opportunity presented itself to prepare an own-initiative report devoted to the question of the project to build a gas pipeline (called Nord Stream) in the Baltic Sea. Own-initiative reports must receive a green light from the Conference of Presidents (chairpersons of political groups) and Libicki used his contacts with Brian Crowley (chairman of the UEN) to get support for his initiative. The Law and Justice MEPs emphasised that their colleagues from Civic Platform, members of the EPP, for a long time had been unable to push through the initiative of preparing a report on Nord Stream, allegedly because of the opposition of the strong German delegation in their political group. The Nord Stream project is widely considered in Poland to be aimed at enabling Russia to supply gas to Germany and Western Europe without transporting it through Poland, and thus facilitating “energy blackmail” directed against Poland.68 For this reason the report authored by Libicki, and adopted by the Parliament, demanding an independent assessment regarding the consequences of the project for the Baltic Sea, was considered an important accomplishment.

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67 Report Environmental impact of the planned gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea to link up Russia and Germany PE 390.769 v03-90.
68 Talking about the Nord Stream project, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, then President of Poland, said that “we would not like oil and gas pipelines ever to be used as political instruments. This [Nord Stream] project provokes apprehension in Poland as it was decided between Russia and Germany above our heads” (Gazeta Wyborcza 2005). In a EP debate devoted to the issue Adam Bielan (Law and Justice, UEN) claimed that “by supporting the plans of the Kremlin, which is aimed at overall energy domination in Western Europe, Germany is putting countries [of the former Eastern Bloc] at risk of Russian political blackmail” (EP 2008a).
in Poland. Regardless of its political importance, the report testifies to Law and Justice MEPs' good knowledge of parliamentary reality and skilful use of assets at their disposal.

It should be added that PiS representatives also showed concern for more pragmatic questions of influence, realising that larger group meant greater clout. In interviews at T1, Law and Justice MEPs mentioned the idea of creating a new group that would include British Conservatives and Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS), with the Thatcherite vision of integration as the unifying element. Disappointingly for PiS, both of its potential partners preferred special status within EPP to creating a new entity. The project appeared once again when the new Conservative leader, David Cameron, expressed his support for it. This mobilised the most eurosceptic Conservative MEPs who renewed their calls for putting an end to the alliance with the federalist EPP. Yet, despite pleas from London, the majority of MEPs from the Conservative Party and the ODS decided to remain members of the EPP (BBC 2005, EUobserver 2006). Law and Justice members could find consolation in the fact that they managed to attract a number of Polish MEPs (members of PSL-Piast, Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families) and thus significantly reinforce the Polish contingent in the Group. Eventually, 20 out of 44 group members were Poles.

Self-Defence did not maintain contacts with any European party federation and MEPs representing the party started the term as MEPs not affiliated to any political group. However, from the very beginning they made clear that they did not want to remain so. Rather surprisingly, considering the party's eurosceptic record, some voiced their preference for the major political groups of the EP. One of the Self-Defence MEPs (35), when quizzed about potential allies in the chamber, mentioned the EPP, but went on to add that the presence of the Civic Platform in the group — Self-Defence's adversary on the national scene — made it difficult for his party to apply for membership. Another (MEP 34) claimed that while being non-attached for some time could be useful, as it permitted for example a relatively easy access to speaking time, in the long run becoming a member of a political group was necessary to be effective. Two Self-Defence MEPs already in December of 2004 became members of the PES Group. Others waited till half-term (January 2007) and decided to join the UEN. A few months later one of them changed group membership again and decided to join the Liberals. He argued that only membership in one of the three largest groups gave him

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69 In a ranking created in 2008 on the basis of assessments given by Polish journalists working in Brussels, Marcin Libicki was the third most effective Polish MEP and the report on Nord Stream was quoted as his main accomplishment (Slojewska 2007).

70 The decision to apply, as the respondent emphasised, was difficult not necessarily because the PO would lobby against Self-Defence's membership, but because sitting in the same group with a party that was a sworn enemy on the national arena could resonate badly with voters.
a chance of becoming a rapporteur and thus gain greater potential to influence parliamentary decisions (Szczepanik et al. 2009: 28).

The statements of Polish Euroenthusiasts and Eurorealists regarding group membership, as well as decisions made by them in this respect, show that MEPs from these clusters appreciated the importance that political groups have in the chamber – a clear sign of successful institutional learning. Although the largest groups attracted few new members (one Self-Defence MEP in the PES and one in ALDE), the efforts made by Law and Justice representatives to enlarge the UEN and the decision of other Eurorealists (Piast, Self-Defence) to join this group show that MEPs understood very well that bigger numbers give greater influence.

All that being said, the question of political groups also suggests that ideology, and in particular the attitude towards integration, had some influence on how the information gained in the process of institutional learning was applied in practice. Arguably the experience of parliamentary politics should have led the Law and Justice MEPs to attempt to join the EPP, just like it led a number of other conservative parties before them (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.1). That would give them an opportunity to gain more important posts and reports, and to have greater say in the decision-making process. Moreover, the relationship between the Civic Platform (the main Polish party in the EPP Group) and the Law and Justice was relatively cordial until late 2005. Leadership of both parties admitted that they were considering forming a coalition after the Polish general election scheduled for autumn of 2005. But the Law and Justice MEPs remained in the UEN and, judging by their opinions on the subject, ideology was the main reason behind this decision. MEPs who strongly advocated a limited Union, focused on the economy, and with the intergovernmental element dominating the supranational, were loath to join a group that supported what was in their eyes a federalisation of the EU. This example demonstrates that MEPs' political convictions can be considered to have had a strong impact on how they used the information gained in the process of institutional learning.

4.1.3 European rhetoric

Among the abilities that Polish MEPs had to master, a particular way of arguing one's case was also mentioned. One MEP already in September of 2004 declared the following: *When I want to get something for Polish corn farmers, I am not simply going to say that Polish farmers need it. I am going to claim that it will be beneficial for European corn farmers* (MEP 34). Statements in much the same vein appeared frequently at T2, for instance:
It's not only what we propose, but also how we do it that counts (MEP 7).
If you try to support your proposal only in terms of its benefits for Poland, then you're practically bound to lose (MEP 25).
It is important to learn certain argumentation techniques. One German MEP gave me this advice: “Instead of complaining and claiming that your country is being treated unfairly, it is better to put it as follows: we have a problem in Poland and believe that you — our European partners — can help us”. I believe it was a sincere advice and I try to stick to this strategy (MEP 26).
Advancing your national interest happens somehow undercover here. You can do it effectively when your objectives are presented in European terms. And this is an ability that we practice without respite (MEP 4).

The statements above clearly show that the idea that effective action demanded a particular formulation of proposals was one of the things that Polish MEPs learned over the period analysed. Polish MEPs accepted that they had to justify their proposals not only in terms of their consequences for Poland, but make a wider reference and talk about all citizens of the EU.

4.1.4 Making the most of the means at their disposal

MEPs have a number of instruments at their disposal that they can use in their political activities. Getting to know these instruments, assessing their importance and best ways of using them is key for being effective. These may be things that are apparently as banal as adjusting to the time limits for speakers. The latter are usually strictly adhered to and when speakers fail to meet the limit their microphone may be cut off by the chair. "I always practise my speeches in advance with a watch. If I don't have time to pronounce a few concluding sentences, then the whole intervention becomes futile", recounted one MEP (Szczepanik et al. 2009: 65). Touching upon more sophisticated issues, MEPs stressed that realising the influence wielded by a rapporteur and trying to win reports was very important. Gaining a rapporteurship is not an easy task as most of the time there are more candidates than reports available. For a newcomer it is usually necessary to pass through intermediary stages before gaining a report; these consist of preparing opinions or being a shadow rapporteur.71 They are easier to receive and enable the MEPs to show their competence to their group colleagues and

71 The so-called lead (most relevant) committee prepares a report which is the official position of the chamber towards a legislative proposal submitted by the European Commission. A report is usually accompanied by opinions that express the view of other committees. When a member of one political group prepares a report, other groups usually nominate shadow rapporteurs who follow the actions of the rapporteur and inform their political groups about the progress of negotiations on the issue.
prove that they deserve a rapporteurship. MEPs also noted differences between parliamentary posts: "the Vice-Presidents of the Parliament that are distributed according to the d'Hondt formula do not matter very much. Meanwhile, the committee coordinators that are not distributed equally are very influential. They can influence the position of the group representatives within a committee and have a very important say in the process of the distribution of reports", emphasised one Euroenthusiast (Szczepanik et al. 2009: 16).

Apart from MEPs’ declarations, their achievements testify to successful institutional learning. Some Polish MEPs won very important reports. Jerzy Buzek (Civic Platform, EPP) got the most important one concerning the 7th Framework Programme thatformulates priorities in the realm of research and technological development.72 Buzek also received the MEP Award bestowed by the Parliament Magazine in the category of Research and Technology.73 Konrad Szymański (Law and Justice, UEN) prepared the report on the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument – very important from the Polish point of view as it dealt with funds and programmes directed towards the EU’s eastern neighbours. Jan Olbrycht (Civic Platform, EPP) authored an important report in the Regional Development Committee, and Janusz Wojciechowski two reports on agriculture. Janusz Lewandowski (Civic Platform, EPP) held the very influential post of chair of the Budget Committee and was involved in the negotiation of the 2007-13 financial perspective. Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (Civic Platform, EPP) in the second half of the term became chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Bogusław Liberadzki (Alliance of Democratic Left, PES) prepared three codecision reports in the Transport Committee. Ryszard Czarnecki (Self-Defence, UEN) received the MEP Award in the category of Development, which is all the more important because this policy has mobilised very little interest in Poland. In short, competence in parliamentary tactics, visible in MEPs’ statements, was confirmed by their accomplishments. In the group of MEPs with the most impressive accomplishments there are both Euroenthusiasts and Eurorealists.

The role played by the EP during the events surrounding the Orange Revolution in Ukraine is considered by Polish MEPs and many observers of European politics in Poland to be one of the major successes of the Polish contingent as a whole. It is analysed in the following section as a separate case study.

73 MEP Awards are granted on the basis of a vote in which MEPs and assistants participate. Buzek received this award in 2006. Other Polish winners were: Jan Olbrycht (07, Regional Affairs), Ryszard Czarnecki (08, Development), and Bogusław Liberadzki (08, Transport).
4.1.5 Case study: Ukrainian election

Polish MEPs proved their competence in parliamentary politics when the question of rigged elections in Ukraine was debated. In the Ukrainian presidential election of November 2004, Viktor Yanukovych, an advocate of close co-operation between Ukraine and Russia, emerged as winner, but both the opposition led by Viktor Yushchenko and foreign observers (with some MEPs among them) contested the result and denounced electoral frauds. In the EP, Polish MEPs undertook efforts to mobilise EU institutions to act in favour of a re-run of the election. Javier Solana, the EU Representative for External Relations, who attended the meetings of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee (on 24 and 25 November) met with a determined call for action coming from the MEPs, in particular those representing Poland and the Baltic states. According to the account of one Estonian MEP, Solana started off saying that a phone call would be enough. Only later, under pressure from the MEPs, did he declare that he would travel to Kiev.74 The issue was subsequently discussed during the mini-plenary in Brussels (on the 1st of December) with the representative of the Dutch presidency, Minister for Foreign Affairs Atzo Nicolai, and Benita Waldner-Ferrero, Commissioner for External Affairs. In the meantime, Polish MEPs tried to mobilise support for the idea of EU involvement in the crisis; they sent a detailed letter describing the situation in Ukraine to all MEPs and distributed orange (the colour of the democratic opposition in Ukraine) scarves among their colleagues. During the debate, MEPs, virtually in unison, expressed support for the demand to organise a re-run of the election (see EP 2004c). On the next day a resolution was adopted that condemned the conditions in which the election took place, called for the reorganisation of the second round, and asked the Council of the EU and the European Commission to inform the Ukrainian government that use of force against peaceful protesters would lead to sanctions (EP 2004b: points 2, 4 and 6).75 A delegation of MEPs headed by Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, leader of Polish delegation in the EPP Group, went to Kiev to act as mediators in talks between the Ukrainian parties.

Under pressure from the international community, Ukrainian authorities decided to repeat the second round of the presidential election. In the re-run that took place on 26 December 2004 the pro-Western Yushchenko emerged as winner with a majority of 52 per cent. In the EP, the Ukrainian question was concluded by a resolution that mentioned the possibility of

74 Tunne Kelam at a UACES workshop on Europeanisation, Brussels, 13 October 2005. His account was confirmed by one of the Polish MEPs interviewed.

75 The resolution was adopted by a show of hands, so there is no electronic record of the majority that supported it, but usually a vote by show of hands is deemed sufficient when there is a clear majority in favour of the motion.
Ukrainian membership in the Union (EP 2005c). This carried a considerable importance as EU institutions shied away from such declarations before, and this one could be used as a precedent.

Polish MEPs played a significant part in convincing the majority to accept such a bold statement (Herranz 2005: 92). The actions undertaken by Polish representatives show that they learnt parliamentary tactics. They pushed for a swift adoption of the resolution, to make the most of the high profile and support that Ukraine enjoyed in the chamber. They also resorted to the clever use of symbols, comparing the events in Ukraine to the struggle of Solidarity in Poland against the communist regime. The task of Polish MEPs was made easier by the fact that the chamber has always been sympathetic to the cause of democracy and human rights. Nonetheless, the strong support that the Parliament lent to the Orange Revolution could not have been taken for granted. One of the leading Polish MEPs is probably right when claiming that without the involvement of Polish MEPs, the first resolution would not have included the threat of sanctions and the second one would not have mentioned the prospect of Ukrainian membership (MEP 4).

The analysis of statements, behaviour and parliamentary achievements of Euroenthusiasts and Eurorealists suggests that they identified correctly the major characteristics of EP politics and mastered the tactics that facilitate effective action in the chamber. The process of institutional learning proceeded in much the same way in both clusters with one exception, when ideology influenced the strategic choices made by Polish MEPs regarding political group membership. Guided by the Europe des patries conception of integration, the Eurorealists joined the small UEN group, whereas the Civic Platform MEPs had no qualms about cooperating with the much larger and influential EPP.

In the process of getting a grip on the parliamentary know-how and establishing one’s position in the chamber, the MEPs who held important posts in the past (labelled “personalities” in this thesis, see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1) were privileged. Former ministers could count on the fact that their interventions would be considered “serious stuff” by other

76 The Parliament called “the Council, the Commission and the Member States to consider, besides the measures of the Action Plan within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, other forms of association with Ukraine, giving clear European perspective for the country and responding to the demonstrated aspirations of the vast majority of the Ukrainian people, possibly leading ultimately to the country’s accession to the EU” (EP 2005c: point 14).

77 The considerable role of Polish MEPs during the crisis and in the preparations of this resolution was mentioned by one Hungarian MEP and one member of Parliament’s administration interviewed for this thesis. Virtually all Polish MEPs mentioned Ukraine when asked about the most important Polish achievement in the first part of the term.
MEPs from the very beginning. Meanwhile, those whose names were unknown to their European colleagues had to prove their competence first and at the beginning they felt closely watched (MEP 22) by the more experienced fellow MEPs. However, there are no signs that the “newcomers” were less knowledgeable about parliamentary politics than the “personalities” and “front-line politicians”. “Personalities” naturally played the role of leaders in their respective national party delegations, but the “newcomers” proved capable of learning quickly. Małgorzata Handzlik (a “political newcomer” representing the Civic Platform), for instance, was the first Polish MEP to author a report.

4.2 Eurosceptics

The representatives of the League of Polish Families confirmed their reputation as die-hard opponents of European integration with which they entered the chamber. Even though, as interviews show, they became aware of the nature of parliamentary politics, perceiving the importance of coalition building, consensual behaviour and the strength of the main political groups, only some of them showed signs that this awareness may have influenced their actions, and it happened only a few years into the mandate.

Given their critical views on integration, LPR MEPs had two strategies to choose from on entering the Parliament. They could tone down their anti-EU rhetoric and try to cooperate with the main political groups in order to have some influence over the parliamentary acts; or they could unequivocally present themselves as opponents of the system, refrain from participation in negotiations of legal acts and focus on the critique of the way in which integration has been proceeding. The former strategy was, for instance, followed by the Greens who, from mid-1980’s to early 1990’s, gradually moved away from the strategy of contestation, adopted a more moderate position and tried to participate more fully in the decision-making process (Bomberg 2000). Initially, the behaviour of the representatives of the League of Polish Families suggested that they had opted for the latter. Rather than trying to moderate their rhetoric, participate in negotiations and attempt to introduce some of their amendments into legislation, they focused on sharp criticism of EU institutions. Contrary to the majority of Polish MEPs, they paid relatively little attention to legislative work and focused on speaking in plenary, treating it as an opportunity to make their views widely known. They also resorted to actions that could easily draw media attention. At the beginning

78 Bomberg shows how Green parties present in the EP evolved from using it “almost exclusively as a tribune for social movement process” (2000: 145) to adopting a less radical position and making certain concessions in order to be able to find common ground on certain issues with other political groups.
of term, LPR MEPs flouted the parliamentary etiquette by placing national flags on their desks in the hemicycle. Bogusław Rogalski, in the debate concerning the participation of Rocco Buttiglione in the European Commission, called for dissolution of the EP as it was "dominated by the homosexual lobby" (EP 2004a). When the Corbett-Mendez de Vigo report on the Constitutional Treaty (EP 2005d) was voted upon in the chamber in January of 2005, Polish Eurosceptics – along with MEPs from the United Kingdom Independence Party – organised a noisy event, waving placards and chanting the Socialist Internationale. Some LPR MEPs also organised an anti-abortion photo exhibition where pictures from the Auschwitz concentration camp were put on display and abortion was compared to the Holocaust.

They also rejected the idea of presenting proposals and pleas in a moderate way, resorting to bluntly stating their demands and emphasising the importance of Polish interests, both in the Parliament and outside of it. One LPR MEP praised the Polish government led by Jarosław Kaczyński that, contrary to its predecessors, chose a tough policy towards the countries of the old union. Look at the veto in the negotiations with Russia (MEP 18). A more consensual approach was usually dismissed as defeatist and submissive.

The incidents mentioned above and the LPR MEPs' tendency to express their views rather bluntly confirmed their reputation of people who use their mandate mainly to spread anti-EU opinions, and made it more difficult to establish contacts with representatives of Parliament's largest groups. LPR MEPs were aware of this and admitted to feeling rather powerless in the chamber:

For parliamentarians, such as myself, who do not want the European state, but prefer a free economic co-operation of states, it is extremely difficult to achieve anything here (MEP 18).

Our capacities are limited here simply because the eurooptimists are reluctant to listen to our arguments (MEP 15).

This awareness of being on the fringes of parliamentary life must have been an important factor in the decisions made by six Eurosceptics to leave the IND/DEM Group and join the UEN. They claimed that as members of the UEN, where they joined forces with Polish MEPs representing the Law and Justice and the PSL-Piast, they could do much more for the promotion of Polish interest. This move may be interpreted as a result of the institutional learning process. Having realised that radical contestation only earned them the reputation of parliamentary jesters, they joined a more respectable group in order to try to gain some

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79 The Internationale was to emphasise that the EU was no more than another leftist utopia.
influence over the EP's decisions. The complaints of the Euroenthusiasts who in interviews with the Polish press accused the Eurosceptics of doing nothing, and thus limiting the potential influence that Poland could have in the chamber (Gazeta 2005; Tańska 2004), probably also played a part in the move away from sharp contestation of integration and EU institutions.

But not all Polish Eurosceptics chose the more moderate path. Two MEPs, former members of the IND/DEM who became non-attached in the meantime, were fined by the President of the EP for disturbing the work of the chamber by parading disguised as chickens when the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was debated on 12 December 2007 (europap 2008).80 Those who remained in the IND/DEM seemed convinced that their efforts to make the euroenthusiastic majority "see the truth" may bear fruit:

At first I thought that there is no point in doing anything. Just like the British [from UKIP] who do not go to committee meetings and just potter around. But I decided that my duty is to get involved for the sake of European nations who are lost. Often the MEPs from old member states come up to me and say: what should we do? The CAP is falling apart. Give us some ideas! (MEP 19).

The institutional learning in case of the Eurosceptics consisted not only of gaining knowledge of the mechanisms characteristic for the work of the EP, but also of figuring out how to – as one of them put it – be the opposition in the chamber (MEP 17). For a long time they used the EP as a tribune from which they could irritate the euroenthusiastic majority by expressing scathing criticisms of European institutions. After some time, the majority of them moved towards a more moderate option by joining a more mainstream UEN group and giving up the controversial means of denouncing the EU, while several kept playing the role of unrelenting critics of integration.

Conclusions

This chapter examined the dimension of socialisation called institutional learning. The findings regarding the Euroenthusiasts and Eurorealists confirm hypothesis 1 tested in this chapter.

H1: Polish MEPs will successfully go through the process of institutional learning, becoming participating and effective MEPs.

80 They were Maciej Giertych and Sylwester Chruszcz (Chruszcz later joined the UEN). Apart from them, seven members of the UKIP were fined by the EP (europap 2008).
MEPs' accounts of their work presented in interviews show that the Euroenthusiasts and Eurorealists relatively quickly identified the main factors that facilitate effective action in the chamber and acted in accordance with them. The vast majority of them managed to establish their reputation as reliable MEPs among colleagues and obtain the right to prepare parliamentary reports that are one of the main instruments of influencing the policy-making process in the chamber. The majority of the Eurorealists united in one political group with the objective of boosting their influence. These facts testify to successful institutional learning of the Euroenthusiasts and Eurorealists. They can be considered to have successfully integrated the decision-making process of the chamber.

The situation developed differently in the case of the Eurosceptics. Even though, as interviews show, they apparently identified the main characteristics of parliamentary politics, they maintained their sharp critique of the EU which practically deprived them of influence over parliamentary decisions. They treated the chamber solely as a tribune that gave them an opportunity to get a high profile for their anti-EU views. Only later, in the second part of the term, some of them displayed behaviour that may testify to a change of strategy. The decision made by a number of Eurosceptics to leave the IND/DEM Group and join the UEN, where the Polish Eurorealists sat, may be interpreted as at least a partial move away from the strategy of radical contestation of the EU and an attempt to get more involved in the decision-making process of the chamber.

The following hypotheses pertained to the cluster of Eurosceptics:

**H2a:** The Eurosceptics will boycott the works of the chamber, either by refraining from participating or by trying to disturb its day-to-day activities.

**H2b:** The Eurosceptics will participate in the works of the chamber, presenting their criticisms of integration.

The findings suggest that the process of institutional learning resulted in some Eurosceptic MEPs adopting a less radical behaviour in the chamber. Initially their actions mirrored the assumption formulated in the hypothesis 2a. Later, the Eurosceptics – especially those who left the anti-integrationist political group and joined the UEN – behaved less confrontationally and it is the hypothesis 2b that better depicts their actions.

We have seen how MEPs gained information about the decision-making process in the EP and tried to participate in it effectively. The following chapter examines how norms and codes of conduct of the chamber – especially the culture of compromise and the European model of representation – influence MEPs' behaviour and whether contact with these norms
and codes of conduct results in MEPs modifying their perception of politics and/or reshaping their identity.
Chapter 5. Socialisation as adaptation to the institutional culture of the EP

We have seen in the previous chapter how Polish MEPs adapted to working in the EP on the most basic level, gaining information about the Rules of Procedure and the principal tactics of effective parliamentary work. This chapter goes a step further and examines the dimension of socialisation that in this thesis was defined as adaptation to parliamentary institutional culture. Having analysed how MEPs learned to participate effectively in the policy-making process, we are now interested whether they identify a set of particular parliamentary norms and codes of conduct and, if so, whether adaptation to these norms results in changes in MEPs' self-perception as representatives of different groups, and their behaviour. In other words, how their identity and the role that they want to perform in the chamber develop as a result of their experience within the institution. As this chapter examines the potential transformations of MEPs' identities and roles, part of it is devoted to analysing to what extent they identify with political groups and whether the intensity of this feeling of identification grows over time.

What can be considered as "the institutional culture of the chamber"? Two norms are of major importance in the context of this thesis: the consensual approach to decision-making and the European model of representation. These norms were described at length in Chapter 1 (part 2) and what follows in this paragraph is only a brief summary. The necessity to mobilise considerable majorities behind parliamentary decisions resulted in a particular decision-making style of the chamber. In negotiations MEPs usually maintain a very flexible position, show understanding for their partners' concerns and are ready to make concessions in order to take others on board. It can also be argued that MEPs on numerous occasions demonstrated a tendency to transcend a narrow home country-oriented outlook and make decisions with the EU as a whole as major reference.

The following hypotheses are tested in this chapter:
H3: MEPs' declarations and behaviour will reveal their acceptance of the consensual culture of the chamber.
H4: MEPs' declarations and behaviour will reflect the adoption of a role of a "European representative".
H5: The more supportive of integration MEPs are, the more likely they are to assess parliamentary norms positively and follow them in their actions.
The socialisation process is expected to result in new MEPs accepting these norms and behaving in accordance with them. They will assess positively the culture of compromise and in negotiations display behaviour that is characteristic of it. Their identity as representatives will become more multifaceted and the feeling of responsibility for all citizens of the EU more strongly felt. They will also develop a stronger allegiance to their political group. As the attitude towards the EU is expected to have an impact on how MEPs adapt to the institutional culture of the chamber, these results will be most manifest in the cluster of Euroenthusiasts and less so among the Eurorealists. The Eurosceptics will either show a very superficial acceptance of parliamentary norms or entirely reject them.

The chapter consists of three parts. First, it discusses how MEPs assess the parliamentary culture of compromise and whether their positive, or negative, attitude finds reflection in their actions. The second part portrays the way in which Polish parliamentarians describe themselves as representatives of different groups and assesses whether their conception of representation evolved over the years spent in the chamber. The third part is devoted to the description of MEPs' relationship with their political groups.

5.1 Polish MEPs and the consensual culture of the EP

The analysis in this section is based principally on the data from the second interview (at T2). MEPs were asked the following question: a number of academics, journalists and practitioners talk about a particular culture of compromise that exists in the EP. What is your opinion on this subject? Then: How do you assess this culture of compromise? Could you give any examples when this culture manifested itself?

5.1.1 Euroenthusiasts

The majority of MEPs from this part of the sample recognised the existence of a particular culture of compromise and praised it as one of the major qualities of the Parliament. Many contrasted the consensual culture of the Parliament with the conflict-filled atmosphere of the Polish Sejm: 81

In Poland, the word compromise carries negative connotations – a rotten compromise. Compromises are something shady; they inevitably mean renouncing some of your beliefs. Here it is very different. Someone who is not capable of making compromises is treated as a bad partner.

81 The terms "culture of compromise" and "consensual culture" are used interchangeably.
It is easy to be intransigent and lose everything, the real exploit is to win something. Some of my fellow nationals still do not accept that making some concessions is not a treachery, but helps to get things done (MEP 9).

A better understanding of the importance of compromise and dialogue was for me the most valuable experience of my [EP] parliamentary career (MEP 32).

Polish Euroenthusiasts realise that the willingness of the major political groups to coalesce around a compromise solution is to a significant extent conditioned by the greater strength that it gives to the Parliament’s position in negotiations with other European institutions (Kreppel 2002: 175). However, they perceive this constant search for compromise not only as a utilitarian action, but also as an ingrained attitude prevalent in the chamber (MEP 6).

This positive attitude towards consensus-seeking is reflected in their actions. An MEP from the PES Group described the result of the negotiations on the services directive in the following way:

The adopted directive is not a perfect document. As every compromise it does not fully meet anyone’s expectations, yet no one leaves empty-handed. This is the nature of compromise which, in the Union composed of 25 sovereign states, seems to be the only sensible method of moving forward (Rosati 2006).

Below are two other accounts of decision-making in the chamber that illustrate the behavioural consequences of the adaptation to the consensual culture:

I was a shadow rapporteur for a report on the influence of fair trade on development policy. In my opinion the rapporteur was confusing two terms: Fair Trade and fair trade [the former being a particular campaign with its well known trademark, the latter – a general idea of paying producers a just price] and I put forward an amendment to clarify that. The amendment failed, but I advised my group to support the report anyway (MEP 9).

In case of […] I put forward a number of amendments. My [Polish] colleagues wanted to take the floor, but the [committee] chairman proceeded to voting. That vexed them and they called me to leave the room. But I could not leave the room when my amendments were voted upon! It would mean that I disrespect the committee. Perhaps they want me to comment on my amendments… I believe that my duty is to defend my amendments. The most important failed, but some were adopted. After the vote the committee chairman came up to me and with a pat on the back said "sometimes you win, sometimes you lose" (Szczepanik et al. 2009: 62-63).

These accounts suggest that Polish Euroenthusiasts prefer to accept second-best solutions rather than push for the achievement of all their objectives and risk breaking the negotiations.
They understand that it is virtually impossible to achieve all the objectives, but by making concessions in one case, they can expect concessions from their counterparts in another. Obviously, they adapt to the consensual culture because it serves their longer term interest. But there is more to it than just calculation. The behaviour, which is arguably mostly driven by interest-maximisation, results in a changed attitude and perception of politics. MEPs believe – and many claim that service in the EP strengthened this belief – that compromise is a good thing in itself, not just a means to an end. These findings uncover a mechanism that is much like that depicted by Jeffery Checkel (2005: 809). Having realised what the benefits of consensual behaviour are, MEPs start playing a role; in other words, they behave according to the consensual model quasi-automatically without assessing what exact gains their behaviour will bring in every single situation.

This is not to say that Polish MEPs were completely foreign to the concept of compromise and that they discovered it only thanks to their service in the chamber. All that is claimed here is that they recognise the existence of a particular consensual working culture in the chamber, speak positively of it, and behave in a particular way because of it. They are less likely to stick stubbornly to their opinions and more willing to accommodate their views with those of others by making concessions.

The Euroenthusiasts also spoke very critically about the behaviour of MEPs representing the League of Polish Families (Eurosceptics), which clashed with parliamentary standards. Their rowdy behaviour was said to contribute to a negative image of Poland and Polish MEPs, and was assessed as completely counterproductive in negotiations with other europarlamentarians:

Sometimes when you say too much, it is not easy to go back on yourself. Compromises reached through lengthy negotiations can easily be destroyed by undiplomatic behaviour. A number of Polish MEPs – especially from the League of Polish Families and the Law and Justice – believe that their way of seeing things is the only correct one. And they do not understand that you can sometimes achieve your objectives just by the right choice of words. They think that putting everything bluntly is the best way. And they are happy when they can verbally attack someone. They think that this will cut some slack with the people here [other MEPs]. But people here won’t understand (MEP 24).82

While the Euroenthusiasts can generally be considered to have embraced the consensual culture, there were occasions on which they displayed a behaviour that according to some

82 Very similar complaints of the Euroenthusiasts, especially regarding the behaviour of the League of Polish Families representatives, on a few occasions also the Law and Justice, were reported by Pucyk (2005: 121-123).
observers was too confrontational. It occurred when the issues related to history were debated. This episode, as it pertains to MEPs from all three clusters, is described at the end of this part of the chapter.

5.1.2 Eurorealists

At T2, different opinions regarding the consensual culture appeared among the Eurorealists. Some MEPs were rather dismissive of it, arguing that it was more of a political game than anything genuine. Moreover, if nothing important goes on, then what is there to argue about? When we get to fundamentals, no compromises are possible. Compromises can be made when you debate trivial things. And trivialities are debated very often here (MEP 23). But there were also MEPs who admitted that the particular institutional culture had an effect on their behaviour:

There is an open letter concerning the Near East. I agree with four out of five points included. In Poland, I would hesitate whether to sign it, here I will sign because I know this is the best agreement we can have (MEP 34).

In the report on the activities of Polish MEPs (Szczepanik et al. 2009), published by a Polish think-tank, the Institute of Public Affairs, one can find examples of Eurorealists speaking positively about the culture of compromise. All seven Eurorealists who participated in the study “agreed” or “rather agreed” with the statement that "a culture of compromise exists in the EP, which makes it different from the national parliament". "I believe that many of my colleagues only here [in the EP] learned how to cooperate with others in the spirit of compromise", claimed one of them. One of the opinions quoted was particularly laudatory. An MEP stated that his "greatest achievement [in the EP] was gaining the ability to work in an international team whose members have different views and interests, in order to find compromises that are acceptable". But there were also opinions that showed a pragmatic approach to the consensual culture: "You have to control the intensity of political disagreement in order to conserve your coalition capacity, the ability to cooperate with different people that you might need... tomorrow or some time in the future", said one Eurorealist (Szczepanik et al. 2009: 62).

83 Information presented in this paragraph comes from interviews carried out in preparation of the report of the Institute of Public Affairs (Szczepanik et al. 2009)
Interestingly, MEPs representing the Self-Defence party can be included among the MEPs who willingly embraced the parliamentary consensual culture. Given the party’s critical stance on Europe and its members’ record of controversial behaviour in national politics, many expected the Self-Defence representatives to be among parliamentary firebrands (Tasńska 2004). However, they refrained from radical acts. Even the ostentatious red-and-white (Polish national colours) ties sported by many candidates and supporters during the election campaign were given up. *In the European Parliament we have behaved rationally (MEP 35)*, concluded one of the MEPs. The same MEP emphasised that the adaptation to the parliamentary consensual culture was not only a tactical move, but it would have a lasting effect:

_The European mandate is a fulfilment of a dream of mine. For me, and I guess for many other MEPs from Poland as well, the chamber is a political Champions League. Former prime ministers and ministers… Fantastic school of politics… The political culture is definitely much more developed here [than in Polish parliament]. If we go on to hold some positions in the country, then I am sure we will introduce different standards (MEP 35)._  

Several factors can explain this situation. First of all, Self-Defence’s general stance regarding European integration evolved from rejection to ambivalence (see Chapter 3, section 3.1.2). In national politics, the party’s leader, Andrzej Lepper, tried to build an image of a responsible politician and moved away from radical means of political expression. Thirdly, as one of the MEPs pointed out, *Self-Defence’s representatives in the chamber are different from most of the MPs and party activists in Poland. Lepper imposed severe selection criteria: higher education and languages (MEP 35)*. In sum, already on entry, europarlamentarians representing the Self-Defence could not be considered as radical (in terms of preferred means of political expression) and they had the intention of building an image of predictable and responsible politicians. This strategy mirrored the party’s move away from an unequivocally eurosceptic position on the national arena and the experience in the EP only reinforced their conviction regarding its appropriateness.

In sum, the attitude towards consensual culture was not uniform in the Eurorealist cluster. While some MEPs presented opinions close to those of the Euroenthusiasts, others were more sceptical about the uniqueness of parliamentary culture and depicted it as a feature of political environment to which they had to adapt rather than as a definitely positive element that facilitated the decision-making process. As the parliamentary consensus was built around the position of the major political groups, usually diverging from the stance of parties such as
the Law and Justice, it should not be surprising that the Eurorealists were on average more moderate in their assessment of consensual culture than the Euroenthusiasts.

5.1.3 Eurosceptics

MEPs from the League of Polish Families were dismissive of the consensual nature of the chamber. At T1, summarising his very first impressions of the chamber, one MEP complained that there was no real confrontation, only deals done behind the scenes (MEP 12). This clearly shows that the Eurosceptics prepared for a confrontation rather than negotiations or discussions. At T2, similar opinions appeared. It is usually a "rotten compromise" that is agreed in the EP, claimed the Eurosceptics. In their view, the consensual rhetoric, to which the leading figures of the chamber so often resort, serves as a cover-up for the alliance of the big political groups, created to deprive the smaller ones of influence over the direction of parliamentary affairs. The deal made to share the Presidency of the chamber was often mentioned as a prime example of such machinations:

It's a short way from a compromise to a tacit agreement or a conspiracy of groups that in theory are opponents. A compromise can be good or bad. We revealed the shady arrangement between the Left and the Right here: "this term you rule, then we take the lead and we don't harm one another". Meanwhile, the society gets little of all this (MEP 15).

As another surmises, the frequent co-operation between the EPP and the PES shows that little differentiates representatives of the two main political groups (MEP 18); political conflict – part and parcel of democracy – is nonexistent; and the main objective of the leading europarlamentarians is perpetuating the system that ensures their comfortable existence. "Keep quiet", they seem to be saying to us. Are you not doing all right? Do you really want to destroy all this? (MEP 19).

Their statements suggest that the representatives of LPR perceive the negotiations that go on in the Parliament and the Council not as a search for common solution, but as a zero-sum intergovernmental bargaining whereby someone's success must entail somebody else's loss. Thus, when talking about concrete problems, Polish Eurosceptics do not focus on possibilities of finding common ground, but tend to look for means of imposing the solution they wish for or at least of thwarting the attempts to adopt legislation that they find detrimental to Poland. The following situation, witnessed by the author, provides a good illustration of this point. When discussing the second reading of the REACH directive with Polish MEPs, the Polish minister for industry claimed that a batch of proposed amendments was against the Polish
national interest. The reaction of one of the LPR MEPs was: What are the chances of the government being able to create a blocking minority in the Council? [So as to prevent the adoption of these amendments should they be accepted by the Parliament] (MEP 18). This matches very well with the descriptions provided by other Polish MEPs of behaviour that is characteristic of the Eurosceptics. The latter consistently privilege voting and power politics over attempts to find agreement through negotiations and mutual concessions. Obviously, their critical attitude towards consensual parliamentary politics must have been to a considerable extent determined by the fact that in many domains their anti-integrationist views meant that they could not accept even the widest consensus. Yet, in their statements a conviction was manifest that in the EP the more experienced members incessantly tried to trick Poland into accepting something that was detrimental to its interests. The years spent in the chamber have not dispersed their suspicions.

5.1.4 Historical politics: departure from the consensual style

Their appreciation of consensual behaviour notwithstanding, the socialisation process of Polish MEPs – even from the Euroenthusiastic cluster – did not proceed without certain frictions with the more experienced colleagues. Polish europarlamentarians showed a less consensual attitude in the realm usually referred to by the MEPs and the Polish press as “historical politics”. This label describes the issues related to the Second World War and its aftermath which, according to Polish MEPs, have often been interpreted in the West in a rather simplistic way, without sufficient knowledge of the experience of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe. In 2005, the Parliament touched upon these issues in two resolutions commemorating the anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz concentration camp (EP 2005a) and the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War (EP 2005b). Polish MEPs strived to influence the wording of these resolutions, so that they would reflect the Central European point of view. This sometimes led to clashes with colleagues from other member states. In the case of the Auschwitz resolution, for instance, Polish MEPs protested against referring to Auschwitz as a "death camp in Poland", claiming that such a formulation, used in the draft resolution submitted by the Liberals, the Greens and the Socialists, may be understood as suggesting Polish involvement in the Holocaust (Carter 2005). The Poles insisted on stating in the resolution that “Nazi Germany” created the camp, instead of the mention of “Nazis” in the draft version. A dispute concerning the wording

84 Jacek Saryusz-Wolski deplored that parliamentarians from Western Europe tend to have a very superficial knowledge of Polish history and insisted that “common European identity cannot be built on this ignorance”, (Le Monde 2006). A number of Polish MEPs interviewed made very similar remarks.
between a Polish EPP member, Bogusław Sonik, and Baroness Sarah Ludford, a British liberal, ended up with Sonik leaving the room (Soltyk 2005). In the end, the resolution mentioned neither Poland nor Germany, referring to Auschwitz as “Hitler’s Nazi death camp” (EP 2005a).

When the consequences of the Second World War were discussed, a Polish MEP from the UEN Group, Wojciech Roszkowski, seconded by his Latvian colleagues, argued that the parliamentary resolution should clearly state that the Soviet victory in the Eastern front, while contributing to the defeat of Nazism, also brought about decades of communist dictatorship in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They achieved their objectives as the resolution stated that “for some nations the end of the World War II meant renewed tyranny inflicted by the Stalinist Soviet Union” and emphasised the “magnitude of suffering, injustice and long-term social, political and economic degradation endured by the captive nations located on the eastern side of what was to become the Iron Curtain” (EP 2005b).

Overall, Polish MEPs managed to influence the wordings of both resolutions. Some of them stressed that their actions met with a positive reaction from the majority of MEPs who welcomed Polish efforts to present the history of the continent in its full complexity (MEP 4). Yet, there are also reasons to believe that in the negotiations Polish politicians came across as bent on having an argument that could have been avoided. Alain Lamassoure, a French MEP from the EPP Group, deplored that "Poles have the tendency to keep reopening old wounds, while Europe should help us to forget them" (Le Monde 2006). Some Polish MEPs were aware of this danger of irritating their colleagues, but the issues related to history clearly possessed great significance for them. At some point we thought that maybe we were overdoing it a bit, that maybe we shouldn't have any more anniversaries. But when you hear people mention Polish concentration camps you just cannot sit there and do nothing (MEP 8). Another MEP stressed a different dimension of the problem:

Our involvement in historical politics was something through which we could manifest our identity. It was like saying [to the MEPs from old member states]: "This is us, this is our history. We have our own" (MEP 4).

The fact that the most evident departure from the consensual code of conduct happened within the realm of historical politics shows that this issue that had only symbolic significance was extremely important for Polish representatives. So important, that they were ready to risk their image of moderate politicians because of that.
5.2 Polish MEPs and the European model of representation

This section compares the opinions expressed by MEPs in interviews at T1 and T2 regarding their perception of themselves as representatives and their conceptions of who an MEP should primarily represent. MEPs were asked the following question: "as an MEP, whom do you feel you represent? Your voters, your political party, political group in the EP, all EU citizens?"

At T2 MEPs were also asked: "Would you say that your identity as a representative underwent any changes over the last two years?" The aim is to ascertain to what extent Polish MEPs incorporate the element of representing all EU citizens into their representative role.

5.2.1 Euroenthusiasts

MEPs' opinions recorded at the outset of parliamentary term show MEPs' intention to represent both citizens of Poland and those of other member states. Yet, representing citizens of other countries was in most cases depicted as rather artificial a concept – MEPs admitted that they think about it because they are expected to do so. The relationship with Polish people was clearly easier to establish and whenever MEPs decided to present a hierarchy of allegiances, Poland and/or Polish citizens came first. Below are some statements that illustrate this attitude:

- In theory I represent the peoples of all member states, but this is very abstract. It is difficult for me to represent the Maltese or the Portuguese. I do appreciate the European dimension, but somewhat naturally I am most concerned about my electorate and my region (MEP 9).
- I am to speak for the social groups from my constituency. I am to act in the interest of all citizens of the Community. [...] So, first the people from my constituency, then Poles as a society, and thirdly all other aspects. Today I am a Polish deputy in the EP, perhaps in 2 or 3 years I will feel more European (MEP 25).

One MEP stressed that the first mandate was a particular time when Polish MEPs have the right to adopt the primarily national perspective (MEP 4).

In the interviews carried out two years later, the same theme of trying to represent Poles and all EU citizens reappeared. Certain accounts suggest that two years into the mandate MEPs find it easier and more natural to adopt an EU-wide perspective, but this does not amount to a considerable increase of the feeling of identification with European citizens. MEPs themselves did not think that their identity as representatives of different groups underwent any considerable evolution.
Obviously I feel a different kind of relationship with people from Wielkopolska [Polish region] and with the inhabitants of the Islands of Azores. Nonetheless, the ideal towards which we are striving here is a harmonious balance of Polish and European interest (MEP 9). An MEP must be an active representative of European society. You take into consideration also opinions concerning different countries. Much depends on the subject; some things do not have a direct bearing for Polish interest. In other cases, when the vast majority of our Polish contingent agrees on something, I am prepared to vote against my group. If there is a conflict [between Polish and European interest] – this happens rarely – I tend to vote according to the Polish position, but this is by no means an iron rule. The majority of MEPs attempt to strike a balance between national, European and group interest (MEP 32).

The second quotation shows that MEPs adopt different roles depending on the issue area. Where a Polish interest is clearly identifiable, they act more like national representatives, whereas if the issues have no important or clear-cut implications for Poland, they make an effort to consider the consequences of different decisions for the entire Community.

Questionnaire data shows that although Euroenthusiastic MEPs attached greater importance to representing their voters and all Polish citizens than to representing citizens of the EU, they identified rather strongly with the latter both at T1 and T2 (see Table 8). No significant change was discovered between T1 and T2. Yet, it should also be mentioned that in the study carried out by the Institute of Public Affairs 12 out of 15 Euroenthusiasts were reported to have agreed (4) or rather agreed (8) with a statement that "service in the chamber made me identify more strongly with the role of MEP as representative of citizens of all EU countries" (Szczepanik et al. 2009: 72). This confirms the conclusion of the analysis of interviews that at T2 Euroenthusiasts considered representing all citizens as something more natural than at the beginning of the parliamentary term.
Table 8 Polish MEPs’ attitudes towards their representative role

Average answers to the following question: How important is it for you to represent in the EP the interests of the groups mentioned below?
Answers on a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Your voters</th>
<th>Polish citizens</th>
<th>EU citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euroenthusiasts (N=4)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.3 4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurorealists (5)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.6 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurosceptics (3)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.3 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroenthusiasts at T2 (8)*</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data from 4 Euroenthusiasts who returned questionnaires at T1 and T2 merged with the data from 4 Euroenthusiasts who returned questionnaires only at T2

In view of both qualitative and quantitative data, it can be argued that the Euroenthusiasts adopt the role of a “representative of all EU citizens” alongside that of a “representative of Poland”. Service in the chamber definitely helped the MEPs to conceive how they want to perform the former. Yet, the latter remains their principal representative role. This is similar to conclusions presented by scholars studying officials participating in Council working groups (see for example Beyers 2005). These officials were said to adopt multiple roles (supranational and intergovernmental), rather than switch from one to the other (ibidem: 904).

The task of representing Polish and EU citizens is, according to the Euroenthusiasts, often relatively easy as interests of these two groups often overlap. MEPs from this cluster believe that a dynamic and prosperous EU will bring benefits to Poland, while the reforms they call for are not only tailored to meet Polish expectations, but will be beneficial for other member states. In this context, a number of Poles complained that MEPs from the so-called Old Union sometimes tended to shy away from bold decisions that would bring benefits to the EU as a whole, afraid not to irritate their voters’ sensitivities. The services directive was frequently called upon as an example.

Numerous analyses claimed that Western European countries would benefit most as the largest number of new jobs would be created there, and yet they [MEPs from the EU-15] still did not want to support it. I feel that by pushing the liberal version of the directive, we were acting in both Polish and general European interest (MEP 9).
When assessing how MEPs from the old member states perform their duties, the majority of Polish Euroenthusiasts stated that attention to national interests was more manifest than thinking in terms of the EU as a whole. One MEP stressed that it was a particular disappointment.

I realised that there is no distilled European interest that would be the main point of reference – it was the greatest surprise for me. It is more of a conglomerate of national and party interests. I realised that I had been naïve thinking about European interest, and don't delude yourself into thinking that MEPs pay much attention to the criterion of the common good, especially in financial and economic matters (MEP 1).

But there were also opinions that the Parliament is an environment conducive to the emergence of EU-oriented thinking.

Where there are no – let me put it in inverted commas – “instructions from the capitals”, you can talk about the existence of a consensual European interest that dominates. In the Parliament the community thinking is more widespread than in the member states. Europeanisation of politics and interests is taking place; there is a common interest that is being born out of it, but it is not the only one out there, nor does it dominate (MEP 4).

Interestingly, the author of the first remark – a person for whom the European mandate was the first direct contact with EU politics – was one of the few MEPs who at the outset of their mandate defined themselves as a representative of all EU citizens rather than Polish people. Meanwhile, the second statement was made by a politician with considerable experience in EU politics. It seems that while service in the chamber dispersed the illusions of a political newcomer and made her adopt a more cynical view of politics, to a seasoned negotiator, accustomed to clashes between governments, the chamber was a place where, in favourable circumstances, a common approach – going beyond the defence of national positions – could be forged. This example shows how the perception of the chamber and other MEPs was influenced by the pre-entry experience: for one of the MEPs, the europarlamentarians displayed a disappointingly national interest-oriented way of thinking; for the other, the chamber was the best place to focus on the common interest.

In terms of allegiance, rarely were any foci other than “nation”, “all Poles”, “my electorate”, or “my party” mentioned. Some MEPs declared a particular attachment to the region where they were elected. References to concrete social groups were virtually absent.
from MEPs' narratives. When probed directly they admitted to feeling more attached to a particular group, but normally virtually all of them used the term "Polish interest". Perhaps MEPs implicitly related to certain social groups when talking about "their voters", but a more plausible explanation seems to be that, in the international environment of the EP, Polish MEPs defined themselves as representatives of the nation rather than a particular group. This reluctance to identify oneself as a representative of a group may also be stemming from the catch-all character of Polish parties (Nalewajko 1997: 212, Sitter 2003: 188, Szczerbiak 2006: 112). The only exception were the representatives of the agrarian Polish Peasant Party-Piast who admitted to focusing on defending the interest of Polish farmers. Apart from them, only one MEP mentioned that because of his past experience, he felt allegiance to the trade union movement.

Even though the MEPs defined themselves (both at T1 and T2) above all as representatives of Poland, service in the European Parliament convinced them that in order to gain allies and influence over EU affairs they had to go beyond acting only as representatives of their electorate in Poland.

I believe that if we want to be taken seriously, we cannot focus solely on problems that are important from our [Polish] point of view. Because if we do, we'll gain the reputation of egoists. If you want to be a serious partner, then you should become interested in everything that's significant for the Union. My work in the EP made me realise more a certain Poland- and Europe-centrism that exists in Poland. Poland focuses so much on itself; add to the mix the neighbourhood policy, the special relationship with the US and some general EU stuff. The rest is completely off our radars, and the EP deals with everything. This is an institution that participates in global politics (MEP 9).

This remark shows that even though MEPs did not develop a much stronger feeling of representing other citizens than their countrymen and women, some of them became interested in issues other than those directly related to Poland, and realised that participating in debates on such issues may bring important benefits in terms of building their political position in the chamber. Here the strategic dimension of socialisation becomes manifest. MEPs evidently choose certain behaviours not only because "this is what others do or consider a right thing to do", but because they see concrete benefits of such behaviours.

5.2.2 Eurorealists

Like the Euroenthusiasts, the MEPs included in this part of sample noted, at T1, that they were obliged by the Treaty and Polish law to represent all citizens of the Union and they
meant to fulfil this duty. Yet, they admitted to feeling first and foremost responsible for representing the concerns of Polish people. Similar opinions were voiced in the second series of interviews. Identifying themselves primarily as national representatives, some MEPs emphasised that in their view this was the most widespread way of thinking in the Parliament:

_I do not agree with some pundits who want to analyse everything from the point of view of the Community. It is important, but the majority of europarlimentarians see everything through the prism of their country's interest. If we [Polish MEPs] don't want to lose, we have to adopt this way of thinking. First Country, then Community – this is the order. It is manifest here. Only very rarely do I see an opposite hierarchy (MEP 22)._

Questionnaire data shows that the Eurorealists ascribe a much smaller importance to representing all EU citizens than the Euroenthusiasts (see Table 8 above). A comparison of questionnaires from T1 and T2 shows a slight reinforcement of this type of identification (three out of five MEPs), but it still remains significantly lower than identification with voters and Poland. It should be noted that questionnaire data from T2 also shows an increase in the intensity of identification with Polish citizens.

Two Law and Justice MEPs stressed that they did not find the terms "European interest" or "EU interest" appropriate. In harmony with their preferred vision of integration, they pleaded for thinking in terms of the interests of member states. _If all member states are satisfied, it is a sign that the Union is working well (MEP 23)._ European interest was for them little but a hollow notion, mostly employed as a rhetorical ruse, to defend one's country's priorities in a more diplomatic way.

The notes of bitterness and disillusion were noticeable when MEPs from this cluster assessed the behaviour of colleagues from old member states:

_We are sensible people and we are able to accept good arguments and to make concessions. Yet so far we weren't given such arguments. Could the [European] Constitution that suppresses weaker nations be considered such an argument? [...] I expected more cooperation and partnership [in the EP]. What I notice here is that we are being pushed into a certain predefined path (MEP 28)._

_I have a more sober view of European affairs now. When I started my work here I thought that European solidarity, for the good of the Union as a whole and the states that create it, will be greater. The EU is a bit more than a simple cooperative arrangement between states, but it is not the incarnation of a great idea. Two events dispersed my illusions: the pipeline in the Baltic Sea and the meeting in Kaliningrad, when Schroeder and Chirac agreed to attend even though the EU members bordering Russia were not invited. It is clear that the French and the Germans put their_
immediate interest above European solidarity. The EU is still miles away from the ideal often put forward to describe it and from what I had expected to see here (MEP 23).

Both interview and questionnaire data suggest that the majority of Eurorealists’ identification with the role of European representative as it was defined in this thesis was weak and did not increase as a result of service in the chamber. Two years into the parliamentary term, they defined themselves primarily as national representatives. They also considered such an approach as natural, appropriate and prevalent among more experienced MEPs. In this context the criticisms that some Eurorealists formulated regarding the excessively nationalistic behaviour of certain MEPs — especially French and German — sound slightly out of place as they condemned a behaviour that they seem to have adopted themselves.

Only in one case was a clear change in the approach to the representative role detected. A member of the EP Agriculture Committee reported that his experience in the chamber, and especially in the committee, provoked the following changes:

When I observe the World Trade Organisation negotiations, the common European interest becomes more manifest to me. On issues such as liberalisation in agriculture or the calls for limits on agricultural production, we — European farmers — speak with one voice. [...] Now I see all this much less as a confrontation, we [Poland] versus them [old member states]. My perception is much more nuanced and I can see much more the area of a common European interest in agriculture. The main front for me today is the confrontation between Europe and the rest of the world. First and foremost we have to win that confrontation and only later talk about who gets what in the EU (MEP 26).

As a result of contact with a particular type of issues, mostly World Trade Organisation negotiations, the MEP in question started to identify more strongly with his colleagues from the committee, mostly European farmers or — like himself — representatives of the farming community. Thanks to that, he could more easily imagine himself as a representative of the entire European farming community, something that earlier must have seemed a vague idea. He also redefined his perception of the Poland-EU relationship. From a country that had to confront Brussels to gain resources, Poland became part of the Community that has to deal with a number of global problems.

The MEP’s account suggests that the evolution was mainly due to the experience in committee. With a large representation of former farmers or people with links to the farming
community (Whitaker 2007: 15), the AGRI Committee can be considered as one where the feeling of common interest between members may easily develop. In the view of many MEPs’ – both Euroenthusiasts and Eurorealists – declarations that the idea of representing European citizens seemed rather abstract, it is not surprising that the most manifest effects of socialisation appeared in the committee where the MEP could identify with a more defined social group – farmers. The nature of the issues under consideration was also significant. Being active in the areas where the EU confronted other actors – such as the WTO negotiations – was more likely to result in developing a more complex representative role than dealing with issues where intra-EU conflicts were probable, for example the budgetary negotiations.

5.2.3 Eurosceptics

MEPs from the League of Polish Families, at the outset of the parliamentary career defined their representative role in the most clear-cut way insofar as they admitted to focusing almost solely on issues related to Poland. As one MEP put it (at T1):

We have to learn to look at the Polish interest first and only later consider other factors. We are here in order to defend Polish interests, in order to do something so that motorways are built in Poland. Not in order to take care of the roads in Ireland (MEP 12).

Two years later very similar thoughts were voiced: The basic principle: when something is being discussed, then the question is whether it is good for Poland. If not, then we have to be against it (MEP 15). Questionnaire data shows that both at T1 and T2, Eurosceptic MEPs identified themselves primarily as representatives of their voters and Poland (see Table 8 above). All of them – again both at T1 and T2 – disagreed with the statement that “for an MEP the community interest should be as important as that of their country”.

Their actions in the chamber illustrated this approach. The Eurosceptics marked their first plenary session in Strasbourg by putting little Polish flags on their desks and thus symbolically showing that representing Poland was their key objective. Despite criticisms expressed by other MEPs, they continued to display the flags.

On the subject of the European interest, different points of view appeared (at T2). Some MEPs claimed – similarly to their more pro-integrationist colleagues – that, in their view, Polish and EU interests were often similar and, while defending the Polish interest, they felt that they were acting for the EU’s benefit as well (MEP 15, MEP 19). One MEP stated that he defined himself primarily as a representative of Poland because he could much more easily define Polish concerns than what would be clearly beneficial for all Europeans (MEP 18).
Finally, one MEP claimed that the EU interest simply did not interest him and he felt only responsible for representing Poland (MEP 17).

League of Polish Families representatives were very critical when assessing the behaviour of fellow europarlimentarians from old member states. France and Germany in particular were accused of pushing their own agenda at the expense of the others and of using the European rhetoric only as a cover-up.

Just as they refused to get involved in the policy-making process in the chamber by maintaining their all-out criticism of EU institutions, representatives of the League of Polish Families persistently defined their role as one of national representative. Such a stance can be interpreted as a logical consequence of the diagnosis they give of EP politics, downplaying the role of consensus and seeing it as a confrontation between MEPS defending their respective “national interests”. Their behaviour and statements demonstrate that Polish Eurosceptic MEPS reject EP norms related to consensual behaviour and a broad representative role.

5.2.4 Similarities and differences between clusters

Three similar threads can be detected in the opinions expressed by MEPS from all three clusters. First, representing “Poland” was the strongest feeling for all, both at the point of entry and two years later. Some of them – the Eurosceptics – focus solely on that duty, others feel responsible for advocating solutions that would be acceptable to other countries as well, combining the roles of a national representative and a representative of all EU citizens. Secondly, they are convinced that most of the time the actions that they advocate will benefit both Poland and other member states. Finally, in many accounts there is a perceptible note of disappointment with the MEPS representing the old member states – their limited understanding of Eastern Europe and the tendency to focus on the defence of national interest. This may suggest that the norm of representing EU citizens which, according to one of our hypotheses, MEPS were supposed to endorse is not so strong in the chamber. Perhaps Polish MEPS just expected too much from their counterparts or wanted to justify their focus on national interest by claiming that others acted like that as well.

The comparison of statements made by MEPS at the outset of their parliamentary career and two years later suggests that, for most of them, the way in which they identify with different groups did not undergo a considerable evolution. The majority of Euroenthusiasts seem more at ease with the role of representing all EU citizens, which, at the beginning of term, they described as a rather abstract idea. In a few cases a more considerable evolution
was noticeable. The most striking example was the Eurorealist member of the Agriculture Committee who developed a more pronounced feeling of identification with all EU citizens.

The differences in MEPs' perception of their representative duties find reflection in the way in which they justify their decisions. The resolutions on homophobia provide a good illustration. Three resolutions touching upon this subject were voted by the chamber: two dealt solely with homophobia (EP 2006a and EP 2007a), the third one discussed racism, anti-Semitism and homophobia (EP 2006b). The situation in Poland was widely debated in connection with these resolutions. Some MEPs criticised the decisions of Polish local authorities that did not want to allow the so-called equality parades – public demonstrations promoting tolerance. In the second resolution, the EP was "seriously concerned about the general rise in racist, xenophobic, anti-Semitic and homophobic intolerance in Poland" and requested the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia to "conduct an inquiry into the emerging climate of [...] intolerance" (EP 2006b). These were strong statements and the vote on this resolution could arguably be treated as a test not only of Polish MEPs' views, but also of their perception of responsibility towards Poland. Polish members of PES and ALDE supported the resolutions, while other MEPs voted against them. Obviously it would be a simplification to conclude that those who voted against still feel predominantly as national representatives, while those who supported the resolutions adopted a less nation-focused attitude. MEPs made their decisions according to their opinions on the issues discussed and their assessment of statements included in the resolutions. Yet, the way in which some MEPs referred to the votes revealed a great deal about their conception of their representational role. Wojciech Roszkowski, a Law and Justice MEP (UEN, Eurorealist cluster), in a press article, criticised the first resolution and described the behaviour of one Polish MEP who spoke in favour of it as "attacking his own country" (Roszkowski 2006). Meanwhile, one Democratic Party MEP (ALDE, Euroenthusiastic cluster) claimed that, as MEPs, they sometimes have to criticise their own country because otherwise [they] would not have the moral right to critically assess the events in other member states (MEP 30). The author of the first opinion seems to believe that MEPs, much like government representatives in international negotiations, should defend the interest and reputation of their countries. The author of the second statement perceives his role differently; he feels obliged to forget the

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65 Marek Siwiec (SLD, PES), Vice-President of the EP in the second part of term, made a very similar statement. He claimed that "the concern for the image of our country cannot be the excuse for ignoring the signs of discrimination because of sexual orientation" (Europap 2007).
"right or wrong, my country" tradition, and to present himself more as a politician who is an impartial judge of events in member states, including his own.

5.2.5 Adopting a wider perspective

Evidence from interviews suggests that some changes in the way MEPs perceive and analyse political problems took place. It seems that the wide variety of subjects discussed in the chamber and numerous opportunities to travel and meet politicians from all over the world contributed to the increased awareness of Polish MEPs that Poland and the EU are not isolated polities, but a part of the globalised world. The fact that developments in international politics have a bearing on the fate of the EU, while — conversely — decisions made in Brussels can have serious international consequences became much clearer to Polish politicians, some of whom had only focused on national political confrontations before. The following statements illustrate this shift of focus:

During these two years the way in which I think about politics evolved. My horizons broadened. I left local politics. I am aware that when taking decisions concerning directives, we have to consider the reaction of the US, Russia, China, India and Japan. Much has changed in the way I try to fathom the laws governing the modern world (MEP 25). In my electoral campaign I focused on the problems of my city and region, meanwhile here I am on an entirely different level of thinking... wider... European. We have greater knowledge, better perceive the importance of China, the US, India... We have to adopt other ways of thinking (MEP 3).

Statements in much the same vein were given by MEPs with very different views on Europe. It can be concluded that the “widening of horizons”, resulting in different perception of the political process, was a consequence of the socialisation process for MEPs from all three clusters.

The greater knowledge and understanding of global problems was usually accompanied by greater understanding of the EU-15, each member state’s problems and sensitivities. As mentioned above, a large number of Polish MEPs were disgruntled on realising how limited was the knowledge of the history of their country and they felt obliged to present to their Western European colleagues a more complete version of events. Yet, some Polish MEPs admitted that they had something to learn about their partners as well.

Without changing our stance on economic liberalisation, we have heard so much about disappearing jobs and delocalisations that we understand the other side. We get a much more complete perception of things that, before coming here, were much less clear: what are all these
fears based upon? what are the reasons for the importance of environmental issues? The Western European debate is much closer to us now (MEP 4).

One of the most important things that I learned here is that successful integration demands mutual understanding. We are often vexed that the old Europe does not understand where we come from and what kind of history we had. And no doubt we are right about this, but I admit as well that we still do not have a proper grasp of their problems: the specificity of the Mediterranean area, the difficulties provoked by postcolonial immigration... (MEP 7).

The socialisation process in the chamber had some effects on the way in which MEPs perceive the world around them. They started to pay more attention to global trends and processes and gained more knowledge regarding the specificities of other member states. Getting a fuller picture of the problems faced by the old member states and their concerns did not result in important modifications of attitudes, but such empathy arguably provides a favourable ground for negotiations and finding common solutions.

5.3 Polish MEPs' identification with their political groups

The development of attitude towards the political group can be treated as another aspect of the evolution of MEPs' identity which may occur in the chamber. We have seen that some MEPs were more ready to depict themselves as representatives of all ED citizens. It may be expected that in a similar way they will develop a feeling of loyalty and stronger identification with their political group. This section explores the development of MEPs' attitudes towards their groups.

5.3.1 Euroenthusiasts

As was mentioned above (Chapter 3, section 3.2.2), the Polish Euroenthusiasts were divided between three major political groups of the EP: EPP, PES and ALDE. When asked for reflections on the subject of their political group, the majority of MEPs from this cluster started by stressing that membership in a large group was a prerequisite of effective action in the chamber: our group is internally quite diverse, but without it I wouldn't be able to act effectively. I identify with the group because it gives us means to act in the chamber (MEP 9).

Some MEPs saw their group as something more than just an alliance between like-minded politicians, serving as a mechanism for increasing their influence. One member of the EPP Group spoke very enthusiastically about the facilitating effect that groups have in an institution where politicians representing many nations and parties gather:
I believe that political groups are necessary. They really make it easier to adopt a European outlook. If you go to our meeting and listen to a Spaniard, a German and a Greek, then you get a feeling of how things are. You start to understand how these people think. But this can only happen when political groups meet. When 267 people discuss and argue. Sometimes there are harsh words, but all this enables us to get closer in a way. And if we started functioning in national groups, then what? Poles in one room, Germans in another? And then we would just excite our nationalistic feelings. And finally we would leave our rooms and there would be no other option than to fight (MEP 6).

The political group was presented by this MEP as a crucial element of the consensual system of the EP. Through the exchange of views during group meetings MEPs can learn about the concerns of colleagues from other countries and as a result get a clearer idea of a solution that would be acceptable for all (or at least the vast majority of) MEPs and their constituents. The MEP in question calls it "adopting a European outlook". She identified a clear socialising mechanism: thanks to group meetings, MEPs become more knowledgeable of the problems of other countries, and thus more apt to perform the role of representatives of all EU citizens that the Treaty ascribes to them. This paves the way to a potential stronger identification with such a role, although the MEP in question did not mention this aspect explicitly. She also stressed that achieving compromise would be much more complicated, if MEPs functioned solely in national delegations.

The same MEP went on to add that one of the most important persons for her induction into parliamentary politics was the group coordinator in her committee who provided her with the necessary information concerning both the issues discussed by the committee and the way in which the negotiations were conducted.

Generators of compromise, the groups were also described as fora where a general feeling of community was born among cooperating MEPs.

*Our political group creates a new value. This does not mean that there should be only one Social Democratic party in all member states. The political group is not only about reaching compromises and finding common positions. It is a way of thinking about politics, creating a left-wing consciousness in Europe. My identity as group member is not as strong as that of a member of my national party. Here what counts is the spiritual community, political views are not always the same (MEP 25).*

The latter account suggests that for that respondent the political group was an arena of socialisation that had subtle, but important effects. He did not say that interaction with colleagues from other Social Democratic parties changed his perception of political problems.
He was aware that the differences of views remain. But thanks to his experience of group life he gained an identity of a “European Social Democrat”. Similarly to the feeling of empathy described by the previous respondent, this feeling of “spiritual community” can facilitate communication between members of the group.

None of the MEPs in this cluster said that they felt ill at ease in the group. MEPs usually recognised the general community of views existing between them and group members from other countries. They admitted that there were differences on certain issues, but this was assessed as natural and understandable. These divergences between Polish MEPs and the majority of MEPs in their respective groups are discussed in more detail in the following chapter that deals with changes in attitudes.

The comparison of opinions regarding political groups from interviews at T1 and T2 shows no considerable changes in the intensity of the feeling of belonging to and identification with the group. The general impression evoked by the majority of MEPs’ statements was that although political groups facilitated contacts with other MEPs, the degree of identification was still rather moderate. The following is a good example:

> Perhaps it won’t be a party that becomes of it [cooperation within political group], but a common European spirit. Groups are a clear proof to the fact that we want to get to know each other and work together. Of course I identify with my group, but it is not a very strong feeling (MEP 3).

Some MEPs claimed that with time they gained a more realistic view of their group. One

EPP member can be quoted in this respect:

> I understand the character of the Group better and the differences within the Group are more noticeable for me. I can predict relatively accurately which of my initiatives will not get group support. My attitude towards the group is now less “spontaneously naive”. It does not mean that I identify less with the Group, I just know it better (MEP 7).

It was visible in MEPs' opinions that political groups are not only an arena of cooperation and forging of a common identity, but also of competition and rivalry. Agreeing upon a group position is a process that involves convincing other national delegations that have a diverging view, but also outsmarting them by creating intra-group alliances that will approve certain suggestions and reject others. In a group of a few hundred members, competition for parliamentary reports and speaking time is stiff. This particular atmosphere - a mixture of cooperation and competition - prevailing within political groups is perhaps one of the reasons for a relatively moderate feeling of identification with the group that MEPs developed over time.
There are some exceptions – MEPs whose attitude towards the group was particularly warm. An MEP from the Socialist Group can be quoted as an example of considerable effects that contacts within a political group can have:

*My relationship with the group is much stronger now, mainly because of the contacts I have had with other group members. I feel a much greater need to be part of a team. And the team here is tremendous. People are wonderful; they have a lot of enthusiasm and know how to act effectively. I am already involved in a couple of international projects with them (MEP 24 at T2).*

In another statement the MEP in question demonstrated both strong attachment to the group and understanding of internal politics of the chamber:

*In theory there is no group discipline. I can vote against my group. But what is the use of it? Before I decide to go against the majority of my group I must be sure that my vote will matter... that together with other Polish votes it will change the outcome of the vote on a given amendment or resolution. It makes no sense whatsoever to vote against my group to support an initiative that garners 70 odd votes. Doing this I would only be hurting my credibility. If I know in advance that something supported by my group may hurt my constituents, I would immediately bring this item up during discussions with colleagues... try to convince, to find a different solution and perhaps I would at least manage to introduce certain modifications. Such activities have to be carefully politically prepared. It is a process. Nothing happens out of the blue here (MEP 24).*

The MEP clearly realises that by voting against the group line too often she would lose credibility among her colleagues. The MEP also manifested her commitment to the permanent compromise building process: she believes that whenever the group position seems to be detrimental to her constituents, she can introduce modifications through negotiations. This is in stark contrast with the statements of certain Eurorealists and Eurosceptics whose discourse focused on Polish interest and featured references to confrontation rather than to compromise building. Both of the above statements considered together suggest that the reluctance to act against the group position comes not only out of political calculation, but also out of certain loyalty that the MEP feels towards the group, and out of a belief that through internal negotiations a satisfying solution can be found.

For this person, who had little previous political experience and stood as an independent from the list of the Democratic Left Alliance, experience in the group was crucial. Contacts with group members made her feel enthusiastic about politics. She was very involved in parliamentary politics holding membership in three committees, gaining the right to prepare a number of opinions and shadow rapporteurships. In the second part of the term she was
named vice-chairman of a committee. She also decided to become a member of the Polish party that she represented in the European elections. It should be stressed that the MEP who talked very enthusiastically about group contacts in the EPP was also a person without much previous experience in politics.

Overall, the Euroenthusiasts clearly became accustomed to existence within a multinational political group. Few examples, however, were found that could testify that the feeling of belonging to the group became an important part of an individual's political identity. The majority of MEPs simply acknowledged that they felt a more or less manifest ideological closeness with their group colleagues.

5.3.2 Eurorealists and Eurosceptics

MEPs from these clusters were in an entirely different situation in comparison to the Euroenthusiasts as they did not have an ideologically close group in the chamber that they could join. The vast majority of them changed group membership during the term and ended up in the UEN, which became a quasi Polish group with 20 out of 44 members being Polish. Thus, their experience of group membership was of a much different character than that of the Euroenthusiasts.

The Law and Justice MEPs were members of the UEN Group from the very beginning of the parliamentary term. They did not hide that they treated the Group mainly as just a strategic grouping of parties that for one reason or another could not join any other group. They also declared their intention to form a group that would have a clearer ideological line and greater clout in the chamber. As was mentioned in Chapter 4 (4.1.2), they attempted to attract the British and Czech Conservatives, but to no avail. When talking about the group, they emphasised that UEN never imposed voting discipline, so they could always choose a position that best reflected the Polish interest. Another important feature was relatively easy access to the group Chairman and limited competition for speaking time – advantages that members of the larger groups did not enjoy. They mentioned friendly relations that prevailed within the group, but not the feeling of ideological closeness that featured in the accounts of the Euroenthusiasts.

MEPs representing the Polish Peasant Party - Piast were the only ones among the Eurorealists and Eurosceptics who experienced life within a large group. They started the term as members of the EPP, but left the group after a few months. Behind this change lay most probably reasons related to Polish politics (see Chapter 4 section 4.1.2), but it should be stressed that Piast MEPs were very critical about the way in which the EPP functions. It was
assessed as too federalist and dominated by the Germans (Kuźmiuk et al. 2005). Meanwhile, in the UEN that Piast members joined, the Polish voice could be heard much more often (MEP 27).

The League of Polish Families did not develop a greater cooperation with the eurosceptic parties united in the Independence/Democracy Group. At T1, when assessing their very first meetings with representatives of other parties in that group, one LPR MEP admitted that, apart from the distrust of European institutions, they had little in common:

*What unites us is the opposition to the Constitutional Treaty. Apart from that, the views of our members are very different: we have conservatives, ultra-conservatives and some lefties. Understandably, we cannot agree on a lot of things (MEP 17).*

In January of 2005, Polish Eurosceptics sitting in the Constitutional Affairs Committee demanded a change of the Rules of Procedure that would enable MEPs to sit in purely national groups (LPR 2005). This shows that they had no interest in developing closer cooperation with other eurosceptic parties. Later in the term, the majority of Polish Eurosceptics left the IND/DEM Group. Six of them became members of the UEN, claiming that uniting Polish representatives was the best way to promote Polish interest in the chamber. One MEP became non-attached, three remained in the IND/DEM Group.

A number of conclusions regarding socialisation can be drawn from an analysis of the Eurorealists' and Eurosceptics' relationship with political groups. Due to the particular character of the DEN Group – based upon a common strategy rather than ideological closeness – the question of stronger identification with the group as a result of service in the chamber is practically irrelevant. The DEN was a way of avoiding isolation in the chamber, not a community of likeminded individuals like the larger groups.

PSL-Piast can be evoked as an example of unsuccessful socialisation into a large group. Yet their defection was also a part of rivalry going on in the national party. Had they not been sidelined in their national party, they would have probably remained in the EPP.

Most importantly, the emphasis with which Polish MEPs from both clusters talked about the "polonisation" of the UEN Group reflects the particular importance that they attached to representing Poland and Polish interests in the chamber. Few of them identified strongly with the European aspect of their role.

Even though initially it may have seemed that the UKIP members, some of whom had previous experience of the chamber, would become role models for the Polish Eurosceptics, the majority of the latter were drawn towards cooperation with other Poles rather than
building any closer alliances with anti-integrationist MEPs from other countries. It was argued in the previous chapter that the defection of some Polish Eurosceptics from IND/DEM to UEN – a group that is clearly more EU friendly – may be treated as a result of institutional learning, a move motivated by a desire to participate in the decision-making process. The move resulted in a certain de-radicalisation of the Eurosceptics. In the UEN Group, among other Poles who refused to openly question the idea of integration, Eurosceptics refrained from the provocative means of political expression that they favoured at the beginning.86 Thus, the change of group membership and behaviour can be interpreted as a partial adoption of the consensual norms of the chamber as a result of the socialisation process. Yet, the circumstances of this shift were different from what could be called a classic socialisation process. First of all, contacts with other Polish MEPs – i.e. other freshmen – and not with more experienced parliamentarians were of crucial importance. Secondly, the de-radicalisation was more a tactical choice than a move provoked by support for the consensual norms as such. In other words, it was done in the name of gaining a stronger position in the chamber, not, say, of meeting the expectations of the majority of mainstream MEPs. Referring to the different mechanisms of socialisation proposed by Checkel (2005: 809), the change was provoked by strategic calculation and did not involve a more significant change of beliefs about "the right thing to do".

Conclusions

This chapter explored the dimension of socialisation called adaptation to the institutional culture, examining whether and with what behavioural consequences MEPs adapt to norms and codes of conduct that exist within the EP. The following hypotheses were tested:

H3: MEPs' declarations and behaviour will reveal their acceptance of the consensual culture of the chamber.

H4: MEPs' declarations and behaviour will reflect the adoption of a role of a "European representative".

H5: The more supportive of integration MEPs are, the more likely they are to assess parliamentary norms positively and follow them in their actions.

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86 Eurosceptics who joined the UEN did not take part in the demonstration against the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in which other Polish Eurosceptics were active (Europap 2008). During the parliamentary debate a group of eurosceptics from the UK and Poland made noise and waved placards calling for a referendum on the Charter.
Hypotheses 3-4 can be considered as confirmed only in case of the Euroenthusiasts. They spoke positively of the parliamentary culture of compromise and their actions showed understanding that reaching a decision demands concessions from participants and readiness to accommodate their position with that of other MEPs. In the performance of their role they tried to balance acting in the name of their voters and paying attention to the needs of other citizens of the EU. Their identity became more complex – a feeling of responsibility for all citizens of the EU developed besides the allegiance to Poland and to their constituents.

Within the Eurorealist cluster, the effects of the socialisation process in the realm analysed in this chapter were varied. Some MEPs displayed opinions and behaviour similar to that of the Euroenthusiasts. Others demonstrated a less positive stance towards parliamentary norms, not ascribing any greater value to them, but treating them merely as features of the political environment to which they had to adapt. The Eurosceptics were critical of parliamentary norms and on a number of occasions their behaviour evidently clashed with them. The evidence suggests that service in the chamber had very limited impact on their attitudes and behaviour in the realm discussed in this chapter.

Considered together, those findings confirm Hypothesis 5. A correlation is clearly visible between attitudes towards integration expressed by MEPs at the outset of the parliamentary term and support for parliamentary norms (in words and deeds). Euroenthusiasts displayed the most resolute support for EP norms, the Eurorealists were ambivalent, while the attitude of the Eurosceptics verged on outright rejection. It can be interpreted as unsurprising that politicians generally critical of the integration process are also distrustful of the European Parliament that is one of the symbols of integration. But this outcome of socialisation can also be explained as a result of political calculation. The Euroenthusiasts belong to the largest political groups that control the decision-making process of the chamber (EPP, PES and ALDE) and for them abiding by the parliamentary norms, i.e. behaving in a way that meets the expectations of the mainstream MEPs, is particularly important. If they do not do so, they will not be treated as reliable partners and thus will lose influence. For the Eurorealists following parliamentary norms is not as important. Their political group – UEN – due to the small number of members, plays a minor part in the decision-making process. Moreover, it is the group’s policy that MEPs may vote as they deem right from their national point of view and the determination to have a common position is much smaller than in the larger groups. The Eurosceptics, due to their critical stance towards integration, oppose most decisions taken by the chamber, thus they do not care about being considered as reliable by the euroenthusiastic majority and can ignore the dominant parliamentary norms. Against this
background, it can be argued that MEPs adopt an approach towards parliamentary norms not only by judging these norms in abstraction, but also deciding what benefits will abiding by the norms bring.

Interviews with Polish europarlimentarians highlighted several aspects of the socialisation process that remained outside the initial hypotheses. A large number of MEPs, from all three clusters, admitted that parliamentary experience led them to appreciate more fully the global dimension of politics and to pay more attention to political problems that had been outside their interest before. MEPs from the Euroenthusiastic cluster also stated that through contacts with colleagues from other member states they gained a much more complete understanding of their preferences on various issues.

We have analysed how service in the EP impacted on Polish MEPs’ identity, perception of the political process and behaviour towards other participants of this process. The following chapter will ascertain whether and how MEPs’ attitudes towards concrete policy issues (e.g. shape of EU institutions, internal market, transatlantic relations) evolve as a result of contacts with colleagues from other member states.
Chapter 6. Socialisation as attitude change: Comparing Polish MEPs’ attitudes on chosen issues at the outset of the parliamentary term and two years later

This chapter analyses the dimension of socialisation that we have called attitude change. It examines whether as a result of contacts with other MEPs, or other experiences in the chamber, Polish representatives modified their views in various policy areas. First, MEPs’ attitudes towards major EU institutional issues, such as the balance of power between EU institutions, potential deepening of integration, and assessment of the Constitutional Treaty, are examined. This is to verify whether MEPs in the Parliament “go native”, i.e. adopt more pro-integrationist views. Then, other issue areas, not always easily translatable into the pro-anti-EU continuum, are investigated. They are: transatlantic relations; reforms of the common market; introduction of the euro in Poland; and moral issues, especially legalisation of homosexual marriages. These are issue areas where there are greatest divergences between the opinions of Polish MEPs and the dominant view in the chamber or – more often – in their respective political groups.

On these issues there is room for attitude change, and some pressure – from other MEPs or advisors to political groups – in the form of persuasion is likely to have taken place. Depending on the political group, divergences between the position of the Polish national party delegation and the dominant view within the group appear on different issues. Therefore different test cases were chosen for different Polish political parties.

The potential evolution of MEPs’ attitudes will be identified through a comparison of statements given in interviews at T1 and T2. Opinions formulated by MEPs on other occasions – in press articles and interviews or posted on their websites – are also used. They provide additional information and permit to verify the veracity of statements given in interviews for this thesis. Finally, data from questionnaires, sent to MEPs at T1 and T2, is also referred to. As there are differences in attitudes of members of parties included in the same cluster, the results are presented in a party-by-party order, moving from the Euroenthusiasts (sections 7.1 to 7.3) through the Eurorealists (sections 7.4-7.6) to the Eurosceptics (section 7.7).

We recall from Chapter 2 that four hypotheses will be tested in this chapter:

87 The issues where divergences exist between the position of the Polish delegation and the majority of members of the political group were identified on the basis of interviews with Polish MEPs and their voting record.
H6: Eurosceptics are unlikely to change their position on the major issues concerning European integration.

H7: If there are instances of attitude change towards greater support for integration, they will occur among the Eurorealists.

H8: MEPs will identify more strongly with the EP, emphasising its importance and demanding more powers for it.

H9: Instances of attitude change are more likely to happen in case of well-defined issues, rather than regarding the general “more integration versus less integration” question.

6.1 The Left

As seen in Chapter 3, two left-wing parties (the Democratic Left Alliance and Polish Social Democracy) had their representatives elected to the EP. Their views will be considered together as in the campaign before the European elections, and in interviews at T1, they presented very similar positions on the issues examined here.

6.1.1 General attitude towards integration

Polish Social Democrats pronounced themselves in favour of further integration and the Constitutional Treaty. The creation of the Community is a great value. There is still not enough integration in Europe and the EU should aim to deepen the community that currently exists (MEP 33). Given this very enthusiastic stance at the outset of parliamentary mandate, it is difficult to expect any further shifts in a pro-integration direction. The only change discovered in the case of two MEPs who returned both questionnaires was related to the allocation of funds. While in the first questionnaire both MEPs disagreed with the idea of gradually moving funds allocated to the Common Agricultural Policy towards investments designed to promote economy based on advanced technologies and knowledge, they supported this idea in the second questionnaire.

In the interview at T2, MEPs claimed that service in the chamber cemented their support for European integration. People who are key figures in the PES Group – Rasmussen, Wiersma, Swoboda – are visionaries. They want to see a truly united European Left. We should learn from their idealism, of which – I think – we don’t have enough. I was quite taken
in this European vision. You have to have some sort of a dream that will serve as a guide to your actions (MEP 24). The MEP also stressed how the people from her constituency, whom she invited to Brussels, learned about the mechanisms of integration and supported it. Some people are eurosceptic mainly because they do not have information about where the EU money goes and what benefits it brings. Every time I invite some people here, the bus on the way back is packed with euroenthusiasts (MEP 24).

6.1.2 Economy

With their enthusiastic support for integration, Polish Social Democrats were very close to other MEPs in the PES Group. Differences between Poles and the majority of the Group appeared on economic issues, especially those regarding the organisation of the common market. Polish MEPs entered the chamber supporting liberal changes to European economy, which, in the PES, placed them close to the British Labour, to the right of the majority of Social Democratic parties of the EU-15. Thus, it could be expected that Poles would be subject to persuasion aimed at making them more supportive of the view promoted by the core parties of the PES, advocating a more regulated market. Polish MEPs' attitudes on this issue will be analysed to ascertain whether debates with fellow political group members resulted in any changes in policy preferences.

A press article authored by one of the MEPs illustrates very well the approach of Polish Social Democrats to the European economy (Rosati 2004). Dariusz Rosati reacted to statements made by then German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder who, during his visit to Warsaw in 2004, encouraged the Polish government (Social Democratic at the time) to increase the rate of corporate tax (Niklewicz 2004: 19). Rosati denounced this idea as a growth-stifling measure. "As it is widely known", he argued, "the policy of high taxation hampers economic growth, hinders job creation and technological innovations. [...] High taxes are clearly not beneficial neither for Polish nor for German economy, and nor for the Community as a whole" (Rosati 2004). His conclusion could surprise a good few European Socialists:

The Franco-German tax initiative [proposals to harmonise corporate tax in the EU] is a protective measure and completely out of tune with the challenges of modernity. The developed member states have to accept the idea that companies will move to countries where the costs of running a business are lower and the legal and institutional environment more enterprise-friendly. If the new member states cannot become the destination of these moves, other countries will be chosen, such as Ukraine, India or China. [...] The only changes that make sense are reforms of the economic
mechanism in the developed member states: limiting the role of the state in economy, deregulating the labour market, support to entrepreneurs and—obviously—lower taxes (ibidem).

The issue of economic reforms necessary to stimulate growth in the EU took centre stage when the services directive was debated in the chamber. The directive sought to eliminate administrative barriers to transborder provision of services and to the establishment of service providing firms in other member states. One of the issues at the heart of the debate was the country of origin principle. It stipulated that a firm registered in one member state could provide services everywhere in the EU according to the legal rules of the country in which it was registered, not the country where services were offered (Rosati 2006). In the Parliament, simplifying slightly, the majorities of the EPP and ALDE groups generally supported the principle, while left-wing political groups (Socialists, Communists and Greens) wanted to remove it from the directive, arguing that it would lead to the so-called social dumping—service providers in old member states were to be pushed out of business by firms from the new member states offering low prices, but also low quality service, with little attention to health and safety regulations, and workers’ rights. Polish MEPs from left and right presented a very similar stance, all arguing in favour of the liberal version of the directive. Initially, it seemed that the Parliament’s amendments would reflect their preference. Majorities within EPP and ALDE were said to be firmly in favour of the country of origin principle. Meanwhile, among the Socialists, Evelyne Gebhardt, the rapporteur on the issue, was said to be garnering only limited support for her amendments, designed to weaken the liberal character of the directive. In the end, however, the amendments adopted in first reading by the Parliament considerably altered the proposal. Some Polish MEPs even claimed that the country of origin principle was practically eliminated from the directive. Polish members of the PES group were disappointed with the end result. Dariusz Rosati criticised a number of amendments backed by his political group and claimed that some of them failed because of the opposition from Polish MEPs and other representatives of the new member states. Rosati declared that on this issue he “felt closer to members of the right-wing groups” (Le

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88 According to opinions voiced by several Polish MEPs at a meeting with a representative of Polish Ministry for National Economy (in which I participated) at the Polish Representation in Brussels in November 2005.

89 Such an opinion was put forward by Konrad Szymanski (Law and Justice, UEN) (Europap 2006). One EPP MEP claimed in the interview that the big states and political groups dismantled the services directive (MEP 7).

90 Rosati claimed that thanks to opposition from new member states an amendment stipulating that member states could introduce additional requirements for foreign service providers “with regard to their social policy” or to “protect the consumer” was rejected (Rosati 2006).
The differences that existed between Polish MEPs and the majority of the PES Group were clearly visible in the vote on the parliamentary amendments to the directive. In forty out of seventy-nine (50%) roll call votes on amendments, Polish Social Democrats voted against the majority of the PES Group. It can be suggested that discussions with other members of the PES did not lead Polish MEPs to move away from their liberal position on economic questions. Yet, despite being only partly satisfied with the outcome of negotiations, Polish MEPs decided to support the Gebhardt report (EP 2005e) in the final vote. Even in its weakened version, the directive could still facilitate the transborder provision of services and would thus be useful to Polish entrepreneurs. Supporting the report was also a way of symbolically embracing the parliamentary compromise that—as Poles knew—was not be entirely satisfying for those who opposed the directive in its initial liberal version either.

6.2 The Democratic Party

6.2.1 Institutional issues
Together with the parliamentarians of the Polish Left, MEPs representing the Democratic Party constituted the most resolutely pro-European part of the Polish contingent. Support for further integration went hand in hand with backing of the Constitutional Treaty. When the document reappeared on the agenda during the German Presidency (in the first half of 2007), MEPs from the Democratic Party published an open letter reiterating their support for the Treaty and urging the Polish government to present a position and constructively participate in the negotiations. The signatories called upon:

[T]he President and the Prime Minister to actively engage in preparation of a new European Treaty. We urge [the President and the Prime Minister] to accept the Constitutional Treaty as a basis for discussion. We recommend limiting the number of proposed modifications in order to facilitate the reaching of consensus and, subsequently, the ratification of the Treaty by all member states. We suggest that in the negotiations Polish government privileges the need to render the

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91 In the run up to the French presidential election of 2007, Rosati said “he trusted more Nicholas Sarkozy’s economic policy”. He criticised French Socialist Party Presidential Candidate Ségolene Royale for “promises she couldn’t keep” and the French Left for an “anachronistic attitude towards globalisation” (Europap 2007c).
92 Own calculation based on the data available on the European Parliament’s website.
93 Marek Siwiec (SLD, PES) assessed the compromise around the directive positively because “it will make possible the opening of the market in services, without infringing labour and social rights” (Europap 2006).
Union more effective and to strengthen its community character, in the spirit of the Rome Treaty.\footnote{Open letter regarding the European Treaty, 23 January 2007. Among the initial signatories of the letter were two MEPs from the Democratic Party, Jan Kulakowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, and two representatives of the Social Democratic Parties: Dariusz Rosati and Marek Siwiec.}

Just like their counterparts from the Social Democratic parties, the Democratic Party representatives claimed that their spell in the chamber reinforced their commitment to integration, even if the hands-on experience of the European legislative process revealed also certain drawbacks of the EU structure:

_I have always been an advocate of an ever closer Union. Perhaps as a result of my work here certain bureaucratic weaknesses of the Union became more manifest to me. Perhaps the Union sometimes focuses too much on technical details: discussing the trees, we cannot see the forest. Now that I am inside, my attitude towards the institutions is probably more critical than it used to be. However, my belief in the necessity of integration did not change. Much the contrary, it became stronger (MEP 32)._

A certain evolution of views on institutional issues was described by Bronislaw Geremek, former Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs (between 1997 and 2000), who admitted to accepting the idea of an inner core of countries integrating at a faster pace. Pleas to create a “two-speed Europe” that would enable some countries to embark on a closer cooperation were generally interpreted by Polish politicians as dangerous; it was believed that it would create a risk of Poland being relegated to the second league of EU member states. Geremek, for instance, asserted in an interview in 2004 that “it is obviously inevitable that certain spontaneous centres that drive the integration processes will exist in the EU. But a two-speed Europe or pioneer groups – I cannot see the benefit neither for Poland, nor for Europe. We did not create a united Europe in order to divide it now. The formula that creates differences between countries [...] is pernicious” (Gazeta Wyborcza 2004: 13). Yet, in March 2007, when commenting on the European programme of François Bayrou, the French centrist presidential candidate, Geremek declared: “For a number of years I was opposed to the idea of an inner core because I feared that it would create different categories of members. Today, when the idea comes as a formula open for everyone, I support it” (Europap 2007a).
6.2.2 Transatlantic relations and foreign policy

The issue on which Polish MEPs from the Democratic Party found themselves – to a certain extent – at odds with other members of their parliamentary political group (ALDE) was the role of the United States in international politics. Therefore this issue may be a test case for intragroup persuasion. The Democratic Party representatives, similarly to the majority of Polish MEPs, regarded the US as a crucial partner both for Poland and Europe. Bronislaw Geremek argued in an interview granted to a Polish daily that “only NATO and the presence of the US in Europe guarantees Polish security” and that “Europe needs the US if it wants to play a part in the world order” (Gazeta Wyborcza 2004: 13). He also declared that he had “no doubts about the moral and political reasons of the intervention in Iraq” (ibidem). Perceiving the EU as an organism that will constitute a political challenge to the US is dangerous, added another MEP (30). Yet, in the chamber, Polish MEPs encountered a more critical attitude towards the US. At the beginning [of parliamentary term], when I pronounced the word NATO in the chamber, I felt as if I just used a nasty four-letter word (MEP 30).

The Poles’ reluctance to adopt or support a critical stance towards the US can be illustrated by their behaviour in the EP votes regarding the secret flights and prisons organised by the CIA in Europe. In the autumn of 2005, the American press presented allegations that CIA arrested terrorist suspects in Europe, transported them between a number of European countries and detained them in secret prisons (Priest 2005: A01). These activities allegedly took place outside the legal system of the states mentioned, but with the tacit acquiescence of their governments. In reaction to these allegations, the European Parliament created an investigation committee that was to collect evidence and prepare a report on the issue. Italian Socialist, Claudio Fava, was named rapporteur on the issue. The outcomes of the committee’s investigation were discussed twice in the plenary. A mid-term assessment was carried out in July 2006 and concluded by the adoption of the interim report (EP 2006d). The final report was debated and adopted in February of 2007 (EP 2007b). In both votes, the vast majority of ALDE members supported the reports. Polish members of the group were among the few who voted differently. In the vote on the interim report, most Democratic Party MEPs abstained; in February 2007, when the final report was voted upon, three MEPs voted against it and one abstained.95 This suggests that MEPs from the Democratic Party maintained their belief that

95 In July Staniszewska voted against, while Geremek, Kułakowski and Onyszkiewicz abstained. In February, the three MEPs rejected the report, while Staniszewska abstained.
the US plays a key role in the war on terror and shied away from criticism of the activities of Bush administration.96

When asked about the evolution of the general atmosphere in the chamber on this issue, one Democratic Party MEP claimed that the conditions gradually became more favourable to a constructive transatlantic dialogue. This was partly due to a general evolution of the relationship between the US and the EU, but also to the activities of MEPs from new member states who keep emphasising the necessity of a lasting transatlantic relationship. I hope that our relations [US-EU] will keep improving (MEP 30).

Thus, according to the MEP in question, just as in the case of Ukraine, MEPs from Poland – and other new member states – managed to influence the position of their counterparts. He did not, however, come up with any concrete examples of MEPs adopting increasingly similar views on the issue of US involvement in world affairs. It seems more likely that – as one Law and Justice MEP suggested – the arrival of MEPs from new member states, mostly supportive of strong American presence in the world, merely strengthened the pro-American camp in the chamber (MEP 20).

The importance of the relationship with the US notwithstanding, the MEP also admitted to having become more convinced about the necessity to develop a European security policy and perhaps even a defence policy. Not to mention a foreign policy. The energy crisis of 2005/2006 was for me an impulse to fully recognise this need. Without common foreign policy we will not be able to ensure a stable provision of energy (MEP 30).

The gas crisis that erupted on New Year's Eve 2005 when Russia decided to limit the amount of gas exported to Ukraine was an event with important consequences for the views of Polish MEPs. It should be mentioned that one of the Social Democratic MEPs also stressed the necessity of a common energy policy and, as it will be shown below, MEPs from virtually all political parties reacted in much the same way. Regardless of their attitude towards integration, Polish MEPs look to the EU to provide a guarantee against a potential Russian energy blackmail. Some called for an energy policy whereupon member states would accept an obligation to help those members who found themselves cut off from energy sources, others – like the MEP quoted above – went further, reaching a conclusion that a more coordinated foreign policy is necessary to guarantee safe supply of energy. MEPs' attitudes clearly evolved, but it happened as a result of their analysis of outside events rather than contacts with other actors in the European Parliament. Calls for a common energy policy

96 The fact that Poland was one of the countries that were most forcefully criticised by the report may have been another important factor for the MEPs' decision.
came not only from MEPs, but also the members of the Polish government. Therefore, it cannot be treated as a clear-cut example of parliamentary socialisation.

As the Democratic Party MEPs entered the chamber strongly supportive of the integration process, it was difficult to expect significant opinion shifts in the pro-integrationist direction. They claimed that direct participation in European politics, despite revealing certain drawbacks of European institutional structure, generally reinforced their commitment to integration. On the issue on which arguably there existed the most manifest divergence between Democratic Party europarlimentarians and the majority of their political group – transatlantic relations – no opinion shifts were noticeable in the interviews as the Poles maintained their strongly Atlanticist views. Rather, Polish MEPs claimed that the influence went the other way, with their entry contributing to a weakening of the anti-American mood in the chamber.

6.3 Civic Platform

6.3.1 The Constitutional Treaty and institutional issues
Civic Platform MEPs entered the Parliament as convinced supporters of the integration process. Opinions voiced in the first series of interviews expressed a belief that membership in the EU provided an opportunity for Poland to speed up its economic development and supported the idea of further integration (for example in the realm of foreign policy). Despite support for integration, the MEPs were not entirely in favour of the Constitutional Treaty. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the Civic Platform adopted a critical stance towards the Treaty. When the proposal submitted by the Constitutional Convention was being negotiated by the intergovernmental conference, PO members expressed their opposition to the new voting system in the Council of the EU included in the draft Treaty. Before the European Council summit of December 2003, which was to conclude the intergovernmental conference, Jan Rokita, one of Civic Platform leaders, urged the left-wing government not to make concessions on this issue. Six months later, with the Treaty finally agreed, Mr Rokita declared that his party, once in power, will “do everything to prevent the entry into force of the Constitution” (Sejm 2004). Later the party adopted a less radical position, claiming that they had not yet decided whether to recommend supporting or rejecting the Treaty in case of a national referendum. Thus, in 2004 there was no official party line. MEPs interviewed presented different views. The majority (6 MEPs) preferred not to disclose their position and only said what were in their eyes the major drawbacks and advantages of the document. Some
(2) clearly stated that they would vote against it in case of a referendum, but there were MEPs who declared their readiness to support the Constitution.

Regarding the constitutional debate, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the head of the Civic Platform delegation in the chamber criticised what in his view was an excessive focus on institutional changes:

*The legitimacy of every political organism depends as much on its institutional structure as on the quality of its outputs. The greatest flaw of the Franco-German approach is that it focuses on the institutional solutions, but ignores the output legitimacy. People are interested in security, not in the way decisions are made. Giving the citizens greater influence over the EU affairs is bogus if at the same time the same politicians want to trim the budget and limit the EU's ability to act and deliver. It is a pity that the European project has to pay the price of social reforms of the welfare state in the largest member states. The citizens of the new member states have a long experience of beautiful constitutions and democratic institutions that existed only on paper. I believe they will pay attention mostly to whether the EU delivers what they expect it to deliver: jobs, welfare and security.*

Two years later, he presented very similar views in a journal article: “Citizens are interested in *what* decisions are taken not in *how* they are taken. [...] the focus should be on delivery. EU citizens will not start loving the Union because it changes its voting system or endows itself with a foreign minister” (Saryusz-Wolski 2006: 46). He also called for introducing changes that did not need Treaty provisions to be adopted: “The number of commissioners can be changed by a simple decision of the Council. Transparency in the Council can be introduced overnight. Some other essential changes in the realm of CFSP can be brought about through inter-institutional agreements” (Saryusz-Wolski 2006: 47).

Even though among MEPs there were divergent views regarding the Treaty, the Civic Platform delegation in their contacts with the outside actors maintained a united stance along the lines of the national party position: the final decision regarding the constitution was yet to be taken. When the parliamentary report (EP 2005d) – authored by Richard Corbett and Ifiigo Méndez de Vigo – concerning the Treaty was voted upon in January 2005, Civic Platform MEPs abstained, except for one parliamentarian who supported the report. They voted in the same way when the Duff-Voggenhubber report concerning the Treaty was considered (EP 2006c). Since the ratification procedure was adjourned in Poland as a result of the French and
Dutch referenda, the Civic Platform could maintain its ambiguous stance. In the second series of interviews, most MEPs stressed that the enlarged Union functioned quite well without the Constitution. Discussions that took place within the EPP Group, according to the MEPs, did not lead them to modify their positions. The opinions that without the Treaty institutional blockages would occur turned out to be incorrect. Did the group colleagues manage to persuade us to embrace the Constitution? No (MEP 4).

The reservations towards the Treaty notwithstanding, Civic Platform MEPs were supportive of the idea of strengthening the role of community institutions and advancing political integration in foreign affairs, issues related to immigration and protection against terrorism. Such opinions appeared in interviews both at T1 and T2.

Regarding the balance of power between the major EU institutions, data from questionnaires shows that Civic Platform MEPs supported maintaining the powers of the European Council and the Council of Ministers at the current level (cf Table 9 below). The most varied were answers regarding the European Commission. Among MEPs who returned the questionnaire at T1, some supported an increase of Commission competences, others wanted to limit them and still others maintain it at the current level. At T2, the former dominated. Data from interviews shows that a number of Civic Platform MEPs perceived the Commission to a certain extent as a representative of the interests of the new member states and a barrier against initiatives that would be detrimental for Poland, such as limiting of the EU budget or partial nationalisation of the CAP.

Table 9 Euroenthusiasts' beliefs regarding the institutional balance of power in the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>2004 (N=6)</th>
<th>2006 (N=4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Council</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of the EU</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations based upon questionnaires returned by MEPs.

Questionnaire data shows that Civic Platform MEPs were strong supporters of a more influential EP. One of the leading members of the PO delegation described his attitude towards the EP and that of his colleagues in the following way:

97 The President of Poland at the time, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, announced that he would like to hold the referendum on the Treaty in the autumn of 2005. However, after the French and Dutch referenda and the decision of the European Council to establish a period of reflection regarding the Treaty, the President never formulated an official request for a referendum.
What we observe is a - psychologically perfectly understandable - institutional patriotism. The newly elected MEPs internalise the idea of the EP receiving new powers. They want this institution to have an ever greater clout (MEP 4).

It should be noted, however, that Civic Platform MEPs already on entry were convinced that their institution should receive more powers. Experience in the chamber only strengthened this conviction.

The Civic Platform MEPs also gave a very positive assessment of their work in the EP.

What is very important to me is that I can be effective. As a professor I could write a few books on good governance which would probably have little effect. Here I can feel that my actions make a difference (MEP 1).

6.3.2 Economy

Regarding the common market, the Civic Platform MEPs entered the chamber with a strong commitment to liberal solutions. Completing the common market by allowing the citizens of the new member states to work and establish businesses in the entire EU was one of the key issues for the party representatives. Deregulation and lower taxes were to stimulate European economy.

Poland should support changes that would decrease the social character of European legislation. [...] Too many regulations render the EU much less competitive (MEP 11).

Germany and France are trying to impose [on the EU] their version of a very elaborate social policy. We have to fight against the EU making decisions in the areas such as taxes and social policy. Establishing a European minimal wage will not kill Germany or France, but it will kill Poland. The EU should be based on the smallest possible intervention of state, and European institutions, in the economy (MEP 10).

They [certain old member states] want to harmonise taxes, not because it will be better for the Union, but because it will be better for France and Germany. Further bureaucratisation of the European economy would be a pernicious trend. I support the British view of good economic policy rather than the Franco-German (MEP 2).

Two years later very similar declarations were put forward by the MEPs:

The main problem of the Union lies in its economy. The largest states are not willing to reform their economies, but instead try to make savings by advocating a limitation of the Community budget and building the Union with less money (MEP 6).

Janusz Lewandowski, chairman of the EP Budget Committee in the first half of the term, argued in a press interview that “[t]he watchword is now that budget should make the EU more competitive through allocating more funds for research and development of new
technologies. Yet, I do not believe that spending more on these objectives will help if at the same time important structural reforms are put off – liberalisation of market, free movement for services, lower taxes. All those factors contribute to quick growth of the US economy” (Gazeta Wyborcza 2006).

Civic Platform MEPs were persistent advocates of the liberal version of the services directive. They set up an informal network called Friends of Services which was to be a coalition across political groups and national lines, opposing the weakening of the liberal edge of the Commission proposal. Civic Platform MEPs did not hide their disappointment with the end result of parliamentary negotiations on the directive. Several MEPs claimed that by weakening the liberal character of the directive, their counterparts from the old member states were driven by the willingness to protect service providers in their countries against competition from new member states. Thus, they acted in their national interest, missing an opportunity to stimulate growth in the entire EU. Even though the directive, even in its blunted form, facilitated the access of Polish service providers to Western markets, Civic Platform MEPs voted against the Gebhardt report (EP 2005e) to manifest their discontent with the outcome of the negotiations. It can be concluded that the Civic Platform’s advocacy for strongly liberal economic reforms was equally manifest at the outset of the parliamentary term and two years later.

6.3.3 Morals

When talking about issues related to morality (at T1), Civic Platform MEPs stressed their belief that these should be reserved for member states. We expect that the Union will respect tradition and will not try to regulate on issues related to faith, personal life and education (MEP 6). On this type of issues the Civic Platform described its position as mildly conservative, and views expressed by MEPs confirmed it:

*When it comes to problems such as homosexual marriages, abortion and euthanasia, breaking certain rules that have existed for years does not always bring positive results. Natural law should be a major reference for the EU measures in this type of issues. Natural law describes certain rules specific for European order and liberalising these rules should not go too far. [...] It would be good if the matters of spirit remained the prerogatives of religion and churches, while European administration sticks to more everyday matters. [...] Measures aimed at protecting the family are very important and the Union should promote them (MEP 1 at T1)*

There were no signs of MEPs showing support for more liberal ideas at a later stage. As the question of the rights of homosexuals was widely debated in the chamber, it can be used as a test case. When this issue was debated in the chamber in relation to resolutions dealing
with racism and homophobia (EP 2006a, 2006b and 2007a), Civic Platform representatives reiterated their conviction that the EP should generally stay away from such matters. Some suggested that what was described in the Parliament as a fight for equal rights and tolerance sometimes amounted to promotion of homosexual behaviour and could be interpreted as an attempt to coax member states into adopting legislation recognising homosexual marriages. The Civic Platform MEPs pronounced themselves against legalisation of homosexual marriages in Poland.

I cannot see any reasons for legalisation. There are so many different legal solutions; you just do not need to call it a marriage. I am not bothered if they want to be together. Worse if it becomes social modelling... showing that this is the way, this is some novelty. They want the same name as the one forged by different churches. Why this name? [...] And adoption [of children by gay couples]? I am definitely against adoption. This is the end of the discussion for me. No one will convince me (MEP 3).

The Parliament is used by the Left to impose a certain way of thinking. And if you oppose it, then you are accused of disregard for human rights. It is imposing of political correctness. It starts with the right to manifest, but later comes the legalisation [of homosexual marriages] and attempts to force legislation in this matter. We cannot let this happen. This is up to member states to decide and there are no reasons for the EU to force things. Personally, I am against the legalisation of homosexual marriages (MEP 6).

These extracts from interviews show that discussions that went on in the chamber did not persuade the MEPs to adopt a more liberal view. They perceived the EP’s activity in the area mostly as needless excursions into the realm reserved for member states and attempts to force legislation regarding homosexual couples.

6.3.4 Individual opinion shifts

While no considerable shifts of opinion were recorded on the major issues, certain Civic Platform MEPs admitted that contacts with MEPs and other actors participating in the parliamentary decision-making process have influenced their views. One representative in the Development Committee presented the following account:

On development issues other MEPs were very important for the creation of my views because there was no such thing as a Polish strategy towards developing countries. No point of reference. I was not able to refer to something from Polish experience. What my colleagues convinced me about was that when helping developing countries we should focus on two issue areas where we can get effects relatively quickly and where transformations will put in motion a mechanism of
multiplication of positive outcomes. These issue areas are education and health care. You cannot think that you'll have development in Africa just by building factories there. There will be no development without good social infrastructure (MEP 9).

This account is in line with Jeffrey Checkel's hypothesis (2005: 813) – discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.1.3 – that persuasion and attitude change are more likely when individuals have few strongly ingrained views on the subject being discussed. In this case, the MEP in question approached the subject of development policy with virtually no assumptions to which he would be particularly attached. His story also strengthens the preliminary conclusion made above in relation to the adaptation to the institutional culture that committee assignment in the Parliament and – closely related to it – the issue area on which an MEP focuses, can be very important for the outcome of socialisation (Chapter 5, section 5.2.2).

Another example of attitude change came from the MEP active in the negotiations of the REACH directive.

Very generally, you can see the REACH negotiations as a confrontation of the pro-industry and the pro-environment camp. Initially, somewhat intuitively, we placed ourselves in the former, fearing that for Polish industry the adaptation to stringent EU laws might be too costly. With time, our approach evolved towards taking into consideration the human aspect of the problem. It is a very important directive and it is likely to have significant consequences for people's health. I would say contacts with environment lobby groups – Greenpeace and WWF – were crucial for this evolution. On the other hand, we started noticing that information provided by the pro-industry lobbies was sometimes incorrect. In particular, they tended to exaggerate the cost of adapting to the new system of registering chemical substances.

This shift seems more significant as REACH was one of the most important directives considered by the EP in its 6th term. Interestingly, in this case the actors most influential for the development of MEP's views were not his counterparts, but lobbyists. It is a good example of the mechanism of socialisation that Checkel calls normative suasion (2005: 812, see also section 2.1.3 in this thesis). It shows that even on such significant issues MEPs' "interests and preferences are open for redefinition" (ibidem) and they modify them as a result of exchanges of views with other participants of the decision-making process.

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58 This account was provided by the MEP's assistant who used the plural to refer to the MEP and himself.
6.4 Law and Justice

6.4.1 Institutions

On entering the EP, the representatives of the Law and Justice expressed their scepticism towards the idea of further political integration. It was not, as they stressed, an opposition towards any kind of cooperation between European states. A cooperation that they would accept should be based on intergovernmental structures. Institutions such as the European Parliament or the Commission should not receive more powers as it would lead to the creation of a federal state (MEP 23). This would be doubly wrong: ideologically, as it would undermine sovereign states on which Europe has been based for centuries, and politically, as such a federal structure would not serve the interest of Poland. France and Germany believe that the ever closer integration provides them with a premium. In a state called Europe they will have the greatest say. It is difficult to imagine that in such a state we (Poland) could have more clout than we have in the EU today (MEP 23).

The members of PiS interviewed were unanimous in their rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. The document was condemned as pushing the EU in the federal – i.e. wrong – direction and weakening the position of Poland through the changed voting system. According to the MEPs, the EU did not need a constitution and the changes it needed should strengthen the control of national governments and parliaments over the integration process rather than empower community institutions:

Integration should be to a greater extent controlled by governments and national parliaments. Building big institutions like the EP does not solve the problem. No one in Europe believes that this place [the EP] is a guarantor of civic control and transparency. This parliament is remote from everyone. I do not believe that the EP will provide the democratic legitimacy that the EU needs. This legitimacy can only be assured by national governments and parliaments because only they are close to the people (MEP 20 at T1).

These views were maintained in interviews that took place two years later. In relation to the Constitution, Law and Justice MEPs argued that pessimists who claimed that the enlarged Union would be institutionally paralysed without the Constitution were proven wrong. Without the Treaty the EU functions very well (MEP 21). Law and Justice MEPs voted against the Corbett/Mendez de Vigo report (EP 2005d) that called upon the member states to ratify the Treaty. Questionnaire data show that they maintained their belief that "the new voting
system introduced by the Treaty would be detrimental to Polish influence”.99 Conservation of the Nice voting system was for them the key to Polish influence in the EU. “Poland has to maintain control over the process of economic and social legislation”, argued MEP Konrad Szymaniński, regarding the form of the new treaty that was to replace the Constitution (Szymaniński 2007: 18). [...] “In order to achieve this objective the list of issues decided by qualified majority voting must be limited, or the decision-making system must be such that it gives Poland and the like-minded countries the capability to control events. We have to maintain the political and institutional capability to block harmful regulations” (ibidem).

Law and Justice europarlamentarians also maintained their opposition towards reinforcing the community institutions. Answers to the question relating to the institutional balance of power show that the MEPs favour the preservation of the status quo (cf Table 10 below). Law and Justice representatives are among the few in the Polish sample who do not call for further strengthening of the EP. Only one out of four MEPs claimed that the EP should receive more competences. Konrad Szymaniński, assessing the work of the European Parliament after one year spent in the chamber, stressed that on very important economic issues, such as the working time directive and the services directive, amendments adopted by the Parliament were “clearly detrimental” for Poland (Szymaniński 2005: 13).100 “It is better then”, concludes the MEP, “not to take any risks and not to expand the power of the Parliament in the future” (ibidem).

The EP was also criticised on more ideological grounds. To the principal criticism formulated at the outset of the parliamentary term – that the Parliament is too remote from the average citizen – Law and Justice representatives added another one at T2: that the side effect of the consensual culture is a blurring of political divisions.

What we have here [in the EP] is not a real public debate. We are debating in an exclusive club. [...] The Parliament should be an arena of political confrontations because such is the nature of representative bodies. As it is not the case, then I believe the chamber cannot aspire to be the conscience of democratic Europe (MEP 20).

When asked about ways of making the EU more effective and democratic, Law and Justice MEPs who responded to questionnaires supported (both at T1 and T2) the idea of tighter control of national parliaments over European legislation and transferring certain community competences back to member states (cf Table 11). The proposals of a stronger

99 All three Law and Justice MEPs who returned questionnaires “agreed” or “rather agreed” with this statement both at T1 and T2.
Commission or an EU President elected by the citizens were rejected. Questionnaire data also shows that MEPs generally oppose the idea of more decisions being taken at the European level (cf Table 12). Overall, interviews and questionnaires show that MEPs’ views regarding institutional issues remained stable. The socialisation process did not result in any preference changes in this area.

Table 10 Eurorealists’ beliefs regarding the institutional balance of power in the EU
Average answers of Law and Justice MEPs to the following question: Given the present overall balance of influence among the following bodies, do you think their influence on policy formation should be increased, decreased or remain the same? N=3
Answers: decreased (1), rather decreased (2), remain the same (3), rather increased (4), increased (5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Council</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of the EU</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations based upon questionnaires returned by MEPs.

Table 11 Eurorealists’ beliefs regarding the combating of democratic deficit in the EU
Average answers of Law and Justice MEPs to the following question: Which changes could contribute to reducing the democratic deficit in the EU? N=3
Answers: no (1), rather not (2), rather yes (3), yes (4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tighter control of national parliaments over European legislation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limiting the role of the Union in some areas where it shares the competence with nation states</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of the European Commission</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electing a European President by universal suffrage</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granting stronger influence over legislative matters to the European Parliament</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations based upon questionnaires returned by MEPs.

Table 12 Eurorealists’ beliefs regarding deepening of European integration
Average answers of Law and Justice MEPs to the following question: Would it have a positive or negative effect for your country if, in the domains mentioned below, more decisions were made at the EU level? N=3
Answers: very positive (6), positive (5), rather positive (4), rather negative (3), negative (2), very negative (1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign and defence policy</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite their general wariness of the growth of power of “Brussels”, Law and Justice MEPs, in the questionnaire at T2, pointed to several areas where integration could progress. Completing the single market, cohesion policy, the fight against international crime and a common energy policy were mentioned in this context. This suggests that involvement in the EU policy-making process may have made the MEPs more aware of the ways in which Poland can benefit from membership. Faced with the problem of energy supply, similarly to their more pro-integrationist compatriots, Law and Justice MEPs saw a solution in an EU-based agreement. Yet, this acceptance that some potential exists for new common policies did not lead them to reconsider their views concerning the institutional structure of the Union. Their thinking regarding institutional reforms seems very much based on a political calculation. As more and more decisions taken on the European level (limiting the budget, directives regarding the common market) were in their eyes harmful for Poland, they attached utmost importance to ensuring a strong position in the Council through maintaining the Nice voting mechanism\(^{101}\) that would enable government representatives to create blocking majorities. By the same token, since they see the Parliament’s decisions going most of the time against their preferences, they oppose strengthening of the chamber.

### 6.4.2 Common Foreign and Security Policy

Regarding the EU’s foreign policy, a stability of views was discovered. In the first interview, one of the MEPs, without questioning the need for closer cooperation in these matters, claimed that divergent interests of member states made the creation of a genuine common foreign policy very difficult (MEP 23). According to the MEP in question, it was because of these often opposing objectives of member states, not institutional inadequacies, that the EU could rarely present a united front on the international arena. Therefore creating posts such as that of a Minister for Foreign Affairs was not necessary and even uncalled for. Common foreign policy could function well based on intergovernmental contacts (MEP 23).

\(^{101}\) The system of weighted votes that Law and Justice perceived as favourable for Poland was agreed upon at the European Council summit in Nice in December 2000.
Another MEP criticised the nascent EU foreign policy for its perceived hostility towards the United States:

*I perceive as harmful the tendencies to build a European identity in the realm of foreign policy on an alternative towards the US. [...] These are tendencies that could lead to a complete disarmament of Europe and loss of influence (MEP 20).*

Very similar opinions were voiced two years later:

*The common foreign policy will be operational when every Polish person will say: "What a terrible thing! So many immigrants land in Canary Islands. What are we going to do with them?" And now what Polish people say to that is: "why should I care?" If the Polish do not care about Canary Islands, and the Spanish about the situation in Kaliningrad, the common foreign policy is impossible. I would like Europe to have a common foreign policy that would mean common security. But for now the security is in NATO (MEP 23)*

Law and Justice europarlamentarians also proved strongly committed to stressing the importance of cooperation with the US. In a parliamentary debate dedicated to transatlantic relations Konrad Szymański declared that “among the most important European economic and political problems there is none that can be solved without dialogue and cooperation with the United States. Only a Euro-Atlantic market can help us face the economic competition with China and India. Only Euro-American cooperation can bring success in confrontation with the greatest threat for our security that is Iran”. I hope, concluded the MEP, that “European identity will never be constructed on the artificial, cheap and pernicious confrontation with the US” (EP 2007c).

6.4.3 Morals

Law and Justice MEPs showed particular attention to the questions of moral values (T1). *EU membership entails a risk when it comes to moral issues, such as cloning, homosexual marriages, abortion and euthanasia. The EU in theory does not have a competence here, but it can impose things through the back door (MEP 23).* MEPs were dismayed at the EU’s evolution away from certain Christian Democratic principles: promoting sexual equality but not family values, excessive tolerance for abortion, euthanasia and homosexuality. In their view, the EU is dominated by a bureaucratic elite that – with the approval of some leading member states like France and Germany – promotes left-wing economic and social solutions.
A libertine bureaucracy wants to create Europe based on nothing but contractual law, without any meta-principle (MEP 21). What we observe in the EU are attempts at uniformisation of the individual according to the model of "confused liberalism" (MEP 23).

Similar notes sounded in the second series of interviews. When asked about the main problems of the EU, some PiS MEPs talked about a wider process concerning the West rather than only the EU. Their diagnosis was a pessimistic one.

We've got a social, cultural and demographic crisis. It is something that started 30 years ago and 30 years from now will be a huge problem. Demography, crisis of the family, immigration, mainly from Muslim countries. [...] Acting against the demographic growth in developed countries is suicide... Acceptance of abortion, euthanasia, homosexual marriage... It kills the family (MEP 21, MEP 23 in very similar terms).

PiS MEPs also voiced their disappointment that Christian values are poorly promoted and sometimes even attacked at the European level. They criticised the EPP for making numerous references to Christian values but protecting them feebly in their actions.

The Socialists here [in the EP] are against Christian values, but the EPP isn't going to die for anything. If in a discussion concerning homosexual marriages, Alexander Stubb, the vice-chairman of the Gay and Lesbian Intergroup, takes the floor on behalf of the EPP Group, then what kind of Christian values we are talking about here (MEP 23).

They spoke critically about the parliamentary resolutions dealing with the problem of homophobia (EP 2006a, 2006b and 2007a). The first one (EP 2006a), adopted in January 2006, was described by Wojciech Roszkowski as "undermining the principles of family life in Europe" (Roszkowski 2006). Homosexuals, argued Mr Roszkowski, "do not want respect, they want their lifestyle to be considered as a norm" (ibidem). Another MEP claimed, much in the same vein, that in the European Parliament calls for tolerance sometimes became promotion of homosexual behaviour, which he himself and the Law and Justice opposed:

If you talk about gay pride during which obscene behaviour takes place, then they are invading my freedom. Someone's freedom cannot hurt others' freedom. [...] Adoption of children? Hold it there. These children will definitely be stained then. Let us give them a chance to grow up in biologically normal conditions. If it turns out that a kid has homosexual tendencies, then we should respect it, but we must not promote homosexual behaviour among the young (MEP 22).

The statements quoted above show that a conservative approach on morals, inspired by the teachings of the Catholic Church, is an important part of political identity of Law and Justice MEPs. The debates in the chamber did not convince them to embrace a more liberal view, dominant in the EP, accepting homosexuality and strongly condemning any
manifestation of homophobia. Much the contrary, the debates on homosexuality and homophobia encouraged Law and Justice representatives to defend their point of view—portraying homosexuality as something unnatural—in a very firm way.

6.4.5 The euro

Law and Justice MEPs also maintained their scepticism regarding the euro. The party's European election manifesto claimed that Poland was not ready for the common currency. “Quick introduction of the euro will create an excessive pressure from the powerful economies of the eurozone members, as well as negatively affect the situation of Polish exporters. Before Poland accepts the euro, it is necessary that commercial integration becomes much closer and the structure of Polish economy becomes more similar to that of the old member states. […] The Law and Justice opposes the introduction of the euro until the costs of monetary integration will fall and become considerably lower than the potential benefits” (Law and Justice 2004). In June of 2006, the Law and Justice representative in the Budget Committee spoke in very similar terms: Granted, the euro facilitates daily life, eliminates the exchange rate risks and lowers transaction costs. However, by keeping the zloty, we also keep the control of its exchange rate. The benefits are still not greater than potential problems (MEP 21).

Overall, on the issues analysed here, Law and Justice MEPs, two years into their parliamentary careers, defended very similar positions that they presented at the point of entry. There are signs that MEPs appreciate more the opportunities that the EU offers, for example when it comes to securing steady supply of energy. However, it cannot be argued that the socialisation process resulted in a clear-cut example of attitude change.

6.5 Polish Peasant Party - Piast

6.5.1 Institutions

Views expressed by the Polish Peasant Party – Piast MEPs regarding the future of the Union and relations between institutions were similar to those of Law and Justice parliamentarians: national governments should retain control over the integration process. For me, the EU should be an effective union of nation states. The idea of the United States of Europe is unacceptable (MEP 27). The federalist tendencies are premature. So far we have a “Europe

102 Polish Peasant Party – Piast was set up in 2005 by three MEPs who after a conflict with the leadership of the Polish Peasant Party decided to create an independent formation (see Chapter 4, section 4.1.2).
Sovereignty of member states should be protected (MEP 26). Consequently, the Constitutional Treaty was condemned as an attempt to undermine the sovereignty of nation states. Throughout centuries we had to fight for our own free state. And now they want to create a superstate with the Constitution that destroys nation states (MEP 28). Another argument against the Treaty was that it would considerably strengthen the position of France and Germany at the expense of the smaller states (all three MEPs). Such dangerous tendencies, in conjunction with the ever diminishing willingness of the rich member states to help the newcomers, were said by the MEPs to bode ill for the future of European cooperation. Piast parliamentarians deplored what they perceived as relatively severe terms of accession, accusing the old members of ignoring the solidarity principle. One of them went as far as saying that the EU is built on the suffering of the weak nations (MEP 28). EU membership was also assessed as carrying potentially negative consequences for Polish culture. There are many threats for Polish culture and tradition. You can see it in the media: a dangerous tendency to uniformise cultures. We are going to behave in such a way so as to feel more Polish than European (MEP 26). Yet, despite this very cautious stance towards further integration, when asked about the ways to limit the democratic deficit, two Piast MEPs, besides reinforcing the participation of national parliaments in the process, mentioned (both at T1 and T2) the strengthening of the European Parliament. Former national MPs and influential politicians, they clearly wanted their new institution to count in the decision-making process.

The views of PSL MEPs remained stable on the main issues concerning European integration. In the interviews at T2, they maintained their critical assessment of the Constitutional Treaty and remained cautious regarding the deepening of integration in the near future.

The word "Constitution" was not a fortunate choice. In the coming years we will probably have to continue the constitutional debate and some sort of a treaty that will simplify the existing ones will be signed. The integration will continue, but any radical acceleration in the current situation is not advisable (MEP 26).

This stance could be characterised as pragmatic. The MEP realises the inevitability of further integration, but calls for a slow process that would not entail an institutional evolution towards federalism and would not irritate national sensitivities.

A very similar opinion was voiced regarding the euro by the member of the Budget Committee – cautious, but not entirely rejecting the idea.
The [EU member] states that remain outside the euro area have better growth rates and lower unemployment. I believe this is a reason for a serious debate to what extent the euro is behind it and to what extent there are other reasons for this situation. If this divergence continues, then we could have serious doubts whether the euro can really be considered the currency of the future, making growth possible. But if all goes well, I guess Poland will adopt the euro around 2011/2012 (MEP 27).

6.5.2 Common Agricultural Policy

On entering the Parliament Piast MEPs claimed that protecting the generous Common Agricultural Policy would be one of their priorities, which – considering the agrarian character of their party – was hardly surprising. Two years later, when queried about the possible limiting of CAP funds and the gradual transfer of resources towards expenses on research and development, the MEPs spoke in favour of keeping the CAP in its current form. Two arguments were put forward. One MEP emphasised that ignoring the needs of farmers would be detrimental to all citizens of the Union. The help that the EU provides to farmers is in fact a help for all consumers. If the tendency to limit production in Europe continues, in 10-15 years our food security may be in danger (MEP 26). Another pointed out that regardless of CAP’s advantages and disadvantages, limiting its budget in order to create bigger funds to support scientific innovations would mean less European money for Poland. Due to the underdeveloped infrastructure of our universities, we could benefit from such funds only through co-operation with Western European scientific centres, probably getting only a small fraction of the funds (MEP 27). These statements suggest that ensuring the conservation of generous funds for farmers – Piast’s key constituency – has remained one of the principal objectives of the MEPs.

6.5.3 Signs of change

When talking about the integration process in general terms, one MEP claimed that two years into his tenure he felt more certain about the benefits that it brings. I have more understanding for European bureaucracy. We complain that it costs a lot, but an army would cost even more, not to mention a war. I am getting increasingly convinced that integration is a positive process (MEP 26). The same MEP also admitted – as was noted in chapter 5 (section 5.2.2) – to a stronger identification with the role of a representative of all EU citizens. It seems likely that his positive experience of work in the Agriculture Committee was one of the reasons for the increasingly positive attitude towards integration in general.
But this stronger general support for the Union was not common to all three MEPs from the party. The MEP (28) who was most critical towards the Union in the first interview largely maintained his views. In both interviews (at T1 and T2), in virtually the same words, he described European integration as part of a wider – and very dangerous – process of globalisation:

The main error of our generation is excessive globalisation. Globalisations always led to tragedies (T1). Slavery was also globalisation. And so was feudalism and capitalism. All empires were founded on the centralisation of power and wealth and all ended up swept away by uprisings or revolutions (T2).

We expected bureaucracy here to be quite complex, but what we encountered is really beyond belief.

These statements show that while his colleague – MEP 26 quoted in the first paragraph of this section – developed a better understanding of the Union and was able to identify more with it, the MEP in question (28) after two years in the chamber still perceived the Union as a generally hostile, bureaucratic organism, ruled by a supranational elite and bent on dominating and exploiting the nation states. The example of these two Piast MEPs highlights how individual traits of character – in this case mindset and general approach to the outside world – can influence the outcome of the socialisation process. MEP 28, who had arguably a very stereotypical view of the EU (as illustrated by the extract above) as a quasi-colonial enterprise run by the most powerful Western European countries, hardly modified his position. Meanwhile, MEP 26 who entered the EP as a cautious supporter of integration at best, but without the ballast of stereotypes, admitted to certain changes.

In sum, the socialisation process of Piast MEPs did not result in important attitude changes. One of the three MEPs declared that work in the Parliament strengthened his conviction regarding the benefits of integration. Yet, he remained strongly attached to state sovereignty and his views regarding the mechanisms through which integration should proceed remained the same. In his case, socialisation amounted to understanding the European system better, realising what cooperation with European partners can bring and – as a result – identifying more strongly with the European project. These changes were not detected in the case of the two other representatives of Piast. One of them, who appeared particularly critical of the EU in the first interview, repeated very similar opinions two years later.
6.6 Self-Defence

Even though Self-Defence had a record of eurosceptic declarations (see Chapter 3, section 3.1.2), the views regarding EU issues presented by MEPs at the beginning of term were much different from the condemnation of the EU expressed by the League of Polish Families representatives (see section 7.7 below) and relatively close to the opinions displayed by the Law and Justice and the Polish Peasant Party - Piast. Ryszard Czarnecki, the most experienced in the party delegation, declared support for the institutional make-up of the EU that was very much along the lines of the Law and Justice's "Europe des patries":

Optimal state: the more competences at the hands of nation states, the better. The Union should be focused on economy, with a minimum of political functions. The EP's primary role should be control of the Commission. [...] The EU does not need the Constitutional Treaty. The Constitution is a step towards a federal state.

The views regarding institutional issues presented by two other Self-Defence MEPs who were interviewed at T1, were less trenchant. They declared that they wanted to use the time spent in the chamber to gain more information about the EU and develop a more definite view on the subject. Their general approach towards the EU was open and positive:

European integration eliminated wars in Europe. It is worth to pay millions of euros to maintain European institutions. In the end, it's just the price of several tanks. [...] Contrary to the colleagues who represent the League of Polish Families, I believe that the EP can play a positive role. If I had a different opinion, I wouldn't have stood in the election. The Parliament can surely contribute to attenuating the democratic deficit. We are the link between citizens and European institutions. [...] Today I cannot say whether the EP should be strengthened. I hope that being an MEP will enable me to have a very sober and rational view of the EU institutional system (MEP 35).

Two Self-Defence MEPs applied to join the PES Group already in December of 2004 (after 5 months of service). One of them – interviewed in February of 2005 – presented very pro-integrationist views:

We should be [in the EU] as integrated as possible because only close integration will make it possible to get rid of the conflicts between particular interests of member states. The United States have one policy, even though their territory is bigger than the EU. Louisiana can have different problems than North Carolina, but you have to know how to integrate these problems (MEP 37).
As this person was not interviewed at T1, it is difficult to assess to what extent his views were transformed as a result of service in the chamber.\textsuperscript{103} Considering his limited experience in European affairs, it can be assumed that his case should be considered rather as attitude creation than attitude change. The MEP in question later became a member of the UEN. Asked about reasons for this decision, he claimed that it was not provoked by another change of views on the EU. He chose the UEN because "being a small political group, it was better organised than the PES and work within it was more efficient."\textsuperscript{104}

When assessing the time spent in the chamber (at T2), Ryszard Czarnecki declared that although service in the chamber was an important experience, it did not lead him to modify his views on integration:

\textit{I am wiser and more mature, but I do not feel more European because I felt European when I came here. The interest of Poland is most important for me and my knowledge regarding ways to promote this interest is much greater.}

One of the other Self-Defence MEPs, asked whether his views evolved as a result of contacts with other MEPs mentioned the Constitutional Treaty:

\textit{If we [Self-Defence MEPs] listened only to the arguments presented by the Law and Justice and our colleagues from the party back home, we should have voted against the Constitutional Treaty. Yet, we abstained and it is very significant. We gave out a signal that we support the idea of a constitution, but the proposal must be modified in certain aspects. This shows that colleagues from other countries and political groups influenced our views (MEP 35).}

The behaviour of Self-Defence MEPs in EP votes on three parliamentary reports concerning the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon (EP 2005d, 2006c and 2008c) can be treated as a sign of their increasingly positive attitude towards the progress of European integration.\textsuperscript{105} The first report, on the Constitutional Treaty, was supported by two Self-Defence MEPs, who were by then members of the PES Group (Golik and Kuc); four others abstained. In the case of the report on the period of reflection, four MEPs voted in favour, two against (R. Czarnecki and Rutowicz). In a vote on the report concerning the Lisbon Treaty, only Ryszard Czarnecki abstained; all other Self-Defence MEPs supported the report. Thus, it may be argued that, apart from Ryszard Czarnecki, all other MEPs showed increasing support for the Treaties that entailed further integration.

\textsuperscript{103} The MEP did not reply to the request for interview that was sent to him shortly before T1.
\textsuperscript{104} Answer provided by the MEP via email in November 2008.
\textsuperscript{105} As all three reports expressed positive assessment of the Treaties, support for these reports can be treated as a proxy for support for closer integration. A similar method was used by Martin Westlake (1994b) who interpreted changes in British MEPs' voting record on EP resolutions regarding Intergovernmental Conferences in the 1980's and 1990's as a sign of growing support for integration.
MEP 35 – quoted above on the Constitutional Treaty – also stressed how a trip to China made him appreciate the advantages of membership:

*It is in situations such as that one [trip abroad] that we realise what an interesting political project the EU is. It is out of the question that a Chinese minister for foreign affairs would meet Polish parliamentarians, but he found some time for us – European parliamentarians. They want to talk to the EU, the EU is a partner for them. In Poland or Brussels you don't realise it so strongly, but you do when you travel to countries such as China, India or the US (MEP 35).*

Evidence from interviews and voting record shows that representatives of the Self-Defence, most of whom entered the chamber with limited knowledge of EU politics, developed a positive attitude towards integration over the years spent in the chamber. The development of attitudes is also illustrated by the voting record on EP resolutions pertaining to the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon. MEPs' statements indicate that contacts with more experienced MEPs from other countries were an important factor for the transformations of their attitudes. Parliamentary experience led two Self-Defence MEPs to join political groups with clearly euroenthusiastic profiles (PES and ALDE). Other Self-Defence representatives became members of the UEN.

**6.7 League of Polish Families**

**6.7.1 Institutions**

On the pro- anti-EU continuum the League of Polish Families (LPR) can be placed very close to the anti-European extremity. In the first round of interviews, the EU was described by LPR representatives as a huge bureaucratic structure *(MEP 12)*, ineffective and constantly trying to expand its influence at the expense of member states. Loss of sovereignty was the most important argument against EU membership. LPR MEPs declared their support for the idea of co-operation between European states, but only one that is based on the unanimous decisions of participants. The Council of Europe was mentioned several times as an adequate framework for such co-operation. Such integration could encompass economic issues, but should stay away from political matters, especially those related to moral and ethical questions. *We can eliminate customs; some kind of a common organisation can define rules pertaining to trade and the flow of goods, but it is not necessary to be looking at women’s rights, abortion, euthanasia and homosexual relationships at the same time. Problems concerning morals should remain the prerogative of sovereign states (MEP 16).*
Supranational institutions that could impose something on member states did not feature in the LPR's vision of proper integration. The Commission was the main target for Polish Eurosceptics. They portrayed it as an overgrown bureaucracy aiming to regulate and uniformise everything — an organ sticking its nose everywhere, counting pigs and cows on every farm (MEP 17). Parallels with the Soviet system of planned economy abounded in interviews. There are things that we have to sort out in cooperation with other countries, but for this the Brussels bureaucracy is not necessary (MEP 12).

The Union was also condemned on the grounds of being dominated by the biggest states, especially Germany. The Union exists only because it is beneficial for Germany (MEP 12). In the 21st century, liberated from the complex of guilt, Germans are more and more assertive at stating their claim to hegemony (MEP 13). As a result, the interests of Poland and Germany — one MEP went as far as calling the latter the enemy of Poland (MEP 14) — are irreconcilable.

The Constitutional Treaty was rejected by the representatives of LPR as it embodied all the wrong characteristics of the EU. It would transform the Union into a federal superstate and reinforce the control of Germany and France over the decision-making process (MEP 18).

Politically, the consequences of membership may be deplorable also because it jeopardises Poland's relationship with the United States. Sooner or later [Poland] will have to choose between the US and the EU. I would opt for the US. Their democracy proved to be the right one. Whereas European [EU] democracy is a socialist one — huge bureaucracy and regulations going from top to bottom. I am convinced it will end up in the same way as the "popular democracies" (MEP 13).

Views concerning the nature of integration and the institutional arrangements remained unchanged. The League of Polish Families members got very involved in the campaign directed against the Constitutional Treaty, which they orchestrated together with other, mostly British, members of the eurosceptic Independence/Democracy Group in the chamber. When a report assessing the Treaty was voted upon in the chamber (2005d), the MEPs organised a demonstration waving placards saying "Not in my name" and singing the Socialist Internationale. The argument that the Treaty would transform the Union into a superstate, dominated by the most powerful states in the Union appeared as often at T2 as two years earlier. My stay here convinced me that the model that is being built [the federal model] is wrong. The Union needs urgent reforms (MEP 18).

The only exception in this wholesale criticism of the EU was made for the EP. The findings from interviews and questionnaires suggests that the Eurosceptics were somewhat
confused on this issue. On the one hand, they often criticised the culture of consensus and denounced the Parliament as a powerless institution.

*I cannot resist the impression that all here is somehow predetermined. We can vote this or that way, the final decision will anyway be made somewhere else. [...] On the face of it the scope of subjects approached here is huge, but it is all channelled into some sort of horrid political correctness and nothing really changes. [...] And when we manage to put something right, the other institutions just ignore the opinion of the Parliament. Take the resolution concerning the fruit market. We have worked so hard to push it through Parliament, but the Commission did not do much as a result (MEP 19).*

However, when asked if the EP should have more say in European affairs, they generally replied positively (see Table 13). This ambivalent attitude to the Parliament displayed by the Eurosceptics suggests that they were trying to manage conflicting feelings. Their eurosceptic convictions and the fact that they were largely marginalised in the chamber pushed them to attack the Parliament, however, some of them, once they got involved in the workings of the EP, called for more powers for it. Just as the theory of cognitive dissonance predicted, some Eurosceptics clearly started to believe that the institution in which they worked was useful and needed more clout.

**Table 13 Eurosceptics’ beliefs regarding the institutional balance of power in the EU**

Average answers of League of Polish Families MEPs to the following question: Given the present overall balance of influence among the following bodies, do you think their influence on policy formation should be increased, decreased or remain the same? N=3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Council</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of the EU</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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Source: own calculations based upon questionnaires returned by MEPs.

**6.7.2 Economy**

The potential economic benefits of membership were in the eyes of LPR MEPs mainly illusory. *We will send our money to Brussels and then receive it with the instructions on how to spend it (MEP 13)* is a statement that encapsulates the way in which they perceived the economic relationship between Poland and the EU. The economic terms of accession were condemned as profoundly unfair, while the opening of Polish market presented as having potentially very dangerous consequences. Foreign agricultural products, cheap thanks to huge
subsidies, warned the Eurosceptics, would swamp Poland ruining Polish farmers, while foreign investors would buy off companies and land, and ship profits to their countries. The EU's economic potential was, in their view, constrained by its overly bureaucratic structure – it is all about regulations, quotas, permits and the like (MEP 18). The economic policy of the Union was characterised as dominated by the Franco-German alliance, and therefore wary of liberal measures and unwilling to use the comparative advantage of cheap labour costs in new member states to stimulate growth (MEP 15).\footnote{All statements in the paragraph at T1.}

Very similar criticisms appeared in the second series of interviews. The Union should be based on economic development promoted in a way that helps the poorer [states] to catch up with the richer. This Parliament and this [Constitutional] Treaty do not contribute to this aim, and we have to do everything we can to change it (MEP 15).

LPR MEPs were also very critical towards the euro and maintained their refusal to accept the common currency. It was a natural sense of self-preservation that led Sweden, Britain and Denmark to reject the common currency (MEP 19 at T1). One of the MEPs has made the campaign against the euro (and for a referendum in Poland concerning the future introduction of the European currency) one of his main parliamentary priorities. A member of the Budget Committee argued against the euro in the following way (at T2):

> countries from the euro area are much less economically dynamic than countries that stayed outside. Having own currency is an important instrument of economic policy, meanwhile monetary policy in the euro area is controlled by states who care above all about their – not Polish – interest... France, Germany, Italy (MEP 15).

6.7.3 Morals

Something that ultimately discredited the EU in the eyes of Polish Eurosceptics were the moral standards that it promoted. What comes from (the EU) is moral degeneration (MEP13). Participating in the project, Poland runs the risk of being de-christianised (MEP 13).

The attempts to force the legalisation of homosexual relationships... it just won't be accepted in Poland. And as long as they [EU officials] don't understand it, we won't have common Europe. [...] We must not let them impose decadent laws on us (MEP 18). Look at what kind of problems are being discussed here. Rights of homosexuals? [incredulously] Unemployment, this is a serious problem! (MEP 12).

Statements from the second series of interviews show that contacts with other MEPs did not lead Polish Eurosceptics to modify their position on these issues.
The majority of MEPs from the Civil Liberties Committee treat human rights in a completely different way than how I see them. Here, the rights of minorities are the most important and we have numerous attempts to impose the will of a minority on the majority. There are a lot of crazy feminists. Leftist morality dominates. If you try to refer to the principles of Christian religion or to the Decalogue, it is treated as a deviation. I cannot push through a single proposal in this committee (MEP 18).

Tolerance yes, but we do not tolerate Catholics, is how one MEP (19) described the situation in the chamber.

All LPR MEPs were very critical of the three EP resolutions concerning homophobia and racism (EP 2006a, 2006b and 2007a), and interpreted them as an attack on Poland. *I have no doubts that the resolution was clearly directed against Poland. Worse things happen in other countries, but somehow the attack was against Poland* (MEP 15).

### 6.7.4 Evolution of views

All these criticisms notwithstanding, in the second interview some MEPs were more ready than two years before to admit that the European project possesses certain advantages. *I changed my mind only on one issue. In view of what is going on in the world, the EU has a reason to exist, provided that there is solidarity among its members* (MEP 18). The MEP then went on to add that in the realm of foreign and security policy, and energy policy, the EU could do more. If we consider these statements against the background of the findings presented in Chapter 5, showing that experience in the chamber led MEPs to pay more attention to international issues (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.5), a mechanism can be identified whereupon the increased awareness of EU and international affairs resulted in a conclusion that in certain areas EU membership is an advantage for Poland. Just as Polish europarlimentarians from other political parties, the Eurosceptic quoted above saw a coordinated action on the EU level as the best answer to the looming energy problems. A similar example can be found in a statement of an MEP (19) who, having condemned the way in which the EU functions, then called for support of the Commission in the conflict around the export of Polish meat into Russia.

Overall, after two years of service in the Parliament, representatives of the League of Polish Families remained strongly critical of integration in its current form and any new proposals that would further limit the sovereignty of nation states. Yet, a subtle change in their views seems to have taken place. Some of them seemed more reconciled to the idea of Polish
membership and increasingly noticed certain areas where it may be useful for Poland. It seems to be an important evolution of views, especially considering that the areas mentioned were by no means trivial: defence, foreign policy and energy policy.

Conclusions

The analysis of Polish MEPs' attitudes presented at the beginning of their parliamentary tenure and two years later shows that far reaching attitude change did not take place. Parliamentarians who were unequivocally eurosceptic or wary of further integration did not significantly modify their views once immersed in the predominantly euroenthusiastic environment of the European Parliament. This confirms the conclusions of the most recent studies of socialisation that questioned the existence of a “going native” phenomenon of eurosceptic MEPs embracing integration (Franklin and Scarrow 1999, Scully 2002 and 2005). Hypothesis 6 that was tested in this chapter is thus confirmed.

H6: Eurosceptics are unlikely to change their position on the major issues concerning European integration.

In contrast, it is difficult to formulate an unequivocal judgment as regards hypothesis 7:

H7: If there are instances of attitude change towards greater support for integration, they will occur among the Eurorealists.

A number of MEPs from the Self-Defence party, especially those who entered the chamber without well-defined views on integration, displayed opinions that suggested attitude change towards stronger support for the integration process. Similarly, one member of the Polish Peasant Party – Piasł claimed that EP experience strengthened his conviction that integration was beneficial for Poland and Europe. But Law and Justice MEPs firmly stuck to the views that they presented at the beginning of the parliamentary term. In sum, it cannot be claimed that the majority of Eurorealists underwent an attitude change towards greater support for European integration.

The Euroenthusiasts did not show signs of attitude change on issues where there existed divergences between them and the majority of their political group. Polish representatives within the PES Group remained advocates of much more liberal economic measures than those supported by the majority of their group colleagues, especially those from old member states. The Democratic Party MEPs differed from the rest of ALDE members by their particularly strong attachment to close relations with the United States. Civic Platform representatives were not persuaded by their counterparts from the EPP Group to embrace the
new voting system (the so-called double majority) to be introduced by the Constitutional Treaty.

The evolution of views to which Polish MEPs admitted, or which was manifest in their statements, took more subtle forms and rarely amounted to changes in policy preferences. Euroenthusiastic MEPs claimed that service in the chamber cemented their conviction regarding the advantages brought by integration. Work in the very centre of EU affairs made them aware of certain shortcomings of the EU institutional system, but their support for the European ideal, and belief that cooperation between states was the key to a safe and prosperous future, strengthened. Meanwhile, the Law and Justice MEPs, although consistently defending the intergovernmental view of integration, seem more appreciative of the benefits that EU membership may bring to Poland and more willing to advocate the creation of new common policies, if only in strictly defined areas. Finally, some Eurosceptics seem to have developed a more pragmatic position. Their statements convey a growing conviction that the EU membership and changes that it will entail in Poland are inevitable, and therefore it is better to get involved and try to shape the Union rather than limit one’s actions to criticisms and attempts at torpedoing every single decision prepared in Brussels.

H8: MEPs will identify more strongly with the EP, emphasising its importance and demanding more powers for it.

The Euroenthusiasts clearly identified with the Parliament – they called for more powers for it and assessed very positively their own work in the chamber. Some Eurorealists – even those who did not call for more integration – also talked about the chamber in very positive terms and claimed that its position in European politics should become more prominent. Even some Eurosceptics, although they did not spare critical remarks regarding the way in which the EP worked, happened to declare that a stronger Parliament would be needed. Generally then the hypothesis can be considered as confirmed. Only the Law and Justice MEPs resisted this particular institutional patriotism – their attitude towards the strengthening of the Parliament was cautious and clearly motivated more by political calculation than the instinctive feeling of identification with their own institution. Law and Justice MEPs consistently argued that in their view strengthening of the chamber would not bring benefits to Poland.

H9: Instances of attitude change are more likely to happen in case of well-defined issues, rather than regarding the general “more integration versus less integration” question.
Few examples of MEPs changing their view on concrete issues as a result of arguments and persuasion by other participants of the decision-making process have been found. Their accounts suggest that while MEPs tend to adhere firmly to the central tenets of their political beliefs, they can be convinced by arguments presented by their colleagues on other less crucial issues. On the basis of the findings of this investigation, it is difficult to judge how important and frequent such situations are.

Similarly to behavioural adaptation to the institutional culture of the chamber, described in Chapter 5, changes in attitudes seem to be the effect of careful political calculation. Law and Justice MEPs are a case in point. Even though, wary of loss of national sovereignty, they generally reject any new additions to the EU competences, they started to advocate a common energy policy, realising that Poland can achieve its objectives in this domain only through the EU. In a similar way, one of the League of Polish Families MEPs, familiarised with foreign policy issues through his EP experience, admitted that the EU may have a role to play in that domain.

*Attitude change* was the third and last dimension of socialisation in the analytical framework adopted in this thesis. The following chapter will draw together the findings relating to the three dimensions and formulate some general conclusions regarding the socialisation process of Polish MEPs. It will also interpret the findings of the present study against the background of the results of earlier research.
Chapter 7. Conclusions

The three preceding chapters presented the findings in each of the three dimensions into which the socialisation process was divided for the purposes of this investigation, namely: institutional learning, adaptation to the institutional culture and attitude change. The aim of the present chapter is to draw together the conclusions regarding these three dimensions, in the light of previous studies of socialisation in the EP and other EU institutions, and formulate some general conclusions regarding the socialisation process of Polish MEPs and the socialisation process in the EP in general.

First, a summary of findings is presented. Then, second, the following section discusses the main factors that influenced the socialisation process of Polish MEPs as derived from the analyses of the previous chapters. Third, the chapter relates these findings back to the categorisation of mechanisms of socialisation and types of internalisation put forward by Jeffrey Checkel (2005), discussed in section 2.1.3, in order to highlight the ways in which socialisation of Polish MEPs proceeded, and try to assess how significant its effects may be. The fourth part of the chapter presents some general conclusions regarding the socialisation process of Polish MEPs. It is argued that the discovered evolution of Polish MEPs' attitudes, identities and behaviour can be symbolically depicted as a transformation of national politicians into European ones. Finally, ideas for further research are discussed.

7.1 Summary of findings

The aim of this investigation was to examine the socialisation process of Polish MEPs. The notion of socialisation was understood broadly as a “process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2001a: 30). The investigation was organised around three major dimensions of the socialisation process. First, there was a process of institutional learning, through which MEPs discover the rules of procedure and the basic tactics used in the chamber; in other words, they gain the knowledge and experience necessary for effective action in it. Second, there was a process of adaptation to the institutional culture whereupon MEPs adapt to the norms and codes of conduct characteristic for the chamber. The third dimension – attitude change – covered changes in MEPs’ beliefs and convictions regarding various policy areas, mainly, but not solely, those directly related to European integration.
Chapters 4-6 depicted the findings of the present investigation in each of the three dimensions of the socialisation process. This section draws the findings together and briefly summarises what were the effects of socialisation for each of the three clusters into which the MEPs under study were divided.

Evidence gathered by this investigation shows that Euroenthusiasts quickly gained knowledge about the mechanisms through which the EP functions. Their achievements testify that they became effective MEPs, able to influence the decision-making process. In this cluster the parliamentary norms and codes of conduct were embraced most resolutely. The Euroenthusiasts showed greatest appreciation of the consensual culture, describing it as a real advantage of political life in the chamber. They appreciated the importance of negotiations and were ready to make concessions in order to find solutions that would satisfy the vast majority of participants. When talking about their role conception, they ascribed importance to representing all citizens of the EU and, even though Poland and Polish citizens remained the principal locus of their allegiance, they avoided behaviour that could be interpreted as overly nationalistic. It can be argued that their identity has become more complex as besides the feeling of representing their country and voters, they developed a feeling of responsibility towards all citizens of the EU. In the realm of attitude change, the experience in the chamber cemented Euroenthusiasts' support for European integration, but there is no evidence that contacts with colleagues within the chamber resulted in the Euroenthusiasts significantly modifying their political beliefs.

The Eurorealists, similarly to the Euroenthusiasts, quickly learnt the ropes of parliamentary activity. Within the dimension of adaptation to the institutional culture and attitude change the discovered effects of socialisation were varied. In the case of some MEPs, the effects were quite similar to that detected within the Euroenthusiastic cluster. The majority of Self-Defence MEPs, for instance, resolutely embraced parliamentary consensual culture and showed stronger support for integration. Other Eurorealists, especially representatives of Law and Justice, were less positive towards parliamentary norms and codes of conduct – they abided by them because it was a way of gaining influence in the chamber rather than out of conviction that they are the right way of doing things. Their political beliefs did not change.

In the case of the Eurosceptics, the evidence suggests that even though they possessed the necessary knowledge of the parliamentary policy-making process they consciously ignored it by adopting a very confrontational approach that virtually deprived them of any influence over parliamentary decisions. They were also very critical about parliamentary norms and codes of conduct. Only later, in the second half of the parliamentary term did some
Eurosceptics display a less radical behaviour (by joining the more moderate UEN group). Some of the Eurosceptics were manifestly torn between the imperative to denounce the EP, stemming from their eurosceptic beliefs, and the desire to get involved in the parliamentary work in order to be able to present some concrete achievements to the public opinion in Poland. Similarly, even though they generally strongly opposed deepening of integration, some of them called for more powers for the EP. Their attitude towards integration has become more pragmatic, the all-out criticism was replaced by a more qualified opposition as some of them, however reluctantly, admitted that membership in the EU brought some benefits for Poland. Overall, the Eurosceptics adapted to the chamber mainly on the tactical level by limiting radical behaviour, but they remained critical regarding parliamentary norms and European integration in general.

7.2 General conclusions regarding the socialisation process in the EP

7.2.1 Importance of previous socialisation

The effects of the socialisation process were very similar for MEPs who belonged to the same cluster. Thus it can be concluded that MEPs' beliefs, into which they were socialised during their political career prior to entry into the EP, acted as powerful filters that shaped their experience of the chamber. MEPs who see integration as a *sui generis* phenomenon that is much more than just another case of international cooperation (i.e. Euroenthusiasts), are more inclined to act according to the EP parliamentary norms, going beyond the role of national representative: they show greater appreciation of the process of persuading others, make an effort to consider the issues in terms of the EU as a whole and are more open to make concessions in order to pave the way to a deal acceptable to the vast majority of MEPs. Whereas Eurorealists who see the EU as an intergovernmental enterprise similar to – even if more developed – other international institutions tend to adopt the role of a country representative: they privilege bargaining over persuasion, and display a more rigid position in negotiations, focused on national interest. Finally, Eurosceptics, whose political family made opposition to integration one of the pillars of its programme, approach the chamber as a deeply flawed institution and are suspicious of the norms and values that prevail in it. The lesson that emerges from the analysis of the case of Polish MEPs is that experience within the chamber may strengthen or weaken some views held by an individual, but – apart from single cases – it will not bring about a serious transformation of attitudes or identities.
Why are MEPs’ beliefs resistant to change? What emerges from the study of Polish MEPs confirms the hypothesis formulated by Jeffrey Checkel that internalisation of new norms is more likely when “the agent has few prior ingrained beliefs inconsistent with the persuader’s message” (2001a: 27). This was not the case for the majority of Polish Eurorealists and Eurosceptics. The fervour with which the Eurosceptics attacked the principal features of European integration showed that euroscepticism formed a part of the core of their political identity – they had many strongly ingrained beliefs inconsistent with the norms and values prevailing in the EP. Rejected as an assault on state sovereignty, the EU was also condemned on the grounds of promoting behaviour conflicting with the precepts of the Catholic faith (e.g. homosexuality, abortion and euthanasia). The majority of the Eurosceptic contingent are devoted Catholics and their statements suggested that they perceived the attack on the EU as a defence of their Church. Religious beliefs reinforced euroscepticism and rendered it even more resistant to change. Euroscepticism was also one of the most important traits of the League of Polish Families’ image. This provoked another obstacle on the road to “European conversion”. Even if the MEPs were willing to renounce their anti-EU beliefs, they would run a serious risk of losing friends and influence in the party, as well as support of their voters.

Similarly, the Law and Justice MEPs arrived in the EP with a clear-cut view of integration based on intergovernmental cooperation, and this view resisted the confrontation with the prointegrationist position dominant in the chamber. They appreciated the opportunities that membership offered to Poland, but were also adamant in their rejection of certain features of the integration process that were contrary to the intergovernmental conception of integration. Even though in the UEN Group – that Law and Justice MEPs joined – supporters of the Constitutional Treaty outnumbered the opponents, the Law and Justice MEPs did not show any signs of modifying their strongly critical position towards it.

Meanwhile, in the case of the Self-Defence, such strong preconceptions that could determine the parliamentary experience did not exist. All members but one had little experience of European politics and entered the parliament with only very generally defined ideas about integration and European institutions. In their case the evolution of views was most manifest. It can be argued that thanks to the parliamentary experience they moved from the grey area of poorly defined attitude towards the EU to a position of moderate (and in some cases quite strong) support.
Our analysis of the Polish experience demonstrates that apart from the intensity of political views an important factor that influences the socialisation process is the extent of divergence between parliamentary norms and those adhered to by MEPs who begin their mandate. In her study of European Commission officials, Liesbet Hooghe notes that as "there is no intrinsic contradiction between national and international norms" (2005: 888), the officials tend to accept the latter relatively easily. In the case of this study, the same can be said of the MEPs from the Euroenthusiastic cluster. Even though there may sometimes be tensions between the idea of defending (what they believe is) the Polish interest and the EP norm of adopting a more overarching EU-wide outlook (European model of representation), the support for supranational integration expressed by these MEPs fits well with the norms of the EP. Thus, Euroenthusiastic MEPs support these norms and generally follow them in their actions. Applying Hooghe's reasoning to the Eurorealists and Eurosceptics, a conclusion is in order that they are reluctant to embrace fully the EP norms (or simply reject them) because the national norms to which they subscribe clash with the norms of the EP. Attached to national sovereignty and calling for an EU based on intergovernmental structures, the Eurorealists, and especially the Eurosceptics, question the idea of MEPs transcending the focus on representing their own country. This in turn makes them approach parliamentary negotiations as bargaining exercises rather than a search for the best solution that would be acceptable to all participants.

Apart from ideological reasons, questions of a more pragmatic nature also had a bearing on the socialisation process of Polish MEPs. Because of their position on the margins of EP politics, the Eurorealists and especially the Eurosceptics have little incentive to follow the codes of conduct of the chamber. The three largest political groups in the chamber (EPP-ED, PES and ALDE) can by themselves achieve a relatively strong majority, so the crucial issue for building a strong consensus behind parliamentary amendments is to find agreement between the three largest groups. Once this is achieved, the support of the smaller groups becomes much less important. The EPP representatives, for example, have a greater incentive to look for a deal with the PES or ALDE than with the UEN, even though the latter may on a large number of issues be a more natural coalition partner. As a result, Polish MEPs from the UEN and the Independence/Democracy Group (i.e. Eurorealists and Eurosceptics) may have felt less involved in - or even excluded from - the very developed process of consultations.

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107 The three largest groups comprised (on 1.8.2008) 607 out of 785 MEPs (77%).
and negotiations that go on in the chamber, and as a result assessed the consensual culture of the chamber in a negative way.

The stability of Polish MEPs' attitudes may also be due to a relatively limited intensity of contacts with other, more experienced MEPs. Few Poles described direct contacts with more experienced colleagues as very useful or important in their induction period, apart from the realm of parliamentary daily routine. When MEPs from other countries were mentioned, they usually featured as providers of useful tips related to parliamentary tactics, rather than as authors of stimulating ideas concerning policies or the representative role. It appears other MEPs were important in the process of institutional learning of Polish newcomers, but their influence was less manifest in the two remaining dimensions of socialisation (adaptation to the institutional culture and attitude change). From the accounts of Polish MEPs it can be inferred that most exchanges of views between them and their colleagues take place in formal circumstances, i.e. in committees or in plenary. Few Polish MEPs admitted to having been engaged in longer discussions with colleagues in less formal environment, but those who did usually also emphasised that these contacts were important and influenced their view of politics in the Parliament. 108 When Polish MEPs depicted the process of gathering information on issues that were being considered by the EP, Polish government and experts (from business environment, academia or NGOs) were named as main sources (Szczepanik et al. 2009: 75). Fellow MEPs were mentioned much less frequently. One of the reasons for this may be that other MEPs were treated as adversaries to be proven wrong or convinced, rather than as partners with whom to forge a solution to a given problem. Poor command of foreign languages may be another reason. It is practically impossible to be precise regarding the significance of this factor because, apart from people with long experience on international forums and proven linguistic abilities, it is difficult to assess how fluent most MEPs are in foreign languages. 109 It is likely that for a large number of them it is impossible to have anything more than a basic conversation without an interpreter. For these MEPs, informal contacts are mostly limited to other Polish MEPs, usually colleagues from the same political party. They can learn by observing others, listening to talks in plenary and committees, but cannot engage in informal, face-to-face contacts, which are an important channel through

108 A question regarding the character and intensity of contacts with other MEPs was not included in the interview. Our conclusion is based on MEPs general accounts of life in the EP, conversations with assistants and other researchers. One assistant, for instance, said that “her MEP” sent her to meetings with the group coordinator because his English was not good enough and translation was not provided.

109 Information provided on MEPs’ websites is not enough in this respect. As one Polish daily revealed (Gazeta Wyborcza 2004: 4), even though MEPs claim to speak foreign languages, in some cases their command is very limited.
which the socialisation process occurs in all three dimensions (Hix and Lord 1997, Johansson 1998).

Our analysis of the daily activities of Polish MEPs, as they were described in our interviews, leads to a conclusion that for most of them their compatriots, especially from the national party delegation, have been their most important companions in parliamentary existence. This is due not only to the linguistic barrier mentioned above, but also to the nature of parliamentary life. National party delegations are the principal collective actors in it; they hold frequent meetings to discuss matters and agree upon a common position (Kreppel 2002: 208-210). Members of the same national party delegation usually have adjacent offices, so somewhat naturally they often rub shoulders with each other. The Polish MEPs whom I incidentally encountered in the corridors of the EP were usually accompanied by other Polish MEPs. This is obviously only anecdotal evidence, but seems telling. It may be argued that a large number of MEPs live to a large extent in a “Polish bubble”, encountering the non-Polish participants of parliamentary life during meetings, but rarely going as far as face-to-face conversation.

Previous research did not develop the issue of any correlation between linguistic abilities and/or frequent contacts with representatives of other nationalities and/or parties on the one hand, and a propensity to embrace parliamentary norms or to change attitudes towards certain issues on the other. It is also difficult to ascertain whether there are differences between national contingents in this respect. Were the Poles particularly reluctant (or unable because of the linguistic barrier) to establish relationships with MEPs from other countries? Had their international contacts been more frequent, would it have an effect on attitudes? It is impossible to answer the first question as no studies looking into the freshmen MEPs’ interactions with their peers have been conducted. As for the second, more frequent exchanges of views with other MEPs would not necessarily have resulted in more manifest examples of attitude change. But it is probable that such exchanges could have strengthened the Polish MEPs’ knowledge of the priorities and ways of thinking of their counterparts from other countries, and thus reinforced their commitment to finding solutions through negotiations and making concessions.

7.2.2 The importance of personal experience within the EP for the outcomes of the socialisation process

We have seen that within clusters and political parties the effects of the socialisation process were generally similar. Yet, a number of experiences, attitudes and evolution of views
specific to individual MEPs were discovered. A number of MEPs could be described as "particular cases", their experience differing to a certain extent from that of colleagues from the same cluster/party. These "exceptional" MEPs admitted to having been particularly influenced by service in the chamber: they admitted to changing their attitude on integration, having developed a particularly strong feeling of allegiance to all EU citizens or of identification with the political group. Their cases draw attention to the importance of personal experience in the chamber. The accounts of these MEPs show that the character of their experience of the EP was strongly influenced by the people that they met or events that they witnessed, while others did not. This is understandable if we look at the way in which the European Parliament works: MEPs usually specialise in one or a couple of domains and they focus on the work in the committee(s), interparliamentary delegation(s) and intergroup(s) to which they belong. Therefore an MEP who concentrates on regional development deals with different MEPs, advisors, Commission officials and interest group representatives than his/her counterpart who focuses on internal market. Depending on linguistic abilities, an MEP's relations with other participants of the decision-making process may be either very developed or virtually limited to his/her compatriots.

Evidence from this investigation suggests that while there are elements that constitute a universal EP institutional culture – this thesis considers the focus on compromise and a broad European representative role as such – particular circumstances in which MEPs work may significantly affect their assessments of service in the chamber and adaptation to the institutional culture. A number of Polish MEPs claimed, for instance, that in some committees (e.g. Agriculture), due to the character of the matters discussed, it was easier to create a feeling of community while in others (e.g Budget) MEPs tended to adopt a position focused on the defense of national interest. A part of the EP experience is naturally common to all freshmen MEPs (plenary seatings, the most important issues that are universally discussed), but a great deal of it is individual – it depends above all on the issue area in which MEPs are active and their capability and willingness to contact other participants of the decision-making process. Evidence from this investigation suggests that this personal experience may be very important for the final result of the socialisation process.

The differences in MEPs' assessments of the EP institutional culture can also be explained by a reference to their previous political experience. Newly elected MEPs are not tabulae

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110 Thirty-four delegations whose task is to maintain relations with parliaments of non-EU countries exist in the EP. Whereas intergroups unite MEPs interested in the same subject, for instance animal welfare, tourism, globalisation, or gay and lesbian rights.
They come to the EP with a rich experience from politics and/or other walks of life and that experience has a bearing on their socialisation process. The relationship between previous political experience and the results of the socialisation process was most manifest in the case of the Self-Defense: the only MEP from this party with political experience firmly stuck to his views, while three political newcomers included in the sample expressed stronger support for EP norms and European integration. In the Euroenthusiast cluster the MEPs who showed most enthusiasm when assessing the EP institutional culture were generally political newcomers. Among the Eurorealists and Eurosceptics, some former members of the Polish Parliament complained about the excessive political correctness that they encountered in the EP and said that they missed the fervour of political debate in Poland.

The socialisation process can therefore be presented as a confrontation between the beliefs, norms and values “brought” to the chamber by MEPs and the experience that takes place following the entry into the realm of the Parliament. There is variety in the former and in the latter, and it can explain some of the differences in the results of the socialisation process between MEPs from the same cluster.

7.3 Socialisation mechanisms and types of internalisation

With the idea of formulating the knowledge of socialisation in a more rigorous way, Jeffrey Checkel identified three mechanisms through which socialisation can proceed, and two types of internalisation that it can lead to. These were described in section 2.1.3. This section will discuss how our findings fit into Checkel’s framework.

7.3.1 Mechanisms

In the accounts given by Polish MEPs the mechanism that Checkel calls strategic calculation is clearly identifiable. They often described the adherence to parliamentary norms in terms of a means to an end. They embraced consensual attitudes and made concessions in negotiations in order to be able to request the same from their counterparts. In their speeches they made references to EU interests because they had learnt that this would let them “sell” their ideas better. They attempted to participate in debates on issues without direct significance for their voters in Poland in order to avoid the reputation of narrow-minded nationalists. The change in group membership performed by certain Eurosceptic MEPs and a move away from radical manifestations of euroscepticism are other examples of that mechanism. Being members of the more mainstream UEN Group, the Eurosceptics could hope to achieve a more prominent
position in the chamber (perhaps author a report or push through an amendment) and erase the reputation of parliamentary jesters that they earned in the early days of term.

This is far from genuine socialisation. However, there is evidence that in case of some Polish MEPs the behaviour motivated by interest maximisation led to the creation of certain habits – just as Checkel suggested. Gradually, they started to behave according to the parliamentary norms – *play their roles* – somewhat automatically, without examining what kind of benefits they will be able to draw from a given behaviour in every single situation. The Polish MEP who argued that in the chamber the focus on consensus is not only a clever strategy, but a *deeply ingrained attitude* (*MEP 6*) provided a perfect illustration of this. Accounts given by other MEPs (mainly Euroenthusiasts) show that through contacts with the parliamentary culture of compromise they adopted a more open attitude, became more willing to make concessions and developed a belief that discussions with partners will lead to an agreement, even if initial positions were apparently difficult to reconcile. Evidence from interviews suggests that MEPs gradually developed a habit of looking beyond the concerns of their constituents in Poland, trying to analyse the situation in other member states and discover the reasons behind the demands of their counterparts. The tendency to follow the position of the political group – obviously to a great extent motivated by the willingness to establish a reputation of reliable partners – developed in some cases into genuine loyalty and identification with the group. Accounts presented by some MEPs show that they attached importance to the group being able to present a united front, were willing to give something up in order to reach an agreement and demonstrated a conviction that their group colleagues would understand their concerns if these were adequately justified. In sum, the *mechanism of role playing* is visible in the behaviour of Polish MEPs. They follow certain patterns of behaviour because the latter are established ways of doing things in the chamber.

Interviews with Polish MEPs also yielded examples of the third mechanism described by Checkel – *normative suasion*. Polish MEPs adapt their behaviour and modify their beliefs not only through calculation of costs and benefits or through identification of certain patterns of behaviour and copying them. Some of them admitted that direct contacts with other MEPs were key factors that made them reassess their views, pay more attention to the needs of other participants of the decision-making process and appreciate more the importance of reaching a compromise.

111 "It is possible that what starts as behavioural adaptation, may – because of various cognitive lock-in effects – later be followed by sustained compliance that is strongly suggestive of internalization and preference change" (Checkel 2005: 809).
From those three mechanisms, strategic calculation emerges as the most prominent one. MEPs’ accounts clearly demonstrate that the vast majority of them were very attentive to how politics is made in the chamber. This in turn invites a conclusion that socialisation is not just a passive adoption of certain ways of behaviour, but a process that involves an analysis of the new institutional environment.

7.3.2 Internalisation

Both types of internalisation presented by Checkel can be identified when examining the experience of Polish MEPs. Internalisation Type I was manifest as some MEPs admitted to following certain patterns of behaviour not so much because they assessed them positively, but because these patterns are widely considered as dominant in the chamber and following them is likely to bring tangible benefits in terms of finding allies and gaining trust of colleagues. The Eurorealists, for instance, were generally willing to behave more consensually than on the national arena, even though they often scorned the consensual culture as a smokescreen for national interests or criticised it for rendering the political debate in the chamber bland and vague.

Examples of behaviour that can be classified as Internalisation Type II can also be found. Parliamentary norms and codes of conduct became for some MEPs more than the means to an end. Accounts given by certain MEPs strongly suggest that they perceive the focus on discussions, persuasion and compromise as an extremely valuable characteristic of parliamentary politics and they behave in accordance with these norms because they approve of them. Readiness to reach compromise, commitment to negotiations when differences of opinion emerge and preference for taking adversaries on board rather than outvoting them stems not only from the pragmatic belief that every single concession will be reciprocated, but primarily from the conviction that the particular EP style is the right way to make politics. Statements suggestive of this type of internalisation were pronounced mainly by the Euroenthusiasts and some Self-Defence MEPs who, while stressing the strategic aspect of following parliamentary norms, also claimed that these norms were commendable and made political contacts much easier.

This shows that only in some cases can the socialisation process be expected to have a lasting effect. Many MEPs would probably give up the more consensual ways of policy-making if they left the chamber. They only followed parliamentary norms because it was difficult to participate effectively in the decision-making process by acting differently. Others,
however, stressed that, were they to move back to Poland, they would attempt to graft the EP norms onto Polish confrontational political culture.

The following section further considers the problem of internalisation of EP norms by referring to the concept of two logics: logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness.

### 7.3.3 Logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness

“Socialization implies that an agent switches from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness”, claims Checkel (2005: 804). In other words, MEPs who fully internalise parliamentary norms should behave in accordance with them, instead of calculating what kind of behaviour will be most beneficial in a given situation. Is such a switch perceptible in the case of Polish MEPs? It is difficult to talk about a definite move away from one logic towards the other as one cannot unambiguously state when actors stop calculating and start behaving in a way that is dictated by their identity or a role. Accounts given by Polish MEPs suggest that once they reach a general conclusion that certain behaviour is dominant in the chamber and can bring benefits (for example in terms of policy influence), they then behave accordingly quasi-automatically, without performing a cost-benefit analysis in every single case. The logic of appropriateness sets in. This is what March and Olsen call the “developmental relation” between the two logics. “[A]ction becomes more rule-based in a specific situation”, they argue, “the greater the accumulated experience in that situation. Rules and standard operating procedures supplant and constrain instrumental-calculative action in a given situation as a result of experience” (1998: 953). It does not mean, however, that the logic of consequences is entirely given up. Playing a role entails a degree of automaticity in behaviour, but individuals do not stop looking at the consequences of their behaviour entirely. In certain circumstances, MEPs may choose a behaviour that goes against parliamentary norms, even if they approve of them. This happened, for instance, when the consequences of the Second World War were debated and Polish MEPs did not hesitate to provoke a heated debate in order to reject an interpretation of history that in their eyes was flawed. In other words, even if an MEP expresses convinced support for a norm (i.e. if Internalisation Type II occurs, using Checkel’s terms), it is not a guarantee that they will always abide by it. Attachment to the political group, trust and loyalty towards other members of it, do not mean that an MEP will never vote against the majority of group members. It merely makes such an event less likely. The experience of Polish MEPs can be characterised as an interplay of the two logics rather than a definite switch from one to the other. It is manifest that MEPs play roles in the chamber or embrace some norms because they truly believe in them, but this does
not imply that they take everything for granted and cease entirely to consider the consequences of their acts.

The relative prominence of the logic of consequences in the initial stages of socialisation suggests that it is a reflective process. MEPs, before they decide to follow particular patterns of behaviour, analyse them in terms of costs and benefits that they entail. These cost-benefit calculations are informed by individual beliefs and thus give very different outcomes for different people. As was stressed in earlier sections, for the Euroenthusiasts, following parliamentary norms offers greater benefits than for the Eurorealists and Eurosceptics. It is also worth noting that the fact of existence of a generally accepted norm becomes another factor in the calculation. Here is another area when the two logics overlap. It is emphasised by Kjell Goldmann who — commenting on the concepts of the two logics — claims that

[T]here remains a common situation in social life, in which expected consequences are evaluated on the basis of what is systemically appropriate, or self-interest is defined as that which is appropriate in view of the fact that the actor is ‘fulfilling the obligations of a role’ and is adhering to the ‘imperatives of holding a position’. This is a mixed situation, in which the distinction between the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and the ‘logic of expected consequences’, as defined by March and Olsen, is difficult to apply (2005: 41).

The EP resolutions on homophobia (EP 2006a, 2006b and 2007a), which contained critical remarks about the situation in Poland may be evoked as example of such a situation. Polish MEPs who supported those resolutions were running the risk of being portrayed as attacking their own country. Yet, as seen in their statements quoted in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.4), their calculation of costs and benefits of such behaviour was crucially influenced by the “obligations of a role” — the fact that as MEPs they are not supposed to be country representatives, but objective representatives of all citizens of the EU.

Another issue related to the problem of the two logics is the potential competition between different logics of appropriateness. According to March and Olsen, “[A]ction involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation” (1998: 951). However, people usually play more than one role and in a given situation obligations stemming from different roles may be contradictory. The role of an MEP and the role of a eurosceptic politician are a case in point. While at first sight eurosceptic MEPs seem far from following the logic of appropriateness, as could be expected from an ideal-typical MEP, it may be argued that they follow that logic if we consider how their

112 The expressions quoted are from March and Olsen (1989: 160-161).
eurosceptic identity dictates their actions. One of the core elements of that identity is the conviction that the EP and the European Commission, as supranational institutions, are inherently tainted and every initiative that entails the growth of their powers, whatever its consequences, should be opposed. Accordingly, the Eurosceptics condemned almost everything that happened in the EP, focusing on its allegedly overgrown bureaucracy and contempt for an average citizen. 113

In the case of Polish Eurosceptics, two competing logics of appropriateness can be identified: one that exists within the EP (and stems from the role of an MEP), the other linked to their previous political environment (stemming from the role of a eurosceptic politician), from which MEPs were by no means cut off. It was visible that the two logics of appropriateness (or the two roles) competed: the Eurosceptics generally criticised the EP, but some of them in interviews demanded more powers for it (for example the right of initiative). The influence of what could be called the national logic of appropriateness seems to have diminished with time – some Eurosceptic MEPs reported that they changed their minds and decided to participate in committee meetings that they initially intended to ignore – but it remained dominant.

Considering the case of Polish Eurosceptics, it can be concluded that successful socialisation does not have to be a move from the logic of consequences to the logic of appropriateness, but may be a switch from one logic of appropriateness to another. Once an actor adopts a new role and their identity changes, a set of actions that they will consider as appropriate in a specific situation will change as well. This issue practically does not arise for the Euroenthusiasts as the role of an MEP and that of a pro-integration national politician can be harmonised very well. But it is a key question for the Eurosceptics and, to a lesser extent, the Eurorealists. In their case, the conflict between behaviour stemming from a role of Eurosceptic politician and behaviour stemming from a role of member of the EP was visible. Most of them, most of the time, followed the former.

7.4 Can the EP shape identities and attitudes?

How significant are the effects of socialisation discovered by this investigation? Is the claim that the EP can shape identities and attitudes of its members justified in the case of Polish MEPs?

113 The election of the President of the EP by the two largest political groups which was much similar to political agreements realised in national politics was portrayed as a “major assault on democracy”. They also criticised the fact that during votes on amendments once the committee chairpersons noticed that the largest political groups pronounced themselves for (or against), they often closed the case without counting the votes.
The experience of Eurosceptics and Eurorealists (apart from some Self-Defence MEPs) matches a different interpretation of institutions — that proposed by rationalist theoretical approaches (see for example Moravcsik 1998). The latter treat institutional settings merely as obstacles to which actors have to adapt their strategies. The Eurorealists try to adopt more consensual behaviour and refer to the European interest in their speeches, but for the majority of them there are no signs that parliamentary experience significantly influenced their attitudes or identities. Similarly, some Eurosceptics decided to leave the radically eurosceptic political group (IND/DEM) and join the more moderate UEN group, but it was a tactical move, not one provoked by a deeper reassessment of their attitude towards integration.

It is only in the case of the majority of Euroenthusiasts and some Self-Defence MEPs (included in the Eurorealist cluster) that evidence of evolving identities and attitudes was discovered. In terms of identity, the parliamentary experience enabled the Euroenthusiastic MEPs to get accustomed to the idea of “representing the peoples of EU member states”.* They were not against this idea on entering the chamber, but it was only with time that they learnt what it might entail, and started displaying behaviour that may be interpreted as characteristic for such a role: paying more attention to political and economic circumstances in other countries, and considering political problems from the perspective of the entire EU. The MEPs do this not only with the aim of strengthening their position in the chamber, but out of conviction. Their identity was enriched. The responsibility for representing all EU citizens developed besides the allegiance to Polish people.

In terms of attitudes, the parliamentary experience strengthened MEPs’ belief that a strong and effective EU is beneficial for Poland. They are ready to sacrifice (or at least make some adjustments to) the immediate interest of their constituents in order to contribute to reaching decisions that make the EU more effective. “Strong Poland in the EU” was the mantra repeated by all MEPs. The Euroenthusiasts, after some time in the chamber, are more attentive to the objective of — to quote Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, leader of the Civic Platform contingent in the chamber and chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee in the second part of the term — “strong Poland in the strong EU” (Rzeczpospolita 2008: A14). This is visible for instance in the position adopted by the Civic Platform towards the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. Civic Platform MEPs were critical towards the former, arguing that the new voting system was detrimental to Poland, but they accepted the latter — with the same

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* This is how an MEP’s main duty is described in Poland in the Act of 23 January 2004 on Elections to the European Parliament (Article 4).
voting system – as "the vast majority of reforms introduced by the Treaty should be considered as beneficial for Poland and the EU" (ibidem).

In the case of the Self-Defense party, the effects of the socialisation process are particularly striking. Given the stability of views of other Polish Eurocrats and the fact that the Self-Defence party delegation was led by an MEP adhering to the intergovernmental conception of integration, the fact that Self-Defence not only kept away from the very vocal euroscepticism displayed by the League of Polish Families, but generally spoke in very positive terms about the Union proves that service in the EP can successfully transform hesitating individuals into supporters of integration. Obviously other factors should also be taken into consideration: in 2006 the Self-Defence joined the ruling coalition in Poland. Meanwhile, public opinion polls showed farmers – the single most important constituency for the Self-Defence – to be increasingly satisfied with the effects of membership (Szczerbiak 2007). Both of these factors encouraged Self-Defence members to moderate the criticism of the EU for which the party was known. Nonetheless, statements expressed in interviews revealed that the ways in which the parliament works and the eloquence of the chamber's leading figures impressed the Self-Defence representatives and contributed to their strengthened Europeanism.

In sum, the study of Polish experience in the EP only to a certain extent supports the claims that consider institutions as capable of shaping the identities and attitudes of their members. Judging by the findings of this thesis, such a process is much more likely if norms and values to which an individual adheres are compatible with those prevailing within the institution that he or she enters. If it is not the case, the individuals will adapt to the institution on a strategic level, follow the codes of conduct as much as necessary to avoid isolation, but will not internalise institutional norms and values.

The European Parliament as breeding ground for a European elite

The findings of this investigation suggest that the most significant effects of the socialisation process are to be found not in the realm of policy preferences (the dimension of socialisation referred to as attitude change), but in the domain of adaptation to the institutional culture (the second of our dimensions). In other words, service in the chamber influences not so much what MEPs think about different policy areas, but how they feel as representatives of different social groups and how they perceive the policy-making process and participate in it (analyse political problems, carry out negotiations and make decisions). This aspect was largely absent from most studies of socialisation in the EP, while it was highlighted by scholars who focused
on the COREPER and working groups of the European Commission and the Council of the EU.

Jeffrey Lewis described the COREPER as a "mechanism where Member States internalize and endogenize new ways of articulating, defending and representing their self-interests" (1998: 484-5). Replacing "Member States" by "MEPs" — the same can be said of the European Parliament. Evidence from this investigation suggests that it is a place where MEPs learn a new way of making politics. This learning process includes more than just the rules of procedure and tactics, it encompasses changes of mindset. Contacts with issues that have EU-wide repercussions change the way in which MEPs gather information and think about politics. MEPs learn that each significant decision of the chamber is created through long and often difficult negotiations with other national and political groups. Achieving a compromise means avoiding a stalemate and MEPs are generally loathe to leave the negotiations table without a decision. They appreciate much more the necessity to talk to others and convince them in order to achieve results. At the same time, they pay more attention to the needs of their partners and are more open to be convinced themselves. The policy-making process is assessed not only as rivalry with other national delegations and political parties, but a common project. In MEPs' statements a stronger conviction is visible that success of the enterprise means benefits for all participants. As a result MEPs develop a feeling of responsibility for all citizens of the EU and start to identify more strongly with the project of European integration.

The evolution described above can be succinctly described as the transformation of national into European politicians. Elements of such an evolution have already been highlighted by some studies devoted to the EP. Henry Kerr (1973) argued that MEPs become more interested in European issues and start to use a wider variety of information sources, Fernanda Perreira (1998) discovered that Portuguese MEPs displayed a stronger commitment to European integration and a more balanced, less national interest-oriented attitude. We have added to those findings by showing the variety of effects of socialisation in the dimension of adaptation to the institutional culture, and by highlighting how these effects were correlated with attitudes towards integration that MEPs held on entering the EP.

As we have seen earlier, the results of the socialisation process were not uniform and thus the transformation of national into European politicians has not advanced in the same way for all Polish MEPs. MEPs from the Euroenthusiastic cluster are closest to such an ideal of a European elite. The analysis of their statements and behaviour reveals many of the traits of a European politician highlighted in the paragraph above. Moreover, their statements also
convey a clearly positive assessment of those traits. They embraced parliamentary norms and codes of conduct because they perceived them as the right ones. It is that conviction that is missing among the Eurorealists. In their case, the behaviour and attitudes characteristic of a European politician are also noticeable, but their statements reveal that most of the time they are adopted without strong conviction, almost solely because different behaviour would have relegated them to the margin of EP politics. Finally, in the case of the Eurosceptics, the transformation is least manifest. The majority of them were clearly torn between the tendency to contest integration and boycott the EP, dictated by their eurosceptic creed, and the thought that integration brought some benefits to Poland and thus getting involved in the workings of the EP would be wise. Their very nation-centric – not to say nationalist – attitude towards representation made it difficult for them to abide by the parliamentary norms.

While many Polish MEPs displayed views and behaviour that are characteristic of what we can now call in this thesis an ideal-typical European politician, their strong attachment to Poland was also manifest. A number of Polish MEPs emphasised that in order to defend Polish interests they often coordinated their actions, or at least consulted compatriots from other political parties. There is nothing extraordinary about this as most national groups in the EP coordinate their actions in one way or another. What stood out in the Polish case was the media attention that MEPs did not try to avoid (other national groups usually try to keep a low profile), and the importance that they generally ascribed to these meetings in interviews conducted for this thesis. These meetings took place despite tensions on the national political scene and great differences regarding integration. Due to the latter, the discussions of the so-called Polish Club seldom paved the way for a universal Polish position, but the symbolic importance ascribed to them by the MEPs shows that the idea that – as one MEP put it – *in Europe we have to play in one team (MEP 20)* was a principle accepted by all parties.

Reasons for this relatively strongly nation-oriented discourse may be found on the one hand in certain characteristics of Polish internal politics, on the other in the state of the European Union after enlargement of 2004. Poland regained full independence in 1989 only 15 years before it joined the EU. Talk of renouncing a part of sovereignty, however inevitable and beneficial this could be, must have reminded some of Soviet dependence. The nationalist discourse that questioned integration did not carry any negative connotations, as it was the case for example in Spain and Portugal where nationalism was equalled with dictatorship. Much to the contrary, Polish nationalism thrived on its involvement in the struggle for democracy and full independence. Meanwhile, the cosmopolitan and
integrationist discourse ran the risk of being likened to Communist internationalism. Opponents of the EU often referred to the allegedly all-powerful Brussels bureaucracy that was about to take the place of Moscow (Nalewajko 2003: 127). The nationalistic discourse was much more available for Polish politicians than it was for the new MEPs who came from Spain and Portugal in the 1980’s.

Another factor that may explain the relatively pronounced presence of references to national interest in the discourse of Polish representatives is the EU context. The EU in the first decade of the twenty-first century is a much more closely integrated organism than the European Community twenty years earlier (to contrast the Polish experience with that of first Iberian europarlamentarians again). The need for more integration seems less pressing and self-evident now than it was at the moment of the conclusion of the Single European Act. In the second half of the 1980’s, the Community was carrying out a new project, the Common Market, it had leaders committed to integration, an influential and visionary Commission President, Jacques Delors, and the new member states could count on generous help from the richer countries. When Polish MEPs arrived in Brussels in 2004, the EU was on the brink of the constitutional crisis and clearly at pains to define its identity in the post-cold war era; leadership was lacking and the calls for trimming the EU budget provoked apprehension of the new member states. With the idea of integration deprived of momentum, it seems natural that the model of an EU-oriented MEP gave way to a parliamentarian focused on national interest. As was mentioned, many Polish MEPs expressed their disappointment with the attempts of certain old member states at reducing the budget, limiting structural funds and maintaining barriers to free movement of workers. Some statements convey the idea that given these circumstances, Polish representatives felt obliged to give priority to the role of active advocates of the main national concerns.

Thus the transformation of national into European politicians should be seen rather as enrichment than as a complete change of MEPs' identities. For instance, commitment to representing all citizens of the EU obviously excludes national egoism, but national interest remains the principal reference point for the vast majority of MEPs. What was discovered in this study cannot be called a creation of a new post-national identity. Rather another (European) layer is added to MEPs’ identity, of which national allegiance remains an important component.
7.5 Avenues for further research

This thesis stressed the importance of the dimension of socialisation called adaptation to the institutional culture of the chamber. While previous studies focused mostly on MEPs' views on integration, this thesis emphasises that service in the chamber may have important consequences for MEPs' perception of the EU policy-making process, their behaviour within this process and their identity as representatives of various groups. It is in this realm that the findings of this thesis can chart the path for further research. This investigation privileged breadth over depth, in that its aim was to study the effects of service in different domains and thus many different aspects of adaptation to parliamentary life were touched upon in interviews with MEPs. This approach yielded a rich picture of socialisation, but as the majority of interviews could not last more than 45 minutes some issues were explored only tentatively.

One such issue is the relationship between the representative role and behaviour. This thesis presented a number of examples demonstrating that the MEPs who stressed the importance of balancing the national and EU interest acted accordingly by paying attention to the needs of other member states and avoiding positions that could be seen as too nationalistic. But a wider examination, spanning different policy areas, would be needed to have a more robust basis for the conclusion that differences between Eurorealists and Euroenthusiasts in the approach to the representative role were visible not only in their discourse, but also in deeds.

A number of MEPs interviewed pointed out that some issue areas were particularly propitious for developing a more EU-oriented representative role, while others provoked rivalry between member states. The correlation between issue areas or committee assignment and propensity to adopt a broad European representative role could be further examined.

Few examples of Polish MEPs being convinced by counterparts on a concrete issue have been found. As was shown, when quizzed on this aspect most Polish MEPs came up with examples of themselves convincing others. A study thoroughly analyzing a number of case studies could reveal more about the nature of bargaining in the chamber, showing when MEPs try to persuade each other and when they arrive at final decisions just by trading concessions.

Research into the activities of MEPs who left the EP at the end of the term in 2009 (or were not re-elected) would help to answer the question of how significant and/or lasting the effects of the socialisation process are. Such studies could verify whether the EP experience influences the way in which former MEPs subsequently perform their new political duties.
Finally, the issue of agents of socialisation also merits further attention. The findings of this thesis suggest that it is difficult to claim that other, non-freshmen, MEPs are the main socialising force. Only some Polish MEPs pointed to direct conversations with more experienced counterparts as key events in their socialisation process. Accounts of others suggested that they learnt and adapted to the EP mainly by observing parliamentary life. Still others relied on the advice of Polish MEPs with significant political experience. Events on the national political scene were discovered to be significant for MEPs' decisions and the evolution of their political outlook as well. In short, MEPs' views can be influenced by multiple factors. Further research is needed to bring more information about the significance of these factors, and the potential relations between them.
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191

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Appendix 1 Questionnaire for Members of the European Parliament

1. How would you assess the terms of entry granted to your country in the EU?

- [ ] very negative  [ ] negative  [ ] rather negative
- [ ] rather positive  [ ] positive  [ ] very positive

2. What effect for your country will the membership have in the areas mentioned below?

   Negative (1), rather negative (2), rather positive (3), positive (4)

   - Industry 1 2 3 4
   - Trade 1 2 3 4
   - Agriculture 1 2 3 4
   - Service industries 1 2 3 4
   - Protection of the environment 1 2 3 4
   - Your country's status in the international arena 1 2 3 4
   - Culture, tradition and language 1 2 3 4

3. In which areas, if any, is further integration needed?

4. Would it have a positive or negative effect for your country if, in the domains mentioned below, more decisions were made at the EU level?

   very negative (1), negative (2), rather negative (3), rather positive (4), positive (5), very positive (6)

   - Foreign and defence policy 1 2 3 4 5 6
   - Internal security 1 2 3 4 5 6
   - Immigration policy 1 2 3 4 5 6
   - Corporate and income tax 1 2 3 4 5 6
   - Employment law and workers' rights 1 2 3 4 5 6
   - Health and social protection 1 2 3 4 5 6
   - Education 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Given the present overall balance of influence among the following bodies, do you think their influence on policy formation should be increased, decreased or remain the same?

*Decreased (1), rather decreased (2), remain the same (3), rather increased (4), increased (5)*

- The European Council Summits 1 2 3 4 5
- The Council of Ministers 1 2 3 4 5
- The Commission 1 2 3 4 5
- The European Parliament 1 2 3 4 5

6. In a referendum, or a parliamentary ratification process, which position towards the European Constitution would you personally like to see adopted?

- For
- Against

7. Do you think that there is a ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU?

*Yes  No*

If so, which changes could contribute to reducing the democratic deficit in the EU?

*No (1), rather not (2), rather yes (3), yes (4)*

- Tighter control of national parliaments over European legislation 1 2 3 4
- Limiting the role of the Union in some areas where it shares the competence with nation states 1 2 3 4
- Strengthening of the European Commission 1 2 3 4
- Electing a European President by universal suffrage 1 2 3 4
- Granting stronger influence over legislative matters to the European Parliament 1 2 3 4
- Other

8. Which of the following countries could at some point – provided that they fulfil formal criteria – become members of the EU

- Turkey yes no
- Ukraine yes no
- Belarus yes no
- Russia yes no
- Northern African countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) yes no
9. How important is it for you to represent in the EP the interests of the groups mentioned below?

Not important (1), rather not important (2), rather important (3), important (4), very important (5)

- Your electors
- Your national party
- EP party group
- Citizens of your country
- Citizens of the EU

10. In the EP, are you expecting the influence of your national party to be...

Please rank on a 1 – 5 scale, where 1 – nonexistent and 5 – considerable

1 2 3 4 5

11. How would you assess the influence that the EP has in the decision-making process?

Please rank on a 1 – 5 scale, where 1 – nonexistent and 5 – considerable

1 2 3 4 5

12. How would you describe EP’s contribution to the EU decision-making?

☐ negative  ☐ rather negative  ☐ rather positive  ☐ positive

13. To what extent do the views presented by the EP party group of which you are a member reflect your own position on European issues?

Choose one of the answers below. Please disregard this question if you are a non-attached MEP

☐ Almost perfect convergence of views
☐ On the most important issues I agree with my group’s official position
☐ Usually, I agree with the party group, but on some important issues my stance is different
☐ Often my views differ from group’s official position
☐ Most of the time, I take a stance that is different from the one adopted by the group
14. In the future, which prerogatives should be granted to the EP?


- The capacity to initiate legislation
- More issues decided through the co-decision procedure
- Greater role in the drafting of the EU budget
- The right to elect Commission President from among the candidates presented by the European Council
- Greater role in the construction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
- Other, please state

15. How important are for you the following activities of an MEP?

*Not important* (1), *rather not important* (2), *rather important* (3), *important* (4), *very important* (5)

- Legislation
- Oversight of the European Commission
- Representing the citizens in your constituency/country
- Providing your party/electors with information about the developments in European politics
- Reinforcing co-operation with other parties in the EP group

16. Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following sentences:

- In the EP, my national party’s influence on the decision-making process will depend on the close co-operation with the EP group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>rather disagree</th>
<th>rather agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
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</thead>
</table>

- With the new voting system, proposed by the European Convention, the interests of my country can be effectively protected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>rather disagree</th>
<th>rather agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
</tr>
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</table>

- The necessity of adapting to all the European economic policies will harm rather than help my country’s economic development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>rather disagree</th>
<th>rather agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
• The funds allocated to the Common Agricultural Policy should be limited, so that more money can be invested in the domains that create an economy based on advanced technologies and knowledge.

  disagree  
  rather disagree  
  rather agree  
  agree

• Defending an anti-European stance largely makes efficient action in the EP difficult.

  disagree  
  rather disagree  
  rather agree  
  agree

• The EU should remain primarily an economic, not political, community.

  disagree  
  rather disagree  
  rather agree  
  agree

• To co-operate with its chosen party group in the EP my party will have to modify its stance on certain issues.

  disagree  
  rather disagree  
  rather agree  
  agree

• The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers should have equal influence over the legislative process.

  disagree  
  rather disagree  
  rather agree  
  agree

• MEPs from other member states will show much understanding for my country’s needs.

  disagree  
  rather disagree  
  rather agree  
  agree

• One of the greatest dangers for the EU is the tendency to domination of the so-called “big states”.

  disagree  
  rather disagree  
  rather agree  
  agree

• For an MEP the community interest should be as important as the one of their country.

  disagree  
  rather disagree  
  rather agree  
  agree

• On issues such as abortion or homosexual marriage, European institutions should promote common standards previously agreed by member states.

  disagree  
  rather disagree  
  rather agree  
  agree

• In order to have a coherent common foreign policy it is necessary to introduce qualified majority voting in a larger number of issues.

  disagree  
  rather disagree  
  rather agree  
  agree
17. Could you rank the importance of the factors that incited you to field your candidature in the European elections

* Not important (1), rather not important (2), rather important (3), important (4), very important (5)

- Building your own political career
  - 1
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5

- Promoting your party’s interest
  - 1
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5

- Defending your country’s interests on the European arena
  - 1
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5

- Representing the citizens of the UE
  - 1
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5

- Promoting the role of the EU in the world
  - 1
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5

- Other, please state

18. How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the EU?

☐ very dissatisfied ☐ dissatisfied ☐ rather dissatisfied

☐ rather satisfied ☐ satisfied ☐ very satisfied

Personal data

Gender ☐ Female ☐ Male

Nationality

Education

Previous political experience ☐ MP ☐ Member of government ☐ Member of local assembly/local government ☐ Observer in the European Parliament
## Appendix 2 List of interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/cluster</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Interview at T1 2004</th>
<th>Interview at T2 2006</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Civic Platform/Euroenthusiasts</strong></td>
<td>Barbara Kudyrycka</td>
<td>28 September, Brussels</td>
<td>4 July, Strasbourg</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pawel Piskorski</td>
<td>9 September, Brussels</td>
<td>11 July, Brussels</td>
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<td>Zbigniew Zaleski</td>
<td>23 September, Brussels</td>
<td>20 June, Brussels</td>
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<td>Jacek Saryusz-Wolski</td>
<td>30 September, Brussels</td>
<td>November, Brussels</td>
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<td>Filip Kaczmarek</td>
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<td>23 September, Brussels</td>
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<td>Jan Olbrycht</td>
<td>29 September, Brussels</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Bogdan Klich</td>
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<td>Bronisław Geremek</td>
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