Istanbul: the making of a global city between East and West

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Istanbul: The Making of a Global City between East and West

Özgür Sayın

A doctoral thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

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ABSTRACT

From the outset global cities have been primarily seen as outcomes of changes in global economic capitalism. This has led to critical responses arguing for the need to consider more centrally the role of politics in global city formation, and in particular the need to critically analyse city-state relations in varying geographical contexts. Three dominant strands of critique have emerged: a literature on state rescaling (primarily based on experiences of North American and Western European cities), a literature on developmental states (on East Asian cities) and a literature on postcolonial urban theory (primarily on cities in the Global South). Although these approaches all argue for a re-focusing on the role of the political in global city formation, they do not easily fit other geographical and geopolitical contexts. This thesis aims to contribute to the debate by focusing on the case of Istanbul as Turkey’s emerging global city. Based on semi-structured interviews, this research challenges some key assumptions of global cities research, state rescaling approach, developmental approach and postcolonial urban theory through the case of Istanbul. It also provides a critical conceptual understanding of Istanbul’s globalisation, argues the role of actors in global city making and will demonstrate that contrary to what is generally claimed in the literature, the relationship between Istanbul (city) and Turkey (state) could be assessed as more harmonious rather than tension-filled. Furthermore, the research goes beyond revealing the points where Istanbul conforms or does not conform to the existing approaches, and addresses the very recent academic debates between those who believe that we need new theories to understand the dynamics and impacts of the actual global urbanisation and those who suggest that instead of calling for new theories there is a need to examine and improve the existing approaches. To do that, my research develops an alternative conceptualisation -- the in-between city - that might cover the cities located in the region spreading from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. The argument behind this concept is that owing to their intersectional positions between East and West, and the continual links between their imperial and global periods, cities such as Istanbul, Vienna, Budapest, St. Petersburg or Moscow, present more hybrid characteristics in comparison to the cities categorised by the existing approaches.

Key words: global cities, world cities, globalisation, Istanbul
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Abbreviations

AKP – Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)

CHP – Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)

CCP – Istanbul Chamber of City Planners (İstanbul Şehir Plancıları Odası)

DP – Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti)

IDA – Istanbul Development Agency (İstanbul Kalkınma Ajansı)

IFC – Istanbul International Financial Centre (İstanbul Uluslararası Finans Merkezi)

IMM – Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi)

ISPAT – The Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Investment Support and Promotion Agency (Başbakanlık Yatırım Destekleme ve Teşvik Ajansı)

TOKI – Mass Housing Administration (Başbakanlık Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı)

MOD – Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Kalkınma Bakanlığı)

MOEU – Republic of Turkey Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Çevre ve Şehircilik Bakanlığı)

MOTI – Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ulaştırma ve Altyapı Bakanlığı)

RP – Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)
“This paper calls for ‘new geographies’ of imagination and epistemology in the production of urban and regional theory. It argues that the dominant theorizations of global city-regions are rooted in the EuroAmerican experience and are thus unable to analyse multiple forms of metropolitan modernities” (Roy, 2009: 819).

“[T]here is an urgent need to go beyond narrow calls for ‘new’ theory to more openly recognise the validity of renewing existing approaches to urban theory making. Less fashionable but far more important is the task of ‘stress-testing’ both new and existing concepts” (Hoyler and Harrison, 2017: 2854).

1.1 Global Cities at Centre Stage

Presenting ‘world’ and ‘global’ cities as new city typologies¹, John Friedmann (1986) and Saskia Sassen (1991) are synonymous with the beginnings of a new epoch in urban studies. At that same time, they also lit the touch paper on what has developed into a longstanding, and sometimes heated, debate on the impact of global cities research on urban theory making (Robinson, 2002; Roy, 2009; Peck, 2015; van Meeteren et al., 2016; Hoyler and Harrison, 2017). From the criteria they used to characterise world and global cities, to their main claims and assumptions (e.g. the driving forces behind the global/world cities, functions of these cities, their relationship between each other and with their host states), through to the geographical scope of their research, have long been critiqued and defended by scholars writing from various disciplinary backgrounds and geographic contexts (Acuto and Steele, 2013).

Over the following past three decades, global cities research has remained at the very centre of an academic polarisation of which the various urban approaches are located on different sides of the argument. In this thesis, the most established approaches – or schools of thought – are examined: (i) the global cities thesis; (ii) the state rescaling approach; (iii) the developmental perspective; and (iv) postcolonial urban theory.

¹ Both terms are often used synonymously and interchangeably, albeit with subtle nuances which are discussed in Chapter 2.
Against the backdrop of a restructured global economy characterised by diminishing profits in industrial production, increasing mobility of commodity, labour and capital through technological and political developments, and a geographically more open and market-based form of flexible accumulation, the rise of global and world cities research was the recognition that dense nodes of economic, social and political activity were where globalised capital accumulation crystallised out on the ground (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991; Scott, 2001). Further, in so far as global capital, along with others above, became more mobile across the world, the control capacities of the nation-states within their own borders began to be diminished, and so the sub-national forms of states became more apparent (Taylor 1994; 1995). That is, it was recognition that a select group of increasingly powerful global and world cities harboured the geoeconomic power to orchestrate the operation of the global economy (Beaverstock et al., 1999), and that these cities are increasingly connected to each other in diverse ways in a network – what is commonly referred to as the World City Network (Taylor, 2004b; Taylor and Derudder, 2016) – superseding national boundaries (Taylor, 1997). In subsequent years, a vast array of interventions have extended the theoretical, empirical and methodological scope of global cities research (Derudder et al., 2012; Ren and Keil, 2018), and the initial assumptions and empirical findings of global cities researchers have prompted the emergence of an extensive literature which has come to dominate – and arguably create – the field of global urban studies.

However, global cities research has also been confronting serious criticisms. The first of those is that global city theory contains an inherent political deficit: namely, that it explains the emergence of global cities with the transformation of the global economic system and minimises the role of the national/regional/local governmental actors (Brenner, 2004a; Ancien, 2011; Acuto, 2013 a/b). The second is that the empirical applications of the global cities research are narrowly constructed from, and reinforce, a North American/Western European geopolitical context. Somewhat related to this, the third critique is that the global city argument falls far from explaining how global cities emerge in geographical contexts outside the global North/Western world. These deficiencies have seen the emergence of other global urban approaches which have critically engaged with global and world cities research – most notably, a state rescaling approach which has its origins in the same North American/Western European context of neoliberal urbanism, postcolonial urban theory which is rooted in advancing a Southern perspective, and a literature on developmental states which has its origins in Asia.
The state rescaling approach provides geo-politico-economic insights into the emergence of global cities through drawing attention to the administrative and financial restructuring of advanced capitalist states under conditions of globalisation (Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner, 1998; Keil, 2003). Facing up to the serious crises in the Keynesian-Fordist system during the 1970s, nation-states in North America and Western Europe have not perished as some predicted (Ohmae, 1995); rather they have witnessed an intensive period of rescaling as power, responsibility and authority has been ‘hollowed out’ from the national level and ‘filled in’ at both supranational and subnational scales (Brenner, 2004a, 2018b; Keating, 2013, 2014; Harrison, 2015). Through case-based empirical works, the state rescaling approach makes significant contributions to the political deficits of the mainstream research. Yet, just as in global cities research, the rescaling approach too suffers from the same geographical limitations. More precisely, albeit often assumed to be true, it is still questionable whether rescaling has taken place – certainly to the same extent – in practice in non-western settings (Park, 2013).

The developmental literature emerged from concerns about the applicability of the global cities paradigm in the East Asian context. Developmentalist accounts advocate that because of their political, historical, and even religious characteristics, East Asian global cities (e.g. Tokyo, Seoul) and city-states (Singapore) present a different city typology from the western global cities (Hill and Kim, 2000; Saito, 2003; Ma and Timberlake, 2013). More specifically, the developmental characteristics of the East Asian states mean they have not been simply hollowed-out, nor have been rescaled in a similar way to that the western-centred literature asserts (Fujita, 2011). Instead, considering the economic opportunities which globalisation offers, they have reconfigured their development policies and the developmental state apparatuses (Waley, 2007; Park, Hill and Saito, 2012). Of particular interest is how global city making is often seen as a part of these changing developmental strategies and supported by the national governments as the impetus of national economic development (Fujita, 2011).

The third important counter-theory to the global cities thesis is what many refer to as the postcolonial critique. To the postcolonial researchers, global cities research suffers from an intellectual parochialism because it looks at global South cities through the lenses of the global North (Parnell and Robinson, 2013), and fails to explain local dynamics of global Southern cities that have different historical patterns (Chakravorty, 2000; Miraftab, 2012; Schindler, 2017). Further, by focusing on a small number of specific cities, global cities research drops many cities of the global South off the map of global urban research
(Robinson, 2002; Roy, 2009). Those writing from a postcolonial perspective argue that we should see all cities as ‘ordinary cities’ (Robinson, 2006) and adopt a comparative perspective that puts ‘off the map’ cities back on to the map of global urban research (McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 2011; 2016) in order to understand local dynamics of global/globalising cities in the global South (Dupont, 2011; Shatkin, 2014). More explicitly, they advocate entirely ‘new geographies’ of urban theory, without North-Western lenses to understand the 21st-century metropolis (Roy, 2009; 2016).

Taken all together, global/world cities research and three critical approaches make invaluable contributions to urban theory making. They provide a comprehensive understanding of changing social, spatial, economic, political patterns of cities under globalisation. They, moreover, develop very beneficial arguments about changing relations between cities and nation states; global linkages between cities; divergent and convergent dynamics of the cities from different geoeconomic and geopolitical contexts. These arguments have the power to provide an explanation for hundreds of cities from the global North and the global South (or from West and the East). In other words, after three decades, the cartography of the global urban studies covers a significant part of the world map today.

Despite all these contributions, since global cities research is still “an evolving literature” (van Meeteren et al, 2016: 254), it always needs empirical and theoretical interventions that extend and deepen the knowledge of the research agenda. In that sense, first of all, some recent studies show that there is also an increasing need (and demand) for stress-testing of existing theories (Peck, 2015; Hoyler and Harrison, 2017; Krijnen et al., 2017; Derudder and Taylor, 2018). Secondly, the research also needs interventions to cease the ongoing academic polarisation between different approaches, which might be possible by developing a more nuanced body of global cities research (Sigler, 2016) and revealing the pluralist nature of urban theory making (Peck, 2015). Thirdly, the conceptual map of global urban studies needs to be extended. While existing approaches handled in this thesis build their arguments on certain geographies such as global North, East Asia, or global South, other geographical regions remain outside of their scope (e.g. Eastern Europe or Eurasia) and are commonly excluded – or at least less well-represented – in the research agenda.

The vital question here is which cities can be best for stress-testing and extending the research in line with above critiques. As argued above, many of the existing studies have an overall tendency to focus on core cities which have certain characteristics that fit their story (e.g. New
York-London for global cities, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Mumbai for postcolonial urban theory). These cities, however, reproduce and enhance the existing polarisation, as they can be explained by one theory and cannot be explained by others. However, van Meeteren et al. (2016: 254) suggest that “exclusively drawing on older references has the effect of neglecting developments that may be meaningful when appraising the literature”. Therefore, rather than focusing on these often-used cities, it is necessary to focus on the cities outside these geographical patterns. By the same token, the cities to be selected must have plural and intersectional characteristics that simultaneously allow for stress-testing the four main approaches in global urban research.

This thesis suggests that these cities are neither ‘on the map’ or ‘off the map’ but stand in the very middle of the map. Leading cities of Russia, Turkey, Hungary (standing between Asia and Europe), or Austria (between East and West Europe) might be presented as examples of these. These cities, first, because of their distinctive geographical, historical and political patterns, present an uncomfortable area that existing theories might have difficulty to categorise alone. In other words, unlike the other cities mentioned above, these cities might be considered a neutral ground for the theories. However, at the same time, owing to their geographical positions, these cities bear the political and social traces of looking East and West (plus other possible variants), so they have great potential to allow us to put these theories into a stress test simultaneously. In brief, global cities research arguably needs interventions from the in-between of the map if it wants to become more global.

1.2 Extending Global Cities Research to Consider Cities Caught In-Between: Istanbul on the Stage

Is Istanbul a global city? According to the latest GaWC ranking, in 2016 Istanbul was classified as Alpha (along with 18 other cities); only nine cities have a higher classification (Alpha+, Alpha++). However, where to draw the line to determine what is and what is not a global city is something contentious. Ultimately this is not the most important question. What is not in doubt is that Istanbul is a regionally and globally connected city – best thought of as a globalising city – and the question of global city-ness is secondary in this thesis to the question of how useful the global city concept is in deepening our understanding of Istanbul (and other similar cities) and its urban development.
As the only major city sitting on two continents, Europe and Asia, Istanbul seems to be an excellent case study to stress-test the major approaches in global urban theory and to extend the geography of global urban research. Simply stated, Istanbul is located at the intersection between East and West, and also North and South (Sassen, 2009: 2018). As the capital of three major empires it also has a distinctive historical pattern compared to many other cities around the world (Sarkis, 2009). Crucially, unlike the core global cities, Istanbul was not a part of the Keynesian-Welfare system, so it is not a part of the post-Keynesian geography. Moreover, Turkey has never been a colony like many global South countries and cannot be considered postcolonial. Contrary, it had been an imperial power whose capital was Istanbul. Finally, Turkey is not a developmental state, so Istanbul is not a developmental city or Istanbul-Turkey a city-state.

Looking from these perspectives, it is hard to put Istanbul within one of the existing categories discussed above. The city challenges certain assumptions of the global cities paradigm (Akcan, 2015). By the same token, it also differs from the state rescaling arguments as it follows a different neoliberal path in which administrative structure has not been decentralised in practice (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; Kuyucu, 2018). In other words, Istanbul is not a typical “western/global North” global city. However, due to the above-mentioned features, Istanbul is not a typical Eastern developmental city or city-state, or a global South postcolonial city either. In the past, Istanbul had been defined as a special city having both eastern and western characteristics (Ortaylı, 1978). Today, it “represents the characteristics of both the Global South and North” (Yetişkul and Demirel, 2018). In short, as Sudjic (2009: 4) aptly puts it:

“[Istanbul] is a city like no other and yet it is a city that has things in common with many other cities, even if it does not always recognize it.”

Therefore, focusing on Istanbul as a case-study, this thesis in many respects contributes to the current body of global urban studies. First and foremost, this study extends the map of global urban research by explaining the emergence of Istanbul as a global city. In a study by the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) research group that classified Istanbul as a “Gamma” World City in 2000, the authors noted that “Istanbul is noteworthy because there are no other world cities identified for the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, or Central Asia” (Walker and Taylor, 2000: para.3). In the latest GaWC report, Istanbul is an “Alpha” World City and one of the leading cities in the same hinterland (GaWC, 2017). To explain the
political, economic, global and historical dynamics behind this uptrend, which has not found an adequate place in the literature yet, is at least as important as this rise itself. Moreover, this thesis offers more than just an explanation of a single case-study. It also provides a basis for future studies involving other cities that have similar geographic and historical dynamics to Istanbul, such as Vienna, St. Petersburg, or Moscow. Such a conceptualisation allows an extension to the existing map of global cities research, but also urban theory making.

Secondly, the dissertation contributes to the recent calls for stress-testing the existing theories in global urban research (Hoyler and Harrison, 2017). The study also provides new ways for this stress-testing, such as examining the role of the central and local governments in Istanbul’s global path, the divergent nature of the local-central relationship, sectoral change, and the city’s national linkages. Additionally, putting the three counter-arguments to test, the study also methodologically contributes to stress-testing. Comparative studies often contrast two cities, or two different approaches, however, this study compares four different approaches in a single-case study. For example, apart from the global cities theory, the research also examines the applicability of the geo-political-economic approach to Istanbul through discussing the rescaling process in Turkey. Likewise, the strong central government argument is also used for testing the developmental approaches. Moreover, the case of Istanbul also challenges the postcolonial thesis by searching for traces of ‘catch-up’ motivation, which is posited to be among the key characteristic of non-western cases.

Thirdly and finally, this study, as a side benefit, might serve as an example of how to reduce the contestations and polarisations between different approaches and for bridging them akin to how Istanbul connects the continents. With the exception of urban network studies, which include a large number of cities, the majority of the case-studies discussed so far focus on cities with certain characteristics. This is mostly because these cities offer a comfortable way to show the strength of an argument and/or a critique. As for Istanbul, the city sits in a very advantageous location in terms of geographical connectivity and remains in the centre of different intersections. That is to say, with a reference to the above quote of Sudjic, Istanbul on the one hand challenges all four approaches, but on the other hand, has some partial similarities with the cities being framed by these approaches. This partiality can help the in black-white toned academic debates (explain/not-explain, applicable/not-applicable) evolve towards exploring new ground in which different approaches meet and interlock – a form of bricolage.
1.3 Aims and Objectives

Using Istanbul as a case study, the main aim of this thesis is to stress-test four main global urban approaches and to extend the map of global urban research.

To achieve this, the objectives of the thesis are as follows:

i) To situate the development of Istanbul as a global city within the context of four dominant theoretical approaches: global cities research, state rescaling approach, research on developmental cities, and postcolonial urban theories.

ii) To examine the roles of global city-makers in the emergence of Istanbul as a global city, and to assess the relationship between them.

iii) To develop a critical conceptual understanding of Istanbul’s development under globalisation.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is structured in two parts. The first half of the thesis (Chapters 2-4) develops the theoretical, historical and methodological arguments for adopting a singular case study to the wider body of global urban research. More specifically, drawing on theoretical discussions in mainstream global cities research, Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of this literature from when it has emerged to where it stands now. The chapter then discusses three critical approaches (state rescaling, postcolonial and developmental) including their critiques of global cities research, their main assumptions, and their major contributions to global urban studies. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on how the current body of global urban research might be extended and how explaining Istanbul might help achieving this.

Chapter 3 examines the urban development of Istanbul within three different periods – imperial, national and global – and argues that the city has followed a different trajectory than many other cities discussed in the literature. It suggests that various dynamics shaping the global city formation of Istanbul (e.g. strong central government and the aspiration to become a leading global city) can only be understood within this historical trajectory, notably the continuity between the imperial capital and the global city. Finally, it discusses whether Istanbul is a unique or exceptional city and introduces the in-between city concept that might
provide an insight not only into Istanbul but also into other cities such as Vienna, St. Petersburg or Moscow.

Chapter 4 discusses the methodological approach which has been applied to empirically answer the theoretical questions of the thesis. Beginning with a brief discussion tracing the recent methodological approaches in global urban studies, the chapter, firstly, argues why semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders and individuals, supported with secondary sources, is a suitable way to make sense of the global development of Istanbul. The chapter then outlines the steps being followed before, during, and after the fieldwork. It explains how potential interviewees were selected and recruited, how robust research was conducted in the field, and how a substantial body of voice recordings was turned into codified data providing the empirical basis for examining the research questions.

The second half of the thesis (Chapters 5-7) outlines the empirical findings based on the data collected in the field and the secondary sources. Chapter 5 reveals important insights into Istanbul’s global development and positions this development within national and international urban systems. It does this, first, by blending official economic and demographic statistical data with the opinions of participants with different perspectives, positions, and occupations, providing relevant background knowledge beyond the published materials on the topic. Second, it discusses that as Turkey’s major city and economic capital, Istanbul’s global development is seen as an instrument of national economic development. Moreover, it reveals that globalisation does not provide uneven economic growth beneficial to only the country’s leading city, but other major cities in Turkey have also enjoyed economic growth in this process. Third, it discusses that with this development Istanbul should be assessed in-between the top global cities and the non-western cities such as cities of the global South.

Chapter 6 focuses on the political dynamics behind what is discussed in Chapter 5. It outlines how central and local governmental actors have been shaping Istanbul’s global development (e.g. through legal arrangements, visionary projects, or mega-projects), and interprets the nature of the relations between these actors. The chapter challenges some widespread arguments in mainstream global urban research in two principal ways. First, it reveals that contrary to the assumption that local authorities have a growing autonomy in their own cities, the Turkish central government is still the leading actor in urban policy-making. Second, it shows that the local and central relations are not necessarily in tension, on the contrary, there are strong rational and political reasons for this relationship to be harmonious for both sides.
Chapter 7 seeks to explain the emergence of Istanbul as a global city by returning to the four leading perspectives in global urban studies as potential explanatory tools. To this end, it separately assesses the global city formation of Istanbul within the perspectives of each of the four approaches. The central argument here is that even though Istanbul, owing to its position at the intersection between East and West, can be explained to a certain degree by each of these four approaches, it has also strong political, economic, and relational characteristics challenging their fundamental assumptions.

Chapter 8 acts as a discussion and conclusion chapter and blends the ideas being put forward in the empirical chapters under the light of the existing literature. Furthermore, and more explicitly, with an empirically supported theoretical debate, the chapter assesses whether explaining Istanbul (and some other similar cities) requires a new conceptual frame or a blend of the existing approaches. The chapter, in this way, encourages the reader to reflect on the observation that historical and geographical differences between cities necessitate different perspectives, if not new conceptualisations, to understand their ongoing global developments.

Overall this thesis contributes to advancing contemporary debates in global urban studies by forming an empirical basis for stress-testing major global urban approaches, interrogating local dynamics of global city-making in a highly centralised state, and providing a critical conceptual understanding of Istanbul’s development as a global city. Furthermore, based on these arguments being drawn in the empirical chapters, the thesis speculates on how existing conceptual frameworks could be blended and expanded so as to explain those cities which fall into the cracks between the main approaches for doing global urban research. By doing this, the thesis goes beyond the explanation of a case study and aspires to find a more pluralist and less polarised way of global urban theory making. In order to justify these contributions, the next two chapters respectively critically discuss existing theoretical approaches in global urban research and reveal why Istanbul requires a different perspective.
CHAPTER 2

Global Cities Research & Urban Theory Making

2.1 Introduction: Theorising Cities in the age of Globalisation

The geographies of globalised urbanisation have been a focal point for research following the collapse of Fordist manufacturing in the 1970s. This collapse sparked significant changes to the way the global economy was managed and organised, political structures were rescaled, and the relationship between state and civil society was reconstituted (Brenner, 2004a). Since the 1970s, urbanists – be they geographers, sociologists, economists or historians – have sought to develop new theoretical and conceptual frameworks to account for the rapidly changing nature of globalised urbanisation (Ward and Jonas, 2004; Brenner, 2018b). One of the most influential theoretical framings to emerge for understanding the new geographies of globalised urbanisation was the global and world cities thesis (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991).

Although global cities research has had a ground-breaking effect on shaping the nature of urban studies over the past quarter-century (Acuto and Steele, 2013; Derudder et al., 2012; Parnreiter, 2013), it has not escaped some strong criticisms. Many different approaches have critically engaged with global cities research. Among the critical approaches, perhaps the three most stringent approaches are (i) the state rescaling approach, (ii) the developmental approach, and (iii) postcolonial urban theory. Each of these approaches – based on different theoretical grounds, concentrating on different historical, geographical and/or political contexts, criticising different points of global cities theory – has built a vast range of critical works with different proposals ranging from new theory calls (e.g. Hill and Kim, 2000; Brenner, 2009; Roy, 2009; Brenner and Schmid, 2015) to internationalising urban research (Robinson, 2011; Parnell, 2016).

Recent studies show that these debates continue with an increasing momentum (Brenner and Schmid, 2015; Robinson, 2016a; Storper and Scott, 2016; van Meeteren et al., 2016; Schindler, 2017). On the other hand, many recent studies advance the argument that there is a need for engaged pluralism and a more nuanced body of global urban research to understand and conceptualise the planetary scale urbanisation, which contains new and different cities, relations and networks, urbanisation patterns and dynamics (e.g. Sigler, 2016; van Meeteren et al., 2016; Brenner, 2018a). This can be done by finding innovative ways of doing global
urban research (Harrison and Hoyler, 2018a/b), expanding the empirical scope and geography of the research (e.g. Derudder and Taylor, 2016), and/or stress-testing existing approaches (Hoyler and Harrison, 2017; Krijnen et al., 2017; Derudder and Taylor, 2018). As in this study, this can also be done in a way including three of the above, that is, stress-testing all approaches in a single example in a case-study which cannot easily fit into one of these existing approaches. Such a work might reveal why these theories should be improved and how they can be improved, instead of strengthening a “polemical pluralism” (van Meeteren et al., 2016) which implies that one theory can explain, while others cannot.

In the light of these discussions and taking into consideration the current calls in global urban research, this chapter critically evaluates four major approaches in global urban studies in turn. In line with this aim, the chapter begins with a critical review of global and world cities research (2.2). It then proceeds to discuss other critical approaches; respectively (2.3.1) state rescaling approach, (2.3.2) developmental approach and (2.3.2) postcolonial urban theory. In the concluding part (2.4), the chapter discusses potential ways to extend the research and suggests that stress-testing is a fruitful way to do this. Finally, that part also discusses why and how Istanbul offers great potential for stress-testing all four major approaches.

2.2 Global Cities Research: The Geoeconomic Logic for Global City Formation

Studies analysing cities according to their functions and/or positions within an international system can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century, but this took on another meaning when the world/global cities literature emerged in the 1980s following the collapse of North Atlantic Fordist manufacturing and Keynesianism in the 1970s. It was the observation that a select number of so-called ‘world’ or ‘global’ cities, predominantly in North America and Western Europe, were playing a significant role as anchor points for increasingly mobile, transnational capital, labour and knowledge that triggered a new approach to conceptualising these new urban forms (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991; although these two terms are generally used interchangeably, as explained below, each of them is based on different analytical frameworks). This then raised the idea that these cities are linked to each other and hierarchically positioned in a global network which transcends national boundaries (Taylor, 1994). Building on these theoretical origins, subsequent studies have produced an extensive body of work commonly referred to as global/world cities research. The research, nevertheless, still has some shortfalls arising from the geoeconomic perspective on which its theoretical assumptions are based.
The original world city hypothesis was as an interpretation of the “spatial organization of the new international division of labour” (Friedmann, 1986: 69) within a world-systems perspective. Simply put, what creates this new division of labour is two important processes: a shift of the activities of global corporations from industrial to non-industrial sectors and increasing capital and labour mobility (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). In this way, global capital was argued to be free of national ties and boundaries, and the global economic map was reshaped from discrete national space economies towards a network of cities which housed the headquarters of these large global corporations which were seen to be managing and orchestrating the global economy. In other words, while the old international division of labour is based on state-centred categorisations, the new international division of labour (NIDL) assumes a city-centred hierarchical system. In this system core cities are the spaces of finance, insurance, real estate (FIRE) and advanced producer services (APS), the leading-edge sectors of the globalising economy, and periphery and semi-periphery cities are the spaces of industrial and commodity production (Friedmann, 1986).

According to Friedmann and Wolff (1982: 310), “at the apex of this hierarchy are found a small number of massive urban regions that we shall call world cities”, such as New York, Tokyo and London. To identify this new city type, Friedmann (1986: 72) applied certain criteria such as “major financial centre, headquarters for TNC, rapid growth of business services sector; population size”. Further, being a world city depends on a city’s role in the global economic system. For example, world cities are “the basing points for capital in the spatial organization and articulation of production and markets” (Friedmann, 1986: 71). Additionally, world cities are the spatial reflections of controlling production and market units by transnational capital, by serving as banking and financial centres, administrative headquarters, centres of ideological control, and so on (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982).

Sassen (1991) takes the arguments of Friedmann (1986) and Friedmann and Wolff (1982) a step further and shifts the terminology to speak of ‘global’ cities. Sassen (2001: 347) argues that the purpose of her global city concept is “to conceive of economic globalization not just as capital flows, but as the work of coordinating, managing, and servicing these flows.” For Sassen, trans-border economic and technological developments have not only extended the geography of capitalism but also complicated it, global companies have therefore established headquarters in some cities to manage and control their dispersed activities. Global cities have emerged as the strategic sites in which these command and control functions are highly concentrated and centralised. Along with these strategic functions, a new demand for APS
firms has developed in these cities. Since the global companies have outsourced some of their managerial and organisational functions to specialised service firms such as information technologies, lawyering, accounting, finance firms, these advanced producer services have also been seen to agglomerate in these cities.

These ideas were then supplemented by Peter Taylor. Taylor (1995) agreed in principle with Sassen and Friedmann’s theses that the changing nature of the global capitalism diminishes the control capability of the nation states, and global and world cities become the important nodes of a hierarchical global system. Yet he criticises them on two points. First, for Taylor (1997, 2001), although many studies imply the existence of a hierarchical global urban network, these assumptions are not empirically supported. Second, while their concepts concentrate on global and world cities themselves they overlook the relations within the global urban system. Instead, Taylor (1997) suggested shifting the focus of research to inter-city relations and hierarchical tendencies in the world-city network. Taylor (2001) then developed an interlocking world-city network model to specify this hierarchical global urban network.

These pioneering studies have paved the way for subsequent theoretical, methodological, empirical and geographical interventions most of which aim to describe, interpret and/or investigate the fundamental assumptions of the global/world city concept. Two major research strands can be mentioned here: work on global cities themselves and work about the worldwide relations and linkages between global cities. Generally built on Sassen’s theoretical assumptions about global cities (see Sassen, 2005), some of the studies in the first group have focused on the relevant socio-economic transformations that global cities have undergone, such as social polarisation (Fainstein, 2001; Hamnett, 2003; Timberlake et al., 2012), immigration (Benton-Short, Price and Friedman, 2005; Beaverstock and Hall, 2012; Sanderson et al., 2015) or social diversity (Pooch, 2016).

Moreover, others assess the political aspects and the changing nature of the relations between global cities and their nation-states. The general idea here is that the ties between global cities and their nation-states tend to weaken, since, as Sassen (2005: 30) argues, “economic fortunes of these cities become increasingly disconnected from their broader hinterlands or even their national economies”. Further, global cities have different agendas, interests, and linkages, which sometimes cause tensions between both (Barber, 2013; Clark and Moonen, 2017). Some accounts even claim that cities no longer need their nation-states (Langley, 2002).
The second major expansion of global cities research occurred from the 1990s onwards as part of the broader relational turn in social scientific research (e.g. Castells, 1996; Beaverstock et al., 1999; 2000, Beaverstock et al., 2000; Taylor, 2004b). This body of work has been stimulated by the empirical deficiencies of the initial studies and the questions about how cities relate to each other in the global economic system (Watson and Beaverstock, 2014, Taylor and Derudder, 2018). Network studies make three major contributions to the growing body of global and world cities research. First, by producing different data-sets (e.g. airline flows, Derudder et al., 2011; APS firms, Taylor et al., 2014; NGOs, Taylor, 2004a; global media corporations, Hoyler and Watson, 2013) these studies visualise the global urban networks in which cities are connected to each other in diverse ways. Second, they empirically reveal the (putative) hierarchy in this invisible network of which the most connected cities rank at the top (Taylor, 2005; Taylor et al., 2011, 2013; Liu et al., 2014). Third, measuring changing connectivities and positionalities in these networks (e.g. Derudder et al., 2010; Bassens et al., 2010a; Hanssens et al., 2011; Derudder and Taylor, 2016), they provide comprehensive analyses about both the trajectories of individual cities and also changing geographical patterns of the global economy.

Today, there is an ongoing endeavour of stretching empirical, methodological and geographic limits of the research (Sigler, 2016; Hoyler and Harrison, 2017). One essential and useful way of this is to stress-test the fundamentals of the global city paradigm (Peck, 2015; Hoyler and Harrison, 2017). This can be said to appear as a necessity, namely that so long as the phenomenon called globalisation deepens and expands, new global urban formations, each of which has separate local dynamics, emerge and they begin to push the limits of the central assumptions of the theory. Testing these assumptions through case studies show “where global city theory needs to be extended, nuanced, and adapted” (Krijnen et al., 2017: 2883). This, in one sense, will serve to strengthen the concept but, in another sense, can be read as a kind of defence mechanism against some critiques which have been characterised as creating a ‘straw man’ argument (van Meeteren et al., 2016). Namely, emphasising the exceptional/unique patterns of cities, as non-western approaches often do, helps to understand the pluralist nature and divergent local dynamics of global urbanism; however, it inherently includes the risk of misunderstanding and/or ignoring the planetary dynamics of global urbanism (Peck, 2015). Therefore, instead of being interested only where they come from, the aim of testing should be to improve theories’ explanatory powers (Peck, 2015).
In line with Peck's suggestions, it can be said that a recent agenda in global cities research begins to emerge. There are significant contributions on stress-testing of core assumptions of the global cities paradigm inside and outside of its inherent geographic boundaries, such as advanced producer services and highly skilled labour (in Beirut, Krijnen et al., 2017); command and control functions (Kleibert, 2017; Parnreiter, 2017), and social polarisation (Crankshaw, 2017). Apart from these, some innovative works empirically extend the asymmetric interurban network assumptions by using different measuring techniques such as research and development activities (Csomós and Tóth, 2016), interurban research collaborations (Kanai et al., 2018) and energy networks (Martinus and Tonts, 2015); some of them extend the boundaries of these networks by incorporating "off the map" cities into the map (Derudder and Taylor, 2016; Kanai et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2017).

Despite a recognition that global cities research has been in the flagship position of global urban studies, it has also faced serious criticisms, both internal and external. One of the first and most important among these is that the research is theoretically and empirically western-centric. While the initial studies concentrate on a few putative global and world cities, subsequent interventions create a huge accumulation of knowledge about the globalised and globalising geography of cities. In parallel with the rise of non-western forms of global cities, many global cities researchers have researched their strategic functions (Parnreiter, 2010; Sigler, 2013); divergent and/or convergent dynamics (Jimenez et al., 2002; Parnreiter et al., 2013); different pathways of being a global city (Cochrane and Jonas, 1999; Golubchikov, 2010; Chubarov and Brooker, 2013; Acuto, 2014), city-region (Segbers et al., 2007) or city-state (Olds and Yeung, 2004); or different geographical variants of hierarchical interurban networks such as Asia-Pacific (Csomos and Derudder, 2014) or the Middle East and North Africa (Bassens et al., 2010b).

Nevertheless, just like the research itself, the geography of globalisation has rapidly and extensively been spreading on the planetary scale (Brenner and Schmid, 2015). While, thirty years ago, Friedmann (1986) identified a few world cities almost all of which are located in core countries, Sassen (2016: 98) recently argued:

“As the global economy globalized more and more, the number of global cities also grew. Today we can identify a hundred or so global cities; these vary considerably in their capacities, with some counting on only a few genuinely global operational circuits.”
This implies much more than a quantitative increase in the number of cities. It highlights new problems, new relationships, and most importantly new and diverse pathways of becoming a global city. Of course, the ongoing efforts in this regard cannot be denied, but nevertheless, it is hard to understand these differences without critically examining the core claims and assumptions within the research. The research, in other words, needs to be questioned and refreshed in a way to provide a more extensive understanding of this planetary age of global urbanisation.

Second, stressing the economic processes of global city formation, global and world cities research often underplay the global city maker roles of political agents (Acuto, 2013a, also see following sections). However, local, regional and national governments throughout the world enthusiastically adopt global city strategies and shift their policies to make their cities as global cities (Clark and Moonen, 2017). That is, global cities are not only spontaneous outcomes of economic globalisation but also constructed forms. Recent research in the field addresses this notion of ‘constructed’ by focusing on the role of economic actors in global city making (Hoyler et al., 2018b). Improving this notion by including political processes and actors might serve for a more comprehensive understanding of how and why global cities are constructed. A different aspect is how global cities research assumes that the relations between global cities and their host-states weakens and/or is generally in tension. It is questionable to what extent these assumptions conform with the realities of Western contexts, let alone non-western contexts. As will be seen in the East Asian section, there are different examples contradicting these assumptions. Therefore, the research may also be renewed towards a more nuanced examination of city-state relations.

To summarise, it could be said that from the early works of Friedmann and Sassen to date, global cities research has made invaluable contributions to the understanding of impacts of globalisation, notably economic globalisation, on cities, and their relations between other cities and nation-states. Despite some weaknesses in the early works, recent studies show that the research has broadened its geographical scope both theoretically and empirically. Yet, as will be seen by the discussions in the following sections, there are still some blind spots that need to be further examined and improved.
2.3 Critiques of the Global Cities Thesis

2.3.1 Critique I: State Rescaling and the Geopolitics of Global City Formation

The previous section has concentrated on the key concepts and accounts of global and world cities research. As discussed, within global cities research, the rise of global cities is explained with the effects of globalisation, neither the role of the nation state nor the significance of space is emphasised in their formation (Friedmann, 1986; Taylor, 1994; Sassen, 1996). Some commentators even go so far as to attest that concentration of geoeconomic power in cities is so profound that major urban regions have now superseded national economies as the fundamental unit of the capitalist economy (Ohmae, 1995; Storper, 1997; Scott, 1998, 2001; Barber, 2013; Katz and Bradley, 2013). From a political-economic perspective, such a conceptualisation of global cities falls short because it ignores the political dynamics of urbanisation and role of the political and economic rescaling of nation-states in this process (Brenner, 1998; Jonas and Ward, 2007; Jonas, 2013). Instead, the rescaling approach is concerned with the spatiality of capitalism, spatial responses to its crises and restructuring advanced capitalist-states (Brenner, 1998, 2004a; Harrison, 2015).

The political deficit of the global and world city concepts is a long and much-debated critique. There are many accounts arguing that the research exaggerates the role of the global economy in global city formation and downplays the role of the political dynamics of becoming a global city (see Acuto, 2013a/b). However, the objection in the rescaling approach, in a more theoretical sense, concerns how global cities research conceptualises the urban and capitalism. As Brenner (1998: 8) argues, “much of world cities research has been premised upon the assumption that intensified globalisation entails an erosion of state territoriality” and have neglected “the role of state-level processes in the current round of capitalist restructuring”. However, each round of capitalist production brings to, and exists within, new modes of political-economic regulation and territoriality (Harvey, 2001). That is, “this major restructuring does not come at the expense of the state; in accordance with some kind of either/or, zero-sum, logic” (Harrison, 2015: 19), but triggers a shift to a new mode of regulation.

Unlike much global cities research, the rescaling approach explains the issue within historical and contemporary dynamics of capitalism and also organisational and spatial reflections of these dynamics (Brenner, 1998; 2004a). During the 1970s, the advanced capitalist states of
North America and Western Europe faced a series of economic crises that they were unable to overcome with postwar Keynesian economic policy instruments. Following the collapse of the Fordist-Keynesian institutional compromise the advent of post-Fordist, post-Keynesian, post-national policies fuelled an intense period of state rescaling and research into this (Jessop, 2000). While many argued the irreversible decline of nation-states, the advanced capitalist nation-states have not perished following the demise of Fordist-Keynesianism but have instead undergone a process of rescaling which has seen powers transferred to sub- and supra-state scales (Brenner, 2004a; Keating, 2013, 2014; Harrison, 2015). As will be seen below, this process is often associated with two main processes: (i) the glocalisation of the state (Brenner, 1998), and (ii) the shift from a Keynesian Welfare National State to a Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime (Jessop, 1993, 2000).

Brenner (1998) associates global city formation with the process of glocalisation, indicating a transformation of the historical relationship between capital, state and state-territoriality. For Brenner, nation-states are not eroded but rearticulated and reterritorialised under the conditions of global capitalism. Simply, as capital becomes more mobile and global and the capitalist production tends toward non-industrial sectors, states renew their economic policies and regulatory institutions in a way that attracts capital to their major urban places (Brenner, 2004b). Whereas cities and city-regions become tools of capital accumulation, the nation-scale regulatory policies and institutions required by the Fordist- Keynesian system are variously decentralised, devolved, delegated to sub- and supra-scales of governance (Brenner, 2004a/b). As a consequence:

“Rather than promoting ‘balanced’ urban and regional development within relatively auto-centric national space-economies, the overarching goal of urban locational policies is to position major cities and city-regions strategically within supranational (European and global) circuits of capital accumulation” (Brenner, 2009: 128).

Whereas in Brenner’s thought nation-states still have strong control mechanisms on, and ties with their cities, Jessop (1996) points to the “hollowing out” of the regulatory power of national states towards both supra-national and sub-national scales. In this way, the geoeconomic and geopolitical structure of nation states is going towards denationalisation in terms of territoriality. Jessop (2002a/b) argues that the role of central governments in local and regional development was re-functionalised in the process of transformation from Keynesian Welfare National States to Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regimes, which
concerns economic competition. To him, in this process, while the importance of national scale of economic, social and political organisation has declined, it cannot be said the other scales, such as local, urban, or global, have exactly won and nation states have lost (Jessop, 2013).

While these early studies have laid the theoretical basis for the rescaling approach, Brenner (2009) calls researchers to empirically interrogate these descriptive formulations in the second wave of work on rescaling, the subsequent extension of the rescaling literature can be divided into two major strands: the content and conceptualisation of rescaling and the geography of rescaling. In relation to the first, a considerable number of works examine the rescaling practices of western nation-states at local/metropolitan (e.g. Horak, 2013; Cochrane, 2016; Armondi, 2017) and regional levels (Harrison, 2008; Keating; 2013; Jonas, 2013). Moreover, some accounts are concerned with the more specific and/or diverse forms of rescaling. For example, austerity policies are a widely-discussed topic, especially after the 2008/9 global financial crisis (Lobao and Adua, 2011; Donald et al., 2014; Armondi, 2017). Despite that political rescaling is generally the focus of the research, some studies reveal that rescaling occurs not just as an intergovernmental exchange but also as an authority-transfer between state and non-state actors (Buchs, 2009; Keating; 2014; Keating and Wilson, 2014).

As pointed out by many scholars, in terms of urban governance, this reorientation of state also appears as a more entrepreneurial, competitiveness- and growth-oriented framework (Harvey, 1989; Brenner, 2004a/b; Cochrane, 2016; Peck, 2017b). “The focus on competition between cities as a means of achieving economic advantage” (Cochrane, 2016: 911) has forced city governments to reconfigure their policies so as to create “a good business climate” (Harvey, 1989: 11) that enhance their competitive advantages. In other words, in this process, which has begun from the advanced capitalist countries of the West and has spread to the world, the city administrations, and of course the central governments, have begun to implement the required policies (i.e. public-private partnerships, mega-projects, place-specific projects, international events, etc.) in order to attract the increasingly mobile and getting urbanised capital into their cities (Harvey, 1989; Brenner, 2003; Müller, 2011; Li et al., 2014; Le Gales, 2016; Mayer, 2018).

Another conceptual expand has also occurred through the discussions about the geography of rescaling. The central argument here is that neoliberalism, urbanisation, and rescaling are tripartite processes. Namely, even though this rescaling and the entrepreneurial shift were the
endogenous political-economic transformations in the advanced capitalist states, it has gained an economic and political paradigm status titled as neoliberalism and has migrated to the other parts of the world by the imposition of the supranational organisations such as IMF and World Bank (Theodore and Peck, 2012, Chorev, 2018; Mayer, 2018). Neoliberalism, in principle, includes a series of assumptions such enforcement of free-market, withdrawal of the state from the market, privatisation and deregulation policies (Peck et al., 2018). However, in urban scale, it also implies competitive and growth-oriented entrepreneurial policies and the implementation of the rescaling strategies which to give an increasing administrative and fiscal autonomy (Mayer, 2018). In other words, if neoliberalism is taken as a process, that is neoliberalisation, this leads us to the argument that in so far as the scope of the neoliberalism expands, states necessarily tend to re-scale (Lobao et al., 2009). As Brenner and Schmid (2015) argue, although cities are different everywhere, neoliberal urbanisation and its political and economic regulatory apparatuses inevitably acquire a planetary-scale form.

Indeed, there is no doubt that many states throughout the world have gradually become part of a neoliberal restructuring process that imposes entrepreneurial, flexible, liberal policies, either intentionally or through the pressure of international regulatory agencies. In this sense, there are strong observations that state rescaling processes rapidly spread towards non-western states (Klink, 2013, Park, 2013, Bayırbağ, 2013). Nevertheless, in practice, rescaling initiatives can differ from case to case which have different dynamics in terms of institutional backgrounds, political and ideological factors, and urban environments (Horak, 2013; Jonas, 2013). Even between the USA and Western Europe, the inherent places of rescaling, there are strong differences in terms of practices and aims (Cox, 2004; 2009; Herrschel; 2014). Moreover, these differences become so obvious when looking beyond the North Atlantic Rim. This is because these reforms are generally imported as a state-led strategy for national economic development (Tsukamoto, 2012; Wu, 2016; Kinossian, 2017) and implemented top-down (Ye, 2014) and selectively (Le Galès, 2016).

In many cases, strong central governments limit to profound diffusion of neoliberalism into administrative mechanisms (Le Galès, 2016). In such cases, while entrepreneurial policies are enthusiastically adopted by (often central) bureaucratic and political elites, administrative decentralisation usually takes place either never (in practice) or at a lower level (Kuyucu, 2018). Hence, it should be critically noted:
“...explanations of state rescaling require more nuanced understandings of historically and geographically specific political, economic and social processes and conditions that have affected the scalar (re)configurations of the state in different countries (e.g. geopolitical contexts, nation-building processes, the nature of rule-setting mechanisms, the nature of party politics, uneven geographies of development, processes of social struggle, and national and local rhythms of regulatory stability and crisis)” (Park, 2013: 1121).

The rescaling approach partly fills the political shortfall of the global cities research. It is partly, because, as in global cities research, the rescaling approach is also empirically based on the scalar organisation of the state within a certain historical and political context. These configurations might make sense in the context of neoliberal North Atlantic states, however, as discussed above, there are strong observations showing the contrary examples in non-western contexts. The following discussion will provide a better understanding of these differences.

2.3.2 Critique II: The Rise of Developmental Cities

The approaches that have been discussed thus far are interested in developing a universal conceptualisation of contemporary urbanisation, however, the developmental approach identifies and limits itself within a certain geopolitical context – East-Asia and developmental states and/or city-states. Developmentalist accounts criticise global cities literature not only because it ignores the role of politics but also because it is Western-centric. Drawing upon a set of historical, political and economic differences, generally titled as state-developmentalism, the literature generally tends to reject western-centric theories, that is not only the global cities literature but also the state rescaling approach, neoliberal urbanisation and the new urban politics. Within this motivation, this literature is keen to argue and theorise the distinct urbanisation of East-Asian cities with a particular emphasis on the role of state politics.

As Tokyo is counted among the key global and world cities in the global cities approach (see Sassen, 1991), initial studies have generally attempted to reveal the distinctiveness of Tokyo when compared to London and New York. White (1998) argues that Tokyo’s globalisation story relies on a state-guided development of Japan and is therefore very different from London and New York in terms of “collusion, collaboration, or the adhesion of state and
capital” (White, 1998: 461). Kamo (2000) makes a similar distinction on the basis of the economic structure of these cities: while Tokyo’s globalisation is industrial, London and New York’s are financial. For Fujita (2000: 2187), Tokyo (and other East-Asian capital cities) is mainly associated with “the state-centred financial system”, which is seen as “a policy tool for national development by the state” (ibid.: 2202). The most noteworthy effort in the early studies was that Hill and Kim (2000) furthered these differences into a new conceptualisation of developmental global cities.

Drawing on a set of assumptions based on the distinctive historical institutionalisation of East Asian Developmental-States, they argue that Tokyo, and other developmental cities, are significantly different from western world cities (Hill and Kim, 2000; see also Ma and Timberlake, 2013). To conceptualise developmental world cities, they dichotomised the world city typologies as state-centred, political-bureaucratic (SWCs) and market-centred, bourgeois. The former’s prototype is Tokyo and Seoul, while the latter’s is London and New York (Hill and Kim, 2000). Among many assumptions, perhaps the most important one is that Tokyo’s and Seoul’s world city formation is mainly shaped by their national governments in line with the national economic and political priorities. They further assert that their conceptualisation can also provide an explanation for other cities, notably Taipei, Osaka, and city-states such as Singapore and Hong-Kong (Hill, 2004).

Hill and Kim’s conceptualisation was problematic in two respects. First, it can be argued that they have overplayed the role of national government by ignoring the roles played by other stakeholders. By searching the changing relationship between the Japanese state and business groups, Waley (2007: 1485) points out that national business groups play the leading role in the recent restructuring of Tokyo, while “the state [...] plays an increasingly withdrawn role”. Likewise, Saito (2003) and Saito and Thornley (2003) observe that local governments have gained a decision-making autonomy in developing their cities. Saito (2003) argues that there is a competition between Tokyo’s local and Japan’s central governments in Tokyo’s world-city projects, stemming from increasing decision-making power of local government. Nevertheless, when arguing that this intergovernmental competition means not a local-central tension, but a “mutual dependence with strong rivalry” (ibid.: 301), Saito agrees with Hill and Kim on Tokyo’s distinctiveness which is embedded within the capitalist developmental state. Yet another case study shows that the political differences in different tiers of government might easily turn this relationship into a conflict which damages the world city-goals of the cities, as in Taipei (Wang and Huang, 2009).
Secondly, although Hill and Kim assert that other East Asian cities can be best understood with their concepts, some other scholars critically examine this and point out the differences of the other global cities and city-states in the region. For example, while Wang (2003, 2004) argues that decreasing manufacturing production in the economy vis-a-vis rising FIRE sectors and relative liberalism are distinctive features of Taipei from Seoul and Tokyo, Shin and Timberlake (2006) claim that Seoul is differentiated from Tokyo in terms of openness to foreign capital and industrial decentralisation policies. Yet, they agree with Hill and Kim on the crucial role of South Korean and Taiwan’s central governments in Seoul and Taipei achieving world city status. With a different point of view underlining city-state characteristics in Singapore, Olds and Yeung (2004) put forward the developmental city-state concept. To them, despite its similar developmental characteristics, Singapore is significantly different from others with its fully urbanised territorial structure, direct links to the global economy, openness to global capital flows, and international financial centre position (see also Shatkin, 2014b).

While the early studies were generally not very persistent on the changes of traditional forms and policies of developmental states, recent studies concentrate on these changes, in particular practices of neoliberal policies. There is an obvious observation that developmental states selectively adopt neoliberal policies as the impetus for national economic growth (e.g. Park et al., 2012; Tsukamoto, 2012; Waley, 2013; Heo, 2015). That is, these policies were generally adopted under the orchestration (and proactive intervention) of central governments, without much sacrificing the core traits of the developmental state system (e.g. Fujita, 2011; Tsukamoto, 2012; Wang, 2012; Jou et al., 2014, for an opposite view see Yeung, 2017b). Even administrative decentralisation is often realised as a state-strategy, so the central governments keep their leading positions, contrary to western-centric neoliberalisation theory (Pereira, 2008; Fujita, 2011; Tsukamoto, 2012, for a counter argument from South Korea see Bae, 2013, 2016):

“Tokyo’s urban policy does not conform to neoliberal urbanization arguments: its redevelopment policy is firmly placed in the national policy framework and is financed either by the state or by state-led financial schemes with private and public sectors” (Fujita, 2011: 324).

These studies pave the way for a new and increasingly popular debate: can East Asian states still be defined as developmental in the classical sense (Waley, 2013)? Much recent research
proposes new hybrid concepts to gain insight into regional characteristics of neoliberalism such as neoliberal developmentalism (Liow, 2011; Heo, 2015), developmental neoliberalism (Choi, 2012), or more popularly post-developmentalist (Park et al., 2012; Waley, 2013; Shin and Kim, 2016). While neoliberal economic policies and urban policy changes compatible with neoliberal rhetoric have been spreading throughout the region (Liow, 2011; Waley, 2013; Bae, 2016), the existing structure of developmentalism prevents turning these developments into a full neoliberal regulatory regime. Contemporary urban policy formation in developmental states, therefore, contains both elements of neoliberalism and developmentalism (Shin and Kim, 2016), for example a “combination of the government’s neoliberal political rationality and the developmental state’s governmentality” (Heo, 2015: 351). Despite that there are continuities between traditional and new forms of developmental institutionalism (Shin and Kim, 2016), these developments, nevertheless, imply a turn into a post-developmentalist which cannot be easily understood with the traditional arguments of developmentalism (Waley, 2013).

As discussed so far, this literature develops a highly successful counter-argument against the universal assumptions of globalist and neoliberal accounts, through which it shows how these processes follow different pathways in certain specific geographic contexts. The empirical arguments that they provide reveal how strong central governments have a significant role in the making of their global cities, how they selectively utilise the global/neoliberal processes in line with their national aims, and so that global city formation, at least in the East Asian context, does not come at the expense of or demise of nation-states. Nonetheless, their arguments might be criticised in three respects. Firstly, an observation is that theoretical arguments of the literature are based mostly on the experiences of a few global cities (e.g. Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei) and city-states (Singapore) and often over-generalise the similarities while minimising differences. In fact, by doing this, they fall foul of what they accuse global city researchers of doing, namely generalising from empirical observations of a few selected cities.

Secondly, recent studies point out that the developmental-state form is not as strictly rigid as those early studies assert. In contrast it has been evolving over time. Given the evolution of the literature from developmentalism to post-developmentalist, it is possible to think that the distinctiveness phenomenon, which is the epistemological core of this literature, will be even more questionable in the near future. Third, state developmentalism does not just point to a geographical region; it is also a concept that is formed by the combination of historical,
political, economic, and even social elements (see Öniş, 1991; Yeung, 2017a). Therefore, it is questionable whether the developmental (or post-developmental) city concepts can be applicable in other cases that do not conform with these elements, such as Chinese global cities (Ma and Timberlake, 2013; Zhang, 2013) or others elsewhere.

To conclude, different from the literature discussed previously (and to be discussed further in the thesis), developmental accounts are concerned with the different dynamics of neoliberalism and globalisation in a narrow and specific geographical context, that is East Asia. This approach asserts that developmental states and city-states in East-Asia present distinctive characteristics and that the global or world city concept (or others e.g. rescaling) relying on the experiences of western cities are far from explaining the reality of East Asian global cities. Despite their success, it is doubtful whether they provide a strong generalisable theoretical insight into the plural characteristics of globalisation/neoliberalisation in local contexts. This is exactly what the next approach, at least in some accounts, tries to develop.

2.3.3 Critique III: Postcolonial Urban Theory

The third and final counter-approach to global cities research is postcolonial urban theory. In general terms, unlike the global and world cities research, the postcolonial literature is very sensitive to different forms of urbanism based on historical differences, most notably colonialism (Chakravorty, 2000; Roy and Ong, 2011; Roy, 2016). Postcolonial theorists do not only criticise the criteria used to identify global cities or the overall methodologic tendencies in the mainstream global cities research but also fundamentally question the applicability of global and world city concepts to the geography of cities in the global South. Postcolonial theorists tend to develop new conceptual arguments that allow understanding the developments of global South cities under globalisation, rather than categorising these cities through the lenses of western-produced theories, concepts and vocabulary. This section respectively examines the critiques of postcolonial researchers on global cities research, their alternative arguments, and finally concludes the discussion with a brief critique of the postcolonial approach to global urban studies.

The first and perhaps the most-cited critique on the part of postcolonial theory is that global cities research, at best marginalises, at worst excludes, the global South from (the centre of) urban theory-making (Robinson, 2002, 2006, 2008; McCann, 2004; McFarlane, 2008; Parnell and Robinson, 2013; Sheppard et al, 2015). As Robinson (2002) points out, by identifying a
small range of cities as global and world cities, the mainstream global urban research drops hundreds of cities off the map of urban studies. More explicitly, global cities literature “persists in defining some cities out of the game, as ‘excluded from global capitalism’ and therefore as irrelevant to their theoretical reflections” (Robinson, 2002: 538). Further, since much of the empirical evidence underpinning global city theory is developed from the experiences of the global North/Western cities, their theories, implicitly or explicitly, reflect the Anglophone (Parnell and Robinson, 2013), Anglo-American (Robinson, 2016b), Eurocentric (Roy, 2016), or Euro-American (McFarlane, 2008; Bunnel, 2015) perspectives. The literature, in this way, reflects an ethnocentric logic and falls into an intellectual parochialism believing that their concepts can explain other parts of the world (McFarlane, 2008; Parnell and Robinson, 2013).

However, as Chakravorty (2000: 57) expresses, the arguments built on the experiences of western cities do not quite coincide with the realities of postcolonial geography:

“It is clear that the two-stage Fordist/post-Fordist model cannot adequately describe the economic and urban development of India, particularly its colonial cities (and perhaps some other once-colonized third world nations and cities).”

Based on this historical dissimilarity phenomenon and its subsequent components, as Roy recently argued (2016), there is an epistemological objection to mainstream research. Put simply, since many cities in the global South have undergone different historical stages, in each of which they experienced different urbanism practices and faced different social, political and economic problems, these cities have different urban dynamics than their western counterparts (e.g. Grant and Nijman, 2002; Shatkin, 2007; Simone, 2010; Miraftab, 2012). Therefore, the notion that these cities can be explained through western-based conceptual lenses is theoretically misleading (McCann, 2004; McFarlane, 2008; Parnell and Robinson, 2013, Sheppard et al., 2013; Schindler, 2017). For example, the social polarisation in Cape Town has an ethnic characteristic, as different from the Fordist/Post-Fordist polarisation experienced by western cities (Lemanski, 2007), and the restructuring of the local and central state in Cape Town has directly addressed the post-1994 (post-apartheid period) rather than post-1970 transformations in the international political-economy (Parnell and Robinson, 2013).
The second concern of postcolonial critique is economism and hierarchical tendencies in global cities research. In the simplest terms, identification of some cities as global and world cities (as command and control nodes of the global economy) does not only move other cities off the map but also hierarchically divides cities into global and non-global (Robinson, 2002). Such an approach does not serve developing a universal understanding of global urbanism, in contrast, it enhances and reproduces existing divisions such as East-West, North/South, developed/underdeveloped, and so on (McFarlane, 2010). This approach is also flawed as it reflects a “Darwinian ecology of cities: the survival of the fittest in the keen competition of network capitalism” (Roy, 2009: 821). What is more, hierarchical approaches, even if unintentionally, cause leading global cities to be perceived as success stories, and even, more dangerously, as ideal forms of the city:

“While the world/global cities literature has expanded to incorporate some cities that might, until recently, have been classified as ‘Third World’, the continued assumption of hierarchical relations continues to present alpha [or, most recently, ‘alpha++] cities as the leading edge of urban innovation, dynamism, and aspiration” (Bunnel and Sidaway, 2012: xvi).

This perceived attitude of global cities research provokes the feeling of backwardness and triggers catch-up motivations of developing countries, particularly of postcolonial countries. Terms like ascent or descent which are used to discuss the changing position of cities in the global urban network encourage the authorities of low-ranked cities to raise their cities’ position within this system. More interestingly, rankings show them the way how they can do this: by mimicking the policies of other global/world cities, that is by following the successful examples of the west (Robinson, 2006). Many cities and states in the global South quickly adopt these policies and spend their economic resources on turning their cities into global/world cities (e.g. Goldman, 2011; Dupont, 2011). Global city making, in this way, is elevated to a policy-goal and a strategy of national, regional or local economic development:

“In policy terms, the hierarchies and categories embedded in the global- and world-cities approaches suggest that if cities are not to remain inconsequential, marginalised and impoverished or to trade economic growth for expansion in population, they need to aim for the top!” (Robinson, 2006: 111).
As the section has discussed thus far, from the postcolonial perspective, mainstream global urban research is inherently problematic as it is ethnocentric, economically reductionist and hierarchy-based. Postcolonial urban theory therefore suggests removing these flaws and developing more cosmopolitan, locally sensitive, pluralist, and inclusive urban theories. Theoretically, this can only be possible if global urban theory is postcolonised (Robinson, 2002, 2006), deconstructed and decolonised (Roy, 2009) or provincialised (Robinson, 2003, Pile, 2006; Sheppard et al., 2013, 2015). For example, Robinson’s (2006, 2008) frequently-cited ordinary city proposal is quite noteworthy. She suggests building a postcolonial urban framework that “cuts across the long-standing divide in urban scholarship between accounts of ‘Western’ and other kinds of cities” (Robinson, 2006: 1). In light of this theoretical manoeuvre, Robinson, and others, propose a methodological turn towards comparative urbanism: to globalise urban theory through comparative studies, especially between Northern and Southern cities (e.g. Robinson, 2011).

On the other hand, some accounts attempt to analyse and describe global Southern cities as “other urbanisms” (Shatkin, 2011a: 79), such as “occupancy urbanism” (Benjamin, 2008), “subaltern urbanism” (Roy, 2011a), “actually existing urbanism” (Shatkin, 2011a), “southern urbanism” (Watson, 2009), or “black urbanism” (Simone, 2010b). Some even, more ambitiously, seek to relocate the centre of the urban theory making to the global South (Roy, 2009). For example, rejecting the universal understanding of urbanism, Roy takes Robinson’s proposals forward in a different way and argues that postcolonialism should be understood as “a critical, deconstructive methodology that inaugurates a new way of doing global metropolitan studies” (Roy, 2011b: 308). To do that, Roy (2009) proposes to focus on the contemporary worlding processes and practices as a means of understanding distinctiveness of global South urbanism (see also Roy and Ong, 2011; Roy, 2011c; McCann et al., 2013).

In brief, by their critiques and proposals, postcolonial researchers have made significant contributions to advance global urban research. The first and foremost, postcolonial theory brings another type of thinking that allows “to undertake a political economy attentive to the historical difference as a fundamental and constitutive force in the making of global urbanization” (Roy, 2016: 205). Secondly, it makes considerable contributions to the geographical and methodological expansion of global urban research not only through their own studies but also through their critiques (Robinson, 2016a). Their critiques, perhaps, push global and world cities researchers to think more inventively about different functions and roles of global Southern cities (Kleibert, 2017), or to consider more extensive global
interurban networks (Derudder and Taylor, 2016). Finally, their attempts, especially their calls for comparative studies, are very helpful as they provide an empirical base for stress-testing fundamental assumptions of global and world city concepts (van Meeteren et al., 2016). Taken altogether, it is hard to deny that postcolonial research provides an invaluable ground for a more global urban research.

On the other hand, the critiques and counter-narratives of postcolonial theory have faced serious objections over time (Surborg, 2011; Smith, 2013; Derudder and Parnreiter, 2014; Brenner and Schmid, 2015; Scott and Storper, 2015; Storper and Scott, 2016; van Meeteren et al., 2016). First, although Roy (2016) insists that their primary concerns are about the epistemology of the mainstream research, some researchers think that postcolonial researchers are more concentrated on the outcomes and findings of the global and world city concepts rather than focusing on the logic of them (Smith, 2013). Their critiques have, therefore, been misguided about what the global/world city paradigm actually is. More explicitly, global and world cities research is not about positioning cities as followers and followees (Surborg, 2011) or building hierarchical city-layers (van Meeteren et al., 2016) but about making sense of and visualising the uneven geography of global capitalism.

The second critique is about the particularism and perpetual calls for new theories. As mentioned above, in some postcolonial accounts, there is an emphatic tendency to produce new theories for global Southern cities. Such a call for new concepts can be taken forever. For example, as Taylor pointed out earlier, 100 different ways can be found to describe recent urbanisation (Taylor and Lang, 2004). However, while the discussion of differences is undeniably useful for creating new perspectives, a blessed particularism might sabotage making sense of the communal processes covering all cities (Peck, 2015; Scott and Storper, 2015), or crises and nature of the capitalist urbanisation which has been experienced on the planetary scale (Brenner and Schmid, 2015). Instead of this, what is needed is to concentrate on a general account for the urban and urbanisation (Scott and Storper, 2015; Storper and Scott, 2016).

To conclude, within postcolonial thinking global and world cities research is flawed as it is western-centric, economistic and hierarchy-based. Therefore, to produce a more comprehensive urban research, these flaws have to be removed. In this sense, postcolonial contestation is not just a critique of the mainstream urban research but also a counterattack to winnow out these inherent problems within the body of this literature. Though some insist on
calls for new concepts, their overall calls are for a more pluralist and nuanced, non-hegemonic, nonpolarised and wider urban theory. However, although it is not possible to deny their contributions, it is difficult to say that they have totally reached their overall goal. Recent studies show that the debate, and therefore polarisation, continues. The next section concentrates on these recent debates with a particular aim: What is the way ahead for expanding the body of global urban research?

2.4 Conclusion: The Way Ahead?

This chapter has critically evaluated four major literatures in global urban studies: global cities research, state rescaling theory, the developmental approach, and postcolonial/global South urban theory. The chapter briefly summarises the key arguments with some concluding comments, and discusses how global urban studies, in general, can be extended. This section explicitly suggests that not only the global/world cities theory, but also other counter-approaches need to be stress-tested and that this should be done in a case-study encompassing plural characteristics.

Global cities research argues that a new city typology and hierarchy/order have emerged in the current phase of global capitalism. Global cities, from which the global economy is spatialised, commanded and controlled, are the new spatial forms of this phase, as was the nation states in the previous phase, and sit on top of this hierarchy. Contrary to geo-economic assumptions of the global cities research, state rescaling researchers approach the issue from a more geo-political perspective and argue that nation states are not dying but rescaling to sub-national, local and regional, scale as well as supra-national. From this perspective, what creates global cities and city-regions is not only globalisation but also the reorganisation and reterritorialisation of nation-states. On the contrary, postcolonial and developmental approaches argue that both global cities and rescaling theories are western-centric and therefore not applicable in the rest of the world in which different historical trajectories are experienced.

Nevertheless, considering these discussions, and against the backdrop of deepening and rapidly extending globalisation, it is clear that global urban research needs a more comprehensive and explanatory framework. Two critical questions arise here; how this can be done and where this can be done empirically. For the first, as discussed in the previous pages, some scholars insist on developing new theories of global urbanisation (e.g. Roy, 2009;
Brenner and Schmid, 2015). An alternative might be to improve existing theories (or somewhat blend them) in a way to allow to conceptualise both global characteristics of contemporary urbanism and also local pluralities in this planetary scale development. However, some others think that developing new concepts, approaches or theories might be prolonged forever, and more importantly, that such an effort might undermine the process of developing an urban theory that will allow understanding the common dynamics of global urbanisation covering all cities (Taylor and Lang, 2004; Peck, 2015; Scott and Storper, 2015; Hoyler and Harrison, 2017). Instead of insisting on perpetual calls for new theories, they argue the need to stress-test the fundamental assumptions of the existing theories so as to see where the theories need to be refreshed, and stretch their conceptual limits (Peck, 2015, Hoyler and Harrison, 2017).

By demonstrating both suggestions are possible (and by discussing their plus and minuses), this study aims to take the debate between these two groups a step further. For this purpose, the first and vital step is to stress-test all four major urban approaches in the same case-study rather than testing just a single particular theory in a city as other studies do. This allows noticing where the theories are flawed and how they might be improved. As a side effect, depending on which city is used for testing, to interrogate all approaches simultaneously can allow seeing which approach might fail or succeed in explaining a different dynamic of a city. In this way, the debate can be carried beyond a triumph-defeat duality, asking whether there really a need is for developing new concepts or it is possible to stretch existing approaches by strengthening their explanatory frameworks.

Another question is what kind of case-study provides sufficient empirical ground for this attempt. Looking at existing studies, each theory generally focuses on specific geographical contexts and is empirically based on the experiences of cities in these contexts. Whereas global cities and rescaling approaches generally focus on North Atlantic cities, developmental and postcolonial studies are concerned with East Asian and global South cities. However, comparatively examining these approaches in one of these cities would obviously conclude with the triumphs of one of these approaches. For example, to compare the developmental approach with global cities theory in the case of Tokyo, as in much of the literature, cannot provide an unbiased empirical ground. Further, since it possibly will reveal the explanatory veracity of the developmental theory such an approach serves what Meeteren et al. (2016) criticise as polemical pluralism. More importantly, such cities with certain characteristics do not provide a common ground to allow all theories to be tested. So instead of this, it should be
tested in a more pluralistic city in which none of these theories can totally conceptualise but all of them partially explain.

Considering what has been discussed above, it can be thought that Istanbul is one of the most suitable cases to reach the above aims in many respects. First, it does not totally confront any of the four approaches alone. As Turkey was not a part of the Keynesian-welfare system, today it is hard to explain the economic and political transformations which Istanbul and Turkey have undergone by either a global/world city concept or the state-rescaling approach. Furthermore, as the former capital of three major empires and one of the most important destinations of the Silk Road, one of the most-known routes of the early periods of global trade, Istanbul, until the early 20th century, had always been a major political, economic, military and cultural command and control point in both global and regional sense (see for example Francopan, 2015). In this respect, there is an obvious difference between the historical trajectories of Istanbul and of postcolonial and developmental cities. As can be seen in the empirical chapters, this historical feature, which distinguishes it from others argued in this chapter, makes itself visibly felt even today. On the other hand, since it sits on the intersections between East and West, and North and South, there are various similarities between Istanbul and global Northern and global Southern cities (Yetişkul and Demirel, 2018). Istanbul, therefore, provides a common and neutral ground for comparing and testing theories. The following section will examine the urban development of Istanbul since the imperial period and thereby contribute to the understanding of the similarities and differences.
“From a distance, Istanbul is the immutable intersection of vast and diverse mobilities. It reaches across the East-West and the North-South axes of the world, and all their possible variants. Out of these histories of intersections comes the need to develop specific capabilities for handling and enhancing network functions; it is not simply a question of location at intersections. It seems to me that developing such capabilities across diverse histories and geographies is a particularity of Istanbul’s deep history” (Sassen, 2009: 5).

3.1 Introduction: Framing Istanbul from Imperial to Global

As the previous chapter has discussed, global and world cities research, along with its three counter approaches, provides comprehensive insights into urbanisation (even including its planetary characteristic, political dynamics, localities etc.) under contemporary economic globalisation. On the other hand, the final section of the chapter has also discussed that there are still some cities which do not easily fit into these major approaches and that Istanbul is one of these cities. Precisely because of this, Istanbul offers an attractive ground for stress-testing and extending the scope of global urban research. In order to understand why Istanbul does not fully conform to any of these approaches, this chapter critically analyses Istanbul’s development from the 19th century to the present.

Istanbul has characteristics that contradict the basic assumptions of the major global urban approaches in some respects. For instance, as Akcan (2015:364) puts forward: “Istanbul seems to disrupt a few established notions of the global city paradigm. The first is the role of an authoritarian government, [and] the second is the history of illegal settlements.” Further, it does not totally conform to the neoliberal approach that assumes neoliberal economic transformations lead to an administrative decentralisation (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011; La Galès, 2016; Kuyucu, 2018). Indeed, although some early studies position Istanbul as a third-world metropolis (Keyder and Öncü, 1994) or peripheric city (Jimenez et al., 2002), it seems that Istanbul rather presents a more hybrid characteristic:
“Like its geographical location, Istanbul resembles both West and East; in addition, it has been characterised generally by the less-developed attributes of the Global South but also has certain modern, developed aspects of the Global North” (Yetişkul and Demirel, 2018: 3).

A brief historical analysis of the development of Istanbul is therefore necessary to understand this hybrid, or in-between (see more below), characteristic of the city. There are three reasons for this. First, much of the relevant literature only focuses on the AKP era and the dominant role of its central government in local policies (e.g. Karaman, 2013a; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; Sanli and Townshend, 2018). However, strong centralisation is not an invention of AKP governments, but rather an administrative tradition whose roots are in the imperial times. Second, some ideological tensions (e.g. secular-conservative conflict) shaping Turkey’s politics, including local-central relations, and why Istanbul holds an important place in these tensions can only be understood within such a historical analysis. And third, besides Istanbul’s frequently-cited intersectional characteristic between east and west, the link between its imperial capital and global city status provides an interesting case which is rarely discussed in the academic literature (for an exception see Sassen, 2018) – as Sarkis (2009: 14) explains:

“As the capital of an empire that ruled over an extended territory, Istanbul illustrates the continuities between empire and global city through its current relationship with its first (national) and second (regional) territorial rings.”

With these motivations, this chapter discusses the urban development of Istanbul within three different periods: imperial, national and global. While doing so, it often goes beyond a city-based analysis and examines these developments by referencing the general political climate of Turkey. In this way, it discusses how Istanbul has been reproduced by different forces and with different motivations (symbolic, political and/or economic) in different periods. It also demonstrates that despite the different periods of governments, Turkey’s centralised administrative tradition is maintained almost unchanged. Additionally, by dividing this analysis into different periods, the chapter argues that transition from imperial to national period marks a decline in Istanbul’s status in many respects and globalisation is often seen as an opportunity to reclaim this status in different shapes. This discussion especially helps to understand why global aspirations of Istanbul (and its global city status) are often stated with reference to its imperial past (not national). As a final attempt, it tries to conceptualise this
exceptional pattern of Istanbul as an ‘in-between city’ and discusses whether this conceptualisation can be applied to other cases.

To achieve these aims, the remainder of the chapter consists of five sections: three sections of analysis, with each section devoted to a different period of Istanbul (as imperial, national and global), and two sections of discussion and conclusion. To this end, the next three sections outline the development of Istanbul in different time-periods, each of which gives a different characteristic to the city. These are respectively imperial (3.2), national (3.3) and global (3.4) periods. The chapter then introduces and discusses the concept in-between city (3.5) before a brief conclusion.

3.2 Istanbul in Retrospect: The City as an Imperial Capital

Looking back to the 19th century, if the industrial and the colonial cities were the precursors of many of today’s global/globalising cities, the precursor of today’s Istanbul was doubtlessly the imperial capital. Istanbul had experienced the 19th century globalisation as an imperial capital (not as an industrial city nor as a colonial city) and had witnessed profound social, economic and political changes, each of which has left significant heritages to later periods. Within the notion that Istanbul’s global city formation has important links to imperial Istanbul, this section not only discusses the social, economic and political aspects of the Ottoman capital and the modern developments in the late imperial period⁷, but also traces the imperial origins of global city Istanbul.

Demographically speaking, one of the words that best describes imperial Istanbul is diversity. In an age when nation-states were beginning to be founded in much of Europe, the Ottoman capital was still reflecting the social mosaic of a multi-national and multi-religious empire spread over two million square-kilometres from the Middle East to Eastern Europe. The population of Istanbul, which was one of the largest cities in Europe with a population of more than one million, consisted of various Muslim (Turks, Arabs, Bosnians, Albanians, etc.) and non-Muslim (Armenians, Greeks, Jews etc.) groups³. Interestingly, contrary to the general demographic structure of the Empire, the number of non-Muslims citizens in the city was approximately one hundred thousand more than Muslims. In addition to the city’s inherent

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² From the 19th century, especially its second half, to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 (Ortaylı, 1978; Pamuk, 2007)

³ The spatial division resulting from this diversity is one of the bases of the discourse of meeting east with west, used often today, especially by the politicians (see Chapters 5-7).
diversity, 15 percent of Constantinople’s population was expatriate in the second half of the 19th century (Madden, 2016). This was almost three times more than that of London, which was considered the most cosmopolitan city in Europe for that period (White, 2007).

Some demographic developments that the city had experienced – especially from the second quarter of the 19th century – made an important contribution to this diversity. In parallel to that experienced by other European cities, there had been a significant population growth in Istanbul. This saw the city’s population increase from 359,000 in 1828 to more than one million at the end of the century (Karpat, 1978). However, migrations to the Ottoman capital had different dynamics than that of the European experience, where it mostly resulted from industrialisation (Lawton and Lee, 1989). The first reason for the growth was the Muslim immigrants, coming from the lost territories of the Empire or escaping massacres and conflicts in Russia. The second reason were increasing economic and political relations with Europe; this had led many foreigners, most of whom were tradesmen, bankers, merchants, or diplomats, to relocate to the city (Gül, 2009). As will be seen below, these migrations (and the ethnic and religious diversity of the immigrants) mapped onto the existing spatial pattern of the city, and, when considered their socio-economic consequences, further deepened it.

Apart from the social composition, the spatial pattern of Istanbul (more broadly of Ottoman cities) also made it different from its counterparts. Even though Ottoman cities are often thought of within the concept of Islamic (or eastern) cities (Weber, 1958, also see Eldem, Goffman and Masters, 1999 for a comprehensive discussion), what determines the spatial characteristic of an Ottoman city is, before anything else, the Empire’s sui generis social order – known as the Millet System (İnalçık, 1990; Öner, 2014). In this structure, each religious community, or millet, had settled in particular neighbourhoods in which they lived with their community members. In other words, “neighbourhoods in traditional Turkish cities; is a physical space that is not yet shaped by class and status differences” (Ortaylı, 2010: 305). Cities had also consisted of these different neighbourhoods which were religiously

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4 Constantinople was the principal official name of Istanbul throughout the Byzantine period and the common name used in the West until the early 20th century. It was also used by the Ottoman Empire until the advent of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.
5 In the millet system, the Ottoman society is divided on the basis of religion; not on the basis of race, as in colonial cities, or class, as in industrial cities. Each religious community was regarded as separate millets that had a partial autonomy in their internal affairs such as electing their community leaders (Mordtmann, İnalcik and Yerasimos, 2007), carrying out their religious rituals and daily routines and providing some municipal services such as street cleaning or tax collection within their own communities (Ortaylı, 2008). Although millet is translated into English as nation, it actually defines a religious community, not nation in the modern sense (Scruton, 2007). That is, there is no word in English corresponding to this word.
homogeneous in themselves. Such a spatial composition is more easily observable as religious
diversity increases, and Istanbul, the biggest and the most cosmopolitan city in the Empire,
was inherently the city in which that pattern was the most visible:

“The capital city now consisted of four main areas: the ancient walled city, commonly
known as ‘Stamboul’, with a mixed population and the seat of government and
commerce; Galata, on the north shore of the Golden Horn, inhabited by Westerners
and their embassies as well as sizeable populations of Greeks, Jews, and Armenians;
Üsküdar, across the Bosporus on the Asian side, a mainly residential area populated by
Turks; and Eyüp, to the west of the land walls, with a variety of residences, military
buildings, and palaces along the shore” (Madden, 2016: 286).

In parallel with the existing social and spatial pattern, Muslim immigrants generally settled in
Dersaadet (Stamboul in the above quotation), Üsküdar and Eyüp. Since it was both the
business district of the city and the location of the embassies/consulates (and they have
cultural-religious ties with the non-Muslim population of Istanbul), the address of foreign
immigrants was mostly in the Galata quarter:

“Free-trade agreements led thousands of Europeans to relocate to the city, invariably
settling in the Galata/Pera\textsuperscript{6} areas that had been home to expatriates since the days of
the Genoese merchants” (Madden, 2016: 300).

Therefore:

“Beyoğlu [a district covering Galata and Pera] was the gateway to ‘civilised’ Europe,
the quarter of the city, with its cosmopolitan structure, its Parisian cafes and
ballrooms, through which the European world could be accessed” (Boyar and Fleet,
2010: 325).

80\% of the population were non-Muslim citizens and Europeans (Shaw, 1979), meaning
Galata had become the modern face of the city compared to the other regions preserving their
traditional and Muslim character (Çelik, 1993). Some modern municipal services such as
street lighting with gas lamps, or public transportation (tram and underground\textsuperscript{7}) were first
provided in this quarter (for more information on these developments and changing social life,

\textsuperscript{6} Also called Frengistan (Land of Europeans).

\textsuperscript{7} The underground was built in 1875 and was one of the first in the world.
see Lewis, 1968; Fleet and Boyar, 2010). Along with the diversity, this interesting spatial pattern is the basis of the often-used discourses that Istanbul is the ‘melting pot’ or meeting point of Easterners and Westerners (especially by officials).

As its social and demographic composition, the economic structure of Istanbul and its position in the global order were mostly linked with its capital city status. Although there had been initial attempts to establish various industries, especially from the second half of the century (see Clark, 1974), there is no doubt that Istanbul was not an industrial city (and was not a colonial city). In an economy where the state was the biggest purchaser, the main sector that kept the city’s economy alive was the trade sector mostly depending on public expenditures. Istanbul, not only because it was the biggest city of the Empire (and therefore of the region) but also because it was the capital city, was a major centre for domestic and international trade. The ports of Istanbul, especially those in Galata, were the busiest ports of the Empire and most of the port traffic were imports (Eldem et al., 1999). This is significant for understanding Istanbul’s internationalisation because:

“It attracted foreign merchants from well beyond the empire, from China and India in the east to England, and later America, in the west, from Russia to the north and sub-Saharan Africa to the south. It was the central nexus of the empire from which all networks of commercial power radiated outwards, connecting Ottoman merchants and traders to the capital. A supremely important port, Istanbul’s prosperity and wealth was dependent on the sea and the arrival of ships in its harbours” (Boyar and Fleet, 2010: 157).

Addressing its dependence to import products, some accounts (e.g. Wallerstein, 1979) tend to situate Istanbul (more broadly the Ottoman Empire) as the periphery within the 19th century global economic system, which was defined as an asymmetric integration between core regions and colonial regions (commodities from the colonised region and processed goods to it; Chakravorty, 2000). This approach provides a useful explanation to some extent, but this is not the whole picture. In essence, since the Silk Road established, Istanbul had always had an important place in land and maritime commerce between East and West (Francopan, 2015); and the 19th-century economic globalisation not only strengthened this position of the city, but also diversified its economic activities and economic functions:
“During the nineteenth century, its role in transit trade increased in tandem with the growth of world commerce; and it acquired a new commanding position in the world economy with respect to financing of trade, banks, and insurance. Foreign businessmen lived there and organized in chambers of commerce; commodity exchanges were established as well as futures markets; regional centers of foreign banks were also located there” (Keyder, 1999: 13).

As highlighted in the quote, Istanbul, as the capital city, was the fountainhead of movements of money spreading over a large region in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa and was de facto the financial centre in the region. In the city, there had always been a financial market, which had been developing through short-term loans that the state needed and tax-farming, and a group of investors who were dealing with those (these investors, who mostly consisted of non-Muslim Ottoman citizens, were also known as Galata Bankers; see Pamuk, 2004). Moreover, supported by the institutionalisation attempts of the government such as the establishment of a central bank and a stock exchange, increasing financial integration with the European financial markets had led financial institutions, creditors and merchants to invest in Istanbul and had deepened the financial market in the city (Pamuk, 2004). As will be seen in Chapter 7, this is one of the aspects pointed to by those who associate the financial centre role Istanbul today with its imperial history.

Finally, politically speaking, the Ottoman capital had a different administrative form not only from the emerging modern administrations in Europe but also from the other cities in the Empire. In the classical system, which underwent significant changes from the second quarter of the century, there had been neither modern codified rules regulating local administrations, nor local government offices (Çelik, 1993; Ortaylı, 2010). Essential municipal services, such as street cleaning or tax collection, had been provided by the millets (that is religious communities) themselves under the supervision of local administrations (Ergin, 1936; Çelik, 1993).9

This form of government, which was highly decentralised compared to the administrative systems in Europe, had been gaining a more centralised characteristic from the periphery to

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8 A mode of revenue collection. In the tax-farming system, the right to collect tax revenues was farmed out through auction. There were great merchants in Istanbul, especially in Galata, dealing with this business (Islamoğlu-İnan, 1994).

9 In the classical system, the local authority equivalent to the mayor in the modern sense was the Islamic Judges, called kadi. Some responsibilities of kadi were to control street widths, building heights, markets and security of the city (Çelik, 1993; Ortaylı, 2010).
the centre (Eldem et al., 1999). Istanbul was, naturally, the most strictly controlled and the most centrally governed city among the other cities. In reality, the Ottoman capital was not regarded as a province and/or legal local entity. Unlike the other cities that were governed by local governors and had their own budgets, the capital was financed by the central government and was governed under the strict supervision of the Grand Vizier (Ortaylı, 2010).

The change of this classical system, or more precisely modernisation, was on the one hand a consequence of bottom-up demands fuelled by developing and changing socio-economic conditions in the city, especially in Galata\(^{10}\) (see Lewis, 1968). On the other hand, and more importantly, it was a top-down strategy pursued by the ruling elites seeking to strengthen the Empire’s authority and power against European states through reorganising (modernising/westernising can be used interchangeably) provincial administrations (Davison, 1963; İnalcık and Seyitdanloğlu, 2006; Ortaylı, 2010). Mostly because of the latter, the reforms had a centralised characteristic and the imperial elite had a pragmatic and selective attitude towards these western style reforms – both of which were going to be an inheritance to later periods.

The most important part of a long reform process that must be known in terms of the scope of this work is that:

“A new system of provincial and municipal government was now worked out and put into effect which, with only minor changes, provided the legal and administrative framework of the local and provincial government of the Turkish republic” (Lewis, 1968: 228).

Inspired by some European examples, two important laws – the Provincial Law in 1864 and the Municipal Law in 1877 – formed the legal basis of the modern provincial and municipal administrations in the Empire (Ortaylı, 2010). Interestingly, both laws do not cover Istanbul; separate municipal and provincial laws (significantly more centralised) were later enacted for Istanbul (Tekeli, 2009a).\(^{11}\) As pointed out in the quotation above, this two-tier administrative system was later more centralised and adopted by the Turkish Republic (Ergin, 1936). This

\(^{10}\)Thus, it is not a coincidence that the first modern municipality in the Empire was established in Galata in 1858. \(^{11}\) In 1908, a provincial organization was established in Istanbul for the first time. However, only in Istanbul, a local official directly appointed by the central government served as both mayor and governor (governor-mayor) (Ergin, 1936; Ortaylı, 2010). This would be applied until the 1960s during the republican period (Ortaylı, 2010).
has, further, been the core of Turkey’s current local administrative organisation without being the subject of any significant change until recently (Özbudun, 2011). Hence, the centralised characteristic of Turkey's administrative system and the strong intervention of the central government in local politics (see Chapter 6) have important links to the reforms in this period.

3.3 From Imperial Capital to National City

The date of 1923 is one of the most important landmarks of Turkish history, in particular of its political history, this being the birthdate of the new Turkish Republic after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. However, the date of 1923 is a very important place in the story of Istanbul as much as it is for the Turkish political history. 1923 was, after all, the starting point of a long downturn and rebuilding period for the city. The city which had been the capital for more than one thousand years, firstly lost its status as capital city and all other political and economic privileges. Since consulates, diplomats, commercial attaches and other foreigners like manufacturers, businessmen, and ultimately non-Muslim Ottoman citizens, became a minority in the new republic, they started to leave the city and as such it lost its cosmopolitan characteristic and its significant status. What the new national period brought forward was a period of ignoring Istanbul, followed by reconstruction, and after this, a period of seemingly uncontrolled growth that would transform the imperial city into a metropolis of four and half million people.

3.3.1 Neglected City of the Republic (1923-1950)

As noted above, 1923 symbolised a very important landmark for both the country and the city. Following the foundation of the Republic, Turkey entered an overall modernisation period which is qualitatively and philosophically different from its antecedent. Unlike the imperial modernisation, Republican modernisation, under the single state-party, CHP (Republican People’s Party) ruling, sought a total adaptation to Western norms, social life, and institutions (Lewis, 1968; Ahmad, 1993; Kasaba, 2008). In this period, the capital of the collapsed empire was the city that the new Republic ignored and then reconstructed. 1923-1950 was, therefore, a period in which the city experienced a range of negative political, economic and demographic changes.

There is no doubt that the most dramatic impact of this period on Istanbul was the relocation of the capital. This relocation had two important reasons; the first was security, the second was symbolic. In relation to the first one, after the First World War, Istanbul and some other
Anatolian cities were occupied, and the Turkish War of Independence was commanded from Ankara, one of the unoccupied cities. Ankara, therefore, gained a de facto capital city feature and right before the foundation of the Republic, it was officially declared as the capital. The second was the ideological and symbolic purposes of this relocation. To understand this, it is necessary to investigate the internal dynamics of the Republican modernisation thoroughly. But before that it is important to recognise how:

“[I]n most countries outside Western Europe and North America, modernisation was not a profound societal experience [but] it was an official program conceived and implemented either by colonial governments or by the modernising elites of authoritarian nation-states” (Bozdoğan, 2001: 9).

As a non-western case, Turkey’s modernisation experience could be argued as a state-led project. Along with this, it did not emerge as a consequence of, or within, a colonial process. The rulers of the new Republic built their modernisation project on the country’s imperial past but by othering it. They attempted to build a new modern, laic nation-state through othering their imperial background which was symbolised as traditional, cosmopolitan and Islamic (for detail see Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997). Ankara, and Istanbul in the negative sense, had an important place in this process. For Republican elites, the making of Ankara, which used to be a small Anatolian city, as a modern capital city was going to be the showcase of this state-led modernisation (Gül, 2009). Therefore, whereas Ankara was the symbol of a rising new modern and secular nation that the new regime sought to build, Istanbul was seen to be everything that Republican elites wanted to leave behind – Turkey’s Islamic, cosmopolitan and imperial past12:

“Istanbul [noted the deputy Celâl Nuri] was the capital of the Ottoman Empire, a multinational state formed of peoples of various religious and ethnic identities. Ankara, on the other hand, will have a different meaning as the capital of a national state, a young state still growing up” (quoted in Ahmad, 1993: 93).

In doing so, however, they followed a well-known administrative path:

12 Istanbul and Ankara thus became two of the symbols of the conflicts between secular and conservative groups representing the two main wings of Turkish politics.
“While the Kemalist regime tried to overthrow many past institutions, it also followed the well-worn path of its Ottoman predecessors and established a heavily centralised system of government” (Gül, 2009: 86).

This allowed the central government to allocate its financial resources in line with its political and economic priorities and to control local policies through the governor-mayor appointed directly by the prime minister (Keyder, 2008). This had serious negative impacts on Istanbul not only in the political sense but also in terms of its economy. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Empire, the city had already lost much of its financial power and former significance as a centre for international trade. Further, the central government, which prioritised the establishment of a national industry based in Ankara, directed most of its investments not in Istanbul but in Ankara and its surroundings. It is known that Istanbul received less public investment than many Anatolian towns in the early Republican years (Bisel, 2007). Hereby, while an economic network and infant bourgeoisie started to rise in the new capital, and around, Istanbul lost its position as the major economic centre for the country’s economy, even if it was only for a short time (for detailed information, see Keyder, 1987).

In addition to, and because of, these political and economic upheavals, Istanbul also lost much of its population and most importantly its cosmopolitan characteristic in this period. Even though there had been a significant migration influx from the lost territories of the Empire, the city’s population, which was more than one million in 1897, halved to approximately six hundred thousand by 1927 (Tekeli, 2009b). A significant portion of the people who left the city were its non-Muslims. Some of them were the foreign businessmen and investors who left the city because of the abolition of the economic privileges granted to foreign investors and the nationalisation of foreign companies, but the clear majority of the leavers was the non-Muslim Ottoman citizens. The result was that the population of Istanbul became homogenised. Whereas the non-Muslims were the majority of Istanbul’s population at the end of the 19th century, their proportion fell to 35% by 1927, and 16% in 1950 (ibid.).

This matter must be slightly deepened to understand the current cultural ties between Istanbul and the cities which were once ruled by the Empire but today remain outside of the national border of Turkey. This demographic homogenisation of Istanbul is often identified as an ethnic purification (or Turkification) process by many accounts (e.g. Keyder, 2008). However, this process has not an ethnic, but rather a religious character. With the foundation of the Republic, Muslim peoples, who remained within the new territorial boundaries of the
Republic or migrated from the lost territories of the Empire, such as Bosniaks, Albanians, Arabs were regarded as Turk in the new constitutional context. This meant that the city was homogenised to some extent by the leaving of non-Muslims, but partially kept its ethnically cosmopolitan characteristic. This point which is often missed is important in two aspects. First, it allows understanding the cultural diversity in today’s Istanbul. Second, it also allows understanding the historical background behind the ongoing cultural links between Istanbul and the Muslim people of the Middle East and the Balkans, which is seen to be one of the most important dynamics shaping Istanbul’s regional leadership today.

Returning to Istanbul’s development, despite losing much of its significance and privileges on the global and national scale, it was still the biggest city in Turkey and it could not be expected that the central government would ignore such an important city for a longer period. Following the making of the new capital and the surrounding cities, it was time to reconstruct Istanbul (Gül, 2009; Tekeli, 2010; Akpınar, 2014). In the eyes of the central government, as in other cases, the reconstruction of Istanbul was part of the modernisation process. However, because of the city’s imperial heritance and existing urban structure, this reconstruction had a different meaning than for the others. As stated by the mayor Cemil Topuzlu (1937, cited in Gül, 2009: 80-81):

“In my opinion in order to transform Istanbul into a contemporary city, there is no solution but total demolition with the exception of Istanbul’s monuments, and gradual reconstruction.”

This reconstruction was mostly shaped by the master plans drawn up by the French planner, Henri Prost, who was invited to the city in 1935 (Gül and Lamb, 2004; Bisel, 2007; Akpınar, 2014). The main idea of the Prost plans was to build a modern and beautiful city, which also coincided with the modernisation ideals of the Republican rulers. Briefly stated, the plans proposed the opening of new boulevards, streets and main roads for automobiles and public transportation vehicles, and the establishment of new industrial sites, residential and entertainment areas (for details see Bisel, 2007). In direction of Prost’s plans, there had been significant demolitions especially in the old city centre known as Historical Peninsula. Nonetheless, despite the negative effects of these demolitions, it should also be noted that there was at least a planned urban development in the Prost era. In the following years, this planned development would give way to rapid growth and unplanned urbanisation.
3.3.2 The Growing Metropolis (1950-1980)

The second stage of the national period was between 1950 and the 1980 Coup D’état. This period can also be divided into two sub-periods – the 1950s and 1960s-1970s. In the former, Istanbul became the subject of significant building activities and demographic changes both of which were politically promoted by the central government. Istanbul in this period almost retrieved its old importance, becoming the economic centre of the country, although not the political. The later sub-period, which began with a military coup in 1960, was the time of planned industrialisation and is better known as the period of import-substitution industrialisation. This second period, as did the former, also subjected Istanbul to significant waves of migration from rural areas that neither the city nor the country was capable of managing. Altogether, this stage brought to Istanbul a new urbanisation phenomenon that still has serious impacts on the city spatially, socially and politically – gecekondu (see below)\textsuperscript{13}.

This era started when the Democratic Party (DP)\textsuperscript{14} came to power after the transition to a multi-party system. Contrary to secular/modern and statist RPP, DP has defined itself as politically conservative and economically liberal, so this changeover meant also a shift in political and economic paradigm. For Istanbul, this shift meant a series of urban operations shaped within an ideological approach that was completely different from the previous period. To DP rulers, Istanbul was neglected by CHP during the single-party period, and it needed to be reconstructed to return to “its glorious past” (Gül, 2009: 133). In parallel with the conservative ideology of DP, the rhetorical ground here was the imperial background of the city. Prime Minister Menderes in particular forged a symbolic link between his vision for Istanbul and the imperial history of the city: “Istanbul’s reconstruction is the story of triumph parade. We are, once more, going to conquer Istanbul” (Menderes, 1957, in Akpınar, 2015: 56).

Asserting that technical and financial capacity of the local government was not enough to undertake such a great scale activity, the central government thought that the redevelopment of Istanbul “is not merely the task of the Municipality [but] a part of the great task of the state” (Menderes, 1956, in Akpınar, 2015: 56). In other words, Istanbul’s (re)development policies were mainly financed by the central government and shaped by the direction of

\textsuperscript{13} Literally, landed overnight; a structure similar to, yet different from, squatter settlements (see Buğra, 1998).
\textsuperscript{14} This period should be given in detail because AKP and DP (and their leaders) are similar in terms of their discourses about Istanbul, their political and economic ideologies, and the special importance that they attribute to Istanbul.
desires and priorities of the central government, even directly by Prime Minister Menderes (Gül, 2009; Boysan, 2011; Akpınar, 2015). With full support of the central government and personal involvement of Menderes, significant urban operations took place in this period which radically changed the spatial and social fabric of the city:

“The Democrat [DP] government made the city’s redevelopment a top priority, and channelled major funds and resources towards this goal. [...] This period saw the demolition of thousands of buildings, the expropriation of many properties and the construction of gigantic boulevards, both within and outside the Istanbul Peninsula. These works largely shaped modern Istanbul what it is today” (Gül, 2009: 140).

In addition, to move the city’s spatial development beyond its historical core, DP’s urban policies significantly influenced the population growth in Istanbul. Here, besides the political ideology of DP, their economic perspectives had an important role. As already pointed out above, DP pursued a more liberal economic policy in comparison to CHP who were characterised as statist. While CHP mostly made capital investments in Ankara and some other Anatolian cities, under DP ruling, capital investments were directed to Istanbul. This meant that Istanbul became the major economic centre of the country once again. This trend, in addition to the top-down political interventions of the central government, triggered a labour-migration influx into Istanbul such that in just ten years of DP, the population of the city nearly doubled and reached approximately two million.

This extremely rapid growth, alongside insufficient resources of the city municipality, and the ideological approach of the central government brought a new problem: gecekondu. The problem was that there had been neither enough housing for the newcomers nor enough space within the core areas of the city to build new houses. For the central government, this could only be solved by “increasing the amount of land released for new residential areas” (Gül, 2009: 148). In practice, the problem was solved by the newcomers themselves (but with the connivance of the central and local authorities) by constructing gecekondu on the public lands which remained in the rural periphery of the city at that time. Gecekondu neighbourhoods were to be one of the most important phenomena of the urban development of Istanbul during the 1950s.

The DP period ended with a military coup in 1960. With the coup, Turkey shifted to a planned-economy, known as import-substitution. Through the development plans prepared by
the newly established State Planning Institute, the central government aimed to achieve a state-led industrialisation, rapid economic growth and efficient delivery of welfare services that resembled Keynesian welfare models (Eraydın, 2008; Eraydın and Tasan-Kok, 2014). As expected, the import-substitution system has significantly increased, developed and diversified the industrial production in Istanbul, and by this way, made a trigger effect on demographic and spatial growth (for a broader discussion about the impacts of import-substitution on cities see Jacobs, 1970).

Yet, because of two important reasons, import-substitution industrialisation has reflected in a negative way, rather than positive, to Istanbul's subsequent urban development. First, although this period was called as ‘planned industrialisation’, in fact, a national-scale effective planning could not be implemented and a large portion of the industrialisation investments of Turkey was agglomerated in Istanbul (Türkün et al., 2014). This, inherently, caused a serious labour migration from other parts of the country to Istanbul. Second, as in many other developing countries, in Turkey too, under the fact of the absence of sufficient financial resources to meet the growing need for housing, stemmed from the huge migration influxes, the state has generally avoided any direct intervention to the housing sector and often condoned, and even legalise, illegal-housing (Baharoğlu, 1996).

Therefore, this period, just as the previous ten years, resulted in unplanned development and rapid population growth. In parallel with the increasing economic activities, about three million people migrated to Istanbul between 1960 and 1980. Since there had been no master plan covering the metropolitan area of the city, the new industrial areas and the gecekondu neighbourhoods around them emerged randomly in the periphery of the city (Tümertekin, 2010). By the end of the 1970s, approximately three out of four of the city’s population, which reached approximately five million, lived in settlements that were illegally constructed. These areas have been somehow legalised by the authorities with various amnesties and many have attained district status over time (Türkün et al., 2014). Many districts, which today are considered the central districts of the city, were formed in that way. This unplanned development, which continued in the following years, is one of the important discursive foundations of urban transformation policies and central government intervention today (see Chapter 6).
3.4 Istanbul under Globalisation

Declining industrial profits in older industrialised countries and crises in the postwar model of Fordist-Keynesian policies resulted in these countries shifting towards more market-oriented policies. During the 1980s and 1990s, these multidimensional policies – commonly referred to as ‘neoliberalism’ – were not only institutionalised in North America and Western Europe but also in the non-western world through structural adjustment programs (Chorev, 2018). Turkey followed a similar trajectory. Changing from the planned and statist economic strategies of the previous period with neoliberal economic policies, Turkey entered a rapid integration period in which Istanbul became the centre once again.

As the economic capital and the biggest city of Turkey, Istanbul has become the gateway of Turkey to the globe. Even more importantly, as will be seen in the empirical chapters, in this phase of globalisation, the city has begun to regain much of its privileges, importance, and the functions, which it used to have in the nineteenth-century global-system. Nevertheless, although Istanbul has felt the influence of globalisation since the 1980s, it was still far from showing global city characteristics until the early 2000s. In the 2000s, however, Istanbul witnessed its rise as a global city. This period can, therefore, be best narrated through dividing it into two sections.

3.4.1 On the Road to Global City (1980-2002)

Just as 1923 was the beginning of the national period, 1980 was another milestone that marked the beginning of the global period. By a neoliberal structural adjustment program introduced in January 1980, Turkey shifted from an import-substituting industrialisation strategy to a market-oriented economic regime that includes liberalising global trade, promoting foreign capital and export-oriented growth (Türkün et al, 2014). From that time, Turkey has increasingly incorporated itself into the global economic order, and Istanbul, as the major economic centre of the country, has been the city that was most affected by this integration (Keyder, 1999; Tekeli, 2010). In other words, from the 1980s, globalisation has become one of the drivers that affects Istanbul’s political, economic, and social fabric.

There are two key reasons why this period is identified as the global period. The first is Turkey’s shift to a more globalisation-oriented economy. With economic liberalisation, many national companies began to integrate with world markets. As the economic capital of the country, Istanbul, in this period, began to function as Turkey’s gateway to the global
economy. Moreover, foreign companies seeking to invest in the Middle East and Balkans gradually opened branches and regional headquarters in Turkey. Unsurprisingly, Istanbul was the primary location for companies investing in Turkey (Tümertekin, 2010). Second is the collapse of the Soviet Union and some political conflicts in the region. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Istanbul began to receive increasing immigration from the Bloc Countries (most notably from Eastern Europe and Turkic states in Central Asia) with various purposes such as tourism, working, education, or trade (Kasaba, 2008). Moreover, the political conflicts and civil wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Iraq triggered different immigration influxes to Turkey in general and Istanbul in particular.

Before discussing how these developments were reflected in the macro vision of Istanbul, it is important to briefly consider some of their social and spatial impacts. In parallel to the gradual expansion of global companies and increasing number of foreigners coming to the city, some changes in Istanbul’s cityscape partly echoed the well-known impacts of globalisation: the emergence of new modern offices, shopping centres and five-star hotels and so on. On the other hand, the growth of Istanbul in this period was deeply influenced by another economic dynamic contradicting the discourse of globalisation. In Istanbul, the growth of service sectors did not happen at the expense of industry. Contrary, there had been a slight increase in the industrial manufacturing of the city by virtue of newly-established organised industrial zones during the 1980s and 1990s (IMMCPD, 2009, see also Chapter 7).

These two-sided economic and spatial developments have increased the immigration and unplanned development of the city, as in the previous period (Öktem, 2011). In the 22 years between 1980 and 2002, the population of Istanbul grew at an unprecedented pace with 5.6% annual average, which is nearly two times more than that of the world (The World Bank, 2014). Parallel to the dizzying growth of the population, the gecekondu areas expanded towards Istanbul’s periphery. Further, by the various amnesties declared over time, the legalisation of the gecekonuds continued. Thus, gecekonuds have turned into multi-storey apartment buildings and its neighbourhoods have become large districts/towns. At the threshold of the new millennium, Istanbul was an enormous city with its ten million population, and a significant proportion of the population lived in illegally built districts.

Despite this unplanned and uncontrolled growth, the fact that Istanbul began to regain its former global importance in this period promised a very attractive discourse in terms of urban vision. Local politicians especially have not missed this opportunity. The goal of Istanbul, or
its rulers, was more or less obvious: “Istanbul will be again a world centre for business, trade, tourism, sports culture and the arts” (Roberts, 1990: 7). This goal, which has been repeatedly expressed by other mayors in the post-1980 period, entered into political parlance as a popular campaign promise for the 1994 local elections in which Erdoğan was elected as the metropolitan mayor. The 1995 Master Plan prepared after the election clearly stated the goal of making Istanbul into a leading world city where industry was going to be replaced with sectors such as services, trade, and tourism. In the plan, the economic growth of Turkey and Istanbul depended on Istanbul achieving world city status (Öktem, 2011). In retrospect, no matter how it is named, the (re)making of Istanbul as a global city has been one of the unchanging aspirations of the local rulers since then.

However, neither economic and political developments that globalised the city during the 1980s and the 1990s, nor global aspirations of the local authorities, were able to transform Istanbul into a truly global city. Of course, there are different internal and external dynamics of this, yet two internal factors are especially noteworthy for the content of this thesis. As will be better clarified in the next section, the first and foremost is that global integration of Turkey has not been fully instituted until the 2000s. The economic crises that Turkey experienced every three to four years (between 1980 and 2001) in the neoliberal restructuring process also had an important role in this delay (Cizre and Yeldan, 2005; Yeldan, 2006). The second factor to be emphasised here is the reflection of Turkey’s traditional secular-conservative conflict on the political climate of the 1990s, especially in terms of local and central relations (Kuyucu, 2010).

During the 61 years preceding 1984, there had not been a significant reflection of the conflicts between different political parties on the central-local relations, as Istanbul was governed by centrally appointed governor-mayors or by military-mayors appointed by the military governments within most of this period. However, political developments since 1980 have changed the nature of this relationship. By a range of decentralisation reforms, from the early 1980s the planning and administrative powers and budgets of city governments, in particular of the metropolitan municipalities established in 1983, have been gradually increased (Bayırbağ, 2013). Through these reforms, the local government of Istanbul emerged for the first time in the history of the Republic as a political figure and power, so to speak.

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15 Although the mayor of Istanbul has been decided by elections since 1958, this process has often been interrupted by military interventions. Therefore, between 1923 and 1984, it was no more than 8 years that Istanbul and Turkey were governed by different political parties.
Ideological differences, or vice versa, ideological matches, between central governments and metropolitan municipalities have gained more importance since then.

Yet, as the reforms did not mean a real decentralisation in practice, the direction of this relationship was particularly important for the local governments. As will also be seen in the following pages, in Turkey, any amendment that increased local governments’ power was generally followed by different amendments that reinforced the central government’s hand in local politics (Eraydın and Tasan-Kok, 2014; cf. Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Harrison, 2008; Jonas, 2013). Therefore, while the differences might cause tensions, often to the detriment of local governments, the vice-versa enhanced the policy-making capacities of local governments. For example, Bedrettin Dalan, the first elected metropolitan mayor of Istanbul after the coup, could undertake many mega-projects that exceeded his authority and budget owing to the political and financial support of the central government which was in the same party as the metropolitan municipality. In stark contrast, it is known that his successor, from the opposition party, had problems with the central government on some projects (Tasan-Kok, 2004). A critical milestone in this regard was the 1994 local elections, because:

“In 1994, when Istanbul’s first metropolitan mayor with ‘Islamic’ credentials came to power in the aftermath of an astounding electoral victory, a sense of radical change swept across nearly all strata of the city’s population. Within the circles of the victorious Refah Party [RP (Welfare Party)], this was a prophetic event, referred to as the ‘second conquest’ of Istanbul, 500 years after victorious Ottoman armies entered Constantinople in the sixteenth century” (Öncü, 2007: 246).

The victory of the RP and Erdoğan and their second conquest discourse were met with negative reactions from secular groups, particularly central bureaucracy and military, triggered by the paranoia of an “Islamic takeover” (Öncü, 2007: 247). During most of Erdoğan’s 4.5-year term in office, Istanbul’s local government and the central government were in the hands of different political parties. During this period, there were serious problems between Erdoğan and the central government (and local bureaucrats appointed by the central government, e.g. the city governor), many of which also appeared in the press (Milliyet, 1998). The most noteworthy among these was the cancellation of the 1995 Master Plan by the Council of State for lack of jurisdiction (Mimdap, 2006). Even though the Welfare Party came to power as the coalition partner in the last year of Erdoğan’s period of office, they were forced to resign by the military in 1997 (the so-called Post-modern Coup). Erdoğan
was arrested one year after the post-modern coup and was subsequently banned from politics.\textsuperscript{16}

However, everything changed at the turn of the new millennium. The newly-founded AKP under the leadership of Erdoğan came to power in 2002, after the 2001 financial crisis which was the worst economic crisis Turkey had ever faced. This was to launch a new period in which Turkey and Istanbul were to undergo significant changes at the hands of AKP central and local governments.

3.4.2 Rising Istanbul as a Global City (2002- to the Present)

As many have said, in the 2000s, Istanbul has begun to rise again in the global order and this new experience has been like a regained victory for the city that experienced a great breakdown at the beginning of the 20th century (Walker and Taylor, 2000; Sarkis, 2009; Keyder, 2010; Logie and Morvan, 2014). The sociospatial (Chapter 5), political-economic developments (Chapters 6 and 7) that Istanbul has experienced in this period will be discussed in detail in the empirical chapters through the statistical indicators and the information gathered from the interviews. For this reason, this part, somewhat differently from the previous ones, concentrates on the dynamics behind the global rise of Istanbul, most notably the political dynamics. Considering the contents of the empirical chapters, the section is structured around three axes as follows: (i) from conflict to the alliance; (ii) institutionalisation of global integration (or neoliberalism); and (iii) decentralisation-recentralisation.

As the previous section has discussed, to become a global/world has been a desirable goal of the local governments of Istanbul since the 1990s. After the landslide victory of the AKP in 2002, when the former mayor Erdoğan became prime minister, this goal has gained a more national characteristic. To make Istanbul a leading global city and a financial centre has become a national strategy which is framed by the central government with reference to 2023, the centenary of the Turkish Republic. This was stated later by Erdoğan (2009: n.p.) himself as follows:

\begin{quote}
“I served as mayor in Istanbul for 4.5 years and I had a goal, an ambition in those days to turn Istanbul into a financial capital. Of course, because it was different politics ruling in the central government we couldn’t do it then. But now, we are in power in
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} His political ban was lifted in 2002 by the parliament.
the central government, and also in Istanbul local government. We considered the pros and cons and decided to take prompt action to make Istanbul the financial centre.”

Moreover, it is undoubtedly claimed that since both the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and Turkey’s central government are in AKP control the political conflicts experienced in the previous period have given way to a strong alliance since 2002 (Keyder, 2008; Aksoy, 2010; Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010; Yetiskul et al., 2016). The central government has seriously supported Istanbul’s global city projects in this period in many various respects. As Chapter 6 will discuss in detail, many mega projects (e.g. the Third Airport) and large-scale urban transformation projects that exceed the financial capabilities of the local government have been undertaken by the central government. Another example, in the direction of the aim of making Istanbul a global financial centre, which was mentioned above by Erdoğan, the Istanbul International Financial Centre (IFC) Project, was also put into effect by the central government. Nonetheless, arguably the most important contribution of the central government in this process was to lift all barriers to the global integration of Turkey and Istanbul:

“AKP was fully committed to neo-liberal policies, implying that they assessed the role that could be played by the city in the perspective of attracting business and investment. This meant that the developments of the 1990s which had been tentative, and in some cases not fully above-board, could now be institutionalised. With the new legislation following the massive economic crisis of 2001, Ankara had to agree to a series of reforms which made the integration of the economy into global networks of capital flows more stable” (Keyder, 2010: 180).

As the quote implies, the global integration process that started in the 1980s became a full integration with the policies implemented since the 2000s. During the early years of their rule, AKP enacted a series of legal and administrative reforms providing the legal frameworks for the country’s integration into the global economy (Kayasu and Yetiskul, 2014). In many ways, these reforms were consistent with the policies that the neoliberal paradigm proposes: lifting barriers for foreign investments; a hard privatisation; withdrawal of the state from many public services; flexibility for financial markets, and so on. In this way, the central government paved the way for the expansion of global capitalism in Turkey (the impacts of these policies on Istanbul will be discussed in Chapter 6).
Moreover, the central government has done something else that has deeply affected Istanbul in this period. This involves directing foreign capital, especially real-estate and construction capital, into the city (see below) with various legal amendments (e.g. urban regeneration laws). The strong capacity of the central government for directing global capital into urban space lies in Turkey’s centralised administrative tradition, which is skilfully used by the AKP to achieve their goal of positioning Istanbul in global circuits of capital and finance. This centralised tradition that allows the direct intervention of the central government in local policies also sheds light onto the exceptional neoliberalism experience of Turkey:

“While many of the post-2002 laws are broadly consistent with what might be termed ‘neoliberal’ reforms (such as increased financialization and marketization, and a focus on competition and entrepreneurship), it’s crucial to recognize that the state, and the central government in particular, has not been sidelined by these processes.” (Angell et al., 2014: 650)

As widely accepted in the literature, what best characterises the AKP’s urban policies is an intensive entrepreneurialism which is generally implemented in a top-down way by the central government (e.g. Aksoy, 2012; Penpecioğlu and Tasan-Kok, 2016; Kuyucu; 2018). As a matter of fact, this can be read as a dual process in which decentralisation and recentralisation policies are implemented together (cf. Harrison, 2008). Namely, AKP, in their early years, have pursued a strong decentralisation policy and enacted various laws that strengthened the administrative and financial autonomy of the local governments. These laws gave the local governments power to prepare master plans, to privatise public lands by seeking profit, to declare and carry out urban transformation projects.

On the other hand, they have simultaneously developed new state apparatuses that enable the proactive involvement of central government in urban policy-making (Akilli and Akilli, 2014; Kuyucu, 2018). Among these, especially the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (MOEU), established in 2011, and Mass Housing Administration (TOKI), redesigned during the AKP period, are drawn to the attention as the most important central institutions having a role in urban policies in this era. Both will be frequently mentioned in the empirical sections of this thesis. This strong centralisation, along with the comfortability of controlling both the central and Istanbul’s local government, gave AKP a flexibility to execute the integration and entrepreneurial policies and enable the central government to intervene in local policies without confronting any tensions. As Chapter 6 will discuss, this flexibility especially
appeared in the projects exceeding the administrative or financial power of the Metropolitan Government, such as mega-projects and large-scale urban transformation projects.

Especially TOKI has played a key role in this era. TOKI, founded in 1984 to meet the growing need for social housing in Turkey, has almost remained inactive until the early 2000s. However, with the AKP coming to the power, TOKI’s financial abilities and fields of operation have been increased through various legal amendments, and it has transformed into being a super-powered institution in issues concerning urban planning and construction (Balaban, 2012). As such, TOKI has played a vital role in expropriation and building activities in urban transformation and renewal projects, and in particular in gecekondu areas (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010). Furthermore, it has been given the authority to build and sell profit-oriented real-estate projects and entering into the partnerships with the private sector (public-private partnerships). Under the direct supervision of the prime ministry, since the early 2000s, TOKI “has turned into one of the biggest property developers in the country” (Balaban, 2012: 28). In this way, many public lands and the districts emerging as gecekondu areas, both of which remained outside the capitalist circuit up to the 2000s, have rapidly become sites of capital accumulation. This process, which is carried out with the cooperation of capital groups (national and global) and the central and local state agencies, is one of the essential dynamics to understand the global development of Istanbul in the current period.

3.5 Discussion: Framing Istanbul as an In-between Global City

“Istanbul is a global city whose identity is strongly influenced by its geographic position. Historically it has been an ‘in-between’ city (between Europe and Asia, the Golden Horn and Bosphorus, the Marmara and Black Sea, Muslim and Catholic, Ancient and Modern), but today Istanbul’s position is beyond just geographic and encompasses economic, political, social and cultural spheres of global influence” (Boano et al., 2010: 12).

Thus far, the chapter has concentrated on various political, economic, social and demographic developments of Istanbul (and Turkey) from imperial to global periods. This section discusses how this story of Istanbul can be conceptualised and whether this conceptualisation can provide an understanding of global developments in cities which have similar patterns to Istanbul. As will be recalled, the conclusion part of Chapter 2 discussed that ongoing calls for new urban theories or concepts might strengthen the polemical pluralism in global urban
studies. It therefore proposed to stress-test and improve existing theories. However, this does not mean to insist on a theory or theories that cannot adequately explain a city. That is, when stress-testing existing theories, it is also necessary to see whether a different conceptualisation can work better. Hence, the following discussion should be read as a pre-conceptualisation and a groundwork for the final discussion of the thesis which will be made in Chapter 8.

This conceptualisation can be named as ‘in-between’, as the above quote emphasises. The term of in-between is originally coined by Sieverts (2003, he uses ‘Zwischenstadt’) to explain the hybrid characteristics of suburbanisation and metropolitan areas that are neither urban or suburban (see also Young and Keil, 2010; Addie, 2016). However, here, this term is used as a metaphor resonating most especially with the historical and geographical characteristics of Istanbul. A crucial question here is whether this term can be used to categorise some other cities. To answer this question, it is necessary to underline two points discussed in the previous section. First, theoretical arguments of the approaches discussed in the previous section are based on the experiences of cities in certain geographical contexts. Second, cities categorised within similar typologies, at the same time, follow similar historical trajectories. Based on these two assumptions, it can be hypothesised that cities such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Budapest can be categorised within this concept. That is to say, these cities can be called ‘in-between’ global cities.

Table 3.1 shows how in-between cities present different characteristics than existing city typologies that have been discussed in Chapter 2. First of all, in-between cities are located in a different geographical context than the existing categories. Whereas classical global cities are mostly agglomerations in the global North, especially in North America and Western Europe (or postcolonial cities in the global South; and developmental cities and city-states in East Asia), in-between cities are located in between Europe and Asia. More precisely, these cities sit in the intersections between Europe and Central Asia; such as Vienna and Budapest (between Eastern Europe and Western Europe), or Istanbul, St. Petersburg, and Moscow between Eastern Europe and Central Asia (or broadly Eurasia).

**Table 3.1 City Typologies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identifiers</th>
<th>Classical Global Cities</th>
<th>Developmental Cities and City-States</th>
<th>Postcolonial Cities</th>
<th>In-between Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Cities</strong></td>
<td>New York, London, Paris</td>
<td>Tokyo, Seoul, Singapore</td>
<td>Mumbai, Johannesburg, São Paulo</td>
<td>Istanbul, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Budapest, Vienna</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Secondly, as the third row presents, in-between cities have followed a different historical trajectory. Unlike two-stages periodisation of classical global cities and three-stages periodisation of postcolonial cities and many developmental cities, in-between cities could be periodised as three-stages: imperial-national-global. In retrospect, the concept that best describes the status of these cities a hundred years ago is undoubtedly the imperial city (such a conceptualisation involving Istanbul, Vienna and St. Petersburg; see Öner, 2014). At the turn of the 20th century, just like Istanbul, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Budapest or Moscow were still the capital cities or among the biggest cities of the multi-national and multi-religious empires (respectively the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Tsarist Russia).

**Table 3.2 Population of Istanbul by Years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1.1 million</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>0.9 million</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>12.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>0.7 million</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>13.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1.1 million</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1.2 million</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>14.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1.9 million</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>14.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3.0 million</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>14.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4.7 million</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>15.0 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: Karpat, 1978; Tekeli, 2009b; nüfusu.com; 2018)
The collapse of these empires after the First World War caused a significant decline for these cities in many aspects. With the transition from the imperial to the national period, these cities lost many of the privileges as imperial cities, most important of which were their imperial linkages (political, social or economic). For example, as discussed throughout this chapter, between the years 1897 and 1927, Istanbul has lost almost half of its population, a considerable part of this its non-Muslim residents (Table 3.2). The following years, especially the post-1980 period, the city has received massive migration influxes and reached to 1.1 million in 1950, 4.7 million in 1980, 10 million in 2000 and exceeded 15 million in 2017.

Vienna has followed a similar pattern to Istanbul with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. While it was one of the biggest cities in Europe with its over 2 million inhabitants before the War, by the 1940s, Vienna's population had fallen to about 1.5 million. In other words, Vienna, after the First World War, “was no longer the hub of a Great Power [but] had become the capital of the Republic of Austria, a small country of about 6,000,000 inhabitants” (Hatz, 2008: 311). Some of these cities have also experienced more significant political changes than others. For example, while St Petersburg, as the capital of the Russian Empire, was one of the major political and industrial centres in Europe (Golubchikov, 2010), similar to Istanbul’s experience, it lost its capital city status to Moscow after the collapse of the Empire.

However, with globalisation, these cities have begun to re-live the experiences that they lived in imperial periods but in different ways and have begun to regain their old prominence in the global order. It also marks a symbolic refraction in the historical patterns of these cities, because they often associate their global city status with their imperial histories, not their national periods. For example:

“Once the capital of a multinational empire, and the crossroads of Europe before WWI, [...] Vienna made successive attempts to reclaim global status” (Rethinking Global Cities: Vienna, 2015: n.p.).

And:

“For some two millennia, Istanbul (in its various guises) has been one of the great cities of the world. It has owed its success to its location on the Bosphorus where it has been a cultural and economic cross-roads both between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and between Europe and Asia. For some two centuries, Istanbul has
been in relative decline as world political changes have not been conducive to cosmopolitan centres in traditional empires. [...] With the coming of globalization, new transnational processes abound in which cities can exploit opportunities beyond their own state’s boundaries. In short, the time is ripe to reassess Istanbul as a bridge between East and West” (Walker and Taylor, 2000: para.1).

The symbolic link established between the imperial period and the global period (or imperial city and global city) makes it necessary to evaluate the global aspirations of these cities in a different way. For example, for many non-western cities, ‘catch-up to the West’ is considered one of the important motivations that legitimise global city policies (see the fourth row). However, this approach is far from providing an adequate interpretation for in-between cities. Instead, this motivation could be made with a new term. For example, as the above quotes suggest, this could be identified as ‘regain’.

As seen in the fifth row, the central-local relations in the countries hosting in-between cities could be identified as highly centralised, especially compared with North America and Western Europe. They are more like the East Asian context in which countries traditionally have centralised forms of governments.¹⁷ The centralised administrative tradition of Turkey has already been discussed in this chapter. Similarly, in Russia (Clark and Moonen, 2017; Kinossian, 2017), Hungary (Kovács and Grünhut, 2016) or more broadly in Central and Eastern Europe (Schmitt and Well, 2016) the central governments are in a strong position vis-a-vis their local governments. For example, an interesting comparative study (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015) reveals the strong similarities between Hungary and Turkey in central governments’ involvement in local politics and the methods of legitimising these interventions.

Finally, as in Istanbul, the functions and the positions of the other cities which could be framed as in-between are influenced by their intersection/gateway positions. The previous chapter has argued that whereas core global cities sitting on the top of the global urban hierarchy mostly function as the command and control points of the global economic system, global cities in the global South are generally the gateways of their countries; and developmental cities like Seoul or Tokyo undertake the role of command and control points for the international operations of their national companies (Hill and Kim, 2000). However,

¹⁷ Since there has not been a comparative study involving all these cities, it is difficult to predict which category is more centralistic. Nevertheless, they could be separated as bureaucratically-centralized (East Asian) and politically-centralized (In-between).
cities like Istanbul, Budapest or Vienna mostly function as gateways for both their countries and the countries around them based on their control capabilities (for detailed information about the gateway functions of these cities, see Taylor et al., 2002; ESPON, 2013; for Vienna see also Musil, 2009; for Istanbul see OECD, 2008; also Chapters 5 and 7 in this thesis).

They could, therefore, be seen as regional command and control points in the global economy and could be ranked as secondary or emerging global cities. For example, in a current analysis, Moscow, Vienna, and Istanbul are ranked in similar positions amongst the global cities of the world; respectively 18th, 20th and 25th (A.T. Kearney, 2017). According to the report, these three cities are ranked right below the top global cities and above all cities from the global South. Likewise, in the world cities index published by the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) research network, these three cities are ranked in the third categorization below Alpha++ and Alpha+ and classified as Alpha World Cities (GaWC, 2017).

To conclude, when considering the geographical and historical contexts of Istanbul, the city can be framed as an in-between city; in-between east and west, or in-between imperial and global, and maybe in more dimensions. Istanbul has different patterns than many other cities conceptualised in the literature, but at the same time, as revealed in the above paragraphs, there are also some other cities which follow similar trajectories. These cities demonstrate similar characteristics to Istanbul in terms of politics, economics, and their functions and positions in the global cities order and might be framed as in-between cities. Hence, although this section has been basically framed to conceptualise Istanbul as an in-between city so as to provide a theoretical framework for the empirical chapters, this concept of in-between might be further developed to serve as a theoretical basis of future studies involving these cities.

3.6 Concluding Comments

To provide a theoretical understanding of global city formation in an exceptional geographical and historical context, this chapter has outlined the historical trajectory of Istanbul and has examined the story of the city in three different periods as imperial, national and global. In each period, Istanbul has been the centre of developments that are different but closely related to each other or which are the continuation of each other. All these developments are crucial for understanding the political and economic characteristics of Istanbul today and its position
in the national and global urban order, and further why Istanbul can be conceptualised as an in-between city.

Firstly, through an examination of social, economic and political patterns of Istanbul as an imperial capital, this chapter has demonstrated that Istanbul has followed a different pathway than the cities in the western and the non-western contexts. One of the most important aspects of this pathway is the traditional centralised administrative structure of Turkey, almost never changed, which has been inherited from the imperial period. This is vital for understanding the nature of city-state relations and central government’s involvement in local politics that will be discussed in Chapter 6. Furthermore, discussing its imperial period has also been important for understanding the continuities between imperial Istanbul, which ruled a wide territory from Eastern Europe to the Middle East, and global Istanbul, which is regarded as one of the leading cities in the same hinterland (see also Harris, 2009).

Secondly, the chapter has also argued that the shift from the empire to the nation-state signalled a dramatic decline for Istanbul, in which the city lost not only its capital city status but also its economic powers and privileges as well as its cosmopolitan social structure. Therefore, unlike the other cities argued in the literature whose historical trajectories show a continuity like industrial/post-industrial or colonial/postcolonial, there is a significant diffraction in the story of Istanbul. This will shed light on two important issues which will be discussed in the empirical chapters, especially Chapter 7. The first is that officials link the global city formation of Istanbul to its imperial legacy and define their goals mostly through the city’s imperial past. The second, global aspirations of Istanbul and the root of its motivations to be a global city, should be defined as retrieving or regaining, unlike other non-western contexts whose motivations are mostly described as catch-up the west.

Thirdly and finally, as emphasised throughout this chapter, Istanbul is a global city whose identity is mostly influenced by the historical transitions between imperial and global and its distinctive geographical position between east and west. It could, therefore, be thought of as an in-between city – being ranked between top global cities and the global cities of the global South might be associated with this in-between notion (see previous section). Furthermore, the discussion above demonstrated that Istanbul is not a unique example in this regard. Cities like Vienna, St. Petersburg, Moscow or Budapest have similar historical and geographical patterns to Istanbul and there are some common political, economic and symbolic features between these cases and Istanbul. These common features will be briefly presented in the
empirical sections, but what can be said already is that the in-between concept can be expanded to include these cities in future research.
4.1 Introduction

The main interest of the thesis is the global city development of Istanbul and the historical, geographical and political dynamics behind this development. In this respect, and especially considering the focus is on the ‘making of’ Istanbul, the research adopted a qualitative approach whose main component was semi-structured interviews. With this design, a range of people such as central and local government officials, business groups, environmental and urban activists was interviewed. In the research, secondary data consisting of mainly official statistics and governmental publications were also employed to support the analysis.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section (4.2) gives a brief overview of methodologic tendencies of existing approaches for doing global cities research, and touches upon current methodological perspectives for researching Istanbul. Section 4.3 explains the research design and clarifies the alignment between research objectives and methodology. Section 4.4 summarises the data collection procedures in two separate subsections as semi-structured interviews, and secondary data use. Section 4.5 explains how the data gathered in the field were processed and analysed. The chapter then goes on to discuss positionality and ethical considerations (4.6) and ends with a brief concluding section (4.7).

4.2 Doing Global Cities Research

In the introduction to his edited book Researching the City, Kevin Ward (2014) states that there is no right way of researching cities. Instead the selection of methods is driven by what you want to learn about cities. Adding to that, it could also be said that researching cities is also depending on the context in which the city is assessed. Different geographical, political and/or historical patterns of cities lead the researchers to assess these cities in different contexts, which then form different approaches in the literature. In that sense, all four major approaches introduced in Chapter 2 employ various specific research methods depending on the nature of the knowledge that they aim to extract.

Global and world cities researchers apply both quantitative and qualitative methods. In the case of world cities research, quantitative methods are often preferred as they provide a reliable dataset for comparing (e.g. ranking, classifying) cities on a global scale and for
understanding how they relate to each other (Derudder and Taylor, 2016; Lüthi et al., 2018). Qualitative research methods are, however, applied to produce “practice-based findings on different intercity attributes and relationalities [and to understand] the dynamics of the world city network, from below” (Watson and Beaverstock, 2014: 421). The case-study approach is another method that global/world city researchers apply as it provides a strong local perspective. Researchers typically use case-studies to position specific city/cities and to highlight their divergent/convergent dynamics (e.g. Chubarov and Brooker, 2013; Parnreiter et al., 2013; Zademach and Musil, 2014), or to stress-test the central theses of the global/world city concept (e.g. Kleibert, 2017; Krijnen et al., 2017).

In the state rescaling approach, researchers are generally interested in geo-political-economic dynamics behind global city formation and therefore qualitative methods such as interviews with policy-makers (Li et al., 2014) or interest groups (Keating and Wilson, 2014) are much more in demand vis-a-vis quantitative methods. On the other hand, a more favourable and preferred method in this perspective is the analysis of policies and literature analysis. Such approaches are adopted as they are suitable to trace the neoliberal evolution of urban policies and/or local (city) – central (state) relations (Horak, 2013; Mackinnon, 2013; Armondi, 2017).

In the post-colonial approach, unlike the western context, there is a general tendency towards the comparative and ethnographic methods (Robinson, 2011, 2016; Roy, 2016b). This is primarily because of the efforts to put the divergent historical, political, cultural dynamics of global South cities onto the agenda of global urban studies. As for the developmental approach, because the developmental scholars are generally interested in the political dynamics of global city formation, qualitative interviewing with stakeholders is a frequently used research method, as well as document analysis. For example, Saito (2011) interviewed local and national officials in Japan to examine how the developmental state structure creates a significant characteristic of urban politics, and Bae (2013) explored decentralisation in South Korea through interviewing elites.

Regarding Istanbul, it has been discussed in the previous section that there is now a growing literature exploring its development in globalisation. One side of the literature consists of case-studies (Lelandais, 2014; Akcan, 2015) and occasionally comparative studies (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015), both of which are mostly based on archival research and/or secondary data such as policy documents and state-statistics. Moreover, albeit limited in number, scholars have been increasingly adopting semi-structured interviews. Interviewing is generally
preferred by the researchers who focus on more specific issues such as urban regeneration in a particular district of Istanbul (Unalan, 2010; Yetişkul et al., 2016), or public protests and resistance against urban policies and/or mega-projects (Abbas and Yiğit, 2015). However, there has not yet been a comprehensive qualitative analysis of the recent urban development of Istanbul through interviews with various central and local groups. In other words, this research contributes to the literature not only by extending the existing knowledge about Istanbul’s global city formation but also by means of its research methodology.

4.3 Research Design

This research was designed as a qualitative case study whose main data source is semi-structured interviews. Overall, the objectives of this research are as follows: (i) to provide a critical conceptual insight into Istanbul’s development under globalisation; (ii) to examine the role distribution (and relationship) between global city-makers (in particular the central and local institutions) in the making of Istanbul as a global city; and finally, (iii) to situate the global city formation of Istanbul within the context of major global urban approaches. To fulfil these objectives, various research procedures were followed. The primary data consisted of 32 semi-structured interviews which were collected in two separate periods of fieldwork. Different kinds of secondary sources were also collected to support the primary data, strengthen the argument, and position Istanbul in comparison with other cases. The collected data were then transcribed, coded and interpreted.

Figure 4.1 illustrates how these primary and secondary data are organised to achieve the overall aim of the research. Column 1 presents the research objectives and Column 2 demonstrates the data types used to achieve these objectives. Column 3 gives a detailed breakdown of the question numbers (see Appendix 1) and the secondary sources. The column also shows how these sources were framed to answer a particular research objective. Finally, Column 4 clarifies which codes (Appendix 2) are used to answer which research questions.

Figure 4.1 Alignment between Research Objectives and Methodology
4.4 Data collection

The main data source for this thesis are semi-structured interviews. A total of 32 semi-structured interviews were collected in two separate periods of fieldwork. The first fieldwork period was conducted from December 2015 to January 2016, and the second from December 2016 to January 2017. 22 out of the 32 total interviews were completed in the first period, with the other 10 interviews conducted during the second period. The average length of interviews conducted in the first fieldwork was 60 minutes. This means 22 hours of audio data were collected during the first fieldwork period. In the second period, the average was 77 minutes which corresponded to 12.8 hours of audio data. In total, approximately 35 hours of audio material were generated. In addition to the semi-structured interviews, some secondary sources were also employed in the research. Secondary data, most of which are based on a variety of statistical data, were principally used to support the information obtained from interviews. Further, some government publications have also been used to evidence the arguments proposed by the thesis. The following sections provide detailed information of the procedures being followed in the collection of both data types.

4.4.1 Semi-Structured Interviews

Interviews, as per their dictionary meaning, are conversations between two or more people, one of which is usually asking questions to the other. Talking with people, that is interviewing, is one of the most popular research methods among urban researchers who explore the practices which make cities, and who seek to understand how theories mirror practice in the field (Cochrane, 2014). Interviews, in this sense, can be thought of as an interaction, a verbal interchange between interviewers seeking to reach the information and interviewee/s who are eligible to provide information on a specific topic (Longhurst, 2016). Such an interaction for example could be between a researcher who has theoretical knowledge and assumptions, and a representative of the city elite who has a good knowledge of how the city is planned, shaped, governed by different actors who also interact with each other, as in this research.

Nevertheless, as a research methodology, an interview means more than daily conversations, and could be considered as “an excellent way of gathering information [but] in ways that are self-conscious, orderly and partially structured” (Longhurst, 2010: 103). What makes interviews more than a list of questions or everyday conversations is that they are purposively
designed by the researcher seeking to extract information about the research topic from experiences, beliefs, goals, expectations, etc. of individuals. Interviews, or approaches of interviewing, are varied depending on what researchers seek to learn from people and/or how to elicit information, from more structured ones to more open-ended approaches (Cochrane, 2014). There are three types of interviews in social research: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured (Dunn, 2010). Depending on the focus of the research, purposes of the researcher, people who are interviewed, and the context in which the research is conducted, one or more of these interview types may be employed.

For many reasons, semi-structured interviews are more in demand than other interview techniques among social science researchers (Cochrane, 2014). For example, semi-structured interviews “allow for an open response in the participants’ own words rather than a ‘yes or no’ type answer” (Longhurst, 2016: 145). This means that they allow “interviewees to construct their own accounts of their experiences by describing and explaining their lives in their own words” (Valentine, 2005: 111). In that sense, a semi-structured interview “offers the chance for the researcher and interviewee to have a far more wide-ranging discussion than a questionnaire would allow” (ibid.). Since people’s backgrounds (professional, educational, cultural, religious etc.) and personal experiences influence their points of views, approaches and terminologies that they use in such conversations might also broaden the researcher’s perspective on the research topic. Additionally, semi-structured interviews ease the information interchange and enable the researcher to get more knowledge in a particular interview time through creating a flexible, easy flow conversation environment in which both interviewer and interviewee feel more comfortable. In short, as Longhurst (2010: 106) reminds us:

“[S]emi-structured interviews and focus groups are more than just ‘chats’. The researcher needs to formulate questions, select and recruit participants, choose a location and transcribe data while at the same time remaining cognizant of the ethical issues and power relations involved in qualitative research.”

**4.4.1.1 Interview Structure**

Interviews principally consisted of 4 major parts and 42 open-ended questions (36 questions, 6 sub-questions). The first part of the interview (Questions 1-9) focused on Istanbul’s city development before and under globalisation. The second part (Questions 10-19) examined
Istanbul’s position within Turkey and more implicitly local-central relationship in the Turkish administrative tradition. In this part, the 15th question consisted of six sub-questions, directly asking participants about their opinions on a paragraph which was quoted from a speech of Erdoğan in 2009 about the making of Istanbul as a global financial centre (see p.51). The third part (Questions 20-27) examined the position of Istanbul in the global urban system and concerned issues such as city-competition, regional leadership, advantages and disadvantages of Istanbul. Finally, the last part (Questions 28-36) concentrated on the recent projects (e.g. urban transformation, mega-projects), including their impacts, participation and decision-making processes. This part ended with a couple of closing questions asking interviewees about their expectations and suggestions for Istanbul’s future development.

Even though the questions were identified before the fieldwork began, considering participants’ backgrounds and professions, some alternative questions were also formulated during the research. NGOs and activists, for example, were asked more detailed questions about environmental and social issues, democratic participation, or decision making on projects. Likewise, some questions, or the order of questions, in some interviews were also revised. These revisions were sometimes done by the researcher before the interview, but they generally happened in response to the conversation. This is because the participants were very keen to talk about the issues that they had more knowledge and/or that they saw as being more important.

Just a few interviewees stated that the questions, especially the questions in the first part, were too long and broad. Some of the interviewees also stated that they were not able to answer questions, because the content of the questions is not relevant for their profession. When faced with such a situation the researcher changed the questions as they were relevant to the participant’s profession. Moreover, to get more knowledge from the participant in relation to his/her experience, in some cases the researcher asked some questions with an extra emphasis or added new questions. In one interview, for example, the interviewee who had transferred from a central government department to a construction company was asked to explain the relations between central government and the business world, how his background as an official influenced this relation in his own experience, and differences on decision-making between central government and the private sector.
4.4.1.2 Selection and Recruitment of Interviewees

To get a consistent and robust research output, one of the vital parts of semi-structured interviewing is selecting and recruiting people. As Longhurst (2016) states, unlike quantitative studies which generally choose a random sample, qualitative studies choose purposive samples, namely people are selected depending on their relevance to the aims of the research. Briefly stated, whereas one goal of sampling strategy is to identify the potential participants by taking the main interests of the research into consideration, the second essential goal is to cover a representative sample of all different variants of the research topic as far as possible. In this research, since the specific aim of the researcher was to examine the process of making of Istanbul as a global city, the first goal was to interview with stakeholders having a role in Istanbul's urban development in the recent period. The second aim was to identify a participant pool that enables the different views to be equally represented, that is, to involve all possible stakeholder groups into the data collection process.

With these purposes in mind, three core participant groups were identified before the fieldwork: (i) central government; (ii) local government; and (iii) other stakeholders (e.g. NGOs, political parties, individuals).

Another critical aspect of selecting interviewees is that they should be able to provide rich data on (aspects of) the research topic. Potential participants should be selected with regard to their knowledge on the questions the researcher will ask (Morris, 2015). Relevant to this issue, two important factors were considered by the researcher in the interviewee selection process: (i) some questions examined the relationship between central and local governments when the city and the state were governed by different political parties. However, both the city and the state have been governed by the same political party, AKP, since 2002, (ii) some questions were related to the period in which Tayyip Erdoğan was the mayor which was between 1994 and 1998. Therefore, it was targeted to select potential local and central officials from among mostly executive people who have been working for many years and were able to compare the pre-AKP era with the AKP period.

Considering the research questions and the factors explained above, 36 potential interviewees were identified before the first fieldwork. In the selection of potential interviewees importance was given to four different groups. The 36 interviews were distributed as 18 – officials, 9 – local and 9 – central, and 18 – other stakeholders, including NGOs, business groups, and individuals. The local officials were selected from among those who are working in the
relevant departments of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and Istanbul Development Agency (IDA), both of which are the key local actors shaping urban policies of Istanbul. As for central government, in a similar vein, the institutions were selected in consideration of their roles and significances in forming urban policies, plans, and strategies. Among these, TOKI and the MEU were given a particular importance, as both of them play key roles in the recent urban development of Istanbul. Additionally, some potential interviewees from the central government have been identified considering their responsibilities for the major projects in Istanbul (such as the IFC project).

The second group of stakeholders was divided into two principal groups in order to get a more objective and robust research output; private sector agents and the representatives of the civil society, especially opposition groups such as urban resistance, environmental organisations, labour unions, opposition parties. The potential interviewees in these groups were generally identified by a detailed research of published documents (academic articles, newspapers, reports etc.) and of internet research (forums, social media, online articles and newspapers). Here, in order to be sure that they have adequate knowledge to provide satisfactory answers to the interview questions, their backgrounds were searched, and priority was given to those who have active and intensive participation to the processes not only in Istanbul but throughout the country. Finally, a number of individual interviewees (activists, policy advisors, planning experts, and academics) were also identified with a similar method to that applied in the selection of NGOs.

The second step was to contact the potential participants. As often stated in the literature, there are different ways of recruiting individuals as interviewees, which depends on context, time and place of the research, identity of the researcher, and local values where the field research is conducted (Morris, 2015). In this research, first, an invitation letter, which was written to the name of each potential interviewee, was sent by email before the fieldwork. The content of each letter was composed of a brief introduction about the research, such as title and main objectives, and the researcher, and an explanation of why the potential interviewee was regarded as the ideal participant for an interview, possible meeting time options, expected length of the conversation and finally a request to forward the email to relevant colleagues if they are not available to meet. Each email also included two attachments: (i) the researcher’s CV and (ii) a detailed overview of the project.
Private sector agents and individuals generally responded earlier than other groups. They were mostly recruited through the invitation emails. Whereas professionals generally had a positive attitude, some individuals politely refused to talk by saying that they were not available for a meeting. In such cases, the researcher recruited new interviewees. Here, it is worth pointing out that selection and recruitment of participants is a cultural process that is influenced by both researchers’ and participants’ identities, as well as content and context of the research (Morris, 2015). For example, in this research, despite the positive responses from the private sector and individuals, there was no response from either central or local officials.

In such circumstances to find one or more gatekeepers who are able to remove the barriers is vital to be able to commence with the research (ibid.). Since the researcher lives in the city, he was able to find a gatekeeper, working for the Metropolitan Municipality, through his personal contacts. With telephone calls, the gatekeeper scheduled meetings with 6 out of 9 officials who had previously been asked to be interviewed. Two top-level departments, including the mayor’s office, responded that they were not able to meet because of their heavy schedule, and one other department stated that the scope of the interview was not relevant to their department.

As with local government, many of the central government officials too were persuaded through another gatekeeper, who is working in one of the biggest media holdings and has strong personal networks. Nevertheless, there was a significant difference between the recruitment of local and central officials, which also influenced the success rate. Both because institutions’ websites were not updated and because labour turnover in those institutions was high, it was difficult to access correct information of who is working in the relevant department. Early requests therefore were sent to people who were no longer working in those departments. In these cases, as stated above, new interviewees who are working in targeted institutions and departments were replaced thanks to the gatekeepers.

In addition to interview invitation emails and gatekeepers, snowballing was another strategy to recruit interviewees. A small number of interviewees were identified this way as some interviewees advised the researcher to talk with specific individuals who have a good knowledge of the issue and provided the researcher with contact details. Further to this, one of them arranged meetings for the researcher with two central government executive officials who were not in the initial list. It is worth noting that snowballing and gatekeeping worked most efficiently in accessing NGOs. Since these groups, especially urban resistance and
solidarity groups, are relatively small and informal organisations most of whose members are activists, freelance journalists, students rather than professionals, even though invitation mails were sent, there was generally no response or negative responses from them. As already seen in Table 4.1, the researcher thus did not have enough interview with these stakeholders, but in the second fieldwork period a gatekeeper, a very well-known activist who the researcher did not know personally before, accepted both being interviewed and providing some contacts. Two of the biggest environmental groups in Turkey who refused to be interviewed during the first fieldwork period thus accepted my invitation to participate in the second period.

The numbers demonstrate that at the end of two different fieldwork periods, the researcher was able to conduct 32 interviews out of 60 requests, which is a success rate of 55%. In relation to numbers and breakdown of interviews, in the first fieldwork period a total of 43 requests were sent, 22 of which turned into actual interviews. In the second fieldwork period, 10 more interviews, mostly environmental and urban resistance organisations, were conducted as a response to 17 requests. As seen in Table 4.1, whereas many of the participants in the first fieldwork period were the central and local officials and private sector representatives, in the second one, it was concentrated on environmental and urban NGOs, activists, and political actors.

**Table 4.1 Distribution of Interviews by Groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Numbers → Participants by Groups ↓</th>
<th>First Fieldwork</th>
<th>Second Fieldwork</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual (e.g. policy advisors, planning experts, academics)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector, Trade Associations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs (e.g. environment groups, urban solidarity groups)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.1.3 Conducting the Fieldwork

The interview data were collected in two periods of fieldwork. Although there were differences between the interviewee groups, there were some common procedures followed in both. The participants were verbally informed about the content of the interview, their right to stop or withdraw from the interview at any time, and anonymity and confidentiality. The verbal information was also supported with the informed consent form and participant information sheets. Since some of the participants did not speak or read English, the consent form and information sheet were prepared in both English and Turkish. The researcher then asked participants to sign the informed consent form if they confirmed to be part of this research. Before interviews began, the researcher also obtained consent that the conversation will be recorded. Interviews were only recorded after the permission which was orally granted by the interviewee. There was no negative response to that request.

After the pre-conversation procedures, interviews began with a few warm-up questions. Conversations generally proceeded in the direction of the order of the interview questions. In some interviews, a more flexible order was followed depending on the course of the conversation. This enabled participants to lead the conversation, but under the control of the researcher, and created a more informal atmosphere that eased the knowledge interaction. Another important issue which may influence that interaction was the location in which interviews were conducted. Most of the interviews were conducted in participants’ offices where they felt most comfortable. Nevertheless, location and time of the interviews were also shared with a third person to ensure the researcher’s safety. During the interviews, there was no major issue experienced. As expected, some young interviewees had difficulty in answering the questions about Erdoğan's words (Question-15, see section 4.4.1.1), but in such cases, these questions were supported with follow-up questions.

Despite these commonalities, since the main groups who were interviewed in each fieldwork period were different from each other, location, conversation atmosphere and recruitment strategies also demonstrated some differences. Those differences were also an opportunity which gave the researcher experience of conducting interviews in different cases, because the researcher thus could clearly compare how interviewing officials, or the private sector is different from interviewing activists or NGOs. In addition to what has been mentioned above, some personal experiences, and political circumstances in which the country found itself were other factors which influenced the course of research.
In the first period of fieldwork, whereas some individuals and private sector representatives gave positive responses to the invitation emails, there was no response from the officials – either positive or negative. Therefore, only 5-6 interviews were undertaken within the first week. Then, the local officials who were emailed before were reached through a gatekeeper and meetings were scheduled by the gatekeeper over the phone and interviews progressed at a steady rate over the remainder of the fieldwork.

In addition to interview numbers, arranging interviews through gatekeepers and personal connections had also an obvious impact on the course of the conversations. Under normal circumstances, officials are expected not to be so willing to answer political and critical questions such as those examining the role of the central government, or local-central relations. However, in this research, possibly because the meetings were arranged through one of their colleagues (and a person who is well-known by them), the official participants did not hesitate to answer those kinds of questions even though they stated that the questions were highly political. Moreover, it is worth mentioning here that reaching officials through gatekeepers also gave the researcher the flexibility of setting interview schedules rather than leaving the initiative to the interviewees. The researcher, thanks to gatekeepers, was able to manage the schedule in such a way that meetings at the same location were arranged on the same days.

Political circumstances, such as refugee inflows triggered by the Syrian conflict and terrorist attacks, also influenced the schedule, interview numbers, and content of the conversations. Social and political problems stemmed from refugee inflows were unsurprisingly mentioned by many interviewees, notably the local officials. Furthermore, on 12 January 2016, there was a terrorist attack in the historical district of the city, the Historic Peninsula wherein the Metropolitan Municipality is located. Surprisingly, there was no direct cancellation because of the attack, but two interviews were re-scheduled. Finally, the interview schedule was also affected by personal circumstances. Since a relative of the researcher died during the fieldwork two arranged meetings were cancelled and could not be conducted later, as the participant did not respond to subsequent emails.

The political circumstances, state of emergency and terrorist attacks were the main determinants of the second research period. Despite the state of emergency, the researcher
could have conducted more research, but two terrorist attacks, on 10th and 31st December 2016, affected interview schedules in a negative way. 4 meetings arranged with two local politicians, a party representative, and a trade union representative were cancelled by the participants because of the attacks. On the other hand, it should be stated that neither the attacks nor the state of emergency had an impact on participants’ willingness to talk. Conversely, they were very keen to talk about their experiences and to discuss issues. This is the reason for the difference of the average length between interviews conducted in the first fieldwork period and those conducted in the second. As slightly different from the first research period, interviews in the second research period were rather like informal friendly conversations or an exchange of views.

4.4.2 Secondary Data Usage

In addition to the semi-structured interviews, various kind of secondary data sources were also utilised. Principally, these sources were employed to support the primary data and to strengthen the argument. The secondary data comprise of official policy documents and reports, national and international statistics, and various international city indexes. In terms of time-period, since the primary empirical concern of the research is Istanbul's urban development under AKP governments all the secondary data used in the research covers the years after 2002, when AKP came to the power. As detailed below, in relation to the which secondary resources to be selected and how to be used, the key factor is the context, content, and scope of the empirical chapters (see also Figure 4.1 above).

In Chapter 5, various national official statistics provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (e.g. GDP, GDP per capita, population data) were used to support the analysis of the economic, demographic and spatial development of Istanbul under globalisation. Moreover, in this chapter, official statistics demonstrating shares of the major Turkish cities within national GDP were used to provide a clear understanding of the contribution of Istanbul to the national economy. Similar international indexes have been used to move this comparison to the global scale and to provide a comparative insight into Istanbul’s position within the international context. To trace the political evolution and roles of the central and local state agencies on Istanbul’s global development in Chapter 6, national development plans, Istanbul’s master and strategic plans, institutional reports and official foreign direct investment statistics were employed. In Chapter 7, national and international indicators were used to provide
comparative data on sectoral breakdown and air-transport which are used to stress-test some central assumptions of the global city thesis.

4.5 Data Analysis

Data analysis consisted of four main processes that partly intertwine with each other: transcription, coding, interpreting, and triangulation.

4.5.1 Transcription

The first, and possibly the most time-consuming and labour-intensive, stage in data analysis is to transcribe the recorded interviews (Dunn, 2010). There is no established standard of how the data should be transcribed, however, many researchers suggest that interviews should be transcribed as soon as possible after the conversations (e.g. Dunn, 2010; Flick, 2014) in order not to forget the nuances in the conversations, such as sarcasms, gesture and facial expressions of participants. In this research, the aim was to transcribe interviews immediately afterwards, but interviews were mostly transcribed after the end of each field-trip because a very busy-schedule during both periods of fieldwork meant there was not enough time to transcribe.

When the researcher returned to Loughborough after each trip, 32 interviews which were fully recorded were transcribed and turned into text-based data ready for coding and interpreting. In total, the transcription process took approximately four months. In terms of word numbers, the shortest interview was 4323 words, while the longest was 11 298 words, and the average was 7320 words. That is, at the end of the transcription stage 234 265 words of text-based data were produced, ready to be coded and analysed.

Transcription is considered as a part of data analysis (Flick, 2014) because it gives the researcher initial ideas about coding and interpretation processes, thus enabling him/her to interact and be familiar with the data and it may raise new questions for the research. During the transcription process many sentences seen as important and interesting were highlighted, institutions, strategies, names, and similar, were noted and therefore initial topics – themes began to emerge. As will be seen below, these initial themes provided the basis of the coding framework
4.5.2 Coding

The second essential step in the data analysis process is coding. In qualitative research, coding enables researchers to organise and reduce their raw data, to explore the facts and beliefs hidden behind the words and common characteristics within many separate texts, and to build a theory over the sentences (Cope and Kurtz, 2016). Unfortunately, there is not one way to code which could be step-by-step followed by all researchers. That is, coding, like interviewing, is a process which may change according to the researcher and purpose and/or quality of research (Flick, 2014). Nevertheless, some scholars like Strauss (1987) try to develop techniques to standardise the coding process. Strauss, for example, recommends a three-stage process for coding, consisting of respectively open-coding, axial coding, and selective coding. Coding, from this perspective, is a process which begins with descriptive codes, identifying general patterns and categories, and then continues with more analytic codes, which are more intensive and in-depth and include various sub-codes, however these codes often overlap in practice (Cope and Kurtz, 2016).

Selecting the coding method also depends on how the researcher analyses his/her data; whilst the researchers preferring content analysis generate codes often based on the theory that they apply, the researchers who adopt a grounded theory approach might prefer coding which emerges directly from the data (for more detail see Flick, 2014). As the researcher adopted a thematic approach to interpret his data, the coding was done in a way similar to what Strauss called open and axial coding. That is, the researcher built descriptive codes and sub-codes through consulting research questions to construct a number of general codes, reading all documents with a critical eye and identifying some concepts and categories for common facts, beliefs and patterns.

No matter which coding method is applied, researchers might form a “qualitative codebook, a table that contains a list of predetermined codes that researchers use for coding data” (Creswell, 2014: 199). Such a codebook is useful for researchers because it makes coding more systematic and eases multiple-coding. In the researcher’s case too, a coding framework which consists of both predetermined and in-process built codes and sub-codes was provided (Appendix-2). The predetermined codes, and sub-codes, were developed during, and right after, the transcription process through reviewing field notes, transcription notes and also revisiting research questions. In this way, an initial framework, includes 12 codes and 80 sub-codes, was established. While 5 codes (6-Geography, 7-Govern/Governance, 11-Relationship...
between Local and Central Governments, 13-Stakeholders’ Integration, 15-
Strategies/Goals/Policies) and 50 sub-codes emerged from research questions, the rest of the
pre-determined codes/sub-codes were generated during the fieldwork. In addition, as coding is
a dynamic and text-based process, new codes and sub-codes appeared during the data analysis
period, and so 2 codes and 30 sub-codes were added to the coding framework. In total, the
data were coded into 15 codes and 110 sub-codes.

Finally, coding in this research was done using coding software - NVivo - although there are
some reservations in the literature on qualitative data analysis (QDA) software usage (Flick,
2014). Using the software program was a tool which made coding more systematic and easier,
and significantly reduced the time to complete coding. Over and above these practical
benefits, software coding was adopted by the researcher because it strengthens transparency,
validity and ultimately the quality of the research (Flick, 2014).

4.5.3 Interpreting

Although coding and transcribing are essential parts of data analysis, it is not the ultimate
stage of data analysis. This is because codes only help researcher to organise, and be familiar
with, the data. Codes themselves do not answer research questions (Cope and Kurtz, 2016).
However:

“Working with qualitative data is mainly about interpreting and getting a good
understanding of the words, stories, accounts and explanations of our research
respondents” (Matthews and Ross, 2010: 373).

Like coding, data interpretation is a process too, which depends on what researchers seek to
learn from the data and the methods researchers applied to analyse their data. As briefly
mentioned above, thematic analysis is an inductive method in comparison to more deductive
content analysis (Ezzy, 2002). Indeed, there is no agreed way of how themes are constructed.
Yet it is often suggested in the literature that themes could be built before, during and after
data collection through which researchers read all material case by case – interviews in this
case – compare individual cases to see differences and similarities on specific topics and then
group around these specific topics (Matthews and Ross, 2010; Cope and Kurtz, 2016). That is,
instead of only a theory-based interpretation, themes can be generated based on the research
questions and/or built from data by bringing together a range of codes addressing similar
issues. In this research both methods were applied.
Once some themes were built, it was also important to revisit the research questions and to re-interpret the findings. This is because, building themes based on only codes may sometimes be misleading or time-wasting, because, for example, even if they are interesting or seem important within texts, they may not be essential to addressing the research aim and questions. To consider research questions throughout the theme building process enables the researcher to keep the process under his/her control. On the other hand, this is also a bilateral interaction: considering research questions helps the researcher to engage with his/her own data, themes too may provide new connections between questions, may provide new ideas about them, and perhaps may lead the researcher to refine or change them. In other words, this interaction between research questions and themes is crucial in framing empirical chapters.

Although theme building is an essential part of data interpretation, interpreting data is more than building or identifying themes (Bazeley, 2009). Interpretation data is indeed a process which turns case-based data to topic-based. Interpretation is to compare individual statements on specific issues, to explore the dynamics behind these statements, to categorise actors and to argue the interaction between actors (ibid.). In this research, for example, there are different groups of stakeholders from central government to opponent NGOs who were interviewed. All these different stakeholders were using different terminologies, were approaching similar issues from different perspectives and had different points of view on similar facts. Consequently, interpreting in this research was identifying the rationales behind the individual statements and reviewing the data by thinking about the questions of who said what and why.

4.5.4 Triangulation

One of the essential issues in qualitative studies is to ensure validity and reliability of research. In comparison to quantitative studies, qualitative studies are more open to the interaction between research, data and the researcher, so qualitative research contains an increased risk that researchers might be affected by the research (and vice versa). To ensure validity and reliability of their research, qualitative researchers might apply some extra procedures such as triangulation:

“Triangulation allows scholars to document consistency in findings using different means of obtaining those findings, increasing our confidence that the findings are not driven by a particular method or data source” (Gibson, 2017: 203).
To strengthen the validity and reliability of qualitative research through triangulation can be done in different ways or in different stages of the research. According to Winchester and Rofe (2010), there are four different types of triangulation: multiple sources, multiple methods, multiple investigators and multiple themes. In this research, triangulation was adopted in three different stages: in the selection and recruitment of interviewees, during coding and data analysis, and in code selection and the design of empirical sections. In selection and recruitment of potential participants, to provide a balance between different stakeholders, the aim was to give equal importance to each group of stakeholders (e.g. national and local) and to have equal numbers of interviews with each group. This was not always possible but in analysing and presenting the empirical material attempts were made to remain conscious about which groups are more or less represented in the interview data. Moreover, in coding and interpreting the data, the codes were reviewed various times and the researcher approached individual statements with a critical eye, rather than accepting these as ‘truths’. Finally, the criteria of quote selection were not only driven by how interesting or relevant to the research questions they were, but effort was made to identity which interviewee the quote came from and what their position within the debate is. Wherever possible equal importance in quote selection was given to each group and the empirical chapters were designed to give equal place to different views, which is essential for producing objective knowledge. Alongside this, wherever possible checks were made to validate claims made in the interviews (e.g. through secondary data, or by looking at other interviews).

4.6 Positionality and Ethical Considerations

As Bourke (2014: 2-3) reminds us, “qualitative research seeks to provide an understanding of a problem through the experiences of individuals, and the particular details of their lived experience.” Therefore, qualitative methods always contain the danger that the identity of the researcher may affect the course of the research (Smith, 2016). In such research, to be aware of positionality, reflexivity and power relations is vitally important for achieving the goal of the research:

“It is crucial in any research that we consider our positionality and what that might mean in relation to the ways in which we do our research, and how the people we work with perceive us. By positionality I mean things like our ‘race’ and gender as discussed above, but also our class experiences, our levels of education, our sexuality, our age, our ableness whether we are a parent or not. All these have a bearing upon
who we are how our identities are formed and how we do our research” (Skelton, 2001: 89).

It is essential that any researcher who applies qualitative methods in his/her research should ask questions of who he/she is and how this affects the interactions between the researcher and the people who are talked to and/observed himself/herself before beginning fieldwork (Smith, 2016). Any answer given to those questions also defines where the researcher stands in relation to the participants; whether inside or outside. Whilst being an insider may help the researcher with easy access to the research and participants they could lead the interview to be conducted more informally, whereas an outsider could gain some advantages – particularly interviews with business groups, professionals, environmental NGOs – if they are seen to be more formal.

Yet, on many occasions, or in research practice in another saying, the boundaries between insider and outsider status are not so clear, but rather, they are often blurred and switchable. The researcher, if aware, can use both insider and outsider identities, and even switch from one to another, so that he/she extracts more information from the interviews. In this study, the researcher, coming from a British university, could be regarded as an outsider to the context in which he conducts the field-research; on the other hand, as a Turkish person living in Istanbul for over thirty years, he could be regarded as an insider. This positionality was further strengthened by the fact that he had a good knowledge of different political groups, jargons, and discourses and had strong personal contacts from a wide range of political, social and academic groups. The researcher was, therefore, able to take advantages of both being an outsider and insider.

As was partially mentioned above, the most positive contribution of being an insider to this research was on the recruitment of the interviewees. Most of the official interviews were arranged through the researcher's personal contacts. Thanks to this, despite the fact that the fieldworks were conducted at a time when security issues were prioritised because of terrorist attacks and a failed coup, he was able to easily persuade the officials to talk about highly critical issues and to arrange the meetings without encountering bureaucratic procedures such as official permissions and security investigations. Similarly, personal contacts helped the researcher to be readily accepted by opposition groups. In spite of being under the state of emergency, since the researcher reached to them through persons whom they knew well they
agreed to talk with confidence. That means that the researcher was not regarded as an outsider coming from a different country, but actually an insider whom they might trust.

However, sometimes the outsider status of the researcher as an unfamiliar individual who is seeking information affected knowledge interaction in a positive way. For example, one thing observed during the interviews conducted with individual activists or environmental groups was that interviewees were taking pleasure in explaining issues they think very important to a person who comes from another country. Finally, the researcher’s institution, Loughborough University, and the GaWC research network influenced the course of research in a positive way, which helped the researcher not only in meeting arrangements but also balancing power-relations in interviews with executive officials and business people. Many interviewees, in particular officials, have knowledge about the world cities index published by GaWC, they approached the researcher in a very positive way, some of them even asked questions such as what is GaWC, how do they classify cities and publish indexes, and so on. This raised the profile of the researcher and gave him a more prestigious position in the eyes of those interviewees.

In terms of research ethics, social science projects, including human geography projects, are subject to ethical considerations as their research involves human participants. Outcomes of social science research may cause different impacts on individuals, or societies. Researchers, therefore, should think about ethical issues which are relevant to their research. In addition to essential moral issues, there are several practical reasons why it is important to consider ethical issues: (i) to do research without harming individuals and/or communities which may be affected by the research; (ii) to protect the researcher and the institution against any legal action; and (iii) to ensure the trustability of research within both society and research communities (Hay, 2016).

Ethical approval for this research was ensured by the researcher’s institution, whereby the research was planned with the guidance of ethical practices guidelines and approved by Loughborough University Ethics Advisory Committee. Ethical issues were strictly considered by the researcher in every part of both periods of data collection and analysis. The “Participants Information Sheets”, both English and Turkish versions, were provided before interviews and the participants were informed, both in writing and verbally, about the contents of the research and interviews, their rights to withdraw from the interview without providing reasons, contact details of the Loughborough University Ethical Approval Committee for
complaints if they were not happy. Participants were asked prior to the interview taking place to fill out an “Informed Consent Form” (Appendix-3), to confirm they understood the content and purpose of the interview and that they accepted to take part.

Aside from the issues explained above, it is also essential to inform participants that their identities would be concealed by the researcher, and that confidentiality, anonymity and data protection would be strictly regarded throughout the research and later (Longhurst, 2016). In this sense, it was stated by the researcher and ensured through the signing of informed consent forms that records of the interviews would only be listened to by the researcher, and that all data gathered, including transcripts, would be secured and protected from third parties’ access. Participants were also assured that their names would not appear in any part of the thesis itself and in future papers based on this thesis, and that quotes would be used anonymously. To this end, all names of interviewees have been replaced by an affiliated name, with a full list of these to be found in Appendix 4.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter explained the methodological approach adopted in this thesis and demonstrated how, and why, semi-structured interviews, as a qualitative research method, were employed to obtain the main body of empirical data, which the following chapters are based on. As has been identified above, the methods adopted address the research aims which are: to situate global city formation of Istanbul in current global urban literatures; to examine the roles of the central and local governments in developing Istanbul as a global city; to assess the relationship between Istanbul, as the city, and Turkey, as the country.

The rationale behind interviewing different stakeholders was that interviews with individuals who have a role in shaping urban policies can illumine various issues such as current developments and problems, decision-making practices, relations between stakeholders, and so on. In other words, individual statements, after an interpreting and analysis process, can enable the researcher to develop his own arguments on why, and how Istanbul followed a different trajectory from the other cases argued in the existing literature; how central government, to a larger extent, and local government, to a lesser extent, shape urban policies, particularly those which are relevant to mega-projects and urban transformation; how the relationship between central and local governments can be assessed.
Aside from explaining why semi-structured interviews were employed as the main methodological component in this research, the chapter also shed light on how interviewees were recruited, and how interviews were conducted, in two different fieldwork periods. Unexpected developments such as terrorist attacks and political instability emerged from the failed coup and the declaration of the state of emergency, which had partly affected the course of the fieldwork, and cultural issues such as language selection, adopting gateway methods in both recruitment and conversations were also explained.

The chapter then continued with the data analysis process and explained in detail how the gathered data was transcribed, coded and analysed. The strategies such as open-coding, theme building and the reasons why these strategies were adopted were argued in these sections. Finally, the issues how the researcher positioned himself, and how he conducted an ethical research were explained. In terms of positionality, the researcher, both an inhabitant of the city and a postgraduate researcher from abroad, embodied two different identities, insider and outsider, however the course of the research demonstrated that these identities could be blurred in different interview contexts and could also be drawn on strategically. The ethical considerations section demonstrated that as the researcher was aware of the necessity of conducting an ethically approved research to protect himself, his institution and the individuals interviewed, he considered ethical issues from beginning to end and designed his research under the guidelines of the ethical clearance checklist approved by his institution’s ethical committee.

The subsequent chapters answer the research questions based on the data whose collection and analysis procedures have been explained in this chapter. Chapter 5 provides a conceptual understanding of the global development of Istanbul and discusses how this development is different from - and similar to - theses of the existing approaches. Chapter 6 identifies the distribution of roles between local and central agencies as global city makers and argues the relationship between different actors on this global city-making, with a particular focus on the central and local governments. Finally, Chapter 7 assesses the global development of Istanbul through the lenses of the four existing approaches in global urban studies. Apart from explaining Istanbul, this chapter also acts as a stress-test for fundamental assumptions of these approaches.
“It is a city like no other and yet it is a city that has things in common with many other cities, even if it does not always recognise it” (Sudjic, 2009: 4).

5.1 Introduction: An In-between City Under Globalisation

This chapter explores how the urban development of Istanbul under globalisation might be conceptualised and positioned within national and international urban systems. The primary interest behind such an exploration is the notion that the globalisation experience of Istanbul might be different to that of other cities identified as global, postcolonial, or something else (without ignoring similarities). As discussed in Chapter 2, besides being a planetary-scale phenomenon which all cities have been operating in to some degrees for decades, globalisation is also a local experience in which each city has been following its own trajectory. Owing to its distinctive geographical, historical and political patterns, Istanbul is one of the cities where this local characteristic is the most visible.

Through the analyses of interviews and secondary data, this chapter identifies Istanbul’s own pathway as an in-between city and links the city’s experiences to the broader debates outlined in Chapter 2. To do this, the chapter is structured as three sections, excluding introduction and conclusion. Section 5.2 offers a critical appraisal of three major aspects of globalisation in Istanbul: economic, social and environmental. Then Section 5.3 discusses the relationship between Istanbul and the nation-state of Turkey and its relation to other cities in the country. A key question that will be asked in this section is if and how globalisation has changed these relations. The chapter finally moves its focus from the national to the global and, in Section 5.4, discusses the economic position and functions of Istanbul in the international urban system.

5.2 Janus in Istanbul: Economy versus City

It is widely accepted that Istanbul has been subject to the economic, social and spatial impacts of globalisation since the 1980s (Keyder, 2008). As from the 2000s, these impacts have begun to be felt more intensely with the proactive involvement of Turkey’s central, and Istanbul’s
local, governments to the global integration process (Aksoy, 2010; Islam, 2010; Kizildere and Chiodelli, 2018). How globalisation influences Istanbul can be described with the two-faced Janus metaphor. One face of globalisation offers Istanbul substantial and rapid economic growth and an opportunity to reclaim its global position, lost over a hundred years ago, which is one of the important motivations that fuel global aspirations in Istanbul. The other face, however, irreversibly changes the social and environmental fabric of the city:

“With globalisation, Istanbul has begun to regain its power, in the global sense, that it had in Ottoman and Byzantine [times], and foreign investments have increased. Global investments have brought more industrialisation, and this too has triggered immigration and has led to a huge pressure on Istanbul to grow. In this sense, this pressure has shown itself through a development that has totally changed the traditional settlement fabric and has led to serious urbanisation in the east, west and north of the city. This is, of course, totally my own view. I would say, this is also a process that leads to serious deterioration of the features [historical and cultural that make Istanbul is Istanbul” (MHA#3).

Colic-Peisker (2014: 446) argues that “hyper-competitive capitalist globalisation inevitably creates winners and losers”. Given the economic performance it has shown as of the 2000s, Istanbul is one of the biggest winners of this competitive globalisation (GaWC, 2000; 201718; Parilla et al., 2015; A.T. Kearney, 2017). In this regard, it was no surprise that many business people and officials see globalisation as an opportunity for economic growth, new markets or attracting capital and that they have quite optimistic views about the economic impacts of globalisation on Istanbul (e.g. MOD#1, ISPAT#1, BSR#2, BSR#4, BSR#5). As Figure 5.1 demonstrate, Istanbul has caught a significant economic growth trend between 2004 and 2014, with an annual average of 25.9%. In this period, the GDP of Istanbul grew from 170 million TL in 2004 to 622 million TL in 2014 (Figure 5.1). In 2015, the city’s economy was bigger than that of many European countries such as Austria, Denmark or Greece with its $450 billion GDP (Trujillo and Parilla, 2016).

**Figure 5.1 Economic Growth and Sectoral Distribution in Istanbul**

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18 Calculated based on the ranking changes of cities on the lists of ‘the World According to GaWC 2000’ and ‘the World According to GaWC 2016’.
A thorough analysis of the sectoral variations of this economic growth will be undertaken in Chapter 7, however, in summary, it can be said that the sectoral change of Istanbul’s economy is partly in contradiction to, and partly fits, global city assumptions. The contradictory side is that there is no industrial decline in Istanbul, but rather a steady growth in both the industry and service sectors. Figure 5.1 shows that there is no significant change in the shares of industrial and service sectors in Istanbul within the analysed years. This means that the economy of Istanbul has been growing in both sectoral basis and total economic production. What is very compatible with global city and neoliberal urbanisation assumptions is the use of urban land as a means of capital accumulation and production, excessive growth in the real-estate sector, and active intervention of the state in these processes. Current developments in Istanbul’s real-estate market and the state’s interventions in this market support these theses.

The real-estate sector in Istanbul has boomed in the post-2000 period and has become one of the key sectors behind the miraculous growth of the city (Keyder, 2009; Logie and Morvan, 2014; Le Galès, 2016). Only 5% of the buildings in Istanbul are over 50 years old, and most of them have been built within the last thirty years (Boysan, 2011). In this sense, Istanbul has literally been undergoing a creative destruction process (Mills, 2014). Further, the central and local governments strongly support and even shape this growth with public-private partnerships, mega-projects, urban transformation projects (Karaman, 2013a/b, see also Chapter 6). For example, according to a report published by the World Bank Group, Turkey, in 2015, was in the first place in the world with a total investment of 44.7 billion US$ public-
private partnership investments, which is equal to 40% of the total public-private partnership investments in the world (Kasper et al., 2015).

This growth in the real estate sector was one of the most critical issues that caused differences of opinions between the interviewees about the economic growth of Istanbul. As noted above, some interviewees were quite pleased with the growth that globalisation brings, but a considerable number of interviewees, among which there are few officials, expressed that they are extremely uncomfortable with these developments. They, for example, thought that the real-estate production is no longer shaped by housing demand of people but by economic motivations (MOEU#1) and that it goes beyond the controllable limits, almost reaching the level of ‘madness’ (NGOR#1, NGOR#4). As another urban activist stated like a slogan: “Istanbul becomes the SimCity of global capitalism” (ACT#1). Interviewees were, therefore, quite sceptical about the sustainability of this real-estate based economic growth (e.g. AA#2), although market reports say that Istanbul is one of the biggest and the fastest growing real-estate markets in Europe (PwC and the Urban Land Institute, 2013). One of the interviewees, for example, mentioned that there is a housing oversupply of more than one million in the city (NGOR#3, also see Logie and Morvan, 2014).

As the chapter has outlined thus far, one of the meanings of globalisation for Istanbul is doubtlessly economic growth. Despite a strong opposition, this economic growth is already one of the main factors shaping global aspirations of Istanbul, or its rulers. However, it has also been irreversibly changing the social and environmental fabrics of the city, which is the second face of the Janus:

“The main dilemma is that the socio-cultural and environmental characteristics of the city and the mega-scale investments and projects, necessities of globalisation, conflict with each other. If you want to be a global city, for example, you should create new settlements and develop mega-scale infrastructure projects, linking with these settlements” (MHA#3).

Or, as another local government official confessed:

“We can clearly say that globalisation has affected the planned development negatively. It is not possible to make everything sustainable or to keep them under control. There is an economic competition and people (cities) are competing with each
other in globalisation. This competition pushes ecological or social factors into the background” (IMM#3).

The interview questions exploring the social impacts of globalisation on Istanbul received similar answers. The primary concerns of the interviewees were, unsurprisingly, migration and population growth. Almost all participants, even those who were optimistic on globalisation, thought that Istanbul has been growing at a dizzying rate and stated that they are unhappy with this growth. A central government official, for example, admitted: “Istanbul is a city that has overtaken all estimates in the last 15 years. I think no one has forecasted that the population of Istanbul will be growing as much” (MHA#2).

Istanbul, with its 14.8 million population, holds one-fifth of Turkey’s total population and this number has increased by about three hundred thousand annually (GDIPFC, 2016). The city is already 15th of the 31 mega-cities of the world and is the most rapidly growing city in Europe with 4 percent annual growth, which is however lower than many major cities in the global South (UNDESA-PD, 2016). One of the most striking examples how this development is reflected in the urban space was given by an academic interviewee:

“If you draw a 60 km circle whose centre is the Eminönü [a district in the Historical Peninsula] which might be regarded as the core of the city until recently, in 1990 7.4 million people lived within this circle. This rose to 12 million in 2000, and 14-15 million in 2011. That is, almost all of the population growth has happened within this 60-km circle and 7 million new people have been added to an area with seven million population in 1990” (AA#2).

As Chapter 3 has noted, the city has always received migration and has constantly grown, outside of a short period in the early last century. It is therefore difficult to estimate how much of this growth has been triggered by globalisation, but nevertheless, there is no doubt that globalisation is closely linked to this development:

“While on the one side globalisation makes Istanbul into an aspirational city on the world scale, on the other side Istanbul is growing because of developments like urbanisation, declining rural population, migration, declining agricultural employment. For me, these are not so contradictory to each other” (MHA#2).
For most interviewees, the primary reason for this internal migration is the economic opportunities that no other city in the country can offer (MHA#1, MHA#2, BSR#3, NGOR#3). Along with this, the city offers other advantages such as education or health and therefore continues to attract people from the rest of the country (MOEU#1, NGOR#3). For example, according to an interviewee who migrated to Istanbul 50 years ago, people are still “coming to Istanbul [from other cities of the country] to find a job, to find a good school or for similar things” (NGOR#3). In terms of external migration, there has been a migration trend that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union (see Chapter 3). This trend continues and Istanbul still receives migration from Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East (UCLG#1, LUR#1).

In the most recent context, the city especially “attracts people from the Middle East and there is a considerable migration from the East” (MOEU#1). Some interviewees too touched upon the recent conflicts in Syria, which are another factor that has triggered immigration influxes (ISPAT#1, BAR#2, MM#5, UCLG#1). Istanbul is hosting about 600,000 Syrians today, which is one-sixth of the total number of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Along with the Bosnia and Bulgaria examples mentioned in Chapter 3, the Syria case also reveals that there is a distinctive external migration phenomenon in Istanbul in comparison to other global cities.

What these developments brought to the city in the spatial and environmental sense is a dramatic expansion. There was a consensus among the interviewees on that Istanbul, in the last three decades, has remarkably expanded toward its periphery in which most of the city’s forests and green zones are located. As an NGO member complained “Today’s Istanbul has been losing its spatial ties with the Historical Peninsula [the old city centre] day by day” (NGOR#4) (see Image 5.1). Indeed, while this historical core was about 1440 hectares, today, Istanbul covers an area with about 200,000 hectares (Akınar, 2011). One of the most important milestones accelerating and shaping this expansion is the bridges over the Bosphorus, in particular the Second Bridge (this was also stated by some interviewees: IDA#1, PA#1, AA#2, IMM#6). For an urban planner, 8 million people have settled around the rural areas on route of the Second Bridge (PA#1). In a different aspect, the city has begun to reach its natural borders in the east-west axis and began to expand towards the Northern side in the post-1990s period (Image 5.1). As will be seen in the next chapter, this expansion of the city was one of the main concerns of the people who were sceptical and critical against the mega-projects, especially the Third Bridge.
This expansion necessarily raises another question: What does this ongoing expansion mean in terms of its spatial and environmental impacts? Some interviewees explicitly or implicitly critically pointed out a kind of regionalisation in terms of environment and politics. For the first one, it meant, at least in the eyes of the interviewees, a kind of colonisation. As an NGO representative said, “Istanbul is spreading to its surroundings like an octopus, drawing water from Melen River, drawing energy sources” (NGOR#2). In this sense, this process implies much more than disappearing of the green zones. It can be described as a period of environmental creative destruction in which Istanbul has been consuming its and even neighbouring cities natural resources, forests, underground waters, energy resources, for the sake of economic development:

“We always talk about Istanbul as a city, but it used to have a rural periphery that feeds the city. Now, for example, with the policies pursued by the governments have swept it. The city is exploiting Trakya [the region which covers the lands of Turkey in Europe], Yalova [city], Bursa [city] for food; it has finished its own resources” (NGOR#4).

Furthermore, as mentioned by some interviewees, the city is thought to go beyond its administrative boundaries in the near future. In 2004, planning powers of the local government were increased in a way that covers the periphery of the city. In other words, the
rural side of the city has been included in the metropolitan area. However, if this happens, the city might transform into a region including more than a city. As a central official said:

“To me, Istanbul [urban development] has almost reached its administrative borders, then we will not be talking about current administrative borders in Istanbul in a near future. […] These mega-projects, bridges, are uniting Istanbul with Marmara [the Region], Bursa, for example. This growth trend, development trend is, like an octopus, involving other cities by going beyond lands and seas” (MHA#3).

5.3 Istanbul in National Context: Is the Global City Really versus the Country?

The first observation to make is the political, economic and demographic hegemony of Istanbul in Turkey. This hegemony necessarily makes Istanbul the main place of any central intervention seeking for national economic development. Second, unlike what the globalisation thesis assumes, there is no asymmetric relationship between the global economic development of Istanbul and the development of other parts of Turkey. Considering the data, Turkey’s experience of globalisation, at least until now, is a process in which all the major cities benefit economically, some even more than Istanbul.

As discussed in Chapter 3, despite the political and economic upheavals over time, Istanbul has always been the largest city in Turkey. Today, the city is a major centre in many aspects “such as the financial centre, cultural heritage, cultural capital” (BSR#4). Of course, the economy is an important determinant of this position, yet, there are also demographic and political aspects which affect the relationship between Istanbul and the remainder of the country. In terms of population, Istanbul is far and away the biggest city in Turkey. For example, it is about three times bigger than Ankara, which is the capital and the second biggest city. What makes this data interesting and important is the internal migration dynamics of Turkey. According to the 2014 census, approximately 12 million people in the city of 14 million were people who emigrated from other cities of the country (Akşam, 2015). Therefore, as said by a local politician who migrated to Istanbul from another city: “There are the cultures of 81 cities here: both the city’s own culture and the local cultures of 81 cities in food, drinks or views on social life” (LPL#1).

As the above quote implies, Istanbul hosts people from all over the country and it literally reflects the social mosaic of the country. This means that Istanbul has strong political, social and most importantly economic ties with the remainder of the country. Therefore, many
interviewees thought that economic development in Istanbul will create a positive leverage effect for the rest of the country (see Chapter 7). For now, it should be mentioned that this demographic characteristic of Istanbul also makes it the primary political centre of the country. As a business executive said, “even the political things, results in Istanbul reflect the average of Turkey; because there are people here from many parts of Turkey” (BSR#2). In other words, as said by an academic, “considering the voting dynamics, everything should be read from here” (AA#1). Furthermore, an NGO representative explained:

“The importance of Istanbul is that who wins Istanbul rules Turkey. Istanbul determines Turkey’s politics. For example, where did Tayyip Erdoğan come from? From the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality” (NGOR#3).

In a recent speech, President Erdoğan also used similar expressions and complained that the votes his party received in Istanbul in the last referendum were below the average of the country. The following quote reveals the significance of Istanbul in this sense:

“Istanbul is Turkey and Turkey is Istanbul. We have to give what this city deserves. […] Nobody who does not understand the greatness of Istanbul can serve neither Istanbul nor the AKP. […] If we lose in Istanbul, we lose more in Turkey. If Istanbul falls below the average of Turkey [in terms of voting], we would be sad, suffer” (Erdoğan, 2017b, n.p.).

As for the economic position of the city, Istanbul is evidently the major economic centre of Turkey. Istanbul is, by far, the city that creates the most employment in Turkey, contributing most to the national economy, giving the most taxes, making the most import and export, holding the most financial assets, and so on (TURKSTAT, 2014). The city is also the main command and control centre of Turkey (Yıldırım and Mullineux, 2015). In short, as stated by a businessman, “Istanbul is like half of the national economy; most tax is collected here, most trade is done here” (BSR#2). Therefore, it was not surprising that many interviewees from different institutions or different views used similar words like ‘brain’ (MOD#2, IMM#6, LPL#1) or ‘heart’ (BSR#2, NGOR#1, IMM#5, IMM#6, AA#1) to define the economic position of Istanbul in the country.

To provide an understanding of where this importance of Istanbul in the Turkish economy stands in the global context, Table 5.1 compares Istanbul with selected cities in terms of their contribution to their national economies. With an overall assessment, Istanbul, creating one-
third of the total national economic production, can be positioned between the developmental states and classical global cities (except Paris) and global Southern cities. Nevertheless, with a closer look, the share of Istanbul can be said to more resemble to the developmental cases. While the contribution of London, New York, and Paris to their national economies remain generally limited with the service sectors, Istanbul, as similar to the indicators of Seoul and Tokyo, still make a considerable economic contribution to its national economy in both industrial and service sectors. Another noteworthy indicator in the table is that Moscow, which is thought of as a potential case for the suggested in-between conceptualisation, has similar characteristics to Istanbul in terms of the service sector and total production.

Table 5.1 Global Cities’ Share of National Economic Output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>% of national GDP</th>
<th>% of National Share of Service Sector</th>
<th>% of National Share of Manufacturing Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>7,50</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: Istrate and Nadeau, 2012 in Clark and Moonen 2017; TURKSTAT, 2015b)

Turning to another discussion, many participants used this ‘economic capital’ term to explain the dominant economic position of Istanbul in the country (e.g. IMM#4, BSR#2, NGOR#1). Figure 5.2 affirms the accuracy of these views. According to the figure, Istanbul alone produces approximately 30% of the total national GDP of Turkey. The share of Istanbul is
about three times more than that of Ankara, the second biggest city of Turkey, and almost equal to the sum of all other cities in the table. However, in a different aspect, there is an interesting duality in the Turkish urban system, similar to the USA example. Different from many European examples, where the first-tier cities are also the capital cities (Cardoso and Meijers, 2016), and from the developmental states of which capital cities are also the economic capitals, Turkey’s global city or economic capital, Istanbul, is not the political capital. That is, with the well-suited words of a central government official: “Yes, Ankara seems as the capital, but we are ruled completely from Istanbul in terms of finance and economy” (MOEU#1).

Figure 5.2 The share of National GDP by provinces (2004-2014)

A crucial issue raised here is how globalisation influences other national cities, namely whether the emergence of Istanbul as the country’s primary global city damages the position of Ankara and other Turkish cities. The commonly-held view in the literature is that globalisation causes unequal economic development and regional inequality, and therefore increases the existing hierarchies in national urban systems in favour of first-tier cities (Brenner, 2004b; Sassen, 2005; Crouch and Le Galès, 2012). In other words, second-tier cities are generally assumed to be losers of globalisation in many aspects (BBSR, 2011; Parkinson et al., 2012; Crouch and Le Galès, 2012). In particular, “in highly centralized countries where a ‘winner-takes-all approach’ tends to favour the cities which are already more successful at the cost of other places” (Cardoso and Meijer, 2016: 999).
Ankara should be given a special importance in this discussion because it is the political capital and Turkey’s second-biggest city by both demographic and economic indicators. Therefore, when it is thought together with the discussions in Chapter 3, there are both economic and important political aspects of the relationship between these two cities. An academic interviewee prominently highlighted this point with the following words: “The golden age of Ankara is the pre-globalisation [national period in this thesis]. With the globalisation process, Ankara has experienced a big disappointment” (AA#2). However, interestingly, with a few exceptions (MHA#2, AA#2, NGOR#2) there was little to suggest that Ankara would be negatively affected by globalisation or that globalisation would cause tension between the two cities. This might be because of two reasons. First, people generally see Ankara as the capital city and associate it with the central government, not with its local government (e.g. LPL#1). Second, as will be seen in the next section, political identities are an important variable in Turkish politics, and Ankara’s local government is ruled by the same political party. Hence this gives a reasonable cause to expect harmony, rather than tension, between Ankara and Istanbul.

Moreover, even in economic terms, Turkey’s experience of globalisation presents an interesting trajectory for Ankara and other second-tier cities (Figures 5.2 and 5.3), which is quite different from the general assumptions in the literature:

“In Turkey, [...] Istanbul has been amongst the highest in the country [in terms of GDP] [...] . Ankara, however, is unusual in that it is one ‘second tier’ city in an OECD country that has experienced faster growth than its ‘first tier’ rival” (Harding, 2007: 56).

Figure 5.3, along with Figure 5.2, suggests that globalisation has no significant impact on the existing economic disparities between Istanbul and other major national metropolises, neither positive nor negative. As mentioned above, the existing inequalities between Istanbul and other Turkish cities are clearly visible in Figure 5.2. Istanbul is by far the city which makes the most contribution to the national economy. Yet, there is almost no change in the share of Istanbul’s and other five major cities’ contribution to the national GDP over the analysed period. Given the fact that Istanbul’s economy has grown about three times between 2004 and 2014 (see Figure 5.1), one can assume that these cities have experienced a similar trend of economic growth. Likewise, as can be seen in Figure 5.3, the GDP per capita by the major provinces presents a similar trend. While the GDP per capita of all major cities in the table
has been increasing, there is no substantial change between the rates of increase. In almost all cities, per capita GDP has nearly doubled in the period. Therefore, in terms of the economy, it can be said that globalisation, in the Turkish context, is not a zero-sum game which creates one winner and many losers. On the contrary, all major Turkish cities seem to have made an economic profit from globalisation.

Figure 5.3 GDP Per Capita by Provinces (2004-2014, US$)

(Source: TURKSTAT, 2015a)

Another interesting debate is the relationship between the development of Istanbul and the development of the country. This discussion will, first, make Istanbul’s position within Turkey even more obvious, and second, provide background information for discussions in Chapter 7, especially for why (and with which motivations), the central government is involved in the local projects of Istanbul. As can be remembered, one of the discussions about developmental states is that the emergence of global cities in these states relates to national economic developments of the countries. In the case of Turkey, it might be said that a similar mission is given to Istanbul, at least in the eyes of the officials. This corresponds, in a sense, with what Crouch and Le Galès (2012: 411) call a new economic patriotism:

“National governments have shifted policies in order to strengthen their capital cities as national champion of economic growth; evidence that this occurs indicates that this new form of economic patriotism has been adopted.”
If Istanbul is taken as the economic capital, the words below of an IDA official share strong similarity with the above quote:

“You can see that many mega infrastructure investments are generally made in Istanbul. This demonstrates that Ankara is already conscious of the importance of Istanbul and of that if only Istanbul’s economy develops we can reach this goal. I think, precisely because of this Ankara makes the majority of the investments in Istanbul” (IDA#1).

One part of the participants, mostly officials and the private sector representatives, believed that the economic development of Istanbul makes a very positive impact on Turkey’s national economic growth. Many of them were also very optimistic that this trend will continue. This notion was being combined with the ‘locomotive’ metaphor (IDA#1, UCLG#1, MOEU#1, CCP#1, MHA#2, MOD#1). That is, “if Istanbul grows, Turkey grows. Istanbul is a locomotive city” (MOD#1). They also thought that Istanbul’s growth might be beneficial to the other cities: “It’s not harmful. If we position [Istanbul] as the locomotive; when the locomotive pulls, the other wagons too come after” (IDA#1). More obviously, an interviewee from the central government pointed out that “the growth of Istanbul causes an increase in national wealth, and therefore, other cities get their pieces of the pie” (MOD#1). Further, some of the interviewees stated that Istanbul, and its economic development, might be a role model to other cities in Turkey (MHA#2) and even to some other cities outside Turkey such as Sarajevo or Baghdad (IMM#2). A businessman exemplified this as follows:

“There are many successful administrators in the local governments of Anatolian cities who transferred experiences and know-how which they gained while they had been working in Istanbul’s local government” (BSR#2).

On the other side, a far greater number of interviewees were thinking that such a development includes some risks and may lead to negative results for other cities and the entire country too. According to an interviewee, “if an earthquake occurs in Istanbul, Turkey collapses, [...] cannot recover itself” (NGOR#3). Some officials too expressed that they are dissatisfied with such a development. Though not as direct as the previous quote, a local official said: “If Istanbul is damaged by a disaster, Turkey is much more damaged” (IMM#3). Another point relevant to this issue is that some interviewees criticised the allocation of most of the central investments to Istanbul (e.g. NGOR#4, IMM#1, PA#1). Their point was that this necessarily
causes a decrease in other cities’ shares from the central government funds, and therefore, triggers regional economic inequalities. However, as discussed above, the statistics show that economic inequality between the major cities in Turkey has not increased, at least until now.

5.4 Istanbul in International Context: An Emerging Gateway between East and West

As for where Istanbul is situated in the global urban order, many interviewees found comparing Istanbul with other cities is difficult. The first limitation is to diagnose where the city actually stands, as stated by a local bureaucrat during the interview: “We are categorised in various geographies by different international authorities. Some of them consider us Middle Eastern, others European or Eurasian” (UCLG#1). This complicates the criteria with which Istanbul (or Turkey) is assessed and the cases they are compared to. Moreover, several interviewees thought that it is very difficult to compare Istanbul to other cities due to geographical, historical or social dynamics because “dynamics of Istanbul is so different than anywhere else. You cannot compare Istanbul with Dubai or Cairo, or even London” (PA#2; c.f. Peck, 2015).

The diversity of cities listed during the interviews for comparing Istanbul might nevertheless give an idea of this issue. London, New York, Paris (mentioned respectively 146, 88 and 70 times) were top of the list. About half of the interviewees were thinking that Istanbul should compete with these cities, at least in the future. Rome was mentioned 45 times, mostly because of historical analogies. Moscow was mentioned 28 times, over geographic and political similarities. Other cities such as Tokyo, Singapore and Frankfurt were mentioned less than 25 times. Further, global South cities were mentioned no more than 5-6 times, which will be discussed below. With 67 mentions, Dubai was one of the most cited cities (arguably another in-between city). Aside from its competition with Istanbul for attracting investments leading to the Middle East (ISPAT#1, MOD#1, MOD#2, BSR#5), Dubai was often given as a negative example (BSR#2, IMM#4, CCP#1, MOD#2) or a pattern that Istanbul should not follow (AA#1, MHA#3, NGOR#2, NGOR#1):

“It is an insult to Istanbul that to fill the city with skyscrapers or artificial projects like Disneyland which may be found acceptable for Dubai which is a city with no historical background” (NGOR#2).

Here is an interesting but not surprising point: officials and people from the business world were more optimistic than other interviewees on the position of Istanbul in the global urban
The interviewees in the second group assessed Istanbul mostly through the following criteria: demographic (CCP#1, AA#1), socio-economic (AA#1) or political (democratic participation) (ACT#1), or involvement of the central government (LUR#1, AA#2, PA#1). To those, Istanbul and Turkey were more like the cases in the global South (LUR#1, ACT#1, CCP#1) such as Mexico-City (AA#1) or to cases where the central government has a strong authority over local governments such as Russia or China (AA#2) or “somewhere between global South and Europe” (ACT#1). To be more precise, as one of the interviewees in this group said:

“There is no city in Europe whose population increased from a million to fifteen million in fifty years. There is no city in Europe which has such a big informality phenomenon. There is no city in Europe whose GDP per capita is as low as Istanbul. It can’t be compared to any of them. [...] Mexico City, Buenos Aires, maybe. Istanbul is stronger than Buenos Aires in economic indicators, Mexico City is very close, possibly. It should be compared to cities like Johannesburg. [...] Istanbul maybe compared with the capital cities, or leading cities, of the Third World Countries” (AA#1).

However, to the officials and most of the business groups, Istanbul should be assessed together with the top cities of the world (e.g. IMM#4, BSR#2, MOD#1). The common view in this group was “Istanbul is much ahead of Warsaw, Dubai, and Moscow” (MOD#2) and “should be in the first league of cities” (MHA#2). A different example of this view, with almost similar words, was given by a local official from the Metropolitan Municipality: “Paris, London, New York; if there is a league for cities, Istanbul should be there” (IMM#2). Although this group of participants thought Istanbul should compete with the top global cities, some of them also admitted that “Istanbul has a long way to go, in comparison to the developed countries” (MOD#1). The justification of this view will be better understood in the following paragraph, but especially with the starting-up of the IFC Project (see Chapter 6) many believe that “Istanbul will be one step closer to London, Tokyo, New York triangle” (IMM#6).

For the officials and some individuals (e.g. LUR#1, AA#1, PA#1, NGOR#2), there is a difference between where Istanbul actually is and where Istanbul should be. To many interviewees, what makes this difference is lack of planning, poor physical and legal infrastructure, and other ongoing problems such as rapid and irregular urbanisation and
population increase. For the central and local authorities, unsurprisingly, false policies and strategies that were pursued in previous eras were also among the reasons. The common view, in this respect, was that “Istanbul is a very valuable ore, but very badly processed” (BSR#2). Another participant from the central government said: “I am not sure if Istanbul gets the value it deserves” (MHA#2). The following quote of Erdoğan (2017a) demonstrates that this view was not only shared by interviewees but also by many major politicians: “We did not know the value of this city, we have betrayed it, are still betraying it, and I am too responsible for this”. This constant emphasis on ‘we’ is a useful reminder that city dynamism cannot be explained solely by the geo-economics of global urbanisation, but by geopolitical and geohistorical factors which are often specific to national and regional context (Brenner, 2004a; Jonas, 2013; Jonas and Moisio, 2018).

Regarding the position of Istanbul within the close supranational region, Istanbul has often been assumed as the leading city of the region covering the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, thanks to its privileged features given by history and geography and its functions in the global order. Almost all interviewees, even those with generally critical views, referred to its regional leadership capability, which was well-stated by an urban planner: “Istanbul is the centre in this region, surrounding the Balkans and other neighbour geographies” (CCP#1). In other words, even though it is not able to compete with New York, London, Tokyo, for now (CCP#1), it was thought that Istanbul “is very strong in terms of regional control capacity” (AA#1). A participant from the Development Agency made a similar point with more strategic terms: “Istanbul is a hub. For now, it might be a regional hub between the Middle East and Balkans, but it is also on the way of being a more global hub” (IDA#1). As will be seen in the next chapter, this statement is one of the most-used themes in the promotion of many mega-projects, most notably the IFC Project.

Another relevant issue that this research explores was the potential roles that the city might undertake in the global order. Chapters 2 and 3 discussed that geographical and historical patterns are among the major determinants of their positions and functions in globalisation. The general opinions of the participants were compatible with this view. Most of the interviewees believed that these two aspects, especially the geographical one, shape how Turkey and Istanbul incorporate into the global system. The interviewees who brought the historical features of Istanbul to the forefront insistently emphasised the links between its former status as the imperial capital and the current status as the leading global city of the
region. To understand this view, which will be discussed in Chapter 7 in more detail, it is worth quoting from an executive urban planner:

“Istanbul is a global city. Why? Because as an imperial capital it ruled the Caucasus, Balkans, the Black Sea. Also because of its geography, there is no chance of not being global. What did Napoleon say? ‘If the world were only one country, Istanbul would be its capital’. It is so right. It is gate of East and West, or North, from Africa to Europe. It is a global city even if you do not do anything. It is more global than Moscow” (PA#1).

The ‘gate’ metaphor was furthered by another participant with the following words:

“Istanbul is one of three ‘gateway cities’ in Europe, together with three cities in the North-Mediterranean, Marseilles, Venice, Milan” (AA#2).

Indeed, Istanbul has always functioned as a cultural and economic gateway between East and West, thanks to the advantages provided by its geographical location (Walker and Taylor, 2000; Boyar and Fleet, 2010; Madden; 2016; Swanson, 2016). As also indicated by a recent report exploring the European gateways, Istanbul, today too, strengthens this function and fulfils it in various forms (ESPON, 2013). This was one of the issues that participants, especially officials and private sector representatives, often emphasised. For example, in the words of one of them: “Istanbul is gate of the region opens up to the world and the gate of the region opens up to the region” (ISPAT#1). He exemplified this as follows: “the Japanese come here to open up to Europe and America and others come to open up the Middle East or Central Asia” (ISPAT#1). This view also points out the regional command and control function of Istanbul, which was mentioned by many interviewees (e.g. AA#1, NGOR#4, IDA#1, MHA#1, MOD#1). However, this will be discussed in Chapter 7. For now, the following quote is a good example how the central government market this gateway position of Istanbul and associate this position with command and control functions:

“While we are launching Istanbul, we emphasise that Istanbul sits in the centre of the world. I mean, Istanbul is a transfer point for many international destinations. It has many advantages compared to other transfer points, such as Amsterdam or Frankfurt, in Europe. We cover more than one-third of the world within three hours flight including major cities both in the east and the west. […] This leads to many
international companies establishing their regional and global headquarters in Istanbul” (MOD#1).

Another function of Istanbul (and Turkey) related to this gateway position might be explained through the following quote of Khanna (2016: 7): “Turkey has been called the country where continents collide; now it is the country where continents connect”. In Khanna’s account, with the Marmaray tunnel in Istanbul (see next chapter), Turkey strengthens its position of being “a key corridor between Europe and China” (Ibid.: 7). In this sense, Turkey and Istanbul also play a very strategic role in China’s New Silk Road Initiative that is planned to connect Beijing with London (Ergünsu, 2017). Turkey is one of the main partners of this initiative, and Istanbul, which “was where the land and sea routes of the [historical] Silk Road met” (Ni et al., 2017; 124), will revive its old status in a new way through the project. For example, in addition to Marmaray, the third Bosporus bridge which has a railroad is thought to be one of the most important steps of the route connecting China with the UK (Ünal, 2017).

Finally, as Sassen (2018) points out, Istanbul sits in the centre of diverse flows such as capital, human or political between East (Asia) and West (Europe) and between global North and global South. This can be read as a different interpretation of the connectivity function that Khanna mentions. For example, in terms of global connectivity calculated by different indicators such as economic connection and the number of air routes, Istanbul is among the ten cities which have the most global connections (see Ni et al., 2017). One of the tools through which this connectivity can be most obviously shown is the airline traffic. Istanbul is an important node in the global airline network.19 As stated by an interviewee “after the collapse of the Soviet Union, [Istanbul] has become a major transfer point for the airways from Europe to the Central Asia” (AA#2). Therefore, all participants without exception shared the view that thanks to its geographical location Istanbul has great advantages over cities which are assumed to compete with it. That is, “in terms of airline traffic, neither Bulgaria, nor Greece, or Russia, or Lebanon, or another city can surpass Istanbul” (AA#1).

It is worth underlining one more point before finishing the discussion. This global connectivity is one of the principal elements that both the central and the local governments emphasise and aim to improve (e.g. MOD#1, ISPAT#1, IMM#4, IMM#5, MHA#3, IDA#1). THY, the official airline company of Turkey, is a good example of these efforts. As stated by an IDA official, the company, which is headquartered in Istanbul, “connects Istanbul with

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19 I will return to this discussion on another occasion in Chapter 7.
more than 140 countries and this is quite compatible to the global city strategy of the city” (IDA#1). Moreover, it was believed that this connectivity will be much increased with the starting-up of the Third Airport (ISPAT#1, BSR#4, UCLG#1, IMM#4). The main airport of the city., Istanbul Atatürk Airport, currently ranks fifth in Europe by passenger connectivity (OAG, 2016), and the officials thought that the new airport will surpass Frankfurt Airport and will hit the top spot in Europe (e.g. ISPAT#1, IDA#1, IMM#4):

“There are currently two international airports in Istanbul, and, with the Third Airport, Istanbul will be one of the most important ‘hubs’ in the world. In this way, people will also save 3-4 hours in their daily lives by using Istanbul as a transfer point when they fly from the Far East to Africa, Europe or further destinations. […] When the Third Airport is active, both Frankfurt and London Airports will lose their seats and Istanbul will take their places” (UCLG#1).

5.5 Conclusion

There has been a long debate on how globalisation plays a role in cities’ development and on their position and functions in national and international networks. From the scope of this study, and with a geographic outlook, these debates could be gathered under two contexts: western and non-western. Going back to the discussions in Chapter 2 once again, while global cities and state rescaling theories have developed their arguments mostly over the experiences of western cities, more clearly western European and North American, postcolonial and developmental approaches focus on non-western contexts. However, as highlighted in the introduction of this chapter, Istanbul is not easily categorised as either West or East. The experiences of Istanbul therefore demonstrate some similarities with others but at the same time also show some unique characteristics.

The purpose of this chapter has been to critically conceptualise the development of Istanbul under globalisation and to position this development within Turkey’s national and international contexts. With this aim, the chapter has been structured into three subsections: (i) Istanbul’s own development under globalisation; (ii) situating this development within the national context: and (iii) the position and functions of Istanbul in the international urban system.

The first question this chapter has addressed is how the development of Istanbul can be narrated. The chapter has demonstrated that the urban development of Istanbul has various
divergent and convergent dynamics with the many other global and globalising cities. Economically speaking, globalisation has brought a remarkable economic growth to the city. However, in terms of its sectoral distribution, this economic growth does not conform with the overall hypotheses in the literature claiming that, in global cities, industrial manufacturing is replaced with service sectors (Friedmann, 1988; Beaverstock et al., 1999; Sassen, 2001; 2005). The finance and service sectors in Istanbul have been growing significantly but nevertheless there has been no decline in industry. As some interviewees mentioned, and confirmed by statistical data, there has been an economic growth in Istanbul involving different sectors and subsectors except agriculture.

Just as in the economy, in spatial and demographic developments too, Istanbul has experienced rapid and mostly uncontrolled changes. In terms of urban population, growth rates of Istanbul in the global period are close to, but lower than, the prominent cities of the global South (UNDESA-PD, 2016). As for spatial developments, it is possible to read what is happening in Istanbul through a well-known phenomenon of contemporary global capitalism, the commodification of urban space (e.g. Shatkin, 2011b; Le Galès, 2016). As in many global cities, in Istanbul too, urban land has become a tool of capital accumulation today. Public spaces, green-fields and forests have begun to be opened to zoning operations with the motives of feeding the ongoing growth in construction and real-estate sectors (e.g. ACT#1, LPL#1, NGOR#1, NGOR#3, NGOR#4, MOEU#1, PA#2, IMM#6).

The second concern of this chapter is the position of Istanbul within the national urban system and how this position is affected by globalisation. The agreement of all interviewees has demonstrated that Istanbul is the predominant city of Turkey, not only from an economic but also from many other aspects. Although the global cities literature assumes that globalisation weakens the ties between global cities and other cities within their national urban networks, Istanbul is in an intense cultural, economic and political relationship with the remainder of the country (also see Chapter 7). Additionally, another interesting finding is that there has been no negative relationship between the economic development of Istanbul and of the other Turkish cities. Contrary to the well-known assumption that globalisation increases the economic inequalities between global cities and other cities in the national context in favour of the former (Sassen, 2007; Crouch and Le Galès, 2012; Cardoso and Meijer, 2016), there has been no decline in the economic indicators of the second-tier metropolitan cities of the country.
Finally, this chapter has also discussed the position and functions of Istanbul within the global urban order. For the position of Istanbul, there has been an interesting difference between the views of officials and business people and of other participants. Whereas those in the first group generally positioned Istanbul among the top global cities, participants in the second group often underlined its dynamics resembling the global Southern cities. In fact, both views can be accepted as partly true in the wider context since the city bears the characteristics of both global North and global South (Yetişkul and Demirel, 2018). Yet, there was a consensus that owing to its geographical and historical characteristics Istanbul is in a unique position. There was also another consensus that Istanbul has undeniable advantages in comparison to other cities in the region covering the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and even Central Asia. Once again, these advantages were believed to be the inherent consequences of the city’s location between Europe and Asia, and its imperial background.

In terms of the functions of the city, the interviewees mostly referenced the same point, that is the city’s geographical position. Thanks to this position the city might serve as a gateway between its East and its West for different purposes such as trade routes, energy lines or intercontinental transportation systems (Khanna, 2016). Istanbul functions as a gateway for global companies that brings investors from both East and West to the region (ISPAT#1, BSR#5). At the same time Istanbul functions as a gateway for global capitalism and attracts European and Asian companies seeking to open up to (and to manage their operations in) the regions mentioned above (Sassen, 2009). Finally, Istanbul also serves as a global transport hub connecting the East with the West and North with the South.

Overall, this chapter has discussed some impacts of globalisation on the local scale of Istanbul. It has revealed that the city has been experiencing this phenomenon in an exceptional way - at least in comparison to some other well-known examples argued in the literature - in some respects, which are embedded in the city’s distinctive geographic and historical patterns. This not only shapes the city’s urban development under globalisation but also how the city integrates into subnational and supranational systems and functions in these networks. On the other hand, although this chapter has concentrated on the influences of globalisation, it is also known that such developments are closely related to political factors. Therefore, the next chapter will discuss how the developments discussed in this chapter have been shaped by local and central governments and how the economic growth and development of Turkey has been built on the above functions of Istanbul. What will also be
discussed in the next chapter is the relationship between local and central political actors and other stakeholders in Istanbul’s urban development.
CHAPTER 6

Governments as Global City Makers

6.1. Introduction

Global cities are often viewed as political entities that have gradually had more say in deciding their own destinies, even if these are disadvantageous to their host states. This means that global cities around the world increasingly seek their own interests, pursue their own global agendas, operate beyond their national boundaries, and are more connected to the global urban system than to their national urban system (Derudder and Taylor, 2016; Sassen, 2005; 2018). However, the counter approaches (especially state rescaling and developmental approaches) have demonstrated that these assumptions need to be approached with caution since the central governments, in many different countries, still have a significant role in orchestrating city development and their strategies (Brenner, 2004a; Jonas, 2013). Moreover, as will be seen below, not only in emerging global cities but also in some top global cities, the role of central governments is much more important than it is sometimes assumed; or in other words, administrative and financial capabilities of city governments are not often as high as the global cities literature asserts (Therborn, 2011; Kantor et al, 2012).

Secondly, the arguments that local governments, especially in global cities, have been gaining more power vis-a-vis their central governments also imply that global cities have become spaces in which local and national powers conflict with each other for political-economic interests, so that the relationship between cities and their host states are necessarily in tension (Peck, 2002; Rodriguez-Pose and Gill; 2003; Barber, 2013). Yet, there are also counterexamples (cf. Khanna, 2016); for example, developmental states in which city-state relations can be identified as integration rather than separation (Hill and Kim, 2000; Saito, 2003), and city-states that are not faced with intergovernmental conflicts (Old and Yeung, 2004). From a different angle too, it is also open to debate how much of the relations between cities and their host states are shaped by rational motivations, such as struggles for the scales of political power or for economic interests. Or, more explicitly, as this chapter seeks to understand, how influential political differences between local governments and regional or national governments are in the intergovernmental relations is an important question to be answered.
The empirical arguments of the previous chapter have concentrated on Istanbul’s development in the era of globalisation, and the city’s position in national and global urban systems. In short, the debate has been more about the characteristics of Istanbul as an emerging global city. This chapter aims to develop an understanding of how political actors shape the city’s development and how the relations between them can be assessed. The chapter consists of two different parts, each of which makes a different argument. To begin, Section 6.2 explores the role of Turkey’s national government and Istanbul’s local government in the emergence of Istanbul as a global city. The primary argument in this section is that the central government has been the main driver of this development, and the local government has generally played a secondary role acting within the limits drawn by the central government.

Second, although the literature often assumes the reverse, the relationship between local and central governments in Turkey could be assessed as being much more harmonious – akin to a city-state – which is driven by both rational and political factors. Nevertheless, this harmony between different tiers of government does not mean total harmony. There are, of course, some contested points, conflicts or objections raised by different groups of stakeholders. To develop these arguments, the rest of the chapter is divided into two sections. Section 6.2 highlights the roles of the central and local authorities respectively for Istanbul’s current development. Section 6.3 assesses relations between the city and the state, and sheds light on both rational and political harmony between them and areas of contestations.

6.2. Who Makes Istanbul as a Global City?

One of the controversial debates about global cities is undoubtedly how global cities emerge. For many global and world-city researchers, the answer to this question is primarily the global economic system. On the other hand, by echoing Beauregard (1995: 242) who argued “the global only comes into being through the integration of numerous locally based actors and activities”, it might be said that central and local governments can pursue a number of strategies to strengthen their cities’ positions in the global order. Given the various definitions – or functions – of global cities, it is possible to prepare a basic list of these options: for example, an accessible major airport that increases the global connectivity of the city (Frug and Barron, 2008), an efficient infrastructure and transportation system (Kantor et al., 2012), but most importantly a favourable investment environment to attract global companies to the city.
In this study, interviewees were generally reflective of the above options in their answers. In other words, as stated by an interviewee from the central government:

“In relation to these policies, all minds think alike. There is nothing that we know but they do not know, or that they know but we do not know. These are things that are more or less the same in all corners of the world” (ISPAT#1).

This implies an almost identikit development plan for cities in globalisation, something which is perhaps unsurprising given the rise of a strong policy mobilities literature in global urban studies, itself a reflection of how ideas and policies for ‘success’ in globalisation are being circulated by a cadre of international consultants, thinktanks and policy entrepreneurs (McCann, 2011; Peck, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2014; Crivello, 2015, Kennedy, 2016; Ward, 2018; for Istanbul see Kizildere and Chiodelli, 2018).

The second and more difficult question is who the main actor is in orchestrating and implementing strategies, policies, and projects for Istanbul: is it Turkey’s central government, is it Istanbul’s local government, or do both have equal influence? This question is very important because some arguments (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3.1) have referred to a process in which some of the regulatory powers of nation-states have been transferring to local and/or regional governments (Brenner, 2004b, 2018b; Keating, 2009; Harrison and Hoyler, 2014; Harrison, 2015). Hence, the discussions in this chapter will be the basis for discussions in the next chapter that compares the case of Istanbul to the existing global urban studies literature.

Moreover, clarifying the roles of the central and the local governments will also help to explain how Istanbul, as a city in-between the East and the West, fits into the global urban system in which very different patterns of government and governance exist (Herrschel, 2014; Vogel et al., 2010). Even though decentralisation is often supposed to be a universal phenomenon (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003), many existing studies demonstrate that the extent of decentralisation is varied from case to case (Jonas, 2013). For example, the intergovernmental system in Europe is more centralised than in the USA (Herrschel, 2014), the Central and Eastern EU countries are more centralised than other parts of the EU (Schmitt and Well, 2016), or the East Asian developmental states are much more centralised than the Western states (Hill and Kim, 2000). The discussions below will allow a better understanding of where Istanbul can be positioned among these different examples.
The interviews pointed out that both the central and the local governments have an important role in transforming Istanbul into a global city. However, the interviews revealed that the central government is much further ahead of the local government in shaping the city’s strategies and policies. For example, whereas the central government is responsible for developing national, regional and local strategic plans, including national development plans, environment plans, etc., municipalities and metropolitan municipalities are responsible for local master plans which must be in coordination with the national plans (Yılmaz Bakır et al., 2018). As will again be mentioned below, the master plans prepared by local governments must also be approved by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. Local government are also stakeholders of the local projects developed by the central government institutions as in the IFC Project. It is therefore possible to define central and local government’s roles as respectively leading and supporting actors, as summarised by one interviewee from the Ministry of Development:

“The first actor is central government […] Because of our state tradition we cannot develop separate administrative strategies (e.g. different procedures as in free trade zones) […] The most important one here is the state tradition. The second is the local actor. You know, the annual budget of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality is higher than that of 17 ministries\(^\text{20}\). It is indeed a huge financial power, but they still aren’t the main actor because of the central government’s strategy. To give a proportion, central government’s role on Istanbul is about 70%. For example, the local authority cannot decide the Third Bridge, it must get approval from central government” (MOD#1).

**6.2.1. Governing for Istanbul: Role of the Central Government**

All interviewees without exception believe that there has been a crucial role of the central government, ruling since 2002, on transforming Istanbul from a national leading city to a global city. Only a few interviewees referred the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality as the main actor, but they also stated, between the lines, that the central government takes the main role in practice. Even the groups who criticise this transformation accepted this dominant position of the central government and stated their opposition to the irresistible central intervention to the city. That is to say, there is no doubt in any of the interviewees that it is the

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\(^{20}\) The 2017 budget of the IMM is about 5,5 billion US dollars, which is higher than that of 18 ministries such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.
central government who is performing the main tasks. Those tasks can be categorised under three headings: (i) Planning for Istanbul, (ii) Setting the Scene, (iii) Building for Istanbul.

6.2.1.1 Planning for Istanbul: National Plans – Local Projects

As was touched upon before, Turkey is a country in which the planning system is highly centralised and complex (Kayasu and Yetişkul, 2014; Tasan-Kok, 2015). As stated by an interviewee, “the main planning authority is the central administration, that is, the central government draws the main framework and sets the main strategy” (MHA#3). At the top of the planning hierarchy, there is a national development plan which provides a set of national planning policies for Turkey including economic, social and environmental aspects. This national plan is prepared by the Ministry of Development. Apart from the national plans, Turkey’s main national strategy is defined as the 2023 Vision, also known as the 2023 Targets (Sabah, 2012). The vision consists of 100 goals which Turkey aims to achieve by 2023, which marks the centennial of the Turkish Republic. The overall aim of the vision, most of whose points are economic targets and large-scale infrastructure projects, is to make Turkey into one of the top ten economies in the world. The main “2023 Goals of Turkey” are stated as follows:

- To become one of the 10 largest economies in the world
- To have a GDP of 2 trillion US dollars
- To have an export volume of 500 billion US dollars
- To build a total of 1 million houses.
- To make Istanbul one of the top ten financial centres in the world by 2023.
- To complete the Canal Istanbul Project.
- Urban transformation and regeneration projects will spread to the Aegean and Eastern Anatolian regions after Istanbul (Deloitte-Turkey, 2013; MoD, 2014).

The 2023 Vision is, however, neither a policy framework nor a detailed plan; it is a strategic guide for all tiers of governments which must be considered in preparing both national and local plans. Many interviewees, including some central government bureaucrats, thought that some of the goals were unrealistic or at least difficult to achieve (e.g. MOD#1; BSR#2). Indeed, considering Turkey’s current GDP, US$857 billion, the country must catch up to an annual average growth rate of nearly 20% per year to achieve its 2023 targets, which is almost
five times the world average. Even those who find the aims realistic believed that achieving the targets strictly depends on the economic development of Istanbul:

“If only Istanbul performs its task in line with the targets, Turkey can reach those goals. If Istanbul does not perform, Turkey too cannot reach them” (IDA#1).

It is therefore clear that many of the goals in the 2023 vision are directly relevant to Istanbul, such as the Third Bridge Project, the Third Airport Project, the Strait Road Tube Crossing Project, known as Eurasia Tunnel. Istanbul is aiming to become a regional, and then global, financial centre and an international transfer hub for air transport and maintenance and repair centre (MoD, 2014). The former is conceptualised as the IFC Project, undertaken by the MoD, and the latter is directly conceived over the Third Airport Project by the Ministry of Transportation. Istanbul International Financial Centre Project aims to make Istanbul as one of the top 25 financial centres of the world by 2018 (and one of the top 10 by 2023) and to move Turkey into the top 30 in the Financial Development Index (MoD, 2014). The following quote taken from the interview with a specialist working on the project shows how central government approaches the project which is actually a local issue:

“Indeed, the projects we conceive for Istanbul are actually relevant to Turkey. As I said before, all these targets are targets of Turkey. (…) When we develop Istanbul and make it a leading global financial centre, Turkey will already be one of the top fifteen economies indeed” (MOD#1).

This sentiment was shared by many of the public officials and business sector representatives interviewed, although they approached the issue from different perspectives. Some interviewees, for example, expressed that the project could not be a local project because of Istanbul’s dominant position in Turkey’s economy (BSR#5). The second approach is that the making of a financial centre requires special regulations such as new laws, institutions, incentives and infrastructure investments, which the local government cannot implement (IMM#3, BSR#1). To understand why the central government administers the project, it is worth quoting from an interview with one of the representatives of the private sector:

“It is right. Because the idea that making Istanbul a financial centre must be in accordance with the central government’s idea. Istanbul cannot be a financial centre unless the central government adopts [this strategy]. Because the central bank, state
banks, are still in Ankara, the capital, and they must be moved to Istanbul and this is impossible without central government’s will” (BSR#2).

As will be seen in the following paragraphs, not only the planning of these projects, but also zoning and construction activities, are mostly undertaken by central government. However, this does not mean that all decisions are taken by central government. There are various formal (for example Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality is one of the six stakeholders of the Financial Centre Project) and informal ways in which local administrators can participate in the processes (see Section 6.3.2.). Thus, local governments play a role in commenting on planning applications that affect their area, meeting local requirements of projects such as underground and some other infrastructure projects (IMM#3), or providing business and construction permits (BSR#1). Yet it is worth stating here that both financial and administrative dependency of the local government allows the central government to be more active in decision making and conducting projects.

6.2.1.2 Setting the Scene for Istanbul

Concepts such as ‘global city’, ‘world city’ or ‘attraction centre’ are often explained with economic factors such as a city’s integration into the global economy. It could be said that the central government is seen as the main actor who sets the legal framework for this economic integration. Unsurprisingly, all public officials and business sector representatives almost agree on how the government could provide this integration and ensure its continuity. To be more precise, what is expected from the central government is, for example, “banking legislation, other legislation, allowing foreigners to buy properties, and so on” (BSR#1). Likewise, another business sector representative stated that considering global competition, the central government should regulate the legal framework which reduces investment procedures, and wanted, as an example, the central government to change the law of citizenship for foreign investors (BSR#4). Indeed, it is also worth noticing that the law was changed in January 2017. The new law grants citizenship to foreigners who buy a one-million-dollar property or who found/buy a company with two-million-dollar capital (ISPAT, 2017).

The central government’s approach is by and large similar to that of the private sector. For example, an interviewee from the Investment Promoting Agency, defining Istanbul as a major
centre for the finance sector, expressed that they seek to attract investments from all corners of the world (ISPAT#1). He also added:

“The state has some strategies [to attract FDIs] of course and we are carrying out these strategies. One of the most important strategies is, for example, the incentive system which offers different incentives depending on sectors or regions” (ISPAT#1).

Central government’s approach and role could be better interpreted if this process is tackled within a holistic view. Namely, this has indeed begun with legal amendments and continues with the latest amendment in citizenship law. The AKP government enacted two new laws after they came to power in 2002: (i) the Law no. 4875 on Direct Foreign Investments; and, (ii) the Law no. 4916 on Property Acquisition. These new laws abrogated the permission and approval system for foreign direct investments, eased property acquisition for foreign real persons and companies, and so allowed foreign companies to open new branches, offices, production centres without facing strict bureaucratic permission procedures. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 demonstrate how these laws have affected the amount of foreign direct investments and the numbers of foreign companies in Turkey. There is no doubt that Istanbul is the city that is mostly affected by these developments.

Figure 6.1 shows that while total investment for the 23 years before the law was introduced in 2003 was around US$15 billion, after the law, the annual average total of foreign investment increased to about US$12.5 billion. Although there is no official statistic which shows how much of this investment comes to the city, relevant experts interviewed pointed out that Istanbul has attracted more than half of the total investment (ISPAT#1, BSR#5). The numbers in Figure 6.2 support what the interviewees said. The graph shows the number of active firms in the country and the city and highlights the difference before and after 2003. Although there were only approximately 5500 foreign companies in the country in 2002, almost 50,000 companies were active in 2015 and unsurprisingly more than half of these companies were located in Istanbul.

**Figure 6.1 Foreign Direct Investment Inwards in Turkey**
6.2.1.3 Building for Istanbul: Mega-Projects

As in many other cities around the world, in Istanbul too, global aspirations become visible in urban space through physical projects, that is, mega-projects such as an international airport, and large-scale property projects (Fainstein, 2008; Orueta and Fainstein, 2008; Shatkin, 2011;
Kanai, 2013; Jonas et al., 2014; Shen and Kee, 2017; for Istanbul see Dogan and Stupar, 2017). Therefore, mega-projects in Istanbul were one of the most discussed and most important topics of the interviews. Unsurprisingly there was a strong disagreement between representatives of civil society, officials, and the private sector on the necessity of these projects; but this disagreement disappeared when the interviewees were asked who undertakes these investments. All interviewees without any exception said the central government is the main authority which undertakes the projects. For example, a central government official stated: “The mega-projects of Istanbul [see Table 6.1 below]; Marmaray, […] the Third Bridge, the New Airport, all these are under Ministry of Transport’s responsibility” (MHA#3). The interviewees’ answers also shed light on different aspects of why the central government takes on this responsibility: macro framework, legislation and finance.

First and the foremost, in macro scale, these projects (see Table 6.1) are planned and built within the scope of Turkey's national, regional and global economic and political strategies. They, therefore, often gain a national character rather than local in the eyes of the central government, and even of the local government. For example, as will be recalled from the previous chapter, the railroad, to be built, over the Third Bosporus Bridge aims to integrate the rail-route between Asia and Europe (New Silk Road Project), which will strengthen Turkey's central position in this project. Similarly, the Third Airport and the IFC projects are compatible with Turkey's national goals of becoming a major regional (then global) hub for the airline networks (ISPAT#1, IMM#4) and financial markets (IDA#1, MHA#3). As stated by the former minister of the MOD, though its main base is in Istanbul, IFC projects indeed has broader targets such as ensuring national economic development, making of Turkey as a global and regional attraction centre and to expand its economic prestige beyond the national boundaries (Yılmaz, 2015). In brief, with his words: “The IFC is not a local project of a particular city, but a project of Turkey” (ibid; n.p.).

As a different example, Marmaray and Istanbul Strait Road Tube Crossing Project (named as Eurasia Tunnel Project), a 14.6 km motorway route, including 5.4 km tunnel crossing the Bosporus over the seabed, both aim to alleviate the traffic pressure of Istanbul, and, in the broader sense, serve for Turkey's national strategy of connecting East with West. Perhaps most striking among these projects is the Canal Istanbul Project, also known as the Crazy Project, as it shows how national economic and political strategies are shaped in a compatible way. The project will be used for transit shipping passes between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara by linking two seas with a new canal. By doing this, the central government aims to
by-pass the Montreux Agreement and to regain its political and economic power on the intercontinental maritime traffic across the Bosporus (Hurriyetdailynews, 2018). The project also includes the New City Project, a new residential area hosting about 500,000 population on the edge of the Canal. According to a market report prepared under the coordination of the ISPAT, the New City project, together with other real-estate and mega projects, is expected to create lucrative business opportunities for global investors (Deloitte-Turkey, 2013). To summarise, these projects, in one aspect, aim to a construction-based economic growth, in both local and national scale, through public-private partnerships, and, in another aspect, are planned and developed as a part of Turkey's national strategies of increasing its political and economic dominance in the region.

**Table 6.1 Mega-Projects and Urban Transformation Projects in Istanbul**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Project Type</th>
<th>Relevant Institutions</th>
<th>Cost (US$)</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Current Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 3rd Bosporus Bridge</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>MOTI</td>
<td>2.5 billion</td>
<td>A new bridge across the Bosporus. It is the biggest suspension bridge that has a railway network in the world (Image 6.1).</td>
<td>Completed in 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 3rd Airport</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>MOTI TOKI</td>
<td>22 billion</td>
<td>Planned to be one of the largest airports in the world, with a yearly capacity of 150 million passengers.</td>
<td>Under Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Financial Center</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>MOD MOEU IMM</td>
<td>2 billion</td>
<td>The aim is: Istanbul shall first become a regional financial centre, and ultimately a global financial centre.</td>
<td>Under Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marmaray Project</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>MOTI</td>
<td>2.3 billion</td>
<td>A 76,3km metro route between Asian and European sides of the city, with a 13,5km undersea tunnel.</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canal Istanbul</td>
<td>Commercial / Transport</td>
<td>Upcoming</td>
<td>15 billion</td>
<td>42 km artificial sea-level waterway between the Black Sea and Marmara</td>
<td>Upcoming</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Alongside with the strategic dimension of mega-projects planning, the implementation of such projects requires the direct intervention of the central government in the legal sense (IMM#1, IMM#2, IMM#3, MOD#1, MOD#2, MHA#2, MHA#3). For example, some projects, such as the Third Bridge, require the expropriation of large amount of land, which is depending on approval by the Council of Ministries (MOD#1). Likewise, some projects require treasury guarantees to attract global investors and these guarantees can only be given by the central government (IMM#1). Further, some of the mega-projects are located within the administrative boundaries of more than one city, even though those are directly relevant to Istanbul. In such a case, these projects can only be conducted under the coordination of the central authorities (MHA#2). On the other hand, central intervention on mega-projects is not only an inherent requirement stemming from the distribution of authority between local and central governments but also the conclusion of a process developed by the central government who is seeking to allocate investments in line with the national plans. An NGO representative drew attention to this issue as follows:

“Especially with the article 80\textsuperscript{21} decision power on a certain amount of investment is given to the Council of Ministries. They can offer exemptions including Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures” (NGOR#3).

The third aspect of the issue is about finance. Moving from the above expropriation example, the amount of expropriation for the Third Bosporus Bridge and The North Marmara Motorway alone (see Image 6.1) is approximately 1.5 billion Turkish Liras and the total cost of the projects is more than 7 billion Turkish Liras which is approximately one sixth of the city’s annual budget\textsuperscript{22}. Likewise, as Table 6.1 shows, the Third Airport (see Image 6.2), which will be one of the biggest in the world, believed to increase Istanbul’s position in the global cities hierarchy by making it a global air transportation hub, is estimated to cost US$22 billion, which is much more than the Metropolitan Municipality can afford. Given their costs

\textsuperscript{21} Article 80 of the Law No. 6745, passed in August 2016, provides power to Council of Ministers to give incentives, financial and bureaucratic such as exemptions from licences or permissions, to investment projects. NGOs concerns are that the article eases up the Environment Impact Assessment Process (See Env.net, 2016).

\textsuperscript{22} For other mega-projects in Istanbul see http://megaprojeleristanbul.com
and nation-wide effects, decision-making in and funding of airports is a process in which central governments are heavily involved, even in cities like London (Department for Transport, 2017) and Tokyo (OECD/ITF, 2014), which have much greater financial possibilities than Istanbul.

As has been mentioned before, many interviewees agree that Turkey is a very centralised country in terms of local government finance too. Local governments have no autonomous revenue sources and are heavily dependent on the funds allocated by the central government (AA#1). They, therefore, “cannot cover these investments with their own budgets; they cannot do such big investments” (BSR#2). Consequently, these projects being undertaken by the central government is welcomed by all local officials interviewed, as one of them explicitly expressed:

“The central government also has a very important role indeed. Although local government has a big budget, it is not always enough. [...] Because we cannot do all these projects ourselves, we are waiting for support from the central government. [...] The support of the central government in mega-projects such as the 3rd Bridge, the 3rd Airport or Canal Istanbul, paves the way for us” (IMM#4).

Image 6.1 The Third Bosphorus Bridge

(Source: Sabah, 2016)

6.2.2. Governing in Istanbul: Role of the Local Government

There is no doubt that one of the most controversial issues arising from the interviews was about the functions of local government. Although the Metropolitan Municipality is seen as the main authority on paper, most of the interviewees thought that local government has a secondary position behind the central government. In that sense, it is highly possible to
assume that there is a kind of hierarchic distribution of roles between the central and the local
governments. This vertical relationship was harshly stated by an academic as follows: “the
role of the central [government] is to make decisions, and role of the local [government] is to
enforce decisions” (AA#1). Or, with a different statement:

“We position ourselves according to these strategies. For example, the central
government prepares development plans, or the Ministry of Development tells the
Istanbul Development Agency: In relation to the 2023 Goals, 10th Development Plan
is published. They [the Ministry] say what should be done to reach the 2023 goals. We
should do some investments relevant to economy or environment, for example. This is
the central government’s duty. So, central government is planning everything in line
with the 2023 goals, what we should do is to fulfil these duties” (IMM#4).

As understood from the above quote, some of the primary roles of the local government in
this hierarchic distribution are, for example, “to solve local problems [of the projects]”
(BSR#2), “to follow licences procedures in relation to the Finance Centre Project” (BSR#1),
and “to point central government the way on mega-projects” (IMM#3). The Metropolitan
Municipality is in one sense acting as the local implementer of the central policies, and like
the other local governments in the country, it must act within the legal frameworks and
strategies drawn up by the central government. On the other hand, thanks to its financial
capacity and the political/economic importance, Istanbul’s local government is also able to
carry out planning and building activities which are highly difficult for other cities.

6.2.2.1 Planning in Istanbul

In the planning scheme of Turkey, there are two different kinds of local plan: master plans
and strategy plans. In Istanbul too, therefore, there is both a spatial plan, the Environment
Plan, prepared by the Metropolitan Municipality (IMMCPD, 2009); and a strategic plan,
Istanbul Region Plan, prepared by the Istanbul Development Agency (IDA, 2014). Both are
local plans that provide a set of policies for the city covering economic, social and spatial
aspects of what the city is aiming to achieve by 2023. There is, moreover, a hierarchy between
the plans in the planning framework, in favour of the strategic plan. It is therefore that the
Regional Plan must be considered in preparing the Environment plan.

In relation to spatial planning, in 2004 the central government published a new planning
framework, the law No. 5216, and gave planning power for whole administrative boundaries
to local governments. Before that law, according to urban planners in the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, the Metropolitan Government had a limited planning power which did not cover the whole metropolitan area (IMM#1, IMM#2). After the amendment, two different plans were prepared, 2006 and 2009 (Revised version of the 2006 plan) Istanbul Environment Plans, by the Metropolitan Municipality.

What is important here is that an urban planner from local government, who was one of the planners who prepared the master plans in the 1990s, said that the current plans (2006 and 2009) show a consistency with the previous plans, or rather, are built on those prepared during Erdoğan’s period of office. It was mentioned in Chapter 3 that the 1995 master plan had a vision of making Istanbul as a world city in which service, trade, and tourism sectors are agglomerated. There is a similar vision in the 2009 master plan: making Istanbul a world city and strengthening the city’s global competitiveness, especially in finance, trade, and tourism (IMMCPD, 2009). Likewise, as echoed by an interviewee (CCP#1), Ali Müfit Gürtuna, the successor mayor of Erdoğan, used a similar discourse: to revive the global identity of Istanbul, which has been the capital of three empires. A similar consistency can also be seen in the emphasises on the historical, cultural and geopolitical importance of the city. For example, the 2009 Master Plan highlights:

“Istanbul, the point where East meets West and blends, has a synthesis coloured with the cultural accumulation that different civilisations have formed throughout history. In addition, Istanbul, located at the intersections of the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, is one of the important world cities that provides service to these regions, owing to its strategic and geographical location and cultural connections” (IMMCPD, 2009: i).

Another issue in relation to the latest plan, 2009, which is also essential to see the hierarchical relationship between the local and the central, is that the plan did not include two of the most popular mega-projects, the Third Airport and the Third Bridge. This plan was prepared by the Istanbul Metropolitan Planning Centre, which was later closed. An executive who used to work for this institution expressed: “Our plan was working very well without the airport and the bridge” (PA#1). Another urban planner from the Metropolitan Municipality, who took a role in preparing the plan, used a similar statement:
“While we were preparing the 2009 Environment Plan, I have thought the Third Airport in a different location, which might be discussed whether it was right or wrong, but our central government decided on a different location [current site]” (IMM#3).

Image 6.2 The New Airport of Istanbul

(Source: Grimshaw Architects, 2015)

The same interviewee then pointed to another aspect of the matter:

“We are the institution that are responsible for preparing the urban plan within the metropolitan municipal borders, but in legal frame there could be many other institutions which have a plan-making power” (IMM#3).

Within the traditional centralised state structure of Turkey, there are several tools through which the central government can directly influence the local plans. For example, in the 2009 plan, the plan was revised by the local government following a direct request of the central government, and the airport and the bridge were included. Moreover, there are various central
government institutions which have planning powers in certain locations (e.g. Ministry of Tourism in tourism areas). The place-specific plans prepared by the relevant central government institutions take precedence in practice over plans prepared by the local governments. In other words, the local governments must either take the central government’s priorities into account or must revise the plan in line with their priorities as in the 2009 plan. This enables the central government to intervene in city planning, and causes a messy and complicated local planning framework, which many interviewees from all groups complained about (e.g. IMM#1, IMM#3, MHA#3, BSR#1, BSR#2, CCP#1, PA#2, UCLG#1, NGOR#1).

Further, the central government established a new planning framework after the foundation of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization in 2011 and further centralised this planning hierarchy. With this amendment, the master plans prepared by the local governments must be approved by the ministry. Another change to the planning frame came with the establishment of the Development Agencies, for this research Istanbul Development Agency, in 2009, as a part of the EU accession process. After it was established, the Agency identified itself as an agency working for transforming Istanbul into a global city and was given power and responsibility to prepare local vision plans for the city (IDA, 2014). The Istanbul Region Plan 2014-2023 is the recent strategic plan prepared by the agency. As its name implies, the plan was prepared in compliance with the 2023 Goals, and its primary goal is to set the local strategies for the 2023 targets (IDA, 2014). Briefly stated, it draws a set of economic, social and spatial strategies “to transform Istanbul into a global attraction centre for science people, global capital, for the economy” (IDA#1). There is, therefore, a strong discursive consensus between national development plans and the Region Plan.

6.2.2.2 Building in Istanbul

Bearing the global aspirations of the city in mind, both people who rule the city and the people who live in the city were asked about the problems that stand in the city’s way of becoming a leading global city and about disadvantages of Istanbul compared with other cities. The answers given to those questions point to similar issues; one is non-earthquake resistant buildings based on unplanned urbanisation and the other one is traffic and infrastructure problems. In particular, the local authorities stated that they have serious complaints from both local people and national or global investors that there is not a sufficient and well-functioning public transport system, especially no adequate underground network. So indeed, compared to cities that are assumed to be competing with Istanbul, such as
Moscow, Istanbul’s underground network is not well developed. The information obtained either through the interviews with local officials or from official documents show that these two issues are directly under the responsibilities of the local government.

The local officials who were interviewed emphasised that the local government gives particular importance to improving Istanbul’s underground system. The local authorities interviewed emphasised that the local government attaches special importance to improving the underground system of Istanbul. Indeed, since 2004, Istanbul’s underground network has increased from 45 km to 150 km (IMM, 2016). This will reach to 330 km when the ongoing projects will be completed. As a local bureaucrat said: “only in Istanbul, all underground investments are carried out by the Metropolitan Municipality” (UCLG#1). There is no doubt that the local government either considers central government’s aims or decides in coordination with them, or both.

This is also a kind of task sharing, written or unwritten, between local and central governments, as stated by a local government executive: “We create the local infrastructure of the IFC Project, in line with the central government needs” (IMM#3). Another executive official from Institutional Development and Governance Systems Department of the Metropolitan Municipality also said on this issue that as a part of the local and national 2023 Goals the central government assigns improving public transportation system (IMM#4). Some – ongoing or completed – underground routes are directly on the locations where the central government is conducting mega projects like the Financial Centre Project or the Third Airport Project.

Another important and controversial issue is the urban transformation. Essentially, there was a consensus between interviewees that urban transformation is an obligation for Istanbul, due to unplanned urbanisation, skewed settlement, and therefore poor conditions of existing buildings, and earthquake hazard. For example, a board member of one of the largest construction companies in the country said: “There are about 5 million houses in Istanbul, 1.5-2 million of them, that is 50 per cent, must be renewed” (BSR#4). However, this consensus disappeared when people were talking about how this transformation should be done. Until recently, the local government has been the main authority on urban transformation issues. They even staged competitions and undertook some mega-scale projects in cooperation with district municipalities. Yet, many interviewees, especially central government officials and private sector agents, were thinking that because of the number of
buildings to be transformed, of the number of people to be affected by this transformation, and of the cost of this transformation, the local government alone could not overcome this issue.

It is necessary to mention here that urban transformation is also an opportunity for investment or attracting investment. Actors from the private sector, for example, were thinking that to accelerate the process, urban transformation projects might be made more attractive for the private sector through introducing legal changes, such as vat incentives, tax cuts or obligating city-block based transformation (rather than parcel based), and so were advocating that although the Metropolitan Municipality is the main authority in this issue, the central government should step in when it is needed. Some central government officials too mentioned that they attempt to attract foreign capital through using rent-sharing methods in urban transformation projects. An interviewee, for example, stated that they are keeping in touch with an international construction company relating to a transformation project in one of the city’s districts (ISPAT#1).

Therefore, it is possible to say here that the central government, through its institutions, has also become an actor of urban transformation, together with the private sector. Especially, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization gained the power to conduct urban transformation projects, if district municipalities demand, and/or if it sees it as necessary. An official from the Ministry, who actively participated in one of the largest urban transformation projects in the city, Fikirtepe Urban Transformation Project, justified their interventions in the project by saying that because of populism or financial abilities local government could not do that (MOEU#1). She also said that they regard local authorities as the main authority responsible for urban transformation and that they would like to transfer their power to them in the near future. In short, although the local government is the main authority for urban transformation, many different institutions may get involved in the projects. It therefore becomes a messier situation and has become one of the issues that the local authorities are dissatisfied with:

“There is a chaos indeed in relation to our duties. I mean urban transformation: The main actor is the ministry, particularly after the law no. 6306. To the law, the ministry gives the power to metropolitan municipalities, yet they can give power to district municipalities if they think it is necessary. After the law, a lot of district municipalities applied to the ministry and were empowered. So, although the metropolitan municipality is given the main role to manage urban transformation and to organise
the district municipalities in urban transformation projects, it is also like being by-passed” (IMM#6).

6.3. Relationship between the City and the State

One of the much-discussed issues in the global cities literature is how globalisation influences the relationship between global/globalising cities and their nation-states (Jonas and Wilson, 2018). Much of the literature assumes that cities and states lost their mutuality of interests and that the local governments of global cities might have different interests and agendas from that of their national governments (Taylor, 1995; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Barber, 2013). A potential result of this is that the relationship between national and sub-national scales of government tend to be in tension (Brenner, 1998; Peck, 2002; Barber, 2013), as noted by Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2003: 334):

“[T]he interests of subnational and national governments tend to be at odds . . . Although national governments would prefer, ceteris paribus, to devolve responsibilities (authority) to their regional or state governments with as few accompanying resources as possible, the subnational governments would prefer the opposite case. The balance between these extremes will depend upon the relative strength, or, in political terms, legitimacy, of the two tiers of government.”

On the other hand, some other studies too, mainly from non-western contexts, say that city-state relationships need to be assessed within the internal context of each state and contend that they are not necessarily in tension (Hill and Kim, 2000; Saito, 2003). In a similar vein, another argument in this issue is that considering their financial and political limitations, the cities might enjoy the support of their national governments to raise their positions in global cities hierarchy (Frug and Barron, 2008; Clark and Moonen, 2017). In the light of the discussions that have been made until now and will be made below, it can be said that the case of Istanbul demonstrates a similar characteristic to the approaches that assume the intergovernmental relations might be more harmonious than conflict ridden politics of scale which dominates much contemporary thinking in global urban studies. To be more precise, there is an obvious harmony between Istanbul, as the city, and Turkey, as the country that is more similar to the developmental city-state approach of East Asia than the state rescaling literature of North American and Western Europe. This harmony stems from different dynamics such as common interests, mutual dependencies, and political identities. However,
it does not mean that there is an exact harmony or that there is no area of contestation. For example, over-centralisation, or lack of participation in decision-making are some of the issues leading to complaints of urban and environmental groups, and even by a few local and central officials.

6.3.1. Rational Harmony – Interests and Obligations

As noted above, the Istanbul example demonstrates that there might be an intergovernmental relationship which is different to that assumed in much of the literature on the politics of global city formation. First of all, there are rational reasons for this relationship to be in harmony for both local government and central government. For Istanbul’s local government, to receive the support of the central government, especially in mega-projects, is beneficial for raising the city’s position in the global cities hierarchy. From the point of the central government, to support the global desires of the city and to steer its policies and investments in line with this goal mean economic growth as it will bring more investment to the city. Nevertheless, this harmony is, of course, mostly between governments and private sectors. Almost all NGOs representatives and other individual interviewees – with a few exceptions (AA#1, LPL#1) – were against what the discourse of and policies about the global city or its derivatives will bring to Istanbul (see 6.3.3. below).

Different dimensions of the rationality, or mutual obligations between different tiers of governments will be discussed below, but before that, it should be answered whether, or not, there is a consensus on the goals and interests of Istanbul. Despite the rising discourse that cities, especially those who are global, have different interests than that of their national states (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Barber, 2013), the Istanbul case offers a different example. Though defined with different terms such as global city, financial centre, attraction centre, odak şehir (attractive city) 23, many people interviewed, either national or local, seemed to agree that it was necessary to reach these targets and that this would be beneficial to Istanbul and Turkey. To demonstrate this harmony between central and local administrations, it is worth quoting from three different interviews:

“We are planning Istanbul to serve as a service city or congress and tourism city. So, in that sense, there is a consensus between central government and the local authority”

(IMM#3).

23 The Mayor, Kadir Topbaş, describes ‘odak şehir’ as a city in which all companies desire to be located (Topbaş, 2016).
“So, I think there is a consensus between central government and the municipal government and the development agency on making of Istanbul as a global centre, an attraction centre, or a transport hub” (IDA#1).

“Both central and local administrations share the same vision, they are working to make Istanbul into a global brand. Metropolitan Municipality, district municipalities, and the central administrations, including us, aim to make Istanbul as a global city” (MHA#3).

As pointed out earlier, one of the dimensions of globalisation that must be associated with the emergence of global cities is that cities become a tool for capital accumulation not only for local governments but also national governments (Brenner, 1998). In this sense, global cities are viewed as the engines of national – or regional – economic development, and national governments from all corners of the world are more involved in the emergence of global cities (Hill and Kim, 2000; Zhang, 2013; Herrschel, 2014). The interviews demonstrate that the case of Istanbul is consistent with this assumption. The central government believes that to increase the global position of Istanbul, which produces half of the national economic production, will be beneficial to the country’s economic development. In other words, as an interviewee explained: “The development of Turkey is going parallel with the development of Istanbul, [and the government] encourages this development in some ways” (CCP#1). It is observed by some central government officials during interviews that the central government was approaching these local issues in terms of national achievements (MOD#1, MOD#2, ISPAT#1). Perhaps because of this, as quoted when the 2023 goals were discussed above, the IFC Project is seen as a national rather than local project.

A similar national approach in relation to projects was also observed with some local officials, which was useful to think once again about the local-central relationship. A new airport, for example, was argued over its contribution to the country’s economy (IMM#4), or the finance centre project was mentioned how tax incomes of the central government will increase (IMM#3). In brief, as an IDA official said:

“No, I think it is so harmonic. We can already see when we look at the central investments: There are many investments in Istanbul. I think, this already shows that Ankara (the central government) is conscious of the importance of Istanbul and of that
we can achieve our goals only if Istanbul’s economy develops. That is why they mainly invest in Istanbul” (IDA#1).

Even though it is often mentioned that Turkey is a highly centralised state, it should not be forgotten that owing to its economic and political importance, Istanbul’s metropolitan government is not an ordinary local administration that the central government could easily neglect or discard (MOD#1). Therefore, to work in harmony with the local government and to thoroughly share the tasks is crucial for the central government. This is because, the underground investments, for example, and some other infrastructure investments are undertaken by the local authority in coordination with the central government considering macro projects (IMM#3). Otherwise, as some interviewees pointed out, the local government may endeavour to prevent a project (MHA#1), go to court to cancel a project (BSR#4), create a strong opposition through involving NGOs and the public (NGOR#3), not logistically support the projects which affects investors’ decisions (UCLG#1), that is somehow prevent (MHA#1), or at least delay (IMM#2), the projects. From a different aspect, on an occasion of disagreement:

“When we consider the local government’s budget, unless they use the budget in line with the central government’s goals, the central government stands by with folded arms. I mean, the central government can’t set a separate budget to invest in Istanbul itself” (MOD#2).

Likewise,

“Now, of course, being a national financial centre is not something that only a mayor can do by himself. I mean, it is a very big project indeed. I think, it necessitates an adoption in central [government] as well, so being in different views or different parties are a valid reason not to make it real. But after being the same party on both sides, and agreements, it is easier to achieve” (IDA#1).

Therefore, even though it is often assumed in the literature that “the economic fortunes of these (global) cities become increasingly disconnected from their broader hinterlands or even their national economies” (Sassen, 2005: 30), what is clear is that the cities, at least some of them, still need the support of their national governments to gain these fortunes (Wang and Huang, 2009; Clark and Moonen, 2017). It might even be said that, in more centralised states, global cities fall behind in the global competition when they lose the support of their national
governments (Wang and Huang, 2009). In such cases in which Istanbul too could be included, working in harmony with the central governments becomes more crucial for local governments. Hence, rather than assuming that “the interests of cities and of the nations which they belong [...] are often necessarily in tension” (Barber, 2013: 9), it seems to be quite rational, at least in the case of Istanbul, to give ear to what a former local bureaucrat said:

“If the metropolitan municipalities, so called local governments or local parliaments, and central governments are governed with harmony, and stability, those cities, countries easily develop, achieve the goals” (UCLG#1).

This study demonstrates that it is crucial to receive the central government’s financial and political support if Istanbul wants to raise its ranking in the global order. In that sense, it is quite rational for the local government too to work in harmony with the central government. As many interviewees agreed, it is almost impossible to make global aspirations come true, if those aspirations are different from those of the central government (BSR#2, IMM#3, IMM#6, MOD#1). One of those interviewees, a local government executive, for example, confessed: “We cannot achieve the goal we aspire. We can achieve them in 3-4 years by support of central government, otherwise it takes 50-100 years” (IMM#3). This harmony is crucial not only for the city’s global targets but also for other infrastructure investments and day-to-day municipal services. An example given by a local official on this topic was quite interesting: “Some parts of underground constructions are undertaken by the state, so we are able to focus on different fields in local” (IMM#6). It must be said here that, as the quotation at the beginning of the paragraph emphasises, even though this harmony is seen as an obligation, political identities of these governments have an important role in this harmony too.

6.3.2. Political Harmony – Values

In a country such as Turkey where political polarisation is remarkably high, for local and central governments being controlled by the same political party could be a key for working in harmony. The answers given to the questions which are seeking to explore local-central relations already demonstrated that being the same ruling party in both tiers of governments is seen by most interviewees as an important factor for them to work in harmony. In addition to this, the answers also provide a better understanding of the levels of polarisation. Three of the main interview groups - local and central officials and private sector representatives - were
very pleased that both the city and the state are being ruled by the same party. The interviewees working for the Metropolitan Municipality said that they are unwilling to work with a different party in central government. On the other hand, another group of interviewees complained that this close relationship, together with many other reasons, decreases their involvement in decision-making processes.

Political polarisation is both a reason and a consequence of why political belongings or identities are felt in more depth. The words that local and central authorities used when they mentioned each other could be thought of as a reflection of this feeling: “there is a harmony; think of them like sons of a family” (IMM#6). This quote from a local metropolitan government executive is not a singular statement. Similar views from other officials were observed during the interviews. These mutual feelings are at the same time one of the most important barriers which stand in front of potential conflicts between different authorities, as a metropolitan executive highlighted: “Because both the central and the local government are in the same hand, there is no disagreement” (IMM#5). Another important factor that the interviewee highlighted was that if the local and central authorities are in the same party, they can easily stay focused on the same targets (IMM#5). It could be given as example that local interviewees adopted the 2023 targets as local targets. Central officials’ approaches at this point were not so different, six of them speaking of central local relations explicitly expressed that they see working with the same party in local governments as a key factor for working in harmony and achieving targets faster. As an example:

“What I see after I started to work here is that working with the same party in local government is an advantage for me. I have witnessed because they share a common vision they can work in harmony and give decisions faster” (MHA#3).

It is worth quoting from two different interviewees, one from the metropolitan government and one from a ministry, to demonstrate how this political harmony eases the process towards achieving targets:

“There is no conflict now. For example, the municipality might approve and conduct a project that our prime minister, our president wants to do in Istanbul, it might not have done if there was a different party in the metropolitan municipality” (IMM#5).
“It is parallel with central government. I mean, government supports the metropolitan municipality’s projects, but the municipality too share their projects and consulted with the central authorities” (MOEU#1).

It is possible to understand from the interviews with the authorities how being from the same party eases the policy-making processes. There are various formal and informal ways in which local authorities can meet with central officials and negotiate about solutions of their problems, and of course, being from the same party significantly increases these ways (IDA#1, IMM#4, MOEU#1, MHA#2). Istanbul is much more advantageous in this regard compared to other cities, because: “In Ankara [the central government], there are many top-level bureaucrats and politicians, who had previously worked in the Metropolitan Municipality”²⁴ (MOEU#1). Probably also thanks to this, many local government officials were thinking that they have various opportunities to meet with the central government institutions and that they could easily express their opinions and objections to the projects that interest them (IMM#1, IMM#2, IMM#3, IMM#5). By emphasising on being from the same party, some of the respondents also stated that they can directly contact the relevant ministries and receive their support for their municipal debts and other financial problems (IMM#3, IMM#4). One of them even pointed out that another AKP metropolitan government requested from the relevant minister that the ministry undertake an underground investment which the local government started but could not complete because of the financial problems (UCLG#1). In brief:

“[In Turkey] All local governments would want to receive the central government’s support. I mean, all of them want to walk [with the central government] in the same direction, in both the material and nonmaterial sense” (IMM#1).

One of the issues that this study explores is whether being local and central governments in different parties might create a tension. As discussed in the Chapter 2, one criticism of the global cities concept is that the economic significance of global cities is often exaggerated. Given this significance as a fact, a clear assumption would be that the central governments necessarily support their cities who want to be global. However, in Istanbul, as one private sector representor remembered:

²⁴ As an anecdote supporting the quote, two interviewees from central government have transferred from the local bodies to central institutions.
“In the past, we had seen different examples such as cutting local governments budgets, disapprove the projects. I mean, it is a fact in Turkish political tradition, state administrative tradition” (BSR#1).

Although there is not much emphasis on this in the literature, there are many examples how political differences between city governments and state governments cause tensions, such as the conflicts between a Labour governed Greater London Authority and the Conservative UK Central Government (Brenner, 2004b; Hijino, 2017) or between the Socialist Paris Regional Government and the French Central Government (Fouchier, 2013; Kipfer et al, 2017). Since city-state relations are embedded in wider historical, cultural and political contexts, extents and contents of the tensions differ from country to country. Nevertheless, as the state becomes more centralised, so this conflict seems to become more destructive for local governments than for central governments. For example, in one of the few studies in the literature, Wang and Huang (2009) demonstrate that the disagreements between central government and local government, which are different parties, negatively affected Taipei’s world city position.

In Turkey, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, it is not difficult to guess that such a conflict is more dangerous for Istanbul than for Turkey. That view was clearly articulated in the responses given by the local officials, based on their own experiences in the 1990s or what they heard from their colleagues. For example, some local officials who used to work with a different central government mentioned that the central government had broken out of the routine inspection regime and had sent many inspectors (IMM#5), that their master plans prepared under Erdoğan’s period were not approved by the central government (IMM#1), or that some projects were stopped by the central government (IMM#6; UCLG#1). A central government official who used to work for the Metropolitan Municipality in the past stated that while he was in the local government he heard from his colleagues that some of Erdoğan’s projects were stymied by the central government when he was the mayor (MHA#3). Another said:

“In our youth, that is the 1990s, these conflicts had cost cities, or society a lot, but I think we are heading towards a different Turkey with the harmony achieved for last 10-15 years, since 2002” (MHA#2).

Almost all officials interviewed underlined the point that the above quotation also highlights: the harmony achieved since 2002. Therefore, neither local nor central officials wanted to
experience a different political process that might end this harmony. Local officials for example thought that they might have difficulty in working, if a different political party rules the country, because, as one of them explained: “a different party in local, I mean differences between governments, gets something slower willy-nilly” (IMM#6). A metropolitan executive too explicitly stated that possibility of a coalition government, after the general election on 7 June 2015, worried them because of the risk of losing a thirteen-year stability (IMM#4). A central official defined this possibility as a ‘problem’ and stated that this affects Istanbul in a negative way (MHA#2). He also added that “there is a harmony now under the leadership of our president”.

Some groups, NGOs and critical individuals, approach this harmony from a different perspective. They too agreed there is a harmony between the municipal authority and the central government, but they also claim that this harmony just reduces time on decision-making. According to this group of interviewees, the neoliberal mind-set is a dominant ideology which is shared by all major parties to different degrees, so all these parties implement more or less similar policies in different cities that they govern. Hence, from this perspective, there is no significant difference between opposition parties and the ruling party, as an executive planner from the Chambers of City Planners noted:

“In Izmir, for example, CHP municipality implements similar policies. The metropolitan municipalities governed by MHP such as Manisa, Mersin implement similar policies. There is no difference in local politics indeed, so I don’t think there might be a problem or a conflict between local authorities and central government” (CCP#1).

Nevertheless, what all critical interviewees agreed on was that this harmony affects the policy-making processes. They told that they cannot participate in bidding processes. An academic complained that “they are working in an excellent harmony. There might be some disagreements, but nobody could hear that” (AA#2). Some NGO representatives noted that they could not hear anything about the plans until they came to the local council because they generally carry this process with central government behind closed doors, but they can relatively easily find a possibility to participate in the projects carried out by the local government ruled by opposition parties (NGOR#3; NGOR#4).
6.3.3. Conflicts and Areas of Contestation

Although local government authorities interviewed enjoyed central government’s support and their relationship with the central government, and so there was no complaint on that issue, a limited number of local officials raised some minor objections to the way in which central government approaches urban issues. For example, an interviewee complained that “the Metropolitan Municipality is bypassed” (IMM#6) by the central government when he was talking about the urban transformation. Another one highlighted that “local governments might have different priorities from the central government but the multiplicity of institutions that have planning power might cause some disagreements” (IMM#3).

It is possible to find similar objections in between the lines of the interviews done with the central officials and private sector representatives. For example, a TOKI official had a similar thought from a different perspective: “central government’s priorities might be different to that of the local, and in such a case local’s decisions might be pushed aside” (MHA#3). Another bureaucrat, who used to work for various central institutions and the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, pointed out that “central government should only focus on the national plans and leave local planning to local authorities” (UCLG#1). Furthermore, a central government bureaucrat confessed: “It is not easy to govern Istanbul from Ankara. Now, you cannot see the needs of Istanbul from Ankara” (MOD#1). For that reason, about half of the central government officials believed that central government should be more involved in decision-making processes and their role be strengthened.

However, there are some different arguments too in central government’s side that legitimize their interventions. To some central officials, local administrations are such election-oriented institutions that if the central government do not intervene in urban policies, they prefer short-term and populist investments rather than long-term, risky, and expensive investments (MEU#1, MOD#1). Likewise, there was a further opinion on the central government side which is that local administrations lack a sufficient number of qualified technical or executive personnel (MHA#1, MOEU#1, MOD#1). This view was also shared by some interviewees from different groups (NGOR#4, BSR#2, BSR#5, IMM#5). Those who share these views, therefore, thought that central intervention is one of the crucial factors to ensure the continuity of local politics.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that because of the political and rational harmony between local and central governments, none of these objections created a conflict between them. Hence, the main objections come from non-official actors, that is private sector representatives and opposition groups. Private sector objections are more about planning and governing processes, such as the existence of many authorities which have planning power (BSR#1), uncertainty in legislation or bureaucratic processes (BSR#4), or coordination problems between different authorities (BSR#2). Private sector representatives thought that to overcome these problems the municipal government should be more autonomous (BSR#1), or the city should be governed with a different administrative structure than other metropolitan cities (BSR#2). It should be noted here that since they have no difficulty in participation and communication about their problems and expectations, as was exemplified above, they voiced their critiques quite slightly.

Unsurprisingly, opposition groups’ outlooks on the issues argued are much more radical than those of the private sector. Specifically, civil society representatives interviewed were highly critical of their involvement in the policy-making processes. All interviewees in this group claimed that they are not included in decision-making mechanisms. A well-placed critique on participation, for example, came from an urban activist (ACT#1). She stated that there are many projects which seek to transform Istanbul into a global city, but they do not hear anything until they are brought to local parliament, because these policies are decided behind closed doors with the private sector, both national and global (ACT#1). Another interviewee, who is the leader of a solidarity group in one of the city’s districts where the Third Bridge is located, pointed out local government’s populism:

“We cannot involve in the local decisions. They [local politicians] come before the elections and mention their projects to influence our preferences, but [after the elections] they govern as they wish” (NGOR#3).

Moreover, an interviewee from a national environmental organisation made an interesting comparison, which is also important to see the city’s position in the national urban order. He stated that in Anatolian cities they can participate in policy-making processes, but in Istanbul, the private sector, together with the central government, is more dominant in these processes (NGOR#4).
Now their comments on policy-making processes are very critical because many officials thought that the government are so far as possible open to other stakeholders’ involvement in policy-making (IMM#1, IMM#6, MHA#2, MOD#2, ISPAT#1, MOEU#1). According to an interviewee, the central government organises many workshops and meetings to increase participation (MOEU#1). Likewise, a Head of a Department in the Metropolitan Government stated that when they work on a project, they invite various occupational groups to get their comments on the project (IMM#1). Here is a point that none of the officials who mentioned civil stakeholders’ integration could give a specific example of how these stakeholders participate, at which stage they are able to get involved and who these stakeholders are, they rather made implicit or superficial statements. As an exception, an official at the IFC Project stated that various national professional associations related to the finance sector were included in the project (MOD#2).

When the above views of the authorities were asked to NGO representatives, another interesting aspect of the issue also appeared. Namely, some activists expressed that the local and the central governments encourage the people who share similar views with them to establish associations and then include this groups in policy-making processes to prevent a potential opposition (NGOR#2, NGOR#3, ACT#1). It was even stated that local governments start such kind of NGOs [or GONGOs, government-oriented NGOs] (ACT#1). Moreover, some interviewees from these groups accused the local government of pretending. According to them, local administrators sometimes arrange meetings with the NGOs and various local solidarity groups in order to share their projects, most notably urban transformation projects. However, these meetings are often set after decisions are made, that is, they do not go beyond the information stage. Yet, nevertheless, the authorities sell these meetings as if they are practices of participative local governance (ACT#1, PAD#2, NGOR#2, NGOR#3, NGOR#4).

Another and particularly important contestation point is the negative impact of current policies and projects, in particular mega-projects, on the social fabric and the urban environment. The NGOs representatives interviewed claimed that urban policies are not shaped considering the needs of the city and its people but with the profit and rent motivations fuelled by global aspirations (NGOR#2, NGOR#3, NGOR#4, LUR#1, ACT#1). According to one of the urban activists from Istanbul Urban Defence:
“Istanbul is the place that this economic-oriented mentality at most shows itself. This mentality transforms any and every part of the city, green zones such as the Northern Forests, parks, public spaces, and neighbourhoods, into investment areas” (NGOR#2).

Another frequently expressed concern was that with mega projects expansion of the city will move from the existing east-west axis towards the northern side, including the Northern Forests of Istanbul. The most important reason for this concern was that, as touched upon in the previous chapter, after the construction of the Second Bosporus Bridge, the city quickly expanded towards rural areas and forestlands on the line of the Bridge (PA#1, AA#2). Moreover, the developments justify these concerns. As Image 6.3 reveals, the primary mega-projects of Istanbul –The Third Bosporus Bridge (1), The Third Airport Project (2), Canal Istanbul (3), and The New City Project (4) – are in the periphery of Istanbul, in particular in the villages and the forests on the northern side of the city.

Image 6.3 Mega-Projects of Istanbul

(Source: IstanbulSMD, 2018)
When officials are asked what they think about this matter, it was observed that their answers reflected their economic-entrepreneurial mentality which is highly criticised by opponents. Many interviewees working for government agencies spoke out time and again that they are conscious of adverse changes on society and environment brought by globalisation and sensitive to that issue (MHA#1, MHA#2, MOD#1, IMM#4, IMM#5). However, their general opinion was that those damages could not be avoided but must be minimised. One of them for example said that both local authorities and relevant ministries make most of technological opportunities on mega-projects to minimise environmental damages (IMM#3). Yet another one remembered that they consider environmental impact assessment reports of mega-projects (IMM#1). On the other hand, although they thought they are sensitive to the environment, nevertheless a considerable number of officials expressed that they often prioritise economic growth and development and sometimes tolerate negative side-effects of projects. For example, an interviewee from the central government exemplified this as follows:

“One would wish that they protect cultural fabric, historical items, but a developing country could be forced to push something into the background. Of course, we should protect our forests, but I have never heard any country that succeeded in both economic development and environmental protection.” (MOD#1)

6.4. Discussion and Conclusion

As discussed in Chapter 2, the current phase of globalisation can be seen to bring new territorialities or boundaries, new networks of cities, new functions and opportunities for cities (Derudder and Taylor, 2016; Sassen, 2018). Along with this, what globalisation also generates is a new distribution of power between cities and their host states in favour of the former, and therefore, new forms of relations which are negotiated. More globalist accounts claim that nation states are day by day losing their administrative power against the cities within their own territorial boundaries, and that cities, at least some of them, gradually gain more power to determine their own destinies (e.g. Ohmae, 2005; Khanna, 2016; Sassen, 2018). Such assumptions also consciously or unconsciously imply a tension between these two governing bodies, both seeking their own interests (Barber, 2013). To contribute to these discussions, the chapter has touched upon three important issues; central government’s role in determining Istanbul’s policies, power and responsibilities of the local bodies, and the nature of the relationship between the city and the state. In order to understand how and why the central government has a role in local issues and what the motivations are that determine
relations between the local and the central state, it aims to bring opinions of many different stakeholders together and to identify the reasons shaped by distinctive, if not unique, dynamics of the country.

The first contribution of this chapter is pertaining to duties, functions, powers and responsibilities of central and local institutions in the city and distribution of their roles. The results show that the central government has been playing a crucial role in the city’s current development: from setting local goals and political priorities in line with the national plans to undertaking almost all mega-projects in the city. In addition to these Istanbul-specific interventions, the central government has further made various legal amendments that reinforce Turkey’s, and Istanbul’s, global integration. This dominant role of the central government is often considered as a necessity by the many interviewees except the NGO representatives. Also remembering centralisation discussions in Chapter 3, it could be said that lack of financial sources in addition to local government’s limits of power underlie this necessity. In other words, although the municipality has a massive budget, compared with other cities, it has not always enough to do all the investments required to achieve their goals.

The chapter has also drawn attention to the functions of the local administrations, the Metropolitan Municipality and the Development Agency. It was highlighted that the local government has a secondary role in shaping the city’s development vis-à-vis the central government. Their roles are giving local support to projects which are determined by national policies, participating in decision-making mechanisms, and of course other day-to-day municipal services. Nevertheless, the city today can make their own master and strategic plans and set its own priorities even though it must take national plans into account. Furthermore, both urban transformation projects, covering a considerable part of the city, and underground investments, almost impossible for other cities when their budgets are considered, are also carried out by the Metropolitan Municipality. However, this does not mean that the local government is not the only authority which are able to do those. There are many central institutions that have similar powers as, or more powers than, the metropolitan government on either city-planning or specific zone planning. This situation, as in the urban transformation issue, may sometimes lead to messy problems in the planning of the city and thus to complaints of, at least some, local officials.

Another contribution of the research presented in this chapter exists in the form of the development of current knowledge on city-state relationship. It is often argued in the literature
that the global cities are increasingly operating within their own networks by looking out for their own interests and these interests might be different than that of their host states (Langley, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Taylor, 2007, 2013; Pincetl, 2018). This might cause tensions, or conflicts, between those cities and their host states (Barber, 2013). However, what is discussed above proves that considering a city’s economic importance for the country, working in harmony with one another is something that is beneficial to both administrations. This is because, otherwise, neither local government can make their global aspirations come true nor the central government, itself, could reach their national targets of 2023, most of which are directly relevant for Istanbul. Moreover, this harmony is not something that only arises from rational motives. For all officials, being from the same party is another and an especially important reason for working constructively between the central and local governments.

As outlined in Chapter 3, there is an ongoing political polarisation in Turkey between secular and conservative groups, the roots of which can be traced back to the collapse of the Empire. Again, as remembered from the same chapter, Istanbul is one of the cities wherein this polarisation is the most visible. It is therefore that being ruled by different political parties might be an occasion of a conflict between Istanbul’s local government and Turkey’s central government, as the opposite might be an occasion of harmony. In fact, many local authorities interviewed (IMM#2, IMM#3, IMM#4, IMM#5, IMM#6), and central government officials too (MHA#1, MHA#2, ISPAT#1), stated that they are pleased with the current situation and are unwilling to work in a different political party, neither in local nor in central government.

This harmony or conflict mostly based on the political identity is both a result of and an indicator of the political polarisation. In essence, as was stated above, there are also some problems between the city and the central governments, but these problems do not cause any conflict between them. Even when the local authorities complain about something, they drop the subject by telling that this kind of disagreement might happen in the family. However, it was possible to observe serious indications of tension or conflict in interviews with those who have different political roots. The urban opposition and environmental organisations voiced serious criticisms of the government on issues such as lack of political participation, negative social and environmental impacts of urban policies, and so on (ACT#1, AA#1, AA#2, NGO#1, NGO#2, NGO#3, LUR#1, CCP#1).
On the other hand, some of these interviewees, perhaps with an ideological attitude, associated these policies with only the AKP governments by ignoring or only briefly mentioning the neoliberal mindset lying behind these policies (AA#1, NGOR#1, NGOR#3, LPL#1). Unsurprisingly, the sides who were criticised, that is the authorities, generally approached these criticisms with an ideological attitude (ISPAT#1, IMM#2, IMM#4, MHA#1, MHA#2). Such an attitude, so to speak, strengthens ideological belongings and leads to political polarisation. Therefore, the disagreements between the local and the central governments, both of which have the same political views, do not turn into tensions or a conflict since the political identities become more dominant.

To conclude, the issues discussed in this chapter provide a better understanding of central and local governments’ roles in shaping urban policies, and local dynamics that make harmony between the city and the state essential. However, the findings presented in this chapter are most useful because they cause us to consider that the relationship between cities and states do not always have to be in tension but might be in harmony stemming from many different motives. Both this and the earlier chapters moreover form a basis for the discussion in the next chapter. This brings many issues together and seeks to find Istanbul a place in the current body of the global urban literature.
CHAPTER 7

Is There a Place for Istanbul? Positioning Istanbul within Global Urban Studies

7.1 Introduction

The emergence – or making – of global cities is not a singular global process, but rather a pluralistic process that is deeply rooted in local characteristics of cities, regions and nations. At one level, global urban research is dominated by studies researching cities in certain geographical categories, such as the global North, global South, or East Asia. However, as argued in Chapter 3, owing to distinctive dynamics such as imperial heritance, the centralised state tradition and geographical location, Istanbul falls outside (maybe more accurately, falls between the gaps of) the conceptual map of existing approaches. The empirically supported arguments of earlier chapters have concentrated on providing a conceptual understanding of how these dynamics have shaped the emergence of Istanbul as a global city.

With the contention that Istanbul does not fully fit into any of the existing approaches in global urban studies, this chapter seeks to position the characteristics of Istanbul within the existing body of global urban research. By doing this, the chapter also serves a wider academic purpose, which is to stress-test all these approaches in a single case study. By looking at Istanbul through the lenses of four leading approaches to global urban research (global cities research, state rescaling approach, developmental state approach, postcolonial theory), it critically examines the applicability of these approaches to Istanbul. The argument in this chapter demonstrates that although these approaches can provide partial insights into Istanbul, there are strong divergences in Istanbul which these theories fail to explain. Finally, the chapter also provides the final step before the concluding discussion whether the existing approaches can be utilised in a blended form to explain cases like Istanbul.

To these ends, the chapter starts with an examination of Istanbul’s global development through a global city lens. In Section 7.2, the source of global city formation, sectoral turnabouit, command-and-control functions of Istanbul and the city’s national and international connections will be respectively analysed to understand if and how the global city concept is capable of explaining global city formation of Istanbul. Section 7.3 interrogates the applicability of the state rescaling approach to Istanbul by tracing administrative decentralisation practices in Turkey and entrepreneurial governance. The section reveals that while the geopolitical economic approach offers a helpful theoretical
insight for understanding rising entrepreneurialism in urban politics, it is far from adequate for explaining the vertical nature of the central-local relationship in a highly centralised country.

Then, Section 7.4 turns to the developmental state approach and argues that Turkey and Istanbul have some similarities to developmental states in terms of the centralised structure of city-state relations and national urban systems based on the dominance of one particular city. The section also reveals that the developmental approach fails to fully explain the case of Istanbul, as Turkey lacks the key apparatuses of developmental states that are at the core of the developmental state approaches. Section 7.5 examines how postcolonial urban theory provides insight into Istanbul, which has a different historical background from that of most global southern cities, by examining the validity of postcolonial critiques of global cities research (city rankings, exemplars/followers duality, and catch-up) in Istanbul. The last section of the chapter summarises the key argument and, more importantly, poses the question whether the case of Istanbul needs a new explanatory concept or is more usefully explained by bringing together aspects of existing approaches in form of bricolage.

7.2 An Exceptional Global City: Istanbul through the Lens of Global Cities Research

This part assesses the global development of Istanbul by using the assumptions of global cities research. To do that, four of the best-known assumptions of the global city concept on the political, economic, functional and relational aspects will be used as a lens to make sense of the development of Istanbul under globalisation.

7.2.1 Source of Global City Formation: Global Economy or the State?

Within the literature, one of the hotly debated topics is the role of political factors in the emergence of global cities. In very general terms, the foundational argument of global cities research is that changes in the global economic system make global cities. This hypothesis of the research has been extensively criticised for its neglect of the role of the state in global city formation (Ancien, 2011; Therborn, 2011; Derudder and Parnreiter, 2014). Addressing this deficit, numerous studies argue how governments pursue a series of policies to make their cities global (Zhang, 2013). Furthermore, focusing on the political dynamics, some scholars from different approaches have produced alternative hypotheses of global city formation such as state glocalisation (Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner 1998) or nested interaction (Hill and

Table 7.1 Alternative Hypotheses on World Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of World City Formation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The global market system (globalisation) creates world cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political agency (politics) is the primary factor in creation of world cities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Tsukamoto and Vogel, 2007)

However, it is almost impossible to determine whether globalisation or politics is the primary factor in global city formation. Global dynamics, of course, play a vital and undeniable role in global city formation, yet a global city is not only something that emerges spontaneously, but it is also something aimed and made. For example, considering their most basic definitions, global/world cities are thought as the places where the headquarters of multinational corporations and leading global APS firms are agglomerated (Sassen, 2016). This definition obviously puts the economy at the centre of global cities as a constitutive element. There is also an assumption behind this definition that the cities are located in an actually globally integrated economy and companies are more active than cities in the choice of places where they will establish their headquarters. However, as explicitly stated by the representatives of the private sector, “if there is a goal to become a global city some legal arrangements must be made” (BSR#1). For example, “we must ensure a political and economic stability atmosphere in order to create a reliable investment climate for global investors” (BSR#4). Otherwise, “if you do not make these arrangements, no one invests here” (BSR#1), and “you cannot globalise” (BSR#4).

Hence, instead of comparing two approaches and choosing one, to highlight the importance of political factors without ignoring globalisation provides a better insight into the topic. This is because, what is also known that global city-making is a fashionable political strategy throughout the world (Clark and Moonen, 2017). National and local governments are pushing their major cities to attract more investment and global city making is a part - and a tool - of this process. This is also valid for Turkey and Istanbul:
“Istanbul is in a competition with other major cities in the region for grabbing the global capital coming to the region, and we develop various strategies to attract these foreign investments” (ISPAT#1).

It has been mentioned before that the making of Istanbul as a leading global city is an aspirational goal for both Turkish national and Istanbul’s local governments (MHA#3). However, as many of the interviewees have expressed (e.g. MHA#3, BSR#1, BSR2, MHA#1, MOD#1, MOD#2, IMM#4), achieving this goal also depends on various steps that must be taken by national and local governments (see also Chapter 6). For example, as stated by a central government official: “If we want to become a global city, we must create a more qualified environment in Istanbul [in terms of physical infrastructure]. We work for this” (MHA#3). Likewise:

“For a city to be a global city, the transportation infrastructure, the connectivity infrastructure must be well established, and of course, these projects should be supported with different working principles and legislation” (BSR#1).

AKP governments have successfully managed this process from the very beginning. With neoliberal adjustment policies, which are harshly criticised by opposing interviewees (NGOR#1, NGOR#2, NGOR#3, LUR#1, AA#1, AA#2, ACT#1, CCP#1), they have set the legal ground for Turkey’s global economic integration. In this way, they have succeeded in positioning Istanbul as an attractive location for excess liquidity in the global economy (NGOR#4). What is more, through some place-based strategic projects (e.g. IFC, the Third Airport Project), ongoing infrastructure investments or incentives, they have also successfully taken steps to reinforce Istanbul’s global urban identity. All these policies have a key role in the development of Istanbul as a global city following the 2000s (BSR#2, BSR#4, BSR#5, MOD#1, MOD#2, MHA#3).

Of course, this rise can also be explained by changes in the global economic system, however, in the light of the discussions above, it is hard to deny that there is also a political background of this uptrend. Namely, focusing only on the economic dynamics fails to explain why this uptrend is captured by Istanbul, not Athens or Budapest. In 2000, these cities were classified in similar positions to Istanbul\textsuperscript{25}, so they might have been expected to be in similar positions

\textsuperscript{25} While Istanbul and Budapest were Beta+ cities, Athens was a Beta city.
today (GaWC, 2000). However, based on latest research of GaWC\textsuperscript{26}, while Istanbul is classified as an Alpha city, there has been no significant change in these cities’ rankings\textsuperscript{27} (GaWC, 2017). Therefore, to understand this change, it is essential to grasp the political and economic conditions of these countries and the policies that they have pursued in this period, at least as much as the global economic conjuncture.

\subsection*{7.2.2 A Service City, but Still Industrial}

According to Sassen (1991: 3-4), global cities:

“…function in four new ways: first, as highly concentrated command points in the organization of the world economy; second, as key locations for finance and for specialized service firms, which have replaced manufacturing as the leading economic sectors; third, as sites of production, including the production of innovations, in these leading industries; and fourth, as markets for the products and innovations produced.”

The rise of global and world cities is often associated with the sectoral turnabout from manufacturing to a more service intensified economy (Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor, 2000; Sassen, 2000; Parnreiter, 2013). To this assumption, global cities have appeared as the production spaces of certain sectors such as finance, real-estate, insurance and other advanced services (Sassen, 2016). Therefore, cities such as New York, London or Paris are characterised by a sharp decline in manufacturing employment vis-à-vis service sectors (Kantor et al., 2012). However, some scholars are sceptical about the validity – or at least strength – of this sectoral shift assumption in the geographies beyond North America and Western Europe, for example in Seoul and Tokyo (Hill and Kim, 2000; Ma and Timberlake, 2013) or the global cities of China (Savitch et al., 2014). The following discussion proves that Istanbul too is one of the cities where this assumption is questionable:

“What is claimed in the discourse of globalisation is a totally deindustrialised, service and finance intensive city, yet this is not what is happening in Istanbul. Istanbul is not deindustrialising but continues to industrialise. Services are also increasing, so there is

\textsuperscript{26} As an interesting example of how cities are interested to learn what they can do to improve their place in the rankings, it can be given that a few GaWC researchers were invited to deliver a presentation about the works of GaWC by a governmental institution (Marmara, 2018; for presentations of the GaWC's researchers, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K7KneAMTUS&feature=youtu.be)
\textsuperscript{27} Both Athens and Budapest were Beta+ cities.
a total development in Istanbul. GDP is also increasing, both industry, and service sectors are increasing” (CCP#1).

Table 7.2 illustrates a sectoral breakdown of selected cities. According to the table, classical global cities (yellow boxes) share certain attributes. While the share of the manufacturing sector in these cities is about five percent, business and finance sectors produce more than 40% of the total economic output. Likewise, the developmental cities (green boxes) have similar economic characteristics among themselves. Although finance is the leading sector in Seoul and Tokyo, industrial production keeps its importance. Industrial production in these cities is more than twice as large as that in the global cities. Especially Seoul is noteworthy with the highest manufacturing proportion in the table. As for Istanbul, the city’s sectoral composition is more like the developmental cities rather than the classical global cities. Istanbul, with its 15.60% manufacturing output, ranks second after Seoul. Moreover, as will be seen in the following paragraphs, given the sectoral distribution of Istanbul’s economy by years, the industry keeps its position in Istanbul (see Figure 7.1 and 7.2). For example, about one-third of the city’s active labour force is still employed in the manufacturing sector (TURKSTAT, 2014).

On the other hand, even though developmental cities and in-between cities seem to be close to each other in terms of sectoral distribution of the economy, it is possible to say that there are considerable differences when looked at numbers of the industrial production of these cities and the structure of the industry. Hence, it is worth briefly mentioning the sectoral economic outputs of the cities in order not to be misleading (see Parilla et al., 2015). For example, the annual industrial output of Tokyo, the world's wealthiest city with more than $1.5 billion of annual GDP, is four times bigger than that of Istanbul, which has the highest industrial output among in-between cities with 226 million dollars. Similarly, Seoul produces much more industrial output than Istanbul, Vienna, and Moscow. In terms of numbers, the industrial production of in-between cities is closer to the top global cities such as New York and London, rather than Seoul and Tokyo. From a different aspect, while Tokyo and Seoul host to the leading national industrial conglomerations activating on the global scale (Hill and Kim, 2000), Istanbul's industrial production is mainly provided by SMEs (see below). This can be seen as another difference between developmental cities and in-between cities.

What is more interesting, this is also the case for Moscow and Vienna, which have similar geographical and historical characteristics to Istanbul. These two cities share a similar
composition as Istanbul. Vienna has almost the same percentages as Istanbul, excluding local/non-market and transportation sectors. Yet, these cities do not have sectoral characteristic as rigid as global or developmental cities. For example, Vienna is more like global cities in transportation and local/non-market sectors (yellow coloured numbers) but, in other sectors, is similar to developmental cities. Furthermore, these cities present some divergent local features that make them difficult to be categorised (blue boxes). For example, Moscow has a tourism rate which is much higher than any other city in the table. The same can be said for the transportation sector in Istanbul. Probably because of the huge investments of the central government in the transportation sector (see Chapter 6), Istanbul is the city with the highest rate of transportation among the cities in the table.

Table 7.2 Sectoral Composition in Selected Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>Classic Global Cities</th>
<th>In-Between Cities</th>
<th>Developmental Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Finance</td>
<td>51.70%</td>
<td>46.90%</td>
<td>43.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/Non-Market</td>
<td>24.10%</td>
<td>24.50%</td>
<td>25.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Tourism</td>
<td>12.90%</td>
<td>12.30%</td>
<td>13.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>4.60%</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: Parilla et al., 2015)

To state again by narrowing down the scope, contrary to globalisation discourse, a sharp industrial decline vis-a-vis service sectors does not appear in Istanbul. Some scholars writing about Istanbul claim a decline in industrial jobs in accordance with the global city rhetoric and that the industrial labour force has gradually moved to the city’s peripheral areas or other cities (Keyder, 2005; Karaman, 2013b; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015). However, the figures below and the information obtained from the interviews contradict this view. According to Figure 7.1, which demonstrates the economic growth in two sectors, both industrial and service
sectors have constantly been growing since 2004. In the period analysed, both sectors grew more than three times. Consequently, as shown in Figure 7.2, shares of industry and service sectors in Istanbul’s economy have remained almost unchanged in this period.

**Figure 7.1 The GDP Growth of Istanbul by Sectors (2004-2014, Million TL)**

(Source: TURKSTAT, 2015b)

**Figure 7.2 The Share of Industrial and Service Sectors to the GDP of Istanbul (2004-2014)**

(Source: TURKSAT, 2015b)

Some local (IDA#1, IMM#1, IMM#6) and central (ISPAT#1, MHA#3) officials have explicitly voiced that they aim to shift industrial production out of the city, but they have also
admitted not to have achieved this goal yet. The most important reason for this is the industrial pattern of Istanbul. Industrial production of the city is mostly provided by Small and Medium Size Enterprises, agglomerating in organised industrial zones (Kaygalak and Reid, 2016) many of which were opened in the 1990s and the early 2000s (OSBBS, 2016). More than a million people in Istanbul still work in the manufacturing sector (Sabah, 2016) and these organised industrial zones absorb a considerable amount of this workforce (LUR#1). Further, some of these zones are located in the central areas of the city, not in the periphery (LUR#1). For example, one of the eight OIZs in the city, which is the largest of Turkey, has about 155,000 workers and this OIZ is only fifteen kilometres from the Historical Peninsula. Hence, moving these industrial zones out of the city is a huge social and economic transformation, which requires serious planning and organisational activity (BSR#2). Further, Istanbul still receives foreign direct investments in some industrial sectors such as pharma, mechanics, and electronics (ISPAT#1). Looking at all of these, one might say that this table, contradicted by the discourse of globalisation, is likely to remain stable for a while.

7.2.3 Not Global, but Regional and National Command and Control Point

Another key and widely debated matter in the global cities literature concerns the functions of global cities in the global economic system (Parnreiter, 2014; Hoyler and Taylor, 2013; Kleibert, 2017). Basically, the global city concept posits that global cities are the command and control centres of the global economy (Sassen, 1991). The argument behind this hypothesis is that with the concentration of headquarters of global companies in some advanced cities these cities emerge as the central points from which the global economy is commanded and controlled. Further, depending on the numbers and/or qualification of headquarters and other offices, in particular those of advanced producer service firms, these functions also determine global control capabilities of cities and their ranking in the global/world cities system (Taylor et al., 2014). The cities ranking at the top of the global cities hierarchy are host to more global headquarters of major multinational companies, notably global advanced service firms (Taylor and Csomós, 2012; Csomos and Derudder, 2014). Going from top down global headquarters leave their places to the regional headquarters and major and minor offices (Liu et al., 2014; Lüthi et al., 2018).

In such studies measuring city connectivity within global urban networks, Istanbul is generally ranked among the global cities of secondary importance (Liu et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2017). Accordingly, even though there has been a significant rise in Istanbul’s position in
global city rankings (see Chapter 5) it is still not the case that the city has a control and command function in the global sense. Based on its ranking, Istanbul is characterised as a regional and national command and control centre. The interview findings too by and large confirm these assumptions. As partly discussed in Chapter 5, the general view was that Istanbul has not had such a high level of global control capacity and service network that it could compete with leading global cities yet (e.g. CCP#1, AA#1). Even those thinking that Istanbul should have competed with top global cities have not had a contrary statement.

However, it was a widely shared view among the interviewees that Istanbul is a national and regional command and control point. Since there is already an extensive discussion highlighting the national control capacity of Istanbul as the economic capital of Turkey, the emphasis here is on the regional function of the city. Yet, to give some numbers would be useful to better understand the national headquarter function of Istanbul. According to the most recent data, more than half of the national headquarters of Turkey’s top 100 holding companies are located in Istanbul (Fortune Turkey, 2016). Furthermore, as mentioned above, economic functions of Istanbul are not limited to the service sector, the city also functions as Turkey’s major centre for industrial activities. This is the case also for management functions. Today, 42 of the top 100 industrial corporate headquarters are in Istanbul (ISO, 2016).

In the regional sense, as highlighted by some interviewees, Istanbul is “very strong in terms of control capacity in the region” (AA#1) and is a “regional focus/centre” (NGOR#4) for global corporations. This means that “a company investing in the Middle East, Eastern Europe or Caucasus opens a head-quarter in Istanbul to manage its operations” (AA#1). A current example in this regard came from an ISPAT official: “Coca-Cola, Microsoft, Intel [...] command their operations in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia from Turkey” (ISPAT#1). Further, some MNCs have moved their regional headquarters from other cities in the region (for example Athens) to Istanbul (ISPAT, 2011). As it is understood from the interviews with local and central bureaucrats, the general strategy of the state in this issue is to strengthen Istanbul’s position to host more MNC regional headquarters, most notably of those operating in service and finance sectors (e.g. IDA#1, ISPAT#1).

These views are also supported by some researchers (Jimenez et al., 2002; Baycan-levent, 2003; Sassen, 2009; Alvarez and Yarcan, 2010; Yıldırım and Mullineux, 2015). In an early study, for example, Jimenez et al. (2001: 39) identify Istanbul as a regional command and control point based on GaWC research and claim that:
“Istanbul is seen by international capital as likely to be the command and control centre for the Balkans, Middle East, Black Sea Region.”

Sassen (2009) too highlights the regional control capabilities of Istanbul. According to her, more than half of the foreign companies coming to Turkey, many of whom come from the EU, established headquarters in Istanbul. Identifying Istanbul as a regional hub, more recent research (Bhandari and Verma, 2013) provides similar data to what the official said above. The authors further underline a different aspect that makes Istanbul more advantageous compared to other cities in the region:

“Culture, of the country, provides locational advantages. Turkey provides locational advantages to MNCs to serve Central Asian and Caucasus republics of former USSR. Siemens, Chase Manhattan and Good Year established their regional offices in Istanbul to export to the entire Eurasian region. Shared religious, cultural and linguistic ties have made Turkey a gateway to the Muslim and Turkic-speaking populations of the Caucasus and Central Asian Republic. Hundreds of MNCs have established regional headquarters in Istanbul-Turkey’s economic capital.” (ibid.: 582)

7.2.4 Both Globally and Nationally Connected City

The fourth thesis is about the global relations and connections of global cities. To recap this argument, it is worth quoting from Sassen (2000: 54-55):

“It seems likely that the strengthening of transnational ties between the leading financial and business centres is accompanied by a weakening of the linkages between each of these cities and its hinterland and national urban system.”

To this hypothesis, whereas globalisation increases the cross-border relations of global cities, but at the same time, it has a negative impact on the national linkages of these cities. That is, there are various international city networks in which global cities are active and link to each other rather than the cities within their own national networks. As discussed in Chapter 2, these networks are empirically demonstrated through various indicators such as advanced producer service firms (Taylor et al., 2014) or some other industries (Krätke, 2014; Sigler and Martinus, 2017), telecommunication infrastructures (Rutherford et al, 2004), or, mainly air transport data. Along with the connectivity and relationality, these theses also assume that so long as cities become more global and their international connections increase, a new
hierarchical order is born between cities. In other words, the most globalised cities, that is, the top global cities, are the ones that have the most external connections (Derudder et al., 2010).

There is no doubt that there is a positive relationship between globalisation and the global connectivity of Istanbul. Almost all interviewees confirmed this in various ways with their own experiences. For example, business people addressed the increasing business opportunities with global business circles (BSR#2, BSR#5). In the same way, many interviewees stated that air or maritime transport connectivities of Istanbul have increased significantly thanks to globalisation (MHA#2, MHA#3, IMM#4, IDA#1). Furthermore, in a different perspective, some interviewees from the environmental and urban solidarity groups expressed that globalisation increases their linkages and cooperation with international NGOs (NGOR#1, NGOR#2, NGOR#3, ACT#1). Officials also gave interesting examples in this regard. One of them touched upon the diplomatic connectivity and stated that there is an ongoing increase in the number of diplomatic mission representatives in Istanbul (UCLG#1). Some others too mentioned that they find more opportunity to communicate and to work in cooperation with the officials of other global cities (MHA#3, MOD#1, MOD#2).

These experiences of the interviewees might also be empirically supported with the air transport statistics. According to Figure 7.3, illustrating the top 20 airports by global passenger traffic, Istanbul-Atatürk Airport, one of the two international airports in the city, is the 11th busiest airport in the world and the 3rd in Europe. Moreover, according to the global hub airport list on which cities are ranked by the number of transit passengers, Istanbul-Ataturk airport is ranked 7th in the world and 2nd in Europe after Frankfurt (European Commission, 2017). The report also highlights that Istanbul was one of the most rapidly growing airports during the period 2006-2015. Therefore, given the data, one might say that there has been a remarkable increase in Istanbul’s connections with the globe. Likewise, based on the data, a further interpretation might be that Istanbul is not only the city with the most global connections on the national scale but also one of the cities with the most global connections in its own hinterland.

**Figure 7.3 Top 20 Airports in 2015 by Passenger Traffic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>City (Airport)</th>
<th>Passengers Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ATLANTA GA, US (ATL)</td>
<td>101,491,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Passenger Flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>BEIJING, CN (PEK)</td>
<td>89,938,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>DUBAI, AE (DXB)</td>
<td>78,014,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CHICAGO IL, US (ORD)</td>
<td>76,949,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>TOKYO, JP (HND)</td>
<td>75,573,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>LONDON, GB (LHR)</td>
<td>74,989,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>LOS ANGELES CA, US (LAX)</td>
<td>74,937,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>HONG KONG, HK (HKG)</td>
<td>68,283,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>PARIS, FR (CDG)</td>
<td>65,766,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>DALLAS/FORT WORTH TX, US (DFW)</td>
<td>65,512,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>ISTANBUL, TR (IST)</td>
<td>61,346,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>FRANKFURT, DE (FRA)</td>
<td>61,032,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>SHANGHAI, CN (PVG)</td>
<td>60,098,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>AMSTERDAM, NL (AMS)</td>
<td>58,284,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>NEW YORK NY, US (JFK)</td>
<td>56,827,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>SINGAPORE, SG (SIN)</td>
<td>55,449,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>GUANGZHOU, CN (CAN)</td>
<td>55,201,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>JAKARTA, ID (CGK)</td>
<td>54,089,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>DENVER CO, US (DEN)</td>
<td>54,014,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>BANGKOK, TH (BKK)</td>
<td>52,902,110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: ACI World Traffic Reports, 2015 in European Commission, 2017)

In consideration of the above paragraph and data, there is no reason for not approving the validity of the argument that globalisation strengthens the global linkages of global cities for Istanbul. However, the second part of the argument, that is weakening national connections, fails to explain Istanbul. On the contrary, bearing in mind the discussions on globalisation and domestic migration in Chapter 5, one might claim that globalisation makes a positive influence on this connectivity. To support this argument, as it is done in many studies, we might simply refer to air transport data. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 give comparative air transportation statistics for Istanbul and London, as a leading global city, and allow three different interpretations on this issue. Firstly, Istanbul is not as globally integrated as London in terms of either international flights or passenger flows. Despite the fact that there has been
a rapid growth in both indicators, the numbers of international passengers and flights in Istanbul is still less than half of London’s.

Figure 7.4 London Air Transport Data by Flights and Passenger Numbers

(Source: CAA, 2017)

Figure 7.5 Istanbul Air Transport Data by Flights and Passenger Numbers

(Source: DHMİ, 2017)

Secondly, London’s data show that numbers of international flights and passengers are much higher than domestic ones and that there is a slight decrease in domestic flights, as expected from a global city. However, the difference between domestic and international flights in Istanbul is not as high as in London, despite the city’s high-ranking position within international transit hubs. This demonstrates that Istanbul’s connection with cities within its own national system is far greater than that of London, at least in the sense of air transport. Finally, unlike London and contrary to what the global city concept asserts, there is a
remarkable growth in both domestic and international flights in Istanbul. Hence, this data can be interpreted that globalisation strengthens the connections of Istanbul with the cities within both national and international networks.

7.3 Entrepreneurialism Without Decentralisation: The Political Economy of the Making of Istanbul as a Global City

This section intends to understand the ongoing development of Istanbul and Turkey within the concept of state rescaling, and to stress-test the hypotheses of this approach in an atypical geopolitical context. In essence, the state rescaling concept refers to the spatial and structural reconfiguration of the advanced capitalist states of western Europe and North America that have undergone a series of economic and political crises in the 1970s to new subnational and supranational scales (Keating, 2013, 2014; Harrison, 2015). In general terms, this shift is reflected in urban politics as entrepreneurial, competitiveness-led and growth-oriented approaches, privatisation, and more importantly rising administrative and fiscal autonomy (Harvey, 1989; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brenner, 2004a; Theodore et al., 2011; Cochrane, 2016). Moreover, this shift has not remained limited to the advanced capitalist geography but migrated to other parts of the world as a new economy-political paradigm titled neoliberalism, through mostly the impositions of institutions like IMF or World Bank (Jessop, 2002a, Theodore and Peck, 2012).

However, since import levels and shapes of these policies vary depending on demands, goals and administrative traditions of the states, neoliberalism, as a political project, has a plural characteristic gaining different meanings in different geopolitical contexts (Le Galès, 2016). More specifically, despite the overall tendencies, state rescaling practices in non-western contexts differ from western examples (Park, 2013); especially in historically centralised states such as China (Wu, 2016; Lim, 2017), Japan (Tsukamoto, 2012), Russia (Müller, 2011), and Turkey (Kuyucu, 2018). What is noteworthy in such states is that there is a kind of selectivity between economic and political variants of neoliberalism in favour of the first one, and a tendency to approach decentralisation reforms with a general hesitation. For example, Kuyucu (2018) reveals in a recent article that while the neoliberal experience of Turkey promotes entrepreneurial policies, it does not lead to a political decentralisation.

With a similar standpoint to Kuyucu (2018), this study argues that neoliberalism appears in Turkey with a rising entrepreneurial mentality in urban politics rather than a political
decentralisation. In other words, despite the irresistible attraction of explaining with neoliberalism, and its popularity in the relevant academic circles (e.g. Can, 2013; Karaman, 2013a; Elicin, 2014; Lelandais, 2014; Eder and Öz, 2015; Özbay et al., 2016; Kizildere and Chiodelli, 2018), this study advocates that neoliberal discourse (and the concept of state rescaling) provides only a partial understanding for Turkey. In the words of Le Galès (2016: 13):

“Let us take the case of Istanbul for instance. A series of papers have now argued that the transformation of Istanbul is all about neoliberalism. Neoliberalism explains Istanbul’s development (Karaman, 2013[a]; Eder and Özlem, 2015). Is that really so, however? One part of the story is about Istanbul’s status in the competition between large globalising metropolises – not really a new issue that is grounded in neoliberalism. By contrast, the general explanation in terms of neoliberalism is both empirically very weak and reveals a naive analysis of the role of ideas on policy changes or about the state.”

This study, instead, offers to discuss this process as entrepreneurialism without decentralisation.

7.3.1 Is There Anything Getting Decentralised? The Turkish Pathway to Neoliberalism

The primary issue to strengthen the debate is the characteristic of the central-local relationship in Turkey, that is, how centralised the administrative structure in Turkey is. This is also important for shedding a light upon the debates in the following sections. The first thing that can be said about this issue: Depending on their positions and backgrounds, most of the participants remarked on the highly centralised administrative characteristic of Turkey in different aspects. A group of participants directly – and often carpingly – said that the Turkish central government is very strong vis-a-vis the local governments. Needless to say, this group of interviewees consisted mostly of critical non-official participants. The general view of these interviewees can be summarised with the quote below said by an academic advisor:

“They are not asking local government while they are building the bridge (the 3rd Bridge). They are not asking local government while they are building the tunnel (the Eurasia Tunnel Project). Whatever is being done in Istanbul, the local government just serves for the projects whose decisions are made by Ankara. So, we are not talking about a relationship like the relationship between Westminster and London Greater, London Council” (AA#2).
Another group of participants most of which were local officials gave some examples that could be interpreted in such a way, even though they did not term it directly as centralisation. Some of them stated that “the central government has a planning power in some specific areas” (IMM#1), and that in such areas “central government’s decisions have more priority than those of the local governments” (IMM#2). Others touched upon financial issues. This was especially noteworthy because, in terms of financing of local governments, Turkey is regarded as one of the most centralised OECD countries (OECD, 2008). Relevant statements of the participants confirmed this assertion in a sense. According to these interviewees, huge debt stocks (MOD#2, IMM#4), their dependencies on centrally distributed funds (IMM#4, IMM#6), limited obligation authority (IMM#1, MOD#2, IMM#6) are among the major problems of local governments in Turkey. For the metropolitan officials, all these are also valid for Istanbul, even though it holds a massive budget in comparison to the other cities in Turkey.

Under such conditions, local governments have to receive financial support from the central government for mega-projects, infrastructure investments (e.g. underground systems) and urban transformation projects that exceed their financial capabilities. As remembered from the previous chapter, the local officials stated that the local government is not able to bear the costs of the mega-projects by their own budget unless the central government undertakes the projects. Needless to say, the need for financial support of the central government also means in practice that the local governments must seek to receive the approval of the central government for such investments. In other words, unlike the advanced capitalist states where local governments have relatively more fiscal autonomy, this fiscal centrality gives the central government a superiority over the local governments.

Yet, this is only a part of the issue. We need more for answering the question of why the central government does not weaken in a country which has been following neoliberal policies for more than three decades with a growing momentum following the 2000s. Once again this can be explained by the centralised tradition of Turkey and the pragmatism which is another imperial legacy (see also Section 7.4). As voiced by many interviewees, Turkey is not a country willing to develop policies that might diminish its centralised administrative characteristic (AA#2, CCP#1, MOD#2, MHA#2, IMM#4, IMM#6, IMM#3, NGOR#2, BSR#1, MHA#3, UCLG#1). More precisely, the central governments have a selective attitude while adopting the foreign originated policies (for a wider discussion see Le Galès, 2016). For example, as reminded by an urban planner, Turkey has not relinquished from this attitude
even for being a member of the EU, which is one of the country’s major strategic goals (CCP#1). Turkey has signed the European Charter of Local Self-Government by making reservations to many clauses most of which were about the financial and administrative autonomy of local governments (CCP#1).28

Secondly, in the advanced capitalist states, through the rescaling policies, “many traditional functions of national states are now displaced into lower or superordinate state institutions that are wholly new or else have been fundamentally altered thereby” (Keil, 2003: 278). However, in Turkey, the reforms that strengthen the power of the local governments and gain them relative autonomy, either politically or financially, are often followed by new legislative regulations enabling the central government to regain its power in a different way (Kayasu and Yetişkul, 2014). To put it in another way, rescaling in Turkey can be described as a process in which decentralisation has gone together with re-centralisation:

“With the establishment of the Ministry of Urbanization and Environment, the ministry can cancel a project which the local government wants to do or can do any project which the local government does not want to do. TOKI can change or modify the plans of urban transformation projects those are conducted by TOKI. You can by-pass the municipalities. There is an institution like TOKI, and a ministry like the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and a law like the Disaster Law. These three tie the hands of local governments and can by-pass municipalities” (AA#1).

Following the reminders of the above quotation, right after coming to power, the AKP implemented serious rescaling reforms that have increased the autonomy of the metropolitan municipalities (Akilli and Akilli, 2014; Alkan, 2015; Kuyucu, 2018). Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, for example, expanded its administrative boundary to the entire metropolitan region (from 1864km² to 5343 km²), gained planning power for the entire metropolitan area, and gained power to get into partnership with private companies. However, with the establishment of MoEU, the obligation that these plans have to be approved by the ministry was imposed. Even further, a ministry official stated that “the ministry had a power of preparing and conduction its own master plans if it deems necessary” (MOEU#1). There are about thirty institutions having a planning power for specific places and/or for the entire city, and most of those are central government agencies (MHA#3). This further strengthens the

28 As an anecdote, Turkey is the country that has made reservation to the largest number of clauses.
central government’s hand in local planning. The result is explicit in the words of a local government official:

“There had been less plan-making power, we couldn’t make some decisions but now the metropolitan municipality can make or approve its own plan [in the city council]. Of course, this does not mean that the ministry approves, and we can implement, but at least, we can still make the plan” (IMM#3).

Or, in other words, after approximately forty years of neoliberal restructuring processes:

“What we call the real authority, or actor in Istanbul is not the Metropolitan Municipality as it is on paper. It is not just the Metropolitan Municipality. Although it seems that the authority of planning the metropolitan cities in Turkey is largely passed to the municipalities, the ports, for example, are administrated by the port authority; train lines, transportation system are controlled by the Ministry of Transportation. I mean, all decisions relevant to Istanbul such as road decisions, bridge decisions, tunnel decisions, metro decisions, major commercial decisions, even the opening of any meteorological station, are given by Ankara” (AA#2).

There is one more aspect that needs to be mentioned here. Unlike the overall tendency in the relevant literature associating this centralisation with the AKP and its ideology (Karaman, 2013a; Abbas and Yiğit, 2015; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; Öncü and Balkan, 2016; Kizildere and Chiodelli, 2018; Yetişkul and Demirel, 2018), Chapter 3 has argued that centralism is Turkey’s state-tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire. A considerable number of participants also confirms this view (e.g. NGOR#2, NGOR#3, BSR#1, CCP#1, LPL#1). For example, a critical urban planner said: “Since Tanzimat Period, in which the local administrations were first established, the centralised structure in Turkey has never been lost” (CCP#1). More interestingly, this was also accepted by the local chairman of an opposition party who was thinking that “Turkey is a country ruled by the central [government], not by the local [government]” (LPL#1). In brief, the centralised administrative system was not created by AKP, but AKP has reproduced this tradition in line with the rules of the neoliberal game:

“As you too ask, it is an important problematic how much power local government has. So, I agree with you, the thing here which must be examined is the embedded top-down entrepreneurial mentality. It could be said this top-down structure has always
been a fact in Turkey’s history from the Ottoman [period], but now entrepreneurialism too is also added to this. Possibly this [entrepreneurialism] is the fact which makes the most significant difference from previous periods” (NGOR#2).

7.3.2 City Making as an Entrepreneurial Strategy

While rescaling and entrepreneurial policies in urban governance are often associated with each other, at least in advanced capitalist states, in Turkey policy-makers have generally adopted an economic reading of neoliberalism rather than a political one. The entrepreneurial approaches to urban governance have, therefore, diffused more into the local and central policy-making processes in comparison to decentralisation policies. What was observed by the official participants was that although they were approaching the decentralisation issue with caution, they somehow idealised the entrepreneurial methods in shaping local policies (IMM#4, IMM#6, MHA#2, ISPAT#1). The following quotation from a local government official responsible for developing urban governance systems exemplifies this entrepreneurial shift in urban policy-making:

“Local authorities should act like successful businessmen. They should govern the cities as they would run a private company. We can increase our tourism revenues in the Historical Peninsula. We should provide that visitors spend more money in the city” (IMM#4).

The examples showing this entrepreneurial view of policy-makers can be increased, but the more important question is how these views are reflected in the urban field. This entrepreneurialism can be read through examinations of public-private investments, state response to political movements, or directly legal amendments, however, to stay in the frame of the study, here will be discussed how these views have been shaping local strategies, policies, and issues. At the macro level, as in Europe or in other non-western geographical contexts (see Section 7.5), these views come into existence in Istanbul as the strategies that enhance the global competitiveness of the city. To ensure economic development, increasing the city’s competitiveness has been one of the priorities of the two layers of government. The officials said that they considered the competitive advantages of Istanbul in policy-making processes and that they draw up different strategies, financial and policy frameworks to strengthen these advantages.
The macro strategies of Istanbul such as its global city, regional hub or financial centre visions, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 6, are also a reflection of this entrepreneurial mentality, fuelled by this competition notion. For example, despite often being stated as a necessity, the Third Airport Project is also supported by the officials with the expectation that it will strengthen the city’s position among the international air transport hubs and so will contribute to national and local economic growth (IMM#4). A clearer example in this issue is the relocation of the Central Bank from Ankara to Istanbul. This example is also noteworthy as it reveals how owing to its financial and administrative power the central government can play a role in increasing the city’s competitiveness. As said by a local policy-maker:

“Within the framework that Istanbul is to be one of the leading financial centres of the world, all the central financial agencies, especially the Central Bank, are moving to Istanbul. Istanbul therefore makes a certain progress on the way to becoming the financial centre of the world.” (UCLG#1)

However, more interestingly, more micro and local problems like urban safety, the underground network, infrastructural deficiencies or urban transformation are often mentioned in discussions about Istanbul’s global competitiveness. This means that many participants are looking at local problems from the global competition perspective at the same time. The officials, on the one hand, expressed that these are the local problems of the city to be solved, while on the other hand, they stated, between the lines, overcoming these deficiencies is a necessity for being a global city or a financial centre. In the words of a central government official:

“The Third Bridge may be a new one, Marmaray, an international airport, these are *sine qua non* for becoming a global city. With these steps, Istanbul will gain an utterly different acceleration of growth.” (MHA#2)

At the micro level, the rising entrepreneurial mentality can also be discussed in terms of looking to the city itself as a means of economic development (Cochrane, 2016, Le Galès, 2016). In this perspective, the historical and cultural values of the cities and even further the urban land itself are seen as tools of capital accumulation by the administrations (Harvey, 1989). For the first one, Istanbul undoubtedly offers a unique richness to the policy-makers and it was possible to understand during the interviews what this richness means to the official participants. As different from the other participants, officials saw this historical
richness at the same time as a marketing strategy that would increase the number of international tourism facilities and the tourists and increase the tourism revenues. Being referred to as “Disneyfication of the Ottoman” by an urban activist (ACT#1), this strategy is also explicit in the following quote:

“The fact that the city has a rich historical and cultural heritage also attracts people from the outside. The number of domestic and foreign tourists; this is not on the desired level, but there are quite nice projects. When they are completed, Istanbul will both better live its own culture and reinvigorate the tourism.” (IMM#4)

The second, commodification of urban land, brings more dramatic results for the social and land fabric of Istanbul. Chapter 5 has discussed this in detail through the developments of the housing market, and environmental impacts of this development. Here, the focus is on the urban transformation projects so as to better reveal the entrepreneurial approaches of the governmental authorities. In principle, there was no participant who thinks that urban transformation is not a necessity for Istanbul. On the contrary, everyone thought that this was a problem that had to be resolved urgently because of unplanned urbanisation and earthquake risk. However, no matter how urban transformation is justified, it is certainly clear that there is also an entrepreneurial mentality behind the urban transformation projects. In other words, apart from being a necessity, the urban transformation is also seen as an “important tool to attract foreign direct investments” (ISPAT#1) and reinvigorate the economy (PA#1, PA#2, BSR#2, BSR#3).

This view, therefore, changes decision-making and participation processes on the projects. Although the authorities claim to the contrary, other respondents complained that the needs and demands of contractors, not their own, are considered and that they often only hear about projects after they have been decided (AA#2, NGOR#2, NGOR#3). This was confirmed in a different way by an official who was saying that “we are negotiating with an international investor on a large-scale project but cannot share the details as it has not been shared with the public yet” (ISPAT#1). The central government also makes these projects more profitable for the investors by increasing floor area ratio and offering tax exemption (PA#2). Further, through the institutions with the authority to enact urban transformation such as TOKI or MoEU (see Chapter 3), the central government acts like a market actor and gets into partnerships with private investors in return for profit sharing (ACT#1) or, in their own words, “they are paving the way for the private sector” (MHA#2). The result, therefore, is:
“The main areas that need urgently being transformed in Istanbul are the city’s peripheries. However, while there is a full mobilisation in the valuable areas of the city, for example in Kadıköy district, there is no scheduled project for the city’s periphery” (CCP#1).

This is because:

“The urban transformation has not made any progress for four, five years. Urban transformation is only in Bağdat Caddesi, Kadıköy in Istanbul. In there, contractors demolish an eight-storey building and build a ten-storey building instead and make the profit, because the rates are very high. However, in Bağcılar, in Küçükçekmece or Gaziosmanpaşa [peripheral districts], if you do the same in such places you go bankrupt” (BSR#2).

To conclude, contrary to the urban political economy literature, the neoliberal restructuring in Turkey has emerged in a way that the central government has not been rescaled but has changed their approach to urban governance and the ways in which they intervene in local politics. These have been reflected in local policies as an entrepreneurial mentality in which the central government has been more actively involved in local politics. This entrepreneurial mentality has diffused from the macro strategies such as the global city or financial centre visions to micro policies like protecting historical values, strengthening physical infrastructure or urban transformation. However, although these can also be observed in non-western states, having undergone a similar neoliberal transformation, as will be discussed in the following sections, Turkey has significant differences from those states too.

7.4 Centralisation without Effective Planning: Istanbul through Developmental Lenses

This section discusses how the emergence of Istanbul as a global city can be explained from a developmental state perspective. Considering the national urban system of Turkey – and Istanbul’s position in this system – and the centralised nature of city-state relations, global city characteristics of Istanbul are more like those of state-centred cities (in East Asian developmental states) than global cities in the western context (Ma and Timberlake, 2013). Therefore, even though the developmental approach is generally thought to provide an explanation for a narrow geographical context (Fine, 2013; Yeung, 2017a), it can provide a satisfactory explanation for Istanbul around the above two similarities. However, it will be seen in the following parts of the discussion that the plan-rational and bureaucratic
characteristics of the developmental cities and city-states approach are not easily transferable to either Turkey or Istanbul.

Probably due to geographical and cultural distances, cities and city-states in East Asia were among the least mentioned cities in the interviews conducted for this study – albeit the politics of state-local relations bears the closest relevance for Turkey and Istanbul out of the four dominant approaches in global urban studies. For example, even though the fact that Tokyo is often rated among the top global cities, it was mentioned much less than New York and London – suggesting that actors only look West and do not look both ways as might be expected of a city which is a gateway between East and West. Likewise, Taipei and Seoul, other well-known developmental cities, were almost never mentioned. Interestingly, Singapore, as a city-state, was mentioned 15 times. But this was usually done either to emphasise the importance of Istanbul for Turkey or to explain the differences between Istanbul and Singapore. For example, “Singapore is a city-state, Istanbul is not a city state, of course, there are 80 more provinces, but it has so much importance for Turkey in terms of the economy, in every respect” (MOD#1). Likewise, by a local government official: “Istanbul is not like Singapore, a city-state” (IMM#4).

However, there are more similarities between Istanbul and these cities than it is thought. For example, in light of the discussion so far, possibly no one would find it strange if Istanbul were written in the following sentences instead of Tokyo and Seoul (and Turkey instead of Korea):

“if Tokyo is defeated in the global competition between cities, the entire country will decline” (Masuzoe, 2015, np).

“Korea has a long history of centralised rule and until recently the central government was the decisive actor in Seoul’s development” (Clark and Moonen, 2017: 69).

Here is not the place to discuss all similarities, instead, the discussion is limited to the two most important factors that the above quotes imply: the national-city system and the position of central government. Firstly, in terms of the domestic urban systems, both in Turkey and in developmental states, there is a major city, dominating other cities and hosting most of the national economic activities. As shown in the following table, in terms of population, GDP, and employment, Istanbul has a similar weight in Turkey to that of Tokyo and Seoul in their own countries (Owing to its city-state characteristic, Singapore has a special position among
the cities in the table. Just like Tokyo and Seoul, Istanbul is also a major demographic and economic centre in its national city-system and, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, globalisation has no significant effect on this position.

Table 7.3 Istanbul and the Developmental Global Cities/City-States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators – City</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Seoul</th>
<th>Tokyo</th>
<th>Istanbul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of National Population</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of national GDP</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of national employment</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: Clark and Moonen, 2017; TURKSTAT, 2014; 2015b; 2016)

In the case of the existence of such a major city, to support its global competitiveness seems to be a reasonable strategy, especially for a country that prioritises rapid economic development like Turkey. This is firstly because, to improve an existing major city and to guide investments, both national and foreign, to this city is easier and less costly than to create new ones (NGOR#1). Further, Istanbul produces much more added-value than other cities in the country, so targeting investments to Istanbul is quite reasonable for a rapid return (IDA#1). Therefore, as in developmental states (see Clark and Moonen, 2017), in Turkey too, the central government supports the development of Istanbul as a global city to lend impetus to the national economic development (MOD#1, MHA#1, MHA#2, MHA#3, BSR#1, BSR#2, IMM#4, IMM#6, IDA#1). The main point here is, in the words of a central government official:

“There is no contradiction. It is clear that the central government necessarily focuses on Istanbul first. If it triggers the potential in Istanbul, it can easily trigger the other cities’ potentials” (MOD#1).

Further, the argument that city-state relations in developmental states are based on integration rather than separation (Hill and Kim, 2000; Ma and Timberlake, 2013) can also be thought to be valid for Turkey. As discussed earlier (Chapter 5 and Section 7.2), Istanbul has strong economic and social relations with the other cities in the country. Probably because of this, many interviewees thought that the rise of Istanbul as a global city will not create a tension between Istanbul and the rest of the country, on the contrary, it will be for the benefit of other cities (BSR#2, MHA#2, MoD#1, IMM#2, MHA#3, IDA#1). Many participants defining
Istanbul as a role model have claimed that Istanbul’s development positively influences the other cities (IMM#1, IMM#4, IMM#6, BSR#2, MHA#2). For example, as a central government official said: “In fact, this must be seen as a growing cake. The more the cake grows, the greater the share that other cities will have from this cake” (MOD#2). However, it should also be added that many of the participants were business groups and NGOs which operate on the national scale, as well as central government actors, but on the local scale, all participants were from Istanbul’s local government. Therefore, it is hard to guess whether the views would be similar if the interviews were done with the local governments of the other major cities.

The third and most important similarity between developmental cases and Istanbul is the existence of a strong central government. The debate in the developmental approach is that owing to the strong capacity of the central government on governing the market, developmental states can relatively easily change their economic policies from creating national champion industries to national champion cities. Further, due to their pragmatic characteristics, they selectively adopt these policies and so the decentralisation discourse of neoliberalism has difficulty to explain the changes in the regulatory capacities of these countries (Park et al., 2012). As Chapter 3 discussed, in addition to a centralised state structure, such a pragmatism is also a key (and historical) characteristic that defines the approach of Turkish ruling elites regarding foreign policies. Thus, Turkey’s neoliberal transformation experience is similar to that of the developmental states. In both cases, neoliberal policies have been adopted and implemented, but, as discussed above, this has not caused a decentralisation in administrative structures.

This flexibility does not only enable central government to adopt and/or change policies but also provides convenience in terms of implementing these policies. Therefore, support of such a central government is at the same time improving the global competitiveness of Istanbul (BSR#1, BSR#2, IMM#3, IMM#4, IMM#5, IMM#6). As in developmental states, in Turkey too, cities are dependent on centrally distributed funds (BSR#2, AA#1, MOD#2, PA#2, NGOR#3, NGOR#4) and the projects associated with global city making often exceed the financial capacity of the local government (MoD#1, IMM#4, IMM#6, IMM#3, MHA#3, IMM#1, BSR#4). However, the central government distributes the central funds and can carry out these projects more easily than the local government.
Despite all these similarities, there is a significant difference, which makes it almost impossible to explain Istanbul’s trajectory using this approach. Developmental states are often defined with the plan-rationality whose continuity is based on the existence of a bureaucratic elite:

“One key dimension of state capacity is embedded autonomy through which the state bureaucracy is embedded in society and yet insulated from competing social interests and gains substantial autonomy from strong political influence in order to avoid the rent-seeking and predatory behaviour of certain politicians and interest groups” (Yeung, 2017a: 2).

However, in Turkey, it is hard to claim the existence of such a plan-rationality and of the bureaucratic elite and technocrat cadre:

“It is difficult to claim that we have a national development policy. You know, in reality, we have never prepared a national plan. Of course, we make development plans, but we cannot follow them” (CCP#1).

“There is a discourse; there are some incremental, changeable policies. This city, of course, attracts investments, but there is no executive technocratic body to steer these investments. It was IMP (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality), such kind of body, but you possibly know what has happened to IMP. They all resigned, after the 2009 plan was changed [by influence of Central Government]” (AA#1).

These were not just things that opposition participants said to criticise the government. Conversely, many central and local officials have also complained about the lack of a strong, qualified and efficient bureaucratic mechanism and bureaucratic cadre (and accordingly about the lack of efficient working and planning). Even though it was often implicitly stated, the lack of an efficient working mechanism is one of the main reasons for coordination problems between different tiers and agencies of the government and the implementing of the strategies. This can be seen in the following comments of a local government executive and a ministry official at the MOD, the institution which sets and implements the national development strategies:

“Yes, that is, we have a development plan, but is there an agency that can reflect this plan to the local, or to control or to coordinate the plans? This was the State Planning
Institution before, but it was closed. Now we have the Ministry of Development, for example, but I don’t think this is used efficiently” (IMM#3).

“Not only for just Istanbul, this is our main problem. We have strategies, plans, programs in every respect, we prepare a very good action plan, prepare a strategy, set 2023 vision and even 2071 vision, but we have difficulties to implement them. This is maybe because we cannot succeed with coordination in Turkey. Since there is no coordination, we define one coordinator and we define the related organisations under it, but they never take responsibility for their responsibilities. In this case, you can get nowhere. I mean, the city is developing with its own capacity” (MOD#1).

Further, the lack of such a strong bureaucratic elite weakens bureaucracy and bureaucratic planning against the interventions and populist demands of politicians.29 This leads to the problem of continuity in government policies and the problem of planning, which were the most complained about issues in the interviews. For example, in Istanbul – and Turkey –, a project approved by the predecessor can be cancelled by a new mayor (BSR#2) or the central government (as it was in the 2006 master plan) (AA#1), or sometimes it can be a sudden regulation or a zoning change with a decision from the central government (BSR#1). More importantly, according to the priority or purposes of the central government, legislative amendments can be made to facilitate its intervention in urban policy; such as giving zoning (BSR#2, MHA#3), and urban planning power (IMM#3) to different institutions.

Taken all together, even though the central government makes a significant contribution to Istanbul’s global development, the absence of a well-functioning bureaucracy and planning mechanism reduces this contribution and even sometimes makes a negative impact. This is because either plans, goals, and projects are not realistically determined by the experts or there are changes in the way how these are to be achieved and/or to institutions that implement them. For example, the IFC project, one of the most important visionary projects of Istanbul, was first under the responsibility of the Metropolitan Municipality, however it was then given to the MoD (MHA#3). This did not only cause money, labour and time loss but at the same time evidently delayed the goal of Istanbul becoming a global financial centre. In fact, as the following quotation shows, it is also questionable how realistic this goal is:

29 Moreover, ties between bureaucrats (or officials) and politicians are much closer in Turkey than in East Asia. If these interviews would have been conducted in Japan, for example, most of the interviewees could have been bureaucratic elites, however, in Turkey, most of the official participants were the people who were in a direct or indirect relationship with the ruling party.
“Regarding the 2023 goals, we [central government] aim to make Istanbul one of the top ten financial centres. Of course, it does not always mean we achieve these goals. You set a goal then try to achieve these goals, but it is an ambitious goal to make it as one of the top ten” (MOD#2).

The differences that make it difficult to explain Istanbul and other in-between cities through the developmental state perspective are not limited to these. In the conceptual sense, as well as efficient bureaucracy and planning, the developmental state approach is based on a specific historical development process and various cultural-religious elements such as Confucianism, social solidarity, and political unity (Saito, 2003; Hill, 2004; Hill et al., 2012; Watson, 2013). For example, Saito (2003) argues that whereas there has been observed some tones of the intergovernmental competition between Tokyo and Japan, this has not turned into a conflict because of Japan's cultural and religious characteristic. Likewise, as one reason why the national (especially industrial) economic development is so much prioritised in the developmental states is showed by the historical trajectories of these countries, the so-called late-industrialisation (Hill and Kim, 2000). Moreover, unlike cities like Istanbul, many developmental states have followed a historical trajectory which is similar to the global Southern countries, namely that they had once been the colonies of different empires. However, this will be discussed below, as it is more appropriate to the nature of postcolonial critique.

Moreover, as discussed above, the economic productions and the functions of the in-between and the developmental cities are different from each other. Albeit similar in terms of sectoral distribution, the industrial economic output of the cities that have been called the in-between cities are much lower than that of the developmental cities. Further, at least in the case of Istanbul, it is hard to claim the existence of such a globally operated heavy and intensive industrial production, which is the case for the developmental cities. Finally, as again discussed above, the functions of cities also differ. Whereas the developmental cities generally function as the headquarters for their national corporations to manage their global operations (Hill and Kim, 2000), Istanbul is more prominent in the regional-scale command and control and gateway functions.

To conclude, the developmental approach has provided a good understanding of how global cities emerge in non-western contexts, especially in highly-centralised states. Istanbul can, therefore, be seen as closer to these cases than the other three, especially considering the political aspects. Nevertheless, Istanbul and Turkey are differentiated from the developmental
cases in terms of bureaucratic and planning mechanisms, as well as other historical, cultural and economic factors. This is a quite significant difference which means that this theory fails to fully account for the experience of Istanbul. Because, as seen above, if a well-functioning and effective bureaucracy in a strong central state has a positive impact on the global position and development of the city, as in developing states, a centralised state devoid of bureaucratic planning can have a negative impact on the development of the city or can delay the city reaching its targets.

7.5 It’s Regaining, not Catch-up: Looking at Istanbul from the Postcolonial Perspective

The intention of this section is to interrogate the global development of Istanbul through the lens of the general criticisms of the postcolonial urban theory on global cities research. This study finds the postcolonial challenge to global urban theories very valuable and useful because, above all, it provides an understanding of alternative forms of global urbanisation based on historical differences (Chakravorty, 2000; Roy and Ong, 2011; Roy, 2016). However, with reference to the starting point of the theory, this study argues that the postcolonial approach cannot provide an adequate understanding for Istanbul that has never been a colony. To carry out this discussion, some concerns of the postcolonial theory about the global and world cities research will be referenced: hierarchical rankings, exemplar-imitator duality, catch-up notion (for a comprehensive and recent debate between postcolonial and global/world cities theories see also Robinson, 2016a; van Meeteren et al., 2016).

One of the main concerns of postcolonial critiques of the global cities approach refers to the classification and ranking of cities by a few exact economic indicators (Robinson, 2002, 2016a; Roy, 2009). These hierarchical rankings trigger the backwardness feeling for cities which are located at the bottom or are not located in the rankings, and more importantly, consciously or unconsciously, encourage them to follow certain policies if they want to rise in the rankings (Robinson, 2008; Goldman and Longhofer, 2009; Dupont, 2011; Goldman, 2011). A hierarchical approach to cities, in such a way, reproduces the existing categorical divisions between different cities (e.g. East-West or developed-underdeveloped) and positions cities as those that need to be followed (cities at the top) and those that must follow (cities at the bottom) (Robinson, 2006; 2013). In other words:
“Perhaps most worrying for postcolonial urban studies, world-cities approaches have a strong interest in hierarchies, by placing cities in hierarchical relation to one another, implicitly some cities as exemplars and others as imitators” (Robinson, 2006: 94).

Firstly, there is no doubt that the hierarchical ranking of cities is an impressive aspect for city rulers. It was observed during the interviews that the assumption that cities are in competition has been accepted and internalised by officials (UCLG#1, MHA#1, MHA#2, MHA#3, MOD#1, MOD#2, IMM#2, IMM#3, IMM#4, IMM#6). For example, a central government official explicitly said: “Now, we live in a world in which cities compete with each other” (MHA#2). Furthermore, many of them stated that they hear about various global city indexes (e.g. GaWC’s World Cities Index, ZYen’s GFCI, or Megahubs Index). More interestingly, officials often explained Istanbul’s positions, developments and future goals by referencing these indexes (MOD#1, MOD#2, IDA#1, IMM#4). For example, a central official (MOD#2), working on the IFC project, said; “for 2018, our aim is to move Istanbul to the top 25 in the global financial centres indexes”. Another example, from the local government official: “Istanbul ranks 29 in the top 50 World’s Megahubs, and we are working to make that better” (IMM#4).

Moreover, in accordance with the postcolonial critiques, the attempts to make Istanbul into a global city (even if it was sometimes named differently) and/or to raise its position in the rankings (for example as seen in the above quotes) have been highly advocated by the officials. However, there was a significant difference in Istanbul which was contradictory to the postcolonial arguments. Unlike their arguments, the feelings of backwardness, underdevelopment and/or being off the map, have not been observed in any interviewee, even the opponent ones. Conversely, almost all the interviewees, whether supporters or critics of global city making, agreed that Istanbul has a unique history and geography. Many of the officials were thinking that Istanbul has always had a privileged position in the world and cannot be assessed in the same league as ‘underdeveloped’ or emerging cities.

The rational here is, no doubt, the city’s imperial background. As was pointed out in the previous chapters, this background still defines the relations of Istanbul with its hinterland and with the world in the eyes of many participants (for example IMM#4, IMM#2, IMM#6, NGOR#2, NGOR#4, UCLG#1, IMM#5). Further, according to many interviewees, there is a continuity in the relationship between the global city and the imperial capital (BSR#1, BSR#2, MHA#2, MOD#1, IMM#2, IMM#6, IMM#3, MHA#3 MHA#1, PA#1, UCLG#1,
LUR#1). In other words, this imperial history has often been thought to be the main reason why Istanbul is a global city. Therefore, unlike many cities in the global South whose global characteristics and distinctive features (and catch-up motivations, see following paragraphs) are often explained with their colonial backgrounds (Grant and Nijman, 2002, Dupont, 2011, King, 2015), in Istanbul this emphasis is on its imperial history:

“At this point, one of the main factors that have already made Istanbul an attraction centre is that it has hosted many empires; [and therefore] its cultural mosaic and historical accumulation. The city, therefore, embodies many different mosaics in social life, commercial life. I mean, the people are necessarily developing different skills, perspectives, and experiences to the life, because there are so many different factors, aspects here. Hence, that the city was the capital of the empires is an important role in that the city is so attractive today” (IMM#3).

“Is Istanbul a global city? I think it is a global city. Istanbul, in both Ottoman and Byzantine periods as well, was a city in which many different cultures came together, in which many cultural, social and economic interactions took place. It still maintains this characteristic. I mean, Istanbul has always been an important city for the world; now it is; will be in the future too” (MHA#3).

This debate might be deepened with the second criticism of the postcolonial approach; exemplars-followers duality. As introduced above, in the eyes of postcolonial theorists, the rankings and classifications of the global and world cities research encourage cities at the bottom to climb up to upper rankings (Robinson, 2002; Goldman, 2011). In other words, since the global city is presented as “an authorized image of city success … global cities have become the aspiration of many cities around the world” (Robinson, 2002; 546, 548). Moreover, “mega-cities, in particular, are advised and incentivised to become shiny modern global cities, like New York, London, Tokyo” (Sheppard et al., 2013: 894). This concept is bought into by city managers and policy-makers as a “paradigm model to emulate” (Dupont, 2011: 535). In the wider context, this means that many cities around the world imitate the top global cities, and even take them as role models. Especially in the global South, there are many buyers of such rhetoric which are referencing the western global cities; for example, “Silicon Valley of Asia – Bangalore” (Goldman and Longhofer, 2009), “a world class city-region – Nairobi” (Myers, 2015), “Asia’s World City – Hong Kong” (Sigler, 2016), or “the Global City in Asia – Singapore” (ibid).
In relation to these criticisms, some interview questions interrogated whether Istanbul takes a city (or cities) as an example/role model. Interestingly but not surprisingly, there was a consensus in the answers given to these questions. Almost all interviewees answered this question with reference to Istanbul’s historical and geographical position. First, according to governmental actors, there is no city or model that Istanbul follows. An executive interviewee responsible for institutional development and governance in the local government (IMM#4) stated that he reads other cities’ visions such as that of London, but their strategy is to become a focus/centre city\(^{30}\). Likewise, two bureaucrats working in the IFC project (MOD#1, MOD#2) mentioned that they have reviewed other well-known projects (e.g. London, Frankfurt, Shanghai, Dubai), but they are trying to create their own model rather than following a particular model. The general view shared by many of the officials was similar to the one expressed below:

“Istanbul is a city to be an example; not a city that takes an example. You are asking this question, I think Istanbul should not take an example. Of course, there are problems, faults to be criticised, however, owing to power coming from its past, Istanbul is a city the can be an example” (IMM#2).

It was noteworthy to see that the other interviewees had almost similar views to those of the officials. Most of them shared the view that Istanbul should be itself rather than following another city. Even opposition participants were quite critical on that the city’s authenticity, its historical values, were not protected by rulers but destroyed for the sake of economic return (PA1#, NGOR#1, ACT#1, NGOR#3, NGOR#2). On the other hand, while assessing over the projects appearing in urban space, some opposite interviewees stated that the city is beginning to resemble cities like Dubai (NGOR#2, ACT#1, PA#2) Shanghai (AA#1), or Kuala Lumpur (AA#1, NGOR#4, PA#2). Nevertheless, it should be noted that these cities were not given as conscious examples but mentioned randomly to convey criticism and/or jokingly (see also Chapter 5).

Given the above paragraphs, it is obvious that Istanbul is not seen to imitate and follow another city. But what is more interesting is that Istanbul itself is thought of as a role model, especially by the officials. The following words said by two central officials well illustrate this thought:

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\(^{30}\) See the Focus City Vision in Chapter 6.
“Istanbul is not a city that should take others as a role model, but a city that should be taken as a role model. I don’t think there should be a question as which city should be a role model for Istanbul, because Istanbul, itself, is already a model for others” (MHA#2).

For a more explicit historical emphasis:

“Well, now, there are just a few cities like Istanbul which sits at the centre of global air, marine, land transports and which sits at the centre of history. I mean, there are just a few cities like Istanbul having lots of privileges. For me, other cities try to imitate Istanbul. With pros and cons, Istanbul is a role model for others. Historically, it is the city defining the East and the West. I mean, the East is the East of Istanbul, and the West is the West of Istanbul” (MHA#1).

This imperial reference also raises the third question of the debate: How are the global aspirations of Istanbul being rationalised? From the postcolonial perspective, the notion that catch-up to the west (or climb to the top in the global urban hierarchy) is an important source of motivation for non-western cities that shape their global aspirations and global city making policies. That is well summarised by Ong (2011: 18):

“While speculations in capital are obviously not limited to Asian cities, inter-city comparisons reinforce the link between economic speculation and urban aspiration. Speculative discourses draw together the building of impressive urban structures and the imagination of a city’s global future. The constant allusion to other cities energizes efforts to assemble ideas, forms, and alliances in order to ‘catch up’ with pace-setting cities that now exist outside the West.”

However, what is seen in Istanbul is, as a central government official talking about the IFC Project reveals:

“In fact, Istanbul was already a leading centre in the global financial system in the past. Possibly, Istanbul was a centre before other financial centres have emerged in Frankfurt, Europe or elsewhere. Especially, Galata, Galata Bankers was the core of this financial centre. That is why Istanbul had already experienced globalisation but then it lost due to the subsequent economic and political developments. Now, it has been reliving this with new experiences” (MHA#1).
As one may remember, Chapter 3 has raised a different argument about this issue and has argued that the regaining notion might be more explanatory for Istanbul even though it has not been so dwelled on. The central argument of this notion was that the transition from imperial to the national period means a decline in the city’s status, so globalisation offers an opportunity for the city to regain its old importance. Interviews have confirmed these predictions. The discussions and conclusions made so far are already a sign for this; many people are discussing the significance of Istanbul and its position by referencing the imperial period. What is more important and obvious is that the idea that Istanbul is achieving its old status occupies an important place in people’s mind, at least of those who rule the city. As in the above quote, this belief might be seen in the following words from a local government executive:

“Istanbul has a historical mission. For a certain period, especially after the 1900s, after the war, we lived serious things which deeply influenced us, namely that there has never been an opportunity to unlock our potential. But now we are blowing away the cobwebs and unlocking our potential” (IMM#6).

Just as in the above quote, another central government official, thinking that Istanbul has been reclaiming its power in the imperial period, stated that as it was the major financial centre of the region in the nineteenth century becoming a financial centre today is a historical reality for Istanbul (MHA#3). There were also more interesting examples in this issue such as the Milion example given by three local officials (IMM#2, IMM#5, UCLG#1). According to them, Istanbul was the centre of the world (symbolised by the Milion which is the zero-point) until the collapse of the empire and it then lost this status. For them, Istanbul was beginning to regain its importance now. Another interviewee, an executive manager in a leading construction company, stated that one of the first underground railways of the world opened in Istanbul but it was not developed later (until recently) (BSR#4).

In sum, the postcolonial critique offers an analytical method of thinking in the sense of bringing together different historical patterns with the global city formation. However, looking exactly from this perspective, Istanbul has gone through different historical processes,

31 In fact, there were a few participants who directly mentioned this decline, as the overall course of the interviews was about current developments (IDA#1, IMM#5, AA#1, MHA#3, ACT#1, NGOR#2). Yet, as seen in the quotes, it was possible to read this mentality through between the lines.

32 The Milion (also known as the Milion Stone) was a monument erected in the 4th century AD in the Byzantine period. It was a zero-mile marker of the empire, namely that distances for the roads leading to all cities in the empire and other leading cities in the world were measured from that stone.
not only from the global cities in the west but also from today’s postcolonial cities. Given the views of almost all interviewees, whether opponent, pro-government or officials, about the historical and present importance of Istanbul and about its privileged position, one could say that the different historical trajectory of Istanbul has created different perspectives for the city. Since such feelings and perspectives are difficult to see in postcolonial cases, explaining Istanbul through the lenses of postcolonial theory may be useful in terms of the way of thinking, but it is incomplete in terms of final conceptualisation.

7.6 Concluding Comments: Explaining an In-between City

This chapter has examined the global city characteristics of Istanbul through the lenses of four major global urban approaches. Some of the fundamental claims of each approach given in Chapter 2 have been used to do this examination. The chapter has, therefore, functioned as a stress-testing tool for these approaches. It has been discussed thus far that the relationship between urbanisation and globalisation is a fuzzy process having many shapes in local contexts. Similar policies, strategies, and even similar transformations appear in different forms in different geographies, which have led to the emergence of different urban approaches to make sense of these developments. The arguments in this chapter have revealed that these existing global urban approaches have provided a significant but partial understanding of Istanbul’s global development. In other words, the basic hypothesis of this thesis that owing to its geographical and historical features Istanbul does not fully fit into any of these approaches have been confirmed with the research findings.

At first, global city formation of Istanbul has been examined through the four main assumptions of global cities research, each of which referred to a different body of the research; political, economic, functional and relational. In three of the four assumptions, the developments in Istanbul are contradictory to what has been asserted in the global cities theses. Unlike the well-known deindustrialisation hypothesis of the global cities research, apart from being a service city, Istanbul has still an industrial characteristic. Moreover, contrary to London, for example, globalisation has not weakened but strengthened the ties between Istanbul and other cities in the domestic network. However, globalisation has not had as much of an economic or relational impact as often assumed. On the other hand, the functions of Istanbul in the global economic order and the policies framed regarding these functions are not different to the assumptions. While the core global cities function as the global command and control nodes, Istanbul undertakes this role for its own hinterland.
The political deficit within the core of the global cities research has been filled here by the state-scaling approach as expected. The state rescaling approach has adequately explained the changing nature and dynamics of the local politics under contemporary neoliberal globalisation. This is because the entrepreneurial approaches to urban governance and the state rescaling strategies, were born as a response to the crises of the late 1970s in the industrialised economies (Harvey, 1989), have transferred into non-western states wherein governments had been advised by institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank to liberalise their economies, and adopt the mission of becoming the entrepreneurial and mediator states to ensure economic growth (IMF, 2000). What has happened from that time, the policies implemented, the visions, the strategies are more or less similar in many countries, cities, city-states which are under a similar neoliberal restructuring (Old and Yeung, 2004; Dupont, 2011; Zhang, 2013).

In this regard, neoliberalisation is likely to be a comfortable and somewhat easier explanation kit. Not only in Turkey, but elsewhere also, a significant number of studies explain what is happening with a pre-packaged concept called neoliberalism (Le Galès, 2016). However, as revealed above, the political side of this restructuring in Turkey, indeed in many non-western states as well, does not totally fit into the neoliberalisation experiences of western countries. This is because:

“Neoliberalism has rolled out from the West to encounter the structural forces of non-Western communities. Negotiations between non-Western structural forces and the ideas of neoliberalism take place in two ways - first, between political actors who cope with neoliberalism in various manners, ranging from adoption to rejection and, secondly, within each of these actors who interpret and apply neoliberalism according to their own values, interests and purposes derived from their time-space-specific roles and backgrounds” (Tsukamoto, 2012: 872).

Looking from this perspective, what is expected is that as a non-western city the experience of Istanbul should be more like other non-western experiences rather than like the western cases. However, as it is not a western city, it is not a city which can be comfortably identified as an eastern, or southern city either. For example, the approach of the developmental scholars explains well how central governments, especially strong ones like that in Turkey, have a role in making their cities as global cities and how they keep their central characteristics even under the destructive influences of globalisation. However, even though Turkey (or Russia or
Hungary) is doubtlessly more centralised than the USA, or western European states, this centralisation is far from being bureaucratically institutionalised and plan-rational, which are the core features behind the developmental state approach (Park, 2017a). Such differences have demonstrated that the central governments that lack those characteristics might unconsciously harm, or at least contribute less to, the positions of their global cities in the global urban system.

Finally, postcolonial urban theory provides an excellent way of critical thinking for researchers from non-western contexts by revealing that different historical trajectories result in different outcomes (Chakravarty, 2000, Grant and Nijman, 2002). In this sense, it has made an invaluable intellectual contribution to the understanding of Istanbul. Yet, based on this same historical point of view, in empirical basis, it could be said that the long imperial history of Istanbul necessitates to put it in a different place from the postcolonial cases. This is the most explicit in the sources of the global aspirations of the city; whilst colonial background and catch-up still occupy a place in the minds of rulers in the global South cities, interviews demonstrated that the main source of motivations in Istanbul are the imperial past of the city and the aspiration of regaining the power lost after the collapse of the Empire.

To conclude, Istanbul is in many ways contradictory to the narratives of global urban theories. The centralised nature of city-state relations or the political-economic transformation of this relationship, the imperial roots of Istanbul’s and Turkey’s global aspirations, the economic structure of the city and its importance for the country; these are not the issues that the existing theses can sufficiently explain. Yet, this does not mean that Istanbul is totally different from other cities and can never be explained by these theses. In contrast, as seen above, each theory has contributed to the understanding of a different aspect of Istanbul’s global development. Then the question in the title can be asked again: Is there a place for Istanbul? That is, can the existing theories be blended in a way that they explain Istanbul and other similar cities? Or, is it necessary to develop a new theoretical concept to explain these cities? The next chapter will conclude the debate that has been made thus far by giving emphasis to these questions.
8.1 Introduction

The recent phase of globalisation has dramatically changed the political and economic geography of the world from the 1970s onwards. This new wave in which cities and city-regions are at the centre has brought along new economic, institutional, and spatial transformations; has provided new cross-border linkages of cities; has constituted a new global urban order and inter-urban hierarchies; and, in brief, has offered new opportunities and challenges to cities/city-regions and their nation-states. Over the past forty years, numerous geographers, urban scholars, sociologists and economists have shed light on different sides of these developments, and by doing so, have built a critical body of work known as global urban research.

A central component of global urban studies is global and world cities research. This stresses the global economic developments as the constitutive elements of global cities (Sassen, 2016; van Meeteren et al., 2016). It also concerns the impacts of these developments on global/globalising cities (Sassen, 2018) and the relations between – i.e. networks of – cities (Taylor and Derudder, 2018). Partly contrasting with this geo-economic approach to cities in globalization, the state-rescaling approach suggests a geo-political-economic reading which unlocks the dynamics of state-scalar territorial restructuring of nation-states, most notably in the advanced capitalist states of the global North (Brenner, 2004a, 2018b; Keating, 2013; Jonas, 2013; Moisio and Paasi, 2013b; Harrison, 2015; Moisio, 2018a). The other two counter-theories, postcolonial and developmental approaches, are rather built on an epistemological objection questioning the validity of western-produced urban theories for the cities of the Global South (Robinson 2002; Roy, 2009, 2016), East Asia (Fujita, 2011; Tsukamoto, 2012; Heo, 2015) and beyond.

One way or another, each of these four approaches classifies cities by the certain attributes conforming their fundamental assumptions and putting them into categories and groups (global, globalising, postcolonial, developmental etc.) Today, most of the world’s geography and of the cities/city-regions seem to be identified and covered by at least one of these approaches. Yet, this does not imply a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach can explain all the cities
around the world. Just like Istanbul, cities such as Moscow or Vienna, or Australian and Chinese global cities, mean there are still numerous examples having more hybrid and *sui generis* characteristics which are not easily fitting into any of these approaches alone.

Bearing this ‘not-easily-fit’ characteristic of Istanbul in mind, this research had two main aims: to stress-test the fundamentals of four major global urban approaches in a case study which none of them can explain alone, and to extend the conceptual map of the global urban research towards a more hybrid case. In doing this, it has been built on three research objectives:

(i) to provide a critical conceptual analysis of Istanbul under globalisation;
(ii) to argue the role of the global city makers, with particular attention to the political actors, in the emergence of Istanbul as a global city, and to assess the relationship between these actors; and
(iii) to situate the story of Istanbul within the wider context of major global urban theories.

In line with these aims, the thesis has critically examined the four major perspectives in global urban studies and has discussed how the globalisation of Istanbul can be explained within, and outside of, these approaches. Furthermore, it has begun to formulate an alternative conceptualisation of the ‘in-between’ city to account for cities such as Istanbul. Then, the empirical chapters have conducted a comprehensive analysis of Istanbul’s globalisation with a comparative perspective to reveal the dynamics which these major approaches can explain and those which they fail to explain. Now, this final chapter draws together these discussions and critically outlines a research agenda. Before this, Section 8.2 draws together the findings of the empirical chapters to resolve the research questions. Section 8.3 then builds on this and goes further by discussing how Istanbul can act as a lens on to the challenges and opportunities for advancing the scope of global urban research more broadly; (i) Is it by blending and improving the existing four approaches in a way to produce more politically, historically, sensitive global and world cities theory? or (ii) Is it by developing the ‘in-between’ conceptualisation more explicitly to account for globalising cities located between Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which carries the danger of being geographically-narrow and strengthen existing polemics and polarisations in the literature?
8.2 Istanbul: Understanding the Globalisation of an In-Between City

One of the questions this thesis has addressed is how globalisation occurs in Istanbul and how it influences Istanbul’s position within national and international urban systems. With regards to the former, it could be said that Istanbul, with globalisation, experiences a considerable economic growth, and demographic and environmental changes which are closely relevant to this economic growth. Some of these developments like economic growth, the growth of the real-estate sector, internal and external migration and population present similarities with that of other global cities. In other words, these are the experiences that can be forecasted within globalisation process. Yet, a more in-depth analysis has revealed that Istanbul has strong local characteristics, which are unobservable in many global cities, in terms of the sectoral distribution of the economy or the motivations of this migration.

Looking at the national context, another unexpected side of this process has further appeared. As it is known, one of the key arguments in global cities research is that globalisation increases the economic disparities within the national urban systems in favour of the global cities (Sassen, 2008; Crouch and Le Gales, 2012; Cardoso and Meijer, 2016; Iammarino et al., 2018). In this sense, globalisation is often argued as if it is a zero-sum-game of which the winners are the global cities and the losers are the second-tier cities. Looking at the case of Istanbul, one observation was that there is an obvious gap between the total economic value produced by Istanbul and by the other major cities in the country, in favour of the first one. Despite this superiority of Istanbul, another observation was, however, that all the analysed cities have caught a similar trend of economic growth to Istanbul. More interestingly, according to the market reports, three of these cities, along with Istanbul, ranked among the world’s top ten in 2014, in terms of economic growth rate (Parilla et al., 2015). Even though there has been no direct data showing that Istanbul’s global development has positively or negatively influenced these cities, at the minimum, it seems reasonable to claim that all major Turkish cities have benefitted from the economic development that globalisation brings.

The questions exploring Istanbul’s position within international urban systems have revealed an interesting, but not unsurprising, diversity in the views of participants. Whereas a group of participants, most of whom were the officials and business people, have positioned Istanbul within top global cities, others have generally thought that Istanbul can be assessed together with the cities of the global South. In this sense, these views have confirmed this thesis’ premise that Istanbul carries some traces from both East and West, and North and South (for a
similar conceptualisation see Yetişkul and Demirel, 2018). On the other hand, there has also been a consensus about Istanbul’s position among the cities located in Central Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Almost all interviewees claimed that Istanbul is the leading city of the hinterland covering these regions. By the participants, this leadership has often been associated with Istanbul’s former status as an imperial capital. This link references an interesting continuity between the imperial city and the global city, which has not received the attention it deserves in the literature (for three exceptions see King, 2016, for Istanbul see Harris, 2009; Sassen, 2018).

Another important discussion has been about Istanbul’s geographical position in between East and West and about how this position affects the potential functions of Istanbul on the global scale. The views of the participants on this issue have been similar to the general assumptions in the relevant literature. As in previous research (e.g. Walker and Taylor, 2000; Sassen, 2009; Khanna, 2016), the interviewees too have thought that Istanbul, thanks to its privileged location, might undertake a gateway/corridor function between its East and its West for various purposes such as people, information and capital mobility, energy and trade routes or transportation.

As the second objective, the thesis has addressed how actors, especially official authorities, have a role in the emergence of Istanbul as a global city. It has also assessed the relations between the central and the local governments and questioned the dynamics of this relationship. This corresponds to an important debate in the literature. In general terms, the global cities research concentrates on the geoeconomic logic behind global urbanisation, global city formation, and the cross-border linkages between cities (van Meeteren et al., 2016). One of the critiques of this approach is that it overlooks the role of the actors and practices in these processes (Acuto, 2013a/b, Hoyler et al., 2018a). As well-stated by many researchers, global city formation is at the same time a political process in which local, regional and national governments take part (e.g. Olds and Yeung, 2004; Golubchikov, 2010; Jonas, 2013; Moisio and Paasi, 2013a; Zhang, 2013; Harrison, 2015; Clark and Moonen, 2017).

In the beginning, the thesis had simply premised that any research not touching upon the role of central and local governments cannot adequately explain Istanbul’s transformation into a global city. The findings too have confirmed this premise. Both the central and the local governments have been actively involved in the globalisation process of Istanbul, and even
have shaped this process. The global integration policies that were implemented in the 2000s, strategic goals such as becoming a global financial centre and international transportation hub, and the mega-projects and other infrastructure investments which support these goals, have shown that AKP governments, both centrally and locally, have read and managed the globalisation process and the economic opportunities that it offers.

Moreover, looking at the distribution of the roles between central governmental institutions and Istanbul’s local government, the findings indicate an interesting situation: Turkey’s central government has dominated the process in comparison to the local government. This was noteworthy because, if leaving the developmental researchers aside, the general view in the literature is that either as an enforced and inherent result of the developments in the global economic order (Ohmae, 2005; Sassen, 2005, 2007; Taylor, 2013), or as a political-economic strategy developed by the nation-states faced with these developments (Brenner, 2004b; Jonas, 2012a, 2012b; Keating, 2013; Harrison, 2015), central governments have transferred some of their regulatory powers to the local and regional governments. One way or another, this implies that global cities and city-regions have been gradually gaining a more autonomous power in shaping their political and economic relations (Le Galès, 2016).

Yet, what has been observed in the case of Istanbul was that in the institutional base, Turkey’s central government is the main actor of Istanbul’s globalisation. Developing the legal framework for the global integration of Turkey and Istanbul, setting the main strategies of the city, deciding on and conducting mega-projects, are generally shaped by the central government and in line with its priorities. Istanbul’s local government rather plays a secondary role due to various fiscal and administrative deficiencies and a strong centralised governmental tradition of the country. Local government, for example, participates as a local stakeholder in policy-making and decision-making processes related to Istanbul, and is rather responsible for operating day-to-day municipal services and improving infrastructure systems other than mega-projects (e.g. underground investments).

Another controversial topic in global urban research is the relations between cities/city-regions and nation-states, and the determinants of this relationship (Jonas and Wilson, 2018). One view is that relations between local and central governments tend to be in a tension which stems from the changing political and economic interests of cities and their increasing cross-border connections (Taylor, 1995, 2007; Langley, 2002; Sassen, 2006; Barber, 2013; Pincetl, 2018). On the other hand, there are also examples showing that nation-states are not
troubled by these developments and even actively support the global connectivities and competitiveness of their leading cities so as to ensure nation-wide economic growth (Hill and Kim, 2000; Saito, 2003; Crouch and Le Galès, 2012; Moisio, 2018b). From an economic standpoint, Istanbul seems to better fit the second perspective: The central government promotes Istanbul’s global city development to maintain national economic development; and the local government, thus, attracts more global investments (e.g. through integration policies and incentives), increases its global linkages (e.g. through mega-projects), and above else, gains financial flexibility since much of the relevant investments are funded by the central government.

Nonetheless, the economy is just one face of this issue: Ideological differences or similarities between local/regional and central governments are still an important determinant of this relationship. For example, empirical work on London (King, 1989), Paris (Subra and Newman, 2008; Fouchier, 2013) or Taipei (Wang and Huang, 2009) gives an idea of how political differences between city and state governments may cause tensions and conflicts between those. The fact that Istanbul and Turkey are governed by the same political party brings with it that the local government works in tandem with the central government. All officials clearly expressed that they work in coordination, cooperation and harmony with each other since they are from the same party. They also highlighted that they might encounter problems if one of these were to be governed by a different party. Though not including Istanbul, a recent study comparing three metropolitan cities in Turkey (two governed by opposition parties, and one by the ruling party) affirms the views of the officials in a sense (Kuyucu, 2018). It shows that while one of them built a better relationship with the central government to receive support in fiscal and approval processes, the other two faced some problems in the same processes.

As for the third part of this relationship, that is, the representatives of civil society and business sector, although these participants stated that the two governmental bodies work in harmony owing to the above-mentioned factors, their positions within this relationship have varied depending on the group they represent. The private sector actors have been observed to be a part of this harmony. With a more explicit statement, they have been satisfied with not only the relationship between the central and local governments but also, and more importantly, with the relationship that they build with the governmental institutions in terms of their involvement in the policy-making processes. However, as expected, it is hard to say the same for the NGOs, activists and other opposition groups. These expressed their view that
decisions are given behind closed doors and that they are excluded from these processes, even if the projects necessitate their direct involvement.

Finally, the research has evaluated the emergence of Istanbul as a global city from the perspectives of four major approaches in global urban studies; respectively global cities research, state rescaling approach, developmental state approach, and postcolonial urban theory. This can be read as an effort both to situate Istanbul’s own experience within the broader body of global urban studies and at the same time to stress-test some key hypotheses of the mentioned approaches. From the perspective of global cities theory, the foremost discussion has been about the source of the global city formation of Istanbul. In consideration of the empirical findings, one can say that this process cannot be fully understood to follow an either-or logic. That is, neither states, as claimed by the statist researchers, nor the global economy, as widely-accepted in globalist academic circles, is the only driver of global city formation. Instead, the central and the local governments, perceiving the changes in the global economy as an opportunity of economic development, have been actively involved in global city making processes.

The second testing-point concerned the sectoral distribution of Istanbul’s economy. As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the key identifiers of global cities is the sharp decline in the manufacturing industries vis-a-vis FIRE and APS sectors (Beaverstock et al., 2000; Sassen, 2005, 2016; Parnreiter, 2013). However, in Istanbul, there has been no such decline. In this sense, Istanbul stands in a closer position to the developmental cities in comparison to the classical global cities. As the third, the command and control function of Istanbul has been explored. Istanbul functions as a control and command point for many global companies, however, this function is not yet on the global scale, but rather on the regional scale. Finally, the changes in the national and international connections of Istanbul were explored and compared with that of London, as one of the top global cities. As Sassen (2018) puts it, one of the likely outcomes of globalisation is that the cross-border connections of global cities are increased whereas their national linkages weaken. London’s data, based on airline passengers and flights, was compatible with this assumption. However, in Istanbul, the statements of interviewees and airline data indicated that globalisation has made a positive impact on the city’s national and international connections.

In relation to the state-rescaling perspective, the discussion covered two important aspects; decentralisation of the central government and rising entrepreneurial policies. For the first, it
has been revealed that Turkey has not experienced an administrative decentralisation but has even strengthened its centralised tradition with the recent and ongoing interventions of the central government (Le Galès, 2016; Kuyucu, 2018). However, for the point of the entrepreneurial mentality, Turkey and Istanbul are no exception: The rising entrepreneurial trend in urban policies has penetrated deeply into the approaches of local and central officials. In this sense, it is quite possible to read the current urban strategies through the notion of entrepreneurial governance, but on the condition of considering the decentralisation-decentralisation debate.

As for the developmental approach, some strong similarities between Istanbul and the developmental cities have been found. These similarities can be summarised in three points: the strong position of the central government, its role in shaping urban policies and national urban system based on one dominant city, which is necessarily the global city of the country. Yet, for Turkey in general, it is hard to say that there has been an efficiently working planning system and bureaucracy, both of which are among the typical characteristics of state-developmentalism. Interviews have shown that these problems have also been reflected in planning and policy-making processes in Istanbul.

The final approach was postcolonial urban theory. As can be remembered, postcolonial researchers raise serious criticisms of the ranking-based aspects of global cities research, claiming that these provoke cities to compete against each other for positions in these rankings. During the study, it has been possible to see the various signs of this attitude in the interviews made with officials and private sector representatives (see Chapter 7). It has been observed that many interviewees accept the assumption that cities compete against each other in the global order as if it is an inherent reality. Further, the position, development, strength and weakness of Istanbul have often been explained by referencing the well-known city indexes. However, looking with a historical reference which is advocated by the theory itself (Roy and Ong, 2011; Roy, 2016), a remarkable difference, which is probably not seen in any postcolonial city, has appeared in Istanbul. The ambition of Istanbul to be a leading global city has generally been associated with the notion of regaining its former, imperial, status. This issue has perhaps been the most incompatible side of Istanbul’s development with a postcolonial perspective, which will be discussed in more detail in the following section.
8.3 From Istanbul to the Globe

In the light of all discussions made thus far, this section is reserved to the most important discussion of the thesis: How can the global city development and characteristic of Istanbul and of other similar cities be better understood; whether through a bricolage of the existing approaches or by formulating a new in-between concept? This discussion also shows the position of this thesis with regard to the wider body of global urban research; (i) within the academic circles who call for new theories to understand new dynamics of contemporary global urbanism (e.g. Roy, 2009; Brenner and Schmid, 2015); (ii) within those advocating to strengthen the existing approaches through stress-testing, empirical and/or comparative case studies (e.g. Hoyler and Harrison, 2017).

Table 8.1 compares the existing approaches with the in-between concept by their strengths and weaknesses in the case of Istanbul. Whereas the first four columns give a breakdown of the existing approaches, the last column presents the alternative in-between concept. The final row shows how the existing approaches can be blended to understand the cities argued as in-between. The following paragraphs respectively examine these five perspectives and discuss which one can provide a better understanding of Istanbul.

Table 8.1 Existing Global Urban Approaches vs. In-Between City Concept

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONCEPTS</th>
<th>Global/World City Theory</th>
<th>State Rescaling Approach</th>
<th>Developmental State Approach</th>
<th>Postcolonial Urban Theory</th>
<th>In-between City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRENGTHS &amp; WEAKNESS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengths</td>
<td>* Gives a world-wide understanding of the cities’ developments under globalization.</td>
<td>* Well explains the changing attitudes of central and local governments on local policies.</td>
<td>* Highlights the role of the central governments.</td>
<td>* Shows the importance of the individual historical trajectories in global city formation.</td>
<td>* Offers a closer and in-depth analysis of global cities in the regional context (between Eastern Europe and Central Asia), including their positions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Changing positions and functions cities in the global</td>
<td>* Strong on the political conditions which have enabled the globalization</td>
<td>* Shows the possibility of the alternative scenarios for the city-state relationship.</td>
<td>* Strong on understanding the development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Weaknesses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order. <em>Cross-border relations of cities</em></th>
<th>of cities in North America and Western Europe.</th>
<th>local differences create different outcomes in globalisation *Strong on understanding the development of cities in East Asia.</th>
<th>of cities in the Global South.</th>
<th>functions, local and regional characteristics. *Gives a background for the historical analysis of the relationship between imperial cities and global cities. *Strong on understanding the development of cities such as Istanbul, Moscow, St Petersburg, Vienna in globalisation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Too economy-centred, therefore, minimises the role of the other of actors, political, economic etc. *Misses the local determinants of city-state relationship. *Assumes that global city development is harmful to the other cities within the national context and to</td>
<td>*Overgeneralizes the claims of decentralisation. *Heavily Westernised in its original formation, therefore how useful is it for understanding non-Western settings. *Can be seen to overplay the role of the state vis-à-vis other non-state actors. *Critiqued for its original territorial-scalar conceptual framework vis-à-vis more</td>
<td>*Too narrow because it only works in a specific-geo-political context. *Hides the politics of scale in city-state relations.</td>
<td>*Suspicious about non-colonial cases. *Can be seen to critique how global cities research has been captured (i.e. setting up a straw man argument) rather than its original foundations.</td>
<td>*Danger to serve a polemical pluralism and a narrow understanding of global urbanism. *Makes the field of global urban studies more parochial by adding another new approach.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first column engages with the global city concept. There is no doubt that global/world cities research has provided a general and worldwide understanding of changing functions, positions, economic and social dynamics of cities under globalisation, and of how cities connect to each other in supranational networks (Hoyler et al., 2018a). In this sense, by ignoring the theoretical and empirical grounds that the global cities research provides, it is hard to discuss the increasing international connections of Istanbul, its regional superiority as a command and control point, and its position as an international air transport hub, and even its ambitious goal to be a global financial centre. On the other hand, there is much empirical evidence to show that some local dynamics of Turkey, in general, and Istanbul contradict the fundamentals of the global city concept: for example, the undeniable role of the central government, growth in the industrial economic output, increase in the national connections of Istanbul, and there being no considerable negative impact of globalisation on existing economic inequalities between major cities of Turkey.

As for the second approach, the concept of rescaling of the state brings an extensive insight into the political economy of global cities (Swyngedouw, 2004; Brenner, 2009; Jessop, 2013). It provides a strong analytical ground to discuss the entrepreneurial turn in local policies in Turkey, as elsewhere around the world. As discussed earlier, this entrepreneurial mode of governance has been adopted and legitimised by both the central and the local government and at the same time has somewhat legitimised their local policies and strategies thanks to the economic development discourse which the term implies. In this sense, entrepreneurial governance is a key term to understand the current interventions of the governmental actors in the urban space. Yet, it does not seem possible to say the same for the argument that national governments have been decentralised. Discussions in Chapter 3 and the last two empirical chapters have questioned the validity of the decentralisation arguments in the Turkish context. Further, considering the similarities in their administrative structures and central governments’ approaches to local policies, these assumptions can also be claimed to be valid.
for other states such as Hungary and Russia (Golubchikov, 2010; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; Clark and Moonen, 2017).

The developmental state perspective puts emphasis on the role of political factors in global city formation, but within a narrow geopolitical context: East Asia. The arguments of the developmental scholars encourage researchers to think not only about how and why governmental actors are actively involved in global city making processes but also about the possibility of the various kinds of relationship between global cities and their nation-states, and between global cities and cities within their national borders. For all these points, Turkey stands in a closer position to the developmental states than to western contexts. In addition to Turkey, given other examples like Russia or Hungary, the developmental approach can explain the strong influence of the central governments in these countries on local policies. However, looking at the constitutive elements of the developmental state concept, such as an effective bureaucracy and bureaucratic planning, historical trajectories of these countries, even religious and cultural factors, it is quite questionable whether this approach works in the other geographies beyond East Asia. Indeed, as mentioned above, the lack of a politically-independent bureaucracy and an efficient spatial and strategic planning are two of the crucial problems of Turkey and Istanbul. These are substantive points which are hard to be explained by the developmental perspective.

Postcolonial urban theory, before anything else, produces a valuable critique of the global/world cities research by framing historical differences as the key factors (Roy, 2016). Moreover, as mentioned above, their claims on how rankings influence city rulers are also noteworthy. Nevertheless, there is an obvious ontological difference between the postcolonial cities and Istanbul. Along with Vienna, St. Petersburg and Budapest, Istanbul has a strong imperial background and as discussed in Chapter 7, this imperial background still influences the city’s global position, functions and even ambitions (Harris, 2009; Sassen, 2018). Additionally, postcolonial scholars, at least some of them, highlight dualities such as global North/South, colonizers/colonies, but Istanbul presents a more hybrid characteristic including some elements of both global North and global South. Therefore, to understand such a hybrid city and possibly others in the region there is a need to go beyond these dualistic perspectives.

Altogether, there is no doubt that all these four major approaches have given invaluable insights into characteristics of urbanisation under the influence of contemporary globalisation and into economic, political and social aspects of this experience. These are also valid for
Istanbul to a large extent. Yet, as discussed thus far, each approach alone fails to explain some points of the global development of Istanbul. In that case, as the first alternative, it needs to be discussed whether these approaches can be improved to explain the cities which have initially been conceptualised in Chapter 3 as in-between cities.

For such an attempt, the main theoretical ground should be the global/world city concept. This is not only because this research is the flagship of global urban studies but also because it produces the most comprehensive theoretical, empirical and methodological knowledge of contemporary urbanism and provides a very extended base for discussing, interrogating, and testing various hypotheses in local contexts. Given the strong and weak points of the four approaches, three main axes can be identified: political, local and historical.

First, if an approach explaining the cities in this region is developed, it should certainly be politically sensitive. As mentioned earlier, the administrative structures of many of the countries in this region are more or less similar to each other. Perhaps these are not as characteristic as the East Asian countries, but nevertheless, the countries located in the region spreading from Eastern Europe to Central Asia present a more politically centralised characteristic than the countries in the North-Atlantic axis. Moreover, even though it is limited, there has been some evidence that countries like Russia (Golubchikov, 2010; Kinossian, 2017), Hungary (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015) or Turkey blend entrepreneurial policies with national political and/or economic interests and that (global) city-making is part of this hybrid formation. Therefore, such a perspective must necessarily include the entrepreneurial governance practices and take the involvement of the central governments into account.

Second, the concept should be locally/regionally sensitive. As discussed throughout the thesis, the overgeneralised theoretical assumptions might fail in local contexts. In order not to fall into this fallacy, a more deductive methodology focusing on local dynamics, positions or functions of these cities can be adopted. Musil’s (2009) work on Vienna can be given as an example for this kind of approach. His argument about Vienna as a bridge and gateway between Eastern and Western Europe complements the arguments made for Istanbul in this thesis. Therefore, by remaining within the general logic of globalisation/neoliberalisation, producing case-based or comparative studies might give interesting and valuable results for the understanding of global cities in this region.
The third point is to adopt a historically sensitive approach. Not only the cities themselves but also the political, economic and planning practices which constitute the cities are historical products. They have been produced and reproduced many times within individual historical trajectories of cities and states. The historical differences between cities are, therefore, one of the fundamental factors that create current differences between them. Likewise, cities having similar historical patterns, often present similar characteristics today in terms of their functions and positions in the global urban order (King, 2016). As discussed in Chapter 2, both postcolonial and developmental researchers have produced an extensive theoretical and empirical literature, however, all these studies built on the historical trajectories of their own cities. Nevertheless, by taking their perspectives as a way of thinking, not a theoretical ground, such kind of approach can be developed for the cities mentioned above. That is, as in this thesis, potential studies exploring the links between current positions, functions, ambitions, in brief, global city formations of the former imperial cities in the region and their imperial backgrounds might give an extensive and robust explanation.

On the other hand, as a second alternative, instead of producing a bricolage of the existing approaches, these cities might be categorised under the title of in-between cities. The first and foremost question here is why such a concept might be needed, and also how this could make a contribution to the existing literature. In human geography or urban studies literature, the terms like north, south, east or west are not just concepts defining directions, but also ontological and epistemological categories (Müller, 2018). They are used to conceptualise and classify countries, regions, and cities which are assumed to have similar patterns. These patterns might be framed by similar historical and economic trajectories as is global North and global South (Roy, 2016), or they might also include political, cultural and religious factors, as in East Asia example (Saito, 2003).

Looking at the conceptual map of global urban studies, existing approaches are seen to be concentrated in global North-South (or the former East-West) dichotomy (Tuvikene, 2016; Müller, 2018). However, the cities located in between Europe and Asia cannot be easily placed within any of these divisions, namely, they are often “fallen between the cracks” (Müller, 2018: 2). Rather than having certain attributes like global, developmental or postcolonial cities, these cities present more hybrid and intersectional characteristics between global North and global South (see Yetişkul and Demirel, 2018; Müller, 2018). Therefore, developing such a regional city concept might serve to inject these hybrid cities into the conceptual map of global urban studies and, by doing so, fills the crack sitting between the
map and advances the global urban theory. Furthermore, this concept offers a closer perspective to these cities so that it could bring a better explanation to the global city formations of cities like Istanbul, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Budapest or Moscow (Table 8.1). Finally, as these cities have similar geographical, historical, political and economic characteristics, the in-between concept inherently includes three main nuances that are suggested for improving existing theories.

In order to show how in-between concept might serve for these aims, the table below (8.2) is formed through improving and supporting the city typologies table (3.1) in Chapter 3 with the empirical discussions made in the previous chapters. As different from the previous one, the present table has also been given place to different processes that show why in-between cities can be understood through a separate concept. First, as mentioned above, the in-between concept might cover cities in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Eurasia. In addition to being located in this conjunctural region (for the term of conjunctural urbanism see Peck, 2017a), these cities have a different historical pattern than the cities conceptualised by the existing approaches.

Table 8.2 Existing City Concepts vs. In-between Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identifiers</th>
<th>Classical Global Cities</th>
<th>Developmental Cities</th>
<th>Postcolonial Cities</th>
<th>In-between Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Global North</td>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>Global South</td>
<td>Between Central Europe and Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Development Process</td>
<td>Industrial to Postindustrial</td>
<td>Colonial, National and Global</td>
<td>Colonial, National and Global</td>
<td>Imperial, National and Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Global Corporations</td>
<td>Global Headquarters</td>
<td>Global and National Headquarters</td>
<td>National Headquarters</td>
<td>Regional and National Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Functions</td>
<td>Global Command and Control</td>
<td>Command and Control for National Economy</td>
<td>National Command and Control</td>
<td>Regional Command and Control and Gateway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positions in Global Urban Networks</td>
<td>Dominate the global urban network</td>
<td>Dominate the national network and in the top-rankings in the global networks</td>
<td>Dominate the National Urban System</td>
<td>Dominate both regional and national network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position in the Urban Hierarchy</td>
<td>Top (Alpha++ and Alpha+)</td>
<td>Top (Alpha++ and Alpha+)</td>
<td>Lower rankings</td>
<td>Between Global North and South Alpha, Alpha- and Beta+.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Role of the Politics**

Increasing role of the local-regional administrative bodies.

**Distribution between central and local bodies, with a greater role of the central government**

Mixture

The central government undertakes the key role.

**The Motivation to the Global City-Making**

Become more influential and local/regional economic development

To ensure the national economic development Catch-up

To integrate to the world Catch-up

National economic development

Regain the old importance and privileges

Often blended with nationalism, national political targets, and post-imperialism.

**Centre-Local Relations**

Mixture Assumed in conflict

Harmony

Mixture

Harmony

**Civil Society Participation**

High

Low

Low

Low

In historical context, the existing division between global North and global South can be read through another division: the colonisers and colonies. It is difficult to place the in-between cities into one of these categories, as they were “not just colony, but neither just coloniser” (Müller, 2018: 15). In other words, they have undergone neither the colonial-postcolonial nor the industrial-postindustrial transitions, and consequently, have not experienced the similar political, economic or social transformations with these cities (ibid, 2018). Conversely, they followed a sui generis and a more interstitial historical trajectory. With a brief reminding, as an inherent result of the political upheavals at the beginning of the previous century and the collapse of the multinational empires, they lost their significances, powers, links, and networks which they used to have in the imperial era. While some of them became the cities of the newly founded nation states (Keyder, 2008), some others, then, were involved in the Soviet Bloc (Joenniemi. 2003, Hirt et al., 2016, Tuvikene, 2016).

The global economic and political integration process into which these cities (indeed their host states) incorporates since the post-1980s offered them new economic opportunities, roles and possibilities of new connections in both regional and global scale. In other words, thanks to globalisation, “many (though not all) one-time imperial cities of the late nineteenth century
have at the close of the twentieth, mutated into what have, since the 1990s, increasingly been termed of the world or global cities’’ (King, 2016: 186). Thus, in a sense, not only Istanbul but also many major Eastern European cities such as Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague have included in a process in which they ‘‘regain some of their pre-war importance’’ (Sassen, 2018: n.p.). For example, like Istanbul, Vienna begins to regain its regional financial centre function and international linkages, which it lost after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Zademach and Musil, 2014). The same can be said of Moscow (Argenbright, 2014) or St. Petersburg (Golubchikov, 2010).

So, how did this happen? With an economic point of view, it is widely acknowledged in the global cities literature that cities have begun to undertake different functions with the integration of global economy. As summarised at the table 8.2, whereas the leading global cities are the global command and control points, the postcolonial cities are often framed as the national gateways and command and control points, and the developmental cities generally function as the stations for the global operations of their national corporations. However, the process causing the emergence of in-between cities and the postcolonial cities are slightly different than the current examples, and, just as the term implies, it can be framed between the leading global cities and others.

With the participation of their nation-states into globalisation process, the in-between cities both have emerged as the centres in which their host states open up to the global economy, and also have begun to undertake regional gateway and command and control functions (Argenbright, 2014). These cities were already the major cities of their own national urban system until the 1990s, even though they had been mainly remained outside of the international networks. The national economic production of countries such as Russia, Austria, Poland, Hungary, and Turkey had mainly agglomerated within their capital or the leading cities. Then, with the starting of the integration, these major cities have appeared as the doors which their nation states have opened to the global economy, and vice-versa.

In a regional sense, owing to the favourable locations, cities like Istanbul, Warsaw, Moscow, Budapest, and Vienna have functioned as emerging gateways for flows of the business, trade, knowledge, transportation or people between east and west (Walker and Taylor, 2000; Brade and Rudolph, 2004; Musil, 2009; Sassen 2009, 2018; ESPON, 2013). Another process having a direct and positive impact to this has been that many leading MNCs have begun to make their investments into this region. Given the qualification of these investments, it is seen that
much of MNCs have established the regional headquarters in the major cities of the region to manage their supranational operations. In this way, these cities have been placed at the very centre of different regional (and to a lesser extent global) networks, links, connections, and flows.

A reading of the positions of the in-between cities in the global urban order can also be made through global cities league tables and the competition between cities. For example, according to the recent GaWC World Cities Index, whereas the leading global cities of the global North and the major cities of the East Asian developmental states are classified among the Alpha+ and Alpha++ cities, the global Southern cities are generally ranked among the lower groups (GaWC, 2016). The position of the in-between cities, however, is rather between the global North (and the developmental cities) and the global South cities, namely they are generally ranked as Alpha, Alpha- and Beta+. Based on their regional leading positions and their functions explained above, the in-between cities can be positioned above the global Southern cities and be thought as the secondary global cities (Sassen, 2009; 2018; Zademach and Musil, 2014; Uszkai, 2016). Furthermore, the in-between cities dominate the interurban networks in their own region, and they are in a regional competition (albeit not yet in the global) between each other to keep their command and control point positions in these networks.

Another similarity that makes us think that these cities can be conceptualised together is their traditions of state, that is, the existence of the centralised nation-states, and their role in the development of their cities as global cities. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, there has been a vast literature examining the role of the states in the emergence of global cities in many different parts of the world. Nevertheless, to make a distinction here, it is possible to mention that this process appears in the global North with the effects of the global economic actors and often involvement of the local/regional governments. Existing studies reveal that in the global South, there are, implicit or explicit, coalitions between global capital, international organisations such as IMF and the World Bank, and national/regional/local administrations (Dupont, 2011). Likewise, in the developmental states, the characteristic roles of the national and local governments as well as national capital are more central (Waley, 2007). Unlike these examples, what has been observed for in-between cities is that the national governments appear as the primary actors in the global city making process.
As discussed above, the states of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Turkey have traditionally more centralised administrative structures in comparison to their western counterparts (see Schmitt and Well, 2016). Even in the global period, the decentralisation reforms in much of these states “have been rather cosmetic, with local governments enjoying only very limited discretion on important decisions relating to local issues” (Sienkiewicz, 2007: 94); even though other parts of the world have experienced different processes of and levels of administrative decentralisation (see Hambleton and Gross, 2007; Clark and Moonen, 2017). Further, these powerful national governments have supported and even actively participated in the processes in which their major cities have emerged as global cities; which also challenges to both economic and political-economic theses about the global city formation. Through numerous ways such as implementing global integration policies, leading foreign direct investments to their major cities, making mega infrastructure investments, and supporting international organisations and events which will be held in these cities, these central governments have made major positive impacts on the global positions of in-between cities (Golubchikov, 2010; Argenbright; 2014; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; Clark and Moonen, 2017; Kinossian, 2017). Moreover, in many cases, it is observed that central governments shape the urban policies (and so global-city making process) directly, insomuch that they sometimes by-pass the local or federal governments.

Another critical question here is what the motivations of the central governments of in-between cities to make of their cities as global cities are. In the literature, the motivations of global-city making are generally explained through economic factors, especially, for the leading global cities of the global North. These cities compete each other to attract more foreign investments, to keep their leading positions and to ensure their local economic developments. In the postcolonial and the developmental cases these factors are somehow dolled with the catch-up and late developmentalism (or neo-developmentalism). Yet, for in-between cities, different political, economic and ideological motivations can be mentioned. Of course, national economic development is a primary and major motivation here. However, global-city making is often supported and/or legitimised by the central governments through nationalist discourses and regaining motivations (Akcan, 2015; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015). This sense of regaining blended with nationalism, which is difficult to observe in other cities, not only constitutes a discursive and legitimatising ground for global city-making policies, but also triggers to (and associated with) the regional geopolitical and geoeconomic ambitions of the nation governments, which can be discussed as post-imperialism, or neo-imperialism.
Although there has been a dominant role of the central governments in the in-between city formation, this does not mean that the local governments have no role in this process and the relationship between local and central governments are in tension (Kolossov and O'Loughlin, 2004; Sanli and Townshend, 2018). On the contrary, this makes visible that there are different types of city-state relations and different factors shaping this relationship. For example, in in-between cities, as well as economic motivations, political and ideological factors have also a crucial role in shaping these relationships and these factors demonstrate the local and the central government might work in harmony (Kinosian, 2017; Clark and Moonen, 2017; Sanli and Townshend; 2018), which is different from the many western examples which this relationship is assumed as a conflict (Barber, 2013). Considering the historical role and importance of these cities, their primate positions within their national urban system, these cities provide appropriate grounds for their national governments to aim their national political and economic targets. Further, the support of the central governments and the benefits which they achieve by doing this create a mutual economic gain for both cities and states (Ardenbright, 2014; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; Clark and Moonen, 2017). Therefore, the central governments can be said to seek the support of the local governments of these cities and to avoid entering an implicit conflict between each other, and of course vice-versa.

One consequence of this coalition between local and central government, which can also be called as harmony, is that civil-society participation, excluding the economic actors, in global city making processes often remain lower degrees (Trumbull, 2002; ALB, 2011; Akcan, 2015; Ünsal, 2015; Sanli and Townshend, 2018; Florea et al., 2018). As also discussed in this thesis, they are generally excluded from the decision-making processes. Therefore, the objections here are mostly from civil society representatives or from opposition parties. With these characteristics, in-between cities stand closer to the non-western cases, rather than the western examples. Although the democratic participation to the decision-making show an alteration from case to case, and project to project, it is generally argued that the involvement of civil society representatives is higher in the countries of the western world than the global South (Miraftab, 2004, Goldman, 2011; Schindler, 2014); and Asian examples (Miller and Bunnel, 2012).

On the other hand, such a conceptualisation carries some serious risks. At first, despite its persuasive arguments in the regional context, it is questionable, at least for now, whether it can be improved in a way to give a global understanding of contemporary urbanism. That is, just as the developmental state approach, the in-between concept too might only work in a
narrow geopolitical context. This also poses another risk. As Taylor and Lang (2004) point out, hundreds of concepts can be developed to describe today’s urban forms and intercity relations. However, producing an excessive bulk of concepts might muddy the water, namely might make it difficult to notice and to understand the common experiences of global/globalising cities. Further, considering the recent debates on engaged/polemical pluralism (see Robinson, 2016a; van Meeteren et al., 2016), insistent calls for new theories/concepts, which also imply to reject the existing ones, have a danger of fuelling the ongoing polemics between different approaches of global urban studies, which is definitely not what this research wants to serve.

Thirdly and finally, almost all arguments and hypotheses presented in this thesis have been developed based on the empirical information produced from a single case study. Although the thesis has also benefited from relevant literature sources suggesting that the cities identified as in-between cities have similar common characteristics in many aspects (see Chapter 3), to develop such a concept there is a need to obtain more empirical knowledge of these cases. As can be remembered from Chapter 2, one of the serious criticisms of early global cities research, especially Sassen’s theses, was that the global city concept had been built upon the experiences and commonalities of only a few cities (Robinson, 2002) and that it had been lacking empirical evidence (Beaverstock et al., 2000). From this point, there is no significant methodological difference between universalising common aspects of a few cities like New York or London and producing a regional conceptualisation through blending the empirical information collected from a case study with a few relevant sources. Therefore, in order not to fall into the same fallacy, this conceptualisation should be empirically supported and strengthened with further case studies in cities mentioned above.

To conclude, instead of choosing one of these two methods, it makes sense to think that both alternatives can contribute to the wider body of global urban research. The first option, which seems more reasonable for now, responds to some recent valuable calls in the global urban studies: stress-testing (Hoyler and Harrison, 2017), engaged pluralism (van Meeteren et al., 2016) and cosmopolitan global urban research (e.g. Robinson, 2002; Mcfarlane, 2010; Myers, 2014). First, it is obvious that there is a need to stress-testing the validity of the fundamental assumptions of the existing approaches (Hoyler and Harrison, 2017). This research, along with similar potential studies, can be used to reveal where the existing theories need to be improved, and to improve them.
Second, this research also contributes to recent calls for engaged pluralism in global urban research. As discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of this thesis, much of the existing research has been done in cities having certain characteristics. Of course, such an approach provides a very comfortable ground to show the explanatory strength of a particular theory and/or the weakness of others, however, in the grand scheme, it also feeds the ongoing polemics between different global urban theories. This research has shown the existence of more hybrid global city formations which all theories have difficulty to explain in some respects. Therefore, future studies exploring hybrid cases like Istanbul might make positive impacts to develop a more pluralist and a less conflictual body of global urban research. That is, as the frequently-used bridge metaphor for Istanbul and Vienna implies, this conceptualisation can function as a bridge between the different approaches. Thirdly, as this concept necessarily suggests looking at divergent, as well as convergent, patterns of in-between cities, a more cosmopolitan and inclusive global urban research might also be developed, which is what especially postcolonial researchers insist on (Robinson, 2016b; Robinson and Roy, 2016).

Nevertheless, in principle, this does not mean to reject the alternative option. The term ‘in-between’ can be used as a conceptual ground for both comparative and case studies exploring cities located between Europe and Asia. When/if enough empirical evidence is produced, this term can be elevated to a concept status which defines the many global/globalising cities in this intersectional geography of the world. This would also advance the global urban theory in a different way. Yet it seems premature to be ambitious in this regard, so it would be more appropriate to leave the last word to future studies.
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Appendix-1 Interview Questions

Opening

Could you begin by briefly telling me about your role here at [ ] and how you came to be in this role?

Istanbul’s City Development

1. How would you characterise the urban development of Istanbul?
2. How much does Istanbul’s history (e.g. Ottoman Empire) still impact its urban development?
3. How has Istanbul’s urban development changed under globalization?
4. How has the strategy for Istanbul’s urban expansion changed under globalisation?
5. Who are the major actors in the expansion of Istanbul as a globalising city?
6. What does Istanbul being a “global city” mean to you?
7. How coherent is the strategy for the expansion of Istanbul as a globalising city?
8. Is there tension between the political-economic strategy for Istanbul as a globalising city and other strategies – perhaps around social inclusion, environmental issues etc.?
9. How complementary are Istanbul’s global aspirations with more local issues?

Istanbul’s Position Within Turkey

10. How would you characterise Istanbul’s position within the political and economic landscape of Turkey?
11. What structural advantages/disadvantages does Istanbul have in Turkey?
12. What are the duties of local and central government in relation to Istanbul’s aspiration to be a leading global city?
13. How coherent is the strategy for Istanbul to become a leading global city and the national strategy for the growth of Turkey’s economy more broadly? How does this play out in relation to the 2023 goal?
14. Do you see any tension between Istanbul’s aspiration to be a leading global city and the national government’s wider aspirations for Turkey as a whole?

15. Erdoğan was quoted in 2009 as saying that “When I was the mayor of Istanbul, I aimed to transform Istanbul into a global financial centre but the central government did not allow this. Now, I am the Prime Minister of Turkey and local government of Istanbul is from our party, so there is not any obstacle on front of the make it real.” (Erdoğan, 2009).

   a. How far do you agree with Erdoğan’s assertion that when he was Mayor of Istanbul the central government prevented the transformation of Istanbul into a global financial centre/global city?

   a. Can you identify any examples of policies/developments which were blocked by central government?

   a. How far does this reveal a tension between how political elites in Istanbul and Turkey do not identify with a common strategy for Istanbul’s development as a global city?

   a. How far do you agree with Erdoğan’s assertion that with Istanbul and Turkey being controlled politically by the same party that there are no longer any obstacles to making Istanbul a global financial city/global city?

   a. Is there any evidence for this?

   a. Are there any examples of policies/developments which have gone ahead since 2009 that would not have gone before?

16. How would you characterise the current relationship between the local government of Istanbul and the central government? Could you compare this relationship with previous eras, in particular the times when being central and local governments from different parties?

17. What is the relationship between Istanbul and other cities in Turkey – notably Ankara?

18. How far is Istanbul’s aspiration to be a global city complementary to/at the expense of other Turkish cities (e.g. Ankara)?
19. Historically, how do you define the municipal organizations in Turkey? What are the pluses and minuses of Turkey’s municipal organization? (In which situations do they need the help of central government?)

**Istanbul & Turkey within International Urban System**

20. How would you position Istanbul in relation to other cities in Europe?

21. How would you position Istanbul in relation to other cities in the world?

22. What would you say are comparable cities to Istanbul (in Europe or the world)?

23. Which city does Istanbul aspire to be?

24. What structural advantages/disadvantages does Istanbul have in relation to other cities (in Europe/globally)?

25. How does Istanbul’s position on the edge of the European Union impact its development as a global city?

26. How does Istanbul’s position as a city between east and west impact positively on its development?

27. How does Istanbul’s position as a city between east and west impact negatively on its development?

**Looking to the Future**

28. How do you expect Istanbul’s urban transformation to progress?

29. What do you think about the mega-projects, such as Third Bridge, Third Airport, or Canal Istanbul? To what extent do you consider that these projects are essential to move Istanbul in the global arena on a higher level?

30. An important part of this transformation is the “urban transformation projects”. What are your opinions about current urban transformation projects? To what extent they are essential for improving the urban fabric or increase the competitiveness of the city?

31. How do these transformations (urban transformation projects, mega-projects, etc.) affect Istanbul’s urban development?
There are some criticisms about these projects, in particular in terms of urban fabric and environment. What is your opinion about these criticisms?

How could some of the barriers, or areas of contestation, be resolved better in future?

How can the relationship between local and national government be strengthened/better aligned?

What is your future goal/vision/plan for Istanbul?

If I came back in 5 years, how do you think things will have changed?

Finally, is there anything that we have not covered that you would like to add or think it would be useful for me to know/explore?
Appendix-2 Coding Framework

User Guide:

Bold Font – Codes that were in the original framework that has been developed after completing both the interviews and transcription, but before any interview analysis had been initiated.

Normal Font – Codes that emerged from the data as actually coded the material.

1. ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES - LEGAL REGULATIONS
   a) 5216 - The Law on Greater-Metropolitan Municipality
   b) 6306 - The Law of transformation of Areas under Disaster Risks
   c) Local Government Reform
   d) Regulation about Earthquake
   e) Regulations about Planning
   f) State of Emergency

2. CITY
   a) Current Developments - Trends
      I. Dispossession
      II. Gentrification
      III. Growth and Expansion
      IV. Land - Property Prices
      V. Loss of Uniqueness
      VI. Less Public Space
   b) Dynamics of Urbanisation
      I. Global Dynamics
      II. Historical Dynamics
      III. Local - National Dynamics
   c) Features
      I. Historical Features
      II. Unique City
   d) Location - Geopolitics
      I. Bridge
      II. Gateway to East and to West
      III. In between East and West
      IV. Intersection
   e) Problems
I. Earthquake
II. Lack of Green Space
III. Migration - Rapid Growth
IV. Other Problems
V. Overcrowdedness - Density
VI. Physical Infrastructure
VII. Traffic
VIII. Unplanned Urbanisation - Illegal Housing

3. DEMANDS - SOLUTIONS - FUTURE EXPECTATIONS
   a) Criticisms
   b) Demands - Expectations from Local Government
   c) Demands Expectations from Central Government
   d) Solution
      I. Administrative
      II. Economy
      III. Legal
      IV. Planning
      V. Urban Fabric

4. ECONOMY
   a) Economic Growth
   b) Employment
   c) Foreign Capital
   d) Private Sector
   e) Public Private Partnership
   f) Sectors
      I. FIRE AND APS
      II. Industry

5. ENVIRONMENT SUSTAINABILITY
   a) Absorption of Natural Resources
   b) EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment)
   c) Environmental Impacts of Mega-Projects
   d) Environmental Sustainability
   e) Socio-Economic Sustainability

6. GEOGRAPHY
a) Ad. and Disad. of Istanbul in Global Order
b) Europe - European Union
c) Global - Globalisation
d) Istanbul and Turkey in Global Order
e) The Middle East

7. GOVERN GOVERNANCE
a) Centralization
b) Pros and Cons of Local Government
   I. Autonomy
   II. Political Continuity
   III. Finance - Budget
   IV. Lack of Expert - Qualified Personnel
   V. Populism
c) Pros and Cons of National Government
   I. Continuity
   II. Populism
d) Trends
   I. Decentralization
   II. Deregulation
   III. Entrepreneurial Governance
   IV. Emergence of Neo-liberalism
   V. Selling city
e) Urban Planning

8. ISTANBUL IN TURKEY
a) Historical Representation
b) Interests of the city and the country
c) Istanbul and other cities
d) Istanbul as a Region
e) Istanbul for Turkey
f) Istanbul vs Ankara

9. ORGANISATION – AGENCIES
a) Central Government
   I. Council of Ministries
   II. MOEU
III. ISPAT
IV. MOD
V. Other Ministries
VI. Presidency
VII. The Prime Minister's Office
VIII. TOKI
IX. Ministry of Transportation

b) Development Agencies
   I. ISTKA

c) IMP (Istanbul Metropolitan Planning Centre)

d) International Agencies – Events – Institutions
   I. MIPIM

e) Local Government
   I. City Councils
   II. District Municipalities
      a. Fatih
      b. Kadıköy
      c. Sarıyer
      d. Others

III. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality

IV. Other Cities Municipalities
   a. Ankara
   b. İzmir
   c. Others

f) NGOs
   I. Business Groups
      a. Musiad
      b. Tusiad

II. Chambers of Urban Planners

III. Environment and Urban Solidarity Groups
   a. IKS
   b. KOS

10. POLITICS – IDEOLOGIES
   a) AKP
b) CHP
c) Other Political Parties
d) Political Polarisation
e) Political Stability
f) Secular - Conservative Conflict

11. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
   a) Conflict
   b) Harmony
      I. Interests
      II. Required
      III. Values
c) Hierarchy
d) Lack of Coordination

12. SOCIAL
   a) Change in Social Life
   b) Inclusion - Exclusion
c) Neighbourhood Culture
d) Quality of Life
e) Social Fabric
f) Socio-cultural diversity
g) Socio-economic welfare

13. STAKEHOLDERS INTEGRATION
   a) Buy-in
   b) Decision Making Mechanisms
c) Getting Around the Law
d) GONGOs
e) Informing
f) Legal-Process
g) Otherisation - Labelling
h) Participation
i) Pretending
j) Representation

14. STATISTICS - EVIDENCES – FACTS
   a. FDI
b. GDP - IMEX  
c. Housing  
d. Physical Infrastructure  
e. Population  
f. Tax - Revenues  
g. Tourism  
h. Transport  
i. Trends  
j. Urban Transformation  

15. STRATEGIES = GOALS – POLICIES  
   a) European Capital of Culture 2010  
   b) Historical Responsibility  
   c) IFC  
   d) Local  
      I. Attraction Centre  
      II. Brand City  
      III. Competitive City  
      IV. Focus City  
      V. Control Command Centre  
      VI. Controlled Growth  
      VII. De-industrialisation  
      VIII. FIRE - APS  
      IX. Global City  
      X. Istanbul Environment Plan  
      XI. Istanbul Region Plan  
      XII. Other Strategies (Culture, History, Tourism, etc.)  
      XIII. Regional Leadership  
      XIV. Role Model  
      XV. Transport Hub  
   e) Mega-Projects  
   f) Municipal Policies - Services  
      I. Daily Municipal Services  
      II. Environmental Policies  
      III. Public Transportation
IV. Social Policies

g) National

I. 2023

II. Regional Leader

h) Slogans

i) Urban Transformation
Appendix-3 Informed Consent Form

Title of the Project: Istanbul – The Making of a ‘Global City’ Between East and West

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Taking Part

The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me. I understand
that this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all
procedures have been approved by the Loughborough University Ethics
Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee.

I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form.

I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation.

I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study, have the
right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any reason, and will not be
required to explain my reasons for withdrawing.

I agree to take part in this study. Taking part in the project will include being
interviewed and recorded (audio).

Use of Information

I understand that all the personal information I provide will be treated in strict
confidence and will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers
unless (under the statutory obligations of the agencies which the researchers
are working with), it is judged that confidentiality will have to be breached for
the safety of the participant or others or for audit by regulatory authorities.

I understand that anonymised quotes may be used in publications, reports, web
pages, and other research outputs.

I agree for the data I provide to be securely archived at the end of the project.

I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any materials related to this project to
Ozgur Sayin.

Bodily Samples
I agree that the bodily samples taken during this study can be stored until 31/12/2023 for future research in the same research theme as this project. [Or]
I agree that the bodily samples taken during this study can **only be** used for this study and will be disposed of within 5 years [or] upon completion of the research 30/09/2018.

____________________  __________________  ______________
Name of participant  [printed]  Signature  Date

____________________  __________________  ______________
Researcher  [printed]  Signature  Date
## Appendix-4 Full List of Affiliated Names for each of the 45 Interviews

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
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<td>AA#1</td>
<td>Academic Advisor</td>
<td>Academic Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA#2</td>
<td>Academic Advisor</td>
<td>Academic Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT#1</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>A Well-known Urban Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSR#1</td>
<td>Business Sector Representative</td>
<td>Member of Board of a one of the top National Real-Estate Companies</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Business Sector Representative</td>
<td>Executive Member of a National Business Association</td>
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<td>BSR#5</td>
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<td>CCP#1</td>
<td>Chamber of City Planners</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
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<td>Istanbul Development Agency</td>
<td>Senior Official</td>
</tr>
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<td>Executive at City Planning Workshop</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality</td>
<td>Executive at Planning Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>IMM#6</td>
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<td>Investment Support and Promotion Agency of Turkey</td>
<td>Senior Official</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPL#1</td>
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<td>Executive of Provincial Organisation of an Opposition Party</td>
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