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R&D productivity and intellectual property rights protection regimes
preprint
posted on 2009-05-13, 10:37 authored by Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, Khemarat TeerasuwannajakWe study firms' preferences towards intellectual property rights (IPR)
regimes in a North-South context, using a simple duopoly model where
a North and a South firms compete in a third market. Unlike other
contributions in this field, we explicitly introduce the South's capability
to undertake cost-reducing R&D, but maintain the South's inferiority in
utilizing and managing its R&D. In contrast to traditional results, we
show that the North may encourage lax IPR protection provided that its
South rival's R&D productivity is sufficiently high, while the South may find it in its best interest to strictly enforce IPR protection if its R&D
productivity is low. In this sense, our results do not support the idea
of universal or uniform IPR protection regime. In addition, we find that
if firms are allowed to agree on any level of information exchange when
IPR protection is strictly enforced, such an exchange can always be established as long as each firm is ensured that what it gets to utilize in return is greater than a half of what it gives to its rival.
History
School
- Business and Economics
Department
- Economics
Publisher
© Loughborough UniversityVersion
- VoR (Version of Record)
Publication date
2009Notes
This is a working paper. It is also available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/lbo/lbowps/2009_06.htmlISSN
1750-4171Book series
Loughborough University. Department of Economics. Discussion Paper Series;WP 2009 - 06Language
- en