This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository (https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the following Creative Commons Licence conditions.

![Creative Commons License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/)

**Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.5**

You are free:

- to copy, distribute, display, and perform the work

Under the following conditions:

**Attribution.** You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor.

**Noncommercial.** You may not use this work for commercial purposes.

**No Derivative Works.** You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.

- For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work.
- Any of these conditions can be waived if you get permission from the copyright holder.

Your fair use and other rights are in no way affected by the above.

This is a human-readable summary of the Legal Code (the full license).

Disclaimer

For the full text of this licence, please go to:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
Date: 25 June 2007
Version accepted for publication

Paper for EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION

THE EUROPEAN AND THE NATIONAL IN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH¹

Sabina Mihelj, Loughborough University

Abstract

The paper discusses some of the major omissions and simplification created by established approaches to European communication, in particular the inclination to think of Europeanisation primarily, and often exclusively, in relation to things national. It points to the simplistic narrative that sees transnational communication in Europe as a very recent phenomenon, and demonstrates how this narrative glosses over various historical forms of transnational communication in Europe. It then briefly addresses the intellectual roots of this narrative, and argues that they also lead to neglecting the existence of diverse, often competing contemporary forms of Europeanisation and transnationalization in public communication. Finally, the paper argues that more sustained attention should be paid to sub-national patterns of stratification of European communication, particularly those arising along class divisions.

Keywords: nation, Europe, media, communication, class, democratic deficit

Despite its methodological diversity, the fast-growing field of research on European communication shares a common tendency to think of Europeanisation primarily, and often exclusively, in relation to things national: national public spheres, national journalistic cultures, national identities, nation states. Even European Union’s lack of democratic legitimacy is often approached through the same lens: as a phenomenon arising from the discrepancy between the increasingly supranational and intergovernmental policymaking, and the still largely national frameworks of public debates, political participation and collective identities. The inclination to think of the European principally in relation to the national is present in at least two closely related ways. Firstly, the conceptual pair of European and national serves to provide a narrative background to the analysis: European(ised) forms, practices, institutions and contents of communication as historically very recent phenomena, which are dislodging or at least radically transforming earlier, national ones. Europeanisation is for example defined as ‘a multi-dimensional and gradual process that in one way or another extends public

¹ I would like to thank the participants of the EJC symposium on ‘The Media and the European Public Space’ for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Václav Štětka for sharing his knowledge on the media system in the Czechoslovak Republic. This paper also owes much to ongoing collaborative research and discussions with Thomas Koenig and John Downey.
discourse beyond national spaces’ (Brüggemann 2006: 4) and is seen to occur ‘when nationally based mass media shift their focus away from the national political arena towards the European level’ (Pfetsch 2004: 4). From this perspective, things national are seen as elements of the past, while things European belong to the present and are premised on a more or less radical break with the (national) past. Secondly, the conceptual pair of European and national informs also the framing of research questions, and consequently the definition of the main units and categories of analysis. By and large, researchers are primarily interested in the similarities and differences between individual national communicative spheres, in their relative degrees of Europeanisation, or various nationally inflected perceptions of European issues. Consequently, the main, and quite often the only, independent variable in comparative analyses of European communication is the nation-state, or the national public sphere. This paper aims to demonstrate that established approaches to the relationship between the European and the national in communication research are in danger of producing rather simplistic conclusions, and miss issues that should be of prime concern to communication scholars. The following sections also briefly discuss how these approaches relate to long-established ways of thinking about the role of mass communication in social integration, and suggest how and why future research in the filed should strive to move beyond them.

National and European: past and present?

The presence of the narrative backdrop that sees transnational forms of identity, political legitimacy and communication in Europe as historically recent phenomena, leads us away from acknowledging the various forms of historical coexistence of the national and the transnational in European communication prior to the formation of the European Union. As some authors have pointed out, a ‘proto-European’ or ‘transnational’ communicative sphere was in fact created well before the various national communicative spaces, and can be traced at least as far back as the period of the Enlightenment (Schulz-Forberg 2005: 30-31), if not even the Middle Ages (Splichal 2006: 708). We need only to consider the widespread elite use of Latin and later French across the European continent, the transnational circulation of early newspapers in the 17th and 18th centuries, or the establishment of the International Telegraph Union in Paris in 1865, to understand that forms of transnational communication per se are nothing new. Although we should be wary of any anachronistic projections of present notions and forms of Europeanisation and transnationalization onto the past, it is quite clear that cross-border communicative spaces and exchanges in Europe do not belong exclusively to the realm of the present.

However, this is only a relatively minor part of the problem, and one that can be solved rather simply by acknowledging that historically, national media systems dislodged previously existing, ‘transnational’ forms of communication, and that in a sense, and grossly simplifying, the rise of European communication reverses this trend. However, this corrected narrative continues to overlook the ways in which transnational forms of communication and cultural exchange – as well as, in some cases, media legislation and political legitimisation – continued to exist, if not flourish, even in periods when European states were at the height of their power, and exerted the highest level of control over their respective communicative spheres. These departures from ideal-typical
national public spheres are most clearly apparent when we take into account long-
established multinational and multilingual media systems such as those of Switzerland
and Belgium. The Swiss Broadcasting Corporation established its three national
transmitters – French, German and Italian – already in the early 1930s, later adding
regular programmes in Romansch, with an analogous development taking place in the
realm of television since the late 1950s (Erk 2003). Belgian broadcasting history is
similarly linguistically diversified, and resulted in separate radio and television services
for the three main language communities: Flemish, French and German (Jongen et al.
2005). If we add the more recently ‘devolved’ media systems such as those of Spain and
the United Kingdom, the narrative that reduces recent transformations to a simple
transition from national to European spaces and forms of communication becomes even
harder to sustain.

Another long-established layer of public communication in Europe that diverges from the
ideal nation-state model, and is hardly ever considered in recent empirical research,
consists of more or less institutionalised forms of cross-border media cooperation and
exchange. Although this may sound counterintuitive, the advent of these transnational
forms of communication was in fact closely intertwined with, and in a sense provided a
precondition for, the rise of modern national communication systems. The history of
international broadcasting associations in Europe is a good working example of this
interdependence. The International Broadcasting Union (IBU), established in Geneva in
1925, was formed shortly after the development of first public radio programmes across
Europe, and was charged with the task of imposing a national order of things onto the
chaos of early radio broadcasting, as well as with the task of facilitating cooperation
between different (national) stations. IBU’s successor, the Organisation Internationale de
Radiodiffusion et Télévision (OIRT),2 was funded in Brussels in 1946 with the same dual
mission. However, in the increasingly polarised Cold-War Europe, OIRT proved too
dominated by the Soviet Union to offer an attractive platform for Europe-wide
cooperation between broadcasting institutions (cf. Eugster 1983). The membership of
OIRT eventually became limited almost exclusively to socialist Eastern European states,
while broadcasting organisations from Western Europe, together with the non-aligned
Yugoslavia, established the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) in 1950, and launched
the Eurovision news exchange in 1954 (Pustišek 1984). With the fall of the Iron Curtain,
this two-tiered system became superfluous, and the Europe-wide integration of the
communications sector eventually led to the merging of OIRT into EBU (Wood 2003). It
is therefore clear that the most recent wave of Europeanisation did not emerge in a world
populated exclusively by nation-states and national communicative spaces. Instead, it
intervened into and transformed prior patterns of cross-border broadcasting in Europe.

Last but not least, the narrative premised on a simple progression from the national to the
European becomes even more implausible once we turn to the new and aspiring EU
members states of Eastern Europe. For all the newly formed nation-states that emerged
out of the rumbles of multinational socialist federations, things national were obviously
not a matter of the past: instead, the post-Cold-War European integration went hand-in-

2 The organisation was first established under the name Organisation Internationale de Radiodiffusion
(OIR) and was renamed into OIRT in 1960 (Pustišek 1984).
hand with nation-state building. Of course, national media systems in these new countries were not built from scratch: the respective Soviet, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav federal republics had well-formed ‘proto-national’ media spheres decades before their transformation into nation-states became even remotely possible. Yet while republican-level media habitually addressed their audiences as members of a distinct collectivity, they also quite clearly signalled that this collectivity is part of a larger, federation-wide one. For example, following the decentralisation of key party organs and state institutions in the 1960s and the 1970s, the media system in Yugoslavia became increasingly devolved: most media were controlled at the republican level and were increasingly geared for republican audiences. However, republican media systems co-existed with pan-Yugoslav modes of address and media. These included the news agency TANJUG (Telegraphic Agency of New Yugoslavia), the daily newspaper Borba (Struggle), a well-established system of programme exchange coordinated by Jugoslovenska radiotelevizija (Yugoslav Radio-Television), and the short-lived television channel Yutel (cf. Thompson 1994). A similarly multilayered media system could be found in Czechoslovakia. While both Slovak and Czech republics had their own newspapers, television and radio channels, several media were targeted at the whole population. These included the first channel of the Czechoslovak State Television, the radio channel Československo (Czechoslovakia), renamed into Hvězda (Star) in 1970, the press agency Československá tisková kancelář, the official daily of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Rudé právo (Red Law), which was also the biggest newspaper in the country, and several weekly magazines, including Mladý svět (Young World), published by the Socialist Youth Union, and the humoristic weekly Dikobraz (Porcupine) (Štětka 2007). Judging from these examples, it is quite clear that for a substantial number of European states, recent Europeanisation of communicative spaces was not just a simple addition to national communicative patterns. Instead, it was a process that displaced or reconfigured earlier transnational communicative links and spaces, and instituted new ones. Unfortunately, existing research on European communication normally focuses only on the most recent, post-Cold-War period, and thus gives us little insight into the ways in which present forms of Europeanisation may be reproducing, or diverging from, patterns established prior to 1989. For example, the so-called ‘horizontal Europeanisation’ or ‘mutual observation’, which consists of communicative links between different states and is increasingly often recognised as an important dimension of Europeanisation (cf. Koopmans 2004: 6; Brüggeman et al. 2006), obviously existed well before the

---

3 It should be acknowledged that audiences of these ‘transnational’ outlets were unevenly spread. Since most of them were produced in the lingua franca of the federation – Serbo-Croatian or Czech respectively – they quite unsurprisingly attracted much smaller audiences among segments of population who did not speak this language on a daily basis – Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, Slovenians and Macedonians in Yugoslavia – and were most successful in the republic in which they were published. In Yugoslavia, the situation was complicated further by substantial regional variations within Serbo-Croatian language. Even within the central Yugoslav republics, which nominally shared the same language, attempts to establish common broadcast media were therefore viewed with great suspicion, and were ultimately abandoned altogether.

4 In the case of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, old transnational patterns were either abolished altogether, as for example the Czechoslovak press agency or the Yugoslav television channel Yutel, or appropriated by the successor states, with their audiences shrinking accordingly, as for example in the case of TANJUG, now a Serbian news agency, or Rudé právo, now known simply as Právo, one of the major Czech dailies.
establishment of the EU. The precise understandings of Europe and institutional infrastructures that underpinned it were rather different from those present today: in the realm broadcasting, they were supported by Eurovision and Intervision, and followed Cold-War patterns of thinking about Europe. What kinds of horizontal Europeanisation resulted from this, and how their patterns changed over time, are only some of the many questions that could be addressed if research designs would adopt a longer time-span.\(^5\)

**Overcoming the internalist bias**

The main root of the simplistic narrative, based on a simple progression from the world of nation states to European integration, lies beyond the current debate on Europeanisation, and can be found in the long-standing ways of thinking about social integration and mass communication, stretching from Karl W. Deutsch’s work in the 1950s to Manuel Castell’s theory of network society in the 1990s. For well over half a century, studies of communication and social integration have been focussed primarily on what is going on on the inside of respective communicative spaces, and assumed that social integration necessarily entails the creation of internally homogenous communicative spaces, coextensive with the borders of the polity (Schlesinger 2000). Patterns of mass communication that did not conform to such an ideal pattern, or lied beyond the ‘internal’ space circumscribed by the territorial boundaries of a polity, were either overlooked or treated as transitional or aberrant stages of development that should eventually give way to a homogenous communicative space matching the political unit, be it national, regional or global. Only after being faced with phenomena that could not be fitted easily into the nation-state centred model – the rise of satellite and cable television, increased transnational migration and the proliferation of diasporic communication – have media scholars begun to question the classic theoretical framework (e.g. Morley and Robins 1995; Price 2002). Over the past decade, this questioning has led to a denunciation of the nation-state-centred framework, and prompted an exponential growth of research into the media of diaspora, multiculturalism and transnational communication (e.g. Karim 2003; Georgiou 2006). These critiques had repercussions also in the field of European communication research: authors now largely agree that European communicative sphere should not be conceived as an extended version of an ideal-typical national public sphere (e.g. Van de Steeg 2002; Machill et al. 2006). Instead, this sphere is now increasingly being described in terms of a network, emerging on the basis of a mutual opening, interpenetration, and thus ‘Europeanisation’ of national communicative spaces (see e.g. Habermas 2001: 18; Schlesinger 2003: 10-13).

It is rarely recognised that these most recent conceptualisations of European communication effectively challenge only one side of the traditional argument – namely the assumption that progressive integration should ultimately lead to a homogeneous communicative sphere that coincides with the political unit. At the same time, these approaches often continue to perpetuate the other, equally problematic side of the

\(^5\) Needless to say, the limitations of dominant sampling strategies are, to an important extent, a result of pragmatic limitations – namely the fact that comparative research of this kind is very demanding in both financial and methodological terms.
conventional argument, namely the internalist bias. True, by approaching European communicative space as a complex, multilayered network rather than an internally homogenous sphere, the new conceptualisations avoid the assumption of self-enclosed national communicative spheres. However, they often lead to a reproduction of the same kind of bias at European level. This is most clearly evident if we look at the selection of countries included in empirical analyses. In the large majority of cases, this selection is limited to European states, thus automatically precluding an empirical exploration of similarities and differences beyond Europe. The only transnational competitor to Europeanisation that is occasionally acknowledged in existing research is globalisation. As Craig Calhoun (2005: 277) rightly notes, the fact that European media become less national does not automatically mean that they become ‘European’; instead, they become a part of a global system of information and entertainment production dominated by the United States. Consequently, various forms of Europeanisation of public communication ‘must not only carve out a communicative niche in competition with purely national public communication, but also relative to transnational communicative interaction that goes beyond Europe’ (Koopmans 2004). However, such acknowledgments are rarely translated into empirical research designs. Only very recently have researchers of European communication started expanding their categories of analysis in ways that can cater for competing forms of transnationalization, for example by enlarging the samples of media content to include those from non-European states, most often the USA and Canada (see e.g. Risse and Van de Steeg 2003; Trenz 2004a; Downey and Koenig 2006; Koenig et al 2006), and by distinguishing between ‘Westernisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ (Risse and Van de Steeg 2003; Brüggeman et al. 2006). In addition, one can also detect a growing awareness of sub-European patterns of transnational similarities and differences in media content, for example between old and new members (de Vreese et al. 2006) or between groups of national communicative spaces that display similar ideological perspectives on Europe (Trenz 2004b; Mihelj et al. 2006). Recent empirical research into national editorial and journalistic cultures uncovered similar transnational patterns of similarities and differences, suggesting that different national cultures could be grouped along the East-West and South-North axis (Preston and Horgan 2006), roughly following the contours of the model suggested by Hallin and Mancini (2004). Arguably, such studies reflect a growing awareness of the fact that Europeanisation of communicative spaces – as well as any Europe-wide convergence of editorial and journalistic values and practices – is not inflected only by national frames, but also by regional, language-based, historical and ideological alliances.

It is to be hoped that future comparative studies will pay more sustained attention to these divergent and competing patterns of transnationalization. An empirical exploration of such patterns, however, will also require changes to dominant sampling and coding strategies. For the moment, most studies focus exclusively on the reporting of European issues, without examining its position within news coverage on the whole and e.g. its relative weight vis-à-vis news on national events (but see e.g. Koopmans 2004 and Peter et al. 2005 for exceptions). An analytical strategy amenable to the exploration of competing forms of transnationalization would need to go further than that, and for example examine also the relative weight of news from non-European countries and
regions, particularly those that can be expected to function as focal points for competing forms of transnationalization in Europe, namely Russia and the U.S.

**Sub-national cleavages**

Apart from being prone to internalist bias at European level, prevailing approaches to European communication also tend to gloss over sub-national cleavages. As a rule, Europeanization is seen primarily, and often exclusively, as a development that affects nationally and territorially defined communicative spaces, leading to the broadening of the scope of public discourse in these spaces beyond the territorial state (Brüggeman et al. 2006: 4, emphasis in original). In line with this, the European public sphere is expected to emerge on the basis of a Europeanization of national publics (Machill et al. 2006: 63). Analytically, the prime concern of research is therefore to examine and compare the relative degrees of Europeanization of different national units, for instance by establishing ‘the extent to which claims extend beyond the geopolitical boundaries of a nation-state’ (Statham and Gray 2005: 67). Other kinds of stratification of European communication, and hence other potential units of analysis, arising along other major social cleavages – such as those of gender, ethnicity or class – are accorded only scant attention. Despite explicitly focussing on communicative links and similarities that exist above or beyond national units, investigation of European communication thus often falls prey to the long-standing weakness of comparative research, namely the tendency to overstate the internal homogeneity of national units. Although authors do occasionally acknowledge that the internal homogeneity and distinctiveness of national public spheres is often exaggerated (see e.g. Van de Steeg 2002: 501-502; Trenz 2004: 292-293), such considerations are rarely made to bear on empirical research frameworks.

As long as news production and distribution remain segmented along nation-state borders, national differences are of course bound to remain one of the key conceptual distinctions in comparative media research. Yet precisely because of this, national differences in media content – or, for that matter, journalistic cultures and practices – are so much beyond dispute that empirical research aimed simply at proving their existence seems superfluous. The emphasis on testing the existence and relative extent of nationalisation vis-à-vis Europeanisation may have been a valid objective for the first wave of empirical research on the topic, aimed at developing and testing the basic conceptualisations and empirical measurements. Although disputes over appropriate measurements will doubtlessly continue to emerge, there seems now to be sufficient consensus over core issues to move both the conceptual and empirical endeavour further. Within each country, media production and distribution are shaped to address a wide variety of different taste-publics, defined with respect to gender, age, ethnicity, political orientation, religious persuasion, leisure-time preferences etc. It is reasonable to expect that Europeanisation will enter these different sub-national spheres in different ways, and that at least some of these sub-national differences will follow similar patterns across different European states, in spite of national inflections.

One such sub-national cleavage runs along the lines of regional and/or linguistic differences within countries, and is particularly prominent in federalised or culturally
highly diverse countries. Although theoretical discussions of European communication regularly note that some European states are far from conforming to the ideal-typical nation-state (see e.g. Koopmans et al. 2000; Schlesinger 2003: 10 and 25, n3), such acknowledgments are seldom elaborated any further, let alone translated into concrete methodological suggestions. Rare comparative studies that explicitly examine the specificities of European coverage in regional press (Kevin 2003: 57-59, 76-77, 170-171; Tresch and Carolina G. de Miguel’s 2003) suggest that regional media are highly diverse and thus difficult to treat as a unitary block sharing similar characteristics across state, but also that they do indeed develop specific patterns of Europeanisation. In some cases, Europeanisation seems to go hand-in-hand with ‘nation-like’ behaviour of regional media (Kevin 2003), or even fragmentation and polarisation within nations (Tresch and de Miguel 2003). This indicates that Europeanisation is not inflected only by national differences, but by regional specificities as well, thus supporting the argument that studies of European communication should treat regions as important units of analysis. Samples including larger numbers of countries with regional media cultures may also provide greater opportunities for establishing patterns of similarity across particular types of regional media in different countries.

Another, perhaps even more immediately important sub-national media cleavage that requires more sustained attention by media scholars, is the division between elite and popular media (see Slaata 2006: 20 for a similar argument). This division acquires particular significance in the light of theories suggesting that hybrid, supranational or cosmopolitan, and thus also European, forms of identification have an elective affinity with economic liberalism. As such, they are prone to be more widely spread among more affluent social strata, which in turn are more likely to have the necessary forms of capital to practice such identities, as well as profit from them (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999; Friedman 2000; Bauman 2005). Structural patterns of popular attitudes towards European integration appear to support these theories. Although national differences stand out as the most important determining factor, class differences continue to play considerable influence as well. On average, those with higher levels of education, income and social position – that is, precisely those that are likely to profit most from integration and in particular market liberalisation – are generally more supportive of integration (see e.g. Deflem and Pampel 1996; Marks and Hooghe 2003).

It is reasonable to expect that these patterns have their counterpart in the patterns of differences between elite and popular media treatment of European issues. As several authors have noted, genuinely supranational spaces of communication in Europe are limited to a tiny stratum of political and especially economic elites (Schlesinger 1999: 264; Koopmans et al. 2000: 4; Kevin 2003: 38-41). It is also quite clear that elite media provide significantly more coverage of European issues than outlets addressed at mass audiences. Comparative studies have shown that Europe is more often appearing in the press than in television news, that public television channels broadcast more news and programmes related to European issues than their commercial counterparts, or at least give such issues more prominence, and that the amount of tabloid coverage of European issues is on average lower than the amount of coverage in broadsheets (Kevin 2003; Peter et al. 2004; Gleissen and de Vreese 2005: 231; de Vreese et al. 2006). Apart from
differences in the amount of coverage, some recent studies have also produced evidence suggesting that tabloid news coverage of European issues is, on average, more negative, or at the very least less positive, than reporting appearing in broadsheets (Pfetsch 2004: 31-33; de Vreese et al. 2006: 493-495). We can therefore conclude that on the whole, the better educated and higher-income strata of national populations across Europe – precisely the ones that are, as highlighted earlier, more supportive of European integration – are likely to find more, and more positive news on European issues in the media they follow.

We still know rather little, however, about the more qualitative differences between elite and popular media treatment of Europe, for instance differences in framing and discourse, rather then merely amount or tone of coverage. These qualitative differences are particularly important in the light of research that suggests popular attitudes towards European integration cannot be explained solely in terms of rational choices, i.e. by reference to objective factors such as potential gains and losses relative to individual’s socio-economic status. In addition to that, we need to take into account also a host of mediating factors that contribute to the subjective perception of these conditions, including mediated information and public discourse (Mau 2005). In order to do so, however, we need to address questions that go beyond ones usually raised in existing research: besides asking how much Europeanised, or how much Europhilic popular and elite media are, we should also be examining what kinds of interpretations and explanations of European issues they are offering, and to what extent these are amenable to democratisation.

The little evidence we have so far is far from encouraging. A recent comparative analysis of claims-making in newspaper coverage revealed that Europeanisation plays into the hands of elite actors, and among those primarily government and executive actors, while legislative and party actors, and even more so civil society actors, only very rarely gain access to Europeanised public debates (Koopmans 2007). Quite unsurprisingly, those profiting most from the Europeanisation of public communication were also found to be most supportive of European institutions and the integration process. Another recent study, examining the newspaper coverage of debates on the EU constitution (Mihelj et al. 2006), also showed that popular and elite outlets filtered the debate in significantly different ways. Similarly as general broadsheets, popular newspapers paid substantial attention to arguments in favour of a stronger, federal Europe, as well as counterarguments fuelled by fears over the weaning of nation-states and national identities, and finally to debates over the lack of democratic legitimacy. However, they less often reported on the politico-economic side of the discussion, namely the debate between economic liberals and welfare state proponents. Important differences appeared also between general broadsheets and financial newspapers: the latter paid

6 Quite unsurprisingly, these patterns of differences in media content also coincide with differences in journalistic routines and values found among media professionals working for elite and popular media. The generally much lower, and more negative amount of coverage of European issues in popular media is in line both with ‘secularised’ professional imaginaries of their journalists (cf. Heikkilä and Kunelius 2006), as well as with the fact that these media have fewer specialist correspondents in Brussels and more generally fewer institutional links at the supra-national levels (Statham 2004).
much more attention to economic liberal arguments, considerably less often discussed federalist positions, and almost completely ignored arguments about the democratic deficit as well as arguments in favour of a stronger welfare state. In sum, precisely those audiences who are likely to be most immediately affected by the outcome of the debate over the future of welfare state in Europe – either by gaining most (economic elites) or by loosing most (lower social strata) – were given comparatively less, or at least much less balanced information on the topic. Results of these two studies clearly indicate that a simple increase in the amount of European coverage will not necessarily help overcome EU’s legitimacy crisis. If filters uncovered here are endemic to media coverage of European issues on the whole – and it seems reasonable to expect that they are – greater presence of European topics in national media systems across Europe can only lead to the deepening of the current democratic deficit. This is reason enough to conclude that future research on European communication should pay more sustained attention to the class-inflected politics of representation of European issues, rather than dwelling solely on national differences.

Conclusions

This paper pointed to some of the recurring blind-spots of existing research on European communication, and suggested venues for future exploration that so far attracted little, if any attention. It was argued that studies of public communication in Europe are often haunted by a set of problematic assumptions about the relationship between the European and the national. These assumptions are closely related to a long-established pattern of thinking about public communication’s role in social integration. For well over half a century, studies of communication and social integration have been focussed primarily on what is going on on the inside of respective (usually national) communicative spaces, and assumed that social integration necessarily entails the creation of internally homogenous communicative spaces, coextensive with the borders of the (national) polity. Although researchers of European communication are aware of some of these flaws, and are for example weary of projecting the nation-state ideals of public communication onto the European level, some problematic aspects of the old approach continue to persist. In the large majority of cases, studies are limited to materials from European states only, thus automatically precluding an empirical exploration of competing, non-European patterns of transnational convergences. Furthermore, research is usually restricted to the post-Cold War period, takes almost no notice of earlier waves of Europeanisation in the public communication sector, and hence overlooks historical legacies that continue to affect contemporary forms of European communication. Finally, the prevailing conceptualisations and empirical analyses of European communication also tend to gloss over sub-national cleavages. As a rule, Europeanization is seen primarily, and often exclusively, as a development that affects nationally and territorially defined communicative spaces, while sub-national (and potentially cross-national) communicative patterns in Europe, arising along major social cleavages such as those of gender, ethnicity or class, are accorded only scant attention. In order to be able to address this problem, media scholars should avoid thinking about European communication solely in relation to national public spheres and national identities. Instead, we should also pay sustained attention to non-national forms of stratification of public
communication, and the ways in which they relate to inequalities arising along the lines of class, ethnic, gender and other social cleavages.
References:


