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The Media and the Symbolic Geographies of Europe:
The Case of Yugoslavia

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Introduction
Following the dramatic reconfiguration of the map of Europe after 1989, scholars dedicated considerable attention to questioning the seemingly neutral categories used to define the borders of Europe and European regions and cultures. ‘Balkan culture’ – just as ‘European’, ‘Western’ or ‘Eastern’ culture – was no longer conceived purely in terms of objective criteria, but also as “an argument over meanings and definitions, advanced by particular people, in particular places, for particular purposes [...] and reconfigured in response to changing social, cultural and political processes” (Bracewell and Drace-Francis, 1999, pp. 56). Often inspired by Edward Said’s influential study of the Western conceptions of the Orient (1978) – but for the most part also well aware of the limitations of applying Said’s approach to the Balkans – historians, anthropologists and political scientists have produced a number of detailed studies exploring the historical formation and variegated uses of Western perceptions of the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and other regions designated as ‘Eastern’ (cf. Corn, 1991, 2003; Allcock and Young, 1992; Wolff, 1994, 2001; Todorova, 1997; Gingrich, 1998; Goldsworthy, 1998; Norris, 1999; Neumann, 1999; Jezernik, 2004). Taken-for-granted mental mappings were dismantled as human constructions, developed only in the modern era; the habit of seeing Europe as divided into Eastern and Western Europe became a commonplace in the Enlightenment period, replacing the earlier division of Europe into the South and the North (cf. Wolff, 1994), while the discourse of Balkanism as a place of disorder, decay, underdevelopment, violence and totalitarian measures was formed over the course of two centuries and crystallised with the Balkan wars and World War I (cf. Todorova, 1997). It has been repeatedly asserted that the choice of criteria used to define
borders and differences between regions such as Eastern and Western Europe, or Central Europe and the Balkans, is never neutral. Instead, it is guided by particular ideologies and supported by (and supportive of) specific relationships of domination and subordination in the international political arena. For example, the various historical definitions of the Balkans were criticised for their inclination to represent the Balkans in terms of their similarity to or deviation from Europe, associating them with backwardness and barbarity and subordinating them to the developed and civilised Europe, thus justifying the existing relationships between Western European and Balkan states in a particular period (cf. Todorova, 1997, Bracewell and Drace-Francis, 1999).

While the majority of these studies has focussed almost exclusively on the ways Western European authors imagine the Balkans and the East, some scholars have pointed to the fact that these symbolic geographies are far from being an exclusively Western European product. Instead, they are often (re-)produced locally, within the despised regions themselves, whose inhabitants tend to internalise the categories applied to them by their Western observers, or use them to distinguish themselves from the inhabitants of neighbouring states (Bakiæ-Hayden and Hayden, 1992, Bakiæ-Hayden, 1995; Todorova, 1997; Norris, 1999; Goldsworthy, 1999; Iordanova, 2000, 2001; Bjelæ and Savie, 2002). The symbolic geographies gaining ground in socialist Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and proliferating in the successor-states after its disintegration are a case in point. In their pioneering essay, Milica Bakiæ Hayden and Robert M. Hayden highlight several statements of Slovenian and Croatian public figures to demonstrate how they were involved in constructing a chain of ‘nesting Orientalisms’, claiming “a privileged ‘European’ status for some groups in the country while condemning others as ‘Balkan’ or ‘Byzantine’, hence non-European and Other” (Bakiæ Hayden and Hayden, 1992, pp. 5). Following their arguments, several scholars have set out to explore the appropriations and uses of the East/West and Europe/Balkans dichotomies among peoples once sharing a common Yugoslav state, mostly focussing on Croatia or Serbia (Buden, 1997, 2000; Œolovie, 1997; Rihtman-Avgustin, 2000 [1997]; Guzina, 1999; Jansen, 2001a; Živkovic, 2001; Šakaja, 2001, 2003; Czerwiński, 2003; Lindstrom and Razsa, 2004; Volèi, 2005) and, to a lesser extent, Slovenia (Patterson, 2003, Mihelj, 2004a) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Helms, 2004).

When looking for examples of local appropriations of various symbolic geographies in the territory of former Yugoslavia, authors often turn to the media – either to the mass media such as the daily and weekly press or television and radio news programmes, or to media with somewhat more limited audiences such as cultural and scientific journals,
collections of essays, travelogues and memoirs. However, they virtually never reflect on the characteristics of sources used, for example their range of distribution and audiences, and on what this can reveal about the potential impact of particular appropriations of symbolic geographies within the larger society. For example, the fact that a specific mental mapping is used or discussed in a cultural or scientific journal cannot be seen as a confirmation of the thesis that this particular mapping holds a hegemonic position in the whole society. Furthermore, even if one finds firm evidence of a widespread use of a particular symbolic mapping in the mainstream mass media, this does not provide many clues about whether and how this mapping is used and appropriated among the wider population on a day-to-day basis. In existing examinations of symbolic geographies in Yugoslavia, such considerations are almost non-existent, and investigations of mental maps shared by the wider population are extremely rare (see Šakaja, 2001 for an exception). For the most part, authors tend to draw strong conclusions about the hegemonic status of particular mental mappings without ever expressing doubts about the representativeness of their sources and samples. Lately, some authors have explicitly argued against the tendency to treat Balkanist and similar discourses as all-pervasive, persistent and uniform, and called for more attention to be paid to “those countervailing forces that may curb the power of rhetoric with aspirations to hegemony” (Patterson, 2003, pp. 141). If this is to be achieved, more thought will have to be given to the selection of sources, and to those characteristics of sources that may affect the formation, proliferation, reification or negotiation of particular symbolic geographies.

In an attempt to fill a part of this gap, this chapter first provides a brief summary of existing investigations of symbolic geographies in Yugoslav republics (and later independent states), identifying frequently discussed aspects as well as those which have not yet received enough attention. Then it addresses the question of whether, how and to what extent particular media have supported the spreading of symbolic geographies analysed in existing studies. The chapter does this by discussing the institutional arrangements of the Yugoslav mass media (press, radio and television), looking at how they might have contributed to the success of these symbolic geographies, but also how they may have countered the (re)production of such symbolic geographies, and were overlooked in existing studies. Then it examines a range of ‘media’ in a wider sense of the word that have participated in the formulation, appropriation and negotiation of various symbolic geographies. After investigating cultural journals and films – the media that have already been considered as sites of (re)production and negotiation of symbolic geographies – it concludes by considering
means of communication whose role in the formulation and appropriation of symbolic geographies has not yet been fully acknowledged: music, food, and street names.

An overview of existing studies of symbolic geographies of Yugoslavia and successor states, 1980s-1990s: main issues and omissions

In the course of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars, the existing network of collective identifications, including collective memories and collective attachments to space, changed substantially. Before the 1980s, the symbolic divisions of Yugoslavia into its Western and Eastern (or, even more often, Northern and Southern) parts were not seen as insurmountable. Each republic and province was seen as an integral part of Yugoslavia, and thus as a component of a compact spatial and cultural unit that, albeit internally diverse, actually shared a recognizable common identity: it was neither Western nor Eastern. The positioning of Yugoslavia as neither-Western-nor-Eastern penetrated into various levels of public discourses in the federation, and various spheres of Yugoslav culture, politics and society were envisaged in terms of their proximity to and distance from both East and West. Particularly with the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s, the neither-Eastern-nor-Western positioning became one of the central elements of the socialist Yugoslav political identity and one of the defining traits of the Yugoslav foreign policy (Petkoviæ, 1986). Furthermore, the distinguishing feature of the socialist Yugoslav economy (in the official jargon: self-management), in which business was run in the form of cooperatives, was thought of as combining elements of both Soviet (i.e. Eastern) economic statism as well as the Western free market economy (cf. Sirc, 1979). Finally, even the descriptions of the Yugoslav media were sometimes framed in terms of their neither-Eastern-nor-Western character. Pedro Ramet, for example, opened his chapter on the socialist Yugoslav press with the following assertion: “Like Yugoslavia itself, the Yugoslav press is neither of the East nor of the West,” (Ramet, 1985b, pp. 100).

In the late 1980s, this particular positioning, coupled with the image of Yugoslavia as characterized by unity-in-diversity, was gradually disappearing. Rather than being a source of pride, the internal diversity of Yugoslavia was, among political elites in Slovenia and Croatia, increasingly seen as an obstacle to its further development, and Yugoslavia itself begun to be perceived as an unviable mixture of incompatible civilisations or cultures: the Western and the Eastern one, the European and the Balkan one. Milica Bakia-Hayden has
summarized this change at the level of symbolic geography and its impact in the following way: As a political entity, the former Yugoslavia encompassed traditional dichotomies such as East/West and their nesting variants (Europe/Asia, Europe/Balkans, Christian/Muslim), largely neutralizing their usual valorization. With the destruction of this neutralizing framework, the revalorisation of these categories, now oppositions rather than simply differences, has resulted in the destruction of the living communities that transcended them. (Bakiæ-Hayden, 1995, pp. 927) However, this transformation did not occur in the form of a linear, unequivocal development, nor was it ever complete. Rather, as becomes evident from a careful consideration of examples quoted in various studies of symbolic geographies in the region, a range of distinct labels and dichotomies was used to draw a number of differently positioned symbolic borders; these labels, dichotomies and borders were invested with a wide array of meanings; and finally, they were not only used to draw distinctions between, but also within particular (formerly) Yugoslav nations. Without aiming to be exhaustive, these variations can be divided into four main groups:

(a) geographical labels and dichotomies: East vs. West, Eastern Europe vs. Western Europe, Europe vs. the Balkans, Europe vs. South-Eastern Europe; Europe vs. Asia, Central Europe vs. the Balkans, Central Europe vs. Eastern Europe, Mediterranean vs. the Balkans etc.;
(b) political borders seen as dividing lines between Europe and the Balkans, West and East etc.: the border between Slovenia and Croatia, the border between Croatia and Serbia, the border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro, the border between Vojvodina and the rest of Serbia, the border between Serbia and Bulgaria, Romania and Albania;
(c) intra-national divisions seen as running in parallel to symbolic geographical divisions: the rural/urban divide, divisions between different political options within the same state;
(d) meanings and values attached to geographical labels: Europe as a symbol of civilisation vs. Europe as a symbol of decadence, Balkans as a symbol of barbarism vs. Balkans as a symbol of vitality, Europe as a union of nations vs. Europe as a union of states.

In existing studies, by far the most often discussed mappings are those employing the dichotomies Europe vs. the Balkans and Central Europe vs. the Balkans. Several authors have argued that in particular Slovenia and Croatia have reserved the labels Europe or Central Europe for themselves, disparaging the rest of the former Yugoslavia as Balkan (Guzina, 1999; Buden, 2000; Rihtman-Avguštin, 2000 [1997]; Lindstrom and Razsa, 2004). While most studies have focussed exclusively on examples where the symbolic division is drawn in an unambiguous manner, some attempts have recently been made to identify cases where
such mappings were disputed; for example, it was shown that several Slovenian intellectuals disputed the labelling of Slovenia as Central European (Patterson, 2003, pp. 119-121), and that in the months preceding the plebiscite for Slovenian independence in 1990, there was some evidence of newspaper articles explicitly countering the Balkanist discourse (Mihelj, 2004b, pp. 214). Other symbolic geographical labels have received far less attention, although there is reason to suspect that some of them – in particular the North vs. South division – were a common element of everyday conversations, and were not, like the discussions about Central Europe, Europe and the Balkans, limited to intellectual and political elites. As Zlatko Skrbiš (1999) argued, the notion of the ‘Southerner’ was used extensively in Slovenia to refer to people from other former Yugoslav republics, and the South “has been commonly perceived in a symbolic fashion as the personification of economic underdevelopment, hot-bloodedness and, most often, otherness” (Skrbiš, 1999, pp. 121).

The shifting nature of symbolic borders is another often raised issue in existing examinations of symbolic geographies in Yugoslavia. As several authors argued, the opinion-leaders in virtually each Yugoslav republic and province aimed to portray themselves and their co-nationals as authentically European, and presented the federal unit located towards the East or South as comparably less European and more Balkan. The often-quoted ironic excerpt from Slavoj Žižek’s *The Fragile Absolute* captures the logic of this chain-reaction very well:

For the Serbs, [the Balkans] begin down there, in Kosovo or in Bosnia, and they defend the Christian civilisation against this Europe’s Other; for the Croats, they begin in orthodox, despotic and Byzantine Serbia, against which Croatia safeguards Western democratic values; for Slovenes it begins in Croatia and we are the last bulwark of the peaceful *Mitteleuropa*; for many Italians and Austrians they begin in Slovenia, the Western outpost of the Slavic hordes; for many Germans, Austria itself, because of its historical links, is already tainted with Balkan corruption and insufficiency; for many North Germans, Bavaria, with its Catholic provincial flair, is not free of a Balkan contamination … (Žižek, 2000, pp. 3-4)

Such uses of Europe and the Balkans undeniably present yet another extension of the dark side of the history of the idea of Europe: a history of division and exclusion rather than unity and inclusion (cf. Delanty, 1995). But however amusing, accounts such as Žižek’s fail to acknowledge that within individual states, symbolic geographies were used in a number of
different ways, and were invested with a wide range of meanings and values. For example, divisions such as Europe vs. the Balkans would often be applied to divisions within particular nations, thus carving them into a European part and a Balkan part. Frequently, such a use of this symbolic geography would coincide with the rural/urban divide in the country (cf. Rihtman-Auguštin, 2000 [1997], pp. 227-228; Jansen, 2001b, pp. 51; Norris, 1999, pp. 163; Helms, 2004, pp. 12-14; Volèiè, 2005), while in other cases, the label Balkan would be applied to political enemies, be it nationalists or anti-nationalists (cf. Rihtman-Auguštin, 2000 [1997], pp. 218-219; Jansen, 2001a, pp. 7-9), including Croatian communists such as Tito (Jansen, 2001a, pp. 6).

Another aspect that has not yet received enough attention is the variation in the meanings and values attached to different geographical labels within the same states. Most studies remain limited to the examination of the uses of Europe as a symbol of everything valuable and desirable, and as a chief instrument of exclusion. Milica Bakiæ-Hayden’s approach is a case in point; according to her, “the symbolic power of ‘Europe’ to represent ‘civilised’, ‘enlightened’ or ‘progressive’ in Yugoslav debates created a standard against which peripheral European countries could judge their multiple selves in competition against each other” (Bakiæ-Hayden, 1995, pp. 927). Although it is true that the idea of Europe “has become a political football by which groups can distinguish themselves from others,” (Delanty, 1995, pp. 135), this has not been the only use of Europe (and associated dichotomies such as Europe vs. Balkans) within Yugoslavia. The symbolic geographies circulating in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s are a case in point; although Serbs can and sometimes do present themselves as European and/or transfer the stigma of being Balkan to their neighbours, they far more often employ a rhetorical strategy of self-balkanisation or self-exoticisation, applying the Balkan stigma to themselves, and thus agreeing that they are wild, uncivilised, primitive, violent, irrational, passionate etc. However, in such cases, the characteristics associated with the Balkans are often charged with a positive value: the wildness, barbarity, passions, primitiveness etc. are presented as precious features which the peaceful, civilised, cold-blooded and decadent Europe misses (Živkoviæ, 2001, pp. 12-15; Jansen, 2001, pp. 12-14; Helms, 2004, pp. 13; Volèiè, 2005, pp. 164).

This duality in the symbolic portrayal of the Balkans is, as a rule, matched by a duality in the symbolic portrayal of Europe. For example, Ivan Èoloviæ (1997, pp. 43) argued that in Serbia, “the mythical image of the West as the embodiment of justice, culture and prosperity, within which the Balkans and Serbia in the Balkans acquire the infamous role of
the symbol of underdevelopment, primitivism and barbarity” was paralleled by the resurgence of the belief that contemporary Europe has succumbed to the temptations of humanism and materialism and that in fact, the Serbs are the only true heirs and guardians of the authentic European values (see Volêiè 2005 for a detailed examination of such understandings among young Serbian intellectuals). In Croatia, too, Europe would quite often be portrayed in overtly negative tones; especially after it became obvious that Western Europe did not intend to enter the Yugoslav wars as Croatia’s ally, Europe ceased to function as an unambiguously positive symbol. Similarly as in Serbia, Europe was believed to be corrupted by materialism and consumerism, while Croatia was thought of as a true hero and a martyr, a country which is yet again sacrificing itself for Europe, in order to defend its true values (Christianity) from the onslaught of the East (Islam) (Buden, 2000). Finally, such resentment towards Europe would occasionally surface in Slovenia as well. For example, in the late spring of 1992, when Slovenia had to cope with increasing numbers of war refugees from Bosnia, and Western countries were unwilling to intervene, Europe was represented as extremely irresponsible and accused of betraying its own values and rules (Mihelj, 2004b, pp. 297-302).

Finally, the notion of Europe as a union of nations, or more precisely nationally homogeneous states, can also be identified in existing discourse. Within Slovenia and Croatia, the disintegration of multinational Yugoslavia and the creation of nationally homogeneous states was often presented as an unavoidable part of becoming European, and thus – given the symbolic values usually attached to Europe – of becoming civilised and modern. Precisely at the moment when Europe was striving to transcend the nation-state model, the political elites in Slovenia and Croatia have come to equate Europeanisation with the formation of nationally homogeneous states (cf. Mihelj, 2004b, pp. 208-209). Obviously, such an understanding of Europe required the elimination of Yugoslavia and all the layers of identification and attachment that were not compatible with the nation-state model. The new supranational collective attachment to Europe could only be established if the previous supranational collective attachment to Yugoslavia was abolished, and the state structure supporting it disintegrated.

The Mass Media Institutions in Socialist Yugoslavia: Decentralisation as a Guarantee of Democracy or a Prelude to Disintegration?
Arguably, the institutional arrangement of the mass media in Yugoslavia rendered the media very open to embracing the symbolic geography that divided Yugoslavia into incompatible geo-cultural zones and, ultimately, into individual nation-states. At least two major reasons can be identified: (a) the fact that the Yugoslav media were conceived primarily as crucial propaganda and educational institutions supporting the views of the governing elites, and not as public forums where different opinions could be openly confronted, and (b) the fact that the Yugoslav media system was heavily decentralised and included only a very limited number of pan-Yugoslav media.

The mass media in socialist Yugoslavia were – in tune with what came to be known as ‘the Leninist theory of the press’ – conceived primarily as propaganda and educational institutions, and not as public forums where different opinions could be openly confronted. The constitutionally guaranteed “freedom of the press and other media of information and public expression” had clear limits (cf. Thompson, 1994, pp. 8-10), and combined with a high level of self-censorship, resulted in a culture inside of which journalists were used to being the loud-speakers of political authorities; once these started employing the new symbolic geography, most of the mass media followed suit.

One certainly needs to acknowledge that the Yugoslav media were more abundant, varied and unconstrained than in any other state in the Eastern block (Thompson, 1994, pp 5), and that in particular the Yugoslav press has repeatedly resisted or circumvented political controls, endeavouring to “expand the sphere of its legitimate activity, even to the point of criticising the government itself” (Ramet, 1985b, pp. 101). However, due to the particular way in which the media system was decentralised, a large proportion of these criticisms took the form of a conflict between a particular Yugoslav republic or province (or its political elite) and the federal government, and for the most part, different views were not confronted in a single public sphere, but coexisted in different, separated public spheres.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the political power in Yugoslavia was devolved from the central (federal) organs to the six republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia), two autonomous provinces within Serbia (Kosovo and Vojvodina), and their respective branches of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. At the same time, the media were also decentralised: each republic and province had its own major daily newspaper, its own radio and television centre, as well as several regional newspapers, radio stations and weekly magazines, which effectively functioned as forums for the discussion of views held by respective republican or provincial elites. Only a small number of the media, with very limited audiences, would address the population of the
federation as a whole. While it is true that such an organisation of the media system led to a situation where, as Pedro Ramet (1985b, pp. 102) argued, “diametrically opposed viewpoints [could] be found in the daily papers of the different republics on a recurrent basis”, one can not agree with the claim that such a federalisation of the press “contributes to the openness by undermining central direction and by getting people accustomed to seeing different interpretations voiced in the press”. The decentralisation of the Yugoslav media system has indeed provided opportunities for the constitution of a number of distinct and differently oriented public forums, yet it needs to be kept in mind that these forums were not equally accessible to the whole of the Yugoslav population, and did not provide an opportunity for different views to be read, listened to or discussed by the same population. With the exception of a couple of pan-Yugoslav media, the mass media in Yugoslavia were controlled at the republican or provincial level, increasingly geared for republican or provincial audiences, and distributed and consumed within the particular republic or province.

Furthermore, in most republics, especially the ethnically most homogeneous ones, these audiences would to a large extent correspond to particular Yugoslav nations. To put it differently: various Yugoslav nations had come to constitute exclusive imagined communities of the various republican/provincial media long before there were any visible signs of the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Vogrinc, 1996, pp. 13), and the banal nationalism (Billig, 1995) had long been built into the repetitive forms of press, radio and television in particular republics. Keeping this in mind, Gertrude J. Robinson’s (1977, pp. 192-199) interpretation of the diversity of opinions in the Yugoslav media seems to be more correct than the one given by Ramet: “In this country’s multinational setting, content is selected with ethnic priorities in mind; this tends to encourage regionalism and fosters hermetic points. […] These could be potentially destructive of federal unity by undermining the search for and definition of mutually acceptable political alternatives.”

One could hardly ignore the role of existing institutional arrangements of the mass media in socialist Yugoslavia for the spread of symbolic geographies that went against the notion of a common Yugoslav geo-cultural space. However, such uses were not inevitable, and moreover, not all the mass media were equally open to such uses. Firstly, the overlapping of republican mass media audiences and individual Yugoslav nations was far from perfect. Particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where no clear national majority was in place, it was virtually impossible to address the whole audience in nationalist terms, as a homogeneous nation. Furthermore, regardless of the ethnic composition, not all the mass media in particular republics would be equally prone to endorse the new, exclusivist symbolic geography; at
least some media would, as a rule, subvert such geographies or support different ones. And
finally, besides the republican mass media, which were more prone to endorsing the new
symbolic geography, the Yugoslav media landscape also included a number of pan-Yugoslav
media: the daily *Borba* [Struggle], the news agency *Tanjug*, the *Radio Yugoslavia* and the
short-lived TV station *Yutel*. These media could address the members of various nations as
Yugoslavs and could foster their attachment to a common, Yugoslav space. One could thus
expect these media to adopt an alternative symbolic geography of Yugoslavia, one which
envisaged Yugoslavia as a whole as a future member of the European community of states.

Still, one should also acknowledge that these pan-Yugoslav media were rare and did
not attract a wide audience. Thus, most of information issued by federal bodies, which
largely countered the disintegration and supported a vision of Europe that included the whole
of Yugoslavia, did not reach the audiences through the federal media, but through republican
ones, who would regularly criticise and delegitimise ideas fostered by the federal bodies (cf.
Mihelj, 2004b, pp. 221-222 for the case of Slovenia). The fate of *Yutel*, the only pan-
Yugoslav TV station, established in 1990, is a case in point. Due to severe budgetary
limitations, *Yutel* had to rely on the technical as well as political support of television centres
in other republics and provinces. Most of the time, the majority of republican and provincial
TV centres declined *Yutel*’s offer to broadcast its programmes on any of its channels, and
even when they accepted, they tended to broadcast *Yutel*’s programmes outside of prime-
time, and on channels whose signals did not cover the whole territory of a particular republic
(Thompson, 1994, pp. 38-49). Moreover, *Yutel*’s news items were regularly criticised and
ridiculed by republican TV news; they claimed *Yutel*’s reports were being biased in favour of
another republic’s point of view (cf. Kurspahiæ, 2003, pp. 69). Arguably, the re-framing of
*Yutel*’s reporting through the particular republican mass media, in combination with *Yutel*’s
limited coverage, importantly diminished the already limited influence of *Yutel*’s narratives,
geographies, and collective identifications. Therefore, its representations of Europe and
Yugoslavia and the concomitant collective attachments, just as representations produced by
the other federal media, could hardly rival those offered by the mainstream republican or
regional media in each particular republic or regions. Furthermore, as most federal media
(with the exception of *Yutel*) were based in Belgrade, they were, from 1987 onwards,
exposed to the pressures of Miloševiæ’s regime, and after a period of resistance, mostly
succumbed to them (cf. Nenadoviæ, 2000 [1996]). Finally, the reach of collective
representations offered by the various independent opposition media inside individual
republics – such as *Radio B92* and the TV station *Studio B* in Belgrade or *Radio 101* in
Zagreb – was also very limited. Although representations provided by these media should not be ignored – since they may show that nationalist, Balkanist and other discourses were not as homogeneous and all-pervasive as is sometimes suggested – it also has to be admitted that until political control exerted over them was eased, they could not seriously rival the mainstream ones.

**A Wider Conception of the ‘Media’**

Radio, television and the periodical press provided the main forums within which the new symbolic geography was negotiated, solidified and reified as a regular frame of political and intellectual discourse. However, the gradual formulation of the new symbolic geography, its inculcation into everyday practices, as well as its various appropriations and negotiations – including explicit rejections –, often took place outside of the mass media. In order to gain insight into these aspects of the development and spread of the new symbolic geography, one needs to take into account a whole range of media in the wider sense of the word: fiction books, theatre plays, collections of poems, cultural journals, music, street names, monuments, stamps, state symbols, food etc. Each of these media played a particular role in the process – some of them being crucial for the initial formulation of the new symbolic geography, others for its final reification.

Although this thesis would need additional empirical investigation, there is enough evidence to suggest that the media produced by intellectuals – literary works, theatre plays as well as essays published in cultural journals – were among those media where the new symbolic geography of Yugoslavia was first formulated. Several authors have argued that it was in the field of cultural production that the legitimacy of the socialist Yugoslavia was first shaken, thus preparing the grounds for similar changes to take place in other fields, including politics. According to Pedro Ramet (1985a), a veritable ‘apocalypse culture’ developed in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Associated with “pessimism, gloom, resignation, escapism of various kinds, and a feverish creativity”, as well as “normlessness and anomie”, this culture was characterised by an “openness to radically new formulas”, springing from the sense that the Yugoslav system “has arrived at a historical turning point, that it is, so to speak, at the ‘end of time’” (Ramet, 1985a, pp. 3). Contributors to this apocalypse culture – writers, poets, theatre directors, intellectuals, even politicians – saw themselves as social critics, voicing criticisms of the system, or as prophets, warning of dangers ahead and offering new visions of the
future. Through various forms of cultural production, a mixture of different diagnoses and prophetic visions was offered, ranging from fiercely nationalist to entirely a-nationalist ones, and some of them included elements of the divisive symbolic geography that was to become so widespread in the years to come.

From the mid-1980s, poets, writers and intellectuals in Slovenia have been discussing Slovenia’s links with Central Europe in various cultural journals (Naša sodobnost [Our Contemporary Times], Naši razgledi [Our Views], Primorska srečanja [Encounters of the Littoral] and others), and organising the annual literary festival Vilenica in order to put Slovenia on the cultural map of Central Europe. Finally, the cultural journal Nova revija [New Review] published the Contributions for the Slovenian National Program (1987), a collection of essays written by writers, poets and other intellectuals professing an independent Slovenia, most of them underpinned by a clearly nationalist mind-set (Mihelj, 2004b, pp. 162-167). The journal also provided many examples of the harshest variant of the Slovenian derogatory attitudes towards the Balkans (Patterson, 2003, pp. 118). In Serbia, a similar role in the crystallisation of the new geopolitical positioning of Serbia was played by among others, Književne novine [Literary Newspaper] and Duga. However, as Patterson (2003, pp. 119) rightly warns, one should be ware of assuming that the symbolic geographies used in these journals were monolithic; even in Nova revija, Balkanism was not a uniform and all-pervasive strategy. Furthermore, it may well be that other cultural or scientific journals and similar outlets – for example, those which did not wholeheartedly embrace nationalism and virtually never appear among sources used in existing studies of symbolic geographies in the region – were entirely devoid of such Balkanist mappings, or perhaps even openly critical of them.

Besides the media and cultural products created by and aiming at highly educated and profiled audiences, other, more popular or more widely consumed forms of cultural production can also be considered as a site where the old spatial attachments (along with collective memories and collective identifications in the wider sense) were being challenged and renegotiated: music, films, TV shows and series, street names and monuments, state symbols, bank notes, stamps, and even restaurant menus. Interestingly, it is precisely those authors who have examined popular cultural forms who have most often pointed out that the stigma of the Balkans is not always transferred to the neighbours, and that the label ‘Balkan’ is not necessarily associated with negative characteristics. Instead, it is sometimes consciously and explicitly accepted as a valid self-designation and even associated with positive values and represented as an object of desire. Unfortunately, out of all the diverse
popular cultural forms, only film has received a fair measure systematic treatment in existing literature on the topic. According to Dina Iordanova (2001, pp. 61), the preferred mode of self-expression from many Balkan film-makers producing their films in the 1990s was a specific voluntary ‘self-exoticism’: “the ‘otherness’ of the Balkans, which may have originated in the West, is gradually taken up and internalised by local directors who claim to represent the Balkans ‘from within’”. One of the traits of films by Balkan film-makers where such self-exoticisation becomes clearly evident is, to her view, the narrative structure. According to her analysis, a number of films is structured around the same plot, drawing on the travelogue tradition and on the figure of the visiting Western protagonist, depicting “well-balanced and presumably sane Westerners who venture into the Balkan realm of barbarity”.

Other popular, widely consumed cultural forms have received only cursory treatment in existing studies of symbolic geographies in the region, but promise to be a rich source; one of them is music. As Alexander Kiossev argued, both in the territory of former Yugoslavia as well as in other Balkan states, the 1990s saw an unprecedented rise in the popularity of certain types of rock and folk music (or a mixture of both), which successfully replaced English and American music in clubs and pubs: turbo folk and Yugo-rock in Yugoslavia, chalga and folk music in Bulgaria, menale in Romania. According to him, these elements of popular culture actually “turn the [...] picture of the Balkans upside down and convert the stigma into a joyful consumption of pleasures forbidden by European norms and taste. Contrary to the traditional dark image, this popular culture arrogantly celebrates the Balkans as they are: backward and Oriental, corporeal and semi-rural, rude, funny, but intimate” (Kiossev, 2002, pp. 182-183).

However, it also needs to be noted that the self-exoticisation apparent in films and music has not always been embraced wholeheartedly. For example, in the 1990s, when the neo-folk and turbo folk music in Serbia was increasingly associated with nationalist mobilisation and was even openly supported by the regime, one of the central traits of Belgrade rock groups was their aversion towards this type of music. Among rock groups and their fans, rock music and culture were associated with the positive values usually attached to Europe, thus to an extent perpetuating the symbolic value associated with rock music in the 1970s. Unlike some of their predecessors in the 1980s, who have experimented with mixing rock and folk music (cf. Ramet, 2002, pp. 135-136), these bands have rejected any association between the two music styles. As Eric D. Gordy argued, “in contrast to its ascribed cultural value in most parts of Western Europe and America, rock and roll is perceived by Belgraders as high art and implicitly opposed to neofolk, which is regarded as
‘Balkan’ and ‘primitive’” (Gordy, 1999, pp. 144). Such a symbolic mapping of neofolk was shared by a large part of the urban population in Belgrade, and supported also by anti-Milošević radio stations such as B92, which refused to broadcast neofolk music. Obviously, neofolk was (and continues to be) yet another element of popular culture in the territory of former Yugoslavia which serves as a site where attachments to specific symbolic geographies are contested.

Another group of media (in a wider sense of the word) that have played an important role in spreading and contesting the new geo-cultural attachments, but have not received enough attention in existing studies, relate to food: menus in restaurants and hotels, verbal descriptions of food or references to particular dishes appearing in the various media from magazines to graffiti. Although there is no essential national cuisine, food can have a key role to play in nationalist sentiments, with invasions of ‘foreign food’ treated as dangerous to the national identity or celebrated for their exotic difference (Bell and Valentine, 1997). During the disintegration of Yugoslavia, a range of examples could be quoted to demonstrate such disparate uses of food. Just as elsewhere in former socialist/communist states, political changes were paralleled by a massive proliferation of new restaurants and chains serving dishes that were markedly different from those usually consumed within Yugoslavia – for example Chinese restaurants and Northern American-style fast food chains. Yet the enthusiasm accompanying the introduction of these new foodscapes went hand in hand with the accentuation of differences between the South Slav national cuisines and the erasure of regional commonalities, in particular Balkan dishes. In Serbia, for example, the traditional šopska salad, made of tomatoes, cucumbers, onions and covered with grated cheese, well known in the wider Balkan region, was renamed into ‘Serbian salad with cheese’. In Croatia, on the other hand, various grilled meat dishes characteristic of the Balkan region were no longer sold as Balkan, but as Croatian, and exceptions to this unwritten rule would soon be met with sharp criticism. For example, in the summer of 1996, the Croatian weekly Nedeljna Dalmacija shared the shock and disgust of a Croatian minister who found out that the menu of a renown hotel on the Croatian islands of Brioni included also a ‘Balkan plate’ and a ‘Serbian salad’ (cf. Rihtman Auguštin, 2000 [1997], pp. 217). Following a similar logic, virtually all cafes in Zagreb in the 1990s began serving espresso and cappuccino, while Turkish coffee was increasingly hard to find in a public space (Jansen, 2001a, pp. 8). In Belgrade, on the other hand, Turkish coffee would still be widely available in cafes – however, instead of being labelled as Turkish, it would be referred to as ‘usual coffee’ [obiäna kafa] or cooked coffee [kuvana kafa]. A similar aversion to Balkan dishes could be
found in Slovenia too. In a letter sent to the editor of a magazine published in Slovenia, a reader protested against the availability of Balkan dishes in Slovenia and suggested using food as a means of awakening the national consciousness: “Let’s finally get rid of the Balkan ‘grills’ and let us make Slovenian cuisine the awakening of the conscience of those who like to eat and think in a Slovenian way” (quoted in Skrbiš, 1999, pp. 120). Burek, a pastry containing cheese, minced meat or spinach, known throughout the Balkans, was another dish that became stigmatised in the context of Slovenian popular culture. This aversion was clearly expressed in a graffito that appeared in Ljubljana in the late 1980s: “Burek? Nein Danke!” As Mitja Velikonja argued, “the rejection of burek was meant to symbolise the rejection of Yugoslavia, emphasising Slovenia’s differentiation from the other Yugoslav republics, in particular Serbia and Bosnia” (Velikonja, 2002, pp. 95, n32). Still, despite ample evidence of the purification of restaurant menus and national cuisines, and the strict elimination of Balkan dishes and drinks, one should note that these trends did not necessarily affect patterns and habits of eating and drinking in the private sphere. At least some ethnographic data suggest that in their own kitchens, people continued to prepare Turkish coffee and labelled it Turkish, while private picnics are even today unimaginable without èevapèeiæi (meat rolls) and other meat dishes commonly regarded as typically Balkan. As Stef Jansen argued, this could hardly be interpreted as a conscious effort to support a positive image of the Balkans and rebel against the dominant Balkanist discourse; rather, it was simply a matter of continuity—where this was at all possible, people simply continued to live their lives in ways they were used to (Jansen, 2001a, pp. 13).

Another means of communication through which the new symbolic mapping was introduced into the everyday lives of people inhabiting spaces once known as Yugoslavia were street names and monuments. Historically, few major political changes or events have passed by without being inscribed into the urban space via street-naming or monument building, and the creation of new states in the territory of former Yugoslavia is no exception. In the past two decades, several authors have examined the ideological implications of street names (Azaryahu, 1996, 1997; Pinchevski and Torgovnik, 2002). These studies have mostly remained focussed on the exploration of street names as inscriptions of a particular interpretation of history, and thus of a specific collective memory, while no explicit attempt has been made to examine the street names as markers of particular symbolic geographies. The existing investigations of changes in street names during the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the formation of new independent states tend to follow the same format. In fact, most of the changes in street names marked the erasure of the earlier collective memory and the
installation of a new one, and a large part of the new monuments, buildings and street names
commemorated specific historical characters and events hailed by the new reading of history.
The streets and squares once named after heroes, battles or brigades of the National
Liberation Struggle—the struggle that served as the centre-pillar of the socialist Yugoslav
unity—were now named after heroes and historical events linked exclusively to the (re-
written) individual national histories (cf. Rihtman-Auguštin, 2000 [1997], Robinson et al.,
2001). However, these renamings would, albeit in an indirect manner, mark a change in the
symbolic geography as well; by commemorating particular historical events and
personalities, they would simultaneously commemorate also old geopolitical and geocultural
positionings and divisions. In some cases, the new symbolic geography was marked in a
more explicit way too. For example, one of the main roads in Ljubljana, the capital of
Slovenia, was renamed into Dunajska cesta [Vienna Street], thus bringing the old capital
from the period of the Habsburg Empire, and a major point of reference for Central Europe,
back into the everyday landscape of Slovenians. An even more unambiguous examples could
be found in Zagreb, where a cinema, previously known under the name of ‘the Balkans’, was
renamed into ‘Europe’ (cf. Rihtman-Auguštin, 2000 [1997], pp. 11), and where the Federal
Republic of Germany and Vatican appeared in street names, while Belgrade and Moscow
disappeared from them (Šakaja, 2003, pp. 2 ). In Sarajevo, on the other hand, many new
names for streets would commemorate key events and individuals from both the period of the
Ottoman rule as well as the period when Bosnia was under the control of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire (Robinson et al., 2001, pp. 967). In such a way, two alternative symbolic
geographies of Bosnia potentially got inscribed into Sarajevo streets; one positioning Bosnia
as Balkan, the other as European, replicating the ambiguous positioning characteristic of
public discourses in Bosnia.

Since they are subject to recurrent everyday use, street names can serve as particularly
efficient means through which a new imagining of space penetrates into people’s everyday
lives. Arguably, their everyday use and functionality “mask the structures of power and
legitimacy that underlie their construction and use” (Winchester et al., 2003, pp. 74). Or, in
Azaryahu’s phrasing: “The merit of street names is their ability to incorporate an official
version of history into such spheres of human activity that seem to be entirely devoid of
direct political manipulation. This transforms history into a feature of the ‘natural order of
things’ and conceals its contrived character” (Azaryahu, 1997, pp. 481). Yet it needs to be
noted that while changes in street names in the territory of former Yugoslavia were, unlike
the tearing down of old monuments and erecting of new ones, not accompanied by special
public events, they hardly passed by undisputed. The sections of letters to the editor in daily newspapers, for example, often included protests against specific changes in street names. Also, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that new street names have not always become widely accepted, and that local people often tend to use old names long after they have been officially erased. Furthermore, as Laura Šakaja (2003) notes, the naming and renaming of streets involves official ideology, and as such it is not necessarily a good indicator of popular cultural symbolism. In order to get a better insight into the latter, she examines the imaginative mapping apparent in Croatian ergonyms – names of business associations, companies etc. – registered in the telephone directory listings in 2002. Her findings again show an overwhelming presence of references to Europe, and only a negligible number of references to the Balkans: out of 2607 geographic ergonyms, Europe appeared in 358, while the Balkans only in 3. Moreover, ergonyms including names of Western European cities or countries far outnumbered those with names of Eastern European cities or countries.

The list of the media that could provide valuable sources for investigations of various uses and appropriations of symbolic geographies in former Yugoslavia and successor states could certainly be extended much further, and could include cultural products such as radio and TV talk shows, TV series, stamps, banknotes, coats of arms etc. Arguably, these media have been of paramount importance for the introduction of new symbolic geographies into everyday practices and beliefs of common people, as well as for their particular appropriations and negotiations. Although less explicit than the ones appearing in political speeches or highly profiled cultural journals, these symbolic geographies of everyday lives, to paraphrase Hillary P. M. Winchester, Lily Kong and Kevin Dunn (2003), are just as deeply implicated in the maintenance and challenging of symbolic meanings and power relations, and are worth being included into future studies.

Conclusions

Existing examinations of symbolic geographies in Yugoslavia and the new states formed in the region in the 1990s largely ignore the characteristics of sources they use to demonstrate the existence of particular mental mappings. Moreover, they tend to restrict their analysis to a narrow set of geographical labels, their uses and meanings – most often those that bear some resemblance to discourses of Orientalism and Balkanism as identified by Edward Said and Maria Todorova. As such, they do not provide enough sound bases for
generalisations about the use of symbolic geographies among the mass media or political and intellectual elites in particular states, nor can they be used to make claims about the use of symbolic mappings by the whole populations of these states in their everyday lives. On the basis of issues discussed in this chapter, three main strategies can be suggested that may help overcome these weaknesses. Firstly, future investigations should consider a wider range of possible geographical labels, and pay particular attention to meanings and uses that divert from those discussed by Said and Todorova. Secondly, more thought should be given to the selection of sources, and research should include the media that are – following arguments provided above – more likely to yield examples of symbolic geographies that do not conform to the dominant ones: the Yugoslav federal media, the media with an explicitly ant-nationalist stance, various popular cultural forms etc. Thirdly, research should focus on the uses and appropriations of particular symbolic geographies within practices everyday life, looking at whether, how and to what extent have particular mental mappings – communicated through a wide array of the media – become accepted as taken-for granted frames of reference that organise experience on a day-to-day basis.

References


