An analysis of the sport policy process in the Republic of Korea: the cases of elite sport development and sport for all

This item was submitted to Loughborough University's Institutional Repository by the/an author.

Additional Information:

- A Doctoral Thesis. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University.

Metadata Record: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/5886

Publisher: © Eunah Hong

Please cite the published version.
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository (https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the following Creative Commons Licence conditions.

For the full text of this licence, please go to:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
An Analysis of the Sport Policy Process in the Republic of Korea: The Cases of Elite Sport Development and Sport For All

by

Eunah Hong

A doctoral thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

January 2010

© by Eunah Hong
Abstract

This thesis aims to analyse the sport policy process in the Republic of Korea through an examination of the cases of elite sport and sport for all. This study assesses the utility of a number of theoretical frameworks all of which were created either in the North America or Europe. The following macro-level theories are discussed and assessed: Marxism, Elitism and Pluralism. At the meso-level Policy Community (Marsh and Rhodes 1992), Multiple Streams Framework (Kingdon, 1995) and Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkin-Smith, 1999) were investigated and their utility in the Korean context was evaluated.

Two case studies, elite sport and sport for all, were chosen and qualitative research methods were used in order to gather empirical data. A series of forty three semi-structured interviews were undertaken. The first round of interview was conducted between 22nd June 2007 and 11th July 2007 followed by more extensive second round of interviews from 29th November 2007 to 15th June 2008 in Korea. The interviewees included academics, journalists, elite athletes, senior officers in the government and sub-national government, senior officers in national government organisations such as KSC, NACOSA, SOSFO, senior officials in KISS, NGBs, the business sector, the military sector and voluntary organisations such as YMCA. Interview data was supported by extensive analysis of documents including government reports, annual Sport White Papers, newspapers and magazine articles.

One of the central findings is that decision-making in relation to high performance (elite) sport policy is dominated by members of the political, business and military elite. High performance sport decision-making is tightly controlled by the government which has been consistently the core actor in Korea’s elite sport policy process with there being little evidence of civil society involvement. As regard Sport For All, different levels of government and also non-government organisations were involved in promoting Sport For All. However of particular note is the lack of contact and cooperation between the government and other non-government organisations, for example, YMCA in terms of sharing experiences of promoting sport. Despite the involvement of different levels of government and of
non-government organisations policy direction and momentum was largely set by the elite level of central government.

The analysis reveals that elitism is the most appropriate framework to apply in Korean sport policy at the macro-level. As for the meso-level, none of the three frameworks were considered to be particularly useful although Policy Community appeared to be appropriate in the early stage of the research.

**Key words:** sport policy, policy analysis, elitism, elite sport, sport for all, Republic of Korea
Acknowledgements

In producing this PhD thesis, there are a number of people to whom I would like to express my sincere thanks. First and foremost, this thesis would not have been completed without supervision from Professor Barrie Houlihan and Dr. Mahfoud Amara. I would like to thank Barrie not only for his unstinting support, but for providing me with a ‘role model’ of an academic, with his deep knowledge and expertise and generous support whenever necessary. I would also like to thank Mahfoud for his constructive feedback and enthusiasm, encouraging me to push myself to complete this piece of work.

Thanks then go to Professor Ian Henry, who was my director of research. His advice was valuable, which I will always appreciate. I also would like to thank Dr. Paul Downward for his support of an academic nature and when ‘refereeing’, which I often struggled to handle in England.

It is not possible to list all of the other names whom I want to thank. However, I would like to express my thanks to all of the staff in the Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy for their abundant advice regarding my research and life in general, PhD colleagues in the Institute for sharing pleasure and difficulties, especially, during the Friday sessions and coffee break afterwards in the Students Union. Finally, I want to thank my parents whom I love the most and have been my best supporter at all times. Their consistent encouragement and affection were the driving force for me to accomplish this journey.

I wish to express my gratitude to the British Council for awarding me the British Chevening Scholarship in the first year and to the Korea Sports Council for scholarship during the second and third year. Thanks to these financial support, I could conduct a PhD without additional financial concern. I hope that I will be able to contribute to the development of Korean sport policy and play a role in bridging between Korea and the UK in sport related fields in the near future as much as I can.
Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement</td>
<td>iii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>iv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>xiii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations</td>
<td>xiv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 1 Introduction

Research aims, objectives and contexts
Rationale for selecting two case studies and theoretical discussions
Thesis structure

Chapter 2 Historical Review

Introduction
1953-1960: Reconstruction of the nation after the Korean War
Politics
Economics
Culture and Social aspect
Sport
1961-1979: Re-emergence of Nationalism
Politics
Economics
Culture and Social aspect
Sport
Politics
Economics
Culture and Social aspect
Chapter 3  Theorising the Policy Process

Macro Level Theories

Introduction

Marxism

Classical Marxism

Neo-Marxism

Debate between Miliband and Poulantzas

Weaknesses and Strengths

Applicability of Marxism to Korea

Elitism

Classical Elitism

Modern Elitism

Weaknesses and Strengths

Applicability of Elitism to Korea

Pluralism

Classical Pluralism

Neo Pluralism

Weaknesses and Strengths

Applicability of Pluralism to Korea

Power

Lukes’ perspective of power

Foucault’s perspective of power

Structure and Agency

Structurism

Intentionalism

Dialectical Approach
Conclusion

Meso Level Theories
  Introduction
  Multiple Streams Framework
    Weaknesses and Strengths
  Policy Community
    Weaknesses and Strengths
  Advocacy Coalition Framework
    Weaknesses and Strengths
  Conclusion

Chapter 4  Methodology

Introduction
Ontology and Epistemology
Methodological considerations
  Methodology
    Quantitative Research
    Qualitative Research
Research Method
  Case Study Approach
  Documents
  Interview
Data analysis
Reliability and Validity
Research Design

Chapter 5  The Case Study of Elite Sport Development

Development of Elite Sport Policy in Korea
A Review of Elite Sport Policy Research
Elite Sport Policy in Korea
  1960-1979
    Government’s View on Elite Sport
    Government’s Structure and Financing
| Facilities | 163 |
| Sports Science and Coaching | 166 |
| Talent Identification | 170 |
| Competition Structure | 171 |
| Hosting Strategy | 172 |

1980-1992

| Government’s View on Elite Sport | 174 |
| Government’s Structure and Financing | 175 |
| Facilities | 178 |
| Sports Science and Coaching | 185 |
| Talent Identification | 191 |
| Competition Structure | 192 |
| Hosting Strategy | 193 |
| Role of Businesses | 194 |
| Role of Armed Forces | 196 |

1993-2009

| Government’s View on Elite Sport | 198 |
| Government’s Structure and Financing | 198 |
| Facilities | 200 |
| Sports Science and Coaching | 215 |
| Talent Identification | 219 |
| Competition Structure | 226 |
| Hosting Strategy | 231 |
| Role of Businesses | 234 |
| Role of Armed Forces | 236 |
| Conclusion | 239 |

**Chapter 6    The Case Study of Sport For All in Korea**

| Introduction | 246 |
| Sport For All (SFA) in Korea | 249 |
| The Role of Government | 251 |
| From the End of 19th century to 1953 | 252 |
The Role of Government  254
The Role of Voluntary Organisations  257
Sport Sector  257
   Chosun Sports Council (CSC)  257
Non Sport Sector  258
   YMCA  258

1954-1979  264
The Role of Government  264
The Role of Voluntary Organisations  267
   Sport Sector  267
   Non Sport Sector  268
   YMCA  268
The Role of Commercial Organisations  272

1980-1988  276
The Role of Government  276
The Role of Voluntary Organisations  281
   Sport Sector  281
   Non Sport Sector  283
   YMCA  283
The Role of Commercial Organisations  284

1989-2009  286
The Role of Government  287
   NACOSA (National Council of Sport For All)  299
   Integration and Separation of the sport governing bodies  304
   SOSFO (Seoul Olympic Sport Promotion Foundation)  314
The Role of Voluntary Organisations  314
   Sport Sector  314
      Dong-ho-hoe  314
      Other organisations  316
Non Sport Sector  316
   YMCA  316
The Role of Commercial Organisations 318
Company Sport 319
Conclusion 324

### Chapter 7 Conclusions 328

**Introduction** 328

**Analysis of the two case studies** 328
- Elite Sport 329
- Sport For All 332

**Macro-level theoretical in-sights** 336

**Meso-level theoretical in-sights** 341

**Methodological reflections** 344

**Contribution, Limitation and Future Research** 346

**References** 348

**Appendix** 387
# List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Index of Per Capita Product at Constant Prices</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Foundation Date of the 50 Largest Chaebol, 1990</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>The Share of the Top 30 Chaebol in Manufacturing</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Increase in automobiles in Seoul between 1980 and 1990</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Economic Growth of East Asian Tigers</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>Summary of Korean history from 1953 to 2008</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>A summary of the classic pluralist and neo-pluralist positions</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Types of policy networks: characteristics of policy communities and issue networks</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Typology of Coalition Opportunity Structures</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Two approaches to studying social capital</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Basic Belief of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Differences between quantitative and qualitative research</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Types of interviews</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Sources of Evidence: Strengths and Weaknesses</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Korea’s performance in Summer Olympics</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Korea’s performance in Winter Olympics</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Size of delegations in the Olympics</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Major events hosted in Korea</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Landmarks in the international sport stage</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>High-ranking Korean officials in the IFs</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Summary of dimensions in elite sport policy</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>KSC’s financial support from government</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Talent Identification Project</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>Key Changes in the NSPL in 1982</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>Sport budget in Chun’s era</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>Grants for coaches, trainers and athletes</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>The cost of Jamsil Complex</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>Numbers and Sports of foreign coaches 1982-1988</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.15 Changes in the National Youth Festival 192
5.16 International sports events hosted in South Korea 194
5.17 A number of medals Sangmu athletes won (-1992) 196
5.18 Sangmu’s performance in CISM 197
5.19 Detailed accounts for the national athletes’ strength, fees 208
5.20 Improved financial rewards to national athletes and coaches 208
5.21 Points evaluation for athletes’ lifelong pension 211
5.22 Points evaluation for athletes’ lifelong pension
(A) Monthly payment (B) Lump sum payment 211
5.23 Number of pensions given to elite athletes 212
5.24 Reward for 2004 Athens Olympics medallists 213
5.25 Updated facilities in TN Village 216
5.26 Number of athletes and the cost of running TN Village 218
5.27 Categories of Sports by KSC 221
5.28 The Government support to school sport teams 227
5.29 Import foreign coaches and its government’s support 229
5.30 Annual training schedule in Sangmu 240
5.31 The Categorisation of the sport in Sangmu 243
6.1 Comparison among School Sport, Elite Sport and SFA 252
6.2 YMCA History from 1903 to 1953 260
6.3 YMCA’s hosting competition after 1925 262
6.4 The number of participants in local YMCAs in 1925 263
6.5 Brief History of YMCA (1954-1979) 269
6.6 YMCA membership in 1974 270
6.7 The number of sport teams operated by the companies 274
6.8 Selected YMCA SFA activities 1980-1988 283
6.9 YMCA programmes between 1985 and 1986 284
6.10 Changes in Monthly Average Household Income and the amount spent on Cultural and Recreational 287
6.11 The objectives of the Hodori Plan 289
6.12 The 1st National Sports Promotion Five-Year Plans 290
6.14 The 2nd National Sports Promotion Five-Year Plans 292
6.15 Funding plan for sport centre construction 296
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Section Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>Key events in the History of NACOSA</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.17</td>
<td>SOSFO funding expenditure</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>Support for SFA facilities</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>Distinction of usage between the National Treasury and the Fund in use of resources</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>Details of the Board of Directors in SOSFO</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>Five Year Plan for ‘School Astroturf Playground Project’</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**List of Figures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Annual increase in the number of newly organised unions</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Varieties of Policy Networks</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Diagram of Advocacy Coalition Framework</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>The interrelationship between the building blocks of research</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Procedure of Talent Identification</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>SFA organisations between 1954 and 1979</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Diagram of organisation involved in SFA and their inter-relationships</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>The organisational structure in NACOSA</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>The Change in SOSFO funds in 2002-2007</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>National Treasury and SOSFO Fund</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>The organisational map of contemporary SFA in Korea</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Advocacy Coalition Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Accreditation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFC</td>
<td>Asian Football Confederation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIPS</td>
<td>International Sports Press Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Asian Games Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISM</td>
<td>Conseil International du Sport Militaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Chosun Sport Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFA</td>
<td>Korea Football Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale de Football Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISU</td>
<td>International University Sport Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAISF</td>
<td>General Association of International Sports Federations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAAF</td>
<td>International Association of Athletics Federations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBF</td>
<td>International Badminton Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF</td>
<td>International Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>International Taekwondo Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JISS</td>
<td>Japan Institute of Sports Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Japanese Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAF</td>
<td>Korea Archery Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KATA</td>
<td>Korea Athlete Trainers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>Korea Broadcasting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KISS</td>
<td>Korea Institute of Sport Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBO</td>
<td>Korea Baseball Organisation (check)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNSU</td>
<td>Korea National Sports University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOC</td>
<td>Korean Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOWOC</td>
<td>Korea World Cup Organising Committee (check)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSF</td>
<td>Korea Shooting Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSC</td>
<td>Korea Sports Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWF</td>
<td>Korean Wrestling Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBC</td>
<td>Moonwha Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBP</td>
<td>Ministry of Budget and Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCT</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCST</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEHR</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHW</td>
<td>Ministry of Health &amp; Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Multiple Streams Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACOSA</td>
<td>National Council for Sports For All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCAAA</td>
<td>National Collegiate Athletic Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Governing Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Sports Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NJSF</td>
<td>National Junior Sports Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSO</td>
<td>National Sport Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPL</td>
<td>National Sports Promotion Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Olympic Council of Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Olympic Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVF</td>
<td>Outside Village training Fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Policy Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>Policy Entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>Physical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Public Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Sport Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBS</td>
<td>Seoul Broadcasting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERI</td>
<td>Samsung Economic Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOOC</td>
<td>Seoul Olympic Organising Committee (check)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>Sport For All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNC</td>
<td>Swimming Natation Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOSFO</td>
<td>Seoul Olympic Sport Promotion Foundation (SOSFO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSSI</td>
<td>Samsung Sport Science Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STC</td>
<td>Samsung Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS</td>
<td>Sports Talent Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TN</td>
<td>Tae Neung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBA</td>
<td>World Boxing Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBC</td>
<td>World Baseball Classic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>World Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTF</td>
<td>World Taekwondo Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men’s Christian Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YWCA</td>
<td>Young Women’s Christian Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 WC</td>
<td>2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Introduction

Research aims, objectives and context

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the sport policy process in the Republic of Korea in relation to elite sport development and sport for all. The thesis focuses on the nature of role of the government, the core actors involved in decision making and relationships between the central government, sub-national government and other organisations, such as national government agencies. The thesis also explores the extent to which and the way in which the policy process for sport in these two case study areas has changed over time.

Prior to entering the discussion of this research, a few terms need to be clarified. First, as shown in the title of the thesis, the ‘Republic of Korea’ is the official name of the country on which this study focuses. Having remained as two divided countries since the end of Korean War in 1953 the two Koreas need to be distinguished. It could be argued that the titles ‘South Korea’ for the Republic of Korea and ‘North Korea’ for ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ have been commonly used by the international media as well as within the Korean press for the sake of convenience. Nevertheless, in this thesis, the titles ‘Korea’ will be adopted to refer to the ‘Republic of Korea’ and ‘the North’ will be used to refer to the ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’. This terminology is commonly used in Korean academic literature.

Second, the scope and nature of the of two case studies should be defined. As Green (2003) suggested, an operational definition of ‘elite sport’ can be adopted from the Canadian definition by Semotiuk (1996). Semotiuk (1989, quoted in Semotiuk 1996: 7) defined elite sport as ‘a competition sport at the highest international level with a priority placed on sports in the Olympic Games programme and on those sports with regular world championships’. In contrast, it appears to be virtually impossible to find a specific definition of ‘Sport for All’ (SFA) because different terms have been used in various countries by a number of academics. This definitional confusion exists despite the existence of the ‘Sport for all Charter’ adopted by the Council of Europe’s Sports Committee in 1976. There is a fuller
discussion of the problem of defining SFA in Chapter 6 where it will be suggested that SFA will be used interchangeably with ‘mass participation’, ‘recreation’, ‘lifelong sport’, ‘community sport’ and ‘sport for lifetime’, unless otherwise stated in this thesis. Furthermore, as regards the content of the thesis, the analysis includes data which was collected up to April 2009.

In order to achieve the research aims mentioned above, the following objectives have been identified:

- To review and analyse the recent political, economic, cultural context of Korean sport policy
- To analyse the development of sport policy in two areas: elite sport development and sport for all
- To identify and evaluate different frameworks for policy analysis

**Rationale for selecting the two case studies and theoretical discussions**

For over half a century Korean governments have used elite sport as an instrument to achieve several policy objectives. Diplomatic resources have always been of key importance to Korea given its complex pattern of international relations. The geographical location of Korea between the North, China and Japan prompted Korea to be alert at all times to the delicate nature of the nation’s security. Sport, as is the case with so many other countries, has been one tool available to the Korean government which can be used to send diplomatic messages. The use of sport in international relations has the benefit of being relatively low cost, high profile and low risk. Of particular importance to Korea has been the need to demonstrate its superiority over the North by beating them on the international sporting stage. Also, the Korean government showed consistent interest in bidding for hosting mega sport events, particularly hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games which was seen as a good opportunity for Korea to symbolise and display its modernity to the world. The following mega sport event, 2002 FIFA World Cup, was also considered as a chance to show the dramatic development of Korea after the Seoul Games and the full recovery from the IMF crisis which harshly hit the country in 1997. This
hosting strategy was regarded as an instrument to raise Korea’s national brand or profile, integrate Koreans and enhance national pride.

Having been liberated from Japan in 1945, Korea officially began to emerge on to the international sporting stage. The first step was that the Korean Olympic Committee affiliated to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1947. It is important to note that Korea continued to participate in all summer Olympics since the 1948 London Games except for the 1980 Moscow Games which was boycotted by the United States. Sohn Ki Jung, a Korean Marathoner won the gold medal in the 1936 Berlin Olympics, nevertheless, the victory was inevitably recognised as Japan’s as Korea was then occupied by Japan (1910-1945). The largest number of delegation, 224 of athletes and officials were sent to Japan in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics for raising the morale of Korean who were still staying in Japan. The first gold medal came from a wrestler Yang Jung Mo, who won in the 1976 Montreal Olympics. It should be noted that Korea had consistently ranked above 10th in the Olympic medal table, apart from the 2000 Sydney Olympics (12th), for almost three decades. As for the winter Olympics, Korea put an end to its ‘no medal’ performance in 1992 and has kept producing medals since then.

It could be argued that Sport For All is much more recent area of government policy compared to elite sport. Some elements of SFA can be found in the early period, and of particular note is the role of the Chosun Sports Council, the YMCA and schools. The Chosun Sports Council, which was established in July 1920 and re-established in November 1945 after Korea’s independence, held sport competitions and formed sport associations. The importance of YMCA should be emphasised not only because of its long history since 1903 but the consistent introduction of sports, promotion and contribution for the development Korean SFA by devising and implementing various sport programmes for the general public. Sport activities in schools led by missionaries from the West and early Korean sports leaders impacted on the promotion of SFA in Korea as well. However, according to a number of sport academics and experts, it was immediately after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games when the Korean government started to show an interest and to become involved in encouraging SFA. The experience of becoming the host of the mega sport event in 1988 prompted Korean citizens to perceive sport as ‘good’ and an important
element in their quality of life which prompted the growth of demand for sport participation which had also been stimulated by increasing wealth and concerns with health and welfare issues (Chang, 2002).

Although both government involvement in elite sport and SFA were, as will be shown, prompted by non-sport objectives, the two case studies provide a number of interesting contrasts. While the government used elite sport for diplomatic and international relations purposes, SFA was approached from the close connection to health and welfare. The other point to make is that it is relatively easy to define the term elite sport and to measure its success, which is normally based on the number of medals in the Olympic Games. In contrast, as discussed above, SFA cannot be defined easily because of its ambiguity and it is even harder to specify the objectives of the SFA and to determine how to evaluate the progress of SFA policy.

Some preliminary comments need to be made concerning the theoretical discussion due to the fact that most of the analytical frameworks, both macro level and meso-level, have been developed in Western Europe or North America. In this context, it was considered as valuable to research whether these theoretical frameworks can be applied outside their original cultural orbit. Bearing in mind that Korea had experienced dramatic change in terms of political, economic and social sphere and that it is tending towards a more pluralistic society, no research was conducted in the area of sport policy which adopted the policy frameworks mentioned above. From this point of view, this thesis could contribute to fill the gap caused by the fact that a substantial proportion of the sport policy literature originates in European countries or North America.

**Thesis structure**

The first stage in achieving the aim of the thesis is to provide a historical review (Chapter 2) which outlines how Korea has changed, particularly since the end of the civil war in terms of politics, economics and social aspects. It also highlights how these changes influenced the sport sector. Following a discussion of periodisation four periods have been identified according to watersheds in Korean history. The first period (1953-1961) starts from 1953 because Korea could only start
reconstruction after the Civil War. The second period (1961-1979) examines 19 years of President Park’s authoritarian military government. The third period (1980-1997) discusses the process of democratisation with the emergence of a civilian president and the IMF crisis which hit Korea harshly in 1997. The last period (1998-2009) examines the dynamic restructuring process of Korea up to April 2009.

Chapter 3, Theories of the policy process, outlines the study’s analytical framework and investigates the utility of macro and meso-level analysis for the two case studies, elite sport and SFA. As for macro level, (Neo) Marxism, (Modern) Elitism and (Neo) Pluralism are explored in order to help the researcher to understand how Korean society works, which would inevitably have influence on sport policy. In links to Chapter 2, Korean society has arguably moved from (Neo) Elitism to (Neo) Pluralism with the government changing from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. Following on from the macro level discussion, three meso-level frameworks are reviewed: Policy Community, Multiples Streams Framework and Advocacy Coalition Framework. Bearing in mind that each framework has its strengths and weaknesses, the applicability of the frameworks to Korea is considered. Reviewing macro and meso-level theories, it is necessary to explore debates regarding the concept of power through relationships between various actors, which is regarded as a central concept for research on the policy process. To answer questions such as ‘Who has the power?’, ‘Where does it lie?’, ‘How can power be observed?’, the works of Lukes and Foucault are reviewed in particular detail.

Chapter 4, Methodology, begins with a discussion of ontology and epistemology. Three core research paradigms, Positivism, Interpretivism and Critical Realism are reviewed. This process of analysis led the researcher to adopt a Critical Realist position, based mainly on the work of Bhaskar (1979), that reflects the belief that there is a world “out there” independent of the researcher’s knowledge, but that not everything is observable in the social phenomenon and that there is a causal relationship between structure and agency. The section on research methods discusses the appropriateness of both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Of particular significance for this study are qualitative research methods which were consequently adopted as the main technique for this study and included the case study approach, document analysis and interviews. Finally, the issues of reliability
Chapter 1: Introduction

and validity are examined and the way to attempt to overcome the limits of the qualitative methods are discussed. The discussion shows that the researcher acknowledges the limitation of qualitative research methods in terms of their reliability and validity and attempts to minimise weaknesses in order to raise the quality of the research.

Chapter 5, The case of elite sport, has been divided into five sections. The first section discusses the development of elite sport policy in Korea. In other words, Korea’s involvement on the international elite sport stage is examined, including Korea’s performances in the Olympics, the size of squad, the hosting strategy and the number of people in high-ranking position in the international sport arena. The second section is a literature review of elite sport policy and four studies are selected for their particular relevance in developing an analytical framework applicable to the Korea context: UK Sport et al (2006), Green and Oakley (2001), Digel (2002) and Green and Houlihan (2005). Considering that Green and Houlihan (2005) have condensed the outcome of earlier studies into four key elements which are considered to be the main constituents of an elite sport development system, the discussion of the four elements of the elite sport success, facilities, full-time athletes, sports science and coaching and competition opportunities are identified and discussed. The next three sections are delineated according to the following periodisation and timeline: 1960-1979, 1980-1988 and 1989-2008. Six common themes emerged from the analysis, which are: the government’s view regarding elite sport; government structure and government financing; facilities; sport science and coaching; competition structure; and hosting strategy. It needs to be stressed that because of the broad scope of sport science and coaching, talent identification is dealt with separately under the theme of sport science and coaching in order to reflect its importance. Two more distinctive and perhaps unique features, the role of business and the role of armed forces, of Korean sport policy emerged from the second period and are therefore included in the fourth and fifth sections.

Chapter 6, The case of Sport For All, begins by introducing and exploring definitions of SFA suggested by several academics in different countries. The section looks at the way SFA emerged in Korean society and how SFA was defined. Before entering to chronological period, the role of government in SFA is reviewed
Chapter 1: Introduction

based on Houlihan’s (1997) research. Unlike Chapter 5, there are four periods in this Chapter. In each period, the role of the government, voluntary organisations (sport and non-sport sector) and commercial organisations are reviewed. The first period (the end of 19th century to 1953) describes the evidence of the emergence of several forms of mass participation from the early period through Royal Edicts on education which affected foreign and missionary schools. From 1903, the YMCA began to introduce western sports to the general public. The second period (1954-1979) covers from the end of Korean War through to the demise of the Park Jung Hee era. Although Chang (2002) called this period the time of ‘stagnation of SFA’, it is argued that this is a critical moment in the development of SFA in the sense that it was during this time that the National Sports Promotion Law was enacted. While it could be argued that this Law was made for the purpose of supporting elite sport, it should not be denied that the Law opened the door for the SFA policy to be implement in terms of increasing sport facilities in each region. The third period (1980-1988) is relatively short but important in the emergence of Sport for All Korea Association (SAKA), the independent voluntary SFA organisation. The hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics coinciding with the increase of disposable income started to stimulate people’s interest in SFA. The last period (1989-2008) illustrates the impact of local (sub national) autonomy on SFA. The funding of SFA clearly shows a dramatic increase in recent years due, however, to the fact that the government realised the importance of SFA in relation to health and welfare rather than sport’s own sake. The emergence of National Council for Sport for All (NACOSA), which is a sport for all governing body in Korea, and Dong-ho-hoe (voluntary clubs) contributed to the move rapid development of SFA.

Chapter 7, Discussion and Conclusion, returns to the research questions identified in Chapter 1 and discuss of the main characteristics of the policy process in relation to elite sport development and SFA. The distinctive features of each case and any similarities or differences between the policy processes in the two areas will be identified, according to Chapter 5 and 6. The following section is composed of evaluating the usefulness of the macro theories and meso-level framework bearing in mind that those frameworks are mostly developed either Europe or North America. After the discussion of methodological issues, from the Critical Realist
perspective, the contribution of this thesis and suggestions of areas for future research will be identified.
Chapter 2: Historical Review

Chapter 2 Historical Review

Introduction

This thesis is aimed at evaluating the sport policy process in Korea. As sport cannot be separated from its political, economic, cultural and social contexts, it is necessary to discuss Korean history based on those dimensions. One of the important tasks before conducting a historical review is to periodise in an appropriate manner. As regards Korea, it is worth considering the comment below by Im (1999: 75) when setting timelines:

Korea compressed the multiple stages of industrialisation and democratization into a few turbulent decades of national division, the ruins of war, the repression of military dictatorship, and the constraints of a massive military standoff between the opposing states on the peninsula.

Bearing these comments in mind recent Korean history can be delineated into four periods. The first period is from 1953 to 1961 and can be referred to as the dawn of modern Korea. It was in 1953 that Korea started the reconstruction of the nation after the Civil War. The reason for starting after the Civil War is that it was then that Korea started to engage in international sport. During the time from 1910 to Liberation Day in August 1945 when Japan colonised Korea, sport was merely a tool to achieve the Japanisation of Koreans (Ok, 2005). Missionaries from western countries introduced a number of sports to Korea and had great influence but Japan’s oppression prevented Korea from developing sport. This is clear in the case of Taekwondo, Korea’s martial art. Because of the Japanese ban on all kinds of folk games, including Taekwondo, in order to suppress Koreans Taekwondo was handed down secretly by the masters of the art until the liberation of Korea in 1945 (www.wtf.org, accessed on 8\textsuperscript{th} August 2006).

The second period is from 1961 to 1979. It was in 1961 that President Park Jung Hee, who held power for 19 years, appeared in the political arena. Park’s substantial work in terms of his contribution to Korea’s economy should not be underestimated, however, the dark side of Yusin (a period of prolonged one-man rule) finally led to him being
Chapter 2: Historical Review

assassinated. According to Im (1998), Yusin was a structure that made it possible for Park Jung Hee and a minority of his followers to hold on to power. The military group was the most powerful elite during Park’s era.

The third period runs from 1980 with the emergence of contemporary Korea following a direct election by the people, to 1997, when the IMF crisis hit Korea. It is possible to observe the process of democratization in this period. The last period is from 1997 to 2008.

1953-1960: Reconstruction of the nation after the Korean War

Politics

After the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, there was a state of chaos right across the country in every sector. All the infrastructure and production facilities were destroyed. According to Irma and Kim’s (1969) study, the value of capital stock in Korea in 1953 was zero because of the War. In 1948 Rhee Seung Man was elected as president in the first-ever election. The president’s ambition to be in that position forever prompted a number of amendments to the constitution. As Song (1990) argued, Rhee was mainly interested in the politics of unification rather than economic development. In 1952 when the government was still based in Busan due to the ongoing war, Rhee changed the constitution to make the presidency a directly-elected position. To achieve that aim, he declared martial law and put in prison the members of parliament who were expected to vote against him. As a result, Rhee won the election by a large margin. He won again in the 1954 elections and pushed for change to exempt himself from the eight-year term limit.

Rhee’s regime came to an end in April 1960 with the student-led uprising. During his presidency, the government was not only in an unstable condition but there was an atmosphere of cynicism and hopelessness reinforced by the increasingly corrupt regime, according to Wade and Kim (1978). As Moran (1998) noted, Rhee employed the police, security personnel and right wing paramilitary groups to threaten opponents and
Chapter 2: Historical Review

manipulate elections before he was undermined by student protests. Also, the business and entrepreneurial groups were not strong enough in terms of size and political legitimacy to challenge his position. Rhee’s resignation was triggered by the violent repression of a student demonstration in Masan on March 15th, the day of the presidential election. Local police suppressed the protests, but after the body of a student was found floating in the harbour they exploded again. Following this, non-violent demonstration spread across the country. As a consequence, Rhee resigned on April 26th.

It is worth looking at the corruption in Korea, which is the product of a combination of historical and structural factors. Moran (1998) argued that the state was an important variable but not the only one. Social forces in the form of rising entrepreneurial groups and patron-client ties of family, region and school also affected the level of corruption (Moran, 1998). According to Moran (1998), the weakness of civil society was one of the important factors. Also, the business and entrepreneurial clusters were not robust enough in terms of size and political legitimacy. The moral authority of Rhee’s government, made difficult by the persistent factionalism of party partisans and the lack of a broadly accepted political formula, was eroded because of its relative inattention to social reconstruction, arbitrariness, excessive centralization, and gathering corruption (Wade and Kim, 1978). Favoured businesses were given former Japanese-owned firms at undervalued prices, licenses to import scarce goods, dollar loans and other advantages, which allowed them to monopolise markets but also tied them closely to the government. (Moran, 1998).

Economics

Economic growth after the Korean War was modest. As Das (1992) noted, during the period from 1953 to 1961, economic growth was 4.1 percent on average. This was believed to be due to the construction industry and the expansion of industrial capacity which served the local market. Substantial foreign aid made possible the reconstruction after the war. Reeve (1963) showed that the average annual rate of increase of the GDP was 5.2% between 1954 and 1960. The annual per capita increase in production increased grew rapidly until 1955, but was interrupted in 1956 because of bad crop year.
Chapter 2: Historical Review

It recovered well in 1957, but began to drop swiftly during 1959 as illustrated in Table 2.1 below.

**Table 2.1 Index of Per Capita Product at Constant Prices (1953=100)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The ‘Import Substituting Industrialisation’ of Rhee Seung Man’s economic policy accelerated corruption because it protected Korean industry from foreign competition whilst providing lucrative rent-seeking havens (Moran, 1998). Having been supported by the US and other allies, Korea was not motivated enough to pursue economic prosperity. Rhee Seung Man’s government focused on local and international politics rather than the pursuit of rapid economic growth (Muller, 1997). Eckert et al (1990) argued that between 1953 and 1962, seventy percent of Korea’s imports were from the US. For instance, the Korean textile industry grew 24 percent per year from 1953 to 1957 thanks to US assistance. The industry achieved virtually complete import substitution in cotton, rayon and woolen goods and started to find export markets. It is also noteworthy that the substantial US help to Korea made it easier for the nation to pursue its export-led growth in the 1960s without a backlog of debt. The American military support also played a crucial part in Korean economic growth by freeing domestic resources for development. In Rhee’s time, the government was enhanced by its control of former Japanese-owned assets and its influence over the spending of foreign aid funds, which allowed increasing corruption. Businessmen who received tariff protection, import licenses, foreign exchange at favourable rates, government contracts financed with aid funds, or who were permitted to buy former Japanese assets at bargain prices, were frequently involved in bribery or other corrupt practices (Kim, K. D. 1976, Song, 1990).

Of particular significance in this period is the role of Chaebol1. These originated in the Yi dynasty and the period of Japan’s control. Most of them arose between 1945 and

---

1 Chaebol is used as a collective noun in this thesis, which indicates big conglomerates.
1960. According to Lee, Y.H. (1997), Chaebol gathered fortunes mainly in unlawful ways, for instance through bribes, tax evasion, smuggling and illicit property. The most significant means seems to have been repatriated property disposal. After World War Two and liberation from Japan, a large number of assets were handed over to the American Office of the Property Custodian. The rest of them were transferred to Rhee’s regime. Rhee then tried to develop a patron-client structure by influencing foreign aid and the domestic economy (Moran 1998). For example, if an entrepreneur had a close relationship with high officials in the regime, he would have greater advantages behind the scenes. Paying back in the form of political funds to the politicians started to be taken for granted from this period. Such political-economic adhesion was characteristic of the 1950s (Lee, Y.H., 1997). In the 1950s, Korea was largely dependent on aid from the UN and US. Rhee’s regime showed a tendency to allocate funds unevenly, in other words, they favoured certain firms.

Culture and Social aspect

It is not surprising that Japan prevented Koreans from having the chance of education, especially higher education. According to Hobday (1995), in 1945, about 74% of the population of 25 million were illiterate. Between the period 1945 to 1953, there was investment to improve general education, aimed at producing technicians, craftsmen and engineers. 2.5 % of the government’s budget was used for education in 1951 and this proportion steadily increased (Hobday, 1995). Chang (1980) showed that, according to the government’s statistics, in 1953 only thirteen private elementary schools existed. The number of students was around five thousand. The huge input into education resulted in the production of a well-educated labour force that would provide the backbone of the labour-intensive industries during this era (Song, 1990). Wade and Kim (1978) pointed out that enthusiasm for education among Koreans came from neither the American military government nor the administration of the First Republic. Koreans own desire for learning accelerated with liberation. As a result, the number of universities, colleges, schools and students continuously increased. A compulsory education system was formulated in 1950 and completed after two decades. According to Chang (1980) the proportion of those aged six to eleven who enrolled in elementary schools increased from 72.9% in 1953 to 97.5 in 1970.
The discrimination between boys and girls in terms of the extent of the opportunities in education should not be ignored. It was taken for granted that girls ceased to study in favour of their brothers. The phenomenon of women stopping work after they got married did not apply in the 1950s as married women kept working for their living. In the 1950s most women had to work to feed their family. It is clear that the number of working females markedly increased compared to the pre-War era. The sectors in which women worked varied from agriculture to commerce, engineering and manufacturing. Textile factories especially were one of the most popular workplaces for women. However, it is argued that work conditions were extremely poor and they were underpaid. It is suggested that almost everyone had the opportunity to go to elementary school.

The War caused a great number of casualties, particularly of young males of military age. It is estimated that 5% of civilians were killed. As a result the death rate far exceeded birth rate. According to the Tax Research Report, population growth in Korea was 2.9% on average between 1955 and 1960. A high birth rate and low mortality due to improvements in medical technology were major factors. Reeve (1963) argued that the total population of Korea increased from 21.5 million to just under 25 million. The unstable situation after the War encouraged people to move to Seoul, the capital of Korea. Better quality of education and government reconstruction projects prompted an increase in jobs. Urban population increased from 11.6 percent in 1940 to 24.4 percent in 1955 and 28.3 percent in 1960. According to Kim and Choe (1997), the aftermath of the War caused a massive population flow from North Korea to the South. The whole nation was destroyed and infrastructure disappeared. It is believed that the major shift in Korean population was from rural to urban areas.

**Sport**

Under then Korea’s post-war circumstances, sport attracted little government interest. According to Ha and Mangan (2002), physical education in schools was similar to military training. Military officers replaced PE teachers, due to the lack of qualified personnel. The replacement of PE terms with military words indicated that the government aimed to use sport for the purpose of defending the South against North
Chapter 2: Historical Review

Korea (Kang, 1990). As Na (1983) and Kim, M. (1996) noted, western sports and activities which were introduced in the early 1900s could be encouraged through the educational institutions. In 1954, the Ministry of Education increased physical education to three hours a week in middle and high schools. It also imposed a compulsory two hours of physical education in universities, so that every student had to take two credits for sports related modules. Throughout this period, physical education became a compulsory subject across the age range. As for women’s sport, Ewha Women’s University played a role in furthering sport participation. As we will see below, school sport inspired women to take an interest in sports. While girls were brought up in a Confucian culture they hardly had a chance to see or play sports. Girls were attracted by sports teams and facilities in school. This may account for the fact that most national players at that time were high school students (Ha and Mangan, 2002).

Practice of the Korean national martial art, Taekwondo, had been interrupted during the colonial rule. Upon liberation from Japan after World War II, Taekwondo was ready for a rebirth. After the Korean War, a number of Taekwondo gymnasiums emerged across the country and started to gain popularity. The Naming Committee was formed and suggested the name “Taekwondo”. “Tae” means to kick and “Kwon” means to punch. The name Taekwondo was submitted to President Rhee and had his endorsement. Taekwondo was born on the 11th April 1955. In 1955 General Choi tried to popularise it in all the universities and military outposts across Korea, and the Korean Taekwon-Do Association was established in 1959.

1961-1979: Re-emergence of Nationalism

Politics

About a year after Rhee’s resignation, Korea was in a state of disorder and was experiencing social and economic problems. The Third Republic was established with Park Jung Hee’s military coup d’etat in 16th May in 1961. According to Eun (1996), it was ostensibly accelerated by the corruption and incompetence of the civil government.
Chapter 2: Historical Review

Park’s ideology can be inferred if we observe his military and educational background. Park served in the Imperial Japanese Army and conceptualised Korea as ‘Rich Country, Strong Army’. It placed the Korean military at the heart of Korea’s politics (Eckert et al, 1990). Park showed a desire to maintain personal power indefinitely. Moreover, the president knew that Korea needed U.S. economic and military support and shared former president Rhee’s anti-communist views and hostility towards the North, although his attitude was more flexible than his predecessor (Eckert et al, 1990).

Although the speed of Korea’s economic growth during the 1960-70s was remarkable, its success failed to be shared evenly across all areas. It actually produced significant economic disparities. Seoul and the south-east especially had become more industrialised than the south-west. Park, B.G. (2003) suggested two reasons for this which originated during the Japanese colonial period. First, the Japanese promoted colonial industrial development along the railway line from Seoul, Daegu to Busan. Second, these areas were relatively less damaged by the Korean War. As a result, most industries were concentrated in those areas. It is also said that the 1960s export-oriented industrialization project provided huge benefits to Seoul and the south-east.

It was during the 1970s election that parties became more explicit in using territorial strategy. The opposition nominee standing against Park was Kim Dae Jung, who was regarded as a favorite son of the south-west. The result showed a very distinct south-east/ south-west divide. During this period the state wholly controlled businesses and guided their strategy as in the case of export-led policies. To get support and assistance, businesses needed to obey government instructions. If they failed to do so, the assistance was likely to be withdrawn. Under these circumstances, not only were favours given to firms that originated from the Kyongsang area, but these firms could also secure extra help through donations. Park always selected winners such as Chung Ju Yung of Hyundai and Cho Chung Hun of Hanjin. Therefore, companies had to perform well to continue to get help from the government. As Moran (1998) noted, they could not avoid having to pay ‘political funds’ back to the state. Corruption and politics were closely linked for a long time.
Chapter 2: Historical Review

Economics

According to Park, B.G. (2003), Park’s regime targeted economic growth aimed at giving people material benefits to offset the lack of political legitimacy. It was surprising that a per capita GNP $100 in 1963 increased to $1,000 in 1978 and $5,000 in 1990 (Eckert et al., 1990). Krueger (2005) stated that the speed of economic growth in Korea was unheard of anywhere else in the world. It was shown that export earnings grew at 41% a year on average from 1959 to 1968. In 1960, exports accounted for 3% (comparative figure) of GDP, and from 1963 to 1972 real GDP growth averaged more than 9% a year. (Krueger, 2005)

Lee, Y.H. (1997) argued that Park Chung Hee exercised the President’s right to direct economic intervention. As Haggard and Moon (1993) argued, powerful state control over economic resources was essential in Korea. The basic strategy was to target a few sectors of the economy that were expected to perform well in international markets (Kim, J.S., 1995). Amsden (1990) insisted that Park’s government actively coordinated, led and disciplined the economic activities of businesses through an export-oriented industrialisation program to motivate them to invest in industry rather than engaging in previously unproductive activities. The main principle for economic development was “export first”. It caused Korean companies to concentrate on marketing their products overseas rather than to the domestic market (Song, 1990). To achieve its aim, the government decided to support huge companies (Chaebol) rather than small ones, because these were more efficient due to their economies of scale and had access to a much broader range of overseas markets (Kim, J.S., 1995). As Im (1998) pointed out, the other side of Korea’s dramatic economic growth were problems, such as high inflation and a weak financial structure due to over dependence on loans and so forth.

We have mentioned Chaebol a number of times so far because of its significance in Korea. Chaebol had been the backbone of Korea’s economy during the 1950s and expanded rapidly during this period. According to Im (1998), the top thirty Chaebol accounted for 32% of the total sales in 1977 and 39.7% in 1981. The state imposed very strict measures to control the Chaebol. First, during the first and second economic development plans which will be discussed later, the government strategically
Chapter 2: Historical Review

supported a few industries such as oil refining and chemical fertilizers. Second, the government took various measures on taxation and tariffs. Third, the Chaebol was able to accumulate foreign capital in the transportation and construction industries associated with the Vietnam War. As Jones and Sakong (1980) said, ultimate power rested with the President and he made core decisions by himself. The government supported the Chaebol so strongly that they were able to maximize the quantity of exports. In return Chaebol could borrow capital from banks and financial institutions at interest rates lower than the rate of inflation, they expanded into most of the industries, acquired permission to open up new markets in the Middle East and pushed into other second financial markets such as insurance and securities (Im, 1998). It can be said that this economic elite, the Chaebol, was a dominant group which ran parallel to the military elites of Park’s era. It is also worth remembering that the academic (intelligence) elites, who were headhunted by the government to make up for their lack of economic knowledge, played an important role behind scenes.

As a tool for showing Koreans that Park’s regime was committed to ‘saving’ the nation from corruption, the Committee for the investigation and execution of Illicit Wealth Accumulation Charges was established. It is not surprising that, fines were imposed on the major Chaebol. What Park’s government suggested was instead of paying fines, they could instead donate towards constructing factories for reviving Korea (Eun, 1996). The intimate relationship between the government and the Chaebol facilitated heavy industrialisation in a limited time. To achieve this goal, everything needed to be controlled under the central government. Johnson (1989) described Korea’s “economic miracle” as the product of a dominant capitalist development state which was characterised by a high level of state authoritarianism vis-à-vis emerging civil society. Eun (1996) stated that the Korean economic development plan was implemented to favour the capitalists at the expense of the people’s quality of life and welfare.

Immediately after May 16th 1961, Park Jung Hee unofficially directed the drafting of a five year economic plan (Jones and Sakong, 1980). The First Five Year Plan (1962-1966) was officially adopted in 1961. Its start was not satisfactory because of poor preparation caused by time constraint and lack of available data and experience, but it showed that the government was committed to the development of the nation. Also it
motivated a number of inexperienced political figures and officials to appreciate the importance of planning procedure and experience. According to Song (1990), its main objective was to break the vicious cycle of poverty and to build a foundation for self-sustaining growth. Jones and Sakong (1980) argued that thanks to previous trial and error, the Second Five Year Plan (1967-1971) began with some relevant guidelines. It resulted in wide credibility both abroad and in Korea. As Song (1990) noted, the Third Five Year Plan (1972-1976) was drawn up by young, highly educated bureaucrats with the main focus on heavy and chemical industries. Compared to the Second Plan, it sought to decentralise policy planning processes. The Fourth Five Year Plan (1977-1981) was carried out by more experts and groups including foreign consultants. Hobday (1995) pointed out that during the Fourth Plan, the government arranged foreign loans of $222.6million and established an industrial estate for the production of semiconductors and computers.

Cultural and social aspects

In 1962, at the beginning of the Five Year development plan, the yearly population growth was very fast (2.6 percent) and far above the economic growth rate (2.2 percent). Thus the per capita GNP growth rate was negative (Song, 1990). As Kim and Choe (1997) said, the main reasons for the population explosion in urban cities such as Seoul were social factors, namely, that a large number of people moved from rural areas to cities. As quoted in Seoul Metropolis (1977), social factors were responsible for 90% of the total growth at one stage (Kim and Choe, 1997).

It is worth noting various opinions regarding equality issues during this period. According to Eckert et al (1990), while Korea’s urbanization raised the general standard of living and absolute poverty was reduced significantly, the distribution of the wealth has been questioned. Song (1990) argued that government-driven industrialisation focused on the industrialisation of large cities, especially Seoul and its neighbours. This caused several urban problems including shortage of housing, schools and public services. From the 1960s the gap between urban and rural increased dramatically. To eliminate the chasm, the government undertook the New Village (Saemaul) Movement from 1971. It aimed to improve the living conditions and the income of rural people. Song (1990), however, quoted World Bank data which stated that: “the distribution of income in Korea is among the best in the developing world”.

19
Chapter 2: Historical Review

Another phenomenon to focus on is the emergence of networks, inter alia, Hak-Yun (alumni networks), Ji-Yun (hometown networks), and military academies. Most key positions in the regime were from the Kyongsang area or the same high school as President Park. Having attended ‘T-K ’(Taegu Technical/Vocational School-Kyongbuk High School) was known as a way to reach a high position in Korea (Moran, 1998). According to Moran (1998), a renowned businessman, Kim Woo Choong of the Daewoo Corporation, obtained positions of power because his father taught President Park at Taegu Technical high school. Park, P.W. (2002) showed that the largest share of high-level positions in South Korea was occupied by south-easterners (40%). In 1970, the south-easterners made up 30.4% of the total national population, and it produced 40% of high ranking government civil servants in the 1960s and the 1970s. As Moran (1998) noted, there were about 40 secret societies in that period, and among those Hanahoe (one mind) played a key role in Chun Doo Hwan’s coup in 1980. Since then, Koreans have believed that people from the south-east have more opportunity to seize power compared to the other regions. In such relationships, the state elites were dominant figures. Therefore, people from other regions such as Kwangju and Chonju have long thought themselves discriminated against and neglected in development by the government (Song, 1990).

Sport

Although there have been controversies over President Park Jung Hee, Park’s personal philosophy and powerful driving force built the foundation of modern Korean sport (Ha and Mangan, 2002). According to Kim, S.Y. (2004), Park’s regime showed its interest in sport as a tool to counteract the lack of legitimacy and assist modernization. Ha and Mangan (2002) also said that Park had a great desire to promote sport in order to secure legitimacy for the regime and acquire public support for his military rule. President Park’s Cup² is one of the examples of the way the regime used sport as a political instrument. In addition there was Park’s objective to reunifying Korea. Park intended to create a stronger and unified country. The main tasks for Park’s government were

² When Jang Duk Jin, a former senior government official, became the president of the Korean FA in Jan.1970, he tried to create a tournament which could be similar to the King’s Cup in Thailand or Merdaka Cup in Malaysia. With the favourable atmosphere caused by Korea team’s three championship titles, Merdaka Cup (July), King’s Cup(Nov.) and Asian Games in Bangkok(December), a ‘President Park’s Cup Football Competition’ was launched. (Jeong, 2009)
political security, social order, material prosperity and mass patriotism. Sports development could be connected to all of them. As we discussed previously, PE was a kind of military training rather than pure education. A module of military training became compulsory for students in high schools and universities (Im, 1998).

According to Kim, S.Y, (2004), the biggest achievement of Park’s government was setting up the support system for elite sport. The aim of focusing on elite sport was to divert Koreans attention from politics to sport. The plan consisted of improving the increasing pool of elite athletes, training elite coaches, developing athletes’ welfare systems and awarding scholarships for athletes in university. Although social and economic circumstances were not favorable to a sport during the 1960-1970s, legal proceedings made it possible to pursue such a policy (Kim, S.Y., 2004). In 1961, the government enacted the National Sports Promotion Law and, for the first time, distributed funds to the Korea Sports Council, which was established in 1920. Before that time it was run by donations or corporate funds (Korea Sports Council, 1972).

As Ha and Mangan (2002) argued, President Park was so committed to using sport as a political tool that he was fully prepared to invest all necessary resources into the sport, especially the elite sport system. This is made clear in Park’s address at the opening ceremony for the Korean Sports Council Hall on 2nd June 1966:

>We must know that our athletes going abroad to participate in international games and achieving splendid records have achieved more than hundreds of our foreign diplomats spending large budgets ever have.

This statement indicates how much the President valued athletes and thought of them as ‘ambassadors’. (Ha and Mangan, 2002). As Kim, S.Y. (2004) indicated, one of the meaningful achievements in this period was securing ‘funds for national sport development’. It included government contributions, fund raising, advertising, fees for sport facilities and interest generated through the fund management. The fund was used for construction of Tae Neung Athletics Village and supporting the athletes who participated in the international games, pensions, sport scholarships and so forth (Kim, S.Y., 2004).
Chapter 2: Historical Review

Government efforts to strengthen sport could be seen in the change of structure with the Promotion of Sport Section transferred from the Department of Culture to the Department of Sport. The staff were increased to twenty and were divided between a National Sport Section and a Student Sport Section (Kwak, 1994). According to Lee, W.Y. (2004), the Sport Council which used to be the consultative organisation for the Minister of Education and Culture was elevated to the ‘National Sport Council’ and became the supreme policy making committee.

It was Park’s regime that started to prepare the bid to host the Seoul Olympics. According to Park, S.J. (1991), the success of hosting the 42nd World Shooting Championships in 1978 gave confidence to Koreans to host a mega international sport event. Park Jong Kyue who was named as the 25th president of the Korean Sports Association played a key role in persuading the President to make the final decision at the bidding stage. Park, S.J. (1991) suggested four persuasive reasons to bid for the 1988 Games, first, in the case of Japan, the Tokyo Olympics created a stepping stone to the dramatic increase in per capita GNP. It was considered that the Olympics had helped Japan join the developed nations. Second, South Korea could seize the opportunity to bring to a close the confrontation with North Korea. It was embarrassing for Park to be frequently questioned as to whether the food in Korea was edible or the toilets properly flushing, which was believed to originate from North Korea’s propaganda. Third, hosting the Olympics could give Koreans pride in their country. Fourth, the president could see that the financial cost was bearable assuming that the economic development plan was spread out over a decade and the IOC helped the host country in order to share the burden. In addition, the IOC allowed the host countries to acquire income by games admission fees, sales of television advertising and so on (Park, S.J., 1991).

While the government was focusing on the development of elite sport, there were also elements of mass participation. As Ha and Mangan (2002) argued, the President’s leadership of the mass participation was based on his ‘Healthy People Policy’ which aimed to create a socially powerful and prosperous country. The fact that the National Sports Promotion Law divided national sport into elite sport (kyungki cheyuk) and mass sport (kunmin cheyuk) shows that the government was aware of the main two elements of sport.
Chapter 2: Historical Review

Under the motto of ‘sound Korean people’ Park proclaimed “We must not forget for even a moment that cultivating a strong and fit people and making sport an everyday part of people’s lives will provide the vitality necessary for the task of modernizing the Motherland (12th September 1968)” (Ha and Mangan, 2002). One of the ideas that the President put into practice to promote sport participation was ‘national exercises’. The design of the programme was completed in 1977 and promoted during 1979 through recording tapes, diagrams which described each posture to the schools, public offices and companies. While Kim, S.Y. (2004) noted that the regime contributed to the development of national sport for all by administrative and financial procedures, Ha and Mangan (2002) argued that ‘sport for all’ was not able to make much progress due to lack of substantial resources to build appropriate facilities. Nevertheless, the fact that the government realized the importance of mass participation cannot be denied.


Politics

In Korea’s history, this period has special meaning in the sense that the authoritarian government transformed itself into a democratic government. However, as Im (1998) said, Chun Doo Hwan’s government was only an extension of the previous regime in terms of its lack of legitimacy in power and the way it governed the nation using political and institutional violence towards the general public. After Park Jung Hee’s assassination in 1979, Chun carried out a two-stage coup d’état. The first stage started on Dec.12th 1979 and the second one on May 17th 1980. The second coup caused an antigovernment demonstration including Kwangju Uprising, which lasted for nine days. As a consequence of it, the acting president Choi Kyu Ha resigned and Chun was elected president in a rubber-stamp election (Kihl, 2005).

As Cumings (2002) described, the Kwangju Uprising was a real tragedy. There were reports of a minimum of 600 and a maximum of 2,000 killed. The demonstration was self-organised by students and independent citizens trying to save the nation from the new martial law regime that Chun had just announced. It inevitably exposed Chun’s
weakest point, his lack of legitimacy. To establish legitimacy for his regime, Chun called a parliamentary election. According to Kihl (2005), after the opposition party’s victory there was no alternative for Chun other than adopting a new strategy. Chun’s coup had significant differences from that of Park. While Park’s coup cost relatively few lives, Chun’s involved the deaths of a number of soldiers as well as a serious attack on Seoul, the capital of Korea (Eckert et al., 1990). According to Shorrock (1988), the characteristics of the resistance to Chun’s regime was not the same as previous democratic movements. It had evolved as a national independence movement and opposition to Korea’s military alliance with the U.S.

As briefly mentioned previously, it is worth looking at Hanahoe, one of the central underground groups during Chun’s era. It started under the name of the ‘five star society’ and changed to Hanohoe, meaning ‘one mind’. The fact that Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo were founder members indicates the power of the society. Hanahoe was considered as the route to reach key positions. Not only the military posts but also other important seats in the government were filled with members of Hanahoe in the 5th and 6th Republics (Im, 1998).

A new constitution was adopted by a national referendum on October 27th 1987 followed by a presidential election on December 16, 1987. It provided a direct way of electing the president. The new Sixth Republic of Korea was launched on February 25th 1988 (Kihl, 2005). The democratisation of Korean politics in 1987 resulted from a long struggle which included the Student Revolution of April 19th 1960. Unlike Latin America and Eastern Europe, the development of democracy in Korea was led not only by elite machinations but also by popular and civic sectors in the society (Kihl, 2005).

Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993) was chosen as president by the first direct elections in Korea. Roh was one of the military personnel who got involved in the coup d’état after Park’s assassination. According to Cotton (1993), under Roh’s regime Korea started to move towards democracy, overcoming the persistent legitimacy crisis. However, it was undermined by the fact that Roh was the classmate of former President Chun in Korea the Military Academy and one of the participants in the 1970 coup d’état after Park Jung Hee’s assassination. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that it was the first peaceful transfer of power in the history of the Republic of Korea (Eun, 1996). Eun (1996)
argued that, as a result of Rho’s background, as mentioned above, he was reluctant to move forward to democracy. His regime was not very much different from the previous one in the way that it treated people who asked for political democracy and redistribution of wealth. While Chun’s regime produced a daily average of 1.6 ‘prisoners of conscience (yangsimsoo)’, or political prisoners, the average for Rho’s government was 4.4 prisoners per day.

It is significant that Korea’s democracy movement reached a peak in 1987, eight years after President Park’s assassination. In 1987 Korea recorded high economic growth and trade surplus with low inflation. It showed that democratic transition could occur in “good times” as well as in “hard times” (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). Cheng and Krause (1991) stated that the democratic transition resulted in greater consumption, provoking inflationary pressures and the demand for wage increases rather than productive gains. Although Roh won the presidential election, the result revealed the way Korea was split according to region. The vast majority of votes that each of four candidates acquired were from their home areas. Roh faced the phenomenon of yeosoyadae (ruling minority and opposition majority). It made major legislative bills difficult to pass, but he overcame this situation by merging three parties although excluding that of Kim Dae Jung. Korean politics was transformed from a “four-party stalemate” in 1988 to “the conservative alliance” in 1990 (Park, J., 1990).

On the 29th June, 1987 there was a critical pronouncement by Rho Tae Woo which enabled Korea to move forward in terms of democracy. Rho’s regime announced that it would be targeting increasing the distribution of wealth and greater democratization (Lee, Y.H., 1997). Kihl (2005) illustrated the list of proposed reforms, which included a revision of the presidential election law, political amnesty and a restoration of civil rights to dissident leader Kim Dae Jung, protection of human rights, promotion of freedom of the press, local autonomy and self-governance, reform of political parties and social reforms for building ‘a clean and honest society’.

Eckert et al (1990) suggested the following reasons for Rho Tae Woo’s declaration of June 29th. First, Korea was on the verge of hosting the Olympics. The government had been preparing to use the Olympics as a tool for international recognition. Kihl (2005)
also suggested that, because of hosting the 1988 Olympics, the issue of the extent of political stability in Korea had attracted international attention. Second, the scope of the student demonstration supported by citizens was massive. Students threw stones and fire bombs and combat police fired tear gas almost every day. A large number of middle class people stated that they were on the side of the students in their attempts to restore democracy.

With the end of five year term of President Rho Tae Woo, the first civilian president in Korea emerged. Kim Young Sam (1993-1998) was elected by popular vote as the first civilian president since 1961 and, as such, enjoyed a popular mandate in its initial stage of democratization, following a successful transition from the Roh Tae Woo administration. The reason why Kim Young Sam’s government was no longer called ‘the 7th Republic’ is that the president himself and the other figures who were part of the central government were not military people, which implied that it was a democratic regime (Im, 1998). It inherited the legacy of promoting economic development through liberalising reform, that was the hallmark of the Roh Tae Woo era. President Kim imposed strong civilian control over the military, and opposed close relationships between political figures and businesses (Im, 1998). It can be said that Korea was entering a genuine era of democracy or democratic consolidation. It was the first time that two candidates who had lost in the election made conceding speeches to congratulate the winner.

According to Kihl (2005), during the 1992 election campaign, all candidates emphasised their plans to reduce the government’s role as, at that time, the state was so huge and powerful that it completely controlled the economy. It appeared that Korea was moving towards a laissez-faire market economy and that the role of government was to be reduced to a minimum. In the president’s inaugural address in 1993, Kim Young Sam announced that Korea would be born again by undertaking reforms. He said that “misconduct and corruption must be rooted out, the economy must be revitalised and national discipline must be enhanced” (Kihl, 2005). An examination of his policy is provided below.
Chapter 2: Historical Review

**Economics**

The power of the Chaebol had become even greater during the 1980s. They were given exceptional treatment by the government for the purpose of recovering competitive export power. It is notable that capital invested in the Chaebol came from foreign funds (Im, 1998). In the mid 1980s, about 66% of GNP in Korea came from the top five Chaebol. Fortune magazine announced that among the fifty biggest firms worldwide, two of them were Korean companies, namely Samsung and Hyundai (Eckert et al, 1990). Table 2.2 shows when the major Chaebol were established in Korea.

**Table 2.2 Foundation Date of the 50 Largest Chaebol, 1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Eun (1996: 144)

As Eun (1996) noted, the degree of concentration remained high. The five top Chaebol (Hyundai, Samsung, Lucky-Goldstar, Daewoo and Ssangyong accounted for 21.3 percent of all manufacturing turnover, approximately 60% of the total share of the 30 top Chaebol as shown in Table 2.3.

**Table 2.3 The Share of the Top 30 Chaebol in Manufacturing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of Turnover</td>
<td>32.0(15.7)*</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>40.2(23.0)*</td>
<td>36.8(21.3)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Employment</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ( ) means the share of the top five Chaebol

Source: Adapted from Eun (1996: 182), Economy Planning Board (Eun, 1996)

According to Eun (1996) the survey conducted by the Parliamentary Inspection of the Administration in Sept. 1991 indicates that 32.1% of their total equity was owned by their subsidiaries in 10 top Chaebol. Internal shareholding in the 61 Chaebol averaged
46.9% in 1991, up from 45.4% in 1990. Despite the government’s attempt to solve the problem, the concentration of ownership was becoming greater. The structure of ownership stayed the same as early industrial capitalism (Eun, 1990). According to Lee, Y.H. (1997), Park Chung Hee’s government applied direct intervention until the end of the military regime. As with Park, Chun tried to compensate for lack of legitimacy by achieving economic development. Rho, on the other hand, aimed at acquiring legitimacy by decreasing authoritarianism and increasing wealth distribution, because his regime was installed through democratic constitutional reform.

There are some figures suggested by academics and researchers which show the rapid economic growth of Korea during this period. According to Seguino (1997), standard macroeconomic indicators for Korea were indeed impressive, with GDP growth rates averaging from 9% annually in 1972 to 15% in 1990 [Bank of Korea, 1994]. During Chun’s period, the annual growth Korea experienced was 12%, raising the per capita GNP to US $2,300 (Shorrock, 1988). Koh (2005) showed that the GNI per capita of $1,749 in 1981 increased to $2,643 by 1986, and then to $12,197 by 1996 (www.nso.go.kr). Shin and Shaw (2003) said that the average annual growth rate between 1990 and 1995 was 7.2%.

However, this high growth rate slumped dramatically in 1980 for several reasons. While Song (1990) suggested that it was due to the socio-political unrest after the President’s assassination, Kihl (2005) argued that it was influenced by the 1979 world energy crisis, domestic violence and political turmoil. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) showed that the inflationary pressure of the consumer price index increased from 18.3% in 1979 to about 30% in 1980. During 1979-1980 the GNP growth was –3.3% the first negative sign, and down from 7.0 percent in 1979. In 1980, there was a negative growth rate of –5.2% after almost two decades of consecutive growth. After this difficult period, the economy in Korea, began to show signs of recovery in 1986. Between 1986 and 1987, macroeconomic and trade policy brought low interest rates and the economy also benefited from, low oil prices and a depreciation in the dollar exchange rate. Also during this period, huge public investment in the infrastructure for the Seoul Olympics impacted positively on the Korean economy (Kihl, 2005).
The current worldwide leading companies for semiconductors such as Samsung and LG, started during this period. As Hong (1997) noted, Korean governments had tried to promote the semiconductor industry since the 1960s but had not succeeded. In the early 1980s, private firms started to step forward. It is noteworthy that massive investment in the semiconductor industry were financed by private companies not by the state, partly because of financial liberalization. Samsung was the frontrunner and raised $190 million in 1984 alone through a number of channels such as syndicated foreign loans, convertible bonds etc. According to Hong (1997), until the early 1980s, Korea did not own any semiconductor manufacturing factories. However, Korea emerged as the third largest semiconductor producer in the world in less than a decade. Mathews and Cho (2000: 2) argued:

The Korean firm Samsung took the world lead in chip production in 1993, only a decade after launching its first chip memory product. Samsung’s entry into the industry, like that of the other Korean firms, Hyundai and LG, was accomplished through its own internal efforts supplemented by leveraging the most advanced product and process technologies available in Japan, Europe and the US.

One of Kim Young Sam’s most popular anti-corruption policies was the “real name system” which outlaws accounts created under counterfeit names for nefarious purposes. The Korea News review (18th December 1993) reported that a total of 234 government officials were known to have accumulated fortunes illegally. They were suspected of being dishonest when disclosing financial statements and had engaged in tax evasion or land speculation. Of these, 94 were asked to leave and 140 received a warning. The President also purged from the military generals who were charged with bribery. It was very difficult and risky for the President to remove high-ranking generals, but the democratic legitimacy made this action possible.

In 1997, Korea confronted its biggest ever financial crisis, the so-called IMF crisis. The reasons for this will be discussed in detail in the next period. Economists evaluated the IMF crisis from different perspectives. Chang (1997) pointed out some of the problems after the second bailout at the end of December in 1997. First, the IMF’s 5% inflation target resulted in too strong a deflation in the Korean economy. It meant that Korea had
to endure a huge increase in import prices which led to a chain of bankruptcies and a deepening economic depression. Second, Korea needed time to identify which financial institutions should be shut down and to prepare for the entry of foreign banks into the Korean economy. However, the IMF immediately took strong action without consulting the Korean people, so that Korea was inevitably exposed in volatile circumstances. According to Lee, C.K. (2000), the IMF was not fair in handling the crisis. The result of the financial crisis was that private banks stopped rolling over their short-term credits to Korea. The debtors were Korean Chaebol and financial institutions. One consequence of this debtor crisis was that the IMF ordered the government to use public funds to rescue the Korean private sector. As Montes (1999) stated, the foreign banks curtailed their lending to Korea. Relatively small Canadian and European banks had lent Korea $10,721 million, which was 5.7 percent of their total international lending. This figure was the result of reduction of $2,937 million and 2.7 percent of the Korea exposure in six months. It was notable that the IMF was not able to predict the Korean financial crisis at all. In the annual report of August 1997, only three months before the crisis, it applauded Korea’s macroeconomic policy (Lee, C.K., 2000).

According to Montes (1999), Korea has implemented a broad range of deregulation for financial markets and opening. Nonetheless, it seems as though foreign market participants had not fully recovering confidence in the Korean market. The Korean government was committed to restructuring financial institutions from the early stages of the crisis. It focused on financial institutions that were overloaded with non-performing loans, high leverage and poor management. It definitely helped the country by rescheduling $24 billion of short-term foreign liabilities at banks into longer-term loans in early February 1998.

Cultural and Social aspects

Lee, J.W. (2002) defined students as the grounds and conditions of social and political discourse in Korea in the 1980s. Students were called the voice of conscience and true representatives of the minjung (common people). Political, social, economic and cultural issues were raised across the country. According to Eckert et al (1990) ideological shifts that occurred among Korean students were caused not by the Korean War, but by the April Revolution in 1960, Yusin and Kwangju Uprising.
Chapter 2: Historical Review

According to Lewis (2002), there were two kinds of movement in the late 1990s in connection with the Kwangju Uprising which produced very different results. One was the student movement, but the ideological shift that occurred among Korean students because of the April Revolution was not welcomed any more because of its violence. Even the death of a university student during the riots failed to get sympathy from the public and the media did not hesitate to condemn the radical student movement. But the other, the labour movement, appeared to be successful. Lewis (2002) argued that this was because they consciously used a peaceful approach, which differentiated them from students. After the 29th June pronouncement, ‘the great strike’ started from the Hyundai Engine Cooperation, one of the biggest companies in Korea. The Hyundai group forbade employees to organize a trade union but the workers ignored this because of the chance given by the democratic atmosphere in the society (Eun, 1996). It spread to other divisions inside Hyundai as well as to other companies. As you can see from the Figure 2.1, the number of newly organized unions hugely increased after ‘the great strike’. According to Eun (1996) these strikes gave workers the chance to organise trade unions and receive higher wages.

**Figure 2.1 Annual increase in the number of newly organized unions**

![Annual increase in the number of newly organized unions](source)

It is also important to note other major social changes during this period. First, the pace of Korean urbanization increased to 49.8%, 68.7% and 75% in 1970, 1980 and 1990 respectively (Kim and Choe, 1997). The United Nations survey indicated that the rate of increase in urbanization in Korea over the previous three decades had been one of the fastest in the world, even among other developing countries (Kang Dae Gi, 1987; City
of Seoul, 1991). Another major socio-economic development was, according to Shin and Shaw (2003), the process of “demographic ageing” which was extremely rapid compared to other countries. It showed that the old-age dependency ratio in Korea was 8-9% in the 1980s and 1990s but was predicted to double over the following two decades- a development which took 140 years in France and 86 years in Sweden. As regards income distribution, Park C.M.’s research (1991) indicated that income distribution seemed to become more equal to some extent and referred to one report (Economic Planning Board, Social Indicators in Korea, 1987) which indicated that the relative gap between the income share of the top and bottom was 8.9 in 1980 and 7.2 in 1985. Finally, Kim and Choe (1997) noted that the car ownership sharply increased between 1980 and 1990. As the table 2.4 shows, by 1990 more than 1 million cars were on the streets, about 70% of which belonged to private owners. This also caused problems in terms of lack of parking spaces in the housing areas. As most apartments were constructed before the automobile boom, there were not enough parking places.

**Table 2.4 Increase in automobiles in Seoul between 1980 and 1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1980-85 (Rate of increase %)</th>
<th>1985-90 (Rate of increase %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles(A)</td>
<td>206,778</td>
<td>445,807</td>
<td>1,064,026</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1000 Population</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1000 Households</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>190.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Seoul Metropolis, 1990 (Kim and Choe, 1997)

**Sport**

While it can be argued that president Chun Doo Hwan used the Olympics as a strategy to overcome the lack of the regime’s legitimacy (Lee, W.Y., 2004), it can not be denied that the Olympics impacted on Korean sport in a greater extent. Considering Korea hosted two mega sport events in Seoul, the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympics in 1988 successfully, this period of 1980 and 1990s can be described as the autumn when the fruits ripened, according to Ha and Mangan (2002). It is important to note that these two mega events had a significant synergy effect on Korean society (Koh, 2005). She argued that middle class population increased due to Korea’s economic prosperity and
Chapter 2: Historical Review

the public began to recognise their leisure as an active consumption of free time for themselves.

It is worth looking at this in some detail with reference to the hosting strategy. Koh (2005) suggested some reasons why Korea was so keen on hosting those mega sport events. First, in spite of Korea’s rapid development in terms of GNP, she was still not known to the outside world. Being a host on the world sporting stage would be expected to give a boost to the Korean people in terms of raising national pride and identity. Second, the state aimed at national development and integration of the people. In other words, the regime tried to deflect people’s attention towards the big sporting events. As for the Asian Games, they were considered to be a rehearsal for the Olympics. It was a good opportunity for Korea to test out stadiums, accommodation and transportation. According to Kihl (2005), the Seoul Olympics was a great opportunity for the authoritarian regime to appear to pursue democracy. It is believed that Chun’s regime saw the Olympics as a tool to conceal the government’s undemocratic activities and suppress the people’s movement (Ahn, 1990). Ha and Mangan (2002) argued that the big effort to host the Asian Games and Olympics accelerated the momentum of elite sport in Korea. The Ministry of Sports was established in 1982 by President Chun and Rho Tae Woo was appointed as Minister of Sport. The goal of the Ministry of Sport was expressed in Minister Rho’s inaugural address. Roh said:

The Ministry of Sport was established with the purpose of fully committing to the preparation for the Seoul Asian Games and Olympics and be ready for entering the developed sport nation. To achieve the aim, we will put every effort into talent identification, training coaches, sport science, remodeling old facilities, strengthening the sport organizations such as KSC and National Sports Federations, and developing school and society, military sport (quoted in Im, 1998: 235)

The fact that the government viewed the Ministry of Sport as a critical part of the process is shown by the profiles of the ministers. A total of six ministers headed the Ministry between 1982 and December, 1988. There were two former generals, two politicians, one administrator and one with a sport background. It is worth noting that a
couple of key figures in the 5th republic were included- Rho Tae Woo and Park Se Jik (Im, 1998). It is important to note that Chun’s government revised the National Sports Promotion Law in 1982. The new phrase inserted in the updated Law was to ‘enhance national prestige through sport’ which had not been made explicit by the previous government (Lee, W.Y., 2004).

While the development of elite sport policy dates from Park’s regime, interest in ‘Sport for All’ dates from the late 1980s. According to Koh (2005), the success of the two mega events, the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympics in 1988, made Koreans more interested in physical activities. It is important to note that the government started to invest in infrastructure, but only for the elite sports. The sport revenue was increased due to profits from the Seoul Olympics and the ‘National Sport Promotion Foundation’ was set up. The government played a central role in the formation of the ‘National Sport Promotion Foundation’. The Hodori plan, the government’s National Sport Promotion Plan, was launched in 1990 and the People’s Lifetime Sports Association was established. As Ha and Mangan (2002) argued, it could be said that the era of ‘sport for all’ in Korea started in the 1990s.

Chun’s period was the era of professional sports. It started with baseball in 1982, football followed in 1983 and Sireum (Korean traditional wrestling) in 1983. One of the factors that enabled baseball to succeed in Korea was the policy called ‘Home based system’ which was initiated in six areas across Korea. This strategy impacted on the integration of people in various regions who supported the same teams and resulted in the development of professional baseball over two decades (Im, 1998). According to Ha and Mangan (2002), the growth of professional sport was useful for distracting Koreans’ interest from politics and helping to limit general political involvement. One of the tools Chun attempted to divert public opinion from politics to sport issues was to break the monopoly of Sports Newspapers so that people are likely to become interested in sport. ‘Sports Seoul’ emerged as a competitor to ‘Ilgan Sport’ which was the only one of its kind until May, 1985. (Lee, W.Y., 2004).
Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) was the first opposition party candidate to win a Korean presidential election. As Shin and Shaw (2003) noted, Kim Dae Jung’s era was remarkably liberal compared to previous regimes and the tight relationship between the state and Chaebol was weakened. The reason this government appeared more liberal than the former one was that the regime tried to introduce a more western style welfare system. The development of a public works programme and increase of expenditure on unemployment insurance were examples (Shin and Shaw, 2003). As quoted in Kihl (2005), Diamond (1996, 1999) expressed the view that the third wave of democratisation in the late twentieth century was now over and the saga of Korean democratisation was complete. He said that the presidential election of 1997 marked the point in history when Korea became a democracy.

When Kim Dae Jung was elected he focused on the policy towards North Korea the so called “sunshine policy” which Kihl (2005) suggested was based on three principles: first, South Korea would never tolerate armed provocation of any kind; second, South Korea did not have any intention of undermining or absorbing North Korea; and third, South Korea would actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation with the North. According to Walker and Kang (2004), the sunshine policy was aimed at securing peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula by seeking economic and humanitarian cooperation.

According to Walker and Kang (2004), the climax of Kim Dae Jung’s achievement was a visit North Korea to meet Kim Jong Il in 2000. It was the first face-to-face meeting of Korean leaders in 53 years. After this historic summit there were a few signs of a friendly mood, such as two reunions of separated families and an agreement to reconnect a cross-border railway. It made people think that re-unification could become a reality in the near future. However, this optimism was soon undermined by the announcement by North Korea of its nuclear weapons program.
Chapter 2: Historical Review

Considering that information technology started to have an influence on politics in 2000 as Han (2000) suggested, it is worth looking at the development of new information technology in this ten year period. After Kim Dae Jung’s administration provided a huge amount of public funds for the spread of broadband internet access, Korea ranked 6th in the world in terms of the number of internet users positioned behind the U.S., Japan, China, Germany and the United Kingdom (Shin, 2005). Watts (2003) pointed out that two thirds of Korean households had broadband and people spent an average of 1,340 minutes on line per month. According to Han (2002) the citizen alliance which campaigned for a fair election was a by-product of the 1980s’ democratization process, and was led by the ‘386 Generation (30s, born in 80s)’. They blacklisted unacceptable candidates for the nominations and carried out a huge negative campaign through the internet. The ‘Defeat Movement’ gave a shock to the whole Korean political system and existing power groups.

It is argued that Rho Moo Hyun’s victory in the presidential election proved the power of young internet users. When Chung Mong Joon (another candidate who pledged to assist Rho to win, and the president of Hyundai Heavy Industry) withdrew his support at the last minute, young people used the internet and mobile phones to persuade their peers to vote for Rho. According to Han (2002), the reaction to Chung’s withdrawal demonstrated the power of mobile phones and the Web to directly affect the election results. As Han recorded in Lee and Choi (2002), from midnight to 3 am, the website “naver.com” recorded 3 million visits which is five times its daily average. From 11 am to 1 pm, 18 million mobile phone calls were recorded. Han also argued that the power of Netizens (people in the cyber net) triggered political events and they achieved a major player position, the majority of whom were the 2030 Generation (20s~30s age group). The young, led by No-sa-mo (the fan club for Rho supporters) was opposed to Lee (the Grand National Party) being elected as a president because he was a leader of the conservative party.

Walker and Kang (2004) also believed that new technology influenced the 2002 presidential election. Television debate had a major impact on Rho’s victory. As they quoted in Kim, W.B. (2003), 72% of voters watched at least one debate on TV, 67.5% of voters said their decision was influenced by it and 37% of them had changed their
minds through watching the debate. There was no doubt that No-sa-mo played a critical role in Rho’s victory in the presidential election (Shin, 2005).

On 12th March, 2004, the unprecedented impeachment of the president occurred in Korea. The political uncertainty and upheaval overwhelmed the country. Within an hour of Rho’s impeachment, his presidential powers were suspended, except for staying in his official residence in the Blue House. Cho (2005) indicated that the reason for the impeachment was Rho’s breach of election law by asking people to support the Uri Party (ruling party) in the general election. It gave the opportunity for the opposition party to impeach the president. Dissatisfaction over the Rho government’s various policy failures, for example, the lowest growth rate of the economy in five years (with 3.1 percent of the GDP growth in 2003), and the ineptness of the president’s leadership reached a climax. The opposition party passed the motion despite strong protest. The Constitutional Court finally dismissed the impeachment motion brought by the National Assembly in 14th May.

Economics

It is necessary to look into the reasons why Korea was so strongly affected by the IMF crisis. Kim, D. (1999) identified a number of factors which contributed to the crisis with the first being the overlap of downturns in the long-term business and investment cycles was significant. During the rapid economic growth in Korea, there was a failure to establish a robust business system based on market principles. Most enterprises tried to continue expanding rather than generating profits based on sound economic rules. The principles of self-restrain and responsibility were neglected and it led to the lack of inefficiencies in resource allocation. As a result, the substantiveness of the economy itself weakened and the actors in Korea economy fell into a state of moral hazard (Kim, D., 1999).

Second, the crisis came from bankruptcy of many loan-dependent businesses. Korean manufacturing companies showed an extremely high average debt-equity ratio, being 396.3% in 1997, 2-4 times higher than that of U.S. Eun (1996) stated that the amount of money the top 30 Chaebol borrowed was more than 21 trillion Won, 29.2% of the total
money lent by banks in 1990. Im (1998) also argued that the average liability ratio for the top 30 Chaebol was more than five times the equity capital. Kwon (2003) pointed out that this was the result of the state’s excessive intervention and of opportunistic businessmen. It led to a lack of competitiveness that weakened investors’ confidence. Third, the crisis had taken place because of the weakening of the regulatory regime of the state (Chang, 1998). Before the crisis, the bureaucrats in the economic sector had failed to monitor the dramatic increase in short-term loans from foreign lenders. As Kwon (2003) said, the senior officials were concerned about the possibilities of an economic crisis. Immediately after the crisis broke, a number of big companies went bankrupt, for example, Daewoo, Hanbo (steel), Kia Motors, Sammi, Jinro. Also within the financial sector Korea’s five largest banks had undergone mergers and of the thirty merchant banks, more than half had been shut or merged (Park, Y.C., 2001)

Nevertheless, it was estimated that Korea was recovering well and the IMF policies adopted were being implemented successfully. Korea actually repaid stand-by drawings nine months earlier than scheduled. As Krueger (2005) noted, with the Korean government tackling the policy failures fast and robustly, Korea was able to recover successfully within a couple of years. Tang (2000) also said that Korea used the IMF crisis not only as the opportunity to rebuild the economy, but as the chance to strengthen its social safety net. As the Table 2.5 shows, Korea recorded –5.5 % growth in 1998, which proved a significant downturn from 1997 and identifies its severe position compared to other Asian countries. Korea was able to repay all the loans to the IMF in 2001 three years earlier than expected. Korea recovered quickly compared to the other East Asian countries (Kwon, 2003).

Table 2.5 Economic Growth of East Asian Tigers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / Country</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 2: Historical Review

Starting in 1997 with the collapse of Hanbo, the 14th Chaebol in Korea, numerous Chaebol companies such as Kia, Sammi, Hanshin slid into bankruptcy. For example, Daewoo was the second largest group until its collapse. In 1999, most of the Daewoo companies showed a negative net worth (Enrlich and Kang, 1999). Kraar (2003) also mentioned that the Daewoo companies were $65 billion in debt, which was the one of the biggest bankruptcies ever. Daewoo had expanded by purchasing state-owned industries at bargain prices.

Kim Woo Choong, CEO of Daewoo, was accused by the Korean prosecutors of accounting fraud and embezzling $2 million. Kim commented “My big mistake was being too ambitious, especially in autos. I tried to do in five years what usually took ten to fifteen years. To gain economies of scale, we made investments without the markets’ being there, and then had to find ways to sell the cars” (Kraar, 2003). Kraar (2003) suggested that although Daewoo employed more than 300,000 people in 110 countries and produced everything from autos to electronics to grapes for French wine, the profit margins were very thin. Daewoo’s collapse harshly affected the stock market in Korea, which fell from 941 to 839.

According to Kihl (2005), in implementing the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed reform agenda following the 1997-1998 financial crisis, the Kim Dae Jung administration pledged to pursue the strategy of “parallel development of democracy and market economy.” Kim Dae Jung’s government implemented an assertive plan for economic reform which concentrated on improving the transparency of financial institutions, privatization and decentralization, the removal of obstacles for foreign investment, and the restructuring of the large, but financially inefficient Chaebol (Canada Asia, February 2003). As a result, 17 out of the top 30 Chaebol experienced restructuring and entered receivership by the end of 2000 (Mo and Moon, 2003).

Cultural and Social Change

Tang (2000) recorded how the IMF crisis hit Korea in terms of its social effects. As Asiaweek (30th April 1999) showed, Korea’s jobless was 8.7% in February 1999, with 1.79 million people unemployed. According to Tang (2000), men who were fired from
the company felt ashamed and did not get any help from society or the government. Tang stated that social tensions were at a dangerous level at that time.

As The Economist (21st June 2003) indicated, the economic crisis gave the Korean people a big shock particularly when the youth unemployment rate (20-29 years old) soared to 7.1% in May 1998. The Economist quoted the Korea Employers’ Federation by saying that 1,327 companies with more than 100 employees were planning to cut jobs by 30% that year. What made things more difficult for young job seekers was that companies preferred experienced workers rather than people who had just graduated from the universities. Kwon (2003) showed that the number of the unemployed young people between 15 and 34 years old was 781,000, which accounts for 53.9% of all the unemployed. The massive layoffs provoked an increase in crime and divorce with the figure in 1988 conspicuously higher than in previous years.

As Tang (2000) noted the huge layoffs in Korea caused conflict between employers and employees with the unions frequently strongly resisting layoffs. However, in relation to the Daewoo crisis, the Korean labour union reached an agreement to accept massive layoffs as the alternative was that Daewoo would be liquidated and all the employees would be sacked. Kim, D.K. (2005) showed that unemployment, economic growth and unionisation were correlated to each other in the long run in Korea. With regard to Korea’s growing labour unrest, President Rho Moo Hyun said he would try hard to minimize conflict between the employers and the employees and would expect cooperation from the business leaders over this issue (Canada Asia, February 2003).

In May 2002, the five-day working week started in Korea. The three-part alliance of government, labour and management, predicted that the average number of days off for workers would increase from 92 to 144 days a year. With the emergence of the five day working week, more jobs would be generated in areas such as leisure and tourism.

It was clear that more women were becoming involved in male-dominated areas such as being members of parliament and high public officials. The Korean National Statistical Office showed that the ratio of women members of parliament dramatically increased from 5.9% in 2000 to 13.0% in 2004. In 2004, women accounted for 38.4% of the
candidates in administration, 35.0% in diplomacy and 24.3% in Law in the three higher civil service examinations.

Sport

The change from a military government to a civilian regime prompted a dramatic decrease in elite sport in terms of the size of the sport department in the Ministry and in terms of financial support. When the IMF crisis hit Korea, sport teams were the prime target for companies wanting to cut expenses and approximately 80 Sil-up (company-semi-pro teams) were dissolved (Lee, T.Y., 2000).

The 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan (2002 WC hereafter) was not only the first mega-event to be held in Asia in the 21st century but also the first since the 1988 Seoul Olympics. It was also the first co-hosted World Cup ever. It was Japan who formed a bidding committee early in 1991 and had spent $74 million to host the World Cup (Rutledge at al., 1996). However, FIFA made the decision that the 2002 World Cup would be held in two countries, Korea and Japan.

According to Mclauchlan (2001), Japan was shocked by Korea’s last minute participation in the hosting bid, because until then Japan had been the only candidate. For Mclauchlan (2001) it seemed that the 2002 WC was going to require more interaction between the two countries than merely the fever of football. To enable Korea to make up for lost time, Chung Mong Joon, a President of Korea Football Association and a vice president of FIFA had a key role. Chung and his team traveled to 34 countries in 133 days in 1994 and 35 countries in the following year. What the Korean promotional statement emphasized was that Japan had never qualified for the World Cup Final, and that the support from the Korean people was much greater than from the Japanese. According to Reuters News, while 29% of Japanese showed an interest in hosting the World Cup, 85% of Koreans actively wanted to host it. Korea also insisted that it would contribute to the peace process in Asia by persuading North Korea to participate. In answer to that, Japan pointed to the unstable situation on the Korean peninsula, reminding FIFA of the unrest in Korea in 1987, right before the Olympics. Horne and Manzenreiter (2004) suggested that the main reason Japan was enthusiastic about
becoming the host was the development of J-League, the professional football league, which was started in 1993 with the object of hosting the World Cup. Baseball had been the dominant sport in Japan for such a long time. This was the opportunity for Japanese football to develop. They also argued that there was a sense of a regional pride in Japan hosting the first World Cup in Asia.

According to Horne and Manzenreiter (2004) both governments were keen on hosting the World Cup because it would attract huge national and international media attention for the hosting cities. By enhancing their cities, they could re-route global tourist flows. For Korea, which had been undergoing an IMF crisis, the World Cup was the perfect vehicle for recovery (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004). It was argued that Korea rebranded itself as an advanced modern society and economy. Under the neo-liberal influences of global capital accumulation and transnational marketing strategies, football, more than any other single sport, had become inextricably linked to the agents, structures and processes of global capitalism. As Horne and Manzenreiter argued the 2002 WC stimulated several new developments, for instance, it strengthened national identity and various voluntary agencies.

According to Kim and Morrison (2005), the main impact of the 2002 WC was on the economics and the synergies of national unity. A source from the Korea National Tourism Organisation (2002) stated that 230,000 foreign football fans visited Korea and spent $2242 per person. According to the SERI (Samsung Economic Research Institute) report, Korea’s successive victories against strong European teams such as Poland, Portugal, Italy and Spain would increase competitive power and elevate the image of Korean products. Also, through the street celebration led by the Red Devils (Korean voluntary supporters club), Korea showed its passion, fever and energy to the whole world (Korea National Tourism Organizations, 2002). In addition to that, there is no doubt that the scenes of vast crowds of supporters of the Korean national team watching public viewing screens in a number of places across Korea, impressed people on the other side of the world. It is worth pointing out that national and municipal governments actively promoted the public viewing by installing screens, for which broadcasting fees were paid to FIFA (Manzenreiter and Horne, 2007).
It is no surprise that sport is always related to political matters. Kim Dae Jung’s government gave $500 million to North Korea in 2000 for the purpose of developing an inter-Korean summit. According to Choi (2002), the sunshine policy produced several inter-Korean events, for example, unification basketball, football and table tennis. The Hyundai Asan Foundation decided to build a new gymnasium in Pyongyang that could accommodate 12,000 people. About $57 million was due to be invested in providing space for North Korea’s sport and cultural events. In a friendly mood after this, the North sent teams and officials to the Busan Asian Games in 2002 and the Universiad in Daegu in 2003 (The Korea Times, 6th January 2004).

The Second Asian Games, hosted by Korea, was held in Busan, the second largest city in Korea. All 43 member countries of the OCA (Olympic Council of Asia) participated in the games. East Timor, the world’s newest nation, joined the games as a guest. The main focus was on North Korea who made a decision to join at the last minute. It was the first time that the North had participated in an international sport event in South Korea since Korea was divided into two and it was also the largest inter-Korean exchange programme since the 1990s (Choi, 2002). The extent to which the South’s government supported the North’s delegation was more than mere friendly relations, but was in the pursuit of the restoration of a national community (Choi, 2002). South and North Korean athletes marched together at the opening and closing ceremony under the “Korean Peninsula Flag”. Moreover, the South Korean government allowed North Korea to display the North’s national flag in limited areas such as stadiums. Choi (2002) suggested that the Busan Asian Games was a critical step towards more frequent athletic exchanges between the two, and the two Koreas have tried to bridge their differences since North Korea’s apology for the naval skirmish in the West Sea on 29th June 2002.

There was another bid for the Winter Olympics in 2010 but this failed. Pyeongchang is not a very well-known city compared to its western competitors, Vancouver and Salzburg. However, it surprised the world by being top in the first round. Lacking only three votes, Pyeongchang had to go to a second round where Vancouver beat Pyeongchang by three votes (The Korea Times, 13th May 2004). The Korean sport leader Kim Un Yong, vice president of the International Olympic Committee was
criticized for lobbying against Korea because of ambition to be the IOC Vice President (Daily Times, 29th January 2004). Kim Un Yong, a member of the IOC Committee, was jailed on charges of bribery and embezzlement. He was accused of taking bribes from a Korean sportswear company which later became an official sponsor of the Korea Olympics Committee. There were also allegations of the embezzlement of public money. The IOC announced that Kim was suspended from his vice presidential position until the Korean investigation and the Ethics Commission Probe were completed.

As we have seen above, Korea had been bidding for a number of sport mega events during the last two decades. Korea successfully hosted the 1986 Asian Games, 1988 Seoul Olympics, 2002 WC and Busan Asian Games and the 2002 WC was the pinnacle of the 21st century event. After Pyeongchang province failed to host the 2010 and 2014 winter Olympics, they started to consider bidding for the third time in 2018. While there are different reasons for hosting mega sport events, depending on the characteristics of the government and the time period, in the case of Korea, making up for the lack of legitimacy of the regime, and boosting national identity could be the main reasons. The governor of Pyeongchang, Kim Jin Sun, indicated that hosting the Winter Olympics would remind people worldwide of the Seoul Olympics in 1988 and improve the national image. He also mentioned that he would expect it to have an impact on the region’s economy. The income and expenditure for the Olympics would be expected to produce a profit of approximately 45 billion won.

Turning to discuss mass participation Kim Dae Jung’s administration sought to improve facilities for “sport for all” and encourage people to take part in sport across the country (Kim, S.Y., 2004). As Kim, S.Y. (2004) observed, quoted in the survey conducted by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2003), “we would hope to more people get involved in sporting activities year on year”. In 2003, 39.8% of respondents said they participated in sport (at least 2-3 times a week, for more than 30 minutes) on a regular basis. This is a 6.4% increase compare to figures for 2000.

Roh Moo Hyun’s government showed great enthusiasm for giving people easier access to sport. In November 2005 the Ministry of Culture & Tourism and Ministry of

---

Chapter 2: Historical Review

Education and Human Resources announced that artificial turf grounds would be made in schools across the county by 2010. It is projected that 170 billion won will be invested and that 443 schools (elementary, middle and high school) will benefit from this. This project is due to be implemented by two Ministries in cooperation with autonomous cities or provinces. It also focuses on balancing the needs of cities and province with a minimum of one ground being built in each province.

For the purpose of encouraging more people to join sport, the 7330 campaign was started in 2005 (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2005). 7330 implies that we need to exercise at least 3 times a week (7 days) for more than 30 minutes. With the emergence of the five-day week Korean people continue to increase their interest in participating activities which can enhance their health in their leisure time (Yonhap News, 9th March 2008).

The most important source of funding for sport is the Seoul Olympic Sport Promotion Foundation (SOSFO). It was established on 20th April 1989 as a public foundation. As a commemoration of the 1988 Seoul Olympics it aimed to elevate the quality of all citizens’ life by sport-related financial assistance. SOSFO initially used the Olympic surplus reserve and the sport promotion fund. To be able to function fully in the future with fast growing sport participation and demand for facilities, SOSFO has launched the sport lottery ticket, cycle racing and so forth.

We have reviewed Korean history in four time periods according to political, economic, social and sport perspectives. The summary in Table 2.6 points out the key events and developments in each period.
Table 2.6 Summary of Korean history from 1953 to 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politics</strong></td>
<td>Establishment of the first government</td>
<td>Park Jung Hee (Yusin)</td>
<td>Democracy consolidation (The first civilian president)</td>
<td>President impeachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr.1960 student revolution - Rhee fell</td>
<td>Regionalism</td>
<td>Liquidation of authoritarian regime</td>
<td>Influence of high-technology on politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Kwangju riot May, 18, 1980</td>
<td>Sunshine policy towards North Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economics</strong></td>
<td>Import Substituting Policy</td>
<td>Five year economic development plan</td>
<td>‘Real name system’</td>
<td>Recovery from IMF crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergence of Chaebol</td>
<td>Export oriented Chaebol’s era</td>
<td>IMF Crisis (1997)</td>
<td>Socialist approach from Noh Moo Hyun’s government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption of the state and Chaebol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture and social aspect</strong></td>
<td>Increase in educational opportunity after liberation from Japan</td>
<td>Hak Yun (school alumni elite network)</td>
<td>Massive lay offs (a part of restructuring)</td>
<td>Increase of youth unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase in urban population</td>
<td>Ji Yun (town, military elite network etc.)</td>
<td>Acceleration of family division and suicide rate</td>
<td>More leisure time due to 5-day week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deepen regionalism</td>
<td>Decrease of gender gap in terms of education opportunities, income, social status etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sport</strong></td>
<td>PE attracts more attention</td>
<td>Nation building (military regime)</td>
<td>Hosting major sport events: Asian Games (twice), Seoul Olympics, Growing interest in ‘sport for all’</td>
<td>Hosting FIFA World Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ready for the revival of Taekwondo</td>
<td>Concentration on elite sports</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bid for Winter Olympics (Pyeongchang)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46
Chapter 2: Historical Review

Conclusion

This chapter has been concerned with exploring Korean history in terms of political, economic, social and sport perspectives. Let us look at the themes which have emerged in the historical review of Korea, inter alia, in relation to sport.

First and foremost, the transition from an authoritarian regime to a liberal democracy needs to be emphasised. When Park Chung Hee took office he sought something that could make up for his lack of legitimacy as a President and for him sport was an efficient tool. Also, he realized that sport had the capacity to increase national identity and pride when athletes performed well in the world sport arena. Even though the government could not afford to invest all the money the athletes needed, an important legal and financial framework was established in this period with the passage of the National Sports Promotion Law and the establishment of the National Sports Promotion Foundation. The perspective on sport that Park had initiated was transmitted to subsequent regimes.

In Chun’s government, sport continued to be used as an instrument for diverting attention from politics and as a driving force for ‘nation building’. The hosting strategy can be linked to these perspectives, as will be discussed below. As the civilian president took over the leadership, the direction of sport policy seemed to change. Although the government did not want the elite athletes’ performance to go down, it appeared that the interest of the government in sport was not as great as under military presidents. Despite the substantial criticism that was directed at President Park Chung Hee, it cannot be denied that he opened the door for the development of both elite sport and sport for all.

It is worth noting that following the move from military dictatorship the state began to view sports from the perspective of welfare provision. As Korea moved towards liberal democracy the issue of welfare became more important on the government agenda and sport became one of the priorities. At the sub-national level a number of programs had been implemented in recent years, for example, the ‘7330 movement’, (one week (seven days), three times and thirty minutes exercise), led by the National Council for Sports For All.
Second, the emergence of a hosting strategy demonstrates several important aspects of Korean policy. During the last half a century, Korea has hosted a number of sport events (Seoul Olympics in 1988, 2002 WC, two Asian Games in 1986 and 2002, World Universiad Games in 2003) and put in bids for others (2010, 2014 Winter Olympic). Hosting a mega sport event is a vehicle for national public relations. As Korea was known as ‘the country of the War’, a ‘nation that has no edible food’ and a ‘dangerous country to visit’ for many years the governments seems to have regarded hosting sport events as an opportunity to improve Korea’s image in the world. Needless to say, this can also encourage national integration and the development of democracy.

It could be said somewhat ironically that the Seoul Olympics signaled the start of an era of ‘Sport for All’ or mass participation in Korea. It not only offered opportunities for Koreans to experience the highest level of sport, but encouraged them to become actively involved in sport activities. In addition, the dramatic increase in wealth in a relatively short period of time further prompted the public to have more interest in sport participation.

Third, it is worth noting the role of the Chaebol in sport, as well as in other sectors in Korea. As mentioned above, people started to seek ways to enjoy life, thanks to the growth of disposable income since late 1980s. From the business point of view, sport was considered as a potentially bright market to be involved in. The interest of businesses in the sport industry can be seen, for instance, in building leisure centers, sponsoring amateur/ professional clubs and creating sporting events. Needless to say, hosting mega sport events enabled businesses to announce the excellence of their product or brand to the world.

This becomes even more significant when it comes to the era of professional sport, between 1982 and 1983. It would not be possible to form a professional league without the Chaebol’s commitment. It is argued that the government intervened to a large extent in creating such leagues, in terms of urging the Chaebol to make teams. Even though it did not sound fascinating to the Chaebol, they had no other option but to obey as a nation under an authoritarian regime. It is believed that this strategy was used by President Chun to divert peoples’ attention from politics to sport, in order to hide his
lack of legitimacy, although there was an element of the president’s personal affection to sport.

It is worth discussing the way that the Chaebol operated in terms of their sport teams as it seemed inevitably to conflict with the common characteristics of businesses. While the prime motive of businesses is maximizing profit, it appeared that managing professional sport teams would undermine that goal, especially when the Chaebol had to invest a great amount of money though they could not expect to break even. With the Chaebol as owner of the sport team, sport was treated as one of the departments in the company. The dependency on the mother company could not inspire officials in the sport sectors to attract fans by striving to increase loyalty between the club and the region where the Chaebol were based. Instead, the effort to promote the brand or product of the Chaebol could be seen as the constant priority.

One of the examples was the ‘nameless jersey’ of the football players. For over two decades, the name that football fans could see on the back of a player was not the players own name but the name of the brand or product of companies such as Hauzen (the washing machine section of Samsung Electronic) on the Suwon Bluewings. It reflected the approach of the Chaebol who valued exposing their goods to the media above promoting their players, who were the central assets of professional sport. It is not surprising that a number of Chaebol such as Sambo basketball team and LG Sierum club did not hesitate to dissolve their teams in the name of restructuring when the IMF crisis hit Korea.

Lastly, it is worth noting how the government allocated sport to various departments, which indicates the government’s view on sport. It is noteworthy that the first Ministry of Sport, established in 1982 for the preparation of 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics, was an independent organization. It reflects the fact that Chun saw sport as top of the agenda for the fate of his regime. With the appearance of a civilian president, the importance of sport, appeared to decrease with the disappearance of the word ‘sport’ from the name of the Ministry. Sport was combined with culture as the ‘Ministry of Culture and Sport’ and finally the word ‘sport’ was removed completely from the government organisation when it was named the ‘Ministry of Culture and Tourism’. It
Chapter 2: Historical Review

took a decade before the word ‘sport’ came back into the Ministry when Lee Myung Bak government renamed it the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism in 2008.
Chapter 3: Theorising the Policy Process

Chapter 3 Theorising the Policy Process

Macro-level theories

Introduction

In this thesis it is necessary to understand macro level theories (theories of the state) in order to analyse the sport policy process in Korea. The central theme of the policy process is ‘power relations’ between the actors involved in policy making. It is worth noting that macro level theories sensitise the researchers to be alert to certain themes, to help design research strategies by asking particular questions and to analyse frameworks. The questions which can be raised include: ‘Who has power?’; ‘How is power used?’ and ‘What are the interests of the powerful?’. Not only can macro level theories give us an answer to the broad range of questions above about the overall political system, but also an understanding of the state as central to policy development. Three approaches were selected: Marxism, Elitism and Pluralism. As Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) argued, there are reasons for choosing these theories. Both scholars contended that these theories help readers to understand the world better and provide them with various perspectives on the world. They encourage testable and useful questions and allow debate and research to be conducted in a more sophisticated manner. However, it should be borne in mind that these theories have clear limits in terms of the range of application. Dunleavy and O’Leary revealed that the work which focused on the domestic politics of liberal democracy resulted in the inapplicability of the theories to other political systems. Moreover, the fact that specific characteristics of the state, for example, ethnicity, gender and nationalism, were not discussed needs to be recognised, as this research is based on Korea, which is located in Asia, and has experienced significant structure changes in political structure from an authoritarian to a democratic government and in which the changes of gender role continue to be seen. In this chapter three macro theories, Marxism, Pluralism and Elitism will be discussed. We intend to look at the strengths and weaknesses of each theory and evaluate how they would be applicable in a Korean context.
Marxism

Marxism has been one of the most familiar macro level theories. However, it does not seem to define its ideology or the key concept of social class in a clear manner. Strinati (1995) argued that it appears that Marx’s ideology changed over time as his ideas continued to develop. It can be said that Marx’s ideas are a way of understanding the world and acting upon it, and therefore, it is not just a theory. It does not mean, however, that we can ignore Marxism. As Hay (2006) said it is useful in the sense that Marxist theories of the state provide fruitful insights into the complex relationship between the state, the economy and society in capitalist democracies.

Classical Marxism

According to Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987), Marx and Engels developed the first concept of ‘scientific socialism’ by criticising and restructuring the ideas from three sources. As Smith (1993) suggested, Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto regarded the state as nothing but an Executive Committee for the bourgeoisie. They described the state as ‘a body of armed men’ indicating that when a proto-class of exploiters initially imposes government by a coup the dominant class uses force towards the rest of society (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). There are two implications here. One is that the bourgeoisie have a range of interests in opposition to those of the proletariat and the dying classes such as the ‘feudal’ aristocracy. As a result, the bourgeoisie directly control and run the state for their own interests. The other is the prisoner’s dilemma for the bourgeoisie. If all bourgeoisies seek their own interests rather than the collective interest, the proletariat is likely to be over-exploited. To prevent this happening, the state needs a degree of autonomy to intervene to enable better labour productivity and workers’ rights (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987).

In Marx’s description of historical materialism, the concept of ‘superstructure’ is important and refers to the base of a society, which in Marx’s view, is its mode of material production and the ways, usually economic, whereby it reproduces itself materially. According to Strinati (1995), the mode of production determines the superstructure of a society, its political and ideological institutions, the social relations and
sets of ideas that lie outside the base, like the family, the state, religion, education and culture. Marsh (2002) pointed out that, to Marx, agents have little, if any, autonomy because the mode of production of material life determines the mass consciousness and the economic ‘base’ determines the ‘superstructure’. As Giddens (1986) argued, capitalism is inherently a class society and the class relations upon which it is founded are intrinsically ones of struggle or conflict, as the history of existing society demonstrates, according to Marx.

Another important concept in Marxism in the notion of ‘false consciousness’ which was developed in The German Ideology. In this book, Marx and Engels were certain that the ruling class could promote false perceptions to a particular class without overt policy intervention. As Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) said, ‘false consciousness’ can prevent the mass from realising how much they would gain from freedom. The classical Marxists contend that beliefs and ideas are necessarily flawed or distorted in specific ways, and consequently the ways in which people perceive the world are normally false. According to Jarvie and Maguire (1994), the real problems of humanity stem from real social contradictions that give rise to forms of ‘false consciousness’ about material reality. It is worth noting the corresponding relationship between social structure and systems of thought. The fact that sport was considered as the possession of non-educated people indicates that under Confucianism there was a clear chasm between moon (academic work) and moo (physical discipline) and this division still exists in Korea. It is worth reiterating that the only escape from false consciousness in classical Marxism is through a practical critique of the conditions producing such consciousness (Jarvie and Maguire, 1994). As regards the development of ‘false consciousness’, Evans (2006: 43) commented that:

---

1 Confucianism, which was introduced to Korea during the Koguryo Kingdom in 372, has remained influential in Korean culture despite periods of colonisation and contemporary modernisation. Confucianism is characterised by its humanistic values which place an emphasis on education, filial piety, loyalty and respect for life (Kwon, 2000). Guo (2005) argued that the passion for developing the education system conforms to the respect for education inherited originally from Confucianism and deeply embedded in Korean society.
A Marxist would say that those people owning the means of production also control the process of government and can use this source of domination to impose their views on society. This results in a ‘false consciousness’ among the proletariat, whereby they accept their subordinate position in capitalist society and do not question the existing social and political structure.

**Neo-Marxism**

As Jarvie and Maguire (1994) argued, classical Marxism was displaced by so called ‘Neo Marxism’, due to the advent of geographical, generational and formal political shifts. Althusser had the greatest influence on the post-war expositions of ideology. According to Jarvie and Maguire (1994), Althusser tried to establish Marxism as a science and attempted to remove the idea of economic determinism. He strived to resolve the theoretical problems that had been left unresolved in the past. As Strinati (1995) argued, Althusser interpreted Marx’s ideas to suggest that the superstructure is determined by various incidental and contingent factors as well as by the base.

According to Ives (2004), Gramsci’s concept of hegemony also played a pivotal role in Neo-Marxism. Gramsci redefined hegemony in the context of the contemporary era by describing the formation and organisation of consent and providing a much broader social and cultural portrayal of modern society (Ives, 2004). Hay (2006) pointed out that what Gramsci contributed to the context was the idea that even though the subordinates offer stubborn resistance to the capitalist class this does not change the status quo. This was important in the sense that Gramsci had reinserted human subjectivity as a dynamic agent within Marxist philosophy.

It could be argued that Gramsci wanted to develop his vision in the fields of ideology, politics and culture, even though he was well aware of the importance of the economy. As Scott (2001) said, Gramsci believed that when cultural representations constrain the alternatives that lead people to consent to their own subordination, the power of the dominant class is largely secured. Scott (2001) also mentioned the places where consent is produced by the formulation of ideas, for example, churches, trade unions and schools. He was keen to observe both consent and coercion in civil society and the state.
According to Joseph (2006), Gramsci argued that hegemonic power does not come directly from the dominant economic group but has to be negotiated and constructed.

It is important to note six features of the modern Marxist theory of the State as summarised by Marsh (1995). First, Neo-Marxists view economic relations as determining class relations, which in turn determine the form and output of the state. Second, there is a consequent rejection of determinacy. Relations between economics and political are considered to be contingent rather than causal. Third, they do not accept that a theory of the state is possible. Fourth, they consider that there are factors other than class, such as gender and race, which result in structured inequality. Fifth, a plurality exists, which refutes the notion that social forces are not united. Sixth, structures based on class and other social forces may constrain or facilitate, but they do not determine outcomes.

Debate between Miliband and Poulantzas

To understand the neo-Marxist view more carefully, it is important to note the debate between two prominent scholars and their different interpretation of neo-Marxism, Miliband (instrumentalism) and Poulantzas (structuralism). They showed a contrasting perspective in that Miliband was focusing on empirical study by testing the facts, while Poulantzas was interested in establishing a theory. As far as Hay (2006) was concerned, the debate between the two originated from their different starting points in terms of the way to perceive the state.

According to Newman (2002), Miliband’s perspective reveals a very different approach to Marxism and the ‘bourgeois’ world. Miliband saw the state as a network of interpersonal relationships among the state elite as Hay (2006) also argued. Newman (2002) contended that Miliband held the clear position that the state sometimes acts against the interest of the ‘dominant classes’ which can cause internal division. Although Miliband realised that his work was under theorised, he did not agree with ‘structural super-determinism’. As Held (2006:174) noted, Miliband (1969: 128-9) argued that: “state institutions function as a crucially important and committed element in the maintenance and defence of the structure of power and privilege inherent in … capitalism”
Miliband’s counterpart, Poulantzas, thought of the state as the objective structural reality of social class and the state. According to Scott (2001), Poulantzas viewed states as arenas of class power, indicating that they are channels through which class power is realised. Poulantzas took the position that the state has a ‘structural-functional’ role based on its intrinsic relation to the mode of production. According to Joseph (2006), Poulantzas insisted that the state cannot be reduced to the decisions of its leading personnel or leading representatives of capital, precisely because the state plays a role in transcending any potential differences between these people and acts as mediator between capital and labour. Hay (2006) argued that agents can hardly influence structures, indicating that agents are the ‘bearers’ of objective structures. Poulantzas held that the state has a ‘relative autonomy’, which means it has independent power to some extent. This implies that the state might implement policies that do not favour the interests of certain capitalistic groups in order to defend the longer-term objective of perpetuating the system as a whole (Giddens, 1986). It is worth pointing out that Poulantzas’s view was that the structure and form of the state was the product of past class struggles, as Marsh (1995) said.

**Weaknesses and Strengths**

It appears that the power of Marxism is getting weaker. Cowling and Reynolds (2000) suggested a few reasons for Marxism’s downfall, including the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ideological shift in China, the decreasing influence of social democratic or socialist politics in the 1970s and the rise of ‘New Right’ politics that combined authoritarian conservative politics for the purpose of free market liberal economics. As Dahl (1970) argued, it seems that Marx was too hasty in projecting the conditions of the early phases of industrialisation into the indefinite future. We might question the necessity of Marxism in this globalising world where capital and people are moving around the world swiftly. It is inevitable for Marxism to face heavy challenges from liberal democracy, due to its limitations and biases. However Western countries, whose means of production is private ownership, are less democratic than they might be. This is because economic democracy within enterprises and society-wide allocation of resources are insufficient. The concept of economic determinism and crude reductionism has also been severely criticised.
Chapter 3: Theorising the Policy Process

One of the justifications for studying Marxism comes from Hay (2006), who said that Marxism is still a powerful theory providing insights into the dynamic and complicated relationship between the state, economy and society in capitalist democracies. As Cowling and Reynolds (2000) argued, Marxism is still a useful tool for understanding our society. Even if Marxism tends to be thought of currently as unfashionable, it still has a substantial influence on theoretical and political debates. They said: “The structure and hegemonic critiques of the politics of disability, sexuality, gender and race, and radical democracy owe much of their epistemological suppositions and methodological discourses to the example of Marxism” (Cowling and Reynolds: 2000: 5). In addition, Marxism provides a dynamic view of society and has a set of arguments and competing analyses. (Cowling and Reynolds, 2000)

Applicability of Marxism to Korea

It is important to consider what Marxism would lead us to focus upon in this study. The questions we could ask from the Marxist point of view include ‘Is there any class conflict or class action?’, ‘Where does profit lie?’, ‘Where is the business interest?’ It could be argued that Marxism may be useful for answering the above questions which would help in analyzing sport policy in Korea. On the other hand, we need to be aware that Korea may attempt to reject Marxism, considering that Marxism was the dominant ideology which underpinned North Korea.

The relationship between the state (the minority who exercise power) and the public (the majority of citizens) reflected Marxism until the 1970s in Korea. There was hardly any grievance from the mass, at least explicitly, because the majority of people accepted that the ruling class made all the decisions. With the fall of the authoritarian regime, the oppressed public started to challenge the ruling class, and this can be referred to as an emergence of Neo-Marxism. While Marxism emphasised economic determinism, the fact that intellectuals, the media and pressure groups emerged as central groups giving voice to the world, indicates that there are other factors which can influence society.
Marxist theory can be applied to the way that sport was used in Korea during the authoritarian government era. As we discussed in Chapter 2, a number of professional sport teams were formed in the early 1980s under the command of President Chun. The government took control over businesses, Chaebol, and the tight connection between sport and the state continued. The state regarded Chaebol as a tool for achieving economic prosperity and Chaebol saw the state as the source of advantages such as tax favours. It could be argued that the concept of ‘false consciousness’, which Marx and Engels suggested, was apparent in the sense that the government prompted the Chaebol to make professional sport leagues in order to divert public attention from politics to sport. According to Cho (2008), Chun’s government displayed the governmental rationality through the tool of the professional baseball league by diverting public interest into non-political issues. It is also suggested that the launch of the league was successful in efficiently turning people’s attention away from political matters to sport or leisure, as well as in satisfying the public who wished to enjoy the economic surplus. It could be considered that the state intended to encourage employees to channel the emotion, stress and feelings caused by long working hours into watching sport, rather than exercising violence. It could, therefore, be regarded as a form of exploitation which the ruled might not have realised at the time.

Elitism

‘Elite’ is one of the most common terms used when explaining power distribution in society. Field and Higley (1980) argued that elites are defined as the persons who acquire strategic positions in public and private bureaucratic organizations such as governments, political parties and trade unions. According to Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987), the concept of the ‘elite’ began to be used comprehensively in social science early in the twentieth century, after it was adopted as a core idea by Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto.
Chapter 3: Theorising the Policy Process

Classical Elitism

Classical elitists contend that it is inevitable that social power will become concentrated in a small group of controlling elites, according to Evans (2006). It is a natural phenomenon that elite holds and exercises power. Michels (1968) argued that there is an ‘iron law of oligarchy’, which results in the dominance of the leadership over the rank and file membership (Evans, 2006).

Pareto (1966) argued that two classes exist in society. The governing elite are the people who directly or indirectly play a critical part in political life or government and the other class is the majority of people who have no significant role. According to Powers (1987), Pareto described the elite by using metaphors. One group, described as ‘foxes’, are those who prefer to rule through cooperation and diplomatic intrigue. The other are ‘lions’, who prefer to rule by using brute force. Pareto emphasized that an elite who keeps the balance between lions and foxes would be able to exercise control successfully.

It is worth discussing Mosca’s argument as regards elites. According to Dahl (1970), Mosca argued that two classes of people appear in all societies. A class that rules monopolises power and is smaller in number, while a class that is ruled is controlled by the rulers and is larger in number. Evans (2006) pointed out that the distinctive point is that Mosca did not view ‘the rulers’ necessarily as economically dominant. Power is said to be inherited, but can transfer to other classes because of political collapse.

Modern Elitism

As Mills (1956) described, after the revolution in the US the elite was made up of “many-sided men” who could move easily from one role to another at the top of each of the major institutional orders. Mills also said that the political outsiders who seized command in the executive are legal, managerial and financial figures in the corporate rich. According to Domhoff (1990), the US had neither an institutional church and permanent military system nor a political network that could rival the capitalists for power until World War II. It is only in the last one and a half centuries that social
classes and states have emerged as the most important actors in advanced capitalist countries.

According to Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987), Mills developed the concept of a ‘power elite’: a triumvirate of leadership groups drawn from big business, the military and the political cliques surrounding the US President. Mills (1956) used the term ‘power elite’, criticizing the term ‘ruling class’ that Marx had used previously because he did not believe that it allowed enough autonomy to the political sphere. Mills, however, pointed out that the three elites only occasionally acted in concert because of concern to retain their autonomy, according to Evans (2006). On the other hand, Scott (1991) argued that not all societies have a power elite. It is said that a power elite exists only when recruited from a power block, that is, a group with similar background and ability to monopolise status and authority in the state elite over a certain period.

It is worth looking at how Hay (2006) identified different levels of governance from which the elite might be formed: international, macro-state and sub-sectoral. First, at the international level, an epistemic elite community consists of professionals who have a common belief and set of political values, as Haas (1990) argued. According to Haas (1990), an epistemic community was defined by Holzner and Marx as “those knowledge-oriented work communities in which cultural standards and social arrangements interpenetrate around a primary commitment to epistemic criteria in knowledge production and application”. Second, as regards the macro-state level, it is argued that the most prominent example of elite formation was during Thatcher era between 1979 and 1990 in Britain Hay et al (2006: 53) noted: “It represented an elite strategy which achieved domestic autonomy and governing competence and with it, electoral dominance throughout the 1980s”. As regards the sub-sectoral level, the concept of policy networks emerges, which we will discuss in greater detail later. It is worth noting that if a policy community excludes from the policy making process certain groups who are likely not to agree with the established policy agenda, it could result in protecting the status quo and create ‘members’ and ‘non-members’ in the policy process (Evans 2006). In relation to the link between the macro and meso-level analysis, this connection between elitism and the policy community needs to be investigated as research continues.
Different views of the state can also be found in elitism. According to Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987), all elite theorists defined the state organisationally as a compulsory institution which successfully maintains a monopoly of legitimate force within a given territory. Skocpol (1979: 25) acknowledged that ‘the state as an actor or institution has been highlighted’, saying that the state is only an arena where social and economic conflict takes place. Mann (1988) defined the state as a political network whose primary function is territorial regulation, and argued that the state increases its autonomy through its interaction with other states. Elitism views the state as acting on behalf of the dominant class (Marsh, 2002).

**Weaknesses and Strengths**

Like any other theories, elitism is not immune to criticism. It does not provide answers to several questions, such as, ‘Where do elites come from?’, ‘How are they formed?’, ‘How do elites die?’, ‘Are there any limitations on elites in terms of size and membership?’ In other words, ‘Can we say how much they are open or closed?’, and ‘Does elitism explain the dynamics of society?’. According to Dahl (1970), elitism failed to define the scope of elite influence, emphasizing that the influence in a certain area should be measured in terms of size and intensity (Parry, 1969). What this means is that a person who can influence one policy does not necessarily impact on another. Dahl (1970) argued that a person having power does not mean anything unless this power is clearly defined within a range of activities that he/she could influence. Evans (2006) pointed out that there is a lack of evidence to support the evidence of cohesive, active and sustainable elite groups. As globalisation gains momentum the fact that the power of the governing elite remains territorially based should create a competitive advantage in the overseas market as well. Evans (2006) pointed out the weaknesses of classical elitists such as Michels, Pareto and Mosca. Pareto could not prove the theory of elite domination in Italy, his home country, and Mosca failed to show that although previous governments were often characterised by a self-serving elite, this is not always the case. Michels’ argument that elite domination characterises Western European political parties is vulnerable to counter critique as he tends to choose rather convenient empirical evidence. As Evans (2006: 45) suggested, it is worth noting Dahl’s (1985) pluralist critique:
Elite theorists frequently make the mistake of equating a capacity for control with facilitative power. The formation of a ruling elite requires not only control over important resources, but also the establishment of unity and cohesiveness among its members.

Nevertheless, elitism is a useful descriptive tool and may have some explanatory power in relation to analyses of decision-making processes and social stability. It is a theory that can be seen in reality in the sense that wealth and power are in the hands of the few, as for example illustrated by Pierce (2004) who reported that seven hundred aristocratic landowners own a tenth of the land in England. Let us think about how elitism could be applied to Korea.

Applicability of Elitism to Korea

Prior to discussing elitism in the Korean context, it is worth bearing in mind what the elitists look for when they see Korea through their lenses. The questions which could be asked includes: ‘What kind of elites are there?’, ‘Who are the dominant group of elites?’, ‘Does the powerful elite change under different regimes?’, ‘What are the unique characteristics of Korean elitism compared to that of the West?’ As we discussed in the Chapter 2, elitism, that is, a combination of a military and economic elite, arguably continued until the end of the Rho Tae Woo era, despite the weakening influence of military power. Chaebol, which was considered to be one of the most important contributors to the dramatic economic development in Korea, were able to exercise their power for a long time. According to Hundt (2005), the dominant power of the Chaebol was believed to diminish when the state showed its commitment to pushing forward financial and industrial restructuring, regardless of strong opposition, immediately after the IMF crisis. These economic elites, however, are still regarded as significant factors in Korean society. A controversial court decision of probation for Kim Seung Youn, a CEO of Hanwha Group, following violence using outside forces towards a group of people who harmed his son, indicates that the prosecutory authority was reluctant to impose penalties as it might upset the Chaebol.²

² On May, 2007, a son of Kim Seung Youn was hit by a number of people in the bar after a dispute. Kim, a CEO of Hanwha, dispatched security guards and retaliated by exercising violence on four people who harmed his son. Kim was arrested and sentenced to one and half years in jail, suspended for two years, and 200 hours of community
Since Park Jung Hee seized power, another kind of elitism has existed in Korean society which is still prevalent in both observable and unobservable ways, so called, Hak-Yun (a network based on the same high school, university or military), and Ji-Yun (a network based on the same hometown or region). With the changes of government, it is taken for granted that people, not only in the Ministries, but in the organisations where political influence can be exercised, are replaced by others from the same background, based on Ji-Yun and Hak-Yun. While the extent of the influence of networks seems to vary during different periods, it is worthwhile to look at a survey conducted by Joongang Ilbo in September 2005. The questions were put to 31,800 elite members from the fields of politics, academia, law and medicine. The conclusion was that the closed elite community is opening up with Hak-yun being less dominant. It is a significant result that the percentage of graduates from Seoul National University entering the traditional elite (ministers in government departments, doctors, professors, lawyers, high public officials) has fallen sharply in recent years. It suggests that the possibility for people to change their social status has become greater than in the past, which could blur the boundaries of the elite membership group.

In addition, elitism is a useful lens through which to analyse Korea from a number of perspectives. The Roh Moo Hyun government (February 2003-February 2008) showed signs of challenging elitism because President Rho himself was not from the traditional elite. Unlike previous presidents (the majority of whose Ministers were from elite schools), Rho tended to favour people from non-elite backgrounds (outside the pool of traditional elite school graduates) and also tried to abolish Seoul National University for the purpose of “equality in education”. Newsweek (May 2007) suggested that Roh’s anti-elitist rhetoric had diminished the standing of the presidency and damaged South Korea's reputation. Yang Sung Chul, a former ambassador to the United States, said "President Rho has undermined the authority of the presidential office itself. This is a process of dismantling authoritarianism".

It is worth noting the argument of Kim and Bell (1985) who studied the applicability of democratic elitism to the Korean context. They argued that it would not be relevant to apply conventional Western theories to a country that lacks the socio-cultural service.
preconditions of pluralism. Although pluralism from the West impacted on the formal institutional framework of the Korean government, the extent remained minimal. According to Kim and Bell (1985), the political system of Korea was supported not by a pluralistic interest group, but by domination and regulation by the elite groups. It is worth noting the comments from Woo and Kim (1971: 555) which indicated that the elite do not have the willingness to accept the voice of the masses, stating:

The new Korean elites tend to base their elitism on the assumption that the masses are not yet democratically acculturated and therefore incapable of making any viable national policy judgement.

**Pluralism**

As the word ‘plural’ implies, pluralism contrasts with the concept of ‘monism’ and implies that there are many sources of influence in politics. Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) argued that the idea of rejecting absolute, unified state power was at the core of pluralism. Pluralism became popular after the Second World War as an explanatory tool for political science, especially in the US (Pierson, 1996). According to Smith (2006), the epistemological foundation of pluralism is a behaviourist position which holds that absolute truth and social facts can be found through investigation.

Schmitter (1979: 15) defined pluralism as:

A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self determined categories which are not specially licensed, recognised, subsidised, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state, and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories.
Chapter 3: Theorising the Policy Process

Classical pluralism

Smith (2006) argued that pluralism began as a more practical response to the desire to limit state power in the new constitution in the U.S. and ‘consensus’, similar to an ‘agreement’, was one of the key features of American pluralism. In other words, if people had complaints about something they were expected to take political action. It was believed that there was no grievance if no lobbying or political activities took place.

It is worth noting that Dahl (1967), one of the earliest and most prominent pluralist academics, stated that no section of the people, not even the majority, has absolute sovereignty. He insisted that bargaining, negotiation and compromise always happen in the policy making process because there is no monolithic coalition among the executive, the House or the Senate. As Held (2006) noted, power is said to be non-hierarchical and competitively arranged. It is an essential part of an ‘endless process of bargaining’ between a variety of groups representing different interests, for instance, political parties, students and religious groups. According to Pierson (1996), the genuine source of pluralism is a diverse society rather than a disaggregated state. He pointed out that the UK and the US were both based on pluralism in that people could express themselves in various ways by observing the rules of the society, respecting other opinions and exercising negotiation.

McLennan et al (1984) described two ways in which the state can operate under classical pluralism. One is to create a balance between various pressure and interest groups for the purpose of securing social and political stability. The other is to function as an arbitrator between rival demands in order to achieve an impartial outcome. Schwarzmantel (1994) also contended that within classical pluralism the state acts as a neutral arbiter to maintain the cohesion of the political system. According to Held (2006), governments mediate and adjudicate between demands from a diverse range of interest groups who pursue political influence.

It is important to note that challenges to classical pluralism from both empirical day-to-day political events and academic research emerged during the 1960s and 1970s. Several events such as Martin Luther King’s assassination, the Anti-Vietnam War and
civil rights movements led to a weakening of classical pluralism, according to Held (2006). One of the key reasons for the failure of classical pluralism was the way that power and power relations were conceived in Western liberal democracy. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) contended that power can be exercised not only by affecting a person’s decision making, but also a person’s set of preferences. Held (2006) indicated that classical pluralism failed to understand the asymmetries of power between several variables such as gender, class and race, which were, to a large extent, behind the decay of what they called ‘consensus politics’. In a similar vein, Lukes (2005: 39) commented: “Dahl may be highly misled if power is being exercised within the system to limit decision making to acceptable issues. People could act separately, or in concert, or produce no action”. It means that power can keep certain issues off the agenda and prevent the diversity which classical pluralists insist on. This dimension of power will be discussed later in greater detail.

Neo Pluralism

Criticism of pluralism prompted the emergence of Neo-Pluralism. According to Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987), some might say that pluralists do not have a theory of the state, and others might argue that they have only a naive theory of how the state behaves in a neutral way in a liberal democracy. It is worth noting the point Schwarzmantel (1994: 62) made. He questioned how unity can be preserved in any society, saying: “How is diversity to be prevented from degenerating into a pathological form, into fragmentation, into a situation in which there is no representative of a common interest?”

According to neo-pluralist proponents such as Dahl and Lindblom, interest groups do not have equal distribution of power and the state is not totally neutral towards all interests. The key point in neo-pluralism is that businesses exercise huge influence over the state and the nature of democratic outcomes. As Lindblom (1977) argued, whenever the state has to make decisions, state officials ask whether it is good for business or not, because employment or product output directly contribute to election results. Lindblom and Dahl argued, therefore, that the state cannot be considered as a neutral arbiter
among multiple interests, and interest groups cannot be viewed as necessarily equal. (Held, 2006)

Looking at the comparison between classical pluralism and neo-pluralism below, the latter has a tendency to put more weight on the inequality of the distribution of power among numerous actors in society than the former, which perceives the world as evenly balanced in terms of power and resources.

**Weaknesses and Strengths**

One of the criticisms of pluralism is the gap between the rhetoric and the practical level. It is not difficult to accept that power is evenly dispersed to various actors. However, it becomes hard to demonstrate at the empirical level. Generally speaking, it is said that the US is a pluralist nation. However, according to Mills, political power in the US has become concentrated in the intellectual, economic, military and scientific-technical ‘power elite’, and the decision making also tends to be conspicuously biased towards international corporate capitalism (Kim and Bell, 1985).

Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) argued that there could be political distortions. An example is that core policy coalitions, macro-economic management and foreign and defence policy remain very directly controlled by conventional representative political mechanisms. However, they said that neopluralism still remains the dominant perspective for understanding the role of the state and society in both North America and Western Europe. It is also worth taking account of the elitist perspective which criticises pluralism. Mills (1956), author of ‘The Power Elite’ stressed that the state was dominated by a power elite, consisting of top business, military and political personnel (Evans, 2006).
Table 3.1: A summary of the classic pluralist and neo-pluralist positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classical Pluralism</th>
<th>Neo-pluralism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principle(s) of justification:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Secure government by minorities and, hence, political liberty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Crucial obstacle to the development of excessively powerful factions and an unresponsive state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Features:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Citizenship rights, including one-person-one vote, freedom of expression, freedom of organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A system of checks and balances between the legislature, executive, judiciary and administrative bureaucracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Competitive electoral system with (at least) two parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diverse range of (overlapping) interest groups seeking political influence</strong></td>
<td>Multiple pressure groups, but political agenda biased towards corporate power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governments mediate and adjudicate between demands</strong></td>
<td>The state, and its departments, forge their own sectional interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constitutional rules embedded in a supportive political culture</strong></td>
<td>Constitutional rules function in context of diverse political culture and system of radically unequal economic resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Conditions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power is shared and bartered by numerous groups in society</td>
<td>Power is contested by numerous groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide resource base of different types dispersed throughout population</td>
<td>Poor resource base of many groups prevents full political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value consensus on political procedures, range of policy alternatives and legitimate scope of politics</td>
<td>Distribution of socioeconomic power provides opportunities for and limits to political options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance between active and passive citizenry sufficient for political stability</td>
<td>Unequal involvement in politics: insufficiently open government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International framework upholding the rules of pluralist and free-market societies</td>
<td>International order compromised by powerful multinational economic interests and dominant states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Held (2006: 173)
Despite these criticisms, pluralism presents a stronger case than other classical state theories, according to Smith (2006). Smith indicated two features which explain why pluralism has remained persuasive. One is that pluralism can be accepted by different political positions. In other words, whether people are conservatives, liberals or radicals, it does not hinder them from supporting or opposing diversity or the distribution of power. The other is its willingness to respond to its critics and to changing realities. The fact that pluralists have not tried to define the pluralist theory shows that they are ready to react to debate or criticisms swiftly, which allows room for continuous development. As Vogel (1989) argued, pluralism does not offer any general theory and it tends to regard modern societies as characterised by plurality. Marsh’s (1995) perspective on pluralism is that even though some groups are more privileged than others so that they can make more impact, there is no one group or interest which dominates policy making.

Applicability of Pluralism to Korea

As with the previous two theories, Marxism and Elitism, it is worth discussing what Pluralists look for in the context of Korea. As mentioned before, it is essential to evaluate whether the rhetoric is consistent with the empirical evidence. Although it sounds ideal that power is dispersed evenly among a number of interest groups, we cannot be sure that this happens until we find out how Korean society operates. The questions we could ask include: ‘Are pluralists looking for the development of organisations or of civil society?’ or ‘Is there a competitive party system?’

It could be argued that a number of interest groups, such as the media, pressure groups and non-profit organisations emerged to voice their opinions. Business groups continued to keep their power while the military have lost power to some extent. As we discussed in Chapter 2, Chaebol influenced decision making in various sectors, due to their close connection with politics. It is arguable that the power of Chaebol has not weakened, despite the changes in the members who rank highest on the list of Chaebol. In relation to sport, it could be argued that the transition from amateurism to professionalism in Korea provides some evidence of neo-pluralism. Among a number of actors at the start of professional baseball, football, and basketball, business was the
most prominent group in terms of driving the formation of a structure of owners and sponsors. Without these conglomerates’ involvement in sport, it is unlikely that the league could have been started or have been sustained up to now.

It could be argued that pluralism is more applicable to contemporary Korea, which portrays herself as a ‘liberal democracy’. Nevertheless, it is difficult to confirm this at present. It would be worth returning to the discussion of whether pluralism comfortably fits Korean society or not, following the analysis of the two case studies in Chapter 4 and 5.

**Power**

We have looked at macro level theories and will examine meso-level frameworks in order to understand where the power lies. Our initial concern in discussing power is how to conceptualise it, as power is a critical factor in understanding the policy process through its relationships between various actors. Answering questions such as: ‘Who has the power?’, ‘Where does it lie?’, ‘How can power be observed?’ would be the core task here.

It is far from easy to define ‘power’, as scholars look at it from different perspectives. Held (2006) described power as the capacity of social institutions or agents to control or transform their physical and social environment. Held and Leftwich (1984) said that power is about the forces that affect it and enable it to be exercised and also the resources that underpin this capacity. Polsby pointed out that ‘power’ could be understood as ‘influence’ and ‘control’:

> Power can be conceived as the capacity of one actor to do something affecting another, which changes the probable pattern of specified future events. This can be envisaged most easily in a decision-making process (Polsby, 1963: 3-4).
It is worth noting that in political analysis power is usually limited to relationships among human actors, as Dahl (1970) said. The discussion of structure and agency will be dealt with later. Now, let us focus our attention on two prominent academics in the field of ‘power’: Lukes and Foucault. Among numerous arguments as regards power, the argument of these two scholars is considered to be particularly significant.

**Lukes’ perspective of power**

Power can be discussed at three levels, according to Lukes (2005). The first dimension is straightforward, and says that A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. In this Lukes adopted the ideas of Dahl (1961). Observable behavior is an important factor in this argument and it involves the pluralists in studying decision-making as their central task. However, Lukes does not agree with calling it a pluralistic view, as Dahl, Polsby, Wolfinger and others do, because he argues that pluralist conclusions can only be derived when applied to structures which are identified as pluralist. Scott (2001) pointed out that these ‘zero sum’ power relations are thought be asymmetrical and hierarchical relations of super- and sub-ordination in which one agent can gain only at the expense of another. Lukes summarised a one-dimensional view of power by saying that it:

> involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation (Lukes, 2005: 19).

Bachrach and Baratz (1970) criticized the pluralist view saying that it is too simplistic and can give an incorrect picture of US politics. The main idea is that the pluralist perspective does not reflect the fact that power is exercised by setting limits to the scope of decision-making on relatively “safe” matters. ‘Mobilization of bias’ is a concept used by Schattschneider (1960) indicating that persons or groups may exercise power by ‘creating or reinforcing barriers to the airing of policy conflicts’. According to Bachrach and Baratz (1970), a group of predominant beliefs and values tend to be focused on giving benefit to a minority group or elite. In the second dimension of power
it is critical that power is recognised not only in ‘decision making’ but also in ‘nondecision-making. Nondecision-making indicates that when there is demand for a change the existing benefits and privileges in the community can be suppressed before they are even voiced. Alternatively they can be kept covert or made to disappear before they reach the relevant decision-making or decision-implementing stage; or, failing all these things, they can be maimed or destroyed in the decision (Lukes, 2005). As Lukes (1974) noted, the bias of a system exists by the patterned behaviour of groups who are socially structured, rather than by the action that an individual selects. Lukes (2005) concluded that a two-dimensional view of power involves a qualified critique of the behavioural focus of the first view, as well as allowing consideration of the ways in which decisions are blocked on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, as embodied in express policy preferences and sub-political grievances.

Nevertheless, Lukes argued that neither the one nor and the two dimensional views of power were sufficient for a complete understanding of power. He held that these two views are too individualistic and do not allow for consideration of the many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics by using social forces. According to Ham and Hill (1993: 70), Lukes suggested a third dimension of power which involves “The exercise of power to shape people’s preferences so that neither overt nor covert conflicts exist” It was contended that a power group will maintain dominance and a manipulated consensus may exist (Lukes, 1974). This links to the Marxists’ notion of false consciousness where there is an explicit exercise of power by the capitalist class to create a hegemonic ideology.

According to Scott (2001), Lukes (1974) argued that the power of a principal is obvious because of its ability to make people who are ruled believe that their interest depends on doing something which could be harmful to them or contrary to their deeper interests. With the need to incorporate real interests and Marx’s concept of ‘false consciousness’ into the model of power, social structure needs to be taken more seriously. As Wartenberg (1990) noted, power is not limited to the ‘discrete intervention by a social agent in the life of another social agent’, but may also involve the existence of enduring structured constraints over actions. Lukes called it ‘facilitative power’, and this may be
Chapter 3: Theorising the Policy Process

held by collective actors and classes. Even if there are problems with Lukes’ distinction between structural constraint and forms of structural determination that do not involve power, according to Layder (1985), he made the duality of structure and agency the heart of discussions of power.

Foucault’s perspective of power

The most important ingredient of Foucault’s view of power is that power is a relationship between different individuals and groups which only exists when it is being exercised. O’Farrell (2005) points out that power is not a ‘thing’ or a ‘capacity’ which can be possessed either by State, social class or specific individuals. Foucault’s argument owes much to both Gramsci and Althusser, although he stressed that power was not to be seen as the monolithic possession of a class or any other social agency (Scott, 2001). Lukes (2005) illustrated two of Foucault’s arguments. One is that there is a deep and close relation between power and knowledge, and these mechanisms are viewed in relation to the various applied social scientific disciplines deriving from the shaping influence on people of experts’ knowledge claims. The other argument is that Foucault emphasized, in terms of the mechanism of power:

Its capillary forms of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and inserts itself into their very actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes, and everyday lives (Foucault, 1980: 39).

As Lukes said, Foucault’s focus was more on structural relationships, institutions, strategies and techniques, rather than on concrete policies and the actual people they involve. According to Garland (1990), ‘power operated ‘through’ individuals rather than ‘against’ them and helps constitute the individual, who is at the same time its vehicle. For Foucault, discourse is where meanings are contested and relations of power determined. Scambler (2005) noted the ‘false’ power of hegemonic knowledge, which is always prone to be challenged by counter-hegemonic discourses providing alternative versions of reality. According to Scott (2001), power exists throughout the social sphere that surrounds and penetrates the public, political sphere of sovereign power. Scott
(2001) also argued that discourse constitutes people as subjects who are authorized (as experts) to discipline others, but the most pervasive and effective forms of power occur where people learn to exercise self-discipline.

As Scott (2001) pointed out, it is important to recognize that the relations between nation states or large business enterprises are manifested in and through the interpersonal encounters of their presidents, chief executives, and other holders of authority. This interpersonal power has to be seen in relation to the production and reproduction of structures of domination. Foucault said: “If we speak of structures or mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise power over others” (Foucault, 1982: 225).

It is worth noting that Foucault stressed that the state and government ranges across power/knowledge networks which are not contained in one place (Hay et al, 2006). The feature of power/knowledge is critical in Foucault’s discussion. As O’Farrell (2005) noted, Foucault’s view is that knowledge and power operate almost interchangeably, which indicates that no form of knowledge emerges independently of complex networks of power, and that the exercise of power produces certain types of knowledge. Modern forms of power are experienced as a multiple series of localized tactics that touch every aspect of our lives. Among Foucault’s arguments, the term ‘governmentality’ is notable. According to Foucault, governmentality is the rationalization and systematization of a particular way of exercising political sovereignty through the government of people’s conduct. In other words, it allows for the incorporation of freedoms into the mechanisms which guide people’s behaviour in the social body, rather than restricting freedoms, as is the case with discipline (O’Farrell, 2005).

Looking at Lukes and Focault’s arguments, clear similarities between the two can be found, especially in terms of manipulation of ideas. The difference between them lies in how the idea is manipulated and its impact. While Marxists say that the relationship is deliberately manipulated, Foucault argues that the pattern of controlling relationships tends to grow organically. According to Foucault (1986), who was interested in finding out factors that control sexuality, sexual behavior is not simply regulated by laws from the government, but by construction of a whole complex of apparatus, institutions and
regulations responsible for their application. It transmits and puts in motion relations that are not relations of sovereignty, but of domination. As we can see in the macro level theories and power arguments, structure and agency play key roles in this thesis. Research questions mentioned earlier can be answered when we understand the relationship between structure and agency and the way that power is exercised in relation to the two.

**Structure and Agency**

As McAnulla (2002) said, a number of social scientists indicated that the ‘structure-agency’ question has been the most important theoretical theme in the human sciences over time. According to Giddens (1984), power is one of the crucial concepts of social science and is surrounded by relations of action and structure. The main issue of the structure-agency debate is to what extent actors can shape their fate, as against the extent to which their lives are structured in ways beyond their control, that is, the degree to which fate is determined by external forces (McAnulla, 2002). Bulpitt argued that a number of political scientists insisted that structure-agency questions should be dealt with as a core theme in the studies they conduct.

It is worth noting the definition of structure and agency. Hay (2002) contended that structure refers to the ordered nature of social and political relations and to the fact that political institutions, practices, routines and conventions appear to exhibit some regularity over time. Agency, on the other hand, indicates action, that is, the ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously to attempt to realise his or her intentions, implying a sense of free will, autonomy and choice. According to McAnulla’s (2002) definition, agency is an individual or group ability to have an influence on the environment, and structure is the material conditions that create the range for people to take action. The structure and agency debate concerns the extent to which we are products of our environment, as against the degree to which we can determine our own fate. Some scholars such as Anthony Giddens tried to resolve this debate. However, it is appropriate to deal with it as an avoidable problem (McAnulla, 2002). As Green (2007) argued, the analysis can begin in the broad political and social processes which influence sport policy development in general, and the necessity of the structure and
agency debate in relation to elite sport development. He particularly stressed that it is required to investigate the relationship between structures, agents and value/belief systems in the construction of frameworks for elite sport development. As regards this study, the above debate can stretch to the area of SFA in Korea. Three approaches can be delineated:

**Structuralism**

Structuralism arose from the study of linguistics to investigate the relationship between words and was according to McAnulla (2002) shaped by Ferdinand de Saussure. Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) explained structuralism as a social phenomenon that needs no reference to the intentions of individuals. Althusser (1970), who saw Marxism as a structualist approach, said that the structure of the relations of production determined the places and functions occupied and adopted by the agents of production. Structuralists like Althusser argued that agencies acted according to structures which they were not aware of, and kept ignoring the possibility of individuals who might shape the path of history, according to McAnulla (2002). As Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) said, Althusser’s schema was that individuals were only bearers of roles (träger), which indicated that they should always be considered as supporting the unfolding of structural laws, without reshaping those laws.

It is worth to looking at criticisms from Hay (2002) with reference to structuralism. First, structuralism does not admit the influence of actors upon events due to its definition that actors do not have independent influence. Second, structuralism neglects human subjectivity. Humans are little more than functional relays for processes which are beyond their control, influence or comprehension (Hay, 2002). Third, critics pointed out that structuralism promoted fatalism and passivity. In other words, it does not mean anything to us if everything is predestined whatever our actions are. Lastly, Hay pointed out the inconsistency of structuralism. It cannot answer the question “Could structuralism be explained if the structuralist view were valid?” which showed a contradiction between the ‘enlightened’ theorist and the ordinary people in the world.
Chapter 3: Theorising the Policy Process

Intentionalism

Hay (2002) argued that while structuralism rejects the idea that the agents shape reality, intentionalism denies the concept of structure. McAnulla (2002) suggested rational choice and public choice theories are relevant. Bunge (1996) argued that rational choice theory focuses on the action of individuals who seek to benefit themselves. In other words, the agents consider what specific behavior can bring substantial advantage to them. Ward (2002: 69) summarized:

It explains individual actions and the outcomes they lead to in terms of the course of action (Strategy) open to them, their preferences over the end-states to which combinations of actions chosen by the various players lead, and their beliefs about important parameters, such as others’ preferences.

Public choice theory, which is regarded as a sub-field of rational choice theory, mostly applied to politicians and government officials. As McAnulla (2002) noted, politicians and government bureaucrats try to maximize their own interest by holding on to power and extending the scope and resourcing of their own area of vested interests.

Dialectical Approach

According to Hay (2002), younger socialists such as Anthony Giddens appeared in the late 1970s, arguing that it was necessary to go back to the fundamental ontological principles, because former socialists failed to form the relationship between structure and agency. There is a tendency for academics in the contemporary era to try to put structure and agency together, rather than observing separately, which is called the dialectical approach. As McAnulla (2002) argued, Giddens’ structuration theory shows that structure and agency are not separate entities, which means they are dependent on each other and inter-related, like flip sides of the same coin. The key point in this approach is that certain actions can prompt the reconstitution of the structure. However, Hay (2002) emphasized that the relationship between structure and agency is internal rather than external: they are mutually dependent, indeed mutually constitutive.
However, structuration theory has been criticized both theoretically and empirically. According to Archer (1996), Gidden’s theory made the distinction between structure and agency meaningless, indicating that it is not actually feasible to construct the relationship between the two. It also showed that it is not possible to conduct empirical research to investigate the relationship or dialectic between structure and agency (McAnulla, 2002). Layder (1997) also mentioned that the independent entities, structure and agency, are lost to analysis, and therefore the interaction between them cannot be traced over time. It is also worth noting the strategic-relational approach suggested by Hay (1990) and Jessop (1990). According to these two scholars, structure is the starting point and action only takes place within a pre-existing structured context. This could be described as ‘strategically selective’, and it tends to give advantages to certain ‘players’. With this approach, actors can be described as reflexive, but they can formulate strategies to overcome the problems caused by strategically selective situations, according to McAnulla (2002).

**Conclusion**

We have looked at three macro level theories. Considering Chapter 2, we might suggest that elements of Marxism, Elitism and Pluralism are applicable to analysis of sport policy in Korea. However, we need to acknowledge that any of these theories could apply to any countries and they are all subject to empirical investigation. Therefore, it is not the researcher’s intention here to argue further as it is necessary to investigate the way to apply these macro level theories to Korean society through the progress of this research. As discussed in Chapter 2, pluralism appeared and developed during the government transition in the early 1990s. On the face of it, power appears to have been distributed to numerous groups such as interest groups and non-profit organizations. However, in practice, Korean society may still have been run by elites right up until the contemporary era, although certain elite groups appear to have been more powerful than others under different regimes. We could argue that the evidence of Marxism and pluralism do not seem to be very great, and the value of pluralism appears to be doubtful, while elitism seems to have remained for several decades. It is necessary for
us to reserve judgement regarding the Macro level theories until the empirical evidence has been examined.

In the references to ‘power’ as used by Lukes and Foucault, it is operationalised at all different levels or dimensions. It is worth stressing that some of the frameworks which we will look at fit more comfortably within certain macro level assumptions. For example, Kingdon’s MSF could sit comfortably with pluralism or neo-pluralism but less so with Marxism, as Marxism is based on the idea that power is concentrated in the hands of a social class and it does not leave room for other actors or social groupings to exercise influence. In that sense, it leads on naturally to the discussion of meso-level frameworks.

**Meso-Level Theories**

**Introduction**

In the previous chapter, we have discussed Macro Level analysis. Macro level theory is a good tool for understanding the way the society works overall. However, it cannot give an answer to “Who makes or rules policy?” and “How do they rule and make policy?” at the level of organizations such as ministries, national sport governing bodies and interest groups. As the policy process gets more complex as time goes by, it is very difficult to understand it on its own. It cannot be denied that macro level is too crude to analyse a specific policy process. Meso-level analysis can provide help in understanding the complex policy making process and also provides a link between micro-level analysis, which focuses upon the government in particular policy decisions, and macro-level analysis, dealing with broader questions of the power distribution within modern society (Rhodes, 1997). However, we will not discuss micro-level analysis in this study as our main interest is with change in national policy. The three frameworks which were selected are: Multiple streams framework (MSF, hereafter), Policy Community (PC, hereafter) and Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF, hereafter).
Four criteria that Houlihan (2005) identified were used to guide the selection of meso-level frameworks. First, it should attempt to explain both policy stability and change. Considering that sport policy has been changing rapidly in a number of industrial countries, this criterion is particularly important. Second, it should give a broad perspective on the policy process overarching agenda-setting, policy implementation, impact on policy and so forth. Third, it should be applicable across a range of policy areas. Either conducting comparative research across policy areas or investigating specific fields, for instance, education and health, that have a potential ‘spillover’ effect, will be valuable. Finally, the time period of the frameworks considered is medium term (five to ten years). A short period cannot reflect on policy change appropriately.

**Multiple Streams Framework**

Kingdon (1995) adapted the ‘garbage model’, which was originally developed by Cohen et al. (1972) in the US federal government. The ‘garbage model’ focused on illuminating two pre-decision processes, which are agenda setting and alternative specification. According to Parsons (1995), Kingdon was intrigued by the approach to agenda-setting in which solutions search for problems, and the outcomes were a function of the mix of problems, participants and resources. Kingdon was interested in the way issues become ‘serious’ issues, how they catch the attention of people in the public policy sector, how agendas are set and why ideas ‘have their time’ (Parsons, 1995). According to Zahariadis (2003), the ‘alternative specification’ is guided by the selection process in the policy stream, and by the specialists in the policy area who are implicitly involved. Zahariadis (2003) described a phenomenon whereby decision-makers throw up problems and attach them together, stressing the concepts of ambiguity and temporal sorting. The point he made is that policies are the result of problems, solutions and politics. They are coupled or joined together by policy entrepreneurs when windows of opportunity open. He emphasized continual policy change rather than stability as a key characteristic of the policy process.

It is worth noting that MSF deals with policymaking only under conditions of ambiguity. Feldman (1989: 5) defined ambiguity as “a state of having many ways of thinking about
the same circumstances or phenomenon”. More information may reduce uncertainty but may not reduce ambiguity. For instance, more information would make us understand the spread of AIDS but would not indicate us whether AIDS is a health or moral issue. As Cohen et al (1972) suggested, choices form a ‘garbage can’ into which ‘various kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated’. It continuously creates new problems as further decisions are made. Cohen et al (1972) referred to ‘organized anarchies’ where ambiguity is widespread. According to John (1998), ‘organized anarchies’ indicates the process of continual change and the intermittent involvement of all kinds of decision makers, which is as far away from the sequential model of policy-making as can be imagined.

It is worth discussing the characteristics of ‘organised anarchies’ as used by Zahariadis (2003). First, participation is fluid in the sense that legislators and bureaucrats come and go across different departments or sectors. Also, non-governmental actors from organizations such as trade unions and consumer groups have a significant influence over certain decision-making. Second, policy makers have a tendency to make decisions without setting preferences. Pressure of time would be one of the most common excuses that policy makers might use. As Kingdon (1995) said, action is often exercised by fuzzing over what one is trying to accomplish. Cohen et al (1972) argued that the ‘organised anarchies’ could be described as “a loose collections of ideas’ rather than ‘coherent structures’. Kingdon (1995) points out that the organizations discussed here are very different from businesses that have a clear goal, which is making a profit. Third, the process whereby organizations make a certain input to get a certain output is not clear. The boundaries of responsibility for policy makers is blurred. Complaints from congressmen about ministries in the government can often be heard.

The fact that we do not know what problem underlies conditions of ambiguity is a genuine difficulty (Zahariadis, 2003). Weick (1979: 175) argued “choice becomes less an exercise in solving problems, and more of an attempt to make sense of a partially comprehensible world”. In contrast to models that stress rational action, the ‘garbage can’ provides an alternative logic based on time. Contradictions and paradoxes appear and choice is often made on a first-come, first-served basis. Who pays attention to what and when is critical due to the limited time and resources. It is reasonable to use a lens
that gives significance to time rather than rationality. People have a tendency to be concerned with problems needing an urgent solution, rather than solving the problems they want to. Attention to a particular issue is a function of opportunity, bias, formal position in an organization or government, and the number of issues competing for policymakers’ attention.

It is necessary to discuss Kingdon’s three streams (1995) which are the keys to this framework. First, there is the problem stream which might include issues such as fiscal crisis and air pollution. The question is why policymakers pay attention to some problems and not others. There are mechanisms to attract policy makers’ attention based on the fact that problems are often not evident from the indicators. This means that the problems need to be pushed to the fore by some events such as a disaster or crisis in order to catch the attention of people in and out of the government. According to Kingdon (1995), the indicators are a measurement for assessing the scale of and change in problems. Indicators such as government data and reports and infant mortality rates can be used to measure the magnitude of change in order to catch official attention. Disasters such as an airplane crash or personal experience are other examples. Parsons (1995) argues that the data which gives information on current performance highlights unanticipated consequences indicating failure to meet goals. Letters from constituents and impact evaluation studies are such examples. Government officials normally receive feedback regarding current programmes in both systematic ways, such as formal evaluation studies and also in informal ways such as complaints and casework, or through bureaucratic experiences (Kingdon, 1995). It is also worth bearing in mind that it varies from sector to sector as to how crisis or disaster impacts on the agenda. Health, for example, is of universal interest and is always on the agenda, so it does not require any major happenings in order to be recognized. In contrast, transportation is an area where, unless there is a real crisis, it is hard to make the government acknowledge the problems. However, a big rail or flight accident can directly impact the nation’s economy, whereas hospital patients would only be affected as individuals or group that is much smaller in number than those in the transportation case (Kingdon, 1995).

In the context of Korea, sport is one of the more visible items for the public to read about or watch in the mass media. As Kingdon suggested, the more visible the policy
domain, the less important are crisis and disaster. This means that it is more difficult for sport to be considered as critical unless something big happens. The issue of ‘sport diplomacy’\(^3\) did not appear significant until the case of ‘Yang Tae Young’. Yang was a national gymnast who competed in the Athens Olympics, failed to win a gold medal because of the mistake by the judges and ended up receiving a bronze medal as a result. Jung Ki Young, a director of international cooperation department in the KOC, revealed in Sports Korea (February 2009: 17) “It was a clear mistake by umpires. But people in the Federations could not react swiftly enough to deal with the situation. Everyone felt that we should strengthen our power in terms of sport diplomacy so that we don’t have this disadvantage again in the future” It should be stressed that public opinion, which was infuriated by the KOC, prompted the organization to take action such as creating pools of potential sport diplomats, including formal Olympic medalists, international referees and administrators in the National Sport Federations and by sponsoring further education abroad for the limited number of people selected.

Second, there are policy streams which have three factors that make ideas come alive: technical feasibility, the extent of value acceptability and budgetary implications, according to Zahariadis (2003). Technical feasibility is an important feature as practical implementation is different from theory. It would be more likely to acquire support if solutions could attract a broad range of experts from the policy communities. According to Kingdon (1995), feasibility is closely linked to implementation and the proposal is not likely to survive to the point of serious consideration without feasibility. As regards value acceptability, Zahariadis (2003) argued that solutions that receive support from policy communities which consist of a broad range of specialists, such as academic analysts and relevant civil servants, are likely to be accepted. As Kindgon (1995) noted, even though not all specialists have the same values, in some respects, they have a tendency to view the world through a similar lens, and apply a similar approach to problems when it comes to the time for approval or rejection.

---

\(^3\) The explanation of the term by Korea Sports (KOC): The dictionary definition is the act of promoting the nation and a favourable relationship with other countries through sport (Doosan Baekgua, 2008), Kim Un Yong, a former IOC Vice president said “The characteristic of sport diplomacy is different from the diplomacy in the government. It is less formal but it should have firm trust and friendship. You can’t do it overnight. You have to make an effort to meet others as much as possible and make a deep friendship.” (Joongang Ilbo, 19th November 2008).
Budget constraint is another factor we need to consider. We could argue that less costly solutions have more chance of being accepted in the policy stream (Zahariadis, 2003). It is worth noting that budgetary considerations can act as a promoter or a constraint, according to Kingdon (1995). He quoted the comment by one analyst regarding the cost of medical care “The estimates are that health expenditures in the federal budget will double every five years. The budgetary pressures are just unbelievable.” This comment is an example of how items can be pushed higher on the government agenda. In contrast to this, there are numerous items which failed to make it on the agenda at all because of monetary constraints, or which appear as an agenda item, but fade away due to budgetary reasons (Kingdon, 1995: 106).

The concept of ‘policy primeval soup’ should not be dismissed in the context of policy streams. As Dawkins (1976) said, biologists call the mass of molecules floating around before life came into being the “primeval soup”. In the same way, ideas float around in policy communities. Ideas are produced by experts in these communities, such as in health and the environment, who share a common concern in a single policy area. Among a number of policies, only a few would be taken seriously. According to Parsons (1995), the soup changes by a process of natural selection, survival, demise and recombination.

Third, there is the political stream consisting of several elements. One of them is the national mood. Kingdon (1995) said that the national mood becomes apparent when a large number of people think about certain issues along common lines, which can change and impact on policy outcomes or policy agendas. Politicians often see the support or opposition of interest groups as signs of consensus or dissent within the political boundary. A second element is the turnover of key personnel in the administration which, according to Zahariadis (2003), has a huge impact. As Kingdon (1995) contended, turnover not only generates fresh agenda items, but also makes it impossible to consider other items that might be thought deserving at another time. According to Zahariadis (1999), the combination of the national mood and turnover in government would have the strongest effect on setting the agenda. While discussing these political streams, it is worth saying that participants in the political streams tend to build consensus by bargaining, that is, by compromising on ideal positions so that they
will gain wider acceptance and trading provisions for support, which is different from the policy stream (Kingdon, 1995). John (1998) noted that when policies and problems symbiotically float in their ‘policy primeval soup’, the political stream influences agendas.

In the MSF, ‘policy entrepreneurs’ play a critical role in the survival and success of an idea. ‘Policy entrepreneurs’ include people in or out of the government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research organizations who are willing to invest their time, finances, energy and reputation expecting a return in the future. This could be seeking personal interest, such as keeping one’s occupation or promoting a personal career, or they could also want to increase their own value or their chance to shape public policy (Kingdon, 1995). Policy entrepreneurs always have to be ready to react swiftly and seize the opportunity to initiate action in terms of ideas, proposals and expertise when a policy window opens. Policy windows can be defined as:

opportunities for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to draw attention to their special problems. Otherwise, the opportunity will be gone and they may have to wait for the next one, which could be a few years or some decades away. A policy entrepreneur must have good skills and strategies. When issues arising on the agenda streams are joined together at critical moments in time, this is called ‘coupling’ (Kingdon, 1995: 165).

According to Zahariadis (2003), this coupling could occur differently depending on the kind of streams. If windows open in the problem stream, coupling can be a consequence. If windows open in the politics stream, coupling can be a doctrine which is more likely to find a problem rather than a solution. Newly elected politicians are keener to promise policies rather than actually solving problems. Policy makers prefer to find solutions before raising problems. Technological improvement will help the work of bureaucrats. A policy which succeeded in a certain sector would be likely to be applied to another sector regardless of the circumstances. A policy entrepreneur’s position and power matters when coupling streams. Those who have a broad network and persistent attitude are more likely to be successful at coupling (Kingdon, 1995). The successful entrepreneurs could be said to be those who are prepared to spend considerable
resources to make their ideas and pet proposal palatable to various policymakers. Park Se Jik, who was successful at ‘coupling’ in establishing the Seoul Olympic Sports Promotion Foundation (SOSFO) would be a typical example of a ‘policy entrepreneur’ in Korean sport.

**Weaknesses and Strengths**

Let us look at some criticisms of MSF. One is that it is not realistic and satisfactory to separate the ‘agenda setting’ from the whole policy making process when explaining how change takes place, which was pointed out by Sabatier, according to Parsons (1995). Focusing on agenda setting means that there is a tendency to neglect the implementation perspective and offer only a partial analysis of stability and change. It would lead us to think that all the actors in the policy process play a role partly because each of them has issues and agendas of their own, rather than thinking the model only applies to agenda setting.

Another criticism is that MSF is less easily transferable across political systems and is less illuminating in more centralized political systems such as France, UK and Korea, although Zahariadis developed a modified model better suited to parliamentary systems. It is said that the MSF is merely a heuristic device rather than an empirically demonstrable guide to policy analysis. In theory, description and prediction should be symbiotic, but in practice they are not. MSF strives for understanding and explanation more than for prediction (Zahariadis, 2003).

Although MSF has been criticized, we need to note its strengths. As Kingdon (1993) said, political ideology is a good heuristic device in an ambiguous and rapidly changing world. From the multiple streams viewpoint the policymaking process is fluid and less predictable than it appears through other lenses in public policy (Zahariadis, 1995). It does not reject rationality, but it seeks to explain policy precisely when the assumptions of clarity and self-interest are inappropriate descriptors. The lens is robust because it can incorporate both mathematical and verbal formulations. It also demonstrates the profitability of a dialogue between the disciplines or fields of organisational theory, policy studies, psychology, sociology and so forth. Kingdon’s model is particularly
useful because it integrates policy communities with broader events and because it addresses the ideas-versus-interest dilemma. The incorporation of policy windows gives multiple streams a dynamic quality that differentiates it from explanations of structurally determined policy styles or rational choice. Unique concepts, such as policy entrepreneur, window policy, spillover, policy primeval soup etc, are well integrated within the theory itself and with other concepts.

**Policy Community**

Before we discuss Policy Community (PC hereafter), it would be useful to look at the term ‘Policy Community’ as authors define it in different ways. As Atkinson (1992) argued, the concepts of ‘network’ and ‘community’ are so broad and inclusive that they have essentially metaphorical qualities. Richardson and Jordan (1979) used the terms ‘policy community’ and ‘policy network’ interchangeably to refer to the close links to be found between civil servants and favoured interest group organizations, according to Dowding (1994). Wilks and Wright (1987) used terms such as policy universe, policy area, policy sector and the policy issue when explaining policy community and networks. The term policy community referred to all actors, including potential ones, who share common interests and “policy focus”. The “policy network” denoted the nature of the “linking process” that happens in the community (Wilks and Wright, 1987)

Having looked at a variety of terms indicating policy community and network, it is worthwhile focusing on a specific concept. Following this, we will look at how the US and British scholars used PC in their researches. Jordan (1990) suggested that American political scientists formulated the network concept by using expressions such as “whirlpools of activity” and “web of relationships in the subsystem”. According to Lowi (1964), the triangular nature of the concept is composed of congressional committees, interest groups and central government agency. It gave birth to the most highly integrated concept, the so called, ‘Iron triangle’. Peters (1986: 24) argued that:

> each actor in the iron triangle needs the other two to succeed, and the style that develops is symbiotic… All those involved in the triangle have similar interests.
In many ways they all represent the same individuals, variously playing roles of voter, client, and organisation members.

Rhodes (1997) argued that most decision-making takes place in these limited, closed communities. He stressed that contemporary policy-making involves a large number of institutions in each policy sector. From Rhodes’ point of view, it is necessary to investigate the structures of dependency within policy networks and identify the main types of network at the central and local level, including the professional, local government and producer networks, and how they interact with central government. Rhodes adopted Benson’s (1982) idea that organisations exchange resources. Although decision-making bodies have some room for manoeuvre, they usually depend on each other, and thus form close dependent relationships within a policy sector.

Marsh (1995) argued that it is inevitable that there will be a dominant coalition in the policy community, due to asymmetry of information. Rhodes (1988) also said that the government controls the rules of the game and is in charge of access to the network. However, it is notable that Marsh (1995) opposed Rhodes’ idea, insisting that the whole range of networks that integrate groups and government vary, depending on the groups involved or the nature of the policy.

Generally speaking, American literature emphasises personal relationships among key actors, rather than the structural point of view. It can be called micro-level analysis. It initially focused on the existence of sub-governments and often regarded them as constraints on the democratic orientation of the policy. However, same research showed that it could only apply to a limited policy area in the US, which needless to say, is beyond the American congressional system. The research also revealed that a number of results are dependent on domains. For instance, the health domain is characterised by networks far more integrated than those found in energy, as Laumann and Knoke (1987) suggested. This policy community idea had a tendency to fit with the European governments that had stronger bureaucracies and executives than the USA. A more explicit UK network approach was developed by Rhodes (1986; 1988) and by Marsh and Rhodes (1992). Having said that, it is more appropriate Britain to observe the relationship between the department, the regulatory agency and the interest group or
groups excluding the legislative committee.

The concept of the policy community which will be used in this thesis is Marsh and Rhodes’ (1992). The reason is not only that Marsh and Rhodes produced formal definitions for categorizing from policy community at one end, to issue network at the other, as Dowding (1994) suggested, but they also continued researching policy network for a long time and generated fruitful outcomes which are regarded as the most credible.

Rhodes’ framework is based on a theory of power dependence. This is a kind of game for both central and local participants. Each deploys its resources, whether constitutional-legal, organisational, financial, political or informational, to maximise its influence over outcomes, while trying to avoid becoming dependent on the other ‘players’. The organisations have to exchange resources to achieve their goals. The appreciative system of the dominant coalition influences which relationships are seen as a problem and which resources will be sought. The dominant coalition regulates the process of exchange by the rules of the game. Variations in the degree of discretion are a product of the goals and the relative power potential of interacting organisations. This relative power potential is a product of the resources of each organisation, the rules of the game and the process of exchange between organizations (Rhodes 1981). This is within the intergovernmental tradition. The significant weakness of this model is that it fails to distinguish between micro, meso-and macro levels. The reason for this is that Rhodes used the corporatist theory to analyse the ‘ground’. Marsh (1983: 1) points out that many authors could not successfully distinguish between corporatism as a form of government-interest group relations and corporatism as a theory of the state. Within the corporatist theory of the state the macro level analysis involved an account of the changing characteristics of British government during the post-war period. The micro level analysis emphasized the behaviour of particular actors such as individuals or organisations. The meso-level analysis stressed the relationship between the centre and the range of sub-central political and governmental organisations. The concept of policy network is appropriate for the meso-level.
As mentioned before, Rhodes (1986) defined a policy network as a cluster or complex of organizations connected to one another by resource dependencies (after Benson 1982). He suggested five types of network (policy community, professional network, intergovernmental network, producer network and issue network) according to their integration, membership, resources and power (Rhodes, 1997). Here, our attention turns to the work by Marsh and Rhodes who are considered as two of the leading theorists in the ‘policy community’ field.

Marsh and Rhodes described the characteristics of the policy community, according to Rhodes (1997). First, there are a limited number of participants with some groups consciously excluded. It is common to include one government agency or section within that agency. It is also important to observe the ‘rules of the game’ in order to receive permission to enter into a PC. Second, the values, membership and policy outcomes are consistent. The limited participants in the policy community do not change frequently and are stable over a long period of time. Third, all members in the community interact frequently on policy issues. The government agency and the key interests will be constantly involved in the policy process and so interaction is daily and of high quality.

Fourth, there should be a high degree of consensus. As Smith (1993) said, if a network is to develop into a policy community there has to be a high degree of consensus on policy aims and the rules of the game. It is said that ideology can play an important role in producing consensus in a policy community in terms of defining what policy options are available and what constitutes a problem (Marsh, 1995). This perspective can be linked to Lukes’ (1974) third dimension of power, which suggests that power can be ideologically manipulated. By verifying what problems and solutions are acceptable, it confirms that other alternatives are not even considered within or outside the community, because the attempt to take these alternatives into consideration would diminish both the consensus and the community. Fifth, the nature of the relationship determines the nature of a policy network. In a policy community, relationships are formed by exchange. Groups with this level of resources have information, legitimacy and implementation resources, which can be exchanged for a position in the policy process and some control over policy.
Sixth, resources influence the nature of interaction. If the government agencies want some of the pressure group’s resources, they have to offer some input into policy, and if the group is to stay within the policy community it is likely to want policy that favours its interests (Smith, 1993). The basic interaction is one involving bargaining between members with resources. Seventh, positive sum games are observable in the policy community. Each group in the policy community expands its power and influence over policy and the structures of the participating groups are hierarchical so that leaders can guarantee compliant members. The existence of formal institutions, such as, advisory committees, and informal ones such as ad hoc committees, allow officials to distinguish insiders from outsiders.

In contrast to a policy community an issue network has a large number of actors with relatively limited resources. It is open to a broad range of groups, which allows them to come in and out of the policy area without difficulty (Marsh, 1995). However, it does not mean that issue networks are completely open, and groups have to be recognised as having some interest in the area and some minimal resources to exchange in order to be in the issue network. As a result, change of membership can occur frequently. Heclo (1978) used the term in political science by comparing ‘issue networks’ with ‘iron triangles’ in the context of the US executive. It is evident that an issue network is not the same as an ‘iron triangle’. A lively issue network constantly communicates criticisms of policy and generates ideas for new policy initiatives. It was also pointed out by Heclo (1978) that stability and continuity are at a premium and the structure tends to be atomistic. An issue network involves only policy consultation. Many participants interact based on consultation rather than negotiation or bargaining. Interaction fluctuates and various members can have access to it. Consensus is limited and conflict is ever-present. An unequal power relationship exists in which many participants may have few resources, little access and no alternative. Zero sum games are likely to happen. Marsh and Rhodes insist that professional networks, intergovernmental networks and producer networks can be positioned anywhere between the two extremes.
### Table 3.2 Types of policy networks: characteristics of policy communities and issue networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Policy Community</th>
<th>Issue Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership: Number of participants</td>
<td>Very limited number, some groups are excluded. Economic and/or professional interests dominate.</td>
<td>Large Encompasses range of affected interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration: Frequency of interaction</td>
<td>Frequent, high quality, interaction of all groups on all matters related to policy issue.</td>
<td>Contacts fluctuate in frequency and intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity</td>
<td>Membership, values and outcomes persistent over time.</td>
<td>Access fluctuates significantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>All participants share basic values and accept the legitimacy of the outcome.</td>
<td>A measure of agreement exists, but conflict is ever present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources: Distribution of resources within network</td>
<td>All participants have resources; basic relationship is an exchange relationship.</td>
<td>Some participants may have resources, but they are limited, and basic relationship is consultative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hierarchical; leaders can deliver members.</td>
<td>Varied and variable distribution and capacity to regulate members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of resources within participating organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power:</td>
<td>There is a balance of power among members. Although one group may dominate, it must be a positive-sum game if community is to persist.</td>
<td>Unequal powers, reflecting unequal resources and unequal access. It is a zero-sum game.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Marsh (1995) argued, consensus can be hard to achieve in the issue network. It is inevitable that various government departments or agencies will conflict, which is the main reason for developing an issue network. It is unlikely that most of the groups here have enough resources to exchange or have control over policy implementation. Therefore, consultation may be the best way for the groups to have a relationship with
each other rather than interaction based on resources.

**Figure 3.1 Varieties of Policy networks**

![Diagram of policy networks](source: Marsh and Rhodes (1992: 183)

**Weaknesses and Strengths**

It is impossible for any approach to be satisfactory in every respect. Below are a number of criticisms regarding the policy community framework. According to Rhodes (1997), he deliberately concentrated on the concept for the purpose of analysis by focusing on welfare state services involving sub-central government which are said to be a profession (semi profession). The location of the networks on the continuum is also less clear. The distinction between policy network and issue network is obvious. But professional interests, economic interests or government may dominate a network. However, the model suggests that there cannot be a professional, producer dominated policy community. It implies that a producer network is necessarily less integrated and cohesive than a professional network. More empirical research needs to be conducted for the development of this framework.

The concept of ‘Network’ is difficult to use as the foundation of an explanation unless the investigator incorporates other factors, such as the interests, ideas and institutions which determine how networks function. According to John (1998) networks are both everything and nothing, and they occur in all aspects of policy-making. Hogwood (1987) stated that he was not entirely convinced about the usefulness of the policy network when it comes to understanding how issues are processed in the political system. Many issues, he argues, are not so tidy as the ‘policy community’ theory claims. In the practical world, issues tend to overlap and get mixed up with other issues. According to Hogwood (1987), issues do not exist in well-defined communities, but
interact with the ‘solutions’ which are on the look-out for problems. Because issues are not well packaged they will change and move from one garbage can to another rather than staying in a given community or network. It is important to note that he did not mean we should abandon this concept, but rather that we should be more subtle in the way in which we define the boundaries between policy communities and policy areas.

Kassim (1994) indicates that it is not clear where networks begin and end and who belongs to the network and who does not. He also argued that because network analysis is sensitive to changing relationships, it is so flexible that it only describes, rather than explains, the variation. In a similar vein, the fact that policy networks are relatively open-ended means that it is not possible to predict exactly who will take part in specific decision-making events (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992). John (1998) said that it does not give an account of the exercise of power. Rhodes’ model implies that policy evolves consensually, because the participants share conceptions of their interests. Network analysts do not have a theory to explain how policy is made in the shifting, more diffuse, issue networks, except to say that it contrasts with that made in policy communities. In the real world, conflict and bargaining always occur although actors abide by the ‘rules of the game’, they have room to manoeuvre.

Atkinson and Coleman (1992) said that networks are governed by sets of rules which determine how decisions are made and who participates in policymaking. However, they did not suggest where these rules that govern network activity come from, or how they shape policy making. Implicit in the attention to the distribution of organizational and other (technical knowledge) resources across state and non-state actors, is the premise that the resource or power dependency within the network shapes how decisions are made and by whom. By extension, networks in which actors are mutually dependent on the resources of one another to realise their objectives would then have a different mode of interaction and different consequences for policy-making than those in which resources are unevenly distributed.

Despite the above weaknesses, PC is worth considering as an analytic framework. First, as Jordan and Richardson (1983) said, the style of policy making is consultative and regular in Britain. Thus, institutional discussion is a way to make sure that consultation
Chapter 3: Theorising the Policy Process

takes place. Second, consultation has advantages for government. It means that policy making is consensual rather than conflictual. Through establishing a PC government can depoliticise a policy area so that it is less likely to be politically hazardous. Third, the British government is highly departmental (Jordan and Richardson, 1983). PCs are a means for a department to further extend the barriers against other departments becoming involved in policy making. By segmenting and depoliticising a policy arena, a department is excluding other actors who are likely to interfere in policy and thus make the policy process more difficult. A PC, by supplying a department with information and political support, can also assist Ministers in inter-departmental battles. Parsons (1995) said that it provides a metaphor for complexity which ‘fits’ with the technological and sociological changes of modern society. Daguerre (2000) concluded that it is a useful heuristic device for describing the relationship between government and interest groups and other relevant agencies or individuals involved in policy making. (Marsh 1998)

Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) was developed by Sabatier in 1981-1982. Sabatier attempted to find 1) an alternative to the stages model (Jones, 1977) that was dominating policy studies at that time, 2) a developed model to overarch top-down and bottom-up approaches for implementing policy, 3) one which incorporated technical information which can contribute to a better understanding of the policy process (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 117). In the mid 1980s, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith developed a revised ACF which was subsequently modified in 1993 and 2007.

It is worth stressing that the ACF has been developed over recent years and has been used widely in research carried out across Europe and North America. There was, however, a tacit assumption that the ACF did not fit well with Corporatist nations such as the Scandinavian countries or with developing countries where an authoritarian government was in power, for instance Eastern Europe. Sabatier and Weible (2007) helped compensate for this weakness by demonstrating that the ACF can be applicable to those countries as well. Both academics argued that advocacy coalitions in the
corporatist nations are likely to have fewer actors, and the norms of compromise will generate incentives for brokers who moderate deals across coalitions. Several studies were also released in the area of sport policy by Houlihan and White (2002), who developed an upgraded version of ACF for UK sport development policy. Parrish (2003) also applied the ACF to the European Union’s sport regulatory policy, suggesting two advocacy coalitions, the single-market coalition and the socio-cultural coalition. In this research, advocacy coalition was defined as:

people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system, in other words, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions and who show a non-trivial degree of co-ordination over time. (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 138)

In the ACF framework, there are normally two to four advocacy coalitions that are constituted by having the same ideas and interests about certain policy issues. At any particular time, each coalition selects a strategy involving the use of guidance instruments, such as changes in rules and information, as a tool for altering the behavior of various governmental authorities in an effort to realize its policy objectives. When conflict arises it is mediated by ‘policy brokers’ who are the third party of actors. As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) noted, these ‘policy brokers’ play a role in finding some reasonable compromise that will reduce intense conflict. According to Sabatier (1999), the ‘policy broker’ is a source of policy change. It is also worth noting the concept of ‘policy oriented learning’, which means relative long-term changes in beliefs caused by new information or experience (Sabatier, 1999). These changes depend on the level of belief systems to which we will now turn our attention.

Sabatier (1999) explained three levels of belief systems in an explicit manner. First, there is ‘deep core’ which describes fundamental normative and ontological axioms such as those found in a religion or, in the secular world, those relating to individual property rights. As Sabatier and Weible (2007) said, it is a product of childhood socialization which is strongly resistant to change. Second, there is ‘policy core’, which concerns the basic strategies for achieving core values within the subsystem. An
example of the ‘policy core’ in Korean sport policy could be the relative emphasis on elite sport and Sport for All initiatives, which is expected to change over time. According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), the concept of subsystem needs to focus on the group of people or organisations that interact on a regular basis over ten years or so for the purpose of influencing policy formulation and implementation within a given policy domain. Sabatier and Weible (2007) argued that the policy subsystem is the most useful unit of analysis for understanding and explaining policy change. They argued that it is unlikely to see policy-oriented learning either in deep core beliefs or policy core beliefs, whereas secondary core beliefs would be more susceptible to learning. Third, there are ‘secondary aspects’, which are narrow beliefs whose scope is only part of a subsystem. They include specific aspects of the problem in particular place or information regarding performance of specific programmes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). An example of the ‘secondary aspects’ in Korean sport policy would be the criteria for funding distribution to elite sport and sport for all. John (1998) argued that ‘deep core’ and ‘policy core’ as described by Sabatier (1993) resist change over time, whereas beliefs in the ‘secondary aspects’ are considered to adjust relatively easily in the light of new experience or fresh information (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 122). The reason why core beliefs do not alter is that decision-makers can interpret events in a way that does not challenge the axioms of knowledge. Core positions lead to stable coalitions unless disrupted by major crisis.

It is worth noting the basic premises of ACF. First, as Sabatier (1993) argued, policy change needs to be observed for at least a decade to find out how policy analysis shapes the agenda and how policy learning takes place. It was from Weiss (1977) that the idea regarding a time span was derived, the so called ‘enlightenment function’ of policy research. According to Weiss (1977), making decisions over a short period of time has a tendency to underestimate the influence of policy analysis, because it needs a longer timescale for research to change the belief systems of policymakers. Second, it needs to be reiterated that policy subsystems, as mentioned above, are the most useful unit at the present time. Subsystems had traditionally been limited to a range of “iron triangles”, made up of administrative agencies, legislative committees and interest groups. However, it was suggested that journalists, researchers, and policy analysts should also be included, in addition to actors at all levels of government who formulate and
implement policy (Heclo, 1978; Jordan and Richardson, 1983). In support of this argument, studies have shown that in the policy process researchers play an important role, as Sabatier and Weible (2007) stated. Third, according to Houlihan (2005), the possession and use of technical information is important. Information such as the importance of the problem, its causes, and the expected impact of various solutions is a central part of the work of administrative agencies (Sabatier, 1978; Crandall and Lave, 1981; Mazur, 1981). In discussions of the ACF so far, we can see that some features overlap with PC. Therefore, before we look at the structure of the ACF, it is worth discussing similarities and differences between the two frameworks: ACF and PC.

As John (1998) argued, the coalition in the ACF is a group sharing common ideas and interests for the purpose of arguing against other coalitions within the same policy sector. In this sense, the importance of common ideas, it is similar to PC. However, there are a number of differences. As regards actors who can belong to the coalition ACF embraces journalists, policy analysts and so forth from all levels of government and these bargain and form alliances within networks. ACF does not presume policy-making systems are consensual or are dominated by stable crosscutting elites, while policy community does. Whereas Kingdon (1995) argued that the analytical and political streams converge now and then, thus providing a window of opportunity, Sabatier viewed analysis, ideas and information as a fundamental part of the political stream and a major force for change (Parsons, 1995).

As shown Figure 3.2, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) described three sets of processes in policy change over time. First, there is the endogenous interaction of competing advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem. Understanding the subsystem is essential as most of the policymaking takes place within it. Sabatier and Weible (2007) argued that the rule for identifying the subsystem is to focus on the substantive and geographic scope of the institutions that structure interaction. The main focus is on the utility of policy-oriented learning in the alteration of values and belief systems as regard to particular policy-related issues. According to Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993), policy-oriented learning is an ongoing process of search and adaptation motivated by the desire to realise core policy beliefs, with a change in core beliefs requiring an accumulation of evidence over a decade or more, encompassing the
enlightenment function. Weiss said that ‘as new concepts and data emerge, their gradual cumulative effect can change the conventions policymakers abide by and to reorder the goals and priorities of the practical policy world’ (1977: 544).

Second, there are exogenous factors which are considered to be relatively ‘stable system parameters’, such as social structure and the constitution. Third, there are factors exogenous to the subsystem, and the ACF assumes that these are more susceptible to change over a decade or more and are a critical prerequisite for major policy change. These processes relate to changes in socio-economic conditions, technology, public opinion, the systemic governing coalition and policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems.

A significant update by Sabatier and Weible (2007) in relation to the ACF is the concept of ‘Coalition Opportunity Structures’, extracted from Lijphart (1999). Two sets of variables are suggested here: the degree of consensus needed for major policy change and openness of political system. The following table displays the way that the ‘Coalition Opportunity Structures’ can be applied to different macro-level structures. Pluralist coalition opportunity structures tend to have open decision systems and moderate norms of compromise, while corporatist structures require strong norms of consensus and compromise, and relatively limited norms of participation. Weak norms of compromise and relatively restricted norms of participation can be found in the Westminster systems, whereas authoritarian nations have a tendency to have weak norms of compromise and restricted participation (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Parsons’ (1995) argument is parallel to the ‘Coalition Opportunity Structures’. It would be more useful to apply the ACF in the case of the US, where power is fragmented in Washington, prompting policy making to take place in the interaction among multiple actors. The ACF would be less suitable to apply in countries where power is concentrated in the central government.
Table 3.3 Typology of Coalition Opportunity Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Openness of Political System</th>
<th>Degree of Consensus Needed for Major Policy Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Recent Corporatist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Traditional Corporatist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sabatier and Weible (2007: 201)

Weaknesses and Strengths

With reference to the criticism of the ACF, it is worth looking at John’s (1998) argument. John (1998) suggests the ACF does not explain policy change, with the main assumption that some relationships in the policy making process are stable. Policymaking is stable until a large socio-economic event changes the coalitional pattern. A second criticism is that the ACF does not incorporate all the aspects of policy change, contending that it tends to over-emphasise external factors through its use of the time-series method. In contradicting Parson’s view (1995), the study in the US confirms its usefulness for explaining policy change over time, but it remains to be further researched in terms of expanding the scope to other countries with different political, economic and social structures.

It is also worth noting Houlihan’s (2005) critique which argues that the ACF is weak when it comes to theorization of power. He argued:

The concept of power receives very little attention because of the underlying rationalist assumption that, in the medium term, evidence from policy learning will result in policy change even if it challenges policy core beliefs. Power then is a property of ideas rather than the outcome of resource control and the pursuit of interests. The failure of actors to act in accordance with evidence is due to factors such as limited time, computational constraints, or cognitive dissonance rather than the manipulation of the policy agenda through the mobilization of bias (Houlihan, 2005: 173-174)
In spite of these criticisms, the ACF does have strengths as well. First, the ACF not only explains policy change (this should link to the weakness regarding policy change), but it also provides a relatively distinct criterion for distinguishing major from minor policy change. Major change occurs in the core policy aspects of a governmental program,
while minor change occurs in the secondary aspects. Second, stability is explained in terms of dominant coalitions and the persistence of deep core and policy core beliefs. The ACF has a broader focus than many of its rivals and has the potential to illuminate aspects of the policy process beyond a preoccupation with agenda setting. Third, the ACF, as Sabatier pointed out, has been widely applied across a range of different policy sectors in a number of countries, and has, more importantly, been subject to substantial debate and refinement as a result of application in the field (Houlihan, 2005). Sabatier and Weible (2007) displayed a broad range of ACF applications conducted by a number of scholars and students between 1998 and 2006 in various sectors such as sport, health, cultural, offshore oil & gas, water and climate change. It is worth stressing that the ACF was researched not only in Europe and America but also in Asia, Africa, South America and Australia, which enhances our understanding of the ACF application in different structures and political systems. As Green (2003) suggested, the ACF provides a tool for analysing policy that incorporates both neo-Marxist and neo-pluralist perspectives in the sense that policy is affected by a variety of groups.

Conclusion

The aim of this section has been to evaluate the usefulness of the meso-level explanatory frameworks. There are numerous frameworks in social science, but we selected three frameworks for the reasons mentioned in the introduction. This chapter can also act as a bridge between macro level and methodological discussions.

It seems that all three frameworks can be applied, at least in part, in the Korean context. Although it is not essential to pre-determine which analytic tools we would apply in a Korean context, it is worth considering the way that these frameworks could be applied to Korean sport policy and the link to macro level theories before conducting the field work.

As for MSF, a few concepts are worth emphasizing, such as ‘organised anarchies’, which refers to the randomness and ambiguity of the process of agenda setting (policy making), ‘Policy Entrepreneurs’ are those who are swift enough to act (‘coupling’)
when the ‘window of opportunity’ is open so that they place certain issues on the agenda. The notion of ‘Policy Entrepreneur’ is very similar to the concept of ‘Policy Broker’ in the ACF model. The MSF, with its emphasis on distinct problem, policy and political streams, would appear to sit more comfortably with pluralism rather than Marxism because these three streams are likely to exist in the society where power is not concentrated in certain groups.

As regards PC, one of important features is that membership is restricted and all members share common values and beliefs. Unlike the MSF, it may be less applicable in a pluralistic society which consists of open, diverse interest groups, but may sit more comfortably in societies where elites are the centres of power in policy-making. The argument by Marsh and Rhodes (1992) with reference to power in the PC needs to be reiterated. They argued that power is dispersed in balance, even though one group could dominate. It might sound like an aspect of pluralism or neo-pluralism, but we could also view it as neo-elitism, if we see that power is distributed within a certain group (elite).

Concerning the ACF, on the face of it, it appears to be the most relevant framework to adopt due to the inclusion of a relatively long time span, at least ten years. This might be able to explain changes in Korean sport policy, such as the shift of the government’s interest in sport, from elite sport only, to SFA, while maintaining a certain level of support for the elite sport. Green’s (2005) suggestion of adopting Dunleavy and O’Leary’s (1987) idea is worth highlighting. Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987: 306) argued that ACF assumptions, especially the policy subsystem, are similar to neo-pluralism:

Wherever policy making is split between different agencies or tiers of government, complicated systems of inter-governmental or inter-agency relations evolve. These systems create ‘policy communities’ where rational debate and education about issues can take place, processes which are equally or more important than the traditional interest or power-based bargaining observed by conventional pluralists.

As macro level theories show blurred boundaries between (Neo) Marxism, (Neo) Pluralism and (Modern) Elitism, these three frameworks show some overlapping
characteristics. It is extremely difficult at this stage (before the empirical work) to predict which one best fits Korea. I intend to keep the options open in terms of application of frameworks until I conduct the field work.
Chapter 4 Methodology

Introduction

This chapter aims to link the theoretical aspects that we have discussed so far to a discussion of research methods. It consists of sections which discuss concerns related to ontology, epistemology, research design and data analysis. To begin with, the aim of the research needs to be addressed. This study is an exploration of the sport policy process in Korea through an analysis of the cases of elite sport and sport for all (SFA) in Korea from 1953 to 2008. The analysis utilizes analytic frameworks such as policy networks, multiple streams framework and advocacy coalition frameworks. The central research questions are ‘How has the role of government changed over time?’, ‘Who have been the key actors in making sport policy?’ , ‘What prompted policy change?’ and ‘What are the relationships between the central government, sub-national government and other organisations such as national government agencies in Korea’s sport development?’

The objectives of this research are as follows:

- To review and analyse the recent political, economic and cultural context of Korean sport policy
- To analyse the development of sport policy in two areas: elite sport and sport for all
- To identify and evaluate different frameworks for policy analysis and their applicability to Korea

As Hay (2002) argued, we need to bear in mind that ‘ontology logically precedes epistemology, which logically precedes methodology’ as shown in Figure 4-1.
Figure 4.1 The interrelationship between the building blocks of research

Source: Grix (2002: 180) adapted from Hay (2002: 64)

Ontology and Epistemology

It is considered that researchers should be familiar with philosophical concepts such as ontology and epistemology. However, it is far from easy to understand them. Why are ontology and epistemology so important in social science research? Why should we know about them? Grix (2002: 176) suggested that a clear knowledge of the ontological and epistemological assumptions are required for the purpose of:
Chapter 4: Methodology

- Understanding the interrelationship of the critical features of research (including methodology and methods)

- Avoiding confusion when discussing theoretical debates and approaches to social phenomena

- Being capable of understanding others’, and defending our own positions or perspectives.

As shown Figure 4.1, ontology is the first step in research, followed by epistemology and methodology. Blaikie (2000: 8) defined ontology as “claims and assumptions that are made about the nature of social reality, claims about what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each other.” According to Marsh and Furlong (2002: 18), ontology is a theory of ‘being’ which focuses on whether there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is independent of our knowledge of it, and reflects how researchers see the nature of the world. Hay (2002: 61) said:

Ontology relates to being, to what is, to what exists. One’s ontological position is, then, one’s answer to the question. ‘What is the nature of the social and political reality to be investigated?’ Alternatively, ‘What exists that we might acquire knowledge of?’

There are two major ontological positions: foundationalist and anti-foundationalist. Foundationalists consider that there is a real world ‘out there’ which is external to agents and focuses on identifying the causes of social behavior (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). As Bryman (2001) indicated, the foundationalist position is that social phenomena and their meanings are independent of social actors. The definition of foundationalist ontology by Hughes and Sharrock (1997) is described as one based on an unquestionable set of indisputable beliefs from which our knowledge may be logically deduced. Foundationalists point out that essential differences of ‘being’ can be found in the structure of the foundations upon which social life is built (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). They noted that foundationalists focus on finding out the causes of social behavior, emphasizing the explanation of it.
On the other hand, anti-foundationalists concentrate on the meaning of behavior and consider that the world is socially constructed (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). As Bryman, (2001) mentioned, anti-foundationalists explain that social phenomena and their meaning are socially constructed and require continuous revision. According to Marsh and Furlong (2002), no observer can be objective because the social world they live in is related to the social construction of reality. Grix (2002: 183) summarized the main point of the anti-foundationalist position as being: “Not all social phenomena are directly observable. Structures exist that cannot be observed, and those that can, may not present the social and political world as it actually is”. Grix’ description of the two approaches below gives us an idea how the ontological debates involving foundationalists and anti-foundationalists can assist in conducting our research.

**Table 4.1 Two approaches to studying social capital**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontology</th>
<th>Epistemology</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foundationalist</td>
<td>Positivist</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Survey Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Using multiple cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-foundationalist</td>
<td>Interpretivist</td>
<td>Quantitative or qualitative Limited number of in-depth cases</td>
<td>Interviews Surveys</td>
<td>Interview Transcripts Survey data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Grix (2002: 184)

The views of Burrell and Morgan (1979) are helpful for understanding ontology. They describe the difference between the foundationalist and anti-foundationalist position as being:

Whether the ‘reality’ to be investigated is external to the individual – imposing itself on individual consciousness from without – or the product of individual consciousness; whether ‘reality’ is of an ‘objective’ nature, or the product of individual cognition; whether ‘reality’ is a given ‘out there’ in the world, or the product of one’s mind.
It is instructive to note that the ontological questions concern the relationship between structure and agency, the extent of the causal and/or constitutive role of ideas in the determination of political outcomes, the extent to which social and political systems exhibit organic, as opposed to atomistic, qualities (in which the product of social interaction is greater than the sum of its component parts). The most fundamental aspect is the extent of the separation of appearance and reality, if any. The extent to which the social and political world presents itself to us as real depends on what is real being observable (Hay, 2002).

Now, let us discuss epistemology, one of the core branches of philosophy, which is about how we come to know what we know (Grix, 2002). Grix argues that epistemology focuses on the knowledge-gathering process, and is concerned with developing new models or theories that are better than previous ones. At the same time we should not forget the assumptions on which theories are based, and where they came from originally. As regards macro and meso-level theories, which we discussed in Chapter 3, it is necessary to be aware that most of these theories have been developed by scholars from North America and Western Europe, and that different political structures, such as the level of democracy or authoritarianism, can influence the construction of our knowledge and ways in which social phenomena are investigated. As Grix (2002) contends, it is critical which epistemological position, positivism, and interpretivism or another position, is selected as it leads us to use certain research methods rather than others. In literature which discusses epistemology, a number of school of thought are identified.

First, positivism, which adheres to a foundationalist ontology and views the world as existing independently of our knowledge of it (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). According to Sparkes (1992), intelligence, social class and motivation are conceived of as independently existing entities. The ideal for the positivists is to view the world from a detached vantage point outside of it, rather than from a place within it. It also emphasizes this dualism, namely, the separation of mind and the world, which is critical in the sense that it leads to the view that truth has its source in this independently existing reality (Sparkes, 1992). Direct observation can be used to test the validity of a theory that is prevalent in natural science, so that a researcher has an objective view,
which is value free. It is possible because, from the positivist perspective, there is no
dichotomy between appearance and reality. According to Hay (2002), positivists
attempted to make causal statements about social phenomena and to separate empirical
and normative questions, a contrasting position to that adopted by interpretivists.
Bhaskar (1979: 27) argued:

> Positivism stresses that there are causal laws, generalities, at work in social life.
> It is also correct to insist (when it does) that these laws may be opaque to the
> agents’ spontaneous understanding. Where it errs is in the reduction of these
> laws to empirical regularities, and in the view that it is thereby committed to
> the process of their identification.

It is important to be aware of criticism that positivism receives from other academics,
especially, interpretivists. As Marsh and Furlong (2002) argued, the main idea is that
social science is different from natural science in the sense that social structures are
influenced by the activities they form, such as marriage, and the actions of agents.
Quine (1961) pointed out that it is not possible to describe or classify knowledge
without interpreting it, because theory and experiment cannot be separated. He
continued that when the researchers find certain facts which do not fit into the theory,
they tend to conclude that the facts are wrong rather than the theory. In a similar way,
according to Kuhn (1970), scientists ignore observations that they find do not fit until
the ‘paradigm shift’ is reached.

A second school of thought is interpretivism which rejects the idea that the world exists
independently of our knowledge. Interpretivists argue that the world is socially or
discursively constructed, and it is the interpretation or understanding of social
phenomena which affects outcomes. These outcomes can only be established and
understood within traditions and discourses (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). According to
Grix (2002), it is important to emphasize that interpretivism stresses the role of both
agents and structures. Grix argues that the idea that the world is socially constructed
implies that there is no objective truth. However, interpretivism is not immune from
criticism. Hay (2002) argued that nothing can be used as a tool to evaluate the validity
of their knowledge, because the interpretists only give subjective opinions about
Chapter 4: Methodology

phenomena. He also pointed out that one person’s point of view is as acceptable as another’s because it is derived from different ontological and epistemological perspectives. According to Sayer (2000), the tendency of interpretivism to reduce social life wholly to the level of meaning, ignoring material change and what happens to people, was broadly criticized regardless of their understandings (Fay, 1975; Giddens, 1976).

At this point, it is necessary to reflect on the research questions in order to select the most appropriate position in terms of methodology. The research questions include the change in the government’s role, the driving force for change, and power relations between central and local government or other organizations in Korean sport policy, both in elite sport and sport for all. It needs to be acknowledged that there is ‘elite sport policy’ and ‘sport for all policy’ in Korea, independent of the researcher’s knowledge which takes the perspective of the positivists. Without accepting this assumption, the research cannot be initiated. To investigate power relationships between organizations and core actors in sport, it could be argued that not everything is expected to be seen. Bearing in mind that sport cannot be separated from the political, economic and social context, which explains why Chapter 2 was necessary, it is argued that the phenomena in the sport policy arena are socially constructed, following the view of the interpretivists. Also, it is acknowledged that both structure and agency could influence each other and have a causal relationship. The point of causality is linked to the view of positivism.

As discussed, it can be argued that neither positivism nor interpretivism comfortably fit when investigating the research questions. This is because some aspects of the research questions match either one or the other. Therefore, the position which appears to be the most appropriate is that of the Critical Realist (CR hereafter) which can stand midway between positivism and interpretivism. As Marsh and Furlong (2002) contended, CR shares an ontological position with positivism, but has more in common with relativism in epistemological terms. Critical Realists (CRs hereafter) acknowledge that there is a world out there which is independent of our knowledge. They also believe that there is a causal relationship between structure and agency in social phenomenon. These two views are the same as those of positivists. However, like interpretivists, CRs argue that
there are things that we cannot observe in social phenomena because of deep structures embedded in specific social or cultural background which prevents researchers from observing them. For example, the lack of a route to transmit athletes’ opinions to the sport governing body in Korea was taken for granted for many decades. The fact that Korean society in general is hierarchical and that an even stricter hierarchy exists in elite sport needs to be considered in order to fully understand certain policies such as the pension scheme or military exemption.

The point to emphasize from the CRs’ point of view is that structure does not determine, but is able to facilitate or constrain agents, and vice versa. CRs also argue that while interpretative understanding is an important and necessary feature of any social science, it does not mean that there is no scope for causal explanation, according to Sayer (2000). As for the Korean case, the reverse situation of the funding allocation in SOSFO shows how structural change can influence sport policy. Until 2003, elite sport received more funding from SOFO than SFA. However, the amount of SFA funding dramatically increased and more than doubled in 2006. This indicates that the government, which has had concerns for the welfare of the public since the development of liberal democracy, implemented a different kind of sport policy. It could be said that SFA which offers opportunities and facilities to the public is more important than the development of elite sport which supports a limited number of top level athletes. Some might argue that this reflects the reviews of Rho Moo Hyun’s left wing government, which focuses more on ‘balance’ than ‘growth’. This perspective confirms the CR position, which argues that the world is socially constructed. In this case, sport policy can be shaped by the historical characteristics of the presidency.

Some important features of CR are set out by Sayer (2000). He argued that CR offers an alternative to several philosophical and methodological positions which are considered to be lacking. First, in the philosophy of natural science, CR offers a third way between empiricism and positivism on the one hand, and relativism on the other. Second, in the philosophy and methodology of social science, CR provides an alternative to both the hopes of a law-finding science of society modeled on natural science methodology, and the anti-naturalist or interpretivist reductions of social science to the interpretation of meaning. It is also meaningful to discuss the difference between ‘the real’, ‘the actual’
and ‘the empirical’. According to Sayer (2000), ‘the real’ refers to the structures and causal powers of objects. ‘The actual’ means what happens if and when those powers are exercised, and ‘the empirical’ indicates a domain of experience, and whether that is observable or not does not matter. This links to the implication of CR, which Sayer (2000) argued in relation to power, in that power may exist but be unexercised. Therefore, what has happened, or been known to have happened, does not exhaust what could happen, or could have happened. In relation to this, Hay (2002) argued that if we are to reveal the structured reality of the world we live in, we must look beyond the superficial realm of appearances, deploying theory as a sensitizing tool to reveal the structured reality underneath the surface. It is this ‘depth ontology’ which underpins CR, according to Hay (2002). Marsh and Furlong (2002) contended that it is necessary to distinguish external ‘reality’ from the social construction of the ‘reality’, in order to explain the relationships between social phenomena. According to Scambler (2005), based on Bhaskar’s CR, “social structures should be seen as real, intransitive and possessed of causal powers which, when exercised, become generative mechanisms giving rise to tendencies in open systems”. Bhaskar, quoted in Scambler (2005: 165), states that social scientists should look ‘beneath-the-surface’ to explain phenomena ‘on-the-surface’. The characteristics of the three paradigms can be identified in Table 4.2.

It can be said that CRs regard theory as an important factor in recognizing the difference in social phenomena between those which are directly observable and those which are not (Hay, 2002). In Green and Houlihan’s (2005) study based upon a set of ontological and epistemological assumptions closely associated with CR, they argued that theory helps to identify and explain underlying structural relationships in policy networks, communities and advocacy coalitions.
Chapter 4: Methodology

Table 4.2. Basic belief (Metaphysics) of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Positivism</th>
<th>Interpretivism</th>
<th>Critical Realism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ontology</td>
<td>naïve realism – “real” reality but apprehendable</td>
<td>relativism – local and specific constructed realities</td>
<td>“real” reality but only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehendable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>dualist/ objectivist; findings true</td>
<td>transactional/ subjectivist; value-mediated findings</td>
<td>transactional/ subjectivist ; created findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>experimental, manipulative; verification of hypotheses; chiefly quantitative methods</td>
<td>Hermeneutical, Dialectical</td>
<td>Dialogic/dialectical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Norman and Yvonna (2003: 256)

Methodological considerations

Methodology

Bearing in mind both ontology and epistemology with regard to research questions, it is necessary to consider whether research methods should be quantitative, qualitative or a combination of the two according to their appropriateness in terms of consistency between philosophical thought and method. As Bazeley (2007) argued, the choice to use a qualitative approach should be determined, not by the prior preference of the researcher, but by the research questions and purpose. It has to be considered whether the quantitative and qualitative distinction is appropriate for classifying methods and data, for researchers who use these methods and data, and for the research in which they are used (Blaikie, 2000).

According to Bryman (1988), the key epistemological difference between the quantitative and qualitative approach is that they operate with different principles.
regarding what constitutes knowledge about the social world and how it can legitimately be gained. Bryman argued that quantitative research, namely, the application of a ‘scientific’ approach, in the form of surveys and experiments, does not take account of the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences. Therefore a qualitative research strategy such as participant observation and unstructured interviewing were proposed, since its practitioners would be able to approach the people they were investigating and be less likely to impose inappropriate conceptual frameworks on them.

When it comes to this research, the argument of Marsh and Furlong (2002) should be reiterated. They argued that methodological implications can be derived from CR on the basis that the outcomes are influenced by the way the world is socially constructed, acknowledging that there is a real world ‘out there’. Therefore, both quantitative and qualitative methods can be used in CR. Bryman’s approach to explaining some of the differences between the two approaches is useful and is summarised below in Table 4.3. Further discussion is provided in the section which follows.

Blaikie (2000) points out that it is misleading to say that an objective/subjective distinction can be made when comparing quantitative and qualitative methods. He argued that all data begins with the qualitative form. In the social world it is fundamentally subjective to record or measure things. It is worth noting that quantitative methods make replication or corroboration easier to achieve.
Table 4.3 Differences between quantitative and qualitative research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of qualitative research</td>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>Means of exploration of actors’ interpretations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between researcher and subject</td>
<td>Distant</td>
<td>Close</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher’s stance in relation to subject</td>
<td>Outsider</td>
<td>Insider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between theory/concepts and research</td>
<td>Confirmation</td>
<td>Emergent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research strategy</td>
<td>Structured</td>
<td>Unstructured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of findings</td>
<td>Nomothetic</td>
<td>Ideographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image of social reality</td>
<td>Static and external to actor</td>
<td>Processual and socially constructed by actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of data</td>
<td>Hard, reliable</td>
<td>Rich, deep</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bryman and Burgess (1999:36)

Quantitative Research

In natural science, surveys, experiments, collected data, structured observation and content analysis are the main vehicles of quantitative research (Bryman, 1988). According to Bryman (1988: 13), it is “the package of practices and assumptions that are part-and-parcel of quantitative research, and which derive from the application of a natural science approach to the study of society, that occasions distaste”. Norman and Yvonna (2003) argued that advocates of qualitative research regard their work as value free and focus on investigating causal relationships between variables rather than processes.

As Baert (2005) argued, quantitative research focuses on factual observations and the distrust of theory. He quoted a comment from Horkheimer (1972: 232) that: “Every other kind of scientific statement which does not offer a deposit of facts in the most familiar categories and, if possible, in the most neutral form, the mathematical, is already accused of being theoretical”. As illustrated by Bullock et al (1992),
quantitative methods can offer authoritative survey data, relate various factors and contribute to evaluating the incidence and boundaries of problems within the situation.

Quantitative research is not immune from criticism. According to Blaikie (2000), quantitative researchers generally believe that their methods, and the application of them, can control any possible influence from the researcher. They also ignore or try to eliminate, the hermeneutic processes, and tend to assume that time and space do not pose insuperable restrictions. As John (2002) said, we cannot deny that there is a tendency to produce results too cleanly and to hide the messiness derived from analysis of data. It is worth stressing that quantitative researchers have concentrated on establishing the validity and reliability of their measurements, that their instruments measure what they claim to measure, and that they do so consistently. Corroboration and replication appear when we investigate the methods by which validity and reliability are established (Blaikie, 2000).

Qualitative Research

The qualitative approach aims to understand the experiences and position of key informants in the context by techniques such as participant observation, in-depth individual interviews and focus group interviews (Devine, 2002). According to Devine (2002), qualitative methods are associated with interpretive epistemology, which takes the view that there is no objective science independent of social beliefs and values. Therefore, actors interpret through their own perspective and contexts (Benton, 1977). As Norman and Yvonna (2003) noted, qualitative researchers try to find out the socially constructed nature of reality, through the close relationship between the researcher and what is studied stressing that it is a value-laden nature of inquiry.

Let us look at some characteristics of qualitative research as described by Mason (2002). First, qualitative research concerns how the social world is interpreted, understood, experienced, produced or constituted. Second, it is based on methods of data generation which are both flexible and sensitive to the social context in which the data are produced. Third, it is based on methods of analysis, explanation and argument building which involve understandings of complexity, detail and context. It aims to produce
rounded and contextual understandings on the basis of rich and detailed data. There is more emphasis on ‘holistic’ forms of analysis and explanation, than on charting surface patterns, trends and correlations. It often uses some form of quantification, but statistical forms of analysis are not seen as central.

Qualitative research is not immune from criticism, however. Miller (1995) pointed out a lack of representativeness and reliability. In other words, the perception that qualitative research does not carry out much sampling compared to quantitative research still exists. Devine (2002) argued that problems can appear when researchers select interviewees who are connected with one another, so researchers spend a huge amount of time sampling in order to minimize these issues. As Devine and Heath (1999) noted, poor sampling is likely to undermine the strength of the research. Qualitative research is also said to be non-objective and hold a biased view. This is inevitable in the sense that researchers must participate in the conversation with trust (Bulmer, 1982). Nevertheless, the aim of qualitative research as described by Schofield (1993: 202) is as follows:

The goal of the qualitative approach is to produce a coherent and illuminating description of and perspective on a situation that is based on and consistent with detailed study of that situation….It is impractical to make precise replication a criterion of generalisability in qualitative work.

Despite these limitations, qualitative research is thought to be the most appropriate in our case as the central data required in this study are the values, beliefs, and understandings which can produce an in-depth and thick description of social phenomena. Although there are a number of methods in qualitative research, as mentioned above, case studies, interviews and documents were selected as research methods. Let us look at those methods in detail.
Chapter 4: Methodology

Research Methods

The aim of social research is to describe and explain the actions of agents and the structures that they produce and reproduce in our lives. It is impossible to observe both structure and agency, so we need to have behavioural or observational evidence (Scott, 1990).

Case study approach

It is argued that case study research is a comprehensive strategy of inquiry, and a valid methodology (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2003). Creswell (2007: 73) defined case study as:

A qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information, and reports a case description and case-based themes.

According to Goode and Hatt (1952), the case study tries ‘to keep together, as a unit, those characteristics which are relevant to the scientific problem being investigated’. For a qualitative research community, case study pays attention to the close relationship between political, social and cultural aspects and concentrates on experiential knowledge of the case (Stake, 2005). According to Stake (2005), Stouffer (1941) argues that the end of case study research presents something unique which can be extended to the nature of the case, its historical background, the physical setting, other contexts, including economic, political, legal and aesthetic, other cases through which this case is recognized and those informants through whom the case can be known. Yin (2003) suggested three sets of circumstances in which we can consider case studies as the preferred strategy. First, if the research questions are ‘how’ and ‘why’, rather than ‘what’ or ‘who’. Second, if the researchers have little control over events, and third, if questions concern contemporary events with some real-life context.

In relation to this study, it can be said that there are three characteristics which fit well with the three features Yin described. The research questions include ‘What role does
the government plays in sport policy in Korea?’ and ‘Why does sport policy change?’.
From a CR position it could be argued that the phenomenon of Korean sport is
independent of the researcher’s knowledge, and is socially constructed, and that the
researcher does not have control over the social world. Taking these perspectives
together with the fact that this research covers a recent future frame, it could be argued
that case study is the appropriate method to answer the research questions. As
mentioned, two case studies have been chosen: elite sport and sport for all. Of course,
there are a number of other areas in Korean sport, for example, school sport,
professional sport, traditional sport and disability sport, which could have been selected
by the researcher, but the rationales for selecting these two case studies are as follows.
As regards the former, it can be said that elite sport is the most appropriate example to
illustrate government involvement in a sport over the long term. Bearing in mind that
public policy concerning the role of government is our central interest in this research,
the choice of elite sport can be regarded as appropriate. In terms of deciding another
area which, like elite sport, can demonstrate a distinctive policy, sport for all was
chosen because of its links to different policy areas including welfare, health and
community development. This is a contrast to elite sport, which is related most closely
to international diplomacy and justifying the legitimacy of the regime. It can be argued
that these two cases provide an overview of the sport policy process in Korea, which is
an under-researched area. In addition, this research is expected to contribute to future
research by opening the door on sport policy analysis.

Before and during conducting the case studies, it is also vital to note the criticisms of
case studies, compared to quantitative methods. Yin (2003) made three points on this
subject. First, case studies have the possibility of sloppy research and biased findings
being presented. This could be called a lack of rigor, which other strategies following
specific procedures are less likely to face. Second, case studies are not useful for
generalizing. The question is ‘how can you generalize from one or two cases?’ Maxwell
(2005) argued that in qualitative research, the generalisability is based on the
development of a theory which can be stretched to other cases, not on explicit sampling
of some defined population to which the results can be extended (Becker, 1991; Ragin,
1987, Yin, 1994). Yin (2003: 10) gives a brief answer:
Case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations of universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a ‘sample’, and in doing a case study, your goal will be to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).

According to Maxwell (2005), internal generalisability means the generalisability of a conclusion within the setting or group studied, while external generalisability indicates its generalisability beyond that setting or group. The former is a key issue for qualitative case studies whereas the latter is not. Cook and Campbell (1979) refer to ‘statistical conclusion validity’ in quantitative research. Maxwell (2005) argued that in the case study, the descriptive, interpretive, and theoretical validity of the conclusions rely on their internal generalisability to the case as a whole.

Third, case study takes a long time and it tends to generate data which is unmanageable. It is suggested that ethnography and participant-observation take a lot of time and effort in the ‘field’. As Yin (2003) noted, case studies do not rely solely on the two methods of participant-observation and ethnography. As regards this research, it is expected that document analysis and semi-structured interviews within case studies will be the main methods. This is not only because of the time constraint, but is thought to be the most appropriate way of answering research questions.

Documents
A massive volume of documents is released every day in various forms. Scott (1990) pointed out the difference between normal data and sociological data. He argued that the latter are not only constructed with a scientific, theoretically informed intent but that great care is given regarding the quality of the evidence, so that the validity and reliability of the data constructed from the evidence is sound. According to Denzin (1970), numerous high volume techniques are used today, such as massive surveys and recorded speech. Nevertheless, document analysis provides an invaluable part of most schemes of triangulation, as well as remaining an important research tool in itself. In relating to case studies, which we discussed previously it could be said that collecting appropriate data is extremely important. As Yin (2003) argued, in qualitative research,
especially case study, gathering and analyzing relevant data is one of the most common methods. It is essential that the documents corroborate and increase the evidence from other sources (Yin, 2003).

It is worth noting the differences between primary, secondary and tertiary sources, as illustrated by May (1997). The materials collected or written by people who actually witnessed the events they describe are primary documents. According to Burgess (1990), the researcher might employ secondary sources if these sources cannot be seen in a social context. Secondary sources refer to the ones that are written after an event and which the author had not personally witnessed. It is inevitable that potential problems could arise, which researchers should be aware of. Tertiary sources include indexes, abstract and bibliographies which enable researchers to position other references, according to May (1997). In this thesis, a combination of these three sources will be used. Interview scripts, minutes of the board meetings in the sub-national government, and the speech script from the President or Minister of the MCST are primary sources, while the Sports White Paper published by the MCST, journals and newspaper articles are secondary ones. Some indexes or statistics could be regarded as tertiary sources.

After obtaining the necessary data, it is important to interpret them properly in order to get a valuable result. Unlike quantitative research methods, problems can emerge in the qualitative approach in terms of interpretation and assessment. As Sparkes (1992) said, document analysis is difficult because “it is approached in terms of the cultural context in which they were written and may be viewed as attempts at persuasion”. Let us look at the four criteria in analyzing documents illustrated by Scott (2001): authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. First, authenticity is about whether the document is genuine, complete, reliable and of unquestioned authorship (MacDonald, 2001). According to Scott (2001), the initial problem which could appear is whether the document is an original or copy. If it is a copy, it is important to know whether it is a copy of the original or a copy of a copy. Confirming that it is a sound document, the researcher should authenticate the identity of the document. Second, credibility means how the document is likely to be distorted, in other words, how sincere it is. It is essential for researchers to be alert to the fact that the content of the document could be modified by authors who seek practical advantage. As Scott (2001) said, it is likely to
be thought that the primary sources (first-hand, eye-witness, actually involved in the events) are more accurate than secondary sources (second-hand, non-participant). The reason for the belief is the superior conditions under which the primary sources are collected. Third, representativeness refers to whether the documents are composed of representative sample of the universe of documents as they originally existed. It is natural in a study for something to be missing, but we need to bear in mind how much is missing and why (Scott, 2001). McDonald (2001) argued that the researcher needs to approach the material assuming that everything is potentially suspect, especially things which may become the main part of the data. He or she should also be alert to things which are supposed to be there, but are missing. Fourth, finding out the meaning of the document is extremely critical because it is our purpose to understand the full significance of what the document says. As MacDonald (2001) argued, for the social researcher, the variety of language used in different cultures and at different times is a critical factor in understanding the surface meaning. If we fail to read something properly, it has no value at all. The following step in understanding of surface meaning is an interpretative understanding. Scott (2001: 30) argued:

Interpretative understanding is the end-product of a hermeneutic process in which the researcher relates the literal meanings to the contexts in which they were produced in order to assess the meaning of the text as a whole.

As MacDonald (2001) argued, the researcher should consider the overall conditions under which the text was produced and the specific context within which the individuals conceived it, so that they are able to evaluate whether this interpretation ‘makes sense’.

It is worth emphasizing that we need to be cautious in dealing with newspaper documents because of their connection with those in power. As Hay (1997) commented, social power can be viewed through the media and the media can reflect the marginalization of particular groups of people and the social characterization of others. In terms of defining the ‘real’ issue, political actors, aided and abetted by the mass media, help construct an image of ‘reality’, whereas ‘powerless’ individuals, in other words, the general public, only respond and react to the media context (Negrine, 1989: 33).
11). The questions we could ask include ‘Were certain themes chosen for the sake of the government?’ and ‘Were there any hidden pressures so that specific issues emerged?’. Compared to the era of the authoritarian regime, the Korean media is unlikely to be controlled by the government. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of government pressure and constraints on the Korean press which limit its freedom, as Negrine (1989) contended regarding the mass media environment in Britain.

**Interview**

The interview is one of the most common and powerful ways to understand human beings and becomes a tool for both qualitative and quantitative researchers to depend on in order to obtain rich, in-depth data, according to Fontana and Frey (2005). Researchers appear to believe that the results are trustworthy and accurate and that the relationship of the interviewer to the respondent that evolves during the interview process does not unduly bias the account (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997; Silverman, 1993). However, it should be remembered that this view does not mean that interviewers can ignore contextual, societal, and interpersonal elements, because interview is a technical process and the procedures are standardized (Fontana and Frey, 2005).

According to Fontana and Frey (2005), it is difficult for the interviewer to collect objective data for the purpose of neutral use for scientific purposes, as the data is historically, politically, and contextually bounded. Interview methods always involve more than two people and not merely the neutral exchange of questions and answers. As Holstein and Gubrium (1995) argued, this “active” nature leads to the creation of a collaborative effort, the so called interview. As Seale (2004) noted, several terms are used in referring to types of interview, for example, ‘depth’, ‘unstructured’ or ‘life history’. He said:

This type of interaction involves researchers themselves doing interviews, rather than the ‘hired hand’ approach of large-scale survey research, where teams of interviewers are trained to ask the same questions in the same way of everyone they interviewed.
It is worth stressing that qualitative interviews are often conducted, with researchers taking a certain epistemological position. However, there is room for flexibility in that interviews can be used in combination with other research techniques. For instance, in-depth interviews can be used with wider questionnaire-based survey, and focus groups with ethnographic approach (Byrne, 2004).

Let us look at three kinds of interviews: structured, unstructured and semi-structured. First, we consider the structured interview which is dependent on the use of a questionnaire as the data collection instrument. The interviewer asks identical pre-established questions to all respondents and controls the pace of the interview, assuming that there is a script to be followed in a standardized and straightforward manner. As Fontana and Frey (2005) argued, the structured interview has a tendency to be conducted under a stimulus-response format, and providing that the respondent answers the questions truthfully, it is pre-determined to reveal adequate indicators of the variable in question, so long as the questions are phrased properly. According to May (2001) the method whereby each interviewee is asked the same question in the same way increases the validity of research. If any differences are shown between answers they can be considered as genuine ones, rather than the result of the situation in which the interview was conducted. By questioning the respondents about an identical issue but using a different form of sentence or wording, the validity can be checked. Fontana and Frey (2005) pointed out that the structured interview aims at capturing exact data of a codable nature for the purpose of explaining behavior within the limit of set categories. It is worth noting that there is very little room for interviewees to express their thoughts or opinions and it is required that the people who answer should fall within a certain range which the researcher has predetermined as May (2001) said.

The second type of interview is the unstructured interview, which also be called the open-ended interview. As May (2001) argued, it provides a broader understanding of the respondents’ perspective by allowing interviewees to talk more freely within their frames of reference. Fontana and Frey (2005) argued that the unstructured interview tries to understand the complex behavior of members of society without imposing any a priori categorization which could restrict the field of inquiry. According to Patton (2002), it leads us to understand the perspective of other people without predetermining
those views through prior selection of questionnaire categories. With this type of interview researchers are likely to become buried under an increasing mountain of field notes, transcripts, newspaper clippings and audio tapes (Fontana and Frey. 2005).

Third, we look at the semi-structured interview, which is the one to be used in this study. It is getting more attention worldwide because of the expectation that the interviewees’ viewpoints are more likely to be expressed openly in a limited situation, other than in a standardized interview or a questionnaire (Flick, 1998). The semi-structured interview is a technique which lies between the structure and unstructured interview (May, 2001). The questions are normally specified, but the interviewer has more freedom to look beyond the answers in a manner which would appear prejudicial to the aims of standardization and comparability. According to Yin (2003), the case study interview adopts an open-ended style, that is, we can ask key respondents for facts and also for opinions about events. Yin (2003) argued that researchers may even ask for the respondents’ insights into specific events and may apply such propositions as the basis for questions that follow. The respondent can also introduce other people for interview and recommend other sources of evidence. It is worth noting that a key informant can greatly influence the success of research, which we will discuss more later on. Let us look at the core features of the semi-structured interview that Mason (2002) identified: the interactional exchange of dialogue, a relatively informal style compared to the formal question and answer type, a topic-centred or narrative approach designed to have a flexible structure in order to develop the opportunity for researcher and interviewee(s) to exchange their opinions, and involvement in construction or reconstruction of knowledge. The difference between the three forms of interview is shown below table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Interview</th>
<th>Required Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structured interview</td>
<td>Neutrality, no prompting, no improvisation, training to ensure consistency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-structured interview</td>
<td>Some probing, rapport with interviewee, understanding the aims of the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open-ended interview</td>
<td>Flexibility, rapport with interviewee, active listening</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Noaks and Wincup (2004: 80)
The semi-structured interview is considered to be most appropriate for this research, based on Mason’s (1996) argument. He said that this method is useful when researchers are likely to be making certain kinds of epistemological assumptions about the interaction between himself/herself as a researcher and those he/she is researching. From a CR point of view, it is important to investigate the understandings or beliefs held by interviewees regarding the sport policy making process in Korea. Byrne (2004) contended that qualitative interviewing is particularly helpful as a research method for accessing individuals’ attitudes and values which cannot necessarily be observed or accommodated in a formal questionnaire. Another reason to use interviews is that it is expected to explore ‘hidden voices’ from interviewees. Byrne (2004) said that interviews have been particularly rewarding for researchers who want to acquire voices/opinions which have been ignored, misrepresented or suppressed in the past. In this context, it can be expected to produce the data which could provide the reason for policy change. Having some structures to start with, flexible and open questions would encourage interviewees to share their opinions, experiences and beliefs.

As Byrne (2004) argued, it is necessary for researchers to be aware of a number of variables which will affect the outcome, for example, who is being interviewed, the location of the interview and the form of questioning. Let us look at these variables in detail. First, it is important to decide criteria for selecting interviewees. The selection criteria for interview in this study were those who: 1) have been involved in sport policy making (preferably in a senior position) for at least five, and, preferably ten years, in either the public or private sector. 2) are deemed to have direct experience or knowledge in the sport area. 3) are very experienced in either the academic or media sector so that he or she can provide further insight in relation to sport policy in Korea over time.

The first round of interviews took place between 22\textsuperscript{nd} June 2007 and 11\textsuperscript{th} July 2007 in Korea. eight people, either academics or journalists, were interviewed, in order to have an in-depth understanding of Korean sport policy over a period of time. This fits criterion 3). The second round of fieldwork interviews followed in the period from 29\textsuperscript{th} November 2007 to 15\textsuperscript{th} June 2008. According to criterion 1) above, the senior officers interviewed belong, or used to belong, to organizations such as the Minister of Culture
and Tourism and KSC, SOSFO, NACOSA, KISS, local governments, National Sport Federations, the business sector, the military sector and sport medicine experts. As regards criterion 2), elite athletes and coaches were interviewed from four sports, namely, athletics, swimming, taekwondo and short track. Both athletics and swimming were chosen because these two sports always appear in the media as ‘fundamental sports’ which need to be prioritized by the government. In Athens Olympics, Korean athletes won no medals in either swimming or athletics, which award 90 medals overall (athletics 46, swimming 44), but they ranked 9th in the table by winning thirty medals in total (gold, silver and bronze). Hankyurae newspaper (1st September 2004) argued:

Korea is the only country among the top ten without a medal in athletics or swimming. We cannot hope to be at the top if we neglect those two sports. We cannot be a genuine winner on the international Olympic Stage unless the government invests in ‘fundamental sports’.

The reason for selecting Taekwondo is because it is not only a Korean national sport but Korean athletes have continued to be successful since the Sydney Olympics when Taekwondo was made an official Olympic Sport by the IOC. Short track was proposed in order to reflect Korea’s consistent success in the Winter Olympics.

In order to access these interviewees, three strategies were adopted: Direct contact, ‘gate keeper’ and ‘snowball’. First, a researcher contacted interviewees by phone or e-mail. Following that, applied techniques of ‘gate-keepers’ and ‘snowball’ were used for those who were difficult to reach through the given network. The fact that the researcher had been involved in the sport sector as a FIFA Referee for seven years allowed more access to people in senior positions. Considering that all the interviewees were men except for one female athlete, the question of whether the interviewees treated her as a young female student or a sport official was one of the factors to consider during the interviews.

It should be stressed that KSC, which sponsored the researcher for two years (October 2006 – September 2008) during her PhD, played an important role as ‘gate-keeper’ in allowing her to speak to several current and former senior officers in SOSFO,
NACOSA as well as KSC. As regards elite athletes and coaches, a professor who is an Olympic Medalist offered considerable help by introducing some current and former top elite athletes to the researcher. When applying the ‘gate-keepers’ method, it was important for the researcher not to be influenced by the gatekeepers in terms of the particular way of conducting the interviews or by the using his or her power or authority, as Byrne (2004: 188) pointed out. As the interviews proceeded, it appeared that the ‘snowball’ method, by which the researcher asks people to introduce their colleagues or friends, was working well. Some interviewees suggested that they could introduce experts who could offer a more valuable answer to specific questions. At the same time, it was critical for the researcher to be careful that the interviews were not concentrated on any specific groups in terms of political preferences and attitudes towards the issues (for example, the KSC/KOC integration and separation matter). In addition, there was a point when the researcher had to stop interviewing before the number of transcriptions became unmanageable and before overlap and inapplicability occurred with regard to the research focus. It was useful to be reminded of the remark by Byrne (2004) that ‘snowball’ could be a very successful way to make contacts, but it is not likely to produce the required variety or range of people, as people tend to know and provide introductions to others who are similar to themselves.

It should be reiterated here that the interview data is utilized in order to hear voices from inside the sport sector. A protocol was agreed for the reporting of individual responses to protect the anonymity of interviewees. Even though a job title or brief description was used to refer to the interviewee’s position, the interviewees’ name would not be disclosed. If this was not considered appropriate, the term ‘senior official’ was used. Table 4.5 provides a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of documentation and interviews.
Table 4.5 Sources of Evidence: Strengths and Weaknesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Documentation</td>
<td>• Stable: can be reviewed repeatedly&lt;br&gt;• Unobtrusive: not created as a result of the case study&lt;br&gt;• Exact: contains exact names, references, and details of an event&lt;br&gt;• Broad: coverage-long span of time, many events, and many settings</td>
<td>• Retrievalability: can be low&lt;br&gt;• Biased selectivity: if collection is incomplete&lt;br&gt;• Reporting bias: reflects(unknown) bias of author&lt;br&gt;• Access: may be deliberately blocked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>• Targeted: focuses directly on case study topic&lt;br&gt;• Insightful: provides perceived causal inferences</td>
<td>• Bias: due to poorly constructed questions&lt;br&gt;• Response bias&lt;br&gt;• Inaccurate: due to poor recall&lt;br&gt;• Reflexivity: interviewee gives what interviewer wants to hear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Yin (2003: 86)

Data analysis

As Flick (1998) argued, the researcher should limit his or her recordings to what is absolutely necessary for the research question in terms of both the amount of data which is recorded and the thoroughness of the recording. Nevertheless, the usage of a voice recorder was accepted by most of the interviewees. There were a few people who showed reluctance to this because of sensitivity or personal discomfort. In these cases it was essential for the researcher to take a verbatim note during the interview and fill in the gap immediately after the interview was completed through recollection, so that as much as possible could be recorded. According to Silverman (2000), transcription can play a role in improving analysis as it enables researchers to replay unlimitedly. It also allows the interviewer to focus more on the interviewees, which prevents the interviewees from getting only secondary attention (Patton, 2002). It should be
reiterated that the main purpose of the interview is to gather high-quality data. Patton (2002) pointed out that it is necessary to avoid the situation where the interviewees are tempted to ask interviewers for advice, approval or confirmation, which could reverse the situation between interviewer and interviewee (Patton, 2002).

After completing forty three transcriptions, it was necessary to review each one carefully and tease out some themes which emerged in order to begin analysis. To assist in this, N-Vivo software was installed, taking into account the argument from Bazeley (2007). She argued that the multiple functions of computers, including recording, sorting, matching and linking, can be utilised by the researcher as support when answering research questions from the data. This prevents losing access to the source data or contexts from which the data have come. Of particular significance was the fact that the use of a computer for qualitative analysis can contribute to a more rigorous analysis, according to Bazeley (2007). While the effectiveness of the software appears to be persuasive, we need to discuss some dangers of using it. As Bazeley (2007) said, the reliability and trustworthiness of the results acquired depends on the skill of the user in both carrying out the method and using the software. Moreover, software can ‘mess up’ without the researcher realising that it has been affected (Gilbert, 2002). Using N-Vivo software was helpful in saving time compared to the traditional way of sorting numerous interview scripts manually, and it was much easier to go back to a certain quote, if necessary, as research progressed. However, being too dependent on the software should be avoided as the researcher could face a disastrous situation if some problems occur during the analysis of the data, for example, in the corruption of certain language characters. In this study, unreadable characters could have caused problems. However, it was fortunate that this only happened after completing the data analysis.

A number of techniques are available for the qualitative analysis. When data is in text form, as in this study, categories can be created, documents can be coded, patterns can be described, theories from data can be generated and so forth (Blaikie, 2000). In this thesis, thematic analysis was adopted in order to understand the values and beliefs of the interviewees in certain contexts. Coding can be divided into two stages, according to Blaikie (2000). The first step is to break the data down into categories and sub-categories. Strauss and Corbin (1990: 63) described it as: “Taking apart an observation,
a sentence, a paragraph, and giving each discrete incident, idea, or event, a name, something that stands for or represents a phenomenon”. The second stage is to find relationships between these sub-categories and categories and put the data back together in a new way. The themes which came out of the data analysis are the government view on elite sport, the structure and finance of the government, facilities, sport science and coaching, national sports festival, hosting strategy, the role of business and the role of the armed forces in the case of elite sport. As for sport for all, the themes of the role of government, the role of voluntary organizations in sport and non-sport sectors and the role of commercial organizations became apparent.

**Reliability and Validity**

The concepts of validity, reliability and generalization have obtained the status of a scientific holy trinity (Kvale, 2002). Kvale argued that some qualitative researchers ignored or dismissed these concepts, and other qualitative researchers have stretched beyond the bounds of relativism to a rampant anti-positivism in order to broaden the concept of validity. It is worth noting that transcriptions are representations of some original reality, and are interpretative constructions and decontextualised conversations (Kvale, 1996). Fielding and Fielding (1986) argued that methods such as interviews and documents that are triangulated are all vulnerable to a self-report bias which results in the same biases and sources of invalidity and a false sense of security (Maxwell, 2005: 112).

‘Reliability’ is the extent to which a measurement procedure yields the same answer, however and whenever it is carried out (Kirk and Miller, 1986). It is an easy task to have two persons independently type the same passage of a taped interview, and then have a computer programme list and count the number of words that differ between the two transcriptions, thus providing a quantified reliability check (Kvale, 1996). In qualitative research, in this study, however, when the researchers record tape, transcribe and make trifling mistakes, it can significantly affect the reliability of people’s responses (Silverman, 2005). It can be said that there are more opportunities for a researcher to return to the scripts, if needed, in contrast with tabulated figures from
survey research questions. As regards checking validity and reliability, Silverman (2000: 185-186) said:

This opportunity is not always present in qualitative research. There are many observational studies where the reader has to depend on the researcher’s depiction of what was going on. Indeed, perhaps the extended immersion in the ‘field’, typical of much qualitative research, leads to certain preciousness about the validity and reliability of the researcher’s own interpretation of ‘their’ tribe or set of interview respondents.

Bryman (1988) argued that reliability is an issue about the consistency of a measure. To check for internal consistency we need to ask the question: “Does it comprise one unitary idea or separate components?” As for checking a measure’s consistency over time, the test for this entails administering the measure on more than one occasion. According to Yin (2003), carefully constructed reliability is designed to minimize the errors and biases in the research. He also contended that documenting the procedures in the previous work, or establishing several steps which are as simple as possible in order to make them operational, are ways to acquire higher reliability.

According to Bryman (1988), validity indicates how we can be sure that a measure really does reflect the concept which it is supposed to be referring to. It is important to note the suggestions by Yin (2003) that the researcher should make sure of its validity by: selecting the specific types of changes that are to be studied (and relating them to the original objectives of the study) and demonstrating that the selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the specific types of change that have been selected.

When considering using the qualitative method in the context of this study, it is necessary to think about reliability. Silverman (2000) defined reliability as the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions. The relevant questions would be ‘How confident can one be in the consistency of documents in a certain sport policy area?’ or ‘How can one get consistent answers from interviewees?’ It is worth noting the explanation of internal and external reliability by Fielding (2006). The former
concerns the consistency of data over the course of the research in the sample sites, and the latter concerns the agreement between independent reports of the phenomenon gathered at different sites by different researchers. In this study, the issue of external reliability was of more concern to the researcher because follow-up studies do not normally take place in other settings similar to the original surroundings. It should be stressed that time constraint was one of the reasons which prevented the researcher from conducting hundreds of interviews (for example, interviewing five people in SOSFO who are middle aged men, in senior positions, of similar education and political background, instead of one as a representative) in order to improve reliability. Moreover, it is noteworthy that even if a researcher attempts to replicate the interview, it would not satisfactory, as time does not stand still and settings change, and the researcher has to allow for the fact that conducting the original study will have had effects on the setting and its members (Fielding, 2006).

As regards interviews, a researcher should acknowledge that it is difficult to get high reliability in the semi-structured interviews as the interview environment is not controlled in any way. Even if the questions each interviewee was asked were the same, the historical, political and social context in which the individuals were living impacts on the answers. Whether they lived under the authoritarian regime or the democratic government, how old they were, and whether they worked inside the sport sector or not had to be borne in mind before, during and after the interviews. The other factor to note was that the interviewees tend to have more power than the researcher due to the nature of the semi-structured interview. It is up to the researcher to decide how to encourage the interviewees to express their beliefs, thoughts and opinions, even on matters of policy failure or politically sensitive issues. In order to obtain the in-depth data from the interviewees, it is critical to adopt an appropriate manner in the interviews. Maxwell (1992) contended: “Traversing the distance between the object and the resulting representation has been well mapped, with error or bias checks being developed that enable a valid and reliable reconciliation between interpretations and object”. In reference to this point, Haywood and Mac an Ghaill (2006) contended that distance concepts in methodology are characteristic of qualitative research as well as quantitative research. It draws the researcher’s attention to the fact that she needs to take a balanced line with interviewees in order not to give impression that she is either
too familiar with certain issues, or does not have any idea about the questions she intends to ask. It cannot be denied that the interviewer’s status as a female international football referee based in Europe helped the male interviewees (except for one female athlete) to provide their knowledge and opinions as fully as possible, in the sense that they were less reluctant to talk about sport policies since that the interviewer was herself a member of the sport community, and in an area dominated by men. Having been informed that the researcher was writing a PhD thesis in the UK, they had a tendency to be less defensive in answering questions, as they were sure that the interview data would not be made public inside Korea. In addition, the fact that the questions did not include any personal issues was thought to be useful in terms of interaction between the interviewer and the interviewees.

In spite of the efforts taken by the researcher, it was not possible to completely overcome the lack of reliability in the qualitative research. To minimize the problems of reliability, triangulation with the documents was significantly important and useful. Now, let us look at the issue of validity, which is considered to be particularly important in qualitative research, especially, interviews.

Validity indicates the answers that ‘correspond to what they are intended to measure’ (Fowler, 1993). It is instructive to note that validity is limited by reliability but not vice versa. It inevitably implies invalidity if answers are inconsistent (Fowler, 1993). According to Maxwell (2005), validity refers to the correctness or credibility of a description, conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other sort of account. Validity can be divided into two types. One is internal validity, which is applicable to explanatory or causal cases. What we should focus on is the other type, that is, construct external validity. According to Yin (2003), a theory must be tested by replicating the findings in more trials, where the theory has specified that the same results should be shown. Devin argued that, to enhance the validity of qualitative research, several tools can be used, such as group discussion and asking for reactions to the interpretation of the interview transcript in order to reach consensus on the interpretation and reinterpretation (Devine, 2002). Mason (2002: 188-189) explains how to judge validity as below:
The judgments are about whether you are ‘measuring’, or explaining, what you claim to be measuring or explaining. They therefore concern your conceptual and ontological clarity, and the success with which you have translated these into a meaningful and relevant epistemology. Given the concerns about the appropriateness of measures of reliability of method, qualitative researchers tend to prefer to focus their interest and efforts on what they see as the more sophisticated and meaningful concept of validity.

As main research methods are qualitative in this thesis, there is a greater concern with questions of validity. The questions which could be asked in relation to validity would be ‘How reliable is your interview data?’, in other words, how confident can the researcher be that the interviewees answered questions honestly. Considering that policy issues, per se, and policy failure in particular, can sometimes be a sensitive area for the interviewees to speak about, it is essential for a researcher to be aware of the limits of the interviews. However, the fact that Korea can be referred to as a liberal democracy increases expectations that the interviewees can express opinion with less concern. It should be stressed that this validity issue was carefully considered before the interviewee selection process. As regards choosing senior officers in the government and sub-national government organizations, the balance between retired people and current staff was taken into consideration. This was based on the belief that people who are working at the present moment can give opinions about up-to-date matters, but may feel uncomfortable mentioning specific issues because of the situation they are in. In that sense, former senior officers were thought to be more open and relaxed about things which happened in their time. The effort was made to get people in similar positions in different organizations, so that their opinions on a specific issue, such as the integration/separation issue between the KSC and KOC, could be shown. As for the athletes, all the players were retired, which gave greater freedom for them to express their opinions. There were some concerns about the culture of strict hierarchy among Korean athletes, which might act as an obstacle, despite their retirement. From the researcher’s point of view, it turned out to be the opposite of what was anticipated. Of particular note was the fact that all the athletes were, perhaps, too willing to share stories of events behind scenes, which made the researcher nervous of continuing recording even though she was allowed to do so. Keeping in mind the argument by
Fielding and Fielding (1986) that triangulation automatically increases validity, the principal of triangulation should be explained. In this study, two types of triangulation are observed. One is the triangulation between interviews as mentioned above, the other is through documents collected from field work and desk research conducted before and after each interview.

**Research design**

‘Research design’ refers to the process of acquiring an answer to the ‘why’ research questions from a narrow point of view (Blaikie, 2000). However, in this study, a broader meaning should be considered. As Blaikie (2000) indicated, ‘research design’ is the plan, structure, and strategy of investigation in order to gain answers to research questions and to control variance. Yin explained what research design is about:

> It is a logical plan for getting from here to there, where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and there is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions. Between ‘here’ and ‘there’ may be found a number of major steps, including the collection and analysis of relevant data (Yin, 2003: 20).

Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested some points that need to be considered in the research design as follows: state the problem or a policy option, outline a theoretical perspective, suggest procedures that will be employed, sampling, instrumentation and data-analytic procedures, establish a time schedule and ‘milestone events’ which can be checkpoints for monitoring, designate agents who will implement each step, project a budget in terms of time, people and funds and suggest an expected end product. Figure 4.2 is the research design for this thesis, which summarizes the methodology discussed so far and indicates the phases involved, followed by chapters containing two case studies. It was constructed based on the Blaikie’s (2000) model.
Chapter 4: Methodology

Figure 4.2 Research design

Topic: An analysis of the sport policy process in Korea-the cases of Elite Sport and Sport For All
Identification of research questions, research objectives, theories and frameworks and research strategies.

Research Method: Mainly qualitative (documents and semi-structured interviews)

Desk research for the field work (Jan. 2007-Feb. 2007)

Identify 1st round interviewees and make interview questionnaires
(Jan. 2007 – June 2007)

1st round interviews, collect documents

Desk research for the 2nd round interviews
(July 2007 - 2nd round interview)

2nd round interviews, collect documents and make interview questionnaires

Transcription (June - July 2008)

Research additional information (Sep. 2008)


Source: Adapted from Blaikie (2000:43)
Chapter 5 The Case study of Elite Sport Development

Development of Elite Sport Policy in Korea

It could be argued that Korea is one of the most successful countries in elite sport in terms of the medal table of the Summer Olympics. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show a consistently high level of success, especially over the last two decades or so, with Korea ranking around the 10th in the Summer Olympics. Korea also put an end to its ‘no medal’ performance at the Winter Olympics in 1992 [Korea did not participate in 1936] and has won at least one medal at every Winter Olympics since. However, it is important to note that the medals Korea won were concentrated in a few sports, namely archery, judo, taekwondo and short track speed-skating. This consistent level of success in recent years suggests that the Korean government has a policy which trains and supports elite athletes. The main aim of this section is to understand the role of government policy in elite sport in Korea.

As the KSC publication Cheyuk (August 2004) pointed out, during eight Olympic appearances since 1948, Korea only won 1 gold, 6 silver and 11 bronze medals. In contrast, Korea won 6 gold and 6 silver medals at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. ‘Cheyuk’ commented that it is undeniable that the absence of eastern Europe countries contributed to the result, but the government’s support for 500 days of systematic training [to be discussed later] should not be overlooked.

As Korea was occupied by Japan from 1910 to 1945 and governed by the US between 1945 and 1948, there are few ‘landmarks’ in the Olympic movement in Korea during this period. Although Korean athletes began to appear in the Olympics in 1932 in Los Angeles, they participated under the auspices of the Japanese Olympic Committee (hereafter JOC). The first Olympics where Korea participated under the name of the Korean Olympic Committee (hereafter KOC) was the St. Moritz Winter Olympics in 1948.
Table 5.1: Korea’s performance in Summer Olympics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City/Country</th>
<th>Gold</th>
<th>Silver</th>
<th>Bronze</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Rank (participant countries)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936*</td>
<td>Berlin/Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>- (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>London/UK</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24th (59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Helsinki/Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37th (69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Melbourne/Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29th (67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Rome/Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>- (83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Tokyo/Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27th (93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Mexico City/Mexico</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36th (112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Munchen/Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33th (92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Montreal/Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19th (140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Moscow/USSR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>LA/USA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10th (140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Seoul/Korea</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4th (159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Barcelona/Spain</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7th (169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Atlanta/USA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10th (197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Sydney/Australia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12th (199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Athens/Greece</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9th (201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Beijing/China PR</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7th (204)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sohn Ki Jung won gold medal in marathon in 1936 at Berlin, setting up a new world record. However, the IOC recorded it as a Japanese medal because Korea was occupied by Japan at that time. Sohn was forced to put the Japanese flag on his chest, but Joongang Ilbo and Donga Ilbo, two main newspapers in Korea, released pictures of Sohn’s victory, deleting the Japanese flag. Only the photo in Donga was caught by the Japanese officials and publication was suspended indefinitely. Joongang, however, stopped publication voluntarily. Therefore, the first Korean gold medallist in Olympics is said to be Yang Jung Mo, a wrestler who won in the 1976 Montreal Olympics.
Table 5.2: Korea’s performance in Winter Olympics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City/Country</th>
<th>Gold</th>
<th>Silver</th>
<th>Bronze</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928–1988</td>
<td>St.Moritz/Switzerland ~</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Calgary/Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Albertville/Canada</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Lillehammer/Canada</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Nagano/Japan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Salt Lake City/Canada</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Torino/Italy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first Summer Olympics Korea attended was the one in London in 1948. Even though the independent nation of the Republic of Korea was not yet founded, it did not stop the KOC being established after acquiring permission from the US while Korea was under American governance. According to Lee, H.L. (2003), the KOC was the only case of a National Olympic Committee that the IOC permitted to enter the games before the country was even established. The first Olympics in which Korea participated after the foundation of Republic of Korea was Helsinki in 1952.

One of the IOC principles: ‘one country, one National Olympic Committee (NOC)’, made the North ineligible to join the IOC as a separate nation, due to Korea’s prior affiliation. After Korea’s entrance to the IOC, the North eagerly tried to get recognition from the IOC. However, the application was rejected in the 54th IOC Congress held in Melbourne, Australia in 1956. The following year in Sofia, Bulgaria, the IOC finally decided to allow the North to affiliate to the IOC, imposing conditions that the North Korea Olympic Committee could only act within the Northern boundaries and that they could only participate in the Olympics as a representative of the KOC. As Lee, H.L. (2003) said, North Korea competed in the Tokyo Olympics, although the first sports talks between the two Koreas broke down. This involvement of North Korea in the Tokyo Olympics influenced the IOC to recognise North Korea as a member, and this was officially announced at the 60th IOC Congress in 1963, in Germany. The participation of a united team in the 41th World Table Tennis Championship, and the 6th FIFA U20 Championship, together with the co-marching at the Sydney Olympics, can be described as the fruits of persistent negotiations between the two.
Chapter 5: The Case study of Elite Sport

It is notable that Korea has continuously participated in the Olympics, except for the Moscow event in 1980, due to the US boycott. It was particularly remarkable that Korea took part in the Helsinki Olympics in 1952 even though the Civil War was under way. There were split opinions over whether Korea should send athletes abroad in wartime or not. The official invitation by the President of the Organising Committee and the recommendation by the IOC President influenced the final decision. The dispatching of players and officials to Helsinki was finalised on the basis that it gave self-confidence to the Korean people and displayed the nation’s strength. It showed that the government viewed sport as an important tool to build and sustain the nation. Despite much effort, the gaining of two bronze medals could not convince the Korean government to maintain its involvement in sport.

However, the size of the squad and the number of officials in the Olympics continued to increase, as shown in Table 5.3. Sixty seven athletes and officials headed to London two months before the government of Republic of Korea was founded. It was barely possible to send delegations to London, in terms of expense, at that time. According to ‘Cheyuk’ (August 2004: 10) the ‘ad hoc’ committee collected money, asking for the nation’s support. $80,000 could be raised by selling one million ‘Olympic supporting tickets’, which enabled the squad to reach London after a twenty-day trip by ship via Hong Kong, India, Egypt and Rome. The dramatic increase in the Korean squad in 1964 is intriguing. One of the reasons the KOC was able to send the biggest number ever was due to the first Olympic appearance of North Korea. Under the political circumstances, it was an urgent task for Korea to compete with the North and gain a victory. As the Olympics took place in Tokyo, the morale of one million Korean residents in Japan had to be taken into consideration. Sending these large teams would show the rest of the world that Korea had achieved political and social stability. The other motivation came from the poor performance in the London Olympics. According to Cheyuk (August 2004: 12), Korea implemented a four-stage-special training programme lasting 530 days, in order to achieve a better outcome, as briefly mentioned before. Having missed the Moscow Olympics in 1980, following the US decision to boycott the Games, Korea sent the largest squad ever to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, and this is said to be the beginning of Korea’s success story in the Olympics. Needless to say, Korea, as the host country of the 1988 Seoul Games, made the most of this
opportunity in terms of maximising opportunities and winning medals by participating with the highest number of athletes (477) and officials (125).

Table 5.3 Size of delegations in the Olympics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City/ Country</th>
<th>No. of athletes</th>
<th>No. of officials</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>London/ UK</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Helsinki/ Finland</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Melbourne/ Australia</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Rome/ Italy</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Tokyo/ Japan</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Mexico City/ Mexico</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Munich/ Germany</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Montreal/ Canada</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Moscow/ Soviet Union</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>LA/ USA</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Seoul/ Korea</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Barcelona/ Spain</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Atlanta/ USA</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Sydney/ Australia</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Athens/ Greece</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Beijing/ China PR</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapt from KOC Homepage (www.sports.or.kr)

It is difficult to disentangle the hosting strategy from elite sport policy in Korea. The government displayed consistent enthusiasm for hosting sport events with the purpose of raising national pride, patriotism and the profile of Korea in the world. Having attempted to win the bid for several sporting events, it was necessary for the government to invest resources in elite sport in order to produce favourable results. It was essential for the Korean government to show strong support and commitment behind for the thirty-year-bidding strategy. From the 1986 Asian Games to the unsuccessful bids for the Winter Olympics in 2010 and 2014, the focus on hosting mega sport events was uninterrupted as shown in Table 5.4.
Different strategies, on the part of central and local government can be found in each period. The close relationship between the government and business also needs to be highlighted, considering the critical role played by business as regards hosting the events.

**Table 5.4 Major events hosted in Korea**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Starting Date</th>
<th>Name of Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Sep. 1986</td>
<td>The 10th Seoul Asian Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sep. 1988</td>
<td>The 24th Seoul Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jan. 1997</td>
<td>Mooju, Jeongu Winter Universiadi Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May. 1997</td>
<td>The 2nd Busan East Asian Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jan. 1999</td>
<td>The 4th Kangwon Winter Asian Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May 2002</td>
<td>FIFA World Cup Korea and Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Sep. 2002</td>
<td>The 14th Busan Asian Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Aug. 2007</td>
<td>FIFA U-17 World Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Aug. 2011</td>
<td>IAAF World Championships in Athletics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Sep. 2014</td>
<td>The 17th Incheon Asian Games</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are conflicting opinions regarding the hosting of sports events. It is important to note the different perspectives, and the 2002 World Cup is a good example to illustrate the dissimilar aspects. Horne and Manzereiter (2004: 191) quoted from the Korea Times:

In March 2001, the Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy promised to develop a multi-faceted strategy to maximise the economic impact of the World Cup. The state-run Korean Development Institute predicted the creation of 250,000 jobs and additional industrial output of US$ 8.82 billion, with a 22 percent share going to the construction sector (as of 4th June 2001).
On the other hand, there are some studies which deny the correlation between hosting mega sport events and economic development. For example, Szymanski (2002) argued that, in statistical terms, no significant positive macro-economic impact on GDP was found among the host nations for the football World Cup. According to Horne and Manzenreiter (2004), the sport economists virtually concluded that countries should stop hosting sport events to acquire economic profits, and should regard them purely as forms of national promotion. In Korea, there are critical voices concerning Korea’s persistent hosting policy. These began a short time ago with the local autonomy system, as mentioned above, when power was distributed from central to local government in 1995. It is closely linked to the period when most cities started to bid for sport events in the late 20th and early 21st century. During this period that there was stronger motivation for politicians such as mayors, governors and magistrates to obtain a visible outcome in their own region. We could observe the typical relationship between sport and politics here. The problem lies with the fact that those who are in charge of cities or provinces tend to compete to host sport events without evaluating the value and impact carefully, and this can cause problems from the government’s point of view. The Minister of Culture and Tourism suggested that the KOC should function only as a clearing house in order to avoid the waste of national resources and to increase efficiency (Munhwa Ilbo, 14th January 2006). As for the legacy of staging the 2002 WC, it can be summarised by saying that it provided opportunities for developing partnerships and investment, business contacts, and national pride and cohesiveness, including street cheering. These are commodities which no economic assessment could ever put a price on, according to Lee and Taylor (2005).

The other important area to discuss is Korea’s key involvement in the international sports arena, as it is closely linked to the development of elite sport policy. Bearing in mind that elite sport gained government support, based on the expectation that good performance in the mega sport events such as the Olympics would elevate Korea’s profile and national image, it is necessary to look into how Korea positioned herself in sport worldwide. It was in 1920 that the KSC was formed, and the KOC joined the IOC on 20th June 1947, soon after its launch in 1946. As Lee, H.L. (2003) noted, an NOC must be established in order to be a member of the IOC. In addition, it was necessary for each sport to be affiliated to the International Federations (IFs). A few Olympic
sports were asked to join the IFs, including athletics, football, basketball, boxing and skating. The majority of other sports joined the IFs directly after the liberation from Japan. The year that various sport affiliated to the IFs is shown in Table 5.5. It is also important to note the number of Koreans involved in the international sport organisations or the IFs. According to the Sports White Paper (2007), having officials in the senior positions in the international sport organisations reflects the power of the country in terms of economics and politics, as well as sport. Also, to be involved in the decision making as a president or a member of the board can offer opportunities to improve the level of performance of the sport and have greater influence. The Sports White Paper (2007) recognises that there is only one person, Lee Kun Hee, who is at present an IOC member. His involvement in the IOC has continued since 1996 as president of Samsung, one of the IOC official sponsors.

It needs to be borne in mind that Korea had heavily depended on one person, Kim Un Yong, who was the vice president of the IOC and president of the WTF (World Taekwondo Federation) until 2003. The prosecution of Kim Un Yong prompted the government to create a plan for emerging ‘sport diplomats’. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism announced the 10-year-plan called ‘Project for strengthening sport policy and strengthening sport diplomacy’. The short term plan included creating a human resource pool of former/current diplomats, national players, referees and professors, and establishing an International Committee so that a few members could be sent to various international events on behalf of the KSC.

The long term plan involved a language programme and scholarships for further education (Kyunghyang Newspaper, 28th January 2004). The situation in Korean sport was worsened by the fact that Park Yong Sung, president of IJF (International Judo Federation) at that time, and newly elected president of KSC (February 2009), was suspended from activities due to his conviction for embezzlement in the Doosan Group. As a result, Lee Kun Hee was considered to be the sole person able to play a substantial role in successfully bidding for the 2014 Winter Olympic in Pyeongchang. As for the 2010 Winter Olympics Korea ended up losing to Sochi, Russia, by four votes in the second round, after being defeated by Vancouver by 3 votes.
### Table 5.5: Landmarks in the international sport stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of joining International Organisation/IFs</th>
<th>The 1st international appearance</th>
<th>Key moments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KOC 1947 (IOC)</td>
<td>1948 London Olympics</td>
<td>Host 1988 Seoul Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUSB 1967 (FISU)</td>
<td>1979 Mexico Universiad Games</td>
<td>Host Summer Universiad Daegu 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletics 1945 (IAAF)</td>
<td>1947 Boston Marathon</td>
<td>Hwang Young Jo (marathon) won gold medal in 1992 Barcelona Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taekwondo 1949 (FIG)</td>
<td>1973 World Taekwondo Championship</td>
<td>Adopted as a medal sport in 2000 Sydney Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football 1948 (FIFA)</td>
<td>1954 Switzerland World Cup</td>
<td>FIFA 2002 World Cup Semi-finalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basketball 1947 (FIBA)</td>
<td>1948 London Olympics</td>
<td>1984 LA Olympics: Women silver medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archery 1963 (FITA)</td>
<td>1978 Bangkok Asian Games</td>
<td>Kim Jin Ho won 5 medals consecutively in 1979 Berlin and 1983 Los Angeles World Championship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skating 1947 (ISU)</td>
<td>1983 World Championship</td>
<td>The first gold medal (short track) in winter Olympics Albertville, France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we look for other Korean members of the IOC’s twenty-five commissions, there are three Koreans: Chun Yi Kyung (Athletes, Women and Sport Commission), Chang Ju Ho (Sport For All Commission) and Kim Sang Woo (International Relations).

---

1 KUSB stands for the Korea University Sports Board
Chapter 5: The Case study of Elite Sport

According to the Sports White Paper in 2007, 10 people in 10 sports serve as presidents of sports federations in Asia, and 18 people in 15 sports hold the position of vice president, as of December 2006. As for the IFs, 13 people hold high ranks, such as president, vice president, general secretary and executive members, as shown below.

**Table 5.6: High-ranking Korean officials in the Ifs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>Number of people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Taekwondo, badminton</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>Football, archery, modern pentathlon</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>Skating</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive member</td>
<td>Athletics, skating, ski, hockey, modern pentathlon, cycle, baseball</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11 sports</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sport White Paper (2007: 437), Olympic sports only

**A Review of Elite Sport Policy Research**

We have looked at Korea’s involvement on the international elite sport stage. As our central interests are the role of the government in Korean sport policy, questions such as ‘Would it be possible for Korea to succeed in elite sport without the government’s interest and support?’ and ‘What are the main dimensions of elite sport policy in Korea?’ can be asked. Four bodies of research were reviewed in order to identify on appropriate framework for this research.

Green & Oakley (2001) suggested ten dimensions of elite sport policy, based on their research, which looked for similarities in approach to elite sport in both the former eastern bloc and in eight western countries. UK Sport et al (2006) identified nine factors which led to elite sporting success when they compared six sample countries. Digel (2002), a prominent German sport academic, suggested six characteristics by comparing elite sport systems in eight countries. And Green and Houlihan (2005) listed on four
significant dimensions of elite sport policy in their study of Canada, Australia and the UK. Let us discuss some of the factors derived from these studies.

First, it is clear that all the authors put great emphasis on elite sport facilities. Green & Oakley and UK Sport et al explicitly mentioned the importance of facilities. UK Sport et al found that all sample countries except Belgium invested an increasing amount of money in facilities to prepare for the Athens Olympics. Even though Digel did not explicitly stress the facility factor, it can be argued that he took for granted the existence of excellent facilities, which were clearly evident in Germany, as an ingredient in elite sporting success. This is quite likely in that he concentrated more on the context within which an effective elite sport system could develop (Houlihan, 2008). With reference to Digel’s view on the role of the business economy, he suggests that the health of the economy can affect the availability of finance for elite sport, both directly and indirectly. As the number of facilities built by sponsors has increased, it can be said that the economy includes the facilities, even if the link is weak.

Second, Green & Oakley and UK Sport et al emphasised similar points with regard to support schemes for athletes after their career. The examples they mentioned were a career service, educational support and personal finance. As Green and Oakley showed, France’s INSEP (National Institute of Sports and Physical Education) provides a variety of services, such as a ‘retirement’ fund and vocational qualifications (Michel, 1996). Digel’s argument about the role of education, the economy and the armed forces can connect to this theme as well. As for the education, sport schools play a very important role in Russia, which has 3,000 sport schools and where 80% of the individual sport athletes in the Olympics graduated from one of the colleges of the Olympic Reserve.

As regards economics, sponsorship impacts on the individual athletes and on certain sports. It is extremely difficult to find pure amateur sports as sport becomes more commercialized. As for the Federal Republic of Germany or Russia, the role of the armed forces has been significant in the elite sport success. Bearing in mind Korea’s circumstances of facing against the North, the armed forces are certainly an important area to look into in this study. It can be argued that education, the economy and the armed forces together account for the increase in full-time athletes. Despite the
increasing importance of full time athletes, we need to remember Green and Houlihan’s point, that it is extremely hard to give a definition of ‘full-time’ athletes.

Third, Green & Oakley and UK Sport et al frequently mention the importance of talent identification and development system. While UK Sport et al focused on the wider spectrum which includes coaching and the science of elite sport, Green and Oakley talked about it more specifically. They argued that it is necessary to narrow down the field and focus on sports which have great potential to win medals in mega sport events. Digel noted that there are central research institutes in all sample countries, and sport medicine, biomechanics and physiotherapy appeared to be significant factors in the success of elite sport. Green and Houlihan viewed the developments in coaching, sports science and sport medicine as prominent characteristics of elite sport policy.

Last, it is necessary to provide competition opportunities for elite athletes at the international as well as domestic level. It is also essential to draw up a competition calendar in the light of international events. Green and Oakley said that the majority of international competitions are scheduled in favour of the Northern Hemisphere, which makes it harder for Southern Hemisphere athletes to participate, in terms of travel distance and expenses. UK Sport et al said that a number of research projects showed that hosting sport events on home soil affects the performance of athletes in terms of international success. According to Digel, the education system, in other words, the schools and universities, design a competition programme of their own and support the elite sport system such as the NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association). This fits into Green and Houlihan’s category of competition opportunities.

There are a few characteristics emerging from the literature which can be referred to as general environmental and cultural factors, as shown in Table 5.7. Having attempted to find an analytical framework for the elite sport system, most researchers are concerned with identifying the ingredients of success in the elite sport system. Green and Houlihan’s model appears to be the most applicable to this thesis as they concentrated on teasing out what constitutes an elite sport policy or system. Selecting this model can be persuasive in the sense that elite sport policy condenses well into four areas covering the key elements, and it is also the most recent argument reflecting today’s elite sport
world. Table 5.7 shows the detailed characteristics that each literature suggests. As discussed above, there are clusters of dimensions which can be grouped together for the purpose of analysis as they are so closely related. Taking into account the historical differences in politics, economics and culture between Korea and the European or North American countries, some modifications are expected to occur after the analysis of data.
### Table 5.7 Summary of dimensions in elite sport policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Green &amp; Oakley</th>
<th>UK Sport et al</th>
<th>Digel</th>
<th>Green and Houlihan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Elite-first-access facilities</td>
<td>-Training facilities</td>
<td>-Role of economy (good economy, more investment)</td>
<td>»» Development of elite sport facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Lifestyle support</td>
<td>-Financial support</td>
<td>-Role of economy (sponsorship, donation)</td>
<td>»» Emergence of ‘full-time’ athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Preparation for life after sport</td>
<td>-Athletic &amp; post career support</td>
<td>-Role of Education (sport schools/universities)</td>
<td>»» Development in coaching, sports science and sports medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Effective talent identification system and monitoring</td>
<td>-Talent identification, development system</td>
<td>-Role of Science</td>
<td>»» Competition Opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Targeting of a limited number of sports</td>
<td>-Coaching provision &amp; coaching development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Well structured competition calendars with continuous international exposure</td>
<td>-International Competition (organisation of events)</td>
<td>-Role of Education (Schools organize competitions on their own)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Environmental/cultural factors</td>
<td>-Understanding the role of the different agencies</td>
<td>-Role of state and politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Simplicity of administration</td>
<td>-Role of Mass media (TV, newspapers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Excellence culture environment</td>
<td>-Role of Economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive planning for each sports needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Now, let us look in detail at the four areas of elite sport policy that Green and Houlihan suggested in relation to Korea: development of elite level facilities, emergence of full time athletes, developments in coaching, sports science and sports medicine and competition opportunities.

First, it is essential for the government to build sport facilities in order to develop elite sport. In Korea, the success of elite sport (in terms of the Olympic medal table) does not parallel the development of facilities in terms of numbers and quality. It is believed that Korea sought a similar strategy to that of Canada. As Green and Houlihan (2005: 102) said, in Canada the construction of high performance facilities was explicitly related to the hosting strategy for major events. One of the senior Sport Canada officials was quoted as saying: “The only way we support facilities is through our Major Games … our hosting policy”. The establishment of sport facilities was closely linked to the hosting of mega sport events in 1986 and 1988, as well as the National Sports Festival which took place across the country and will be discussed later. Bearing in mind the special circumstance of Korea antagonism towards the North, it would be intriguing to investigate the facilities in Sangmu (Korea Armed Forces Athletic Corps).

Second, in order to define ‘full time’ athletes, several factors need to be considered, such as the number of hours athletes spend in training, the number of competitions they participate in and the amount of regular salary they receive from the government and public sponsors or private companies. Green and Houlihan (2005) suggested that ‘full-time athletes’ can be categorized as ones who train and compete on a full-time basis, who receive direct support from governmental organisations, and who benefit from prize money and sponsorships linked to professional sport. In Korea, full-time athletes emerged from the sport schools which the government started in order to directly intervene in elite sport policy. The other form of full time athletes, the so called Sil-up team, first appeared in sports such as shooting and archery. It was not long before Sil-up teams also emerged in football and baseball. The companies who run the teams include banks, city councils, national railways and public offices. The players were considered as both athletes and employees at the same time. According to Choi (1971), footballers in the Sil-up bank team, for example, normally work the same as their colleagues, but they stay and train together for one week or one month once the
competition schedule is released. Unlike professional players they get paid like normal bank employees (Kim, K.S., 1990).

Another feature we need to look at is the armed forces. Sangmu called itself the “cradle of Korea’s elite sport”, and it is clear that Sangmu contributed to Korea’s success in mega sport events. It seems that there is a consensus that the athletes in Sangmu are full-time athletes, even though they are technically registered with the Ministry of National Defence. Sangmu athletes were deployed to each of the sport teams after 6 weeks basic military training at Nonsan Korean Army Training Centre. According to Sportschosun (7th December 2006), the time that the athletes spend in military training is only a week, and includes moral education and front-line experience. Even though there is a winter training of over two months, this consists of fitness rather than military training, which confirms the views that Sangmu athletes work on a full-time basis.

Third, it goes without saying that coaching development and also the implementation of science and medicine in the sport sector is getting more important for elite sporting success. As regards coaching, there are several issues which are important, such as improving coaching qualifications, scientific talent identification, monitoring the progress of talented and elite athletes and inviting coaches from overseas. A representative example is the head football coach in Korea’s national team. Ironically, four out of five foreign coaches are Dutch, and they were in charge of Korean football from 2001 to 2007. When Korea reached the semi-final in the 2002 WC under the leadership of Guus Hiddink, the policy of bringing foreign coaches to improve the national team seemed to have borne fruit. Of particular note was the view that Hiddink’s success partly came from his coaching method, namely, the combination of sport science and medicine. He brought with him other experts, including a fitness specialist with a sport physiology background and a video analyst. It is well-known that they individualized the players’ fitness programme for the purpose of peak performance during the World Cup and injury prevention. In general, the importance of coaching, sport science and medicine emerged with the establishment of the Korea Institute of Sport Sciences (KISS) in 1989. However, the Sports Science Research Centre of the Korea Sport Council was in fact built in 1980. After the major events in 1986 and 1988, the KISS was established in the TR Village and integrated into the Seoul Olympic
Sports Promotion Foundation (SOSFO), moving out from the TR Village in 1999. The areas that KISS works on are: supporting the development of methods to select and evaluate athletes, setting up academic programs for coaches, providing scientific training methods and technical information and consulting athletes who need psychological support (www.sports.re.kr, accessed on 15th February 2007).

Fourth, it is also critical to offer chances for elite athletes to compete both domestically and internationally. It had become more complicated to organize the competition calendar because of the conflict between the IFs and the NSOs. In Canada, there is growing concern over more and more swimmers moving to the universities in the US, where greater rewards attract the athletes. One consequence is that it leads Canadian swimmers to participate in the NCAA competition and gives them an excuse not to compete in the Swimming Natation Canada (SNC) competition, due to the overlap of competition schedules between the two organizations (Green and Houlihan, 2005). In Korea, a similar conflict happened in shooting between the Korea Shooting Federation (KSF) and Sangmu. KSF called up national players to prepare for the World Cup which was due to be held from February to May in 2006 in different venues around the world. However, four out of ten athletes from Sangmu failed to join in training with other athletes. Sangmu argued that they needed to practice for CISM (Conseil International du Sport Militaire), which was planned to be held in Norway in June. The KSF criticized the fact that Sangmu, which had been run by the government budget, neglecting national athletes’ training and participation in international competitions (Yonhap news, 20th January 2006).

**Elite Sport Policy in Korea**

The analysis of the elite sport policy process in Korea can be delineated into the following three time periods: 1960-1979, 1980-1992 and 1993-2009 (as of April). The selection of 1960 as a starting point is because it was the beginning of President Park Jung Hee’s government, which actually initiated elite sport policy. The second period indicates the demise of Park’s authoritarian regime and the start of the new military based government. The last period runs from the emergence of a civilian president to
the year following the Beijing Olympics. While Chapter 2 started to look at the last period from 1998, immediately after the IMF crisis struck Korea, it is considered that the start of the regime’s transition towards liberal democracy in 1993 was a more significant watershed in the case of elite sport.

When comparing the four elements of elite sport policy identified in Green and Houlihan’s (2005) framework, the data analysis in this thesis revealed eight themes: government’s view on elite sport, government structure and government financing, facilities, sport science and coaching, competition structure, hosting strategy, the role of business and the role of armed forces. The last two can be applied from the second period. These themes will be used under the subheadings for each period in this chapter. Talent identification will be discussed as a sub-heading of sport science and coaching.

1960-1979

As briefly mentioned above, the Korean War, which ended in 1953, impacted on all aspects of Korean society, inter-alia, economically and socially. The destruction caused by the War meant that there was little scope for Koreans to view sport as an important part of their lives. According to Kim, B.C. (2008), it could hardly have been expected that the government would have promoted any sport in the early 1950s. The Rhee Seung Man government (1948-1960) was brought down in 1960 due to the April 19th revolution², and the subsequent regime, led by Jang Myun, was not capable of handling the difficult situation. The lack of leadership and the unstable politics prompted the coup d’etat on May 16th 1961 which resulted in the start of the Park Jung Hee era (Lee, H.L., 2003). Despite the holding of an election, Park’s regime lacked legitimacy, as his power was based on military support. It was, therefore, necessary for Park to create a strategy to integrate Koreans, stressing nationalism and the ideological opposition to the North.

The 1960-1979 period is especially important for sport as it was during this period that most of the national sport federations in Korea affiliated to international federations or

² The student-led revolution occurred on the 19th, May, 1960, which opposed the corruption and authoritarianism of the regime resulted in the resignation of presidency and exile to Hawaii of Rhee.
Asian governing bodies. For example, domestic Korean organisations affiliated to the International University Sport Federation (FISU) in 1967, the International Sports Press Association (AIPS) in 1967, the General Association of International Sports Federations (GAISF) in 1975, the International Badminton Federation (IBF) in 1962 and the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) in 1973. According to Kim, S.Y. (2004), the sport policy of Park’s government, so called ‘sport diplomacy’, acted as a stepping stone for Korea’s enhancement by producing members of the international sport organisations from the 1980s onwards. Now, let us discuss how the government regarded sport during the 1960s and 1970s.

### Government’s View on Elite Sport

The Korean government tends to get involved in elite sport because there are opportunities to develop national pride and rivalry with the North and other Asian neighbour countries such as Japan and China. In other words, domestic and international political motives can be observed in the government’s involvement in elite sport. As mentioned previously, due to the lack of legitimacy of the regime, President Park viewed sport as a useful tool for the purpose of diverting public attention from politics and for integrating Koreans. An example from a former deputy Minister of Sport is worth noting. Full commitment to produce a World Boxing Association (WBA) middleweight champion in 1966 was evident from the interview. The Deputy Minister said:

> When Kim Ki Soo ascended in rank, it was necessary to invite an opponent from abroad. However, where was the money? The guaranteed fee was inconceivable. Were there any media, or business sponsor? It was the time when black and white TV had just been launched. Then Park Jong Kyu, a chief of presidential security, who had enormous power, gave support behind the sources in order for the match to take place. (Interview, 6th December 2007)

As Weekly Donga (23rd January 2008) suggested, President Park had a great interest in boxing athlete Kim, who was a popular figure from a poor background. The President ordered Park Tae Joon, CEO of a chemical engineering company called Daehan
Joongsuk, to help Kim to become the world champion. As a result, the training facility named Kwonil (meaning ‘become the World Number One with fists’) was built for boxer Kim. It can be argued that President Park spotted the opportunity to organise a big match in order to take advantage of it. Using a few elite officials under him was not considered to be a problem in the authoritarian period. It could be considered that the people who received orders from Park are the equivalent of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ from the MSF or ‘policy brokers’ from the ACF that we looked at Chapter 3. However, considering that both MSF and ACF are concepts that are part of a pluralistic society, they do not appear to be applicable to this period when the President had sole power to make decisions. Under the authoritarian regime, and the highly closed elite community led by President Park, those who implemented orders can be regarded as ‘agents’ of the President rather than either ‘policy entrepreneur’ or ‘policy broker’.

It should be understood that the atmosphere across the country was not favourable to sport during and after the Korean War. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the government considered elite sport to be an important matter because it was believed that elite sport success could promote national pride and raise the morale of Koreans. The fact that athletes were sent to participate in the Helsinki Games in 1952 during the War displays the government’s commitment to elite sport. Under the circumstances where Korea was struggling to recover from the War, there was no financial source that could support the athletes. It was estimated that approximately 800 million won ($478,000) was required in order to participate in the Olympics, which was an exorbitant price, even taking inflation into consideration (Korea Olympic Committee, 1996). Nevertheless, the whole of Korea, especially those involved in sport, and led by the ‘Olympic Support Council’(Olympic-hoo-won-hoe), put much effort into collecting funds by selling badges, engraved with the KOC emblem, and by acquiring donations. According to the Korea Olympic Committee (1996), MPs contributed ten percent of their tax and the armed forces also donated towards dispatching athletes.

The reasons to dispatch the largest number of athletes and officials to the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 were explained previously. Of particular note is the fact that Korean elite sport began to develop after participation in the Tokyo Olympics in 1964. Although the KOC sent the biggest squad, predicting that North would participate as a
separate nation in the 1964 Olympics, the North ended up boycotting the event. Park’s intention to be superior to the North, however, did not weaken. In the 1966 FIFA World Cup, Korea decided not to participate due to its concern that it might be defeated by the North, which had a record of twenty nine wins and only one loss. Consequently, FIFA imposed a five thousand US dollar fine on Korea. However, there was even more astonishing news. The North had reached the quarter final in the World Cup in England. It triggered the Korean government to make a team named ‘Yangji’ and the KFA to run a league for bank teams along the lines of the Sil-up teams in an urgent attempt to improve the level of football. The role of Jang Duk Jin, the finance director of the KFA and a niece of Yuk Young Su, the first lady, was significant in forming the ‘bank league’ (Hankook Ilbo, 6th May 2004,). According to Sportsseoul (23rd March 2008), the Yangji team continued to display performances on an equal level with the national team, thanks to the full support of the government. This continued until ‘Yangji’ was disbanded for political reasons in March 1970.

The support from Park’s government for Taekwondo is noteworthy as it shows the ideological conflict between the two Koreas. The WTF was created in 1973 separately from the International Taekwondo Federation (hereafter ITF) that General Choi Hong Hui launched in 1966. General Choi having exiled himself to Canada because of his ideological differences with President Park, the ITF began to send trainers to the North in 1980 to promote Taekwondo (Yonhap News, 4th April 2009). The person who appeared at the forefront of Taekwondo in 1971 was Kim Un Yong, who was a Presidential special adviser in the Blue House. In the same year, President Park designated Taekwondo as a national sport and gave it full support (Jeong, 2009). According to Jeong (2009), Park showed enthusiastic support for Taekwondo as it could help to strengthen qualities of self-reliance, which was important for national defence, offer Koreans lessons in manners, encourage people to obey rules and foster nationalism by saluting the national flag.

---

3 The delegations from the North who arrived in Japan on 5th October 1964, five days before the opening of the Tokyo Olympics, withdrew when they found out that six of their athletes were banned from participating. This was because the North had taken part in the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) held in Jakarta, Indonesia. The IOC regarded GANEFO as anti-Olympic as the IOC had placed sanctions on Indonesia for refusing to issue visas to athletes from Taiwan and Israel in the Jakarta Asian Games in 1962. As a result, the IOC banned the athletes from competing in the Olympics for a year (Jeong, 2009: 77).
Government Structure and Government Finance for sport

For the purpose of maximizing Korean integration and nation building in the post-war period, Park’s regime concentrated on developing elite sport and public fitness. Under the slogan ‘Fitness is National Power’, legal and institutional systems were set up which leads us to a discussion of the National Sport Promotion Law (NSPL hereafter). As Lee (2003a) argued, the urgency of displaying a good performance in the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 pushed forward the creation of such a law. Furthermore, the government’s intention to integrate the nation and to show its superiority against the North was one motive behind the enactment of the Law. Ha and Mangan (2002) pointed out that the elite sport policy during this period was government-led. According to Shin (2004), it was not until 1962 that the Law, which embraced sport only, was created. It is pointed out that the NSPL appears to have been directly adopted and modified from Japanese laws as the order and contents look very similar to the one in Japan (Shin, 2004). Nevertheless, Sport White Paper (2006) said that the NSPL allowed entry into the new era of national sport with strong government commitment. According to Ha and Mangan (2002), most of the laws in relation to the promotion of sport were introduced during the Park Jung Hee era. Three partial revisions were completed between 1963 and 1979, and among several modifications, the detailed plan to protect and develop elite athletes and the policy of compensation are notable. These will be discussed in greater detail later on.

As for government structure in sport, it is important to discuss the transition of the KSC. After 16th May 1961 all the sport organisations were integrated into one under the KSC in line with government policy. However, this only lasted until 1964 when the KOC broke away, insisting that it should observe the IOC Olympic Charter, which states that the National Olympic Committee should preserve its autonomy. The following year, the Korean PE Committee also became independent, securing permission from the Ministry of Education. The continuing struggle between these organizations ignited a severe conflict at the Bangkok Asian Games in 1966. The dispute between the KSC, which was in charge of selecting athletes, and the KOC, the body responsible for the athletes taking part in the competitions, resulted in some disgraceful conduct, according to the KOC (1996). Moreover, the actions of the Korean PE Committee, which had begun to
expand its territory by hosting ‘students sport competitions’ and imposing restrictions on the number of participants in the national competitions, in order for the students to attend classes, was not received positively by the KSC (Lee, H.L., 2003). The situation where there were three Korean sport governing bodies, even for a short time can be seen as evidence of pluralism. However, it is important to note that authoritarian elitism was still dominating Korean elite sport. As a consequence of the above conflict, President Park ended up ordering reunification of the three sport organisations, and this was realised in February 1968.

Unsurprisingly, a number of criticisms were made about the downgrading of the KOC, one of the special Committees which have remained until now. According to a former senior officer in the KSC (Interview, 7th December 2007), it was unfortunate that the PE Committee was merged as it was doing a great job in revitalising PE at that time. The PE Committee was also downgraded to one of the departments in the KSC, where it has remained ever since. The role of the PE Committee nowadays is said to be minimal because of lack of financial resources. (Interview, 7th December 2007). According to a KSC article\(^4\), the KSC changed its character from being the organisation that took charge of mass participation for the general public, to a central governing body which embraces all areas of sport. Nevertheless, it is argued that the KSC had a tendency to concentrate on elite sport, as shown in Table 5.8, in terms of the increased funds from the national treasury that the KSC received. As Lee, C.W. (2005) argued, the significant increase in government funds in the years of major sport events such as the Olympics or Asian Games illustrates the fact that the government took elite sport seriously and accordingly provided substantial support.

\(^4\) Article 33 in the National Sports Promotion Law, six purposes are stipulated: Nationalisation of sport, Development of PE and Mass Participation, Enhancement of national pride by developing talent athletes, Support National Sport Federations and to Encourage & Spread the Olympic Movement (www.sports.or.kr)
Chapter 5: The Case study of Elite Sport

Table 5.8: KSC’s financial support from government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National Treasury (Won)</th>
<th>Major Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>5,721,872</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>31,154,511</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>86,732,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>117,240,900</td>
<td>Tokyo Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>105,424,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>169,849,838</td>
<td>The 5th Asian Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>127,754,311</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>364,824,831</td>
<td>Mexico Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>238,702,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>439,999,300</td>
<td>The 6th Asian Games</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Sports Council (1972: 367)

The other feature we need to look at is the ‘National Sport Deliberative Committee’ formed by the government in March, 1970 (Sports Whitepaper, 2006). The material regarding this Committee is very limited. However, it is useful in understanding the sport policy in this period. This Committee held a very broad range of responsibilities, including consideration of the needs of national sport, school sport, sport facilities, sport funds, sports equipment and implementation of Korean sport policy. The prime minister was appointed as Chair of the Committee and the seventeen members included ministers of various sectors such as education and culture, defence, commerce and finance. The fact that the Ministry of Culture and Education, which received the bidding proposal for the Seoul Olympics from the KSC, laid this before the Committee is evidence of the Committee’s significance. The sub-committee of seven members reached the conclusion that it was right to proceed with the bidding for the sake of national integration, interchange with communist countries and public relations in opposition to the North (Lee, H.L., 2003).

Having the prime minister, government ministers, the President of the KSC and MPs as members, points to the fact that the government viewed the role of the Committee as highly important in that it appointed members of the elite to make sport related
decisions. However, it could be argued that given the membership of the committee there were few, if any, significant sports leaders who were not included as most sport leaders also tended to be senior political figures. The concept of PC can be applied here in relation to the meso-level policy frameworks referred to in Chapter 3. As Marsh and Rhodes argued, PC is defined as an organic phenomenon where like-minded people gather together, sharing common interests, ideas and values. In this case, the government is considered as a member of PC. From this point of view, it can be said that Park’s regime has some characteristics of a PC. However, one might contend that it cannot truly be regarded as a PC because it is a manufactured one, in that the people who make up the cluster do not have the same beliefs or values, but they have no other option than to obey instructions from the president under the authoritarian regime.

One of the landmarks in Korean sport was the establishment of the Seoul Olympic Sport Promotion Foundation (hereafter SOSFO) which used to be called the National Sports Promotion Foundation. It was created in September 1972 on the basis of the NSPL, the law on the National Sports Promotion Fund and the Enforcement Ordinance. It took less than three years for the KSC to start taking control of the fund. According to Lee (2003a), the incorporation of the Foundation into the KSC indicates that the Foundation was no longer considered to be a governmental organisation. It is suggested that the close-won victory over the North in the Teheran Asian Games (Korea won one more gold medal) and the possibility of ongoing competition against the North, prompted the KSC to support elite sport more effectively (Lee, H.L., 2003). It is said that approximately seven billion won was accumulated from several sources including one billion won from the National Treasury on a yearly basis, adding additional charges to the entrance fee to sport facilities and profiting from cigarette advertisement. The ongoing development of the Foundation needs to be followed closely, as it keeps impacting on mass participation, as well as on elite sport. The process of establishing SOSFO and the periods which followed, will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Facilities

It is said that the first modern elite sport facility in Korea was Dongdaemun (meaning East Gate) Stadium, built in 1926, which functioned as the main venue for competitions,
especially for baseball and football. After winning Merdeka Cup in 1967, President Park summoned four senior officials in the KFA, including Choi Chi Hwan, then president of KFA, and asked them if they needed any help. One of the requests was for the installation of flood lights in Dongdaemun Stadium so that football matches could be played at night, as well as in the day. As Park and Kim (2001) said, Dongdaemun Stadium could boast the first floodlit facility in Korea, thanks to the Ministry, which swiftly reacted to orders from the President.

Hosting competitions prompted the government to build new facilities in Korea over many decades which is similar to the situation in Canada, as discussed previously. For example, there was strong intervention by the government in the construction of Hyochang Stadium when it came to hosting a sport event. When Korea qualified to hold the 2nd Asian Football Tournament, it was an urgent task to build a stadium as there was no facility that could hold international matches. After a report was received by President Rhee Seung Man, he issued a command to build the stadium in Hyochang Park on land belonging to the state. The sub-committee that was set up shortly afterwards included high officials such as Im Hung Soon, a mayor of Seoul Metropolitan City, a president of the KFA and a Minister of Finance & Economy. The strong government commitment pushed forward the plan, only 4 months after the sub-committee’s formation a grand structure with a 15,000 capacity, at the cost of 230 million won was completed in October 1960. It was the first football-only stadium in the eighty years since the English sailors first brought football to Korea (Park and Kim, 2001).

It can be seen that President Rhee’s decision-making process was similar to that of Park Jung Hee is observed and shows the almost absolute power that the authoritarian regime was exercising in Korea. It could be argued that the simplified hierarchy for implementing the plan led to the rapid development of Korea’s sport infrastructure. In this elitist Korean society, Luke’s first dimension of power quoted from Dahl (1957) “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” can be observed. When the President decided to do something, regardless of its legitimacy, it was taken for granted that the government officials and non-governmental actors who received instructions from the President would take action to
produce the outcome. In this sense, it could be suggested that ‘coercion’ as a form of power existed where government elites complied with the president’s wishes, due to the threat of deprivation even if there was ‘a conflict over values or course of action between them’ (Lukes, 2005: 21). It needs to be borne in mind that the threat the officials felt might not always have been explicit.

Just as the 2nd Asian Football Tournament led the creation of Hyochang Stadium, the National Sports Festival (NSF, hereafter) contributed to the construction of sport facilities right across Korea. With sport competitions taking place in various regions, it was inevitable for the local authorities to build facilities to accommodate those events. According to the Korea Sports Compilation Committee (1981), Kwangju built a main stadium with 30,000 capacity, a baseball stadium of 10,000 seats and an indoor gymnasium for the festival in 1965. Other cities put efforts into creating a sport infrastructure and Jeju island set aside a period in which to host the festival in 1998, which meant that all the sixteen cities and provinces experienced the hosting of National Sports Festivals. Of particular note was the effort and enthusiasm of the people of Jeju Island to host the games, which not only sparked development in the region in line with the cities but also gave an opportunity to display the beauty of the most popular tourist place in Korea. According to Lee, H.L. (2003), it is estimated that the Jeju Island authorities spent approximately 50 billion won on hosting the festival.

As regards indoor facilities, ‘Hankook (means Republic of Korea) Gymnasium’ needs to be highlighted. According to a Former Deputy Minister of Sport (Interview, 6th December 2007), Hankook Gymnasium and the YMCA gave birth to Korea’s elite sport. Several sports including boxing, weight lifting, wrestling and taekwondo took place in these two places. While the YMCA changed direction towards mass participation, stressing physical fitness of the public, Hankook Gymnasium was used for the development of elite athletes. It is said that the Gymnasium used to be run by the Japanese, but once the owner returned to Japan it belonged to no one. According to an interviewee, it was donated to the KSC and sold. The centrepiece of the sport policy of the Park Jung Hee government was the establishment of Tae Neung Village (TN
Village)\(^5\) in 1966, on the eastern outskirts of Seoul. The process of the construction of TN Village was described by a former senior officer in KSC. He said:

> With the Tokyo Olympics ahead, there was no place for the athletes to stay. They used to stay in certain houses and move to their training places every day. Then the president of KSC, Min Kwan Sik, who was close to President Park, thought it essential to have one training centre in order to focus the training. The place they found was an empty space between two tombs of kings. As it belonged to the Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea (hereafter CHA), nothing was allowed to be built on it. Nevertheless, Mr. Min visited each member of the CHA and persuaded them of the necessity of the training venue and finally got approval from them. Also the strong support from President Park Jung Hee cannot be underestimated. (Interview, 7\(^{th}\) December 2007)

A current director of the CHA, Um Seung Yong said:

> In 1970, a close friend of President Park applied pressure to build the shooting range only 100 metres from Tae Neung Bong Boon (one of king’s tombs). This was only possible under a military regime. There is no way it could happen nowadays. In fact, permission was given providing that the range was dismantled after the Asian Championships. However, the Korea Shooting Federation has been ignoring this condition for nearly four decades” (Yonhap News, 7\(^{th}\) November 2007).

**Sports Science and Coaching**

It is argued that Korea’s poor performance in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics aroused interest in sports science within the government. It prompted the KSC and universities to establish sports science research centres. KSC created a ‘Sports Science Committee’ in 1964 and Kyunghee, Younsei and Hanyang universities opened research institutes to

---

\(^5\) The village is called various names in English such as National Athletics’ Village and National Training Centre. However, in this thesis, TN Village is used (Tae Neung is the name of the town where the centre is located in Seoul).
focus on sport sciences. The number of centres increased in the 1970s at centres such as Ewha Womens university and Korea National Sports University. Their contribution to the improvement of athletes’ fitness and techniques should not be ignored (Lee, 2003a). Test rooms for applying sports science in practical terms were made in the TN Village in 1967. Approximately 20,000 people participated in the sport science training and several high-tech items of equipment such as a treadmill, a detector to measure swiftness, an electrocardiogram (ECG) and an electromyogram (EMG) were installed (Lee, H.L., 2003). Of particular note is the fact that the KSC began a training course for coaches, the so called ‘Coaching Academy’ in 1964. The curriculum included cultural studies and practical research totaling 400 hours. As Kim, S.Y. (2004) said, the course was planned to run three times a year and fifty places were allocated.

Before dealing with ‘coaching’, it is important to discuss ‘school based teams’, as almost every elite athlete comes from a school team somewhere in the country. It is not our intention to examine school sport in detail here. However, it is worth pointing out some aspects of policy that the government implemented in this sector. Of particular significance is the Physical Fitness Badge System (hereafter Badge System, che-lyuk-jang) which the Park Jung Hee government set up in 1970 for the purpose of improving the general fitness of students and the badge grades affected the university entrance exam results for decades. It should be emphasized that Park’s regime aimed to identify and cultivate outstanding athletes through this Badge System (Ha and Mangan, 2002). The School Banner Support System followed, for the same purpose and it led students to select a sport depending on their geographical or social situation. It provided opportunities for talented athletes to be discovered through competitions, including the National Youth Festival. It can be argued that those with talent who decided to continue their career as athletes inevitably spent most of their time in training and participating in competitions. In this context, it is necessary to consider what defines a ‘full time’ athlete in Korea before entering into a discussion of coaching and talent identification. As we discussed earlier in this chapter, it is difficult to define ‘full-time athletes’ as its meaning varies depending on the culture, context and even the sport. It is not accurate to draw a line between amateur and professional athletes according to whether they are full-time or part-time. According to Houlihan (2005), in the UK, the abandonment of amateur status in swimming did not result in the emergence of a squad of full-time
swimmers. Houlihan pointed out that the notion of ‘full-time’ remains a relative term, as most elite level swimmers remained either employed full or part time or unemployed (receiving state benefits), until the introduction of lottery funding. In the Korean context, athletes have to choose whether to remain in education or commit to being full-time athletes at an early age. Becoming a full-time athlete does not mean that they earn enough money to live on, but at least the government covers their scholarship and training fees which encourages them to focus on sport.

The launch of sport specialist middle and high schools directed and encouraged by the Ministry of Sport can be considered as the beginning of the era of full-time athletes in Korea. The first sport school was established in Seoul in 1971 and it was compulsory for all the students to stay in the hall of residence, for which there was no charge. All the costs were covered by Seoul Metropolitan City (Lee, H.L., 2003). The success of the Seoul Sport School prompted other cities to establish sport schools and these increased to 21 (6 middle schools and 15 high schools) by 2006. In 2006, 1.8 billion won from the National Treasury and SOSFO was spent on these sport schools (Sport White Paper, 2006). As Kim, S.Y. (2004) argued, the role of sport schools should be considered significantly for two reasons. First, sport schools ran teams in sports such as swimming, athletics and gymnastics, which do not normally get much attention in other schools and second, they prioritised sports considered to be strong in Korea, judging by the Olympic medal table, including judo, weightlifting, wrestling and boxing.

Subsequently, the Korea National Sports University (KNSU), which used to be called the Korean National College of Physical Education, was established in 1976 and successfully fulfilled its purpose in terms of producing medallists in every mega sport event. The percentage of medallists in mega sport events from KNSU (current students or graduates) is overwhelming, as will be seen later. It shows clearly that the government played a critical role in the consistent success of Korea’s elite sport. It is very important to reiterate that the ‘Sports Talent Scheme’ (STS hereafter, chey-uk-teuk-ki-ja-je-do) was established by the government in 1972 as part of the sport development plan, with the aim of setting up a system that provides opportunities for talented student athletes to continue their higher education so that they enhance national prestige by becoming competent coaches (Ministry of Education and Human Resources inside information, 2006). Regarding the process of selection, the National Education
Evaluation Institute first chose athletes based on the data given by the KSC and universities regarding which athletes met the criteria in each academic institution, regardless of grades in the University National Entrance Exam (Kim, S.Y., 2004). According to Lee, H.L. (2003), the number of student athletes continued to grow every year because of the substantial benefits from the STS and it is estimated that this plan significantly contributed to the success of the 1986 Asian Games, 1988 Olympics and 1990 Asian Games in terms of winning medals.

As regards full time athletes, a pension scheme and military exemption policy is of particular note. After the enactment of NSPL in 1962, a pension, which originated from the ‘Regulation of Performance Improvement Study’ in 1974, began to be awarded to athletes and coaches the following year. The donation of 40,000,000 won from President Park, which was a large sum at that time, together with contributions from other politicians, amounted to 102,000,000 won. The idea of the pension was raised during discussion of how to use the funds accumulated in the National Sports Promotion Foundation. The first beneficiaries in January 1974 were eighteen athletes who met the guidelines for gold, silver and bronze categories. The gold category was for those who won a gold medal in the Olympics, and they were given 100,000 won per month. The silver category was for silver medallists who won at least one gold medal in the world championship or three gold medals in the Asian Games, and they received 70,000 won monthly. Olympic bronze medallists with more than two gold medals in the Asian Games were regarded as being in the bronze category and received 50,000 won every month. According to Cheyuk (August/September, 1993), the pension scheme significantly influenced the performance of elite athletes. Not long after the commencement of the new policy, Yang Jung Mo won the first gold medal in wrestling since the independence from Japan at the 1976 Montreal Olympics. It was also the first time in sport history that Korea had ranked above 20th. As regards military service, a compulsory duty for Korean male citizens, the policy that began under Park’s regime was very important, as the government provided an opportunity for male elite athletes to be exempt from military duty. Those who satisfied the criteria could complete their term of duty by serving for five years in their area of expertise, that is, sport. This demonstrates President Park’s concern for elite athletes. The details of this policy will be discussed in the later periods.
Chapter 5: The Case study of Elite Sport

**Talent Identification**

Comparing Jarver’s (1981) research on the tests and criteria for selection of talented athletes, Korean talent identification protocol seems to follow the example of the USSR, one of the front runners in terms of elite sport success at that time. First, well-trained primary school PE teachers screen a wide range of students who are between the ages of 8 and 10 to choose the talented ones. The initial tests include height, weight, speed (30m from a standing start) and endurance (a 12 or 15 minute run). Second, a follow-up evaluation is conducted at the age of 10 to 12 years based on factors such as sport specific tests or progress made in physical capacity. Those who have been overlooked at this stage can have another chance a year later because full performance capacity may not be obvious at this age. Lastly, the final selection is made in two stages for those who are between 13 and 14 years old. It is agreed by most authorities that this is the best age to predict performance abilities in a specific sport. One test is based on the ideal model for a particular event, including the level achieved in the specific sport and the results of physical and psychological tests. It is expected that these statistics or observations will be provided by the coaches in charge. The other test is for general physical capacity and event specific capacity and measures strength, power, speed and mobility. Statistical identification and monitoring of the progress of talented and elite athletes can be dealt with from the coaching development perspective. The ‘Talent identification development project’ (T-Project hereafter) began in 1965 across 11 regions, and ended in 1971 with an output of 350 talented athletes. Considering that not many countries in the world were aware of the T-Project, Korea could be regarded as one of the pioneers. Those who were chosen were either sent to schools that ran a team in his or her sport, or trained under the leadership of the sport governing body. However, this project had to stop in the seventh year, due to lack of funds and a systematic plan (Lee, Y.S., 2001). The result of this is shown Table 5.9.

Although the idea of systematic coaching, sport science and medicine was not prevalent of this time, it is instructive to note that the concept of combining coaching and sport science appeared in this period. As Kim, S.J. (2000) described, in the TN Village, between the hours of 10 am and 2 pm, the athletes concentrated on the programme designed by the officials in the sport science laboratory in consultation with coaches.
Chapter 5: The Case study of Elite Sport

and managers in each sport. It needs to be stressed that the KSC took charge of the project without relying on the cities or provinces, which again demonstrates the strong commitment of the government towards elite sport.

**Table 5.9 Talent Identification Project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of applicants</th>
<th>Number in final pool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3,452</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4,404</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2,538</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,533</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,762</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Competition Structure**

As discussed previously, it is necessary to have a systematic competition structure to succeed in elite sport. Two competitions, namely the National Sports Festival (NSF hereafter) and the National Junior Sports Festival (NJSF hereafter), played a key role not only in offering opportunities for athletes to compete but also to pursue a higher level career in their field, if selected. The NSF originated from the Chosun Sport Council, which was established in 1920, and continued to be held, except for the period between 1938 and 1944 because of the involuntary dissolution of Chosun Sport Council (Sports White Paper, 2006). The competition was set up in 1925 embracing a variety of sports. Prior to this there was one single sport competition. Although Japanese athletes participated and Japanese officials were involved in hosting games, the first pure sport festival that Koreans hosted was the All Chosun Sports Competition in 1934. With the liberation in 1945 the festival gained momentum, increasing the number of sports and participants. In 1948, it was renamed the National Sports Festival and the method of running the event was modified so that each rival city or province could compete.
Chapter 5: The Case study of Elite Sport

(Incheon Metropolitan City, 1999). The festival continued across Korea since 1957 and it was intended to balance the level of development from region to region. It provided an opportunity for the local areas to have sport facilities and to grow economically, with 10,000 players and officials.

A significant change in the NSF occurred in 1972. As Lee, H.L. (2003) suggested, it soon became necessary to separate students into groups (under 16 elementary and middle schools) due to the growing size of the festival. There were two additional factors to consider. One was that young people struggled to show their real abilities under the pressure of adult performances, and the other was that it was not appropriate for training students because of the overheated atmosphere of the competition. A former senior officer in KSC explained the background of the changes of competition structure. He argued:

> The idea of splitting it into two competitions was based on promoting school sport. The model of the Boys Sport Group (author’s translation) in Japan was considered initially. However, the Japanese model was actually a reflection of Germany’s model. The fact that Japanese students voluntarily joined the club and moved forward on the elite path if they were good enough led the Korean government to change some of the characteristics of the festival. (Interview, 7th December 2007)

According to the Sports White Paper (2005), in 1972 the NJSP began with the purpose of raising girls and boys with sound character and a cooperative attitude who would contribute to the prosperity of the country. Approximately 50% of the participant athletes in the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics were identified through this competition and these athletes gained 72% of the total gold medals won by Korea.

**Hosting Strategy**

It can be argued that hosting strategy is closely linked to the elite sport development policy. The main reason for the intimate relationship between the two objectives is that the government can be obliged to continue to support the development of elite athletes
squad by investing more money in training, importing foreign coaches and building state-of-the-art facilities in order to produce as many medals as possible. As discussed previously in Chapter 2, hosting mega sport events not only enhanced national pride and prestige among Koreans but also improved the global image of Korea.

As regards to the 1988 Olympics, it was the Park Jung Hee regime that started preparations for the Seoul Olympics bid after gaining confidence by hosting the 42nd World Shooting Championship in 1978. Park Jong Kyu, then president of KSC considered that the window of opportunity had opened, not only for the nation, but for the regime itself. Park Jong Kyu made every endeavour to persuade President Park who was concerned about several factors, including the financial burden. The bidding, which was approved by the National Sport Deliberative Committee as mentioned, ceased owing to the assassination of President Park in 1979. However, it provided a foundation for next regime to proceed with the plan. The question of whether Park Jong Kyu could be considered a ‘policy entrepreneur’ of MSF or a ‘policy broker’ of the ACF should be discussed. The same argument can be applied as in the case of Park Tae Joon, who helped boxer Kim Ki Soo become the world champion. It would be appropriate to say that these people played the role of the President’s agents rather than the more independent role identified for agents in the two frameworks discussed in Chapter 3. It is important to emphasize that the authoritarian government was in power during this period and decisions in the sport sector could not have been dealt with outside of this elite sport community.

The bidding for the 1988 Seoul Olympics restarted with the advent of Chun Doo Hwan, who was a military figure and became president through a Coup D’etat. President Chun faced the same task as President Park in terms of overcoming the regime’s lack of legitimacy and, as a former footballer, viewed sport as an efficient tool to divert public attention away from political matters. The enthusiasm of the Korean government to beat Nagoya, a city of Japan, in the bidding process is illustrated by Cha (2009: 56).

The government appointed the Hyundai magnate Chung Ju Young as the Seoul Olympic Chairman, and he and other Korean Chaebol industrialists travelled around the world winning the votes of IOC delegates…Seoul prepared
detailed technical presentations, including an incredible scale model of the future Olympic Village.

Following the announcement from the IOC that the 1988 Olympics were awarded to Seoul, beating Nagoya by a two-to-one margin, the Ministry of Sport was established. This was another sign of the Chun government’s commitment to the purpose of hosting a successful Olympics for the first time in Korean history. As discussed in chapter 2, the Seoul Asian Games was a rehearsal for the Olympics and included building stadiums and accommodation and managing the event (Koh, 2005). It was believed that the Korean government benefited hugely from hosting these two events and raised the profile and image of Korea in the world. Research conducted by Nebenzahl & Jaffe (1991) found that the 1988 Seoul Olympics positively impacted on the perception of the Israelis towards Korean products in terms of reliability, quality and knowledge. Koh (2005) contended that the games strengthened self-confidence among Koreans and enhanced national prestige on the world stage. The impact of the Seoul Olympics on Korea is described by Cha (2009: 57) as follows:

Seoul had accomplishments to show off at its Olympic coming-out party. The country had experienced an astounding 12 percent annual growth rate. In the year of the Games, Korea exceeded $100 billion in total trade, buoyed by the phenomenal growth of exports at 27 percent per annum … Korea could also showcase itself as one of the most successful cases of peaceful democratic transition in the world.

1980-1992

Korea was plunged into a state of chaos after the assassination of President Park in December 1979. Chun Doo Hwan became president through an election indirectly organised by the National Assembly, but failed to gain public popularity (Shorrock, 1988). The coup d’etat ignited numerous demonstrations, especially in Kwangju, in the south-east of Korea. The public masses played an important augmenting role through protest demonstrations and votes in crucial elections (Burton and Ryu, 1997). With
many deaths and casualties brought about by the military elite group, Korea was in an increasingly unstable situation. Kim, B.C. (2008) described the Kwangju incident as a massive slaughter of civilians, which caused the coup-based military regime to seek a way to nullify and defuse Korean people’s growing anger against the government. According to Burton and Ryu (1997), the political changes in Korea in 1987 entailed an elite settlement preceded by a long and costly history of elite conflict, and were precipitated by crises that threatened an escalation of elite warfare. As Park, C.M. (1991) argued, Chun’s regime used economic policy as a means of engendering political support by continuous rapid growth and the containment of inflation. However, another method was required in order to calm the country down under an illegal regime.

With reference to this, let us look at some of the evidence that the government viewed sport as an efficient tool for overcoming its lack of legitimacy. It can be argued that restarting the bidding for the Seoul Olympics during Park’s era was the first movement. In the later 1980s, more disposable income, together with successful Olympic hosting, encouraged Koreans to become more interested in sport. This growth of Koreans’ interest in sport fitted into the government’s strategy to create a professional sport league. Cotton (1992) noted that the Seoul Olympics provided enormous leverage, in the sense that, without them, continuous civil disorder would have undermined the Republic’s most important foreign policy initiative for decades and made a mockery of Chun’s long-standing pledge to hand over power to his successor in a peaceful fashion. Coming to Korea, the nations of the world would hope to find a tranquil country for the first Olympics since 1972 unmarred by a boycott (Shorrock, 1988).

The Government’s View on Elite Sport

At the height of the Cold War, US influence in Korea could be seen in sport as well as in politics. As Kim, B.C. (2008) mentioned, the sport-and-politics relationship is part of a wider issue that directed Korea towards the globalising world community, due to the deteriorating relationship with its dominant partner, the US. The government was keen on displaying Korea’s superiority over the North, which was controlled by the Soviet Union. Gaining a victory against the North in sport competitions would be
advantageous for the regime. According to Koh (1990), countries on both sides of the globe had fought strongly to upgrade their political power through the international sports arena during the Cold War era. The tension of trying to show superiority over the North is evident in the words of a former member of the Technical Committee of the Korea Football Association. Of particular note is the fact that the tension prompted the creation of a professional football league in Korea. He argued:

Korea was at a critical point after failing to qualify for the World Cup in 1974 and 1978 and losing in the first round of the World Cup in 1982. To repeat North Korea’s famous victory in the quarter-final against Italy in 1966 was considered to be our target. To achieve that, what could we do? The idea to change from tournaments to a league system was proposed, in order to give more opportunities for footballers to have experience of matches so that they could improve their performance on the international stage. In my opinion, that was the starting point of the K-League. (Interview, 5th July 2007)

As discussed previously, under the volatile circumstances that Korea was facing due to the political situation, the Chun government regarded sport as an ideal instrument for soothing the nation. A former producer of Korea’s main broadcasting system commented:

When the ideas about professional sports aroused in the Blue House (the president’s residence), Mr. Suh Jong Chul, a former boss of President Chun at the Military Academy went ahead with a plan of forming a professional baseball league on the same lines as the Japanese baseball league. We can say that sport was used for political purposes, but it resulted in a positive product. (Interview, 11th January 2008)

As Cho (2008) argued, the launching of the professional baseball league was successful in diverting people’s attention from political issues to leisure in an efficient manner as well as satisfying the public who wanted to enjoy the increased disposable income. From a critical realist point of view, the recurring relationship between the structure and agency can be found here. A few core actors (agents) in the government had a direct
influence on creating the leagues (structure) in response to public demand in the affluent society. Kim (2008) pointed out that the public appetite for international elite sport such as the Olympics grew to high levels in the 1980s. It is notable that these actions came out of pre-existing structures such as the authoritarian military order. The structure also tended to create condition through the observable and unobservable power where businesses (agents) felt obliged to cooperate to create teams. Having acquired their collaboration (agents), a new structure, the professional league, was able to emerge.

It is intriguing to see how the perspectives of the leader impacts on sport policy. It is not our intention to compare Korea to other countries. However, it is worth noting the case of the UK, which shows a contrast to Korea. In the UK, while the neo-liberal governments of Margaret Thatcher from the 1970s to early 1990s tended to neglect sport, John Major’s enthusiasm for sport changed the government’s attitude and approach, especially in relation to elite sport and PE (Bergsgard et al, 2007). Korea’s elite sport, on the other hand, was highly regarded by the government until the authoritarian and military based government of the early 1990s, because of the problem of legitimacy and the personal interest of President in sport. Having served in the Military Academy, both President Chun and President Rho were deeply involved in sport, especially, football and tennis. As a former footballer in the Daegu Vocational High School and the Military Academy, Chun’s affection for sport was well established and greater than previous presidents in Korea, as all the interviewees agree. Nevertheless, the issue of government support had loomed since the civilian president took power in 1993. An Olympic gold medallist reflected on those ‘renaissance’ days of the 1980s when he was in the TN Village:

We all had to gather for exercise in the centre ground every morning. Sometimes, President Chun turned up with a few bodyguards without any notice. He observed our training, had breakfast with us and left. He said, ‘I just came to see you guys as I missed you’. It was a great encouragement.” (Interview, 5th December 2007)
Chapter 5: The Case study of Elite Sport

As regards the birth of the professional sport league mentioned above, although it is extremely difficult to explain fully what was going on behind the formation of it because of the hidden manoeuvres, it can be argued that Chun’s personal interest in sport played a critical role (Kim, B.C., 2008).

**Government Structure and Government Financing**

As a former Minister of Culture and Tourism mentioned, the revisions of the NSPL were made for the purpose of coping with the change in the sport environment. There were a few alterations during this period, and the one in 1982 is considered to be among the most important because full texts were modified. According to Lee’s (2002) study, the whole amendment of the Law aimed to develop national sport and enhance national prestige through sport. Lee, J.W. (2002), nevertheless, argued that the real purpose of the change was to prepare for the hosting of the two mega sport events, the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics since the previous Law was not sufficient to support these events in terms of finance and organisations. In the event, the government decided to fully support elite sport, acknowledging that improving athletes’ performances inside the nation and hosting two events successfully were important.

The significant modifications and the link to elite sport are shown in Table 5.10. The two added clauses revealed that the government explicitly tried to encourage elite athletes to improve performances on the world stage by emphasizing patriotism. Through the creation of the National Sports Promotion Fund the government came up with an idea to generate maximum financial resources to invest in elite sport for the purpose of achieving the best result ever in both 1986 and 1988. It stated that the fund could be drawn from the advertisements on cigarette packets, entrance fees to certain sport facilities such as stadiums, gymnasiums, swimming pools, golf courses and additional collections from horse racing.

As Lee, H.L. (2003) argued, the whole revision of the Law came to fruition in several ways, for instance, selecting and training 4,359 talent athletes, educating coaches, expanding the KISS and ranking 10th in the LA Olympics in 1984, 2nd in the Seoul Asian Games in 1986 and 4th in the Seoul Olympics in 1988. It also functioned as a stepping stone for the government to make a similar special law for future events such
as 2002 WC. Another remarkable law change in Korean sport can be found in the post-Seoul Olympics. As we will discuss later, SOSFO was formed and it needed an amendment of the law to create such an organisation. A partial modification on 31st March 1989 was mainly about renaming, from ‘National Sports Promotion Foundation’ to SOSFO. Some new contents appeared, including sports lotteries, Olympic emblem business and the procedure to appoint the CEO, board of directors and auditors. It should nevertheless be pointed out that too much emphasis on elite sport prompted the government to neglect school sport for the majority of students and mass participation in sport.

Table 5.10 Key changes in the National Sports Promotion Law in 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>20th March 1982</th>
<th>31st December 1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1.(aim)</td>
<td>To promote national sport, increase fitness and sound mind for the health of the nation</td>
<td>Added: to contribute to the enhancement of national prestige thorough sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.14 and 15 (protection &amp; development of athletes)</td>
<td>Government should pay living expenses for those who won medals in the Olympics when they are retired</td>
<td>Added: for those who won medals in the Olympics and other competitions imposed by Presidential decree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.(National Sports Promotion Fund)</td>
<td></td>
<td>New: Funds’ foundation, creation, usage, other businesses, advertisement, additional collection of the entrance fee to the sport facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-19</td>
<td></td>
<td>Funds can be given by the government and non-government agencies (enable companies to provide funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.Promotion of KSC</td>
<td></td>
<td>New: KSC’s establishment, National Sports Promotion Foundation, for borrowing capital, tax cuts, prohibition of similar name, inspection and supplementary rules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s work based on the change of the NSPL
In relation to the Olympic hosting in 1988, it is important to note that the Ministry of Sport was established to prepare for mega sport events. The Ministry of Sport contributed to the increase in mass participation in sport as well as producing talented athletes for the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics (Kim, S.Y., 2004). The significance of the name ‘Ministry of Sport’ is important as this was the only period when the Ministry was for sport alone. According to the Sports White Paper (2006), the launch of the new Ministry was remarkable in the sense that sport was elevated to a new dimension, from being merely part of education. The status of the Ministry in charge of sport could affect the function of sport administration and policy as a whole. The power of the Ministry of Sport can be illustrated from an interview with a former senior officer in the Ministry of Sport.

Having Mr. Rho, President Chun’s right hand man, as the first Minister of Sport, we had no fear of other ministries, although we were a new born baby. Everyone knew that Mr. Rho was going to become the next president. With this strong background, we could give more than enough financially towards elite sport. It was all-out war before the Asian Games and the Olympics in terms of funding athletes’ development and reconstructing old facilities in the TN Village to produce the best result in 1988. (Interview, 6th December 2007).

Table 5.11 clearly supports the above comment. The budget increased by 100% between 1982 and 1983 and in 1985 sport received the highest proportion (0.35%) of the government budget.

As for the structure of the Ministry of Sport, a total of 187 people worked in this organisation. With the creation of 1-3-10-4 (1 Department, 3 sections, 10 parts, 4 directors), four directors took charge of Planning & Management, Sport Development (Sport Policy, Community Sport, School Sport, Sport Facilities), Sport Science (Planning, Training, Research) and International Sport (Supporting International Competition, Overseas Cooperation). However, as Mulling’s (1989) research showed, based on several interviews with senior officials of that time, the fact that all members had worked either as bureaucrats or politicians and only one person had come from the
KSC (i.e. had explicit experience of managing sport policy) since its inception is a criticism that the Ministry of Sport cannot be immune from.

**Table 5.11 Sport budget in Chun’s era**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>A. Government General Account budget (million won)</th>
<th>B. Sport Budget (million won)</th>
<th>Ratio (B/A)</th>
<th>Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>80,400</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>93,317</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>104,167</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
<td>Ministry of Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>111,729</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>Ministry of Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>125,324</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
<td>Ministry of Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>138,005</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>Ministry of Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>160,596</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td>Ministry of Sport</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kim, H.S. (2002) from the Ministry of Finance and Economy

The Ministry of Sport retained its sole position until 1987, notwithstanding small scale changes inside. In 1988, the Department of Youth was added to the Ministry, with the increase to a staff of 225. It was renamed the Ministry of Sport and Youth in 1990, incorporating responsibilities for two sectors. It reflected the government’s perspective that sport and juveniles could be dealt with together. A senior officer in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, who had served in the sport sector since the era of Ministry of Sport argued:

> The era of the Ministry of Sports and Youth’ was the peak in terms of setting sport policy, I think. It was short but...we could make sport policy across the country. We created PE programmes, as most of the youngsters are students. We were able to direct youths in a positive way through sport (Interview, 20\textsuperscript{th} December 2007)

The establishment of SOSFO on April 20, 1989 was one of the most significant decisions for Korean elite sport, as well as for SFA. It was created to support projects relating to national sports promotion, sport science research, and wholesome youth
developments, to raise, operate & manage the national sports promotion funds, and to implement projects commemorating the Seoul Olympics (www.sosfo.or.kr, accessed on 28th September 2008). The motive for the creation of SOSFO is not clear in the documents or literature. However, an interview with a senior officer who had been working for SOSFO from the beginning revealed the close behind the scenes relationship between sport and politics - a view shared by a number of other interviewees. He said:

The Olympic Organising Committee employed people from various backgrounds. Only those who were dispatched from the government could go back to their positions after the Olympics, but there were about 400 people left without the guarantee of still having their jobs. The Chairman of Seoul Olympic Organising Committee (hereafter SLOOC), Park Se Jik, devised a plan to create SOSFO with the surplus of 350 billion won which should have gone to the National Treasury. When President Rho received a proposal from Park (a close friend of Rho’s), he pushed for the plan to go forward. Roh’s personal interest in sport as a military figure played an important role in the decision. The political structure of SOSFO consisted of a President, a chairman of SLOOC and senior officers in the Ministry of Sport. (Interview, 20th December 2007)

The last comment above suggests that the “Policy Community”, such as it is, composed of a limited number of members who have common beliefs and values, and who played a critical role in founding the new organisation. Furthermore, Park Se Jik, a ‘policy entrepreneur’, recognised that there was a crisis over the possible loss of 400 jobs and reacted swiftly when a ‘window of opportunity’ was opened, using the close relationship with President Rho. It can be estimated that the favourable atmosphere in sport after the Seoul Olympics gave momentum to Park to sustain his plan. It is also notable that Park, who was directly appointed from the government, was willing to invest his time, energy and reputation in seeking a long-term political career or future promotion by succeeding in the creation of SOSFO (Kingdon, 1995). Unlike the two figures, Park Tae Joon and Park Jong Kyu, whom we discussed previously, Park Se Jik could be regarded as a ‘policy entrepreneur’ in the sense that he initiated a specific idea
and put in effort to make sure that it materialised. Keeping in mind that Korea was still under the military regime it appears however that the society was becoming pluralistic compared to the era of Park Jung Hee’s regime due to pressure from the international community regarding hosting the Olympics, which allows us to apply the elements of the MS framework. While the two Parks in the 1970s exercised their plans according to instructions from the President, Park Se Jik actively tried to realise certain policies which is a clear difference from the other two Parks.

Let us look at the resources that SOSFO had in the early stages. The seed money was based on the surplus 311 billion won from the Seoul Olympics and the fund (approximately 40 billion won) from the National Sport Promotion Foundation. The revised law allowed the Foundation to collect money from sport lotteries, sport facilities’ entrance fees and advertisements on cigarette packets. According to SOSFO figures (www.sosfo.or.kr, accessed on February 10th 2008) between 1989 and 1997, 153.8 billion won was spent on elite sport, which was 67% of the total cost of 231.1 billion won. It is clear that the government’s top priority was elite sport, considering that the amount invested in sport for all was only 65 billion won (28%). Nevertheless, a former senior official in KSC did not consider this to be an entirely positive situation. He argued:

According to the IOC Olympic Charter, all the surplus or deficit from the Olympics should be handed over to the NOC. However, this was ignored. I guess it was due to government’s intervention. Strictly speaking, all the money that SOSFO had belonged to the KSC/KOC. In addition, the KSC had some money from the ‘National Sport Development Foundation’ and this was taken away and merged into the SOSFO fund. (Interview, 7th December 2007)

The government’s interest and involvement in sport can be also found in the welfare benefits that athletes received. Kim’s (2000c) summary of the Presidential Order (1982) below indicates the President’s care was in the top tier for the athletes. Chun argued that it was important to:
Ensure that gold medal winners’ fundamental living environment is guaranteed by supporting their studies or providing houses. Their increase in social status will have a positive impact on young people and enhance their desire to become athletes. In order to accomplish the above objectives, the Prime Minister and relevant government ministers should consult one another to raise social interest in sports.

This was the pinnacle era for elite sport, and both official and unofficial welfare benefits were given to the athletes. A retrospective views from a former national player shows the status of elite athletes at that time:

We, national athletes had ID cards. When we were caught up by the police after a few drinks, they let us go if we showed our cards. Chun was so considerate of us. When one won a medal at either the Olympics or the Asian Games, the government put her/him in a position of priority for the purchase of apartments built for the Olympics or Asian Games, which were sold to the public on completion of the houses. We also received about 300,000 won from Chun on Chusuk (Thanksgiving holiday). That was a huge amount of money in those times. I am sure that no elite athletes would criticize Chun. (Interview, 5th December 2007)

The grants from the government on specific days are shown in Table 5.12. The Ministry of Sport (1992) stated that 133 athletes who had won medals or ranked second in the Universiadi competition or first at the Asian Games were given special benefits in purchasing houses (Kim, S.J., 2000). According to Kim, S.J. (2000), the fact that the number of athletes who had received financial benefits increased since 1981 indicates the special consideration given by President Chun Doo Hwan.

The two most significant welfare policies in Korean elite sport were the lifelong pension scheme and military exemption. According to Lee, Y.S. (1999), 19 to 133 athletes received 85,190,480 million won between 1975 and 1992. The response of the athletes’ who were excused from the military duty is important to note. A former short track national athlete said:
If there was no military exemption policy in Korea, Korea’s short track wouldn’t be in the position it is now. I think it is a good policy. The problem lies with a few athletes who abuse it. Those who win medals in the Olympics or gold in the Asian Games deserve it. I am sure they invested much more time and effort into training than normal people who serve in the army for 2-3 years. (Interview, 5th December 2007)

Table 5.12 Grants for coaches, trainers and athletes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Special Day</th>
<th>Coach</th>
<th>Trainer</th>
<th>Athletes</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Chusuk (Thanksgiving Day)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Chusuk (Thanksgiving Day)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christmas</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Christmas</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Chusuk (Thanksgiving Day)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christmas</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Chusuk (Thanksgiving Day)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Chusuk (Thanksgiving Day)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>85,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christmas</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>81,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kim (2000, 205) adapted from the Ministry of Sport (1992: 79)

Facilities

It cannot be denied that, as regards elite sport facilities, TN Village played a central role in Korea’s elite sport success. New facilities built between 1980 and 1992 were a multi-purpose gymnasium (1983), artificial grass pitch (1984), indoor swimming pool (1985) and cross country course (1986), according to the KSC (Sports White Paper, 2006). To complement the TN Village, two more training venues also played an important part. One is Jinhae Athletic Village, which was constructed right after the 1984 LA Olympics, and Onyang National Swimming Pool, built in 1986. Having been awarded the right to host the Asian and Olympic Games, it was necessary to build the sport facilities that Korea lacked at the time the announcement was made. The Sport White Paper (2006)
states that epochal expansion of sport facilities could be seen in the preparation for these mega sport events. It also pointed out that a revision of the ‘Law on the planning & management of additional funding’ allowed the local sport facilities to receive financial support from the national treasury. Two venues were constructed, Jamsil Complex and Olympic Park, in order to host the Olympics. The former includes the main stadium for the Seoul Olympics and the other venues listed below. The cost of each venue in the Jamsil Complex is shown in Table 5.13.

**Table 5.13 The cost of Jamsil Complex**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilities</th>
<th>Completion of construction</th>
<th>Cost (Won)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Main stadium</td>
<td>29th September 1984</td>
<td>46.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warm-up facilities</td>
<td>29th September 1984</td>
<td>2.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseball stadium</td>
<td>15th July 1982</td>
<td>12.6 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indoor Swimming Pool</td>
<td>20th December 1980</td>
<td>5.8 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Olympic Park of 2.6 million square kilometres consisted of facilities for a number of sports, including cycling, tennis and fencing. The strong leadership of the government in acquiring the estate was illustrated by one of the former Vice Ministers of Sport.

When Roh Tae Woo, then Minister of Sport, went to the site for the Olympic Park to secure the place, the demonstration was so violent that he was nearly killed. However, the military government with the full support of the administration paved the way for Seoul Metropolitan City to obtain ownership of that area of land, which enabled all the sport facilities for the Olympics to be built on one site. (Interview, 6th December 2007)

In the light of Chun’s commitment to elite sport, it is not surprising that he actively directed the creation of sport facilities. The example of football is useful here to show how the improvement of facilities impacted on athletes’ performances. Unlike its strong position in Asia as a country which had played in six consecutive FIFA World Cups, Korea had failed to qualify for any major competitions after appearing in the
Switzerland World Cup (1954) and the Tokyo Olympics (1964). It was taken for
granted that football was played on a ground made with sand or clay in the old days.
The comment from a former senior officer in K-League, indicates that the President, a
supremely powerful figure at that time, could influence elite sporting success. He said:

When President Chun was in power, a national sport festival was held across
the Korean peninsula. He ordered every city and province to make a natural
grass ground. As a consequence, players could get accustomed to playing on
grass grounds, and they ended up dramatically improving their techniques and
fitness as it was more demanding than a sand ground. It is phenomenal that
Korea has never been excluded from taking part in every final round of the
Olympics and World Cup since. I believe that the creation of a football
infrastructure was a stepping stone for Korea to be positioned the top in Asia
for two decades. (Interview, 11th January 2008)

The situation with winter sports facilities was not much different. After the first
artificial Dondaemun indoor ice rink built in 1964 was shut down due to under-use by
the public and the high cost of electric power in 1984, Tae Neung indoor rink opened in
the same year. Athletes in figure skating, short track and ice hockey shared the facilities,
but it was not able to provide much room for public use. This ice rink was originally
built in 1970 as a swimming pool, but was later converted into an ice rink (Koh, 1990).
A commercial Lotte World rink was subsequently opened in 1988 and Mokdong rink
was ranked in the 2nd tier of international standard (Hwang, 1996). The lack of facilities
was described by one of the Olympic medallists in short track as follows:

I had an interview after winning a gold medal in the World Championship in the early 1990s. A foreign journalist asked me how many ice rinks there were
in Korea. I answered, ‘Only one’. Tae Nung indoor ice rink was the sole facility where we could train. I added that there are less than fifty athletes in
short track. What I heard afterwards was that the journalist thought I meant that
the team I belonged to owns one ice rink and the number of players in the club
is approximately fifty. (Interview, 5th December 2007)
He also gave military presidents Chun and Rho the credit for the increase in ice rinks, which is an evidence of elite power in Korea:

After reaching the top podium in the Albertville winter Olympics in 1992, we were invited by President Roh Tae Woo to the Blue House and awarded a decoration. In his speech, he announced he would make at least one skate rink in each province. It eventually became reality that we had many more facilities for skating. However, I would like to emphasise that the person who actually laid the foundation for constructing the ice rinks was President Chun. (Interview, 5th December 2007)

Sports Science and Coaching

In this section, sport science, sport medicine and coaching will be discussed. The issue of talent identification will be included in the section on coaching. The decision on hosting mega sport events alerted the government to take action in order to produce outstanding performances in the homeland. It resulted in the KSC expanding the ‘Sport Science Commission’ and launched the Sports Science Institute in the KSC in 1980. This became a foundation named the ‘Korea Sport Science Institute’ in 1989. It is argued that Chun’s special order to promote sport science development to produce the best ever performance in future events affected the transfer of the Institute’s status.

As Lee Jong Gak, a president of KISS said: “When we opened in 1980, the wall between science and sport was very high.” (Interview, 13th April 2007), it was inevitable that there was much conflict with coaches when sport scientists started to apply their knowledge to the practical world. The following comment from a researcher in KISS indicates why the first KISS president Lee Kung Se (1980-1989) kept stressing that researchers should go out into the field rather than sit in an office:

For the first five to ten years, we had quite a problem. The reason was that we (sports scientists) thought that the coaches were ignorant and failed to counteract the lack of practical experience in the sport field. (Interview, 3rd December 2007)
In relation to sport science, sport medicine appeared in this era. The Sport Medicine Association was launched in 1984 and gained recognition around the time of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, according to a medical doctor in one of the biggest hospitals in Korea. A discussion on sport medicine will be dealt with in more detail in a later period.

As regards coaching, it is notable that President Chun gave big bonuses to coaches in specific occasions, as shown in Table 5.13. However, it was in 1982 that the coaches started to get paid, according to one of the first KISS researchers:

To be selected as a national player or coach was a great honour in itself. Nobody dared to ask for any financial reward for it. The KISS, established in March 1980, proposed that the government should pay coaches who were working in TN Village. It was hard to create a policy from nothing as you can imagine. (Interview, 28th June 2007)

He continued:

Then President Choi Kyu Ha, General Chun Doo Hwan with substantial power and the Minister of Sport, Roh Tae Woo were in charge of it. When the KISS proposed 1 million won for ‘A’ coaches...... Roh asked “Why is it so much?” The answer was “Coaches work in the TN Village virtually all year long. There have been a number of family disruptions because the coaches were never at home.” Roh nodded and asked “How much is it going to cost for a year then?” It was estimated that the total salaries for a year was less than 1 billion won. I think that only military group could make such a decision so quickly. (Interview, 28th June 2007)

With regard to foreign coaches, it was in 1982 that Korea began to bring in coaches for the purpose of gaining know-how, skills or tactics in order to achieve its aims in both the 1986 and 1988 Games. Koh (1990) pointed out that as TN Village started to earn a reputation, a number of foreign coaches across the globe applied for a job that paid $3,000 a month with free board, lodging and interpreters. The Sports White Paper (2006) stated that the criteria for a sport to be considered for having coaches from abroad were as follows: A potential medal winning sport, a poor performance sport with
high expectation of the impact in terms of improving performance or coaching quality. It appeared that every sport was eligible and satisfied at least one of the features, which meant that much clearer guidelines needed to be suggested in order to maximize the outcome of bringing in foreign coaches. A Seoul Olympic Medallist admits that there was a positive effect from this policy:

The main reason for the scheme was to perform the best ever and not be ashamed. With the money that Chun’s government had urged the Chaebol to provide, we could participate in competitions abroad and have training overseas, which was extremely difficult at that time. I was able to have an opportunity to learn from a foreign coach so that I ended up winning a medal in the Olympics. I am sure it was the ‘Golden Era’ for elite athletes. (Interview, 22nd June 2007)

On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that there were cases which failed to achieve the expected results of employing foreign coaches in certain sports. As a performance director in one of the NSOs said, a few coaches from overseas did not succeed because they failed to overcome the cultural difference and get along with Korean coaches. Table 5.14 shows the numbers of foreign coaches imported into Korea during the 1980s.

It shows that track & field and gymnastics had consistently employed foreign coaches over the years. A comment from a senior officer in the Korean Athletic Association indicates that at that time not only the visible support from the government, but the interests from the federation were greater than at present. He argued:

We (athletics) had a great amount of support under the military regime. When the Korea Electric Power Corporation was in charge of us, financial aid was huge. The government viewed athletics as a sport with a bright vision until the professional sport league was created. We were not falling behind China or Japan in that period. However, the level of competition is high in Asia nowadays. (Interview, 10th January 2008)
Table 5.14 Numbers and Sports of foreign coaches 1982-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Sports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Track and Field, Swimming, Wrestling, Badminton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Track and Field, Gymnastics, boxing, wrestling, weightlifting, judo, shooting, handball, fencing, badminton, ice-hockey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Track and Field, Gymnastics, boxing, wrestling, weightlifting, judo, shooting, handball, fencing, badminton, ice-hockey, horse riding, rowing, yachting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Track and Field, gymnastics, swimming, wrestling, cycling, boxing, handball, fencing, rowing, horse riding, yachting, basketball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Track and Field, gymnastics, boxing, swimming, shooting, hockey, canoeing, rowing, fencing, horse riding, yacht, wrestling, ice-skating, physiotherapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Track and Field, swimming, gymnastics, boxing, canoeing, rowing, ice-skating, skiing, basketball, handball, wrestling, judo, tennis, shooting, horse riding, yachting, fitness coaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Gymnastics, canoeing, skiing, fencing, swimming, horse-riding, track and field, yachting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kim (2000c: 217), adapted from the Ministry of Sport and Youth (1990: 75)

Talent Identification

As discussed before, the talent identification project of the Korea Sport Science Institute was centred on potential athletes who had the possibility to participate in the 1984 and 1988 Olympics and the Asian Games in 1986, based on past records in both international and domestic competitions. The Ministry of Sport, with cooperation from the education councils in cities and provinces, conducted physical tests on students who gained the special grade or 1st grade in the annual fitness test. It started with 100,000 students (aged 7-15, elementary to high school) who were ranked the ‘special category’ and who were eligible to take a fitness test. Finally 4,359 were selected after going through a range of evaluations according to each sport’s requirements (Lee, H.L., 2003). Lee, H.L. (2003) stated that those students had training with experts and were given feedback in the summer and winter camps in school holidays. The number was reduced later and new talents were included in the list for continuous identification. Having been
halted for a decade in its task of identifying talented athletes, due to the lack of funds and professional planning, the project was restarted in 1982 with the establishment of the Ministry of Sport. KISS took the responsibility of establishing the criteria for talented athletes and the KSC led the project (Shin, 2007), which has continued.

It is not our intention to study school sport in depth here, nevertheless, it is worth noting the support from the government for school sport teams. According to Lee, H.L. (2003) in 1983, the Ministry of Sport initiated funding for each school to develop elite athletes in particular sports and every school focused on different ones. Sport high school graduates received 45 gold medals in the 1986 and 7 gold medals in 1988. The graduates contributed to the recognition of Korea in international sport. In order to promote these schools, financial support was increased by 30% and more schools were set up in a number of regions so that a regional balance could be achieved (Kim, S.J., 2000).

**Competition Structure**

It is estimated that the National Sports Festival contributed to Korea’s elite sport success in the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics not only by identifying talented athletes, but also by enhancing performances. Of particular note is the big change in the youth sports festival in terms of the point system and awards. As the ‘Total Points System’ had a tendency to cause over-heated competition among student athletes and cities or provinces, it was discontinued. In addition, there was a demand for the KSC to spread the competition to smaller units such as cities or provinces, which again did not succeed in the long term. The major changes to the festival are indicated in Table 5.15.

**Table 5.15 Changes in the National Youth Festival**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of sports</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of people</td>
<td>6,878</td>
<td>10,378</td>
<td>12,855</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolish total point system</td>
<td>Revival of total point system, adopt exhibition sports</td>
<td>Festivals held in each city and province</td>
<td>Revival of NSF, only award individual prizes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 5: The Case study of Elite Sport

Hosting Strategy

As Green (2007) argued, hosting the Sydney Olympics impacted on Australia in terms of the pace and direction of federal sport policy administration and funding allocations. Similarly, the decision in 1981 by the IOC in Baden Baden to award the 1988 Olympics to Seoul provided a massive opportunity for the government to invest in elite sport. Having been halted due to the assassination of President Park in 1979, the bidding for the Olympics gained momentum due to the great interest of President Chun. According to a renowned academic in the sociology of sport, there were three perspectives on why the government showed enthusiasm for hosting the event. He argued:

First, there was a political aspect. The government tried to improve their image of military dictatorship through sport. Second, there was an economic view, that hosting a mega sport event can bring substantial profit. Third, there was a diplomatic perspective. The time was nearly the end of the Cold War and communism was about to collapse, so they hoped that hosting the Olympics would contribute to the reconciliation of the world. (Interview, 3rd July 2008)

To prevent any mistake due to lack of experience of hosting mega sport events, the KSC held a number of competitions in the run up to 1988 as a ‘rehearsal’ for the main event (See Table 5.16). Of particular significance was a rush of large-scale international sports events held in 1985 which included eighteen sports.

In addition to the themes of the first period, two have emerged which greatly influenced Korea’s elite sport: Sangmu and Chaebol
Table 5.16 International sports events hosted in South Korea, 1982-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. sport events</th>
<th>Sport officials</th>
<th>Athletes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>1,780</td>
<td>2,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>1,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>2,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>2,848</td>
<td>4,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td>3,326</td>
<td>4,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>2,180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Sports and Youth (1992: 100)

The Role of Business

In order to fully understand the elite development system in Korea, the role of Chaebol needs to be examined. A number of amateur sport teams as well as professional teams had been run by Chaebol and the role of the Chaebol ranged from owning teams, taking charge of NSOs to sponsoring teams or competitions. In the early 1980s, the government encouraged businesses to get involved with sponsoring national sports federations and professional sports teams. The presidents of a number of NSOs had been the heads of corporations. The appointment of Jung Ju Young as a president of the KSC was followed by a number of Chaebol’s becoming involved in sport. For example, Choi Soon Young (Shingdonga, football), Choi Won Suk (Donga, table tennis), Lee Dong Chan (Kolon, basketball) and Jang Il Ryong (Jinro, track and field). The heads of twenty five out of thirty three NSOs were from Chaebol which were expected to donate substantial funds towards the running of the organisations (Jeong, 2009).

The background to forming the professional league needs to be highlighted as it shows the process of decision making, not only in politics but in sport. The comment from an academic in sport medicine illustrates how the government exerted pressure on the Chaebol. He said:
I have heard this story from my senior. When President Chun tried to form a professional league, he called a meeting of the CEOs of Chaebol. Chun asked, ‘Who wants to make a team?’ Doosan was the only one who raised a hand to say ‘yes’. Chun murmured…‘Well’…and went out. After a few minutes, he came back to the room and asked the same question. Everyone in the room raised their hands. (Interview 21st December 2007)

In Park, Y.O.’s (1997) research, vast amounts of money were poured into elite sport in the 1980s when sport nationalism was prevalent in Korea. The KSC’s budget of 12 billion won in 1979, increased to 62.4 billion won in 1985. If we include the unofficial development fund from the Chaebol, the amount was believed to be 80 billion won. According to Kim, S.J. (2000), the launch of the professional baseball league by the business groups was probably related to the political role of sport during the Fifth Republic. The tax exemption given by the government was a necessary ‘carrot’ for Chaebol to provide such a league by investing huge amounts of money. It is not our intention to discuss in detail the influence of the media. However, its role must not be neglected. It included names such as MBC (Moonhwa Broadcasting Corporation) and KBS (Korea Broadcasting System), which played a critical role in the birth of the professional league in baseball and football in terms of creating teams and broadcasting those sports on live.

Among several Chaebol, Samsung deserves particular attention. The later period will illustrate more about the role of Samsung in elite sport. A CEO of Samsung and a former president of the Korean Wrestling Federation (KWF), from 1982 to 1997 Lee Kun Hee is a major figure who contributed to wrestling’s six consecutive gold medals in the Olympics. The current president of KWF, Chun Shin Il said:

We should give all credit to President Lee in terms of stabilising the Federation. Lee provided over 22.5 billion won from 1982 until now. We plan to establish a competition to applaud his work named the ‘Samsung’ or ‘Lee Kun Hee’ wrestling competition, either as a domestic or international competition. (www.Sports2.co.kr, accessed on 25th September 2007)
Chapter 5: The Case study of Elite Sport

The Role of the Armed Forces

One of the bodies that has had a most significant effect on Korean elite sport policy is the Armed Forces Athletic Corps (hereafter Sangmu). Since Korea had been in a state of war since 1953, all men were required to do military service for 24 months (as of 2008). It is natural that military sport was focused on physical fitness to prepare for combat and a significant change can be seen in elite sport development in the armed forces. Sangmu was established in 1984 for the purpose of producing success at domestic mega sport events, such as the Asian Games in 1986 & Olympics in 1988. Prior to Sangmu’s emergence sports were spread across the army, navy and air force. These sports finally merged into a group of twenty sports based in Sungnam, on the outskirts of Seoul. The number of sports increased to 25 in 1986 and 33 in 1987 just before the Seoul Olympics. According to a distinguished academic Sangmu was modelled on practices in the Eastern Bloc countries. As shown in Table 5.17, Sangmu has generally been successful in producing medals in mega events over two decades. As Choi (2000) argued, 15-20% of the medals Korea acquired came from Sangmu and 1,200 of the athletes (including 130 coaches) belong, or used to belong, to Sangmu. It is no wonder that Sangmu is nicknamed as ‘the 2nd Athletic Village’.

Table 5.17 A number of medals Sangmu athletes won (-1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / Competition</th>
<th>No. of athletes</th>
<th>Medal (Gold/Silver/Bronze)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984 LA Olympics</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1/0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 Seoul Asian Games</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15/8/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 Seoul Olympics</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2/2/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Beijing Asian Games</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>10/15/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Barcelona Olympics</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0/0/1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sangmu homepage (www.sangmu.mil.kr, accessed on 10th December 2006)

Furthermore, Sangmu athletes participated in CISM (Conseil International Du Sport Militaire) forty nine times since 1955 athletic championship and delivered considerable success (see Table 5.18).
Table 5.18 Sangmu’s performance in CISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Host country</th>
<th>No. of participating sports</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995 (the 1st)</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 (the 2nd)</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sangmu interview data

According to a Sangmu internal document, sixteen out of eighteen facilities in Sangmu were created between 1986 and 1992, including those for handball, track and field, swimming, hockey and tennis. As regards the fitness training facility opened in 1992, it was the fact that the Minister of Sport and Youth was from a military background that enabled Sangmu to have such a large area, according to a senior officer in Sangmu. With reference to the Multiple Streams concept of a “window of opportunity”, it can be said that the Minister was swift enough to act to exercise his power in creating an additional facility which was needed by athletes in the Armed Forces when the window of opportunity opened.

As discussed previously, male athletes could be exempted from military duty providing that they met certain criteria set by the government, such as winning a Gold medal in the Asian Games or any medal in the Olympics. However, the majority who were not eligible for this dispensation had to either serve in the normal army or in Sangmu. There was a consensus among interviewees that serving one’s time in the army meant the end of a sport career. Even those whose sports had no quota in Sangmu would be vulnerable when planning their future. A former national athlete in short track stated:

As far as I know, there was a spot for speed skating in Sangmu. But there isn’t now, so male skaters must go into the army, which means ‘the end’. If you take a year off skating, you can say you are finished. (Interview, 5th December 2007)
Chapter 5: The Case Study of Elite Sport

1993-2009

After more than two decades of military rule the first civilian president was elected in Korea in 1993. The power the military figures had started to weaken and as the government’s robust efforts to root out corruption spread, the country blossomed. Having signed up to the convention founding the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) on December, 1996, Korea’s per-capita income exceeded $10,000 nationwide and $20,000 in the major cities (Enrlich and Lee, 1998). This indicates that more disposable income became available to Koreans and the phase-in of the five-day week from July 2004 prompted people to consider leisure and sport in their free time.

Government’s View on Elite Sport

It might be argued that the interest of the government in elite sport was likely to decrease with the emergence of a civilian president. Supported by the legitimacy of the democratic process, it was natural for the emphasis in sport policy to shift away from elite sport to mass participation in sport. This view was supported by a number of interviewees, including senior policy makers in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. However, it was also suggested that the government fully understood that sport was one of the best ways to integrate Koreans through cheering athletes in the mega sport events and supporting athletes to perform well on the world stage. It can also be seen that the government used sport as a way to gain public popularity. Typical examples are the military exemption clause that was altered immediately after the achievement of reaching the semi-final in the 2002 FIFA World Cup and the 2006 World Baseball Classic. As a Sangmu official argued, a number of requests for military exemption were made to the Ministry of Defence from MPs and KSC before and during these competitions. The final decisions by the government used new criteria, which showed that there was no fixed rule, and this caused frustrations to athletes in other sports. A former national athlete said:
I am disgusted to see that Law can be changed so easily. We, athletes in so-called ‘unpopular sports’ are so disappointed to hear that kind of news. Inside the TN Village, other ‘popular [professional] sports’, for example, basketball and football, do not get into the spotlight because they are unable to win medals even in Asia. Olympic Medallists and the World Champions are only considered to be highly welcome here. But those in ‘popular sports’ are the ones who get all the benefits (Interview, 5th December 2007).

The other notable feature is the decrease in the president’s personal interest in sport. A typical example was President Chun’s frequent visits to TN village which had a big influence on the elite athletes’ morale in that era, as a former national athlete illustrated. According to Joongang Ilbo (1st May 2008), presidents Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Joong only visited TN Village once during their five year term. Roh Moo Hyun visited twice, but the fundamental approach towards elite sport was similar to his predecessors. A senior officer in SOSFO said:

President Chun and Rho Tae Woo were extraordinarily interested in sport because of their military background. They played sport from a young age. In contrast, the two President Kims enjoyed a sort of ‘jogging’ relationship at most. It makes a lot of difference whether you are actually involved in such activities or not in terms of the intimacy you have with sport. (Interview, 20th December 2007)

The consensus seems to be that the Kim Young Sam period was a “dark age” in the history of Korea’s elite sport, according to a number of journalists and academics interviewed. One journalist described the situation as follows:

In the past, heads of Chaebol used to take responsibility for a number of sport federations and donated a great amount of money. It’s a shame that Kim Young Sam brought that to a close. It led Chaebol to begin running away from sport. We can see now some of the MPs are taking the chair of National Sport Federations. (Interview, 26th June 2007)
In Korean elite sport, after nearly fifteen years of being partially neglected by the presidents, expectations were raised among elite athletes and coaches under Lee MyungBak’s government. This was due to his involvement in sport, particularly swimming, between 1981 and 1992 when he was president of the Korea Swimming Association, the Asian Swimming Association and the executive committee of the World Swimming Federation while he worked for the Hyundai Corporation. It is argued, however, that President Lee’s affection for sport aroused suspicion as there was almost nothing in the manifesto in relation to sport in both the presidential election in 2007 and the Undertaking Committee, according to Joongang Ilbo (1st May 2008).

**Government Structure and Government Financing**

As we have noted in the previous periods, the NSPL was revised a number of times when the direction of policy or modification of the system required a change. A senior officer in the MCT said that the recent changes in the Law were deregulation of the sport facilities and the transfer of ‘disabled sport’ from the Ministry of Health & Welfare to the MCT. The same senior officer also expressed regret that the integration of elite sport and SFA organisations had not been realised, although it was floated on the agenda from the start of Roh Moo Hyun government. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 as it involves NACOSA, the governing body of SFA.

During this period, it is clear from his memoirs that President Kim Young Sam was committed to reducing the size of government. He reflected:

> Before I started to take office, I thought about restructuring the government organisations. When I merged the Ministry of Culture and Sport & Youth in April 1993, even Mr. Rho Tae Woo opposed it for the sake of the civil servants, based on the fact he was a former Minister of Sport. Once the whole restructuring process was completed, the public welcomed it as a form of globalisation and local autonomy. (Kim, Y.S., 2001)

However, it needs to be stressed that the public supported the idea of reducing the size of the government as a whole, not removing sport from the government. It might be that
Koreans did not have much time to consider sport as they had more important matters to think about, such as the state of the economy, which directly linked to their daily lives. Therefore, the comment by President Kim Young Sam should be interpreted carefully. Nevertheless, sport was regarded as significant by President Roh Tae Woo, who used to be the first Minister of Sport, due to the fact that neglecting sport might diminish his achievements. A senior officer in MCT reflected:

From the era of the Ministry of Culture and Sport, the vision of the Minister began to focus more on culture than sport. It naturally led to sport tending to be neglected, which resulted in the reduction of the sport department, the budget and so on. (Interview 20th December 2007)

Sport completely disappeared from departmental titles in 1998 when the Ministry of Culture & Sport was renamed the Ministry of Culture & Tourism. A reduction in the number of departments (from 2 to 1), sections (from 7 to 4) and staff (from 77 to 56) was inevitable (Sport White Paper 2006). The change in the title of the Ministry implies that the government’s interest in sport had declined during this period. However it is notable that Korea was one of the first countries to insert ‘sport’ in the name of the ministry. Green (2007) argued that sport had moved among a number of different government departments over the past three decades in the UK and caused fragmentation of sport’s organisational administration and some disharmony. It was not until 1997 that ‘sport’ was included in the title of a government department, with the launch of the Department of Culture, Media and Sport under a new Labour administration, but this is a very recent phenomenon. In 2008, sport re-emerged in the Lee Myung Bak government, when the Ministry of Culture and Tourism changed its title to the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism (hereafter MCST). It took one decade to bring sport back into the name of the Ministry. According to a senior officer in KSC, the proposal to insert sport was passed in the Cabinet Council in 2007, but has not progressed in Parliament since then. It can be suggested that MPs in 2007 did not view it seriously enough and the fact that the Roh Moo Hyun government was coming to an end would have influenced them to leave things as they were. The revival of sport recently may dilute concerns raised by the absence of sport under President Lee’s Undertaking Committee. It remains to be seen whether further changes in the
administrative location of sport and the detailed policies will take place over the next five years.

The absence or presence of ‘sport’ in the title of a government department notwithstanding there has been a longer term trend to acknowledge sport as an element of welfare which resulted in other ministries tending to become involved in influencing sport policy. Currently it is important for the MCST to have a good relationship with other departments, for instance, the Ministry of Health & Welfare, and the Ministry of Education & Human Resources. As different Ministries have their own rationale for including sport in their range of activities, conflict was inescapable. As for the efficient use of funding, it is necessary for the Ministries to work together. One of the examples was illustrated by a senior officer in the MCT. He said:

This year (2007), the same sort of sport competitions for the elderly were held separately by MCT and Ministry of Health & Welfare (MHW). For us, it was so obvious that we had to do it, as it is a ‘sport’. But the MHW argued that the department in charge of policy for the elderly should take it. Fortunately, we reached an agreement to have a single competition from next year, planned by MCT (Interview, 20th December 2007)

In order to understand the government structure in relation to sport, a discussion of the procedure for the presidential election in the KSC, which takes charge of sport matters in Korea, is useful in terms of identifying government influence on sport governing bodies. For many decades, approximately fifty people who were heads of National Sports Federations voted for president of the KSC. It was inevitable that this sparked a controversy, due to the possibility that results could be manipulated by persuading just over half of them to vote in a certain way. In this connection, the comments of KSC president, Kim Jung Kil, after the public hearing, is noteworthy. He said:

I was elected through the votes of 48 heads of NSOs. It is impossible to eliminate things like close ties and friendship. The government can always influence the result as well. I think there should be a direct election for a job that represents Korean sport. In my time there was no woman or athlete who
had a vote. I am considering forming a pool of three thousand people [to act as an electoral college] (Sekye Ilbo, 14th December 2007).

According to Yonhap News (6th December 2007), the ‘Reform Committee’ put forward a proposal for the establishment of an electoral college of up to three thousand, which reflects the intentions of Kim Jung Kil. The idea was to include several groups of people including heads of NSOs, representatives of athletes and coaches, and staff in the KSC and NSOs. It could be argued that this shows an attempt to establish the KSC as a civil institution. Several criticisms were raised against this suggestion, such as the difficulty of dealing with such a large number of people, the high expected cost and the problem of factionalism. Although the new guideline was accepted in the general meeting of the KSC, it took many steps to revise the Statute, according to a senior officer in the KSC. The problem that led to Kim Jung Kil’s resignation started when the proposal of Ms. Ku Ahn Sook, as general secretary in the KSC, was not approved by the MCST. The fact that she did not have any sporting career or background failed to convince the MCST. Kim’s last words at the press conference expressed his frustration: “I should be the last president of the KSC who has to leave whenever the government changes.” (28th April 2008, Kyunghyang Newspaper). Kim confirmed the reason for his stepping down by saying “As long as the uncomfortable relationship between the government and KSC continues, it is bound to hinder the preparation for the Beijing Olympics.” (12th May 2008, Nocut news). In addition to the absence of a KSC president, it is important to note that two other main sport governing bodies, SOSFO and NACOSA (The National Council Of Sport for All) in Korea did not (in May 2008) have a Chair. As NACOSA is a Sport for All organisations it will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. Concerning SOSFO, the resignation of Park Jae Ho, CEO, for the purpose of running for the National Assembly explicitly shows that the position is for politicians who view it as a stepping stone to a high-profile political career, rather than for people equipped with a sport background and knowledge. A senior officer in SOSFO argued:

The appointment of CEO in our organisation is by a Minister’s recommendation and president’s appointment. I don’t think it means much. The Minister approves the board of directors. From the MCT point of view, we must follow the orders they
impose. We feel frustrated when there is no feedback between the two bodies. (Interview, 20th December 2007)

As for budget matters in sport the MCT, similar to other ministries, submits a budget plan to the Ministry of Planning & Budget for the period until June 30th for the following year. They review and evaluate it until September. It takes seventy days or so to acquire approval from the president. Presidential confirmation is followed by a Parliamentary review which tends to be a formality according to a senior officer in MCT. While the central government solely controlled funding over all the ministries in previous periods, it appears that the Ministries have more autonomy nowadays. A senior officer in the MCT explained:

The Ministry of Planning & Budget imposes a ceiling to each Ministry. However, each Ministry is allowed to decide how to use the money, the so-called, ‘top-down’ budget system. As for the case of MCT, it is necessary to submit a detailed plan, which indicates how much will be allocated to culture, sport, tourism, art and so on. If there is a hosting plan, such as Pyeongchang for the Winter Olympics and Incheon for the Asian Games, sport is likely to get more funding. (Interview, 20th December 2007)

Having carefully looked into a number of documents from the government and non-governmental organizations, it seems that the boundary between the ‘national treasury’ and ‘Fund (SOSFO)’ has become blurred. Generally speaking, the ‘national treasury’ is taxpayers’ money that the government spends where it is necessary. On the other hand, the SOSFO Fund is one where the Law specifies its usage depending on its characteristics. In this context, the problem is explained by a senior officer in MCT

Unlike other kinds of funds, the ‘Sport Promotion Fund’ is very comprehensive as ‘sport’ can be interpreted broadly. We used to spend national treasury money on elite sport for projects such as construction of facilities for the NSF and the infrastructure for mass participation. As the fund had more money to spare, it was spent on the management of KSC. (Interview, 20th December 2007)
A senior officer in KSC suggests that it no longer means much to separate two different sources, because the government combined all the public funds and took charge of distributing them, whereas the MCT used to control the entire Fund in the past. He argued:

In the case of the KSC, its proportion of the Fund has increased every year because the government keeps trying to cut the percentage in the national treasury and allocate a larger portion of the finance to Funds, whereas a 1:1 ratio used to be applied. Six percent of the annual budget is acquired by the KSC’s own businesses, and ninety four percent is said to be a combination of national treasury and Funds. (Interview, 13th December 2007)

This shows that the KSC is heavily dependent upon the government. A study by Park in Cheyuk (2004) shows that a similar phenomenon can be found in most of the NSOs: Seven sports federations were able to finance less than 10% by themselves, and ten sports raise between 10 and 20 % independently. Thirteen sports could raise their own funds comprising 20-40% of the whole budget. Considering that a number of presidents of the Federations donate a certain amount of the financial resources, the situation that the NSOs faced meant a considerable dependence on finance from the government.

As regards the financing of the TN Village while a great deal of money had been invested in running main training facilities, the question of insufficient ‘training days’ and the cost of usage of ‘outside village training fees’ (OVF, hereafter) surfaced with the appointment of Lee Erisa, a renowned former table tennis player and the first female head of the TN Village. As regards training days, the number of days athletes could train in TN Village was restricted to 110 days per year. The reason for this and Lee’s efforts to try to increase it can be heard in the radio interview. She said:

I strongly believe that the amount of training you put in is in proportion to the result. I actually said that I was willing to close TN Village after three months because we would run out of funds before the Asian Games in Doha unless something could be done urgently. Thanks to the media, the seriousness of the problem became known to the public and the government. It became a main
issue in the Parliamentary Culture and Tourism Committee in 2005. As a consequence, it increased to 150 days and 180 days in 2005 and 2006 respectively. (23rd May 2007, Nocutnews)

This quote indicates the influence (and perhaps growing influence) of media in Korea’s elite sport policy. Once public opinion is stimulated by the media, it attracts the attention from not only those in the elite sport community, but also even from MPs who are not directly involved in sport, as they recognise the importance of elite sport success to the nation. This offers some evidence, though slight, of the impact of civil society pluralism. Lee also explained why the increase of training days was critical. She continued:

The number of training days directly affects the allowances of athletes and coaches. As you know, coaches stay in TN Village and are away from home. 150 training days of training means that they only receive a salary for eight months. How can they live for four months without being paid? This year it has increased to 180 days but it only covers nine months. My mission is to make sure that they can get paid for 12 months a year. (Nocutnews, 23rd May 2007)

While Lee’s achievements were considerable, the way TN Village and NSOs use money allocated by the government ‘Outside Village training Fees (OVF)’ was closely examined. Doubt and suspicion over its transparency and efficiency caused a problem, according to Chun Young Se, an MP who was investigating this issue in the National Audit. He indicated that misuse of OVF caused a draining of the budget two months before the 2006 Asian Games. The OVF is earmarked for meals and accommodation outside the TN Village for those athletes who need to train in other places. Chun argued in a KBS radio interview:

According to our probe, eleven federations used more money than the whole period of last year until the end of this year (2006). It shows that the way they used the budget was not efficient at all. We consider that more OVF means more training, so that must not be blamed. The problem is that the allowances that athletes and coaches received didn’t match the OVF increases. Considering that there were not many international competitions compared to last year, there
was no reason for the number of training days to be increased. (7th, October 2006):

This argument is supported by the data. In the case of yachting, allowances increased only 32% whereas OVF increased 234%. Moreover, sports such as shooting, Taekwondo, cycling and squash showed an increase in OVF and a decrease in allowances, according to Newsmaker (20th December 2006). It is pointed out that the blame lies with each Federation for abusing its allocated budget. Table 5.19 shows the financial circumstances that TN Village faced just over half way through 2005.

We can also see the increase in the fees and allowances which athletes and coaches received over two decades in Table 5.20 which indicated that a significant increase occurred between 2002 and 2005. One of the factors that prompted the increase of monetary reward is believed to be the temporary promise that TN Village made to the athletes and coaches, who had bitterly complained about the military exemption given to the semi-finalist footballers in the 2002 FIFA World Cup (Sportschosun, 21st March 2006). The change of law brought about by the president’s ‘positive consideration’ was regarded as unfair to other sports and the military duty that ordinary male citizens had to fulfil.

A special fund for the Olympics was established after the Athens Olympics in preparation for the 2008 Games, which were to be held in Beijing for the first time. When President Rho Moo Hyun spoke with medallists, coaches and officials who had contributed to the success of the Athens Olympics, they said to him that it would be necessary to start training from the moment the disbanding ceremony was over, according to a senior officer in KSC. This was the beginning of separate resources for training fees for national athletes and the amount allocated rose from 15,167 million won in 2005 to 18,176 million won (Korea Sports Council, 2005). It can be argued that the government gave elite sport a top priority position in terms of the budget they allocated. The National Treasury finance for elite athlete’s training, especially for the Olympics, kept increasing. Even though the funding for reserve players and talented young students seemed to increase, the actual growth was not comparable to that for national players. The budget for national players’ training from SOSFOO was increased from 11,497 million won in 2003 to 18,012 million won in 2007, while the budget for
reserve development showed a relatively slight growth from 5,090 million won to 5,690 million won over the same period.

Table 5.19 Detailed accounts for the national athletes’ strengthening training fees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003 (won)</th>
<th>2004 (won)</th>
<th>2005, July (won)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OVF</td>
<td>3,069,384,300</td>
<td>2,933,323,930</td>
<td>3,151,722,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance</td>
<td>5,749,540,080</td>
<td>5,784,159,250</td>
<td>4,790,042,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>309,153,150</td>
<td>315,072,220</td>
<td>63,529,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>21,046,550</td>
<td>21,035,030</td>
<td>10,973,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pocket money</td>
<td>12,010,000</td>
<td>11,747,405</td>
<td>3,701,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>135,033,770</td>
<td>197,949,580</td>
<td>52,745,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>77,208,000</td>
<td>100,835,350</td>
<td>59,056,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual material</td>
<td>2,340,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>67,520,000</td>
<td>79,264,995</td>
<td>47,241,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training abroad</td>
<td>1,400,229,615</td>
<td>1,529,766,261</td>
<td>208,870,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign coaches</td>
<td>112,653,650</td>
<td>92,372,500</td>
<td>4,780,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info collection from abroad</td>
<td>68,718,260</td>
<td>123,000,940</td>
<td>38,056,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical and physio facilities</td>
<td>40,825,850</td>
<td>144,850,180</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve training condition</td>
<td>430,700,140</td>
<td>495,347,320</td>
<td>94,990,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,496,363,365</td>
<td>11,828,724,961</td>
<td>8,525,711,317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Sports Council (2005: 4-27~ 29)

Table 5.20 Improved financial rewards to national athletes and coaches (per person)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>18,000→21,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>11,000 →16,000</td>
<td>11,000 →18,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletes Daily allowance</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,000 →15,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coach allowance</td>
<td>763,000</td>
<td>1,041,000</td>
<td>1,521,000 →2,021,000</td>
<td>2,021,000 →2,800,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we have repeatedly used the term ‘Fund’, it is important to note how it is formed. It was an urgent task for SOSFO senior officers to brainstorm how to stabilise the fund in the long term, according to a senior officer in SOSFO who actually attended the meeting. He said:

Our aim was to increase the fund to 500 billion won in five years and 1 trillion won in ten years. In order to reach that goal, we had to seek other ways to make a profit. The one we found was the Japanese model in terms of business diversification (Interview 20th December 2007).

As a result, SOSFO runs a cycle race, a motorboat race, the sport toto (Lottery) and the Olympic Park tel. Forty percent of the proceeds of the first two sports and thirty percent of sport toto are required to be put into the ‘Fund’, which is the ‘National Sports Promotion Fund’ (www.sosfo.or.kr). The visit of a Chinese delegation to SOSFO in order to use the Korean case as a standard in terms of managing the fund, maintaining a legacy for considering post-Beijing Olympics, is noteworthy. The role of SOSFO should not be underestimated as it not only provides support to elite sports but also to the general public for projects such as artificial turf, or national sport centres throughout Korea. Details of the areas in which the SOSFO fund invests can be found in Chapter 6.

A senior officer in SOSFO argued:

If SOSFO could have run with only the budget from the government, we wouldn’t have needed to start sport toto, which encourages people to analyse sport and have more interest in it. It has had a great effect on some sports, as the profit is returned to the grassroots and NSOs. (Interview, 20th December 2007)

In the KISS report by Lee, Y.S.(1999) on the improvement of welfare systems for sports people, five categories were suggested: A special assistant fund, disabled pension, performance enhancement research pension, coaching research fund, sport scholarships and study-abroad support. In addition, military exemption, a fund for further education, a loan to launch a sport related businesses and awarding decorations can be included in the schemes. As noted in the previous periods, a typical example of welfare policy in
Korea’s elite sport is the lifelong pension scheme. As Lee, Y.S. (1999) said in his study on the welfare system for sports people, there is no country which pays a life-long pension to its athletes except Thailand. However, in Thailand it was only applied to a boxing athlete who won the first gold medal in the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. The pension is calculated based on the guidelines in Table 5.21. Of particular note is that there are two ways that athletes could receive money. While Table 5.22 (A) shows that the pay starts from the date when the amount was decided and lasts until the death of the recipient, and the upper limit is one million won, Table 5.22 (B) indicates that there is no upper limit for the lump sum. The pension for elite medallists sometimes appears in the media as incompatible with the situation for the general public. All the current and former athletes interviewed expressed frustration with the way Korean people perceive it and pointed out that the perception is far from true.

A former national athlete explained how difficult it is to receive the maximum amount of pension:

To receive one million won per month, an athlete needs to win a gold medal in the Olympics and a medal(s) in the World championship or two gold medals in the World Championship and two gold medals in Asian Games. Don’t you think it is something that should be reviewed that it requires this much effort to receive a million won? There used to be a clause that only for Olympic gold medallists could more than 1 million be granted. When the topic of incongruity was raised it became clear that, there were only four athletes who were eligible for it. Considering that the Olympics are held every four years, only ten or so athletes would be produced in a century. When people say we receive too much pension, I have no comment. (Interview, 5th December 2007)
Table 5.21 Points evaluation for athletes’ lifelong pension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gold</th>
<th>Silver</th>
<th>Bronze</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
<th>6th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olympics</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Championship 4 years cycle</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 years cycle</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 year cycle</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Universiad, Asia Competition</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.22 Points evaluation for athletes’ lifelong pension

(A) Monthly payment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Monthly payment</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20–30</td>
<td>300,000~450,000</td>
<td>From 20 points 150,000 won per 10 points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–100</td>
<td>525,000~975,000</td>
<td>75,000 won per 10 points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110 or Olympic Gold Medal</td>
<td>1,000,000 won (upper limit)</td>
<td>25,000 won per 10 points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 110</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,500,000 won per 10 excess points (5,000,000 won for Olympic Gold medals only)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(B) Lump sum payment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Monthly payment (1000 won)</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20–30</td>
<td>22,400~33,600</td>
<td>From 20 points 1,120,000 won per point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>34,160</td>
<td>From 30 points 560,000 won per point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The original name of the pension scheme is ‘Performance Enhancing Research Pension’. As Cheyuk (1993) indicated, it is certain that the scheme contributed significantly to the success of elite sport in Korea. As seen in Table 5.1, in the Montreal Olympics in 1976 after the initiation of pension scheme, Korea ranked 19th and has moved upwards dramatically since. It is critical that President Park was so eager to take action in terms of setting up the pension plan. The president’s donation of 40 million won was a sign of
how much he was committed to initiating the project. It prompted people of all levels of society to join in so that a total of 100 million was collected. When the senior officials met to discuss the use of the money, they decided to award pensions with the interest they could acquire from savings in those funds. Table 5.23 shows how the pension scheme developed.

Table 5.23 Number of pensions given to elite athletes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of recipients</th>
<th>The amount paid to the athletes (10 million won)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975-1992</td>
<td>19-133</td>
<td>8,519,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>1,571,600 (cumulative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>5,390,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1,317,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>1,461,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>1,693,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>1,004,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lee, Y.S. (1999: 83)

The point raised by the interviewees that pensions for elite athletes are different from those for civil servants or the military needs to be considered. While the pension for the latter can be transferred to his/her spouse in case of accidental death, the athletes’ pension does not have that kind flexibility. Also, the fact that the amount of pension does not increase with inflation was pointed out by the athletes. Above all, the most critical feature to consider is fairness among different sports. Athletes in some sports can participate in the World Championship every year, whereas those in other sports can compete only every other year. Players in archery could win several medals by competing in both individual and group matches, while Taekwondo athletes cannot win two medals in one World Championship. The KISS report (Lee, Y.S., 1999) argued that issues such as those athletes who did not reach the minimum number of points to receive a pension, guidelines for points between competitions, medals and different periods of world championships, and pensions of professional players need to be evaluated. The problem is that athletes lack channels through which to explain their opinions in Korean elite sport. Apart from the life-long pension for medallists in the
major Olympics, the KSC also awarded prize money to athletes and coaches as in Table 5.24.

Table 5.24 Reward for 2004 Athens Olympics medalists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medal</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>Individual Athletes</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coaches</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coaches</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>Individual Athletes</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coaches</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>$7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coaches</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze</td>
<td>Individual Athletes</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coaches</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coaches</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Medal</td>
<td>Fundamental Sports</td>
<td>Swimming (Only reach to the final round) Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Across the sports Athletes</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coaches</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Sports Council (2005: 3-4)

Let us now turn our attention to the issue of the military exemption. The related legislation was enacted in 1973 and stressed that those who get benefits from this should work for the sports sector for at least 5 years. Those included in the categories below (2007) can complete their duty by taking a four-week basic training course. Current Military Service Law the 49th Enforcement Ordinance states the guidelines for eligibility for exemption as: 1) Above 3rd in the Olympics (Team sports: Only participating athletes are eligible) 2) A 1st in the Asian Games (Team sports: Only participating athletes are eligible) 3) Above 16th in the FIFA World Cup [25 June 2002]
and 4) Above 4th in the WBC World Baseball Classic). According to a newspaper report, both 3) and 4) were removed at the end of 2007 (2nd April 2009, Maeil newspaper).

The problem with the financial reward system lies in the fact that the criteria change according to public opinion, which frustrates elite athletes, especially those in ‘non-popular sports’. Examples in recent times are the case of the 2002 World Cup and the World Baseball Classic in 2006. As soon as the 3) above was added, the athletes and coaches refused to train despite having the 2002 Busan Asian Games ahead. One of their demands was that those who won a gold medal (1st) in the World Championships should be eligible for military exemption as well. When the decision on the WBC was made, the National Coaches’ Association resented having to argue the rationality of the case of the World Championship. As Sportchosun (24th November 2006) said a few days later, the proposal by the National Coaches’ Association was submitted to the TN Village, KSC and the MCT. A discussion was held between the Ministry of Culture & Tourism and the Ministry of National Defence. Even though their efforts did not produce the outcome they wanted, it was a significant movement from the elite sport groups towards the government. A national coach said:

I was not in TN Village when it happened. When I heard from one of my juniors that they had decided to take action, such as refusing to train and writing a letter to the upper level of the government, I said ‘well done!’ to him. Elite athletes had never spoken out before because it was not acceptable in the sport culture of Korea. If you look at movie actors, they demonstrate strongly on the streets holding signposts and shouting what they want, as with the screen quarter issue. Why not elite athletes? (Interview, 7th January 2008)

The interviewed elite athletes and coaches agreed that there is no official route for them to convey their thoughts, complaints and feedback. It was believed that athletes had been accustomed to obey coaches’ instructions regardless of the situation. It is interesting to hear the voice from a national coach who was based in TN Village:

There is a Coaches’ Association in TN Village but…wouldn’t it be difficult for that kind of organisation to function properly? Most sports in Korea which win
lots of medals are individual sports, for example, judo, table tennis, wrestling and archery. I can only think of women’s handball in the group sports. What it indicates is that it is extremely hard for individual players to speak as one because they are not used to doing it. (Interview, 7th January 2008)

A professor in the Department of Taekwondo who was a national player argued:

The KSC should act as a spokesman for elite athletes, but it belongs to the government anyway. The only time when the current or former athletes get publicity is during the election season. Politicians use elite athletes as a tool. The problem is that once the election is over, they will be thrown away as has often happened historically. We should raise our voice more. (Interview, 4th December 2007)

Facilities

According to TN Village, in 2006, there were 15 training facilities which can accommodate 710 athletes, 500 men and 210 women. 1,175 athletes in 44 sports train approximately 210 days a year. The athletes in the summer and winter Olympics and the Asian Games are the ones eligible for the places. There is a number of enlarged or updated buildings in TN Village as shown Table 5.25. Funds have consistently been invested in TN Village in order to refurbish old and to construct new facilities and between 1999 and 2006 over 70,000 million won was invested. Of particular significance is that only money from the national treasury was spent. According to a senior officer in KSC it is estimated that the training fees for national athletes and costs for facilities in TN Village come entirely from the national treasury. (Interview, 13th December 2007)
With the large number of athletes trying to train in TN Village, it was necessary to build additional facilities in order to accommodate them. One such facility is Taebaek Village built on land owned by the Korean Forest Service and constructed in June 1996. It is
located in a hilly area and is mainly for the enhancement of cardio vascular fitness in twenty one sports including track and field, swimming, wrestling and skating. The other venue is Moojoo Village, another satellite town, which opened in August 1997 and is designed for the Winter Olympic athletes. In addition, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Athletic Village is under construction in Jinchun and Choongbook Province and a total of 355 billion won will be invested between 2005 and 2015. Korea Sports Council (2005) argued that the new village was essential because of the various legal restrictions (National Heritage Protection Area, Limited Development District and Military Installations Protection Area) on the current land where TN Village is located. There are also difficulties over the lack of usable land, pressure from the CHA (Cultural Heritage Association of Korea) to move the village to other areas and the need to provide a pleasant environment for national players, reserve players and talented students. The outdoor facilities will be for teams from field & track, hockey, tennis, archery and golf. It is also notable that a sport medicine & science centre will be included (Korea Sports Council, 2005).

It might seem that the intensity, frequency and length of training has been similar over the years. However, according to Park Jung Koo, who inspects daily life in TN Village, there has been a distinct change in training. In particular, quite a few sports have opted not to do training on Saturdays, presumably due to five-day working week in Korea. Reports indicate that the compulsory cross country on Saturdays is not required for all the athletes (Kyunghyang Newspaper, 2\textsuperscript{nd} December 2005). Of particular note is the fact that sport science is used more now in order to improve athletes’ performance than in previous periods, which will be discussed in detail in a later section. With the advent of the era of liberal democracy, various opinions were heard with reference to the existence of TN Village. Extreme voices called for its abolition, but with approximately 80,000 athletes trained each year in the TN Village (KSC: 2005), this does not seem to be feasible as it is very deep-rooted in Korean elite sport policy according to a current national athletics coach.

As shown in Table 5.26 substantial amount of money has been invested in TN Village to cover the cost of food, operating costs and daily allowances for athletes, coaches and staff. Under the authoritarian regime, the CEOs of Chaebol often visited the TN Village.
and handed over some ‘pocket money’ to encourage athletes. However, under the very
different circumstances today, Lee Erisa, the head of TN Village, asked the general
public to give more support to the athletes who were making huge efforts to produce the
results in the Beijing Olympics, emphasizing that she could not expect support from
Chaebol as in the past (Newsis, 7th August 2007).

Table 5.26 Number of athletes and the cost of running TN Village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of athletes</th>
<th>Running cost</th>
<th>Costs Outside of TN Village</th>
<th>Allowance</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2,805</td>
<td>1,436,303</td>
<td>2,219,240</td>
<td>3,009,611</td>
<td>6,665,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3,253</td>
<td>1,530,989</td>
<td>2,812,839</td>
<td>5,212,816</td>
<td>9,556,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>1,532,403</td>
<td>2,933,323</td>
<td>5,784,159</td>
<td>10,249,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,761 (22nd August)</td>
<td>1,270,257</td>
<td>3,233,806</td>
<td>7,250,690</td>
<td>11,754,753</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Sports Council (2005: 7-37)

Regarding the issue of the location of the TN Village, under the CHA control, 150
athletes and coaches demonstrated against the CHA’s decision which forbade the
change of Kamraekwan from a venue for fitness training to a female dormitory, as TN
Village asked. The remark below reflects on the movement ‘if only slight’ in Korean
elite sport towards a more pluralistic interest group based society. The decision making
in the elite sport community accepted opinions from athletes, coaches and the public
which were reinforced mainly by the media. A former Asian Games gold medallist
spoke in an excited tone:

I thought it was great! It’s the first demonstration as far as I remember. The
head of TN Village kept saying to us that we should look at what movie people
are doing. What she meant was that those often get tens of millions of won by
one rally. In that aspect, this movement was really important. It’s not easy
because sports people are educated to obey and not to ask questions in order to
become good athletes. It is highly important that the demonstration resulted in
the permission from the CHA to remodel the facility, which was previously
declined. (Interview, 7th January 2008)
Sport Science and Coaching

It is clear that sport science and medicine have been increasingly applied to coaching. High technology and scientific coaching were observed especially in the preparation for the Olympics. The extent or level of application of sport science or medicine varies from sport to sport. An active approach can be found in the KISS before the Beijing Olympics. The situation that worried athletes was that in Beijing there was air pollution and high humidity and this focused attention on sport science. According to Kookmin Ilbo (19th March 2008), KISS was considering distributing masks specially designed for athletes who were sensitive to air contamination, based on the results of a survey of 350 athletes, and ice jackets which delayed the rise in body temperature by cooling the heart. Another example of the application of science was a simulation programme in archery. The venue where archery would be taking place in Beijing was expected to be the narrowest ever and four metres away from the spectators’ seats. The Korean Archery Federation (KAF hereafter) was preparing the virtual stage for the Olympics for eight months with the support from the KSC. Yoon Byung Sun, the general secretary of KAF, said “Thanks to ‘Dartfish’, a software company, we could create cheering spectators, noise, and announcement of comments (www.newsis.com, accessed on 7th May 2008). It can be said that the funding that KSC provided to KAF was possible because of archery’s status in Korea, as one of the ‘Priority Sports’, based on the performances in past Olympics. The result of two golds, two silvers and one bronze in the 2008 Beijing Olympics could be considered as an indication of the value of sport science in relation to archery.

In contrast, sports which do not belong to the top category face a very different reality when it comes to support from the sport scientists. KISS, established inside the TN Village in 1980 and currently under SOSFO, operates teams which include several researchers. One of the core tasks in KISS regarding elite athletes is called ‘Support Teams for Priority’. Due to shortage of researchers, it is inevitable that support will be provided mainly for ‘Priority Sport’, based on the criteria shown Table 5.27. The teams are formed of researchers whose major field of interest is either sport biomechanics, physiology or psychology in order to cover the whole dimension of athletes’ performances. According to a current researcher one consequence of this pattern of
organisation is that individual researchers have to take charge of three or four sports (Interview, 3rd December 2007). This could eventually lead to many athletes not being able to benefit fully from scientific analysis and support. As a former national athlete argued:

I had many chances to be analysed by sport scientists as I was considered to be the best in my field. But for other athletes except very top ones, it is almost impossible to benefit from such things, which I think is a pity. (Interview, 7th January 2008)
## Table 5.27 Categorisation of Sports by KSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Level</th>
<th>OS/AS</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Sports</th>
<th>No. of sports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>OS</td>
<td>- medals won in Athens&lt;br&gt;- gold medal won in Sydney&lt;br&gt;- gold medal won in Winter Olympics or medals won in Turin</td>
<td>- Archery, badminton, boxing, shooting, gymnastics (men apparatus), handball (women), judo, table tennis, taekwondo, weight lifting, wrestling&lt;br&gt;- Fencing&lt;br&gt;- Ice Skating (short track, speed)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>- fundamental sports with potential to improve</td>
<td>- Athletics&lt;br&gt;Swimming&lt;br&gt;Gymnastics (women apparatus)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>OS or AS</td>
<td>- above 8th place in Athens&lt;br&gt;- gold medal sport in Doha</td>
<td>- Handball (men), hockey&lt;br&gt;- Cycle, horse riding, yachting</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AS</td>
<td>- gold medal sport in Doha</td>
<td>- Golf, softball tennis, bowling, rowing&lt;br&gt;- Canoeing, modern pentathlon, softball etc.&lt;br&gt;- Ski (jumping), curling&lt;br&gt;- Ice skating (Figure) biathlon etc.&lt;br&gt;-Baseball, basketball, football, tennis, volleyball</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OS or AS</td>
<td>- summer sports&lt;br&gt;- above 8th in Turin or Gold medal in Aomori Winter Asian Games&lt;br&gt;- winter sport&lt;br&gt;- professional sport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* OS: Olympic Sport * AS: Asian Games Sport

Source: TN Village internal document
According to the Sports White Paper (2006), KISS held several seminars to emphasise the importance of sport science to athletes and coaches and they designed a programme to analyse not only Korean athletes’ performances, but also that of their opponents. To do this, some researchers accompanied teams abroad or went overseas to collect data or expertise. One year prior to the Beijing Olympics, KISS opened an internet website for national athletes and coaches to enable them to access the information about their opponents’ strengths and weaknesses. However, for some Korean athletes the opportunity to benefit from the expertise of sports psychologists when they needed to discuss their own concerns and weaknesses was undermined by the lack of confidentiality. According to one formal national athlete:

When I was under great pressure for the biggest competition in my life, I went to talk to a researcher in KISS without discussing or informing my coach. Afterwards I found out that they passed on my words to the coach because they were all friends! Realising that staff in TN Village and KISS are so close, I couldn’t do it any more. I would rather talk to a medical psychologist outside who can keep what I say secret. (Interview, 7\textsuperscript{th} January 2008)

This comment is supported by a KISS senior researcher. He was proud of forming an intimate relationship with coaches in TN Village, which JISS (Japan Institute of Sports Science) envies. The director of the department of elite sport research in KISS stressed: “Our sport science continues to develop thanks to the cooperation between national coaches and KISS researchers”. The dilemma regarding the close networks between the two organisations and the protection of athletes’ privacy needs to be openly discussed.

Based on the interviews, it appears that not every sport favours sport science. Whereas some sports recognise the importance of it, others do not consider the application of it at all. A senior officer in the Korean Athletic Federation clearly understands the value of sport science which he learned from the Japanese case. He said:

Japan struggled a bit when they concentrated on mass participation rather than elite sport. However, thanks to the grassroots’ population, the government invested a lot of money into elite sport combining with sport science. They
invented technology that fits Asian athletes. It would be good to learn from them, but it is not acceptable in Korea’s Track and Field as long as Sohn Ki Jung’s medal in the Berlin Olympic remains (Interview, 10th January 2008)

A KISS researcher who is responsible for Track and Field criticised the attitude of coaches. He argued:

We are not going forward. The scientific approach has not been very successful yet. Coaches are too stubborn to apply science because they think experience is the best. They need more passion and enthusiasm to enhance the athletes’ performances. (Interview, 3rd December 2007)

Staff in the Taekwondo confidently stated that they were not in the least interested in sport science. A senior officer in Korea Taekwondo Federation argued:

We don’t really think sport science is required in Taekwondo. I guess sport science means providing good quality food and drinks for athletes, doesn’t it? We would possibly consider psychological aspects, but coaches have been dealing with this. (Interview, 17th December 2008)

Also, a junior officer in Kukkiwon (Taekwondo headquarters) said:

I think sport science is important in the record competitions. However, in a match situation against an opponent as with Taekwondo … maybe … strong mentality, agility, decision making are more important than sport science, in my opinion. (Interview, 7th January 2008)

As for swimming, it is intriguing to hear a former national swimmer’s voice. He said:

There is no sport science involved in swimming training. Well … I guess there has been some thought about it… but it appears very difficult to adopt, as far as I am concerned. From a psychological aspect, I can say that coaches have been playing a negative role! (Interview, 8th January 2008)
Although he was reluctant to give more details, it appears that his coaches had a tendency to emphasize high intensity training and strict discipline without considering individual athlete’s mentality.

The important feature to note is the government’s attitude to sport science when it comes to the real world. A senior sport science officer who was forced to become a spectator rather than a support for the athletes reported:

> When we could not enter the training ground and competition venue for major sport events because no AD [Accreditation] was given, it was so frustrating. All the AD is distributed to heads of NSOs, MPs and so forth. What can I say? ... We have been writing about this problem at the end of every report but no change has yet been made (Interview, 3rd December 2007)

It is said that the KSC funds researchers’ flights and accommodation for big sport events, including the World Championship, World Cup and Olympics, for ten days or so. In case of not getting any support from the KSC, a few federations such as weight lifting happily pays for the researchers as they know their importance, according to a senior researcher in KISS.

As regards sports medicine, there is a marked lack of consensus on the nature of sport medicine and when it became a significant aspect of elite athlete preparation. An orthopaedic surgeon who runs a private clinic divides sport medicine into two: “While the performance sector includes fitness trainers, KISS, weight and diet experts, the clinical sector consists of diagnosing patients, rehabilitation and treatment.” (Interview, 5th December 2007) A senior officer in Korea Athlete Trainers Association (KATA hereafter) defined sport medicine as a ‘school of thought that deals with prevention and treatment of disorders in athletes or people actively involved in sport’. (Interview, 21st December 2007).

Within Korea there is no consensus as to the definition of sport medicine and, perhaps not surprisingly, the government has shown little interest in this area of science. Sports doctors complained that there were too many regulations and restrictions imposed by
the government, which prevented them from making a profit in the sport medicine sector. As the orthopaedic specialist pointed out, this explains why major hospitals such as Samsung Medical Centre and Hyundai Asan Medical Centre have reduced the size of their sport medicine centres over the last decade. He also showed frustration with experience in his clinic:

I hope that the government does not tie us up with all kinds of red tape. They make all the regulations and force us to operate our clinics within their boundary. That’s why we could end up paying lots of fines. For example, we are not allowed to employ trainers in our clinic for rehabilitation weight training, as they are considered to be non-medical personnel. (Interview, 13th December 2007)

With regard to a licence to practice in the field of sport medicine, it is said that the government has no role to play because the licence awarded by the Korean Society of Sports Medicine is acceptable in Korea. However, although the Ministry of Health & Welfare is in charge of medical policy in terms of issuing certificates based on medical law, no policy can be found that refers to sport medicine, according to a medical doctor. However as a senior officer in KATA noted, there was a government proposal to establish a system of national licence in relation to sport medicine but the project in K university, which continued for five years, was eventually abandoned because of competition from other universities. He pointed out:

As far as I know, the Ministry of Health and Welfare planned to dispatch ‘exercise prescription specialists’ after setting up a national licence system. However, too many parties lobbied by a different route. That was a pain to policy makers in the government. (Interview, 21st December 2007)

During this period there was a notable change in athletes’ and coaches’ attitudes towards sport medicine. A medical doctor said:

A high school (16-18 years old) football team has had fitness training in our gym for two weeks. They have been coming to us for a few years now in the
off-season. The players take various tests and we train them based on individual data and scientific knowledge. It shows that coaches have begun to realise the importance of sport medicine and science to enhance athletes’ performance. (Interview, 13th December 2007)

This example is rare in amateur sport. The turning point in most coaches’ perception of sport medicine in Korea is either due to the importing of foreign coaches or studying abroad, according to an academic in sport medicine. However, he argued:

People started to hear the term ‘sports medicine’ around the 1988 Seoul Olympics. Half of the professional coaches are aware of it, particularly in baseball, football and basketball. As for amateur teams, I can say almost none of them recognise it. There are so many coaches who do not have a basic knowledge of physiology in relation to their sport and only stress strong mentality. (Interview, 13th December 2007)

Talent Identification

As mentioned of the beginning at this chapter, talent identification can fit well into the discussion of coaching as the two are very closely related. We can start by looking at the rule that the percentage of talented athletes in schools should not exceed 3% of the total number of students in the school and should have received prizes in certain competitions stipulated in the law in order to be eligible to enter high schools or universities as ‘Sports Talent’ students (Lee, H.L., 2003). Unlike other developed countries, Korean elite athletes did not rise from the club system. The centres for elite sport are said to be sport teams in normal schools across Korea. As noted in previous periods, sport schools produced high proportion of Korea’s high profile athletes. However, the role of the ordinary school should not be neglected.

The government offers funds to sport teams in ‘normal’ schools after evaluating their performance and policy towards elite sport. All the Olympic sports, twenty eight summer sports and six winter sports, can benefit from the scheme. Both national treasury and SOSFO resources were spent on these projects up until 2002. However,
only SOSFO money has been invested in school teams since 2003 (see Table 5.28). The amount of support since 2003 has stayed almost the same at 190,000,000 won (Sports White Paper 2006)

Table 5.28 The Government support to school sport teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Treasury</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The government’s support for sport schools since their establishment has continued. The funds are for training supplies, purchase of equipment, and competition hosting fees (Sports White Paper, 2005).

It was taken for granted that the student-athletes did not attend classes in the afternoon or participate in competitions during weekdays. This not only resulted in exploiting student athletes’ and depriving them of the opportunity to study but damaged their non-sport career prospects. A PE inspector from a District Office in Seoul argued:

There used to be no restriction on the percentage of student athletes who were eligible to be ‘Sports Talent Scheme’ (STS) recipients, but nowadays it cannot exceed 3% of the total number of students. It means that you can enter a university if you are good at certain sports regardless of your academic abilities. It received a positive response at the beginning. However, the STS led students to neglect study and the public to look down upon the elite student athletes because of their lack of academic background. As Koreans’ priority is to enter good universities, it has been recognised that they cannot win medals in parallel with attending classes. (Interview, 29th November 2007)

It has always been an issue that the gap between popular sports and unpopular sports increases every year. It is natural that young pupils who are regarded as potential
athletes tend to select certain sports with high earnings and a bright career. Unless the government sets up a policy for unpopular sports, it is expected that these unpopular sports would be short of athletes. Academic Kang Joon Ho from Seoul National University stressed that, as regards unpopular sport, the government should select talented athletes at a young age, train them and be responsible for their life after their sports career (27th October 2005, Donga Ilbo). A general secretary of an unpopular sport federation said, “We can’t properly support an Olympic national team because of lack of money and personnel. Support talented athletes? That’s out of our hands!” (Interview, 29th February 2008). The mother of Kim Yuna (the first figure skating champion in the International Skating Union Championship in April 2009) said:

Before Yuna got support at the age of 12 (1st grade of middle school), we had to pay lesson fees, rent, equipment, overseas training, costumes, equipment … totalling approximately 1 million won per month. The financial burden fell on the athletes individually. Once they were selected for the reserve or talent athletes group it got better to a certain extent.

A member of staff in the Korea Skating Union said “We partially fund the athletes for renting the ice rink, a training allowance and meal expenses” (21st November 2006, www.ohmynews.co.kr). The source continue to suggest that apart from this modest support there is no alternative for talented athletes in the individual sports but for them to rely on their parents to pay until they are qualified to have training in TN Village

After the introduction of foreign coaches in preparation for the 1988 Seoul Olympics, a number of coaches have come to Korea in various sports, as shown in Table 5.29. It seems that Korea has a tendency to invite coaches from abroad when hosting a mega event to produce the best possible result. The same concept can be applied to Athletics. It is regarded as vital to produce at least one medalist for the IAAF World Championships in Athletics which will be held in Daegu in 2011. A Performance Director in the Korea Athletics Federation said:

We have three foreign coaches in long distance, triple jump and high jump at the moment, but we aim to employ ones for all the areas (sports). For two
months while our athletes are training in Australia, we will evaluate them and make long term contracts for the success of 2011. (Interview, 10th January 2008)

Table 5.29 Import foreign coaches and its government’s support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sport (disciplines)</th>
<th>No. coaches</th>
<th>No. countries</th>
<th>The amount of fund (1,000 won)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>9(13)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>108,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7(9)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>91,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>9(10)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>110,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5(5)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4(4)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5(5)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>112,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3(4)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>92,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5(8)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>244,892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sport White Paper, 2006: 164

However, Korea also exports a number of coaches – often ex-athletes. According to a KSC official, it is extremely difficult to know the precise number, as individual athletes go abroad through their personal network, rather than via the official routes such as the KSC or NSOs. Let us hear the view of elite athletes regarding the issue of retired athletes going abroad for coaching. A former short track athlete said:

The reason quite a few former athletes have left Korea is that there are no places for them to coach. What makes me sad is that people tend to regard those athletes as ‘betrayers’. As there is no official way to go overseas through NSOs, athletes have to find ways by themselves through personal networks,
and they become vulnerable to being disadvantaged by a lack of knowledge of making a contract, and the chance to learn essential techniques is stolen from them at the end of the day. (Interview, 5th December 2007)

As Korea performed poorly in the 1988 Seoul Olympics in ‘Fundamental sports’ that have a great number of medals, the government designed a plan to develop talented athletes in track & field, swimming and skating. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism enacted the 1st National Sport Development 5-year Plan in 1993. The talent identification project started for the purpose of expanding the pool of elite athletes and developing those athletes up to international level. Initially athletics, swimming and gymnastics were selected, as they are considered to be fundamental sports. The talent identification for fundamental sport continued to expand with requests from other sports. In 1994 the number of sports increased to 8 (with the addition of archery, shooting, table tennis, skating and skiing), and to 9 (with the addition of badminton) in 1995, totalling 519 students. The procedure for identification is indicated in Figure 5-1. 600 elementary school athletes across Korea took a KISS scientific fitness test and 200 were chosen. The numbers of athletes increased with the growth of sports (Sports White Paper, 2005).

The selection process for talented youngsters (4th year of primary school: 11 years old to – 3rd year of middle school: 15 years old) is explained by one of the KISS researchers who is involved in the process. After receiving the list of the athletes recommended by each city and province, KISS researchers conduct tests and rank them, based on competition results, physical fitness and potential. The ‘Selection Committee’ is the main body that finalises decisions in terms of the kind of sports and gender. Once the pool is decided, they monitor the group continuously and replace some athletes who have injuries or, low level of fitness and poor records.
According to Korea Sports Council (2005), number of talented youngsters (Kum-na-moo) decreased after 1995 when the programme was integrated into the reserve players’ scheme. However, in 2002, 163 young people from track & field, swimming and gymnastics talented youngsters were separated from reserve players scheme. The following year, skating and skiing was added to the list, and the number of sports and athletes was predicted to increase in the future (Korea Sports Council, 2005). This increase was due to pressure from other sports to take part in the programme. The two hundred athletes who are selected receive 200,000 – 300,000 won per month and train together every summer and winter vacation for certain periods of time. A KISS researcher explained the situation of the scheme: He argued:

Initially 80 Track & Field athletes were selected as there are 48 events, and 15-20 people were allocated for swimming and gymnastics. Those in winter sports asked ‘Why not us?’ We call it ‘populism of administration’. Skating and skiing were then included. I think it shouldn’t be like this. The money that is supposed to be invested in Track & Field is being taken away. I believe that they should focus on certain sports and concentrate the funding. (Interview, 3rd December 2007)

**Competition Structure**

In this section, the debate on National Sports Festival in terms of its existence and on rights of student athletes will be discussed. As regards the former, it is notable that the size of the festival grows every year. In the 87th NSF in 2006 in North Kyungsang province, 30,756 participated and 350 new records were set (SOSFO, 2007). It can be agreed that NSF had played an important role in identifying talent in Korea’s elite sport.
However, the issue of continuing this competition or changing its form has remained on the agenda for a long time. With the abolition of the games being suggested by one MP. A senior officer in KSC argued:

We should be careful not to harm students when deciding policy. Rather than insisting on the abolition of the competition or hosting it every two years, the focus should be on improving and creating an environment where students do not neglect their study. (Interview, 13th December 2007)

The idea of hosting NSF every other year had been proposed by Parliament in the past. However, it had the potential to cause a number of problems, according to a senior officer in KSC. He indicated:

Most of the teams in this country operate for the purpose of participating in NSF, especially those that belong to cities or municipalities. It means that the teams are likely to give up as soon as the NSF is not held annually. (Interview, 13th December 2007)

The momentum which drove the NSF to be continually regarded as critical, was the strategy by the government which awarded teachers points if their teams achieved places above third. According to a PE inspector, the points system explain why there are many more heads of schools from a PE background than there are from other subjects. However, the side effect of this points scheme for teachers was that it resulted in abuse of student athletes in order to get them to reach the target at all costs, as a performance director in Track & Field argued. It is also intriguing to hear a different view from an officer in the Ministry of Education and Human Resources who commented:

NSF is directly related to the promotion of teachers. Superintendents in each city and province have all the authority. The question arises whether we (PE related people) need to take the lead in eliminating NSF which gives advantage to PE teachers? (Interview, 18th December 2007)
For the young athletes participating in the competitions, it was taken for granted that they could neglect their academic studies but as Korea changed to a liberal democracy in the 1990s, stories emerged about athletes who were in conflict with the KSC or their Federation. A representative example is a national swimmer holding a 50 metre Korean record, Jang Hee Jin. Jung Yoon Soo, a sport columnist, evaluated the problems in Korea’s elite sport by looking at Jang’s case. He commented:

The Jang Hee Jin scandal showed the weakest link that Korean sport education has. We should firstly call her a ‘second year middle school girl’ rather than a ‘swimming athlete’. As a student Jang resisted entering TN Village, arguing that she wanted to swim without quitting her studies, which are a ‘basic’ requirement. However, the Korean Swimming Association regarded her only as an ‘athlete’ who could win a gold medal, so they suspended her from the national team. This was a ‘normal decision’ in Korean elite sport (Jung, 15th January 2006).

Jang Hee Jin’s experience supports the observation by Volkwein and Haag (1994) which suggested that athletes should be regarded as whole human beings rather than machines. It does not appear to be working well in Korea where for example a number of competitions are held during the week in term time.

From the human rights perspective, a comment by a former academic should be noted.

In the era of ideology, it was true that winning against North Korea was the most powerful tool for showing to the world we are superior to the North. However, now we have to see TN village considering athletes’ human rights. In a democratic society, we cannot blame athletes who run away from TN Village and refuse to enter the Village any more. In the past, athletes were criticised for this behaviour, but nowadays we can’t force them to stay. (Interview, 28th June 2007)

The role of the media needs to be touched upon here. While the media in previous periods were not very active in reporting the reality of student-athletes’ life, the articles
and TV programmes in recent times have raised the awareness of the public regarding the abuse or unfair treatment of athletes. This might be taken as evidence of a (very) tentative change in Korea from an elitist to a more open pluralist nation, which means that civil society organisation, such as the Sport of the Civil Coalition, can have an impact with the help of the media on the sport policy agenda. According to a former Minister of Culture and Tourism, partly as a result of public and media pressure a task force was established with the close cooperation of the Ministry of Culture & Tourism and the Ministry of Education & Human Resources in 2007, to address the problems forcing student athletes, especially with reference to the pressure to neglect their academic studies.

Hosting Strategy

Following the success of the Seoul Olympics in 1988, Korea continued to bid for mega sport events with bids being led by the government until the early 1990s. This trend began to change with the involvement of greater local autonomy in 1993. The power concentrated in central government was distributed to cities, municipalities and provinces, which motivated the heads of those administrations to produce visible outcomes. In this respect, hosting sport events was seen as a significant opportunity for these politicians. The major events that Korea has bid for in more recent years include the FIFA World Cup (2002), Busan Asian Games (2002), Daegu World Athletic Championship (2011) and Pyongchang Winter Olympics for 2010 and 2014.

It appears that the positive impact that came with the introduction of the ‘Local Autonomy System’ influenced the government (both central and local government) to consider continuing to host sport events in the future. As a result, several events were able to be held across Korea, as shown in Table 5.4. The pinnacle of hosting success was the 2002 FIFA Korea/Japan World Cup (2002 WC, hereafter) when Korea became only the 11th country in the world to host both the Olympics and the World Cup.

The bidding process for the 2002 WC is instructive. Considering that Korea and Japan were at loggerheads for historical reasons, as discussed in Chapter 2, the bidding process aggravated the simmering tensions (Mclauchlan, 2001). The fact that Japan was
the only candidate for three years before Korea announced its bid intensified the tension between the two countries. As 2002 WC was the first FIFA World Cup in the 21st century, as well as the first one in Asia, both Korea and Japan were keen on acquiring the hosting rights. As McLauchlan (2001) argued, hosting the 2002 WC would be a great opportunity for Korea to, inter alia, expose the big conglomerates’ products to potential international customers. The appointment of Koo Pyong Hwoi, a chairman of LG group, as head of the World Cup bidding Committee was evidence of the Korean government’s commitment. As Cha (2009) argued, these mega events, including the 2002 WC, have become multimedia global entertainment bonanzas, financed by a great deal of corporate sponsorship. Co-host nations Korea and Japan had public and private sector contributions in the range of $4 billion for constructing seventeen new stadiums and related facilities, and the broadcasting rights sold by FIFA were worth $800 million. An examination of the motives for hosting the 2011 World Athletic Championship indicates that contributing to the development of elite athletes was rarely a primary motive. Daegu, the third biggest city in Korea, launched its bid in order to revive its local economy, which had been in deep recession for a long time after the textile industry, regarded as its main resource, declined. As a senior officer in the Korea Athletic Federation argued, the bid was led by a former Minister of Foreign Affairs who took charge of the organising committee. The former and current mayors also showed great enthusiasm for the bid. However, the enthusiasm for hosting did have significant consequences for elite sport policy as is illustrated by the this comment from a senior officer: “To be honest, we preferred to win the bid for 2013 not for 2011. We’ve got too much pressure now to train athletes who can get a medal and we are too short of time.” (Interviewed 10th January 2008) When looking at the talent identification, a significant increase in funding can be linked to the hosting of events due to the fact that the government realised the importance of a good performance by the host country. It is expected that these opportunities might lead the Korean people to be more interested in athletics, so that more talent can be identified and trained through the broad range of grassroots participation opportunities.
Chapter 5: The Case study of Elite Sport

The Role of Business

It has been continuously stressed that the Chaebol’s role in Korean elite sport has been immense, especially under the military regime, but it seems that different characteristics can be found at different times. Until the 1980s, there was no other option for the Chaebol but to obey the government’s instructions to create teams for a league and provide financial gifts to elite athletes to raise their morale. However, it can be seen that, from the 1990s, Chaebol was involved in sport in order to raise the profile of the company through public relations and to demonstrate social responsibility. According to Park, Y.O. (1997), the heads of eight and six NSOs were employed by Hyundai and Samsung respectively and the amount they invested in sport was 15 billion won. Park, Y.O. (1997) also pointed out that Chaebol’s approach to sport can be regarded as being based on a ‘market principle’. Considering that consumer demand was increasing both in Korea and globally, mega-events were a good opportunity for Chaebol to lead people to associate sport with its brands or products. She said:

Chaebol’s investment in sport has some logic. Not only do they target the industry to gain substantial advantages from connections with sport or sport stars, but they also want to take advantage of the environment surrounding sport. Considering that sport has a strong influence on people around the globe, those with an ambition to expand their market could expect to have more opportunities to advertise their brand or products by being involved in sport (Park, Y.O., 1997).

A journalist pointed out that the motive for Chaebol to support sport has changed over time. He argued:

Chaebol are caught up and can’t get out of it. They genuinely want to wash their hands of running sports teams. Samsung has a number of sport teams. Having gained so much profit, it cannot imagine stopping operating the teams. I think they continue to do it for the purpose of giving back to society rather than for public relations or political reasons. I am sure that there is no pressure from the government today. (Interview, 26th June 2007)
The IMF crisis in 1997 clearly confirmed the status of sport in Korea, and sport was viewed as the first sector to be removed by many Chaebol companies when restructuring was required. It started with the disbanding of 50 teams in 19 sports from 1997 to April 1998. From January to March 1998, 10 teams were liquidated which resulted in 212 male athletes, 143 female athletes, 39 head coaches and 35 assistant coaches losing their jobs (Lee, H.R., 2003). It might be argued that it meant athletes lost the opportunity to continue their career and young players quit playing sport owing to the uncertain future. Notwithstanding these circumstances, Samsung’s long standing commitment to elite sport is noteworthy. According to a senior officer in the Samsung Sports Bureau:

Since the formation of the Samsung Sports Bureau in 1992, not one single team has disappeared so far. Other Chaebol gave up operating sport teams immediately after the IMF crisis, but we resisted following the trend. When the upper management suggested that we had better reduce teams, we kept saying we would cut some costs instead. We are very proud of that. Of course, the willingness of the owner was a clear key factor. If he said ‘remove’, we would have had no other option than to do so, would we? (Interview, 12th December 2007)

The establishment of Samsung Training Centre (hereafter, STC) is an exceptional feature of the Korean elite sport development system which again shows the commitment of Samsung to elite sport. The purpose of the STC is to produce as many as national elite level athletes as possible, according to a senior officer, and more than fifty percent of them are considered to be national level athletes at present. Ahn Byung Chul, a Head of STC confidently said “It is the first trial for a business to build this kind of facility. I think once it bears fruit it will be spread to others and finally contribute to sport development in Korea.” (Seoul Newspaper, 9th November 2007).

Before we discuss STC more detail, it is necessary to look at the role of Samsung Sport Science Institute (SSSI, hereafter), launched in 1996. The idea was proposed by Ahn, the current head of STC, who believed that a scientific approach was essential for the development of sport teams in Samsung. The initial cost to form the Institute, including
the purchase of appropriate machines and the staff payroll, is estimated to be less than 1 billion won, according to a senior officer in STC. He argued that they used to say the cost of creating the Institute was even cheaper than the price of one athlete. In the early years of the SSSI many tests were conducted an athletes to establish a series of scientific ‘norm’ to inform both training and rehabilitation strategies. According to Seoul Newspaper (9th November 2007), one hundred and thirty athletes per year face a rehabilitation phase caused by injury. The data accumulated over a decade makes it possible for those athletes to receive a personalised programme. The suggestion of creating an STC was proposed in 2001. However, it was not launched until 2005-2006, according to a Samsung senior officer. The land on which STC was built is in Sooji, just on the outskirts of Seoul. Samsung Life Insurance, which owns the property, financed the building of the STC and each of Samsung’s subsidiaries pay rent to use it, depending on the ratio of occupancy. As the officer argued, each subsidiary is so anxious not to pay a penny more than necessary due to the issue of internal accounting. The state-of-the-art facilities, worth 46 billion won, include rooms for weight training including rehabilitation equipment, fitness training, basketball, table tennis, volleyball, taekwondo, wrestling, 300 metre track and swimming pool with an aqua therapy machine. The motive of investing a great amount of money to build this facility was to gather together teams that were spread out in various places, according to a senior officer in STC. He explained the main reason to build the STC:

We thought that there could be a synergy effect if we gathered together a number of teams for the purpose of efficient scientific training, providing a balanced diet in terms of nutrition, and so on. Instead of employing 2 or 3 staff for each team for cooking, we need only bring one nutritionist and nine people who are in charge of athletes’ diet. (Interview, 30th November 2007)

It is said that eight teams, all from indoor sports, were encouraged to move to the STC. It was inevitable that certain sports were excluded, for example, football, baseball and badminton that already had their own training grounds in other venues. It could be questioned whether there was any kind of ‘policy learning’ in creating STC. According to a senior officer in STC, he considered that the strict control in TN Village would lead to the failure of STC. Despite certain restrictions on things such as alcohol, smoking
and night snacks, athletes are allowed to enjoy their time, which is a big difference between STC and TN Village. (Interview, 30th November 2007)

We now turn to the commercialisation of sport as it affects coaching, sport science and medicine, using the example of a swimmer, Park Tae Hwan. As soon as Park won three gold medals in the 2006 Doha Asian Games ‘Speedo’, one of the world’s eminent swimwear brands, proposed a $30 million deal with full support by organizing a team of seven experts composed of a Korean coach, foreign coach, personal trainer, physiotherapist, nutritionist, interpreter and training partner, according to Joongang Ilbo (17th January 2007). A special programme was designed after conducting several tests to individualise the programme so that it perfectly fitted Park’s needs. Data analysis was to be conducted by Speedo headquarters in London (Sportchosun, 23rd January 2007). It was expected to provide the optimum way for Park to reach the target, which was winning a gold medal in the 2008 Beijing Olympics. It was significant in the sense that it was unprecedented for a world-wide sports company to have a long-term plan to sponsor an amateur athlete in Korea. In the Beijing Olympics Park won a gold medal in the 400m freestyle and a silver medal in the 200m freestyle, which were the first Olympic swimming medals in Korean history.

The project was adapted from the case of Hackett in Australia and Phelps in the U.S, according to a senior officer in Korea Swimming Association who initiated the scheme. He also said that the only support Park Tae Hwan received from the government was administrative aid, such as issuing an ID card when he went abroad for training or competitions (Interview 5th December 2007). However, the Federation also accepted the request when Speedo asked for Park to re-enter the TN Village eight months before the Beijing Olympics. ‘The urgency of winning a medal’ was a main factor in the Federation’s approval (Kookmin Ilbo, 21st February 2008).

The Role of Armed Forces

Technically, the armed forces can be referred to as soldiers rather than athletes. However, when we look at the amount of time they put into training the facts do not appear to support this views. As ordinary Korean male citizens, it is mandatory for the
athletes to take basic military training of five to six weeks, consisting of a few one to three day bouts of raid training, shooting, mental training and education for a successful induction into the army, including regulations and army behaviour. Upon completing a certain period of training, they become qualified as ‘army national players’ and are eligible to participate in various competitions. The Sangmu athletes were reluctant to answer and hesitated to express their opinions when asked the question by the researcher “Would you consider yourself as a soldier or a full-time athlete?” Looking at the annual training plan and the daily schedule described in the interview scripts, it would be appropriate to consider them as full-time athletes rather than military personnel. Except for the specific dates allocated for the above mentioned training, military drills cannot be found. As one of the athletes in Sangmu revealed, Sangmu athletes can concentrate on a daily practice either with the team or individually, unless he aims to be promoted and stay longer in Sangmu.

Table 5.30 Annual training schedule in Sangmu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main training</td>
<td>Strengthening physical fitness(winter)</td>
<td>Participation in competition</td>
<td>Strengthening physical fitness (summer)</td>
<td>Participation in competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remark</td>
<td>- basic fitness</td>
<td>Specific technical training</td>
<td>Concentrate on sports aim at participating in winter</td>
<td>Specific technical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Specific fitness (each sport)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sangmu internal document

A football player who joined from one of the K-League teams argued that the intensity and amount of training in Sangmu is higher than for the professional team. A senior officer in Sangmu confirmed:

We have seen many players who were not recognised as talented before set a new record and win medals. The fact that athletes can keep their career while serving in the army is a magnificent benefit for them. With the systematic and
high intensity training, we are able to produce medallists who were not previously as good as they are now. (Interview, 7th December 2007)

It leads us to question what kind of qualifications the athletes need in order to enter Sangmu. Sangmu publicly revealed the criteria which athletes in KOC need to meet. They must be one of the following: 1) a current or former national player 2) a current or former national reserve player (member of a regular team) 3) a university or youth national player 4) a winner of 1st, 2nd and 3rd prize in either domestic or international competitions or 5) a player considered to show great potential based on fitness, talent and record. The final selection is made based on the application document and physical tests. (www.sangmu.mil.kr)

All the interviewees agreed that Sangmu is regarded as the second best option for male elite athletes next to receiving military exemption. The important point to note is the criteria for the allocating the number of athletes in each sport. The guidelines from Sangmu suggest that it is calculated on the number of entries for competitions such as the national sport festival or CISM plus some reserves in case of injuries, but some sports are given a specific quota based on the group they belong to. Some individual sports such as wrestling and weight lifting are given a quota based on twice the number of athletes in each weight category plus some reserves for the same reasons as group sports. The impact of military institutions on Korean society is said to be in decline compared to the era of authoritarian government. However, Sangmu’s role in elite sport cannot be underestimated. The rule which requires all male citizens to serve in the military for a given time makes Sangmu more prominent in terms of offering opportunities for elite athletes to continue their career. In this period, the debate on the maintenance of Sangmu is the key issue with which to begin the discussion. Having faced the IMF crisis in 1997, the abolition of Sangmu was seriously considered in Kim Dae Jung’s government for the purpose of reducing the defence budget. A senior officer in Sangmu described the background situation in the Ministry of Defence at that time. He said:

Immediately after the IMF crisis, three restructuring plans were proposed in the Ministry, which were the dissolution of the Armed Forces Nursing Academy,
Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and Sangmu. Fortunately, all three of them survived. As for Sangmu, it ended up being resolved by small-scale restructuring, thanks to the collective protest of sport related officials. (Interviewed, 7th December 2007)

According to Lee, H.L. (2003), the sport related officials insisted that Sangmu should exist for Korean elite sport at all costs. If all male athletes who are in peak form in their sports career must serve in the army without being able to carry on their training, there would be an inevitable decline in their performance, leading to the weakening of Korean elite sport. As Lee, Y.S. (2001) commented, there was a strong voice in the government suggesting that it was spending too much money on the non-combat army, and even Sangmu’s performances had not been very satisfactory, although the annual budget of Sangmu (4 billion won) is 0.028 percent of the national defence budget (14 trillion won). A comment below from a senior officer in Sangmu demonstrates aspects of both pluralism and elitism:

In my opinion, we should give credit to the heads of the national sports federation who desperately tried to persuade people in the government. The fact that the then Minister of Culture and Tourism was Park Ji Won, a right hand man of the president, must be an important factor as well. (Interviewed, 7th December 2007)

There are some very weak elements of MSF here. Regarding a policy stream, Sangmu’s case could be considered similar to transportation in the sense that it is unlikely to attract attention from the government unless there is a crisis. The proposal by the Ministry of Defence to abolish Sangmu would indicate that it was not only the government that regarded the situation as major crisis, but the elite sport community as well might have seen it as a critical issue. Considering that there were very few individuals, namely the President and Ministers, who made key decisions in sport in the past, a difference in the decision making process can be observed. More people from various organisations were now allowed a voice, such as senior officers in NGBs, heads of NSOs, the media and pressure groups, as well as top public servants including the President which indicates that Korea might be exhibiting elements of elite pluralism.
rather than the established elitism (neo-elitism). Having survived the controversy, it might even more difficult to request additional funding for Sangmu, according to a senior officer in Sangmu. He argued:

If we could succeed in getting more funding, it would only be possible after a few years, as the annual plan is made once every five years. However, it is likely that our request to build an indoor gymnasium will be behind requests for improving barracks or quarters and so on. (Interview 7th December 2007)

A few changes in the groups to which sports were allocated in over time can be found. The current structure is shown Table 5.31. However, what prompted the entrance and exit of certain sports is not clear. Various opinions have been expressed. According to a veteran journalist, some restrictions existed at the initial stage in Sangmu. He said:

Sangmu was supposed to run only ‘unpopular sports’ teams that the companies and schools were not interested in, plus fundamental sports such as athletics, swimming and gymnastics. Sangmu, nevertheless, could not resist creating ball game sports because there was hardly any media attention for ‘unpopular sports’. (Interview, 28th June 2007)

Table 5.31 The categorisation of the sport in Sangmu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st competition group</th>
<th>2nd competition group</th>
<th>3rd competition group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>football (men and women)</td>
<td>baseball, badminton</td>
<td>rifle, pistol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>basketball, handball</td>
<td>volleyball, tennis</td>
<td>skeet, air rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boxing, rugby</td>
<td>hockey, gymnastics</td>
<td>aquatics, archery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>judo, taekwondo</td>
<td>weightlifting, table tennis</td>
<td>fencing, athletics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wrestling</td>
<td></td>
<td>cycling, pentathlon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sangmu Homepage, www.sangmu.mil.kr

Another journalist indicated that public opinion was strongly influenced by the creation of teams in Sangmu, emphasizing that the role of the media was also a very important factor in directing public opinion. He believed that general opinion carried great weight,
although the preferences of a commander or high officials in Sangmu could affect the decision (Interview, 26th June 2007). A perceptive opinion was provided by one of the Sangmu officials. He argued:

I have been trying to find the answer for a long time. Frankly speaking, I don’t know. As far as I know there were individual sports, group sports and shooting. But I can’t see the rationale for the (current) categorisation. Ball size? The number in the squad? Nothing fits perfectly. (Interview, 7th December 2007)

It is also pointed out by Sangmu’s senior officer that the government views the funding of elite sport as a matter for the Ministry of Culture & Tourism rather than the Ministry of Defence. The resources from SOSFO, approximately 2.3 billion won, used to be an important source of funding for Sangmu, commented the Chief of Sangmu. He argued that the fund was not available when the new ‘Fund Law’ came out because it did not allow Sangmu to receive money twice from the government. It prompted Sangmu to put pressure on each federation to provide some financial assistance. As a consequence, the cycling Federation came up with substantial aid and Samsung (Athletics) and Yonex (Badminton) showed a commitment either as a president of the Federation or a main equipment sponsor. Even though no facilities have been built by the commercial sector yet on the Sangmu site, it is expected that businesses will be more involved in the new era of Moonkyung, where the new Sangmu will be located. Before we look into Sangmu’s transfer to Moonkyung, let us look at the current facilities. As we discussed before, all the indoor facilities were established between 1986 and 1992, except an indoor shooting range built in 2000. As regards the indoor shooting facility, it is known that the president of the Korean Biathlon Federation spent 100.4 million won, according to a senior officer in Sangmu. The majority of outdoor training facilities were made between 1986 and 1988 apart from a baseball park in 2001. The modern pentathlon facility in Sangmu is the only one in Korea which provides training places for athletes from outside Sangmu as well. Those facilities which were built in the mid 1980s and 1990s are believed to have remained unchanged. The reason for Sangmu’s move, despite the existing range of training facilities, is a new city construction scheme in Songpa District where Sangmu is now located. The means of raising approximately 408 billion won is described by a senior officer:
After the Korean Land Cooperation sells the current land, they will build facilities in Moonkyung and donate them to Sangmu. Two agreements were concluded between the organisations: the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Construction & Transportation, the Chief of Sangmu and the Director of the Korean Land Cooperation. (Interview, 7th December 2007)

The selection of a venue was competitive as cities or provinces viewed having Sangmu in their city as a good opportunity for the local economy and public relations. The formalities of the transfer that would be expected to be completed between the end of 2010 and early 2011 are shown in an internal Sangmu document. First, Sangmu would open its facilities to the public once their sport teams finished their training. It aims to contribute to the welfare of officers, families and the Korean people in general. They also propose to create a tentatively named ‘Sangmu Facilities Management Foundation’ for the purpose of operating and maintaining the facilities. It is expected to take the burden away from Sangmu and also offer job opportunities to people in the Moonkyung area. Second, Sangmu plans to bring the commercial sector in to form a ‘leisure town’, including an eighteen-hole golf course, sports medical centre, water park and four-season-sleigh course. Third, Sangmu is committed to providing programs for the general public, for example, a youth basketball class. The profit from these activities would be reinvested in supporting and training athletes in Sangmu.

It is notable that Sangmu revealed an interest in working with commercial sectors, which was tacitly unacceptable under military rule. It can be argued that one individual who leads the decision making can change the whole approach of an organization, in this case, the Chief of Sangmu, Yang Se Il. Chief Yang regarded the situation of a transfer as an opportunity for Sangmu to move forward in terms of becoming increasingly independent of the government and raising the profile of Sangmu. The swift and active evaluation of the plan in Moonkyung resulted in the approval by the Minister of Defence so that the project could continue. It could also attract interest from senior policy makers, not only in Kyungbook Province where Moonkyung is situated, but also adjacent Daegu where the 2011 World Athletics Championship will be held, as regards building a warm-up facility (Internal document, Sangmu).
Conclusion

In this section, the usefulness of meso-level frameworks and macro theories will be discussed in the context of Korean elite sport. The key strategies of Korean elite sport policy will be reiterated and the centre of gravity of its current situation in terms of decision making will be considered.

It is important to review the frameworks discussed in Chapter 3 with reference to the case of elite sport in Korea. First, MSF argues that there are three streams, which are problem, political and policy streams. Of particular note is the concept of ‘policy entrepreneur’ which describes people who are willing to devote their time, reputation and energy for the purpose of future promotion or pursuing a long-term political career (Kingdon, 1995). The term ‘policy broker’ in the ACF implies a similar meaning, although ‘policy broker’ tends to stress the role of ‘liaising’ between actors more. However, although these two concepts are appropriate to apply to a pluralistic society, it is difficult to fit them into the case of Korean elite sport as it has exhibited a highly elite-centred policy making process, despite significant government change, which will be discussed later on. As regards the Policy Community (PC) framework, it could be suggested that a PC has existed over time regardless of the characteristics of the government. However, it is doubtful whether it is a PC as defined by Rhodes and Marsh. In relation to Korean elite sport, policy tended to be dominated by a very small policy elite led by the President and drawn from high ranking politicians or business leaders. It is important to note that this “PC” was constructed due to presidential power, rather than emerging organically. Therefore, to refer to the decision making process in elite sport as being located within a policy community would be inaccurate. Further evidence of the inapplicability of the PC or ACF is provided by an examination of the actions of coaches and athletes in relation to military exemption, which were reactive in the sense that they responded to an agenda set by others, rather than being proactive. The fact that none of the three frameworks is useful suggests that Korea needs a different framework and, through discussing those theoretical tools highlights the elements that are missing in Korean elite sport.
It is significant to note that many aspects of the policy process in Korea have been less elitist in recent years as the government has moved from an authoritarian to a civilian regime. However, when it comes to high performance sport policy, it appears that the state elite have been the ones who have dominated, even if there has been some slow and slight moderation through the development of lobbying and the capacity of coaches and athletes to protest, with some support from the media. Also, it can be seen that the authoritarian government left critical legacies in Korean elite sport, such as the enactment of the NSPL, the establishment of SOSFO, a life-long pension and the military exemption scheme for elite athletes.

It can be argued that the state’s high performance policy was driven and affected by three separate but interwoven strategies: the hosting strategy, the business strategy of Chaebol and policy developments in the military. First, hosting sport mega competitions prompted the government to invest more money in elite sport development. It was deemed necessary if not-essential for a host country to produce good performances for the global audience, and also to build high quality facilities and other infrastructures. Second, the influence and power of Chaebol can still be considered substantial, even if the motive for Chaebol being involved in sport has changed over time. Until 1992, Chaebol had no other option than to obey the orders of the government, for instance, creating or sponsoring sport teams. Under the authoritarian governments it was win-win situation, because substantial benefits were awarded from the government such as tax exemption while they maintained a good relationship with the government. With the emergence of a civilian president, sport was viewed as a tool for public relations throughout the 1990s. This phenomenon remained until the IMF crisis hit and caused a majority of the teams to be disbanded. Nevertheless, a few Chaebol remained involved, notably Samsung, who refused to abandon operating teams based on the philosophy that it was a social responsibility to give something back from selling products to general public. In this context, neo-elitism is applicable in that business plays a big role in sustaining and developing Korea’s elite sport. Third, the contribution of the Armed Forces, so called Sangmu, should not be neglected in the success of Korean elite sport. Under the conscription system due to ‘at-war’ circumstances in the Korean Peninsula, the device of military exemption by Park’s government encouraged athletes. For the limited numbers in each sport who were not
eligible for exemption, Sangmu provided the opportunity for athletes to serve in the army and train almost full-time. It is important to emphasize that the status of Sangmu was maintained, even during the public expenditure crisis in the late 1990s, thanks to the influence of groups within the elite sport policy sector.

Finally, it is instructive to note where the centre of gravity lies in Korean elite sport policy in 2009. Not surprisingly, it can be argued that it is still with elite politicians. As regards the level of independence of organisations, such as SOSFO, KSC and NSOs, it is not very high, because of strong government intervention. The comment by Shin Jae Min, a deputy Minister of MCST in the new government is significant: “The government do not intervene in the appointment of the KSC or KBO (Korea Baseball Organisation). Our aim is that elite sport should be led by the private sector, while the government is actively initiating SFA matters, which have a greater element of public goods and services”. For example, Yu Young Gu, a CEO of Myungji Medical Centre, was recommended as a President of KBO from the Board of Directors but failed to acquire approval by the MSCT for the name of ‘procedural defects’. According to Newsis (20th February 2009), the political pressure forced him to resign as a candidate in December 2008. Although Yu received approval in February 2009 with the collective re-recommendation by the Board of Directors after the remarks by Shin Jae Min above which encouraged the sport governing bodies mentioned to expect improved independence, it remains to be seen if the government decided not to intervene the appointment process of the NGBs.
Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

**Chapter 6 The Case study of Sport For All in Korea**

**Introduction**

Having examined the case of elite sport policy in Korea, we now turn our attention to another aspect of Korean sport: Sport For All (hereafter SFA). Prior to discussing SFA in Korea, it is important to note the various ways that SFA has been conceptualised. The idea of sport as a mass or popular movement originated at the beginning of the 19th century. According to Seppänen (1991), sport was used as an instrument for education in England, continental Europe, and in Scandinavia. Of particular significance is the reformation and the rise of Protestantism as Luther who argued “It is a part of a Christian’s duty to take care of his own body’, though Calvinists and Puritans had a restrictive attitude towards physical activities. It is notable that during the Middles Ages, throughout Christendom, the physical well-being of human beings was neglected. As Brailsford (1969) argued, Puritan values did not allow people to play traditional sports and games, because it was believed that the body was only a poor servant of the soul, so we should seek more valuable goals. This shows that the ideology in a certain period determines the way people perceive sport.

As SFA is such an ambiguous term, it is inevitable that different aspects will be emphasised by different academics. Seppänen (1991) argued that SFA is a coherent social movement whose primary goal is the encouragement of physical exercise for everyone. DaCosta & Miragaya (2002) referred to SFA as any kind of sport practised without the pressures of top sport, which is usually represented by athletes dealing with measured performances and accepted rules. In the light of the difficulties in defining SFA, Houlihan (1999) refers to the Council of Europe Sport For All Planning Group definition, which places SFA within a three-fold context of improved health (and the financial savings to be made within health budgets), the contribution of sport to a person’s physical and moral development and the need for self-expression. Nevertheless, Houlihan (1999) argued that this definition does not reflect a consensus and that the range of interpretations of SFA is reflected in the variation in policies aimed at meeting SFA objectives.
Another feature we should point out in regard to SFA is that there are different expressions of SFA in different countries, which makes it even more difficult to grasp the meaning. For example, in socialist countries, ‘mass sport’, ‘mass physical culture’, ‘physical and sport activity’ and ‘sport and recreational activity’ terms were used for SFA (Bankov, 2004). In a Japanese context, according to Ikeda et al (2002), a number of phrases have been used to describe SFA, for example, ‘trim’, ‘community physical education’, ‘lifelong sports’, ‘health and fitness’. Korea is no exception in this regard, and ‘recreation’, ‘life sport’, ‘lifelong sport’, ‘society sport’, ‘sport for lifetime’ continue to be used interchangeably.

According to Bergsgard at al (2007) it was in the 1960s and early 1970s that many governments in industrialised countries showed an interest in mass participation in sport. The concept of SFA became familiar in 1975 with the introduction of the ‘Sport for All’ Charter presented by the Council of Europe’s Sports Committee. As Green (2006) noted, the justification for the Article 1 ‘Every individual shall have the right to participate in sport’ (Marchand,1990: 16) is that sport reflects socio-cultural development in relation to a variety of welfare services such as health, education and social services. Houlihan (1999) argued that the Charter suggests a high level of government intervention in the form of support from public funds, a planned approach to facility development, administrative machinery to develop and co-ordinate policy, and finally, a willingness to use legislation for the purpose of achieving SFA. Of particular note is the fact that the Committee of Ministers in the Council of Europe recommended that the concept of SFA should be expanded to include the disabled and older people (Council of Europe, 2001).

Bankov (2004), who researched SFA in East European countries, argued that SFA during the 1980s was considered to be a Western idea and the Council of Europe’s Sport for All Charter (1962) was never used as a reference. However, although the ideology was clearly distinctive, there was great similarity in the content and forms of SFA. It appeared that, whatever the ideological differences, SFA entailed a form of physical activity undertaken in leisure time in both East and West. Nevertheless, it failed to silence the professional debates on SFA (Bankov, 2004).
Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

**Sport For All (SFA) in Korea**

As was briefly discussed before, it is not surprising that SFA is far from easy to define in the Korean context. According to Um (2003), the term ‘SFA’ was first used in 1961 when KSC created a ‘department of SFA promotion’ and a ‘department of women’s sport’. It was not until 1981 that SFA was used officially in the title Sport For All Department in the Ministry of Sport. According to the Sports White Paper (2006), ‘life sport’ was used interchangeably with ‘community sport’ in the 1980s. The concept of ‘life sport’ was mentioned in 1986, in the government report on ‘the National Sport Development Long Term Plan’ produced by Seoul National University. It had initially appeared in the Hodori Plan in 1989, which is the government’s National Sport Promotion Plan. Subsequently, the Department of Community Sport in the Ministry of Sport was renamed the Department of Life Sport in 1990 and it was added to the NSPL on 31st December 1993 (Sports White Paper, 2006). Notwithstanding the problematic nature of the definition of SFA, the Ministry of Culture & Tourism (MCT hereafter), the KOC and a few other non-sport Ministries such as Health & Welfare, Education and Youth have become more interested in SFA because the concept of well-being had become a major the main issue in 21st century Korean society. At the same time, the media and sport officials suggested the necessity of a paradigm shift from elite sport to SFA. Im Bun Jang (1990), a former Chairman of KISS, said:

> SFA, sport activities based on people’s voluntary participation, is important in a welfare society. It aims not only to increase their fitness and health, but to form a sound leisure culture, raise healthy people in the society and become a tool for a national welfare policy.

To help in understanding SFA in Korea, let us look at how the government distinguished it from other sports such as school sport and elite sport (see Table 6.1). It is of significance that SFA indicates voluntary activities, it does not impose any restriction on place or time and it aims to provide satisfaction or pleasure to the public who participate.

---

1 Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) became the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST) as of 29th February 2009.
Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

Table 6.1 Comparison among School Sport, Elite Sport and SFA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>School sport</th>
<th>Elite sport</th>
<th>SFA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subject</strong></td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Youth (peak age)</td>
<td>Everyone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basis of Participation</strong></td>
<td>Compulsory</td>
<td>Compulsory</td>
<td>Voluntary, fun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contents</strong></td>
<td>Game, sports, fitness training, dance etc.</td>
<td>Official sports</td>
<td>Game, sports, fitness training, dance etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td>Classes at school</td>
<td>Training period and competitions</td>
<td>Free time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td>School facilities</td>
<td>Official sport facilities</td>
<td>All facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose</strong></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Victory, Profession</td>
<td>Leisure, meet the needs of public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Before we discuss the other themes emerging from the data analysis as regards SFA, it would be useful to examine briefly the first theme, namely, the role of government, over time. The other sections under each subheading will be followed by the role of voluntary organisations in the sport and non-sport sectors and the role of commercial organisations.

**The Role of Government**

The main concern in this thesis is to investigate what factors influenced the government’s SFA policy in Korea. Until recent times, sport was a marginalised and piecemeal interest for the government in Korea, like many other countries. Sport was considered as a useful tool to achieve non-sport policy objectives, for example, education and preventing youth delinquency. However, it appears that sport has become a much more important policy area for contemporary governments, especially in relation to health. As Houlihan (1997) indicated in his comparative study with reference to the role of government in a number of different countries, each country has its unique characteristics of government involvement in sport, but at the same time, there exists substantial commonality of motives. Therefore, this leads us to look at different government views of sport in other countries and how it changed, before we turn our attention to the case of Korea.
Among Houlihan’s (1997) summary of reasons for government involvement in sport, three points are stressed in relation to SFA. First, the government plays a regulator role in controlling the traditional sports and pastimes of the community, such as hunting. This was a big issue between landowners who wanted to preserve their property right and the public who demand access to those areas to enjoy themselves. It can still be observed today in the case of gambling and extreme sports, that the government imposes certain restrictions or regulations for the sake of society and individuals. Second, the government was a service provider when sport became a way to deal with health matters. This indicated that the health benefits of sport and recreation started to be considered important. It prompted the local authorities in the UK to build swimming pools and parks in order to encourage the public to use them, not only for sanitation, but also recreation. Canada’s 1961 Fitness and Amateur Sport Act was the first major intervention by the federal government with funds of $5 million. The act arose out of the increasingly sedentary lifestyle and the awakening of PE teachers and health professionals in Canada to the dangers this presented.

Third, the government intervenes in sport for the purpose of social integration. This has been an important issue, as it is believed that sport can impact on reducing juvenile delinquency and unemployment. In particular, potential problems surrounding the urban working class needed to be carefully monitored. In an effort to solve these problems there was an emphasis in Britain for example on the importance of physical training and military drill in the Education Acts of 1870 and 1902. More recently the ‘Action Sport’ project was one of the initiatives that the British Sports Council launched after the urban riots for the purpose of fostering the integration of disaffected social groups by dispatching sports leaders to local communities. According to Houlihan, the governments can be considered to be enablers who facilitate the provision of services by others such as education and youth departments, and also redistributors who offer minority groups and the elderly access to sport facilities as a part of welfare policy. In other words, the resources come from taxpayers’ money.

Houlihan (1997) argued that the above points reflect an instrumental view of sport whereby the government saw sport as a malleable and convenient tool to achieve some other policy objectives. It makes it difficult to believe that sport is encouraged by the government for its own sake. Behind the scenes, some other reasons can be seen.
Bearing in mind the three roles of the government, let us look at the Korean government’s view on SFA during four time periods. The analysis of the SFA policy is delineated as follows: From the end of 19th century to 1953, 1954-1979, 1980-1988 and 1989-2008. Unlike Chapter 5, The Case of Elite Sport, the periodisation starts from an early date as the literature suggested that diverse forms of play and physical activities which might be referred to as SFA, were observed during this early period. The second period is from the end of the Korean War to the demise of the Park Jung Hee regime, which was an authoritarian regime lasting for nineteen years. The third period is relatively short and is from the emergence of a new military president to the hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, which can be referred to as the watershed of Korean SFA. The last and contemporary period is from the post-Seoul Olympics to March 2009 where the research time line finishes.

From the End of 19th century to 1953

The Role of Government

It can be said that the backbone of the modern concept of sport is based on Gaehwa Sasang (‘Gaehwa’ means enlightenment and ‘Sasang’ means thought or philosophy by author’s translation). According to Lee, I.S. (1992), Gaehwa Sasang was derived from the noble (yang-ban) class and a minority group of public (joong-in) intellectuals in the 1860s and 1870s. These people insisted that Chosun (the old name of Korea) should introduce and implement high technology, education and modern culture to seek the prosperity seen in the West. The modern sport concept was a part of the cultural movement which aimed to see Chosun develop further in the future (Lee, I.S., 1992). Of particular significance is the Kabo Reform in 1895 which played an important role in sport as well as in the whole of Korean society. According to Chang (2002), the Kabo Reform, which refers to the modernisation of politics, economics and society as a whole, had effects right across the Korean Peninsula and it divides SFA history into two different periods: before and after 1895. While Korean sports did not move beyond traditional play or folk games to embrace more modern western sports until 1984, the Kabo Reform prompted the introduction of western sports into Korea and gradually adopted the modern form of SFA (Chang, 2002). In spite of the fact that Chang (2002)
used the term ‘SFA’ here, it would be more appropriate to use SFA and mass participation interchangeably in this thesis.

During this early period, the direct intervention by the government in sport is hardly seen. However, the enactment of the Royal Edict on Education (kyo-yuk-ip-kuk-jo-seo) by King Kojong in 1895 is said to be influential for the holistic education system and the establishment of modern schools. It is said that the Edict significantly impacted on sport as shown below, and reflects the view of the most powerful figure in Korea at that time (Lee, H.L., 2003):

> If you look at rich and strong countries around the world, public intelligence is of a high standard. Education is the backbone that sustains the nation. Those who read the old books are not useful any more. I am going to proclaim an education edict now. Seek practical knowledge, moral excellence and physical fitness. Make sure you are diligent enough to strengthen your muscles and bones so that you can enjoy a healthy life. Also don’t only think about your own welfare, but cultivate the good of the public. (2nd February 1895, author’s translation)

According to De Ceuster (2003), the Royal Edict on Education stressed the need for teaching practical and scientific matters conducive to strengthening the country. The critical point was that the government began to pay attention to sport, becoming aware of its significance in terms of education. De Ceuster (2003) also indicated that PE played a significant part in introducing sports to Korea. For example, during the period under Japanese control sport was taught as a means of defending a country rather than purely for leisure. It appeared to be inevitable for the government to emphasise nationalism and regulate the youth through PE in schools, in order for them to be fit. Some literature also suggests the significant role of the schools themselves, especially mission schools, in promoting and disseminating sport during this period. Although it is not our intention to study school sport in depth, it should not be neglected in relation to SFA, considering its important role. Due to its close link to the government and the difficulty of putting a discussion of schools in the section of voluntary or commercial organisations, it seems that this is the appropriate place to deal with the subject.
According to the KOC (1996), PE had to be included in the school curriculum after the proclamation of the Edict and Regulations in August, 1906. De Ceuster (2003) contended that the modernisation of the school curriculum was prompted by the reformist Kabo government and based on the Royal Edict on Education in 1895. A number of modern schools were established immediately after the announcement of the Edict and several missionaries, especially from northern Presbyterian and northern Methodist churches, started to build schools. As Lee, H.L. (2003) said, they focused on introducing western education and modern sciences, and gave admission to all the students who wanted to learn. The mission school where modern PE was initiated was Baejae hak-dang (school), the first mission school in Korea, built by Appenzeller in 1885, and they taught students a number of western sports including baseball, football and basketball as extracurricular activities. Today’s Kyungshin middle and high school, then Underwood hak-dang, also included ‘recreation’ in the curriculum. In 1891, thirty minutes’ of gymnastics was timetabled for the very first hour of the day as a part of education (Kyungshin middle, high school, 1966). In Ewha hak-dang, the first womens’ university, which was established in 1886, gymnastics was named as an official subject (Ewha 100 years Compilation Committee, 1994).

It is also notable that foreign language schools played an important role in spreading modern sports in Korea. Those schools mainly taught English, French and German but they also introduced various sports brought from the West. An English teacher, Hutchinson, especially contributed to the PE-friendly environment maintaining playgrounds and purchasing sport equipment (KOC, 1996). The KOC (1996) pointed out that the Undonghae (sport festival) held in foreign language schools was the first of its kind. One of the historical leaders, Ahn Changho, established Daesung School in 1907 and Heung-sa-dan\(^2\) in 1913, realising that education is extremely critical for the independence and prosperity of Korea. According to Lee, I.S. (1992), Ahn criticised the view at that time that Moon (study) was superior to Moo (physical movement) and suggested that three factors should be taught at schools, namely, Ji (knowledge), Duk (personality) and Che (physical fitness). As Lee, I.S. (1992) revealed, Ahn encouraged Heung-sa-dan members to organise sports clubs for the ultimate purpose of achieving

\(^2\) Ahn Chang Ho established in 1913 for the purpose of acquiring national independence and building a modern country. Their five principles, which lasted 2009 are: nation unification, clean society, education, civil society and youth (www.yka.or.kr)
national independence and development towards a modern society. As De Ceuster (2003) said, it seems clear that the major boost for the popularisation of modern sports came from the mission schools through organising teams to compete with other missionary schools. There was also the role of the YMCA in coordinating the inter-school games which is worth emphasising. It is argued that modern sports could reach the whole society thanks to the success of inter-school matches (De Ceuster, 2003).

The Role of Voluntary Organisations

Sport Sector:

Chosun Sport Council (CSC)

Gaining momentum from the March 1st movement (Korean independence movement) in 1919, Koreans who were involved in sport became aware of the necessity of having their own organisation because Chosun Sport Association was an organisation established by the Japanese. As a result, Chosun Sports Council (CSC hereafter) was established on 13 July 1920. As noted in a KOC (1996) document, this was ten years after the revival of the modern Olympics, which suggested that Korea did not even know what the Olympics were about, while the West was developing sport on a greater scale. With the initiation of the CSC, the right atmosphere for sport to spread out to the public was created. Across the country, approximately ninety sport organisations were formed (Lee, H.L., 2003). According to De Ceuster (2003), in this period, a number of sport associations were established, such as the Chosun Sireum Federation in 1927, the Ewha Women’s Vocational, the Korean Association for the Promotion of Women’s Sport, the Korean Judo Association and the Korean Sports Federation.

According to Lee, H.L. (2003), there were two men who played key roles in creating the CSC, which originated from the Korea Gu-lak-bu (Club). One was Lee Jong Gook, who was studying in Tokyo with the ambition to become a leader of the PE movement when he returned to Korea. The other was Lee Won Yong, who was a manager of Kwangshin Shoes and a former baseball player for Osung High Schools. Sportspeople

3 One of the Korean traditional sports, two players hold ‘Satba (thigh band) of opponents at the beginning and the person who wrestled the opponent down to the sand floor wins.
from Osung High School and baseball players from the Central Christian Youth Association often gathered in Lee Won Young’s office. The number of people at the meeting continued to increase and they proceeded to create the CSC. Among them, was Byun Bong Hyun, a former baseball player at Waseda University in Japan, who became a journalist in Donga Ilbo and largely led the movement. He wrote a significant four-page-article under the title of ‘The necessity of establishing a sport organisation’, to argue for a purely Korean sport organisation. According to a senior officer in the YMCA, this form of support [newspaper articles] during this period was common but did not extend to financial assistance. However, it is worth pointing out that the CSC started to host sport competitions including the first national baseball competition, (regarded as the forerunner of today’s National Sports Festival), the first national football competition in 1921 and the first national women’s softball tennis competition in 1923, due to the enthusiasm of the CSC and sponsorship from Dong-a Ilbo (Lee, H.L., 2003). The KOC (1996) states that the main contribution of the CSC for the eighteen years up until 1938, when it was liquidated because of Japanese coercion, was to host several national sport competitions. On the 26th November 1945, the CSC was re-established when Korea gained independence from Japan. According to Kim, M.K. (1993), the CSC was a leading organisation in the SFA movement.

Non Sport Sector:

YMCA (Young Men’s Christian Association)

It is said that the YMCA also played a crucial role in Korea’s SFA movement for several decades. The Young Mens’ Christian Association (hereafter YMCA) was formed by George Williams in London in 1844 for the purpose of tackling social problems that were arising in big cities after the Industrial Revolution. According to De Ceuster (2003), the YMCA implemented policies and programmes to discipline the body through an elaborate sports programme. It was in fact the USA YMCA, founded in 1851, which really focused on sport (www.ymca.org.uk). The Korean YMCA was strongly supported and influenced by the American YMCA, which led them to adopt the philosophy of Gulick, namely, unity, symmetry and development in sport programmes. As De Ceuster (2003) quoted in Johnson (1979: 30), the amendment to
the YMCA’s constitution in 1866 said, ‘The object of this association shall be the improvement of the spiritual, mental, social and physical condition of young men’.

De Ceuster’s (2003) description of the role of the YMCA in Korea during the colonial period is worth noting. Between 1910 and 1920, when Korea was in a difficult situation due to the first colonial rule, the YMCA provided opportunities for Koreans to experience ‘western’ culture by establishing, in 1903, the Seoul YMCA (Seoul Y, hereafter), also called the Hwangsung Christian Youth Association (Hwangsung-kidok-chung-nyun-hoe, ‘Hwangsung’ means Seoul). The purpose of Seoul Y was to urge Christian reformists who had given up on direct political action to help in gradually reconstructing an energetic Korea. As part of a large scale ‘modernisation’ programme, the YMCA introduced modern sports which were a very successful part of the Korean YMCA programme (De Ceuster, 2003). A senior officer in the Seoul Y agreed:

When the feudal society started to open the door, YMCA introduced to the public a number of sports which could promote health, such as free gymnastics. It continued to do so until the YMCA premises were burnt down during the Korean War in the early 1950s. (Interview, 8th January 2008)

According to De Ceuster (2003), Seoul Y was able to be in the forefront of the promotion of sport in colonial Korea because of the professional support of instructors from the North American Council of the YMCA and the best indoor sport facilities in the country. With the dismissal of the Independence Association (dock-lip-hyup-hoe), Christian youths who participated in the ‘The Whole Nation Sport Meeting (man-min-un-dong-hoe)’ requested the establishment of a Korean YMCA (Korea Y). Lee, E.S. (1990) pointed out two reasons why young people were so eager to create a YMCA in Korea. One can be found in the Nevius Mission, which aimed to build churches that would be sustainable on their own without support from missionary headquarters or missionaries from the ‘west’ (Chang, 2003). The Mission targeted working and lower class people who were isolated from churches. The other reason was that the descendants of the reformists (Gae-hwa-pa) were keen to achieve the independence which their ancestors had failed to secure. Approximately 150 young men whose parents were public high officials or intellectuals gathered together for the establishment of Korea YMCA (Lee, E.S., 1990).
In this connection, it is instructive to note that the Christian Student Association, formed in Baejae Hakdang in 1896, the so-called, ‘hyup-sung-hoe’, became the Christian Student Association (ki-dok-hak-seng-hoe). As the youth of the population showed such enthusiasm for a Korean YMCA, the missionaries such as Underwood and Apenzeller officially raised the issue, realising that the special organisation was essential to attract upper class young men in Korea. Consequently, Seoul Y (Hwangsun Christian Youth Association) was born absorbing the Christian Students Association in Baejae Hakdang (Lee, E.S., 1990). A brief history of the YMCA until the outbreak of the Korean War is shown in Table 6.2. According to Kim, C.B. (1984), the Seoul Y began to implement sport related programmes in 1916, emphasising the importance of the first indoor gymnasium. It is argued that the combination of the appropriate facilities and the importing of sport expert, Barnhart, who had been working for the YMCA in Illinois State, as a sport manager, led to the Korean YMCA being foundational for the development of sport in Korea.

**Table 6.2 YMCA History from 1903 to 1953**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>The first YMCA, HCYA was established (28th October)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Initiating of sport activities, host YMCA outdoor sports festival (22nd May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Introduction of Judo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>Introduction of Basketball by Gillette</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Introduction of Skating by Gillette</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Propagation of modern sport to the public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>The first baseball league (Osung, Bosung, Hwimoon and Chungnyunhoe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Open indoor gymnasium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction of volleyball by Barnhart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>The first indoor sport festival (annual event)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>The first athletics competition in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The first indoor ‘Un-dong-hoe’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Introduction and spread of Denmark light gymnastics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>The first All Chosun Competitions in several sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Gymnastics seminar for citizens’ health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Introduction of badminton</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: YMCA’s Annual Report, 2005

As De Ceuster (2003) argued, the YMCA became a prime contractor, building gymnasium across Korea where young people could participate in sport under its
supervision and guidance. The donations of $40,000 from Wanamaker and Rockefeller were essential for the completion of a three storey gymnasium in Chongro, the central part of Seoul (Mulling, 1989). In addition, the opening of an indoor gymnasium in 1916 prompted the popularisation of SFA in Korea, and four years later the first indoor sport festival was held. It is also important to note that Barnhart introduced volleyball to women, that resulted in volleyball becoming one of the most popular women’s sports in Korea (www.ymcakorea.org).

According to Lee, S.J. (1999), Seoul Y prioritised education seeking the development of sport and religious missions. Fifty six football games and thirty three indoor sports were organised from September 1906 to June 1907. A variety of sports were introduced to Korea including basketball, baseball and skating, and people were sent abroad in order to acquire knowledge from western countries (Choi, 2005). It is intriguing that the YMCA turned its attention to team sports such as baseball, invented by James Naismith in 1891, and volleyball, developed by William Morgan in 1895. Mulling (1989) also said that the YMCA formed the Physical Committee and encouraged the public to take part in ball sport. It is indicated by De Ceuster (2003) that the reason for encouraging team sports was to promote both teamwork and sportsmanship.

The commitment of the YMCA to hosting sport competitions nationwide is shown Table 6.3. The baseball league composed of Osung, Hwimun and the Youth Association (chung-nyun-hoe-hwak-gwan) is said to be the first league in modern Korean sport history (Park, 1996). One of the leading figures in the YMCA in Korea, Shin Hungu, then general secretary of the YMCA, became the 7th president of the CSC. According to Mulling (1989), it was not uncommon for members to hold dual posts, since the CSC was closely linked to the YMCA. It implied that the spirit of the YMCA and the way to administer the organisation might have been taken on board by the CSC. According to De Ceuster (2003), the CSC was mainly active as an organiser of sporting events. An important development was the organisation in Seoul Stadium from 1929 onwards of the 3 day All-Korea Games, which involved a variety of sports. Since Shin’s presidency of the YMCA, the number of competitions dramatically increased. But no more competitions were organised by the YMCA after 1942 due to the Japanese War (Kim & Kim, 1999). During the Japanese occupation, Japanese sport organisations began to intervene in Korean sports, arguing that their motive was to give ‘help’.
While our main focus so far has been the Seoul YMCA, it is also important to see how local YMCAs contributed to SFA development in Korea. According to Kim (2002a), a number of YMCAs were created: in Hamhung (1918), Sunchun (1919), Pyongyang (1920), Daegu (1921), Kwangju (1922), Wonsan (1925), Junju (1925), Shineuiju (1925) and Gimchun (1928). Various sports were taught and competitions took place in the cities, for example, a skating competition was led by Hamhung in 1920, before the other cities began hosting events. The All Chosun Football Competition run by Pyongyang between 1921-1926 was said to be the best-organised local event of its kind. Kim (2002a) pointed out that these competitions contributed to the development of athletes’ performances across the country and that a balance among cities in terms of sport development was able to be achieved. As Table 6.4 shows, sport appeared as the most significant part of local YMCA activities, except for bible study (Lee, H.L., 2003). It could be strongly argued that the main concern for the YMCA was to give more opportunities for the public to play sports and provide competitions for them to enjoy, rather than trying to develop elite sport by identifying the talented athletes.

### Table 6.3 YMCA’s hosting competition after 1925

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of competitions</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Chosun middle school basketball Competition</td>
<td>1925-1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter Basketball League</td>
<td>1927-1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Chosun Apparatus Gymnasts Competition</td>
<td>1927-1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Chosun Volleyball Competition</td>
<td>1928-1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Chosun Amateur Boxing Competition</td>
<td>1928-1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Chosun Sirum Competition</td>
<td>1927-1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Chosun Weightlifting Competition</td>
<td>1928-1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Chosun Table Tennis Competition</td>
<td>1928-1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Chosun Archery Competition</td>
<td>1929-1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Chosun Group Judo Competition</td>
<td>1929-1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Chosun Basketball Free-throw Competition</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Chosun Basketball Competition</td>
<td>1933-1937</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4 The number of participants in local YMCAs in 1925

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hamhung</th>
<th>Sunchun</th>
<th>Pyongyang</th>
<th>Daegu</th>
<th>Kwangju</th>
<th>Wonsan</th>
<th>Shineuiju</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y activity</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4358</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>563</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible study</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible study attendance</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>780</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>4650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious meeting</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3,265</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It appears that the YMCA played a central part in diffusing sport to the public. Of particular note is ‘un-dong-hoe’, a form of sport festival. The first of its kind was held on 2nd May 1896 by Hutchison’s foreign language school, as previously mentioned. An un-dong-hoe’ led by Seoul YMCA and hosted on 9th June 1906, is even more significant, as they awarded prizes to winners and encouraged people to have fellowship after the event by having meals together. After this, schools continued organising them themselves and it reached a peak between 1905 and 1909 (Choi, 2005). Choi argued that un-dong-hoe functioned as a foundation for SFA in Korea. According to Kim and Kim (1999), the sports that people took part in included football, horse riding, baseball and a tug of war. In addition, there were other projects the YMCA initiated that were conducive to the spread of SFA in Korea. As Donga Ilbo reported, the first indoor un-dong-hoe was held on 12th March 1920. Kim and Kim (1999) argued that the indoor un-dong-hoe had similar characteristics to the one that was held outside until 1909, although a few sports such as track & field and recreation programmes had to be replaced, due to the limits of the space. It is intriguing that a basketball game was held between western ladies and students in Ewha Hakdang, which indicates that women were given an opportunity to participate in sport at a time when they were largely excluded from physical activities. The significance of these un-dong-hoe is that the YMCA introduced and taught different sports to the public in diverse venues, as well as fulfilling its missionary purposes.
The PE seminars, consisting of PE lectures and health promotion seminars, which were introduced by YMCA needs to be discussed. PE lectures tend to explain to the public why they need to do physical activities, teach the rules or techniques of the sport and promote good health by alerting the public to the importance of fitness. In 1931 Danish delegation gave exercise demonstrations in Korea with 26 of his/her colleagues, which greatly impressed the public and prompted an expansion in participation. As Kim and Kim (1999) said, PE lectures contributed to sport development in local areas and health promotion seminars impacted on the establishment of related organisations in Korea by awakening the public to the importance of health. As well as the YMCA and YWCA (Young Women’s Christian Association) the lecturers also contributed to the SFA in Korea. The department of health in the YWCA implemented a number of regular events and activities, for example, trampoline, badminton, modern dance, ballet and special classes for women such as folk dance, swimming and skating. It is notable that the YWCA influenced Koreans to become proactive in terms of participating in social events through introducing free lessons and voluntary work so that people could experience SFA (Lee, H.L., 2003). As Cho (2001) said, the 1st All Chosun women’s softball tennis (jung-ku) competition in 1923 was organised jointly by the leadership of Donga daily newspaper and the CSC. Between 1955 and 1965, sport in the form of PE or hygiene lessons became part of daily life, encouraged by the YWCA. In summary, the CSC and the YMCA were the two organisations that promoted mass participation in sport among the Korean people during this era. It does not appear that there was any form of interaction between the two organisations or that there was any financial support from the government to these groups.

1954-1979

The Role of Government

Compared to the previous period, it is difficult to find aspects of mass participation in sport during this era in the sense that the government was explicitly interested in promoting elite sport in the 1970s. Sport was considered one of the favourite tools that the Park Chung Hee regime used to cover up the lack of legitimacy by distracting public attention, arousing national identity and pride and integrating the nation. In
addition, ideology was an important issue when facing up to North Korea. It was essential for propaganda purposes that Korea was seen to be superior to the North in as many ways as possible, in order to demonstrate that democracy was a superior ideology to socialist communism. Under these circumstances, it seemed that there was not much scope for mass participation in sport on the government’s agenda. As the Sports White Paper (2006) noted, it was unrealistic to expect the government to balance both elite sport and SFA because elite sport was a means of displaying national power. Chang (2002) called this period the time of ‘stagnation of SFA’ reflecting on the circumstances after the Korean War (1950-1953). Considering that leisure time, affluence and appropriate facilities are important factors for the SFA movement, Korea was not in a position to meet those needs. People had to work for long hours, the income they earned was low and there were few sport facilities to encourage the general public to take part in sport.

It could be argued that there was no obvious ‘SFA policy’ in this period. However, there was an emergence of interest in SFA from the government. Park’s administration displayed commitment to SFA from 1970 by establishing the ‘National Sport Deliberative Committee’, which is the upgraded title of the ‘Sport National Council’. The Committee managed various matters such as plans for national sports in general, sport facilities, operation of funding and plans for supplying sports equipment (Lee, H.L., 2003). The profile of the Committee members showed that the government viewed sport as an important task. The prime minister was appointed as chairman and the minister of culture & education and the president of KSC took vice-chair positions. The members of the Committee embraced a broad range of people who had knowledge and good reputations in relation to national sport promotion, including Ministers of Defence, Finance and Commerce, a member of the KOC Committee, MPs, sports academics, and the president of a newspaper publishing association. This membership could be taken as clear evidence of elitism in Korean SFA policy. The absence of other representatives from National Sports Organisations, SFA organisations such as the YMCA and voluntary sport organisations indicates a strong element of elitism in Korean sport. It is also important to point out that a Community Sports Committee was created in the KSC. Of particular note is the ‘Community Sports Promotion Five Year Plan’ announced by this Committee in 1976. The Plan includes reinforcement of the SFA administration, securing a budget for SFA, training SFA Coaches and setting up an
official coaching licensing system, and conducting research into SFA (Lee, H.L., 2003). According to Han (1977), the Plan allowed the government and civil societies to work together to implement the policy.

As regards the grassroots, the government used several organisations including the Korean recreation association, the YMCA and Boy and Girl Scouts in the local areas, in order to promote SFA across Korea, according to Lee, H.L. (2003). Lee also argued that there was an intimate relationship between the government and the organisations mentioned above. However, there is no evidence of cooperation in a practical way. According to the interviewees, these organisations may have agreed to work closely to implement agendas set by the government not because they wanted to but because there was no other choice than to obey the government.

As mentioned previously, Korea was not ready to accept the SFA movement because of its economic and social circumstances. It is also suggested that the lack of appropriate laws, as well as the absence of financial resources to build sport facilities were the other main obstacles to SFA development. The enactment of the National Sports Promotion Law (NSPL, hereafter) in 1962 could, therefore, be regarded as a significant step in Korean SFA as well as in elite sport. As we examined in Chapter 5, the trigger for the NSFL was the fact that the 1964 Olympics were going to be held in Japan, the country that had controlled Korea for 35 years, and where a number of Koreans were still living. It was a crucial mission for Korea to perform well, especially for the morale of the people left in Japan. This points to the fact that the development of SFA in Korea was driven by elite sport objectives.

Before the NSPL was passed, there were only a few regulations as far as sport was concerned. As Kwak et al (1994) argued, the sole regulation that included every aspect of sport was the ‘Regulations on gyms and playgrounds according to school instalment guidelines’ in the ‘Education Law Enforcement Ordinance’. Considering that the KSC was in charge of almost all the sport competitions, it was not felt appropriate to promote sport under the poor economic circumstances where people were struggling to survive on a daily basis. It was the NSPL that laid the foundation for the spread of sport to the general public, as Shin (2004) argued. Article 11 states that the nation and local authorities should construct and maintain sport facilities such as playgrounds,
swimming pools and gymnasiums, according to a presidential decree, which was a crucial step in building a strong sport environment. However, as Lee, H.L. (2003) said, it was difficult to build facilities due to the lack of specific regulations or guidelines for such construction. In Seoul, there were only 25 small-size stadiums, 1 gymnasium, 11 swimming pools, 2 archery centres, 1 ice rink, 3 horse racing tracks and 6 camping sites in 1960. The number increased significantly during the Park Jung Hee era to 8 complex stadiums, 29 public stadiums and 25 public indoor gymnasiums spread across the country (Lee, H.L., 2003).

It is worth noting three revisions of the NSPL which were made in 1965, 1967 and 1971. The important feature to note is that each change was made for a mega sport event either the Tokyo (1964), Mexico (1968) or Munich (1972) Olympics. It cannot be denied that the revisions were primarily aimed at improving Korea’s performance in the Olympics, but there were benefits for SFA. Of particular importance was the replacement in 1965 of the phrase ‘can support’ with ‘should support’ in relation to SFA. The revised article reads: “The nation should support a part of the costs which the local authorities need for sport development every fiscal year”. In addition, a new article was added to give tax exemption for private sport facilities. (14th June 1965 No.1698 in NSPL decreed article) While nothing can be found in the 1967 revision with reference to SFA, in 1971, Article 8 mentioned more detail concerning ‘company sport’. The previous article stated “The local autonomous entities actively support sport events that each sport organisation hosts”, whereas the new article was divided into two parts and strengthened the clause by using the word ‘should’. First, it said: “The local authorities should either host a sport festival themselves at least once a year in their administrative district or allow sport organisations to run them” Second, it said: “Local authorities should host an ‘office workers sport competition’ at least once a year” Besides those mentioned above, clauses were included about supporting sport organisations, and a sport development fund was created in Article 16. (22nd January 1971 No. 2297 in NSPL promulgated). Despite the clauses in relation to SFA, it is important to reiterate that the law served only as a tool to strengthen elite sport, and played a very minor role in the development of SFA (Song and Kim, 1997).
Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

The Role of Voluntary Organisations

Sport Sector

During this period, there were very few sport organisations related to SFA. According to the Sports White Paper (2006), the Korean Institute of Recreation, a private organisation, acquired permission from the Ministry of Culture & Education to try to diffuse recreation, PE and health programmes to the public. The programme was designed to promote SFA and included folk dance, recreation classes, on-site instructions and coach training (Chang, 2002). The role of KSC in the SFA can be heard from a former senior officer in KSC:

KSC had not been involved in mass participation since the re-integration of three organisations (KSC, KOC and PE Council) in 1968 although promoting sport to the Korean public was clearly stated as one of the missions of the organisation. One could be the lack of funding towards mass participation. The other could be the fact that the success of elite sport gives greater spotlight to the KSC President than that of mass participation. (Interview, 7th December 2007)

Non Sport Sector

YMCA

It is argued that the YMCA greatly contributed to SFA in Korea. The motive of the YMCA is clear as shown below in the ‘Aim of the Christian youth group’, which was agreed in the 23rd Christian youth group federation national festival on 23rd April 1976.

Christian youth group aims for young people to learn and train to follow Jesus Christ, work for the sake of love and righteousness, contribute to improving the

---

4 Based on the Article 33 in the National Sports Promotion Law, the KSC has five objectives: Pan-nationalisation of sport activities, promoting school sport & mass participation, raising national pride by supporting elite athletes, assisting NGBs and enhancing the Olympic movement
welfare of the general public and create a new culture so that eventually the
kingdom of God will be established. (Kim, C.B., 1984)

The YMCA activities came to a halt because the hall was partially burnt down during
the Korean War. However, Busan organised a ‘YMCA Specialist Institute’ and ran
training courses for instructors (Cho, 2001). In the 1960s, they focused on promoting
sport and recreation as a sound leisure (Lee, H.L., 2003). The activities YMCA
implemented are as indicated below in Table 6.5.

**Table 6.5 Brief history of YMCA (1954-1979)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Start of rebuilding the YMCA hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Opening of the 1st indoor swimming pool</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1967 | Completion of a new hall  
The 1st Citizen (Sa-hwe-in) Badminton Competition  
Start of swimming lesson for beginners |
| 1968 | The 1st advanced lifeguard lesson  
The 1st swimming lesson for disabled children |
| 1969 | The 1st children’s fitness test was set up  
The 40th Judo competition (succeeded to Chosun Group Judo competition) |
| 1971 | The first blind boys’ group judo competition was held  
Kwangju YMCA completed indoor gymnasium |
| 1973 | The 1st National Children Individual Weight Judo Competition  
The 1st Citizens (Sa-hwe-in) badminton competition  
Opening of YMCA movable swimming pool |
| 1976 | Baby sports club was created  
The 1st published YMCA ‘Sports Debate’ |
| 1979 | Opening of ‘Song-pa’ branch (sports programmes) |

Source: YMCA Annual Report, 2005, internal document, Seoul YMCA

It is notable that the new hall was finally finished in 1967 after a slow reconstruction. It
was the first multi-indoor gymnasium where a number of sports, such as basketball,
swimming, weight lifting and judo, could take place. With the building of new facilities,
the YMCA announced five principles underpinning the social-physical education
movement, according to Chang (1988). These were: the development of health and
physical fitness, development of the mind and of moral character, opportunity for
personal independence by using creative talents, growing responsibility as citizens and leaders and leading a Christian life. A former senior official in YMCA said in the interview:

Having come back from training in the US, I saw that some organisations such as the KSC and sport federations had been set up. I viewed encouraging the general public (children, mothers, the elderly etc) to take part in sport as an important issue. I can say that the YMCA is the birthplace of Korea’s SFA movement (Interview, 20th December 2007)

It seems clear that the new facilities prompted the YMCA to devise various programmes to encourage people to participate in sport (Internal document, Seoul YMCA). It also opened the door for the public, regardless of background, to experience sport and learn social skills to improve their quality of life. As Table 6.6 shows, there was a big gap between the genders, particularly in the over 30s. Nevertheless, the fact that the YMCA encouraged people to access sport activities is of particular importance in the development of SFA. During the rebuilding of the new gymnasium, the YMCA focused on promoting SFA to improve the fitness and education of the public, whereas previous work was more concentrated on introducing and popularising sport (Cho, 2001). It is important to note that the YMCA opened classes for children and middle and high school students, and recorded their fitness, immediately after the opening of the new facility, which was the first of its kind in Korean history. The YMCA also conducted tests for adults and educated the public in ways to prevent disease, as Cho (2001) has stated.

Table 6.6 YMCA membership in 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 18</td>
<td>3,226</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>4,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>4,232</td>
<td>1,404</td>
<td>5,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 30</td>
<td>2,622</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>2,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,080</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>12,710</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Seoul YMCA 100 years history (2004: 428)
The other feature to emphasise was that Seoul Y followed the global trend in terms of academic theories regarding sport. They invited two scholars in 1968 and 1974 and hosted seminars. One of the scholars Dr. Cureton, introduced the concept of ‘physical aptitude fitness’ which focused on harmonising physical, mental, social and ethical qualities (Kim, H.S., 2002). Appropriate programmes for development of these skills were created, including a ‘beauty gymnasts class’ for mothers, a ‘boys & girls physical aptitude fitness class’ for middle and high school students and a children’s ‘winter vacation sport class’ (Kim, H.S., 2002). According to a source from Seoul Y, during the 1970s, a second scholar, Dr. Cooper, stressed the importance of aerobics exercises, which prompted the creation of sport programmes, such as walking, aerobics, dancing and swimming. It is estimated that these have contributed to the prevention and treatment of chronic diseases (Internal document, Seoul YMCA). Dr. Cooper’s programme was selected to be an official module in Seoul Y for two years. The reason why it was not included immediately after the seminar is not clearly known, according to Kim, H.S. (2002).

It is evident that swimming had been a core part of the programme in Seoul Y for many years. The building of a swimming pool in 1967 was considered to be an important milestone in this period. The ‘movable swimming pool’ was designed to provide opportunities for children of low income families in the deprived areas for five to ten days. It is also important to note that the voluntary coaches were PE teachers in middle and high schools and students studying sport in universities. The figure of 1,500 people using the ‘movable swimming pool’ over a period of four weeks (23rd July – 25th August 1973), illustrates the success of the programme. As regards the facilities of YMCA, it should be pointed out that the YMCA believed buildings and facilities owned by themselves should function only as a tool and not be the goal. In other words, depending on the circumstances, so long as the Christian youth group considered that it would be more beneficial to use other facilities within the local areas, then there was no reason not to do so, as Kim, C.B. (1984) mentioned.

There were a few other non-profit organisations which promoted SFA, such as the YWCA, the Korean scout association and the Korean alpine club. The YWCA, which we discussed in the previous period, set up a department of health & sport and held special seminars for SFA coaches, regular lessons in various sports, including
trampoline, badminton, fencing and women’s sports such as Korean dance, skating and social dance. The Korean alpine club, the second established social organisation in Korea, held a climbing training course for enthusiastic people and captains of university climbing clubs for the purpose of expanding the number of people interested in climbing mountains (www.cac.or.kr).

To sum up, the role of the YMCA during this period in SFA was critical. It is argued that because the YMCA had the appropriate facilities it enabled them to design and deliver a variety of programmes for people regardless of gender or age. To produce Jo Oh Ryun who won gold medals in the Asian Games (1970 and 1974) and Choi Yoon Hee who was also a gold medallist in the Asian Games (1982 and 1986) indicates that YMCA’s role was not limited to SFA, but able to stretch to elite level (YMCA, 2004). It appears that the YMCA did not aim to identify and train elite athletes at that time. However, having run various programmes, outstanding athletes were discovered as a result. It is also instructive to note that there was no formal connection between the government and the YMCA and that the YMCA created and implemented the SFA policy independently, without government support or municipal subsidy.

The Role of Commercial Organisations (Businesses)

As regards the commercial sector, ‘company sport’ (Article 10 of the 1962 National Sports Promotion Law) should be discussed first and foremost. According to Koh et al. (2006), ‘company sport’ is defined as a sport activity that employees do in a workplace or in external facilities based on a programme provided by instructors appointed by the company. The 1962 law stated that companies and public agencies employing 500 or above should establish athletic club activities, both indoor and outdoor, and hire sport trainers. Businesses and public agencies with over 100 employees were required to establish a physical education committee. The law also provided for physical activity days for government workers (Kim, K.S., 1990). According to the KISS report (2006), the term ‘company sport’ was first used in ‘Cheyuk’ magazine by Na Hyun Sung. Na (1968: 187) argued:

SFA and company sport have identical goals: To create a richer social life, to establish a healthy life style, to promote recreation, to consider sport as part
of life and to generate an encouraging atmosphere in order to improve productivity.

Why the government was concerned with company sport at that time needs to be examined. It is difficult to discover the motives behind the government’s interest in supporting company sport during this era. Koh et al (2006) suggested that company sport was stressed as part of the management of businesses from the late 1970s. In the sense that it was expected that sport in workplaces would improve relationships among employees and would lead to enhanced productivity and a sound culture in the organisation. It appears that the government began to show a strong interest in company sport in the 1980s (Koh et al, 2006). The development of production technology and the resulting change in the form of labour might have prompted the government to have an interest in company sport in order to improve employees’ health and motivation (Lee, H.L., 2003).

To understand the motives of the government in forming company sport teams, it is useful to discuss ‘sil-up’ teams. According to the NSPL, companies which employed more than 100 people should generally have an indoor gymnasium and outdoor sports areas. As Lee, H.L. (2003) said, this requirement was not achievable in the short term, therefore, in order to run ‘sport teams’, the companies came up with the idea of ‘sil-up’ teams. The companies employed athletes and allocated them to certain positions in the company. The athletes worked in the workplaces, but also trained and participated in competitions in the name of their companies. From the government’s point of view, this was a useful policy, due to the fact that it provided full-time jobs for elite athletes and promoted the name of the companies through exposure to the media or the public. A clause of Article 9 in the NSPL states, ‘The workplaces that the presidential decree stipulates should form at least one sport team and employ a coach/instructor’. The companies chosen were mostly state-owned firms including national enterprises, banks, government offices and this was the trigger for the system of ‘sil-up’ teams. As Table 6.7 illustrates, there were huge differences between regions in terms of the number of company sports teams. Seoul boasted the highest number of teams, while on the other hand, Jeju had only one team. It is probable that the economic disparities between Seoul, the capital of Korea, and the rural areas are the main cause of the gap (Lee, H.L., 2003).
As regards the commercial perspective, there are some elements of this in the YMCA in terms of hosting competitions. As we saw in previous periods, a number of competitions continued to be held through the time, thanks to certain newspaper companies. According to a source from Seoul Y, Hankook Ilbo and Seoul Financial Newspaper co-hosted swimming classes for beginners in 1967. It is difficult to determine whether there was any form of sponsorship involved in co-hosting in that period. A director of the sports division in Seoul Y argued:

Hosting literally means hosting. It does not mean that there was any sponsorship involved. Having newspaper companies as a host organisation indicates that the competition would be expected to be advertised free of charge. Of course, newspaper companies were allowed to use the name of the competition that they hosted. (Interview, 8\textsuperscript{th} January 2008):

Table 6.7 The number of sport teams operated by the companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>No. of teams</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>No. of teams</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>Choongnam</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Junbook</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyungki</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Junnam</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangwon</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kyungbook</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choongbook</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kyungnam</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeju</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.1 SFA organisations between 1954 and 1979

The network of relationships in Korean SFA is summarised in Figure 6.1. While the number of organisations involved in SFA increased compared to the previous period, most of them appear to have been isolated rather than interacting with each other. Both the National Sports Deliberative Committee, set up by the government, and the Community Sports Committee of the KSC were composed of members of the elite and made, or deliberated on decisions on their own. Two signs of a partially reciprocal relationship, can be observed. In Figure 6.1, (1) indicates that the government’s enactment of the NSPL prompted companies to build sport facilities for employees and create sport teams, mostly in state-owned teams. As a result, increased sport facilities encouraged Korean workers to participate in sport and elite athletes were given opportunities to continue their sporting career in more stable circumstances. This eventually contributed to the plan of the government which was keen to support elite athletes as shown (2).

The other relationship was between YMCA and media. It could be argued that the support YMCA received from newspaper companies who published a number of sport
competition hosted by YMCA was significant (3). According to senior officer in YMCA, there was no monetary transaction involved. It appears that inserting the name of newspaper in front of the competition title would have given benefits to the newspaper companies (4). To sum up, during the period from 1954 to 1979, the government, KSC and YMCA implemented their own policies independently during this period.

1980- 1988

The Role of Government

Although it is generally believed that SFA began to be recognised after the Seoul Olympics in 1988, this period is critical since a brand-new Ministry of Sport was established immediately after the announcement of hosting Seoul Olympics in 1981, which determined the policy for SFA. Im Bun Jang, an academic in sport sociology explained:

The government buoyantly proceeded with its SFA policy because it could not emphasise only elite sport. SFA was thought of as something that was needed for health, social life and harmony. The government at that time played a main role in enlightening the public. (Interview, 3rd July 2007)

As Chang (2002) noted, it was the 1980s that brought the period of revival of SFA in Korea. He suggested that the evidence for this was the modification of the NSPL to keep up with current times and the emergence of a SFA department and sport promotion bureau inside the Ministry of Sports to implement SFA policies. Mulling’s (1989) study, based on interviews with senior government officials, also showed that the Ministry of Sport had a particular perspective in relation to SFA, especially concerning adolescents. Lee Young Ho, a former Minister of Sport, argued that the government became more aware that they should look beyond the Olympic preparations and focus on young people. In the same vein, Oh Ji Chul, the chief assistant to the Minister of Sport, believed that sport could provide juveniles with the chance of being active in a proper manner and prevent youth crime. Shin (2004: 92) quoted the words of
Kim Jip, then member of Parliament, as recorded in the 114th Parliamentary Minutes (1982:2), where he insisted on the necessity of a complete revision of the NSPL:

We are about to host two mega sport events. Sport has been changing its meaning and become a leisure activity in the welfare society. I would like to propose that the government now needs to take action in terms of supporting mass participation across Korea by establishing appropriate laws (author’s translation).

The particular change with reference to SFA in this period was that the National Sports Festival was divided into summer and winter events for the purpose of expanding the sport base evenly across Korea and developing local areas (Shin, 2004). As stressed in Chapter 5 regarding the importance of facilities, the primary requirement for the success of SFA policy was developing sport facilities, according to Lee, H.L. (2003). According to the NSPL, the Chun Doo Hwan government seemed to have clear objectives regarding SFA, for example, building one playground, one gymnasium and one swimming pool in every city and province by utilising facilities constructed for the NSF. In addition, they conducted research through the ‘National Sport Development Survey’ in order to design programmes for different groups, they encouraged company sports in workplaces and enforced the holding of sports days twice a year as part of the regime’s plan. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the government’s top priority was still elite sport, which is confirmed by the budget allocation. As illustrated in the Table 5.11 in Chapter 5, the percentage of the government’s budget allocated to sport increased from 0.13% in 1982 to 0.23% in 1983 and the establishment of the Ministry of Sport was the main driving force behind the dramatic growth of the budget which continued to increase to 0.29% in 1984 and 0.35% in 1985. It is difficult to observe the percentage of budget for elite sport and SFA separately, however, Lee, W.Y. (2004) indicated that the budget increase for elite sport was prompted by investing into sport facilities and identifying and training talented athletes for the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and the budget for SFA, which was 0.4% of the entire sport budget in the Ministry of Sport decreased to 0.1% in 1985, which is evidence of the priority accorded by government to SFA compared to elite sport.
Notwithstanding the focus on elite sport, Chang’s (2002) comment is noteworthy. He argued that the facilities the government built in each province, as set out above, were not only for elite use, but for the general public as well, to encourage people to take part in sport activities. In other words, the legacy of the facilities for hosting mega sport events could become the infrastructure for SFA. As Lee, H.L. (2003) illustrated in ‘Cheyuk yunkam (sports year book) 1980’, the government gave 125 billion won for sport facilities at 139 sites. This resulted in more than half the cities and provinces having playgrounds and gymnasiums by 1991.

In addition to the facilities, it is worth discussing a plan called the ‘Han River Development Project’, which was primarily designed for the general public. As Han’s (2000) study suggested, the idea of solving problems such as contaminated water and the impaired beauty of the scenery caused by rapid industrialisation had been floated for a long time. The decision to host the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics pushed the scheme forward. The plan had two purposes: economic development and the provision of leisure activities. It took four years to complete (1982-1986) and was 41.5km long, with an area of 39.9km². According to a source, by 1999 there were a large number of facilities, including 18 football pitches, 3 baseball grounds, 34 volleyball courts, 42 basketball courts, 27 tennis courts, 9 gateball venues, 18 badminton courts and 7 swimming pools. Currently, four parks are located to the north and eight to the south of Han River, and a total of 257 venues for 19 sports are available for people to use. The number of people who used these facilities in 2005 is 48,213,000 (with a daily average of 132,000), and 51,028,000 (with a daily average of 140,000) in 2006. However, these figures should be treated with considerate caution as they include people who only take a walk through the parks (www.hangang.seoul.go.kr). It is also known that some non-profit organisations such as the Korea SFA Centre and Korea Youth Association(www.koya.or.kr) manage seven swimming pools along the Han River.

According to Chang (2002), the number of participants in SFA increased to 29.1% in 1986, thanks to all the effort by the government and related organisations such as the Korea Sport For All Centre in 1981 and the Korean Association of Sport For All in 1986. It was a significant landmark when the government carried out research into mass participation in sport for the first time in 1986. It prompted the government to offer a
variety of programmes to different groups of people according to age and gender (Lee, H.L., 2003). Of course, the fact of more disposable income as a result of economic growth and increased leisure time cannot be ignored.

Turning to consider the role of the various governing bodies for SFA during this period when the Ministry of Sports was created in 1982, SFA was under the Community Sports Development section of the Sports Promotion Bureau. While the government gave much weight to elite sport, a few other organisations played a role in SFA. First and foremost, was the Korea Community Sports Promotion Association created by Chun Kyung Hwan, a younger brother of then President Chun in 1986. The foundation of this Association was Saemaul Sports Committee which originated from Saemaul Movement\(^5\) during Park Chung Hee era. As Lee, W.Y. (2004) observed, even though it was not explicit, this Association was run for political purposes in addition to the aim of promoting sport to the public. Lee also pointed to the lack of ethics and professionalism in financing the Committee which for example, misused finance from the ‘community sport promotion fund’ allocated within the KSC. Unfortunately Chun Kyung Hwan was sentenced to seven years imprisonment and fined 2.2 billion won in 1989 for embezzlement and tax evasion during his term in the organisation (Hankyung Business, 1\(^{st}\) September 2008). However, during his time in office he played a significant role in diffusing various sports to the public. According to Donga Ilbo (17\(^{th}\) August 2008), Chun Kyung Hwan viewed badminton as one of the sports that contribute to the success of the Saemaul movement and took the initiative for it to be played in gymnasiums and in areas of natural springs in the mountains. He even gave badminton rackets as gifts to heads of public officers and asked them to form badminton teams in their councils or companies. A former KSC senior official commented:

Chun Kyung Hwan took the SFA Committee, which was part of the KSC, away on a trip when he was in charge of Saemaul Sports Council, and also provided a substantial budgets. It showed the intimate relationship between politics and sports, since Chun Kyung Hwan was the President’s brother (Interview, 7\(^{th}\) December 2007)

\(^5\) The government’s movement which was initiated by President Park Jung Hee. It aimed to lessen the gap in standard of living between cities and rural areas, stressing ‘diligence, independence, cooperation’.
Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

As for football, it can be argued that Chun Kyung Hwan’s role in the spread of football was also substantial. A senior officer in the Korean Football Association reflected: “Chun often toured Korea and played football in a number of cities and provinces. It definitely prompted the growth of Sunday morning football in terms of the number of teams.” When considering political involvement it is clear that SFA in Korea is not immune from criticism. A former Deputy Minister of Sport argued:

The SFA in Korea is not natural but artificial. Chun Kyung Hwan imitated elite sport in the Saemaul Movement. A typical example is the ‘spectator mobilisation’ at Hyochang stadium. It all stems from the lack of a philosophy of sport. In my opinion, SFA started from a specific group who were mimicking elite sport. (Interview, 6th December 2007).

Notwithstanding all the government efforts to disseminate SFA to the public, it cannot be denied that the government’s main interest remained the successful hosting of the Asian Games and the Olympics in Seoul and achieving its target position in the medal tally, due to the fact that Korea had never experienced hosting such big events before. The Chun Doo Hwan Fifth Republic was called the ‘Sport Republic’, since the regime was fully committed to supporting elite sport to achieve international success, as well as staging professional sport for the purpose of diverting public attention from politics. Some might argue that professional sport prompted the spread of SFA in Korea. According to Chang (2002), the birth of professional sport led to spectators accepting sport as a healthy leisure activity for the general public created more interest in sport and led to the development of SFA. However, in the absence of any evidence to support Chang’s conclusion, it could be argued that professional sport functioned the opposite way. Those who considered taking part in sporting activities might, instead, have settled for watching it on TV or in the stadium, rather than directly experiencing it for themselves.
The Role of Voluntary Organisations

Sport Sector

The Sport for All Korea Association (SAKA) was created in 1981 and played a key role in the SFA movement in the 1980s. It was set up as a ‘SFA promotion centre’ and ran the campaign with the help from experts in the YMCA. Chang Ju ho, a founder of SAKA, explained the reason behind its birth as described below. It needs to be pointed out that Chang worked for Seoul YMCA upon return from the US, where he was trained in the YMCA. As a result, some support from the YMCA would be expected in the operation of SAKA:

While I was concentrating on the YMCA, I thought of creating a SFA independent organisation, as the YMCA was a religious body. Centres (with a secular character, author’s translation) were started in other regions by the Ministry of Home Affairs and SOSFO. This was possible because of the cooperation of different parties: KISS (when I was a head of KISS after the Olympics) proposed three kinds of models, SOSFO provided the construction fee and local authorities offered the land. (Interview, 20th December 2007)

The fact that Chang was working outside of the existing sport system in Korea should be stressed. The point that he was not from the so-called, political, or business elite may reflect an element of pluralism. Furthermore, the concept of ‘Policy Entrepreneur’, as discussed in Chapter 3, could also be appropriate. Having recognised that the government did not have a clear strategy or fixed position as regards SFA, it can be argued that Chang successfully took this opportunity to form SFA centres which could meet people’s needs. The first issue of the magazine published by SAKA makes clear the necessity of SAKA:

Sport is becoming more popular every day since the decision over hosting the 1988 Olympics … It is well known that several developed countries linked elite sport to mass participation, as they believed that more participation leads to the success of the Olympics. Now, it is time for us to encourage people to take part in sports … SAKA has been established based on the NSPL. With the
demands of the times we aim to contribute to the health of Korean people and recover our humanity through mass participation. (Chang, 1983: 1)

It is important to note the establishment of the Sport for All Busan Association (SABA hereafter) in 1984 in order to follow SAKA in Seoul which promotes SFA movement to the general public. As Chang was working for Seoul YMCA before he created SAKA, Oh Dong Suk, a general secretary of SABA, who proposed a meeting to initiate an organisation, was working for Busan YMCA as a director of sports. He said:

About thirty people gathered to discuss how we can revitalise SFA in Busan. There were academics, sport journalists and a few former national elite athletes. After a dozen of meetings, we formed a SABA with little financial resource or adequate facilities. (Busan Ilbo, 4th April 2009)

According to Busan Ilbo (4th April 2009), SABA began as a voluntary organisation renting a tiny room near to Busan train station. They recruited members and coached them in the swimming pool or gym in the city centre by paying a fee per hour. SABA was registered as ‘society organisation’ in 1985 and acquired permission for a juridical foundation in 1989 from the Ministry of Sport. As of April 2009, various sport programmes, including swimming, golf, table tennis, sports dance, yoga and belly dance are open to the public, from 6am to 10pm. It is intriguing that SABA began to support ‘company sport’ in Busan and formed a ‘recreation research group’ in 1985 (www.busansports.com). This paragraph a bit more explanation.

Of particular note is the fact that while YMCA and SAKA concentrated on encouraging the public to take part in SFA, there was hardly any sign of government support for these organisations. It is difficult to find any lobbying attempt from either the YMCA or SAKA directed towards the government. The reason might be that the two SFA organisations were already aware of the government’s lack of interest towards SFA so that they did not even bother to try. What is clear is that the government began to draw up the SFA policy without seeking help from existing bodies in terms of renting facilities or creating programmes and even ignored their activities. It is also notable that even though YMCA and SAKA were enthusiastic about promoting SFA, there is no evidence that they attempted to lobby government on the issue.
Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

Non Sport Sector

YMCA

The role of the YMCA in Korea’s SFA continued to be significant in the 1980s. Despite some suggestion of a decreasing role in sport of the YMCA from 1980s, a manager of the sport division in Seoul Y believed that the YMCA contributed by bringing numerous sports from western countries and spreading them throughout Korean society. The continued involvement of the YMCA in sport and its innovative role in SFA is illustrated in Table 6.8.

Table 6.8 Selected YMCA SFA activities 1980-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Activity Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>The first YMCA Citizens basketball free-throw competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Publication of a book ‘Christian Youth Group’ sport activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Class of synchronized swimming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Supervision of 1988 Seoul Olympics Han river festival</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Table 6.9 illustrates, for the YMCA, sport programmes were a significant element of the organisational range of activities. While the number of sports-related activities and events broadly equalled these focused on social development the number of participants, which exceeded 600,000 people, greatly exceeded those participating in other YMCA activities. A broad range of projects were implemented, including the promotion of citizens sport, sport classes for toddlers, yoga, gymnastics, swimming and fencing.

It is also important to emphasize the financial independence of the YMCA. A director of sport in the YMCA said:

There was no support from the government at all. The YMCA was very poor until the late 1970s. In the early 1980s, we purchased some land in the Kangnam area at a low price and began to rent it out, and the situation got better. With the increased programme, the YMCA became fully independent financially (Interview, 8th January 2008)
Table 6.9 YMCA programmes between 1985 and 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985 (no. events)</th>
<th>1986 (no. events)</th>
<th>1985 (no. participants)</th>
<th>1986 (no. participants)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Development</td>
<td>6,899</td>
<td>7,241</td>
<td>59,251</td>
<td>51,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youths &amp; boys</td>
<td>5,088</td>
<td>4,727</td>
<td>359,538</td>
<td>395,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Education</td>
<td>2,590</td>
<td>3,235</td>
<td>158,677</td>
<td>185,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Sports (SFA)</td>
<td>5,889</td>
<td>6,845</td>
<td>604,708</td>
<td>650,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gospel mission</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>2,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Friendship</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>3,430</td>
<td>9,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special events</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>5,950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Role of Commercial Organisations (Businesses)

It was not until the late 1980s that businesses showed an interest in SFA and developed a marketing strategy. According to Chang (2002), this lack commercial interest towards SFA was due to the fact that SFA had been practiced in either school facilities or public areas equipped with sport facilities. This period is important in SFA because this was virtually the start of ‘company sport’, for ordinary employees. Koh et al (2006) argued that the government began to show an interest in ‘company sport’ in the 1980s. A few policies related ‘company sport’ can be found in other non-sport sectors, most of which are in a labour context and concerned, for example, with ‘workplace health promotion movement funding’, ‘prevention support for muscle, and bone related diseases’, and ‘industrial disaster workers rehabilitation fund’. A law was enacted which imposed a duty on companies to provide sport activities for employees. It stated that workplaces with more than 500 employees should have at least one sport club, hold sport meetings more than twice a year and hold a Sports Day and Sports Week. More details regarding company sport will be discussed in a later period.
A summary of the organisations involved in SFA between 1980 and 1988 is shown in Figure 6.2. The significant relationship between the government and Saemaul Sports Committee is evident. The appointment of the president’s own brother to the top position in the organisation clearly demonstrated the government’s intention to intervene in the Committee (1). With regard to Chun Kyung Hwan’s attempt to expand sports such as badminton and football, it could be argued that the government tried to expand their influence to the grassroots population (Lee, W.Y., 2004). Those companies mentioned early continued to operate sport teams and ordinary firms began to observe specific days as set out in the NSPL for example, Sports Day and Sports Week (3).

The other relationship we need to note is that between the YMCA and SAKA. This seems a natural relationship as Chang Ju Ho, the founder of SAKA, had been working for the YMCA. From the analysis, there was no evidence that either YMCA or SAKA had lobbied the government. It appears that these two organisations shared ideas and human resources (4) but were both independent of the government. Having maintained focus on elite sport, Korea Sports Council had a Department of Community Sport as there is little evidence of detailed activities related to SFA. The relationship between
YMCA, SAKA and media is said to be similar as one between YMCA and media earlier period (5).

1989 – 2009

It has become common to hear the words ‘SFA revitalisation’ from the heads of sport organisations in the contemporary era. Sport is one of the topics that appears on government agendas because of its link to health, youth and welfare. In September 2008, six months after the start of the Lee Myung Bak government, Yu In Chon, the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST hereafter) delivered a keynote address. His policy aim as regards SFA was summed up in the slogan: ‘sports within fifteen minutes from home’. The policy indicated that the government would create sport facilities and provide coaches to encourage people at every level of society to take part in sport. The Minister also stressed that they would make sure that the elderly and disabled could participate in sport “without any difficulty”.

According to the Sport White Paper (2006), the perception of sport among Koreans had changed after the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the economic growth of the 1990s. Korean people began to believe that anyone could participate in sport in their leisure time to improve their health and quality of life. (Sport White Paper, 2006: 93). According to a former academic in the field of sport sociology:

The Ministry of Sport set up the SFA plan because they could not ignore SFA and only stress elite sport. The significant change in sport policy was seen after the 88 Olympics, when the government realized the importance of SFA in terms of health, harmony and social stability. The concept of ‘welfare’ emerged with the local autonomy system in the sense that the head of the region had to implement policy which had a visible impact on the life of the general public in the area. SFA policy was one of the most efficient tools to achieve the aim. The cohesive power of ‘Dong-ho-hoe’ caused the heads to target them and support

[^6]: [http://www.mcst.go.kr/web/introCourt/minister/address/minAddressView.jsp](http://www.mcst.go.kr/web/introCourt/minister/address/minAddressView.jsp)
their activities. It can be said that SFA policy is led by private organisation, whereas, in the past, it was done by the government.” (Interview, 03 July 2007)

His comments require some elaboration. First, the reason for the government’s support can be indicated by Chang (2002). Chang said that the economic and social changes, such as increased disposable income, more leisure time, people’s desire to improve the quality of their lives, living longer and better health, prompted the Ministry of Sports and Youth to launch the Hodori Plan. Table 6.10 shows the growth of household income and the amount spent on cultural and recreational activities over time. Second, the chiefs of the regions had to be sensitive to public opinion in order to win votes in the next election. Third, Dong-ho-hoe refers to a ‘club’ in the western sense, which was run both on-line and off-line. The clubs were independent, voluntary organisations which became popular with the introduction of the internet, particularly at the end of the 1990s. As for the on-line community, it started from a small number of people who met in cyber space to chat or share information about certain sports and resulted in the organising sports clubs in the real world. More details will be discussed later regarding the role of voluntary organisations.

**Table 6.10 Changes in Monthly Average Household Income and the amount spent on Cultural and Recreational Activities (Sample Households of Urban Workers)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monthly Average Household Income (A)</td>
<td>830,000 won</td>
<td>1.6 million won</td>
<td>2.56 million won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural and Recreational Expenses per Household (B)</td>
<td>14,000 won</td>
<td>28,000 won</td>
<td>47,000 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) / (A) x 100</td>
<td>1.68%</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
<td>1.93%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Chang (2002: 145)

**The Role of Government**

While the Korean government had become more involved in sport, its focus remained on elite sport. A journalist pointed out one of the reasons why the government focused
on supporting elite sport as follows: “The government viewed elite sports as the best way to produce a visible impact. It takes a long time to invest money in public sport facilities for the masses and promote sport activities across the nation”. It is said that sport was dealt with by the central government until the start of the local government autonomy system in 1995. Since then, self-government has been the key method of sport administration in local authorities. One would, therefore, expect SFA policy to vary from area to area depending on the size, budget, population and the level of public interest.

It could be argued that the most significant plan in relation to SFA in Korea was the Comprehensive National Lifesport Promotion Plan, the so called, Hodori Plan of 1990 (Hodori is the name of the Seoul Olympics mascot). This was a three-year comprehensive national sports promotion programme initiated by the Ministry of Sport and Youth. According to the Sports White Paper (2006), the Hodori Plan embraced elements from the government, local authorities and private sectors in order to promote SFA. According to Kim, M.K. (1993), the model for the Hodori plan was known to be Germany’s ‘Golden Plan’, which the West German Olympic Committee had been implementing for fifteen years. As Seoul Newspaper (3rd November 2006) reported, twenty seven million people (thirty percent of the total population) were playing sports in 89,000 clubs throughout Germany and only paying fees of eight to ten Euros, thanks to the ‘Golden Plan’.

It should be emphasized that the aim of the Hodori Plan was to create sport facilities for everyone regardless of age, income and gender, and enable access to these facilities without any obstacles such as cost, thereby encouraging people to take part in sport throughout their lives. The core ideas for the Hodori Plan are shown Table 6.11. As Lee, H.L. (2003) noted, the Ministry of Sport and Youth not only designed various programmes for different groups (children, women, elderly, and disabled) but created the ‘National Fitness Index’ to encourage the public to self-evaluate their fitness level. The establishment of the National Council for Sport for All (NACOSA, hereafter) by the government in February 1991 is an indication of a strengthened SFA policy. NACOSA will be discussed in detail later on.
Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

The Hodori Plan seemed to gain momentum when the civilian president Kim Young Sam took over and set up the 1st National Sports Promotion Five Year Plan (1993-1997). According to the Sports White Paper (2006), the government was keen on keeping a balance between elite sport and SFA. It would indicate that there was expected to be more support for SFA, which was under-funded at that time compared to elite sport. In relation to Kingdon’s MSF discussed in Chapter 3, the political stream could be seen in terms of the key personnel involved in this case the President, when Korea started to move towards being a pluralistic society with the emergence of civilian government.

Table 6.11. The objectives of the Hodori Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilities</th>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Coaches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• expand facilities</td>
<td>• develop &amp; deliver SFA programme</td>
<td>• Improve the system of training SFA coaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- establish seng-hwal-kwan in remembrance of the Seoul Olympics</td>
<td>• develop &amp; deliver national sport (kuk-min-kyung-ki-jong-mok)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- create small-sized SFA facilities</td>
<td>• develop &amp; deliver SFA programme depending on the social stratum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- create tennis courts in the public elementary schools</td>
<td>• develop &amp; deliver healthy life gymnasts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- create swimming pools in the metropolitan cities</td>
<td>• run '90 national sport classes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- create “leports” (Leisure+ sports) parks</td>
<td>• develop company sport programmes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Improve usage of the existing sport facilities</td>
<td>• host '90 national sirum king selection competition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- improve usage of public sport facilities</td>
<td>• host national fitness evaluation competition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- increase the access to school facilities by the public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- opening up of the Olympic facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Chang (2002) said, Korean people’s desire for sport activities increased dramatically after the success of 1988 Seoul Olympics and the government’s interest and support for SFA also grew. Table 6.12 shows details of the Plan and the government’s commitment to the promotion of SFA can be seen by the fact that it was positioned at the top of the list. It is important to note that the government announced a plan for constructing district culture/sport halls for the people in big cities. It is known that Seoul metropolitan city and the other cities were in charge of this, having received funds from the local authorities. For people in rural areas such as in farming and fishing communities, culture/sports halls were expected to be built from 1993. A special reserve fund in the Korean Racing Authority would pay for their construction, according to SOSFO (2003). As for cost of the plan, this was estimated to be 1,667 billion won, but ended up being 4, 129 billion won (Sports White Paper, 2006: 22).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy task</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| National diffusion of SFA                        | - Inspire people to participate in sport  
                                          | - Expand & improve sport facilities and train SFA coaches  
                                          | - Systematic development and support of national sport activities  
                                          | - More opportunities for healthy leisure |
| Continuous Development in elite sport            | - Scientific, systematic development of first-class athletes  
                                          | - Improvement in the operation of domestic competitions  
                                          | - Train quality coaches  
                                          | - Seek better welfare policy for sports people (che-yuk-in) & more independence of sport organisations |
| Promote international sports cooperation         | - Strengthen Korea’s status in sport worldwide  
                                          | - Seek efficiency in the international sport exchange matter  
                                          | - Contrive national harmony through sport |
| Development of sport science                     | - Strengthen research base in sport science |

7 This is a non-profit organization established by the Korea Racing Authority Law and supervised by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The mission of the KRA is to provide exciting and fair racing to the fans and contribute to the public services from the financial resources generated by racing.
http://company.kra.co.kr/foreign/english/en_sub01_03.htm
Table 6.13 The change in participation rates, 1991-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation Rate</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A source from Donga Ilbo (11th February 2009) quoted some figures from the Sports White Paper (2007) which was the source of the 2006 figures in Table 6.13. As for the frequency of SFA participation, 28.6% of the population ‘Did not do any sport activities at all’. The figures for people who participated in sport less than 2-3 times a month,
once a week, 2-3 times a week, 4-5 times a week and every day was 13.3%, 13.9%, 24.0%, 12.0% and 8.1% respectively.

The government attempts to give more weight to ‘fundamental sports’ and winter sports, which were considered weak compared to summer sports. According to the Sports White Paper (2006), the number of SFA facilities significantly increased in cities and provinces with the building of 34 playgrounds, 32 gymnasiums and 1,456 town sport halls. Moreover, level one SFA coaches who were eligible for an exercise programme were trained for the first time, and the total number of SFA coaches reached 19,314.

The 2nd National Sports Promotion Five-Year Plan, which was published in 1998, gave even more weight to SFA. As Table 6.14 shows, it is notable that the balance between the elite sport and SFA was stressed. It could be thought that the government tried to apply the model of sport of the developed nations, the so called club system, which involves grassroots participation that could potentially lead to the podium, if the athletes were successful. However, the genuine rationale encouraging SFA needs to be considered. Was the government’s idea of balance between the two areas of sport for the sake of SFA, which had been left far behind elite sport, or was the aim to develop SFA in order to produce successful elite athletes?


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy task</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Form community-centred environment for Sport For All participation | - Expand sport facilities which can be used as a place for community purposes  
- Increase SFA programmes for under-participation groups  
- Recruit and deploy SFA coaches  
- Scientific support for public fitness monitoring  
- Promote SFA led by private sectors |
| Maintain the top performance level in the world & Strengthen the relationship between the SFA | - Seek expertise in terms of talent identification and development system |

8 Fundamental sports indicates athletics, swimming and gymnastics in Korean context.
Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

| and elite sport | - Improve the autonomy of sport federations  
| | - Rationalisation and computerisation of competition operation system  
| | - Balance between the SFA and elite sport through the development of sport club system  
| Consolidation of the relationship with other countries and North Korea | - Increase the number of countries  
| | - Seek efficiency in the international sport exchange matter  
| | - Build national harmony through sport  
| | - Diffuse symbolic sport for promotion of Korea’s image  
| Prepare for the stepping up through successful hosting 2002 Korea Japan World Cup | - Set up system of competition operation, secure stadiums  
| | - Systematic preparation for opening ceremony, operation competition  
| | - Create atmosphere for nationwide participation and government support  
| Reinforce international competitive power of sport industry | - Research and development in sport industry  
| | - Preferential mortgage support for underdeveloped area for building private sport facilities  
| | - Seek deregulation of the development of private sport facilities  
| | - Seek ways to protect rights and safety of customers who use sport services  
| Pursue development of sport science and competitiveness and improve efficiency of sport administration | - Enhance the capacity of KISS  
| | - Strengthen the research into public fitness and elite performance  
| | - Construct integrated, information network and provide a variety of sport information  
| | - Enhance the expertise of sport human resources and deploy experts in local authorities  

Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

Though it was not a new idea, as the 1st National Sports Promotion Five-Year Plan stated the government’s commitment to access for everyone to sport, it is still significant to note that the motive for promoting SFA reflects welfare perspectives in Korean society, as set out in the Sports White Paper (2006). Also, as Lee, H.L. (2003) pointed out, it can be seen that the state-led sport policy had changed to a local authority-led one. The Sports White Paper (2006) argued that it was inevitable for sport sectors to seek decentralisation and private-led policy due to the trends of ‘Localisation, Privatisation and Pluralisation’ which were prevalent in Korean society. As for pluralisation, the Sports White Paper did not clearly define the term. However, the word ‘pluralisation’ appears to indicate tendency to include more diverse actors in decision making by distributing power from central government to local authorities, as occurred with the beginning of the ‘Local Autonomy System’. President Kim Young Sam, who led the ‘Local Autonomy System’ implemented this policy in order to generate more enthusiasm from local governments for building facilities, providing programmes and hosting more sport competitions because of the chance of winning votes in the upcoming elections. It could be argued that there was a tendency to become more pluralistic in making sport-related decisions in Korea, compared to the authoritarian era, when the central government was in sole charge of decision making. However, it needs to be reiterated that the SFA policy community, which consisted of a limited elite, were still the ones who made decisions in relation to SFA matters. On the macro level it can be said that the concentration of power was weakened. However, the exclusiveness of the policy community still existed in every local area. Whether this restriction of the membership was looser than that in elite sport needs to be considered.

No longer having a lack of legitimacy, the regime was prompted to delegate responsibilities for sport policy to each local authority so that they could devise their own schemes depending on size, circumstances and special needs of the region (Lee, H.L., 2003). In the same vein, the main focus in this period, from the SFA point of view, was to build sport centres in local areas to balance the distribution of facilities across the different regions. Local authorities and the SOSFO led the plan and it was intended that the construction cost would be covered by the SOSFO fund. The government continued to build the culture-sport centres in farming and fishing villages which started in 1993.
Of the facilities now seen in Korea, let us look at the ‘Public Sport Centre (PSC)’. As Lee, S.G. (2005) said, the PSC is a sport facility for the general public, funded by the government or local authorities, and is considered to be a public service. The aim should not be to seek profit, but to improve the quality of life for people in the community. Park Jae Ho, a former Chairman of SOSFO, summarised the nature of the PSC as a project to construct sport facilities including swimming pools and fitness clubs in the cities, provinces and local authorities which particularly aims to help the disadvantaged (Park, J.H., 2007). According to Lee, S.G. (2005), the PSC could be categorised as a social welfare organisation which is seen as a fundamental feature in developed countries. SOSFO (2003) pointed out that PSC is able to provide opportunities for people to meet and communicate face to face and share their experiences. In the high-tech society surrounded by on-line culture, the communication between people could help to keep humanity alive. As Kim, B.S. (1992) noted, playing various sports with other people contributes to the positive development of communities. It is certain that people would not only be learning sports’ skills, but also the knowledge of how to manage leisure time, how to keep fit and social skills in terms of communication and relationships with other members.

Preceding the 2nd National Sports Promotion Five-Year Plans (1998-2002) announced by the Kim Dae Jung government, an additional scheme was established in August 2001 called ‘SFA Revitalisation’ and ‘Sport Industry Development Programme’. According to a senior officer in the MCST, a number of sport researchers from KISS and other sport experts participate in drawing up the National Sports Promotion Plans every five years. With regard to the ‘SFA Revitalisation’, which interests us in this section, this was focused on providing equal opportunities for sport participation to everyone with the start of the five-day working week and increased interest in well-being (Sports White Paper, 2006). The details included expanding community-friendly SFA facilities, developing emerging sports programmes and setting up the new system of leisure sport management. In 2003 the Roh Moo Hyun government announced the 3rd National Sports Promotion Five-Year Plan which was in place until 2007. Overall, the plan was not very different from the previous ones. However, there were seven central features which appear to be somewhat unique in relation to SFA, and these will be discussed below.
First and foremost, the expansion of sport facilities to allow residents to access the provision more easily was considered to be vital. The scheme involved building national sport centres, culture-sport centres for farming and fishing communities, multi-purpose SFA parks, grass and all weather surface facilities, gate ball grounds, and facilities for the public in villages and schools. National sport centres which aimed to provide for the welfare of the public were planned to be built in 53 locations during the period 2003-2007. The SOSFO and local authorities such as cities, provinces and municipalities led this plan and three billion won was allocated to build each centre. The additional cost was to be funded by local authorities. The local authorities were to secure the land by themselves (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003). The investment plan for the given period is shown in Table 6.15. These were other plans also supported by funds from the National Treasury, SOSFO, local authorities and other sources such as the Korean Horse Affairs Association. This was very similar to the plan of the previous government. There was also a scheme to create 30 to 40 golf courses by 2010 and to make them affordable and accessible to the public.

Table 6.15. Funding plan for sport centre construction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOSFO</td>
<td>158,570</td>
<td>37,600</td>
<td>30,970</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAF*</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>208,570</td>
<td>47,600</td>
<td>40,970</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*LAF: Local Authority fund

(Source: The Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003: 35)

Second, the government showed great interest in developing a voluntary and independent sports club system. Offering competition opportunities to everyone was the main objective. The target was to increase the proportion of sport club membership in the total population from 3.6% to 10%. Setting up three phases, 2003-2004, 2005-2006 and 2007 onwards, the aim was to implement various schemes dependent on the characteristics of each region and sport. These included local youth clubs, national mothers’ clubs and nationwide membership clubs. The National Mothers’ SFA Competition had gained popularity over the years. A number of competitions for women were held, hosted by NACOSA and the Woman’s Sports Association, and 3,500 people in 10 sports took part in the competitions in 2002. As Seoul Newspaper
(3rd November 2006) said, it is also notable that the KSC had run six youth sport clubs since 2004 for a probationary period, trying to discover talented boys and girls. This would need to be reviewed over time as the KSC movement could cause conflict with NACOSA, who is responsible for SFA in Korea. Even though the Articles of the KSC state that mass participation is an area which is under its jurisdiction, the fact that the KSC was focused on elite sport would be likely to prompt controversy over the SFA leadership.

Third, the government planned to develop various programmes to encourage people to participate in sport. The target groups for the programmes were children, youth, the elderly, women and the disabled, as well as the general public. It is significant that 15 billion won from the 2002 FIFA World Cup surplus was allocated to the Korean Disabled People’s Development Institute (Ok, 25th June 2003). Also, the number of SFA classes was expected to increase from 25 in 2003 to 45 in 2007. NACOSA had devised a number of SFA programmes, in the form of books, CD-ROM and DVD to encourage the public to be actively involved in sport. Over five years, 694 million won of SOSFO funds was to be invested in these programmes (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003).

Fourth, the government aimed at maximising the function of the National Fitness Centre, established in 1994 in the TN Village as a part of the 1st National Sports Promotion Five-Year Plan. The 2nd Plan caused the Centre to move to the Olympic Park and extended its work to the general public. There were new facilities including a demonstration laboratory for exercise treatment of adult diseases, a laboratory to check cardio-vascular capacity and muscular conditions and funding of 8,920 million won was allocated from SOSFO. In addition, schemes such as a nationwide check on the health of the public, development of a national health and fitness index and research into SFA in Korea were proposed (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003).

Fifth, it is important to note that the government saw leisure sport as a potentially large area and enacted a law in relation to leisure sport and the equipment needed to enjoy it in order to regulate or restrict sports which impose a potential danger to people’s lives, such as scuba diving and wind surfing (Chang, 2002). Also, as the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2003) pointed out, government support was necessary in creating
facilities for leisure sport, due to its lack of profitability. However, the main problem in relation to the management and development of leisure sport is the plurality of stakeholders who all insist on taking responsibility in their respective policy areas.

Sixth, it is notable that the government viewed SFA coaches as being as important as those of elite sport. The biggest problem with the current coaching licence system was the fact that 73.4% of SFA coaching certificate holders were concentrated in 6 out of 69 sports such as golf, bodybuilding, taekwondo, ten pin bowling, swimming and aerobics. It is believed that coaches in these sports are likely to acquire jobs relatively easily, due to the popularity of the sports, and be well-paid compared to other sports. It is now recognised that new coaches in emerging sports need to be recruited and trained and therefore more systematic programmes which meet the needs of contemporary society are necessary. Strengthening the criteria for SFA coaches and retaining them is seen as critical to the success of SFA policy.

Finally, the government planned to promote sport and motivate the population more effectively through a nationwide SFA campaign in the media, so that the public could incorporate SFA as an important part of their lives. A number of documentary programmes and special materials were prepared to create an atmosphere that encouraged the public to participate in sport (The Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003). The ‘7330 campaign’ led by NACOSA is a typical example and this attempted to highlight the benefits of sport activities through posters, stickers, advertisements and TV. In particular, 15 slots on Seoul Broadcasting System TV, covering the SFA national festival, the one-wheel bicycle trend in a primary school and company sport (Jokgu: Foot volleyball) are believed to have aroused viewer’s interest. It is important to note that all the sources with reference to the campaign came from SOSFO.

Now, as discussed in Chapter 5 regarding changes in the NSPL over time, let us look at how the NSPL was modified with regard to SFA. There were four revisions of the NSPL during Roh Tae Woo regime, which reflected the changes in society. Considering that three of the changes were partly due to the change of other laws, our focus will be solely on changes in 1989 which emphasised SFA. Of particular importance is the substantial number of Articles in the NSPL introduced regarding SOSFO (the name was changed from the National Sport Development Foundation to the Seoul Olympic Sports
Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

Promotion Foundation). The government allowed SOSFO to run facilities, advertise for the purpose of collecting funds and expand ways to raise funds, which we will see in detail later on.(Article No.4105, 31st March 1989). Since then, no major revisions have been observed in Korea.

According to research carried out by the Korea Consumer Agency, the average Korean spent more than 150 million won each year during the period of the five-day working week on leisure activities (Sports White Paper, 2006). In relation to the increased interest for Korean public and the government in sport, it is important to note some opinions from academics. Im and Lee (1995) argued that the public began to request the government to provide various services for their needs which is different from the past when the government mainly concentrated on the number of medals in the Olympics. Choi and Oh (1990) suggested that the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympics and the dramatic economic growth prompted the government to see the quality of life as a welfare issue in relation to the health and fitness of the population. Chang (1990) also emphasised that the Ministry of Sport’s ultimate aim was to help make Korea a happy, welfare society. Now, let us look at the key organisations which take responsibility for SFA in Korea under the MCST.

NACOSA (The National Council of Sport For All)

It is necessary to discuss NACOSA, a SFA governing body established in 1991, in greater detail. It soon became a corporation aggregate after acquiring permission from the Ministry of Sport and Youth. According to the Sports White Paper (2006), NACOSA was created in order to deliver the SFA national policy, the so called ‘Hodori Plan’, which was devised during the 6th Republic. The Sports White Paper (2006) argued that the government’s commitment to implementing SFA policy increased due to the huge interest in sport participation among Koreans after the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympics, and the urgent necessity of sport in an era of industrialisation and automisation which would cause health problems for the public. Under these circumstances, it was planned to create an organisation like those in developed countries which could play a central role in SFA, rather than providing aid to a number of local Dong-ho-hoe, which was expected to be less efficient and sustainable (Sports White Paper, 2006). From July 1990 voluntary and independent sports club members
across Korea began to form SFA Associations in cities, provinces and municipalities. It is important to note that this formation was initiated by Dong-ho-hoe members. After only four months (November 1990), fifteen City and Provincial SFA Associations had been created. A brief history of NACOSA and the structure of the organisation can be found in Table 6.16 and Figure 6.3, respectively. The seven partner organisations in Figure 6.3 included the Korean Elderly Association, Korean Women’s Sports Association, Korean University Students’ Association. The objectives of NACOSA are: to enhance people’s health and fitness through the promotion of SFA, to lead people to have a sound leisure culture, to establish an advanced sport culture and to build a foundation for the unification of Korea by developing Korea’s identity and patriotism (http://www.sportal.or.kr).

The motive behind the final objective of NACOSA regarding Korea’s unification requires comment. The objective relates to the support given by ex-patriot for the Seoul Olympics. As explained by a senior officer in NACOSA:

A number of Koreans who were living overseas contributed to the Seoul Olympics by raising funds. A part of the money was included in the Olympic surplus which was used to create the SOSFO. In order to pay tribute to Koreans around the world, the government initiated the World Koreans Festival and invited Koreans from 169 countries to encourage them to keep their identity. The Committee for the World Koreans Festival was set up in 1992 and integrated into the NACOSA.

It is important to note the background to the birth of NACOSA. Of particular significance is the fact that there are conflicting opinions from those inside and outside NACOSA, in terms of the political motives. A number of interviewees considered that NACOSA was formed for political purposes. A former senior officer in KSC said: “There was a private network called ‘Wol-gye-soo-hoe (laural tree society)’ when Park Chul Un was the Minister of Sport. As far as I know, NACOSA was formed to gather votes from sport people before a certain election.” In contrast, a senior officer in NACOSA denied that the politics played a part in the formation of the organisation. He strongly argued:
It’s nothing to do with politics. It appears that Chun Kyung Hwan was trying to create an organisation because he loved sport so much. However, when it came to the forming the body, he didn’t play any role at all. What happened was that a completely different group of people from SFA Councils in cities and provinces, involved in football and athletics made the decisions. A representative was elected and the Council chose Choi II Hong as the president. This was the start of the NACOSA.”

Regardless of its political involvement in the formation of NACOSA, it cannot be denied that the government is still deeply involved in NACOSA’s affairs. One of the controversies was the Ministry of Culture & Tourism’s rejection of the presidential nominee submitted by NACOSA. To avoid confusion, it needs to be emphasised that Article 3.13 in NACOSA states that all the executives should be approved by the Minister of Culture and Tourism (NACOSA internal document). The core issue was how to interpret the clause ‘the person who can keep political neutrality’ which was added to the regulation during the presidential election process, With the agreement of the Board of Directors, NACOSA gave their recommendation to the government. However, the MCT rejected it because they considered that Lee Kang Du, a MP from Hannara Party, was not politically neutral. According to a senior officer in NACOSA, inside practitioners did not take this issue seriously. It seems that despite the addition of new rules, the conventional way to

---

**Table 6.16 Key events in the History of NACOSA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1989</td>
<td>A ‘Hodori Plan’ was announced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1991</td>
<td>Formation of NACOSA. Choi II Hong was inaugurated as Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1991</td>
<td>NACOSA was authorised by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1994</td>
<td>NACOSA and the World Korean Festival Committee was combined to form one organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1995</td>
<td>World Korean Festival was held (45 countries, 500 participants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1997</td>
<td>Korea and Japan SFA exchange programme started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2001</td>
<td>Korea and China SFA exchange programme started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>‘The Festival of Korean Sport For All’ was held (60,000 participants)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.sportal.or.kr/skin/default/ebook/ebook/VIEW.HTM](http://www.sportal.or.kr/skin/default/ebook/ebook/VIEW.HTM)
get approval for the president’s appointment, namely, to suggest names from political parties, would have been accepted without any difficulties.

**Figure 6.3 The organisational structure in NACOSA**

As a source suggested, Lee, who was cynically called ‘NACOSA president who failed to take office’, finally ended up taking charge of the organisation thanks to the overwhelming support of the general meeting which took place in Aug 2008 (Kukinews, 19th September 2008). It cannot be denied that the change in the regime in February 2008 favoured Lee due to his position as a Hannara Party MP.
It is instructive to note that it was not difficult for the government to appoint politicians as heads of sport organisations. This is called a ‘parachute appointment’ in Korea, implying that he or she comes from outside sport and is chosen, not because of their genuine enthusiasm or experience in the sport sector but because of their intimate friendship or network with the President. According to Professor Yang Jae Keun, thirteen current MPs, seven from the ruling party, five from the opposition party and one independent politician, were chairing sport bodies under the control of the MCT. They include Park Jae Ho in SOSFO and Kim Jung Kil of KSC, both of whom are well known to be President Rho Moo Hyun’s comrades (Naeil News, 2nd August 2006). As regards the court case over the appointment of NACOSA president, the result had not been announced when the interview took place (Jan.2008). A senior officer in NACOSA clarified the fact that it was a matter between the Ministry of Culture & Tourism and MP Lee as an individual. He elucidated the status of NACOSA saying:

We cannot fight against the government as we are under the government. If we resist the government, we had better dissolve. Whether Mr. Lee wins or loses, the ball is in the hands of the MCT. If they say yes, we will usher him as president, if they don’t, that’s it.” (Interview, 26th December 2007)

Particularly notable is the government’s attitude towards openness in the appointment of sport governing bodies or national sport federations. The government is not reluctant to open the door to ‘placed men’, even if they do not have any sport background. It appears that the government prefers someone who is an ‘inside’, from a similar background and therefore perceived as dependable. It could be argued that this phenomenon provides some evidence that a policy community exists in Korean SFA as this policy community has restricted membership which does not allow new interests to join easily. They tend to have shared values and beliefs, regarding the development of SFA, but their objectives are set not within the ‘community’ but are strongly influenced by government and it would be impossible for the group to neglect the government’s interest.

As shown in Figure 6.3, the structure of the NACOSA is far from being simple because of the continuous increase in size due to the influx of a number of Dong-ho-hoe members. When the position of president was left vacant for nearly three years, the
media highlighted the growth of NACOSA, which now boasts 18 million SFA participants and 3 million registered members. Considering the size of the SFA population, it could be argued that NACOSA had become an organisation that the government could not ignore. It may indicate that NACOSA has the potential to function as a lobbying body to attract even more funding to SFA projects or programmes, but evidence to substantiate this conclusion is currently lacking. A senior officer in SOSFO confirmed that they give funds to support 1,500 SFA coaches compared to the 35 they used to support financially. The growth of SFA is explained by a general secretary of Korea SFA Football Association. He said:

There are less than 500 elite badminton players registered in KSC. However, the number of members in badminton Dong-ho-hoe is approximately 400,000. Also, while there are two elite football tournaments in one region, more than twenty competitions are held within Dong-ho-hoe (Interview, 10th January 2008)

As discussed, the establishment of NACOSA is a significant element in Korean SFA as a whole. It seems that NACOSA tends to take centralised control over policy, such as promoting the 7330 movement, supporting the training of SFA coaches, providing sports lessons through the internet (40 sports for the five years 2004-2008), hosting the National SFA Festival and World Koreans Festival. However, the policy appears to be delivered through utilisation of a sub-national government structure, including the City and Province council of SFA, and nationwide federations for each sport. Of particular note is the role of Dong-ho-hoe for as a KISS researcher argued, “SFA in Korea grows voluntarily with Dong-ho-hoe at the centre, rather than being led by the government” (Interview, 3rd December 2007)

Integration & Separation of the sport governing bodies

As discussed in Chapter 5, disputes over the restructuring of the sport governing bodies failed to be resolved for more than four decades after their re-integration, due to the conflict between KSC and KOC officials which began at the 1966 Bangkok Asian Games. There seems to be a consensus in the Korean sport community that the struggle for the leadership was the main reason the issue remained unsolved (Nam, 9th March
2009, www.kukkinews.com). Having concluded that the situation became more settled due to the establishment of NACOSA, it is necessary to explore the debates regarding the integration and separation issue involving the Korean sport governing organisations. A senior officer in KSC said:

In 2004, the discussion continued for a year in the KSC Board of Directors, the General Meeting of Representatives, the KOC Standing Committee and the General Meeting. Agreement over integration of the KSC and KOC was reached. The problem was the position of NACOSA as it was not under our jurisdiction. Our argument was to embrace NACOSA so that the three organisations could become one. (Interview, 13th December 2007)

However, a general secretary of the Korea SFA Football Association confidently argued that the reason for the delay in reaching a consensus was due to the enormous size of the membership of NACOSA, as mentioned above. He seemed to think that the KSC was reluctant to combine with NACOSA because they were few in number. This perspective reflects on Lukes’ first dimension in which power can be exercised by the individual through their role in making decisions. In other words, the more people you have, the stronger your voice. In contrast, a senior officer in NACOSA expressed a completely different opinion regarding the integration and separation of the sport governing bodies. He was certain that the integration would jeopardise NACOSA’s status because: “In Korean culture, we will inevitably follow the elite sport governing body if we integrate without deliberation.” In these comments, we can see the link to the second and third dimension of Lukes’ notion of power. The implication of the senior officer’s words is that the structured, highly hierarchal Korean society, would lead the SFA governing organisation (NACOSA) to be dragged along by the elite sport governing body (KSC), because the former is viewed as immature, having a short history and of less importance than the latter. As Lukes (2005: 27) argued “The most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place” This power asymmetry tends to minimise the chance for the issues to come to the surface.
Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

SOSFO

The Seoul Olympic Sport Promotion Foundation (SOSFO) is a central funding body for Korean sport, particularly SFA. It is a juridical foundation, established on 20th April 1989 after the Seoul Olympics, to encourage national sports promotion and sport science research. The rationale behind the creation of SOSFO is hardly mentioned in the documents or literature. However, one of the senior officers in SOSFO who had been working in the organisation since its birth explained:

When the SLOOC (Seoul Olympic Organising Committee) was established, they recruited staff who were good at English from various sectors including civil servants, banks and private companies. Except for the civil servants who could return to their workplace after the Olympics, 700 people or so would have been left without jobs. With the surplus of 350 billion won and the increase of GDP in Korea, Park Se Jik, a Chairman of SLOOC, thought that the paradigm of sport would change from elite sport to SFA in the near future and that this could solve the problems of employees in the SLOOC. The effort to persuade Park to make such an organisation began (Interview, 20th December 2007)

It is argued that the close relationship between President Rho Tae Woo and Chairman Park was crucial for the plan to proceed. The military background and affection for sport of President Rho prompted the creation of special clauses in the NSPL and the birth of SOSFO. The same senior officer argued:

The core people who contributed to the birth of SOSFO were President Rho, Chairman Park and a senior officer in the Ministry of Sport. The President’s power brought about the birth of SOSFO, despite the protest from the Ministry of Finance and Economics. I can say that SOSFO was the work of Park Se Jik who cared about the employees who might not find employment after leaving SLOOC. (Interview, 20th December 2007).

In relation to the perspective of MSF as discussed in Chapter 3, it can be said that Chairman Park was a successful ‘Policy Entrepreneur’, in the sense that he
Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

acknowledged the time when a ‘policy window’ was opened and put much effort into creating the organisation, as shown in Chapter 3. The other point to stress is that Park could achieve his aim because he was a member of the Korean sport policy community. It appears that the PC consisted of the President, a limited number of senior officials, and a few senior business people, and that the ‘coupling’ in establishing the SOSFO was completed in a successful manner.

Now, let us look at how the initial finances of SOSFO increased and how it was used over two decades. It is notable that the initial fund of 352.1 billion, a combination of 311 billion won from the surplus of the Seoul Olympics and 41.1 billion won which was invested in the establishment of the National Sports Development Fund, had belonged to the KSC until then.

**Table 6.17 SOSFO funding expenditure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td>1,031</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>2,367</td>
<td>2,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>2,324</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(66%)</td>
<td>(63%)</td>
<td>(47%)</td>
<td>(85%)</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td>(48%)</td>
<td>(48%)</td>
<td>(27%)</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
<td>(24%)</td>
<td>(28%)</td>
<td>(34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>1,527</td>
<td>1,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28%)</td>
<td>(30%)</td>
<td>(47%)</td>
<td>(11%)</td>
<td>(41%)</td>
<td>(44%)</td>
<td>(43%)</td>
<td>(62%)</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td>(67%)</td>
<td>(64%)</td>
<td>(60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5%)</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
<td>(3%)</td>
<td>(7%)</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
<td>(8%)</td>
<td>(10%)</td>
<td>(9%)</td>
<td>(8%)</td>
<td>(7%)</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: adapted from [http://www.sosfo.or.kr](http://www.sosfo.or.kr)

It is necessary to examine some features regarding Table 6.17 and Figure 6.4. According to SOSFO ([www.sosfo.or.kr](http://www.sosfo.or.kr)), a substantial amount of money, 10 billion won in 1999 and 2001, and 190 billion won in 2000, was used for the construction of the FIFA World Cup stadiums and that was included in the fund for elite sport. The increase in the fund in 2003 is due to lottery money (157 billion won in 2003) and the FIFA World Cup surplus (85 billion won). Of particular note is the opposite phenomenon occurring in elite sport before and after 2004. Elite sport received more funding up until 2003 but the fund for SFA increased significantly every year and took over from elite sport in 2004.
The percentage of the fund invested in elite sport and SFA from 2003 to 2008 shows that SFA had become more important for the government. In 2003, 48% of the fund was put into elite sport and 43% was for SFA. However, the percentage for SFA increased to 62% in 2004, while that for elite sport decreased to 27%. Since then the ratio between elite sport and SFA appears to have been maintained (www.sosfo.or.kr). SOSFO stated that the increase in SFA funds was caused by the need to create a sport infrastructure, such as community sport facilities and school playgrounds to
demonstrate the use of lottery funds. The details of the usage of SFA funding can be found in Table 6.18. Continuous spending on community sport facilities, the National Sports Centre and sport facilities in towns can be regarded as evidence of the government’s increased interest in SFA over the last 5-6 years.

Bearing in mind that the SOSFO fund (Fund hereafter) is such an important resource for sport, it leads us to consider if there is any direct support from the government, namely, the National Treasury. According to a number of interviewees, there seems to be agreement that the boundary between the National Treasury (Kuk-ko) and the SOSFO fund (Ki-Kum) had become blurred. As we can see in Figure 6.5, the resources of the Fund have increased dramatically, while the opposite trend is shown with the National Treasury. The ratio of money from the National Treasury to money from the Fund was six to four until 2001 but became four to six after 2004. The reason according to SOSFO was that the money which had been spent on elite sport was being transferred to the Fund. The increase of 32 billion won in 2007 was due to the construction of additional sport facilities in local areas (http://www.sosfo.or.kr).

SOSFO argued that the Fund enhanced the effectiveness of the national sport budget, which was National Treasury plus Fund, by complementing the government sport budget. However, the view from a senior officer in SOSFO is worth noting. He pointed out that the Fund seems to provide a justification for the government to decrease their support from the National Treasury. He continued:

Having money that you can see just out there, the Fund, leads the government to put sport aside and easily dismiss it from the priority agenda. What is worse is that more than one Ministry, including Health & Welfare, tries to be involved in sport matters, which negatively affects the sport sector. It’s a pity that the whole sport financial pie gets smaller. For the development of Korean sport the pie needs to get bigger and bigger. (Interview, 20th December 2007)
Table 6.19 Distinction of usage between the National Treasury and the Fund in use of resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Treasury</th>
<th>Fund</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite Sport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Develop national athletes</td>
<td>- KSC Operating expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Expand sport facilities for elites</td>
<td>- Amalgamation of the National Sports Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Build National Sport Festival (NSF) facilities</td>
<td>- Develop school sport teams, sport schools, superior athletes in the NSF and reserve athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Expand training facilities for national athletes (create training complex for national athletes)</td>
<td>- Develop Youth Sport Clubs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Create Taekwondo Park</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support international competition or events</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Partially support SFA parks</td>
<td>- Overall SFA promotion projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Expand SFA facilities (Build National Sports Centre, SFA facilities in school grounds and towns, football centres, parks, mini sport facilities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Sport Exchange</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dispatch competitions, exchange between the nations</td>
<td>- Host middle, small size domestic or international competitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dispatch competitions in each sport</td>
<td>- Support policy oriented projects (exchange between the nations, host mega sport events)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Both National Treasury and Fund invested into mega events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.sosfo.or.kr
It can be difficult to see clearly which funds belong to the National Treasury and which belong to the Fund. That is why it was agreed by a number of interviewees that there is no point in distinguishing between the two any more. In relation to SFA, while the Fund is supposed to be used for SFA promotion projects and facility enlargement, there is also be an element of this in the case of National Treasury funds, as shown in Table 6.19.

Now, let us discuss in more detail the Fund that is the central asset as far as SOSFO is concerned. There are four main sources of the fund in SOSFO: cycle racing, motorboat racing, sports toto and Olympic Parke tel. For example, in the case of the fixed return category in sport toto, 30.638% of the sales after refunds and bought-in management fees, are eligible to be used for sport development, based on the NSPL enforcement decree. There are four areas that sports earnings can be used for: construction for the FIFA World Cup stadium (50%), SOSFO fund (30%), support National Sports Organisation which sports issues the lottery (10%) and cultural or sport events which the Minister of Culture, Sport and Tourism designates (10%). According to a SOSFO senior officer, the executive members brainstormed a way to grow the seed money of 350 billion won up to 1,000 billion in ten years and the decision to run businesses involving gambling was made. Article 19 in the NSPL states that SOSFO can raise money through government funding, voluntary funding from other sources, advertising on cigarette packs, entrance fees to the stadiums, gymnasiums, swimming pools and golf courses which the presidential decree allows. However, it needs to be emphasised that the SOSFO does not have any independence, as the Fund is controlled by the government. A senior officer in SOSFO quite unequivocally said:

We don’t have any autonomy at all. No, No, NO! We are meant to make decisions but the Ministry of Planning and Budget has all the power in terms of allocating the budget. Whatever fantastic proposal we submit, Those who, for the most part, do not have any interest in sport ask us to remove it. (Interview, 20th December 2007)

As regards the government funding process, it is necessary to understand the ‘Top-Down Ceiling System’. With this system the Ministry of Planning and Finance allocate the funding ceiling in each Ministry. The distribution of funds to each department in the
Ministry is up to the Ministry itself. A senior officer in the MCT argued that more autonomy is given to each Ministry now than in the past when the Ministry of Planning and Budget exercised very tight control. Consequently, sport for example, may have better opportunities to bid for mega sport events. In contrast, a SOSFO senior officer offered a different perspective saying “Under the ‘Top-Down Ceiling System’, sport tends to be neglected in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT). Although we have great ideas and projects, they will be pushed aside if another department in the MCT has a so called ‘attractive plan’.”

Like NACOSA, SOSFO cannot avoid being influenced by the government in terms of appointments to top positions. Considering that the Minister of Culture, Sport and Tourism (MCST)\(^9\) has a right to nominate the Board of Directors (BOD), as shown in Table 6.20, following the Recommendation Committee’s proposals, it is not possible for SOSFO to be an autonomous body. The BOD in SOSFO is composed of nine people, including government officials, academics, voluntary organisation staff and coaches. Lee Jong In, Chair of the BOD meeting on 28\(^{th}\) January 2005, implied in the Board minutes conflicts between the SOSFO and the government:

> On the face of it, SOSFO seems to make huge profit. However, we face a serious internal crisis. It is caused by the decline of cycle racing, the poor progress of motor racing and the fall in interest rates. We had used additional tax on golf courses without any problem but the government is insisting that we spend that money only on creating public courses

The comment from a SOSFO senior officer summarised the limits on SOSFO’s autonomy when he said: “The MCST thinks that they make all the policies and you (SOSFO) implement it”

---

\(^9\) As mentioned in page 3, Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) became the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST) as of 29\(^{th}\) February 2009.
Table 6.20 Details of the Board of Directors in SOSFO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Career</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Park Jae Ho</td>
<td>Chairman of the Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sohn Jae Taek</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Board Members*</td>
<td>Jo Hyun Jae</td>
<td>Head of sport dept. in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kim Jae Chul</td>
<td>General Secretary of KSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kim Chang Ok</td>
<td>Delegates of Open Society 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kim Seung Chul</td>
<td>Director of Korea Track &amp; Field Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Professor in Sungkyunkwan University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Executive Director</td>
<td>Ju Won Hong</td>
<td>Head coach, Samsung Stock Tennis Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kim Ku Sung</td>
<td>Chairman of Korea Transparency Organisation, Member of Anti Corruption Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing Auditor</td>
<td>Kim Young Duk</td>
<td>Standing Auditor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Board members as a result of position held outside of SOSFO

Source: [http://www.sosfo.or.kr/open/announce_overview04.asp](http://www.sosfo.or.kr/open/announce_overview04.asp)

Little detail has given previously regarding the position of school sport in Korea. However, it is necessary to mention here the ‘School Astroturf Playground Project’ formulated in November 2005, because it links very closely to SFA. According to a source, this project is based on the public pledge of the President in 2002 which promised that three hundred school sport facilities would be developed every year for the purpose of strengthening the quality of PE, encouraging youth to participate in sport and giving opportunities for the community to be involved in SFA (Internal document, 3rd February 2006: Ministry of Education and Human Resources [hereafter MEHR]). A senior officer in SOSFO argued that the turning point for this plan was the visit by Lee Hae Chan, then the Minister of Education, to one of the schools. He was very impressed to see sustainable and well-maintained surfaces and asked an official to investigate the facilities around school grounds in Korea. The senior official stressed the importance of power in the policy implementation saying “It is of little use if many people in the lower level suggest or ask something. One word from a powerful person gives a momentum.” The other part of this project was to create astroturf playgrounds in order not to be ashamed when hosting the FIFA World Cup. With the drawing up of the contract known as the Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) between the MCT and MEHR, 443 schools were expected to be equipped with the facilities between 2006 and
2010 at the cost of 177 billion won. It was decided that the ratio for dividing the cost between the central government (MEHR and SOSFO) and local authorities should be seven to three, according to MEHR. The same ratio was to be applied between the MEHR and SOSFO in dividing the cost of the projects, as shown in Table 6.21 At the heart of the plan, there is a cooperation between different Ministries, namely, MEHR and MCT. This is said to be the first collaboration in a sport-related task.

Table 6.21 Five Year Plan for ‘School Astroturf Playground Project’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of schools (Aim)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>1,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEHR</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCT/SOSFO</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authorities</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Education and Human Resources, 2006

The Role of Voluntary Organisations

Sport Sector

Dong-ho-hoe

The term Dong-ho-hoe has been used repeatedly, especially with regard to NACOSA. As mentioned previously, Dong-ho-hoe indicates voluntary clubs which are independent of the government or other sport organisations. The introduction of the internet triggered the increase of Dong-ho-hoe in cyber space and enabled people to share information about certain sports and recruit participants who could enjoy sport together in the real world. A number of interviewees, including journalists and academics, showed a consensus that the problem with Korean contemporary SFA lies in the internet on-line community. Of particular note is that while each Dong-ho-hoe registers with NACOSA, there is no substantial support (especially finance) for the running of Dong-ho-hoe, although according to a KISS senior researcher, when there is
a competition hosted by a National SFA organisation, some money can be offered (Interview, 3rd December 2007).

A veteran journalist stressed the role of local government and municipalities in SFA:

Nowadays a lot of SFA activities can be seen in ‘Gu’ (districts) and ‘Dong’ (towns). The number of sport programmes that municipalities design varies a great deal. We cannot deny that when it comes near to the election period, it has a tendency to become ‘political’.

As shown in Figure 6.3 the number of Dong-ho-hoe had increased to 94,481 as of 12th January 2009. The fact that over 90,000 Dong-ho-hoe represent different sports, means that it may be possible to have a continuous process of bargaining over bringing more fund in Dong-ho-hoe activities in a non-hierarchical environment, Held (2005) argued: It seems obvious that these collective voices could not be totally ignored by the government, considering the size of ‘Dong-ho-hoe’. According to the present analysis, there was no lobbying group which emerged from Dong-ho-hoe that influenced SFA policy in Korea. However, the activities associated with ‘Dong-ho-hoe’ need to be carefully monitored to see whether lobbying groups appear in the future to develop the nascent the pluralisation of the Korean sport community.

The increase of Dong-ho-hoe even had an effect on the KSC, which mainly focuses on elite sport even though its governing Article clearly identifies a duty regarding SFA. A senior officer in the KSC revealed that NACOSA virtually took over the task of SFA from the KSC. From a critical point of view he argued that SFA does not appear to move forward, in that case, KSC is willing to initiate SFA related projects. He said “We would like to encourage Dong-hoe-hoe members who belong to fifty five National Sport Federations to compete in the National Sport Festival as exhibition events.” Considering that the interview was held in December 2007 at a time when the controversy between the KSC, KOC, and NACOSA was still high, the above quote appears to indicate that the KSC wants to re-emphasize its policy leadership over sport in Korea, from grassroots to elite level.
Other Organisations

Cultural Action is one of the non-government organisations which embraces education reform and cultural heritage. The governing Article states that Cultural Action is funded through an annual membership fee and donations from individuals or groups. It views sport as a part of culture, which leads to various activities being held with reference to SFA, not elite sport. The Womens’ Sports Association Korea was accredited by the government in 1990. The original body was called the Sport Women’s Association. The members consist of retired national athletes who wanted to return the support and affection they had received during their career by coaching the public. They contribute to promoting sport to the women of the population, especially mothers; by hosting national sport competitions (http://www.wsa.or.kr). Lastly, it is worth noting The Association For International Sport for All (TAFISA), which is the only private SFA organisation accredited by the IOC and which aims to enable everyone to enjoy a healthy life through ‘SFA’ in the 1990, according to Mael Kyungjae newspaper (23rd March 2007). Lee Sang Hee, the president of TAFISA, accelerated the momentum of the organisation after 2005 by pursuing a number of programmes. For example, TAFISA opened a research centre for designing exercise programmes to those in need in 1992, the first of its kind in the private sector and held SFA symposiums, to which they invited not only Koreans, but also people from other Asian countries such as Japan and China. The biggest achievement so far is estimated to be hosting the TAFISA Congress in Busan in September 2008.

Non Sport Sector

YMCA (unless stated, it indicates Seoul YMCA)

It should be borne in mind that the YMCA had played a very important role in diffusing sport among Koreans over many decades. However, it could be argued that the role of the YMCA in sport had tended decrease in the 21st century. Despite the YMCA’s promotion of SFA in Korea, its religious character could not avoid restricting its influence. In addition, as Chang (2002: 141) said, the increasing number of sport facilities available, such as swimming pools and gymnasiums, made the YMCA’s role less central to the creation of participation opportunities. As shown below, the range of
YMCA’s activities seems to be much smaller than in previous periods. A former academic of sport sociology expressed the same opinion: He said:

The YMCA played a central role in the 1960-70s in SFA but the function of the organization has clearly changed. As we point out at every seminar held by the YMCA, their interests are political issues including environmental matters. As far as I am concerned, the YMCA is only in charge of a few national sport centres that Seoul Metropolitan city has outsourced. The SFA is now being led by local authorities. (Interview, 3rd July 2007)

Nevertheless, it is important to look more deeply at the role of the YMCA in the contemporary era. The range of programmes is designed to include babies sports clubs, boys and girls soccer clubs, youth fitness classes, citizens’ sport classes and toddler groups. Furthermore, there are programmes such as Yoga, Pilates and Belly dance which reflect the new demands of people who are eager to live a healthy lifestyle. The basic lessons, such as swimming, YMCA traditional exercise gymnastics, basketball and taekwondo continue to be taught. No exception was made for the YMCA when it came to devising programmes for company workers with the establishment of the five-day week and increased leisure time. Of particular significance is the fact that the YMCA tried to build close relationships not only with communities but also with schools and universities. For example, the YMCA focused on football classes in primary schools as a part of the university-company cooperation (san-hak-hyup-ruk) programme in 2005, and supported Club Activities (CA) as a form of penetrating communities which led to the facilities being used efficiently and sport students getting the opportunities to coach children (YMCA, 2005). It is also worth noting the programme called ‘Y’s way’ despite its failure to sustain for a longer period. ‘Y’s way’ was held at four or five schools on Saturdays, with approximately twenty five people, under the leadership of instructors sent by the YMCA. As a director of sport in Seoul YMCA argued, the programme had to be stopped due to the lack of support from schools. The teachers’ complaints of leaving the workplace late because of their responsibility for the students, indicate that a more delicate approach should be made in the future (Interview, 8th January 2008).
He continued that as regards the sport facilities in Seoul which are managed by the YMCA since 1980, the YMCA had diffused SFA as well as running multi sports centres which belong to the District Council or private sectors. Of the eight sport facilities the YMCA managed in 2008, three of them are outsourced by Seodaemun-Gu, Yangchun-Gu and Seocho-Gu (Korea Electronic Power Corporation Art Centre). He argued: “As far as the YMCA is concerned, our job was complete when the SFA started, was diffused and became established. Others might say that the role of YMCA appears to have reduced recently, but I believe that we are functioning well.” (Interview, 8th January 2008).

Not having received any kind of support from the government, the membership fees and rent income are said to be the main resources for operating the centres, according to the director of sport in the YMCA. He argued that the rent in the Jongrho and Kangnam branches, which are considered to be in one of the most expensive areas, contributes to their autonomy to a great extent. Notwithstanding its 100% financial independence (as of January 2008), he denied that Seoul Y was capable of supporting local YMCAs that had been struggling for many years especially after the IMF crisis. He emphasised: “It only means that the Seoul YMCA is not in the red” (Interview, 8th January 2008).

The Role of Commercial Organisations (Businesses)

It is not surprising that the Chaebol continued investing a huge amount of money into professional sports and international events. In contrast, they are reluctant to become involved in SFA as it does not seem to be profitable in the short term. However, in recent times, a number of companies have begun to sponsor SFA competitions. For example, ten sports that participated in the 2008 ‘sport club leagues’ hosted by NACOSA, received approximately 300 million won some of which was from companies with the rest coming from local authorities (Sports Seoul, 17th December 2008). According to Chang (2003), SFA activities were practiced in the public sport facilities or schools constructed by the government. Chang (2003) argued that in the immediate aftermath of the Seoul Olympics, commercial sectors recognised the potential of private sport facilities, and the number of facilities increased continuously. The Samsung Leports Centre, established in 1989 and equipped with a swimming pool,
weight training facility, golf practice range, indoor ten-pin bowling rail and multi-purpose gymnasium in a building with five storeys above ground and four below, is one of the examples.

Another aspect of the impact of commercial interests on SFA can be found with the introduction of the concept of ‘sport marketing’ by Seoul Metropolitan City in October 2006. The City appointed a marketing company and asked them to develop a sponsorship programme in cooperation with Seoul City Sport Council and Seoul SFA Council. The designated company would plan appropriate marketing programmes depending on the characteristics of the sport. This ‘sport marketing’ project is expected to encourage more citizens to participate in sport with the development of sport programmes, according to Seoul Metropolitan City (2005).

Company Sport

As we discussed in the early periods, the Hodori plan pressured enterprises to abide by the law which stated that those with more than 100 employees should install facilities for at least one sport and those over 500 workers should provide at least two facilities. The government awarded a few inducements, including tax reductions, for companies that purchased or rented land (Um, 2003). In an era of automation, we often hear that Korean workers face serious health problems due to lack of exercise and westernised diet, which inevitably produces an increase in medical costs, but also of a loss of productivity. Koh (2007) argued that the most efficient solution to this issue is to revitalise ‘company sport’. Through promoting sport activities, the companies could expect a number of benefits, for example, increased productivity, improved industrial relations, decreased absenteeism and enhanced employees’ health, satisfaction and social ties with their colleagues. It should be also reiterated that the positive experiences in the workplace spill over into workers’ families participating in sport, in other words, SFA.

It is notable that the NSPL Enforcement Ordinance was revised and came into effect on 8th February 2006. A study by KISS researchers (2006) showed that, in 2005, 280 listed enterprises in Korea did not run ‘company sport’ programme very well. 77.9% of the
companies’ sport programmes were concentrated on one-day events, such as mountain climbing and sport festivals. Almost half of them, 49.5%, responded that they held an event only once a year. However, the survey also indicated that many firms support sport clubs organised by workers (67.9%) and assist individuals (40.4%) so that they can provide for their own sport needs. Overall, the participation rate for company sport clubs appeared to be less than 30%. Of particular note is that 76.2% of the companies either included the full cost of ‘fitness training fees’ in the employees’ salary or make a contribution to the cost. It is argued that 17.7% of the health clubs had a qualified instructor and 6.19% of them were full time employees. On the other hand, it appeared that a majority of workers had a positive view of ‘company sport’ and 77.1% of the respondents said ‘company sport’ made a positive contribution to their firms. The most popular forms of sport that employees want to do was individual training either in health clubs or swimming pools in the workplace (39.3%) followed by a subsidy for sports activities outside of the workplace and hosting of sport competitions.

As the Sports White Paper (2006) suggested, the main tasks in developing company sport is to encourage Dong-Ho-Hoe within the workplace to participate in the all-year-long national leagues in various sports. Under the leadership of NACOSA, employees in the companies could compete for ten months from March to December. They could reach the final league if they went through the leagues in their cities, provinces, districts and the wide regional league. The exception is football, where FILA, a global sport brand, provides financial resources to regional leagues as a main sponsor (The Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003).

A unique example in relation to company sport in Korea is the Samsung Wellness Clinic (hereafter SWC) which started in June 1994. The initiation of the facility and programme was proposed by Ahn Byung Chul, a former KISS researcher, who joined Samsung Sports Science Institute. After acquiring results from a survey of employees regarding ‘welfare policy’ in the Samsung corporation, a more active approach was adopted. In other words, they decided to provide facilities for employees in the proximity of the workplace, according to a general manager of SWC. The growing popularity of the SWC among its users, the Samsung employees, can be understood by referring to the interview with the general manager. He said:
Approximately 25,000 people are working for Samsung around Seoul city centre. Only 1,000 employees who were selected are able to use this facility all through the year. To give a fair chance to as many employees as possible, we began to renew the membership of those who came more than fifty percent, of the time, only for a maximum of two years. (Interview, 10th December 2007)

The increase in the number of SWCs from one to twenty over a fifteen year period illustrates that it was appropriate to the needs of employees in the contemporary era. It is notable that a somewhat different philosophy is found in ordinary company sports. While a number of companies run Dong-ho-hoe and attempt to take part in the competition, the SWC does not pursue the idea of ‘competition’. He pointed out that the main objective of the SWC is to improve individual health and fitness on a regular basis. This explains why they pay a lot of attention to the safety of the users to prevent any injury caused by over training. He also stressed that the affection and positive view of sport from the owner, Lee Kun Hee, was one of the reasons why SWC could operate for one and half decades.

This type of facility is said to be the first of its kind in the world. A number of Chaebols, such as Posco, Doosan and SK were known to create similar facilities benchmarking SWC. However, the general manager of SWC said:

It is easy to take hardware and implement programme. At the same time, you need staff who have theoretical and practical knowledge to operate high-tech equipment. If you ignore this aspect, it is likely to become like a fitness centre in your town. It is a pity that not many employees use its facilities … when there is pressure in terms of budget, the ‘welfare’ is the first sector that can be hit. (Interview, 10th December 2007)

In relation to the company sport, a significant phenomenon can be observed in football. Under circumstances where people usually view elite sport and SFA as being separate, a natural migration from elite sport to SFA in football had appeared, according to a general secretary of Korea SFA Football Association. The supply and demand of quality footballers from the public sector had remained high. He argued:
The level of football between county offices is semi-professional. When the football matches hosted by army divisions take place, the person who is in charge of SFA in the county comes along and observes the players. They pick out good players and employ them as officials in special government service when they are released from the army.

Bearing in mind that the number of elite athletes who could continue training such as happens in Sangmu, is strictly limited. The opportunities for them to show their ability in non-elite competitions might be another way to keep up their sporting careers. In addition, being able to work for the public offices in provinces or districts would offer a favourable opportunity for elite athletes who struggle to find jobs except on the football field, generally because of lack of academic qualifications.
Compared to previous periods, a more complicated structure is shown in Figure 6.6. It is important to point out that other Ministries showed an interest in SFA for non-sporting objectives, for example, health, welfare and education. Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism cooperated with other Ministries, for example, with Ministry of Education & Human Resources for ‘School Astroturf Project’ (MEHR) and with Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) for hosting ‘veteran sport competition’ as shown (1) and (2) in Figure 6.6. The role of SOSFO should be emphasised as it is the a critical financial source provider. (3) shows that the fund which SOSFO receives from the Ministry of Budget and Planning after approval every year. SOSFO provides fund to
NACOSA (4) and NACOSA as a government agency initiates a number of programmes to promote SFA across Korea through its networks as shown in Figure 6.3. It is critical for NACOSA to communicate and collaborate with local governments to deliver SFA policies (5). One of the projects NACOSA implemented was ‘7330 movement’ and the promotion was conveyed with media’s support (6).

As it has been stressed throughout this chapter, the YMCA implemented SFA programmes and promoted sport for the general public in Korea independently of the government or other sport governing bodies. The only support they had was from the media when hosting competitions (7). In recent times, the story about sport activities in companies were reported through TV and newspapers. It is expected that these companies could expose their company names and improve firm’s active/ healthy image while media contributed to the promotion of sport to the public. Samsung Wellness Clinic can be considered as a new form of ‘company sport’ in the contemporary era which had already been benchmarked by other companies. The fact that YMCA had hosted a number of sport competitions for ‘company workers’ indicates the reciprocal relationship between the two (9). Commercial leisure centres were shown in a sense that it is required to observe certain laws (10).

Having discussed the comment from a senior officer in KSC earlier in this Chapter 6, KSC at least showed that they are willing to initiate action in relation to SFA, for example, encouraging Dong-ho-hoe members in the NGBs which are registered to KSC to participate in the National Sports Festival as exhibition events. Also, the fact that KSC started to support club system for students (non elite-athletes) indicates its commitment to SFA as well as elite sport. However, it appears that KSC tries to implement SFA policy independently rather than with other organisations. It remains to be seen how KSC would move to in relation to SFA in the future.

**Conclusion**

In this section, the four themes that emerged in the SFA analysis will be discussed in relation to the macro and meso-level frameworks. The first theme concerns the extent to which the government ignored existing SFA activities and actors. While non-government organisations, such as the YMCA, SAKA and BAKA were committed to
the promotion of SFA to the Korean public, the government tended to neglect those organisations and rather pursued SFA policy independently. It is important to note that two parallel SFA policies can be observed in Korea, one is at the governmental level led by NACOSA and the other is at the non-governmental level. The fact that the involvement of non-governmental organisations did not impact on shaping Korean SFA policy is of particular significance. There is no evidence that there was any attempt at lobbying by the YMCA on the government perhaps due to the fact that sport was not the primary organisational objective of the YMCA. Consequently, the Korean government established a SFA governing body (NACOSA) in order to implement the first SFA national policy Hodori Plan without any obvious reference to existing SFA providers or programmes. The government continued to develop Korean SFA through governmental and other organisations affiliated to NACOSA, for example the SFA councils in the provinces and districts and the national SFA associations for each sport which were all clearly separate from the SFA activities of the non-government organisations. The establishment of SFA governing body by the government can be interpreted as evidence that decisions regarding SFA policy were developed within a relatively closed group of elite members in the government. Similar to the case of elite sport, evidence of elitist forms of decision-making can be found in Korean SFA policy although there were some elements of pluralism which will be discussed below.

The second theme concerns the pluralisation of SFA stakeholders although not the pluralisation of power. The number of groups or organisations which emerged around the issue of SFA had steadily grown, especially in the last 20 years. It could be argued that the YMCA has been the steadiest and the most influential body in terms of the SFA promotion in Korea for many decades. However, in more recent years several other organisations had become involved in the SFA policy delivery while the YMCA continuing to contribute to the development of SFA in Korea. With the economic and social change, the Ministry responsible for the promotion of SFA was joined by other Ministries which had developed an interest, largely instrumental, in SFA such as the Ministry of Health & Welfare and Ministry of Education & Human Resources. Moreover, companies put great effort into encouraging their employees to participate in sport either in a non-competitive or competitive way. A distinctive feature of SFA development in Korea is Dong-Ho-Hoe both as an internet community and as a real world voluntarily phenomenon which organises sports activities independent from the
government. In relation to macro level theories, it could be argued that Korean SFA had some elements of pluralism in the sense that multiple Ministries, which previously tended to consider each other as competitors or hindrances rather than co-operator, are now involved in aspects of SFA. However, the fact that final decision is made at the top level of NACOSA signifies that elitism could be the main tool for understanding the Korean SFA policy process. Thus while there has been organisational multiplication power has remained concentrated.

Third, the government’s interest in SFA is shown in the increase in expenditure since 2003. The fact that SOSFO provided a significant amount of funding for making sport facilities for the public indicates the government’s commitment towards SFA. As discussed previously, the change in the percentage that SFA receives of the total sport budget in SOSFO is a critical indicator of the government’s significant interest in SFA. 43% of SOSFO funding in 2003 was spent on SFA and it increased to 62% in 2004 and remained around 60% until 2008. Considering that the percentage of elite sport decreased from 48% in 2003 to 24% in 2006, the lowest figure so far, it could be argued that SFA holds a stronger position than ever in Korean sport. It is also notable the change of total expenditure which continuously increased from 2004 and 2005 by 14.5% and from 2005 and 2006 by 31.1%. The extent of increase declined to 3.3% and 8.9% from 2006 and 2007 and 2007 and 2008 respectively.

Fourth, the delivery mechanism of SFA policy is also noteworthy. It can be argued that while the central government retains control over the delivery of the policy through sub-national government structures or local sport organisations which underpin NACOSA, for example, the City and Province councils of SFA and local federations for 109 sports. As discussed, the purpose of NACOSA is to implement the Hodori Plan which was set up by the government for the first time in relation to SFA. Since its establishment, NACOSA had led the “7330 Movement”, developed and distributed SFA lesson programmes and taken responsibility of hosting the World Koreans Festival and the National SFA Festival. While NACOSA is a major influence on Korean SFA, it was up to local governments and organisations, which are under the NACOSA in terms of the structure, to develop and deliver SFA schemes for their local areas. The theme of ‘Localisation, Privatisation, Pluralisation’ in the era of Kim Young Sam, the first civilian President, pushed the SFA plan forward with the introduction of the ‘Local
Chapter 6: The Case study of Sport For All in Korea

Autonomy System’. The final point to make is in relation to the role of Dong-ho-hoe in Korea SFA. The existence of lobbying was not found in this study, nevertheless, bearing in mind the phenomenal growth of Dong-Ho-Hoe, which reached a membership of 94,481 as of January 2009, it is possible that Dong-Ho-Hoe may become an influential SFA lobbying group.

Compared to the case of elite sport in Chapter 5, it is even more difficult to apply theoretical frameworks, especially, the meso-level frameworks. Regarding the observation that elitism appears the most relevant macro level theory in relation to SFA policy in Korea, it is probable that the Policy Community may be a more applicable analytic meso-level framework than Multiple Streams or the Advocacy Coalition Framework, which tend to fit better with more pluralist political systems. While there were some examples of roles for Policy Entrepreneurs or Policy Brokers in the elite sport case there were far fewer examples in the case of SFA. As for the Policy Community metaphor SFA policy appears to be made in a closed elite group, NACOSA and the government (Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism), which is similar to that of elite sport. However, it would be not appropriate to say that a Policy Community exists in SFA due to the fact that the members did not create a group with common beliefs and values but were appointed to the position by the government. Therefore, these senior officers inevitably tend to follow the direction of the government rather than trying to promote alternative policies. Thus if ‘Policy Community’ is the most appropriate meso-level analytic framework then it needs to be borne in mind that in relation to SFA the community was one that, so far at least, has been created by the governmental elite rather than emerging from civil society.
Chapter 7 Conclusion

Introduction

The central research questions in this thesis are ‘How has the role of government changed over time in Korean sport policy?’, ‘Who have been the key actors in making sport policy?’ ‘What prompted policy change?’ and ‘What are the relationships between state organizations (for example, central government and sub-national / local government) in Korea’s sport development?’ In this section, the analysis of the two case studies will be reviewed followed by a discussion of the macro and meso-level theoretical insights generated by the research including discussion of power and structure and agency based on the philosophical position adopted by the researcher. The usefulness of these macro and meso-level frameworks will be evaluated in the Korean sport policy context followed by a discussion of the limitations of the research and the scope for future studies.

Prior to discussion of the results of the analysis, it is worth recalling the three objectives of this study.

- To review and analyse the recent political, economic and cultural context of Korean sport policy
- To analyse the development of sport policy in two areas: elite sport and sport for all
- To identify and evaluate different frameworks for policy analysis and their applicability to Korea

Analysis of the two case studies

The aim of this section is to review and compare the key conclusions produced from the analysis of the two case studies, elite sport and sport for all (SFA).
Elite Sport

For over half of the century, from 1953, immediately after the Korean War, elite sport has been the consistent high priority for the Korean government’s sport policy for various reasons. It is important to note that the government focused on elite sport to a greater extent mainly for non-sporting objectives, such as those related to regional politics, the lack of regime’s legitimacy, the support of the hosting strategy, improving national integration and enhancing national pride. Keeping in mind that some of these reasons may overlap each other, let us look into each aspect in detail.

The government viewed elite sport as an efficient diplomatic tool in connection with regional politics, especially in terms of its relationship with North Korea. As we discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, it was necessary for the Korean government to make efforts to beat North Korea to show its superiority on the international sporting stage. The National Sports Promotion Law was enacted in order to produce better results than those of North Korea at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, which reflected the government’s ideological stance against the North. The remarkable progress of the North to the quarter final of the FIFA 1966 England World Cup prompted the Korean government to create the ‘Yang-ji’ team, which gave salaries equivalent to the players in sil-up teams\(^1\) and provided a grass pitch in the grounds of the Central Information Agency (Yonhap News, 5\(^{th}\) Aug. 2008). In addition, one of the reasons for sending the biggest delegation ever (224 people) to the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964 was that a number of Koreans had continued to live in Japan after the end of Japanese occupation in 1945 and Korean success at the Games was considered to be a good opportunity to raise their morale. A second reason for sending such a large team was the desire to perform well in the country of the ex-imperial power. When the opportunities emerged to enhance national pride and develop rivalry with neighbouring countries including the North, Japan and China, the government did not hesitate to get involved in supporting elite sport.

As discussed in Chapter 2, until the emergence of a civilian president in 1993, the lack of democratic legitimacy was an obstacle for the government to move the country

\(^1\) Sil-up teams were mostly established in banks, city councils, national railways and public offices. The players were considered as both athletes and employees at the same time and got paid as normal company employees.
forward. Especially for military governments, sport was regarded as an efficient tool to distract public attention from its lack of legitimacy. The birth of professional sport led by President Chun Doo Hwan and the bidding for the 1988 Seoul Olympics in both Park Jung Hee and Chun’s government are evidence of the government’s attempt to cover up the lack of legitimacy and also to divert public interest from politics to sport. It is important to note that this hosting strategy did not stop with the change of government from an authoritarian regime to a liberal democratic government. As discussed in Chapter 2, Kim Young Sam, the first civilian president in Korea, initiated a ‘local autonomy system’ which distributed a considerable amount of power in decision making to local authorities. Sport was believed to be a critical issue that politicians in every region could take advantage of in order to win votes for the following election due to the growing demand from the citizens for mass participation in sport. As a result, Korea continued to bid for a number of international sport competitions, for example, Mooju & Jeonju Winter Universiadi Games, the 2nd Busan East Asian Games, and Summer Universiadi Daegu 2003 as well as mega sport events, including the 2002 Busan Asian Games and the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang for 2010 and 2014.

During the bidding process over three decades, it was considered essential for the government to invest financial resources in the squad development, creating appropriate facilities and bringing in foreign coaches in order to produce better results in the Olympics medal table in order to maintain national pride. Government support to elite sport was particularly significant in the sport budget during the 1980s. As shown in Chapter 5, the establishment of the Ministry of Sport in 1982 for the purpose of supporting the Asian Games and the Olympics in 1986 and 1988 respectively prompted the dramatic increase in the sport budget. The ratio (sport budget / Government general account budget) increased from 0.13% in 1982 to 0.23% in 1983, 0.29% in 1984 and 0.35% in 1985. As discussed in the Chapter 2 and 5, the government expected that hosting mega sport events would play a role in improving individual Korean’s prestige, national pride and the image of Korea as a nation to the rest of the world. Having been known as ‘the country of the War’ and a ‘dangerous country to visit’ to the rest of the world, hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics was regarded as an opportunity to improve Korea’s global profile. Two decades later, Korea took another opportunity to rebrand herself after recovering from the IMF crisis by hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup.
It is important to elaborate on the distinctive features of Korean elite sport policy process. First, Korean elite sport policy was created by the government based on the several motives mentioned above, which indicates that elite sport did not grow organically in Korean society. Consequently, success in developing elite success depended heavily on the government’s willingness to retain elite sport success as a top priority. The consistent hosting strategy in relation to mega sport events, such as Asian Games and the Olympics, led by the central government and local government emphasises the significance of government for elite sport policy.

Second, it should be reiterated that a central organisation in Korean elite sport, namely the Korean Sports Council, has not had autonomy when it comes to the appointment of its President and other senior executive members. The government, in this case, Minister of Culture, Sport and Tourism, had the power to approve the recommendation list for appointments. As discussed in Chapter 5, Kim Jung Kil, a former KSC President resigned just before the Beijing Olympics in 2008 due to the government’s disapproval of proposed general secretary indicating that an uncomfortable relationship between the government and KSC still exists. This could be viewed that government is fully committed to retaining control of elite sport in the era of pluralisation and liberal democracy which might encourage third parties to intervene in Korean elite sport policy.

Third, as for decision-making process in elite sport policy, there has been no significant change from government to government. As noted in Chapter 5, there was some evidence of the emergence of civil society with the support of media however, it was slight and weak. Of particular note is that civil society was not excluded but there was no credible organisation which we could identify. Unlike the way Korean society had adopted many of the characteristics of a more pluralistic liberal democracy, highly centralised decision making remained often personalised by the President. One of the examples was the request for special fund for the Beijing Olympics which was made to the President in the Blue House when medalists and coaches who performed well in the Athens Olympics were invited. Although there is no substantial evidence that President Rho accepted the request and made a decision instantly, it appears that very limited political elites or President himself made the decision.
Finally, the close links between government, Chaebol and Sangmu can be stressed as one of the ingredients in the continuing success in the elite sport. A limited number of political elite members including the President, worked closely together with members of the business elite and military elite for the purpose of producing top elite athletes who could enhance national pride in the mega sport events, especially the Olympics. The point to be recognised in that most of the sports that won medals in the Olympics had received financial support from Chaebol, for example, wrestling from Lee Kun Hee, former president of Samsung and archery from Hyundai. Also, as shown in Chapter 5, a number of NGBs were chaired by presidents of Chaebol such as track and field (Jinro) and basketball (Kolon). Also, the role of armed forces, the so-called Sangmu cannot be under-estimated as statistics shows that significant percentage (15-20%) of the medals that Korean athletes won came from Sangmu and over 1,000 elite athletes belong to. Considering the circumstances that Korean male citizens must serve in the army for a given period because of the ‘state of war’ on the Korean Peninsula, Sangmu enabled male athletes who were not eligible for military exemption to continue their sports career during their military services.

Sport For All (SFA)

Compared to elite sport policy, SFA emerged as a policy concern of government in relatively recent times in Korea. A number of academics and various literature are agreed that the era of SFA started with the hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics. However, the discussion of SFA in the early period prior to 1988, was also useful in understanding the phenomenon of mass participation in sport. As discussed in Chapter 6, it was unlikely that SFA would emerge as a priority in the 1960s and 1970s in the government agenda due to the difficult economic situation. Nevertheless, we could find some evidence that the government or other parties regarded sport as important during the period from the end of 19th century to 1988. The Royal Edict on Education announced by King Gojong in 1895, which argued that education should seek practical knowledge, moral excellence and physical excellence influenced the creation of modern schools and the whole education system. It was critical that the Edict prompted PE to be included in the school curriculum. With the influx of foreign missionaries and establishment of several schools, various kinds of sport could be taught. It is also
notable that the Chosun Sports Council (CSC), which was formed in 1920 and liquidated in 1938 because of Japanese coercion, played an important role in forming many sport associations and hosting several national sport competitions. Since the CSC was renamed the Korea Sports Council (KSC) in 1948, the capacity for promoting mass participation in sport tended to move away from the KSC due to the fact that the KSC began to focus on elite sport even though the KSC Statute includes the promotion of life sport, that is, SFA.

It could be argued that the forerunner and the longest-established organisation in Korean SFA is the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) created in 1903. Having been influenced by the USA YMCA, which put more weight on sport than other areas of non-religious activities, Seoul YMCA introduced modern sports as a ‘modernisation programme’, built an indoor gymnasium, hosted sport competitions with the cooperation of newspaper companies and provided programmes for various types of users. While the government was at the heart of Korean elite sport policy, SFA started from non-governmental organisations and missionary schools. While the YMCA continued to promote SFA in Korea, SAKA was created early 1980s and taught various sports for the general public. It is important to note that both the YMCA and SAKA designed and implemented programmes in order to promote SFA to the public without government support.

There was a SFA related body, the National Sport Deliberative Committee within the machinery of government which took charge of SFA matters but it did not appear that SFA received much attention as the Committee had to cover the whole range of sport areas from national sport plans to sport equipment matters. While the government supported elite sport from the 1960s for several reasons mentioned above, it took much longer for the government to show an interest in SFA. When the government eventually turned its attention to SFA in the late 1980s motivation was not sport itself but for the sake of health and welfare. Hence, one common feature between elite sport and SFA is that both are attractive to the government because of their political contribution to non-sporting objectives, for example, diplomatic and welfare-related objectives. The change in the government’s attitude towards SFA can be found in the funding allocation as discussed in Chapter 6 from 2003 to 2008. It is worth noting that 48% and 43.3% of the total SOSFO fund was spent on elite sport and SFA respectively in 2003. In the
following year, SFA fund increased to 62.4% while elite sport only retained 27.5% and this ratio between the two sectors has continued. From a Critical Realist perspective, this funding change illustrates that structure can facilitate or constrain agents but structure does not determine agent and vice versa. As Sayer (2000) argued, there could be room for a causal explanation between structure and agency even though interpretative understanding is a necessary and critical point in social sciences. The above example explains how structural change can influence sport policy in Korea. As liberal democracy has continued to develop in Korea, each government tends to have somewhat different policies towards sport. It could be argued that SFA policies which appeared on the government agenda partially under the previous governments in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} National Sports Promotion Five-Year Plan 1998-2002 gained more attention because of people’s increased demands, due to more wealth and leisure time. Some might argue that the characteristic of the Rho Moo Hyun government, left wing in Korean politics, focused more on ‘balance’ than ‘growth’ so that the balance of sport inevitably lay towards SFA rather than elite sport.

It would be worth noting how Green (2006) applied power from a Foucauldian (1982) perspective, who thought of power as the rationalities and techniques of government which seek to shape and guide those who are the object of government “to particular sets of norms and for a variety of ends” (Dean, 1999). It could be argued that the Korean government’s commitment to encourage sport participation are the rationalities and techniques which shape behaviour constitutive of “active” citizens. This concept of “active” could include the sense of “becoming active” or genuinely participating in sport and physical activity, and active in taking responsible steps for one’s own health and well-being, according to Green (2006). As discussed in Chapter 6, bearing in mind that the concept of ‘well-being’ has become one of the main themes in Korean society, it may be argued that the 7330 movement (exercise three times a week, 30 minutes in each session) led by NACOSA appears to be the evidence of the mindset that the government had for the purpose of increasing the health of healthy citizens not only to make society dynamic and lively but to cut the cost incurred from people being ill.

As noted in the case of elite sport, it is important to stress some distinctive features of Korean SFA policy process. First, while elite sport policy was led by the highest level of central government SFA involved different levels of government, in other words,
central government and national government agencies such as National Council of Sport for All (NACOSA) in SFA policy making process. Elite sport was tightly controlled by the government because the government used elite sport as a tool for several purposes, however, the government had loose control over SFA compared to elite sport not because it was forced to by internal or external pressure but because the government chose to do so. Nevertheless, the government’s close involvement in the appointment of the NACOSA President can be seen as evidence of its determination to control SFA to a certain extent.

Second, it is also important to emphasise that both government (and sub-national government) and non-government organisations are involved in SFA however, there is little contact between them. While the YMCA, which had contributed to Korean SFA over a century, is said to design and operate their programme on their own way the government became involved in SFA policy independently. As discussed in Chapter 6, the reason that the government and YMCA developed their policy separately is not clear but there was no evidence that the YMCA attempted any lobbying of the government. It might be the fact that sport was not the top priority or the core concern of the Korean YMCA or the YMCA did not even try to lobby having realised that SFA was not a priority for the government. It is also notable that the government did not appear to seek help from existing bodies active in the field of SFA in terms of designing programmes or using existing facilities. Here, the point to make in Korean SFA is that the YMCA and others did not seek to influence public policy.

The third distinctive feature of the SFA case concerns decision making process. The government’s establishment of a SFA governing body, NACOSA, reflects not only the government’s interest in promoting SFA, but also the government’s determination to take policy leadership in relation to SFA policy. Key decisions in relation to SFA were made within a relatively closed group of the political elite which is similar to elite sport. Thus while there has been organisational multiplication and delegation power has remained concentrated at the central government level.

Finally, the role of Dong-ho-hoe which indicates voluntary clubs in Korea which are independent of the government or other sport organisations, has been significant. Even though there was a lack of evidence showing an element of Dong-ho-hoe lobbying for
the development of SFA, the dramatic growth of Dong-Ho-Hoe, which numbered 94,481 clubs as of January 2009, needs to be monitored as it may become an influential lobbying group to acquire more funding for SFA in the future. Before introducing a discussion of the theoretical perspectives explored in this study, it is important to emphasize the centrality of elite decision making in the Korean elite sport and SFA. As we discussed in Chapters 3, 5 and 6, there is a considerable evidence of elite decision-making in both cases. The circulation of members of the elite between the government, business, military and sport was significant and they often overlapped with each other. Presidents Park Jung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan and Rho Tae Woo were at the centre of decision making in Korean sport during their regimes. Park Se Jik, a Chairman of Seoul Olympic Organising Committee who led the creation of SOSFO, Chun Kyung Hwan, a brother of President Chun Doo Hwan and established Korea Community Sports Promotion Association, could be referred as the examples of the elite-centred decision making.

**Macro-level theoretical in-sights**

In Chapter 3, (neo) Marxism, (modern) Elitism and (neo) Pluralism were discussed. As Green (2005) argued, macro-level theory could be helpful in understanding and explaining both the membership of meso-level coalitions and policy outcomes from them. The purpose of this review is to assess the usefulness of these theories in the context of Korean sport. In order to achieve this purpose, it is important to bear in mind the debate regarding power relations and structure and agency, which are central themes in social sciences. As mentioned in Chapter 3, having acknowledged that three theories could be applicable in Korea, the conclusion was kept open in order to analyse data from the empirical research.

As regards Marxism, questions arise relating to the existence of classes, conflict between classes, the nature of business interests. Reflecting the point that Korea was under an authoritarian regime until the 1970s, the relationship between the state, the minority who exercise power, and the general public, the majority of Korean citizens, could fit into a Marxist analysis in the sense that the public rarely showed any complaints towards the state, at least explicitly.
In relation to sport, Marxism could be a useful lens to understand the involvement of Chaebol in sport. Whether Chaebol’s creation of professional teams or sponsoring NGBs was caused by the government’s arm twisting or the promise that Chaebol received from the government regarding tax benefits, it was a significant phenomenon that the government successfully used Chaebol to make commodities out of sport. Of particular note is Samsung, which has continued to run a number of sport teams even establishing their own training centre which can be considered as another product from the Marxist perspective.

The concept of ‘false consciousness’ can be applied to the launch of professional baseball league in 1982. As discussed in Chapter 3, President Chun Doo Hwan pushed the league plan forward and made it a reality. It can be argued that professional sport functioned as part of the government’s ideological apparatus in the sense that the regularly-held baseball matches reproduced certain values such as patriarchy, hierarchy and elitism but also because they diverted attention from the lack of democracy in the political system. Chun’s government clearly intended to divert people’s attention from politics to sport by creating a commercial competition structure a strategy which can be regarded as a form of class based hegemonic control over popular ideology. As noted, Marxism provides some insight into Korean sport policy process but it is not convincing as a comprehensive explanation of the distribution of power or the patter of decision making.

Therefore, our attention turns to pluralism which became popular after the Second World War as an explanatory tool for political science, especially in the US, according to Pierson (1996). As the term suggests, pluralists argue that power is not concentrated in a specific person or group but dispersed evenly among a number of interest groups. On the other hand, neo-pluralists argue that there are various pressure groups but the political agenda tends to be biased in favour of corporate power. As alluded to in Chapter 2, the dramatic political transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy may suggest that Korea has become a more pluralistic society. According to the BBC (20th February 2009), the US Secretary of the State, Clinton, highly valued Korea’s prosperity and democracy in her visit to Korea where she expressed her opinion that
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Korea seems to be a more pluralistic society than before in terms of embracing more varied civil societies and listening to public opinions more openly, per se, via internet\(^2\).

There is some evidence which reflects pluralism in the two case studies as discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. As for the elite sport, the demonstration by top athletes and coaches against ‘special’ military exemption to football and baseball players immediately after the 2002 FIFA World Cup and 2006 World Baseball Classic could be referred to as an indication of nascent pluralism. However, this is insufficient evidence not only because it is a relatively isolated example, but also because this protest was reactive to an agenda which was already made by other people rather than being proactive which would indicate an inducement in earlier stages of the policy process.

Here, as regards the silence of those athletes and coaches before this first public demonstration, the conceptualisation of power formalised by Lukes is useful. Lukes (2005) argued that people could act separately, or in concert, or produce no action. It means that power can keep certain issues off the agenda and prevent the diversity which classical pluralists insist on. Regarding this demonstration, which was the first in the elite sport history in Korea, it can be argued that unobservable power was exercised even before the protest to exclude the voice of the elite sport sector, as well as to keep problematic issues off the agenda. As a Critical Realist, a researcher believes that there is a world out there which is independent of her knowledge and that there is a causal relationship between structure and agency in social phenomenon. While these two views are the same as those of positivists, there are views similar to interpretivists’ position. Critical Realists acknowledge that not everything is observable in social phenomena because of deep structures embedded in specific social or cultural background which prevents researchers from observing them. As discussed in Chapter 3, Lukes suggested that a third dimension of power involves “The exercise of power to shape people’s preferences so that neither overt nor covert conflicts exist” (Ham and Hill, 1993: 70). Lukes (1974) also argued that a manipulated consensus may exist which will enable the powerful groups to maintain their dominance. For example, the lack of a formal route to transmit athletes’ opinions to the sport governing body in Korea mentioned above was taken for granted until recent times. It is necessary to

\(^2\) Korea is the top 4\(^{th}\) in the list of most wired countries according to figures announced by the International Telecommunication Union (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3222664.stm)
understand that Korea in general is a hierarchical society and that an even stricter hierarchy exists in elite sport.

As for the case of SFA, the emergence of Chang Ju Ho, a former YMCA staff member and a founder of SAKA (Sport for All Korea Association), can be regarded as an aspect of pluralism considering that Chang did not come from the conventional sources in the sport sector because he had neither a business nor a political background. However, his prominence would not be enough to conclude that policy-making concerning Korean SFA had become more pluralistic, either. If the government had provided support to the YMCA or SAKA or even suggested any cooperation for the promotion of SFA, it would have been more appropriate to say that SFA policy in Korea became pluralistic. The case for saying that it is the desire of the government to maintain their elite-centred decision making is strengthened by the fact that the government initiated SFA policy separately from the movement of these two organisations. To overcome the explanatory limitations of pluralism from the two case studies, elitism may be the option we can adopt among three macro-level theories.

In relation to the elitism, the power struggles between different kinds of elite can be examined in Korean sport. As Mills (1956) argued in relation to the US the state was dominated by a power elite, consisting of top business, military and political personnel (Evans, 2006); a similar phenomenon can be found in Korea. It could be argued that military elites were dominant until 1970s whereas from 1970s onwards most military elites were replaced by business elites. The emergence of an influential group of business people had been at the heart of policy making, which reflects Lindblom’s neo-pluralism view or neo-elitism. It is important to note that the way transition of elites occurred was not that one elite pushed out another, but that as the military situation stabilised another elite came through as the military threat from the North reduced and rapid economic development became the priority. It is important to note that there were overlaps which were involved in the military, political and business sectors. During the Roh Moo Hyun government (February 2003- February 2008), there were some challenges to dilute elitism, such as President Rho’s idea of abolishing Seoul National University, the first in rank, in Korea, in the name of ‘equality in education’ but this failed to materialise. The other features of elitism are ‘Hak-Yun’ (a network based on the same school from elementary school to university) and ‘Ji-Yun’ (a network based
on the same home town or region) which had continued to play a role in running a nation.

When it comes to the area of Korean sport, it is argued that a limited number of members of the political and business elites, of course including the President, have remained central to the decision making process. Although there has been a slight and slow increase in protest capacity of athletes and coaches with some support from media and an element of lobbying, it appears that the state elite have been the dominant group in making decisions in most key policy areas for example, in relation to hosting mega sport events, pension scheme for athletes and coaches, launch of professional sport league, revision of military exemption, allocation to special funding for the Olympics, and Sangmu’s survival after the IMF crisis in Korean elite sport. A similar phenomenon can be found in the case of SFA. As discussed in Chapter 6, the delivery of the policy tends to be accomplished through local authorities and appropriate organisations, but the overall control and decision making is made in the central government through its agency- NACOSA. The fact that most of the SFA policy decisions are made at the top of NACOSA, whose President is not independent from the government, and many of whose senior board members have links to the political elite suggests strongly that elitism is the most useful theoretical framework to understand not only elite sport but also SFA policy in Korea as well.

It would be useful to examine the argument by Kim and Bell (1985), which was noted in Chapter 3, who studied the applicability of democratic elitism to the Korean context. They argued that it would not be relevant to apply conventional Western theory to Korea where socio-cultural preconditions for pluralism do not exist. It cannot be denied that, while pluralism from the West influenced the formal institutional framework of the Korean government, the extent remained negligible. It is also notable that the political system of Korea was supported not by a pluralistic interest group, but by domination and regulation by the elite groups (Kim and Bell, 1985). Woo and Kim (1971) said “The new Korean elites tend to base their elitism on the assumption that the masses are not yet democratically acclimatised and therefore incapable of making any viable national policy judgement” Therefore, it could be concluded that elitism is the most applicable macro level theory to apply in this thesis.
Meso-level theoretical insights

In Chapter 3, three meso-level frameworks are set out in order to analyse the policy process in Korea. What needs to be remembered is that the researcher did not pre-determine specific framework which will be applied to the Korean context. Considering that these three frameworks, Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Policy Community (PC) have been applied most frequently in either Europe or North America, it was decided to leave the option open until the empirical research was completed.

Compared to other frameworks, the ACF might appear to have the advantage in this thesis because it has been applied to relatively diverse areas such as sport, water, health and climate change, not only in Europe and America but also in Asia, Africa, South America and Australia, which offer insight into the application of ACF in different political systems and structures in the last decade (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Parsons (1995) argued that ACF can provide a coherent and comprehensive approach to the analysis of policy making and policy learning when the government is open towards consultation with interested groups and organisations. It is also suggested that the coalition in ACF tends to include policy analysts, journalists from all levels of government and these networks are enabled to bargain and form alliances among the members of the coalition. As Green (2003) suggested, ACF provides a tool for analysing policy that incorporates both neo-Marxist and neo-pluralist perspectives in the sense that policy is affected by a variety of groups. On the other hand, Kwon (2007) argued that meso-level theories including the ACF cannot take into account that the policy changes could have occurred due to certain structural conditions, for example, political structure, the level of industrialisation and the level of openness in trade. Bearing in mind that the structural influence on policy change takes a long time, they set the policy space leading to a range of possible policy trajectories. It should be also noted that structural factors do not determine policy trajectories. Houlihan (2005) pointed out that ACF is weak in terms of theorization of power.

The concept of power receives very little attention because of the underlying rationalist assumption that, in the medium term, evidence from policy learning will result in policy change even if it challenges policy core beliefs. Power then
is a property of ideas rather than the outcome of resource control and the pursuit of interests. The failure of actors to act in accordance with evidence is due to factors such as limited time, computational constraints, or cognitive dissonance rather than the manipulation of the policy agenda through the mobilization of bias. (Houlihan, 2005: 173-174)

There are a few features of the ACF which might be applicable in Korean sport policy. First, belief systems can be looked at in relation to Korean sport. Hierarchy and deference in Korean sport could be an example of ‘deep core’ which is very difficult to change. It is expected that people do not challenge to their seniors in the Korean sport organisations and athletes obey coaches’ instruction at all times. As noted in Chapter 3 briefly, how the government move the centre of gravity in elite sport and SFA can be viewed as ‘policy core’ which can be changed relatively easily compared to ‘deep core’. What could be even easier to change than ‘policy core’ is ‘secondary core’ for example, government’s funding distribution to elite sport and sport for all.

Second, the concept of ‘coalition’ can be considered. In the ACF, there are normally two to four advocacy coalitions and they share ideas and interests regarding specific policy issues. It might be argued that two selected case studies, elite sport and SFA might be called as two of the ‘coalitions’ in the whole sport sector. Other coalitions could include school sport and youth sport. However, the fact that the leadership of the two coalitions contain members of the political elite which overlap each other in many aspects suggests that this application would not be appropriate considering that it is unlikely that competition has occurred between the coalitions. As concluded in the macro-level analysis that elitism is the most useful tool to understand Korean sport policy, it appears that ACF does not comfortably fit into elitism. Thus ‘policy broker’ who mediate the conflict and ‘liaison’ among between actors in coalitions would also not be applicable in Korean sport policy as there is no need to liaise between the elite sport and SFA due to overlapping memberships.

As regards Multiple Streams Framework, there are a few concepts which can utilise in the analysis of Korean sport policy. As discussed in Chapter 3, ‘Policy Entrepreneur’ indicates people who are willing to invest their energy, time and reputation to push their political career forward or to achieve future promotion, which is a similar to ‘Policy
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Broker’ in ACF. Park Se Jik, who contributed to the establishment of SOSFO, a sport funding provider organisation, could be an example of a ‘Policy Entrepreneur’ who succeeded in ‘coupling’. Having had an insight into the necessity of SFA organisation with the crisis that hundreds of employees might not have jobs after the 1988 Seoul Olympics (problem stream) and 350 million won of surplus from the Olympic Games (policy stream) he pushed the plan forward by using his links to the President (political stream) at a time when the atmosphere in Korean society was then favourable towards participating in sport. The concept of ‘coupling’, when issues appear to the agenda streams are joined together at critical moments in time is important in the policy process, can well be applied to Park Se Jik.

It is important to note that some of the frameworks may fit more comfortably within certain macro level assumptions. Kingdon’s MSF could sit comfortably with pluralism or neo-pluralism but not with Marxism. As Marxism is based on the idea that power is concentrated in the hands of a social class, it does not leave room for other non elites based actors to be involved. The point that ACF does not presume policy-making systems are consensual or are dominated by stable crosscutting elites indicates how well ACF can fit into pluralistic society. Having investigated that a highly elite-centred policy making process has been dominant despite of significant government change in Korea, it becomes inevitable that ACF and MSF would appear inappropriate analytic frameworks.

This elite-centred nature increases the possibility that network analysis, especially the Policy Community, may be the most useful framework. From a consideration of Korean sport policy, it seems that a PC has existed over several decades regardless of the characteristics of the government. Characteristics described by Marsh and Rhodes (1992) appear to fit the Korean sport policy process, for example, excluded and limited membership, sharing basic values among participants and a hierarchical pattern of relationships. In relation to both elite sport and SFA, policy tended to be dominated by a limited number of elite members including the President, senior politicians or business leaders. However, of particular significance is that this “Policy Community” in Korean sport was created because of the president’s power rather than emerging organically from the interaction between the state and civil society. Therefore, to refer to the decision making process for elite sport as being located within a policy
community would be inaccurate. Hence the way that Rhodes and Marsh (1992) define Policy Community questions the applicability of the PC to the Korean case.

To sum up, it could be argued that none of the meso-level frameworks was particularly useful in Korean sport context. Instead of applying a specific framework, the decision was made to leave the question open until the field work was completed and analysed because most of the literature on the three frameworks was either based on Europe or North America, although this is less the case with the ACF in recent years. Even though no particular framework was selected in this research, it should be emphasised that this research still has a great value in the sense that it allowed a researcher to know what elements are missing for example competing coalitions with elite sport or SFA. In addition, some of the concepts provided insights to examine its relevance in the Korean context. One is that it prompted us to investigate whether ‘Policy Community’ virtually exists in Korean elite sport or SFA. According to the analysis, the Korean sport community was not formed organically with people who have identical beliefs and values but it was created in a manufactured way. As the government led the creation of this Korean sport community, it was not possible for them to share power to any significant degree. Their role may just give advise to the government or to provide a degree of legitimacy for government or Presidential decisions. The other aspect to consider is the genuine characteristic of this sport community, in other words, it needs to be considered if whether the Korean sport community is a policy making community or a policy implementation community. Having reached a decision by the President and high ranking position politicians, especially, in the case of elite sport, the policy implementation community is the more probable answer.

**Methodological Reflections**

It is important to reflect on the methodological issues which were raised during the four-years of research. It may be argued that the fact that a researcher is a Korean young female with some exposure to the media as a FIFA referee was advantageous to gather necessary documents and interview senior officers in the government and non-government organisations.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Due in part to the support from one of my sponsors of Korean Sports Council and also due to my ten years of football involvement, access to interviewees was greatly facilitated. As many of the interviewees were aware of my KSC studentship I was concerned that this might affect their openness in answering my questions however, the openness of those interviewees was beyond expectations. With the on-going process of the liberal nature in Korea, most of the interviewees appeared to be relaxed and open in the way they expressed their own opinions. It can be suggested that because the interviewer was a PhD student based in the UK, interviewees felt comfortable in answering questions as there was no immediate concern or threat to them for speaking out regarding sport policies. It can be argued that there was a belief that the interview data would not be made public inside Korea at least.

Second, the interviewer’s status as a well-known youngest international football referee was another favourable factor in conducting the interviews. Although the researcher had not met most of the interviewers before the field work, the way interviewees opened their mind in expressing their opinion perhaps indicated that they felt comfortable talking to an ‘insider’ within sport. It seems that the interviewees accepted or regarded the interviewer as a ‘sportsperson’ (che-yuk-in) therefore, they were willing to help a researcher as much as they could rather than distancing themselves from the researcher.

Finally, the fact that the researcher was a young female PhD student is considered to be a positive factor to encourage the interviewees to provide their thoughts and opinions. Bearing in mind that only one interviewee was a female (an elite athlete), the opportunity to answer questions in relation to sport policy could have viewed as interesting and fresh for the middle aged male interviewees. It can be reiterated that two combination of the researchers’ background, FIFA Referee and female, appeared to have generated synergy effect in acquiring satisfactory interview data. Having missed one condition between the two, it would have been very different situation considering that sport society in Korea is extremely patriarchal, especially at the senior level in the organisation and very conservative in terms of accepting people from outside of the sport boundary.

However, there were certain issues where the researcher still needed to exercise caution in the data collection process, for example, to avoid any influence from ‘gatekeepers’
Chapter 7: Conclusion

or snow ball method in terms of leaning to certain perspectives on political issues. Also, it is necessary to point out the effort to improve validity and reliability which is prone to be criticised especially in the qualitative research. To minimize the validity issues, careful procedure was adopted in the interviewee selection, for example, taking into account that people who are working at the present times are more likely to give opinions about up-to-date matters, but may feel uncomfortable mentioning specific issues due to the situation they face. In this context, former senior officers were thought to be more open and relaxed about things which happened in their time. It led the researcher to a balance between retired senior officers and current staff in the government and sub-national government organizations.

It is important to stress that triangulation was used in this thesis bearing in mind that it automatically increases validity as argued by Fielding and Fielding (1986) bearing in mind no research can be without weakness. Two kinds of triangulation are observed in this thesis: One is the triangulation between interviews, the other is through documents collected from field work and desk research conducted before and after each interview.

**Contribution, Limitation and Future Research**

One of the contributions of this thesis could be that it opened a research area which was not conducted before in Korea. As the first PhD thesis in the sphere of sport policy analysis in Korea, it can be expected to encourage other researchers to study in the future. Also, inter-disciplinary and comparative policy research with sport can be developed not only in the Korean context but Asia, Europe and other continents.

It is necessary to address the limitations of this research and the areas for future research. To answer research questions efficiently, mainly qualitative research method was used as it allows one to grasp the understandings and thoughts of people about social phenomena and to acquire “thick” description. It inevitably led the researcher to be aware of the issues of reliability and validity. Due to a time limit and practicality reasons, it was essential not to go beyond a certain number of interviews. To improve reliability, the researcher attempted to choose a representative selection from sport governing bodies or a relevant organisations instead of interviewing a few senior officers who have similar experience, education and political backgrounds. As for
external reliability, there were concerns as it is rare for follow-up studies to be conducted in other settings similar to the original surroundings. Even though a researcher tried to replicate the interview, it would not be satisfactory due to the fact that settings change and time continues to pass so the researcher must allow for the point that conveying the original study will have had effects on the setting and its members (Fielding, 2006).

The final point to make is that macro level theories were useful to analyse Korean sport policy process but this was not the case with the meso-level frameworks. As Critical Realists believe that the world is socially constructed, the unique characteristics of Korea, for example, the political situation due to the occupation period by Japan and the US influence and hierarchy structure, should be considered by creating a modified meso-level framework.
References

Abelmann, N. 2003, The Melodrama of Mobility, University of Hawai'i Press, USA.

Ahn, C.S. 1993, Democratization and political reform in South Korea: development, culture and institutional change.


Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 2003, From Promises to Implementation: South Korea's New Administration, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Canada.


References


Bazeley, P. 2007, Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo, Sage, London.


Canada Asia 2003, Commentary: From Promises to Implementation: South Korea's New Administration, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.


Chang, J.H. 1988, 12th-16th, September, "Korea YMCA Physical Education Programs", The 11th world YMCA consultation on health and physical education

Chang, J.H. 1983, Wish to become a cradle of sport for all, Sport for All Korea Association Bulletin, Seoul.


References


Cheyuk 1993, August/ September, Special: Research fund for improving performances, Korea Sports Council, pp.6-11, Seoul.

Cheyuk 1977, January, At the time of 'Community Sports Promotion Five Year Plan', Korea Sports Council, pp.21-22, Seoul.

Cheyuk 1968, The focus and promotion plan of company sport (by Na, H.S.), Korea Sports Council, vol.29, Seoul


Cho, M.D. 2001, The influence of YMCA physical training activities on Korean physical training, Yongin University.


Choi, Y.L. 2000, A study on the role of Korean Armed Forces Athletic Corps in the development of the Korean military sports, Unpublished Master Dissertation, Yonsei University, Seoul

Chun, Y.S. 2006, 9th October-last update, KBS radio interview: Tae Neung Village training fee and athletes' human right issue. Available:

Chung, D.S. 1990, Q: Why should the government take charge of sports? A: Because sports represent vital national interests, Koreana magazine, Seoul.


Cotton, J. 1993, Korea Under Roh Tae Woo: Democratization, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, Australia.


References


References


Diamond, L. & Kim, B.K. 2000, Consolidating Democracy in South Korea, Lynne Rienner, London.


References


Finocchiaro, M. 1988, Gramsci and the history of dialectical thought, Cambridge University Press, USA.


References


Green, M. 2006, "From "Sport for all" to not about "sport" at all?", European Sport Management Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 217-238.

References

Green, M. & Houlihan, B. 2005, Elite Sport Development: Policy learning and political priorities, Routledge, UK.


Guo, Y. 2005, “Profile of Korean Education” in Asia’s Education Edge: Current achievements in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China and India, Lexington books, USA, pp. 75-118.


References


Hankyooreh 2006, 17th August, Join hands local council with education council ... dramatic increase of cultural sport facilities.


References


Hogwood, B.W. 1987, From Crisis to Complacency? Shaping Public Policy in Britain, Oxford University Press, London.


References

Hong, S.G. 1997, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in East Asia: The Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan and South Korea, Edward Elgar, UK.


Houlihan, B. 1999, "'Sport for All' in the UK and Europe: substance and rhetoric", paper presented at the colloquium "Sport for All in Canada: Building on the European Experience."


Ilgan Sports 2007, 13th April, Korea Institute of Sports Science: do not miss even one drop of sweat, the National Council of Sport for All
References

Im, B.J. 1995 Seminar materials for the development of Sport for all.


Im, Y.T. 1998, 50 years history of Republic of Korea: 2 from Yushin government to the birth of people's government, Deulnuk, Seoul.

Incheon Metropolitan City 1999, The 80th National sports festival whitepaper, Incheon Metropolitan City.


Jang, B.D. 2006, 10th July-last update, Sport Industry Promotion Law, this is the way. [Homepage of Seoul Utd], [Online]. Available: www.seoulutd.com [2007, 20th April].


References


Joongang Ilbo 2007, 15th January, Pyeongchang Olympic is the opportunity for strengthening global competitiveness, Seoul.

Joongang Ilbo 2007, 17th January, Initiate 'Beijing Dream team' for Park Tae Hwan, Seoul.


References


Joseph, J. 2006, Marxism and Social Theory, Palgrave Macmillan, UK.


References


Kim, B.K. 2004, A study on the physical education policy of 3rd Republic of Korea, Korea National University of Education.

Kim, B.S. 1992, "A development of fitness service model for sport clubs", The Korean Alliance for Health, Physical Education, Recreation and Dance


Kim, H.C. 2003, The Effect to be influenced upon job satisfaction and productivity by gymnastic activity of working place, Unpublished Master Dissertation, Kyunghee University.

Kim, H.J. 2003, Kwanhoon Journal, Korea


Kim, K.T. 2002, 22nd Dec.-last update, Roh's Young Army Used Internet to Win [Homepage of The Korea Times], [Online]. Available: times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200212/kt20021222217394212... [2006, 24th March].


Kim, M.S. 1990, Sport for All Movement: It's Sports For Everybody in Korea, Koreana magazine, Seoul.


Kim, Y.S. 2001, The reminiscences of President of Kim Young Sam (1), Chosun Ilbosa.


Koo, C.M. 1985, The study of sports preference based on the social status, Unpublished Master Dissertation, Seoul National University

Kookmin Ilbo 2008, 21st February, [half time] Park Tae Hwan return to athletes' village ... something is not refreshed, Seoul.


Korea Lifetime Sports Association 1983, Community Sport 83, Community Sport.


Korea Olympic Committee 1996, April, KOC 50 years history 1946-1996, .

Korea Sports Council 2005, 2005 Committee on Culture and Tourism, National Audit requested material.


Kraar, L. 2003, 3rd February, Wanted Kim Woo Choong disappeared from South Korea three years ago as his company was collapsing under a $65 billion pile of debt. Now, in an exclusive interview, the former Daewoo chairman talks about his rise and fall and his life in exile., Fortune, USA.


369
References


Kyunghsin Middle, H.S. 1966, 80 years history of Kyungshin, Seoul.


Lett, D.P. 1998, In pursuit of status: The making of South Korea's "New" urban middle class, Havard-Hallym Series on Korean Studies, USA.


Lincoln, Y. & Guba, E. 1985, Naturalistic Inquiry, Sage, USA.


Maeil Kyungjae 2007, 23rd March, Sport for all is an ingredient of elite sport, Seoul.


References


References


Mills, C.W. 1956, The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, USA.


Ministry of Culture and Tourism 2007, 2006 Sports Whitepaper (Cheyukbaekseo), Gyemunsa, Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

Ministry of Culture and Tourism 2003, 'Participation government' five year National Sport Promotion Plan, Seoul.


Ministry of Sport and Youth 1992, Sport Youth Administration 10 years, Seoul.


Moonwha Ilbo 2006, 8th March, <opinion> 'WBC military exemption' too hasty.


Morse, J.M. & Richards, L. 2002, Read me first for a user's guide to Qualitative methods, Sage, USA.


Munhwa Ilbo 2006, 14th January, Should not bid for the international sport events recklessly, Seoul.


Naeil Shinmun 2006, 8th February-last update, How do we have to see the president of NACOSA who is a politician?. Available: http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?modeLSD&mid=sec&sid1=102&oid=086&aid=0000042342 [2007, 8th March]


References

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/imfrok.htm [2006, 1st March].


Newsis 2009, 20th February-last update, Yu Young Gu, approved as a president in KBO. Available:

Newsis 2007, 7th August-last update, <Beijing D-365> Chairman of Tae Neung Village Lee Erisa "the moment of glory and crisis is crossing". Available:


Nocut News 2008, 12th May-last update, No more 'parachute appointment' [Homepage of Nocut News], [Online]. Available:
http://www.cbs.co.kr/Nocut/Show.asp?IDX=824152 [2008, 10th December].

Nocut News 2007, 23rd May-last update, China is strong in all sports ... it would be difficult in the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Available:


References


Park, J.H. 2007, Sport for all: possible only when public sport facilities exist, National Council for Sport for All.


References


Patton, M.Q. 2002, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods, 3rd edn, Sage, California.

Patton, M.Q. 1990, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, 2nd edn, Sage, USA.


Polsby, N.W. 1963, Community Power and Political Theory, 2nd edn, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.

Powers, C. 1987, Vilfredo Pareto, Sage, USA.


References


Shindonga 2007, 26th February, Waste three years, 2002 World Cup football 'we might disgrace ourselves', Seoul


Skocpol, T. 1979, States and Social Revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia and China, Cambridge University Press, USA.


References


SOSFO 2003, A plan for efficient management of public sport centres, Seoul.


Sports Chosun 2007, 23rd January, Park Tae Hwan, get taller 1.86cm, Seoul.

Sports Chosun 2006, 7th December, Asian Games, Hwang Hee Tae and others from Sangmu could get exemption if they won gold medal?, Seoul.

Sports Chosun 2006, 24th November, 'Military Exemption for the world championship gold medalist' agenda no progress for 5 months ... 'amateur cold treatment', Seoul.


Sports Seoul 2008, 17th December-last update, Sport for all, club league competition, company and local authorities increase interest in sponsoring ... Available:
References


The 100 years history of Korean Sport Compilation Committee. 1981, The 100 years history of Korean sport

The Economist 2003, 21st June, Asia: Young, bright and jobless: Unemployment in China and South Korea, London.

The Korea Herald 2002, 11th July, K-League asks government to provide tax favors to soccer players, Seoul.

The Korea Times 2004, 6th January, Kim Un young Claims He Gave $1.1 Mil. to NK IC, Seoul.


The Law 1965, 14th June, "The Law 1698 Proclamation of the National Sports Promotion Law", .

The Straits Times 27th June 2002, Korea sparks new hope for Asian soccer, Singapore.
The World Bank 1987 (II), Korea: Managing the Industrial Transition, , USA.


UK Sport, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Belgium), WJH Muller Instituut (Nethalands), Sheffield Hallam University (UK) 2006, 'Sports Policy Factors Leading to International Sporting Success' (SPLISS), UK Sport, London.


Wade, L.L. & Kim, B.S. 1978, Economic Development of South Korea: The Political Economy of Success, Praeger, USA.


Weick, K.E. 1979, The social psychology of organizing, Random House, New York.
References


Weiss, M.R. 2004, Developmental Sport and Exercise Psychology: A Lifespan Perspective, Fitness Information Technology, USA.


Yonhap News 2008, 19th March, Many teams come to Korea for training ... special effects of Beijing Olympics, Seoul.


Yonhap News 2007, 6th December, Controversy over revision of election process of KSC President, Seoul.
References

Yonhap News 2007, 5th August-last update, <Beijing Olympics D-365> The dream of Beijing 'Express science'. Available: 

Yonhap News 2007, 7th November, Who solves a problem for 40 years of Tae Neung shooting range?.

Yonhap News 2006, 6th December, A controversy over the absence of Sangmu athletes in the training for national shooting players.

Yonhap News 2006, Sport Industry Promotion Law, pass leaving out the clause of supporting professional teams, Seoul.

Yonhap News 2003, 25th June-last update, World Cup Organising Committee goes to history [Homepage of Yonhap News], [Online]. Available: 

http://www.mcst.go.kr/web/introCourt/minister/address/minAddressView.jsp [2009, 13th January].


**Appendix A. Interview Schedule**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>22.June.2007</td>
<td>Academic, Olympic Medallist</td>
<td>Kwandong University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>26.June.2007</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Joongang Ilbo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>26.June.2007</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Korea Broadcasting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>28.June.2007</td>
<td>Journalist/ former academic</td>
<td>Sports Chosun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>29.June.2007</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Hanyang University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>03.July.2007</td>
<td>Former academic</td>
<td>Seoul National University (Retired)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>05.July.2007</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Soongsil University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>29.Nov.2007</td>
<td>Senior Officer</td>
<td>Culture &amp; Sports Division, Gangnam District Office, Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>30.Nov.2007</td>
<td>Senior Officer</td>
<td>Samsung Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>03.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Senior Researcher</td>
<td>Department of Sport Policy, KISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>03.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Senior Researcher</td>
<td>Department of Sport Science, KISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>04.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Academic, Olympic Medallist (Taekwondo)</td>
<td>Korea National Sports University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>05.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Olympic Medallist (Short track)</td>
<td>Club coach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>05.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Orthopaedic Surgeon</td>
<td>Private Clinic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>05.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Former Performance Director</td>
<td>Korea Swimming Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>06.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Olympic Medallist (Taekwondo)</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>06.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Former Deputy Minister of Sport</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>07.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Former Senior Officer</td>
<td>International Department, KSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>07.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Senior Officer</td>
<td>Chief of Administration, Sangmu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>07.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Athletes (football)</td>
<td>Sangmu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>07.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Athletes (shooting)</td>
<td>Sangmu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>10.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Senior Officer</td>
<td>Samsung Sports Administration Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>13.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Senior Officer</td>
<td>General Management Department, KSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>13.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Medical Doctor</td>
<td>Hyundai Asan Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>14.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Former General Secretary</td>
<td>Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Organising Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>17.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Senior Officer</td>
<td>Korea Taekwondo Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Education Researcher</td>
<td>School PE, Health &amp; School Meals Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>20.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Former Academic</td>
<td>Ministry of Education &amp; HR Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>20.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Senior Officer</td>
<td>Member of SFA Commission, IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>20.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Senior Officer</td>
<td>Sports Promotion Department, SOSFO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>21.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>Korean Athletic Trainers' Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>26.Dec.2007</td>
<td>Senior Officer</td>
<td>Business Management Team, NACOSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>07.Jan.2008</td>
<td>Junior Officer</td>
<td>International Department, Kukkiwon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>08.Jan.2008</td>
<td>Asian Games Medallist (Swimming)</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>08.Jan.2008</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Sport Department, YMCA Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>10.Jan.2008</td>
<td>Chief of Executive Office</td>
<td>Korea Soccer Association of Sport for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>12.Jan.2008</td>
<td>Former General Secretary</td>
<td>Korea Women's Football League</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B. Sample Interview Questions

Government officials

- How would you describe changes of the government’s priority in elite sport and mass participation over time?
- Could you explain motives of government’s hosting strategies over time?
- What is the relationship between MCT and KSC, SOSFO, NACOSA?
- What process is required to acquire budget for Sport?

Senior officials in the National Government agencies

- What is the relationship between your organisation (KSC, SOSFO and NACOSA) and MCT or other sub-national organisations?
- What change has it been made in terms of government’s intervention in your organisation?
- Who do you think main actors of Korean elite sport and sport for all?
- What is the main issue in the integration/separation of sport governing bodies?

Elite athletes

- Can you describe the way you had felt over time as an athlete in terms of the government’s support/concern towards elite athletes?
- What kind of route do elite athletes choose when they want to raise their voice or complain?
- What is your opinion about life-long pension scheme?
- How important is it to get military exemption (only male athletes)?

Senior officials in NGBs

- How much difference has it been in relation to government’s support to elite sport from authoritarian regime to civilian government? (Both monetary and non-monetary)
- Could you tell me the way your Federation identify talented athletes?
- How important is sport science/sport medicine in your sport? How much did/do you adopt it?
- What is the role of your Federations in sending your male athletes to Sangmu?

Senior official in Samsung Training Centre (STC)

- Could you explain how STC set up?
- What was the initial cost when STC was established?
- Was there any kind of support or regulation from the government?
- Could you tell me the relationships between STC and other NGBs, Sangmu and TN Village?
Senior official in Samsung Sports

- How many sports does Samsung operate?
- How did you overcome the IMF crisis in terms of maintaining sport teams?
- What kind of government regulations are there in running sport teams?
- Is there any work Samsung Sports attempt to do in the context of sport for all?

Senior officials in Sangmu

- Could you tell us the role of Sangmu in Korean elite sport?
- How much funding do you receive from the government?
- How could Sangmu survive in the IMF crisis?
- Is it possible for Chaebol or other businesses to build facilities inside Sangmu or sponsor teams?

Athletes in Sangmu

- Could you explain your daily and weekly schedule?
- Do you consider you as a full time athlete or soldier?
- What benefits do you get from coming to Sangmu?
- If you had not come to Sangmu, how would your career have been changed?

Senior Researchers in Korea Institute of Sports Science

- How does KSC consider sport science?
- How did you build relationships with coaches in TN Village?
- How many sports can benefit from sport science?
- What difficulties do you have at the moment?

Senior official in YMCA

- Could you explain the role of YMCA over time in Korean elite sport and sport for all?
- How do you consider the role of government in sport for all?
- What kind of sponsor have YMCA had? What kind of support did newspaper companies provide to YMCA?
- Which organisations do you regularly contact or work together?

Senior official in Samsung Wellness Clinic (SWC)

- How did SWC set up?
- What are the motives of SWC?
- What are the responses from users (employers)?
- Have you been contacted from government for benchmark purposes or something?
Appendix C. Transcription Example

A senior official in the government (Ministry of Culture and Tourism as of 20th December 2007)

Q: From the government's point of view, how would you describe changes of priority in elite sport and mass participation (Sport for All)?
A: Until the 1988 Seoul Olympics, elite sport was the centre of the government’s attention. It was important for athletes to win lots of medals in the Olympics and raise national pride. After the 1988 Games, the interest in Sport for All began to grow. With the establishment of NACOSA in 1991, the support and attention towards SFA increased. At this moment, I see that the centre of gravity in the Korean government's sport policy is moving towards Sport for All than elite sport.

Q: Who is the main organisation in making sport policy in Korea?
A: Sport Bureau in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) has overall responsibility of Korean sport policy. As for the enforcement of the policy, Korea Sports Council is in charge of elite sport and NOCOSA takes responsible for Sport for All. Sport Councils and local SFA Council across the country have a duty to deliver the policy. These local organisations intimately cooperate with local authorities.

Q: How has the National Sports Promotion Law (NSPL) been revised?
A: As time goes by, the necessity of the revision of the NSPL can be raised. The government or sport organizations can request certain issues. Or senior officers in the sport governing bodies can ask for consideration regarding the law change. Recently, there were amendments about de-regulation for sport facilities and transferring disabled sport from the Ministry of Health & Welfare to MCT.

Q: Could you tell me a procedure for MCT to acquire sport budget from the Ministry of Budget & Planning (MBP)?
A: We have to go through same process as other Ministries. By the 30th of June in the previous year, we must compile a budget and submit to the MBP. Then, MBP
evaluates, gets approval by the President of Korea Republic and submit to the Parliament etc. It takes about 70 days until November to get finalised for the following year.

Q: Is there a big difference in terms of the person who takes charge of in the MBP?
A: Korea's budget system nowadays is called 'top-down'. MBP allows each Ministries to have autonomy in a certain extent. Each Ministry is given 'ceiling' and within the amount of fund, the allocation is left to each Ministry's discretion. As for the case of MCT, we have to distribute the fund to culture, tourism, sport, arts and so on. For example, next year sport is likely to have more portion because of bidding for mega events such as Incheon Asian Games or Pyeongchang Winter Olympics.

Q: Could you describe relationships between MCT and other Ministries?
A: Let me explain the relationships with the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW). I can say that there was some conflict in relation to sport for veterans (over 60s). This year we hosted the ‘National Veteran Sport Competition’ and MHW held the 'National Veteran Health Festival'. This identical competitions were held in two different names as MCT considered that sport is within MCT boundary while MHW viewed the welfare of elders as MHW’s boundary. Fortunately, the agreement was reached and only one competition will be hosted from next year by MCT. I think that MHW can use the budget for other areas next year.

Q: What's the relationships between MCT and KSC, SOSFO which are the government agencies?
A: Those organizations are all government-affiliated organizations. It means that they are corporate bodies which receive guidance and supervision from MCT based on the NSPL. As for the KSC, the president should get approval from the Minister of Culture and Tourism. As regard SOSFO, the appointment is recommended by the Minister and approved by the President. All the matters such as business planning, Articles, budgets should get approval from MCT.