The mediated public debate of British National Identity cards 1915-2008

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for

Mum and Dad
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Abstract

Within the growing field of surveillance studies, national identity cards and related issues have become an important research topic. Most research in this field, however, does not consider the role of media in the development of surveillance. This research examines the history of mediated public debates about identity cards in the U.K. In the U.K, since the Identity Cards Bill 2004, National Identity cards have been widely debated across the British national newspapers once again after several heated historical debates in WWI, WWII, and the 1990s. It is this thesis’s purpose to analyze the role of the British national newspapers in generating support and resistance in the development of British national identity cards in the past one hundred years, respectively in 1915, 1919, 1939, 1951, and from 1994 to 2008. This thesis also seeks to find out the continuities and changes in the way British national newspapers influence the repeated introduction and withdrawal of identity cards over time. Specifically, by employing the methods of content and frame analysis, the thesis examines the actors involved in the mediated debate of British national identity cards, their argumentation, the frames underlying the argumentation and the themes appeared in the debates, in order to find out to what extent the British print media supported or opposed the identity cards over time.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

This thesis is a research on the mediated public debate on British national identity cards over the past one hundred years, seeking to locate the arguments of actors for and against national identity cards, and to explain the frames underlying the argumentation. National identity card systems have been introduced three times in Britain in the past one hundred years, in 1915, 1939, and 2006.

The first-ever British national ID card (officially titled a ‘Registration Certificate’) was born in 1915 after the outbreak of the First World War, under the Registration Act 1915. As both Agar (2001) and Elliot (2008) point out, it was designed to accompany the National Register, which was intended mainly for purposes of conscription and national mobilisation. Thirty-two million registration forms were distributed, and twenty-five million registration certificates were issued to individuals (The Observer 1915, 15th Aug: 9, The News of the World 1915, 15th Aug: 6). Although ‘non-compliance’ and a deficiency of national registration data led to the scheme ending in failure, and to its withdrawal in 1919 after WWI ended, the potential of a mandatory or voluntary national identity card system was made clear to the war government and civil servants. For example, some saw this measure as a good way to observe epidemic conditions and to compile medical records, and in fact the registration numbering system was retained for use by the NHS and is still in place (see Thompson 2008: 147; Nissel 1987; Spencer 1995; Elliot 2008).

The second British national ID card system was enforced under the Registration Act 1939. It had a dual purpose: to aid conscription and to facilitate food rationing (Agar 2001; Elliot 2008). The idea of linking the card with food rationing ensured the success of the second national identity card system; however, it was finally abolished in 1952 due to public resentment and because there was no further need for food rationing, as Agar (2001) noted.

The third British national ID card system was introduced by the Labour Government after the events of 9/11 2001, under the Identity Cards Act 2006. Unlike the earlier national identity card systems, the latest scheme is designed to combat crime (such as terrorism, illegal immigration and identity fraud) and to aid public services (for example by helping to provide
efficient and effective access to public benefits, which echoes the e-Government plan proposed by Labour Government since 2005) (Identity Cards Bill 2004-2005\(^1\); Wills 2008). The Identity Cards Act 2006 also requires much more personal and identifying information from applicants, including a digital photograph and fingerprints (Identity Cards Act 2006). Furthermore, the Act has been passed by the U.K. Parliament under peacetime circumstances: there is no war emergency as in WWI or WWII, no urgent need for conscription, and no food rationing.

In addition to the national identity card schemes outlined above, it should also be noted that in 1995, the Conservative Government tried and failed to introduce such a system in Britain, publishing a Green Paper entitled *Identity Cards: A Consultation Document* (Spencer 1995; Wills 2008). Spencer (1995: 4) also lists a number of other unsuccessful identity cards proposals:

- A bill under the Ten Minutes Rule was proposed in 1988 by Tony Favell; A Private Member’s Bill in 1989 by Ralph Howell; and two further Ten Minute Rule Bills in 1993 by David Amess and in 1994 by Harold Elletson. Another Bill of this type, proposing a unique personal ID number for all those born after 1 January 1990 and for other residents on application, was proposed in 1989 by Jacques Arnold.

It is against this background of the repeated introduction and abolition of national identity card systems in Britain that this research will investigate why state surveillance (such as documenting individual identity) has occurred, how it has operated in aid of bureaucracy, and how the media has generated support or opposition towards it. More specifically, to what extent has the British print media supported or opposed the introduction and withdrawal of national ID card over time? What kind of role have they played in these developments? How have they operated over time, from WWI to the present? Finally, how has the media framed identity cards over time?

The answers to these questions are not to be found in the current surveillance studies literature. Rather, surveillance studies, especially in the past two decades, have focused on the technical aspect of state surveillance and the sociology of the technology – how it functions, how it succeeds, how it fails, and how it affects our lives (Rule 1973; Clark 1987; Norris and Armstrong 1999; Torpey 2000; Lyon 2001a; Lyon 2001b; Identity Project 2005; Report on

\(^1\) The Identity Cards Bill 2005 is the same as the Identity Cards Bill 2004 introduced into the last Parliament by then Home Secretary David Blunkett. Identity Cards Bill 2004 fell at dissolution, which caused the Labour Government to introduce Identity Cards Bill 2005 into the Parliament once again for legislation.
There is little research on the media representation of state surveillance; and the role of the media in the development of state surveillance, more specifically national identity card systems, remains unexplored. For example, *The Identity Project*, a report on the British biometric ID card system published in 2005 by the London School of Economics, devotes no more than three pages to a discussion of the mediated public debate on ID cards. Instead, it focuses mainly on the technologies, cost/effectiveness and other practical matters. Such marginalisation of the role of mediated public debate highlights the need for further research into the media representation of British national identity cards.

Surveillance researchers and civil liberty campaigners have been warning the British public of the danger of ‘walking into a surveillance society’ ever since the introduction of the Identity Cards Bill 2004 (Report on the surveillance society 2006; Murakami Wood 2009; Lyon 2009). The term ‘surveillance society’ first appeared in Oscar Gandy’s (1989) work *The Surveillance Society: Information Technology and Bureaucratic Social Control*, describing the social impacts brought by the advance of information technology; and was further developed by David Lyon (1993, 2001a), whose work assessed the surveillance technologies in everyday life. Though it is a popular term, Murakami Wood (2009) warned against generalisation, since the conception of the ‘surveillance society’ varies from country to country and over time. Therefore, the term ‘surveillance society’ in this thesis is only applicable to the UK, not globally.

The passing of the Identity Cards Act 2006 was not the first occasion upon which the idea of national identity cards had attracted so much attention. As early as 1915, when the National Register was introduced in Britain for the first time and accompanying Registration Certificates were issued to citizens, there were heated debates in British national newspapers over a series of issues, such as whether the Register should be compulsory or voluntary (Daily Telegraph 1915, 14th May: 6; Fellowes 1915; Daily Mail 1915, 28th May: 5; Daily Mirror 1915, 8th Sep: 2). In 1951, the ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ case triggered a debate on the legitimacy of the post-war national identity card system and challenged the abuse of police power to check ID cards (The Times 1951a, 13th Jun: 2; The Times 1951b, 28th Jun: 6; Daily Mail 1951, 13th Jun: 3; Daily Mirror 1951, 27th Jun: 5). The case ignited a parliamentary debate on the policing and legitimacy of the ID card system, which led to its abolition in 1952 (Agar 2001).
In this thesis, I will examine the role of the British national newspapers in the public debates on three British national identity card systems by employing a traditional methodological approach – thematic content analysis of the national newspaper articles from multiple British national newspapers; I will also use frame analysis. The thesis comprises three case studies: WWI, WWII, and 1994-2008.

- **1915**: The first-ever National Register was born and Registration Certificates were issued to each citizen. However, in 1919, the National Register was abolished due to high cost and fears over civil liberties (Elliot 2008).

- **1939**: The National Register and ID card system was re-introduced to aid the war effort (Thompson 2008). In 1951, ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ led to parliamentary debate and the abolition of the scheme in early 1952 (Dovey 1986, Agar 2001).


The three case studies will be followed by a comparative analysis, which will seek to determine the extent to which the three mediated debates differed from each other in terms of, for example, themes, actors, arguments and frames.

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to the research topic, methods and the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 evaluates the most relevant theoretical and empirical works with regard to mass media, state surveillance and the public
sphere, in an effort to identify the trends and weaknesses in contemporary surveillance studies and to justify consideration of the role of the mass media and the public sphere in the research on British national identity cards. In particular, the chapter aims to explain the role and functions of the communication media and the public sphere in the civil society; it also seeks to examine the theoretical and empirical works in state surveillance so as to locate what has been marginalised in contemporary surveillance studies; finally, it moves to review the significance of modern communication media in realising visibility, and emphasises the value of mediated visibility in surveillance studies. Chapter 3 outlines the methodological premises both in theory and in practice. It explains how content analysis and frame analysis are designed to aid the research, and discusses the theoretical and empirical works in relation to content analysis and frame analysis. Chapter 4 presents the first case study, including both content analysis and frame analysis of the news coverage of British national identity cards in 1915 and 1919. To aid the discussion diagrams are presented, along with a detailed analysis of the news content, including the themes that emerged in the mediated debate, the actors, and their argumentation. The chapter also includes analysis of the mapping of nationalism and liberalism frames in the media representation of British national identity cards. Chapter 5 explores the media representation of the British national identity card system in 1939 and 1951, seeking to explain why ID cards were introduced and abolished. In Chapter 6, the case study is extended to a much wider time period – from 1994 to August 2008, in order to consider why the Identity Cards Bill 2005 succeeded whilst the Identity Card Green Paper in 1995 failed. Drawing on the three case studies, Chapter 7 moves to discuss the similarities and differences in the media representation of British national ID cards over the past 100 years. It aims to explain what has remained the same and what had changed, and why. Chapter 8 provides a summary of the thesis findings, considering whether the national newspapers have functioned as the ‘watchdog’ of the government over time, and the extent of their influence on the public debate over ID cards.
Chapter 2

Mass Media, State Surveillance and the Public Sphere

2.0 Introduction

Democracy is not possible without a functioning political public sphere that puts the individual in a position to decide and act autonomously. (Meyer and Hinchman, 2002: 1)

The public sphere, in Habermas’ (1999) account, originated in the salons and coffee houses of mid-seventeenth century Western Europe, and was dominated by well-educated middle class males who freely exchanged opinions on public issues. What is more, “the modern prominence of the public sphere concept was initially bound up with the struggle against despotic states in the European region. The language of ‘the public’, ‘public virtue’, and ‘public opinion’ was a weapon in support of ‘liberty of the press’ and other publicly-shared freedoms. Talk of ‘the public’ was direct against monarchs and courts suspected of acting arbitrarily, abusing their power, and furthering their ‘private’, selfish interests at the expense of the realm” (Keane 2000: 53-54). In this sense, in the seventeenth century just as today, the public sphere aimed at protecting the liberty of individuals.

However, the intensification of state surveillance is threatening personal freedom and individual liberties, to the extent that Information Commissioner Richard Thomas has warned that we are sleepwalking into a surveillance society (A Report on the Surveillance Society, 2006). With the rapid development of Information and Communication Technologies, state surveillance (such as a national ID card system) is becoming more affordable, systematic and routine, with the aim of achieving efficient bureaucratic administration (Lyon 2001a, 2001b, 2002). ICTs are utilised to increase the power, reach, and capacity of surveillance systems. In other words, computer and telecommunication technologies form essential infrastructures for administrative and organisational life. This seems to prove that the worries of Max Weber and Michael Foucault have become real, that the advance of capitalism and the growth of bureaucracy will inevitably damage individual liberty.

In these circumstances, it is essential to study how the public sphere reacted to the intensification of state surveillance over the years, in terms of the protection of individual freedom and liberty. Therefore, it is the intention of this thesis to examine the reactions of the
British national newspapers (one medium of the public sphere in contemporary society) towards the repeated introduction and withdrawal of British national identity card systems in the past one hundred years, in order to find out what has been debated, how the debates were framed, and to what extent the public sphere has supported or opposed the British national ID cards.

The purposes of this literature review chapter are as follow: first, in section 2.1 – The Mass Media and the Public Sphere – to discuss the role and functions of the communication media and the public sphere in the civil society; second, in section 2.2 – History of Surveillance Studies – to critically examine and explain what has been neglected in surveillance studies; and finally in section 2.3 – When Surveillance Met the Mass Media – to review the significance of modern mass communication media in realising visibility, and to emphasise the value of mediated visibility/transparency in surveillance studies.

2.1. The Mass Media and the Public Sphere

2.1.1 The Transformation of the Public Sphere

Jürgen Habermas’ early work – *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* – was originally published in Germany in 1962, and translated into English in 1989. The significance and flaws of Habermas’ study have been widely debated by many scholars across disciplines. Here, it is necessary first of all to briefly review the essence of his work. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in some major Western European countries like Britain and France, public places such as salons and coffee houses became a forum for rational public debate, which gradually formed a distinctive social interaction separate from the state authority. In such places, elites and bourgeois people gathered to exchange their free and argumentative views on daily issues. “Debate proceeded according to universal standards of critical reason and argumentative structure that all could recognise and assent to; appeals to traditional dogmas, or to arbitrary subjective prejudices, were ruled inadmissible … [Also] Habermas is sanguine enough to realise that this generalised commitment to collective and rational self-determination was never fully realised. The bourgeois ideal of unhindered free speech was always some distance from reality, and this gap widened as the capitalist economy became more centralised and concentrated” (Gardiner 2004: 28). Not only does Habermas discuss the emergence of the public sphere, he also expresses his pessimism
regarding its development, because: “1. The blurring of state and society (the relationship of the individual to the state has increasingly become one of client or consumer of services, rather than citizen.); 2. Politics becomes a stage show (argumentation and debate are now subordinated to the logic of the competition for power between parties.); 3. ‘Public opinion’ is increasingly synonymous with the results of polling surveys/focus group research, which politicians use and seek to manipulate for their own ends; 4. Public communication has been moderated by the demands of big business and it has led to a regressive ‘dumbing down’ of the level of public debate” (Roberts and Crossley 2004: 5-6).

In the case of the public sphere’s response to the repeated introduction and withdrawal of British national ID cards, Habermas’ concerns remain insightful. For example, since 2004, when the British Labour Government introduced the proposal for biometric ID cards, the state has been portraying this controversial scheme as an opportunity for government to provide better public services to citizens, which illustrates Habermas’ concern over the relationship between the state and individuals, especially in a welfare state where access to public benefits are essential to the bureaucratic administration (Pleace 2007). Another example in the mediated debate of British national ID cards is related to Habermas’ concern regarding the formation of public opinion. Polling results and focus group research have become increasingly synonymous with public opinion, so that politicians and interest groups can manipulate it for their own ends. Since the entitlement card proposal in 2002, various polling surveys, mostly conducted by the Home Office and the press, have investigated the extent to which the system is supported or disliked. Those conducted by the Home Office all had the same result – that the British public welcome the introduction of a biometric ID card system.

Habermas was criticised extensively by many academics for his concentration on the bourgeois public sphere and male-domination, for his pessimistic conclusion on the public sphere and for his relative neglect of the fast development of communication media (Roberts and Crossley 2004, Garnham 1992, Calhoun 1992). Downey and Fenton (2003:187) added that “Habermas saw proletarian public spheres … as derivative of the bourgeois public sphere and as unworthy of much attention. In his response to the conference in 1989, Habermas recognises this as a problem with the book… Thus Habermas recognises not only the existence of alternative public spheres but also their capacity for challenging domination.” Zaret (1992) also criticised Habermas’ neglect of religion, science, and printing in England in
the seventeenth century when analysing the emergence of the public sphere.

Academics such as Verstraeten (1996) began to rethink the concept of public sphere and take the media into more positive consideration. Verstraeten admitted that it is still impossible to achieve a rational public sphere, partly due to the commercialisation of the media, but he also criticised Habermas’ conclusion on the decline and decay of the public sphere. Furthermore, he considered that Habermas treated the public only as consumer of the public sphere rather than producer. In Bennett and Entman’s (2001: 2-3) account, “public sphere is comprised of any and all locations, physical or virtual, where ideas and feelings relevant to politics are transmitted or exchanged openly”.

The public sphere is supposed to engage as many intelligent actors as possible; but nowadays interest groups such as international companies “have a very clear idea of their private group interests” and “are able to manifest these interests in the public sphere”, especially when that sphere is more and more mediated (Verstraeten 2000: 74). Thus, according to Verstraeten (1996: 351), “the media in particular, situated as it were at the intersection of the public and private spheres, play a pivotal role in defining, shifting and exploiting this boundary”. It is not until the public, especially individuals, have a better understanding of what is in their best interest and start to shed their biases when facing the pluralistic public sphere that the search for a ‘public interest’ can actually commence (Verstraeten 2000).

In sum, the public sphere was originated to protect liberty from being damaged by states, through providing a social space for individuals to exchange opinions on public matters, freely and unrestrictedly in a rational and argumentative manner. And with the public sphere becoming more and more mediated, it is necessary to examine what kind of role the media plays in the development of surveillance. If the intensification of surveillance is threatening personal freedom and civil liberty, then to what extent did the media campaign against it? And what was the effect of the campaign? This thesis is thus dedicated to supplement surveillance studies through examining the level of support and opposition the media generated towards surveillance over time in Britain.

The next part will discuss the relationship between the public sphere, the civil society and the mass media, as “civil society constitutes the socio-cultural preconditions for a viable public sphere” and “the mass media have become the chief institutions of the public sphere”
2.1.2 The Public Sphere, the Civil Society and the Mass Media

As Dahlgren (1996: 127) explained, “[civil society] is a domain of social interaction which is situated between market and state (and organised political society)”. According to Cohen and Arato (see Dahlgren 1996: 127), “civil society is institutionally composed chiefly of: (a) The intimate sphere (especially the family); (b) The sphere of associations (in particular, voluntary associations); (c) Social movements (which point to its political relevance); and (d) The many forms of public communication”. Though closely related, the concepts of the public sphere and the civil society differ in many ways, for “civil society points to patterns of interaction and social organisation, including their institutional and legal aspects. The public sphere has to do with societal discourse and dialogue of political relevance. Clearly they can impact on each other … a public sphere depends on a favourable organisation of civil society” (Dahlgren 1996: 131). Cox’s (1975) Civil Liberties in Britain gave explicit details of how civil liberties were compromised and fought over from the 1930s to the 1970s, through continuous social movements by different social organisations.

It is also significant to realise the relationship between the public sphere and the mass media, as in today’s society, mass media plays a major role in delivering “societal discourse and dialogue of political relevance” (Dahlgren 1996: 131). Habermas also noted that “in the contemporary circumstances of mass suffrage, newspapers and magazines, radio and television are the media of the public sphere” (see Higgins 2008: 27). Not only is the media significant to realising the public sphere, it is also critical to democracy (Scammell and Semetko 2000, Williams 1996, Rubin 1977, O’Neil 1998). Williams (1996: 2-3) categorised the role and function of the mass media in society into two kinds:

One puts a commercial value on everything, turning citizens into consumers; children into vulnerable merchandising targets via video games, magazines, film and television; and information into ‘infotainment’ … [the other views] media as a liberating force for human enlightenment and progress, informing, entertaining, nurturing creative talent and being financially and editorially independent from powerful vested commercial or political interests. At the heart of this view is a respect for diversity and pluralism, and a recognition that unchecked media power can undermine democracy.

O’Neil (1998: 1) explains why the media is viewed as ‘a liberating force’:
There is a common understanding that a strong connection exists between mass communication and democracy. Simply put, the assumption is that for democracies to function, civil society requires access to information as a means to make informed political choices. Similarly, politicians require the media as a way in which they can take stock of the public mood, present their views, and interact with society. The media are thus viewed as a vital conduit of relations between state and society … As the **fourth estate** or **watchdog of government**, the media are expected to critically assess state action and provide such information to the public. Ideally, then, the media not only provide a link between rulers and the ruled but also impart information that can constrain the centralization of power and the obfuscation of illicit or unethical state action. (O’Neil’s emphasis)

Scammell and Semetko (2000: xiii) summarise “the media’s duties to democracy” as follows: “1. most important, to act as a watchdog against the state; 2. to supply accurate and sufficient information; 3. to represent the people in the sense of adequately reflecting the spectrum of public opinion and political competition”. However, as O’Neil (1998: 2) argued, “How effectively the media achieve such tasks in modern liberal democracies is open to questions. Some argue that the media have moved away from their watchdog role, choosing to form close ties with political elites and thus limiting the degree of critical analysis within the news. Others … have further developed this argument by pointing to the strong connection between the media and market forces”. For example, Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston (2007) argue that the American press have failed to fulfil their tasks as watchdog of the government, and that there has been insufficient public scrutiny of government policy and actions. Patterson (2000) also criticised the commercialisation of the American press, which has led to its low contribution to the country’s freedom. However, McLeod (2000) is optimistic about the operation of the news media in fulfilling the duties of democracy. He believes that the news media and the public should not blame each other for the existing problems; instead, more regulation should be provided for journalists to follow. In the research of the media responses to British national ID cards in the past one hundred years, it is critical to find out to what extent the British national newspapers have functioned as watchdog or otherwise over the years.

In summary, the development of mass media and the rise of civil society in the 20th century seem to provide an encouraging environment for the realisation of the public sphere. This will be explained further in the next section.
2.1.3 The British National Newspapers as a Public Sphere

The newspaper press is claimed to be the ‘Fourth Estate’ of the realm (Sparks 2000, Scammell and Semetko 2000). According to Curran and Seaton (2003: 4), the press “made a vital contribution to the maturing of Britain’s democracy by becoming more responsible and less partisan”, although Semetko (2000) argued that the British daily press can be more partisan on politics, especially at election time. In addition, as mentioned above, “the mass media have become the chief institutions of the public sphere” (Dahlgren 1996: 7-8). One of the most important functions of the newspaper media is to provide a platform for public debate on varied issues, such as the introduction of a biometric ID card system in Britain. Meanwhile, the importance of an active public debate has already been emphasised by many scholars (Lasch 1995, Street 2001, Higgins 2008). Therefore, it is essential to find out how the British national newspapers act as a medium for public debates, which in turn help to realise the public sphere.

The public sphere in Britain is said to be in crisis, overshadowed and contaminated by tabloidisation, sleaze journalism and spin doctors, all of which adversely affect the quality of political journalism and of democracy itself. These shadows challenge the future of democratic debate in the public sphere. Aeron Davis (2002) in his Public Relations Democracy, studied the resources available to political, economic, and social organisations with regard to media coverage. He found that big corporations have benefited from public relations management by employing former advocates of liberal pluralism and allocating significant resources to PR. Since the big companies can afford the expensive professional spin doctors, they can be included in the visible section, whilst some interest groups and individuals without financial support have little chance of making their names and opinions visible to the public gaze.

However, McNair (2000) argued that, from the late twentieth century, the public benefited from a more accessible and plural political public sphere and the political journalism had become more critical of the elites and started a more thorough reportage of the political process. He carried out a thorough exploration of the political public sphere in modern Britain, categorising the national newspapers according to their political stance, analysing the phenomenon of sleaze journalism, and giving relatively less importance to public relations. Davis, in contrast, looked into the rise of public relations industries and found their impacts
in the public debate and mediated visibility. Anthony Browne (2006), in his humorous way, mocked the ‘political correctness’ and corruption of public debate in modern Britain. He argued that ‘political correctness’, which allows certain groups of people free of criticism from the others, had ruined the democracy in public debate by dominating the morality of ideology. However, Browne’s work does not include any substantial theoretical analysis in explaining the phenomenon of ‘political correctness’; and his argumentation is not supported by any systematic content analysis of the news coverage.

Whether as a result of public relations or of political correctness, it is clear that different groups and individuals achieve different levels of mediated visibility. Sometimes political correctness helps to make the poor and the powerless visible to the public either out of sympathy or for other reasons. In 2007, the resignation of Michael Grade as BBC’s Chairman and his decision to work for ITV made some headlines, and many journalists and academics worried that the last guardian of serious journalism and democratic media had gone. It is reasonable to worry, but alongside the shadow, there is sunshine. Surveillance studies are attracting more attention than ever, and especially in the last decade excellent researchers such as David Lyon, Gary T. Marx and John Torpey have taken the lead. Instead of sharing Habermas’ pessimism, it would be better to commence empirical research on the media’s response to state surveillance in Britain.

To sum up, public debate is a fundamental expression of democracy in civil society. The media representation of surveillance and British national ID card systems can be unbalanced or restrained. A detailed examination of how national newspapers have responded to the repeated introduction and abolition of national ID card systems over the years is required, to see how the public debate has progressed and affected the agenda.

2.2. History of Surveillance Studies

Surveillance raises some of the most prominent social and political questions of our age … [It] has been made to cohere with any number of institutional agendas, including rational governance, risk management, scientific progress and military conquest … Surveillance is a feature of modernity. (Haggerty and Ericson 2006: 3)

The prominence of surveillance in modern society inevitably makes it a popular research topic for academics from many disciplines. With the progress of surveillance studies on, for
example, CCTV cameras and individual identification documentation, many concerns have been voiced over the intensification of surveillance and the impacts on personal freedom and civil liberties. It is the purpose of Section 2.2 to explain what has been achieved by surveillance studies to date, and what has been neglected.

### 2.2.1 The Definition of Surveillance

Surveillance (in French) literally means ‘watching over’. The term tends to evoke somewhat sinister images, smacking of dictators, intelligence agencies and paparazzi, an idea of surveillance that has been “enhanced by novels and films” (Lyon 2007: 139) such as Dan Brown’s *The Digital Fortress* and American TV series *24*. In 2003 the British national newspapers began to question the intensification of surveillance in everyday life, mainly as a result of the introduction of a national biometric ID card system, as well as the proliferation of CCTV cameras in Britain. In order to have a full understanding of what surveillance means, some definitions are listed below.

“Surveillance is close observation, especially of a suspected spy or criminal.”

--- Oxford Dictionary of English

“Surveillance is any form of systematic attention to whether rules are obeyed, to who obeys and who does not, and how those who deviate can be located and sanctioned.”

--- James Rule (1974: 55)

“Surveillance is the systematic investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons.”

--- Roger Clarke (1987: 3)

“Surveillance is any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purpose of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered.”

--- David Lyon (2001a: 2)

The definition given by the Oxford Dictionary of English is the traditional understanding of surveillance; however, although supported by historians such as Edward Higgs, it is not the type of surveillance that will be discussed in the following sections. In Higgs’ work *The
Information State in England (2004b), he regarded surveillance only as watching over individuals to ensure that they do their jobs and pay their taxes. Thus Higgs only paid attention to surveillance over citizens and workers, but not consumers; as surveillance has already spread into commercial businesses, such as the large amount of data stored by TESCO to analyse consumer behaviour. Considering the spread of computer and information technologies, the intensification of institutional practices, and national registration systems all over the world, it is not hard to see the characteristics of modern surveillance in Clarke and Lyon’s (2006) definitions: “purposeful”, “routine”, “systematic”, and “focused” (A Report on the Surveillance Society 2006: 4).

With the falling cost of surveillance technology, the increasing demand for customer service across the market and the wide application of social control and risk management, surveillance becomes so routine and automatic that people can become used to having their credit card usage recorded, to having their faces videotaped hundreds of times a day while walking in the streets, and to swiping cards to enter their offices. It is necessary to warn people of what routine surveillance is and how it works, and to inform them of the danger of walking into a surveillance society. Meanwhile, it is also vital for researchers in surveillance studies to look into the wide-ranging social consequences of intense monitoring practices as well as specific tactics and technologies. While it is easy to understand Higgs’ point in defining surveillance in a narrow way, it is also necessary to specify the kind of surveillance discussed in this chapter – state surveillance generally covers all state practices in monitoring its subjects. Two other kinds of surveillance widely studied before and after 9/11, but not discussed here, are surveillance in the workplace and commercial surveillance of consumers.

The reasons why state surveillance is chosen to be studied here are as follow: First, every walk of society is now under tremendous state surveillance, including taxpayers, pensioners, the disabled, teenagers, Middle-East born Muslims, and particularly illegal immigrants, although according to the British media surveillance has failed to control illegal immigration or to solve related problems such as illegal working. Second, state surveillance is interconnected with surveillance of employees and consumers in the ways they are carried out, the only difference being that the former is more penetrating and forceful: if one forgets to carry a driving licence and is stopped by a policeman, a penalty will be given immediately; however if one forgets a TESCO club card or office key card, the only consequence will be the loss of some club card points or a delay of a few minutes. States, however, have to rely on
the advanced technologies provided by private institutions to act upon their population. The private institutions do not control the entire spectrum of surveillance, but they can sell the technologies and spread the influences to other organisations.

In summary, since surveillance plays an important part in modern society, it demands comprehensive understanding of both particular issues and broad social consequences. Therefore, researchers in surveillance studies must look into each sector of surveillance, and develop a full sense of its wide-ranging social consequences.

2.2.2 Surveillance Studies in Previous Decades

To date surveillance studies have been dedicated to theoretical and empirical researches, in efforts to analyse where surveillance happens, how it evolved, and why. These studies have yielded many theories, some of which view modernity and state surveillance as a product of industrial capitalism (Weber 1992, Rule 1973), while others regard it from the perspective of social structure and cultural revolution (Foucault 1991, Caplan and Torpey 2001). Recently David Lyon’s (2001a, 2001b) theory, which associates the rise of ICT-enabled surveillance with modernity in terms of 19\textsuperscript{th} century developments such as the growth of military organisation, industrial towns and cities and government administration, has prevailed.

For Weber and Rule, the development of capitalism and the growth of bureaucracy in western countries have inevitably led to the intensification of controls in both political and social life (Mommsen 1974, Rule 1973, Beetham 1985). “Max Weber was… convinced that the universal advance of bureaucratic forms of social and political organisations was bound to place the principles of individual liberty and personal creativity in jeopardy” (see Mommsen 1974: xiii), while James Rule’s (1973) work, which examines several administrative systems in the collection, processing and storing of personal details, echoes Weber’s concerns over the intensification of bureaucracy in modern society. As for Foucault, his most influential work *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, published in 1975 (first translated into English in 1977) was acknowledged to be a milestone in surveillance studies. He brilliantly analysed in overwhelming detail the power/knowledge mechanism in western countries (France, Britain, U.S.) and institutions (factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, and prisons). His significant contribution to the field was based upon the comprehensive analysis of
“Panopticism,” a term he borrowed from Jeremy Bentham. From this inspiration, Foucault was able to use the panoptical effect to analyse institutionalised surveillance. However, he was criticised for focusing solely on the panoptical effect while ignoring the synoptical effect, which is interwoven with the fast development of the modern mass media.

The increase in academic research on surveillance during the 1970s can be explained as a response to the introduction of computerisation in the 1960s and to the decades of the ‘Cold War’. Roger Clarke’s *Information Technology and Dataveillance* (1987) explicitly identified the new surveillance technologies, examined their benefits and dangers, and made some policy proposals to keep the application of dataveillance under control. Surveillance, in Clarke’s eyes, existed in two major forms: personal and mass surveillance, where the difference lay in the number of population under surveillance. The major contribution of Clarke’s dataveillance theory is that he tells the full story of how IT technologies work in reality, and identifies the potential dangers. Influenced by J. Rule, Clarke paid special attention to the components of IT development, the emergence of various ‘smart cards’ and identifications, databanks, and the difficulties of carrying out surveillance. Certainly technologies have been vital for surveillance, especially dataveillance. In addition to intensive labour power, dataveillance requires integration of the capture, storage, processing and maintenance of information. Since each government agency has its own databanks, the integration of data centres has become a very challenging job.

Based on the theoretical works of Foucault, Giddens, Weber, Gandy and Marx, and empirical works including Rule and Clarke, Lyon’s *The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society* (1994) added extra weight to surveillance studies through demonstrating how electronically-based communications and information technologies intensify surveillance practices and processes. After the panic regarding dataveillance in the 1980s, the 1990s and the turn of the century saw more researches in small and specific areas such as surveillance in the workplace, surveillance in supermarkets, CCTV cameras and identity documentation. Several very valuable books came to the stage: Lyon’s *Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life* (2001a); John Torpey’s *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (2000); and *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World*, edited by Jane Caplan and John Torpey (2001). Developed from *Electronic Eye*, Lyon’s 2001 work presented an extraordinary scenario of everyday life, from police surveillance to workplace scrutiny, from surveillance of customers
for commercial purposes to body surveillance, from the politics of surveillance to the future of surveillance. Lyon’s international comparisons and his extensive knowledge of computer sciences made his research particularly convincing and influential. In addition to the countless details of surveillance practices, he sought more explanations for the spread of surveillance by looking into body surveillance and the politics of surveillance. Sometimes the answer to a question is easier to find when one takes a few steps back and starts to observe the entire situation. Lyon’s decades of work in postmodern surveillance won him a high reputation in the academic world, but he concentrated only on certain specific areas. In particular, he neglected the role of the media in the development of surveillance.

One area which Lyon certainly did consider was that of individual identification. In Chapter One of his *Surveillance Society*, Lyon (2001a:15) stated that “the rise of surveillance societies has everything to do with disappearing bodies”. Lyon argued that electronic interactions and transactions make bodies disappear because a significant part of our activities (such as online shopping and text messaging) no longer involves physical presence of bodies. This conclusion is based on his examination of the rapid development of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) and their wide use in both public and private life. ICTs are used to track emails and phone calls, to monitor worker’s performance, to check people’s credit and, a major government concern after 9/11, to make invisible activities visible, so that the authorities can identify whom to trust, the companies can decide who has the credit to sign a mobile contract and the employers can know their employee’s performance. However, the concept of the “disappearing body” is suspicious, since it does not make explicit whose body disappeared, when or from where it disappeared, or when it came back.

Ironically, the disappearing bodies that Lyon once documented are back - national ID cards will enable the police, NHS reception staff, bank employees and many other public servants to check a person’s iris, fingerprint, DNA, and other physical characteristics. From 2008 not only ID cards, but also passports and driving licences, have contained the above biometric information. There is an ironic contradiction here, related to the use of ICTs. Take CCTV for example: even where a suspect is recorded on camera, it is still very difficult and time-consuming to locate him/her without massive databases of individual images, and police have to wait for the results of data mining in huge databases, including education records, and criminal and prison records. This is why police departments are determined to buy facial-recognition software to improve the quality of CCTV camera tapes. We should also
remember Roger Clarke (1987)’s warning that technologies can go wrong, especially in the light of the admission by then British Prime Minister Tony Blair that the fingerprints of everyone obtaining identity cards could be checked against nearly a million unsolved crimes, according to *The Times* on 20th Feb 2007.

Lyon (2001b) also studied the impact upon the many of body surveillance, such as Britain’s new biometric ID cards system. As Lyon defines, ‘body surveillance’ refers to the collecting, processing and storing of information regarding human body parts such as fingers, face, eyes, and other biometrics. He considers that the availability of biometric technologies enables the government to carry out direct checking at any time and anywhere. With 4.2 million CCTV cameras, military satellites, biometric identity documents, intelligent software and police, more and more cost and energy have been spent on body surveillance. Traditional ‘trust’ has disappeared, to be replaced by the token of identity. As a matter of fact, Beynon-Davies (2006: 6) also named identification documents such as passport and driving licences as “tokens”. If a person wants to open a bank account, or even to take out a British National Library reader card, he has to present at least two identity documents showing his address. If an overseas student wants to learn to drive in Britain, he has to ask a British citizen who has known him well for more than 3 years to sign the form and then submit it to the DVLA. If a person in Britain wants to take out a mobile phone contract online, the company will do a credit check before signing the contract. Body surveillance can bring benefits in fighting crime, but it can also destroy trust among individuals. But were bodies ever free from surveillance? This is a question that must be set in a broader context to find the answer. Therefore, it is essential to review the history of individual identity documentation.

Documenting individual identity has for many years been closely bound to the development and use of photography, fingerprints, and most recently biometrics. The work of John Torpey, Jane Caplan, Jon Agar and Christian Parenti all demonstrate that documenting individual identity played an important role in the development of modernity and modern citizenship. It is the modern state’s will to know who you are and what you are by recording the face, fingerprints, DNA and iris; and during capitalisation many economic interest groups began to routinely collect information from customers with the intention of increasing their own profits. Communication technologies such as satellite, CCTV and the Internet enabled nation-states to improve their abilities of body surveillance; whilst at the same time, those technologies made mass media more influential than ever.
Edward Higgs’ exhaustive work *The Information State in England* (2004b) used the example of the Domesday Book, a ‘one-off’ information gathering about properties held by the elite, to argue that information collecting happened long before state surveillance. In his opinion, information gathering can be used to a much greater extent than surveillance; and he examines a national ID card system from the perspective of, the possible benefits it can provide to the public services. Higgs’s great historical research reveals that the U.K. has always been an information state, although the nature of the state has changed markedly over the last five centuries. However, although making a great contribution in terms of historical discovery, Higgs’s theory of surveillance is limited to surveillance of individuals, and he narrowed the definition of surveillance to “watching identifiable individuals to ensure that they do something, or more frequently that they do not do something” (2004b: 11). As mentioned above, the definition of surveillance is vital to understanding today’s surveillance society.

Hewitt (2008)’s work on the history of Canadian passports from 1933 to 1973 also demonstrated that the historic debates about passport security had relevance to the present discussion over biometric identity cards; therefore by studying the historic debates, it would help to understand and analyse the current debates over identity cards.

It should be noted that ‘optimism’ is to be found less often in surveillance studies than ‘pessimism’. In the latter category John Torpey’s *The Invention of the Passport* is one of the most prominent works in the field of surveillance and state practices, along with David Lyon’s *Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life* and Christian Parenti’s *The Soft Cage: Surveillance in America from Slavery to the War on Terror*. While each has its own research area, all successfully build a chilling scenario of routine monitoring of individual movements, activities, and adhering a person’s past to his present, which Lyon believes can change a person’s life chances. Higgs’s perspective on surveillance is not capable of explaining those widespread impacts which, intended or not, can be dangerous and unfair. Yet although these authors used different definitions of surveillance definitions, all recognised the role of identity documentation in nation-states’ administration. Higgs and Parenti, both historians, held oppositional views, with Higgs placing surveillance in the broad context of bureaucratic administration in modern states, extracting the technologic from surveillance and defining it narrowly as information gathering and close watching over individuals. Yet technology is an inseparable part of surveillance. Without history, surveillance means nothing. Without
technologies, surveillance leaves no marks in history.

As mentioned above, academics from different disciplines (criminology, sociology, political science, geopolitics, communication studies and government agencies) have begun to work together to push surveillance studies to a new and higher level. A recent collection of essays, *Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity*, edited by Elia Zureik and Mark B. Salter (2005) emphasised the importance of studying in more depth the new dynamics of global policing and surveillance, and the demand for multi-disciplinary efforts in studying identity cards and passports. In his contribution to the book, Lyon focused on the British ID cards system and raised some questions for the future study of identity cards, for example, “How far are citizens involved in this process, and at what level?” “How accountable are the managers of these massive new systems on which the life-chances of so many are dependant?” (2005:80). Since, as Lyon noted, “the border is everywhere”, answers to these questions are urgently needed. This book contributed greatly to providing new directions for study among researchers in surveillance and identity documents studies. Sometimes asking good questions is more important than providing the answers. Morgan and Pritchard (2005) also analysed the surveillance panoptic effect in tourism, specifically in tourism industry – social sorting. Their work echoed Lyon (2002, 2004a)’s concern over the ‘social sorting’ that becomes so routine and automatic in our everyday life. In fact, Gandy (1993: 1) defines such “discriminatory process” as “panoptic sort”, which includes process “that sorts individuals on the basis of their estimated value or worth” and “reaches into every aspect of individuals lives in their roles as citizens, employers and consumers”. As Gandy (1993; 15) further argues, “the panoptic sort is a system of disciplinary surveillance” and involves three process: “identification, classification, and assessment”. Take the British national identity card system in WWI for example, the first step was the compilation of a national registration, which covered UK population between the age of 15 and 65, which can be taken as ‘identification’ process; the second step was to sort the registered individuals into different groups – those who were eligible for military conscription, those who were skilful in engineering and manufacturing, those who were ‘suspicious’, and etc; finally, the ‘assessment’ process enabled the British government to organise and distribute human resources to various areas in order to achieve maximum effect in winning the war.

In summary, from Foucault’s ‘panopticism’ to Lyon’s ‘surveillance society’, researchers have exerted great efforts to explaining surveillance systems and practices at different levels. The
intended and unintended consequences of ICTs and the events of 9/11 have also attracted academic interest, combining surveillance studies with media studies, where visibility became the key word. However, the response of the mass media to the intensification of surveillance is rarely mentioned in surveillance studies.

2.2.3 What Surveillance Studies have Neglected – Public Debate

When discussing what needs to be done in surveillance studies, David Lyon (2007: 195) emphasised the importance of a “serious surveillance debate” – a public debate on surveillance, especially with regard to civil liberty, social justice and information protection. As mentioned in section 2.1, such debate involves the public sphere and mass media. What surveillance studies have hitherto neglected to do is to examine how the public sphere/mass media have responded to the intensification of state surveillance over the years – what has been discussed, by whom, and how; and the role played by the print media in generating support or opposition to surveillance. Mass media, such as national newspapers, have played an important part in everyday life, either as watchdog of the government or as provider of information and entertainment. As early as 1915 a controversial scheme for a national identity card system attracted a lot of media coverage, when the first-ever British national register and accompanying identity card system was introduced for war emergencies use. By studying the public debate and public opinion on the repeated introduction and abolition of British national identity card systems, surveillance researchers can gain a better understanding of who is promoting ID cards to the public, who is resisting them and, most importantly, how. Finally, such a study will help to promote the “serious surveillance debate” that Lyon urges.

Many books have been published to illustrate or condemn the inevitable surveillance of not only criminals or illegal immigrants, but also ordinary citizens. It would be beyond the capacity of this section to review every work. Instead, the aim is to discuss a few that have discussed something new, something that the previous surveillance studies marginalised – the role of mass media in surveillance studies.

The first important work discussed here is Christian Parenti’s *The Soft Cage: Surveillance in America from Slavery to the War on Terror*, published in 2003. Unlike Lyon, who has a strong background in information sciences, Parenti is a historian and journalist. His portrait
of the relentless intrusion of privacy and the expansion of routine surveillance in the U.S. gave every citizen who cherishes his/her privacy a compelling lesson. This work is important in surveillance studies not because it is superior to Lyon’s works, but because of the author himself. As a historian and journalist whose expertise lies in surveillance history rather than in surveillance systems or techniques, his voice stood for the spread of awareness about intense surveillance beyond computer and information science to other disciplines. While many previous researchers in surveillance studies knew more about how CCTV cameras worked than how the mass media worked, Parenti’s engagement in journalism has equipped him with sensitivity regarding ethics, the public sphere and culture when doing surveillance studies. Thus he pointed out that “[in the 1990s] British media was gripped by a moral panic that fixated on the double threat of crime and terrorism….and all of this helped cast video surveillance as the public safety tool” (2003: 114, 115). Parenti’s observation echoes Norris and Armstrong’s (1999) work on the intensification of CCTV cameras in the U.K. in the 1990s, in which they concluded that the British media actually helped the introduction of CCTV cameras, without hindering or even challenging the government’s proposal. However, Norris and Armstrong did not employ any systematic methods, such as content analysis, discourse analysis or frame analysis to analyse news and television programmes. Therefore, the media representation of surveillance is never properly and methodologically analysed in their work.

Parenti and Norris and Armstrong are among only a very small number of academics to have brought the role of media into surveillance studies. Another fine example is Jon Agar, who in his Modern Horrors: British Identity and Identity Cards (2001), combined media reactions with surveillance studies. Agar mentioned many then-powerful newspapers (both national and local) in his analysis of the birth and abolition of the first two national ID card systems in Britain. However, in common with Norris and Armstrong’s work, he does not provide any systematic and methodological analysis of media representation of British ID cards. There is no content analysis, discourse analysis or frame analysis to establish a full-range examination of who said what and why.

Lina Malokotos-Liederman (2007) examined the public debates of Greek identity cards by analysing the press coverage on Greek national daily press. However, his analysis of press content didn't involve systematic content analysis and frame analysis.
The most important work in this field is a collection containing 15 papers from the top scholars in surveillance studies. In *The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility* (2006), scholars attempt to find answers to the question posed by Lyon (2006: 41): “Do people know how today’s surveillance works?” Lyon admitted that this was “a vital research question to which we as yet have few answers” (2006:41). At the end of the book, Gandy (2006:379) again emphasised that: “It seems unreasonable to expect that those who use these techniques will be the best sources of public awareness of the consequences of their use. Therefore it will be particularly for journalists, scholars, and advocates of informed choice to be able to convey a sense of the array of individual and collective risks that flow from the use of data-mining and other discriminatory techniques.” The neglect of the public debate and public opinion in the past surveillance literature makes one wonder more about the role of mass media in the intensification of state surveillance; specifically, to what extent did the British media support or oppose the ID card system over time? Finally, does their attitude matter?

In summary, past surveillance studies have marginalised the role of the mass media in the development of surveillance. Recently however, academics from across the disciplines have taken the opportunity to search for answers. For example, Lyon and Gandy are very alert to the limited awareness of intrusive surveillance among the public. Thus the question remaining is – How can surveillance researchers inform the public of today’s state surveillance which penetrates and melts into our daily lives, and to what extent do the mass media help in making surveillance visible?

2.3. When Surveillance Met the Mass Media

2.3.1 From Panopticon to Synopticon and Omnipoticon

Everyone locked up in his cage, everyone at his window, answering to his name and showing himself when asked --- it is the great review of the living and the dead. (Michael Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 1991:196)

This is part of Foucault’s description of panopticon, which was originally developed by Jeremy Bentham in 1791. For Foucault (1991: 197), panopticon is “a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism” which allows continuous observation of individuals who are expected to compliant with the system. Panopticon represents control, discipline and the
power of observation. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault first described a dramatic and terrifying public execution in Paris in 1757 - a spectacle of the sovereign’s exercise of power. The execution was shockingly brutal to watch but attracted large crowds. It was one aspect of a regime in which the few were made visible to the many, and in which the visibility of the few was used as a means of exercising power over the many (Foucault 1991). It was not until the early nineteenth century that such physical punishment gradually began to disappear. However, new forms of punishment emerged, as illustrated so vividly in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s novel *The Scarlet Letter*, in which an adulteress woman had to wear a scarlet letter on her clothes every day of her life, making herself a living warning to others. This cruel mental torture was authority’s revenge, punishing the ‘criminal’ in order to strengthen the glory of king and religion.

Foucault is brilliant in describing the differences between the old public executions and today’s justice system, but in John Thompson’s opinion, regarding panopticon as a general model of exercising power in modern society is less convincing. Thompson (1995: 134) argued that “there are some organisations in modern societies which rely on methods of surveillance … but also some other agencies of the state and some private organisations which are concerned with the routine gathering of information”. He went on to state that “it would be quite misleading to focus our attention exclusively on activities of surveillance while neglecting the new forms of publicness created by the media” (1995: 134). The reason why Thompson disagreed with Foucault’s explanation of panopticon lies in their differing perspectives on studying visibility and power. Thompson paid much more attention than Foucault to the role of communication media in visibility. Certainly, it is understandable that Foucault did not consider the role of communication media in early modern France, since the public and the private were still separated. In Thompson’s time, it is much easier to take media and modernity into consideration.

Thompson is not the only sociologist to have found the flaws in Foucault’s theory of panopticon. Thomas Mathiesen (1997: 215) also argued that “Foucault contributes in an important way to our understanding of and sensitivity regarding modern surveillance systems and practices…but that he overlooks an opposite process of great significance which has occurred simultaneously and at an equally accelerated rate: the mass media, and especially the television, which today bring the many – literally hundreds of millions of people at the same time – with great force to see and admire the few.” This process is named synopticon by
Mathiesen. It represents the situation when a large number of individuals observe on something in common that is condensed. To Foucault, panopticism represents a fundamental transformation from the situation where the many see the few (the public execution) to the situation where the few see the many (panopticon). But for Mathiesen, the form of mass media fulfilled the task of modern synopticon in viewer society.

According to Mathiesen, although panopticism still functions in some institutions such as police and medical services, it has co-existed with synopticism in modern society since they have developed in intimate interaction, even fusion, with each other. Mathiesen identified a number of institutions that have been simultaneously panoptical and synoptical, for example the Roman Catholic Church, the Inquisition, and the military.

It seems that panopticon and synopticon are not sufficient to emphasise the role of communication media. In his analysis of the New York Times’ Portraits of Grief - representations of those who died in the collapse of the World Trade Centre - Jeffrey Rosen, a professor at George Washington University, proposed the new term ‘omnipticon’ (Rosen 2004:2). He said that “in the age of the Internet, we are experiencing something that might be called the ‘Omnipticon’ in which the many are watching the many, even though no one knows precisely who is watching or being watched at any given time” (2004:2). Rosen questioned the behaviour of exposing privacy in routine life and especially online activities. His theory of ‘omnipticon’, which was based on interactive online activities, was greatly criticised by Mathiesen’s arguments that the Internet and the Web are hardly for ‘anyone’, and that capital increasingly sees the Internet as a source of profit, so that economic and political control of the Internet is currently becoming an issue.

If Foucault’s fault lies in his neglecting the growing role of communication media, then Mathiesen and Rosen’s flaws lie in their focus on the role of a single medium. Mathiesen only paid attention to television, whilst Rosen was attracted to the new media – the Internet. In some institutions, such as strict church schools, the panopticon model remains very useful for the administration. The essence of panopticon lies in the feeling of being watched every second, even though people in cages cannot see the person watching over them from the central tower. But Foucault believed that the power of visible and concrete rulers was and is fading away. This perspective fits nicely with his view of power in modern society – the visible actors’ power in central institutions of state and society is blurred, indistinct and even unimportant; instead, power is a phenomenon permeating society as invisible micro-power. If
this assumption is true, and if those actors we meet and see in the media are just ornamental figures without power, then it is not necessary to study surveillance from the perspective of media representation and visibility. The power of the ruling class is still represented in the mass media; the eagle and the sun have not disappeared, but are expressed in a different way. In synoptic space, particular news reporters, editors, and commentators who are continuously visible are of particular importance. They not only routinely filter information and shape news production but also have the power to set agenda on news reportage. Murdoch has the Sky media group, which owns the *Sun*, the *Times*, and many television channels; but this economic power does not put the role of visible actors into shadow, which is why the next section will discuss the reappearing bodies in surveillance, and media visibility.

In sum, the fast development of communication media/mass media made academics rethink existing theories of surveillance and visibility. In addition, some new concepts have been developed which criticise the old theories of panopticon and visibility and take the media into account.

### 2.3.2 How Surveillance has been Represented by Mass Media

The success of modern mass communication media has enabled the public to observe events both at home and abroad, both trivial and significant. Princess Diana has been dead for 10 years, but the media and the public are still curious about the myth of the fatal car accident. The Internet has added to this. In the last few years, politicians have been taking advantage of network communication technologies to boost their popularity, and now everyone knows how David Cameron washed the dishes at home. The fact that public figures choose to reveal their private lives to the public eye proves the transformation of visibility in the modern media world.

It has been widely argued by academics that diverse communication media have blurred the division between public and private life (Lyon 2001a, Thompson 1995). Thompson’s explanation of the difference is simple and clear: ‘public’ means ‘open’ or ‘available to the public’; what is public is what is visible or observable; what is private is what is hidden from view. Today, instead of traditional diaries, the web log prevails; it is not surprising to see ordinary people and public figures share very private moments or thoughts via web log or YouTube. Once intimate or private subjects (such as marriage and divorce) have become exposed and exploited by both the mass and non-mass media. In that situation, what is left for
‘public’ matters like surveillance in the media? Two very important reports, *The Identity Project* (2005) and *The Surveillance Society* (2006), both reported on the BBC’s website and free to download, have played an important role in the visibility of surveillance; *The Identity Project* in particular, though partially quoted, was frequently mentioned in newspaper coverage of the ID cards public debate.

“In this new world of mediated visibility, the making visible of actions and events is not just the outcome of leakage in systems of communication and information flow that are increasingly difficult to control; it is also an explicit strategy of individuals who know very well that mediated visibility can be a weapon in the struggles they wage in their day-to-day lives. With the rise of the Internet and other networked media, the capacity to outmanoeuvre one’s opponents is always present” (Thompson 2005: 31, 32). In the public debate of British ID cards, the anti-ID card campaign group No2ID employed the Internet as their communicative platform to spread messages and attract responses. The online interactive communications enabled people from different corners to take part in the public debate, learning the history of surveillance and identity documentation in the U.K. The website has a discussion forum for people to exchange views and sections of campaign news and events with information about the most recent progress; it also tries to win overseas support through the convenience of networking.

Thompson’s (1995) writing on the rise of mediated publicness is very helpful in understanding the visibility that communication media provide for the public. But being visible does not necessarily mean getting attention or deserved debate. Davis (2002) collected evidence of PR resources distribution in government, business, and trade unions, and concluded that the ability to influence norms and values in the new public relations democracy is as uneven as the material distribution of political power and resources themselves. Some interest groups and individuals cannot make their voices heard by the public because they lack resources. However, by using communication media, especially the non-mass media like the Internet, “individuals create new forms of action and interaction which have their own distinctive properties” (Thompson 2005: 32). The success of No2ID in making state practices visible is a good example.

The media’s ability to project powerful images of big events to a mass audience may cause unintended consequences. Taking the reporting of 9/11 as an example, the 24/7 non-stop dramatic visual broadcasting of the horrible scenario (filtered through institutional power
structures and presented in the absence of historical context or political motivation) not only aggravated fear among the public, but also substantially supported the dominant public meaning of the attacks, which was channelled into a political and military response. 9/11 was in itself synoptical in attracting the attention of the whole world to the terror attacks on American soil. The White House and the Pentagon, more usually the surveillance agent, became the viewed in the mass media. Similarly, in the Iraq war the U.S. military, the once-viewer, came to be the viewed by the public through the media reporting. Further examples of the new forms of visibility can easily be found in political scandals, sex scandals and the business world. However, from the 9/11 case, in which threats and horrors visualised through the mass media facilitated demands for more visualising devices to identify suspects, one can begin to imagine the even more visible world in the near future.

This has already been proved in the U.K. According to a BBC News report on 22nd March 2007, MP’s probe ‘surveillance society’: “An author of the report, by a group of academics called the Surveillance Studies Network, said the UK was ‘the most surveilled country’ of all the industrialised Western states. It coincided with a publication by the human rights group Privacy International suggesting Britain is the worst Western democracy at protecting individual privacy.”

Although visibility has many sides – panoptical, synoptical and omniptical (as discussed in the previous paragraphs), it is crucial to understand the new politics of it, especially in surveillance studies. The fundamental role of surveillance is to make subjects visible to certain groups of people. In today’s Western society, sometimes referred to as a “viewer society” (Mathiesen 1997), surveillance systems, technologies and practices have been brought to public scrutiny by decades of surveillance studies carried out by scholars and by the mass media.

2.4. Conclusion

Within the field of surveillance studies there have been substantial researches in theory and practice, in efforts to examine where surveillance happens, how it operates and why. However, to date the role of mass media in the development of surveillance has not been studied in any depth. In particular, the effect of mass media in generating support for or opposition to ID cards has been overlooked in surveillance studies.
In theory, the mass media is widely acknowledged as a ‘Fourth Estate’ and watchdog of the state; therefore, it is their job to ensure that state surveillance is on the media’s radar, so as to protect our freedom and liberty.

In practice, since 1915 there has been heated mediated debate about the repeated introduction and abolition of British national identity cards. The British media has been involved in the history of ID cards by campaigning for or against them. In these circumstances, it is essential to examine to what extent the British mass media support or oppose ID cards, whether they fulfil the role of watchdog, and why.
Chapter 3

Content Analysis and Frame Analysis as Research Methods

3.0 Introduction

In this chapter, it aims to explain how content and frame analysis are implemented in this research for the purpose of identifying actors, themes, arguments and the master frames underlying their argumentation. Content analysis, which seeks to understand messages/data not as a collection of physical events but as symbolic phenomena, is considered to be one of the most important research approaches in social sciences. Its long history can be traced back to the 1600s when the Church was concerned about “the spread of non-religious matters through newspapers” (Krippendorff 1980: 13). Beardsworth (1980: 372) also links the birth of content analysis technique to mass media: “Given the importance of the role allocated to the mass media in general, and to the press in particular, it is hardly surprising that a good deal of attention has been focused, particularly by sociologists, on the content of mass communication.” Not only is content analysis applicable to sociology, it is also widely used in a range of other disciplines, including psychology and political communication.

In contrast to content analysis, frame analysis is a more controversial and relatively new approach for mass media researchers. Frame analysis has mainly been applied over the past two decades, in the understanding of political communication such as social movements. It looks at the dynamics of how people (journalists, politicians, public) rely on experiences and expectations to make sense of everyday life. From Goffman to Gamson and , frame analysis has developed from a sociological-psychological approach to a strategic, systematic and dynamic method used to research on broad issues.

This chapter comprises two main sections: first, it looks at how to use content analysis to assist my research, with a brief review of the theoretical and empirical literature of content analysis; second, it explores how to design a strategic frame analysis alongside content analysis. It is the purpose of this chapter to explain why content analysis and frame analysis have been chosen for this research, and how I designed the methodology.
3.1 Content Analysis

3.1.1 A Brief Review of Content Analysis

In order to study the media representation of British national identity card systems in three periods – WWI, WWII, and 1994 to 2008 – it is critical to analyse the content of the news articles in a scientific way. Content analysis is universally acknowledged as a classic technique for such a purpose.

Definition of Content Analysis

What is meant by the term ‘content analysis’? What characteristics of content analysis make it a multi-disciplinary research technique? Definitions have varied over time, in accordance with developments in theory and practice. The content analysis literature covers a variety of definitions, some of which are general descriptions of the technique, while others identify a specific analytical approach. One of the most influential definitions was from Berelson (1971: 18): “Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.” This concise and useful description “highlights key facts of the method’s origins and concerns” (Deacon et al. 1999: 115). However, Krippendorff (1980: 21) criticises Berelson’s definition as “unclear” and “too restrictive” by using words like “manifest” and “quantitative”. Instead, Krippendorff attempts to be more explicit about the object of content analysis. In his opinion, the nature of content analysis is superior to its specific analytic technique Krippendorff reckons that content analysis aims to provide new insights and increases the researcher’s understanding of his subject, which in turn requires the researcher to be well informed of the knowledge in that particular subject so that he can employ content analytic technique as a tool to find out the answers to his research questions. Otherwise, the researcher will not be able to make sense of the data collected from content analysis. However, content analysis is in its nature a quantitative research tool. In Krippendorff’s (1980: 21) view, content analysis “is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context”. In his prominent work, *Content Analysis: an introduction to its methodology*, Krippendorff (1980: 21) further argues that “as a research technique, content analysis involves specialised procedures for processing scientific data. Like all research techniques, its purpose is to provide knowledge, new insights, a representation of “facts”, and a practical guide to action. It is a tool.”
With the development of content analysis technique and its application to new research questions, Berger (1998: 116) offers a more specific definition: “Content analysis is a research technique that involves measuring something (counting instances of violence; determining percentages of Blacks, women, professional type, or whatever) in a random sampling of some form of communication (such as comics, sitcoms, soap operas, news shows).” Neuendorf (2002: 10) clarifies the definition yet further: “Content analysis is a summarising, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method (including attention to objectivity - intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalisability, replicability, and hypothesis testing) and is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created or presented.”

From the above definitions, it can be seen that despite changes brought about by developments in mechanical issues such as computer text analysis, one persisting tendency is that content analysis has been developed into a systematic technique applicable to a multitude of new social and political problems and different types of materials.

**History of Content Analysis**

As Berelson (1971: 21) states in his *Content Analysis in Communication Research*, “A brief survey of the history of content analysis provides a useful orientation to the field.” Berelson divides the development of content analysis technique into two periods: “early applications (to the 1930s)” and “the renaissance of content analysis” (1971: 22). Krippendorff on the other hand (1980: 13-20) divides the growth of content analysis technique into five specific phases: “quantitative newspaper analysis” (1890s – 1920s); “early content analysis” (1930s); “propaganda analysis” (1940s); “content analysis generalised” (1950s); and “computer text analysis” (late 1950s - 1960s).

All the above techniques are still in use today and are applied to a wider variety of content than ever before. The time range given above only indicates the time when important changes occurred in content analysis history; that is, not the birth and death of each method, but a critical period of its development.

Despite the obvious difference in their division of the history of content analysis, Berelson and Krippendorff agree on the milestones in the technique’s development. It was first used by researchers to study the content of American newspapers in order to identify the trends in mass newsprint; then it became more popular with the growth of war propaganda machines as
well as the emergence of radio and television; more recently it has been employed for commercial applications.

As the original model, quantitative content analysis provides basic guidelines for media researchers to carry out projects from a range of perspectives, including linguistic, thematic, and discursive. For my research, it can reveal information such as the number of editorials and hard news stories. Quantitative content analysis can also summarise the appearance and length of quotation of actors. The technique is designed to give researchers a brief view of news samples in general and in specific; thus its results become the foundation of further complex analysis.

My empirical research also covers the media representation of British national identity cards during WWI and WWII. The first-ever British national ID card system was born in 1915 as an accompanying system to the National Register. Confronted with the war emergencies, most British national newspapers, including The Times, Daily Express, and Daily Telegraph, chose to support the National Register scheme and related policies. The tactics those newspapers employed to promote the Register were, to some extent, propagandistic. Therefore, it is necessary to review the development of propaganda analysis in order to carry out the content analysis of the mediated debate of ID cards during the two World Wars.

In the 1940s, content analysis stepped further towards the centre of attention due to the rapid growth of war propaganda machines. According to Taylor (1990: 12), propaganda is “a deliberate attempt to persuade people, by all available means, to think and behave in a manner desired by the source”. Krippendorff (1980: 16-17) argues that doing a propaganda analysis requires the researchers to understand “the political process involved”, to “relate [messages] to the situation”, and to value both the qualitative and quantitative indicators. After the Second World War, content analysis started to spread to different disciplines, including public media, television, psychology, anthropology and history.

**Uses of Content Analysis**

Content analysis has been applied to a variety of disciplines, with respect to diverse research questions; for that reason it will be beyond the capacity of this section to elaborate all its uses. However, several prevailing classifications of the uses of content analysis are listed below, due to their close links with my own research. Berelson (1971: 26) categorised the uses of
content analysis under three major headings: “characteristics of communication content, the causes of content, and the consequences of content”. Later, Holsti (see Krippendorff 1980: 34) explained Berelson’s theory in a much clearer way: “to describe characteristics of communication – asking what, how, and to whom something is said; to make inferences as to the antecedents of communication – asking why something is said; to make inferences as to the effects of communication – asking with what effects something is said”. In addition, Deacon et al. (1999: 116) demonstrate various applications of content analysis, including “news and current affairs”. The wide range of applications indicates that there is good reason behind the variety of definitions, although its natural domain is communicative and cultural studies.

In my research, I have chosen to carry out a detailed content and framing analysis of all the news items related to British national ID cards systems from several major British national newspapers (for the details, please refer to the Appendix). Not only editorials, but also letters to editors, hard news, feature news, columns, soft news, cartoons and official notices are all sampled for analysis. The reason is to do with my choice of a second method for my research, that of frame analysis, which will be discussed in section 3.2. Frame analysis requires a researcher to look into the dynamics of political communication in order to grasp the shared knowledge of all actors involved in the dialogues. Therefore, it is not enough to use content analysis alone when a researcher looks for more information in a public debate. Before moving on to frame analysis, I will list the detailed steps of a content analysis on the media representation of British national identity cards. First however, there are few rules to be remembered.

3.1.2 Rules of Content Analysis

Despite the diversity of definitions, a broad agreement on the requirement for “objectivity”, “system”, “generality”, and “quantitative” can be identified as the characteristics of content analysis (Holsti 1969: 3-5, Beardsworth 1980: 374).

Objectivity

The main purpose of any scientific investigation is to produce a description or explanation of a phenomenon in a way that avoids any biases of the investigator. Holsti (1969: 3) explains in
great detail what objectivity means in reality, suggesting that every researcher should follow exactly the “formulated rules and procedures” during the research process. For example, in my research, the first and most important step is to make an explicit and complete coding schedule, containing specific instructions regarding “What categories are to be used? How is category A to be distinguished from Category B? What criteria are to be used to decide that a content unit (word, theme, story, and the like) should be placed in one category rather than another?” (Holsti 1969: 3) He concludes by giving a rule to test the objectivity: “Can other analysts, following identical procedures with the same data, arrive at similar conclusions?” (1969: 4) In other words, every step of content analysis research requires very clear definition and instructions.

Though the necessity for objectivity is understandable, as Neuendorf (2002: 11) argues in his definition of “objectivity – intersubjectivity”, “There is no such thing as true objectivity… [Because] ‘Knowledge’ and ‘facts’ are what are socially agreed on.” Hence he refers to another standard named ‘intersubjectivity’, which asks the question “Do we agree it is true?” instead of “Is it true?” Whichever definition is used, objectivity or intersubjectivity requires high reliability, validity, generalisability, and replicability in a content analysis research. This criterion is the foundation when composing a coding frame. For example, when categorising the news, the definitions of hard news, soft news, editorials and so on should be listed clearly in the coding frame so that objectivity is assured.

System

Any scientific research must be specific and targeted. This means that, in content analysis, the inclusion and exclusion of content or categories is done according to consistently applied rules. It also implies that categories are defined in a manner which permits them to be used according to consistently applied rules. However, to be systematic is different from being a good content analysis, because that also requires theoretical relevance.

Generality

Generality provides the theoretical relevance to the findings. Holtsi (1969: 5) argues that “purely descriptive information about content, unrelated to other attributes of documents or to the characteristics of the sender or recipient of the message, is of little value”. He points out that “all content analysis is concerned with comparison, the type of comparison being dictated by the investigator’s theory”.
Quantitative

The goal of any quantitative research is to provide counts of key categories, and measurements of the amounts of other variables. In either case it is a numerical process. Krippendorff (1980: 23) argues that “intuitively, content analysis can be characterised as a method of inquiry into symbolic meaning of messages… Messages and symbolic communications generally are about phenomena other than those directly observed.”

Holsti (1969: 5) proposes two questions over the quantity-quality issue of content analysis: “Must content analysis be quantitative? Must it be limited to the manifest content, or may it be used also to probe for more latent aspects of communication?” Lasswell (see Holsti 1969: 5) once answered the questions by saying that “there is clearly no reason for content analysis unless the question one wants answered is quantitative”. The quantitative characteristic has always been regarded as fundamental to content analysis, both by fans of this technique and by critics. This requirement is also the most debated and researched aspect in content analysis literature.

Early content analysis followed a strict rule that all inferences from content data should be derived solely from the frequency with which symbols or themes appear in the text (Holsti 1969). However, restricting content analysis to a single system of enumeration presents a theoretical and practical problem. By paying attention only to what was ‘present’ in the communicative content, it neglected the advantages of studying what was ‘absent’ from that content. Hays (1969: 58) famously claimed that “the best content analyst is a good conversationalist. In fact, content analysis is an essential part of good conversation.” His speciality in linguistics enabled him to grasp the ‘unsaid’ or ‘absent’ part in the content. It is unreasonable to ask that social scientists know every language in the world or be expert in psychology. But the content analyst should always bear in mind that it is better to use qualitative and quantitative methods to supplement each other. Pool (1959: 192) concludes that “it should not be assumed that qualitative methods are insightful and quantitative ones, merely mechanical methods for checking hypotheses. The relationship is a circular one; each provides new insights on which the other can feed.”

To summarise, content analysis is an unobtrusive technique which accepts unstructured material to process symbolic forms, and is compatible with large volumes of data. The success of a content analysis practice requires objectivity, system, generality, and quantitative
3.1.3 How to Do a Content Analysis that Fits my Research

Step 1: Define the Research Concerns

Content analysis is an extremely directive and content-sensitive method; it gives answers to the questions being investigated. Therefore it is of utmost importance to understand the research questions as specifically as possible before designing sampling and coding strategies. As already stated, there are three key periods in my content analysis research: WWI (1915 and 1919), WWII (1939 and 1951) and the current period (Jan 1994 to Aug 2008). By focusing on these three key periods, which witnessed repeated adoption and abolition of ID cards, the research will examine the mediated debate of British national identity card systems by content analysing the press coverage. It is vital to perform a close observation of the press coverage on national ID cards during those three specific periods, identifying the actors involved and the arguments they constructed. The whole content analysis seeks to locate the communication made by actors over time (simply put, who said what and when) as well as the themes that emerged in the mediated debate.

Step 2: Sampling Based on Extensive Reading on the History of British National Identity Cards

A good sampling strategy requires sound background knowledge of the history of British national identity cards, because such background information justifies what content should be examined. Neuendorf (2002: 50, 51) emphasised the importance of “theory and rationale”, suggesting that researchers using content analysis consider “what content will be examined and why” first. The past one hundred years witnessed three official introductions of national identity card systems in Britain (1915, 1939 and 2006), two withdrawals (1919 and 1952), as well as an attempt by the Conservative Government to introduce a new system in 1995. Before commencing the sampling for content analysis, ample background reading is required. Sources of such information include Hansard (available in hardcopy and online) and the university library, which is useful in locating relevant files and books. Both The Times and
Hansard have indexes, which offer a record of when and where British national identity cards were reported in *The Times* and debated in the House of Commons.

There is no standard answer on how to sample or how large the sample should be. In my thesis, the general principle is to sample systematically based on research questions. When there are a few rare and significant incidents on the list of units, the sample will have to be sufficiently large and include the whole population when each sampling unit is unique. Normally the sampling task is carried out following certain procedures:

1) Identify the type of sampling scheme needed for the specific research

2) Define the population of the research

3) Define the sampling unit

4) Consider how much of the population needs to be analysed to construct a credible, representative sample in relation to time and to extent.

For example, when dealing with news content across a longitudinal time-frame, it is necessary to adopt a systematic procedure for establishing both what is relatively constant and what might change across that time-frame. Otherwise, what basis will the researcher have for using words like “often”, “many”, “recurrent”, “seldom”, “few” and “isolated”, when discussing the sample content? Based on the above guidelines, I adhere to the following procedure to decide the sampling of my content analysis.

① Brief Review of the History of British National Identity Card Systems

- 1915 saw the birth of the first British National Register under the emergency of the First World War. Facing the dilemma of whether to make the register compulsory or voluntary, most of the British national newspapers, including *The Times* and *Daily Express*, did not hesitate to rationalise compulsion in the name of defending Britain and securing victory and enduring peace, in a very passionate way, and became the war propaganda machines. However, newspapers such as *The Daily Herald* stood right against the concept of conscription and the peril of the war. Every national newspaper joined the great debate of what to do under the war emergency.

- In 1919 the Local Government Board, which had supervised the National Register in
1915, was abolished and the responsibility for statistics on health, birth and death was passed to the newly founded Ministry of Health, under the Ministry of Health Act 1919. The Ministry of Health took over the functions of the Local Government Board and National Health Insurance administration. The abolition of the Local Government Board announced the termination of the National Registration Act 1915. As noted by Elliot (2008: 14), “The view in Parliament by the end of the war was that it should be terminated as ‘a step to obviate useless expenditure’.”

In 1939, the National Register and ID card system were re-introduced to aid the war emergencies, such as food rationing. The Minister of Health, Walter Elliot, called for the re-introduction of a universal national register, a proposal that was warmly welcomed by national newspapers such as *The Manchester Guardian*. Despite resistance from the Independent Labour Party, the National Registration Act 1939 was passed in July 1939.

In 1951, the significant *Willcock vs. Muckle* case, described by the *Daily Mirror* (26th June 1951: 5) as “a law case considered in legal circles the most important of the century – a case to decide whether a policeman still has the right to demand that an Englishman produces his identity card”, attracted huge press attention from the moment it went to court in December 1950.

From the heavy-weight *Manchester Guardian* to the mass-circulation *Daily Mirror*, large press coverage was given to this case, not only because many Lord Justices attended it, but also because of the public interest in discussing whether national ID cards were still necessary and legitimate in peace time, especially when the King had declared on 8th Oct, 1950 that the ‘emergency’ was over. Under such complex circumstances, *Willcock vs. Muckle* became a hot topic for public debate and newspaper coverage.

Agar (2001: 110) devoted one and a half pages to studying *Willcock vs. Muckle*, believing so strongly in its significance that he began by stating that: “when National Registration collapsed in February 1952 following the *Willcock vs. Muckle* decision, British identity cards also ended, much to the frustration of Whitehall”. He added that, “during the Second World War reaction against identity cards was muted, even when, after 1941, police officers routinely asked for cards in ordinary driving incidents. After 1945 the widespread attitude of editorials was that identity cards were a wartime necessity but not acceptable in peacetime Britain…. [Papers] supported local hero Clarence Willcock…”. 
This case won attention not only from the media but also from the academic world. To study the history of British national ID cards, it is important to pay attention to this case. As well as speeding up the abolition of ID cards, it alerted the public to what ID cards really meant for citizens, for police, for everyday life, and for the future.

In 1994, the Conservative Government, led by John Major, published a Green Paper containing proposals for a voluntary ID card system. The proposal was dropped, due partly to a Cabinet split on the policy and partly to the transfer of power from the Tories to Labour in 1997. In 2001, the Labour Government decided to recycle the Conservative proposal for national ID cards, or so-called ‘entitlement cards’, in order to resolve asylum issues. In 2005, the Labour Government introduced the Identity Cards Bill 2005, and it was passed in Parliament in March 2006.

2) Narrow Down the Scope

Since the significance of these moments is assured, the next step is to decide which newspapers to count and what time period to focus on.

For the historical case studies, after checking *The Times* and *Hansard* (House of Commons) indexes for 1915, 1919, 1939 and 1951 (using keywords ‘National Register’/ ‘National Registration’/ ‘Identity Cards’) for the frequency of news coverage in different months, the following limitations were set:

1) May 1915 – September 1915

2) Jan 1919 – Dec 1919

3) Jan 1939 – Dec 1939

4) Jun 1951 – Jul 1951

For the more recent case study, after a Nexis search using the same keywords, the following limitation was set:


Choose the Newspapers

Different British national newspapers have been chosen for the historical case studies and the more recent case study. This is because, first of all, some of the current British national Sunday newspapers did not exist in 1915, 1919, 1939 and 1951. Next, compared with the historical case studies, the more recent case study can take full advantage of modern technology in terms of online newspaper databanks such as Nexis. Many British national newspapers have already digitalised most of their content, and researchers can subscribe to these databanks to download the digital version of the required news items. The historical case studies for 1919 and 1939 were carried out after the three other case studies, by which time newspapers such as *The Times*, *Guardian and Daily Mirror* were available from their digital databanks; hence it was much more efficient to search for news items using digital services rather than going to the Colindale Library in London. Therefore, for the historical case studies of 1919 and 1939, *The Times*, *The Guardian and Daily Mirror* have been chosen as the news sources for content analysis and frame analysis.

**Step 3: News Collecting and Filtering**

The key principle is to be as consistent and systematic in applying the research instruments as possible. Because some of the relevant stories and debates from the above sources were not available online, it was necessary to turn to the British Newspaper Library in Colindale, London. Even where online access is available, one still has to compare the click-to-print stories with the microfilms, in order to gain more accurate information as to layout and illustration. For the case studies of the years 1915 and 1951, four weeks’ work in the British Library Colindale yielded 396 pieces of stories printed out from microfilms, in A3 and A4 formats. It is prohibitively expensive to buy rolls of microfilm and bring them back to Loughborough University Library to read. Instead, the researcher must read the microfilm
patiently, note down the date and page numbers of relevant news, and then print them out. It took an additional two weeks to input the content of the stories to the computer, so as to keep the photocopies as original documents for future use and to facilitate composition of the coding schedule and content analysis with digital files to be available at any time and anywhere.

For the case studies of years 1919 and 1939, access to the online archives of three national newspapers (The Times, Manchester Guardian and Daily Mirror) is available respectively at http://www.ukpressonline.co.uk/ukpressonline/, http://infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/informark/0/1/1/purl=rc6_TTDA?sw_aep=loughuni, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=504&CERT=Q09QVD1SRUpUUFReU9XSW1TVTVVUFRRbVzrVlNQVEk9JkF0aGVuc1VzZXJZD1sYm9zc3h3MiZPcmdJZD0xNjMmQXRoZW5zRmVksUQ9dXJuOm1hY2U6ZWR1e2Vyi5vemcudWs6YXRoZW5zOmZlZGVvYXRpb246dWs%3D.

Access is only available to those who have registered with an online service such as Athens pass. After gaining access the researcher took the following steps: 1). Enter ‘national identity cards’ (as a whole phrase, NOT separately) in the search terms column; 2). Choose ‘anywhere’ among all variables in the next column; 3). Choose ‘OR’ in the next column; 4). Enter ‘national register’ (as a whole phrase, NOT separately) in the search terms column; 5). Choose ‘anywhere’ in the next column; 6). Select ‘date is between …’ in the next column to specify the time range; 7). Enter ‘01-Jan-1939’ and ‘31-Dec-1939’ OR ‘01-Jan-1919’ and ‘31-Dec-1919’; 10). Click ‘search’ to start the search and the results will be displayed in date order.

In addition, it was necessary to filter all news items collected from the online archives, deleting any item that had any of the following characteristics: 1). Irrelevant to British national identity/entitlement cards (for example, some fiction/feature news made passing reference to ‘ID cards’ but did not contain any news or discussion of British national ID/entitlement cards); 2). The same news that appeared twice or more in the search results (thus delete the duplicates).

For the news from 1994 to August 2008, Nexis is a useful resource which saves researchers huge amounts of precious time and money. However, there are limitations to such electronic news databases. Snider and Janda (1998: 5) explained that the drawbacks are caused by “the
common discrepancy between print and electronic version of publications”. Although the Nexis database claims to be full text, it does not contain graphics, captions, tables and inserts; therefore the electronic version of the news is not as complete as the paper one. Snider and Janda (1998: 10-11) also emphasised that due to “retractions”, “corrections”, “multiple editions”, “policy changes”, “syndicated columnists” and “newswires”, the electronic database is not capable of delivering complete and consistent news articles as researchers demand. Deacon (2007) also raised concerns over many methodological issues (such as validity, reliability and time range of news archives) when using Nexis for press content analysis. Without underestimating the value of Lexis-Nexis as “the most widely used digital news archive in social scientific research”, he explained some flaws in this mode of sampling: “the difficulties of capturing complex thematic issues via key words; the problems of addressing the context of news content; the loss of the visual dimensions of news; and the reality that dependence on digital archives limits the historical reach of news analysis” (Deacon 2007: 22). To improve the effectiveness of the Nexis service, he offered several solutions to the above disadvantages: “checking for ‘false positives’ and duplicated items, scanning the titles and periods sampled for any high level omissions in data, and checking items for inconsistent unitisation” (Deacon 2007: 23).

The collection of sampling units for the case study 1994-2008 comprised the following steps. First, search the digital database Nexis as follows: 1). Enter ‘national identity cards’ (as a whole phrase, NOT separately) in the search terms column; 2). Choose ‘anywhere’ among all variables in the next column; 3). Choose ‘OR’ in the next column; 4). Enter ‘entitlement cards’ (as a whole phrase, NOT separately) in the search terms column; 5). Choose ‘anywhere’ in the next column; 6). Click ‘UK National Newspapers’ in the next column; 7). Manually select the chosen 11 national newspapers displayed in the next column; 8). Select ‘date is between …’ in the next column to specify the time range; 9). Enter ‘01-Jan-1994’ and ‘01-Aug-2008’; 10). Click ‘search’ to start the search and the results will be displayed in date order.

The following illustration is displayed to support the above guidance.
Second, after downloading all the news items generated by the Nexis search engine, it is necessary to go back to the last search by clicking ‘edit the search’, and then modify ONLY one search criterion by selecting one newspaper each time without changing the other criteria, in order to find out whether Nexis has provided all the data required for each newspaper in the time range. By selecting only one newspaper each time, without changing other search criteria, the Nexis database can reveal the oldest date of news it stores; note down all the oldest dates of available news of all 17 national newspapers, as shown in the following table.
Third, visit the British Library website to find out where it stores the required data that Nexis
can not offer. Some of the missing data can be located in the British Library (St Pancras) in
some exclusive-to-British Library data banks such as Newsbank, and the rest are stored in the
Newspaper Library in Colindale in the form of microfilm. After trips to the British Library
and the Newspaper Library in Colindale, combined with the Nexis news database, the
complete data were collected.

Fourth, filter through all news items collected from Nexis and the British Library, deleting
any news item that have any of the following characteristics: 1). Irrelevant to British national
identity/entitlement cards (for example, some fiction/feature news mentioned ‘ID cards’ once
or twice but did not contain any news or discussion of British national ID/entitlement cards);
2). The same news that appeared twice or more in the Nexis search results (thus delete the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Available date in Nexis database</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Times &amp; Sunday Times</td>
<td>01-01-1994 to 01-08-2008, complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail &amp; Mail on Sunday</td>
<td>01-01-1994 to 01-08-2008, complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror &amp; Sunday Mirror</td>
<td>01-01-1996 to 01-08-2008, 1994 &amp; 1995 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph &amp; Sunday Telegraph</td>
<td>01-01-2001 to 01-08-2008, 1994-2000 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Express &amp; Sunday Express</td>
<td>01-01-2000 to 01-08-2008, 1994-1999 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>01-01-1994 to 01-08-2008, complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent &amp; Independent on Sunday</td>
<td>01-01-1994 to 01-08-2008, complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sun</td>
<td>01-01-2000 to 01-08-2008, 1994-1999 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News of the World</td>
<td>01-01-2001 to 01-08-2008, 1994-2000 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Observer</td>
<td>01-01-1994 to 01-08-2008, complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>01-01-1994 to 01-08-2008, complete</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1 Available data in Nexis database
These steps are extremely time-consuming. Therefore, the so-called high efficiency of computer content analysis is as limited as manual analysis, albeit in different aspects. In addition, the “empiricism” that Beardsworth (1980: 390) once warned of can easily be encouraged by online data mining techniques such as key word searching in Nexis. Thus, it is vital to take note of the methodological problems in using Nexis for press content analysis. It is much better to take enough time to compare the results found in Nexis with the numerous newspaper stacks in order to achieve an accurate sampling before any data analysis.

The following tables present the number of news items collected for the case studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Times and Sunday Times</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Express</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Guardian</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Herald</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News of the World</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Observer</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>341</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2 The Number of News Items (for case study of 1915)
### Table 3.3 The Number of News Items (for case study of 1939)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Times and Sunday Times</td>
<td>19 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Guardian</td>
<td>23 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>19 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>61 items</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.4 The Number of News Items (for case study of 1951)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Times and Sunday Times</td>
<td>14 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>5 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>4 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>7 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Express</td>
<td>8 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Guardian</td>
<td>10 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Herald</td>
<td>7 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>55 items</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Number of Items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times and Sunday Times</td>
<td>182 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>125 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail on Sunday</td>
<td>24 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>54 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Mirror</td>
<td>5 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>219 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Telegraph</td>
<td>25 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Express</td>
<td>90 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday Express</td>
<td>26 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>225 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>118 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent on Sunday</td>
<td>20 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sun</td>
<td>52 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News of the World</td>
<td>13 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Observer</td>
<td>37 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>10 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,225 items</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5 The Number of News Items (for case study of 1994 – 2008)
**Step 4: Deciding what to count**

What is counted should always be determined by the research objectives. There are no specific criteria, but it is necessary to consider as many details as possible in order to code the contents. The researcher should break the content down into single components, and then sort them into different categories. My method was to read as many news items as possible in a one-week period (a total of 512 news items chosen randomly from all sampling units), thus enhancing my familiarity with the news coverage of British national identity cards and enabling me, to a certain extent, to know what the mediated debate of British national identity cards is about. After the news reading, it is very helpful to refer to some of the content analysis practices made by other researchers for inspiration. Good time management and a well-researched content analysis plan are critical to a thesis. Therefore it is always worth reading some valuable content analysis cases before designing one’s own. In my research, the main categories to be considered include themes, actors, and quotations.

**Step 5: Deciding on qualifying criteria**

The task of deciding on qualifying criteria requires the researcher to identify systematically which sample units fall within the remit of research. It is necessary to make careful decisions from the outset, and stick to them firmly and consistently. The criteria will be presented together with the coding frame in the next step – designing a coding frame.

**Step 6: Designing a Coding Frame**

A complete coding frame comprises two parts: coding schedule and coding manual. The purpose of making a content analysis coding schedule/frame is to have a quantitative view of the news – who got to talk; what he/she said; how many times he/she appeared and when he/she appeared; how he/she was presented in the news.

A coding schedule is supposed to be accurate, concise, objective, and targeted. Its details mainly depend on the research question. Different research questions require different coding schedules. It is one of the most important steps in content analysis, because while content analysis software can reduce the time needed for data analysis, making the coding schedule is still labour intensive.

To ensure the integrity of the coding process, a separate coding schedule is required for each period – 1915/1919, 1939/1951, and 1994 to 2008. Some of the basics contained in each coding schedule, plus the qualifying criteria, are as follow:
1. Newspaper Title (as indicated in each item)

2. Type of Newspaper (1. Popular Tabloid; 2. Mid-market Tabloid; 3. Quality Newspaper)

3. Date-Month-Year (publishing date of the item)

4. Location of the Item (page number of the item)

5. Headline of the Item

6. Name of the Author of the Item (including journalists, readers, columnists and other individuals whose names appear in the by-line).

7. Type of Item.

Under this category, the sub-categories are: 1. Parliamentary Report (the reporting of events in Parliament, such as legislation procedure and quotations from M.Ps); 2. Editorials (this type intends to demonstrate “the institutional voice of the newspaper” [Keeble 2001: 96] on current affairs and usually has no by-line); 3. Hard News (“the reporting of issues or events in the past or about to happen. It is largely based on selected details and quotations in direct or indirect speech. Hard news begins with the most striking details and thereafter information progressively declines in importance. Some background details may be needed to make the news intelligible but description, analysis, comment and the subjective ‘I’ of the reporter are either excluded or included only briefly” [Keeble 2001: 95]. In short, it is mainly “conveying the information” [Keeble 2001: 95]); 4. Soft News (“the news element is still strong and prominent at or near the opening but is treated in a lighter way. Largely based on factual detail and quotations, the writing is more flexible and there is likely to be more description and comment. The tone, established in the intro section, might be witty or ironic. It is more an entertainment genre” [Keeble 2001: 95]); 5. News Feature (“usually longer than a straight news story. The news angle is prominent though not necessarily in the opening section and quotations are again important. It can contain description, comment, analysis, background historical detail, eye-witnessing reporting and wider or deeper coverage of the issues and range of sources” [Keeble 2001:95]); 6. Opinion Pieces (“emphasis on the
journalist conveying their views and experience, usually in an idiosyncratic, colourful, controversial fashion. Usually known as columnists” [Keeble 2001:96]); 7. Reader’s Letters; 8. Others

8. Size of the Item (in number of words)

9. Use of Pictures in the Item (Yes/No)

10. Number of Pictures (if Yes to 9)

11. Content of Pictures (see Appendix for detailed codes)

12. Themes appearing in the Items (see Appendix for detailed codes)

From the perspective of my research, a theme is the subject/topic of a debate. Theme analysis, as Beardsworth (1980: 375) explains, “does not rely on the use of specific words as basic content elements, but relies upon the coder to recognise certain themes or ideas in the text, and then to allocate these to predetermined categories”. A theme is to be distinguished from the broad research topic, and does not include trivial issues in a debate. It ought to be neutral and concise. For example, an opposition party member interviewed by a journalist on the question of whether to adopt British national ID cards insists that it should be dropped due to the extremely high cost, and the money spent instead on equipping the police force. Here, the theme is cost. Cost is the focus of the argument; it is also neutral and concise. The word ‘cost’ might not actually appear in the news, but it can be generated by examining the arguments carefully. After identifying a theme, the next step is to measure it. Because content analysis is quantitative in its nature, themes ought to be measured quantitatively. In my research, a subject/topic can only be counted as a theme when the argument around it is at least one third of the total size (in words) of that item.

13. Actor Codes (see Appendix for sub-categories and detailed codes)

Any person or organisation or government department referred to or quoted in one sentence or more, or mentioned manifestly in a single item is regarded as an actor.

14. Gender of the Actor (1. Male; 2. Female; 3. Unknown)
15. How the Actors Appear (see Appendix for detailed codes)

16. Length of Quotation (direct and partial quotations counted in number of words)

**Step 7: Data Collecting**

When the coding schedule is compiled and tested, the next step is to make a card for each piece of news, and segment the news into variables and values. Nowadays the development of content analysis software offers much convenience to social sciences researchers. However, considering the moderate scale of the sample, and because my research aim is to find out the arguments of all actors and how the arguments and frames changed over time, I employ manual analysis instead of the WORD system and SPSS. Manual analysis enables me to be more familiar with each actor’s argument in different items; it also ensures that all data are collected and categorised accordingly.

Generally speaking, content analysis requires the researcher to list all explicit research questions, and then design a research plan that includes sampling, data collecting, categorising, data processing and the classes of inference which may be drawn from the data. Holsti (1969: 26) designed a sophisticated content analysis research table, which instructs investigators to look into the following areas: 1). What has been communicated over time (who said what)? 2). How are the messages delivered? 3). To whom are the messages delivered? 4). What is the effect of the communication?

At the analysis stage there are some principles to follow, without which the analysis will be meaningless. First, a cluster of data can be interpreted from many perspectives, depending on the researchers themselves and their research questions. It is only necessary to explore the data based on the questions, rather than the data themselves. Second, the data can mean anything or nothing when context is missing from the analysis. Therefore, the analysis can only make sense when the historical background is added in.

There are two practical tools that can ensure efficient and accurate data collection – electronic coding cards (using Microsoft Word) and Excel software. A sample electronic coding card is shown below:
Table 3.6 Sample electronic coding card

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Title</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Newspaper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date-Month-Year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Item</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporter/Author</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Item</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Pictures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Pictures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content of Picture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Actors Appear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Quotation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The advantage of using electronic coding cards is that they are more flexible than traditional paper coding cards. Electronic coding cards allow the coder to modify the data at any time, create a searchable and duplicable databank, are money-saving and friendly to the environment. Excel allows the coder to carry out some basic statistical analysis of the data stored in electronic coding cards.

Data collecting is not only as time-consuming as making the coding schedule, but also requires a high level of concentration. In my experience, it is always useful to have a hard copy of the coding schedule on hand, reminding me of every definition and qualifying criterion in the coding schedule. Data collecting can also be very complicated and extremely time-consuming during the frame analysis stage, even when the coder has on hand a comprehensive list of key words/phrases.
**Step 8: Analysing results**

Krippendorff (1980) maintained that the data/statistics derived from coding should be placed within certain context for further interpretation/analysis in order to generate new insights to the understanding of the research topic. At this stage, the analysing process should be centred on the research questions. In my case, the focus is on themes, actors and their arguments, which requires me to be well equipped with knowledge in the history of world wars, British politics, history of British national press, and etc. Researchers are expected to be able to explain their findings within certain context, explaining what the statistics meant and their relation to the research questions. It is important that the researchers can make full use of the data and analyse them in a rich, contextual way.

**3.1.4 Summary**

Content analysis, after decades of growth, is now a major empirical methodology employed by many social scientific researchers. Its attractions include accuracy, depth and width of knowledge. When employing it as a research method in this thesis, the first priority is to ensure that it is capable of answering the research questions; then it is necessary to check the validity and reliability of the procedures, and finally the time management of its operation and its effectiveness.

Content analysis is a circular methodology; that is, the procedures described above are not in a fixed order all the time. Furthermore, even if all the procedures have been executed properly and carefully, it might be necessary to go back to step 1 or step 3 to improve or modify some details. Or it might be that when imputing the photocopies of microfilms into Word format, the researcher notices that a part of the news is illegible and has to return to Colindale Library to resolve the problem. Such improvement is always time-consuming and costs money. Therefore, it is necessary to manage both time and finance during the content analysis work. Good time management and great patience will pay the researcher back in the end.
3.2 Frame Analysis

Deacon et al (2007: 165) comment that, “framing analysis may at present be less developed in terms of the clear methodological steps it provides the media analyst, but when used in combination with other analytical methods, it does possess considerable value”. Therefore, it is the intention of this section to explain why frame analysis is chosen to be used in combination with content analysis, in order to produce another interpretation of the news content. Frame analysis, though not yet as prevalent as content analysis, has been growing increasingly strategic and systematic since it first originated in North America. More explanation about this relatively new methodology is given in the following sub-sections.

3.2.1 A Brief Review of the Development of Frame Analysis

Goffman and the Origin of Frame Analysis

Sociologist Erving Goffman (1974) is often considered to have been the first to introduce framing analysis as a methodology and a perspective to examine everyday communication. He suggested that every culture produces two types of primary frameworks: natural and social. In his (1974: 24, 27) Frame Analysis, he argues that “we tend to perceive events in terms of primary frameworks, and the type of framework we employ provides a way of describing the event to which it is applied … [and] primary frameworks of a particular social group constitute a central element of its culture, especially insofar as understandings emerge concerning principal classes of schemata, the relations of these classes to one another, and the sum total of forces and agents that these interpretive designs acknowledge to be loose in the world”. Goffman’s studies, in sum, defined ‘framing’ as a dynamic process through which societies and individuals reproduce meaning. In a later book, Gender Advertisements (1979), Goffman applied his theory of frames to the study of gender, concluding that a system of gender stereotypes pervades Western cultures. The advertising industry reinforces these stereotypes by incorporating them into the images which people experience in their daily lives. Goffman claims that these stereotypes in turn frame the way people envision masculinity and femininity, and therefore, to some extent, frame each person’s sense of identity.
Although Goffman’s studies are considered to be ‘imperfect’ and ‘out-of-date’ and accused of being ‘inconsistent’ and ‘unsystematic’, I find his ideas very inspiring in studying the mediated debate of British national ID cards in the past 100 years. For example, it is interesting to note that frames such as “national security comes first” are embedded in the pro-ID cards campaigns; whilst anti-ID cards campaigns always emphasise that “civil liberty and privacy come first”. This leads to questions around where such frames were employed and how they evolved over time. Many claim that Goffman is today cited mainly for symbolic reasons, as current analytic work has little in common with his original Frame Analysis; but I find his work very helpful in the understanding of how frames mediate our everyday life.

Though ‘imperfect’, Goffman’s theory of framing helps with the studies not only of gender, but also of social movements. A number of scholars dedicated to the development of social movements, for example Snow and Benford, have applied Goffman’s work as a foundation for composing a systematic frame which can help to explain the successes and failures of social movements. Those studies are not related to my research, and thus no further introduction is given to them here. However, there is one researcher who, from the 1990s, has affected the development and enriched the theory of frame analysis a great deal. That researcher, William Gamson, is discussed next.

**Gamson’s Theory of Frames**

William Gamson tried, in the 1990s, to resolve the problems that Goffman left behind - how people think about public issues and how social movements might appeal to non-activated people (individuals that are not engaged in such social movements). He argued that people think and communicate through images (rather than facts and information), which act both as reproductions and as “a mental picture of something not real or present” (Gamson et al. 1992: 374). He also notes that different people hold different opinions and reach different conclusions over images. Cultures do not assign fixed meanings to images; instead, people negotiate the image meanings. This is a very important argument in Gamson’s work, because before Gamson, most frame analysis scholars took it for granted that frames are shared by a group of people consistently. It was Gamson who broke this assumption and brought new insights into frame analysis.

Gamson also argued that social movements employ three kinds of frames: “aggregate frames”;
“consensus frames”; and “collective action frames” (Gamson 1992, 1995). Aggregate frames define issues like social problems, and assign responsibility to people who hear the message of the frame to take action about the problem as individuals. Consensus frames define a social problem as one which can only be resolved by collective action. Consensus frames construct a powerful sense of identity for the people who will act collectively, but leave the identity of the party or parties responsible for causing the problem indistinct. Collective action frames, on the other hand, define a problem as intrinsically wrong and as caused by an identifiable actor; they also establish an adversarial relationship between members of a social movement who can resolve the problem through collective active agents responsible for the problem. Collective action frames can only form if people perceive an issue through all three component frames (injustice, agency, and identity). Snow and Benford (2000), in Framing Processes and Social Movement: an Overview and Assessment, responded to this concept by affirming Gamson’s work and expanding the theoretical foundation of collective action frames.

Gamson differs from other social movement scholars by emphasising the significance of studying media discourse, which he defines as “a tool for analysing meaning” (Gamson 1995). He argues that people make sense of issues by employing a combination of three lenses to filter out relevant images – common knowledge in a given culture, people’s own experience and media generated images (Gamson et al. 1992). Gamson also differs from other social movement scholars by offering some valuable advice for the study of framing competitions in the media. He notes that journalists tend to pay more attention to writing a good story than to representing all sides in a conflict in a fair way.

Gamson’s works lay the groundwork for the strategic frame analysis and are of great value to the understanding of the media effects in political life. He has accelerated frame analysis from ‘think-able’ to ‘do-able’, and through this contribution he has made the technique more acceptable than ever in the academic world. However, we still need specific frame analysis procedures to apply to more topics, beyond gender studies and social movement studies. That is why strategic frame analysis is required.

**Strategic Frame Analysis for micro-level media effects studies**

In recent years, media scholars and researchers have been working on the frame analysis approach in the hope of making this intelligent perspective more practical and much easier
for learners to apply to their studies. Moreover, since the 1990s, communication scholars and practitioners have begun to build a new approach to explaining social issues to the public.

According to the Frame Works Institute (2008: 1): “Strategic frame analysis is an approach to communications research and practice that pays attention to the public’s deeply held worldviews and widely held assumptions.” They developed a series of questions to be considered when applying the concept of frames to the arena of social policy (2008: 1):

- “How does the public think about a particular social or political issue?”
- “What is the public discourse on the issue? And how is this discourse influenced by the way media frames that issue?”
- “How do these public and private frames affect public choices?”
- “How can an issue be reframed to evoke a different way of thinking, one that illuminates a broader range of alternative policy choices?”

Strategic frame analysis provides a micro-level media studies perspective and methodology. Its specific guidelines to the practice mean that it is more practical and easier-to-apply than the old frame analysis approach.

Whatever the difficulties, it is critical to remember that frame analysis can be applied to many different political and social issues and can produce intelligent results if it is operated with consideration of the above-mentioned historical development.

**Definitions of Frame Analysis**

Goffman (1974: 10) defined “frame” as some “basic elements” he can identify as the “principles of organization which govern events”. Gitlin (1980: 6) perfected the definition as “principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters”. Both Goffman and Gitlin’s definitions indicate that, unlike content analysis, which examines who said what, frame analysis aims to find out why he/she said that.

In addition to the above generalised definitions, there are some other influential definitions. For example, Entman (1993: 52) notes that: “To frame is to select some aspects of a
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to
promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or
treatment recommendation.” His perception is echoed by Reese’s (2003: 10) definition: “A
frame is a central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what
the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration.”

Reese (2001: 19) also concludes that “what power relationships and institutional
arrangements support certain routine and persistent ways of making sense of the social world,
as found through specific and significant frames, influential information organizing principles
are manifested in identifiable moments of structured meaning and become especially
important to the extent they find their way into media discourse, and are thus available to
guide public life”. In other words, frame analysis can give the public a real picture of how the
‘reality’ is constructed through the collaboration of many agencies so as to avoid being
misled by the powerful media or other influential institutions. According to the Frame Works
Institute (2008: 3), elements typically found in news segments that often signal meaning are

In summary, the above elements can help people process the news information based on their
personal experience and cultural boundaries. But there are many traditions of journalism that
affect the way we process news information, which influence not only what issues we think
about, but also how we think about them, and when.

From the above briefing, it is clear that there has been an enduring debate over frame analysis
in both theory and practice. Robert Entman (1993) questioned the ‘fractured paradigm’ of
framing, arguing that different researchers might have different interpretation of what frames
meant and how frames work. It is difficult to identify a consensus on the concept of framing,
let alone in relation to practical analysis. Many researchers chose not to share their frame
analysis methodological details with others. All these caused huge difficulties to frame
analysis in terms of defining ‘frame’, locating frames and distinguishing from one frame to
another, and etc. However, it is still worthy to design a fitted frame analysis for my research,
which is going to be discussed in the following sections.
3.2.2 Frame Analysis in Practice

As a New Perspective

Frame analysis, as a new perspective, can teach social movement activists how to organise their argument and schemata; it can offer an alternative to the old ‘objectivity and bias’ paradigm; it can help communication scholars to understand mass media effects in more depth and more thoroughly, both at macro and micro levels. The concept of framing is very useful due to its potential to get beneath the surface of news articles and expose the hidden assumptions. Tankard (2001: 97) pointed out that “the study of media framing can help us identify and examine crucial points in the opinion change process where these powerful effects are taking place … much of the power of framing comes from its ability to define the terms of a debate without the audience realising it is taking place. Media framing can be likened to the magician’s sleight of hand – attention is directed to one point to that people do not notice the manipulation that is going on at another point.”

As a Comprehensive Tool

Over the past two decades scholars have developed many approaches to measuring media frames. The “media package” approach (Gamson & Modigliani 1989) presents the keywords and common language that would help identify a particular frame. For example, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) took language from pamphlets and other writings by advocates of nuclear power. They argued that this kind of package would offer a number of different condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and positions in shorthand, making it possible to display the package as a whole with a deft metaphor, catchphrase, or other symbolic device.

The “list of frames” approach to measuring media frames conceives of framing as involving various elements or dimensions of stories. Tankard (2001: 101) listed 11 focal points for identifying framing: “Headlines and kickers (small headlines over the main headlines), Subheads, Photographs, Photo captions, Leads (the beginning of news stories), Selection of sources or affiliations, Selection of quotes, Pull quotes (quotes that are blown up in size for emphasis), Logos (graphic identification of the particular series an article belongs to), Statistics, charts, and graphs, Concluding statements or paragraphs of articles”.

Another approach, the “multidimensional”, was used in 1990 by Swenson (see Tankard 2001: 100), who coded eight elements that defined story framing with regard to the debate around
abortion: “Gender of the writer, Placement of the article (front page, editorial page, first section but not page 1, other), Terms used to refer to the pro-choice group (pro-choice, abortion rights, pro-abortion, anti-life, combination, not applicable), Terms used to refer to the pro-life group (pro-life, right-to-life, anti-abortion, anti-choice, combination, not applicable), Whether the woman’s rights or the foetus’s rights are considered paramount, The morality orientation of the article, Discussion of when life begins, Terms used to refer to the foetus”.

Different research questions require different approaches. Therefore, a key issue here is to design a frame analysis based on past practice, but that fits my own research. This will be explained in the next section.

3.2.3 Design Frame Analysis that Fits my Research

Concept of Frames

To do a frame analysis, it is necessary first to set the foundation by specifying the definition of frames. The definition adopted in the frame analysis of news collection for 1994-2008, in view of its close connection to Goffman’s original theory of frames, is Todd Gitlin’s (1980: 6) “Frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters”. The other definitions listed in section 3.2.1 are considered as inclined to suggest that frames are intentionally selected by journalists, rather than deeply-rooted ideologies and worldviews. Compared with Goffman’s original concept of frames and Entman’s definition, Gitlin focused more on ‘principles’, which stand for ideologies, philosophies and deeply-rooted worldviews that triggered the actors’ arguments in the debate.

Measurement of Frames

If Gitlin’s concept of frames is employed in this frame analysis, it is understandable that one also needs to know how to identify the above mentioned principles or frames. Ever since Goffman proposed the theory of frame analysis in 1974, the development of this theoretically-challenging concept has made great progress with the practice of management and organisational studies, social movement studies and media studies. However, there has been no explicit measurement model or step-by-step practice to identify frames. After
reviewing some qualitative framing literature, I have reached the conclusion that qualitative framing studies normally keep their measurement models as secret as possible. Even in some well documented studies, it is extremely difficult to locate the detailed tactics used to identify the frames. In most cases, researchers use techniques borrowed from discourse analyses and sociolinguistics to identify frames. Still, unfortunately, how the techniques are modified to fit into frame analysis is not very clear.

In such circumstances, some researchers switch to quantitative analysis for explicit measurement models to help identify frames. Koenig (2007: online) explained that “although quantitative studies in frame analysis are relatively rare, their measurement models are more explicit than qualitative studies … usually, a list of more or less parsimoniously identifiable frame terms such as ‘attributes’ or ‘devices’, were used as manifest indicators for the identification of frames”. In addition, quantitative studies are usually more systematic and integrated.

In quantitative research, there are a number of studies that use multi-scale items to code the data with the help of trained coders. The advantage of this method lies in its high reliability, whilst its disadvantages are the higher cost and time consuming nature in practice. Thus, Downey and Koenig (2006: 171) use the alternative method of keywords measurement, considering that this “offers greater reproducibility”. Key words are used more often as indicators, because frames are mostly latent. People may use different words and signals under the same frame. Therefore, in order to systematise the frame analysis, key word measurement is employed in my research. After this stage, the next step is to determine what kind of frames one is looking for in frame analysis. This leads to another question, that of frame taxonomy.

**Categories of Frames**

Koenig (2007: online) wrote that “three themes reoccur so frequently in the literature, they might be considered master frames. These are *liberal individualism, ethno-nationalism, and harmony with nature*. Considering the nature of my research topic, only two master frames are included in the frame taxonomy: *liberal individualism* and *ethno-nationalism*. The availability of “master frames” is credited to David Snow and Robert Benford (1988), who along with Burke Rochford Jr. and Steven Worden (Snow et al. 1986), and again with Scott Hunt (Hunt et al. 1994: 464), also developed the theory of “frame alignment processes”,
including “frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation”. The development of master frames is closely linked with the study of social movements, such as the civil rights movement and student movement. In Doug McAdam’s (1994: 42) work on culture and social movement, he summarised that the availability of master frames can “inspire” interest groups to “reinterpret their situation” as well as “to mobilise based on their new understanding of themselves and the world around them”. In other words, master frames become a cultural or ideological foundation that can be used by different groups to facilitate their actions.

*Liberal Individualism*

Koenig (2007: online) explained that,

Liberal individualism is the dominant ideology of modern state and society throughout most parts of the world. The American Dream, democracy, market economy, the civil rights movement, [surveillance studies]² and the academy have all drawn on the liberalism frame. At the core of this master frame is the image of humans as rationally acting individuals, which are endowed with freedom rights. Liberalism's strong emphasis of the individual as an ontological entity is probably a far more important cause for the current strife for identity than the modern organization of society. At the interface between group and individual, liberalism stresses freedom of association rights. In contrast, groups that are based on forced membership are emphatically illegitimate for liberalism. There is one exception, though, namely the ascriptive group.

Based on Koenig’s description of liberalism, the liberalism frame can be defined as – *worldviews that mainly regard individual liberties and personal freedom as the central concern to interpret British national identity cards systems.*

*Ethno-Nationalism*

Koenig (2007: online) argued that,

Ascriptive groups are at the core of the second master frame, *ethno-nationalism*, which has become intertwined with liberalism over the last two centuries … Nationalism supposes the existence of primordial groups, which are viewed just as much as ontological as are liberalism's individuals.

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² Inserted by the author
Nationalism thus has raised the legitimacy of all primordially coded groups ... With the rise of the modern nation-state primordialized national citizenship identity has become a master frame instituted on state and inter-state level as well as in the scientific community. Once a primordialist identity for the organization that shall override most other allegiances, namely the state and civil society as its presumed originator, is adopted, all primordially coded identities acquire a strong legitimate advantage.

Therefore, nationalism frames, in terms of British national ID cards system studies, can be interpreted as – *worldviews that use national interests as the benchmark to value national registers and ID cards*. These two master frames provide us with interpretative guidance that can form our perspectives in the initial qualitative analysis.

**Frame Alignment Processes**

David Snow and his colleagues (Snow et al. 1986: 464) developed the concept of “frame alignment processes”; that is, “the linkage of individual and social movement organizations’ interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interest, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary”. As a matter of fact, McAdam (1994: 36, 37) presented a better interpretation of frame alignment processes, arguing that they could be regarded as “acts” and “efforts” from the movement organisers for the purpose of legitimating and motivating individual and collective activities. Hunt et al. (1994) offered further detailed analysis of how to achieve a successful frame alignment, defining three identities in that process: “protagonists”, “antagonists” and “audiences” (1994: 186). In their research, the first step for movement organisers and followers (“protagonists”) is to define the “reality”. In the case of British national identity cards, both pro-ID card and anti-ID card groups are expected to describe to their audiences what the reality is. The pro-ID card group might argue that a biometric identity card is merely part of our routine life in a modern and technology-facilitated world; meanwhile the anti-ID card group might say that the individual documents are part of the state surveillance system that may damage our civil liberties. After defining the reality, the next step is to explain the causes of these movements, who the opponents are, who the audiences are, and so on. Taking the case of ID cards once again, each interest group needs to explain to their target audience what their aims are, who they are fighting against, and why.
Frame alignment includes four processes - frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation, as mentioned above. Since my research only involves the frame bridging process, the other three processes are not further discussed here. Snow et al. (1986: 467) referred to frame bridging as “the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem”. In the research of the media representation of British national identity cards over the past one hundred years, examples of frame bridging process include British national newspapers’ patriotic acts to support the National Register in 1915, and their appeal for the abolition of ID cards in 1951.

**Identifying Frames in Textual Data – Detect the key words**

1). Detecting Key Words Manually

Although the news collection in my research is quite large, I have decided to employ manual selection of key words, mainly because it ensures that no key words are missed out at the later computer-assisted key words hunting stage, which is quite time-consuming and can be confusing. First of all, the key words and phrases we are looking for to identify the frames are not necessarily the most frequent words or phrases, but rather those with high emotional value, such as ‘capitalism’ and ‘conscience’. It will save the researcher some time if the key words or phrases are listed alphabetically in a table for later verification use.

I found the following map very helpful in identifying and categorising key words. It should be noted however, that it is merely an example, not the complete map. As stated above, key words and phrases are not necessarily those that appear most frequently in the news. They usually have emotional values and controversial meanings. For example, if one actor repeatedly emphasises the importance of defending civil liberties and scrapping the national ID cards proposal, then words and phrases such as “civil liberty” and “freedom” became key in identifying frames, because different people have different interpretations of liberty and freedom. In short, it is essential to locate such emotional and controversial words as accurately as possible during the manual selection process.
Frames | Key words/phrases
--- | ---
Liberalism | +
Frame | -
Nationalism | +
Frame | -

+ means in favour of conscription/national register;
– means against conscription/national register.

Table 3.7 Sample key words/phrases hunting card

2). Use MAXQDA to Verify the Key Words/Phrases

Among the many computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software packages available to social researchers for use in frame analysis are ATLAS.ti, Kwalitan, MAXqda, NVivo, and Qualrus.

In my research, I have used MAXqda to find the key words and frequencies. The procedure is as follows:

1) Store all data in .rtf form instead of .doc or .pdf.

2) Input all data into MAXqda.

3) Set up the stop list to filter some ‘meaningless’ words.

4) Click the button $\sum$ in the right hand corner to generate the word frequency.

5) Export the word frequency data to Excel for calculation.

6) Get a list of key words.

Comparing the list of manually selected key words and computer-generated key words, one will usually find that they differ slightly. This is the point at which the researcher needs to decide which key words matter.
Identifying Frames – Expand the Key Words to Fuzzy Lexemes

As mentioned above, key words are normally used as indicators. When the list of key words is generated from MAXqda, the next step is to link those key words with certain fuzzy lexemes (Koenig 2004). For example, if I have ‘men’ as a frequent key word, it is very important to expand this word to many other related nouns (in relation to my own data sample), such as ‘soldiers’, ‘businessmen’, ‘workers’, ‘married men’, ‘single men’, ‘divorced men’, and ‘country men’. Carrying out this step can improve the reliability of key word measurement by linking as much useful information as possible to the frames that we drew before the data analysis.

Frame Valence Mapping

When all the key words and phrases have been identified, verified and confirmed, the next step is to consider the frame valence. Generally speaking, there are two valences in a frame – plus and minus. In my research, I define the plus as ‘in favour of conscription and national register’ while the minus is ‘against conscription and national register’. An essential step in the frame analysis in this research is to have solid background knowledge in the literature of nationalism and liberalism, considering that these are the main master frames I look into. The liberalism frame in relation to national ID cards systems normally holds positions on civil rights, personal liberties, freedom, democracy, rule of law, and equality. The nationalism frame normally reflects positions such as historical records and values, responsibility and obligations, patriotism, citizenship and ethnicity. Bearing the above knowledge in mind, the next step is to map the valence of each sampled item.

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Table 3.8 Sample valence-mapping card
There can be several valences in one piece of news and it is necessary to go through each piece of news very carefully and then mark the valence accordingly.

3.3 Conclusion

It is necessary to note that frame analysis is different from agenda-setting or discourse analysis. Frame analysis allows researchers to examine the public debate at a much more macro level, so as to identify the ideologies and philosophical roots behind the arguments. Thus, to do a frame analysis requires more knowledge in the literature of nationalism and liberalism, whilst content analysis requires more knowledge in the literature of mass media and the public sphere.

Content analysis can help in gathering micro-level details of press coverage, such as the quantity of hard news, the length of quotations, the most frequent words, and the most mentioned actor. Frame analysis is designed to accompany content analysis, complementing it by revealing more insights about the frameworks through which actors have interpreted ID cards over time. It can present a vivid scenario of how the mediated debate of British national ID cards has developed over time, and explain why there have been repeated introductions and abolitions of ID cards systems. It can also help to explain the role of the media in the public debate of ID cards in Britain over the years.

The above considerations explain why I have chosen to use a combination of content analysis and frame analysis in my research on the media representation of British national ID card systems in the past 100 years.
Chapter 4

Case Study 1: British National ID Card Systems in 1915 and 1919

- The Historical Debate of British National Identity Card Systems

4.0 Introduction

Since 2003 there has been much media coverage of the British Labour Government’s attempt to introduce biometric ID cards. However, neither the introduction of a national identity card system in Britain, nor the current mediated debate on the issue, are unprecedented. Throughout the 20th century, the implementation and renewal of ID cards in Britain were accompanied by debate in the newspapers, especially in opinion pages and leading articles. One cannot understand the history of British national identity cards without looking at such debates; rather, as Higgs (2004b: 204) concluded in his historical studies of the information state in England, “scholars should be attempting to build theory on historical case studies”. In fact, placing the study of British national identity cards in the historical context – what happened and what was discussed in the newspapers – is vital to the understanding of today’s debate. National identity card systems have been introduced twice in Britain, in 1915 and 1939, to aid war emergencies, in each case igniting much mediated public debate with regard to cost, timetable of introduction, purpose, and the impact on civil liberty.

This chapter will begin by examining the most relevant theories and reviewing the empirical researches on British national ID cards. The second and third parts of the chapter will comprise thematic content analysis and frame analysis of news and debates on ID cards during the first introduction of the National Register and accompanying ID card in 1915, and the abolition of the National Register in 1919. These two periods provide special angles and great detail to examine the history of British national ID cards.
4.1 The First British National Identity Card

4.1.1 A Brief History of Individual Identity Documentation in Britain

Caplan and Torpey (2001) link the birth of individual identification systems to three elements: mass literacy/an official culture of written records; historical emergence of modern concepts of individuality and subjectivity; and a public commitment to the moral and philosophical significance of the human self. They also argue that “in Europe the proximate origins of this culture of written records lie in the early medieval transition from oral to written procedures, prompted initially by royal interest in the reliable documentation of property ownership and legal processes” (Caplan and Torpey 2001: 2).

In the case of Britain, the first-ever such written record was made at Christmas 1085, when William the Conqueror decided to create a record of the manors that made up the realm of England. He sent out commissioners to each shire to hold special sittings of the country courts. The information was collated by monks at Winchester, and the finished product, Domesday Book, was regarded as the single most exhaustive exercise in data collection by the central state in pre-modern England until the taking of the first population census in 1801 (Higgs 2004b). Higgs (2004b) also argued that William had intended the survey as a means of identifying and controlling only that tiny minority of his subjects that held land granted by the Crown. Thus, the great survey had distinct limitations. It was a one-off exercise that was not repeated on a comprehensive scale, or even kept fully up-to-date. It was a collection of local oral intelligence at one point in time, and the length of the collection process was considerable. It was a single book, not a set of searchable databases as is currently being created by the British Government. What is more, Domesday Book was not a census of the population, but essentially a record of landholding and landed wealth. Nevertheless, it still represented an important start in identity documentation history.

Subsequent types of registry include the registration of baptisms, marriages and burials. From at least the tenth century, English kings have always taxed the population to fund wars. In order to know how much fighting manpower existed, law was enforced, welfare dispensed and property rights recorded at the local level, and the information passed to the central state. To this extent, the central state depended on the information collected by local elites.
In the long history of identification, the following can be identified as early milestones:

- In 1217, English Jews were forced to wear yellow badges in the form of two stone tablets identifying them as Jews (Schoenberg 2006: 4).
- A statute of 1381 forbade all but peers, notable merchants, and soldiers to leave the UK without a license/internal passport (Torpey 2000: 18).
- Under the Vagabonds Acts of 1388 and 1495, badges were issued to some of the disabled beggars in Gloucester in 1504, in order to distinguish them from the able beggars. Under the Vagabonds Act of 1697, all those in receipt of poor relief were supposed to have the letter P and the initial of the parish sewn on their clothes.

With the birth of the modern state, more restrictions and laws were introduced to regulate the movements of the population. These included the Elizabethan Poor Law and the Act of Settlement and Removal of 1662, the Act of Union of 1800, and the first ‘Passenger Act’ of 1803. As Torpey (2000:71) notes, “the United Kingdom moved to strengthen its capacity to identify and regulate the movements of foreigners at the same time that it inaugurated a domestic free market in labour”. In this way, “Great Britain thus preceded Prussia in achieving this essential precondition of industrial capitalism” (Torpey 2000: 71). More importantly, Torpey (2000:19) argues that “documentary controls on movement were decisively bound up with the rights and duties that would eventually come to be associated with membership – citizenship – in the nation-state”.

If Domesday Book gave scholars like M.T. Clanchy the impression of being “hardly used for any practical administrative purposes” (see Higgs 2004: 3), few will doubt that with the introduction of later laws which identified specific groups of subjects or regulated adults’ movements inside their own country, states exhibited their determination to “penetrate and embrace” (Torpey 2000) their population.

Caplan and Torpey’s idea of the “subjectivity and individuality” and “moral and philosophical significance of human self” are very inspiring in the understanding of modern citizenship and nationhood. However, it is not the purpose of this chapter or of the thesis to explain the birth of British nationhood and citizenship. Rather, the aim is to address the essence/nature of identity documents in modern society. Anthony Giddens explains that “administrative power can only become established if the coding of information is actually
applied in a direct way to the supervision of human activities” (see Torpey 2000: 15). This power is exactly the nation-state’s capacity to penetrate and embrace its subjects through the use of national registration systems. Documents such as passports, driving licences, health care cards and identity cards have been playing a vital role in what Caplan and Torpey called the “cat-and-mouse” game. Not surprisingly, “the cat has held the better cards” (Caplan and Torpey 2001: 7).

In other words, identity documentation has become an ever more powerful tool employed by nation-states to impose rule upon their populations. Meanwhile, the adoption of identity documents seems always to be linked with war and security. In the next section, round one of the cat-and-mouse game in Britain is explained.

The first “general identity card issued in Britain” was introduced under the National Registration Act 1915 (Agar 2001: 104). This card, never officially called a ‘National Identity Card’, was an accompanying certificate to the National Register, to be signed and carried at all times as required by the Act. It was very simple in form: “a folded card carrying a limited set of information backed up by registers of further personal and administrative data, held locally or centrally, and processed by hand” (Agar 2005: 2). Thus it was very different from today’s biometric ID card, which may store an individual’s name, address, gender, date and place of birth, immigration status, fingerprints, iris patterns, facial image, signature, and even medical information; be held by national register databases and processed by computers. As the UK Cabinet Office (2002: 9) defined in its Identity Fraud report, identity is constructed of three elements: “biometric identity”, “attributed identity”, and “biographic identity”. The first British national identity card only included ‘attributed identity’ information such as full name, date of birth and address.
However, this comparative simplicity and limited demand for personal information did not make the certificate popular among the public. To explain its failure, it is necessary first to understand its birth. Moreover, national identity cards are barely the tip of the iceberg of individual identity documentation. The next section seeks to briefly examine the history of individual identity documentation in Britain, especially in relation to national identity cards.

4.1.2. Decades of Crisis and Conflict in the Early 20th Century

As mentioned before, the first national registration and ID card system in Britain was introduced in 1915. Some academics state that the national registration in 1915 and the accompanying ID card were mainly used to aid conscription by providing statistics of eligible manpower to the War Cabinet (Wadham, Gallagher and Chrolavicius 2006). Although quite distinct from the Aliens Acts, the Passengers Act, and other immigration laws, like them the National Registration Act 1915 takes for granted the existence of the nation-state. The Aliens Acts and the Passengers Act mainly targeted ‘foreigners’ or so-called ‘outsiders’. They were

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3 This image was found on <http://www.rekoorsoftware.co.uk/sales/90104.jpg>, accessed on 20th Jan 2008.
designed to distinguish foreigners from British subjects, so as to protect ‘us’ from the potential threats caused by possible large scale immigration. Thus the difference lies not only in scope and purpose, but also in the social background to the Acts.

Powell (2002: 120), in his historical work on British nationhood and identity, argues that one of the three most important developments in the first quarter of the 20th century in Britain was “the expansion of the role of central government as the twin imperatives of warfare and welfare produced a much more interventionist, centrally powerful state”. The introduction of a national register system in 1915 represents part of the state’s grand plan as a more interventionist and centrally powerful administration, as such a system enables the government to have instant access to a databank filled with information on an individual’s age, gender, profession and address.

It is easy to understand that national registration was helpful in a wartime emergency for purposes of conscription, although in 1915 the scope of the registration was national rather than local as in pre-modern times. However, to convince the population between the ages of 15 and 65 to register their address and professions and to carry their ID cards at all times, to agree with the universal registration system, to be willing to report changes of address, and to spy on suspicious foreigners, is quite another issue. These ‘extra’ and unprecedented responsibilities are worthy of more attention.

It is also important to understand that, like nation-states, identity documentation systems took hundreds of years to come to fruition. Caplan (2001: 64) stated that “the silence of English law on the matter of names is constant with a governmental system in which registration and identity cards have not normally been part of the apparatus of administration”. However, while that conclusion may be accurate in terms of what happened in the 19th century, modern British governments have certainly recognised the value of national identity registration; otherwise identity cards would not have been introduced in 1915, reintroduced in 1939, resubmitted in 1997, and eventually introduced again in 2006. As Agar (2001:106) remarked:

The fact that many of the civil servants regarded a properly organised National Register as an invaluable tool of government shows that the first process could outweigh the second: the anti-German rhetoric evaporated when they sought to persuade their superiors of the benefits of a permanent peacetime Register and identity card system.
The political conflict that Agar noted is also evident in Powell’s comment that “internal disagreements occurred within the coalition government, especially in 1915-16 over the issue of conscription (Powell 2002: 141). The Labour Party was against the Bill in principle, unlike today. As Philip Snowden put it: “I submit that the ulterior purpose of this Bill has not been disclosed, because if there was no motive behind the Bill than that which is disclosed in it, then such a Bill could not possibly have emanated from any other source than Bedlam” (Wadham, Gallagher, and Chrolavicius 2006: 6). At first the government denied this claim, but six months later the Bill was used to aid conscription.

Ultimately, the first British national identity card failed due to its “lack of parasitic vitality” (Agar 2001: 107). The government learnt from that failure, so that when the time came to introduce the second British national identity card, during the Second World War, the card also carried the function of food rationing. As discussed above, the importance of the first ID card lies both in its birth and in its failure. It was the first fruit of national identity documentation in the long history of state practices in Britain. As will be explained in the next section, that fruit tasted different to different people at different times.

4.1.3. The British National Identity Card Debate

David Cameron, the Conservative Party Leader, has famously claimed many times that identity cards are just not British (see Brogan 2006). His argument echoes remarks made in the Daily Express in 1945 (see Agar 2001: 110), that “except as a wartime measure the system is intolerable. It is un-British… It turns every village policeman into a Gestapo agent”. Britishness, according to Tilley and Heath (2007: 662), “was a constructed identity which brought these nations together and was built in the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries on conflict with the ‘Other’ of Catholic France, on the common project of the British Empire with its economic and military successes and opportunities, and on shared Protestant religious and cultural traditions”. They argue that the common institutions of liberty and parliamentary democracy distinguished Britain from the authoritarianism of the European states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; whilst from the post-war period Britain was set apart from other European powers by its pride in its welfare system. From that time onwards however, the collapse of the British Empire, weakening global political influence and continuing economic decline all led to the fading of ‘Britishness’. As Wellings
(2002: 98) argued, “the processes of industrialisation, imperial and commercial expansion, and nationalism are all closely interwined”. He further explained that the emergence of a sense of ‘Britishness’ was linked with commonalities like Protestantism, empire and war with imperial rivals. Wellings also pointed out that it was necessary to realise the relation between ‘English identity’ and ‘Britishness’ as well as to distinguish between the two.

It is beyond the scope of this section to include a full-scale discussion of what ‘Britishness’ means, so this examination is limited to some theories of the meaning in relation to identity cards. As Agar (2001) pointed out in his historical research of two ID cards in WWI and WWII, Britishness is “a continuing theme in debates about identity cards” (Agar 2001: 101).

It is worth mentioning that the British only became ‘citizens’ when the Nationality Act 1948 was passed to settle the post-war migration issue. Before 1948, residents of the British Isles and the British Empire had been labelled as subjects of the Crown. During WWI this did not stop civil servants from persuading “their superiors of the benefits of a permanent peacetime Register and identity card system” (Agar 2001: 106), because “a war that demanded mobilisation of nearly all industry and population inevitably led to an expansion of the state in Britain: political actions that would have been unthinkable before 1914 now became necessities” (Agar 2001: 103). The “unthinkable” decision was to develop a system of national registry and identity card, which was described as a “Prussianising” institution. J. M. Winter (see Agar 2001: 103) noted the process of differentiation: “What was ‘English’ was defined in opposition to what was taken to be German: decency versus bullying, fair play versus atrocities, amateurism versus militarism.” In WWI, British soldiers and later officers were mostly described as “middle-class, patriotic, unemotional, unintellectual, and masculine”. However, Agar also emphasised that national identity meant different things at different times to different people.

In his historical exploration of controls on movement since 17th century Britain, Torpey (2000: 66, 71) argues that:

As the leading edge in the development of industrial capitalism, Great Britain should presumably have led the way in the creation of free markets in labour, of which an essential component was the dismantling of ‘feudal’ restraints and the consequent mobility of labour. …… [However] the United Kingdom moved to strengthen its capacity to identify and regulate the movements of foreigners at the same time that it inaugurated a domestic free market in labour.
The excess labour in the U.K., a result of a bad harvest in Scotland and the breakup of traditional agriculture in Ireland, had to be guaranteed easier departure; whilst access to the U.K had to be tightened in order to avoid the arrival of more free hands. In the long history of immigration policy, Torpey (2000:69) notes the phenomenon whereby “[although] England had long been remarkably open to outsiders……Great Britain in 1836 moved sharply towards the regulation of foreigners”. In other words, economic pressure forced Parliament to take ‘unBritish’ actions. The ancient ‘Britishness’, which valued its “immigrant-friendly reputation”, had to fade away to make space for the changing world. What is more, Torpey (2000) compared the ‘British’ and the ‘Prussian’ from the perspective of their manipulation of the labour market, noting that “when the British brought their free national labour market into being, they felt they had too much labour power on hand; when the Prussian did so, they feared they had too little” (2000: 71). This has resonances with the argument in LSE’s The Identity Project Report (2005:53) with regard to the introduction of biometric identity cards in the U.K that: “It is important to note that the United Kingdom is not bound by the EU specifications, yet the Government recently argued that it must comply with them.” Government policy is not in the range of discussion here; rather it is the government’s argumentation of what Britain should do now and in the future in the public debate that is worthy of attention and interest. That will be the focus of the next section: State Practice and Identity Cards.

Agar’s research can inform and inspire the examination of the recent ID card debate: First, he is the first scholar to examine in depth the introduction and dismantlement of the first two identity cards in WWI and WWII, second, his theory of “parasitic vitality” explains why the Labour Government now emphasise “better public service” to promote the new biometric ID cards; finally and most importantly, his discussion of the media (newspapers) response (including the ‘Britishness’ and ‘Prussianising’ theme) to two identity cards and national register systems contributes greatly to the understanding of today’s public debate. However, the media responses he cites in his work were fragmented and inconsistent, so his was not a real scientific analysis of media representation, not to mention the whole public debate.

Torpey’s work gives a detailed description of freedom of movement in 19th century Britain. His insights on immigration control are invaluable to understanding the introduction of the new biometric ID card in the U.K. However, he barely mentions the contemporary public debate or media representation of passports or the Alien Acts, a shortcoming shared by the
LSE Identity Project Report (2005). The LSE report is frequently referred to by British media and politicians, but mainly with regard to the cost of the ID cards system. The report contains a comprehensive review of the Identity Cards Bill 2005, including the identity card legislation, the international environment, the IT environment, the cost of the system, public trust, and biometrics. In its 303 A4 pages, the only section related to public debate is Chapter 119 (2005: 139) - merely four and half pages - “The Environment of Public Trust”. As well as neglecting the issue of public debate, the content of this chapter is rather weak. The conclusion that “public support is likely to be fickle” (2005: 141) is based only on certain MORI, ICM, and NO2ID polls, and on extracts from discussions on the NO2ID website.

However, not all researchers studying identity registration consider it a negative phenomenon. Szreter (2006: 67, 78) asserts that “identity registration at birth is a UN proclaimed human right”, and specifically compliments the creation of the General Register Office of England and Wales as “a nationally-funded and administered civil registration system of births, deaths, and marriages for all, regardless of religious affiliation”, which in turn has contributed greatly to Britain’s economic development by facilitating the labour market, social security and local justice. Szreter’s work is to some extent similar to Higgs’ studies on information collecting in England, since both take a social and statistical function perspective to study identity registration and the collecting and processing of related information.

To summarise, all the above studies contribute to the understanding of the development of British National Identity Cards, but none of them pay sufficient attention to the public sphere from WWI to the present. Therefore, the mediated debate of ID cards has been marginalised and fragmented in the identity documents studies.

4.1.4 State Practice and Identity Cards - Identity Cards in WWI

The National Registration Act 1915

On 5th July 1915, in the middle of the First World War, the National Registration Bill was read in the House of Commons, requiring every person between the ages of 15 and 65 to enrol on a national register for the purposes of using the workforce to the best effect. As a
result, personal information on all the adult population was compiled in locally-held registers, and identity cards were issued. The direct reason for this Bill was “a fierce debate raging in the War Cabinet among those ministers willing to consider conscription and those who wanted to continue the policy of voluntarism. The argument turned on knowing the number of men within the population available to go to the front line; because existing statistics were judged to be insufficiently accurate, the Cabinet decided to resolve the matter through the introduction of national registration” (Agar 2005: 3). The outcome of this National Register was satisfactory to the Cabinet: 1,413,900 men in England and Wales were still available for national service (Farr 2002, Agar 2005). Once this figure was generated, politicians’ interest in and stance towards national registration and identity cards changed dramatically.

**The Aliens Restriction Act 1914**

If the National Register proved the War Cabinet’s abilities to control British citizens to some extent, the Aliens Restriction Act 1914 had already revealed the ambition to control boundaries in wartime. This Act “sharply enhanced the power of the government”, especially in such a war period, “to prohibit or impose restrictions on the landing or embarkation of aliens in the UK” (Torpey 2000: 112). Torpey further explains the significance of this Act by arguing that:

> Although the law made no explicit mention of passport requirements … it put the responsibility of proving that a person is not an alien on that person, making documentary evidence of one’s nationality largely unavoidable, particularly if one did not look or sound “British”. It also provided for the possibility of requiring aliens to live, or of prohibiting them from living, in certain areas, and of registering with the authorities their place of domicile, change of abode, or movement within the UK.

However, the real reasons for such strict controls over both aliens and citizens remain diverse. Different cultural, political, and economic situations mean that each nation has different reasons for establishing identity documents and related policies. For example, in the 1820s and 1830s, the British Parliament focused on making policies that could take the burden off the domestic labour market and poor rolls. Therefore, it made sense that access to the UK should be restricted to avoid the incursion of excess hands. Nowadays, as will be discussed later on in this chapter, policing is inter-connected with economic and political issues.

While it might have appeared at the time that all these Acts and Laws were designed only for the Great War, this turned out not to be the case. The Aliens Order 1920, an improved and more effective version of The Aliens Restriction Act 1914, provided that the restrictions
“should continue in force … not only in the wartime circumstance aforesaid, but at any time”. Henceforward, anyone entering or leaving the UK was required to have “either a valid passport furnished with a photograph of him or some other document satisfactorily establishing his national status and identity”. The Order also mandated the maintenance of a “central register of aliens” under the direction of the Secretary of State.

The Failure of the First ID Card

Public indifference and hostility to the first British National ID card, coupled with economic concern about the large expenditure involved, led to its demise soon after the First World War ended. Even while it was still in operation, the military had their own metal identity cards and civilians did not bother to carry their own cards at all times. Cards were easily lost, and since they were not regarded as valuable, often the loss went unreported. The failure of the identity cards (also called Registration Certificates) stimulated the General Register Office to re-think the cost-effectiveness of such a system. As a result, the GRO decided to link the second National Register and identity card system with food rationing, which ensured the success of that system during and after the Second World War.

In the next part of this chapter, a thematic content analysis of news coverage and parliamentary debate will illustrate the value of examining the public debate of the first national identity card system.

4.2 Thematic Content Analysis of Newspaper Coverage on British National ID Cards: The Birth of the First ID Card System in 1915

4.2.1 Content Analysis Case Study 1 - The Birth of the National Register and ID Card System in 1915

As indicated in Table 3.2, altogether 341 pieces of news were collected from 10 national newspapers for the period between May 1915 and September 1915, during which the National Registration Act came into force throughout Britain and Ireland. First, those 341 items were categorised according to the type of news, as shown in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 below.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>The Times</th>
<th>Daily Mail</th>
<th>Daily Mirror</th>
<th>Daily Telegraph</th>
<th>Daily Express</th>
<th>The Manchester Guardian</th>
<th>The Herald of the World</th>
<th>The News of the World</th>
<th>The Observer</th>
<th>People</th>
<th>Total (In items)</th>
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Table 4.1 Summary of Types of Items (in number of items) of Case Study 1
Table 4.1 presents a clear view of the make-up of the news, including parliamentary reportage, editorials, hard news, soft news, news feature, personal think pieces, readers’ letters, official notices, and war posters. The variety of news types proves that the first British national register system caused huge concern among the British national print media, at a time when newspapers were still dominant among the media. From Table 4.1, it is also evident that The Times and Daily Mail had more variety in news types than the other eight newspapers. The Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph, Daily Express and Manchester Guardian had less variety; but all had a fair number of parliamentary reports, hard news and readers’ letters. The four weekly national newspapers, on the other hand, paid barely any attention to parliamentary reports and readers’ letters, which led to a lack of variety. This illustrates the importance of taking into account as many newspapers as possible when carrying out content analysis, in order to gain a complete version of the media representation.

Figure 4.1 displays the percentages of each news type in all the items collected from ten British national newspapers in 1915. It demonstrates that hard news, parliamentary reports, and readers’ letters were the three main components of mediated public debate of the National Register and related issues in 1915. Considering the novelty of the National Register in Britain, and that the National Registration Bill 1915 was introduced under tremendous
pressure from the frontline, it is no surprise that parliamentary debate took up 18% of the news coverage. Parliament was the primary source for newspaper correspondents to collect information on the National Registration Bill, while parliamentary debates were often reported verbatim, something that is less common in today’s newspapers.

The newspaper survey found 53 pieces of letters to editors (excluding the 214 readers’ post cards to the editor of the Daily Express) that discussed the National Register 1915 and related issues, which again indicates the amount of public attention towards the Register and consequent conscription. Those writing the letters included religious figures such as Alfred Marlborough (Dean of Exeter), retired military such as Major-General Sir Elliott Wood, Members of Parliament, medical doctors, academics and ordinary people. Regardless of social status, most of the letters are in favour of conscription and immediate national service, arguing that all necessary means should be used to win the war and save liberty.

Next, the total sizes of items in the ten newspapers were compared. The results are shown in Figure 4.2 below.

![Figure 4.2 Total Size of Items in Ten Newspapers](image)

Clearly, The Times contributed most to the news collection, followed by The Manchester Guardian, Daily Telegraph and Daily Express. One reason is to do with the different nature of daily and weekly national newspapers; another is that newspapers such as The Herald employed many posters rather than text news, whilst newspapers such as The Times and Manchester Guardian were more dedicated to text.
The next step was to find the percentage of different groups of readers who took active part in the National Register public debate in 1915. The results, as shown in Figure 4.3 below, indicate that they came from all walks of society: women and men, politicians and farmers, professors and doctors. The peril of war cost many families their relatives, and the ‘injustice’ of the voluntary system employed before the National Registration Act 1915 was criticised by most of the readers who wrote to those ten national newspapers. They perceived the voluntary system as noble, but as unfair and unjustified; they insisted that conscription was the only solution and that war service should be everyone’s responsibility.

![Figure 4.3 Readers’ (Authors of Letters to Editor) Profile](image)

**War Posters For and Against the National Register in 1915**

During the First World War, the British national newspapers published many war posters to support or oppose the National Register and related issues such as voluntary recruiting, conscription and war munitions. At a time when “there was no radio, no television; the moving picture industry was in its infancy, and, in any case, silent… posters, therefore, were bound to play a vital role in shaping opinion, providing easily digestible information and boosting morale” (Judd 1972: 31). War posters are “instruments for promoting and disseminating war aims, social cohesion, ideological purpose and various forms of citizenship, and in more recent times for voicing opposition” (Aulich 2007: 7). In the media coverage of
the National Register and ID card system from May to September 1915, British national newspapers, including The Times, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, Daily Express, News of the World, Observer and People published 29 war posters in total in support of recruitment and the National Register, manifesting the rights and responsibilities of being a British subject (as stated earlier, the British ‘citizen’ did not exist until 1948), and calling for every British inhabitant to share the duty to fight against the Germans and save the king and the empire; whilst The Herald published 11 posters opposing the National Register and identity card system and condemning the impact of total war on the everyday life of the working class.

“Ideally, the best posters are striking, economical and efficient, and deliver a direct and simple message” (Aulich 2007: 8). Poster 4.1 is a good example of how British war propagandists “recognised the importance of inspiring the individual to action by whatever means possible” (Aulich 2007: 8). The poster uses the war hero Lord Kitchener to encourage and inspire men to join the army, with a description of the recruitment requirements. It delivers a very direct and simple message to the public: Lord Kitchener needs more men at the front, fighting to save the king and the country. It was published repeatedly in most of the British national newspapers in 1915, although its effectiveness was rather limited, because conscription posters were soon published, as shown in posters 4.2 and 4.3. In 1915, when the British public were still subjects of the British Crown rather than citizens, it made sense that the posters would include sentiments such as “Save the King”.

In circumstances in which the British national newspapers, including mass circulation papers such as the Daily Mail and Daily Express, were mostly pro-war and had “spent the past decade preparing their readers for war”, “opposition to the war was commercial suicide” (Temple 2008: 31). As such, posters with a clear statement and striking pictures became one of the instruments used by the British press to influence their readers on recruiting and the National Register.
Lord Kitchener
Calls for More Men

I have said that. I know let
the country know when men
are needed for the war.
The time has come and I now
call for 300,000 recruits to
form new armies.
Those who are engaged on the
production of war material
of any kind should not leave
their work. It is to those
who are performing their duty
that I appeal.

Kitchener

NEW CONDITIONS OF ENLISTMENT—Age Limit now 40

Age . . . 19 to 40.
Height: minimum 5ft. 2in.
Chest: minimum 33in.

Enlistment for General Service
for the duration of the War.

God Save the King

Poster 4.1 “Lord Kitchener Calls for More Men”

[Published in the People on 23rd May 1915, on p.19]
As the war emergency worsened in 1915, and more men and munitions were required at the front, the war posters were modified: now they promoted the idea of conscription rather than voluntary recruitment, and the tone of the language also changed. While Poster 4.1 uses Lord Kitchener’s reputation as a war hero to promote voluntary recruitment, Poster 4.2 employs more threatening text. Now Lord Kitchener is saying, “Come along, my lads, now’s your time to go willingly while you have the chance, for there’s a man coming round the corner who's made up his mind to have you”; and the title of the poster is “The Country Needs (and will have) You”, indicating that conscription is on its way and all eligible men will be made to serve the country.

Poster 4.2 “The Country Needs (and will have) you”

[Published in the People on 30th May 1915, on p. 5]

The proposal of national service and conscription will inevitably cause controversy and debate, even when it is done in the name of saving the country. In this case, the War Office
and the national newspapers in support of national service and the National Register had to combat public scepticism. They did so by promoting conscription as the most efficient and effective way of winning the war, and therefore of saving the country and the liberty cherished by Britons. Posters 4.3 and 4.4 were designed according to this agenda. Unlike Poster 4.2, with its more authoritative visual language, the posters reproduced below adopt an argumentative manner to convince the public that conscription is the “express” way of winning the war and of saving liberty. “Posters need to be effective” (Aulich 2007: 15), and the way to deliver such effectiveness involves certain “description narrative techniques” such as the “elaborate illustration and text” demonstrated in Posters 4.1 and 4.2, as well as metaphor, as shown in Posters 4.3 and 4.4. Whatever the technique, the purpose is to deliver a simple and clear message to the public as effectively as possible.

Poster 4.3 The Quickest and Best Way to Berlin

[Published in the People on 16th May 1915, on p. 5]
Poster 4.4 to the Rescue

[Published in the People on 1st August 1915, on p. 5]

Unlike the other British national newspapers, which published posters encouraging national service and the National Register, The Herald published many anti-war posters opposing the introduction of conscription. These employed a combination of techniques such as metaphor and narrative illustration, with a few lines of text at the bottom. This anti-war attitude undoubtedly ran the risk of losing readers, as the tide of patriotism was dominating the mediated debate. While the pro-conscription posters (Posters 4.3 and 4.4) regard national service and the National Register as express ways of winning the war, Poster 4.5 considers it a Prussian method copied from the Germans. Poster 4.5 was directly targeted against conscription, arguing that conscription is not British rather than illustrating the effect of war on the working class; whilst Poster 4.6 mocked the National Register and accompanying registration certificate system.
Poster 4.5 For Future Use

[Published in *The Herald* on 5th June 1915, on p. 1]
Poster 4.6 Dependents

[Published in The Herald on 14th August 1915 on p. 1]
Women and the First British National Register

As Dahlgren (2009) and Couldry (2004) both emphasised, various actors (political and economic elites, citizens and the mass media) can generate different levels of power to influence the political agenda and other matters. The inclusion of women in the first British national register illustrates how suffragettes and political elites affected the national register agenda in the press.

The First World War opened out new opportunities and altered conditions for women, which brought in turn gradual acknowledgement of the right – and the need – for women to move from the private to the public sphere of activity. (Condell and Liddiard 1987: 21)

Marwick (1991) and Byles (1985) also saw the First World War as a progressive force in reversing the social and political role of women of all classes in Britain. The inclusion of women in the National Register 1915 undoubtedly ignited a series of debates both in the media and in Parliament; and the final decision to include women in the national service was an outcome of two main reasons: the shortage of labour in munitions production and other industries, and the campaign led by the Women’s Social and Political Union which had been fighting for women’s political and social rights (especially suffrage). When war broke out, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, President of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, appealed to her members to join the war effort: “Let us prove ourselves worthy of citizenship, whether our claim be recognised or not” (Condell and Liddiard 1987: 7). Although “the non-violent work of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies was eclipsed by the sensational tactics of the new militant Women’s Social and Political Union – the suffragettes” (Condell and Liddiard 1987: 3), the claims later made by the WSPU were very similar to Ms. Fawcett’s.

On July 6th 1915, the Daily Mail reported a women’s march organised by the WSPU to call for women’s cooperation in war work. On that day, the WSPU demonstrated to Mr Lloyd George their eagerness to make munitions and do other war work, which they hoped would release men for the front. They carried banners bearing slogans such as:

- Shells made by a wife may save her husband’s life.
- For men must fight and women must work.
Women believe in duty as well as rights.

We demand the right to serve.

The WSPU campaign for women’s inclusion in national service would please Lloyd George, who was facing a great deal of pressure to produce enough munitions; this would be much easier to achieve if more labour became available, men or women. However, the proposal unsettled some politicians (such as Sir T. P. Whittaker, M.P. for Spen Valley 1892-1919, and Mr. J. M. Robertson, M.P. for Tyneside 1906 to 1918) and the media (such as The Herald, and Lovat Fraser of the Daily Mail). Sir Thomas Whittaker even moved an amendment to remove women from the National Registration Bill 1915 during its legislative progress through the House of Commons, arguing that the service of women was unnecessary and very limited. Lovat Fraser also opposed the inclusion of women in the National Registration Bill, arguing that such a measure would be a waste of time and money. The Herald again employed the tool of war posters to oppose the inclusion of women in national service, not by arguing that it was unnecessary, but instead portraying the sufferings of poor women (see Poster 4.7).

War work might appeal to the WSPU as beneficial for their cause, “but not all women’s war work could offer the glamour, pity and exhilaration that were generally thought to be the reward of the successful war nurse” (Ouditt 1994: 47). For those women “without financial independence, who were of course the great majority” (Condell and Liddiard1987: 7), war not so glorious, as Poster 4.7 illustrates. They suffered from the “consequent drop in income” due to losing their men to recruiting, while the unemployment caused by “the initial economic disruption” and the lack of protection by “the male trade unions or by any welfare system” (Condell and Liddiard 1987: 7) worsened their situation. The enthusiasm for war, or patriotism generally, was seen more among middle and upper class women. As Marwick (1991: 127) noted:

Many women of the middle and upper classes showed from the start great anxiety to contribute to the patriotic cause. Indeed one of the most interesting psychological phenomena of the war is the way in which the suffragettes, who for ten years had been waging war on the Government and the community, now outshone everyone in their patriotic fervour and stirring appeals for national unity and endeavour.

In contrast, lower-middle and working class women were more concerned with how to survive the war peril, as Condell and Liddiard’s work shows.
Enthusiastic or not, the inclusion of women in the National Register 1915 provided more eligible labour for munitions, industrial and agricultural work, which contributed a great deal to the final war victory. Until July 1914, there had been 212,000 women employed in various industries, especially textiles and clothing, where women made up 58% and 68.1% of the workforce respectively. By April 1918 there were around 4,808,000 women workers employed in industrial work, most of them from working-class families.

Despite their participation in the war work,

In the months immediately following the war, the attitude in the press towards women changed radically. They were suddenly urged to 'go home', release their jobs to returning soldiers, or to get back to domestic service and the laundry trade where they were really needed. This sudden surge of press hostility is quite startling in comparison with the exaggerated praise heaped upon women in the war years. In such a climate, the thousands of women who lost their jobs received little public sympathy, and the Government, anxious about the escalating costs of out-of-work donation, and nervous about the possible social impact of thousands of disillusioned, unemployed ex-servicemen, used labour exchanges to push women into what was seen as more appropriate work. (Braybon 1995: 153)

Therefore, while the British national newspapers’ attitude towards the inclusion of women in the National Register Bill 1915 could be seen as supportive, it was nevertheless transitory and superficial. The suffragettes had taken advantage of the opportunity to achieve more in their political agenda. In Poster 4.7 we see a representation of what was left for working-class women, who did not enjoy much financial independence. Thus it would be wrong to claim that the First World War transformed the social and political status of British women; however, it is also misleading to argue that the war had no long-term influence whatsoever in changing the social-economic status of women.
Poster 4.7 Is War So Glorious?

[Published in The Herald on 8th May 1915, on p. 1]
Next, the news items were analysed in order to extricate the main themes. Sixteen themes were identified:

1. The need for conscription and the National Register.
2. Comparison between conscription and voluntary systems.
3. Public opinion on conscription/voluntary systems/National Register.
4. The scope and impact of the National Register.
5. The National Register legislation in the Houses of Commons and Lords.
6. The completion of the National Register forms.
7. The local compilation of the national register.
8. The cost of the national register.
9. The handling of data gained from the National Register.
10. The history of conscription in other countries and areas.
11. National registers and conscription in other countries and areas.
12. The handling of National Registration Cards.
13. Strikes and national service.
15. The timetable for the introduction of the National Register.
16. Others
Figure 4.4 reveals how many times each theme appeared.

![The Frequency of Themes](image)

The switch from voluntary recruitment to conscription was not completed without many fights over the policy, which explains the dominance of themes such as the need for the National Register and conscription, and the comparison between voluntarism and conscription. The discussion on the legislation, cost, timetable for the introduction of the National Register and how to compile the Register followed quickly upon the debate regarding whether or not compulsory service should be adopted. In addition, a considerable amount of media coverage tried to explain to the public what this registration was and how it could be compiled on a national scale to help win the war. After the passing of the National Register Act 1915, the focus of the mediated debate was switched from ‘voluntarism vs. conscription’ to official instructions for completing registration forms and the handling of data.

As Phillips (1995: 109) points out, the First World War marked a “significant and lasting break in the statistics of the Registrar-General”. The General Register Office was directly responsible for the compilation of the National Register in 1915, which to some extent stretched the statistical capacity of the GRO to its extreme. Therefore the GRO distributed large amounts of brochures and leaflets, instructing the British on how to complete the registration forms, and most of the newspapers published those official instructions to help with the introduction of the Register.

As a next step, it is necessary to review the frequency and length of quotation of group actors
before studying the individual actors. As Table 4.2 illustrates, the Liberal Party (individually and collectively) appeared more frequently than any other group, with the second longest quotation of 8,528 words. The Conservative Party was the second most mentioned and quoted group actor, with the longest quotation of 11,949 words. Among other group actors, central and local government authorities, policing and military authorities, organisations and their representatives were the secondary main groups involved in the public debate of National Register and related issues.

The Decline of the Liberals and the Rise of Labour

The First World War transformed British politics. Before 1914, Britain was “not a democracy, even in purely political sense: the franchise was not based on any universalist principle, but on certain property or residential qualifications, with the result that two-fifths of all men, apart from all women, did not have the vote; some men had several votes” (Marwick 1991: 29). In 1918, the last year of the First World War, Government passed a Representation of the People Act, which gave the vote to all men over 21, and to women who were over 30 or over 21 and householders (owned their house) or married to householders. In addition, party politics took a dramatic turn, with a decline in Liberal strength and a rise in Labour influence, even though the Liberal and Conservative parties were the top two most quoted actors. In 1918 the number of Liberal M.P.s dropped to 161, where there had been 272 in December 1910 and 400 in 1906. As Marwick explains,

The war experience gravely weakened the Liberals, cruelly testing their unwillingness to adopt collectivist remedies in the national emergency, and their faith in traditional liberal values, while it greatly strengthened Labour, through the participation of its leaders in the successful wartime coalition, and through the greater confidence and cohesion the working class as a whole derived from its participation in the war effort. (Marwick 1991: 27)

The traditional liberal values did “lack a strong concept of citizenship” (Carter 1998: 70), which naturally put the Liberals in a dilemma when faced with the first total war in modern times. Indeed, Pugh (1995: 11) argued that

In 1914 many Liberals regarded Britain’s entry into war as a defeat for them. Even ministers like Grey and Asquith, who felt certain that it was in Britain’s national interest to prevent another French defeat at the hands of Germany, were depressed at the turn of events.
In an effort to sustain the power of the Liberal Party in the face of growing criticism over
domestic and foreign policies, Lloyd George, as a pro-conscription figure, decided to steer
the Party away from traditional liberal values and into the stream of collectivism through the
introduction of the National Registration Bill 1915. As Minister of Munitions he did achieve
great results through imposing his ideas of national mobilisation and organisation. However,
his policy backfired due to divisions in the Liberal Party over conscription, as well as strong
opposition from the Labour Party and anti-conscription groups. Indeed, “even the passing
of the Military Service Acts in the early months of 1916 did not bring to an end the fight
against conscription” (Carsten 1982: 64).

Meanwhile, as the war peril worsened, there was an increasing demand for labour for the
frontline and for industry. This inevitably led to a situation of full employment, which
“greatly strengthened the bargaining power of the workers and produced another major
advance for the trade union movement, whose membership rose from just over 4 million to 6
million between 1914 and 1918” (Pugh 1995: 20).

The First World War also saw the Labour Party achieving a new status by entering the
Cabinet in 1915 and participating in the Coalition Government of 1916-17. Labour seized the
opportunity presented by the weakening position of the Liberals to capture trade-union and
working class support.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Length of Quotation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central and Local Official Authorities</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Authorities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing and Military Authorities</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Media</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Authorities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of Institutions</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>11949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>8528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Nationalist Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Parliamentary Party</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Public</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Authorities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 Frequency and Length of Quotation of Group Actors
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading Actors</th>
<th>Length of Quotation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>Daily Express</em>’s 214 readers</td>
<td>9195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mr. Walter Long, <em>Conservative M.P.</em></td>
<td>8468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>President of Local Government Board 1915-16,</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The person who introduced the National Register Bill.</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mr. Lloyd George, <em>Liberal M.P., Minister of Munitions 1915-16</em></td>
<td>3197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Lord Lansdowne, <em>Conservative</em></td>
<td>2487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mr. Ellis Griffith, <em>Liberal M.P., Under-Secretary for the Home Office</em></td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lord Haldane, <em>Liberal</em></td>
<td>714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Lord St. Davies, <em>Liberal</em></td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sir Charles Macara, <em>President of the International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers’ Associations</em></td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3 Length of Quotation of Leading Actors

Table 4.3 lists all the leading actors involved in the mediated public debate of British national registration and identity cards, each with a quotation of more than 500 words published in newspapers. Actors from all walks of life are represented – readers, Conservative M.P.s, Liberals, representatives of organisations and two religious authorities. The reason for treating 214 readers of the *Daily Express* as one collective actor is that their post cards to the editor were a direct response to the paper’s call for patriotic actions, and expressed very similar opinions. In 1915, the *Daily Express* appealed to their readers to send simple and clear postcards rather than letters to summarise in a few sentences “what would you do if you were the Government”. Thousands of postcards were sent, 214 of which were published in a series of news reports. The postcards were full of radical opinions and harsh language. For example, in a card published on May 15th, 1915 on page 6, James H. Harvey of Oxon wrote:
Conscription at once. Retire Haldane and McKenna. Confiscate all German, Austrian, and Turkish money invested in British firms.

In a card published on the same page, A. L. Harwood of Stainers had written:

Kick out of office all pro-Germans, make the more wealthy keep the poorer, and make all cultivate food and make clothing and everything that is necessary for our brave soldiers. Compel all who will not work but are drinkers to be soldiers.

Other strict and patriotic methods advocated by Daily Express readers included immediate martial law, a free hand for Lord Kitchener and Lord Fisher, business organisation of labour, full public disclosure of all facts that would not be of use to the enemy, employment of interned Germans on the land, and increased employment of women. It is difficult to judge the integrity of the postcards or to find out whether they were altered and manipulated by the Daily Express. Even so, the published postcards did prove one thing: a section of the public was so concerned about the peril of war that they agreed to take any means necessary to ensure victory (Bromley 1998). This message was instrumental in setting the conditions to introduce a war emergency bill in relation to conscription. In June 1915, soon after the Daily Express published the postcards, Mr. Walter Long brought the National Registration Bill 1915 to the House of Commons under the ‘Ten Minute Rule’ so as to avoid the first reading.

The Local Government Board also played a vital part in the compilation of the first national register in the UK, and contributed to the development of war propaganda. As L’Etang (1998: 414) observes, “While central government determines overall legislation, locally elected bodies implement policy within the constraints of their local budgets.”

All the leading actors listed in Table 4.3 supported this bill completely, even Lord Haldane, who was wrongly attacked by the Daily Express and its readers as “pro-German”. In this situation all the efforts of The Herald, a weekly working-class newspaper which used ten strongly opinionated war posters on its front pages and four editorials to ruthlessly accuse the rich of capitalising and depriving the working class, could not stop the war propaganda machine or prevent the introduction of conscription.

Having identified the leading actors, it is also important to know what they said; that is, the evidence they used to support their claims. The main types of evidence were as follow:
1. Ratio of married men in the military and the resulting consequences/costs.

2. The number of men recruited under voluntary/compulsory systems.

3. The Census 1911.

4. The achievement of efficient organisation and mobilisation in the past and in other countries.

5. The contribution to the war from the working class, middle class and upper class.

6. The need for efficient organisation and mobilisation in the UK.

7. Speeches by public figures.

8. Public opinion.

9. Women’s involvement in the National Register and war work.

10. The necessity for the Registration Bill since the Government had already got more power under the Munitions Acts.

11. Interference with the personal liberty of the citizen.

12. The credibility of the Coalition Government.

13. Expected voluntary help from citizens to reduce cost and save time associated with operation of the Register.

14. The ethics of conscription and national service, including “Prussianism”.

15. The impact of the age limits and occupation restrictions in recruiting.

16. The war casualties and munitions struggles.
As can be seen from Figure 4.5 above, the frequency of the evidences used by actors to support their argument is in accordance with the frequency of the themes. The need for efficient organisation and national mobilisation of all eligible labour and resources in Britain was the official and most common explanation used by pro-conscription actors to support the National Register and national service. Meanwhile, anti-conscription actors attacked the idea of compulsory national service as “Prussianism”, “unBritish” and a waste of time and money. They argued that voluntary recruitment would ensure the quality and patriotism of the soldiers, whilst conscription would mean that many “slackers” were enlisted. However, mounting war casualties and the shortage of munitions became very persuasive evidence to silence the anti-conscription actors, who were accused of delaying the national organisation and mobilisation. One interesting argument made by some actors justified the recruitment of single men instead of married men on the basis that not only were single men cheaper in terms of cost/compensation, but they were also more morally correct by being loyal to the idea of family.
4.3 Frame Analysis of Newspaper Coverage on British National Register and ID Cards in 1915

4.3.1 Key Words and Phrases Hunting

I found the following map very helpful in identifying and categorising key words and phrases manually. Key words and phrases are not necessarily those appearing most frequently in the news. They usually have emotional values and controversial meanings. For example, if one actor repeatedly emphasises the importance of being a good citizen, or refers to the shameless slackers avoiding going to the front, then words and phrases like “good citizen” and “slackers” became key in identifying frames, because different people have different interpretations of citizenship and related issues. Patriots normally consider ‘serving their country’ as an important obligation to every ‘good citizen’; however, others may consider that responsibility to be forced upon individuals, whereas each person should act according to his own will. Therefore, it is essential to locate such emotional and controversial words as accurately as possible during the manual selection process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Key words/phrases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism Frame</td>
<td>War for liberty/freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany as a pagan power/scientific barbarians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberties of anonymity,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germanising of our free country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Glorious end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conscription is/not anti-democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forced labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism Frame</td>
<td>Do your duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enthusiasm/Patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indifference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ignorance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of courage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wastrels/slackers/shirkers/evasions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good/bad citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obligations/responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Make sacrifices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fair/unfair/unjustly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Include women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voice of the nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foolish optimism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Save the King/the Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capitalist/capitalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upper/Middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oppress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strike</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4 Key Word/Phrases Found in 1915 News

Poster 4.8 below represents an excellent example. The poster, titled “Is Your Conscience Clear?”, was published repeatedly in almost every national newspaper and targeted those eligible men who had not yet enlisted. Words like “conscience”, “doing your share”, “crisis”, and “duty” were selected on purpose, aiming to impose a moral burden upon the state’s subjects. Those words are exactly what the researcher needs to identify and locate during the key words/phrases hunting process.
Is Your Conscience Clear?

Ask your conscience why you are staying comfortably at home instead of doing your share for your King and Country.

1. Are you too old?
   The only man who is too old is the man who is over 38.

2. Are you physically fit?
   The only man who can say honestly that he is not physically fit is the man who has been told so by a Medical Officer.

3. Do you suggest you cannot leave your business?
   In this great crisis the only man who cannot leave his business is the man who is himself actually doing work for the Government.

If your conscience is not clear on these three points your duty is plain.

ENLIST TO-DAY.

God Save the King.
4.3.2 Distribution of Frames in General

Distribution of Master Frames in 1915 News (341 Items in Total) – Table 4.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberalism</th>
<th>Liberalism</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Capitalism</th>
<th>Capitalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915 News</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>341 items</td>
<td>11 items</td>
<td>37 items</td>
<td>174 items</td>
<td>17 items</td>
<td>2 items</td>
<td>11 items</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Means in favour of conscription/national register;

- Means against conscription/national register.

- Liberalism + rhetoric: The National Register can avoid the unfairness caused by the voluntary system by treating each citizen equally. Based on the theory of framing processes (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994), actors employing the liberalism master frame to support the National Register in 1915 (including political elites such as Mr. Walter Long, Mr. Josiah Wedgwood, Liberal M. P. for Newcastle-under-Lyme, Mr. J. Cathcart Wason, Liberal M. P. for Orkney and Shetland, and Lord Milner; mass media such as the Daily Mail editorial on 6th July 1915; and citizens such as readers who wrote letters to newspapers appealing for compulsion) defined the reality as follows: The voluntary recruitment system caused unfairness to those who fought at the front and their families; the burden of fighting the war should be equally distributed among British citizen. In order to solve such unfairness, compulsion and national registration were demanded to replace voluntarism. This rhetoric was designed to oppose anti-compulsion argumentation from the perspective of individual liberalism.

- Liberalism – rhetoric: The National Register is infringing personal liberties, restricting personal freedom, and giving too much power to the Government. Radicals like Sir Thomas Whittaker, Mr. Holt, Mr. Russell Rea, Mr. J. W. Wilson, and Mr. Murray Macdonald were concerned by the powers already bestowed upon the Government by the Defence of the Realm Act and the Munitions Act. With the introduction of the
National Registration Act 1915, the Government would gain further control over all
man-power and productive power.

- Nationalism + rhetoric: The National Register is the only possible means to end the war
effectively and efficiently, and thus defend the British Empire. For the pro-National
Register actors (including most of the British national newspapers and most of the
British political elites), the reality was that national registration was crucial for
mobilising and organising the country for purposes of national defence; while
alternatives such as voluntarism were not sufficiently powerful to win the war.

- Nationalism – rhetoric: The National Register is a waste of time and money, especially in
the middle of the war. Radicals argued that the Defence of the Realm Act and the
Munitions Act would be sufficient for war use.

- Capitalism + rhetoric: All classes of society are contributing to the war service. This
rhetoric was only found in two articles in *The Times*, used to rebuke *The Daily Herald*'s
argument as shown below.

- Capitalism – rhetoric: The capitalists are exploiting the working class in the name of the
National Register. *The Daily Herald* was the sole campaigner employing this
argumentation. For *The Daily Herald*, the working class was pressed by capitalists
(political and economic elites) both to fight at the front and to produce war munitions at
home. This reality was manifested by *The Daily Herald* to target working class
audiences.
### 4.3.3 Distribution of Frames in Each Newspaper

Distribution of Master Frames in 1915 News (10 newspapers, 341 items in total) – Table 4.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Liberalism +</th>
<th>Liberalism -</th>
<th>Nationalism +</th>
<th>Nationalism -</th>
<th>Capitalism +</th>
<th>Capitalism -</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Times and Sunday Times (74 items)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 items</td>
<td>4 items</td>
<td>35 items</td>
<td>2 items</td>
<td>2 items</td>
<td>1 item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail (55 items)</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 items</td>
<td>5 items</td>
<td>30 items</td>
<td>2 items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror (22 items)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 items</td>
<td>8 items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1 item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph (33 items)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 item</td>
<td>5 items</td>
<td>15 items</td>
<td>2 items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Express (40 items)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 items</td>
<td>3 items</td>
<td>31 items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Manchester Guardian (60 items)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 items</td>
<td>28 items</td>
<td>6 items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Herald (19 items)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 items</td>
<td>4 items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 items</td>
<td>9 items</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News of World (12 items)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 item</td>
<td>6 items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Observer (12 items)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 item</td>
<td>9 items</td>
<td>1 item</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People (14 items)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.4 Frame Analysis of 1915 News

Table 4.5 displays the overall distribution of the master frames across all 341 pieces of news with regard to the national newspapers’ representation of the public debate over the National Register and related issues in 1915. The nationalism frame, including both valences, with regard to the mediated debate of the National Register was found in 191 out of 341 items, which proves its dominant position in the mediated debate. The relatively less popular liberalism frame was found in only 48 out of 341 items, accounting for just 14% of the distribution. Compared with those two master frames, the capitalism frame was even less represented, with only 13 items. It is also noticeable that 187 items used frames to support the National Register, while only 65 items employed frames to oppose the Register.

The data in general reveal that nationalism was the dominant view in the mediated public debate of the first National Register in Britain. In addition, more than half of the newspaper coverage of the debate was in favour of the National Register. Most of the national newspapers, including The Times, Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph, Daily Express, Manchester Guardian, News of the World, Observer and People, encouraged the idea of the National Register in its editorials and other news articles, in which nationalism frames were employed as a powerful philosophical weapon. The Herald, with its limited resources and influence, continued to fight against the concept of national registration and related issues such as conscription. That paper employed capitalism as its main rooted worldview to interpret conscription, munitions work, strikes, and the National Register.

In comparison with the nine other newspapers’ enthusiastic promotion of the National Register in the name of patriotism and nationalism, The Herald took a completely different perspective to examine the proposal for national registration and its by-products, for example, conscription and Registration Certificates. The Herald claimed that national registration and conscription were new ways for capitalists to exploit the working class, which would lead to a further deterioration of their living conditions. Nevertheless, the National Register was hugely endorsed by powerful and influential national newspapers, from The Times to the News of the World. The following section will explain in detail how the two camps represented the public debate of the National Register in 1915.
How the Master Frames were Represented in the 1915 Debate

This section will divide the ten national newspapers into two camps: one in favour of the National Register such as *The Times* and *Daily Express*; the other against the National Register and related issues, represented only by *The Herald*. In this way, it is possible to contrast how the two camps constructed their arguments through different master frames.

Nationalism Master Frame

First, it is natural to look more closely at the dominant force in this mediated debate – the nine national newspapers in favour of the National Register. For these papers, the nationalism frame was the major philosophy underlying their arguments. For example, on 23rd June 1915 *The Times* issued an extended editorial, ‘A National Register’, to emphasise the significance of the Register, claiming it as “the most important work before the new Government”. The same editorial condemned the voluntary recruiting system, stating that “the haphazard method of recruiting by advertisement leaves the nation as a whole with sense of doubt and depression and lack of leadership”. It also attacked critics of the National Register, suggesting that not every British man “knew where his duty lay”. In this editorial, *The Times* perceived the National Register from the perspective of national interest; that is, how to win the war most effectively in order to end the war peril. It reassured readers that the National Register was the right way to achieve national organisation, because Britain faced a long and tough war against Germany and the voluntary system did not work well. Based on this philosophy, *The Times* published another nine editorials in June, July, August and September, all emphasising the significance of the National Register in winning the war.

*The Times’* great effort in its editorials was, to some extent, related to readers’ doubts over the National Register. On 31st May 1915, a reader wrote to the editor disputing the functionality of the National Register and stating that “it is to be hoped that precious time is not to be wasted in taking a census of sorts before instituting compulsory service”. Although sharing *The Times’* patriotism, this reader believed that the National Register was a waste of time.
This is a good example with which to explain the valence of the master frame. Both *The Times*’ editor and this reader employed the nationalism frame to interpret the National Register, even though they disagreed over the necessity and functionality of the Register. In both cases their concerns centred on national interest, especially in war time. This explains *The Times*’ continuous efforts in its editorials to convince readers of the necessity and significance of the National Register.

Nationalism is interwoven with patriotism. When, in 1914, Britain faced two unprecedented challenges – Irish Home Rule and the First World War, Lloyd George, in one of his famous speeches presented at the Queen’s Hall in London, claimed that “there is something infinitely greater and more enduring which is emerging already out of this great conflict – a new patriotism, richer, nobler, and more exalted than the old”. *The Times*’ patriotic rhetoric and Lloyd George’s enthusiastic appeal both appear to reflect the rise of British nationalism at the beginning of the First World War. However, Coetzee (1992) argued that British nationalism during the war was not as cohesive as Lloyd George described; rather, it is problematic. For example, amongst the readers’ postcards published by the *Daily Express* to represent public opinion on the Government’s war efforts, many referred to the internment and naturalisation of aliens and the handling of British subjects of mixed parentage. This phenomenon was interpreted by Coetzee (1992: 363, 364) as a nationalism ideology “drawing on the negative connotations ascribed to aliens”. Restrictions requiring the registration and monitoring of alien citizens in Britain were welcomed by *Daily Express* readers as long as no such law would apply to the British themselves. Conscription in Germany was described by many British national newspapers as a Prussian method of controlling citizens; whilst conscription in Britain was nevertheless portrayed as a noble and necessary universal service.
Liberalism Master Frame

Naturally, the media representation of the 1915 public debate over the National Register also contained other philosophies and worldviews. On 6th July 1915 a Daily Mail editorial, titled ‘Grossly Unfair, the Injustice of Voluntary System’, criticised the voluntary recruiting system, but the arguments were not framed entirely in terms of the national interest. Rather, the editorial referred to individual liberties, condemning voluntarism for its cruelty in taking away married men and creating orphans and widows; for its “immense cost” and for applying “moral pressure by bullying posters or recruiting dames to the manhood of the country”. Thus the Daily Mail used a different strategy from The Times to win support for the National Register and conscription, borrowing the liberalism frame as well as the nationalism frame to argue against the voluntary system. Injustice to the men involved, and to the widows and orphans left behind, and moral pressure on individuals, became the focuses of the mediated debate in the Mail. These themes arose when the nationalism and liberalism frames were mixed up during the debate.

Among those actors employing the liberalism frame, there were different opinions over the National Register. Some regarded the Register as a necessary method to decrease the moral burden; others believed that the National Register infringed personal liberties, restricted personal freedom, and gave too much power to the Government. For example, on 2nd July 1915, a Daily Mail parliamentary report quoted from several ‘radicals’ who argued that:

This House declines to proceed with this Bill until proof has been adduced that the powers already possessed by the Government, amplified by the Munitions Bill, are insufficient for the production of the necessary munitions of war.

These ‘radicals’ raised the concern over the power balance between the Government and the public; in this case, their major concern was based on the individual liberalism frame.

Capitalism Master Frame

We have seen how the liberalism and nationalism frames dominated the media representation of the public debate in nine national newspapers. This section will look at how The Herald fought back under the capitalism frame. On 22nd May 1915, George Lansbury, socialist politician and one of the founders of The Herald, explained the reason why tram men were on
strike in war time, and at the same time criticised the behaviour of the press for “representing them [tram men] to the public as a set of mean-spirited, avaricious persons, whose sole idea of life is to squeeze as much money as possible out of the public … [and] blame the working class for all the evils which befall us as a nation”.

Lansbury tried to explain to the public why the working class chose such a time to strike and why some newspapers painted the striking workers as evil. Already, The Herald had for many weeks been publishing whole-page cartoons on its front-page to illustrate how the capitalists exploited the working class under the name of munitions work. Those cartoons vividly represented the current situation of the working class, especially in war time - low pay, little respect, poor living standards and long working hours. However, The Herald’s deeply-rooted capitalism frame did not fit in with the mainstream ideologies and was ineffective in fighting against the National Register. In any case, The Herald’s influence was restricted. At that time the paper was experiencing financial difficulties and conflicts among board members. Lansbury tried his best to keep The Herald in the market, but in 1914 extreme financial problems had forced the paper to change from daily to weekly publication.

In summary, the nationalism frame was the dominating ideology that ruled the mediated public debate of the National Register and related issues in 1915. The liberalism and capitalism frames were not strong enough to compete against the nationalism frame. Nine out of ten national newspapers, including those with high power and influence, all passionately supported the National Register, in an environment of general public endorsement.
In-depth Analysis of the Distribution of Frames across Newspapers

The above section has explained how the nationalism, liberalism and capitalism frames were interwoven with the newspapers’ representation of the first National Register and related issues. It is those philosophies that decide the actors’ arguments in the public debate. In addition to the descriptions of the master frames, it is also important to examine Table 4.6 much more thoroughly in order to compare the distribution of frames in terms of newspaper and frame valence. The following tables illustrate the contribution of every newspaper in supporting or opposing the National Register in 1915.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Number of Items In favour of N.R.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Express</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Manchester Guardian</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Observer</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News of the World</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7 Newspapers Ranking in supporting the National Register
Table 4.8 Newspapers Ranking in Opposing the National Register

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Items Against N.R.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Herald</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Manchester Guardian</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Express</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Observer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News of the World</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8 Newspapers Ranking in Opposing the National Register

Quality Newspapers during World War I

As shown in Table 4.7, in 1915 The Times provided the greatest number of items to support the National Register, with 40 items. The Manchester Guardian and Daily Telegraph offered 28 items and 16 items respectively supporting the Register. Together these three quality national newspapers contributed 45% of the total supportive coverage; whilst the six popular newspapers contributed the rest. The statistics shown in Table 4.8 indicate that these three quality newspapers also contributed nearly half of the total items opposing the National Register, with 27 out of 58 items. These figures tell us some stories about the role of quality newspapers during World War I, especially in the coverage of the National Register debate.
1. *The Times* and Lord Northcliffe in 1915

“Propaganda is widely given credit for helping Britain to victory in 1918” (Balfour 1979: 3), and Lord Northcliffe was an essential part of Britain’s propaganda machine. Lord Northcliffe, real name Alfred Harmsworth, and Director for Propaganda from 1917, purchased *The Times* and rescued it from financial difficulties in 1908 (Camrose 1947). According to Viscount Camrose (1947: 24):

> The fiction that there had been no change in control or ownership was maintained in a formal way for a number of years. Northcliffe’s name did not appear on the share register until 1912 and he did not become a Director until 1916 … [however] it was a comparatively short time before he was in full control of the paper in every respect.

Northcliffe’s ownership of *The Times* lasted until his death in 1922, after which the paper was sold to John Astor. In 1915, Northcliffe was “the dominant force in British journalism, more dominant in that sphere than even Rupert Murdoch today” (Temple 2008: 31). He controlled 40 percent of the morning newspapers, 45 percent of the evening papers and 15 percent of the Sunday papers (Thompson 2006).

In 1912 Northcliffe appointed Geoffrey Dawson as editor of *The Times*, after being impressed by Dawson’s work as a correspondent. However, Dawson did not enjoy his position at *The Times*, unhappy with the way Northcliffe used the paper as a personal instrument to achieve his own political agenda (*The Times* 1952: 448,449).

In terms of the political agenda, early in the First World War Lord Northcliffe targeted national hero and then-Minister of War Lord Kitchener for his shortcomings in war strategies and tactics. He also attacked then-Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, which led to the stepping down of Asquith’s Cabinet and the birth of the first Coalition Government in 1915. It was Lord Northcliffe’s tremendous support that led to the appointment of David Lloyd George as Prime Minister in 1916 (*The Times* 1952). Although the criticism against Lord Kitchener and Mr. Asquith caused sales of *The Times* to plummet, mainly because Kitchener was admired by the public as a national hero, many Cabinet members shared dissatisfaction with Kitchener. While Lord Northcliffe and many politicians all realised the significance of national organisation and mobilisation in order to produce more munitions and enforce conscription, Lord Kitchener preferred voluntary recruitment and despised conscription as a disgraceful way to recruit (*The Times* 1952).
The above facts explain *The Times*’ continuous and firm position in support of conscription and the National Register, not only in 1914 and 1915, but throughout the First World War. There was little that Geoffrey Dawson could have done in 1915 to reverse Lord Northcliffe’s editorial position. This led to his resignation in 1919, although he regained his job in 1923 after *The Times* was sold to John Astor. Lord Northcliffe’s passionate involvement in employing newspapers as instruments to achieve his own political interest determined that in 1915 *The Times* followed his instructions precisely. This is made clear by the fact that the paper did not publish any of Lord Kitchener’s voluntarism campaign posters. Instead, it issued more editorials than any other national newspaper to emphasise the significance of the National Register and conscription in helping the war effort.

② *The Manchester Guardian* and Charles Prestwich Scott in 1915

C. P. Scott bought *The Manchester Guardian* from his uncle, John Taylor, the paper’s founder and a Liberal Member of Parliament. Taylor had pursued a progressive liberal agenda in his newspaper, and Scott certainly inherited his uncle’s spirit (Hammond 1934). *The Manchester Guardian* had the most items (9 items) using the liberalism frame to oppose the National Register, even more than *The Herald*. It also ranks second in Table 4.8, with 15 items opposing the National Register, just four items fewer than *The Herald*.

Scott insisted that news reporting required not only accuracy but also fairness. He encouraged free comments from readers, suggesting that they should be fair and frank. This might explain *The Manchester Guardian*’s large number of letters to the editor compared with other newspapers. However, *The Manchester Guardian* also published 28 pieces of news to support the National Register, alongside its 15 pieces of criticism. This can be explained by Scott’s policy in the First World War. According to Hammond (1946:37), when Scott took over the *Manchester Guardian*, “it was fortunate for him that Manchester was at that moment alive with important movements and rich in men of intellectual distinction”. Scott seized the golden opportunity to promote liberal ideas. Before war broke out, he visited both German influential figures and British ministers, urging that

The Government ought to make it plain from the first that if Russia and France went to war we should
not be in it. To the last he was against British participation in the war, but he recognised when the history of the negotiations in the closing weeks was made known in the Government’s White Paper, that Germany had thwarted Grey’s efforts for peace in rejecting his proposal for a Conference. (Hammond 1946: 51, 52)

However, as soon as Scott realised that war was inevitable, he started to support national registration and conscription (Ayerst 1971). As Hammond describes,

Scott saw at once that all controversy over pre-war policy must be suspended and that we were involved in a struggle that demanded the un-distracted strength of the nation. For the next four years, he was in close contact with leading Ministers.

Although an influential liberal figure, Scott “was in the best sense conservative”, and “he threw himself into the task of rallying Liberal opinion … [however], when war declared, he recognised that the position was radically changed … He was in repeated communication with Ministers, and was always ingeminating the need of greater effort and radical remedies for the stupidity and obstructiveness in high places” Hobhouse (1946: 84, 87-88).

C. P. Scott’s personal belief in liberalism certainly had at least some impact on how The Manchester Guardian reported public debate on the National Register and related issues. Scott understood the dangers of conscription as well as the threat posed by Germany, and this dilemma explains the Manchester Guardian’s coverage of the public debate. In general, Scott stood firmly in defence of the British Empire; while at the same time he approached with caution the methods of national organisation.

3. Daily Telegraph and Lord Burnham in 1915

The Daily Telegraph had a very similar distribution of frames to that of The Manchester Guardian. After being purchased by Lord Burnham’s father in 1855, the price of the Daily Telegraph was reduced to one penny, in order to compete with other London-based newspapers such as The Times which sold for ten pence each. This aggressive strategy worked very well and within one year, the Daily Telegraph beat The Times in circulation (Camrose 1947). In the competition for readers the Daily Telegraph clearly did a better job than its rival, especially since Lord Northcliffe sacrificed The Times’ circulation in exchange for political interest. According to Viscount Camrose (1947), the Daily Telegraph emerged
from the First World War as one of the most respected newspapers in the country.

One *Daily Telegraph* strategy in its reporting of the National Register debate was to interview influential local figures in big cities, quoting from their claims instead of publishing aggressive editorials to convince its readers. Several special pieces of surveys in large cities were instrumental in convincing its readers that the National Register and conscription were the best responses to the war peril.

**Popular Newspapers during World War I**

Tables 4.7 and 4.8 demonstrate that popular newspapers such as the *Daily Mail* and *Daily Express* played as active a role in the public debate over the National Register as did the quality newspapers. During the First World War, popular newspapers were strictly controlled by the British Government because they were the primary method for the British at home to get first hand accounts of the front line. Under the system designed by Lord Kitchener, many reporters followed the British troops at the front and provided eye-witness reports of conflicts and first-hand stories of war. The following paragraphs give background information to explain the distribution of frames in popular newspapers in 1915.

1. *Daily Mail* - another propaganda tool owned by Lord Northcliffe

According to Camrose (1947: 54), during the First World War the *Daily Mail* had the third largest circulation, behind the *Daily Express* and *Daily Mirror*, with *The Herald* in fourth place. The *Daily Mail*, which like *The Times* was owned by and under the editorial control of Lord Northcliffe, took a very strong patriotic line in the reporting of the National Register. Although Northcliffe’s brother, Harold Harmsworth, also known as Lord Rothermere, shared ownership of the *Daily Mail*, he only handled the business operation of the newspaper, leaving editorial matters to Lord Northcliffe (Boyce 1987).

Lord Northcliffe believed strongly in the importance of conscription and the National Register to help the war effort. As noted by *The Times* (1952: 207), “The *Daily Mail* had long...
emphasized the necessity of compulsory military service.” However, his opinion was despised by Lord Kitchener, the war hero admired by the British public. This political divergence caused Northcliffe to attack Kitchener’s war strategies and tactics very bitterly; indeed, after Kitchener died, the Daily Mail even commented that his death was a great piece of luck for the British Empire. However, while it was Lord Northcliffe’s enormous passion for politics that had ensured the early success of the Daily Mail immediately after it was born in 1896, the same passion was to cost him greatly. In 1915, at the height of the battle with Kitchener, circulation plummeted.

Yet despite Northcliffe’s troubles and falling circulation, the ideas of conscription and the National Register were much better received by politicians and the public in 1915 than they had been in 1914. The reason lay in the massive first-hand reporting from the front line by reporters from various newspapers. The scale of the casualties, the shortage of munitions, and the shortcomings of the voluntary recruiting system were among the issues repeatedly discussed in the platform of national newspapers.

Therefore, in the coverage of National Register issues in the Daily Mail, the nationalism master frame naturally became the dominating worldview used to convince readers of the advantages of conscription and the National Register. Thus conscription and the National Register became a widely accepted method not because of its brilliance, but as a sub-product of the war peril.

2. Daily Express – The most aggressive newspaper under Lord Beaverbrook’s control in 1915

The Daily Express was primarily aimed at middle-class and conservative working class households. It was strongly nationalist and imperialist and fiercely patriotic. The paper always carried a highly provocative title such as “The Voice of the Nation – Readers’ Opinion on the Conduct of the War”. Its aggressive articles arose out of the policy it had adhered to since its birth in 1900. According to Allen (1983: 16):

The policy of the paper was announced in the first issue and, like all journals it was, of course, going to be entirely impartial: ‘It will be the organ of no political party nor the instrument of any social clique … Its editorial policy will be that of an honest cabinet minister … Our policy is patriotic; our policy is the British Empire.’
Allen also claimed that the royal family was a ‘hobby horse’ for Beaverbrook, arguing that the issue had “dogged the *Express* for most of its life”, and that “The loyalty which the paper has always shown to the British Empire has drawn to the paper the type of reader who has very pronounced patriotic views.” (Allen 1983: 87)

According to Allen (1983: 23), in 1914 the *Express* did not have a strong identity; it was not taken seriously as a ‘quality’ paper, but neither was it on the lowest rung of the sensation-seeking popular press. Under the ownership of Max Aitken, also known as Lord Beaverbrook, that situation of anonymity was to change. Like Northcliffe, Aitken disliked Asquith and worked to oust him in favour of Lloyd George. Frustrated in politics owing to his difficult relationship with Lloyd George (Boyce, Curran and Wingate 1978), Beaverbrook channelled his energies into his newspaper. As Allen relates:

> He had always had a great regard for the Press as a means of influencing the way people think and it therefore made sense for him to acquire a newspaper. What is more, newspaper ownership would give him just the sort of power he desired, power without responsibility. In politics one is constrained by the other members of one’s party and by the voters, but the proprietor of a national newspaper could, in those days, push his opinions, prejudices and mere foibles as much as he liked. For this was the era of great Press magnates such as Northcliffe, Rothermere and the Berry brothers. (1983: 28)

Unlike *The Daily Telegraph*, which only interviewed influential industrial figures in large cities, the *Daily Express* appealed to its readers for opinions on the conduct of war. The paper published hundreds of readers’ postcards, encouraging ideas that were against the principle of individual liberty, but which fitted with the British national interest, such as the internment of Germans resident in Britain, and the use of poison gas against German troops. Coverage of the war was prominent, with little or no room left for human interest stories; and the paper glamorised conscription and the National Register. There was extensive coverage of national organisation, war casualties, recruitment advertising, and the conduct of the National Register, all from the perspective of the British national interest, which was to win the war and beat Germany.

The *Daily Express* and *Daily Mail* were rivals in many ways; however, they both employed the nationalism frame in interpreting conscription and the National Register. They might have used different tactics to convince their readers, but they shared the common ground that the nation should be organised in order to win the war against Germany.
As pioneers of war propaganda, what the *Daily Mail* and *Daily Express* did not predict was that the British public would become less trusting of the press after the First World War because what the soldiers read in the British newspapers was different from what they had experienced on the front line (Temple 2008).

3. *Daily Mirror* – Northcliffe’s newspaper for ‘gentlewomen’

The *Daily Mirror* was one of the first dailies to introduce photographs to its pages. It targeted women readers by including more amusing pieces, aiming to bring more light information to the people at home (Edelman 1966). It even minimised its news content to a double page, leaving plenty of space for adverts on female interests (Seymour & Seymour 2003). Unlike the *Daily Express*, the *Daily Mirror* covered a lot of human interest stories in wartime, and included advertisements for clothing outlets and food. In addition, because the paper had a long history of close connection with the trade union movement, some of the items covering the National Register debate were related to the workers’ strikes.

*The Daily Mirror* did not issue any passionate or aggressive editorials, letters to the editor or columns promoting the National Register and conscription. It took a neutral stance, explaining the necessity of conscription while raising questions about its social implications, and employing a mixture of liberalism and nationalism frames in its representation of the National Register debate. Its position as “the most popular paper in the trenches” (Edelman 1966:14) was won “because it carried portraits of home”.


These three weeklies were light and lively papers with more amusing content than was found in the quality and popular daily papers. The *News of the World* was undoubtedly the most popular weekly newspaper in Britain during wartime. Like the *Daily Mirror* it covered many human interest stories. Weekly newspapers also included many political cartoons as well as adverts appealing to their readers for voluntary recruitment. Throughout these three papers, the nationalism frame was dominant in the representation of the National Register debate in 1915. Indeed, J. L. Garvin, the then-editor of *The Observer* and a right-wing imperialist, had been advocating the proposal of conscription since the outbreak of the First World War.
The birth of *The Herald* might just have decided its dramatic history. Launched as a platform for the printers’ union, the London Society of Compositors, to carry on an industrial strike, it went on to be sponsored by trade unionists for the purpose of a permanent labour movement and to compete with the newspapers that championed the two main political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. However, it was independent of the official Labour Party. According to Richards (1997: 1),

> Richards (1997:12) points out that, because of its anti-capitalism frame, *The Herald* tended to view its rivals “in purely political terms”. This was to some extent inevitable, since it was alone in its stance as a Labour supporting paper. The reality of war caused a split in the Labour Party, with the mainstream majority supporting the war, but a significant minority in opposition. The latter faction included party leader Ramsay MacDonald, who resigned the post, as well as Keir Hardie, Philip Snowden and Lansbury (Richards, 1997).

Under Lansbury, a socialist politician and pacifist, the *Herald* took a decisive militant political position and in 1914 the paper achieved circulation of 50,000-150,000 a day (Richards 1997). However, as Richards noted, the outbreak of the First World War, and the resulting split within the left, radically reduced both its influence and its profit. Lansbury and his colleagues, core of the anti-war left, decided to switch the *Daily Herald* to a weekly. From the content analysis of the Herald’s representation of the National Register1915, it is evident that the paper played a key role in the campaign against the war. It was in the forefront of the movement against conscription and supported conscientious objectors.

Guided by its left-wing ideology, *The Herald* employed the capitalism frame to interpret the
National Register and conscription issue. During the First World War and afterwards, it strongly encouraged strikes and was a key player in the trade union movement in Britain. As Lansbury (1925: 17) was to explain later,

We were obliged to send agents about the country to buy the paper secretly, having it consigned to us in fictitious names, so as to secure what we needed. People who talk of the tyranny of Trade Unionism have very little conception of the open and secret tyranny exercised by the capitalist against those he wishes to destroy … those capitalists simply hated us because of our Labour origin and point of view.

The Herald overcame tremendous difficulties to deliver very clear and strong anti-war messages to the British people at home, supporting working-class strikes and informing the public of the war peril. Nevertheless, despite these great efforts in opposing conscription and the National Register, most of the national newspapers chose to compromise in the face of the national emergency.

4.4 Content and Frame Analysis of Newspaper Coverage on British National Register and ID Cards in 1919

With regard to the coverage in 1919 of the National Register and identity card, of three British national newspapers surveyed one carried no relevant news items, while the other two together yielded three items. Considering the small size of the sampling population, it was decided to combine the content and frame analysis together. Of the three items, The Manchester Guardian published a piece of hard news whilst The Times published a reader’s letter and an editorial. All three focused on discussion of the future of the National Register after the First World War.

In early 1919, Dr Thomas Stevenson, Superintendent of Statistics for the Register General, called for a single master register of the whole nation. The Manchester Guardian reported this proposal, and the opposition to it. Sir Edward Brabrook challenged Stevenson’s idea by implying that it would be the end of privacy. As early as January 1918, Mr. J. H. Whitehouse, M.P. for Mid-Lanark, had questioned the impact on civil liberty of the National Registration Amendment Bill 1918, when the Local Government Board, under the leadership of Hayes Fisher, proposed adding a clause that would allow the police to require production of the
Registration Certificate. Whitehouse condemned the clause as “alien to the traditions of this country” and as “bound to give rise to a great deal of friction and trouble” if included in the bill. The ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ case in 1951 could be seen as solid evidence in support of Whitehouse’s concern. It appeared that such a master register did not appeal to the Government or to the public as much as in 1915, when war emergencies pressed the Government to produce more and more information, and the task of providing that information fell to the General Register Office in England, Wales and Scotland.

In fact, ever since 1915, Stevenson had been working with Bernard Mallet, Register General of England and Wales, to create a permanent universal registration system for the U.K (Elliot 2008). Elliot’s (2008) work on the British national identity cards in the First World War explores the battles Mallet and Stevenson went through in building up such a national system, and the consequences of their work. He concludes that:

The introduction of a national identification system in 1915 was justified in terms of national emergency, but it was not uncontroversial: it was seen by opponents as unnecessary and costly bureaucracy which interfered with the liberty of the individual. But interference with the liberty of the individual was cast against the greater threat from the enemy. The rhetoric was similar to that used today in the ‘war against terror’, as freedoms are protected through increasingly restrictive legislation.

(Elliot 2008: 15)

The above remarks echo the findings of our analysis of news coverage of the National Register and ID cards in 1915.

In May 1919, The Times published a letter written by a town clerk named L. Walford, who wanted the Government to indicate whether the National Register was to be kept up as a permanent institution. A few days later, The Times issued an editorial calling for clear instructions from the Government with regard to the future of the National Register. Together with the evidence from The Manchester Guardian, this seems to indicate that after the war, the National Register became intolerable. As Elliot (2008: 15) explains:

In the face of national emergency, the majority of the population complied with the National Registration Act 1915, creating a vast and unwieldy bureaucracy which proved difficult and costly to maintain accurately, one of the fears about current proposals. However, the rationale for the National Registration Act, and maintaining the bureaucracy, fell away at the end of hostilities.
As I mentioned at the very beginning of Chapter 1, the potential for a wartime national register and identity card system was explored by civil servants like Bernard Mallet and Thomas Stevenson, who were in pursuit of a permanent registration system in Britain. Agar (2001) also argued that the success of the second national identity card system in Britain during the Second World War was due to its food-rationing function. In fact, as early as January 1918 the Government considered using the national register as a basis for food rationing in Britain, starting in Sheffield. On 14th January 1918, in its coverage of the Sheffield experiment, The Times noted that, “to bring the register up to date and to re-arrange it for the purpose of food distribution would be almost as big a task as to compile a completely new one”. Nevertheless, the National Register and its accompanying registration certificate system from 1914 to 1919 set the precedent for the national identity card system in the Second World War.
Chapter 5

Case Study 2: National ID card systems in 1939 and 1951

The Historical Debate of British National Identity Card Systems

5.0 Introduction

The national identity card system that operated throughout Britain during the Second World War is sometimes acknowledged as the first such system in Britain, partly because the certificate introduced in 1915 was never officially named as a national identity card; and partly because the later system was designed to include a vital function – the rationing of food such as milk and sugar. Furthermore, citizens were required to carry the WW2 identity card at all times and to produce it if demanded to do so by police or military authorities. The British national identity card system in the Second World War was the fruit of long preparation by the General Register Office, which sought to improve upon the system introduced for the First World War (Elliot 2008). Unlike the earlier scheme, which was introduced in the middle of the war, the second British national identity card system was implemented top-down at the very beginning of the Second World War; in fact, “preparations for this ‘National Register’ had already begun at the end of 1938 and were virtually complete by April 1939” (Nissel 1987: 75). The wartime system was abandoned in 1952 due a variety of reasons; and one of them was ‘set the people free’ (Redfern 1990: 511).

In Britain, the Second World War was known as “the people’s war”, a label that arose not only because the total war brought “an unprecedented degree of burden” to the British people, but also because it “function[ed] as a propaganda motif” (Donnelly 1999: 33). Conscription of all adult men and women was regarded as “one of the most striking illustrations of the extension of state powers in Britain during the Second World War” (1999: 45), as well as “central to wartime debates on social reconstruction and the nature of the relationship between citizen and state” (1999: 33).

This chapter will analyse the historical mediated debate of British national identity/entitlement cards in British national newspapers in 1939 and 1951, employing the traditional mass media research tools of content analysis and frame analysis. The main
purposes of these analyses are as follow: 1) using content analysis, to locate the themes that emerged in the mediated debate of British national identity cards; 2) using content analysis, to identify the actors involved in such debate and their arguments; 3) using frame analysis, to explain the argument each actor constructed throughout the debate.

5.1 The Identity Card System in the Second World War (1939 - 1952)

British Public Opinion and the Introduction of Conscription in 1939

Although the introduction of conscription in Britain was not announced in the House of Commons until 26th April 1939, on 1st June 1938 Chamberlain had informed the House that:

Outlines of a scheme in the form of a Draft Bill providing for compulsory military service on the outbreak of war have been in an advanced state of preparation since the year 1922, and have been the subject of consideration by successive Governments since that date.

From 1938 to early 1939, British public opinion, as indicated by the mainstream British national newspapers, had became “increasingly favourable” towards a national organisation scheme including peacetime conscription, both in the immediate aftermath of the September 1938 Munich Agreement and also after the German invasion of the Czechoslovak state in March 1939 (Hucker 2008). However, in view of the traditional British aversion to peacetime compulsory national service, Chamberlain had been very conservative on the matter of enforcing conscription. That is why, between the beginning of 1938 and October of that year, he emphasised several times in the House of Commons that conscription and national service would not be introduced by the British Government until the war emergencies.

The British Government, under Neville Chamberlain’s leadership, considered three possible options in response to German’s military threats towards Czechoslovakia: “either we could have threatened to go to war with Germany if she attacked Czechoslovakia, or we could have stood aside and allowed matters to take their course, or, finally, we could attempt to find a peaceful settlement by way of mediation”, as Chamberlain told the House of Commons on 28th September 1938. He clearly refused to assist Czechoslovakia in any way, because there was no treaty between the two countries. By that time, both the British Government and the public had been maintaining a seemingly pro-conscription but sceptical view towards the dramatic diplomatic climate. Public opinion was divided over the future of British foreign
and domestic policies. The British Right, including Churchill, Duff Cooper, and conservative newspapers owned by Lord Beaverbrook, became more and more inclined to urge the introduction of conscription, demanding that Chamberlain drop his appeasement view and introduce conscription as soon as possible (Hucker 2008). Both the Daily Mail and News Chronicle published public opinion poll results that showed a majority in favour of immediate conscription. Meanwhile, inevitably the British Left questioned the necessity of conscription in “ideologically motivated rhetoric” (Hucker 2008: 450), by emphasising the possible sacrifices that the British working class would have to make if conscription and national service were enforced. Ultimately, the German invasion of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 removed the last traces of illusion regarding appeasement. The national press started to echo the French opinion for a firm response towards Nazi Germany, including immediate conscription.

The National Registration Act 1939 and the Emergency Powers Act 1940

On 5 September 1939, at the outbreak of the Second World War, an emergency registration Act was passed, the National Registration Act 1939. Three reasons were given for the Act, as the Manchester Guardian revealed on 17th August 1939: First, as there had been no census since 1931, it was necessary to provide updated statistics about the population; this would include as complete a survey as possible of the available men and women for National Defence and fulfil the wartime need for complete manpower control and planning in order to maximise the efficiency of the war economy. The National Register was in effect an instant national census and it bears a close resemblance to the 1920 Census Act in many respects. Second, the Act provided a means, through identity cards, of reuniting families separated by evacuation schemes. Finally, the Act would facilitate the food rationing scheme, again through the identity cards. It was considered that the imminence of rationing (introduced from January 1940 onwards) entailed the need for an up-to-date system of universal registration in Britain.

The 1939 Act did not cease to function at the end of that war. By the time of its abolition in 1952 it was being used not just for the three purposes stated above, but for 39 other purposes, the most bizarre of which was to trace individuals who were guilty of bigamy (Agar 2001). In 1947, in a House of Commons debate on emergency laws, Aneurin Bevan, then Minister of Health, stated: “I believe that the requirement of an internal passport is more objectionable
than an external passport, and that citizens ought to be allowed to move about freely, without running the risks of being accosted by a policeman or anyone else, and asked to produce proof of identity.”

The period between 1939 and 1952 was the only time that Britain has had a complete and relatively successful identity card system. The compulsory issue of identity cards was part of the terms of the National Registration Act 1939. The Register comprised “all persons in the United Kingdom at the appointed time” and “all persons entering or born in the United Kingdom after that time”. A schedule to the Act listed “matters with respect to which particulars are to be entered in Register”. These were:

1. Name

2. Sex

3. Age

4. Occupation, profession, trade or employment

5. Residence

6. Condition as to marriage

7. Membership of Naval, Military or Air Force Reserves or Auxiliary Forces or of Civil Defence Services or Reserves.

It is evident that the second British national identity card system demanded more identification information from the citizen. Not only “attributed identity” (Cabinet Office 2009: 9) was included (such as full name and sex”, but “biographic identity” (Cabinet Office 2009: 9) was added into the system (such as occupation and employment). As Koops and etc (2009) argued, the identification system has been evolving towards a more and more complex direction.

Genevieve’s identity card, WW2 People’s War. WW2 People’s War is an online archive of wartime memories contributed by members of the public and gathered by the BBC. The archive can be found at bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar.
This time the local registers were backed up by a comprehensive central register held at the Central National Register Office near Southport. 7,000 transcript books contained details of 40 million registrations. Identity cards - folded cards with name and address but NOT date of birth - were issued. Neither of the two identity cards in World War One and World War Two required a photograph.

If the National Registration Act 1939 enabled the Government to interfere with the nation’s labour market and food rationing, then the Emergency Powers Act 1940 gave the state absolutely sweeping powers to do whatever it believed was necessary for the war effort. The experience gained from the First World War, together with that intensified “state interference in the nation’s social and economic life” helped Britain to become “the most rigorously planned and regimented society in Europe” (Donnelly 1999: 45). Meanwhile,

The collective experience of war and the apparent ability of the state to mobilise the national resources for a common goal were believed to have paved the way for a new relationship between citizen and state. This relationship grew out of the tacit wartime contract between government and people: in return for the civilian population’s tolerance of compulsory measures in pursuit of victory, the government committed itself to the fight against material and social deprivation beyond the end of the conflict. (Donnelly 1999: 49)

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6 Joyce Butterworth’s Identity Card, WW2 People's War. WW2 People's War is an online archive of wartime memories contributed by members of the public and gathered by the BBC. The archive can be found at bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar.
However, “the idea that the state should retain an enhanced role in the economic and social lives of citizens in peacetime did not win unanimous approval” (Donnelly 1999: 49).

In view of the social, legal and economic impacts of the wartime emergency legislation, it was inevitable that it would be reconsidered in peacetime. Take the national identity card system for example, under which the British public were required by law to carry the identity cards at all times for rationing use and to be checked by police if required. After the war ended, food and cloth rationing began to be phased out, and police were accused of abusing their power in checking people’s identity cards for no good reason; as a result, in 1952, the House of Commons decided to abolish the national identity card system. On 21st February 1952, Mr. Harry Crookshank, then Minister of Health and also responsible for the General Register Office, told fellow Members of Parliament that “Her Majesty’s Government have decided that it is no longer necessary to require the public to possess and produce an identity card, or to notify change of address for National Registration purposes though the numbers will continue to be used in connection with the National Health Service”.

In the following sections, thematic content analysis and frame analysis are employed to examine the mediated historical public debate of the British national identity card system in the Second World War.

5.2 Thematic Content Analysis of the Mediated Debate of National Registration and ID Cards in 1939

![Figure 5.1 The Number of Each Type of News Item](image)
The Decline of War Posters in the Second World War

Unlike the introduction of the first National Register in the U.K. in 1915, the re-introduction in 1939 met little resistance from either politicians or the public. As Elliot (2008: 15) noted,

As with much other administration, the lessons from the First World War were put to use in the Second. Vivian was Registrar General until 1945 and devoted a considerable amount of energy throughout the interwar period to perfecting his own plans for a new National Register in a future emergency. At the outbreak of World War Two, he was well prepared. Although the second National Register was still tied to conscription, the link with food rationing ensured that the emphasis was in entitlement as well as compulsion.

From the above figure, it is manifest that hard news and personal opinion pieces make up the majority of the news collection. It is also noticeable that in 1939, war posters disappeared from the media representation of British national registration and identity cards. In 1915, there had been 40 war posters for/against national registration and related issues, and by then the production of eye-catching and patriotic war posters had become a critical ingredient of the war effort. During the First World War, pro-conscription newspapers published simple and direct messages in the form of posters, portraying stereotyped heroes (such as Lord Kitchener) and villains (Germans); whilst anti-conscription newspapers such as The Herald presented the capitalists and some politicians as villains who suppressed the working class by national service and conscription. However, in 1939, “circumstances had changed and posters could not play the same role as their predecessors” (Judd 1972: 31-32), due to the prevalence of the radio. This does not mean that war posters died in the Second World War; on the contrary, they still played an active role in the war propaganda machine. However, British national newspapers did not publish as many war posters for/against national registration and related issues as they had done in the First World War.

The decline of war posters in favour of or opposition to the National Register in 1939 is also related to the good preparation work completed by His Majesty’s Stationery Office, the predecessor to The Ministry of Information. As James (1996: 10-11) noted, as early as January 1939 the HMSO published a 48-page pamphlet, distributed free of charge to every household in Britain, containing detailed information plus two post paid enrolment application forms. The Government had learned from the mistakes they made in the First World War; rather than publishing massive recruiting war posters, they offered suggestions to
men and women of all age groups of how to make full use of their speciality, in order to “prevent impulsive and misdirected volunteering” (James 1996: 11).

**Tight Control on Newspapers during the Second World War**

**Reportage and Propaganda**

The frequency of the themes appearing in the media coverage of the National Register and ID cards in 1939 is presented in the table below. There is little of the debate about the infringement of civil liberties or the huge cost of such a system which had surrounded the introduction of National Registration in 1915. Instead, large numbers of news items were devoted to explaining how the newly-improved National Register would facilitate national service and organisation, help food rationing and defend national unity in war emergencies. There were also significant numbers of news items covering the National Register in Japan, South Africa, and in particular Australia, where the National Register had met strong opposition from the trade unions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The need for national mobilisation and organisation</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The timetable for the introduction of National Register and ID cards</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The purposes of the National Register and ID cards system, such as food rationing</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Register in other countries</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The impacts of the National Register and ID cards system on civil and industrial liberties</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 The Frequency of Each Theme

For the first half of year 1939, the British national newspapers had been informing their readers of the coming National Register and conscription; there was a consensus amongst the national press that the war was inevitable and thus national registration was necessary. From August 1939, the news coverage of National Register and conscription had focused on instructing the public how to register them and
providing information regarding ID cards and food rationing. The impacts of such system on civil liberties had been marginalised in the mediated debate in 1939. The NGO had prepared for the compilation of National Register for a long time and the national press was supporting the registration policy. The whole mediated debate of national registration in 1939 was centred on the timetable for the introduction, the need for national mobilisation and the purposes of such system; whilst there was no serious discussion on the cost, the function creep or the impacts on civil liberties.

The lack of debate about the re-introduction of the National Register in 1939 also meant that the variety of the actors and the length of the quotation in the media representation were all limited, compared with the introduction of the National Register in 1915.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTORS</th>
<th>Length of Quotation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. R. C. Morrison, Socialist M.P. for Tottenham.</td>
<td>290 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Duncan Sandys, Mr Robert Boothby, Mr. Ronald Cartland</td>
<td>198 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Walter Elliot, Minister of Health &amp; Food</td>
<td>115 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Edward Grigg, Tory M.P</td>
<td>104 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Holden, Labour M.P</td>
<td>102 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Fenner Brockway, General Secretary of the I.L.P</td>
<td>45 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Sylvanus Vivian, the Register-General</td>
<td>23 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.V. Alexander, Labour M.P</td>
<td>20 words</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 The Length of Quotation of Actors

From the analysis of the themes and actors, it seems reasonable to conclude that the British national newspapers, in general, were more cooperative with the Government’s war effort than they had been in the First World War. This can be explained in part by the Government’s tighter control over media, and in part by the media allowing itself to be used in the propaganda machine for the war effort. As Welch (2005: x) argued,

The advent of total war in the twentieth century led to the use of the media for political purposes. In
‘total war’, which required civilians to participate in the war effort, morale came to be recognised as a significant military factor, and propaganda began to emerge as the principal instrument of control over public opinion and an essential weapon in the national arsenal.

In both World Wars, the British Government imposed censorship on the media through agencies such as the Ministry of Information; but “the Second World War witnessed the greatest propaganda battle in the history of warfare” (Taylor 1990: 188). Taylor also argued that, especially during the Second World War, clashes between Britain’s war censorship system and the media were rarely seen. The British media, including the national newspapers, were more cautious about what they revealed in their news than they had been during the First World War. Indeed, novelist George Orwell, the author of Nineteen Eighty-Four and widely known in surveillance studies, was so “sickened by the propaganda he had had to do” at the BBC that he resigned and proceeded to write the legendary novel (L'Etang 1998: 431).

The media’s cooperative attitude towards the National Registration Act 1939 was also a result of the experience in the First World War. The public debate of the first-ever National Register and conscription (including the Liberals’ split on voluntarism and conscription), together with the radicals’ anti-conscription campaign, had meant that it had taken the Coalition Government months to pass the legislation in Parliament, which was later seen as a waste of time. The Government had learned from past experience and expected the second National Register to be implemented as soon as possible to deal with the war organisation. National newspapers, including the Manchester Guardian, Observer, Times, and Daily Mirror all supported the National Register scheme, and called for its instant implementation across the country.

5.3 Frame Analysis of the National Register and ID Card System in 1939

Table 5.3 presents the distribution of master frames in news in 1939 (61 items in total).
Table 5.3 Distribution of Master Frames in News in 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939 News</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 items</td>
<td>23 items</td>
<td>0 items</td>
<td>3 items</td>
<td>5 items</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Means in favour of ID Cards;
– Means against ID Cards.

Liberalism + rhetoric: ID cards can help the reunion of families after the war.

Liberalism – rhetoric: National register and conscription cause the loss of civil and industrial liberties.

Nationalism + rhetoric: National register and ID cards can facilitate national service and food rationing, to mobilise the nation during war emergencies.

From Table 5.3, it is concluded that the nationalism master frame was more widely employed by actors in the mediated debate of the British national ID cards system; among a total of 61 news items, the frame has 25% more usage than the liberalism master frame. The distribution of the master frames across each national newspaper is similar from one to another. It is also evident that in 1939 there was no use of the nationalism master frame to oppose the National Register and ID cards, unlike the mediated debate in 1915, when opponents of the National Register employed the nationalism frame to resist the introduction by saying that such a scheme was too costly in finance and time. In 1939, the only resistance came from the Independent Labour Party and the Association of Distributive and Allied Workers, who employed the liberalism frame to oppose the introduction.

The British Government in 1939 clearly recognised that the newly-improved National Register proposed by Mr. Vivian could bring more value to the system itself, as well as helping conscription and other national service work. Vivian’s contribution to the National Register system was to link the ID cards with food rationing. All households had to show their ID cards in order to claim their food ration during the war emergencies. Moreover, in
order to popularise his proposal, Vivian also promised in the *Daily Mirror* that there was no intention to bring the scheme into operation in peace time. As a consequence, the *Manchester Guardian*, for example, issued several editorials calling for immediate implementation of the National Register, explaining how much benefit it could bring to the nation and families. One such benefit would be that there would be no ‘lost’ people after the war. With the ID card system, it would be much easier to reunite families, claimed the supporters of the National Register.

As Elliot (2008: 15) summarised: “Although the second National Register was still tied to conscription, the link with food rationing ensured that the emphasis was on entitlement as well as compulsion.” Of course, not every British citizen liked the idea of food rationing. One *Daily Mirror* columnist named W. M. condemned the scheme as “irksome” because it placed “restriction upon liberty” (Daily Mirror 1939, 19th Sep: 7). However, supporters claimed that the system would ensure fairness, because it would prevent wealthy people from stocking up food, which would cause others to starve. Such arguments show that the liberalism master frame was used both for and against the National Register and ID cards system in 1939. However, Flynn (1998: 10) argued that the British national service was “far from universal”, both during the Second World War and afterwards: by the end of 1940 more than 200,000 deferments had been granted to “policemen, physicians, dentists, merchant seamen, coal-miners, farmers, building and civil engineers”.

In summary, the re-introduction of the National Register and identity card system in 1939 was embraced immediately by the well-prepared national newspapers, without much debate over the cost or the impacts on civil liberties. There was far less resistance than in 1915, when the first-ever National Register system was proposed. The second Register took less time to compile, and it emphasised the entitlement role of the ID card system.

### 5.4 Thematic Content Analysis of ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ in 1951

On December 7 1950, Mr. Harry Willcock was in his car when he was stopped by Police Constable Muckle and asked for his identity card. He refused to produce it. The Hornsey justices found the offence proved, but discharged Mr. Willcock absolutely. Mr. Willcock then decided to appeal against the conviction. Mr. A. P. Marshall, K.C., opening the case for Mr.
Willcock on 25th June 1951, contended that the right to call for the production of a National Registration identity card existed only so long as the period of emergency existed, and the period of emergency, he maintained, had ended. It was this case that ignited a heated public debate over the legitimacy of wartime law in peacetime and finally caused the abolition of the national identity card system in early 1952. As Table 5.4 displays, 55 pieces of news, in seven newspapers, were collected from June 1951 to July 1951 in regard to the ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ case (no news was located in three weekly newspapers: News of the World, The Observer and The People).

First, the 55 items are grouped according to type of news, as shown in Table 5.4. Figure 5.2 contrasts the contribution of each newspaper according to the combined size of news coverage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Times</th>
<th>Daily Mail</th>
<th>Daily Mirror</th>
<th>Daily Telegraph</th>
<th>Daily Express</th>
<th>Guardian</th>
<th>Herald</th>
<th>Total (In items)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Debate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard News</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft News</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Features</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Think Pieces</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readers’ Letters</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4 Summary of News Types 1951

The above table shows that the Times, Daily Express, Manchester Guardian and Herald had more variety of types than the other three newspapers. Only the Daily Mail and Manchester Guardian published letters in relation to ID cards. Compared with the other six newspapers,
the *Manchester Guardian* was the most resourceful in reporting this case because it was the only newspaper to cover parliamentary debate, hard news and readers’ letters.

Figure 5.2 also demonstrates that the *Manchester Guardian* contributed most in the reporting of ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’, followed by the *Times* and *Daily Telegraph*.

Second, it is essential to look at the frequency of themes that appeared in the news items. The fact that this case led to the abolition of the national identity cards system makes every detail discussed by the actors significant.

Themes Appearing in the Items:

1. The validity of wartime regulations in peacetime
2. Police right to demand ID cards

3. The meaning of ‘emergency’ in wartime regulations

4. The impacts of ID cards

5. The progress of the ‘Willcock v. Muckle’ case

6. Similar cases

The nature of this case, a legal argument between the Lord Justices and the lawyers as to the validity of war-time regulations such as the National Registration Act 1939 in peacetime, provided the core theme throughout the appeal by Mr. Henry Willcock. The public resentment towards ID cards placed tremendous pressure on the Lord Justices and the policing department. Because Police Constable Muckle had been following instructions issued by Scotland Yard, the right of the police to demand ID cards was strongly challenged by both Mr. Henry Willcock’s lawyers and the Lord Justices. The policing department responded quickly by restricting the police right to demand ID cards in almost every circumstance.

Third, the next step is to examine the actors – how they appeared and what they argued. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 present a statistical view of the group and individual actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Length of Quotation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(in words)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Local Official Authorities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Authorities</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing and Military Authorities</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Again, the nature of the case made the legal authorities the dominant player in this debate on the national identity cards system, with a massive quotation of 2117 words, most of which were directly abstracted from the live reporting of legal discussion in the King’s Bench Division High Court. The policing department played the second most active role in this debate; but Police Constable Muckle was only ever mentioned, never quoted or paraphrased in any newspaper, and his lawyer too fails to appear in the table of leading actors.

In contrast, the next table shows that Mr. Willcock was the third leading individual actor in the debate, and his lawyer the second leading actor. How did the ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ case come to turn into the case of Willcock alone? The reason lies partly in the pressure felt by the policing department at that moment, especially when Lord Goddard openly attacked the police’s right to demand ID cards in traffic accidents. Although Mr. Willcock lost his appeal in the High Court, he won great public support and even made a speech at the annual conference of the National League of Young Liberals, and launched a ‘Freedom Defence’ fund.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading Actors</th>
<th>Length of Quotation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(In words)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Lord Goddard, <em>The Lord Chief Justice</em></td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mr. Clarence Harry Willcock</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Lord Reading, <em>Conservative.</em></td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chuter Ede, <em>The Home Secretary.</em></td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mr. Clement Davies, <em>Leader of the Parliamentary Liberal Party.</em></td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.6 Length of Quotation of Leading Actors 1951

Without Lord Goddard’s consistent fight against national identity cards in this case, it would
not have been possible for so much attention to have been drawn to it. Even Mr. Davies, leader of the Liberal Party, wrote to Prime Minister Mr. Attlee, asking when the national ID card system was to be abolished. Mr. Davies also got Lord Reading’s support in this debate. Mr. Ede, the Home Secretary, insisted that the ID cards system had proved valuable in rationing. Mr. Marquand, then-Minister of Health, also responded to the criticism by stating in the House of Commons on 2nd August 1951 that:

Identity cards are an essential part of the national registration system, which continues to render valuable services in connection with National Service, security, food rationing, the National Health Service and the administration of other services such as family allowances and post-war credits. The possession of an identity card enables the holder to obtain a new ration book and to withdraw money from the Post Office Savings Bank with the minimum of formality; it simplifies the process of obtaining a passport; it makes it unnecessary to produce a birth certificate in support of a claim for the payment of post-war credits; and it avoids difficulty in establishing identity when applying for dental or other treatment or to be placed on a doctor’s list.

The Labour Government’s success in continuing the identity card system until 1951 was, to some extent, due to its parliamentary majority of 145 seats after the 1945 General Election. However, the 1950 General Election came as an enormous blow to the Labour Government, reducing its majority to only five seats, so that when challenged by the opposition party in the House of Commons, it was forced to reconsider the policy. Throughout 1950 and 1951, the rise of the Conservative Party kept Parliament “in a perpetual ferment” via “late sittings”, “snap divisions and filibusters” (Young 1966: 289), and ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ was undoubtedly used by the Conservative and Liberal Parties to attack the identity cards policy. On 21st February 1952, following the Conservative victory in the 1951 General Election, the new Minister of Health Mr. Crookshank informed parliament that the identity card system was to be abolished, although the numbering system would be kept for NHS use. Crookshank estimated that the abolition of the national identity card system would save around 1,500 staff, and about £500,000 in cost, inviting a call from Mr. Clement Davies, leader of the Liberal Party, to “consider a refund to Mr. Willcock, who did a very considerable public service in calling attention to these cards and to the fact that they were unnecessary and degrading”.

149
5.5 Frame Analysis of ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ in 1951

5.5.1 Key Words Hunting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framing Device</th>
<th>Key Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism Frames</td>
<td>Valuable services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism Frames</td>
<td>Of constitutional importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Necessary/unnecessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unreasonable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alien to British code of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abolish/End/Retrieve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue/Discontinue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stay/Go</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Failure of system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humiliation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.7 Key words/phrases Hunting Card

5.5.2 Distribution of Master Frames in 1951 News

Table 5.8 displays the mapping of master frames in the 1951 case study (55 items in total).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951 News</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 items</td>
<td>47 items</td>
<td>6 items</td>
<td>1 item</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.8 Distribution of Master Frames in 1951 News

+ Means in favour of ID Cards;

– Means against ID Cards.

- Liberalism – rhetoric: Police abuse of power in checking ID cards under any circumstance is unreasonable and unjustified, especially after war emergencies have ended.

- Nationalism + rhetoric: National ID cards are directly linked with the National Register, which offers valuable services to all British citizens. Therefore, it should stay.

- Nationalism – rhetoric: ID cards are no longer useful in peacetime and should therefore be abolished to avoid wasting time and money.
Table 5.9 demonstrates the mapping of master frames across newspapers (7 newspapers, 55 items in total).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Liberalism +</th>
<th>Liberalism -</th>
<th>Nationalism +</th>
<th>Nationalism -</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Times and Sunday Times</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14 items)</td>
<td>8 items</td>
<td>3 items</td>
<td>1 item</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5 items)</td>
<td>5 items</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4 items)</td>
<td>4 items</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7 items)</td>
<td>6 items</td>
<td>1 item</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Express</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8 items)</td>
<td>8 items</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Guardian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10 items)</td>
<td>9 items</td>
<td>1 item</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Herald</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7 items)</td>
<td>7 items</td>
<td>1 item</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9 Distribution of master frames across newspapers
5.5.3 Frame Analysis of 1951 news

Table 5.8 tells a completely different story from that of the 1915 news, when the nationalism frame was the dominating philosophy in the mediated public debate of the National Register. In 1951, with regard to ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’, the liberalism frame prevailed in the mediated debate of the British national ID cards system. All seven national newspapers supported Mr. Willcock in their news coverage. The *Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Express* and *Daily Herald* in particular called directly for the Government to abolish the ID cards system. In summary, 48 out of 55 pieces of news were against the national ID cards system, whilst only 6 items hinted that the system might still be valuable in providing public services. ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ had become the last straw for the British National Register system. The public resentment towards national ID cards reached its peak during the appeal case and many M.P.s, including Lieutenant Colonel Lipton, Hector Hughes and Roland Jennings, raised this question with Mr. Marquand, then-Minister of Health. The following section seeks to examine the detailed debate in 1951 in terms of frame valences and newspapers.

The fate of ID cards is dependent on circumstances

‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ attracted the newspapers from the very beginning of the appeal stage. Interest came to a peak after Lord Goddard told the *Daily Mail* on 13th June 1951 that the “identity card problem had better be decided once and for all”. On 26th June 1951, Lord Goddard was quoted again in the *Daily Mail* saying that:

> It shows the danger of using legislation passed for one purpose for an entirely different purpose. The showing of an identity card is not being used for security purposes at all.

Mr. Marshall, Willcock’s lawyer, echoed Lord Goddard’s remarks:

> It was never intended by Parliament that this would become part of our normal life.

The then Prime Minister Mr. Attlee held different views from those of the legal authorities. The *Daily Telegraph* reported on 20th July 1951 that:

> Correspondence between the Prime Minister and Mr. Clement Davies, the Liberal leader, on the subject of identity cards makes clear the Government view. This is that the National Registration system renders valuable services which cannot be dispensed with immediately.
Mr. Attlee never explained exactly what was meant by these “valuable services”. He considered this case from the worldview of national interest (such as the value of the national identity card numbering system to the National Health Service and National Insurance Programme) rather than that of individual liberties and personal freedom. However, most of the actors involved interpreted the significance of the case from a perspective of individualism. Mr. Attlee’s argument did not win sufficient support in Parliament and the national ID cards system was finally abolished in the House of Lords in early 1952, soon after the Conservative Party won the 1951 General Election with a 16-seat Parliamentary majority.

Throughout the mediated public debate of the British national ID cards system, the liberalism frame dominated every argument, keeping the nationalism frame always in shadow. On 27th June 1951, the *Daily Express* issued an editorial demanding the abolition of the ID cards system, claiming that:

> Harry Willcock went to law for a principle. The principle of whether the English should be treated as a free people. Or like a bunch of convicts out on ticket-of-leave.

> It prevents no crime. It produces no benefit. It does nothing except add power to the bureaucrats and take freedom from the people.

The public also showed their support for Mr. Willcock. For example, a letter to the Editor of the *Manchester Guardian* published on 5th July 1951 stated that:

> The national registration identity card system is invariably a nuisance and sometimes a humiliation. I recall that at an auction my cheque in payment for an item was accepted by the auctioneer’s clerk only after he had scrutinized my identity card.

This letter employs both the liberalism and nationalism frames. The liberalism frame is reflected in words like “nuisance” and “humiliation”; whilst the nationalism frame can be seen from the argument about the functions of the ID cards system. Both worldviews convinced the writer that the ID cards system should be abolished.

Naturally, there were also members of the public who disagreed with the prevailing view, and believed that national ID cards should remain. A letter to the Editor of the *Manchester Guardian* published on 7th July 1951, argued:

> Why all this fuss about showing identity cards to the police on request? The police would not bother
themselves with this procedure without good reason – and I can well imagine the reason in these days of car stealing or “borrowing” in which case the driver would naturally be very loath to produce his identity card.

The carrying and production of one’s identity card is a burden only to those who have something to hide or to those who want to go through life in their own sweet way, without let or hindrance. I have carried my identity card, as a matter of course, since the day it was issued and I should regard the temporary inconvenience of production at the request of a police officer as a very small contribution to the efforts of the police in crime detection or in the enforcement of better road manners.

In this letter too, both the liberalism and nationalism frames exist. However, the writer was able to interpret the ID cards system from a totally different perspective. He did not agree that individual liberties and personal freedom were compromised by the system, and disagreed with the mainstream opinion that police abused their power when demanding ID cards.

Thus, despite the variety of opinions appearing in the mediated public debate of the British national ID cards system, the master frames in 1951 remained very much the same as those in 1915, with the nationalism and liberalism frames continuing to dominate. However, in 1951, the liberalism frame became the prevailing worldview, rather than the nationalism frame as in 1915. More unusually, all seven national newspapers achieved consensus, demanding the abolition of national ID cards in Britain. In summary then, ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ hastened the decision on whether the national ID cards system should stay or go.

However, the withdrawal of the national registration and identity card system was merely the first step in the political agenda of the newly-elected Conservative Government, a decision which fit well with the expectation by the British public that the Government would remove the remaining wartime restrictions as soon as possible (Dovey 1986):

What was not generally known at the time was that as far back as February 1950 an official committee appointed under the previous Government to enquire into the future of National Registration from the standpoint of practical administration had recommended the very three courses of action now adopted: abolition of the system, retention of the identity card numbers for the Health Service, use of the National Insurance records to supply information to government departments. (Dovey 1986: 459)

As mentioned before, the former Prime Minister Mr. Attlee had intended to keep the national registration system in peacetime; however, the committee’s report, which took into consideration the political climate and the imminent General Election, suggested that the
identity card was seen by the British public as a wartime restriction, and had tolerated it
during wartime only because of its adjunction to food rationing. A decision to make it an
enduring feature in peacetime would be unacceptable to the public. In other words, as food
rationing started to be phased out, there was no critical evidence to continue the national
identity card system. Therefore, the committee recommended that it should be abolished,
especially when considering the coming General Election. Navias (1989: 196) also agreed
that “both Churchill and the Eden administrations appeared more concerned with the political
and economic consequences of terminating national service” than with other military
concerns. Consequently, ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ became a platform to debate the political
agenda of national registration. Even after the withdrawal of national registration and the
identity card system, however, the Conservative Government kept the identity card
numbering system for National Health Service use.

5.6 Summary

Although both the first and second National Register and ID card systems in the UK were
introduced for the war effort, there exist many differences between them. The Second World
War did not attract the same public enthusiasm as the First World War, which was reflected in
the mediated debate. For instance, in 1939 there was no discussion on Britishness and
Prussianism when debating the National Register and identity card system. Both the national
media and the public considered the National Register scheme as merely a necessary way of
organising the resources of the country, rather than as an ethical dilemma. Another difference
lies in the post-war reactions towards the National Register and ID card system. As Rich
(1988: 670) argued, after 1945 patriotism “no longer seemed to have the same political
resonance”, which caused British citizens such as Mr. Willcock to fight against the police
abuse of power in checking upon everyone’s identity card on any occasion. Furthermore,
after the First World War the National Register and identity card system could be described as
being forgotten by the public. While patriotism and collectivism were intensified by the war,
they could also easily fade away in peacetime.

It is also manifest that the second British National Register and identity card system achieved
better results in bureaucratic administration, by linking the identity cards to food rationing.
British citizens were required to carry the identity cards at all times for police inspection if necessary and for cash withdrawal use. Yet as Peter Lilley (2005: 5) described, national identity cards were accepted only “as a regrettable necessity in wartime”. In peacetime, such restrictions became intolerable and incompatible with British traditions. That is why the national identity card system was abolished in early 1952 as a political gesture by the newly-elected Conservative Government, assuring British citizens that any unnecessary wartime restriction would be discontinued in peacetime. However, a national identity card system was introduced in the UK in 2005, and became law in 2006, in peacetime. The next chapter will analyse the media representation of British national identity cards from 1994 to 2008.
Chapter 6

Case Study 3: Newspaper Coverage of British National ID Cards from January 1994 to August 2008

6.0 Introduction

The introduction of a national biometric identity card system in the UK in 2004 stirred up an intense public debate on many issues, such as information protection, system security, and cost. Different interest groups have used the print media as a platform to support or oppose the controversial scheme. Almost a decade earlier, in 1995, the Conservative Government had published their Identity Card Green Paper (Spencer 1995), but that attempt to introduce a national identity card system in Britain was finally dropped in October 1996, just before the 1997 General Election. The political power switch in 1997 and the events of 9/11 four years later, especially the effect on national security issues, were milestones towards the introduction of a British national ID card system. Both had a significant effect on the makeup of the actors and on the arguments employed.

The official reasons for having such a high-technology ID card are listed in the Identity Cards Bill 2005 as follow: “a) in the interests of national security; b) for the purposes of the prevention or detection of crime; c) for the purposes of the enforcement of immigration controls; d) for the purposes of the enforcement of prohibition on unauthorised working or employment; e) for the purposes of securing the efficient and effective provision of public services” (Identity Cards Bill 2005: 1-2). The identity card scheme had been on New Labour’s “information age government agenda” since 2002 (Hudson 2002); it has raised many concerns in the papers and among academics such as David Lyon (2005), who have questioned the widespread use of biometric identity card systems globally, and argued that these national registry databases may facilitate digital discrimination and social sorting.

Taking into account the above historical background information, the long time period (from 1994 to August 2008), the diversity of actors and their arguments across 15 years, the data analysis in this chapter is divided into three parts: a) January 1994 to April 1997; b) May 1997 to 10th September 2001; c) 11th September 2001 to August 2008. This strategy not only
makes the data analysis more structured and organised, but can provide information for further comparative analysis of the media representation of British national identity cards systems across different periods.

6.1. Data Analysis of News Collection 01-Jan-1994 to 30-Apr-1997

6.1.1 Content Analysis of News Collection 01-Jan-1994 to 30-Apr-1997

Figure 6.1 shows the number of news items on British national ID cards from 1994 to April 1997. It is clear that the number decreases across these four years. The changes are consistent with the political agenda of the Conservative Party then in power, as summarised below:

- **Oct 94**: At the Conservative Party Conference, Michael Howard announced backing for a voluntary national ID card, in order to combat benefit fraud and follow EU standardised identity documentation procedures. However, the Tory Cabinet was completely split on the ID card policy in terms of whether it should be compulsory or voluntary.

- **May 95**: The Green Paper on Identity Cards published.

- **Sept 95**: A report on ID Cards by IPPR and Justice published.

- **July 96**: Home Affairs Select Committee backed voluntary ID card

- **Aug 96**: Michael Howard promised new law by autumn 1996.

- **Oct 96**: Cabinet drops legislation for the sake of the forthcoming general election in 1997.

- In 1996 Labour MP Frank Field proposed a compulsory ID card plan including DNA data; however, Labour claimed that ID cards would be “a very low priority” if it were to win power.
Figure 6.2 shows the makeup of different type of news among the 201 news items. Hard news is the most popular type of media representation of British national ID cards, making up 55% of the total, followed by readers’ letters and personal opinion pieces.

Table 6.1 lists the frequency of appearance of 11 themes found in the 201 items from January 1994 to April 1997. The themes are tabled in descending order of popularity. The most frequent, the impact of ID cards on civil liberties and personal freedom, appeared in nearly a third of all the news items. It is followed by three other popular themes: timetable, purposes and public opinion.

In 1994, after Michael Howard (then Home Secretary) announced the plan for a voluntary ID card in the UK, a substantial amount of hard news items were informing the public of the Conservative Government’s agenda and the purposes of the ID cards system. However, the most frequent theme was still the impact on civil liberties and personal freedom. More
importantly, the Cabinet split in ID card policy intensified suspicion among libertarians. Grassroots Tory MPs and some right-wing authoritarians were keen on compulsory ID cards; whilst right-wing libertarians such as Peter Lilley were very reserved on such controversial policy. The Conservative Way Forward pressed the Home Secretary to drop the plan for compulsory ID cards; even the Labour Party had no principle objection to the national ID card project if it remained voluntary. Tony Blair claimed that as long as it was affordable and workable, the ID card scheme was good; but he also condemned the idea of a “compulsory identity card”, stating that “instead of wasting hundreds of millions of pounds on compulsory ID cards as the Tory Right demand, let that money provide thousands more police officers on the beat in our local communities”. Labour MP John Spellar started his own campaign against a national ID card scheme based on the assumption that it would be too expensive and unworkable.

Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats played the civil liberty card very weakly, barely holding any ground in the debate of whether such ID cards system should be adopted or dropped. It was left to academics and the Association of Chief Police Officers to project different views on the British national ID card scheme. Activists like Simon Davies voiced concerns regarding biometric technologies, data protection, function creep and cost. The Association of Chief Police Officers was happy with the idea of a voluntary ID card scheme but worried that a compulsory system would damage relations between police and community, especially minority communities. The combination of the Cabinet split and unconvincing arguments made by Howard and Major finally sunk the proposal for a national ID card in 1996. From November 1996 to April 1997 the national newspapers were relatively less active in reporting ID card issues.
After a general review of themes, it is also important to observe the changes in the frequency of their appearance over the four years (see Figure 6.3), cross-examining the changes with the political agenda outlined in section 6.1.1. As early as in 1994, *the Guardian* issued an editorial on 10th August, challenging the Tory Government’s credit-card driving licence scheme by implying that such scheme could lead to a national identity card plan. And *the Guardian* also successfully predicted the Cabinet split over ID cards policy, which did happen after Major introduced the ID card proposal in 1995. What’s more, the editorial showed strong opposition to the idea of a national ID card in Britain by referring to the history that the Australian government failed to introduce a national identity card system in 1984 due to public protests. And after the introduction of Green Paper Identity Cards in 1995, *The Times* issued editorials on 25th May 1995 and 19th Aug 1996 opposing the scheme and referred to the history of national identity card systems in war time; the editorials also challenged the proposal on the basis that it would damage civil liberties and the relationship between the police and the minority communities. From the above, it is evident that the British national press had played a more active role in setting the agenda on the mediated debate of identity cards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>The number of appearances in total 201 items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact on civil liberties</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timetable for the introduction of ID cards</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposes of ID cards</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion on ID cards</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of ID cards in Britain and other countries</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of ID cards</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Database handling</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design of ID cards</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation of ID cards</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biometrics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1 Number of appearances of themes in total 201 items
Table 6.2 lists the leading actors involved in the media representation of British national ID cards from January 1994 to April 1997. The length of quotation of each actor is shown, as well as his/her overall attitude towards compulsory/voluntary national ID cards. The leading actors are grouped according the coding categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITIES</th>
<th>THE DATA PROTECTION REGISTRAR (515 WORDS) – AGAINST ID CARD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLICE AUTHORITY</td>
<td>POLICE AUTHORITY [INCLUDES POLICE FEDERATION AND THE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS] (300 WORDS) – FOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMPULSORY ID CARDS IN 1994 BUT CHANGED POSITION FROM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVLA</td>
<td>DVLA (125 WORDS) – FOR VOLUNTARY ID CARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOME OFFICE</td>
<td>HOME OFFICE (100) – FOR VOLUNTARY ID CARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>Transport spokesman Frank Dobson (215) - unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Affairs spokesman Alun Michael (167) - unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Spellar (111) – strongly against ID card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>Michael Howard (1118) – for voluntary ID card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lord Wakeham of Conservative Way Forward (400) – against ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport Secretary Brian Mawhinney (287) – for voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ID card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Lilley, Social Security Secretary (140) – for voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ID card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Major (155) – for voluntary ID card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib Dem Party</td>
<td>Home Affairs spokesman Robert MacLennan (74) – against ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>card</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.3 Changes in frequency of appearance of 4 prevailing themes over 4 years
| Human Rights & Civil Liberties Groups | Liberty (370) – strongly against ID card
Justice (56) – against ID card |
| Academics & Experts | Dr Michael Levi, Director of Criminological Studies at the University of Wales and an expert on fraud (300) – against ID card |
| Firms | RAC (140) – for ID card |
| Organisations | IPPR (250) – against ID card
Conservative Way Forward (230) – against compulsory ID card |
| Minority Groups | Tara Mukherjee, President of the Confederation of Indian Organisations for the United Kingdom (115) – strongly supportive |

Table 6.2 Leading Actors’ Involvement in the Mediated Debate of British National ID Cards (1994-97)

### 6.1.2 Frame Analysis of News Collection 01-Jan-1994 to 30-Apr-1997

#### Liberalism Frame

**+ rhetoric:**

- It is in your own interest to have ID cards, to protect your rights to security; more convenience; help cut crime

- “Our citizens deserve better protection from the growing threat of identity fraud. Being able to prove who you are is a fundamental requirement in modern society.” - Andy Burnham.

- The will of the people;

- Harmless;

- Make life easier/Convenient;

- Foolish not to have one;

**- rhetoric:**

- Controversial; obligatory; force people to comply; makes the state our master, not servant; deceit; lie; voluntary/compulsory; privacy; freedom; monstrous expansion of big government; infringe personal freedom; dangerous; intrusion/intrusive; expose secrets; a constitutional crisis; Big Brother; Total Surveillance and Control; back door; objections; surveillance society/system; census;

- Excessive; the authorities; comply; snoop; ominous; liberty; repression; compulsion by stealth; bully; universal; unwanted; inevitable;

- Grandiose; authoritarian, manipulative and dishonest; undemocratic;

### Key words/phrases

- “Our citizens deserve better protection from the growing threat of identity fraud. Being able to prove who you are is a fundamental requirement in modern society.” - Andy Burnham.
Table 6.3 List of Key Words/Phrases for Case Study of 1994-2008

Table 6.4 presents the distribution of master frames in news collection from January 1994 to April 1997 (201 items in total).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ Means in favour of ID Cards;</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-97 News</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201 items</td>
<td>58 items</td>
<td>42 items</td>
<td>9 items</td>
<td>78 items</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4 Distribution of master frames in news collection Jan 1994 – Apr 1997

Liberalism + rhetoric: National ID card is multi-purpose, thus is more convenient and efficient in accessing social benefits and travelling. Andy Burnham said that ID cards can enhance citizens’ liberties in modern society.
Liberalism – rhetoric: National ID card is an infringement of personal liberties, restricting personal freedom and giving too much power to the Government.

Nationalism + rhetoric: National ID card system can cut down crime, illegal immigration, identity fraud and social problems, and enhance Government efficiency.

Nationalism – rhetoric: Compulsory national ID card is too costly, will weaken border control, and has function creep.

From Table 6.4, it is concluded that the nationalism master frame was more widely employed by actors in the mediated debate of a British national ID cards system between January 1994 and April 1997, with 7% more usage among the total 201 news items. In addition, 120 news items contain arguments against a British national ID cards system; whilst only 67 items have arguments in favour of the system.

Table 6.4 above does not contain enough information as to how the master frames are represented in the 201 news items. Therefore, it is the purpose of this section to find out how the nationalism and liberalism master frames are represented in the news collection January 1994 - April 1997. To achieve this objective, the representation of master frames will be described newspaper by newspaper, so as to present a specific frame analysis. The editorial stand and commentary stand are regarded as the two main aspects of the representation of master frames.

Times and Sunday Times

Editorial Stand: The Times published a leading article on 19th August 1996, not only questioning the necessity of Michael Howard’s ID card plan, but also warning the public of the impact of ID cards on civil liberties and personal freedom. It analysed the reasons for the failure of Howard’s plan – Cabinet split on ID card policy and objections from civil libertarians. In summary, the Times’ editorial stand was against the national ID cards system, and employed both the nationalism and liberalism frames.

Commentary Stand: Between 1994 and 1997, Times columnist Matthew Parris wrote four opinion pieces on the British national ID cards system. He raised many doubts over the
popularity of such a controversial policy among voters, employing the liberalism master frame to interpret ID cards. He said that the public might hide their real attitude towards such a system when interviewed or surveyed, but they would show their true opinion when voting. Therefore, he warned the Tory Government that this controversial proposal had the “potential to go horribly politically wrong”. Parris devoted great efforts to try to convince the Tory Government to reconsider its ID cards policy for the sake of the General Election to come in 1997. Parris had been the Tory M.P. for West Derbyshire from 1979 to 1986. Thus, while the liberalism frame was much in evidence in his writing, he was also motivated by the interest of the Tory Party. In summary, the commentary stand of the *Times* was against national ID cards. Motivated by electoral concerns, it employed a liberalism frame to oppose the plans.

*Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday*

Editorial Stand: From 1994 to April 1997, the *Daily Mail* issued four editorials about a British national ID card system, three in 1994 and one in 1995. The same themes appear in all four editorials – the purposes of ID cards, such as countering social security fraud, and the business benefits offered by ID cards to the British banking and insurance industries. Both the nationalism and liberalism master frames were used to support the national ID cards plan. In summary, the editorial stand of the *Daily Mail* was supportive of the ID cards plan, based on its faith in the benefits of such a system.

Commentary Stand: Contrary to the editorial stand, Keith Waterhouse, a prominent *Daily Mail* columnist, criticised the ID cards plan on grounds such as cost, administration, and data protection. He believed that such a massive plan was unworkable, that it was too expensive and would damage civil liberties. In summary, the commentary stand of the *Daily Mail* was against ID cards, on the grounds of concerns about both national and individual interests.

*Daily Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph*

Editorial Stand: On 18th August 1996, the *Sunday Telegraph* published an editorial under the title “A Question of Identity”, challenging the Tories’ ID cards plan and warning the public that:
The real danger of the ID card proposal is what it might lead to, and to whom it will give comfort. Britain has always believed that strong border controls are essential in the battle against illegal immigration, drug-trafficking and terrorism … popular enthusiasm for the new ID cards would send the wrong signal to Brussels. It would suggest a willingness to travel further down the road to full European integration. The public should vote with its feet by allowing this ill-conceived and expensive scheme to die.

This editorial employed the nationalism master frame to argue against the scheme.

On the following day, 19th August 1996, an editorial titled “Card-carrying Citizens” criticised the Conservative Government as being “politically inept over identity cards and, more importantly, careless of the threat to civil liberties that its proposals contain”. It said that “the sooner this pernicious scheme is thwarted the better”. In this editorial, the liberalism master frame was used to reject the ID cards plan.

In summary, although these two editorials employ different master frames, the stand was the same – to drop the ID cards plan as soon as possible.

Commentary Stand: The Daily Telegraph’s efforts in campaigning against national ID cards plan were evident not only in its editorials, but also in the commentary section. Simon Davies (Visiting Fellow of Law at the University of Essex) and John Casey (Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge) both wrote in the Daily Telegraph challenging the ID cards plan, but from different perspectives. Davies believed that the ID cards plan would be too costly and he concluded by suggesting that the Tory Government “should pause to reflect that given the experience of other countries it may actually be about to enter into a highly complex scheme that has little or no chance of success”. In Davies’ article, the nationalism master frame was employed to reject the ID cards plan. John Casey, on the other hand, used the liberalism master frame to reject the proposal. He expressed the hope that:

If compulsory cards are ever introduced, I trust that thousands of us, when asked to produce one, will face down the policeman, or traffic warden, or social worker, and draw ourselves up to utter the mysterious words: ‘I am a citizen!’

In summary, both the nationalism and liberalism master frames were employed to criticise the British national ID cards plan.
Commentary Stand: On 10th August 1994, the Daily Express published an article by feature writer Jonathan Cooper analysing the potential advantages and disadvantages of national ID cards. Cooper argued that “there were few complaints when those pictures helped convict killers. Intrusion, if that is what it is called, into our civil liberties is done for a reason”. The combination of national and individual interest in cutting crime, especially identity fraud, led to his conclusion that “identification cards would not cut these out entirely but would go a long way to saving some of the £130 million stolen annually by credit card thieves”.

Bernard Ingham, another Daily Express columnist and Margaret Thatcher’s Chief Press Secretary between 1979 and 1990, passionately welcomed the ID cards plan. On 11th August 1994, he strongly supported then-Transport Minister Brian Mawhinney in the plan to bring in “a hi-tech, identity/licence card with photo, fingerprint, signature, voice and DNA recognition”. He argued that:

I believe in the greatest freedom for the greatest number. And nothing would strike a greater blow for freedom in modern Britain than to handicap the villain, thug and terrorist without inconveniencing the law-abiding … its dogmatic libertarianism would deliver society into the hands of criminals.

Thus, Ingham’s interpretation of the ID card plan was still within the liberalism frame; but unlike Liberty, which stood firmly against ID cards, he approved their use as a powerful weapon to cut crime and thus enhance the security and liberty of law-abiding British citizens.

In summary, the commentary stand of the Daily Express was in favour of the ID cards plan.

Guardian

Editorial Stand: The Guardian issued one editorial on 10th August 1994 and another on 14th
October 1996. The first editorial addressed the diverse opinions on identity cards, informing readers of what was being debated with regard to the national ID cards scheme. It concluded by suggesting that, considering what had happened to the Australian Government’s ID cards plan, a scheme for compulsory ID cards had little chance of success. The second editorial, “ID Crises”, listed the political agenda of British national ID cards from 1952 to 1996. Both editorials employed the liberalism master frame to challenge the ID cards plan.

Commentary Stand: In an opinion piece published on 25th February 1994, Joanna Coles embraced the introduction of the ID cards plan, arguing that:

The arguments against ID cards - once my own Libertarian arguments - look increasingly flimsy compared to the benefits that a sophisticated, well organised system of identity cards could bring.

She believed that the adoption of ID cards was “a question of balance. Balance between liberty and secrecy; between freedom and bureaucracy”. Her real concern was revealed at the end of her argument, where she wrote that:

With the birth of the European Union, it is only a matter of time before we are issued with Euro-IDs as substitutes for passports. At last week's launch of Europol, the prototype of a federal EU police force, many officers were convinced that Euro-IDs could be crucial in countering terrorism, illegal immigrants and bogus asylum seekers. Carrying one extra card seems a small price to pay. Only those with something to hide can fear it.

Thus, her argument was within a liberalism master frame, concerned with how to protect a citizen’s rights and liberties in a modern society. Coles chose to believe in the potential benefits of ID cards in achieving such a purpose.

Matthew Engel’s article “Licence to Snoop”, published on 22nd August 1994, was the most elaborately argued of all the opinion pieces. He analysed the on-going debate of ID cards among politicians, general public and newspapers, warning that a national ID cards system was “the most comprehensive instrument of social control in history” and thus demanded more thorough debate on a national basis. After detailed and explicit analysis of what had been debated and the limitations of the ongoing debate, he concluded:

All this in a country where the population is indifferent, the constitutional redress non-existent, the present government dictatorial, the opposition complaisant, the civil liberties movement marginal and the climate fearful. We have to scream the place down before it is too late.
Engel employed both the nationalism and liberalism master frames to interpret the ongoing debate of national ID cards. His final conclusion suggests that he was against ID cards.

Hugo Young and Will Hutton also wrote regular columns in the *Guardian*. In 1995, Young wrote that “any national ID card scheme, whether compulsory or voluntary, is a menace to society” and therefore should not be implemented due to function creep and civil liberties concerns. Hutton agreed with Engel’s analysis, suggesting that there should be more debate about the ID cards scheme.

To summarise, the comments on national ID cards in the *Guardian* employed both the nationalism and liberalism master frames, and displayed different attitudes towards the national ID cards scheme. Thus, the commentary stand was mixed.

*Independent and Independent on Sunday*

Editorial Stand: The *Independent* argued in May 1995 that “until [Michael Howard] can show us that the card's benefits are worth the risks, we should resist his sales patter”. However, it also suggested that “with technical advances to safeguard privacy and security, and tougher sanctions on errant card administrators, there might be a much stronger case for the card”.

The cost-effectiveness argument and security-privacy dilemma are two main products of the mixture of nationalism and liberalism frames.

In brief, the editorial stand of the *Independent* was to challenge the ID cards plan.

Commentary Stand: On 28th April 1995, Sadie Plant commented on the national ID cards plan from the perspective of individual identity in modern society. She wrote that “the end of the 20th century is also a time of unprecedented confusion for all senses of identity”; in addition, she argued that “no matter how used people had grown to identifying with their working lives, there are far more crucial sources of identity than this and even greater crises ahead”. The individual liberalism frame is clearly seen in her article. However, unlike other commentators, Plant touched on a sensitive issue – individual identity in industrialised society. Exploring this theme in detail, she expressed the view that the younger generation had not experienced the same comfort of a fixed identity as their parents; and they would probably rely on the identity cards rather than cultural identity to live their everyday lives.
To summarise, the commentary stand of the *Independent* is sceptical of the ID cards plan.

*Sun*

Editorial Stand: On 10\textsuperscript{th} August 1994, a *Sun* editorial branded the ID cards plan as a “Great Idea”, proclaiming:

> Why not [national ID card]? No law-abiding citizen should object to carrying them. ID cards will be a big weapon against crooks, illegal immigrant and terrorists. The sooner we get ’em, the better.

The editorial stand of *the Sun* is clearly in favour of a national ID card scheme, identified with a liberalism frame.

Commentary Stand: No comments available.

### 6.2. Data Analysis of News Collection 01-May 1997 to 10-Sept-2001

#### 6.2.1 Content Analysis of News Collection 01-May-1997 to 10-Sept-2001

Figure 6.4 shows the number of news items on British national ID cards from May 1997 to September 2001. It is clear both that the number varies slightly across these five years, and that the media representation of British national ID cards was not as dense as in the period 1994-1997. There were also fewer political moves with regard to national ID cards, since the Tory Government had dropped the proposal in October 1996. The only political developments in these five years were linked to the following agendas:

- **June 2000**: Labour proposed national ID cards to curb underage drinking.

- **February 2001**: Labour proposed ID cards to curb illegal immigration and asylum problems.
Figure 6.4 Number of news items found from May 1997 to September 2001

Figure 6.5 illustrates the makeup of different types of news among the 52 news items. Hard news is again the most popular type of media representation of British national ID cards, taking up 61% of all 52 items, followed by readers’ letters and personal opinion pieces, which is a similar makeup of types as in the period 1994-1997.

Table 6.5 lists the frequency of appearance of nine themes in the total 52 items found from May 1997 to September 2001. The themes are tabled in descending order of popularity. The most popular theme, the purposes of the national ID card, appeared in half of the total 52
items. It is followed by three other popular themes: the timetable, the impact on civil liberties, and immigration. The appearance of the themes is consistent with the political agendas mentioned at the beginning of section 6.2.1. From June 2000, the Labour Government proposed ID cards for teenagers in order to curb underage drinking and smoking. The proposal was well received by the alcohol and tobacco industries. Therefore, a draft version of the timetable for the introduction of ID cards to teenagers nationwide was published. Meanwhile, the proposal was suspected by some actors of being the backdoor to a policy for a national ID card for all citizens. It was not until February 2001 that the immigration theme became central to the media representation. It was proposed that ‘entitlement cards’ be issued to all asylum seekers in order to curb illegal immigration and related problems.

Table 6.5 also confirms the consistency of media representation and political agendas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Number of Appearances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purposes of ID cards</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timetable for the introduction of ID cards</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of ID cards on civil liberties</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biometrics</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of ID cards</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of ID cards</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security industry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5 Frequency of appearance of themes 1997-2001

After a general review of themes, it is also important to consider the changes in the frequency of their appearance over the five years (see Figure 6.6), cross-examining the changes with the political agendas listed in section 6.2.1. It is found that the immigration theme is increasingly exemplified in the mediated debate of British national identity cards, and this is closely connected to the purpose of identity cards, with discussions regarding border control and public benefits. In fact, the immigration issue has only risen to the top of the political agenda within the past few decades. Before 1962, an ‘open door’ policy allowed Commonwealth
immigrants to enter and settle in Britain freely, as “the 1948 Nationality Act had reaffirmed full British citizenship for all members of the Colonies and Commonwealth”, because “post-war economic recovery turned all west European countries into countries of immigration, despite the intentions of their leaders” (Peach 1999: 433). The Act even uses the terms “Commonwealth citizen” and “British subject” to mean one and the same thing. British passports were issued to bearers as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, with the implication that every Commonwealth citizen was also a British subject, and, therefore, guaranteed the right of entry to the United Kingdom. Moreover, after the end of the Second World War, Britain and the Commonwealth countries took in perhaps 170,000 refugee German Jews, more than were received by the United States. It was not until 1962 that the Commonwealth Immigrants Act “marked the overt control over the entry to Britain”.

However, with an increase in the amount of immigration into Britain, “muffled political panic” (Peach 1999: 433) arose, and there has been growing pressure for the Government to take effective action on immigration control and related matters. In fact, research has shown that between 2002 and 2007 attitudes toward immigration hardly changed in Britain (Meuleman et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the introduction of a national identity card system was seen by the Government as a potential cure and a temporary solution, seeking to silence the perceived “panic” over immigration issues.

![Figure 6.6 Changes in frequency of appearance of four prevailing themes over 5 years (1997-2001)](image)

Figure 6.6 Changes in frequency of appearance of 4 prevailing themes over 5 years (1997-2001)

Due to the fact that the Labour Government tried to portrait the ID card plan as a cure to immigration control during this period, the media coverage of such plan was largely focused
on whether such purpose could be achieved or not. The impact on civil liberties was thus relatively less discussed than in previous period (1994-97).

Table 6.6 lists the leading actors involved in the media representation of British national ID cards from May 1997 to 10th September 2001. The length of quotation of each actor is shown, as well as his/her overall attitude towards compulsory/voluntary national ID cards. The leading actors are grouped according to the coding categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITIES</th>
<th>HOME OFFICE (121 WORDS) – FOR ID CARDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY (27 WORDS) - UNCLEAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DAVID HAWKER, OF THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM AND ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY (27 WORDS) UNCLEAR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour Party</th>
<th>Justice Minister John McConnell (129) – for ID cards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Andrew Chevis (70 words) – for ID cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mike O’Brien (33 words) – for ID cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jack Straw (21 words) – against ID cards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Rights &amp; Civil Liberties Groups</th>
<th>Liberty (20) – strongly against ID card</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charter 88 (22) – against ID card</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spokespersons</th>
<th>SNP Justice spokesman Roseanna Cunningham (28 words) – against ID card</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Garda spokesman (21 words) – unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firms</th>
<th>CitizenCard (22) – for ID card</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Tobacco Manufacturing Association (22) – for ID cards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration Service Union (16) – against compulsory ID card</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreign Authorities

| Michael Ring, Irish politician and member of Fine Gael (80 words) – for ID cards |
| Enda Kenny Leader of Fine Gael (35 words) – unclear |

Table 6.6 Leading Actors in the Debate of ID Cards 1997 to 2001

6.2.2 Frame Analysis of News Collection 01-May-1997 to 10-Sept-2001

Table 6.7 maps the distribution of master frames in news collection from May 1997 to September 2001 (52 items in total).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1997-2001 News</th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52 items</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 items</td>
<td>4 items</td>
<td>3 items</td>
<td>21 items</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.7 The distribution of master frames in news collection May 1997 – Sept 2001

+ Means in favour of ID cards;
– Means against ID cards.

_Liberalism + rhetoric_: Law-abiding citizens have nothing to fear from a multi-beneficial national identity card system.

_Liberalism – rhetoric_: National ID cards will infringe personal liberties, restrict personal freedom, and give too much power to the Government.

_Nationalism + rhetoric_: National ID card system can cut down crime, illegal immigration, identity fraud, underage drinking and smoking.

_Nationalism – rhetoric_: Compulsory national ID card is too costly and will not work.

From Table 6.7 it is concluded that the percentage of use of nationalism and liberalism master frames is very similar, with a difference of only one item. In addition, the number of items identified with arguments against a British national ID cards system is very close to the number in favour, again with a difference of only one item.
Table 6.7 above does not contain enough information with regard to how the master frames are represented in the 52 news items. Therefore, it is the purpose of this section to find out how the nationalism and liberalism master frames are represented in the news collection May 1997 – 10th September 2001. To achieve this objective, the representation of master frames will be described newspaper by newspaper, with the editorial stand and commentary stand regarded as the two main aspects of the representation of master frames. However, during those five years, only the Daily Mail and Independent issued editorials, as discussed below.

**Daily Mail and Sunday Mail**

Editorial Stand: On 3rd July 1999, the Daily Mail published an editorial expressing suspicion that the Labour Government planned to use child social security numbering as a first step towards a national identity card system. It also raised civil liberties concerns regarding the introduction of such a controversial system. The editorial employed the liberalism master frame to challenge the ID cards plan.

Commentary Stand: On May 24th 1999, Keith Waterhouse again criticised the proposal for national identity cards. Employing the liberalism frame to interpret the scheme, Waterhouse argued that such a system would severely infringe the civil liberties of British citizens.

**Independent and Independent on Sunday**

Editorial Stand: On 4th Sep 2001, only a week before 9/11, the Independent published an editorial with the headline “Britain’s lack of an identity card should be a source of great national pride”. It explained why a national identity card system would not solve the asylum problems in Britain. It also stated proudly:

That Britain has no national identity card should be a point of national pride, not a defect to be remedied. It says that we are confident enough of our rights and freedoms and secure enough in our social order, not to need to check up constantly on whom is where and why.
In this editorial, both the nationalism frame (represented as cost/effect argument) and liberalism (represented as security/liberty dilemma) are present, arguing against the national ID card proposal.

6.3. Data Analysis of News Collection 11-Sept-2001 to 01-Aug-2008

6.3.1 Content Analysis of News Collection 11-Sept-2001 to 01-Aug-2008

Figure 6.7 shows the number of news items on British national ID cards from 11th September 2001 to 1st August 2008. It is clear that the density of media representation is much higher than in 1994-97 or 1997-2001, reaching a peak in 2003 and falling slightly from 2007 to 2008. The changes are consistent with the political agenda during these eight years, as summarised below:

- **Sept 2001**: Following the events of 9/11, Home Secretary David Blunkett says he will “think at great length” about ID cards.

- **June 2002**: Labour Government introduces policy, plans, and consultation paper on 'Entitlement' cards.

- **Nov 2003**: Identity Cards Bill included in Queen’s Speech.

- **Nov 2004**: ID Cards Bill again in Queen’s Speech.

- **Oct 2005**: ID Cards Bill passed in House of Commons.

- **Jan 2006**: House of Lords rejects ID Cards Bill.

- **Mar 2006**: ID Cards Act 2006.

- **Nov 2007**: Multiple data loss raises suspicions in the data handling of the ID Cards Act 2006.
Figure 6.7 Number of news items collected September 2001 to Aug 2008

Figure 6.8 shows the makeup of different type of news among the 972 news items collected from 11th September 2001 to 1st August 2008. Hard news is again the most common type in the media representation of British national ID cards, making up 45% of all items, followed by personal opinion pieces and readers’ letters. Editorials and feature news also take a greater percentage than in 1994-97 or 1997-2001.

Unlike the two previous periods, the media representation of national identity cards from September 2001 to August 2008 is more diverse in terms of the makeup of news. Commentary pieces (if we include opinion pieces together with readers’ letters and editorials) make up nearly 40% of the 972 items.
Table 6.8 shows the frequency of appearance of 12 themes found in the 972 items from 11th September 2001 to 1st August 2008. The themes are tabled in descending order of popularity. The most frequently appearing theme, the impact of ID cards on civil liberties and personal freedom, appeared in more than a quarter of all the news items. It is followed by four more popular themes: the purposes of ID cards, the timetable for the introduction of ID cards, the cost of ID cards and data protection issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF APPEARANCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact of ID cards on civil liberties</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposes of ID cards</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timetable for introduction of ID cards</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of ID cards</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Database handling</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation of ID cards bill</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion on ID cards</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biometrics</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of ID cards in UK and other countries</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After a general review of themes, it is also important to observe the changes in the frequency of their appearance over eight years (see Figure 6.9), cross-examining the changes with the political agendas listed in section 6.3.1.

Table 6.9 lists the leading actors involved in the media representation of British national ID cards from 11th September 2001 to 1st August 2008. The length of quotation of each actor is shown, as well as his/her overall attitude towards compulsory/voluntary national ID cards. The leading actors are grouped according the coding categories.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITIES</th>
<th>HOME OFFICE (2356 WORDS) - FOR COMPULSORY ID CARDS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THE COMMONS HOMEAFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE (767 WORDS) – FOR COMPULSORY ID CARDS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INFORMATION COMMISSIONER (770 WORDS) – STRONGLY AGAINST ID CARDS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>POLICE AUTHORITIES (405 WORDS) – FOR VOLUNTARY ID CARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PASSPORT AND IDENTITY AGENCY (375) – STRONGLY FOR ID CARDS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>David Blunkett (5450 words) – for compulsory ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charles Clarke (1420 words) – for compulsory ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tony Blair (672 words) – for compulsory ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Andy Burnham (535 words) – for compulsory ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Des Browne (488 words) – for compulsory ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jack Straw (466 words) – strongly against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>David Davis (1892 words) – strongly against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michael Howard (1201 words) – for voluntary ID card.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oliver Letwin (802 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Lilley (418 words) – for voluntary ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liam Fox (412 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>David Cameron (245 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat Party</td>
<td>Mike Oaten (830 words) – strongly against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Simon Hughes (510 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nick Clegg (296 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights &amp; Civil Liberties Groups</td>
<td>Liberty (2210 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO2ID (1643 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irish Council for Civil Liberties (456 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charter 88 (429 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics &amp; Experts</td>
<td>Simon Davies (453 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michael Levi (300 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LSE report on ID card project (130 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations</td>
<td>IPPR (127 words) – against ID cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British Medical Association (237 words) – against ID cards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.9 Leading actors involved in the debate of ID cards September 2001-2008

It is not surprising to find that both the Conservative and Liberal Democratic Parties opposed the introduction of a biometric national identity card system in the UK. Peter Lilley (2005: 4), Conservative MP for Hitchin and Harpenden and former chairman of the Bow Group, was so determined to fight against the biometric national identity card scheme that in 2005, with the help of the Bow Group, he published an 18-page report titled *Identity Crisis: the case against ID cards* to criticise the controversial scheme that “has been hawked round Whitehall for decades”. In the report he attacked the Labour Government’s plan for compulsory identity cards as a potential “Labour’s poll tax” and “an unjustifiable encroachment on liberty in return for at best minor benefits” (2005: 3). His arguments are, to an extent, similar to the Identity Project report published by the London School of Economics in the same year: both reports discuss cost-effectiveness, the impact on civil liberty, public opinion, function creep and biometric technology. The conclusions of both echo the findings of Beck and Broadhurst (1998) that if the identity card system were to become compulsory, its impact on civil liberty would be too damaging. Civil rights groups warn that a biometric identity card system would not bring any benefits, but would aggregate the already strained relations between the police and ethnic minorities (Beck and Broadhurst 1998), a concern shared by the Association of Chief Police Officers in Britain. However, if the scheme were to be voluntary, then the benefits claimed by the Labour Government could no longer exist.

**Consultation and Legislation of Identity Cards Bill 2005**

Table 6.12 below summarises the events in the Identity Cards Bill consultation process.

| July 2002 | 1) Cabinet Office published a report on identity fraud demanding the use of national identity card system to combat serious identity fraud in the UK (Cabinet Office 2002) – For identity cards  
2). The Home Office also presented a research paper to Parliament – |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2003</td>
<td>COI prepared a report on “Public Perceptions of Identity/Entitlement Cards” for the Home Office</td>
<td>For identity cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2003</td>
<td>Feasibility Study on the Use of Biometrics in an Entitlement Scheme for UKPS, DVLA and the Home Office published by Tony Mansfield and Marek Rejman-Greene</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2003</td>
<td>COI published another report on “Identity cards: Qualitative research on perceptions of cost – findings”</td>
<td>For identity cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2003</td>
<td>1) Government published its response to the consultation points of Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud</td>
<td>For identity cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) The Home Office published “Identity Cards: the Next Steps”</td>
<td>For identity cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2004</td>
<td>Home Office published “Legislation on Identity Cards – A Consultation”</td>
<td>For identity cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2004</td>
<td>House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Identity Cards Fourth Report</td>
<td>For identity cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2004</td>
<td>COI “Public perceptions of identity cards – qualitative research report”</td>
<td>For identity cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2004</td>
<td>1) The Government replied to the Fourth Report from the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee</td>
<td>For identity cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) The Home Office published “Identity Cards: a summary of findings from the consultation on legislation on identity cards”</td>
<td>For identity cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2004</td>
<td>COI “Identity cards: people with special issues: response to the proposed customer experience”</td>
<td>For identity cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2005</td>
<td>Home Secretary Charles Clarke replied to Rt. Hon. Jean Corston, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, on the questions that</td>
<td>For identity cards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In July 2004, the Home Affairs Committee published their findings on the draft bill, without challenging the Government other than to ask that they clarify the purposes of the identity card scheme during the legislation procedure. The reason for this lies in the makeup of the membership of the Home Affairs Committee. Seven out of the twelve members were Labour Party members, including Chairman John Denham. However, although the Identity Cards Bill 2004 passed all the stages in the House of Commons, the timing of the 2005 General Election meant that David Blunkett did not bring the legislation to completion. The same bill was introduced by Home Secretary Charles Clarke on 28th June 2005, and had to proceed through all stages of Parliamentary scrutiny once again.

The 2005 General Election not only delayed Blunkett’s plan to complete the legislation of identity cards, but also reduced Labour’s parliamentary majority to 67 seats, so damaging their dominance in Parliament, a critical aspect in the legislation and consultation process. Facing strong opposition from David Cameron and from the Liberal Democrats, attempting to pass the Identity Cards Bill with only a 67-seat majority seemed risky for the Labour Party and indeed, on its second passage through the House of Commons the votes in the Second and Third Readings of the Bill were very close.

During the Bill’s first passage through the House of Commons, at the Second Reading on 20th December 2004 there were 19 rebel votes from Labour MPs, representing the largest Labour civil liberties rebellion at a Second or Third Reading since 1997. The record was soon broken on the Bill’s second passage through the House, at the Second Reading on 28th June 2005,
with 20 rebel votes from Labour MPs. On both occasions, however, the Bill was passed with a huge majority, by 292-votes in the latter case, because the majority of Conservative MPs were under the influence of Michael Howard, who was enthusiastic about ID cards. On 14th December 2004 the *Daily Telegraph* reported that David Davis, the Shadow Home Secretary, had threatened to resign over ID card issues. A friend of his was reported as saying that Davis lost in a debate over ID cards in the Shadow Cabinet because Howard supported the ID cards in principle. Indeed, Michael Howard had himself tried to introduce ID cards when he was Home Secretary in Major’s Government. Furthermore, a number of Conservative MPs did not even show up to vote at the (second) Second Reading, because the Labour Party were so dominant in the Commons. No matter how the Conservative MPs voted, as long as the majority of Labour MPs voted in favour of ID cards, the Bill would pass.

David Davis did eventually resign over the ID card issue and 42-day detention law, on 13th June 2008. Although he stated that the resignation was an entirely personal decision and there was no report of any disagreement between him and David Cameron, it was apparent that he had lost the debate in the Shadow Cabinet. He later admitted that it would be impossible for him to return to the front bench due to his resignation. This unusual action by David Davis indicates that David Cameron and other members of the Conservative Shadow Cabinet have rather different views from Davis on ID cards.

The Second Reading is usually followed by a Committee stage. However, in July 2004 the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee had already published the Fourth Report on the Identity Cards Bill. Therefore, the Third Reading was on its way.

At the Third Reading on the Bill’s second passage through the House, the number of Labour rebel MPs had reached 25, larger than the previous 19 and 20 rebel votes for the two Second Readings in December 2004 and June 2005 respectively. The Bill was then passed to the House of Lords for further discussion. At that stage, if a bill passes unchanged, it becomes law; if the Lords make any changes, the bill returns to the House of Commons, where MPs decide whether to accept or reject the amendments. Normally those amendments will be rejected by the majority of MPs in the House of Commons. The Parliament Act 1911, which Cunningham (2001: 208) called “an essential step in the creation of a democracy in Britain” limited the legislation-blocking powers of the House of Lords, stating that any bill passed unchanged by the Commons in three separate sessions over two years could be presented for
the royal assent (necessary for a bill to become law) without the Lords’ consent. For example, the Lords voted to add a new provision to the Identity Cards Bill as follows:

Before the Identity Cards law can be enforced, the Government must publish a detailed report stating all the costs of the system since 2004 and a cost estimate by year for the next ten years, and a statement of the expected benefits of the system.

However, the majority of MPs voted to remove this requirement, as they did to reject the Lord’s proposed change to the Bill which would make the application for an ID card voluntary when obtaining a “designated document” such as a passport. One amendment from the House of Lords that did survive was to give people the option, until 2010, of not being given an ID card when they renew their “designated document”, although they will still be entered in the National Identity Register.

In summary, the legislation process of the Identity Cards Bill 2005 in the UK Parliament was, to some extent, smooth; however, that did not mean that there was no resistance from the anti-ID card MPs.
Rebel Voters on Identity Cards Bill – led by Socialist Campaign Group

The following Labour MPs voted against the introduction of Identity Cards at the Second Reading on 28th June 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diane Abbott</td>
<td>Hackney North &amp; Stoke Newington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katy Clark</td>
<td>Ayrshire North &amp; Arran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Cook</td>
<td>Stockton North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Corbyn</td>
<td>Islington North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwyneth Dunwoody</td>
<td>Crewe &amp; Nantwich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Fisher</td>
<td>Stoke-on-Trent Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Flynn</td>
<td>Newport West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kate Hoey</td>
<td>Vauxhall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelvin Hopkins</td>
<td>Luton North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glenda Jackson</td>
<td>Hampstead &amp; Highgate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynne Jones</td>
<td>Birmingham, Selly Oak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Marshall-Andrews</td>
<td>Medway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John McDonnell</td>
<td>Hayes &amp; Harlington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda Riordan</td>
<td>Halifax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clare Short</td>
<td>Birmingham, Ladywood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Simpson</td>
<td>Nottingham South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Smith</td>
<td>Vale of Glamorgan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.13 Rebel Votes on Identity Cards Bill 2005 – Second Reading

The following Labour MPs voted against the introduction of Identity Cards at the Third Reading on 18th Oct 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diane Abbott</td>
<td>Hackney North &amp; Stoke Newington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Clapham</td>
<td>Barnsley West &amp; Penistone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katy Clark</td>
<td>Ayrshire North &amp; Arran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Corbyn</td>
<td>Islington North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwyneth Dunwoody</td>
<td>Crewe &amp; Nantwich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Fisher</td>
<td>Stoke-on-Trent Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Flynn</td>
<td>Newport West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neil Gerrard</td>
<td>Walthamstow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ian Gibson</td>
<td>Norwich North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kate Hoey</td>
<td>Vauxhall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelvin Hopkins</td>
<td>Luton North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glenda Jackson</td>
<td>Hampstead &amp; Highgate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynne Jones</td>
<td>Birmingham, Selly Oak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Marshall-Andrews</td>
<td>Medway</td>
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</table>
The following section will seek to explain why the above Labour MPs voted against the Labour Government’s Identity Cards Bill. First however, it is necessary to briefly review the literature on ‘New Labour’, identifying what divided ‘New Labour’ and the Socialist Campaign Group.

The origin and development of ‘New Labour’ has been extensively studied by many intellectuals in order to explain the ideological shift from ‘Old Labour’ and the consequences of that shift (Fielding 2003, Arblaster 2004, Beech 2004, William-Jones 2004, Russell 2005, Rubinstein 2006, Shaw 2007). Rubinstein (2006) argued that the transformation from Old Labour to New Labour in the mid-1990s was the result of three developments: First and most important was the change in British society (such as the falling percentage of working class population); second, the Labour Party was under tremendous electoral pressure from the Conservative Party and felt that changes were necessary; finally, Tony Blair, someone who was capable of changing the Labour Party, was elected as the new leader. While some commentators reject the name ‘New Labour’, preferring to call the Labour Party and the Blair
Government ‘control freaks’ (Jones 2001), it is widely agreed that the reforms implemented by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown led to the three consecutive General Election victories for Labour (Russell 2005, Fielding 2003).

18 out of 26 rebellious MPs were/are members of the Socialist Campaign Group

The Socialist Campaign Group is made up of left-wing Labour MPs. It is often seen as a critic of the ‘New Labour’ campaign led by Neil Kinnock and Tony Blair. In contrast to New Labour’s belief in modernisation and the market, the Socialist Campaign Group is inclined to hold to more traditional Labour movement values. Of the rebellious MPs listed above, the following 16 were members of the SCG: Diane Abbott, Katy Clark, Frank Cook, Jeremy Corbyn, Kelvin Hopkins, Lynne Jones, Robert Marshall-Andrews, John McDonnell, Linda Riordan, Alan Simpson, Robert Wareing, Mike Wood, David Taylor, Michael Clapham, Neil Gerrard and Ian Gibson. Mark Fisher had been a member of SCG, but left the group to join the front bench. Clare Short had left the SCG to join the Cabinet. The other eight rebellious MPs were: Gwyneth Dunwoody, Paul Flynn, Kate Hoey, Glenda Jackson, John Smith, David Winnick, Albert Owen and Geraldine Smith.

Opposition on ID Cards from Socialist Campaign Group

1. Chairman – John McDonnell

John McDonnell has emphasised that the practicality of the ID cards scheme is doubtful. He told the Daily Telegraph that the scheme would be unworkable. Also, he complained that the Government had modified the original bill so much that it had become unrecognisable.


On 24th May 2003, Alan Simpson and Neil Gerrard told the Guardian that the Labour rebels would oppose such a “repressive and unworkable idea” in the House of Commons as strongly as possible when the Government submitted the Identity Cards Bill for legislation. Again on 19th October 2005, Neil Gerrard and Robert Marshall-Andrews expressed their strong opposition to the ID cards plan in the Daily Telegraph. Both insisted that any scheme should be voluntary and that more debate was required.
3. Diane Abbott

As a black female MP, Abbott raised concerns in the impacts of ID cards on black and minority ethnic groups. On 28th June 2005, during her speech on ID cards, she said that

I have consistently raised worries about race with Ministers and colleagues, so it is no coincidence that the Muslim Council of Britain, the Commission for Racial Equality and other organisations representing ethnic minorities have expressed their concerns about the Bill. A recent poll showed that 77 percent of ethnic minority people believed that they would be discriminated against under the Bill. There can be no doubt that the Bill will lead to the compulsory carrying of ID cards—and that from there it must lead to the compulsory presentation of ID cards. We know from the French experience that if we move to such a system, the number of stops and searches on black, Asian and Muslim people will rise, which will be detrimental to community relations.

Abbott’s emphasis on community relations and ethnic minority concerns did not stop the passing of the Identity Cards Bill. However, she continued her campaign against ID cards, even after the Bill became law.

4. Katy Clark, Frank Cook, Jeremy Corbyn

Katy Clark was elected as a Labour MP in the 2005 General Election. Cook has been known as one of the most rebellious MPs in Parliament, while Corbyn argued strongly against the introduction of a biometric card system, claiming that it would lead to a ‘stop and search’ society and to racial profiling, and so damage civil liberty.

5. Lynne Jones’ Appeal to MPs

Jones outlined the pitfalls and costs of the ID cards scheme and published on SCG’s website. She raised concerns regarding both the huge costs of the scheme and data protection issues, concluding that:

Identity cards offer a single point of failure. The ID card would be seen as infallible and relied on too strongly: the benefit of the doubt would be given on the presentation of the card. This would create a false sense of security and create more opportunities for organised crime and terrorism.

At the very minimum, there is no good reason for spending billions on ID cards without far more work on the technology and a proper cost-benefits appraisal being carried out. Such work is a long way off, so now is not the time to expect MPs to have to vote on this issue.

Opposition on ID cards from other Labour rebels

1. Gwyneth Dunwoody
Dunwoody was the longest-ever serving female MP in the UK Parliament, from 1966 to 2008. Although a right-winger, she voted against ID cards out of civil liberty concerns. She challenged Charles Clark’s ID Cards Bill on 23rd May 2005, saying that:

We believe that this is a question of civil rights, and it disturbs us greatly. The history of the holding of every element of information about people's lives by police forces or Governments suggests not that such information is always used responsibly, but that, in some instances, it is used by Governments for the worst possible reasons.

2. Mark Fisher & Kate Hoey

Fisher was sacked from his post as Minister for the Arts in Tony Blair’s 1998 reshuffle, due to Fisher’s rebel vote on the Competition Act 1998. He has remained as a backbencher ever since. In his argument against the introduction of ID cards, he questioned the real reason for the Bill, arguing that it would not help to stop terrorist attacks. Kate Hoey echoed Fisher’s remarks and the two MPs supported each other’s arguments against ID cards in the Commons.

3. Glenda Jackson

Glenda Jackson has been a regular critic of Tony Blair, on policies such as top-up tuition fees. She supported Lynne Jones in opposing ID cards. Glenda Jackson mainly challenged Charles Clarke on the matter of the practicality of the ID cards scheme.

4. John Smith

On 28th June 2005, John Smith asked Charles Clarke:

On the point about countries that have chosen or not chosen to introduce the identity card, does the Right Hon. Gentleman think it significant that after the worst terrorist atrocity in human history, the United States of America considered the matter carefully in the 9/11 commission and rejected the case for an ID card?

His question was warmly welcomed by David Davis, then-Shadow Home Secretary.

5. David Winnick

David Winnick was the only one of twelve members of the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee to vote against the Identity Cards Bill. He argued in the Commons that:
If I was convinced that the measure would help to prevent terrorism, despite all the difficulties—the practical costs and so on—I would vote for it. If identity cards could prevent casualties such as those on 7 July when people died or were seriously injured—one woman, for example, survived but had to have both legs amputated above the knee—how could I say that I would vote on principle against identity cards? I am simply not persuaded, however, that identity cards would prevent terrorism in any way. There have been terrorist incidents in Istanbul and Madrid, but there is no evidence whatsoever that identity cards, albeit without biometrics, prevented terrorism in those countries.

He concluded that the Identity Cards Bill was not justified and he would vote against it to protect civil liberties.

### 6.3.2 Frame Analysis of News Collection 11-Sept-2001 to 01-Aug-2008

Table 6.10 maps the distribution of master frames in news collected from September 2001 to August 2008 (972 items in total).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2001- Aug 2008 News</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>972 items in total</td>
<td>138 items</td>
<td>220 items</td>
<td>96 items</td>
<td>419 items</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.10 Distribution of master frames in news collection Sept 2001- Aug 2008

+ Means in favour of ID cards;
– Means against ID cards.

From Table 6.10, the first impression is that the liberalism frame is more widely employed than the nationalism frame in the overall mapping. From 1994 to 2001 there had been a significant increase in the liberalism + rhetoric, from 4% (in the period 1994-97) to 6% (1997-01) to 10%. The reason is the widespread discussion of the security/liberty dilemma across the fifteen years of media representation of national ID cards, especially after 9/11. The supporters of ID cards reassured critics that the system would not infringe any civil liberties; instead, it can enhance citizens’ liberties and rights by cutting crime and fighting terrorism. They also reassured sceptics that the Government would enforce the data protection acts to ensure that no data are leaked, a promise that the Labour Government has
not kept very well, especially since 2007, when a lot of sensitive data have been lost due to human error.

Liberalism + rhetoric: A national ID card system will cut crime, so enhancing the civil liberties of law-abiding citizens. It can also make life easier by giving fast access to various services such as the NHS and banking.

Liberalism – rhetoric: A national ID card infringes personal liberties, restricts personal freedom, makes Government a ‘Big Brother’ and creates a surveillance society.

Nationalism + rhetoric: A national ID card system can stop terrorism, illegal immigration, identity fraud and social problems, and enhance Government efficiency.

Nationalism – rhetoric: A national ID card is too costly and unnecessary while other identification documents are working well to serve the same end.

Table 6.10 above does not provide enough information with regard to how the master frames are represented in the 972 news items. Therefore, it is the purpose of this section to find out how the nationalism and liberalism master frames are represented in the news collection between 11th September 2001 and 1st August 2008. To achieve this objective, the representation of master frames will be described newspaper by newspaper, so as to present a specific frame analysis. The editorial stand and commentary stand are regarded as the two main aspects of the representation of master frames.

Times and Sunday Times

Editorial Stand: The Times tabled many questions over David Blunkett’s plan to introduce national ID cards, including the purposes, civil liberties concerns, data protection and function creep. The concern was that such an ID card scheme could make the British public dependent in their everyday lives on “the license of a centralised state bureaucracy”. In 2002, the Times again questioned the practicality of designing a “fully computerised national system” for the ID cards plan. In 2004, the Times echoed Richard Thomas’ concerns over the data handling aspect of ID cards, and called for Parliament to take the demand for public and individual privacy into consideration when examining the ID Cards Bill. However, in 2006, the Times stated that “the public should relax about a privacy issue that in a contemporary
card-carrying Britain is entirely irrelevant”. It demanded that the Government “should explain the need more coherently and openly”, but dropped the privacy concerns.

In summary, the *Times*’ editorial stand was very conservative about ID cards, especially over the practicality of the scheme. The nationalism master frame was the main ideology underneath the argument.

Commentary Stand: Soon after 9/11, on 4th October 2001, David Blunkett (then Home Secretary) published an article in the *Times* under the title “At times like these, the majority must be protected from the minority”. He took the chance to promote the national ID card scheme by stating that:

Contrary to some commentaries, my position on identity or entitlement cards remains exactly the same as on September 14 when I was first asked about the issue as Home Secretary. I am persuadable of the case for an entitlement-based card but want to think carefully about it. If I think there is merit in the proposals, they would be put before the British people for consultation.

At that stage, he did not reveal any more details about the entitlement/identity cards scheme.

In an article published in the *Times* on 4th July 2002, Blunkett promoted the idea of a national identity card to fight against illegal immigration. He stated that:

This debate about entitlement cards must focus on illegal immigration, on how the citizen relates to the State and accesses services conveniently and how, in finding solutions to these 21st-century challenges, the State does not invade personal privacy. It is crucial that any entitlement card scheme does not breach the fundamental privacy and civil liberties we all enjoy.

He further explained why by saying that “identity fraud costs the UK £1.3 billion a year at a conservative estimate, a lot of it made up from credit card fraud”. He concluded that:

I believe entitlement cards could foster citizenship by demonstrating the relationship between the State and the citizen, while proving a real weapon against some of the crimes undermining our society.

Blunkett’s strategy in arguing in favour of national identity cards was to convince the public that ID cards would never infringe civil liberties; instead, the scheme would protect the civil liberties that law-abiding citizens are entitled to. He tried to divert all attention to the issue of illegal immigration, by saying that the identity card was specifically designed to target illegal
immigrants, not British citizens. The liberalism frame is clearly evident in his defence of the ID card policy.

_Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday_

Editorial Stand: In its editorial on 28th April 2004, the _Daily Mail_ cast “serious doubts over ID cards”, arguing:

> Identity cards may be popular in principle and Mr Blunkett's instincts are undoubtedly sound. But wouldn't it be better to focus on action that can be taken now rather than plans that will take years to implement?

The cost/effective argument made by this editorial was rooted in the nationalism frame.

Commentary Stand: On 7th February 2002, Keith Waterhouse attacked the “Big Brother” plan for national identity cards within the liberalism frame. He again emphasised the importance of balancing the power relation between the state authority and the British citizen. He discussed the potential implications of such a system on social sorting and data protection. In the following year, 2003, Waterhouse wrote three comment pieces attacking Blunkett’s ID card plan from the perspectives of practicality, cost and civil liberties. Again in 2004, Waterhouse wrote three articles opposing the introduction of ID cards, referring to such a move as “Big Brother”. In 2005, he continued to challenge the practicality of ID cards and explained how the scheme would affect everyday life in Britain. His attacks on ID cards continued after the Identity Cards Bill was passed in Parliament in March 2006. In summary, he employed both the liberalism and nationalism frames in his articles opposing British national ID cards.

Alongside Waterhouse’s attacks stand Jacqueline Laing’s criticism of the Labour Government’s biometric identity card scheme, in an opinion piece titled “Welcome to Big Brother Britain as Labour drives another nail in the coffin of individual freedom”. Jonathan Brocklebank also shared these fears over the “Big Brother” state if the ID card scheme were to become compulsory. Thus the commentary stand of the _Daily Mail_ with regard to Labour’s national identity card plan is deeply critical and sceptical, based on the analysis of the impact of such a problematic scheme on civil liberty and personal freedom.
**Daily Mirror and Sunday Mirror**

Editorial Stand: The *Sunday Mirror* issued an editorial on 25th April 2004 under the title “Voice of the Sunday Mirror: Risk to our rights is on the cards”. Employing the liberalism frame, the editorial demanded that the Government take firm action on data protection to ensure that civil liberties would not be infringed by the introduction of an ID card scheme. It declared that “A Big Brother state - however genial - is no solution”. Another editorial, “Voice of the Daily Mirror: Pointless Passport”, issued on 20th December 2006, called for the abolition of the identity cards scheme and for more police officers to be recruited instead.

Commentary Stand: On 5th July 2002, Paul Routledge accused the Labour Government of introducing a “Big Brother measure”; moreover, he criticised Blunkett as “the most illiberal of anyone in the Government”. Routledge completely disagreed with Blunkett’s argument that an ID cards system was necessary and beneficial. On 5th March 2004 Ron MacKenna echoed Routledge’s suspicion regarding the necessity of such a huge and controversial scheme. Motivated mainly by concerns regarding data protection, he argued that the ID cards plan should be stopped before it was too late. In these commentary pieces the liberalism master frame was the dominating ideology employed to argue against the introduction of a national ID cards system.

**Daily Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph**

Editorial Stand: On 7th February 2002 a *Daily Telegraph* editorial titled “Bad Idea”, claimed that “identity cards have always seemed un-British” and warned the public of the Government’s “appalling record” on data protection.

On 22nd November 2007, soon after the loss of 25 million child benefit records, a *Daily Telegraph* editorial asked “who would trust [the Labour Government] on ID card security?” The editorial concluded that:

This lethal combination of inexcusable incompetence and betrayal of trust will cost the Government dear. The public will think twice about volunteering any sensitive information in future - and who could blame them if they decide that supplying their personal details for a national ID database is a risk they just do not want to take?
In March 2008, the *Daily Telegraph* returned to this issue, describing the Government’s record on data protection as “abject” in its editorial. It also warned the public of the Labour Government’s “plot” to introduce compulsory ID cards by stealth.

From 2001 to 2008, the *Daily Telegraph* published several editorials criticising the national ID card scheme, mostly within the liberalism frame. It referred to the plan as creating “a state of surveillance” and “Big Brother” society.

Commentary Stand: Stephen Robinson, one of the most active critics of the national identity cards plan, devoted many of his columns in the *Daily Telegraph* to condemning the potential dangers triggered by such a scheme. He argued that “a free country” did not need this “Big Brother” measure, which would make it into a “state of surveillance”.

*Daily Express and Sunday Express*

Editorial Stand: In July 2002, the *Express* published three editorials condemning David Blunkett’s national ID card plan, criticising the scheme as “expensive, confused, unworkable and unrealistic”; and demanded that Blunkett drop such a controversial and complex plan. As early as February 2002, the *Express* had warned David Blunkett of the big trouble this ID card plan could cause. The editorial stand of the *Express* has been firm in opposing a national ID card plan, employing both nationalism and liberalism frames.

*Guardian*

Editorial Stand: On 27th April 2004, the *Guardian* challenged the British national identity card scheme by questioning the purposes of ID cards as stated by David Blunkett. Blunkett had admitted in several interviews that ID cards would not stop terrorist attacks. Therefore, the *Guardian* raised suspicions over the exaggerated functions of an ID card system.

In addition to questioning the purposes and function creep of ID cards, the *Guardian* also condemned the national ID cards scheme as making Britain “a surveillance state”. An editorial on 9th June 2008 explained that “The National Identity Register, now being compiled,
is the most ambitious attempt in history to record and share data on private citizens” and continued:

The debate about surveillance is at heart a debate about trust in the state. There are sometimes good reasons for hampering official powers to monitor citizens. The fact that technology makes scrutiny easier does not mean it should be done. However well-intentioned, the state will sometimes abuse information, or lose it (as with child benefit). Besides the practicalities, personal privacy is a fundamental good and its loss should be weighed against any nominal advances in efficiency or security. Even if secure data collection and sharing was possible (and it is not), it would be right to restrict it.

Both nationalism and liberalism frames are identified in the Guardian editorials. The editorial stand has been consistently critical of the ID card scheme, raising concerns on cost/effective and security/liberty issues.

Independent and Independent on Sunday

Editorial Stand: The Independent has scrutinised the “oversold” benefits of a national identity card system and criticised the impact of such a policy on civil liberties and personal freedom. Editorials published on 15th January 2007 and 7th March 2008 accused the Labour Government of “taking a lead in the wrong direction” by implementing a national ID card scheme, and of incompetence in data protection.

In December 2006, an Independent editorial described the national identity card scheme as an “expensive and illiberal intrusion into our lives” and questioned the Labour Government’s ability to protect the database created by a national identity register.

Sun

Editorial Stand: Blunkett’s ID cards promotion may not have won over the Times or the Guardian, but it totally convinced the Sun, which endorsed the plan by issuing three editorials in support of the idea of a national ID card system. It emphasised the great potential
of the scheme.

Observer

Editorial Stand: On 5th November 2006, the Observer’s leading article “Parliament must thwart this snooping state” appealed to Parliament to check the progress of the Labour Government’s “Big Brother” moves.


In order to compare the three case studies, it is necessary first to carry out a general review of the content and frame analysis results described in sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. Table 6.11 below displays the editorial stand of each national newspaper over the 15 years, from 1994 to 2008.

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Times &amp; Sunday Times</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail &amp; Mail on Sunday</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror &amp; Sunday Mirror</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Negative</td>
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<td>Daily Telegraph &amp; Sunday Telegraph</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
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<td>Daily Express &amp; Sunday Express</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Negative</td>
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<td>Guardian</td>
<td>Negative</td>
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<td>Independent &amp; Independent on Sunday</td>
<td>Negative</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Sun</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Positive</td>
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<tr>
<td>News of the World</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Positive (2001-03) Negative afterwards</td>
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Table 6.11 Editorial Stand in the Newspapers 1994-2008
From the above table it is clear that the majority of British national newspapers have been against the introduction of national identity cards for most of the time, with the exception of the *Mail* (1994-97), *Sun* (1994-2008) and *People* (2001 to 2003). *Sun* has been supportive of the national identity cards throughout the Green Paper 1995 and Identity Cards Bill 2004 and 2005. *Daily Mail* changed its attitude after 1997, starting to challenge the identity card scheme. But during the mediated debate of Tory's Green Paper, *Daily Mail* was in favour of a national identity card scheme and believed that it could help curbing identity frauds in Britain. For the rest of the national newspapers, the level and intensity of opposition they generated to Identity cards increased from 2002 and peaked in 2003, which is coherent with the number of news items and editorials they published in these two years. On 1\textsuperscript{st} July 2002, *The Independent* attacked the ID card scheme as “ineffective, illiberal and expensive”; on 4\textsuperscript{th} July 2002, *the Guardian* asked “suspects or citizens: ID card foster intrusion not rights”. Similar rhetoric appeared many times in the anti-ID cards national newspapers from 2003 to 2006. The messages sent out by these anti-ID cards national newspapers are: first, ID card system will never work due to high cost, function creep and data loss; second, it's too damaging on civil liberties. And their campaign against the Identity Cards plan continued after the passing of Identity Cards Act 2006.

**The first British national ID card system implemented in peacetime**

The previous case studies of the media representation of historical British national identity cards refer to schemes born during wartime to assist war emergencies such as food rationing and conscription. Those ID card systems were abolished (in 1919 and 1952) due to resentment from the public, including those of high rank such as Lord Goddard. The Conservative Party proposed a national identity card plan in 1995; however, the Cabinet split on the policy and the impending General Election forced the Government to drop it in October 1996. However, the Labour Government succeeded in enforcing the Identity Cards Bill 2005 in peacetime, when there was no war emergency as in WWI and WWII.

The majority of the British national newspapers have been against the introduction of national identity cards for most of the time. The exceptions have been the *Mail* (1994-97), *Sun* (1994-2008) and *People* (2001 to 2003). Despite the *Sun*’s active role in popularising national ID cards among its readers, it is clear that the rest of the national newspapers have remained in strong opposition to the scheme.
Therefore, the question remains as to what factors led to the success of the Identity Cards Bill in the face of the opposition of the majority of the British national newspapers. The following section will seek to explain in what circumstances and with whose support the Identity Cards Bill 2005 succeeded. First of all, it is necessary to briefly review the consultation and legislation of the Identity Cards Bill.

**9/11 and Labour’s majority in Parliament pave the way for the success of the Identity Cards Bill 2005**

From Table 6.11, it is known that most of the national newspapers were very negative about the introduction of a national identity cards system, both in 1995 in response to the Tories’ Green Paper, and with regard to Labour’s Identity Cards Bill 2004. What is more, Michael Howard had tried hard to push his ID cards plan through the legislation procedure; however, he was met with a Cabinet split on the policy, which made legislation impossible. In contrast to Howard’s situation, Blunkett was endorsed by Tony Blair and the Labour Cabinet, especially after 9/11. The Cabinet unity demonstrated that the authorities had achieved consensus in the ID card policy, and with the comfortable majority enjoyed by the Labour Party after the 2001 General Election, the legislation of the Identity Cards Bill 2004 was relatively smoother than Howard and Major experienced in 1995. As Huysmans and Buonfino (2008: 783) argued, “this is not a debate about the efficiency and effectiveness of a technology like ID cards but about the fundamentals of the political relation between the state and its citizens and especially about the limits of state power”.

The Labour Party won the 1997 General Election by the largest majority of seats since 1945. The 418 seats secured by Labour were the party’s largest ever total, while the Conservative Party gained their lowest number (165 seats) since 1906. The Liberal Democrats saw their share of the vote fall, but gained 46 seats compared with a total of 18 in 1992. Again, in 2001, Labour won the election with 412 seats, down 6 from their total in 1997 but still the second highest number of seats gained by one party since the war. The Conservatives won 166 seats, an increase of a single seat.

The 253-seat majority (1997-2001) and 246-seat majority (2001-05) enjoyed by the Labour
Party in the UK Parliament paved a solid way for the introduction of British national ID cards, in terms of its effect on both the consultation stage and the legislation procedure.

The Identity Cards Bill 2005 was passed in the House of Lords in March 2006 after several rounds of close votes in Parliament. The detailed votes by party tell us that the majority of Labour MPs voted in favour of the Bill, with only a dozen rebel voters, mainly from the Socialist Campaign Group. With such united strength in Parliament, the Labour Party finally made ID cards law. Thus, the question becomes: What made the authorities achieve such consensus on ID cards policy? The answer is obvious: as I argued in Chapter 2, there was a consensus among the authorities in favour of achieving tighter state control. Identification documents have been an essential part of state control, and affordable technologies enhance the state’s ability to achieve its purposes. However, the balance of trust between state and citizen could be disturbed by such a monstrous plan, and this has been a consistent theme in the media representation of ID cards. What kind of excuses could ‘justify’ the national identity card plan? The answer is in front of us: 9/11.

As Blunkett argued in the *Times*, on 4th October 2001,

> The events of the past few weeks have also led to a flurry among the chattering classes about the tension between the protection of our democracy and way of life and the maintenance of fundamental freedoms based on the primacy of the individual. This is a false dichotomy but it raises important questions. The freedom of every individual depends on stability, order and the maintenance of democratic practices. Freedom springs not from abstract legal process but from political action … The credibility of democracy and politics depends on an elected government making a difference to the lives of individuals and responding to the needs of society. That is what the Government seeks to achieve in moving to legislate quickly at the same time as it reassures the citizens of our country.

His actions immediately after this article demonstrated his determination. On 30th October 2001, he announced that all asylum seekers must carry ID cards. The *Daily Express* embraced his decision with passion: “At last, after a tireless *Express* campaign, Blunkett announced ID cards, faster appeals and new asylum centres.” A few days later, on 1st November 2001, the *Times* reported that: “The Home Office has secretly created a prototype national identity card in preparation for the introduction of ID cards for all Britons.” When this information was leaked to the press, the *Daily Express* immediately changed its tone and started to criticise the national identity card plan on the grounds of civil liberty concerns.
In July 2002, David Blunkett stated in the foreword of the Home Office consultation paper *Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud* (Home Office 2002), that:

After the terrorist atrocities in the United States on 11 September 2001, I was asked whether the Government was considering introducing identity cards. I said at the time that any debate about identity cards should not centre exclusively on issues of national security. Far more important are the issues of citizenship and entitlement to services.

Despite his emphasis on identity fraud issues however, Blunkett admitted that 9/11 was one of the reasons why identity cards were to be re-introduced to Britain. When the Home Office published the findings of this consultation paper in 2003, one of the reports was branded on every page with the slogan “Building a safe, just and tolerant society” (Home Office 2003a). In a campaign against identity fraud, “safe” became a priority, rather than “just”. Again, the reason is related to 9/11. When several foreign students were asked during a focus group session why ID cards were being introduced now, “the events of September 11 also [were] frequently mentioned” (Home Office 2003b). ‘Anti-terrorism’ is one of the stated purposes of the British national identity card system, based on the claim that terrorists have been relying on forging false identities; the biometric identity card is intended to eliminate that danger.

In summary, the events of 9/11 were used by David Blunkett as strong ‘evidence’ to support the introduction of national ID cards as a way to fight illegal immigration and organised crime, especially terrorism. With these arguments, combined with Labour’s majority position in Parliament, the ID cards plan was on its way. David Blunkett capitalised the event of 9/11 and its effect on the public perception of ‘security’ and ‘insecurity’. Even without the event of 9/11, he still had his Cabinet colleagues’ support on ID cards policy and *the Sun*'s endorsement on ID cards. However, when the newspapers learned that ID cards were not just for asylum seekers, but for all Britons, they became very concerned. The only exception was the *Sun*, which said that “law-abiding citizens have nothing to fear”. Under these circumstances, what else contributed to ID cards becoming law?

**Tony Blair’s endorsement of ID Cards**

As stated above, most of the British national newspapers were very negative about the
introduction of a national identity cards system, both in 1995 in response to the Tories’ Green Paper, and with regard to the Labour Government’s Identity Cards Bill 2004 and 2005. The media representation of these two ID card schemes did not differ much in terms of the editorial stand. The chief difference between the two situations was that whereas Michael Howard was faced with a Cabinet split on the ID card policy, David Blunkett was endorsed by the majority of Labour Cabinet Ministers. The main opposition came from Chancellor Gordon Brown, who was concerned about the cost of an ID cards scheme; and from Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who wrote to David Blunkett in October 2003, opposing the scheme. In this letter, published by *The Sunday Times* on 12th October 2003, Straw emphasised his doubts regarding the claimed benefits of the ID cards scheme, and his concerns about legal issues the scheme might cause to the Foreign Office. However, with the support of other Cabinet Ministers, such as Health Secretary John Reid and Transport Secretary Alistair Darling, and with the full backing of Tony Blair, Blunkett was able to keep the ID cards scheme on the Cabinet agenda.

Despite the opposition from Gordon Brown and Jack Straw, the Cabinet soon achieved consensus in the ID card policy, and with Labour’s comfortable majority after the 2001 General Election (a majority of 246 seats), the legislation of the Identity Cards Bill 2004 was relatively smoother than Howard and Major experienced in 1995. Tony Blair supported David Blunkett through the pre-legislative scrutiny, making a number of speeches and comments that made clear his determination that national ID cards would be introduced.

At Labour’s Annual Conference in Bournemouth in October 2003, Blair told delegates:

> In a world of mass migration, with cheaper air travel and all the problems of fraud, it makes sense to ask whether now in the early 21st century identity cards are no longer an affront to civil liberties but may be the way of protecting them. (*Daily Mail* 1st Oct 2003)

The *Daily Mail* commented that:

> The Premier's words are a huge boost for Home Secretary David Blunkett who has struggled to persuade colleagues to support the measure he deems vital in tackling terrorism and curbing illegal immigration.
At a Press Conference on 1st April 2004, in answer a question about the impact of the Terrorism Act 2000/2001 on the Muslim population in Britain, Tony Blair commented that

I think that the whole issue of identity cards that a few years ago were not on anyone’s agenda are very much on the political agenda here, probably more quickly even than we anticipated, and that is because we are living in a new world and with a new threat that we have to take account of.

In December 2004, Tony Blair again justified the introduction of the ID cards scheme by explaining that:

This is responsible government not, as some call it, Big Brother government. It is responsible to do what we can to enhance security and ensure that public services are only used by those who are entitled to use them. They will help protect civil liberties, not erode them, because people will be able to produce their own identification. (The Sun, 1st Dec 2004)

The terms “a new world” and “a new threat”, indicate that Blair was again using 9/11 to justify the introduction of national identity cards in the UK. However, he did not explain how exactly the ID cards system could help in anti-terrorism actions. Since Blunkett had won support from Blair by convincing him, in 2002, that ID cards would cut street crime and illegal immigration, it appears that the identity cards scheme was merely intended to make the Labour Government be seen as tough on crime. From 2003, Blair launched his “new world, new threat” argument, trying to demonstrate his determination to combat crime and illegal immigration. On 6th Nov 2006, after the Identity Cards Act 2006 had passed, he wrote an article for the Daily Telegraph under the title “We need ID cards to secure our borders and ease modern life”. The rhetoric did not differ from his previous speeches on ID cards. He still used the term “modern world” to justify the introduction of ID cards; he still argued that biometric technologies were spreading across the world and therefore Britain should also have them. He rebuked those opponents of ID cards who raised civil liberty concerns, stating that “[we are] in a world in which we daily provide information to a whole host of companies and organisations and willingly carry a variety of cards to identify us”.

From the above remarks, it is evident that Tony Blair was determined to introduce the national identity cards system in the name of anti-crime and to ease modern life. He argued that there are new threats in a new world, by which he meant terrorism attacks such as happened on 9/11 2001. Using the “biological weapons threat”, Tony Blair convinced
Parliament to declare war on Iraq; because of 9/11, he supported the introduction of a biometric identity card system. However, from the perspective of New Labour ideology, Tony Blair’s commitment to a national identity card system can be interpreted as an emphasis on crime control after the Government had dropped its ideological battle with the policing department over accountability (Tunney 2007).

In summary, Tony Blair used 9/11 to justify the introduction of a national identity card system; but he failed to explain how exactly the system could help in combating crime and illegal immigration. Despite his flawed argument, his strong support helped David Blunkett to submit the Identity Cards Bill 2004 to Parliament.

7/7 bombings in London in 2005

“The terrorist attacks in London… stoked up the debate over the UK Government’s identity card scheme” (Hunter 2005: 4), which also affected the results of many polling surveys on identity cards. Undoubtedly, 9/11 had helped David Blunkett to popularise the national identity card among the public, as indicated in a 2001 MORI/News of the World opinion poll. The 2001 attacks also justified the purpose of the ID card system to fight against crime, especially terrorism. However, Blunkett admitted that:

The primary reason for having ID cards is not because we believe they will stop terrorists. It will contribute towards the overall task of prevention but it will not guarantee that we will not be hit. (Guardian online 26th April 2004)

The confusion in the purposes of such a controversial and expensive plan, as well as the strong opposition from the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and the quality national newspapers all contributed to a decline in public support for national identity cards until the 7/7 attacks took place in London in 2005, as indicated in the opinion polls conducted from 2003 to 2005 (see below).

**September 2003 Daily Telegraph/YouGov (NO2ID online)**

| “Are you in favour of, or opposed to, the introduction of a system of national identity cards in Britain?” |
This opinion poll was conducted online with a nationally representative sample of 2312 adults between 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 4\textsuperscript{th} September 2003. The poll shows 78\% of respondents in favour of identity cards, which is slightly lower than the 85\% in the poll carried out by MORI/\textit{News of the World} in 2001. YouGov considers this change to be entirely down to a shift in public opinion over time.

\textbf{April 2004 Detica/MORI} (NO2ID online)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In favour</th>
<th>78%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposed</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>7%</td>
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</table>

Detica is an IT consultancy specialising in the delivery of intelligence systems, and has been providing consulting advice to the Government for 30 years. This poll, conducted by telephone with a sample of 1000 adults between 18\textsuperscript{th} and 23\textsuperscript{rd} March 2004, shows 80\% in favour of a national identity card scheme. However, considering Detica’s relationship with the Government, it is not surprising that such results were generated.

\textbf{May 2004 Privacy International / YouGov} (NO2ID online)
YouGov questioned a representative sample of 2,003 electors nationally between 11th and 13th May 2004. The poll was commissioned partly in response to the above MORI/Detica survey published a month earlier. The result generated from this survey shows only 61% of the total sample population in favour of ID cards, which is much lower than the previous results. The reason is directly related to the design of this opinion poll, which includes many concerns over the proposed financial penalties incurred by ID cards.

**June 2005 Telegraph/YouGov**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In favour</th>
<th>45%</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposed</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/issues/id-cards](http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/issues/id-cards)

In 2005, as more details of the proposed plans for identity cards were discussed in national newspapers, and some national newspapers campaigned in opposition to identity cards, public support for ID cards fell to a record low. The result shown in the table above is somewhat dependent on the commissioner of this poll – the Telegraph, a strong opponent of ID cards.

However, the bombins of 7/7 2005 instantly altered the results of public polling on ID cards. A Telegraph/YouGov public opinion survey carried out on 8th July 2005, the day after the
attacks, found that 50% of those interviewed were in favour of identity cards, with 38% against. However, 56% of the sample thought that identity cards would not help in the future to prevent the commission of terrorist acts like those that had been committed in London.

In the days after the London bombings, the *News of the World*, *Times* and *Guardian* all conducted public opinion polls on ID cards. All the results indicated the return of public support for identity cards. However, according to a NO2ID/ICM opinion poll, by November 2005 that support had declined again; 50% of those interviewed were in favour of ID cards, with 47% against.

From the above analysis, it can be seen that for a short while after the London bombings on 7\textsuperscript{th} July 2005, public polls showed strong support for the introduction of a national identity card system in the UK. Despite the strong campaigns from the elite newspapers, academics, civil liberty groups and human rights campaigners, the public remained very concerned about national security, crime, and illegal immigration. In the public’s view, as long as the scheme would be affordable and beneficial, then the sacrifice in privacy and civil liberties would be acceptable. Considering that 2005 was the key period for the legislation, the polling results undoubtedly helped the passage of the Identity Cards Bill 2004/2005. Both the Tory Government and the Labour Government emphasised the role of ID cards in curbing crimes, illegal immigration and enhancing national security; however, what they didn’t mention frequently were the impact of ID cards on the relationship between the state and the citizen, the intensification of surveillance (such as CCTV cameras, multi identification documents, DNA database), and data protection, which are precisely what the British national newspapers warned over the years.
Chapter 7

Comparative Analysis of the Three Case Studies

7.0 Introduction

In the previous chapters, three cases of the media representation of British national registration and ID card systems have been studied, using content analysis and frame analysis methods to discover how national registration and ID card systems were debated and framed, the arguments for and against ID cards, and the extent to which the British national newspapers have supported or opposed ID cards over time.

Based on the content analysis and frame analysis results of the three case studies in the mediated debate of British national ID cards, that is 1915 and 1919, 1939 and 1951, and 1994 to 2008, this chapter aims to find out the differences and continuities in the media representation of British national ID cards over time, in terms of the media’s role in the repeated introduction and withdrawal of ID cards, the level of support or opposition to ID cards, the way the media operated, and the frames employed. The chapter will also explain any differences and continuities identified by comparing the results of the three case studies.

7.1 The State’s Desire for ID Cards Continued over Time

The results of the content analysis of the three case studies reveal that government agencies (central or local) and politicians have been active in the mediated debate of British national ID cards. The state’s desire for an ID cards system never stopped, whether in wartime or peacetime. Max Weber (1992) and Gandy (1993) both emphasised the significance of official statistics in modern bureaucratic society. Gandy (1993: 15) termed this kind of “disciplinary surveillance system” as “the panoptic sort”:

…”the complex technology that involves the collection, processing, and sharing of information about individuals and groups that is generated through their daily lives as citizens, employees, and consumers and is used to coordinate and control their access to the goods and services that define life in the modern capitalist economy.

For modern states, a national identity card system can provide critical information for the official statistics required to enhance the bureaucratic administrative power (Higgs 2001,
Thompson 2008). In wartime, a national ID card system can be employed for conscription use; whilst in peacetime, it can be deployed for welfare uses. The purposes of a national ID card system may vary from time to time, but the state’s intention to implement such a system in Britain never changed. For example, in 1915 the war emergencies demanded national mobilisation and organisation, which put a lot of pressure on the General Register Office to produce statistics on men and women of serviceable age. As Gandy (1993: 7) noted, “the dominant theme of the contemporary discourse on modern society is one of efficiency”. Such efficiency in wartime equated to national mobilisation and organisation.

The National Registration Act 1915 made it clear that the National Register was a local register administrated by the Local Government Board and assisted by the Registrar-General’s office. The GRO’s role “became essential to the expansion of state powers” during the First World War, due to the function of the National Register in aiding conscription (Elliot 2008: 1). The War and the consequent National Service not only brought new obligations to British citizens, but pressed the General Register Office to provide key statistical administrative underpinning. As Higgs (1996: 129) described:

> The key concept in the history of the GRO is perhaps not medicine but citizenship, and the transition from political and social rights based on property-owning to the concept of the citizen as having rights and obligations with regard to the nation state.

However, despite an increase in staffing of the General Register Office to 103 in 1913 from 84 in 1905 (Higgs 1996), “its role in the national registration system taxed the GRO to its limits” (Higgs 2004a: 187). The statistical capabilities of the GRO were hugely compromised because “most of the male clerks of serviceable age had left for the Front, or been loaned to other departments for war work” (Higgs 2004a: 186).

Elliot’s *An early experiment in national identity cards* (2008) explores how the General Register Office (led by Bernard Mallet) orchestrated the first National Register during the First World War, and why ultimately it failed due to “lack of political consensus and lack of support” (2008: 1). Despite this failure, however, the first National Register system did provide the War Cabinet with some useful statistics on population.

In 1915, Mr. Walter Long (Tory MP and President of the Local Government Board), who
introduced the National Register Bill to Parliament, and Mr. Lloyd George (Liberal MP and Minister of Munitions), were two of the most quoted state authorities among the leading actors in the mediated debate, as well as the driving force behind the introduction of the first-ever National Register. One reason is that in 1915, the media representation of the public debate of the National Register focused mainly on parliamentary reportage, which naturally led to massive coverage of the discussions among Members of Parliament. More importantly, both Long and Lloyd George were pro-conscription, and Lloyd George in particular was well placed to influence the introduction of the first National Register in Britain (Sykes 1997, Elliot 2008). Bentley (1987:124) commented that “the successful introduction and later extension of conscription seemed very much Lloyd George’s achievement – or crime”. Bentley’s criticism stems from the fact that in endorsing the National Register, Lloyd George abandoned orthodox liberal values and instead chose “a war persona” (Bentley 1987: 124), becoming “the chief architect of the destruction of liberal values” (Sykes 1997: 203). As Eccleshall (1986) explained, the early Liberals tended to believe in unhindered freedom to pursue individual ambition in a free and competitive market economy; whilst the later Liberals, from the end of the 19th century, started to emphasise the importance of eliminating the gap between the rich and the poor.

Therefore, when the War broke out, Liberals such as Lloyd George called for national organisation and mobilisation, appealing for individuals to sacrifice their private economic ambitions for the common good. Lloyd George didn’t believe in the ideal of a minimal state (which can be illustrated by his introduction of People’s Budget in 1909); instead, he agreed with the need for a centralised state, especially in wartime. Lloyd George and Winston Churchill played significant roles in the passage of the Military Service Acts and the National Registration Act 1915, and were assisted by a group of pro-conscription Liberal backbenchers who had formed a Liberal War Committee and enthusiastically supported the compulsory service (Johnson 2008).

Meanwhile, Lloyd George had gained support from two major Fleet Street press barons, Max Aitken (later Lord Beaverbrook, of the Daily Express) and Lord Northcliffe (of the Times and Daily Mirror). Mr. Aitken and Lord Northcliffe both intended to replace Asquith with Lloyd George, who was in favour of military conscription and national service (Jenkins 1979). With the help of these two powerful press barons, Lloyd George gained more media support for his policies, including the National Register policy.
Walter Long, on the other hand, brought the National Registration Bill to Parliament and explained it in an elaborate way, suggesting that it had nothing to do with conscription but was intended to organise the national resources more efficiently. One reason for his prudence in introducing this controversial bill was that:

The last six months of 1915 saw the Liberal party at war with itself, as Lloyd George, his backbench supporters and the Conservative party pressed Asquith, the non-interventionist ministers and the majority of the party to introduce it. (Sykes 1997: 203)

Lloyd George “was a committed interventionist” himself, while “orthodox Liberals were not” (Sykes 1997: 201).

Under the resulting National Registration Act 1915, the GRO became the central registration authority; and in 1916, with the progressive arrangements executed, the GRO suggested that the national registration system should be continued after the First World War (Higgs 2004b: 137). In 1917 the Hayes Fisher Committee was set up, with the support of the Registrar-General, Sir Bernard Mallet, to consider whether the system should be continued after the War. Mr. Fisher was Parliamentary Secretary to the Local Government Board from 1915 to 1916, and the majority of the members of the Committee were from either the GRO or the Local Government Board. As Higgs (2004b: 137) noted:

The War Office was supportive, since a national register would provide the means of furnishing its Recruiting Department with the information it required concerning youths of military age. The Committee was thus an amalgam of senior civil servants and left-leaning social scientists [Beatrice Webb].

In 1918, the Committee report recommended that the National Register be continued. According to Higgs (2004b: 138), “their recommendations reveal the potential intertwining of positive rights, obligations and state surveillance of the individual”. Elliot (2008: 4) also argued that the aims of the report “can be compared with current proposals for identity cards”. From this perspective, one may suggest that while the technologies have changed, the aims of state surveillance (such as passport and ID card system) have stayed the same. For example, one reason why the National Register system was abolished after the War was that it was very difficult for local authorities to store numerous registration forms and related paperwork. Modern technology can solve such problem by storing all data and sources on hard drives,
which occupy less space and are easier for staff to access.

In 1919 the Local Government Board, which had supervised the National Register in 1915, was abolished, and the responsibility for statistics on health, births and deaths was passed to the newly founded Ministry of Health, under the Ministry of Health Act 1919. The Ministry took over the functions of the Local Government Board and National Health Insurance administration. In fact, the abolition of the Local Government Board announced the termination of the National Registration Act 1915. As Elliot (2008: 14) noted, “the view in Parliament by the end of the war was that it should be terminated as ‘a step to obviate useless expenditure’”.

The withdrawal of the National Register did not put a stop to consideration of the necessity of a peacetime national registration system. As Higgs (2004b: 140) explained: “In a world in which citizens were being mobilised for total warfare, all foreign nationals became a potential threat.” The Aliens Restriction Act 1914 and The Aliens Order 1920 amplified such concerns over individual movements, both internal and cross-border. The national register and identity card system in WWI became a way of telling who was not British.

In 1939 the Minister of Health, Walter Elliot, called for the re-introduction of a universal national register, a proposal that was warmly welcomed by national newspapers such as the Manchester Guardian. Despite resistance from the Independent Labour Party, the National Registration Act 1939 was passed in July 1939. This time, according to Elliot (2008), the General Register Office was much better prepared and capable of organising a value-added national register. As early as 1935, a draft National Service Bill had already been drawn up. In fact, as Higgs (2004b: 140) noted:

As early as 1922, a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was insisting that any decent system of national service would require a good system of national registration.

The First World War experience illustrated that a total war could only be won if all national resources were mobilised and organised in the extreme. In order to accomplish such national mobilisation and organisation, a national register system would be required for statistical and administrative purposes. By 1939, around 5 million women were employed in the forces, industry or commerce; by 1943, a further 2.25 million women had been drawn into employment; and above all, by 1941 around 7 million men had been registered (Higgs
The 1940s was also the key period for Britain’s establishment as a complete welfare state (Fraser 1984, Lowe 1999). The definition of ‘welfare state’ varies with time, and from country to country. Developed from the early confused perception, in 1961 Asa Briggs finally presented a classic definition of welfare state (see Lowe 1999: 14):

A ‘Welfare State’ is a state in which organised power is deliberately used (through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least three directions – first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of the market value of their work or property; second, by narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain social contingencies (for example, sickness, old age and unemployment) which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services.

In the case of the British welfare system, the most important developments paving the way included the Beveridge Report in 1942, the Employment Policy White Paper in 1944, the Family Allowance Act, the 1946 National Insurance Act and the 1948 National Health Act. The rise of the welfare state leads inevitably to the question: who can have access to the welfare system and who can not? In this sense, state surveillance (such as national identity cards) provides a system whereby the modern state can distribute multiple public benefits to the specific population entitled to such welfare. In summary, as Rule (1973) and Norris and Armstrong (1999) concluded, state surveillance (such as an ID cards system) is regarded as one of the most important mechanisms through which the modern state can achieve its routine administrative functions.

It is widely agreed that before World War Two, the British Government’s decision to introduce state services was “motivated by political and national interests”; and the major reason was to improve the living condition of retired soldiers who fought in the Boer War and World War One (Graves 2009: 160, 161). As early as 1918, after the First World War, Lloyd George’s pledge to provide “homes built for heroes” for returning war veterans illustrated one essential strand of the British welfare system – entitlement. Even in 2001, an “entitlement card” system was still being proposed as a solution to asylum problems. Thus, ever since the First World War, the ID card system has been directly linked with entitlement to public benefits and social security.
In 1951, although the local authorities were not quoted, directly or indirectly, in the news coverage, they were mentioned many times by MPs and Lords discussing the functions and the future of the ID cards system; the renewal of ID cards in local council offices and the money withdrawal service provided by local post offices. In 1951, Lord Goddard, Lord Chief Justice, became the main character representing state authorities in the mediated debate of ID cards. The reason is related to the nature of the media coverage. “Willcock vs. Muckle”, which led to the abolition of national ID cards in 1952, inevitably involved legal authorities (both Lord Chief Justice and lawyers) in the development of the case.

In 1952, the National Register and ID card system was finally withdrawn, due partly to fears over civil liberties, and partly to its high cost (£500,000 per annum). Ultimately, as Higgs explained, (2004b: 142-143): “The identity card system was a casualty of the election of a new Conservative government late in 1951”, because both “Conservative and Liberal peers objected strenuously in Parliament to what they saw as ‘Socialist card-indexing’”. However, the national identity card system did not vanish completely. Rather, it was used to create the NHS Central Register system. For example, people who held national identity cards in 1952 would have the same NHS number as their ID card number.

It is evident that the public, along with some politicians, found the existence of the National Register and ID card system intolerable in peacetime, even though they chose to comply with it in wartime. As Higgs (2004b: 144) argues:

> The history of national registration reveals both the potential of the Information State in Britain but also the limits to how far general state surveillance could be justified in times of peace.

In times of peace, in order to justify the proposal and introduction of ID cards, the authorities have used a range of justifications, from illegal immigration to under-age drinking.

From 1994 to August 2008 Michael Howard and David Blunkett became the leading actors as state authorities, due to their roles in introducing ID cards to the UK; Blunkett in particular played a significant role in bringing the ID card proposal into law. In 1995, the Conservative Government published its Green Paper, *Identity Cards: A Consultation Document*, in an attempt to tackle “the seemingly unstoppable rise of recorded crime” (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 35). Although the proposal failed even before being submitted to Parliament, it was “seriously considered by the Home Office” and was regarded as an example of “the rise of mass surveillance in Britain in terms of domestic politics of crime control in the 1990s” (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 27, 31).
The May 1993 Cabinet reshuffle provides one of the main reasons for the acceleration of mass surveillance onto the 1990s’ political agenda (Norris and Armstrong 1999). Michael Howard, “a Euro-sceptic and right-winger” (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 34), took the post of Home Secretary due to his support for and loyalty to John Major during the Maastrict crisis. Howard declared that he would be tough on crime, and at the top of his agenda lay the introduction of mass surveillance in Britain, including an ID card system, CCTV monitoring and a national DNA database. However, his attempt to introduce a national identity card system was “constrained by Cabinet colleagues who [were] fiercely divided about the benefits of a nationwide scheme” (The Times, 14 Oct 1994).

In order to justify the introduction of a national biometric ID card system in the UK in peacetime, David Blunkett exploited the events of 9/11, claiming that ID cards might be introduced in response to the attacks on America. On 4th Oct 2001 he wrote in the *Times* that “at times like this, the majority must be protected from the minority”. Later, in July 2002, he even proposed the concept of “collective liberty” in order to justify the introduction of an ID card system.

The Identity and Passport Service (IPS) was established on 1st April 2006. It replaced the GRO and became the executive agency of the Home Office responsible for issuing British biometric national ID cards. According to the IPS official website:

> The Agency builds on the strong foundations of the UK Passport Service to provide passport services and in the future, as part of the National Identity Scheme, ID cards for British and Irish nationals and foreign nationals resident in the UK.

> The IPS works closely with the Border and Immigration Agency, UKvisas and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to deliver consistent service standards for identity documents across these organisations. The Agency has a key role in transforming the way government interacts with UK citizens and businesses by developing common standards in identity management.

The reason why state authorities have been playing a continuously active role in the mediated debate of British national ID cards is that they have to constantly justify the practice of collecting individual information from citizens. They need to explain to the public and to Parliament that such actions are necessary and beneficial. The national media can be regarded as a platform for state authorities to deliver their arguments regarding ID cards. For example, both Walter Long and David Blunkett published articles in the national newspapers promoting the benefits of national registration and ID cards.
7.2 The Growth of Civil Society

Civil Society is an arena of social and political life autonomous from state domination where progressive values and political practices can be articulated, counter-hegemonic institutions can be created, which can nurture and nourish the creation of autonomous political actors who are able to articulate and defend their interests, propose alternative projects for structuring the state and society, and transform the relations of state and society. (See Stephen Biggs and Arthur Neame 1995: 31)

From 1915 to 2008, one of the more obvious changes in the make-up of the actors in the mediated debate of British national ID cards has been that increasing numbers of academics, experts, police officers and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)⁷ have been included. As Lloyd (2004: 17) explained:

Politics dominated the media until some time around the 1960s … since then, politics and politicians have been – often literally – on the defensive, constantly ceding ground to the media … There were many gains for civil society in that process.

This shift was driven by the media’s purpose “to expose and to embarrass” officialdom and corporations. Edwards and Hulme (1995: 3) also noted that “the 1980s and 1990s have seen an explosion in the numbers of non-governmental organisations (NGOs)”. The variety of actors involved in the media representation also proves the growth of civil society in Britain over the years. According to Dahlgren (1996: 7-8), “civil society has a particular relationship to the public sphere. In brief, civil society constitutes the socio-cultural preconditions for a viable public sphere”, and “the mass media have become the chief institutions of the public sphere.

However, the concepts of civil society and public sphere are not identical. Rather, Dahlgren (1996: 127) explained that “[civil society] is a domain of social interaction which is situated between market and state (and organised political society)”. According to Cohen and Arato (see Dahlgren 1996: 127), “Civil society is institutionally composed chiefly of:

(a) the intimate sphere (especially the family);

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⁷ Michael Edwards and David Hulme (1995: 15) defined non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as “intermediary organisations engaged in funding or offering other forms of support to communities and other organisations”. They also explained that NGOs usually stand for all kinds of non-profit organisations.
(b) the sphere of associations (in particular, voluntary associations);
(c) social movements (which point to its political relevance); and
(d) the many forms of public communication.”

Based on Cohen and Arato’s notion of civil society, the increased coverage of academics, NGOs, experts and the anti-ID cards movement in the media representation of British ID cards can be regarded as an aspect of the growth of civil society in Britain over the years. For example, in the “Willcock v. Muckle” case in 1951 expert lawyers took a prominent role in the debate; whilst in 1915 and 1939 MPs, religious figures, and war propaganda machines such as the Times and Daily Express were dominant. Moreover, in “Willcock vs. Muckle”, Mr. Muckle was a police constable, who demanded to inspect Mr. Willcock’s ID card but was rejected. During the trial, Mr. Muckle’s lawyer explained that from May 1941, instructions were issued to the police to ask for the identity cards of anybody who came into their hands in any circumstances, which included motorists.

Muckle’s lawyer further explained that in 1941 a complete card index system had been set up at Scotland Yard, showing the national registration number of every motorist brought before the court. This explanation was rebuked by Lord Goddard, who insisted that the identity card system was not intended for such a purpose. Lord Goddard condemned the police for abusing the law for wrong purposes, actions which annoyed a great many people and were completely “unnecessary and oppressive”. The case led directly to the withdrawal of the national ID card system in early 1952. It raised concerns over the police’s abuse of power, and implicated the police in the development of state surveillance. However, the case did not stop the police’s arbitrary power to stop and search. Cox’s (1975) Civil Liberties in Britain gave explicit details of how civil liberties were compromised and fought over from the 1930s to the 1970s. The struggle between police surveillance and civil liberties campaigns has been a longstanding feature of life in Britain.

Police involvement in the development of state surveillance has ranged from keeping records of the convicted, to creating fingerprint indices, to CCTV monitoring (Rule 1973, Norris and Armstrong 1999, Norris 2007). In Britain, the first major police surveillance operation was the keeping of criminal records (Rule 1973). The Habitual Criminals Act 1869 required the Metropolitan Police to keep a register of persons convicted of crimes in England. Then in 1901, the London Metropolitan Police founded the Fingerprint Office. According to Rule
(1973: 47) “the number of fingerprint files in the main fingerprint collection has virtually doubled every twenty years since 1910”.

1952 saw not only the abolition of the ID cards system in Britain, but also the spread of “a series of regional clearing houses for police surveillance” (Rule 1973: 59). According to Rule (1973: 31), the rise of mass police surveillance in Britain received increasing public attention from the mid-1960s. Later, with the installation of CCTV cameras on a massive scale in the 1990s, and the introduction of the UK National Criminal Intelligence DNA Database in 1995, police surveillance in Britain again attracted increased public attention (Norris and Armstrong 1999, Norris 2007). Norris and Armstrong (1999: 42) remarked that: “It is unlikely that any urban dweller, in their role as shopper, worker, commuter, resident or school pupil can avoid being passively or actively monitored by camera surveillance systems.”

Another example of the diversity of actors can be found in the mediated debate from 1994 to 2008, in which civil liberty campaigners such as Liberty, Charter 88, NO2ID, Privacy International, Justice, the Refugee Council, and State Watch played a prominent role. In addition, academics and activists such as Simon Davis and Michael Levi have received more coverage than their counterparts in WWI and WWII.

This diversity, and in particular the prominence of academics and experts, proves that in the mediated debate of British national ID cards the national newspapers have given more visibility to actors other than central and local authorities. One reason for this is that a national identity card system requires a thorough and extensive public debate, because it has major social implications for individuals, as academics have stated. An extensive and thorough debate should cover as many opinions as possible, including those of academics and NGOs, although the Identity Project report published by LSE was criticised a lot

Another reason is the growth of the population of British universities from the 1960s onwards. From the 1960s to the mid-1970s, access to British universities, and the size of the university system, increased significantly. Many new universities were founded, for example the Universities of Warwick, Bath, and Essex. This expansion created plenty of positions for experts and academics. In the work Reflections on the Academic Policy Analysis Process and the UK Identity Cards Scheme (Whitley and etc 2007), it is highlighted that the academic research on the UK identity cards scheme by the Information Systems Group of London School of Economics and Political Science had exercised influence on the public debates of identity cards as well as the public policy-making progress.
Similarly, since the 1930s there has been a massive rise in the civil rights and liberties movement. Amongst the oldest civil liberties campaign groups, Liberty was founded in 1934 and Justice in 1957. Both groups have contributed greatly to the fight to stop the ID cards system in the UK, in order to protect civil liberties. NO2ID is a relatively new organisation (founded in 2004), specifically targeted against ID cards. The group is chaired by Mark Littlewood, former Campaigns Director of Liberty, while the deputy chair of NO2ID, Debbie Chay, is also Chair of Charter 88.

The rise of the civil liberty movement in Britain is one of the reasons why the introduction of CCTV cameras was not on the political agenda until the 1990s, even though mass video surveillance technologies had been available as early as the 1970s. As Norris and Armstrong (1999: 35) explained, in the 1970s and early 1980s, “the growing technological sophistication of policing” was regarded by many academics and writers as “against trade unionists, peace campaigners and animal rights activists”, and “there was little or no democratic control over these [police] practices”. However, in the 1990s the political climate was right for the introduction of CCTV cameras. In their *Maximum Surveillance Society*, Norris and Armstrong (1999) list the set of circumstances that allowed the spread of CCTV in Britain: first, the available technology; second, the Government claimed that it would cut crime; third, it fit with the Government’s ideological demand for privatisation of the public sector; fourth, the Jamie Bulger case meant that there was no political resistance, and finally, the Labour Party had been transformed by the process of modernisation, and the launch of New Labour by Tony Blair led to a conversion from Left Idealism to New Left Idealism. Even Liberty was not opposed to the introduction of CCTV, but warned only that there should be sufficient regulation.

Why then did the introduction of CCTV succeed whilst the reintroduction of ID cards failed? First of all, there was no political consensus, since the Tory Cabinet was severely divided on the ID card policy. Second, there was no case equivalent to the Jamie Bulger case to convince the public or journalists that ID cards could really work. Norris and Armstrong (1999) conclude that the British media helped the Government to sell the CCTV scheme in the 1990s. However, the British press was not so supportive on the ID cards scheme.
7.3 The Media Campaign

Over time, as shown by the three case studies, newspapers have continued to campaign passionately for or against national ID Cards. As Jenkins (1979:18) once remarked: “Men acquire newspapers for many reasons, but rarely for the business of running them and making themselves rich.” Press barons in the early 20th century exploited the press as a ticket to the front row of public affairs. They were notorious for interfering with editorial functions, and their response to the introduction of the first-ever National Register was no exception.

In 1915 the Daily Mail took a very strong patriotic line in the reporting of the National Register under the editorial control of its politically passionate owner, Lord Northcliffe. Northcliffe believed strongly in the significance of conscription and the National Register in helping the war (Elliot 2008). His strategy of employing the newspapers under his control as instruments to gain his own political interest meant that in 1915, not just the Daily Mail, but also the Times followed his instructions precisely. Thus the Times did not publish any of Lord Kitchener’s voluntarism campaign posters, but did issue more editorials than any other national newspaper to emphasise the role of the National Register and conscription in the war effort.

Lord Kitchener and many Liberals were in favour of voluntary recruitment, because they “hated conscription as an affront to individual liberty and the symptom of a bloated state” (Bentley 1987: 121). The question of whether to use voluntarism or conscription “went to the heart of questions of British national identity – not only did Britain define herself as a liberal, free state in contrast to the highly organized, state controlled ‘Prussianism’ of her enemies, but she also prided herself on being able to raise enough men to fight voluntarily from a patriotic population” (Elliot 2008: 2).

In this case, there were three mainstreams of political influence. The first was led by Lloyd George, Lord Northcliffe and most of the Conservatives, who were pro-conscription; the second was led by Asquith and many Liberals who tried to delay conscription whilst realising that it might be necessary; the last was a group of MPs who decided to be silent because they did not want to be labelled as ‘unpatriotic’. The pro-conscription politicians were all in favour of Fleet Street’s campaigning for the National Register, which would lead, finally, to conscription.

The Daily Express chose to campaign for conscription in a strongly nationalist and imperialist
and fiercely patriotic way. The paper always carried a highly provocative title such as “The Voice of the Nation – Readers’ Opinion on the Conduct of the War”, pressing Asquith to take immediate measures such as conscription. The Government was condemned for doing too little, too late. As Bentley (1987: 122) wrote: “The war’s demands and pace gave Liberal politicians no space, no time, no air.” The only way out was to compromise and embark on the National Register, so as to mobilise and organise the whole nation to win the war.

While many newspapers screamed for conscription and national service, in 1915 the Herald was deeply involved in opposing the National Register and conscription. It supported the workers’ strikes and condemned the National Register as another method to exploit the working class. What the British national press had in common during the First and Second World Wars was their creation of stereotypes of the German national character.

The relationship between media and war has long been the subject of controversy, marked by claims that “media lack autonomy in wartime and remain largely deferential to government war aims” (see Robinson et al. 2009: 680). A number of studies suggest that the media’s role in wartime is patriotic and more cooperative with states, rather than being a ‘fourth estate’ (Hudson and Stanier 1997, Dadge 2006, Bennett et al. 2007, Anderson 2006, Schechter 2004, Tehranian 2004). For example, Hudson and Stanier (1997) give explicit details of how Lord Northcliffe and Lord Beaverbrook devoted themselves passionately to the war propaganda, and helped the British Government to win the Great War. Lord Northcliffe’s friendship with Lloyd George, and their consensus on compulsory national service, both contributed to the patriotic support for conscription and the National Register from Lord Northcliffe’s newspapers. Patriotic newspapers “propelled the war by fuelling the public’s imagination, fear and hatred” (Anderson 2006: 4).

In 1951 and in the recent media coverage of British national ID cards from 1994 to August 2008, many British national newspapers took an active part in generating support for or opposition to ID cards. For example, in the most recent mediated debate David Blunkett’s promotion of ID cards did not win over the Times or the Guardian, but totally convinced the Sun, which endorsed the plan by issuing three editorials in support of a national ID card system after 9/11, emphasising the great potential of the scheme. Despite the resistance from other national newspapers, the support from the Sun seems to have been enough for the Identity Bill 2005 to be passed in Parliament.

As Lloyd (2004: 18) observed:
This is a struggle for power. The media strive to have power over the same people and for the same reasons as do politicians. We need people to follow us – that is, buy our papers or watch or listen to our programmes.

**Campaigning for different ends – the effectiveness of their campaigns**

In contrast to the tremendous efforts of most British national newspapers in promoting the National Register in 1915, and their warm welcome for the passing of the Registration Act 1914, in 1951 most took a decisive position in opposing ID cards, demanding the withdrawal of the ID card system in a situation where police were abusing their power by checking ID cards at every opportunity. The abolition of ID cards in early 1952 could be seen as the fruit of a media campaign against them. In the most recent mediated debate of British national biometric ID cards, especially from 2002, strong criticism didn’t stop the passing of Identity Cards Act 2006 in Parliament; however, in early April 2010, Chancellor Alistair Darling signalled the withdrawal of British biometric Identity Cards system.

In 1915, even amongst the pro-conscription newspapers, each campaigned for different purposes. As an example, among the hundreds of readers’ cards sent into the *Daily Express*, many called for the internment of all Germans in Britain, including the naturalised ones. In this case, the readers intentionally separated citizenship from identity: although the naturalised Germans had British citizenship, they were still treated as having German identity (blood and race), which as Isin and Wood (1999: 20) explained, “marks out groups from each other as well as allowing for the constitution of groups as targets of assistance, hatred, animosity, sympathy or allegiance”. Thus the war against Germany made some *Daily Express* readers hate Germans merely because they were originally from Germany. However, newspapers like the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Times* took a more cautious approach; their coverage of the National Register and related issues focused mainly on whether the voluntary system should be replaced by conscription, rather than on stirring up a race war.

Resistance from the *Herald* did not change the fact that national registration was in operation. The support from the majority of Fleet Street helped the Government to enact its policy on the National Register and ID card system. However, with regard to the second ID cards system, once the emergency of the Second World War had passed, there was another media campaign on ID cards; and this time, it was against it. On 27th June 1951, the *Daily Express* issued an editorial, “Now change the law”, demanding the abolition of the ID Cards system,
claiming that:

Harry Willcock went to law for a principle. The principle of whether the English should be treated as a free people. Or like a bunch of convicts out on ticket-of-leave.

It prevents no crime. It produces no benefit. It does nothing except add power to the bureaucrats and take freedom from the people.

Thus the *Daily Express*, which had been the most aggressive campaigner for the National Register in 1915, became a supporter of civil liberties in the “Willcock vs Muckle” case in 1951. The complete change in the stance of the *Daily Express* from nationalism to liberalism was closely related to the circumstance when ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ case took place. After the war, the national identity card system didn’t appeal to the public or even the politicians any more. Lord Goddard and Winston Churchill both wanted to abolish the identity card system and the reasons of such withdrawal were due to cost and public resentment. Therefore, the British national press’ attitude towards ID card system changed in different circumstance. The same change could be observed in most of the British national newspapers, and the new stance continued in coverage of the more recent debate. For example the *Times*, which had also been a very active campaigner for the National Register in 1915, opposed Michael Howard’s ID plan, publishing a leading article on 19th August 1996, questioning the necessity of the proposed scheme and warning of the impacts of ID cards on civil liberties and personal freedom. It analysed the reasons why Howard’s plan failed: a Cabinet split on ID card policy and objections from civil libertarians. All these changes indicate that the media has generated support for or opposition to ID cards based on the prevailing circumstances – the perception of ‘threat’. Against a background of war emergencies, most of the national newspapers chose to be patriotic and actively campaign for national registration; however, when there were no such emergencies, newspapers started to emphasise the significance of civil liberties.

### 7.4 The De-centralised Parliament

The results of the content analysis of the three case studies have shown that the percentage of parliamentary reporting in the mediated debate of British ID cards has been declining over time, especially since 1994. This pattern seems to echo Negrine’s (1998: 2) findings that:

By the mid-1990s, then, no British daily newspaper had a dedicated parliamentary page or section which included verbatim extracts from speeches made by Members of Parliament in the House of
In 1991, Simon Jenkins, then editor of the Times, decided to end the tradition of carrying extracts from speeches on that newspaper’s dedicated parliamentary page. Jenkins later explained that the reason for doing so was that he could not find anyone “apart from Members of Parliament” who read it (Negrine 1998). In 1992, Jack Straw organised a study of the quantity of press reporting of Parliament over a six-year period. The resulting report, published in 1993, showed that the press coverage of the British Parliament had fallen sharply during those six years (Negrine 1998, Riddell 1998). For example, as Jack Straw observed, until about 1988, parliamentary debates had received between 400 and 800 lines of daily coverage in the Times. By 1992, that had declined to fewer than 100 lines (Straw 1993).

The decline in parliamentary coverage, in Jack Straw’s opinion, was “a sign of the lessening importance of the role of parliament within society as a whole, as an indication of a declining interest in the nature of debate in the chamber and in argument per se and as a general comment on how a key political institution was now viewed” (Negrine 1998: 2). However, from the journalists’ perspective, as Jenkins claimed, “newspapers are about providing people with news, not to provide a public service for a particular profession or for a particular chamber” (Negrine 1998: 3).

Amid recent suggestions that “newspapers have become more tabloid both in their content and in their approach to news, with a greater emphasis being placed on personalities and conflict, and greater use of photographs, larger headlines, etc” (Negrine 1998: 9), the decline in parliamentary coverage by the British press has been regarded as an indication of the changing nature of Parliament and media (newspapers and television). As Negrine (1998: 29-43) summarised: First, changes in newspaper size, design and layout all contributed to the decline of parliamentary coverage in Britain, especially since the 1990s. Second: “The competition between newspapers has made them more aware of the need to serve readers and give them more of what they want to read – which were probably not parliamentary proceedings.” Third, the downgrading of Parliament, stronger government, empty chamber and the alleged insignificance of most debates have also contributed to journalists avoiding making parliamentary reports.

However, in Richard Whitaker (2006)’s account, between 2005 to 2006 during which the Identity Cards Bill 2005 was rallied between the Lords and the Commons, “objections from Conservative and Liberal Democrat peers clearly forced the government to make
compromises”. Not only the Lords made efforts in trying to defeat the Identity Cards Bill 2005, it also tried to confront the Terrorism Bill. Therefore, Whitaker (2006: 536) argued that from 2005 to 2006, “all of these cases have demonstrated that the Lords’ willingness to defeat the government and, to varying degrees, their ability to influence the content legislation”. Based on the fact that Lords’ efforts failed to defeat the government’s bills, it is evident that the influence of the Lords was very limited, especially when the Labour Government was able to take the majority seats in the Commons.

7.5 The Nationalism and Liberalism Frames

7.5.1 Continuity over Time – Nationalism and Liberalism Frames

Both the nationalism and liberalism master frames have been identified in the mediated debate of British national ID cards in all three case studies, that is, 1915 and 1919, 1939 and 1951, and from 1994 to 2008.

1) Distribution of Master Frames in 1915 News (341 items in Total) – Table 7.1

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+ Means in favour of conscription/national register;

- Means against conscription/national register.

“Nationalism and patriotism do not exist in a vacuum. They occur as a by-product of a country’s relationship with the outside world.” (Gott 1989: 90)

The distribution of the nationalism master frame in the mediated debate of the National Register in 1915 indicated the rise of patriotism in Britain in that time. This comes as no surprise considering that the British Empire faced an unprecedented crisis – in war against Germany. As Freeden (1986: 20) noted:

As the hopes of an early end to the war receded, liberal concerns, practical and theoretical, began to crystallise round a number of issues. First and foremost came that of compulsion, as the debate over conscription began to gather momentum during 1915.
While the Liberals were paralysed by their ideological dilemma, the National Service League, “founded in 1901 to campaign for the introduction of military conscription in peacetime”, claimed that they had “200,000 members, associates and adherents by the outbreak of the war” (Summers 1989: 237). The reason the National Registration Act 1915 had not been introduced earlier is that, as Bentley (1987: 121) explained, in 1914 the Liberal Government “had no direct experience of war against other major powers”, and “their party contained few military experts but a campful of anti-military philosophers”. The very idea of conscription was despised by the orthodox Liberals at that time.

The need to create a national imagery (Isin and Wood 1999) became urgent. Isin and Wood (1999: 27) explained that:

As the demand for staffing the army and navy increased, British statesmen sought ways by which to encourage the loyal service of the masses. By selling the people a mostly rhetorical share in the nation, state authorities were rewarded with societal support and men in uniform.

It seems that the placing of more and more restrictions and responsibilities on individuals became a necessary sacrifice for the sake of the common good, which was to win the war. Opposition to the National Register, whether from Liberals who argued that it endangered individual liberties, or from others who claimed that it might be a waste of time and money, was condemned as ‘unpatriotic’. The prevailing rhetoric was that for the sake of the empire, individuals should accept more responsibilities and make sacrifices, which Walter Long promised would only be temporary.

The legislation of the National Registration Act 1915 indicated that patriotism/nationalism replaced orthodox liberalism during the First World War.

2) Distribution of Master Frames in 1939 News (61 items in Total) – Table 7.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939 News</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 items</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 items</td>
<td>0 items</td>
<td>3 items</td>
<td>5 items</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Means in favour of ID cards;
In 1939, the rhetoric of the state authorities was very much the same as in 1915, when it was used to counter criticism that the National Register and ID card system could severely damage civil liberties. Vivian, the new director of the GRO, promised in the *Daily Mirror* that there was no intention to bring such a scheme into operation in peacetime.

One reason why the plan did not meet as much resistance as in 1915 was that Britain had a much more united Government in 1939. In 1914, the Liberal Government was fragmented and there were many divisions inside the Liberal Party, which led to a Coalition Government in 1915. In 1939 the British Government clearly recognised that the newly-improved National Register proposal by Mr. Vivian could bring more value to the system itself, as well as help with conscription and other national service functions. This time, the reintroduction of ID cards took less time in preparation. The system also carried an additional specific function – entitlement. Unlike the Registration Certificates issued under the National Registration Act 1915, the ID cards issued in 1939 had to be carried at all times, and individuals had to report any changes of address. The public needed to show their ID cards when accessing their food ration, clothing ration, and savings accounts.

Once again, when war emergencies became the priority, liberties were brushed away to make sacrifices for the common good.

### 3) Distribution of Master Frames in 1951 News (55 items in Total) – Table 7.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LIBERALISM +</th>
<th>LIBERALISM -</th>
<th>NATIONALISM +</th>
<th>NATIONALISM -</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951 News</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 items</td>
<td>47 items</td>
<td>6 items</td>
<td>1 item</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Means in favour of ID cards;
– Means against ID cards.

During the Second World War, “the threat of a European conflict reactivated interest in both national mobilization and population trends. Also health care became a right of national citizenship which could be claimed anywhere within the nation” (Higgs 2004a: 209). Later,
“the onset of the Cold War meant that national registration, and national service which it underpinned, was not abolished after the defeat of Germany” (Higgs 2004a: 210).

However, public resentment towards national registration and ID cards reached its peak during the “Willcock vs. Muckle” case. Opponents of the system claimed that the war emergencies were over, and thus ID cards should be abolished in peacetime.

It seems that the public were only willing to tolerate a National Register and identity card system in wartime, but not in peacetime.

4) Distribution of Master Frames in News 1994-2008 (1225 items in Total) – Table 7.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
<th>LIBERALISM</th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
<th>NATIONALISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994-2008</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>108 items</td>
<td>518 items</td>
<td>217 items</td>
<td>266 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1225 items</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Means in favour of ID cards;
– Means against ID cards.

Based on Gott’s theory, nationalism and patriotism occur as by-products of the state’s relationship with the outside world. This offers a good explanation for the distribution of the nationalism frame in the mediated debates of the National Register and ID cards in 1915, 1939 and 1951. During the First and Second World Wars, Britain had an extremely bad relationship with Germany, which explains the high percentage of nationalism frames. After the Second World War, in 1951, Britain was no longer at war against Germany, which explains the public’s resentment towards ID cards, although the Cold War still existed.

From 1994 to 2008, Britain’s relationships with the outside world were much better than in the previous two periods discussed. This might explain the relatively even distribution of nationalism and liberalism frames in the mediated debate of ID cards from 1994 to 2008.
7.5.2 The Difference over Time – Changes in the Distribution of Frames

The liberalism and nationalism master frames have dominated the mediated debate of British national ID card systems in the three case studies discussed here. However, it is manifest that their distribution differs over time. The rise and fall of both nationalism and liberalism in the media representation of British ID cards is closely linked to the perception of ‘threat’ in different periods.

**Liberalism –**

One of the changes between the cases in 1915 and 1951 is the sharp increase in the distribution of the liberalism master frame to oppose British national ID cards. The reason for the significant variation is related to the different circumstances: in 1915 WWI had broken out and led to massive national emergencies; in 1951, WWII had ended and the war emergencies were fading.

During wartime, many civil liberties were damaged by various laws and regulations on individual movements, assembly, expression and media censorship (Stammers 1983). This was tolerated in wartime for the sake of winning the war. However, after the war ended, the British public started to resent such laws and regulations. Therefore, the adoption and abolition of ID card systems were dependent on how the public viewed the balance between security and civil liberties.

From 1994 to August 2008, the distribution of the liberalism frame (in opposition to ID cards) remained stable and dominated the mediated debate. The only time when its distribution was level with that of the nationalism frame (in support of ID cards) was between 1st May 1997 and 10th Sept 2001, during which the mediated debate of British national identity cards was focusing on combating illegal immigration.

**Liberalism +**

The distribution of the liberalism frame (in support of ID cards) has remained at a relatively low level over time. It hit its lowest point in the 1951 case, during which national resentment towards ID cards dominated the mediated debate.

**Nationalism +**

In 1915, when WWI broke out and national mobilisation and organisation were demanded by the War Government, the nationalism master frame was the most powerful philosophical
weapon in the mediated debate of the first-ever British National Register and related issues.

However, in 1951, when WWII ended and the war emergencies were over, the Government could not find any supporting evidence to continue the national identity card system, and decided to withdraw it.

From 1994 to August 2008, after several rounds of efforts from both the Conservative and Labour Governments to promote national identity cards, the scheme finally became law in the UK in March 2006. However, the nationalism frame (in support of ID cards) did not dominate the mediated debate as in 1915.

**Nationalism –**

The distribution of the nationalism frame in the mediated debate of British national ID cards (in opposition to ID cards) has remained relatively low over time. It increased slightly from 1994 to September 1997, when the Conservative Government tried to propose a voluntary national identity card system in the UK, but was strongly rebuked by critics who thought that it was a waste of time and money and that the money should be invested instead in the police force and border control staff.

7.5.3 The Difference over Time – Capitalism Frame

The capitalism master frame was employed in the mediated debate of British national ID cards only in 1915, and was found mainly in news items in the *Daily Herald.*

1) Distribution of Master Frames in 1915 News (341 items in Total) – Table 7.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capitalism</th>
<th>Capitalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 items</td>
<td>11 items</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Means in favour of conscription/national register;
- Means against conscription/national register.
Capitalism + rhetoric: All classes of society are contributing to the war service.

Capitalism – rhetoric: The capitalists are exploiting the working class under the name of the National Register.

The Herald continued to fight against the concept of the National Register and related issues such as conscription, with its limited resources and influence. The paper chiefly employed capitalism as its rooted worldview to interpret conscription, munitions work, strikes, and the National Register. In the opinion of the Herald, citizenship and class were incompatible, and at war.

In comparison with the nine other newspapers, which enthusiastically promoted the National Register under the name of patriotism and nationalism, the Herald took a completely different perspective to examine the proposal of the first National Register and its by-products such as conscription and Registration Certificates. The Herald claimed that national registration and conscription were capitalist means of exploiting the working class, which would worsen their living situation yet further. As Sykes (1997: 200) explained:

Class tensions were exacerbated by exhortations to sacrifice largely directed towards the working class by a middle and upper class that seemed to have foregone few of its own pleasures.

In addition, Isin and Wood (1999: 26, 27) noted that:

Equality of citizenship did not mean equality of class. On the contrary, citizenship could and did maintain class inequality … Class is a system of inequality. It is reasonable to expect that the impact of citizenship on social class should take the form of a conflict between opposing principles.

The reason for this use of the capitalism frame lay in the nature of the Daily Herald. Born as a platform for the printers’ union, the London Society of Compositors, to carry on an industrial strike, it went on to be sponsored by trade unionists for the purpose of a permanent labour movement and to compete with the newspapers that championed the two main political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. As Richards (1997: 1) explained:

From its first issue on 15 April 1912, to its last on 14 September 1964, the Herald was a challenge to the norms and assumptions of the British press … Where other Fleet Street papers were essentially commercial in motivation, the Herald was overtly political. Fleet Street’s ideology was capitalist, but the Herald espoused anti-capitalism. Other papers were created and owned by wealthy proprietors – the Herald was first the creation of part of the labour movement and then the property of the whole of it.
Because of its anti-capitalism frame, Richards (1997:12) continued that:

One of the Herald's enduring weaknesses would be that it saw its rivals in purely political terms and failed to understand the popular appeal of human-interest news. But the movement was painfully aware that none of the new mass-circulation papers supported Labour or was likely to.

The Herald's use of the capitalism frame to oppose the National Register did not succeed. Even worse, its support for strikes and opposition to war led to a dramatic fall in circulation and in 1915 it was forced to change to weekly publication. After the Herald's failure in opposing the National Register, the capitalism frame disappeared from the mediated debate of British national ID cards.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

The Identity Card Act 2006 is now officially in operation, despite strong opposition from the British national newspapers. Since November 2008 foreign nationals applying for a visa to travel to the UK, including international students studying here, have been required to submit their fingerprints and digital facial images to the Home Office, where the data will be held indefinitely. Recently, the Home Office, under the leadership of new Home Secretary Alan Johnson, has stated that identity cards will never be compulsory for British citizens, and has even abandoned the plan for pilot trials at two airports, which means that only foreign citizens are required to apply for biometric identity cards. Meanwhile the Conservative Party has been threatening to abolish the national identity card system if they are elected at the next General Election, a questionable claim considering their attempt in 1995. For its part, the Liberal Democrat Party never hesitates to condemn the scheme. What is more, there has been an on-going anti-ID card campaign organised by groups such as NO2ID and Liberty, albeit that it failed to stop the Identity Cards Act 2006.

For most citizens residing in the European Union, national identity cards, even biometric ones, are already an integrated part of their day-to-day lives. As Beck and Broadhurst (1998) noted, national identity cards are compulsory in Belgium, Italy, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain; and voluntary in Austria, Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden and now the UK. Although in the UK the biometric ID card scheme has been at the centre of an ongoing and controversial debate, this strong opposition did not prevent it from becoming law. In contrast to the two earlier British national identity card systems implemented during WWI and WWII, this intrusive and expensive biometric identification system is being introduced at a time when there is no world war emergency and no need for conscription or food rationing. Instead, it is designed to combat illegal immigration and crime; though many question the effectiveness of such a system.

As argued in Chapter 7, what made it possible for such a controversial bill to succeed in the UK Parliament was the combined effect of Labour’s parliamentary majority, and the events of
9/11 and 7/7. The Labour Government’s introduction of a biometric national identity card system is a reflection of the state’s long history of collecting statistics and information, including individual documentation, so as to achieve a more effective and efficient bureaucratic administration. During the First and Second World Wars, the British Government (Coalition Government in 1915 and Conservative Government in 1939) introduced national registration and identity cards in order to master statistics for war use; even after the Conservative Government elected in 1951 decided to abolish the national identity card system in peacetime out of political concerns, the numbering system remained in use for the National Health Service, just as the previous Labour Government had planned. The purpose of introducing and abolishing a national identity card system may vary from wartime to peacetime; however, the state’s desire for individual identification information never changes.

Despite now being law, the Identity Cards Bill 2005 met with strong opposition from many British national newspapers and NGOs. Compared with the lower level of resistance to the first two British national identity card systems, the Identity Card Bills 2004 and 2005 were challenged by the British newspapers, academics and civil liberty campaigners to the extent that several reports have rebuked the biometric identity card scheme, which in turn reflects the growth of civil society despite the constant bureaucratic pursuit of a centralised information state. The British national newspapers continuously questioned the Government scheme with regard to cost, effectiveness, and the impact on civil liberties. In addition, organisations such as Liberty, NO2ID, Charter 88, Defy-ID, Justice, and Privacy International have all campaigned against the biometric identity card scheme. However, this opposition failed to hinder the scheme. The situation was very different in 1951, when the Government decided to abolish the national identity card system after all the British national newspapers campaigned against it, and the British public became more and more intolerant of the wartime restrictions.

The British national print media has not always fought against the idea of a national identity card system. When the First World War broke out, nearly all the British national newspapers campaigned for conscription and the National Register. The same thing happened at the beginning of the Second World War. Therefore, it seems that the British newspapers alter their attitudes towards national identity card systems according to circumstances. The fact that they did not succeed this time seems to give weight to the concerns of many academics and experts (such as David Lyon and Richard Thomas) that Britain is sleepwalking into a
surveillance society. More importantly, despite the media functioning as a ‘watchdog’ of the Government and criticising the controversial plan, its influence on the Identity Cards Bill 2005 seems to have been limited.

The *Sun* has been a passionate supporter of biometric identity cards since 1994, claiming that “if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear” – a recurring argument in the mediated public debate of British national identity cards. In fact, in a “maximum surveillance society” (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 205) where the public are watched over by CCTV cameras and checked upon when crossing the border, there does seem nothing left to hide, because the Government now stores huge amounts of personal information through multiple agencies such as the DVLA, Passport and Identity, and the Police Department. Moreover, because even the supermarkets now hold giant databases of customer information such as their shopping logs and purchasing habits, a biometric identity card can seem like just another plastic card in our wallet, even though this is not the case. First of all, there is no evidence to support the claim that an expensive identity card loaded with personal information and biometric data can help cut crime or prevent terrorist attacks. Second, the Labour Government is notorious for many counts of data loss. Finally, the previous identity card systems were abolished in 1919 and 1952 for good reason: they cost too much, and were very damaging to personal freedom and civil liberty.

The three case studies in this thesis also demonstrate a gradual decline in parliamentary reportage in the mediated public debate of British national identity cards from 1915 to 2008. The percentage of parliamentary reports in 1915, in relation to the National Register and identity cards, is the highest of all the three case studies. At that time, most of the national newspapers would dedicate a special section or page for parliamentary reportage, covering the debates in the House of Commons and House of Lords. However, such reportage declined during the Second World War and seems to have disappeared in today’s newspapers. It seems that the British press has become more and more independent from the UK Parliament and its political agenda. It is widely argued that the decline of parliamentary reportage is also partly due to the de-centralisation of the UK Parliament.

Finally, in the case studies of the mediated public debate of British national identity cards, the nationalism and liberalism master frames have been identified as the dominating ideologies. The distribution of these two master frames varies over time, depending on specific circumstances. The nationalism frame in support of a national identity card system usually
dominated the mediated debate at times of total war, while the liberalism frame against national identity cards often dominated the debate in peacetime, when wartime restrictions became unacceptable to the British public. In the most recent mediated debate of British biometric identity cards, the liberalism frame against the scheme has dominated the news coverage, but could not prevent the scheme from becoming law.
Appendices

Appendix 1

Content Analysis Coding Schedule for News in 1915

Newspapers’ Coverage on the 1st British National Register and ID Card System (called “Registration Certificate” during WWI) in 1915

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Title</th>
<th>Number of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Times and Sunday Times</td>
<td>74 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>55 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>22 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>33 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Express</td>
<td>40 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Manchester Guardian</td>
<td>60 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Herald</td>
<td>19 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News of World</td>
<td>12 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Observer</td>
<td>12 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>14 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>341 items</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Newspaper Titles

1. Times and Sunday Times (*Digital Archives 1785-1985 available*)
2. Daily Mail
3. Daily Mirror (*Digital Archives 1903-present available*)
4. Daily Telegraph
5. Daily Express
6. Manchester Guardian (*Digital Archives 1821-1975 available, 1976-present will be available from 2008*)
7. Herald
8. News of the World
9. Observer (*Digital Archives 1900-1975 available*)
10. People

Type of Newspaper

1. Popular Tabloid
2. Mid-market Tabloid
3. Quality Newspaper

Date-Month-Year (Publishing Date of the Item)

Location of the Item

1. Editorial page section
2. General news section
3. Politics and Parliament section
4. Opinion section
5. Interviews section
6. Column
7. If no section indicated, list the page number.

**Headline of Item**

**Reporter of Item**
1. Times Parliamentary Correspondent.
2. Times Dublin Correspondent.
3. Times Manchester Correspondent.
10. Lovat Fraser
11. Alfred Fellowes
12. Emilie H. Marshall
13. Boyle Lawrence
14. A field officer
15. George Lansbury
16. John Scurr
17. “The People” Special Commissioner
18. Others
Authors of Letters to Editors (The ‘names’ listed below are not all full names and some of them are pseudonyms.)

Religious Figures
1. Alfred Marlborough, Dean of Exeter
2. A Liverpool Clergyman

Media
3. Times’ Late Berlin Correspondent

Military Authorities
4. A. Marlborough. H. M. T. Tudor (Admiral)
5. Major-General Sir Elliott Wood, retired

Members of Parliament
6. Leo Chiozza Money
7. J. Cathcart. Wason, Liberal MP for Orkney and Shetland

Medical Doctors
8. W. Collier, M. D.
9. Ferdinand Rees, M. D.

Academics
10. Eighty Members of Oxford University

Members of the Public
11. A. J. A.
12. Harry Barber
13. H. S. Gedge
14. Lilian Zetland
15. Nowell Smith
16. Charles Davison
17. Albert Spicer
18. A Grandmother
19. Thos. G. Jackson
20. Z.
21. C. E. Matthews
22. Rowland H. Hill
23. R. Aitken
24. G. E. Raine
25. Concordia
26. C. A. Wyatt
27. W. M.
28. R. C. W. J.
29. Engaged Girl
30. E. M.
31. M. L.
32. S. A.
33. Fair Play
34. W. A. Spooner
35. W. G. Edwards Rees
36. Walter F. Adeney
37. J. F. Heyes
38. W. Boyd Dawkins
39. M.
40. Charles Price
41. Robert F. Rattray
42. J. Redman Ormerod
43. A. E. J.
44. William Milligan
45. Medicus
46. Register
47. Geo Benson
48. T. C. Horsfall
49. Volunteer
50. Frances Balfour, A. Cowdray, Emily Davies, Millient Garret Fawcett, Edith Palliser, Eleanor Rathbone, May Sinclair, Jane M. Strachey, Jane H. Walker, M. D.
51. Samuel Storey
52. Querist
53. Territorial
54. Others

Types of Item
1. Parliamentary Debate
2. Editorials (“Commentary reflecting the institutional voice of the newspaper. Usually carried in a larger font than of the basic body text and without a by-line” [Keeble
3. Hard News (“the reporting of issues or events in the past or about to happen. It is largely based on selected details and quotations in direct or indirect speech. Hard news begins with the most striking details and thereafter information progressively declines in importance. Some background details may be needed to make the news intelligible but description, analysis, comment and the subjective ‘I’ of the reporter are either excluded or included only briefly” [Keeble 2001:95]. In short, it is mainly “conveying the information” [Keeble 2001:95])

4. Soft News (“the news element is still strong and prominent at or near the opening but is treated in a lighter way. Largely based on factual detail and quotations, the writing is more flexible and there is likely to be more description and comment. The tone, established in the intro section, might be witty or ironic. It is more an entertainment genre” [Keeble 2001:95])

5. News Feature (“usually longer than a straight news story. The news angle is prominent though not necessarily in the opening section and quotations are again important. It can contain description, comment, analysis, background historical detail, eye-witnessing reporting and wider or deeper coverage of the issues and range of sources” [Keeble 2001:95])

6. Opinion Piece (“emphasis on the journalist conveying their views and experience, usually in an idiosyncratic, colourful, controversial fashion. Usually known as columnists” [Keeble 2001:96])

7. Readers’ Letters

8. Official Notices and War Posters

9. Others

Size of News (in words; if cartoons and posters, in pages.)

Use of Pictures (including cartoons, posters and photos) in News (Yes/No)

If Yes,

The Number of Pictures Used

1. One
2. Two
3. More than two

The Content of Pictures

1. Cartoons
2. Official Posters
3. Photos of Actors
4. Forms
5. Registration Card
6. Others

Themes Appearing in the Items
1. The Need for conscription and National Register.
2. Comparison between conscription and voluntary system.
3. Public opinion on conscription/voluntary system/National Register.
4. The scope and impact of the National Register.
5. The legislation of the National Register in the Houses of Commons and Lords.
6. The completing of the National Register forms.
7. The local compilation of the National Register.
8. The cost of the National Register.
9. The handling of data gained from the National Register.
10. The history of conscription in other countries and areas.
11. National Register and Conscription in other countries and areas.
12. The handling of national registration cards.
13. Strikes and national service.
15. The timetable for the introduction of the National Register.
16. Others

Actor Codes (Any person or organisation or government department spoken of/quoted in one sentence or more than one sentence, or mentioned clearly in a single item is regarded as an actor.)

Central & Local Official Authorities
1. House of Commons
2. House of Lords
3. The Local Government Board
4. The Registrar-General Office
5. Mr. H. R. Davies, recruiting officer for the country
6. The Press Bureau
7. Mr. Joseph Hill, the Mayor of Derby
8. Mr. Alderman Joseph Blamires, Mayor of Huddersfield
9. Mr. James E. Bedford, Lord Mayor of Leeds
10. Mr. Gorton, Councillor of Coventry
11. Mr. H. C. Nicholas, Councillor of Rhonda
12. Mr. L. Griffiths, Councillor of Aberdare
13. Mr. R. Wilson, Councillor of Gateshead
14. Sir Thomas Shann, Mayor of Manchester
15. Bethnal Green Borough Council

Legal Authorities
16. Mr. Justice Shearman
17. The Grand Jury in Carlisle
18. Others

Policing and Military Authorities
19. Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War
20. The Dublin Metropolitan Police
21. The Naval and Military Defence Standing Committee of the London Chamber of Commerce
22. Mr. Marshall Hall, K.C.
23. Mr. C. Tyrrell Giles, K.C.
24. Brigadier-General Owen Thomas
25. Mr. Fred Acton, High Sheriff of Lincolnshire
26. Others

The Media
27. Miss Meta Simmins, columnist of Sunday Pictorial
28. Le Temps, a French newspaper
29. The Guardian, the Church newspaper
30. The Lancet
31. M. Clemenceau, of the L’Homme Enchaine
32. The Freeman’s Journal, the official organ of the Nationalist Party
33. Westminster Gazette
34. The Weekly Dispatch
35. The Age, Australian newspaper
36. Others

Foreign Authorities
37. Mr. Fisher, the Australian Prime Minister
38. Others

Organisations
40. The London Teachers’ Association
41. The National Union of Teachers
42. Women’s Social & Political Union
43. Cardiff Chamber of Commerce
44. Plymouth Chamber of Commerce
45. Swansea Chamber of Commerce
46. The Urban District Councils’ Association
47. The Surrey Territorial Force Association
48. The Eddisbury (Cheshire) Unionist Association
49. The Press Association
50. Chelsea Traders’ Association
51. The Socialist National Defence Committee
52. The Dungannon Board of Guardians
53. The Walsall Trades and Labour Council
54. Amalgamated Association Union

Representatives of Institutions/Organisations
55. Mrs. Pankhurst, of the Women’s Social & Political Union
56. Mme. Clara Butt, of the Women’s Social & Political Union
57. Mr. Bond, of the Urban District Councils
58. Sir Horace Munro, of the Local Government Board
59. Miss Kenney, of the Women’s Social & Political Union
60. Mr. A. M. Thompson, Chairman of the Socialist National Defence Committee
61. Leading employers of The Clyde Armaments Committee
62. Mr. Albert E. Marlow, J.P., the President of the Northampton Boot Manufacturers’ Association
63. Dr. H. A. L. Fisher, Vice-Chairman of Sheffield University
64. Sir Charles Macara, President of the International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers’ Associations
65. Alderman A. R. Jephcott, of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers
66. Mr. Fell, the tramways manager of the London County Council

Labour Party
67. Mr. Arthur Henderson, leader of Labour Party 1914-17 and also a member of War Cabinet 1916-17
68. Mr. Philip Snowden, M. P. for Blackburn and famous for his pacifist principles
69. Mr. William Brace, M. P. for South Glamorganshire, Under –Secretary of State for the Home Department 1916-19
70. Mr. J. A. Seddon, M. P. for the Newton Division of Lancashire, President of the National Amalgamated Union of Shop Assistants, Warehousemen and Clerks
71. Mr. Tom Shaw, Secretary of the International Federation of Textile Workers from 1911-1929
72. Mr. J. H. Thomas, General Secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen
73. Mr. William Crooks, M. P. for Woolwich 1903-1918
74. Mr. Charles Duncan, M.P. for Durham, Trade Unionist
75. Mr. W. T. Wilson
76. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Treasurer of the Labour Party 1912-1924
77. Others

Conservative and Unionists Party
78. Mr. Walter Long, President of the Local Government Board 1915 - 1916
79. Mr. Hayes Fisher, Parliamentary Secretary to the Local Government Board 1915 - 1916
80. Mr. Bonar Law, M.P. for Bootle 1911-1918, and Leader of Conservative Party 1911-1921
81. Mr. Duke
82. Mr. Rawlinson
83. Sir F. Banbury
84. Sir Edward Carson
85. Lord Derby
86. Lord Newton
87. Lord Curzon
88. Lord Lansdowne
89. Lord Midleton
90. The Duke of Rutland
91. Mr. Evelyn Cecil
92. Sir William Hume-Williams
93. Mr. Turton, M.P. for Thirsk and Malton.
94. Lord Tenderten
95. Major John Hall-Edwards
96. Colonel Sharman-Crawford
97. Major Archer-Shee
98. Mr. Chaplin
99. Mr. G. Terrell
100. Sir J. Lonsdale
101. Lord Tenterden
102. Viscount Peel
103. The Earl of Mayo
104. Mr. L. S. Amery
105. Sir Henry Craik, M.P. for Glasgow and Aberdeen Universities 1906-1918
106. Sir Richard Cooper
107. Mr. Watson Rutherford
108. Major Rowland Hunt
109. Mr. Ronald McNeil
110. Others

Liberal Party
111. Mr. Herbert Henry Asquith, Prime Minister 1908-1916
112. Sir Francis Dyke Acland, M.P. for Camborne, Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries
113. Sir Thomas Whittaker, M.P. for Spen Valley from 1892-1919
114. Mr. Holt
115. Mr. Russell Rea, M.P. for Scarborough 1906-1918 and Junior Lord of Treasury 1915-1916
116. Mr. J. W. Wilson, M.P. for Mid Durham 1890-1915
117. Mr. Murray MacDonald
118. Mr. Hobhouse
119. Mr. R. McKenna, Home Secretary
120. Sir Leo Chiozza Money
121. Mr. Lloyd George, M.P. for Caernarvon Boroughs 1890-1945, Chancellor of the Exchequer 1908-1915, then Minister of Munitions 1915-1916
122. The Marquess of Crewe, Lord Lieutenant of the County of London
123. Lord St. Davids
124. Mr. Winston Churchill
125. Sir Edward Grey
126. Sir John Simon, Home Secretary 1915-16 in Coalition Government
127. Mr. Ellis Griffith, Under-Secretary for the Home Office
128. Sir Ivor Herbert, M.P. for Monmouthshire 1906-1917
129. Sir Joseph Walton
130. Mr. Cathcart Wason
131. Lord Milner
132. Mr. Glyn Jones
133. Lord Heneage
134. Mr. Harold Cox
135. Mr. Frederic Harrison
136. Sir West Ridgeway.
137. Lord Denman
138. Mr. Vaughan Davies
139. Sir Alfred Mond
140. Lord Pontypridd
142. Lord Joicey
143. Lord Devonport, leader of Port of London Authority
144. Harold Tennant, Under-Secretary of State for War
145. Mr. H. W. Forster
146. Mr. Walter Runciman
147. Mr. Outhwaite
148. Sir Horace Munro
149. Lord Esher
150. Lord Haldane
151. Mr. J. A. Pease, President of the Board of Education
152. Mr. Lewis Harcourt, Colonial Secretary
153. Mr. E. Huntsman
154. Sir William Clegg
155. Mr. Thomas Lough
156. Mr. Edgar Jones
157. Sir James Henry Dalziel
158. Mr. John Bryce
159. Mr. Richard Lambert
Mr. Joseph King
Mr. Percy Alden
Mr. Gordon Harvey
Sir Walter Essex
Mr. J. M. Robertson
Sir W. Byles
Mr. Pringle
Mr. Hogge
Mr. Henry Cowan
Mr. Augustine Birrell
Mr. Sherwell
Mr. Pratt
Lord Haversham
Lord Weardale
Mr. Llewellyn Williams
Mr. Morrell
The Earl of Selborne
Mr. J. A. Baker
Mr. A. Ponsonby
Mr. C. P. Trevelyan
Mr. J. H. Whitehouse
Mr. Josiah Wedgwood
Mr. McCurdy
Mr. Kind
Mr. Clough
Mr. H. Watt
Others
Irish Nationalist Party
Mr. Laurence Ginnell, expelled from the Irish Parliamentary Party for the offence of asking to see the party accounts, after which he sat as an Independent Nationalist.
Irish Parliamentary Party
John Dillon, last leader of Irish Parliamentary Party
Mr. T. P. O’Connor
Captain Guest
192. Others

The Public

193. Mr. F. Llewellyn Jones, of Mold
194. The Headmaster of Harrow
195. Two well-known farmers
196. Mr. John Andrews, J.P., of Cardiff
197. Colonel and Alderman W. F. Wyley, of Coventry
198. Mr. William Johnson, of Coventry
199. Sir William Rayaer, of Huddersfield

200. Mr. Ernest Jardine, M. P. for East Somerset. *(Cannot find out his political stand.)*
201. A prominent commercial man in Wolverhampton
202. A young actor with a practical knowledge of engineering
203. Mr. Walford, the town clerk of Holborn

Others

Companies

205. Mr. O’Connell, of the Linotype Company
206. An engineer with his own business
207. A private in the Canadian contingent
208. A superintendent engineer in the Post Office

Others

Religious Authorities

210. The Bishop of London
211. The Archbishop of Canterbury
212. The Archbishop of York, Dr. Lang
213. The Bishop of Hull

Others

Daily Express Readers, whose postcards were published -

215. W. J. Hurman
218. Baird-Carter
219. Pte. Rosewarne, R.A.M.C.
220. C. Hipkins
221. C. A. Shepshed
222. Castle and Co.
223. Thomas W. Morgan
224. W. Monk
225. E. Parks
226. H. J. de Buriatte
227. J. Woolfrey
228. F. H. March
229. R. Mayhew
230. D. Parnals
231. Chas. A. Willdey
232. R. Waymark
233. Walton R. Stainton
234. C. Jeffryes
235. Leonard Steeds
236. C. H. Mitchell
237. J. Hatrick
238. J. T. Macdonald
239. G. Crisp
240. M. A. Garner
241. R. M. Boniwell
242. Arthur F. Smith
243. E. C. Proctor
244. J. F. S. Palmer
245. H. A. Reed
246. Marry Westmore
247. T. G. Tipper
248. F. N. Jones
249. Sir Home Gordon
250. Philip R. W. de Santi
251. Harry Bird
252. Henry White
253. F. P. I. Hanbury
254. S. Key
255. Fred H. Woods
290. Chas. A. Bettesworth
291. J. Mold
292. Theo. P. Jenkins
293. D. Organ
294. John de Saultes Vaughan
295. G. Williams
296. F. Collins
297. John T. Swannell
298. Sir Henry B. Samuelson
299. Colonel W. A. Broome
300. Rev. Nevil Atchley
301. H. S. Stoneham
302. H. Doulglas
303. D. B. Tyler
304. Bullen Spicer
305. E. Wilmer
306. Rev. T. S. Carlyon
307. G. Bowker
308. Fred A. Punt
309. H. J. Bretherton
310. J. Chevalier (Belgian)
311. Wm. Whitemell
312. Ches. F. Butterworth
313. B. Bayley
314. Mrs. Derrick
315. Mrs. C. Marston
316. R. E. Dunglison
317. Mrs. M. Rock
318. Hy. G. Restall
319. Mrs. E. Hughes D’Aeth
320. Alfred C. Havell
321. J. Cooks
322. L. Clarke
323. F. J. Kingsley
Mary. L. Swift
Mrs. Eldred
Mrs. M. A. Platt
E. D. Stacpoole
W. H. Morant
H. Wilson
Robert Johnson
H. Ingram
H. F. Warner
E. Taylor
H. Edgar Wild
H. Matthews
F. Pretty
Alice M. Blackmore
H. W. Green
F. S. Ross
Miss Leigh
M. Austin
E. Eaton
E. Jones
C. J. Plumbridge
Allan Cooper
L. M. Lawrence
M. B. Westlake
T. J. Timson
Rev. F. W. Carlton
F. R. Morris
N. Wheeler
B. Summerfield
W. H. Grove
F. T. Lake
E. L. Smith
Griffiths
Charles Lewin Curtis
358. G. Thorn
359. Rev. E. H. Firth
360. H. C. Byng
361. Geo. C. Pierce
362. William Knight
363. J. Gordon
364. L. Harwood
365. John Bowman
366. Mrs. Rockliff
367. F. Fiveash
368. W. S. H. Lloyd
369. Mrs. Lyall
370. S. W. Norman
371. F. A. Adeney
372. G. Meyrick
373. Frank Boyd
374. Wm. E. Pocock
375. William J. B. Griffiths
376. Thomas Dutton, M.D.
377. G. Clark
378. E. White jun.
379. V. Adams
380. Somerville
381. E. Rocke
382. H. Lewis
383. E. Coombe
384. P. C. Edwards
385. M. Try
386. T. J. MacCartney
387. W. J. Peckham
388. Dora B. Deane
389. Roger Brinton
390. E. Love
391. William Rossmore
Ernest W. Folkard
W. Davis
S. Pratt
S. Edwards
M. Dudley
E. Jack
J. Taylor
H. Jones
George H. Welch
Mrs. K. Spooner
L. Topham
J. H. Hepburn
Frederick A. Page Turner
G. Dale
Rev. H. B. Parker
James H. Harvey
J. H. Brownjon
H. Moffatt
Rev. Whittington-Inca
H. Furborrow
P. H. Jenkin
Mrs. J. E. Pow
J. E. Simpkin
J. Primrose Lindsay
Miss Elsie Brunsdon
J. C. Buffham
E. Hooton
Gooch
B. Charlton
Edward Hart
J. Conway
K. Spencer
M. Jameson
Legislation
1. National Registration Act, 1915
2. The Aliens Act of 1905
3. Factory Act
4. Munitions Act
5. Ten Minutes Rule
6. Notification of Births Bill
7. Others

Evidence Actors Used to Support their Claims
1. Ratio of married men in the Military and the consequences/costs resulted
2. The number of men recruited under voluntary system/compulsory system
3. The Census 1911
4. The achievement of efficient organisation and mobilisation in the past and in other countries
5. The contribution to the war from the working class, middle class and upper class
6. The need for efficient organisation and mobilisation in UK
7. Public figures’ speeches
8. Public opinion
9. Women’s involvement in the National Register and war work
10. The necessity for the Registration Bill since the Government had already got more power under the Munitions Acts
11. Interference with the personal liberty of the citizen
12. The credibility of the Coalition Government
13. Expected voluntary help from citizens to help the Register in order to reduce cost and save time
14. The ethics of conscription and national service, like “Prussianism”
15. The impacts of the age limits and occupations in recruiting
16. The war casualties and munitions struggles
17. Others

How Actors Appear
1. Mentioned only
2. Directly quoted (For example, Aneurin Bevan said: “I read…. ”)
3. Partially quoted (For example, Geoff Hoon today denied British troops were using “lousy equipment” after…. )
4. Reported speech/paraphrased (For example, Aneurin Bevan said he read…..)

**The Length of Quotation**

Direct quotation and partial quotation are counted in words.
Appendix 2

**Content Analysis Coding Schedule for News in 1939**

Newspapers’ Coverage of the 2nd British National Register and ID card System in 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Number of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>19 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>19 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Guardian</td>
<td>23 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61 items</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Newspaper Titles**

1. The Times (*Digital Archives 1785-1985 available*)
2. Daily Mirror (*Digital Archives 1903-present available*)

**Type of Newspaper**

4. Popular Tabloid
5. Quality Newspaper

**Date-Month-Year** (Publishing Date of the Item)

**Location of the Items**

1. Editorial page section
2. General news section
3. Politics and Parliament section
4. Opinion section
5. Interviews section
6. Column
7. If no section indicated, list the page number.

**Headline of Items**

**Reporter of Items**

1. Robert Barr, of Daily Mirror
2. Mr. D. Quinn, of Holborn, E.C.1, reader of Daily Mirror
3. W. M. of Daily Mirror
4. The Manchester Guardian London Staff
5. Sir Edward Grigg, Conservative M.P.
6. Jan Gordon
7. Others

**Types of Item**

1. Parliamentary Debate
2. Editorials ("Commentary reflecting the institutional voice of the newspaper. Usually carried in a larger font than of the basic body text and without a by-line" [Keeble 2001:96])

3. Hard News ("the reporting of issues or events in the past or about to happen. It is largely based on selected details and quotations in direct or indirect speech. Hard news begins with the most striking details and thereafter information progressively declines in importance. Some background details may be needed to make the news intelligible but description, analysis, comment and the subjective ‘I’ of the reporter are either excluded or included only briefly" [Keeble 2001:95]. In short, it is mainly "conveying the information" [Keeble 2001:95])

4. Soft News ("the news element is still strong and prominent at or near the opening but is treated in a lighter way. Largely based on factual detail and quotations, the writing is more flexible and there is likely to be more description and comment. The tone, established in the intro section, might be witty or ironic. It is more an entertainment genre" [Keeble 2001:95])

5. News Feature ("usually longer than a straight news story. The news angle is prominent though not necessarily in the opening section and quotations are again important. It can contain description, comment, analysis, background historical detail, eye-witnessing reporting and wider or deeper coverage of the issues and range of sources" [Keeble 2001:95])

6. Opinion Piece ("emphasis on the journalist conveying their views and experience, usually in an idiosyncratic, colourful, controversial fashion. Usually known as columnists" [Keeble 2001:96])

7. Readers’ Letters

8. Official Notices and Posters

9. Cartoons

**Size of News** (in words; if cartoons and posters, in page.)

**Use of Pictures** (including cartoons, posters and photos) in **News** (Yes/No)

If Yes,

**The Number of Pictures Used**

1. One
2. Two
3. More than two
The Content of Pictures
1. Filling up registration forms
2. Others

Themes Appearing in the Items
1. The timetable for the introduction of the National Register and ID cards system
2. The need for national mobilisation and organisation
3. The purposes of National Register and ID cards system
4. The impacts of National Register and ID cards system on civil and industrial liberties
5. National Register in other countries
6. Others

Actor Codes (Any person or organisation or government department spoken of/quoted in one or more sentences, or mentioned clearly in a single item, is regarded as an actor.)

Central & Local Official Authorities
1. Sir John Anderson, Lord Privy Seal, Home Secretary (Sep 1939 – Oct 1940)
2. The Ministry of Health
3. Mr. Walter Elliot, Minister of Health & Food
4. Sir Sylvanus Vivian, the Register-General
5. Others

Organisations
6. National Union of Distributive and Allied Workers
7. The Association of British Chambers of Commerce
8. The Non-Conscription League
9. The Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen
10. Others

Labour Party
11. Lord Holden
12. A.V. Alexander
13. Others

The Independent Labour Party
14. Mr. Fenner Brockway, General Secretary of the I.L.P
15. Others

Conservative and Unionists Party
16. Sir Edward Grigg
17. Mr. Duncan Sandys, son-in-law of Sir Winston Churchill.
18. Mr. Robert Boothby
19. Mr. Ronald Cartland
20. Others

Socialist Party
21. Mr. R. C. Morrison, M.P. for Tottenham
22. Others

How Actors Appear
1. Mentioned only
2. Directly quoted (For example, Aneurin Bevan said: “I read…..”)
3. Partially quoted (For example, Geoff Hoon today denied British troops were using “lousy equipment” after…..)
4. Reported speech/paraphrased (For example, Aneurin Bevan said he read…..)

The Length of Quotation
Direct and partial quotations are counted in words.
Appendix 3

Content Analysis Coding Schedule for News in 1951

Newspapers’ coverage of ‘Willcock vs. Muckle’ case (Jun – Jul 1951)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Title</th>
<th>Number of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Times and Sunday Times</td>
<td>14 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>5 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mirror</td>
<td>4 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>7 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Express</td>
<td>8 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Guardian</td>
<td>10 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herald</td>
<td>7 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Total</td>
<td>55 items</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Newspaper Titles
The Times and Sunday Times
Daily Mail
Daily Mirror
Daily Telegraph
Daily Express
Manchester Guardian
Herald

Type of Newspaper
1. Popular Tabloid
2. Mid-market Tabloid
3. Quality Newspaper

Date-Month-Year (Publishing Date of the Item)

Location of the Item
1. Editorial page section
2. General news section
3. Politics and Parliament section
4. Opinion section
5. Interviews section
6. Column
7. If no section indicated, list the page number.

Headline of Item
**Reporter of Item**

1. Times Correspondent
2. Times Parliamentary Correspondent
3. Daily Mail Reporter
4. Daily Mirror Reporter
5. Howard Johnson, of Daily Mirror
6. Daily Telegraph Reporter
7. Daily Telegraph Parliamentary Representative
8. Daily Express Political Correspondent
9. Daily Express Staff Reporter
10. F. Imeson-Rocker, Daily Express Post Writer
11. Manchester Guardian Political Correspondent
12. Manchester Guardian London Staff
13. Frank Smith, of the Herald
14. Robert Traini, of the Herald
15. Others

**Authors of Letters to Editors** (The ‘names’ listed below are not all full names and some of them are pseudonyms.)

1. Mrs D. Wise, reader of Daily Mail.
2. Doctor, reader of Daily Mail.
3. Bernard Ardill, reader of Manchester Guardian
4. B. Johnstone, reader of Manchester Guardian
5. Others

**Types of Item**

1. Parliamentary Debate
2. Editorials (“Commentary reflecting the institutional voice of the newspaper. Usually carried in a larger font than of the basic body text and without a by-line” [Keeble 2001:96])
3. Hard News (“the reporting of issues or events in the past or about to happen. It is largely based on selected details and quotations in direct or indirect speech. Hard news begins with the most striking details and thereafter information progressively declines in importance. Some background details may be needed to make the news intelligible but description, analysis, comment and the subjective ‘I’ of the reporter are either excluded or included only briefly” [Keeble 2001:95]. In short, it is mainly “conveying the
information” [Keeble 2001:95])

4. Soft News (“the news element is still strong and prominent at or near the opening but is treated in a lighter way. Largely based on factual detail and quotations, the writing is more flexible and there is likely to be more description and comment. The tone, established in the intro section, might be witty or ironic. It is more an entertainment genre” [Keeble 2001:95])

5. News Feature (“usually longer than a straight news story. The news angle is prominent though not necessarily in the opening section and quotations are again important. It can contain description, comment, analysis, background historical detail, eye-witnessing reporting and wider or deeper coverage of the issues and range of sources” [Keeble 2001:95])

6. Opinion Piece (“emphasis on the journalist conveying their views and experience, usually in an idiosyncratic, colourful, controversial fashion. Usually known as columnists” [Keeble 2001:96])

7. Readers’ Letters

8. Others

Size of News (in words)

Use of Pictures in News (Yes/No)

If Yes,

The Number of Pictures Used

1. One

2. Two

3. More than two

The Content of Pictures

Photos of Actors

Photos of Identity Cards

Others

Themes Appearing in the Items

1. The validity of war-time regulations in peacetime

2. Police right to demand ID cards

3. The meaning of ‘emergency’ in war-time regulations

4. The impacts of ID cards

5. The progress of the ‘Willecock v. Muckle’ Case

6. Similar cases
7. Others

**Actor Codes** (Any person or organisation or government department spoken of/quoted in one or more sentences, or mentioned clearly in a single item is regarded as an actor.)

**Central & Local Official Authorities**
1. House of Commons
2. House of Lords
3. The Registrar-General
4. The Food Office
5. Home Office
6. Post Office
7. Others

**Legal Authorities and Experts**
8. High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division
9. Bradford magistrates
10. Middlesex magistrates in Hornsey
11. Lord Goddard, the Lord Chief Justice
12. Lord Justice Somervell
13. Lord Justice Jenkins
14. Sir Raymond Evershed, the Master of the Rolls
15. Sir Frank Soskice, K.C., the Attorney-General, Law Officer of the Crown
16. Mr. J. P. Ashworth, for the Crown
17. Other Law Officers of the Crown
18. Mr. Justice Hilbery
19. Mr. Justice Lynskey
20. Mr. Justice Devlin
22. Mr. Emrys Roberts, representing for Willcock
23. Mr. Basil Wigoder, representing for Willcock
24. Mr. Vernon Gattie, Muckle’s lawyer
26. Others

**Policing and Military Authorities**
27. Harold Muckle, the Police-Constable
28. Scotland Yard
29. Sir John Nott Bower, Deputy Commissioner of Metropolitan Police
30. Sir Harold Richard Scott, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police
31. M. Lipton, Lieutenant-Colonel
32. London Police
33. Birmingham Police
34. West Sussex Police
35. Kent Police
36. Metropolitan Police
37. Manchester Police
38. Leeds Police
39. Cheshire County Police
40. Others

Labour Party
41. Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister
42. Lord Chorley
43. Lord Winster
44. Chuter Ede, the Home Secretary
45. Mr. Bevan, ex-Minister of Health
46. Hugh Gaitskell, the Chancellor of the Exchequer
47. Hilary Marquand, Minister of Health
48. Lieutenant Colonel M. Lipton, M. P. for Lambeth

Conservative Party
49. Lord Reading
50. Lord Mancroft
51. Lord Llewellin, ex-Minister of Food
52. Mr. John Hay
53. Mr. Manningham-Buller
54. Mr. Churchill
55. Sir Herbert Williams
56. Others

Liberal Party
57. Mr. Clement Davies, Leader of the Parliamentary Liberal Party
58. Mr. Donald Wade, M.P for Huddersfield West
59. Mr. Philip Fothergill, President of the Liberal Party
60. Mr. David Goldblatt, Liberal candidate for Colchester in 1950.

Organisations
61. The Freedom Defence Committee
62. Others

Members of the Public
63. Mr. Clarence Harry Willcock
64. Others

Legislation
1. National Registration Act, 1939
3. An Order in Council of October 9, 1950
4. The Rent Restriction Act, 1938/1939
5. The Statute Law Revision Act, 1950
6. The Road Acts of 1930 and 1933
7. Others

Events
1. National League of Young Liberals’ Annual Conference
2. Launch of a ‘Freedom Defence’ fund by Willcock and his friends
3. Others

How Actors Appear
1. Mentioned only
2. Directly quoted (For example, Aneurin Bevan said: “I read…..”)
3. Partially quoted (For example, Geoff Hoon today denied British troops were using “lousy equipment” after…..)
4. Reported speech/paraphrased (For example, Aneurin Bevan said he read…..)

The Length of Quotation
Direct and partial quotations are counted in words.
Appendix 4

Content Analysis Coding Schedule for News 1994-2008

Newspapers’ Coverage on the Biometric British National ID Cards System from 1994 to 2008

Newspaper Titles
1. The Times
2. The Sunday Times
3. Daily Mail
4. Mail on Sunday
5. Daily Mirror
6. Sunday Mirror
7. Daily Telegraph
8. Sunday Telegraph
9. Daily Express
10. Sunday Express
11. The Guardian
12. The Independent
13. Independent on Sunday
14. The Sun
15. News of the World
16. The Observer
17. People

Type of Newspaper
1. Popular Tabloid
2. Mid-market Tabloid
3. Quality Newspaper

Date-Month-Year (Publishing Date of the Item)

Location of the Item (Page Number of the Item)

Headline of Item

Name of Author of the Item
1. Alan Hall
2. Alan Travis
3. Alice Thomson
4. Alison Clarke
5. Alison Little
6. Amelia Gentleman
7. Andrew Gimson
8. Andrew Grice
9. Andrew Nicoll
10. Andrew O’Hagan
11. Andrew Sparrow
12. Andy McSmith
13. Angus Macleod
14. Ann Treaneman
15. Ann Widdecombe
16. Bernard Ingham
17. Hugo Young, Guardian
18. Keith Waterhouse, Daily Mail
19. Margaret Stone, Daily Mail
20. Matthew Engel, Guardian
21. Matthew Parris, Times
22. Andy Burnham, Home Office Minister
23. Geraint Bevan, Glasgow
24. Ross Johnson, Newcastle upon Tyne
25. Colin Simpson, Workington, Cumbria
26. Colin Bullen, UK Independence Party, Kent
27. Wendy Forrester, London
28. Dr. Alan Sked, Leader of UK Independence Party
29. John Brooke-Little
30. Dr. Rowson
31. Peter Godwin
32. Michael P. Miller
33. Mr Gordon Fyfe
34. Adrian M.B. Bates
35. Peter Morton
36. Tim Rose
37. Birgit Nakielski
38. Jonathan Clay
39. Francis King
40. Jack Parsons
41. Councillor Grahame Leon-Smith
42. Andrew Puddephatt
43. Dorothy Robbins
44. Marie Staunton, Editor of Solicitors Journal
45. John Spellar, Labour MP
46. Clive Boutle
47. Mary Mcilroy Hipwell
48. Ronald Irving
49. Jenny Dawe
50. John Basing
51. Michael Clarke
52. H. T. Jones
53. Maurice A. J. Davis
54. J Fox
55. Peter Tompkins, Head of UK Immigration Service 1981-91
56. Selwyn Ward
57. David Cross
58. A E G Wright
59. M R Romans
60. Charles Hope
61. Jeremy Stanford
62. Liz Parratt
63. Raymond Angel
64. G. W. Barraclough
65. P. E. White
66. Chris Piening
67. W. R. Oatey
68. Desmond Connelly
69. Hugh Price
70. Kenneth Hemstock
71. G. Kelbie
72. Iain Tuffin
73. David Wragg
74. John Wadham, Director of Liberty
75. D. Judge, Perth
76. Mrs Karen Wood
77. D. Williams
78. Professor Peter King, University of London
79. Dr Andrew H. Dawson
80. Alan McLean
81. Michael Suggett
82. Rob Talbott
83. Bill Potter
84. Dr R. Hanka, Cambridge
85. David De St Croix
86. John Pratt
87. John Thorn
88. Brian Barker
89. Paul Flynn
90. Reg Kemp
91. Iain Mathieson
92. Hilary Jones
93. Anne Palmer
94. Clark Cross
95. Jim Howes
96. Oliver Figg
97. Dr Phil Denton
98. Hugh Goodwin
99. Harry Mount
100. Sir Andrew Green, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 1996-2000; and Chairman of Migrationwatch UK, an independent think-tank
101. David Blunkett
102. Anthony Bevins
103. Anthony Browne
104. Anthony King
105. Arthur Leathley
106. Baldock Herts
107. Barbara Amiel
108. Ben Russell
109. Ben Rooney
110. Ben Taylor
111. Ben Webster
112. Benedict Brogan
113. Bob Roberts
114. Bobbi Johnson
115. Brendan Carlin
116. Brian Roberts
117. Bruce Johnson
118. Carol Sarler
119. Catherine Lyst
120. Celia Hall
121. Celia Walden
122. Charlie Methven
123. Charles Masters
124. Charles Nevin
125. Chris McLaughlin
126. Christia Ackrod
127. Christina Zaba
128. Christopher Bell
129. Christopher Booker
130. Christopher Elliott
131. Christopher Hope
132. Clare Dyer
133. Clifford German
134. Colin Blackstock
135. Colin Brown
136. Colm Kelpie
137. Dan Atkinson
138. Danny Lee
139. Donald Macintyre, Political Editor of The Independent in 1994
140. David Aaronvitch
141. David Barrett
142. David Birch
143. David Charter
144. David Hencke
145. David Humphrey
146. David Hughes
147. David Kemp
148. David Mellor
149. David Millward
150. David Norris
151. David Pannick, QC
152. David Parsley
153. David Paul
154. David Rowan
155. David Wastell, Political Editor of *The Sunday Telegraph* in 1997
156. David Williams
157. David Wooding
158. Dawn Neesom
159. Deborah Orr
160. Dominik Diamond
161. Duncan Campbell
162. Duncan Gardham
163. Eben Black, Political Editor of *News of the World* in 1996
164. Eddie Barnes
165. Eric Doyle
166. Esther Shaw
167. Ferdinand Mount
168. Fergus Shanahan
169. Frances Gibb
170. Francis Elliott
171. Frank Johnson
172. Gabriel Milland
173. Gaby Hinsliff
174. Gary Nicks
175. George Galloway
176. George Jones, Political Editor of *Daily Telegraph* in 1994
177. George Pascoe-Watson
178. Gill Charlton
179. Gloria Hunniford
180. Georgia Cameron-Clarke
181. Gordon Rayner
182. Graham Grant
183. Graeme Wilson
184. Greg Hurst
185. Hamish Macdonell
186. Harry Mount
187. Heather Mills
188. Helen Carter
189. Helen Hague
190. Henry Porter
191. Hugo Gurdon
192. Hugh Muir
193. Iain Burchell
194. Ian Black
195. Ian Burrell
196. Ian Drury
197. Ian Kirby
198. Jack Schofield
199. Jack Slack
200. Jacqueline Laing
201. Jamie Livingstone
202. James Chapman
203. James Hardy, Home Affairs Editor of *Daily Telegraph* in 1996
204. James Landale
205. James Merrick
206. James Slack
207. James Tait
208. Jane Merrick
209. Jane Walker
210. Janet Daley
211. Jason Allardyce
212. Jason Bennetto
213. Jason Lewis
214. Jason Nisse
215. Jemima Lewis
216. Jenny Booth
217. Jenny Hope
218. Jeremy Armstrong
219. Jeremy Laurance
220. Jeremy Warner
221. Jill Sherman
222. Jim Sillars
223. Jo Butler
224. Joan Smith
225. Joanna Coles
226. Joe Bolger
227. Joe Morgan
228. Joe Murphy
229. Johann Hari
230. John Adams
231. John Carvel
232. John Casey, a Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge
233. John Cooper
234. John Deans
235. John Kampfner
236. John Macleod
237. John McJannet
238. John O’Farrell
239. John O’Leary
240. John Redwood
241. John Rentoul
242. John Shepshed
243. John Steele
244. John Sweeney
245. John Twomey
246. John Williams
247. Jon Craig, Political Editor of Daily Express in 1994
248. Jon Hibbs
249. Jonathan Brocklebank
250. Jonathan Cooper
251. Julia Hartley-Brewer
252. Julian Glover
253. Julie Kirkbride
254. Kamal Ahmed
255. Kate Foster
256. Katherine Butler
257. Keith Gladdis
258. Kerry Gill
259. Kevin MaGuire
260. Kieran McDaid
261. Kirsty Buchanan
262. Kirsty Walker
263. Kris Sangani
264. Lawrence Donegan
265. Leo Mckinstry
266. Leonard Doyle
267. Lucy Ward
268. Lynda Lee-Potter
269. Lyndsay Calder
270. Lyndsey Turner
271. Macer Hall
272. Marcus Warren
273. Marie Woolf
274. Mark Ballard
275. Mark Howarth
276. Mark Rowe
277. Martin Bright
278. Martín Delgado
279. Martin Wainwright
280. Martin Wood
281. Mary Ann Sieghart
282. Mary Ellen Synon
283. Mary O'Hara
284. Mary Riddell
285. Matt Bendoris
286. Matthew Bayley
287. Mathew Hickley
288. Matthew Knowles
289. Max Hastings
290. Melanie Phillips
291. Melissa Kite
292. Michael Ayton
293. Michael Clarke
294. Michael Gove
295. Michael Hanlon
296. Michael Kallenbach
297. Michael Kemp
298. Michael Lea
299. Michael McDowell
300. Michael McMahon
301. Michael Meadowcroft
302. Michael White
303. Mihir Bose
304. Minette Marrin
305. Muriel Gray
306. Ned Temko
307. Neil Hamilton
308. Neil Leslie
309. Neil Tweedie
310. Niall Donald
311. Niall Moonan
312. Nic Cecil
313. Nic North
314. Nicholas Timmins
315. Nicholas Watt
316. Nicholas Wood
317. Nick Brownlee
318. Nick Cohen
319. Nigel Hawkes
320. Nigel Morris
321. Nigel Nelson
322. Ohad Gozani
323. Olinka Koster
324. Oliver Pritchett
325. Oliver Wright
326. Oonagh Blackman
327. Owen Bowcott
328. Paul Eastham
329. Paul Gilbride
330. Paul Gilfeather
331. Paul Malley
332. Paul Routledge
333. Pascoe Watson
334. Patrick Collinson
335. Patrick Henessy, Chief Political Correspondent of Daily Express
336. Patrick O'Flynn
337. Patrick Wintour
338. Paul Drury
339. Paul Gilbride
340. Paul Waugh
341. Peter Lilley
342. Peter Macmahon
343. Philip Hensher
344. Philip Johnston
345. Philip Webster
346. Polly Toynbee
347. Quentin Letts
348. Rachel Baird
349. Rachel Sylvester
350. Rebecca Smithers
351. Richard Ford
352. Richard Kay
353. Richard Littlejohn
354. Richard Norton-Taylor
355. Richard Stott
356. Robert Kaye
357. Robert Shrimley
358. Robert Winnett
359. Roddy Ashworth
360. Roger Highfield
361. Roger Scruton
362. Rolland Gribben
363. Ronald Unger
364. Rosa Prince
365. Rosemary Bennett
366. SA Mathieson
367. Sadie Plant
368. Sam Leith
369. Sarah Hall
370. Sarah Harris
371. Sara McConnell
372. Sean Coughlan
373. Shami Chakrabarti
374. Sheridan Hough
375. Simon Carr
376. Simon Davies, a Visiting Fellow of Law at the University of Essex
377. Simon Heffer
378. Simon Jeffery
379. Simon Walters
380. Simon Watkins
381. Sorcha Griffith
382. Sophie Goodchild
383. Stephen Bates
384. Stephen Castle
385. Stephen Glover
386. Stephen Grey
387. Stephen Goodwin
388. Stephen Pollard
389. Stephen Rigley
390. Stephen Robinson
391. Steve Bird
392. Steven Morris
393. Steven Philippsohn
394. Stewart Tendler
395. Stuart Nicolson
396. Stuart Price
397. Susan Watts
398. Tania Bragnian
399. Thea Jourdan
400. Tim Jones
401. Tim King
402. Tim Shipman
403. Tim Webb
404. Toby Helm
405. Toby Moore
406. Tom Baldwin
407. Tom Peterkin
408. Tom Savage
409. Tom Whitehead
410. Tony Leonard
411. Tracey Boles
Types of Item
1. Parliamentary Debate (The reporting of what happened in Parliament, such as the legislation procedure of a bill)
2. Editorials (“Commentary reflecting the institutional voice of the newspaper. Usually carried in a larger font than of the basic body text and without a by-line” [Keeble 2001:96])
3. Hard News (“the reporting of issues or events in the past or about to happen. It is largely based on selected details and quotations in direct or indirect speech. Hard news begins with the most striking details and thereafter information progressively declines in importance. Some background details may be needed to make the news intelligible but description, analysis, comment and the subjective ‘I’ of the reporter are either excluded or included only briefly” [Keeble 2001:95]. In short, it is mainly “conveying the information” [Keeble 2001:95])
4. Soft News (“the news element is still strong and prominent at or near the opening but is treated in a lighter way. Largely based on factual detail and quotations, the writing is more flexible and there is likely to be more description and comment. The tone, established in the intro section, might be witty or ironic. It is more an entertainment genre” [Keeble 2001:95])
5. News Feature (“usually longer than a straight news story. The news angle is prominent though not necessarily in the opening section and quotations are again important. It can contain description, comment, analysis, background historical detail, eye-witnessing reporting and wider or deeper coverage of the issues and range of sources” [Keeble 2001:95])
6. Opinion Piece (“emphasis on the journalist conveying their views and experience, usually in an idiosyncratic, colourful, controversial fashion. Usually known as columnists” [Keeble 2001:96])
7. Readers’ Letters
8. Others

**Size of News** (in words)

**Use of Pictures** (including cartoons, posters and photos) in **News** (Yes/No)
If Yes,

**The Number of Pictures Used**
1. One
2. Two
3. More than two

**The Content of Pictures**
1. Sample British Biometric Identity Card/Driving Licence
2. Foreign Identity Card
3. Photo of Actors
4. Diagram
5. Cartoons
6. Others

**Themes Appearing in the News**
For the purposes of my research, a theme is the subject/topic of a debate. It is distinguished from the broad research topic and from trivial issues in a debate. It ought to be neutral and concise. For example, an opposition party member interviewed by a journalist on the question of whether to adopt British national ID cards insisted that the plan should be dropped due to the extremely high cost, and that the money should be spent in equipping the police force instead. In this item, the theme is cost. Cost is the focus of the argument; it is neutral and concise. The word ‘cost’ might not exist in the news physically, but it can be generated by examining the arguments carefully.

Knowing the definition of a theme is the first step, the next step is to measure it. Because content analysis is quantitative in its nature, themes ought to be measured quantitatively. In my research, a subject/topic can only be counted as a theme when the argument around it makes up at least 1/3 of the total size of that item.

After examining all the news collection for 1994-2008, the following themes were identified:
1. Timetable for introduction of ID cards scheme
2. Scale & cost of ID cards scheme
3. Purposes of ID cards scheme
4. Immigration
5. Public opinion on ID cards scheme
6. Legislation of ID cards scheme
7. The impact of ID cards on human rights and civil liberties
8. Handling of database
9. Biometrics
10. History of ID cards in UK and other countries
11. Design of ID cards
12. Security industry
13. Implementation of ID cards system
14. Others

**Actor Codes**
Any person or organisation or government department spoken of/quoted in one or more sentences, or mentioned clearly in a single item is regarded as an actor.

**Authorities**
1. Home Office
2. Metropolitan Police
3. Community Police
4. Deputy Supt. Mike Shorter, Deputy Head of Scotland Yard’s Fraud Squad
5. The Crown Prosecution Service
6. The Health Education Authority
7. The Department of Social Security
8. Immigration Authority
9. Department of Transport
10. Department of Treasury
11. DVLC
12. The Commons Home Affairs Select Committee
13. Work and Pensions Authority
14. The UK Passport Service; UK Passport Service boss Bernard Herdan
15. Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights
16. Labour-dominated Education Select Committee
17. The House of Lords Constitution Committee
18. Public Accounts Committee
19. National Audit Office
20. The National Crime Intelligence Service
21. Scottish Executive’s Geographic Information Service (SEGIS)
22. Labour-controlled Haringey Council in North London
23. The Data Protection Registrar
24. The Information Commissioner's Office
25. The Police Federation
26. Downing Street Efficiency Unit
27. The Local Councils Association
28. the Office for National Statistics (ONS)
29. A Joint Lords and Commons Committee on Human Rights
30. The Department for Constitutional Affairs
31. David Hawker, of the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority
32. Others

**Labour**

33. Tony Blair
34. Gordon Brown
35. David Blunkett, Home Secretary 2001-04
36. Charles Clark, Home Secretary 2004-06
37. David Clark
38. John Prescott
39. John Reid, Home Secretary 2006-07
40. Andrew Chevis
41. Jack Straw, Home Secretary 1997 – 2001
42. Jacqui Smith, Home Secretary 2007 – present
43. Tessa Jowell
44. Nigel Griffiths
45. Jack McConnell
46. Phil Gallie
47. Lord Rooker
48. Mike O’Brien
49. David Winnick
50. Patricia Hewitt
51. Alistair Darling
52. Richard Thomas
53. Des Browne
54. Alan Simpson, Labour MP for Nottingham South
55. Michael Clapham
56. Jeremy Corbyn
57. Gwyneth Dunwoody
58. Neil Gerard
59. Ian Gibson
60. Kate Hoey
61. Kelvin Hopkins
62. Glenda Jackson
63. Terry Lewis
64. John McDonnell
65. Alice Mahon
67. Clare Short
68. Llew Smith
69. Dennis Skinner
70. David Taylor
71. Robert Wareing
72. Tony McNulty
73. Lord Desai
74. Ruth Kelly
75. Geraldine Smith
76. Andy Burnham, a Home Office Minister
77. Paul Boateng
78. Liam Byrne
79. Lord Falconer, then a Home Office minister
80. Baroness Scotland of Asthal, Home Office Minister, Leader of the Lords
81. Geoff Hoon, Leader of the Commons
82. John Spellar, who fought a campaign against introducing ID cards
83. Frank Field, Labour MP for Birkenhead, and Chairman of the Commons Social Affairs
Select Committee
84. Barbara Roche, MP for Hornsey
85. Jim Wallace, Justice Minister
86. John O'Donoghue
87. Tony Benn, former Labour MP
88. Malcolm Savidge, MP for Aberdeen North
89. Beverley Hughes, Home Office Minister
90. Fiona Mactaggart, Labour MP for Slough
91. Chris Mullin (Lab, Sunderland South), Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee
92. John Hutton, Health Minister
93. Nicola Roche, Director of Entitlement Cards at the Home Office
94. Michael Wills, Data Protection Minister
95. Lord West of Spithead, Security Minister and former First Sea Lord

Conservative
96. David Cameron
97. Michael Howard, Home Secretary in 1994
98. David Davis, Shadow Home Secretary
99. Peter Lilley, Social Security Secretary in 1994
100. John Redwood
101. John Bercow
102. William Hague
103. Angela Browning
104. Bill Cash
105. David Curry
106. Nick Gibb
107. Damien Green
108. Douglas Hogg
109. Edward Leigh
110. Jeremy Hanley, Party Chairman
111. John Gummer, Environment Secretary in 1994
112. Richard Shepherd
113. Andrew Bennett
114. Alan Duncan
115. Lord Steyn
116. Lord Strathclyde, Tory Leader in the Lords
117. Baroness Park of Monmouth
118. Transport Secretary Brian Mawhinney
119. Sir Teddy Taylor, Tory rebel spokesman
120. Nicholas Baker, Immigration Minister in 1994
121. Nicholas Winterton, senior Tory backbencher
122. Lord Wakeham
123. David Wilshire
124. Oliver Letwin, Shadow Home Secretary in 2001
125. Anne Widdecombe
126. Liam Fox
127. Dominic Grieve
128. Grant Shapps

**Liberal Democrat**
130. Nick Clegg
131. Simon Hughes
132. Menzies Campbell
133. A senior Liberal Democrat
134. Lib Dem councillor Jonathan Bloch
135. Lord Lester, the Liberal Democrat constitutional expert
136. Richard Allan, Lib Dem’s spokesperson on IT
137. Norman Baker, Liberal Democrat MP for Lewes
138. Charles Kennedy
139. Lord Phillips of Sudbury, a Liberal Democrat peer

**Spokespersons**
140. A spokesman for the Department of Health
141. A spokesman for the Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association
142. A spokesman for Apacs, the Association for Payment Clearing Services
143. Oliver Letwin, Tory Home Affairs spokesman
144. A Scottish Labour Party spokesman
145. SNP Justice spokesman Roseanna Cunningham
146. Richard Thomas, spokesman of pressure group Liberty
147. A spokesman for the Scottish Police Federation
148. Fiona Hyslop, the SNP’s spokesman on childhood issues
149. A spokesman for the Scottish Conservative Party
150. A spokesman for the First Minister
151. Tony Blair’s official spokesman
152. Patrick Harvie, the Green Party’s Justice spokesman
153. Home Affairs spokesman Mark Oaten
154. Mr Blunkett’s official spokesman
155. Tory spokesman for Health and Children, Tim Loughton
156. Liberal Democrat children’s spokesman Annette Brooke
157. Tory Home Affairs spokesman Edward Garnier
158. A spokesman for Atos Origin
159. Tory spokesman Baroness Anelay of St John’s
160. Liberal Democrat Home Affairs spokesman Lord Phillips
161. Nick Clegg, the Liberal Democrat Home Affairs spokesman
162. Liberal Democrat Home Affairs spokesman Alistair Carmichael
163. Edward Garnier, a Conservative Home Affairs spokesman
164. Roger Baker, spokesman for the Association of Chief Police Officers on entitlement cards
165. A senior Home Office source
166. RAC spokesman Edmund King
167. AA spokesmen Luke Bosdet, Adrian Ruck
168. Labour’s Transport spokesman Frank Dobson
169. Liberal Democrat Home Affairs spokesman Robert Maclean
170. A spokesman for the National and Provincial Building Society
171. A spokesman at Barclays
172. Labour’s Home Affairs spokesman Alun Michael
173. An Abbey National spokesperson
174. Labour's Social Security spokesman in 1994, Donald Dewar
175. Commons Speaker Michael Martin
176. The Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs spokesman, Menzies Campbell
177. Tory Home Affairs spokesman Dominic Grieve
178. A spokesman for the Scottish Executive
179. Lord Navnit Dholakia, the Liberal Democrats' Home Affairs spokesman in the Lords
180. Liberal Democrats’ Home Affairs spokeswoman Lynne Featherstone
181. Fine Gael Justice spokesman Jim O’Keeffe
182. Alistair Carmichael, a Liberal Democrat spokesman
183. The Liberal Democrats' Home Affairs spokesman, Chris Huhne
184. A Garda spokeswoman

**Human Rights and Civil Liberties Organisations**

185. Liberty: Shami Chakrabarti, Mark Littlewood, Barry Hugill, John Wadham, Sue Pratt, Andrew Puddephatt, Roger Bingham
186. Stephen Pollard, senior fellow at Civitas, the Institute for the Study of Civil Society
187. Karen Bartlett, Head of the pressure group Charter 88; Chris Lawrence-Pietroni
188. John Scott, Director of the Scottish Human Rights Centre
189. Defy-ID
190. Phil Booth, of the NO2ID campaign
191. Anne Owers, Director of Justice
192. Simon Davies, of campaign group Privacy International
193. Nick Hardwick, Chief Executive of the Refugee Council
194. Movement For Justice spokesperson Alex Owolade
195. Terri Dowty, from Action for the Rights of Children
196. Barry Steinhardt, of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
197. Rosemary McIlwhan, of the Scottish Human Rights Centre; John Scott, Director of the Scottish Human Rights Centre
198. Mouloud Aounit, Secretary General of the French anti-racism group MRAP
199. Michel Tubiana, President of the human rights federation FIDH
200. Sandy Buchan, boss of the charity Refugee Action
201. Commission for Racial Equality
202. Tony Bunyan, of civil liberties organisation Statewatch
203. Irish Council for Civil Liberties Director Aisling Reidy
204. Derek Scott, Chairman of the I Want A Referendum campaign

**Academic and Experts**

205. Anti-forgery experts
206. Gavin Kenny, biometrics expert
207. Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, Deputy Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism at St. Andrews University
208. London School of Economics: Dr. Gus Hosein, Ian Angell, Patrick Dunleavy, James Backhouse, and Simon Davis
209. Dame Stella Rimington, former head of MI5.
210. Bruce Grant, Head of Scotland Yard’s Fingerprint Bureau
211. Professor John McDermid, a software expert at York University
212. Retired Lecturer Alan Woodward
213. London University historian Catherine Cavanagh
214. David Marsland, Professor of Social Services at the West London Institute
215. Mike Rutherford, associate editor of Car Week
216. Ian Rickwood, Chief Executive of Institute of Data Processing Management
217. Dr Michael Levi, Director of Criminological Studies at the University of Wales and an expert on fraud
218. Ken Cherrett, Chairman of the Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance Scheme
219. Andrew Hawkins, of Harris Research
220. Emma Newham, editor of Biometric Technology Today magazine
221. Security expert Bruce Schneier
222. Dr Matsumoto, a cryptographer from Yokohama University
223. Steven Smith, an expert in biometric technology
224. Adrian Beck, lecturer in security management at the University of Leicester
225. Graham Titterington, a principal analyst for Ovum
226. Dr John Daugman, a lecturer at Cambridge University
227. Paul Wilkinson, a terrorism expert at St Andrews University
228. Roberto Tavano, a biometrics specialist for the US company Unisys
229. Professor Ian Angell, of the LSE's IT department
230. Ross Anderson, a computer scientist at the University of Cambridge
231. Geoff Doggett, project officer for Suffolk Key
232. John Littleton, head of regional e-government partnerships at Newcastle City Council
233. John Tullott, the technology editor of Secure Computing magazine
234. Sir James Crosby, former chief executive of the HBOS banking group

**Firms**

235. The Portman Group
236. Nick Caunter, Managing Director of card security experts Retail Decisions
237. Home Office consultants, Atos Origin
238. ICM polling company
239. Corporate Watch think-tank
240. Qinetiq, military research firm
241. Tom Bentley, director of Demos think-tank
242. Ryanair
243. Andrew Waldman, director of card services at Royal Bank of Scotland
244. The AA
245. The RAC
246. NOP research group
247. Greg Bradford, managing director of CACI
248. Andy Lewcock of AEA Technology
249. Security printing firm De La Rue
250. Easyjet
251. Go
252. Capita, the company behind the new Criminal Records Bureau
253. Bell, high-tech security system group; founder and chief executive Pat Curran
254. Howard Berg, of SchlumbergerSema Cards
255. Rethinking Crime and Punishment, think-tank
256. Bart Vansevenant of Ubizen, the company behind newly introduced digital technology
257. TESCO
258. Rob Gierkink, Chief Executive of the company behind the Nectar loyalty card
259. PA Consulting Group
260. Deloitte, one of the world's biggest financial and IT consultancies
261. John Elliott, of Consult Hyperion
262. Andy Kellett, senior research analyst at Butler Group, the IT analyst company
263. Matt Howell, Vice President, Justice, Security and Defence, and Head of ID management at Cap Gemini, the consultancy group
264. Jerry Fishenden, the national technology officer at Microsoft UK
265. Paul Stephenson from thinktank Open Europe
266. Entrust
267. Ellen Leslie, launch manager of CitizenCard
Organisations

268. National Lottery
269. National Federation of Retail Newsagents
270. British Retail Consortium
271. Bill Moyes, Director General of BRC
272. The Association of Chief Police Officers
273. Fred Broughton, Chairman of Police Federation
274. The Association for Payment Clearing Services
275. Marian Pagani, Chairman of the Glasgow Children’s panel
276. Law Society Chief Executive Janet Paraskeva
277. Unison
278. Transport and General Workers Union; Bill Morris, leader of the TGWU
279. Youth Offending Teams
280. The Refugee Council
281. The Institution of Electrical Engineers
282. James Ferman, Director of the British Board of Film Classification
283. Conservative Way Forward
284. The Institute for Public Policy Research, Sarah Spencer
285. Keith Wylie, National Officer of the National Union of Civil and Public Servants
286. Richard Poynder, Chairman of the Smart Card Club
287. Paul O'Grady, boss of the Vintners Federation
288. The Computing Services and Software Association, Tim Conway, the Association's Director of Industry Affairs
289. Mary Reid, member of Liberal Democrats Online
290. Michael Wilks, Chairman of the British Medical Association's Medical Ethics Committee; Vivienne Nathanson, the Association's Head of Science and Ethics; Edwin Borman, Chairman of BMA
291. Keith Best, Chief Executive of the Immigration Advisory Service
292. David Hart, General-Secretary of the National Association of Head Teachers
293. Apacs, banking association
294. Bar Council Chairman Matthias Kelly QC
295. Don Steele, Director of the Association of Retired and Persons over 50
296. Lord Selborne, Chairman of the Royal Society's Science Committee
297. Peter Williamson, President of the Law Society of England and Wales
298. Nick Kalisperas, a director of Intellect, the trade association for the IT industry
299. John Turner, Chairman of the Association of Electoral Administrators
300. The Union of Students in Ireland
301. Gemma Tumelty, President of the National Union of Students
302. John Tincey of the Immigration Service Union

**Militant Guerrillas**
303. Osama Bin Laden
304. Sheik Abu Hamza, head of the militant Supporters of Shariah
305. Muslim Extremists
306. Al Qaeda

**Minorities Groups**
307. Tara Mukherjee, President of the Confederation of Indian Organisations for the United Kingdom
308. Muslim Council; Mahmud Al-Rashid, the Council's Legal Affairs Spokesman
309. Faith Community Consultation (FCC) consortium

**Foreign Authorities and Officers**
310. Nicolas Sarkozy, then French Interior Minister
311. Irish Justice Minister John O'Donoghue
312. George Radwanski, Canada's Privacy Commissioner
313. Italian MEP Marco Cappato
314. A committee of the Canadian parliament
315. Giuseppe Mistretta, the first counsellor of the Italian embassy
316. Irish Justice Minister Michael McDowell
317. Aileen O'Donoghue, Director of Financial Services Ireland
318. Michael Ring, Dail deputy & Irish politician
319. Enda Kenny, Irish politician

**Ordinary Actors**
320. Bill Tidy
321. John Hitchon
322. Alistair Rae
323. Louise Dann
324. Martin Wilmshurst
Gender of Actor
Male
Female
‘Not relevant – unclear’

How the Actor Appears
Mentioned only
Directly quoted (For example, Aneurin Bevan said: “I read…. ”)
Partially quoted (For example, Geoff Hoon today denied British troops were using “lousy equipment” after…..)
Reported speech/paraphrased (For example, Aneurin Bevan said he read…..)

Length of Quotation
Direct and partial quotations are counted in number of words.
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