Globalization, regionalization and cross-border regions: scales, discourses and governance

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1 Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions: Scales, Discourses and Governance

Markus Perkmann and Ngai-Ling Sum

The concept of the ‘cross-border region’ (hereafter CBR) has gained increasing prominence in policy and academic discourses. A CBR is a territorial unit that comprises contiguous sub-national units from two or more nation states. Since borders were hermetic barriers only on rare occasions in the history of national territorial states, the existence of integrated cross-border spaces is no novelty as such. What is new in recent developments is that the construction of cross-border regions has become a more or less explicit strategic objective pursued by various social forces within and beyond border regions. This shift has generated new policy and theoretical concerns for supranational organizations, think tanks, research institutes and scholars. Since the late 1980s, new research institutes, new journals (e.g., *Journal of Borderland Studies*), special issues of journals (e.g., *Regional Studies*, October 1999), supranational programmes (e.g., ‘Interreg’ in Europe and the ‘Greater Mekong Subregion’ of the Asian Development Bank), and think tank reports (e.g., East Asian Analytical Unit on ‘Growth Triangles of South East Asia’) have all emerged to map new policy and research agendas in the fields of border and/or cross-border studies. In addition, the new role of CBRs as actually existing phenomena and objects of strategic intervention has attracted the attention of academic scholars from such varied disciplines as geography, economic sociology, international relations, (international) political economy, political science, public administration, and regional and urban studies.

Indeed, CBRs are relevant to all these disciplines (and others too) both as a topic of investigation and as a new field in which to experiment with new theoretical concepts.

1.1 Cross-Border Regions: Global Contexts and Regional-Local Linkages

The proliferation of CBRs and related discourses is connected to a series of macro-tendencies that have affected the status of national borders in recent years: a) the growth of economic transborder activities through increased movement of goods, services and people – activities that are contributing to, and are in turn reinforced by, the many and varied processes that are producing globalization; b) the transfer of specific state powers upwards, downwards, and
sideways from the national state form that came to provide the principal matrix for the
territorialization of political power around the world after 1945 -- with regional integration above
the level of the national state becoming especially important from the end of 1980s; and c) the end
of the Cold War and the resulting tendential integration of the formerly socialist (planned)
economies into global capitalism. Combined in different ways and to different extents, the above
changes have modified opportunity structures for CBR development in three main ways. First, the
increasing permeability of borders has opened up the space for a variety of transactions that may
produce more or less durable transnational configurations. Such transactions range from the
building of interfirm networks through forms of public coordination and co-operation to more
'social' or 'sociable' interactions. Where these interactions are favoured by spatial proximity, they
can result in the emergence of ‘functional’ regions that span nation state borders. Functional
regions can be characterised as units characterised by a high density of internal interactions
compared to the level of interactions beyond their borders. More recently, the concepts of ‘natural
economic spaces’ and ’natural economic territories’ (Scalapino 1991-92) have been used to argue
for the existence of intermediate units of ‘natural’ economic development cutting through state
borders (Ohmae 1995).

Second, the movement of state capacities previously exercised at national level towards
supranational and subnational authorities has relativized the erstwhile position of nation states as
the primary ‘power containers’ for public governance (on states as power containers, see Taylor
1994; on the relativization of scale, see Collinge 1996). This is particularly pronounced in the case
of the European Union with other macro-regional blocs being more circumspect in this regard
(e.g., the open regionalism favoured by APEC) or more strongly dominated by the power interests
of one state (e.g., the dominance of the USA in NAFTA). Thus, as noted by scholars of the ‘New
Regionalism’, the building of the EU has contributed to a blurring of the modern distinction
between what is ‘international’ and ‘internal’ politics (Hettne 1994; Joenniemi 1997) European
integration thus provides a series of opportunity structures for subnational authorities to participate
in international activities. These include: (a) the recruitment of sub-national authorities as policy
implementation partners on the part of the supranational authorities (Balme 1996), (b) an
increasing role of subnational authorities in the formulation and implementation of ‘their’ nation
state’s foreign policies (‘catalytic diplomacy’, cf. Hocking 1996), (c) a growing density of direct international contact among subnational authorities, bypassing superior levels of government (‘paradiplomacy’, cf. Duchacek et al 1988).

Third, the end of the Second Cold War has encouraged new efforts at economic transformation at the borders of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains as well as more general efforts to re-integrate the post-socialist economies into the capitalist world market. Cross-border co-operation is a promising strategy to exploit opportunities in border territories relatively untouched in recent years by capitalism. In most cases, the initiative was taken by local and regional authorities in the attempt either to create links with global arenas or to mobilise additional resources offered by supranational and international bodies in exchange for co-operating with their counterparts located in contiguous areas (see Jessop 1995 and Chapter 2 in this volume). For local actors, such initiatives provide the opportunity to strengthen their position vis-à-vis their respective central state authorities. This is particularly true where they can recruit resources from third parties, such as supranational authorities or international organisations. A wide range of CBRs and other initiatives to promote cross-border cooperation have emerged as a response to these changes. Given the extraordinary variety of so-called CBRs, any typology will always be imperfect. On the one hand, there are the ‘Euroregions’ and other forms of institutionalised cross-border cooperation in Europe, usually constituted through co-operation among border municipalities, districts or regions. These units typically comprise between one and two million inhabitants and cover areas located within a distance of 50km from both sides of the borders. On the other, there are the ‘Growth Triangles’ in East Asia; they cover considerable parts of their respective territorial states and may even include entire countries. Ignoring these wide empirical variations for the moment, we can note some basic variables that may bring some order to our analysis of this phenomenon. First, CBRs can be differentiated on the basis of their respective ‘border regimes’. In the ‘open border’ scenario, for example, the rationale for cross-border cooperation is provided by continuing erosion of border barriers and steady convergence of political and economic conditions in the regions involved. This scenario can be illustrated from the situation on the borders between adjoining EU member states. In contrast, a ‘persisting’ border scenario prevails where borders are only selectively opened to allow for specific transactions while the friction of these same borders is maintained or even
increased for other transactions. In these situations, the rationale for cross-border cooperation will be based on the persistence of the differences between the nation state territories concerned, as for instance with respect to complementary locational advantages. Examples can be seen from 'Greater China', Singapore-Johor-Riau (‘Sijori’) and the US-Mexican border where persisting locational differences, such as factor price differentials, are at the root of cross-border cooperation initiatives. Second, CBRs differ regarding the role of central state policy, inter-state agreements and regional initiatives in setting them up and keeping them going. It may appear surprising that, for many CBRs, explicit central state interventions generated the conditions for their emergence. This is particularly pronounced in 'persisting border' scenarios. In the US-Mexican case, for example, a narrow strip of Mexican territory immediately adjacent to the US border was declared a Special Economic Zone by the Mexican government. Similarly, the remarkable dynamics of the ‘Greater China’ CBR was sparked off by the establishment of Special Economic Zones in Southern China with subsequent private-public coordination in the region. In other cases, such as the Maputo Corridor in Southern Africa, central state intervention and inter-state co-ordination were even more important. In all these cases, the interest lies in exploiting persisting factor price differentials and other locational disparities. Conversely, central state intervention played a lesser role in most European cases where the initiatives usually came from local and regional authorities, sometimes even in opposition to central state forces. European CBRs can thus be conceived as part of the broader tendency of European ‘Neo-regionalism’, providing new opportunity structures for regional and local authorities (Balme 1996). Similar but more complex examples can be found in East Asia; the cross-border initiative of ‘Sijori’ between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia was promoted by the government of Singapore and supported by local state of Johor and the regional bloc of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN).

1.2 Current Approaches in the Study of Borders and (Cross-)Border Regions

Contributions to this volume typically adopt inter- and post-disciplinary perspectives in the study of the CBRs. Broadly speaking, all essays investigate the social activities that contribute to institution-building across borders. This focus on newly emerging border-spanning institutional configurations distinguishes the present collection from other work in the area -- especially from ‘border studies’ in political geography and ‘border economics’. In political geography, broadly speaking, borderlands and border areas constitute objects of analysis in their own right. They are studied as territorial and social units with idiosyncratic features. Border areas are perceived as socially constructed spaces, mediating and negotiating the existence of linear demarcations between territorial units (e.g., Paasi 1996). In other words, they are conceived as spatially extended
frontiers, i.e. ‘zones of varying widths, in which people have recognisable configurations of relationships with other people inside that zone, on both sides of the borderline but within the cultural landscape of the borderlands.’ (Donnan and Vislon 1994: 8). Such an understanding has also been adopted in anthropologically inflected studies (Blake 1994; Cole and Wolf 1974; Girot 1994). These often use ethnographic methods to examine how borders are involved in shaping the self-understanding of social groups. It is suggested that borders are never as clear-cut as the metaphor of the linear boundary suggests but are shaped and negotiated through various social practices and discourses, often under the leadership of borderland elites. Authors in this tradition tend to emphasise the stability of cross-border social relationships in contrast to changing political border demarcations (Bufon 1993). A similar approach has been developed by social psychologists interested in the subjective aspects of cross-border linkages (see Houtum 2000: 10-13). In contrast to these culturally inflected studies of border zones, ‘border economics’ has traditionally been concerned with the effects of borders or frontiers on economic transactions. This approach is particularly associated with the tradition of neoclassical economics. Borders are conceptualised as barriers to friction-free flows, raising the marginal costs of cross-border transactions. Lösch, one of the founding figures of regional economics, analytically equated the effect of borders to widening the geographical distance between locations (Lösch 1954). This affects where economic activities are located, often leading to the economic peripheralisation of border areas within their respective national systems of production (Nijkamp 1993). At the same time, cross-border differences in factor prices or other conditions can produce negative or positive rents that make the border location attractive for certain types of economic activity (Ratti 1995). In many cases, economic agents on one side of the border are able to appropriate the major part of these rents, inducing ‘asymmetrical relations’ such as commuter labour flows (Maillat 1990). As global and regional border regimes have changed, interest in the economics of borders has come to focus on what happens to border areas when borders become more open. When barrier or filter effects disappear, as they did during the completion of the European Common Market, cross-border flows induced by the exploitation of differences between territories tend to become less relevant for economic activities in the border area. As Ratti (1992) points out, open borders become ‘spaces of contact’ rather than ‘lines’ or ‘barriers’. Due to the institutional embeddedness of the economy, however, the rapid adaptation of economic activities predicted by neo-classical location models has failed to
materialize. An open border is no guarantee that local or supralocal cross-border relationships will develop among economic actors. This is illustrated very convincingly by Krätke in Chapter 6 in this volume. Another example is provided by Houtum’s empirical study on the relatively ‘open’ Belgian-Dutch border shows that ‘mental’ borders prevent entrepreneurs from considering cross-border inter-firm contacts with the same likelihood as domestic contacts (Houtum 1997). The contributions in this volume have different concerns from the above-mentioned currents of research. For they focus on the emergence of 'new institutional spaces' across borders resulting from the interplay between structural change and social agency. Empirically these contributions study strategies and initiatives aimed at creating novel patterns of social interaction that cut across national borders on a subnational scale. This involves the building of new institutions, produces novel ways to govern cross-border interaction, and has repercussions that often go beyond the subnational level. Economic and policy discourses and strategies play a crucial role in inducing these changes. The European attempt to promote cross-border co-operation with large-scale programmes is only one example of how ‘institution-building’ can became an explicit objective of public policy aimed at removing the barriers posed by borders to successful EU integration. Policy-oriented research stimulated by this approach focuses on how best to nurture an ‘institutional space’ favourable to that would promote successful cooperation across borders (Maillat 1990). Such policy-oriented research is also illustrated by the first and second editions of the Asian Development Bank reports on *Growth Triangles in Asia* (Thant 1994; 1998). Although action-oriented recommendations are not absent, the contributions in this volume do not have an explicit policy focus. Instead they treat cross-border co-operation as the result of social processes that include (but are not exhausted by) economic and policy discourses and measures. Policy-oriented work often tends to assume that cross-border cooperation is intrinsically worthwhile and desirable. While not contesting this in principle, our contributors are also interested in the struggles and power shifts involved in building cross-border spaces.

1.3 Towards Post-Disciplinary Interpretations: Scales, Discourses and Governance

In addressing the emergence of ‘new institutional spaces’ across borders, the following chapters can be seen to deepen and complexify the analysis of CBRs by offering a range of perspectives, often combining several in one contribution. In this sense, the contributors are trying individually and
collectively to transcend disciplinary boundaries in order the better to understand CBRs. Among the approaches adopted are discourse analysis, evolutionary and institutional economics (including the regulation approach), the emerging interest in different forms of governance, work on identity formation, the new regional geography, and international political economy as well as more conventional academic disciplines (such as economics, sociology, and political science). Indeed most of the contributors can be seen to reject the legitimacy of disciplinary boundaries and the resulting intellectual specialization. When taken together, these approaches, combined in different ways in different chapters, should contribute to a post-disciplinary perspective on CBRs (on post-disciplinarity, see Jessop and Sum 2001). More specifically, these chapters contribute, in different ways and in different degrees, to our understanding of three dimensions of cross-borderization (see table 1). These include:

- scales, rescaling and scalar articulation
- mobilizing discourses and identities
- building governance institutions

Table 1.1 Dimensions of Cross-border Regions examined in this Volume

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Authors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scales, rescaling and scalar articulation</td>
<td>Jessop (2), Sum (3), Krätke (6), Sum (7), Arase (8), Scott (9), Sparke (10), Lundin/Söderbaum (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilizing discourses and identities</td>
<td>Jessop (2), Sum (7), Sparke (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building governance institutions</td>
<td>Leresche/Saez (4), Perkmann (5), Sum (7), Scott (9)</td>
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(Source: Authors’ compilation)

1.3.1 Scales, Rescaling and Scalar Articulation For many observers, the post-Cold War era was characterised by a complex dynamic of ‘re-scaling’, leading to a spatial reconfiguration of social processes and governance institutions (Brenner 1997: 8; Jessop 1998). Neologisms such as ‘glocalisation’ were coined to characterise these tendencies that ‘change the importance and role of certain geographical scales, reassert the importance of others, and sometimes create entirely new significant scales’ (Sywngedouw 1997: 142). The main question is how do CBRs relate to these wider tendencies of re-scaling? Most contributions in this volume explicitly or implicitly address this question by examining of the modification and re-articulation of various scales, including the
sub-national and supra-national as well as the national. This means taking nation-states and
national societies as one of several scales on which changes are occurring and examining their
articulation with other scales, including those on which cross-border activities and institutions are
developing. In other words, most contributions to this book support the emerging paradigm shift
that recognizes the multiplicity of scales on which social interaction takes place and the complexity
of the interrelations among these scales. This argument is developed most explicitly and fully in
Jessop's Chapter 2 on the political economy of scale. His chapter discusses the general re-scaling
of economic, political, and social processes in order to clarify what is at stake in studying
contemporary CBRs. He
notes the primacy of the national scale in the postwar world with its relative structured coherence
among the national economy, the national state, and national society. This primacy has since been
disturbed through a 'relativization of scale' prompted by a wide range of economic, political, and
social changes that have undermined the taken-for-grantedness of the national economy, the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the sovereign national state, and the relative homogeneity of the
national society. These changes are reflected in a proliferation of scales on which attempts are now
being made to restructure economic, political, and social relations. Jessop then notes the wide
range of contemporary re-scaling strategies and locates CBRs within this framework. He
distinguishes nine different processes and/or strategies that lead to the emergence and
consolidation of CBRs. Finally, his chapter comments on the significance of CBR within the
broader context of state restructuring.

In order to provide a more differentiated picture of these processes as they are presented in the
other chapters in this volume, we would like to clarify an ambiguity in the concept of scales and
re-scaling. The existing literature on these topics tends to use the concept of ‘scales’ in at least
two different ways:

(a) scale sometimes refers to the spatial scope, reach, or extent of specific processes and/or
horizons of action. Much of the discussion of globalization adopts this interpretation of scale,
seeing globalization in broad terms as the product of the stretching of social relations in space
(typically facilitated by new communication, command, control, and information technologies) and
as involving the increasing adoption of the global as the ultimate horizon of action (see Giddens
1986; Castells 1996). This re-scaling can involve a wide range of different actors and social forces
as well as many different systems (economic, legal, political, scientific, health, sporting, etc.) and
socio-cultural spheres.

(b) Scale can also refer to specific bounded or delimited spaces, such as the local, the
regional or the national. Such spaces exist as socially constructed but nevertheless real social
entities that are organised according to a specific social relation: territoriality. It is primarily
governments that constitute these scales as objects of governance and then
target them with specific policies. But other mechanisms and agencies can also be involved in constituting such territorially delimited spaces, as, indeed, we will see for the case of CBRs, in which private and public partnerships often have a key role. This distinction implies that there is a difference between, on the one hand, the ‘re-scaling’ of certain processes (such as regional or urban economic flows, or transnational commodity chains) or the 're-scaling' of horizons of action, and, on the other hand, the ‘re-scaling’ of territorial units (such as the formation of ‘new’ regions). One way to distinguish the two meanings of scale is to refer to the first as re-scaling and the second as de- and re-territorialization or de- and re-bordering. Both types of transformation are relevant to the development and dynamics of CBRs and, indeed, they may well be closely related. In some cases, the re-scaling of processes and horizons of action will induce changes in border regimes between national states and thereby re-direct social activities. This could eventually result in the consolidation of new CBRs and, indeed, prompt other social forces to press for a corresponding or compensatory re-scaling of territorial units and their modes of governance. In other instances, ‘re-scaled’ territorial units may precede the re-scaling of process and the transformation of horizons of action. This seems to be the case with many of the Euroregions that – qua self-proclaimed territorial units – have come into existence as a result of EU financial and institutional support. As Perkmann shows in Chapter 5, the main impetus behind the establishment of many Euroregions stems from EU regional policy rather than from any pre-existing cross-border micro-level networks. The cases discussed in this volume illustrate the varying relationships between processual and territorial re-scaling. In Chapter 6, Krätke explores the relationship between processual rescaling and territorial rescaling in the case of the Eastern EU border. The Eastern Enlargement strategy pursued by the EU led to a selective opening of the external EU borders vis-à-vis the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). This involved the emergence of new patterns in the spatial division of labour exploiting factor cost differentials between the EU and CEEC, resulting in the spatial re-scaling of value chains across the continent. As Krätke shows, this processual rescaling involves both opportunities and threats for immediate border areas, and the emergence of cross-border cooperation activities can be interpreted as – not always successful – attempts to ‘capture’ some of the positive effects of these changes. The interdependence between different processes of re-scaling is also demonstrated by Scott in Chapter 9 on the US-Mexican border. In this case, too, the transformation of border regimes as a result of
national and supranational initiatives

– the Maqualidora policy and, later, NAFTA – led to a re-scaling of economic activity across the North American continent. Local co-operation initiatives, such as that between Arizona and Sonora, emerged mainly as compensatory projects to deal with the complex interdependencies generated by those supra-local processes. In most cases, local and regional cross-border cooperation projects are articulated with the national and supranational scale, such as in relation to immigration, customs, agriculture and crime control. Sum's chapter 3 examines the remaking of spatiality by deploying the ideas of ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’ in relation to the East Asian case for the years between the 1980s and the 1997 Asian Crisis. In this sense, her work is primarily addressed to the second meaning of scale, although she also discusses the re-scaling of processes and horizons of action. She argues that ‘re-territorialization’ has facilitated a convergence between globalization and regionalization, thereby encouraging the expansion of ‘growth triangle’ strategies across the region. Her Chapter 7 then examines the case of ‘Greater China’. Here she focuses on the spatial and scalar (re-) articulation among Hong Kong, townships in southern China, and Taiwan. This approach to ‘Greater China’ as a ‘bounded space’ is echoed in Arase's chapter on the Japan Sea Cooperation. In Chapter 8, Arase focuses on those Japanese subnational actors, such as provinces and large port cities, that are attempting to develop and institutionalize crossborder regional linkages in a proactive manner. They are encouraging cross-border cooperation on matters such as investment, trade, infrastructural projects, education and urban planning. In principle, these subnational attempts are not opposed by the central bureaucracies in Tokyo; but, in practice, decentralization is resisted because it threatens a loss of authority in Tokyo. Nonetheless, subnational actors have been quite successful in using existing central government programmes to finance their cross-border activities. These proactive subnational projects in East Asia stand in sharp contrast with the situation identified by Lundin and Söderbaum in Southern Africa. For, in Chapter 11, they examine the Maputo Development Corridor Initiative in South Africa and Mozambique. This Corridor is analyzed as a neo-liberal initiative that is aimed at extending South Africa's spatial reach cross borders for global competitiveness. In this sense it can be seen as a national project initiated nationally and intended to enhance national economic and political interests in a global context even though it is actualized on a more local, crossborder scale. Viewed in these terms, this particular project marks, for the
1.3.2. Mobilizing Discourses and Identities These processes of rescaling and scalar articulation introduce new scalar discourses/imaginaries around which the new projects are constructed and institutions may be consolidated. For example, new areas might be targeted for public policy coordination and economic growth might be organized around new geographical scales. This involves public and/or public supranational, national and/or subnational agencies naming and mapping new types of space and place as sites of economic change and political ambition -- in this case, imagined trans-local, subregional, city-regional, and/or cross-border scales. Among the forces representing these spaces are policy-making bodies, think-tanks or visionaries. Their documents/speeches, often illustrated with visions and maps that locate these spaces at the centre of actual or potential economic networks, emphasise the significance of CBRs. They introduce new scalar objects such as ‘integrated cross-border regions’, ‘growth triangles’, ‘border cities’, and ‘corridor cooperation’ initiatives to legitimate new regulatory projects.

The reconfiguration of group identities in border areas can contribute to generate social support for the projects targeted at the new scalar objects. Such reconfigured identities may be linked with cross-border entrepreneurial networks, cross-border ‘grant coalitions’, or newly activated ethnic communities across borders. A compelling example of such processes is provided by Sparke in Chapter 10. He explores the spatial-discursive (re)invention of Cascadia as a region that joins the Canadian province of British Columbia and the US states of Washington and Oregon. He examines this process of rescaling as an entrepreneurial ‘re-imagining’ of the region that is occurring despite the absence of significant economic complementarities between the two territories. These new imaginaries are built on a messy and diffused repertoire of images and ideas that are deployed to sell the region as suitable for ‘globalized circuits of investment and consumption’. This involves a kind of spatially-oriented neoliberal strategizing that can be understood as organized around a series of entrepreneurial governance initiatives. Sum shares this interest in the geoeconomics of cross-border building in Chapter 7. She adopts a discursive-material approach to understanding the ‘growth triangle’ of ‘Greater China’ and examines cross-border governance discourses that result from the mixing of nationalist and geoeconomic symbols. These discourses and their associated
identities are shown to mediate the promotion by key actors of cross-border networks and networking practices that cut across three dimensions of production and exchange: those of time-space, private-public, and global-regional-national-local.

1.3.3. Building Governance Institutions If we accept that strategies aimed at intensifying cross-border interaction have structural effects, we must consider the changes in institutions and governance that these strategies engender. The active imagination of cross-border spaces as new sites for action and intervention raises the question of how these spaces are to be governed. As the contributions in this volume show, this governance can take different forms. One feature shared by all the CBRs studied here, however, is that they are far from being 'regions' in the conventional juridico-political sense. For they are not formal administrative units subordinate to a national state bureaucracy nor do they normally have mechanisms that allow for binding popular representation. CBRs are therefore not ‘governed’ in a conventional, territorial sense. Many chapters in this volume argue that CBRs are governed through partial and irregular structures that often operate in a network-like manner. Two main levels can be distinguished. On the micro-level, the integration of cross-border spaces depends on the proliferation and/or reactivation of social and/or economic relationships. This is illustrated by Sum’s Chapter 7 on cross-border coordination in ‘Greater China’. In this case, opportunity structures generated by the selective opening of the Chinese border favoured the emergence and reinforcement of cross-border ethnic network structures that govern production; in a later stage in the development of this cross-border region, these networks also extended to consumption. Since this cross-border space is linked to the development of global capitalism, it is also subject to its crisis tendencies. Sum illustrates this through the impact of the ‘Asian Crisis’ upon the region. The US-Mexican border offered a similarly favourable opportunity structure that induced a thriving Maquiladora industry that relies crucially on cross-border relationships in both the economic and social realm. On the meso-level, governance can involve co-operative relationships between public and other bodies that share certain interests, such as coping with environmental interdependencies or creating cross-border economic spaces. These networks often emerge in response to the failures of central state authorities, with local and regional actors exploiting the new opportunity structures created by regionalisation and
globalisation. This is shown by Arase's Chapter 8 on the Japanese coastal cities as well as by Scott's Chapter 9 on the US-Mexican border. By contrast, in Europe, Perkmann in Chapter 5 demonstrated that many of these networks only emerged as a result of considerable incentives provided by the European Commission. CBRs differ in their constitution at the meso- or micro-levels. Perkmann observes that CBRs with a strong meso-level impact are more likely to be instituted and governed in ways that resemble regions or states. Hence these CBRs appear to reproduce the ‘territorial form’ by establishing public or para-public governing bodies and pursuing strategies targeted at a specific territory and its population. 'Euroregions' in the EU illustrate this as they usually see themselves as cases of European integration on a ‘smaller scale’, although the ambition is often in stark contrast to reality. The other extreme occurs where CBRs are effectively constituted by a multiplicity of – usually economic – interactions. They are generated by certain incentive structures and are largely unaccompanied by large-scale collective co-ordination. An example is provided by the 'Greater China' growth triangle (see Sum, this volume). Scott also shows how a convergence of strategic interests have prompted intense business-oriented co-operation on the US-Mexican border as well as locally-based oppositional grassroots activism. However, governmental co-operation is very fragmented and limited in scope. It was only after the NAFTA side accords were signed that attempts were made to launch bi-national initiatives regarding urban development and environmental protection. The question of how border spaces are governed provides a common perspective on different types and shapes of CBRs. Indeed, the recent proliferation of CBRs can even be interpreted as the result of the increasing ‘decentralisation’ of cross-border governance, i.e., its shift from the central state level to the local and regional realm, often in conjunction with processes of supranational integration. The classic approach to managing border areas involved intra-state commissions or other bodies operating on the central state level. They aimed to manage environmental or economic transborder interdependencies at the same time as preserving the sovereignty of the nation states involved (Hansen 1983). In the case of the US-Mexican border, however, as Scott shows in Chapter 9, these central state bodies tend to be insensitive to the concerns of the local populations. The proliferation of co-operation initiatives rooted in local or regional contexts can therefore partly be seen as the answer to the relative failure of central-state led approaches to cross-border management.

This is the interpretation proposed in Chapter 4 by Leresche and Saez. They argue that
decentralised structures of ‘governing co-operation’ have replaced centralist approaches to managing border areas. Particularly in Europe, the emergence of such decentralised arrangements must be interpreted in the context of a broader tendency affecting the relationship between the central, regional and local levels of public agency. Leresche and Saez argue therefore that cross-border cooperation is part of a process leading to the production of a novel local public space, resulting in so-called ‘political border regimes’. This perspective opened up by Leresche and Saez can equally be adopted for the American and Asian cases, where a wide range of private and public actors are exploiting new opportunities provided by growing regional integration and – intentionally or not – are generating decentralised governance mechanisms for border spaces.

1.4 Some Observations in the Study of Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions

The proliferation of CBRs since the 1980s can be regarded as a contingent effect of globalization, regionalization and the end of the Cold War. These macro-tendencies have increased the permeability of borders and have opened up the spaces for cross-border activities. The empirical evidence provided by the chapters in this volume that there are differences between CBRs that can be attributed to the characteristics of the regional blocs to which they belong. The various shapes of different ‘regionalisms’ have created widely diverging opportunity structures for local and regional actors co-operating across the borders within these blocs. Scott (1999) recognized two diverse logics of cross-border regionalism in the European Union and the North America Free Trade Area. In Europe, public and private actors operating in border areas are actively encouraged by a supranational authority (the European Commission) to create durable cross-border co-operation structures with the aim of improving the economic development opportunities of border areas. In other words, cross-border cooperation strategies are informed by the objective of ‘transnational institutionbuilding’. These strategies have succeeded to the degree that CBRs across Europe today engage in common collective action and are now able to shape supranational and even national policies to their advantage (cf. Perkmann in chapter 5). By contrast, in North America, cross-border regionalism emerged as set of compensatory local initiatives to cope with interdependencies that were induced by strategies pursued on the nation state level. Thus, cross-border regionalism in this area is subject to the logic of free-trade oriented supranational
integration. Cross-border spaces are promoted to exploit factor cost differentials to the benefit of the national economies as a whole. In contrast, in Europe the focus is more on the endogenous development of border areas themselves.

**Table 1.2 Regionalisms and Cross-Border Regions**

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<th>Regional bloc</th>
<th>Regional project</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Characteristics of CBRs</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Intergovernmental co-ordination with relatively strong supranational authority</td>
<td>Creation of a homogenous transnational economic space</td>
<td>Building of durable transnational public governance institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>Intergovernmental co-ordination under US-leadership</td>
<td>Economic integration focussing on free trade</td>
<td>Exploitation of factor cost differentials and relative advantages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Loosely-organised networks of national and regional actors under the rubric of 'open regionalism'</td>
<td>Creation of cross-border competitiveness</td>
<td>Building of cross-border division of labour and subregional complementarities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Authors' compilation)

Sum's chapter 3 adds to this discussion by exploring the East Asian case. She argues that the emergence of 'growth triangles' is part of the regional-globalization trajectory in which local, national and regional actors take the initiative to re-territorialize the global flows of production, finance and trade. This occurs in the context of a regional bloc, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which is organized in a loose, network-like manner under the rubric of 'open regionalism'. In the absence of a strong supranational bloc, actors at different levels and in different countries were given the opportunity to expand the 'growth triangle' strategy in three stages. The aim here has been to enhance subregional competitiveness within a broader regional and global context. This involves the continual search to develop a subregional division of labour mediated by public-led or public-private networks. In sum, the considerable differences between regional blocs explain why the nature of CBRs differs so widely across cases discussed below. The border-transcending forces of globalisation operate within opportunity structures set by the respective
regionalist projects in each of the triads. Where regional integration initiatives are related to intergovernmental projects, national governments are still dominant in defining the basic parameters of the border regimes. In this regard, it can be argued that CBRs are not ‘naturally’ emerging entities as theorists of 'natural economic territorities' (NETs) would like to suggest. As argued by Jessop in Chapter 2, these NETs can be seen as 'economic spaces that have been discursively "naturalized" as well as being economically and politically constructed'. They can be seen as emergent, socially constituted entities with a substantial number of them being created by deliberate policies of the national governments. Far from being 'natural' and thus likely to emerge spontaneously, then, they might be better interpreted as ‘territorial anomalies’ generated by state action. Major examples of this can be found in the SEZs (Special Economic Zones) in Southern China, export-processing zones in Northern Mexico and, to a lesser degree, SEZs in Eastern Europe. Differently put, the emergence of CBRs in these cases results from deliberate attempts (including, notably, central governments) to insert ‘development pockets' on favourable terms into the changing global division of labour. It follows that national and, in the case of the EU, supranational strategies play an important role in defining the agenda for emergent CBRs. As many contributions in this volume show, these strategies are often at odds with the interests of the immediate local border communities. For example, Krätke in Chapter 5 alerts us to the fact that economic interaction between Germany and Poland may not benefit the border areas as it is subject to a metropolitan bias that favours central locations over the often economically underdeveloped border areas. This is reinforced by the fact that European cross-border cooperation policies were often targeted at the creation and improvement of land-based transport infrastructures, possibly leading to a reinforced ‘corridor-effect’ at the expense of the immediate border areas. Scott in Chapter 9 notes that, in the case of US-Mexico co-operation, superior government bodies still define the basic parameters of cross-border regionalization, generating negative environmental and social externalities in the immediate border areas. Whereas Sum in Chapter 7 highlights the importance of national government in creating the initial conditions for the development of the 'Greater China' region, she also shows how local governments re-interpret these policies for their own economic benefit. The ensuing central-local tensions indicate the potentially problematic nature of the politics of scale in cross-border co-
operation. The empirical evidence presented in this volume suggests that the precise outcome of this politics of scale is contingent upon a series of circumstances, determined by local factors, regional border regions, and the wider division of labour. Thus the development of CBRs must be related to the broader context of the changing global economic order as well as to specific projects of regional integration and their associated border regimes. The following contributions provide ample material to open up the discussion.

Bibliography


A few examples are the Nijmegen Center for Border Research (NL), the Danish Institute for Border Region Studies (DK), the Institute for Regional Studies of the Californias (US), The Center for Inter-American and Border Studies at the University of Texas, El Paso (US). SEZs are areas which provide privileged conditions for economic activity. The rationale behind the establishment of SEZ is to induce economic development effects in specific areas or – indirectly – for national
economies as a whole without compromising the generally prevailing institutional framework for economic activity. In many cases, SEZs are established to generate or capture cross-border flows of economic activity, for instance in order to take advantage of factor price differentials. This is why many SEZs are located in border areas, particularly if one takes into account the motives to induce income effects in these usually less developed areas and take advantage of proximity effects.  

3 Bufon argues that even in cases such as the pre-1990 border between Italy and Slovenia, micro-social relationships have shown a remarkable resilience throughout the post-war period (Bufon 1993: 239-240).  

4 Common examples for such differences are: differentials in tax levels and labour costs, labour market supply, transport barriers, regulatory differences, price differences due to exchange rate fluctuations.