An examination of the utility of the concept of governance in relation to the sports of swimming, football and cricket

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An examination of the utility of the concept of governance in relation to the sports of swimming, football and cricket

David Hindley

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Abstract

Much has been written in recent years about governance in the areas of political science, public policy, local government, and international relations. However, social scientific usage of the governance concept has been eclectic, diverse and at times contradictory (Jessop, 1998:29) as well as confusing and sometimes misleading. In addition, despite the burgeoning literature on governance, little research effort has to date been devoted to examining the term in relation to the organisation, administration and management of sports organisations. This thesis is concerned with reviewing the range of applications of the concept, and in particular evaluating the utility of governance in understanding aspects of the management and policy process of sport. For the purpose of this study a case study approach is adopted, focusing on three sports: cricket, association football and swimming, and within these the pattern of interrelationships between the government and related agencies, the media and broadcasters, athlete-representative groups and supporter organisations, as well as focusing on issues relating to gender. The study concludes by arguing that governance broadens our conceptual repertoire, introduces greater sensitivity and subtlety into policy analysis, and highlights problems of coordination both in government and across a range of agencies, organisations and policy actors.

Key words: governance, steering, policy networks, stakeholding
Chapter 1

Introduction

This thesis is concerned with the 'governance' of sport, and in particular evaluating the utility of the concept of governance in understanding aspects of the management and policy process of sport. It is therefore not a 'traditional' thesis that begins with researching a particular problem or issue and then examines what theoretical framework is appropriate, but one that is founded on and centred round the concept or concepts of governance.

The governance concept has a broad appeal. In the last decade or so, the concept has gained currency in debates in political science (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001, Newman, 2001, Pierre and Peters, 2000), public policy (Goss, 2001, Rhodes, 1997, Richards and Smith, 2002) and international relations (Clark, 1999, Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). Governance has become the 'defining narrative' of British government (Rhodes, 2000:6) and represents a central tenet of New Labour's Third Way. Part of the reason for the term's rising popularity is its capacity to encompass the breadth of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing. At its simplest, governance refers to ways of governing, involving a range of organisations, many of which are not necessarily classified under the 'government' umbrella. Thus governance is no longer assumed to involve a single, all-powerful government but a shifting combination of local authorities, public departments and agencies, quasi-public bodies, and private and voluntary organisations.

At the same time, the elasticity of the governance concept can cause confusion and make it difficult to define precisely. Rhodes, for example, delineates seven different meanings; Hirst identifies five versions of the concept, while Pierre and Peters suggests its relevance to a range of different theoretical approaches to understanding the changing role of the state in contemporary society (Rhodes, 1997 and 2000b; Hirst, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 2000). Newman (2001) meanwhile, notes that governance has been used as both a descriptive and a normative term – referring to the way in which organisations and institutions are, or should be, governed – as well as seeking to explain a particular set of changes. As Rhodes argues 'governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed' (Rhodes, 1997:46, original emphasis). Thus, at the
heart of the emerging literature on governance is a shift away from old forms of
government based on hierarchies, towards a new, network-based form of
governance. Given the looseness and ambiguity of the term, it is necessary to
examine and evaluate the concept and its various meanings. As Pierre and Peters
(2000:12) contend 'governance as an analytical perspective is still emerging and
there are contending views on what is the most rewarding approach to governance'.

A useful tool?

What we have then is an increasingly used but still ill defined concept that has been
linked to a wide range of theoretical perspectives and policy approaches (Pierre and
of governance is eclectic, diverse and at times contradictory. Furthermore, does the
link between conceptual interest in governance and social change represent anything
new? For example, many practices now subsumed under the umbrella of governance
i.e. public-private partnerships and policy networks have been analysed under other
rubrics. The primary aim of the thesis therefore is to analyse the utility of the term
governance in relation to sport and determine whether the concept, in one or more of
its formulations, has the potential to aid our understanding of the strategic
management and policy-making process within the sport policy area. For the purpose
of this study we propose a three-pronged conception of governance (see chapter two
for a fuller discussion) drawn from the existing governance literature: that is,
governance as steering, governance as networks and good governance. These
applications provide three different meanings of governance – governance as a
strategy, as an analytical tool and as a normative device.

To elaborate, the notion of governance as steering is broadly about strategic
direction. It refers to looking at different ways of giving effect to strategic direction,
recognising that the responsibility of modern government is changing – increasingly
involving ‘steering’ rather than ‘rowing’, to borrow Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992)
terminology – so that the role of government is to facilitate and co-ordinate rather
than direct and control (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001:3-4). The emphasis on
steering suggests dispersal rather than a concentration of power, with governments
involving a greater number of policy actors and interests both inside and outside
government.

The second conception - governance as networks – suggests partnership,
cooperation and collaboration as an alternative to hierarchical authority. The network
approach focuses on relations between organisations, thereby implying that policy emerges as a result of bargaining between organisations rather than as a result of authoritative decision making by a single actor or institution. Its primary use then, is that of an analytical tool to explore the interaction between the organisations involved in the formation of policy.

The third and final understanding of governance is that of good governance, which refers to the ethical standards underpinning the relationships, methods and instruments of relationships between organisations. While there may be no best way of achieving good governance, the term is essentially normative that is founded on a number of common elements. These are accountability, transparency, combating corruption, stakeholder participation and a clear legal framework (Agere, 2000:7-9).

Broken down, the chief questions raised by the three-pronged conception of governance are:

- Can the three uses of the concept of governance be defined and operationalised as analytical tools?
- To what extent can we talk about sport policy as being ‘steered’?
- Is it possible to identify a policy community or network for sport and how does a governance network differ?
- How useful are the interrelated terms of good governance and corporate governance in understanding meso-level governance, and relations between sports governing bodies and primary and secondary stakeholders?

**The governance of sport**

Despite the mushrooming literature on governance, little research effort has to date been devoted to examining the term in relation to the structure, administration and management of sports organisations. The work of Katwala (2000) on *Democratising Global Sport* is a notable exception. He takes as his starting point the failure of the governing bodies of sport – traditionally amateur, non-profit making associations organising competitions primarily for sporting reasons - to adapt to the changing global sports industry. He goes on to propose a series of guidelines for modernising sporting governance, emphasising stakeholder participation, greater transparency, and cooperation between governments, the European Union and the governing bodies of sport. The prescriptive approach forwarded by Katwala also shares some similarities with the work by the European Olympic Committee (EOC) and Federation...
Internationale de l'Automobile (2001) on composing 'the rules of the game' – a statement of good governance principles for governing bodies of sport. Here, governance was again used as a normative concept, proposing how sport should be governed, rather than exploring the changing character of sport and sports organisations. The thesis therefore seeks to address this issue, although this in itself is only part of the rationale. The ways in which sport is governed and, in particular, failures of governance, have brought the issue into critical focus. Such interest has been fostered by misgivings about strategic directions and manifold complications involved in the decision-making process. An example of this is the confusion surrounding the proposals for the redevelopment of Wembley Stadium. In parallel, Theodoraki (1999) has shed light on a number of difficulties evident in the decision-making processes relating to the UK Sports Institute (UKSI). Here, the primary function of the UKSI was unclear thereby skewing the bidding, while decisions processes 'repeatedly failed to consider the unanimous voice of sports organisations like the NGBs of sport' (Theodoraki, 1999:199).

Rising interest in sports governance has also been cultivated by concerns about the management of amateur sport organisations in light of a significant shift from volunteer-run 'kitchen table operations' to organisations with professional managers attempting to function in a highly rational, bureaucratic manner (Inglis, 1997). It has also been stimulated by appeals for greater organisational effectiveness and for more controls on potential abuse of executive power; and by demands for more effective stakeholder representation and far greater accountability of board members (Davies, 1999).

Within governing bodies of sport, the notion of stakeholding has raised a number of pertinent questions concerning how the interests of groups such as athletes, volunteers, and supporters are articulated. Reflecting on the position of sports people in Canadian athletics, Kidd (1988) advocates athletes' rights suggesting that athletes - referred to as 'sweat-suited philanthropists' - should be better paid, and experience greater control over the planning and conduct of their athletic activity. Kidd contends 'elected athletes' representatives should sit on all major decision-making bodies and that athletes should enjoy the substantive and procedural protections of Canadian law in questions of team selection and discipline' (1988:304). The reality however, is less optimistic. A survey by Sport Canada found that elite athletes are poorly organised, with representation on only seventeen of sixty national sports bodies and most of these representatives are not elected but appointed by coaches and
administrators (Kidd, 1988:304). A more recent small-scale study by Clarke (1999) demonstrates that only one-third of international federations currently have athlete representation. Of these, less than one-third is elected. Clarke goes on to argue 'best practice in governance suggests that directors be competence-based, rather than represent specific stakeholder groups, so that directors can look at what is best for their sport overall rather than have a narrow interest or a conflict of interest.'

Closely related to this is the emergence of issue-centred groups that contribute to a debate about the future governance of various sports. An example of this is the campaign led and orchestrated by football supporters – most notably the Independent Manchester United Supporters Association (IMUSA) and its sister organisation Shareholders United, to prevent the proposed takeover of Manchester United by Rupert Murdoch's BSkyB satellite television company. The formation of SU and IMUSA can be located within a wider attempt by supporters to try and influence the running of the game - raising questions of regulation and control - but also of participation and exclusion, of the organisation and exercise of power in football. There are now over forty independent supporters organisations at club and national level and a myriad of other – some short lived – grassroots protest groups, in addition to a burgeoning fanzine movement (Brown, 1998:50).

The above examples illustrate the changing nature of sports organisations, highlighting a number of issues that are salient to how sport is governed. This brings us to outlining the empirical focus of the thesis. A case study approach is proposed to examine the utility of the governance concepts in sport, focusing on three sports primarily in a domestic context: these are association football, cricket and swimming. The criteria on which the choice of these sports was made are outlined in the discussion of methodology (see chapter five). A sport-centred approach - as opposed to focusing on a specific policy issue such as the proposed redevelopment of the Wembley National Stadium - was favoured because it lent itself more adequately to an examination and evaluation of the three major interpretations of governance identified above. In order to avoid the charge that the cases under investigation are simply too broad the empirical section of the thesis maintains a sharp focus, narrowing the parameters of each sport by delineating specific research themes.

These are:

- The influence of government and government-related agencies on the sport policy and operation of the governing bodies of sport (NGBs)
- The significance of the media and broadcasters in affecting NGB policy
• Issues of gender relating to how NGBs are structured and how they manage their sport
• The ways in which athletes, coaches and managers are represented in the decision-making processes of NGBs
• The ways in which supporters are represented in the decision-making processes of NGBs

These themes were selected in light of emerging issues of sports governance to help frame the case studies and make the research more manageable, as well as supplementing the key questions previously outlined, and because they direct the focus of research to a cross-section of key aspects of work/activity in contemporary NGBs and to significant issues in sport policy.

The structure of the thesis

Chapter two, Theorising Governance flags up the range of applications of the term governance, presenting a review of the emerging governance literature and how the term may best be understood. It concludes that the value of governance is that it is a term, which tries to take account of the blurring between government and civil society and focuses on the individual or group that is affected by decisions of organisations/markets whether government-centred or market/civil society focused. Thus, its utility is in generating a variety of concepts, which facilitate the studying of the changing character of sport and sports organisations whose actions are increasingly the product of the interplay of government and civil society.

The third chapter, The Policy Process of Sport, along with chapter two provides the theoretical backbone to the thesis. Here the international and global dimension to the governance of sport is explored, recognising the complex and multifaceted character of sports governance within a domestic and an international arena. As Allison (1998:29) has commented ‘the system of contemporary world governance in sport is that of complex interdependence, between international and national governing bodies, European law and the courts, the media, commerce and business, supporters and so on’. Following on from the stakeholders identified by Allison, it is argued that the environment for governance of sport is characterised by a plurality of actors and interests. This raises the question whether it is possible to delineate a policy community for sport? In order to answer this, a range of policy models for the ways in which sports policy is formulated is evaluated.
Chapter four, *The Evolution of Government Policy on Sport* discusses the network or sectoral level of governance that refers to the relations between government, the state and the cluster of interests that may be affected by government action or inaction. The initial focus of the chapter identifies the key sectors and actors who shape the ways in which sport is organised, administered and managed. This is crucial to our understanding of how sport is governed at the local, national and international level. It is argued that the sports industry is a complex and at times overlapping mixture of the public, commercial and voluntary sectors. As Houlihan (1997:147) has argued ‘as the social, economic and political importance of sport has increased over the past forty years or so, the triangular relationship between government, the governing bodies (or voluntary sector) and the commercial sector has become more intense and more significant in shaping the development of sport’. This section identifies the primary reasons for government intervention in sport, charts the key periods for government policy on sport, and examines the means of government intervention.

Chapter five, *Research methodology and techniques of analysis* navigates the barriers of the research environment, and provides a rationale for the selected approach to the empirical research. It is contended that a case study approach is appropriate, the value of which is the potential to deal with the subtleties and intricacies of complex social situations, producing ‘thick’ conceptual descriptions (Macpherson et al. 2000). The possible limitations of the sample size are also discussed, suggesting that the aim of the research should be threefold. Firstly, to strive for internal validity, so that the findings map as closely as possible the phenomena in question. Second, to make consistent conclusions that can be generalised to other settings similar to the one in which the study occurred, and finally, to produce findings that can be replicated or reproduced by another inquiry. The discussion of methodology is followed by the empirical section of the thesis, which comprises case studies on the ‘governance’ of the sports of association football, cricket and swimming in England. Each of the case studies is preceded by a review of the key issues in the governance of the sport to provide a context for the empirical research, before going on to examine the case study sports along five research themes: the government, the media, gender issues, athlete representation, and supporter representation.

The concluding chapter begins by summarising the key findings of the empirical research, highlighting the differences and similarities between the three sports. It
goes on to evaluate the usefulness of the three applications of the governance concept.
Chapter 2
Theorising Governance

Governance has become an increasingly popular, if ambiguous, term since the 1980s. This reflects a number of changes that have taken place both within and outside of government. These include the development of new forms of public management (Hood, 1990) in which government is increasingly confined to ‘steering’; the blurring of the distinction between government and markets through the rise of public-private partnerships (Pierre, 1998); the recognition of the significance to policy formulation of policy networks (Rhodes, 1997); and the emergence of multi-level governance. Furthermore, in the last two decades there has been a growing interest in organisational governance that spans the private, public and voluntary sectors. This has in part been stimulated by changes in government policy, such as the contracting out of public services, the local management of schools and the formation of NHS trusts. Thus, the term governance has become widely used in debates in political science, public policy and international relations, but often to mean very different things. A prime reason for the concept’s popularity therefore is its elasticity to cover a broad range of institutions and relationships associated with the process of governing. As Jessop contends, ‘social scientific usage’s [of governance] are often pre-theoretical and eclectic; and lay usage’s are just as diverse and contrary’ (1998:29). The use of the term governance in place of government implies that in contemporary developed economies governing decisions are no longer the sole preserve of governments. Rather, effective decision-making will need to take into account other stakeholders from the private and/or voluntary sectors. As Kooiman contends, governance can be seen to include ‘all those activities of social, political and administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to guide, steer, control or manage sectors or facets of societies’ (1993:2).

Clearly, governance as a relatively recent conceptual language is still maturing and there are competing views on what is the most rewarding approach to governance. Table 1 provides a summary of the variety of definitions of governance identified by a number of political scientists working in this field.

It is therefore appropriate to present a review of the different uses of governance and how it may best be understood. In doing so I will also highlight a number of related and salient concepts – civil society, citizenship and stakeholding – that contribute to and enrich debates about governance. I will conclude by suggesting that the value of
Table 1 Definitions of governance

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<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Meaning of governance</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kooiman (1993)</td>
<td>Kooiman (1993:2) adopts a broad definition of the term, contending that governance can be seen to include 'all those activities of social, political and administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to guide, steer, control or manage sectors or facets of societies'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre and Peters (2000)</td>
<td>Pierre (2000) and Pierre and Peters (2000) identify two different approaches to governance. The first, described as 'old' or 'traditional' governance, refers to a state-centric approach concerned with 'identifying the capacity of the centre of government to exert control over the rest of government and over the economy and society'. In contrast, 'new' or 'modern' governance questions 'how the centre of government interacts with society to reach mutually acceptable decisions, or whether society actually does more self-steering rather than depending upon guidance from government, especially from central government' (Peters, 2000:36).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heywood (2002)</td>
<td>According to Heywood (2002:6) governance is a broader term than government. He states that while 'it still has no settled or agreed definition, it refers in its widest sense, to the various ways through which social life is coordinated ... the term reflects a blurring of the state/society distinction, resulting from changes such as the development of new forms of policy management, the growth of public-private partnerships, the increasing importance of policy networks, and the greater impact of both supranational and sub-national organisations'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richards and Smith (2002)</td>
<td>Richards and Smith (2002) attempt to provide an accessible explanation of the governance concept by encapsulating the key themes outlined in the governance literature. They define governance as 'a descriptive label that is used to highlight the changing nature of the policy process in recent decades. In particular, it sensitises us to the ever-increasing variety of terrains and actors involved in the making of public policy'. They conclude 'governance demands that we consider all the actors and locations beyond the 'core executive' involved in the policy-making process' (2000:15).</td>
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(Adapted from Richards and Smith, 2002)
governance is that it is a concept that crosses the boundary between government, civil society and organisations in civil society. It attempts to take account of the blurring between government and civil society, and shifts the focus on the individual or group and hence its utility in examining the changing character of sport and sports organisations whose actions are increasingly the product of the interplay of government and civil society.

Pierre and Peters (2000) suggest a useful starting point for thinking about governance is structurally, identifying four structural arrangements. The first of these assumes that governance is characterised as hierarchical relations between institutions and actors. According to Mitchell (1993) hierarchy is a structural mechanism for bringing about co-ordination, of producing desired end results, in short it is a way of ‘getting things done’. This model is associated with the traditional notion of ‘top-down’ authority vested in the state. Put another way, government is characterised by parliamentary sovereignty and understood to be the only possible source of governance. While governance through hierarchies still plays a significant role in public and private organisations, the authoritarian perspective fails to capture the complex reality, where there is not one but many centres of power and diverse links between government agencies at local, national and supranational levels (Stoker, 1998). For example, while one of the fundamental principles behind the authoritarian model has been the concept of a unitary state, the policy initiatives of recent years have led to a growing fragmentation in its structure. Thus, both central and local government is believed to have lost functions to other agencies, quangos (quasi autonomous non-governmental organisation) and to the European Union. The ‘hollowing-out’ thesis developed by Rhodes (1994, 1997) suggests that the authority of the state is being eroded or eaten away.

The second model delineates the market as a mechanism of governance. Here, the market is seen as distinct from government and empowers citizens to make decisions about the services that the state provides. Thus, it is assumed that markets can be constructed to cover almost all areas that are currently the responsibility of the state. The obvious weakness of this self-organising framework is that governments demarcate the basic parameters within which markets operate. In other words, markets cannot function without the rule of law and clear statements of property rights. In addition, neither the market nor the hierarchy models outlined so far take account of the ways in which organisations relate to and negotiate with each other or the process of internal bargaining that takes place.
An alternative model to both markets and hierarchies is networks (Kooiman, 1993). In contrast to the previous uses, governance as networks suggests that networks are self-organising and have a significant degree of autonomy from the state. In simple terms, networks imply that governance is a 'broader term than government with services provided by any permutation of government and the private and voluntary sectors' (Rhodes, 1997:51). As Pierre and Peters have argued, 'governments have increased their use of partnerships and a variety of other relationships with the private sector for the delivery of public services, so that the sense of top-down authority exercised through state actors has been diminished or lost' (2000:45). This has prompted questions regarding the state's capacity to steer effectively, especially in an environment characterised by international interdependencies and multiplying internal networks. The elasticity of the network concept however, has prompted criticism questioning whether the approach is just an interesting descriptive device with little analytical content. Furthermore, there is a danger that using the network model may obscure rather than clarify relations of power in the state system. Using the approach makes it difficult to identify those who have influence, because it assumes that power is spread more widely through a 'differentiated polity' (Rhodes, 1997). But it is not clear how differentiated it really is. There are for example, tight controls over those who are admitted to the networks. They may also be hierarchical, with access restricted to certain levels.

A fourth structural form of governance raises the question of whether government is at all necessary, suggesting that in its place communities have the capacity to resolve their problems with a minimum of state involvement. Here, the state is perceived to be too big and too bureaucratic to deal with local issues. The communitarian solution to this problem is to organise governance without government (Pierre and Peters, 2000:21). This assumes that most socio-economic problems can be solved at lower levels of aggregation than that at which they are currently addressed (see Etzioni, 1993). The communitarian view on governance is as an attractive alternative to the state and the market, purportedly resolving common problems and cultivating a civic spirit in the community without breeding large public bureaucracies. However, a number of problems arise when this set of ideas is taken as an approach to governance. A fundamental shortcoming is that the approach makes questionable assumptions that the average citizen wishes to participate in government and to invest a considerable amount of time in governing. Communitarian theory also assumes that significant problems can be solved at relatively low levels of aggregation. In practice, these problems may not be solvable...
in small units, but are global or international in character and uncontrollable through resources available in the local community.

**Governance as steering**

What the above approaches emphasise is that governance is concerned with structure. An alternative way of thinking about governance is not so much about the arrangement of institutions but more about the interactions within and between them. This implies that governance is a dynamic process, and can be used to understand how actors and institutions produce desired outcomes. The notion of governance as 'steering' is crucial here. According to Jessop, the 'complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions and systems which are both operationally autonomous from one another and structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal interdependence' (1997:95). Thus, steering acknowledges that government cannot impose its policy but must negotiate with partners in public, private and voluntary sectors (Stoker, 2000). Stoker goes on to suggest that governance as steering is less about the authority of governments to make decisions and more about their capacity to establish a framework for effective collective action. Greater emphasis is therefore placed on fostering partnerships and collective decision-making and marks a pronounced shift away from top-down, hierarchical authority. In other words, governance recognises the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority. Rather, the emerging literature on governance recognises government as being able to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide.

This view that governance requires the strategic coordination of state and non-state actors informs recent developments in regulation theory. According to Loughlin and Scott (1997) among industrial nations there has been a movement towards 'regulation' as a distinctive style of governance. Here, regulation is loosely taken to mean 'the attempt to modify the socially-valued behaviour of others by the promulgation and enforcement of systems of rules, typically by establishing an institutionally distinct regulator' (1997:205). In this sense, the increasing use of regulation through the need to 'direct' the behaviour of a range of policy actors as an instrument of government has obvious overlaps with the concept of governance as steering. Richards and Smith (2002:33) suggest that regulation requires a relationship based on trust, so that 'the state says that it will trust an organisation to make a decision, but retains the right to hold the organisation to account for those decisions'. They go on to flag up the emergence of a variety of regulatory agencies –
such as Ofwat, Oftel and Ofgas, which have been established by the state in order to monitor the activities of privatised utility companies - as reflecting a key shift from hierarchy to regulation.

**Governance and the state**

Both the process and structural frameworks considered prompt the question as to the role and nature of governments in governance. A related question is whether it is adequate to conceptualise the nation-state as a central player in light of globalisation and the dramatic growth of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs).

The need to re-conceptualise the role of the state in society has been fostered by a number of developments. An approach popular in the 1970s perceived government to be ‘overloaded’, meaning it is unable to resolve all the tasks and demands placed on it by society (see Crozier et al. 1975). These problems were exacerbated by the decline in state capabilities during the 1980s and 1990s largely as a result of financial problems. In terms of sport, the reduced role for the state, and the shift away from universal provision of welfare services, were evident in leisure policy in Britain during this period (Henry, 1993). An additional development that has cultivated the growing interest in governance has been increasing problems of co-ordination, and the ‘failure’ of the state. According to Pierre (2000:5) the state-centric view on political processes has helped raise expectations on the capabilities of the state beyond its ability to deliver. Thinking about governance has also been driven by globalisation that penetrates previously closed and stable exchanges within a system of institutions. As Pierre and Peters have argued, ‘globalisation has become a watchword for almost all types of international impositions on national sovereignty’ (2000:57). Therefore what appears to be the main consequence of globalisation is the erosion of traditional, domestic political authority. However, it is important to recognise that no simple model, such as those arguing that globalisation has eradicated the capacity of states to govern, is likely to capture the complexities that exist. Instead it is argued here that the roles of the state are changing rather than diminishing. According to Turner and Corbacho (2000) the state remains crucially involved in a wide range of programmes from economic development and regulation of the private sector, to shaping patterns of migration and immigration and meeting the basic needs of most citizens. As Pierre and Peters contend, ‘the state remains the key vehicle for the pursuit of the collective interest in society and what we are witnessing is a transition of the state to fit the society of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century’ (2000:68). At the heart of the renewed interest in governance
then is the need to reopen the debate on the role of the state in modern society. A fuller examination of the state in relation to debates on governance is included in chapter three.

It is clear from the discussion so far that the concept of governance not only recognises an increased complexity in our systems of government, but highlights a marked shift in responsibility, a rolling back of the state and a concern to push responsibilities onto the private and voluntary sectors, and more broadly, the citizen. As Rhodes (1996:666) has argued ‘focusing on governance can blur, even dissolve, the distinction between state and civil society. The state becomes a collection of inter-organisational networks made up of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able to steer or regulate’. There is subsequently a need to examine the concept of civil society and its contribution to the governance debate.

Governance and civil society

The question ‘what is civil society?’ has produced a plethora of answers, leading a number of analysts to dismiss the concept as abstract, analytically too imprecise to be useful and ultimately lacking in substance (Kumar, 1993). Nevertheless, there is a baseline agreement that civil society refers to an area of public activity involving a range of groups and associations that is distinct from both the state and the market. This reading of civil society emphasises three key ingredients: ‘The first is a part of society comprising a complex of autonomous institutions – economic, religious, intellectual and political – distinguishable from the family, the clan, the locality and the state. The second is a part of society possessing a particular complex of relationships between itself and the state and a distinctive set of institutions that safeguard the separation of state and civil society and maintain effective ties between them. The third is a widespread pattern of refined or civil manners’ (Shils, 1991:4). However, it is important to recognise that civil society can also degenerate to take ‘uncivil’ and highly sectional forms. For example, associations can be hierarchic and closed, denying their members the free choice that is antithetical to the values of a democratic community.

Civil society is widely used as a descriptive concept to assess the balance between state authority and private bodies and associations. Whereas the state operates through compulsory and coercive authority, civil society allows individuals to shape their own destinies. Thus civil society is viewed as independent of the state and the market, and sufficiently powerful to provide a counterbalance (see Fine and Rai,
Cohen and Arato (1992: 19) for example, contend that a civil society with ‘cross cutting cleavages, overlapping memberships of groups, and social mobility is the presupposition for a stable democratic polity, a guarantee against permanent domination by any one group’. In this way, civil society can be seen to possess clear pluralist characteristics, representing an arena for the interplay of various and disparate groups and associations. In addition, civil society is linked with notions of agency, association and creativity. This explains why a vigorous and healthy civil society is usually regarded as an essential feature of liberal democracy. Diamond (1994) for example, catalogues the significance of civil society to democracy, arguing that it can provide a check on government power and develop democratic skills associated with participation. It follows that the civil institutions that are involved in the development and provision of sport also contribute towards the maintenance and cultivation of civil society. Allison (1998) has persuasively contended that sports clubs fulfil many of the functions identified by Diamond. Similarly, according to Putnam (1995) participation in sport represents an important way that modern democracies produce the ‘social capital’ necessary for healthy and democratic societies. The scale of sport is an important consideration in this respect. In the UK sport has traditionally been structured and developed through a vast network of voluntary organisations. As Slack notes, ‘from the heights of international competition ... to the clubs and community level groups which provide participation opportunities for young children and recreation athletes, the delivery of sport is highly dependent on voluntary organisations’ (2000:44). Many of these organisations have taken the legal form of unincorporated associations. This provides them a degree of autonomy because of the state’s reluctance to interfere in the affairs of a private organisation. As Greenfield and Osborn (2000:84) argue, sports governing bodies have considerable power, and are characterised by long histories of legal freedom and self-regulation. By operating in civil society outside the market, sports organisations pose new and interesting questions of governance.

However, this picture of sports bodies as being autonomous is slowly being eroded. Sports organisations in the UK are less capable of independent action as a consequence of growing dependency on government, especially since the formation of the Lottery Sports Fund. As a result, tensions are created between the

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1 The notion that civil society is separate from the state is contentious. The state establishes laws that set the boundary of the autonomy of the spheres of civil society. In turn, civil society lays down limits on the actions of the state. In short, civil society and the state are enmeshed by the constitution and by traditions that stress the obligations of each to the other as well as their rights vis-à-vis each other.
government, which ultimately controls the purse strings and shapes policy, and the national agencies (Weed, 2001). Furthermore, various stakeholders, court decisions or legislation have increasingly challenged the autonomy of European sports and their governing bodies. The rising power of global sports has also increased the vulnerability of NGBs. As Katwala argues, 'the fact that the IOC owns the Olympic Games does not end questions about how its power is exercised' (2000:7). The commercialisation of sport, especially of football, has also raised questions whether sport is an industry and therefore should be treated like any other business. This has brought the law into play as a method of dispute, challenging decisions made by governing bodies. National courts have made a number of significant decisions, especially regarding the legitimacy of the collective selling of broadcasting rights by football leagues, violence in the field of play and the treatment of breaches of doping regulation.

It is now recognised that sport is an important sector of economic activity, accounting for a significant proportion of Gross Domestic Product, consumer spending and employment (see Gratton and Taylor, 2000). The development of the economic dimension of sport has subsequently extended the operative field of sports governing bodies beyond that of rulemaking to encompass commercial activities. For example, FIFA as the world governing body of football has sought to exploit the sport's commercial value, selling the broadcasting rights to the 2002 and 2006 World Cups for £1.45 billion, as well as developing partnerships with major sponsors such as Adidas, Coca-Cola, General Motors and McDonalds. However, as Katwala (2000:20) has noted, sport does not have a culture of good business practice. This has fuelled public and governmental concern and prompted questions about how the business of sport should be regulated. This, in turn, has raised questions as to the suitability of governing bodies to regulate themselves and their ability to govern other than in their own narrow self-interest (Foster, 2000:267). Weak internal governance in football, for example, has signalled challenges to FIFA and UEFA’s organisational and financial hegemony from elite clubs who claim to produce the revenues and therefore consider themselves entitled to have a greater share. In recent years, there has been an ongoing battle between the governing bodies of football who promote international club competitions and the elite clubs under their jurisdiction. Governing bodies have been threatened not only by an elite club breakaway but also by legal intervention and by regulators applying free market principles to sport through competition law. Both of these can undermine the capacity of traditional governing bodies to
effectively govern sport. The intervention of the European Commission in football's business practices for example, has gone to the heart of FIFA and UEFA's financial and sporting monopoly over the organisation of international competition.

To treat sport purely as a business implies that it is a free market. This assumption is deeply flawed, however. As producers of sport, governing bodies and leagues form natural monopolies. Clubs cannot simply leave a league for an alternative or breakaway league without penalty. In addition, sports fans are not consumers in a traditional free market. In this sense, Adam Brown is correct when he argues 'brand loyalty, rather than quality or value for money, is the determining factor in football consumption, an emotional commitment to the team, which is above and beyond normal consumer choice' (2000:259). Organised sport, and football in particular, draws on an emotional investment by supporters, which is highly unusual in the context of the typical consumer/producer relationship. It is clear from this that governance of sport is particularly complex in part due to the peculiar environment in which sports organisations operate, as well as the wide range of participants involved. Thus, individual sports are typically characterised by multiple interests, and a complex combination of legal, regulated and self-regulatory frameworks.

It is clear from the discussion so far that part of the utility of governance is that is a concept that is capable of taking account of the increasingly blurred boundary between government and civil society. It is therefore useful in studying the changing character of sport and sports governing bodies whose decisions are increasingly the outcome of the interplay of government and civil society.

**Alternative uses of governance**

As we have seen in the course of this chapter, the concept of governance is multi-faceted. Rhodes (2000:55-63) for example, argues that at least seven separate uses of governance can be stipulated, in terms of a 'new process, condition or method'. These are governance as: corporate governance, new public management, good governance, international interdependence, a socio-cybernetic system, a new political economy, and networks. This should not necessarily be understood as a handicap to analysis, but that the elasticity of the term enables it to accommodate the complex and diverse nature of sports governance. With this in mind, two alternative and interrelated uses of the term governance are of particular relevance, namely as a framework for 'good governance' and corporate governance.
The term 'good governance' has wide appeal, having been adopted by a range of international bodies where its variation of meaning has been evident. The World Bank defined governance as a way in which power is exercised in the management and development of the economic and social resources of a country. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) meanwhile understood good governance in terms of relationships. This broad definition includes the relationships, methods and instruments of relationships between government and citizens, acting both as individuals and as part of institutions (Agere, 2000:2). In this sense, good governance encompasses many elements of democracy such as participation and the empowerment of civil society, the private sector and other key stakeholders. In common with democracy, good governance promotes the decentralisation of decision-making, implementation and monitoring. According to Katwala, ‘democratising sport means ensuring it is governed in an open way that is accountable to sport’s key participants, and consistent with the best values of democratic societies and the international community’ (2000:vii). While there may be no best way of achieving good governance, a number of common features may be eluded to, namely accountability, transparency, combating corruption, participatory governance and an enabling legal framework. Indeed, good governance in sport has been used to refer to (1) clearly defined roles and responsibilities of all participants and (2) transparency in the way that these roles and responsibilities are defined, monitored and enforced by governing organisations (The Rules of the Game, Governance in sport conference report and conclusions, 26-7 February 2001). In this way, good governance refers to ‘best practice’ within an organisation and highlights the arrangement of relationships between the organisation and its primary and secondary stakeholders as crucial. Primary stakeholders include those without whose continuing participation the organisation would not exist and in sports terms, may include athletes, sponsors, broadcasters and governments. Secondary stakeholders refer to those groups who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by, the organisation but are not essential for its survival. This group might therefore include supporters, facility owners and municipalities. Good governance may therefore be achieved through ensuring that stakeholder groups are capable of providing an effective counter-balance to the focal organisation.

While the traditions of governance in private, public and voluntary organisations are distinct, government reforms of the public sector and the growing introduction of management practices derived from business into the public and voluntary sectors, has meant the boundaries between the sectors have become blurred. This has been
particularly true with regard to good governance where ideas and practices have been transferred between sectors. Thus, a concern with good governance can also be found in the public and voluntary sectors. In the public sector, the government has sought to introduce greater competition and a range of management practices from the private sector. The subsequent widespread structural reform led to many public services being removed from the direct control of elected local authorities and government departments to be run by quangos operated under contract with central government. Key reforms include the establishment of independent trusts to deliver services in the NHS, the formation of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and Local Enterprise Councils (LECs), and the removal of further education colleges and the former polytechnics from local authority control. However, the rapid growth in the number of quangos, the variety of their governance arrangements and the perceived increase in central government control have led to concerns about the membership and accountability of these public bodies. Plummer (1994: 1) for example, contends that the governance structures of these bodies ‘were created without clear and consistent principles and methods’, resulting in what he terms a ‘governance gap’ and public unease about the legitimacy of many of the quangos. In response, the Nolan Committee (1996) made a number of recommendations. It established some general guidelines and concluded that best practice conforms to seven principles of public life, namely: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. In essence, the Nolan Committee proposed that where taxpayers’ money is involved the government or local authority must retain responsibility for ensuring that the interests of both taxpayers and users are protected, and mechanisms should exist to ensure local influence and accountability.

Turning to the voluntary and not-for-profit sector, its growth in size and significance – in part due to changes in government policy, particularly the contracting out of public services – has led to increasing demands on the sector, and sharpened concerns with improving the standards of management and governance. As a result, the Commission on the Future of the Voluntary Sector looked at governance as one of the many important issues confronting the sector (NCVO, 1996). It recommended that voluntary organisations should clearly define the respective roles of chair, board members, chief executive and staff; ensure that boards have an appropriate balance of members; should not become too large; and should have adequate recruitment and induction procedures. The report also commended the codes of practice developed by the Nolan Committee and suggested that they could be used more widely in the voluntary sector.
The notion of good governance as a term for reform is also gaining credence among a range of sports organisations. As Katwala has noted, 'there are positive signs of an emerging new agenda in sporting governance – for example, in the way that the English Football Association is seeking to transform itself, in the lessons to be learnt from southern hemisphere rugby's confidence in adapting to change, and in the reformist manifesto of UEFA President and defeated FIFA candidate Lennart Johansson' (2000:10). According to Dr. Jacques Rogge, 'basic principles of good governance will give sports bodies a point of reference to ensure they are governing their sport reasonably towards their members. It should also help in basing all actions or decisions on adequate motivation open to control and discussion' (The Rules of the Game, Governance in sport conference report and conclusions, 26-7 February 2001). This usage of the term good governance shares many similarities with the notion of corporate governance.

The burgeoning debate on corporate governance was in large part cultivated by the Cadbury Committee, (1992) which provided a governance model and a point of reference for many countries, markets and companies. In general terms, corporate governance refers to the relationships among stakeholders in shaping the direction and performance of companies. As Tricker has argued, 'the governance role is not concerned with running the business of the company per se, but with giving overall directions to the enterprise, with overseeing and controlling the executive actions of management and with satisfying legitimate expectations for accountability and regulation by the interests beyond the corporate boundaries (1984:6-7). The Cadbury Committee developed a Code of Best Practice in Corporate Governance that was founded on four key principles: (1) the structure, organisation and membership of companies' boards of directors (2) the accountability of boards to shareholders and other stakeholders (3) the transparency of governance standards and processes and (4) the quality of companies' communications about these and other issues. In essence it strengthened the position of non-executive directors, and tried to ensure a balance of power on boards and greater accountability of executives. However, the Cadbury Code has been criticised for putting too much emphasis on self-monitoring and control, and the importance of non-executive directors. Furthermore, Cadbury has been criticised as a voluntary code with no clear means of ensuring compliance.

One reason that the debate on corporate governance is compelling is that it is an implicit admission that markets fail. Put another way, if the competitive free market system worked effectively then there would be little need for shareholders to be
concerned about how their corporations operate. Thus the market, with minimal external intervention, would administer reward and punishment. In reviewing the improved standards of governance in corporations however, it is important to recognise that there are significant differences between sports organisations and companies. For example, the adoption of Plc status by football clubs poses real threats to their social character (Carr et al, 2001) while Gaved (2001) notes that 'shares can be purchased and sold but membership of sports organisations generally cannot'. Moreover, while many sports now have a growing commercial dimension these activities are not sports' fundamental reasons for existing. Nevertheless, the adoption of corporate governance principles by sports organisations may in fact provide advantages, by offering opportunities for supporters to exercise some influence over those clubs where supporters hold significant shareholdings.

Both the corporate governance and 'good governance' frameworks are underpinned by stakeholding as an organising concept. Theoretically, the stakeholder approach is persuasive but the question remains whether it is workable in practice. Inclusion is not a one-way process, yet the stakeholding is premised on the suppositions that not only are stakeholders involved, but that their involvement is meaningful. In other words, 'if the concept of the stakeholder is to be given any operational value it must be defined to exclude' (Maltby and Wilkinson, 1998:199). Furthermore if stakeholder is taken as shorthand for a broad range of groups in society, who in some form affect or are affected by a focal organisation, how is this applied in practice? In this sense, Macdonald and Beattie (1993) suggest that elements of corporate governance in the UK have been developed piecemeal so that these interrelationships have not been fully considered or integrated.

Citizenship

In general terms, a stakeholder system is defined primarily as one that treats those involved in companies as possessing genuine democratic rights. Beyond the private sector, stakeholding extends the scope of democratic principles to the institutions of wider society. Here, the concept of citizenship is of particular relevance in specifying the relationship between the state and individuals within civil society, and expressing the rights and responsibilities of the individual ‘citizen’ and those of the state. There is now a vast literature on citizenship; in part a legacy of citizenship’s ‘buzzword’ status, and partly reflecting citizenship’s almost universal popularity, appealing to a range of ideological positions. For example, Tony Blair and Bill Clinton have made great use of the language of citizenship in their attempts to plot a ‘third way’ to govern society.
It would clearly be an impossible task to review all of these contributions. Instead, a brief conceptual overview is provided, drawing initially on the seminal work of T.H. Marshall, before focusing on the its utility in informing debates on governance.

In general terms, citizenship is a status that mediates the relationship between the individual and the political community. As such, citizenship is closely related to democracy. Citizenship is both relational and reciprocal, comprising (1) the obligations and duties of the individual within civil society to the state, and (2) the individual's legitimate claims and expectations of the state (Hay, 1996:67). According to Marshall (1950) citizenship is a 'status bestowed upon those who are full members of a national community'. Therefore, a key element of citizenship is participation in and membership of a common culture or community. However, as argued earlier, the boundaries of the state are historically variable and subsequently citizenship as a status is continuously contested, renegotiated and redefined (Held, 1989).

Widely regarded as an important contributor to citizenship studies, Marshall (1950) developed a historical typology of the extension of citizenship rights, composed of the civil, the political and the social. Civil rights, according to Marshall are 'composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the rights to justice' (1950:8). The story of the development of civil rights, Marshall argues, is closely associated with the development of a capitalist market economy. Hence, the granting or conceding of formal civil rights represents little more than the universalisation of capitalist principles of social organisation. The political dimension refers to the right to participate in the exercise of political power, either as a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The extension of citizenship to include these political rights is linked, Marshall suggests, to the nineteenth century and is associated with the enfranchisement of the working class and the rise of political parties. The third and most disparate category of rights identified by Marshall is that of social rights. This refers to a spectrum of rights from economic welfare, security, a share in social heritage, and to behave appropriately in a civilised society. Such rights are realised and instantiated in the universal right to welfare. However, as the 'rolling back of the welfare state' in Britain and elsewhere highlights, social rights form an arena of intense political contestation. The political right tends to endorse a narrow view of citizenship that stressed only civil and political rights, the rights that are exercised within civil society and rights of participation. By contrast, the political left advocates
I social citizenship’, the idea that citizens are entitled to a social minimum, expressed in terms of social and welfare rights.

It is argued that there is a need to move beyond Marshall’s conceptualisation of citizenship and to recognise that increasingly citizenship has an important cultural dimension. In that sense, Porro et al. (1999) have argued that sport is a fourth strand of citizenship, linked both to the new cultural needs of the developed societies and to the search for a renewed social identity of the welfare itself. The link between citizenship and the potential role that sport may play in the promotion of diversity, and the development of citizenship skills has been recognised by the New Labour government, which has fostered Active Sports programmes and Sport Action Zones. As Houlihan and White (2002:217) contend ‘sports projects have the potential to move beyond Marshall’s long-established conceptualisation of citizenship as comprising political, civil and social dimensions and accept that there is an important cultural element to full citizenship’. Here, the work of Pakulski (1997) is insightful in flagging up the right to identity and visibility as opposed to marginalisation and cultural assimilation.

Underpinning citizenship is the need for new mechanisms to foster greater citizen participation. Much of the demand for citizen and community involvement in decision-making stems from concerns about the failings of modern democracy. Studies of political participation show a decline in the trust citizens have in their political systems and in their representatives (Dalton, 1996). Furthermore, voting turnouts have decreased in most Western countries in the last few years and many political parties have experienced declining membership. In response, experiments in deliberative methods of policy-making such as citizens’ juries have been promoted as ways in which political rights can be made more meaningful and collaborative. For example, within football there has been a marked shift toward including and canvassing the views and opinions of its supporters through a number of mechanisms including ‘fan’s forums’, fan representation on the board of directors, and supporters’ trusts.

Underlying much of the argument for participation or democratisation is an assumption of the importance of active involvement by citizens. Participation is itself deemed to be a positive action, which encourages the ‘empowerment’ of those who were previously defined as passive recipients of initiatives developed by experts of one kind or another. Clarke and Stewart (1992) distinguish between three models of empowerment, depending on how the individual is defined. These are (1) the customer (in which case the emphasis will be on individual choice through quasi-
markets); (2) the citizen (whereby the emphasis is on rights); or (2) the community, where the emphasis will be on new forms of democratic arrangement. They advocate the idea of self-governing communities, since 'the community governing itself empowers the community and those who live and work within it' (1992:22). Such an approach has been developed by the work of Hirst (1994) on 'associative democracy'. He questions the centrality of government and state in a society that is made up of a plurality of associations. Hirst's arguments are persuasive in that he makes it possible to imagine a society with widespread participation in decision-making over a broad range of issues. It also makes it possible to move towards radical notions of pluralist democracy such as those forwarded by Mouffe (1992).

She questions universal and undifferentiated notions of citizenship, emphasising the importance of differences between individuals and groups, and recognises the extent to which individual citizens have multifaceted political and social identities. Hirst's framework however, is flawed in that it fails to deal adequately with issues of power. Thus, it is not always clear how differences in power between associations will be dealt with. In addition, Hirst ignores the over-representation of professional groups in existing voluntary groups, while ethnic minorities, the unemployed are underrepresented, and women are underrepresented at leadership levels within them (Cochrane, 1996).

A central theme running through the three applications of governance - governance as steering, networks and good governance - is the importance of the role and relationship between stakeholders. Here governance is used to describe emerging forms of collective decision-making and new relationships. The language of stakeholding provides one way of examining changes in the relationships between government and people, and citizens and the state. During the early period of Blair's leadership of New Labour the concept of stakeholding was widely used, emphasising the role of the state as forming partnerships and networks, and how to involve a wide range of groups in society in the policy process. According to Newman (2001:127) these connections are a way of providing greater flexibility and sophistication, and as 'a means of responding to the fragmentation of authority and the problem of accountability in complex societies'. In relation to sport, and in particular the management of sports' governing bodies, the overlapping concepts of corporate governance and stakeholding have emerged as a language for reform and modernisation, and improved financial management. Here, stakeholding raises interesting issues about how the concept may be operationalised – in particular, identifying those involved and affected by policy – and how to involve them in the policy process. In the case of professional football in England, the ideas of
stakeholding and mutualism (Michie, 1999) have been flagged up as ways of increasing the involvement of supporters, and democratising the ownership and governance of football clubs. This is manifest in the formation of Supporters Direct in August 2000, a government-backed initiative, which provides legal and practical advice to fan groups in forming trusts that allow them a greater say in how their clubs are run. Elsewhere, Robson (2000) has emphasised the growing importance of partnerships within and between sports organisations in order to garner cultural, political and financial support.

Theorising governance: some concluding remarks

The general thrust of the emerging literature on governance is to argue that conventional command and control conceptualisations about governing provide an incomplete notion of the role of governments in modern societies. Rather governance signifies 'a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed' (Rhodes, 1996:652-3). Thus, governance is now understood as being possible without government, with the capacity to steer exercised equally well through social organisations as through formal government institutions. That said, it could be argued that the notion of 'governing without government' may also be overstated and equally incomplete, ignoring the continuing necessity for some form of centralised direction. Thus, the role of government is conceived as still being important but as only one part of a more complex set of institutional actors.

This chapter has largely been concerned with exploring the potential usefulness of the governance concept. However, there is an argument that governance is so broad a term as to be meaningless. Peters (2000:46) has questioned, 'has the concept so many meanings that we might be better starting anew and specifying more precisely what we mean and have a single denotative meaning for the term?'. Here, the elasticity of the term governance is taken as a hindrance. While there is no denying that the concept in the emerging governance literature is used in a variety of ways and has a variety of meanings, its value or potential usefulness should be gauged on whether it helps provide a map or guide to the changing character of sport and sports organisations.

It is apparent from the literature review above, that the term governance has become widely used in debates in political science, public policy and international relations, but often to mean different things. Here, it is argued that from amongst the variety of
uses of governance, the three most promising for understanding aspects of sport, sports organisations and policy-making are: governance as a strategy (steering), governance as an analytical tool (networks) and governance as a normative device (good governance). Clearly, the possible utility of the concept of governance depends, in part, upon which of the approaches to governance is adopted. If the ‘steering’ approach is accepted then the question becomes one of the capacities of the actors involved to formulate and change sports policy. If the concept of governance as networks is used, then the focus turns to identifying the characteristics of a sports policy network or community, and associated questions of organisational behaviour and interaction. Thirdly, if we assume the overlapping definitions of good governance and corporate governance, then this raises questions of internal governance, and how relations between sports bodies and primary and secondary stakeholders are arranged. Clearly then, governance provides a potentially insightful and interesting framework for understanding aspects of sport, sports governing bodies and sports policy.

Governing sport in the UK has never been a more complex and challenging task. Part of this complexity can be explained by the growth in the range of stakeholder groups, which includes: clubs, local, national and international organisations, athletes and agents, broadcasters, and supporters/fans. To this we could add the European Commission that has taken an ad hoc ‘arm’s length’ interest in the organisation and development of sport. It is also necessary to recognise the diversity of sports and their differing traditions. Moreover, individual and collective interests are defined and pursued at micro, mezzo and macro levels. To understand the challenge of sports governance therefore requires a focus on multiple locations of decision-making, in both spatial and sectoral terms, and the ways in which relations between actors are conducted and managed.

One value of the term governance then is as an organising concept that crosses the boundary between government, civil society and sports organisations within civil society. It is clear from the discussions above that decision-making is no longer the sole preserve of governments. Rather, an understanding of how sports policy is made needs to take account not only the changing relationship between government and sport (see chapter four) but other stakeholders from the private and/or voluntary sectors. Before doing so it is necessary to examine the complex international or global arena within which these relationships are played out. Moreover, at the heart of the renewed interest in governance is the need to reassess the role of the state in
modern society and to understand the changing functions and the realities of the power structure of the nation-state. These issues will be examined in chapter three.
Chapter 3

The Policy Process of Sport

As was clear from the discussion in chapter two it is important to set the analysis of governance in a broader perspective, recognising the significance of the international and global dimensions to the governance of sport, and the extent to which the governance of sport is increasingly being conducted upon a variety of levels and amongst a diverse set of actors. This is especially important in evaluating conceptualisations of governance as 'steering' or as a metaphor for policy networks. Allison (1998:29) has commented that the 'system of contemporary world governance in sport' is that of complex interdependence, between international and national governing bodies, European law and the courts, the media, commerce and business, supporters and so on. For example, there is a long history of structures operating in sport to provide international liaison and organise regular international competition. As early as 1894 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was founded to promote international goodwill through sport, while in Europe the establishment of football's European Cup in 1955 pre-dated the formation of the EEC itself (1957). Following on from the stakeholders identified by Allison, it is argued that the contemporary environment for governance of international sport is one characterised by a plurality of actors. This raises the question whether it is possible to delineate a national or a European policy community for sport, and if so what are its characteristics? Much of the discussion requires an understanding of the complex process of policy making. The second part of this chapter will therefore consider ways in which policy is formulated, focusing in particular on the representation of interests in the sports policy network. However, the chapter begins with an examination of the insights derived from the study of globalisation and macro-level theorising, and their significance for the evaluation of governance. An understanding of the significance of globalisation for the domestic governance and policy process in sport is of particular importance as it has implications for concepts of governance as steering and the increasing challenge of steering in a more crowded and multi-level policy space. However, it is also necessary to examine the theoretical explanations of strategies of governance offered by macro theories derived from Marxism, pluralism and corporatism.
Sports globalisation, the state and governance

The claim that globalisation has transformed sport in the last half century is supported by the growth in the range and frequency of major international sports competitions such as the Olympic Games and football's World Cup. Before the 1950s, participation in global sports was patchy, often through lack of opportunity and infrastructure, but also through insular attitudes (Katwala, 2000:11). In football for example, British teams declined to enter the first three World Cup finals in 1930, 1934 and 1938, while the English FA similarly shunned the first European Cup in 1957. But what was then a weak, fragmented and politically insignificant infrastructure of global sport has since changed dramatically. As Maguire claims 'the speed, scale and volume of sports development is interwoven with the broader global flow of people, technology, finance, images and ideologies' (2000:357-8). In all these regards the development of the sports media has been significant, enabling sports events to be broadcast to large global audiences. The increase in the number of major sports competitions is mirrored by the formation of international federations to encourage and facilitate international exchange, and the fostering of global governance structures for sport. One consequence of this has been the increasing interconnectedness and interdependence between previously separate sports bodies as old boundaries between the local, the national and the global become blurred. The disciplines of political science and international relations have sought to theorise the impact of these and other changes. One of the key issues that any analysis of globalisation must address is the role of the nation-state in the globalisation process. After all, a number of authors have argued that the state is a chief victim of globalisation, losing its capacity to steer effectively. An explicit outline of this approach is given by Held (1991:207-9) who takes the argument through a series of steps that chart the undermining of the nation-state. Held's argument can be summarised as follows: First, the increasing economic and cultural connections reduce the power and effectiveness of governments at the level of the nation-state. As a result, they can no longer control the flow of ideas at their borders and thus their internal policy instruments become ineffective. Secondly, state power is further diluted by the growth in scale and number of trans-national corporations that are often larger and more influential than some governments. Thirdly, more traditional areas of state responsibility are subsequently co-ordinated on an international or intergovernmental basis. Lastly, in an attempt to link together the above trends, Held argues that a system of global governance is emerging, with its own policy development and administrative systems that further curtail the state's capacity to
steer effectively. Thus it is argued that there is little or no role left to states beyond the provision of infrastructure and public goods. Strange (1996) shares this view, arguing there has been an increasing hollowness or 'retreat' of state authority.

Hirst and Thompson (1999:256) present a contrasting perspective, arguing that while the state's capacity to govern has changed, it nevertheless remains 'a pivotal institution, especially in terms of creating the conditions for effective international governance'. Thus, nation-states should no longer be seen as 'governing' powers able to impose outcomes on all aspects of policy within a marked territory by their own authority. 'Nation-states are now simply one class of powers and political agencies in a complex system of power from world to local levels, but they have a centrality because of their relationship to territory and population (Hirst and Thompson, 1999:275). They go on to describe states as having a 'new' sovereignty in that they police the borders of a territory and represent, to a degree, the citizens within those boundaries. Drawing principally on the work of Hirst and Thompson, Houlihan (2001) emphasises the importance of the state as playing an integral role in shaping the development of sport beyond national boundaries. He argues, 'the extension of sport beyond national boundaries does not take place by bypassing the state but requires its active participation.'

It is argued that neither of these approaches adequately conceptualises the role of the state and non-state actors under conditions of globalisation. The state has been strengthened in some areas, while it has clearly lost power in others. In other words, the role of the state has not diminished, but it has changed (see Weiss, 1998). As Peters and Pierre (2001) contend, there has been a development from a 'command and control' type of state towards an 'enabling' state. This implies the state is not proactively governing society but is more concerned with defining objectives and generating resources from a wide variety of sources to pursue those goals (Pierre and Peters, 2000). The globalisation of the states-system has rendered international relations between states more complex and unpredictable. In the last quarter of the twentieth century there has been a dramatic growth in the number of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs or NGOs). According to Malcolm Waters (1995) these constitute a 'complex and ungovernable web of relationships that extends beyond the nation-state'. Thus the traditional governance structures, where national and international sporting federations are viewed as autonomous or separate is increasingly difficult to defend in light of international and global processes. Historically, international sporting federations have been self-regulating
and claimed to be immune globally from legal and regulatory control. They, and the national associations that constitute them, are outside of the reach of legal orders. However, as the Bosman case has so graphically illustrated, the decisions of sporting organisations within the EU are subject to legal challenge if they fail to conform to necessary European Union employment or contract practices. Despite this landmark case, FIFA dismissed the European Commission’s plans to abolish the traditional transfer fee system as a hollow threat, still believing its regulations to be immune to change by European law. As a result they only belatedly responded to the legal danger it represented. What is clear from this example is the growing influence of national and European law on international sporting federations. The English courts in 1972 for example, ruled that ‘if FIFA were unwilling to alter their rules to accord with the principles of English law, then an English association should not be permitted to remain a member and be bound by their rules’ (Cooke v Football Association, The Times 23rd March 1972). This implies that the locus of decision making in relation to sport does not necessarily lie with the sports governing bodies, nor are the decisions necessarily taken at local or national levels (Henry, 1999:367). Rather, the international sports arena is characterised by a complex web of interdependent and interconnected relationships.

Multi-level governance refers not just to negotiated exchanges between institutions at the international, national, regional and local levels, but to a vertical ‘layering’ of governance processes at these different levels (Pierre and Stoker, 2000). Here it is worth noting that relationships do not have to operate through intermediary levels but can take place directly, for example through the international and regional levels, thereby bypassing the level of the state.

Macro theories of power

The primary focus for analysis is the meso level of governance, that is the network of relationships between organisations, but in order to understand the policy process it is necessary to relate it to the structure of power in society. According to Richards and Smith (2002:2) the nature of power tends to be glossed over by authors writing on public policy, concentrating on specific micro themes such as actor relations, policy tools, or the structure of organisations. It is therefore our intention not to ignore significant macro-themes concerning the nature of power, which flag up important questions for understanding the policy process. Heywood (2002:429) defines power as ‘the ability to influence the behaviour of others, typically through the power to reward or punish’. Hill (1993:41) meanwhile describes policy as ‘the product of the
exercise of political influence, determining what the state does and setting limits to what it does. Any detailed attention to the policy process, including policy implementation, needs to be set in this wider context. In short, the understanding of the policy arena is shaped by broader assumptions about both the nature of the policy process and the distribution of power in society. The main assumptions are advanced by the macro theories of pluralism, corporatism and Marxism, to which we will now turn.

Pluralism, in its various guises, has provided insightful examinations of the policy process. The underlying assumption of traditional pluralism is that power is fragmented and widely dispersed in society rather than concentrated in the hands of an elite or a ruling class. Decisions are made through a complex process of bargaining, negotiation and interaction, which ensures that a wide range of views and interests are taken into account. This implies that policy is the outcome of a process of free competition between diverse interest groups and policy actors across a range of issues. The state in this approach is ‘value neutral’, adjudicating between interests and with no inherent bias towards a particular set of interests. As Schwarzmantel (1994: 52) put it, the state is ‘the servant of society and not its master’. It is argued that this scenario is upheld through a series of checks, such as countervailing powers, which ensure power is not concentrated in the hands of the few. For example, the existence of one pressure group is commonly balanced by the formation of an alternative counter-organisation. A key feature then, of a pluralist democracy – as identified by Dahl (1961) in his empirical study of the distribution of power in New Haven, Connecticut, USA – is that while groups are not necessarily equal, no political party or policy actor is able to dominate. Similarly in the UK, Wilson (1977) has argued that there is a multiplicity of groups representing a diversity of positions in Whitehall, where the mechanisms of government ensure that a range of interests is represented.

This view of power as being dispersed has been heavily criticised by elitists and Marxists. Elitists challenge the empirical claims of pluralism by suggesting that they recognise only one ‘face’ of power: the ability to influence decision-making, and consequently fail to examine the structural and ideological context within which policy is formulated. In contrast to the notion that power is widely and evenly distributed, both Marxists and elite theorists draw attention to the existence of a ‘ruling class’ or a ‘power elite’ that are bent on pursuing their own interests. Similarly, Richardson and Jordan (1979: 13) challenge the contention that the policy arena is open, arguing there are ‘at best oligopolistic situations and at worst monopolistic situations’.

Furthermore, the idea of ‘Whitehall pluralism’ is criticised as in the majority of cases,
government departments will not have the opportunity to represent alternative views and interests.

Modern pluralists, however, have adopted a more critical view of power in society, in which variations in resources and access to the policy process is recognised. In the words of Martin Smith (1990:317) 'neo-pluralism is much more than a minor amendment of classic pluralism; it is a significant break'. Dahl's later work (1985) for example, runs closer to the conventional Marxist critique of pluralism, arguing that the unequal ownership of economic resources tends to concentrate power in the hands of the few. Similarly, Lindblom (1977) has flagged up the significance of economic resources and the advantages accruing to business, which in effect undermines the traditional pluralist contention that the political process is open and competitive. Truman (1951:322) meanwhile has challenged the neutrality of the state, suggesting that its structural arrangement 'handicaps some efforts and favours others'. In short, modern pluralist accounts refute the notion that power is fragmented and widely dispersed, arguing that power in society is concentrated, reflected in unequal access to key resources used in the struggle for political influence. Grant and Marsh (1977:207) however, have challenged the key assumptions of modern pluralism, arguing that business has had a relatively slight impact on steering government policy.

Corporatism, in contrast to pluralism, assumes a closer interrelationship in industrialised societies between groups and the state. In Britain alone, corporatism has been variously defined as a new political economy (Winkler, 1977), a system of industrial relations (Strinati, 1982), a new state form, (Jessop, 1978) and as a system of interest intermediation (Cawson, 1989). While it is clearly problematic to tease out an unambiguous definition, it is nevertheless possible to identify a core assumption that corporatism, in its broadest sense, is a means of incorporating organised interests into the processes of government. Heywood (2002:275) observes 'corporatism is a social theory that emphasises the privileged position that certain groups enjoy in relation to government, enabling them to influence the formation and implementation of public policy'. From this perspective, business is deemed important because it possesses the resources necessary for the successful running of the economy. As capital becomes increasingly influential and concentrated, business seeks 'insider' status because it gives them access to policy formulation, which enables them better to defend the interests of their members. Government, on the other hand, seeks consultation with groups, both as a source of knowledge and information, and because the compliance of major interests is essential if policy is to be workable.
According to Middlemas (1986:7) the post-Second World War state in Britain was characterised by the emergence of 'corporatist bias', that is 'the tendency for industry, trade unions and financial institutions to make reciprocal arrangements with each other and with government while avoiding overt conflict'. Thus, from the late 1950s Britain's economic crisis led to government seeking a more active, interventionist role in the economy. Consequently, both business and the unions were integrated into a wide range of policy-making arenas, becoming 'governing institutions' in continuous consultation with government, and represented on a range of advisory bodies. While Middlemas (1979:380) suggests that the British political system reflected a corporate bias, he asserts that the system itself is not corporatist due to fluctuations in the central relationship: 'like the bias of a wood at bowls [corporate bias] is in itself no more than a tendency always to run to one side'. Jessop (1978:44) meanwhile describes corporatism as a discrete 'state form', arguing that 'corporatist institutions are displacing parliamentary institutions as the dominant state apparatus in Britain'. He goes on to assert that corporatism in itself is incapable of providing the necessary legitimation for policies derived from 'tripartite' bargaining between the government, business and trade unions without the existence of a 'determinate sovereign authority'. In this way, Jessop argues there is a 'contradictory unity', where a fusion of corporatist and parliamentary representation is necessary but ultimately unsustainable.

The value of the corporatist description of meso-level state/government/business relations is open to debate. Some commentators have questioned whether corporatism actually existed (Cox, 1988, Jordan, 1984) while it is also unclear how much influence business exerts. As Smith (1993:34) has argued 'government, business and unions failed to develop the degree of consensus that is said to be necessary for corporatist arrangements to work. Indeed, much of British industry was not very happy with increased intervention in the economy'. As such, it is claimed there is little need for the development of a theory of corporatism: 'in Britain the tradition of secret efficient government developing through ad hoc pragmatic adjustments and legitimated by a dignified parliamentarism reduces the need for participants in the process to have any sort of theory of corporatism' (Harden, 1988:43). Moreover, it has been claimed that corporatism is specific to a particular time and set of relationships, and consequently has little general use in explaining how government and economic groups interact. However, in light of New Labour's attempts to reach out to civil society – most notably to private business – involving them in consultation over policy, has the predicted death of corporatism been premature? Indeed, is the growing emphasis on fostering partnerships with non-
governmental interests, best explained by a corporatist framework or an alternative perspective?

The Marxist view of power is traditionally rooted in class analysis. It is assumed that power reflects the distribution of economic power and, in particular, the unequal ownership and control of the means of production. In this view, power is ultimately concentrated in the hands of the few – described as a 'ruling class' – that is primarily concerned with pursuing its own economic interests, and only makes concessions to other classes in order to perpetuate a system of unequal class power. For neo-Marxists such as Miliband (1969) this is reflected in 'unequal competition' between business and labour groups, the former possessing a control of economic resources and a level of access to government that the latter cannot match.

In parallel, the Marxist notion of the state it is argued cannot be understood separately from the economic structure of society. In this way, the state arises out of, and reflects, capitalist society and the interests of the ruling class. Here, Miliband (1969) portrayed the state as an instrument of the dominant class. In contrast, Poulantzas (1978) stressed the degree to which the structure of economic and social power exerts a constraint upon state autonomy. He argued that the state is 'relatively autonomous' from the ruling class in order to maintain unity through making concessions to numerous fractions and subordinate groups. Offe (1984) has challenged both the instrumentalist and structuralist views of the state, emphasising that neither the interests of the dominant class or the logic of capitalism determines how the state operates. He suggested that while the most significant feature of the state is the way it is enmeshed in capitalism, the state is also concerned with legitimating its power by acting as an impartial arbiter of class conflict. Jessop (1982) has also attempted to overcome the limitations of the instrumental and structural approaches by developing a non-essentialist theory of the state. He attempted to avoid the crude determinism of traditional Marxism by establishing relations between political and economic elements in society without reducing one to the other or treating them in isolation. According to Jessop (1982:221) the state is a plurality of institutions, while state power is 'a complex social relation that reflects the changing balance of power in a determinate conjuncture'.

In summing up, the macro theories of corporatism and Marxism are founded on the idea that relationships between the state and groups tend to be restricted, with power concentrated among dominant interest groups rather then being dispersed. In contrast, pluralists contend that power has shifted from state organisations to groups and organisations outside government, emphasising the growing involvement of civil
society in the formation and implementation of policy. Thus, if governance implies a greater number of actors involved in the policy process, then pluralism would appear to be a useful analytical model for understanding the nature of power in the British political system (Richards and Smith, 2002:172). The emergence of neo-pluralist accounts of power, which represent a less benign view of the state and acknowledge the influence of business in steering government policy, appear to some degree compatible with the idea of ‘society as a largely disorganised and incoherent set of groups with little systematic impact on policy’ (Pierre and Peters, 2000:34). Here, the work of Houlihan (1991, 1997) on the British policy process for sport is instructive, given his perception of a layering of fragmented interests within the sport policy community. Similarly, Roche (1993:102) has argued that the diverse interests of sport are disorganised, reflecting Houlihan’s concerns of organisational pluralism and fragmentation.

The suggestion that power in society is not dispersed, with functional interests and dominant groups having privileged access to the state, has led to the emergence of corporatist and Marxist accounts of British policy-making. For corporatists, relationships between groups and government are shaped by leaders of the peak pressure groups, who are involved in the development and implementation of policy. For example, Middlemas (1979) refers to a corporatist bias of the state, arguing that after the Second World War, trade unions and business were integrated into a variety of policy-making arenas, consulting with government and were represented on a range of advisory bodies and quangos. The focus here in part overlaps with the model of governance, in which the government is only one actor – although still dominant - among a cluster of capitalist interest groups in the policy process. However, since the prevalence of the term corporatism in the 1970s the utility of the concept for analysing the role of pressure groups in British society has waned, reflecting the perception that the influence of trade unions under a New Labour government has decreased. As Richards and Smith (2002:285) argue ‘[New Labour] has rejected the ‘corporatist solution’ adopted by Labour governments of the 1960s and has instead embarked upon a strategy aimed at binding together different elements of society – government, the private sector, the voluntary sector and so on’. Here, the corporatist model sits uneasily alongside the idea that the distribution of power appears to have fragmented. However, while the governance literature contends that there are changes to the policy arena – chiefly, that there has been an increase in the number of actors involved in the policy process - the state remains the most dominant actor, and can intervene when it chooses.
As argued, a Marxist account of the nature of power in society emphasises the importance of economic factors, which ultimately explain differences between individuals and groups. According to Marx and Engels (1846:7 cited in Noble, 2000:85) 'the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: that is the class, which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force'. Thus, the values, attitudes and beliefs that predominate are those that rationalise the rule of the class that dominates within the prevailing relations of production. As John (1998:93) asserts ‘politics reflects the mode of capitalist production and the power of the capitalist class’. In this respect, those who own the means of production are particularly powerful, thus favouring the interests of some groups over others that have fewer economic resources. What then are the implications of a Marxist account of power for the study of governance? Intuitively, Marxism sits uneasily alongside the governance debate, which suggests that resources have shifted away from the core executive to other actors, and that the policy process is increasingly pluralistic. At the same time, the concentration on the role of ruling elites and the determining influence of economic factors may shed light on why some organisations and interest groups are favoured over others. However, Marx’s approach fails to adequately account for the subtleties of the relationships between government and interest groups in particular policy areas (Smith, 1993:47). Nor is Marxism well placed to account for differences between policy sectors and the multiplicity of social and political objectives expressed in the formation of policy, even when they involve economic interests. In summary, the important limitation of Marx’s approach lies in the fact that he proposed a one-dimensional view of power as exclusively linked to economic factors.

While each of these approaches potentially provides useful insights into the study of governance, the shifting theoretical ground illustrates it is necessary to investigate policy sectors in order to understand the complexity of government-group relationships. As a consequence, it is important to acknowledge that actors – such as local authorities, quangos and government departments – have their own interests and objectives that frequently lead to competition for access to, and influence over, the policy process. It follows that one must also recognise that tensions and conflicts exist within state institutions and that organisations are not homogenous but fragmented.

Before continuing, it is necessary to establish some agreement about the use of the term ‘policy’ prior to considering the three main approaches within political science to the explanations of policy variation and change.
Unpacking Policy

Developing a consensual definition of policy is inherently problematic as considerable ambiguity surrounds the use of the term. It may be used fairly loosely to incorporate what Hogwood (1987:4) describes as 'policy as aspiration' as well as in more detail to outline the 'deliberate choice of action or inaction' (Smith, 1979:13). Commonly, policy is reified as an artefact or 'thing' made by particular individuals in the upper echelons of organisations, systems or the state, to be implemented by others 'below'. In the context of sport, the DCMS and agencies associated with central government would therefore be perceived as having a determining influence over what happens at the grassroots level of sport.

Influenced by this traditional conceptualisation, much policy studies research is primarily concerned with the actions of governments or other agencies within the state. For example, Heclo (1972:85) views government action as a defining characteristic of policy: 'a policy may usefully be considered as a course of action or inaction rather than specific decisions or actions.' Continuing this line of argument, Smith (1976:13) suggests that policy denotes 'deliberate action or inaction' thereby widening the focus to include not only the decisions that produce change but also those which resist alteration and those not represented in the policy-making process. It is therefore not solely governments that are concerned with policy-making. As Houlihan (1991) notes, governing bodies of sport, physical education bodies and individual clubs, may have policies they wish to promote.

Public policy itself is difficult to define. Sometimes it is simply equated with the outputs of government, but more usually is implicitly or explicitly contrasted with implementation or administration. Crucially this depends on how policy is perceived. Thus low-level officials may perceive what may be regarded by central government as a question of implementation as a significant policy issue responsible for delivering services or 'street-level policy making' (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Jenkins (1978:15) refers to public policy as, 'a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve'. Thus policy may be made at a number of levels. As Leach (1995:33) has noted, 'the outcome of the policy process may be formally registered in the shape of a United Nations resolution, or new
European Union regulation, or a Cabinet minute, or a law passed by Parliament. But equally it may lead to the approval of a recommendation in a council committee meeting, or a decision recorded in the minutes of a school governing body. Political activity may similarly take place at a variety of levels, from the politics of Westminster, through the internal processes of political parties and pressure groups, down to ‘grassroots’ activities of participation in ward party meetings or issue-centred demonstrations. It is therefore clear that part of the difficulty of arriving at an agreed definition of policy is the highly complex nature of the policy process. In turn, mapping out a theoretical framework and constructing a conceptual language that enriches our understanding of the policy process is equally problematic. As Sabatier (1999:4) has observed, ‘understanding the policy process requires a knowledge of the goals and perceptions of hundreds of actors throughout the country involving possibly very technical scientific and legal issues over periods of a decade or more when most of those actors are actively seeking to propagate their specific ‘spin’ on events’. It is clear, then, that developing a theoretical framework and a conceptual language that illuminates the process by which policy is made presents the policy analyst with numerous difficulties.

Approaches to the Policy Process

Sabatier (1999) argues that because policy making is inevitably such a complex and complicated process, involving many actors and interests and extending over quite lengthy periods of time, it is necessary for the policy researcher to find some way of simplifying the situation in order to understand it. Peter John (1998:11) however, suggests that ‘although the aim of explanation is laudable, it is often difficult to achieve in practice’. One of the main reasons for this difficulty arises from the diverse and confusing mixing of approaches to the policy process. Some highlight institutional laws and rules as impacting on decision-makers behaviour, while others assume that the formation of policy can be neatly divided into a sequence of logically ordered stages. Other approaches seek understanding at the macro level of society while a number of policy analysts strive toward explanations of how small groups make decisions. John’s suggestion that we need to focus our attention on two issues – policy variation and policy change – is a useful starting point. Policy variation includes differences between sectors so that our attention is drawn to variance in the pattern of institutions, the power relations between constituent parts of institutions and cultures of decision-making. Thus, each sector differs in the degree actors cooperate to achieve their goals, while there is also disparity in the instruments and
resources available to decision-makers. Put simply, 'each sector has a unique combination of technological attributes; problems to be solved; demands of managing the policy; and combinations of producer and consumer interest groups that conflict or co-operate to achieve common or group based goals' (John, 1999:8). The key question here is to try to understand whether these differences lead to different styles of policy making and indeed to different types of policy outcome.

The second issue relates to the degree of change or stability in policy-making. Thus, some sectors appear to be in a state of constant flux, with decision-making structures and policy measures frequently changing, while others are characterised by stability with only marginal and incremental change. The key question to address here is what accounts for these variations. In bringing these two issues, John (1998) develops a useful framework for the critical review of the main policy-making models. What follows is a review of three approaches: the policy streams or the 'garbage can' model, the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) and policy networks/communities. These frameworks were selected on the basis of the burgeoning literature on public policy-making as being representative, and to some extent, best suited to the application of policy theory in the UK.

Multiple Streams Framework

The multiple streams framework is developed by John Kingdon, (1995) who adapts the 'garbage can' model of organisational behaviour. While much research on policy-making presupposes that the various activities making up the process can be ordered into some logical pattern or sequence, Kingdon suggests that the reality is messy and much more confusing. He views the policy process as composed of three streams of actors and processes. First, a problem stream consists of data about various problems and the proponents of various problem definitions. The second stream involves the proponents of solutions to policy problems, while the third, the politics stream, consists of elections and elected officials. In Kingdon's view the streams usually operate independently of each other, except when a 'window of opportunity' enables policy entrepreneurs to connect the disparate streams. Such windows, defined as fleeting 'opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems' (Kingdon, 1995:165) are opened by compelling problems or by events in the political stream. An incident of crowd disorder at a football match for example, brings attention to the 'hooligan problem' and issues of policing.
By adapting the ‘garbage can’ model to policy making at the national level, Kingdon attempts to integrate policy communities with broader events and potentially resolve the ‘ideas-versus-interests’ dilemma (Zahariadis, 1999:78). He also tries to explain why some issues receive prominence while others don’t. To this end he suggests that the agenda is shaped by events in the political stream, by compelling problems, and by visible participants such as elected officials. Critics, however, have pointed to a number of weaknesses. Zahariadis (1999:81) summarises these in the form of five questions. First, he asks whether the streams really are independent? Drawing on the work of Mucciaroni (1992) he suggests a more fruitful conceptualisation would be to view streams as ‘interdependent’ with the result that coupling is far less fortuitous but more strategic. Secondly, what is the precise role of policy windows in coupling? Zahariadis (1999) notes there is a great deal of confusion surrounding the exact nature and function of policy windows. How long are they ‘open’ for? What is the significance of solutions to determining a policy window? The third question emphasises the role of entrepreneurial strategy on coupling. Zahariadis (1999) suggests that entrepreneurial position is important in coupling policy streams, in part through access to considerable amounts of resources to make their ideas and pet proposals more palatable to policy makers. This overlaps with the neo-pluralist idea that business has a privileged position in the policy process. Fourthly, do solutions always follow an incremental evolution in the policy stream? In describing the policy stream Kingdon (1995) argues that it is incremental, suggesting that ideas are consistently recombined. It is debatable whether this is actually the case, signalling the need for more empirical work. Finally, Zahariadis (1999) questions whether the multiple streams lens is merely a heuristic device? The approach views the policy making process as fluid and less patterned than other lenses in public policy. ‘The complexity of the argument and the generous tolerance of serendipity have led some analysts to characterise multiple streams as hypothesising an essentially random process where prediction is impossible’ (Zahariadis, 1999:86).

In summary, the multiple streams framework emphasises the ambiguity of policy making. It views the process as messy, complex and less comprehensible than other approaches suggest. In terms of the sports policy area, the multiple streams framework might help explain the linking of possibly disparate policies to problems that may not necessarily be rational. Furthermore it accommodates for the potentially significant role and influence of individuals. For example, sport policy has proved particularly vulnerable to the whims of individual ministers or ‘policy entrepreneurs’. However, while it is widely accepted that the policy process is immensely complex, is
the reality so unpredictable and shaped by serendipity that patterns or stages cannot be discerned?

**Advocacy Coalition Framework**

The advocacy coalition framework (also referred to as the policy advocacy coalition) is associated with the work of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999). It focuses on the interaction of an advocacy coalition – described by John (1999:169) as 'an alliance of bodies holding the same ideas and interests' – within a policy sector. The initial version of the ACF was founded on five presuppositions. First, it stressed the importance of technical information in the policy process. In other words knowledge is seen to play a crucial role as coalitions are formed around ideas and interests about a set of policy issues. Secondly, it was argued that policy change needed to be observed over a time period of a decade or more. The third premise was that a policy subsystem or domain represented the most useful unit of analysis. Fourthly, the ACF employed a broad conception of these subsystems, cast wide to include 'journalists, researchers, and policy analysts, who play important roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas' (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:119) as well as actors at every level of government involved in policy formulation and implementation. The final premise was that 'public policies incorporate[d] implicit theories about how to achieve their objectives, and therefore can be conceptualised in much the same way as belief systems' (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:119).

The ACF is distinct from the policy network approach in that participant’s bargain and construct alliance within networks. Moreover Sabatier contends that policy making depends on change and stability in the wider political system. John (1999) identifies a number of weaknesses of the ACF. Firstly, he questions whether the approach offers a sufficient explanation of policy change. In essence the ACF boils down to a simple formulation: it assumes that policy-making systems can be divided into two or more long-term coalitions. Consequently, a situation deviating from this scenario cannot be accounted for. Secondly, the ACF overlooks the role of institutions and individuals in the policy process. Thirdly, by emphasising the importance of time, the ACF overemphasises external factors. Thus Sabatier stresses 'external shocks' to the detriment of the importance of interests and strategies of coalition formation.
Policy Communities and Policy Networks

The third approach takes as its starting point the relations between policy actors and the ways in which less formal groupings among them can be more influential on the policy domain than more formal institutions. By attempting to identify the characteristics and boundaries of a policy network, a variety of terms have been used, including policy communities, professional networks and issue networks. For example, Rhodes in defining a policy network as a cluster or complex organisations connected to one another by resource dependencies, produces a typology of five network variants ranging along a continuum from tightly integrated 'policy communities' to loosely formed 'issue networks'. It is therefore unsurprising that at least three strands of the network approach can be discerned (Judge, 1999:136-7).

The first treats networks as an analytical model that helps to describe and understand the policy process. The second approach constitutes a typology of interest representation or intermediation. The third strand describes policy networks as a particular form of governance. This is reflected in the work of Rhodes (1997:45) who suggests that governance emerged in Britain as an unplanned governing structure as a result of the 'hollowing out' of the state, institutional differentiation and pluralisation and the sheer complexities facing modern government. Thus, the policy network or policy community approach is closely allied to the politics of pluralism.

Hogwood (1987:18) suggests a broad conceptualisation of the policy community, which comprises 'not only civil servants and ministers but of relevant recognised interest groups and other governmental bodies, both appointed and elected local authorities'. Wright (1988:606) meanwhile emphasises 'those actors and potential actors drawn from the policy universe who share a common identity or interest'. This implies that membership of a policy community does not necessarily equal actual involvement. It is also argued that policy communities have the capacity to restrict entry and deny membership. Rhodes (1986:23) for example, argues that the policy community is 'substantially closed to other communities and invariably to the general public (including Parliament).'. Consequently, in relation to the sport policy community one may expect organisations representing football supporters to be excluded from, or constrained to the periphery.

Roche (1993) makes two prime observations regarding the policy community for sport. The first is that despite sport being commonly presented as 'for all' the spheres of sport administration and policy making for sport are highly restrictive. He asserts that spectators and players are usually either excluded or discouraged from
involvement in the work of NGBs and other agencies concerned with the ‘governance’ of sport. In practice the sports policy community ‘has been largely unresponsive to and untouched by democratic ideals and practices’ (Roche, 1993:74). Secondly, Roche argues that the policy community has been consistently in a state of disorganisation. In other words, sport is one of the most ‘divided, confused and conflictive policy communities in British politics’ (Roche, 1993:78). Houlihan’s (1991) study of the policy process in British sport provides a pertinent illustration. He sheds light on three areas of sport policy in which conflict over fundamental aims and purposes were pervasive: fragmentation and confusion within the sports policy community over football hooliganism, drug use in sport and school aged sport. As Horne et al. (1999:212) have argued, ‘many different organisations have an interest in sports; different attitudes and values exist which in turn create different definitions of the issues involved and the preferred solutions to them’.

As argued, not all members of a policy community are active participants in resolving issues or developing policy. There is subsequently a need for a further conception, that of policy networks, which encompass those actors involved with specific issues or a particular process. In other words, a policy community for sport comprises those actors with a general concern for sport policy. On the other hand, a policy network contains those actors involved in developing policy responses to a particular issue or problem. Thus, Kickert et al (1997:6) defines a policy network as ‘[more or less] stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes’. Similarly, Richardson and Jordan (1979) emphasise the overcrowded nature of certain policy sectors, questioning whether many groups involved actually have an influence? This leads to the distinction between primary and secondary communities. The primary community refers to intimate relationships between interests and department where access is limited. The groups involved participate in the everyday discussion of policy and the definition of issues. In contrast, the secondary community, ‘only have their position because of the sanction of the primary community and so have to abide by their rules. In that sense they support the continuation of the policy community and agenda, they do not threaten it’ (Smith, 1990:315).

Distinguishing between the concepts of policy community and policy network enriches our understanding of the policy process. First, it teases out a distinction between those actors that are part of a policy community but excluded from policy networks. Secondly, it distinguishes those actors that are regularly involved across a
range of networks from those whose involvement is more sporadic. In parallel, it identifies those members of policy networks who are normally members of other associated policy communities. In short, the concepts of policy community and policy network are valuable in a number of ways. First, as a descriptive device that takes into account the negotiated nature of policy-making. Secondly, it provides the conceptual language, that enriches 'detailed case studies and still [facilitates] the comparative analysis of several policy areas' (Wistow and Rhodes, 1987; quoted in Houlihan, 1991:166). Thirdly, it offers a lens for examining the pattern of relations between actors and the degree to which issues are connected to groups of actors in the policy process.

The network approach has been subject to a number of criticisms. It has been criticised for being 'too descriptive and insufficiently explanatory' (Mills and Saward, 1994:87; quoted in Houlihan, 1997:15). In turn, John (1999:86) is concerned that the concepts are spread too thinly to try to explain something that it can only really describe. Dowding (1995) argues that the policy network approach is limited with little explanatory value on the grounds that 'the driving force of explanation, the independent variables, are not network characteristics per se but rather characteristics of components within networks. These components explain both the nature of the network and the nature of the policy process' (Dowding, 1995:137). Put simply, the course of decision-making is determined not by networks but by bargaining and the complex interweaving of interests. A further weakness of the network approach is the lack of clarity regarding the boundaries of networks. In other words where do networks begin and end? Who is included and excluded? This is made more difficult by the differentiation of the phenomenon and the rapid change that affects a policy sector. In response to the strength of these shortcomings, John (1999:89) defends the network approach, suggesting that too much is expected from it. As a result he emphasises that networks are concerned not with explaining policy formation and change, but with capturing the multidimensional nature of policy.

Conclusion

Given that two of the conceptual policies of governance that we are examining are concerned directly with the policy making process – namely governance as steering and governance as networks – it is important to explore the current dominant metaphors for the policy process in order to identify areas of overlap with either usage of governance or conceptualisation of the policy process where governance can be adapted and included as a refinement or development of existing explanatory
frameworks. As argued, the policy process is complex by definition and subsequently poses problems for theorists seeking explanations. The three frameworks outlined attempt to cope with both policy change and stability in its cross-sectoral and cross-national context. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's (1999) advocacy coalition framework offers a connection between ideas and coalition formation in policy sectors. The network approach seeks to examine complex interdependent relationships as they shift and change within a defined space. John Kingdon (1995) meanwhile suggests three streams of policy problems, policy solutions and politics interact to produce policy change. It is argued that in isolation, single strand approaches inevitably are doomed in their failure to capture the complex and multidimensional reality of policy change and variation. Thus the crucial question is which model or synthesis of the approaches provides an accurate description or explanation of the sports policy process? John (1998: 168) highlights the danger of merely lumping approaches together into 'an unreflective amalgam' such that anything can be explained in some way by a perfectly flexible theoretical lens. Indeed, Houlihan (2000) has argued that while the current state of policy analysis has provided a number of insights into the sport policy process, too many of the concepts, theories and frameworks fail to fit the peculiarities of the sports policy domain in the UK. That does not imply that the sport policy is unique, but like other policy sectors it possesses characteristics that are different though not necessarily distinct. Following on from this, an effective framework for the analysis of sport policy should be able to explain a range of characteristics. These include: the international or global nature of sport policy, the multiplicity of actors within the sport policy domain, the vulnerability of the sport policy agenda to intervention by non-sports interests and policy areas, and the fragmented and under-developed nature of the sport policy community. Drawing from these it is suggested that the network approach is likely to prove the most useful for analysis of sport policy at local, national and international levels.

The network approach has been previously utilised as a useful framework for examining sport policy. Wistow and Rhodes (1987) suggest the leisure and recreation policy arena in the United Kingdom be best described as an 'issue network'. For them an issue network is less integrated, have more participants, and a lower level of interdependence, stability and continuity than a policy community. Houlihan's work (1991, 1997, 2000) on sport policy has similarly utilised the notions of 'policy networks' and 'policy communities' as models that highlight the organisations that generate and influence policy relating to sport. Roche (1993) employed the term 'community' in his review of British sport policy, distinguishing
between the political community of sport policy making ‘authorities’ (those with some sort of knowledge or responsibility to act on behalf of a number of sports) and the national community of British society as a whole. He appropriately uses sporting metaphors to describe the sports policy community, identifying the key ‘players’ – for example, the mass media, participant organisations such as the Professional Footballers’ Association (PFA) and the various arms of parliament as distinct from government – in the policy ‘game’. The issue of power and resources is central to how these ‘players’ interact within the policy domain. As Roche (1993:78) has observed, ‘while sport authorities have some power, most financial power lies outside their hands in the control of various other agencies and sectors. There is, therefore, underlying all of the policy pronouncements of sport authorities, a basic gulf between the rhetoric of authority and the power to act, to control and to produce intended outcomes’. This, in part, leads Roche (1993) to conclude that the policy community has been a ‘disorganised shambles’ with a deep gulf between the concept of a national sport policy and the realities of division in the sport policy community.

In existing literature then, the term ‘policy community’ has variously been applied in relation to sports policy making in Britain, highlighting the multiplicity of actors, interests and the contexts in which policy processes take place. As Klijn and Teisman (1997:117) have argued, conceptualising policy areas as networks of interdependent actors involved in the ‘rules of the game’ in which they take decisions on interrelated themes is a productive method for describing and analysing policy processes. Moreover the policy network approach leads to a different view of governance, drawing attention to the interactive nature of policy processes while at the same time underlining the institutional context in which these processes take place.
Chapter 4

The Evolution of Government Policy on Sport

The preceding chapter flagged up the significance of the international and global dimensions to the governance of sport. It concluded with a review of how sports policy is made, evaluating three policy models: multiple streams framework, advocacy coalition framework, and policy communities and policy networks. I argued that the latter model offers potential analytical insights into the sport policy process in the UK. Moreover, the policy network approach leads to a different view of governance, drawing attention to the interactive nature of the policy processes while at the same time underlining the institutional context in which these processes take place. This chapter is primarily concerned with the network or sectoral level of governance, that refers to the relations between government, the state, and the cluster of interests that may be affected by government action or inaction. Such analysis will require not only an examination of how sport is organised and managed in the United Kingdom, and the development of government policy towards sport, but consideration of the relationship between national governing bodies of sport (NGBs) and government, as mediated through its agencies such as Sport England. The initial focus of this chapter then is to identify the key sectors and actors who shape the way in which sport is organised, administered and managed. This is crucial to our understanding of how sport is governed at the local, national and international level and the appropriateness of the various conceptualisations of governance to the UK sport policy context.

It is widely recognised that the sports industry is a complex and at times overlapping mixture of the public, commercial and voluntary sectors. As Houlihan (1997:147) has argued, 'as the social, economic and political importance of sport has increased over the past forty years or so, the triangular relationship between government, the governing bodies (or voluntary sector) and the commercial sector has become more intense and more significant in shaping the development of sport'. Thus from a relatively marginal position, government can now be seen to have considerable involvement in sport in a variety of ways. This involvement is manifest through the national Sports Councils, National Lottery funding, and through local authorities. The question why the government invests in sport and recreation, and intervenes in the markets in which they operate will be considered later in the chapter. The initial focus
is to identify the complex nature of sport, thus throwing up important questions as to how sport is governed at the local, national and international level.

The organisation of Sport in the UK

Historically, the state and the government left provision of sport and physical recreation to unpaid, dedicated and enthusiastic volunteers. It can therefore be argued that sport at the local level, beyond that offered by schools or in a small number of professional sports, was primarily and continues to be, delivered by volunteers. According to Jackson and Nesti, the voluntary sector made a significant contribution to sports provision during the 1970s and early 1980s: 'Whilst local politicians invested huge sums of money in building and staffing flagship sport and leisure centres in their areas, the volunteer workforce continued to supply the coaches, administrators, treasurers and club secretaries without which most formal competitive sport provision would have disappeared' (2000: 153).

The voluntary sector in the UK has grown extensively and is recognised as an essential part of society, taking on more and more roles previously confined to the responsibility of the state (Fenton, Passey and Hems, 1999). In sport the voluntary sector is dominant at club level, providing sporting opportunities mainly through the contribution of free labour time. Gratton and Taylor (2000: 125) have noted that 'in the UK a large proportion of sporting opportunities, from the recreational to the competitive elite, is provided outside the government and commercial sectors'. Thus, the voluntary or not-for-profit sector is largely made up of sports teams and clubs. Typically the organisational structure above club level is managed by NGBs that together provide the backbone to the way sport in the UK is organised. The main function of these bodies is to establish and enforce the rules of sport, select international teams and organise competitions. It is worth noting here, that it is not unusual for one sport to have a multiplicity of NGBs. Whereby, in addition to a Great Britain governing body, there may be separate organisations representing Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland. In addition, many sports also have separate schools associations, while several have distinct disabled organisations. According to Hylton and Totten (2000: 71) there are approximately 112 sports recognised by Sport England and nearly 400 NGBs. This gives an indication of the complex network of sports bodies, organisations and agencies that inform policy at all levels.
In addition to the sports clubs and NGBs, other voluntary sports organisations may be temporary, set up specifically to organise a particular sports event or competition. The amount of volunteering involved in staging major international events can be considerable. For example, the European Swimming Championships held in Sheffield in 1993 involved 700 volunteers, contributing a total of around 95,000 hours. Furthermore, volunteers contribute to the delivery of sport in a more informal capacity outside of organisations such as clubs and governing bodies, such as parents driving their children and friends to sports facilities and events. It is clear therefore, that the voluntary sector is not a homogenous mass but a mosaic of sports and recreation clubs, societies and related bodies.

It is worth noting that this myriad of sports clubs and NGBs in the UK has a long-established tradition of sporting self-governance. Authority to make and uphold the rules of particular sports in essence lies with particular governing bodies. In other words, it lies in voluntary organisations of citizens in civil society that is other than, and even distinct from, the state. Lincoln Allison (1998) has argued that most sporting institutions fit many of the definitions and fulfil many of the supposed functions of civil society. Drawing on the work of Diamond, he suggests that sports bodies make an important contribution to the fostering of an active civil society. According to the American social scientist Robert Putnam, the associations of civil society can create 'social capital', a set of social practices, which involve civic engagement and ideas of reciprocity. The implication is that such a network of civic involvement is necessary for an effective democracy, and provides a check on government power.

While civil society is in no sense a direct function of the state, it is however not altogether separate. The state lays down laws that demarcate the boundaries of the autonomy of the diverse spheres and sectors of civil society (Shils, 1991). Government, for example, is increasingly involved in partnerships with voluntary sector clubs across a variety of sports. Financially, the National Lottery has played a significant role, representing a major boost to capital development and the meeting of revenue costs in the voluntary sector. By March 1998 the Lottery Sports Fund had allocated 1,861 awards to voluntary sports organisations in England, 68 per cent of the total number of Sports Lottery awards. Furthermore the increasing interest in partnerships between local authority departments responsible for sport and the voluntary sector can in part be explained by the government's belief that it may be more cost-effective than relying on the development of direct public provision. The
British government is increasingly seeking to achieve its policy objectives through the co-operation of sports organisations.

Government then, has the capacity to strongly influence or steer, and co-ordinate voluntary and public sector facilities at a broader, national level. Local government has strategic responsibility over its administrative area for the provision of sport. Gratton and Taylor have observed that the government and voluntary sector also have an important and strategic national presence; firstly through the governing bodies of sport that has the responsibility for the organisation and administration of national and international competitions. At the international level, major sports organisations such as the IOC and FIFA are subject to political pressure by governments and interest groups. The second impact is through national governing agencies, such as Sport England and the Sports Councils. According to Roche (1993:80-81) the government constitutes a key ‘player’ in informing sport policy, flagging up the influence of the sports minister and relevant government departments, local authority departments responsible for sport and recreation, and the Sports Councils.

Distinguishing between the Government and the State

Before progressing any further, it is important to clarify a number of the concepts introduced above, in particular to distinguish between government and the state. The term government may broadly refer to ‘a set of office holders, the executive institutions, or a system of ordered rule’ (Kavanagh, 1996:226). Anthony Giddens (1994:310) defines government as ‘the regular enactment of policies and decisions on the part of the officials within a political apparatus’. He goes on to argue that ‘we can speak of government as a process, or of the government, referring to the apparatus responsible for the administrative process’. Confusingly, government is commonly used as shorthand for the state, and in parallel the state is viewed as synonymous with government. It is imprecise to interchange these concepts, and leads to a lack of clarity. As Milliband (1973:46) contends, ‘the treatment of one part of the state – usually the government – as the state itself introduces a major element of confusion in the discussion of the nature and incidence of state power; and that confusion can have large political consequences’.

Government then, is part of the state, but the assumption that the state is synonymous with government is flawed, overlooking the other facets of the state. Put another way, the state refers not solely to government, but ‘an amorphous complex
of agencies with ill-defined boundaries performing a great variety of not very distinctive functions' (Schmitter, 1985: 33). For example, Horne et al. (1999:200) refer to the state as the 'whole apparatus of rule within society', including the government, police, the armed forces, judiciary, state-owned industries and so on. In addition, the state also includes sub-central or regional government, public and semi-public regulatory commissions, corporations and quangos (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations) including the Sports Council. Furthermore, as argued in the previous chapter, the very notion of what the state comprises is not fixed but historically variable. This confirms Connell's (1990:509 cited in Hay, 1996:4) contention that 'drawing boundaries around the state is not easy ... the problem is compounded by the fact that the realm of the state as well as the form of the state changes historically'. Thus, the set of institutions that characterised the British state in the eighteenth century does not closely correspond to those today. In other words, state institutions tend to be fluid and unsettled, with changing boundaries and networks of relationships, which make delineating a single, short and workable definition of the state inherently problematic.

Such a broad understanding enables an examination of the use of state power within a range of non-governmental sports organisations ranging from the International Olympic Committee and other major international sports federations, down to the NGBs and sports clubs at the local level. It is clear from the above discussion that it is not possible to define the precise boundaries of the state as they change over time and between societies. As a result, there is a lack of consensus regarding which institutions belong to the state and which to civil society. Thus, the relationship between government and citizens has become ever more ambiguous as the number of stakeholders has multiplied to include quangos, public sector agencies, public-private organisations, voluntary bodies etc. as well as individuals. According to Cochrane (1998) it is subsequently no longer clear who does what or who is accountable to whom for what. This poses a number of important questions with regards the governance of sport in the United Kingdom.

Attention will now turn to outlining the prime motives that shape government and state involvement in sport. This will then lead to a consideration of the way in which government policy towards sport has developed.
Motivations for government involvement in sport

Perhaps the first question to be clarified is what are the key considerations that feed into government policy on sport? This is an important question if only because of the significance placed on intervention in sport by central and local government. A review of why government has developed what Allison (1993: 17) describes ‘the considerable and necessary politics of sport’ reveals a number of common themes. Coalter et al. (1988) identify six motives for state involvement in British sport. These are: urban deprivation, physical health, social integration, social control and the construction of community, utilitarianism and self-improvement, and limits to public provision. According to Cashmore (2000:331) one of the earliest examples of government intervention in sport is the prohibition of particular sports, such as some predominantly urban and working class blood sports; for example, bull baiting and bear baiting. However, in general terms, explicit legislative intervention by governments to outlaw or police particular sports is uncommon. Nevertheless, governments are increasingly under pressure, both domestically and from international sports federations, to regulate aspects of sport such as drug abuse. A second motive for government involvement in sport is as a means of improving military preparedness. For example, Canada, Britain and France all implemented legislation in the early 1930s or early 1940s to foster opportunities for physical training and fitness. A third motive identified by Cashmore, is that governments have found sport to be a highly versatile tool of diplomacy. In this way, international sport has been used to improve relations between states or as a vehicle for registering disapproval; for example, the Americans boycotted the 1980 Olympic games in Moscow as a way of condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

A fourth motive for government involvement, according to Gratton and Taylor (2000) is the failure of private markets in the provision of sport. They suggest that the private market’s allocation of resources often does not match what government deems to be an equitable distribution. As a consequence, government may use this as a reason for subsidising specific consumers or suppliers, in order to achieve a more equitable distribution of products, resources and sporting opportunities. This has most obviously manifested itself in ‘Sport for All’ policies that are founded on the general notion that non- or under-participating groups such as low-income groups, minority ethnic groups and the elderly should be targeted. A fifth motive is the possible health benefits that accrue from participation in sport and recreation. There is a long-standing assumption that sports participation, exercise and health are intimately
linked. This assumption can be traced back to the ideology of athleticism that linked
sport with health, both physical and 'moral', that was developed in the Victorian
public schools (Mangan, 1981). The idea that sport and exercise are associated with
health is still widely held. A study for the Sports Council (1995:128) 'noted that the
health and fitness message seems to be well known by children. Virtually all of them,
92 per cent agreed that it was important to keep fit ... In addition, 82 per cent agreed
that they felt fit and healthy when they did sport and exercise'. An additional motive
for government intervention is the wider social benefits that accrue from exercise,
such as those of a healthier workforce being more productive and subsequently
losing fewer days due to illness. Furthermore, the cost of preventing health problems
through subsidies to sports participation may lead to efficiency gains.

From the review of the literature on government involvement in sport, it has also
been suggested that participation in sport will 'improve life for many who would
otherwise be attracted to delinquency and vandalism' (Policy for Inner Cities,
Department of the Environment, 1977; cited in Gratton and Taylor, 2000:109). This is
the belief that sports participation facilitates social integration, inclusion and control.
This is evident in Britain, where successive governments invested in sports facilities
and schemes as a solution to urban unrest and youth delinquency (Cashmore,
2000:332). In this context, a need for sport to be more widely available is
emphasised, underpinned by a functionalist reading of sport as means of social
control, socialisation, cohesion, and discipline. The provision of sporting facilities as a
means of accommodating disaffected working class youth has been articulated in
several policy statements since the early 1960s, notably the Albermarle Report, The
Youth Service in England and Wales, and the CCPR's Report, Sport and the
Community. Both papers assumed a connection between the inadequacy of the
existing sport and leisure provision and the problem of delinquent juveniles. The
association between sport policy and social integration has continued through the
1980s and 1990s. An illustration of this is the Action Sport project launched by the
British Sports Council in 1981 following a series of urban riots, that was designed to
put sports leaders into local communities with the aim of fostering the integration of
disaffected social groups (Houlihan, 1997:63).

Gratton and Taylor (2000) also suggest that sport and recreation resources such as
national and countryside parks can be seen as 'public goods' that are associated with
a number of benefits. They also flag up national sporting success as a further public
good. As the White Paper, Sport and Recreation (1975) indicated 'success in
international sport has great value for the community not only in terms of raising morale but also by inspiring young people to take an active part in sport’ (cited in Gratton and Taylor, 2000:112). The benefits of sporting public goods are illustrated in the Coe Report (1985) on British sport’s preparation for the Olympics that highlight national identity, international prestige, and inspiring young people to participate in sport. Sport is therefore perceived as being able to transmit desirable social values and promote a ‘feeling of goodwill among citizens’ (Johnson and Frey, 1985:1).

Polley (1998) stresses the growing economic and cultural significance of sport as a principal reason for governments intervention in sport. During the 1980s and 1990s the public sector was involved in sport for economic development reasons. For example, a city or region may cultivate new sporting facilities to stimulate the local economy through the multiplier effects of the tourist expenditure. Illustrations include Sheffield developing facilities as the host of the 1991 World Student Games, while numerous benefits were attributed to the 1996 European Football Championships being staged in England.

A comparison with other countries suggests that while each national government has its distinctive pattern, there is similarities with regard the motives for involvement (Houlihan, 1991:66). A distinct theme in Canadian sport policy for example, is the prevalent use of sport for nation building and as a vehicle for enhancing national prestige through the development of international sporting excellence. Indeed, the needs of elite sport and the pursuit of national success dominated government policy during the 1970s and 1980s. There are also common policy themes between France and Britain; notably a concern to use sport policy as an element in a broader strategy to redistribute opportunity in society, as an aspect of social control policies, and to strive towards international excellence.

There is a danger of uncritically accepting a largely functionalist account of sport that neatly provides a framework for government intervention. When considering sport’s social role it should be recognised that sport also has dysfunctions (Roche, 1993:76) and can be divisive (Allison, 1986). Thus, sport by its very nature can be differentiating as well as integrating and unifying. Further, it is organised in ways that reflect and reproduce social divisions such as gender, class, age, ethnicity and handicap (Hylton and Totten, 2001, Sport England 2000).

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2 For example, in 1986 sport related revenues brought central government £2.4 billion. By 1990 sport related economic activity in Britain had risen dramatically, constituting £8.27 billion.
In summary, this review has illustrated that a number of considerations feed into government involvement in sport. It is argued that most government intervention has been motivated by an instrumental attitude towards sport where sport is a convenient means to an end, whether that end is social welfare, economic or national prestige. It should be noted however, that these goals are not always mutually compatible, and that the achievement of one objective may undermine the realisation of other goals. According to Riordan (1986) defining motives for government involvement is inherently problematic because of sport’s fragmented organisational structure, and the competing and sometimes conflicting aims and ideologies about the purpose of sport. For example, the objectives of mass participation at grassroots level may sit uneasily alongside the striving for sporting excellence. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that every argument is of equal significance. One might note for example, that the policy of the last Conservative government, partly as a response to the poor performance of the British team in the Atlanta Olympic Games, shifted from a ‘Sport for All’ strategy towards a policy that placed greater emphasis on developing elite level performers. In parallel, New Labour has made clear its intention to go ahead with plans for a UK Sports Institute aimed at developing elite level sport. There are, as stated, political dividends that accrue to governments that can associate themselves with sporting success, and that for politicians the prospect of political dividends is likely to outweigh other considerations. According to Johnson and Frey (1985:1) the trend towards growing government involvement has occurred within other social institutions, and subsequently there is no reason not to expect it to extend to sport. Similarly, it has become increasing problematic to view or defend sport as an idyllic activity separate or isolated from the scrutiny of government. This is in part founded on the growing commercialisation of sport and the recognition that sport is now ‘big business’. Johnson and Frey (1985) go on to argue that sport has acquired the status of a ‘public trust’ that must be protected. As a result, the intervention of government and the state in sport reflects the public interest.

Despite the rise of government interest and involvement in sport we must be wary of treating sport and sports organisations as simply an instrument of government. The responsibility for establishing and enforcing the rules of a sport, stimulating its development and organising events lies with that particular sport’s governing body. According to Greenfield and Osborn (2000) sports governing bodies possess considerable influence, with some NGBs demonstrating near monopolistic control.
over their particular sport. As Katwala contends, 'a primary goal of sporting federations has been to protect their autonomy and power – it is almost as if international sporting bodies, wedded to an absolutist conception of their own sovereignty, want to be the last vestiges of unaccountable power' (2000:7). Indeed, the organisation of sport in the United Kingdom was, until relatively recently, left untouched by the law and could operate to a great extent autonomously. However, the governance structures of sport are changing, bringing into question the future role of major European and national sports bodies. The control that they exerted in the past over the development of sport is now under increasing pressure from a range of stakeholders, including governments, the European Union, players' unions and agents. The increasing influence of commercial, in particular television and broadcasting, interests also represent a significant development.

The evolution of government policy on sport

According to Johnson and Frey (1985:5-8) the relationship between government and sport and the way sport is perceived by government has changed. Historically, amateur and professional sport has been viewed as an end in itself and that this perception was accepted by public officials. Having accepted this image of sport, government has been content to allow the sports industry to regulate itself and remain relatively free from government intervention. However, as argued above, a range of considerations can be identified that has led government to adopt an instrumental approach to sport and increase its involvement in sport.

Historically, sports legislation was largely permissive, while the role of the state was muted with the voluntary sector developing without direct state involvement (Coalter et al. 1988:48). A significant change occurred in 1935 with the formation of the Central Council for Recreation and Physical Training (CCRPT). This followed mounting pressure from the medical profession and the physical education movement for increased state funding. According to Coalter et al. the CCPRT (later the Central Council for Physical Recreation) 'became a forum for organised sporting interests' (1988:48) and was empowered, in part through state investment, to carry out government-sanctioned policies.

The CCPR were instrumental in establishing the Wolfenden Committee in 1960, which addressed a number of issues relating to organised sport under the umbrella 'recreation for all'. Their report recommended better co-ordination and an increase in government finance for governing bodies and sport organisations such as the CCPR
and the British Olympic Association. It also proposed the formation of independent Sports Council as one possible solution to the problem of increasing state involvement while not undermining voluntary activity. However, this suggestion was rejected by the then Minister of Sport, Lord Hailsham who argued 'either a Sports Development Council is the same as these bodies [CCPR; National Playing Fields Association; BOA] in which case it is really superfluous or else it is different from these bodies, in which case it is really objectionable' (cited in Coalter et al. 1988:53). Thus, the Conservative government wished to avoid politicising or professionalising sports administration. This was reflected in the continuing role of the Ministry of Education as the prime grant providing for sport. However by the mid-sixties, government had accepted sport as a legitimate responsibility. This shift was due in part to a growing concern with the potential for urban disorder led by young people, and 'the realisation that state aided sport could help to improve Britain's international sporting performance' (Hargreaves, 1985:221). According to Houlihan (1997:2) there was a growing awareness that sport provided opportunities for achieving political objectives.

The election of a Labour government in 1964 led to the establishment of an Advisory Sports Council that was charged with advising the government on matters relating to the development of amateur sport and fostering co-operation among statutory bodies and voluntary organisations (Gratton and Taylor, 1991). As Coalter et al. (1988:54-5) noted, 'the role of the ASC was to 'define the problem' and to set the agenda' ... more importantly the role of the Regional Sports Councils was, by bringing together local authority members and planning officers, voluntary sports organisations and assessors of government departments, to encourage dialogue and place leisure on the political agenda'. Like other cultural policy quangos such as the Arts Council and the Countryside Commission, the Sports Council was supposed to be independent and answerable to Parliament according to the terms of its charter, rather than to particular governments. As Roche (1993:81) has noted, the Council was intended to 'operate at arms length from the state rather than simply as an arm of the state'.

According to Hargreaves (1986) the establishment of the Sports Council in 1972 represented a sea change in the relationship between sport, government and the role of the voluntary sector. Instead of merely promoting sports provision there was a new direction in sports policy, recognising sport as an integral element of social policy. As the Royal Charter for the Sports Council indicates, the Council had responsibility 'to develop and improve the knowledge and practice of sport and physical recreation in
the interests of social welfare and the enjoyment of leisure among the public at large' (cited in Gratton and Taylor, 1991:14). Put another way, the Sports Council represented the voice of organised sport in government. Here it is worth noting the growing congruence between the policies of the Sports Council and those of the government (Coalter et al. 1988:74). Writing in the late seventies, Denis Howell argued that the Sports Council was by then 'a wholly owned government subsidiary ... doing the job the government wishes to be done and that is not necessarily the job sport needs to be done' (cited in Coalter et al. 1988:74). Indeed, there were and remain a number of constraints and influences on the Sports Council. These range from formal constitutional requirements such as accountability to parliament, to ministerial control over the appointment of Council members. Furthermore, there is a broader argument that ministerial influence is a prime factor in determining policy and undermining the 'independence' of the Sports Council (Coghlan and Webb, 1990, Pickup, 1996).

According to Bramham and Henry (1985) the 1975 government white paper, Sport and Recreation represented a watershed in leisure policy. It viewed sports provision as contributing to social welfare, capable of reducing boredom and reducing delinquent behaviour. However, the document also stressed that 'it is not for the government to seek to control or direct the diverse activities of people's leisure time. Nor do the government wish to adopt a paternalistic attitude to the many different providers of recreation in this country' (Department of Education, 1975 cited in Coalter et al. 1988:23). This highlights an important dilemma with respect to how sport is governed. From the mid-seventies the Sports Council had been in conflict with the government with regard the level of funding required to carry out its objectives. Meanwhile, successive governments have been reluctant to prioritise sport, taking an ad hoc arm's length relationship with sport (Polley, 1998).

While the formation of the Sports Council provides a clear illustration of how the relationship between government and sport developed, the role of local government is equally significant. According to Henry (1993:90) on financial grounds, local government 'is by far the most significant vehicle for the delivery of leisure services'. For example, in 1985 the Sports Council received in the region of £32 million from central government to spend in accordance with its various sport policies. In contrast, the same year English local authorities between them spent approximately £800 million, with the voluntary sector spending around £1.5 billion (Roche, 1993:81-2). Thus, the provision of sport and recreation is localised, with central government –
through the CCPR and the Sports Council providing some limited and additional funding - until the introduction of the National Lottery.

The provision of sport and leisure facilities was dramatically restructured in the 1980s and 1990s, as a result of strategic cuts and an ideological commitment to privatisation. The emphasis placed on privatisation through commercial tendering was formalised in the 1988 Local Government Act (Polley, 1998:26). CCT ensured that the providers were still accountable to the local authority, who stressed the importance of subsidised and targeted services to users with special needs and on low incomes who were unlikely to be catered for under purely commercial management (Collins, 1990).

According to Jackson and Nesti (2000:30) during the 1990s there had been 'a subtle but clear shift in the way in which sports policy has moved'. Underpinning this shift is the recognition that sport has value as an agent for the promotion of a variety of policies. This can be seen in the change from the rigid CCT strategy to a potentially more inclusive approach of Best Value. As the DCMS document A Sporting Future For All outlined, 'Best Value reviews must consider the wider value and benefits of the sports provision and sports development services to the community. This strategy provides the context for local authorities to link the value of sport to the wider benefits of health, social inclusion, regeneration, educational opportunities and crime prevention' (2000:39). While there are clear parallels between these objectives and those outlined in the 1975 white paper, Sport and Recreation, Oakley and Green (2001) argue that the period since 1995 is characterised by 'selective re-investment' in British sport. They identify the post-Thatcher period as representing a policy watershed, with the then Minister for Sport, Iain Sproat announcing that Sports Council activity would 'withdraw from the promotion of mass participation and informal recreation, and leisure pursuits, and from health promotion instead shifting its focus to services in support of excellence' (McDonald, 1995:72). This signals the end of a broad definition of sports development to a more focused, elite-orientated provision.

In summing up the evolution of government policy on sport, the increasing role of government since the 1960s has primarily been ad hoc. One reason for this is the fragmentary and disunited nature of government's responsibility for sport. In 1987 Sebastian Coe, then vice-chair of the Sports Council argued 'we need leadership ... [the sport governing bodies] must find ways of working in harmony and co-operation. Their disunity is a significant weakness in British sport' (cited in Roche, 1993:90).
Until 1997 there was no government ministry with the word 'sport' in the title, despite the position of Minister for Sport since the 1960s. Significantly, it is not since 1979 that the responsibility had granted Minister of State status in government, providing further evidence that sport is deemed peripheral and pushed to the margins by successive governments.

The changing nature of the role of the state as a provider in sport

Henry's (1990) analysis of the state's involvement in sport in post-war Britain identifies four key stages to summarise the changing nature of the role of the state as a provider in sport. These are: traditional pluralism, welfare reformism, the managerialist critique, and the New Right. Until the immediate post-war years the state's role was characterised by traditional pluralism in which the market and voluntary sectors were seen as the primary providers of sporting opportunity. The state involved itself only to the extent of supplementing the provision of those sectors where for example, instances of market failure resulted in inefficient distribution. Thus, sport was regarded by the state as the individual's responsibility, with government provision largely restricted to aspects such as national and local parks, playgrounds, selected sport facilities and so on. The second stage according to Henry can be typified by welfare reformism with its emphasis on the proactive role of the public sector in meeting the needs of groups who were disadvantaged in the commercial and voluntary sectors. Government funding was provided not merely because of cases of market failure, but because recreation and sporting opportunities were deemed worthy of support in their own right. This welfare reformism stage viewed sport and recreation as representing a right of citizenship. Hence recreation and sport were supported as a 'need' and a 'right', as well as a vehicle for other social benefits. In other words, it involved a shift from viewing 'recreation and sport as welfare' to 'recreational and sporting welfare' (Coalter, 1987). The developments of the 1970s discussed earlier, characterise this stage.

The third phrase – the managerialist critique – was in part a result of economic recession, concerns about state welfare spending, and questions about the value of directing funds to mass participation programmes. The goal of the New Right was to reduce state spending and state machinery. Countering this ideology with respect to state involvement in sport, however, was the perceived virtue of national success in the sporting arena, providing as discussed earlier, national prestige and international profile. Furthermore, any tendency for government to withdraw from involvement in sport was countered by the perceived value of sport in addressing social ills.
Nevertheless, a more commercial orientation now exists and policy is directed towards more corporatist styles of sports management.

The ‘failure’ of sports governance

While the relation between government and sport is implicit, with modern international sport presenting 'both problems (spectator violence, defection of athletes, and drug abuse) and opportunities for achieving political objectives' (Houlihan, 1997:2) the ways sport is governed are characterised by a complex and fragmented policy process. This is illustrated by the involvement of several different ministers and departments in answering sports-related questions in the British Parliament (Houlihan, 1991). Grayson (1994) also identified a range of government departments aside from the Department of National Heritage as having an input in sports policy. The involvement of so many government departments according to Houlihan (1991:30) 'poses formidable problems of co-ordination'. Roche (1993) for example, describes the sports policy community for much of the post-war period as being a 'disorganised shambles'. The confusion and lack of co-ordination of government policy on sport can be illustrated by reference to the Conservative government policy statement, Sport: Raising the Game, which was published in July 1995. According to Waddington (1998) the policy document reflected a lack of co-ordination between government departments and 'a woeful ignorance of recent research which was carried out by the government's own Office of Population Censuses and Surveys'. Roberts (1996) has also been deeply critical of Sport: Raising the Game, questioning the original premise of the policy document.

While New Labour has not been slow to recognise the potential of harnessing sport to further their interests and agendas, problems of co-ordination are still evident. The government's new 'sports strategy' announced in April 2000 is founded on the establishment of 110 specialist sports colleges and primarily concerned with enabling talented young people to take the fast track to the top of their chosen sport. Paradoxically, Britain is ranked bottom of the European league for the amount of the timetable spent on school sport, with the annual target for secondary trainee PE teachers being cut in successive years. As David Hart, general secretary of the National Association of Head Teachers, has argued 'the timetable is simply too overcrowded and the facilities in many schools are inadequate. We are not going to produce a nation of fit people let alone find the world-class talent the public so desperately wants unless the government tackles these two root problems (The Independent, Thursday 6th April 2000).
Conclusion

The above illustrations prompt questions about the strategic direction of government policy for sport and about how sport is governed. What then are the implications of the analysis of sport policy for the three-pronged conceptualisation of governance being used? The first application – governance as steering – emphasises the strategic position of government, which has increasingly viewed sport in instrumental terms, as a potential means to an end. As Parrish (2000:23) asserts ‘sport has been used by governments as an instrument of domestic policy. In this connection sport has been employed by governments for the purposes of social control, social integration, nation building and as a tool for economic development and health promotion’. However, this desire to ‘exploit’ sport is tempered by the limited capacity of government to influence sport policy. As this chapter has highlighted, the governance structure of sport in Britain is characterised by a high level of fragmentation, with a number of organisations – including the DCMS, Sport England, NGBs, and professionally or voluntarily run sports clubs – involved in the management and policy process of sport. Attempts by governments to influence this crowded policy space have as a consequence been tentative, confining sport to the margins of its political agenda. Moreover, while government and related agencies possess considerable influence, as in the words of Allison and Monnington ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’ (2002:124) the absence of a sustained and coherent government policy towards sport makes steering difficult. At the same time, since the early nineties there has been a movement towards ever-greater government involvement and control of British sport. This is reflected in the machinery of government that has emerged to assist British sport, providing substantial additional funding available through Sport England, DCMS and other government departments to harness the socio-cultural and integrationist qualities of sport for political purposes. Moreover, the publication of the strategy document A Sporting Future for All (DCMS, 2000) demonstrated an explicit desire by government for more determined intervention in sport, in particular a commitment to the development of elite athletes and fostering a contract culture with the governing bodies of sport.

The second conceptualisation of governance, that of governance as networks, contributes to our understanding of decision-making and identifying the scattering of policy actors involved in developing sport policy in Britain. According to Richards and Smith (2002:21) ‘policy networks are a way of analysing how, in an era when the policy arena is portrayed as being increasingly complex and diverse, government interacts with civil society, especially interest groups which are constantly voicing
their own sectoral demands'. This implies that the traditional role of central
government has in recent times been curtailed to the extent that government is now
only one actor among a 'differentiated polity' (Rhodes, 1997). The application of
governance as networks then, sensitises us to the numerous actors and variety of
terrains involved in the policy process. As noted in the previous chapter, the highly
fragmented organisational structure of British sport characterised by a multiplicity of
actors, often with conflicting goals and objectives, suggests there is little evidence of
an emerging policy community for sport.

The third application of governance – governance as good governance – and the
overlapping language of stakeholding, is constructive in exploring the multifarious
and intricate relationships between policy actors. Indeed, interest in sports
governance has been cultivated by concerns about the management of amateur
sports organisations in light of a shift from volunteer-run ‘kitchen table operations’ to
be replaced with professional managers striving to function in a more rational,
bureaucratic style (Inglis, 1997). It has also been stimulated by appeals for greater
organisational effectiveness and for more controls on potential abuse of executive
power, and by demands for more effective stakeholder representation and for greater
accountability (Davies, 1999). As argued earlier in this chapter, the ‘independence’ of
the Sports Council is open to question, due to the interdependent nature of its
relationship with government. Furthermore, NGBs are growing more dependent on
public investment, with grants to sports bodies increasingly conditional upon support
for government objectives.
Chapter Five

Research methodology and techniques of analysis

Macpherson et al. (2000:49) describe the research world as 'a set of multiple approaches to investigating empirical reality where there are often borders (if not barriers) between the major philosophical traditions and methodological perspectives'. Hence, there is no definitive methods rulebook that delineates the right and wrong ways of doing research. Rather, the social scientist is faced with a variety of routes and has to make strategic decisions about which direction to take (Denscombe, 1997) in order to arrive at a methodologically sound design. This process of negotiation and navigating the 'borders' and 'barriers' of the research environment is the central theme of this chapter. The purpose of this chapter then is to consider and evaluate the methodology that was undertaken in the empirical research that form the case study material that follows.

It is useful at this juncture to restate the original aims and objectives of the study. The overarching purpose of the research is to examine the utility of the governance concept in sport, focusing in particular on the sports of association football, cricket and swimming in England. Drawing on the three-pronged conception of governance delineated in chapter one, the key questions to be answered by this research are:

- To what extent can we talk about sport policy as being 'steered'?
- Is it possible to identify a policy community or network for sport?
- How useful are the interrelated terms of good governance and corporate governance in understanding mezzo-level governance, and relations between sports governing bodies and primary and secondary stakeholders?

A case study approach will be adopted, the value of which is the potential to deal with the subtleties and intricacies of complex social situations. Furthermore, the case study provides the researcher with the ability to combine both quantitative and qualitative methods as it entails more than one method of collecting data. The first part of this chapter outlines the justification for this research design, while the second considers the implementation of the study and the strategy for analysis. There is no clear boundary between research design and methods however. In other words, choosing a design also involves choosing a method, and so the implications of
particular methods have to be understood before a study is designed. Before embarking on a discussion of the case study approach then, it is necessary to develop some understanding of the general methodological issues that were considered in the formulation of the research strategy.

**Philosophical considerations**

Ontological and epistemological assumptions are integral to and inform methodology (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). They include the conceptualisation, design, implementation and analysis of the research. It is necessary at this point to recognise the distinction between methodology and methods. The latter refers to the numerous techniques or procedures employed in the gathering and analysis of data. Methodology, as defined by D'Cruz (2001: 18) ‘is a perspective or very broad theoretically informed framework ... which may or may not specify its own particular appropriate research method/s or technique/s’. The importance of understanding the philosophical perspectives we adopt in research is highlighted by Usher (1996, cited in Higgs, 2001: 50): ‘Any research, whether in the natural or social sciences, makes knowledge claims and for that reason alone is implicated in epistemological questions. It could be argued that all research is based on an epistemology even though this is not always made explicit – in fact most of the time the epistemology that underlies a particular piece of research is taken for granted. It is simply assumed that the research will be positivist/empiricist in its epistemology and therefore unproblematic as an epistemology’. An understanding of epistemology is therefore necessary in order to recognise what different kinds of knowledge there are and what different kinds of knowledge are generated by different kinds of research strategies and in different paradigms.

In debating the production of knowledge, two of the core concepts in the philosophy of social science are *ontology* and *epistemology*. Ontology refers to a view about the nature of social existence and social beings. It deals with questions such as that exist, what is reality, what is the nature of the world? In other words ontology is concerned with the study of existence itself (Flew, 1984). In contrast, epistemology deals with the nature of knowledge, about how we know what we know and in particular about what constitutes an adequate explanation of a specific event or process. ‘Central issues in epistemology are the nature and derivation of knowledge, the scope of knowledge, and the reliability of claims to knowledge’ (Flew, 1984:109). Here the different ontological and epistemological positions are central to
understanding forms of knowledge and transforming research questions into defensible claims or insights.

Underpinning the philosophical frameworks or research paradigms are different assumptions about what constitutes acceptable knowledge. It is generally taken for granted within social sciences research that positivism and phenomenology offer contrasting epistemological approaches. Positivism is premised on the belief that the social world is external and can be measured objectively. Positivist research aims to ‘measure, test hypotheses, discover, predict, explain, control, generalise, identify cause-effect relationships’ (Higgs, 1998:146). Positivism then, emphasises the search for measurement and answers over the desire to interpret and understand. However, the positivist paradigm’s predominantly objective stance, where the data determines the answers, seems rather too oversimplified and limited as a framework for understanding complex situations. In contrast, phenomenology assumes that the world is socially constructed, and that the researcher is implicitly part of what is being researched. In other words, phenomenology is concerned with meaning, developing ideas through induction from data and attempting to understand the phenomenon under investigation. The comparison between positivist and interpretive paradigms are neatly summed up by Wildemuth (1993:451): ‘It is true that the positivist approach, with its goal of discerning the statistical regularity of behaviour, is oriented towards counting the occurrences and measuring the extent of the behaviour being studied. By contrast, the interpretive approach, with its goal of understanding the social world from the viewpoint of the actors within it, is oriented toward detailed description of the actors’ cognitive and symbolic actions, that is, the meaning associated with observable behaviours’.

According to Higgs (2001:48) research paradigms can be used to reduce some of the confusion that exists when we use the terms qualitative and quantitative research. In other words, the fundamental issue is not whether one wishes to do qualitative or quantitative research (or what the terms actually mean) but the position of the researcher, what paradigm they are working from, their conceptualisation of knowledge and the purpose of the research. Thus, the research question shapes what paradigm the research should be located in, rather than preferences to do something one way or the other. Table 1 provides an analysis of the two philosophical frameworks identified in this chapter to represent a useful classification of research approaches. Higgs and McAllister (2001) argue that methodologies need to be selected in relation to their relative strengths and weaknesses and their
Table 1 A summary of the key philosophical frameworks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical framework</th>
<th>Research paradigm</th>
<th>Research goals</th>
<th>Research methods</th>
<th>Data analysis</th>
<th>Review issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positivism</td>
<td>Empirico-Analytical</td>
<td>To measure, test hypotheses, predict, generalise, identify cause-effect relationships</td>
<td>Controlled trials, surveys, questionnaires</td>
<td>Statistical analysis</td>
<td>Objectivity, validity, reliability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenomenology</td>
<td>Interpretative</td>
<td>To understand, interpret, seek meaning, describe, illuminate</td>
<td>Interviews, case studies, story telling, review of texts</td>
<td>Repeated return to data, extraction of themes, interpretation of texts</td>
<td>Soundness, ethicality, quality, valuable contribution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from Higgs, 2001).

alignment with the research question and the research paradigm being adopted. There is subsequently a need to shift the focus away from the simplistic qualitative/quantitative dichotomy to consider the epistemological and ontological factors that underpin the philosophical frameworks. As Higgs and Cant (1998:1) have suggested: 'it is important to note that neither term (qualitative and quantitative research) is fully satisfactory since in both cases qualitative and value-laden judgements can be used and interpretations are made of observations and findings. Similarly ... qualitative researchers can utilise quantitative techniques to analyse data. With this in mind some would argue that it is desirable to describe research approaches also in terms of the paradigm which forms the context for the research'.

In short, the question we should be asking is not whether qualitative or quantitative research is better, but what is our conceptual framework and within what paradigm are we working. It is therefore necessary to look deeper than the labels, as Olson (1996:1) contends 'the question underlying differences of research stances should be their ontological and epistemological assumptions'. Epistemology as a 'theory of knowledge' would therefore inform methodology through considerations of the nature of knowledge and how it can be known and validated (Stanley and Wise, 1990:26). For the purpose of this project, it is assumed that knowledge is socially constructed, and that there is no value-free science. This perspective challenges the positivist dichotomy between 'research object' and 'research subject', and the consequent positioning between the researched (as passive objects) and the objective researcher. Here, the epistemological position can be seen to challenge the apparent
objectivity of the researcher, providing an 'intellectual technology of seeing and doing the entire research project' (D'Cruz, 2001:18).

**Quantitative and Qualitative methods – a false dichotomy?**

As argued, the question of whether to do qualitative or quantitative research to some extent represents a false dichotomy, and has played a major role in the exaggeration of their differences (Bryman, 1988). As Hammersley (1992) contends, what is involved is 'not a simple contrast between two opposed standpoints, but a range of positions sometimes located on more than one dimension'. The social researcher therefore, may be involved in a difficult 'balancing act' through a series of trade-offs. For example, by seeking greater precision we are likely to sacrifice some breadth of description. According to Dey, 'beneath these rivalries, there is growing recognition that research requires a partnership and there is much to be gained from collaboration rather than competition between the different partners’ (cited in Fielding and Fielding, 1986). What is implied therefore, is the distinction between quantitative and qualitative methods ultimately fails to adequately capture the complex range of options that the social researcher is faced with. Rather, by reflecting on both approaches, it is contended that there are a number of other considerations need to be taken into account.

As a rough working definition, qualitative research relies largely on the interpretative and critical approaches to social sciences, emphasising the significance of social context for understanding the social world. Among qualitative researchers there is a tendency to empathise with his or her subject, to view the world through their eyes. The data derived from ethnographic work is often described as 'rich' and 'deep', generally indicative of the attention to detail and their sustained contact with the subject area. In contrast, quantitative research is concerned with deduction, measuring variables in order to test a hypothesis with replicable empirical evidence. The quantitative researcher applies a pre-structured framework in an attempt to become a detached scientific observer3. Similarly, the nature of the data emanating from quantitative studies is often depicted as hard, rigorous and reliable.

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3 The detached or artificial approach painted by quantitative researchers, in contrast to the qualitative emphasis on verstehen, or the natural is misleading. As Hammersley contends, 'to treat classrooms or courtrooms as natural and experiments as artificial is to forget that social research is itself part of the social world' (1992:164). Subsequently, the degree to which the researcher shapes the data is the important issue implicit in this distinction. The role of the researcher and their personal interests and commitments should not be denied in striving toward value-freedom, but acknowledged as an inherent part of the research process.
The view that quantitative and qualitative research constitutes different epistemological positions has led to an exaggeration of the differences between them, and as a result is frequently depicted as mutually exclusive models of the research process. As Filstead contends, ‘quantitative and qualitative methods are more than just differences between research strategies and data collection procedures. These approaches represent fundamentally different epistemological frameworks for conceptualising the nature of knowing, social reality, and procedures for comprehending these phenomenon’ (cited in Bryman, 1992:105). This implies researchers formulate their views about the adequacy for the study of social reality and choose their investigative methods, in light of siding between either-or dichotomies. An alternative proposition is to suggest that quantitative and qualitative research is each appropriate to different kinds of research problem. This illustrates a shift toward the research issue in shaping, to some degree, which technique is employed. As Bryman (1992:106) contends ‘the decision over whether to use a quantitative or qualitative approach should be based on ‘technical’ issues regarding the suitability of a particular method in relation to a particular research problem’.

In effect, an evaluative comparison of quantitative and qualitative methods is relative, shaped by their suitability in answering specific research questions. As Warwick and Lininger have highlighted, ‘the sample survey is an appropriate and useful means of gathering information under three conditions: when the goals of the research call for qualitative data, when the information sought is reasonably specific and familiar to the respondents, and when the researcher has considerable prior knowledge of particular problems and the range of responses likely to emerge ... Participant observation is usually more appropriate when the study requires an examination of complex social relationships or intricate patterns of interaction ... when a major goal of the study is to construct a qualitative contextual picture of a certain situation or flow of events’ (cited in Bryman, 1992:109).

In summary, one is drawn to the conclusion that each method of data collection is ‘useful for some purposes and useless for others’ (Bryman, 1992:109). For example, social surveys are likely to be particularly appropriate where relatively large-scale issues are concerned. Participant observation however, would be wholly inappropriate, but has its own strengths: the absence of a highly structured research design allows flexibility depending on the data collected, and is more adequate than other words, the social researcher is a part of the research situation and therefore both affects it and is affected by it.
the survey researcher to understand social processes. The clear path forward therefore, is likely to be a blending of quantitative and qualitative methods so that their respective strengths might be reaped. It is contended that none of the research techniques are sufficient in isolation, but together they can reveal a detailed and critical insight to the subject under investigation. However, these are not the only issues that are significant. The specific purposes of the research and the practicality of numerous strategies are paramount. Thus, in the words of Melia (1997:33) while the epistemological and technical discussions that underpin the research processes 'are interesting, but do they lead to any difference in the product?' In other words, the social researcher's choice is arguably influenced to a greater degree by other practical concerns, such as access to the subject group, time constraints, finance and resources, and political and ideological considerations.

In light of these considerations, what research method would best answer the research questions identified at the beginning of the chapter? One proposal could be to survey the recognised governing bodies of sport that may provide rich insights on issues of governance and therefore presents an obvious unit for analysis. Ferber et al. (1980:3) define a survey as 'a method of gathering information from a number of individuals, a sample, in order to learn something about the larger population from which the sample is drawn'. Surveys are widely used in social research as they provide a rapid and relatively inexpensive means of discovering the characteristics and beliefs of the population (Williams, 1997:81). It is however important to note that the survey approach is a research strategy, not a research method. Nevertheless, surveys lend themselves to quantitative methods that are considered to be reliable and valid, objective, and orientated towards producing empirical outcomes. Data collection in surveys is predominantly conducted through three types of questionnaire: the mail or self-completion questionnaire; the telephone survey; and the face-to-face interview schedule (Williams, 1997).

In evaluating a particular method, Sapsford (1999) suggests the social researcher asks a number of questions, two of which are relevant here. First, is survey research feasible? The answer would have to be yes given the relatively low cost and constraints on labour and time, although one acknowledges the pitfalls of a potentially low response rate. Second, is survey research the right way to approach the problem, to obtain the kind of answers that are required? It is clear that the complex, multifaceted concept of governance does not immediately lend itself to quantitative techniques. Indeed the very nature of the survey approach means that
the data produced is likely to lack much by way of detail or depth on the topic under examination. This leads us to consider qualitative methods that may elicit in-depth and rich information on a limited number of cases. As argued, the methods used by qualitative researchers exemplify a common assumption that they can provide a ‘deeper’ understanding of social phenomenon than would be obtained from purely quantitative data. In other words, qualitative research seeks to interpret social phenomena, to produce a rich understanding of the complex meaning structures that social actors construct in their specific social environments (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998:3). One of the most appropriate methods for triangulating methods and providing a richly detailed portrait of a particular social phenomenon is the case study.

Case Study approach

Hakim (1988:61) has remarked that ‘the case study is the social research equivalent of the spotlight or the microscope; its value depends crucially on how well the study is focused’. As noted, the value of the case study is its ability to deal with the subtleties and intricacies of complex social situations, producing ‘thick’ conceptual descriptions (Macpherson et al. 2000). Case studies can be flexible and multipurpose, while Shaw (1999:135) suggests ‘they may be descriptive, exploring and providing portraits of little known entities’. Schwandt (1997:13) summarises the conditions for case study research, arguing that ‘a case study is preferred when the inquirer seeks answers to how and why questions, when the inquirer has little control over events being studied, when the object of study is a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context, when boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clear, and when it is desirable to use multiple sources of evidence’.

Here case study is understood as a research strategy to investigate the rich complexities of social phenomena and their social environments4. Furthermore it is important to recognise that ‘the foremost concern of case study research is to generate knowledge of the particular’ (Stake in Schwandt, 1997:13). This raises the question whether outcomes from an individual case study is representative of a larger population? A common response of case study advocates is to deny that case studies are intended to be representative or typical in the sense implied by survey research. For example, Stake (1994:236) refers to the ‘intrinsic case study’ where

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4 An alternative way of conceptualising case study research is to regard it as a particular way of ‘writing up’ research findings. Wolcott (1992:36) refers to the case study as an ‘end product’ viewing it as ‘an outcome or a format for reporting qualitative/descriptive work’.

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"this case is of interest ... in all its particularity and ordinariness". In the intrinsic case study, according to Stake, no attempt is made to generalise beyond the single case or even to build theories. Simons (1996) acknowledges that case study research creates an explicit tension between the study of the unique and the need to explain, generalise and analyse\textsuperscript{5}. It is therefore susceptible to criticism from positivists who demand generalised explanations of social phenomena and predictive claims concerning actions and behaviours. Simons however, argues that this paradox is an essential part of the case study because 'living with paradox is crucial to understanding ... to live with ambiguity, to challenge certainty, to creatively encounter, is to arrive, eventually, at 'seeing anew' (Simons, 1996:238). Mason (1996:6) however, questions this approach stating 'I do not think qualitative researchers should be satisfied with producing explanations which are idiosyncratic or particular to the limited empirical parameters of their study ... Qualitative research should produce explanations which are generalisable in some way, or which have a wider resonance'. Clearly then, the issue of representativeness is a perennial concern of many qualitative or case study researchers. In a strictly statistical sense, it is difficult to generalise from a case study. If we carry out research on an organisation – be it a governing body of sport or a voluntary association – it would clearly be unwise to assume that all NGBs or voluntary associations share the same characteristics or behave in a similar way. Furthermore, the case study approach suffers from a number of limitations. Results can be shaped strongly by the interests and perspective of the researcher so that any subsequent re-study by a researcher with a different perspective may flag up different conclusions. For example, key issues may be overlooked due to the mass of different data, often from different sources, that the researcher must contend with. Similarly, the data collection can be time consuming and costly to undertake. In many cases, especially when dealing with organisations, access to key information may be problematic.

Before going any further it is necessary to discern what constitutes a 'case'. Hammersley (1992:183) broadly defines a case as 'the phenomenon about which data are collected and/or analysed'. According to Stake (1995:133) a case 'is a special something to be studied, a student, a classroom, a committee, a program, a relationship or a theme. The case to be studied probably has problems and relationships, and the report of the case is likely to have a theme, but the case is an entity. The case, in some ways, has a unique life'. Both definitions are vague and fail

\textsuperscript{5} It is also worth noting that where the case study strategy is adopted, cases may be selected for investigation on the basis not of its representative ness, but because of its a typicality.
to adequately recognise that identifying a case is far more problematic. As Atkinson and Delamont (1993:207) assert 'it is quite meaningless for authors of the case study persuasion to write as if the world were populated by 'cases' whose status and existence were independent of methodological and theoretical concerns'. That said, existing research suggests that case studies can range from micro to macro and may be undertaken with individuals, communities, social groups, organisations and institutions, and particular events, roles, relationships or interactions (Hakim, 1988).

According to Stake (2000) what is happening and deemed important within the boundaries of the case study is considered vital and usually determines what the study is about, and contrast starkly with other kinds of studies where hypotheses or issues previously targeted by investigators usually determine the content of the study.

Decisions about case study design crucially must address a number of issues, of which what is a case and problems of representativeness are two. According to Hammersley 'the concept of case study captures an important aspect of the decisions we face in research. It highlights, in particular, the choices that we have to make about how many cases to investigate and how these are to be selected' (1992:184).

Criteria for the selection of the case study

The case studies chosen in the empirical research were selected using the focused sampling technique. Focused sampling refers to 'the selective study of particular persons, groups or institutions, or of particular relationships, processes or interactions that are expected to offer especially illuminating examples, or to provide especially good tests for propositions of a broad nature' (Hakim, 2000:170). In other words, qualitative research can be focused selectively on particular persons or social groups of special interest for the research topic in question. In the case of focused sampling, the emphasis shifts away from the type of sampling logic used in quantitative research (Yin, 1994) to giving specific reasons for why particular cases are included. As a consequence there is a danger that some studies that intend to cover representative samples may actually cover restricted samples, or overlook selection criteria and produce biased results.

Focused sampling then, allows us to choose a case on the grounds that it illustrates some feature or process in which we are interested. However, Silverman (2000:104) contends that this does not provide a simple approval to any case we happen to
choose. Rather it is necessary to think critically about the population we are interested in and choose the sample case carefully on this basis. As Denzin and Lincoln (1994:202) have argued, 'many qualitative researchers employ .. purposive, and not random, sampling methods. They seek out groups, settings and individuals where .. the processes being studied are most likely to occur'. The basis for choosing association football, cricket and swimming as the sports under investigation was made on a number of criteria, which are summarised in table 2.

The emerging literature, particularly from Birkbeck College Football Governance Research Centre (see www.football-research.org) on issues of corporate governance and regulation of professional football provided evidence that the sport was ripe for research. Furthermore, a number of developments and dramatic changes with regard the way the game is organised and governed support this view. For example, the transformation of clubs into Plcs and growing media company ownership of football clubs, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission intervention in BskyB’s attempted takeover of Manchester United, and the increasing role of the European Commission in sport and football in particular as an issue of concern, may have significant implications for the game’s governance and affect the relationships between football's stakeholders. Cricket similarly, is a sport undergoing change and an emerging debate on its governance, particularly in light of problems of corruption and the failure of cricket’s governing bodies to adequately respond in an effective and transparent manner (Katwala, 2000:73-81). Swimming, the third and final case study was chosen as a sport with an emerging agenda in sports governance. The Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) is one of the major governing bodies in the UK and has taken an active role in addressing issues of governance and in particular, the ways in which the interests of its athletes can be better reflected within the organisation. While table 2 summarises the common features of the case study sports chosen, it is also important to note that the sports posses distinctive characteristics and features that are themselves worthy of investigation. For example, the ways in which athletes are represented flags up interesting issues in the case of swimming where the majority of swimmers are minors.

To sum up then, it was felt there was a number of reasons for selecting association football, cricket and swimming as the case study sports under examination. According to Yin (1994:137) ‘case studies have been done about decisions, about programmes, about the implementation process, and about organisational change.'
Table 2 A summary of the criteria for choosing the three case study sports

Common features of the case study sports

The NGBs of the case study sports selected share similar functions of establishing and enforcing the rules of the sport; stimulating the sport's development; organising competitions, responsible for the national team; and representing the interests of the domestic sport in the relevant international federation.

Swimming, association football and cricket are sports currently undergoing change with an emerging agenda in 'sports governance'. Of particular importance is the:
- Significance of government and related agencies (i.e. Sport England) in shaping sport policy of NGBs.
- The increasing significance of the media and broadcasters in shaping NGB policy.
- The way in which the interests of athletes, managers and coaches are represented in the decision-making processes of the governing bodies.

Each of the case study sports attracts a relatively high public profile, and are major recipients of National Lottery funding.

Issues of gender are prevalent in varying degrees within the three case study sports in terms of how they are organised and managed.

A range of common stakeholders in relation to the governance of the case study sports chosen can be identified. These may be summarised as:
- Government and related agencies, for example, DCMS and Sport England.
- The media and broadcasters.
- Athletes, managers and coaches.
- Supporters (or in the case of swimming, the parallel group of volunteers and swimming club members).

Between these types of topic, none is easily defined in terms of the beginning or end point of the 'case'. He goes on to argue that 'the more a study contains specific propositions, the more it will stay within reasonable limits'. In light of this, the selection of three sports flags up problems as the cases under investigation are simply too broad. It is therefore necessary to sharpen the focus of the case study, and to narrow the parameters of each sport by selecting specific research 'themes'. These are as follows:

- The influence of government and government agencies on sport policy of national governing bodies

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• The significance of the media and broadcasters in affecting NGB policy
• Issues of gender within how NGBs are organised and govern sport
• The way in which athletes, coaches and managers are represented in the decision making processes of NGBs
• The way in which supporters are represented in the decision making processes of NGBs

Again, these research themes were selected in light of emerging issues of sports governance and helped frame the case studies, as well as supplementing the original objectives of the research.

Research methods

As mentioned previously, the case study approach enables the researcher to combine both quantitative and qualitative methods as it entails more than one method of data collection. The case studies are based on a series of interviews with key stakeholders as a way of obtaining an insider perspective on their sports organisation and policy-making, and supplemented by a review of official governing body documents. Each case study then, will involve semi-structured interviews with a range of individuals across the stakeholder groups identified, that includes management and key decision makers of sports governing bodies, representatives of supporter groups, and athletes. Further material will be gathered and analysed (annual reports, press releases, committee minutes, and observation notes) to supplement and enrich the interview data. Such a strategy provides opportunities for triangulation; enables the blending of the strengths of the different methods; and creates an overall picture of the phenomenon being examined (Bryman, 1988).

Attention will now turn to reviewing the research techniques employed.

Semi-structured interview

Palmer summarises the objectives of the semi-structured interview as ‘providing the opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply, to uncover new clues, to open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, accurate, inclusive accounts from informants that are based on personal experience’ (cited in Burgess, 1982:107). By ‘semi-structured’ I refer to an interview agenda shaped by the operationalisation of the research questions, but retaining an open-ended and flexible nature. The intention is to allow the interviewees to ‘define’ the situation on the basis of their own experience and so to focus on what they consider relevant. This may be understood as a licence for the respondent to talk about an issue in any way they choose and as
a consequence, veer away from the issues under investigation. However, Bryman (1998:47) contends that this weakness may be turned into a possible strength, stating that ‘a phenomenon like rambling can be viewed as providing information because it reveals something about the interviewee’s concerns. Unstructured interviewing in qualitative research then, departs from survey interviewing not only in terms of formal, but also in terms of its concern for the perspective of those being interviewed’. Thus, the semi-structured interview provides qualitative depth by allowing interviewees to draw upon ideas and meanings with which they are familiar. As a result, it potentially provides a greater understanding of the subject’s point of view.

While the semi-structured interview is recognised as a valuable and commonly used research technique, a number of criticisms have been raised. First, the very nature of the interview, allowing respondents freedom to take the subject of discussion in whatever direction, raises a concern about the actual relevance of the data elicited. A second limitation is the way in which responses can be utilised and problems of comparison. Third, is the issue of anonymity: how can the social researcher provide detailed accounts of the subjects yet preserve their privacy? Furthermore, analysing interviews also presents a critical methodological challenge. For example, is the data to be regarded as ‘straight’ accounts of the interviewee’s experiences, or stories about the experience told as an exercise in self-presentation by the respondent? Silverman (1993) suggests that the interviewer faces a crucial dilemma with regard what to make of the data. On the one hand, positivists advocate the creation of the ‘pure’ interview – one that mirrors the social reality as closely as possible – a position that has been widely criticised in terms of both its feasibility and its desirability. On the other hand, social constructionists argue that no knowledge about a reality that is ‘out there’ in the social world can be elicited from interviewing because, in the words of Miller et al. (1997:99) ‘the interview is obviously and exclusively an interaction between the interviewer and interview subjects in which both participants create and construct narrative versions of the social world’. It is therefore necessary to recognise that the semi-structured interview is a social two-way process where both interviewer and interviewee are ‘practitioners of everyday life’ (Holstein and Gubrium, 1997:122). It is therefore accepted that it is unrealistic to have a neutral and uninvolved interviewer. Rather it is the interaction between the researcher and the participants in research that generates the data (Potter and Wetherell, 1995).
The focus here is not only on the ways in which people make sense of their own experiences, but also what types of discourses they use and draw upon in the process of this 'sense making'. Inherent in this is a distinction between meaning and the interpretation of this meaning by the researcher. The challenge for the researcher then is to convince the reader that their interpretation is as close as possible to the 'real' or 'intended' meaning of the participants (Alexiadou, 2001:55). A further issue of significance is the need to ensure that comparison between interviews is possible in order to heighten the validity of the research (Burgess, 1991). Clearly, consistency is difficult when carrying out semi-structured interviews due to their very nature of openness and flexibility. However, within the semi-structured framework there were specific or common questions and themes that interviewees were asked, thereby increasing the consistency of the interviews.

The concept and use of stakeholders is of particular relevance here, since it is related to 'focused sampling' where interviewees were identified in accordance with the focus of the research, because they are likely to shed light on particular aspects of the governance of sport. Due to constraints of time, money and accessibility researchers are unable to study the entire population. Therefore, practicality demands that we focus on a subset or portion of the population, which is called a sample. In this case, a blend of purposive and snowball sampling were utilised. Purposive sampling involves the researcher using their judgement in order to decide which respondents best suit the requirements of the research project. The construction of the list of interviews then, necessarily introduces an element of selectivity. In many ways this is inevitable as it is difficult for researchers not to bring some degree of subjectivity in terms of what topic to investigate and how to interpret the data. However, attempts were made to reduce this by validating the interview data with other sources, including documentary evidence. Snowball sampling implies that the research is carried out in stages. Initially, a few people with the necessary characteristics are selected. Then these respondents are used to make contact with new people that may shed light on the area under investigation. This technique is particularly useful when one has limited knowledge of the research field and wishes to generate a network of contacts. Snowball sampling is not without its limitations however. Interviewees may nominate other respondents with whom they have close links and share similar views, as potential interviewees. As a consequence, this could provide a restricted sample. In short, purposive sampling, while it is not as demonstratively representative of the target population, does have the advantage of being cheaper and quicker. It is also more flexible in that it allows the researcher to
take advantage of available, perhaps unanticipated respondents who may enrich the data.

The interviewees (see page 267 for a complete list) were therefore selected on the basis of being likely to shed light on particular aspects of the governance of sport, including individuals from the NGBs under investigation, athlete organisations, and supporter groups. As noted, the selection process crucially was shaped by practical considerations, in particular time, money and access.

Telephone interviews were used in a minority of cases, when it proved problematic to arrange mutually convenient times and places for interviews. This form of data collection has become commonplace and has achieved a respected status as a valid means of gathering information (Williams, 1997). Appointments for the interviews where possible were made in advance, and an outline of the interview was e-mailed to the interviewee prior to the telephone interview, to explain the purpose of the research. While it forfeits the visual contact of face-to-face interviewing, it retains the personal element and the two-way interaction between the researcher and the respondent. That said, Heaver and Kellard (2000) acknowledge that building rapport through telephone interviewing is difficult, and that silences are problematic as the interviewee may be thinking about their response.

Analysis of interview transcripts

The aim of the analysis is the writing, for each respondent, of a summary account that captures the qualities and characteristics of their perceptions and experiences. The process involves de-constructing the interview, trying to make sense of meanings and then re-constructing the data into some form of an account. Underpinning the stages outlined below is the recognition that participants use discourses and sense making techniques as ‘resources’ in constructing meaning, while at the same time trying to minimise researcher bias.

Stage 1: At this stage the aim is to familiarise myself with the data, and develop a sense of the whole for each interview. This included repeated readings of the transcripts while listening to taped recordings of each interview.

Stage 2: The second stage involves focusing on those parts of the text that I consider bears the ‘weight’ of the meaning. These sections of the data are then highlighted. At this early stage there is a danger that such a judgement may be hasty, but this is minimised by not dismissing the rest of the data and later re-visiting the
Stage 3: This stage represents an attempt to 'sort out' the data and involves a process of capturing the meaning of talk. Put another way, we are concerned with what the statement tells us about the phenomenon under investigation. Here, the data is categorised into 'themes' that help give shape and form to meaning.

Stage 4: The above stages so far have been concerned with a sense making ordering of the data. The fourth stage involves unravelling the participant's meaning, critically reading the data that is classified under each theme. Observations at this stage help to enrich and expand the individual themes by reflecting on contradictions, asking what is left out and why, and referring back to field notes made during and immediately following each interview.

Stage 5: The final stage entails synthesising the interview data into the case study accounts of sports governance. In the writing up stage the cluster of themes form the basis of the content.

Documentary analysis

According to Glaser and Strauss (1967:162-3) 'documentary materials are as potentially valuable for generating theory as our observations and interviews'. The primary strength of documentary analysis within case study research is that it can corroborate evidence from other methods (Yin, 1994). Forster (1994:148) similarly contends that documents 'constitute a rich source of insights into different employee and group interpretations of organisational life, because they are one of the principal by-products of the interactions and communication of individuals and groups, at all levels, in organisations'. In addition, documentary analysis, which enables the researcher to gather data unobtrusively, is useful when access to the research subjects is difficult, and documents can normally be collected quickly and inexpensively. Despite these potential strengths and their importance for research purposes and in permitting a range of research designs (Hakim, 2000), in comparison to the other methods covered in this chapter documentary analysis is 'not a clear cut and well-recognised category ... It can hardly be regarded as constituting a method, since to say that one will use documents is to say nothing about how one will use them' (Platt, 1981:31). The ways in which documents are used is clearly a methodological and theoretical question, as well as a matter for the technicalities that surround method.
It is obviously helpful to clarify what kinds of documents exist. ‘Documents’ is a general umbrella term that covers a range of sources including film, video, slides and other non-written sources. The most common types of documents however, are written sources such as strategy documents, memos, newspapers, letters and reports, and so we will primarily concentrate on these. Documents can be further divided into primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are those that came into existence in the period under investigation, whereas secondary sources are interpretations of events of that period based on primary accounts (Bell, 1999:108).

The distinction between primary and secondary sources is complicated by the fact that some documents are primary from one point of view and secondary from another (Marwick, 1989:200). Scott (1990) adds a further distinction to the types of document available to the social researcher, dividing documents into four categories according to their degree of accessibility. They are closed, restricted, open-archival and open-published. These categories reflect the fact that while materials may exist it tells us little about whether the researcher may gain access to them.

The amount of documentary material that is examined is inevitably shaped by the amount of time and resources that are available to carry out the research. In that sense it is not possible to analyse everything, and as a result decisions must be made about what documents to select. The selection of documents is significant in what is termed ‘content analysis’ that has been defined as ‘a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context’ (Krippendorff, 1980:21). As with using interviews, the process of ‘reading’ documents is not unproblematic. Documents do not stand on their own but need to be situated within a frame of reference in order that its content may be understood (May, 1997:171). Qualitative content analysis therefore is premised with the idea of process, or social context, and views the author as a self-conscious actor addressing an audience under specific circumstances.

Documents are written for a specific purpose and a particular audience and as a result are to some extent subjective. In addition, the range and variety of documents makes standardising analysis problematic. In turn, sources can be interpreted in different ways, and the guiding principle in documentary analysis is therefore that everything should be questioned. With this in mind, Bell (1999) suggests that a number of critical questions need to be considered when assessing the value of documentary analysis. These can be summarised as follows:

1. What kind of document is it?
2. What does it actually say?
3. Who produced it? What is known about the author?
4. What was its purpose?
5. When and in what circumstances was it produced?
6. Is it complete? Has it been altered or edited?

(Adapted from Bell, 1999: 113-114).

This checklist enables the researcher to assess the suitability of the documents and in the words of Marwick (1989: 233) to ‘squeeze the last drop’ from each document.

Because of the range of documents available, the analysis is necessarily selective in its focus, drawing attention to the research themes under investigation. As a general rule, the most recent annual reports and strategy documents were consulted to gain an overview of the sports’ governing bodies’ work and priorities. In particular, the NGB annual documents were insightful with regard their understanding of corporate governance, as well as the extent to which the governing bodies are supportive of government policy in areas such as social exclusion.

Survey

A third and final research method utilised in the empirical chapter is that of a small-scale postal survey of supporter organisations allied to First Class County Cricket clubs. A short questionnaire, which comprised straightforward, predominantly ‘closed’ response to ease completion and maximise return rate, was sent to eighteen supporter associations with the aim of identifying information about the individual groups, and more importantly, identifying representatives who may then be contacted and asked additional questions that may elicit greater detail or depth.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to provide a ‘natural history of my research’ (Silverman, 2000: 237). Implicit within this history has been an attempt to answer a series of important questions. Firstly, how do I intend to go about the research? Second, what overall strategy was adopted and why? Thirdly, what design and techniques were used, and finally, why these and not others? (Murcott in Silverman, 2000: 236). To adequately answer these questions requires in the words of Alasuutari (1995) a ‘detective story’ complete with false leads and dead-ends. Research is not a coherent, linear and systematic activity that it is often portrayed. In contrast this chapter has sought to illustrate that research is complex, often chaotic, and
sometimes messy process. There are a number of ways of seeing, knowing and
doing research and as a result, the social scientist is faced with a variety of routes,
borders and barriers. Furthermore, the research question/topic outlined at the
beginning of the chapter are shaped by the personal, theoretical, philosophical and
methodological frameworks of the research project. Each of these frameworks
interacts with the research question. For example, what is the aim of the research?
What is our understanding of how knowledge is generated? What issues of feasibility
need to be considered?

I have attempted to navigate this terrain by discussing the implicit epistemological
and methodological issues that frame or shape data collection and analysis. In doing
so, I have argued that knowledge is socially constructed and that the researcher is a
part of the research situation and therefore both affects it and is affected by it. In turn,
it is suggested that a case study approach will be adopted, the value of which is the
potential to deal with the intricacies of complex social phenomenon, producing rich
conceptual descriptions and insights. Moreover, the case study permits the blending
of research techniques as it entails more than one method of data collection. In light
of the problems with regard identifying a ‘case’ it became clear that the focus of the
case study needed to sharpen, and subsequently identifying a number of specific
research themes narrowed the parameters of each sport. Here it is envisaged that
the three case studies examining the sports of association football, cricket and
swimming will involve semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders
(decision-makers, representatives of supporter groups, athletes and so on) and
analysis of a range of documentary material (annual reports, strategy documents,
committee minutes etc.). It is to the case study material that we will now turn.
Empirical material

Case study a: association football

The social history of association football in England can be traced back to the transformation of traditional folk games by the upper-class amateur codes within the public schools of the nineteenth century. Horne et al. (1990) divides the game's development into a number of distinct stages, from the split between association and rugby football to the most recent phase characterised by the creation of a breakaway Premier League, and sponsorship and media influences upon the game. This is not the place to chronicle the history of English football however, as there is a wide range and real depth of scholarly work and sources available, but to identify overlapping themes that are salient to how the game is governed. These are not necessarily exhaustive of the range of such issues, but are selected as those that carry the most evident and significant implications for the governance of football. They are as follows:

i. The formation of, and relationship between, the Football Association and the Football League.

ii. The Taylor Report and the contemporary regulation of the football industry

iii. The breakaway Premier League, the BSkyB satellite television deal, and the 'new commercialism'.

iv. Football's internationalism and global dimensions.

v. The political salience of football.

The impact of each of these elements will be illustrated below, with reference to the changing nature of the governance of football in the English context.

i. The formation of, and relationship between, the Football Association and the Football League

The Football Association (FA) was formed in 1863, its original purpose to unify the games being played in the various schools and universities under a single set of rules. In the words of Mason (1980:14) this 'did much to strengthen the position of the Football Association as the game's leading authority'. From the beginning the FA strove to maintain the values of amateurism amid growing competition between

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clubs, and threats in 1884 from the big clubs to break away from FA control if professionalism were not legalised. Thus, during its early and formative decades, the Football Association remained wedded to the conviction that the game should, where possible, be ‘uncontaminated by politics, planning or commercialism’ (Wagg, 1984:24). Founded in 1888 the ‘professional’ Football League represented a very different set of sporting principles to those of the original members of the ‘amateur’ FA. The roots of the League lay in the emergent industrial regions of the Northwest and the Midlands, while the FA was principally based in the South. The regional, cultural and class-based roots of these different branches of the game have had long-lasting effects on how football has developed, as much in rivalry as in cooperation over the following century (Tomlinson, 1991). The Football Association has remained the ‘governing body’ of football, responsible for every club and league in England and for upholding a single set of rules. The Football League was registered with the FA, which set the regulatory framework.

For much of the post-war period the two bodies protected the interests of lower division clubs by functioning as a mechanism for redistributing power and resources from the old First Division to smaller clubs. For example, the FA actively prevented all the top players going to the biggest clubs through measures such as the ‘retain and transfer’ system and the maximum wage. The League imposed a 4 per cent levy on gate receipts (3 per cent from 1986) to provide a means of cross-subsidisation (Arnold, 1991) while income generated from broadcasting rights was evenly distributed, irrespective of the number of television appearances or audience appeal. Traditionally then, football had been regulated for ‘the good of the game’ by the FA and the Football League, through redistributing money (Conn, 1999).

The breakaway of the top clubs in 1992 with the formation of the Premier League, thereby ending the 104-year old league structure, according to Conn (1999)

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7 The establishment of the Football League was significant in the development of the professional game. The League was a mechanism designed by the leading clubs to protect their investment in terms of both capital and labour costs.

8 Initially, the Football League intended that a player could only represent one club per season, but this was later changed to allow for movement between clubs. Compensation in the form of a transfer fee – the cost of purchasing the registration document – became the norm. The League resisted freedom of contract (a player could not join a new club without the permission of the existing one) on the grounds that it would allow a few wealthy clubs to recruit the best players. They believed that clubs had to be able to hold onto key players if a balanced and thus economically viable competition was to be maintained.
represented a 'betrayal' of the FA's ethos as governing football for the common good. The FA and Murdoch's BSkyB satellite sports channel, Sky Sports, announced a groundbreaking television deal worth £304 million over five years that gave the channel exclusive rights to coverage of the newly established FA Carling Premiership. Thus, the top level of English professional football underwent a radical transformation with the restructuring of the political economy of the League (King, 1998).

What then are some of the implications of the key structural tension between football's governing bodies, for the governance of the game in England? From a deeply rooted amateur tradition in its governance and management, the face of football is increasingly complex and confused, with a shifting pattern of power between the FA, the Football League, the Premier League and the Premiership's elite clubs. The FA's traditional regulatory role as the 'game's leading authority' has been undermined by the influence wielded by England's biggest clubs and to a lesser degree, the Premier League and the Football League. As Gerry Boon (2000:33) has contested:

[It is] the clubs that have the real power in football ... The birth of the 'super league' concept, of which the FA Premier League was the first incarnation, was the initial manifestation of this power in a negotiating context. It represented an attempt by the bigger clubs to have a larger say in how the game was run, the future direction it would take, and the distribution of the financial rewards.

Crucially, there is a battle for power going on between football's governing bodies and the clubs that has shifted and blurred the lines of accountability, regulation and governance.

ii. The Taylor Report and the contemporary regulation of the football industry

The Hillsborough disaster and subsequent Taylor Report have played a significant role in the contemporary restructuring and regulation of the football industry (Taylor, 1998). This approach is further illustrated by a variety of protective policies including opposition to pools, club lotteries and the use of football grounds for dog racing, as well as Sunday matches and participation in floodlit games (Russell, 1997:91).

10 The restructuring has led to growing inequalities between the Premier League and the Football League. This is demonstrated by the fact that the average annual operating profit of Premier League clubs for 1995-96 was £3.8 million greater than that of Division One clubs (Boon, 1997:6). In 1997-98 the total revenue of the Premier League was £569 million – a growth of 23.2 per cent since the Premiership’s conception (Boon, 2000:29).
In the late eighties, the game was confronted with the depressing scenario of falling attendance’s, antiquated stadia, hooliganism, and declining playing standards on the pitch at both domestic and international levels – these latter trends accentuated by exile from European club competitions following the Heysel tragedy. English football at that time was hampered by chronic under-investment and a deeply rooted ‘amateur’ tradition of governance and management (Cannon and Hamil, 2000). The Taylor Report signalled something of a sea change in the sport. While Lord Justice Taylor’s report was concerned with the general issue of safety at sports grounds, he also commented more widely on football’s institutional failures. He highlighted a number of core problems. Firstly, Taylor reported that the League and the FA had both failed to regulate member clubs effectively in terms of fulfilling their safety duties. Second, the business management style of motivation of football club directors was challenged:

As for the clubs, in some instances it is legitimate to wonder whether the directors are genuinely interested in the welfare of their grassroots supporters. Boardroom struggles for power, wheeler-dealing in the buying and selling of shares and indeed of whole clubs sometimes suggests that those involved are more interested in the personal financial benefits or social status of being a director than of directing the club in the interests of its supporter customers (Taylor, 1990: para.53).

In conclusion, the Taylor Report recommended that ‘now is the moment for the fullest reassessment of policy for the game’ (Taylor, 1990:para.58) but in its aftermath there was no fundamental reassessment of the future direction and governance of English professional football. What there was however, was massive public investment to reconstruct and modernise the game. Government intervention was a core foundation-stone on which football’s recovery was based, with an estimated £78 million of public money in the form of grants and interest-free loans provided to the Premier League clubs alone via the Football Trust to implement Lord Justice Taylor’s recommendations (Heinitz, 2000). While the longstanding contribution of the Taylor Report has been to place the modernisation of stadiums and spectator provision high on football’s agenda, the failure of the game’s governing bodies to follow the wider remit of the recommendations has allowed football to ‘rush headlong into television-driven commercialism’ (Brown, 1998:1) with no decisive regulatory intervention.

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Despite the safety issue at the heart of the Taylor Report, for some clubs it represented not only a chance to change the social make-up of those attending, thereby providing a more attractive audience for advertisers, it represented an opportunity to generate profit by charging more for entrance\textsuperscript{12}. Notwithstanding Conn's contention, the key implications of the Taylor Report have been to force the issue of professional management and to rethink how the game is governed. In addition, Lord Justice Taylor's recommendations were influential in making football a legitimate public policy concern.

iii. The breakaway Premier League, the BSkyB satellite television deal, and the 'new commercialism'

Since the early 1980s, the elite English clubs have made a number of attempts to secure a larger share of the game's income. Initially they threatened the creation of a 'Super League' in 1981 but temporarily settled for an agreement that enabled them to retain all gate receipts from home fixtures. Further threats of a breakaway were diverted by the 'big five' clubs (Manchester United, Liverpool, Everton, Arsenal and Tottenham Hotspur) being able to negotiate their own television contract with ITV. From this they received 50 per cent of English football's £44 million income from television, sharing the other half with the Second Division (25 per cent), and the Third and Fourth Division (25 per cent between them). Concerned at the disproportionate distribution of television monies and the potential of further breakaway attempts by the big clubs, the Football League produced a document One Game, One Team, One Voice. In this, the League proposed to establish a new organisation, a council made up of representatives from the FA and the League to govern football, professional and amateur, from top to bottom, for the good of all. Commercial and television deals would be done for the whole of football and money distributed according to the needs of running a healthy game. The FA meanwhile, capitalised on the growing inequalities between English League clubs by formulating a Blueprint for the Future of Football. The document proposed the foundation of a breakaway eighteen-team Premier League, which would retain television income, rather than have it filter through to all 92 Football League clubs. Thus the traditionally amateur governing body of the game that historically had regulated the game for the common good backed the breakaway of the top clubs on the threshold of a huge influx of television money. The FA Carling Premier League described by Graham Kelly as the

\textsuperscript{12} Admission prices have increased 350 per cent over five years (Crabbe, 1996) with the cost of football spiralling at a rate of 16.5 per cent in 1996-97 (Financial Times, 16th September, 1997).
‘biggest upheaval in the game’s history’ (1999:79) formed in 1992. Its purpose writes David Conn (1999:50) ‘was simply to make more money for the big clubs and their owners’. The initial television rights deal with BSkyB netted the Premier League clubs £305 million over five years. In 1996 the contract rose to £670 million for four years.

Thus, the business of football in England has been transformed. The traditional and weak associational model of governance of professional football by the FA and the Football League had been challenged and displaced by a principal-agent or financial model of corporate governance (Keasey, Thompson and Wright, 1997:3). As Lee (1999:86) argues:

The directors of Premier League clubs have embraced a shareholder-centric, short-termist form of corporate governance, which unashamedly assumes that profit maximising behaviour provides the best means for welfare maximisation.

The more overt signs of corporate involvement in football are reflected by the ownership structures recently adopted by many clubs, most notably quoted public limited company (PLC) status. To augment their working capital, a number of clubs has turned to an expansion of their share ownership and membership of the London Stock Exchange. In recent years, twenty-one clubs have either a full listing or were quoted on the Alternative Investment Market (Hawkins, 2000). The main consequences of the new structures adopted by clubs turn crucially on who governs and on what basis they make their decisions.

iv. Football’s internationalism and global dimensions

In a global political sense, the modernisation of football is marked by two phases. The first phase is characterised by the gradual transfer of hegemony from the British Isles to Europe. The second phase is marked by the late modern ascendancy of the new world within FIFA (Giulianotti, 1999:24). The English FA were a central actor in spreading the game globally, but did little to preserve their authority in political and administrative terms. Seven European nations filled the vacuum in 1904, establishing the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). In its infancy, the Home Nations maintained a policy of distance to FIFA. As power was transferred from England to the modern footballing continents of Europe and Latin America, administrative control was also being modernised. A rationalised hierarchy of authorities governed the increasing global complexity of the football world. FIFA remained football’s universal power and invested its member associations with
authority at national level. To ease administration and organisation of competitions, FIFA sanctioned the formation of continental confederations as middle tiers of governance between the national and the global. Notably, within this modern organisation of the global game, the key political and administrative unit was established as the nation state. Thus, with the exception of the United Kingdom (and its four Home Nation associations) membership of FIFA is dependent upon national recognition by the United Nations. However, an increasing number of issues that are nominally the preserve of domestic political systems are being addressed within an international rather than a purely domestic context. An illustration of the significance of national or regional conditions and requirements is the Bosman case.

The judgement by the European Court of Justice in 1995 has had far-reaching implications for domestic clubs and leagues. In short the key finding was that Article 48 of the Treaty – granting all workers the freedom to move anywhere within the European Union to take up employment – applied to footballers in the same way as it applied to other workers. Therefore, the rule requiring a transfer fee on the expiry of a footballer’s contract with his old club when he moved to a new club in another Member State was illegal. There are however, limits and problems to the Bosman judgement. For example, what is the legal position of domestic transfers that do not involve cross-border moves? At one level of analysis, domestic transfers between clubs in the same country are outside the scope of European law. Yet to have one rule for ‘overseas’ players within the EU and a less favourable rule for home players would distort the European labour market by favouring overseas footballers. As a result, the English FA quickly amended its rules to bring domestic transfers into line and abolished transfer fees for players out of contract.

Giulianotti (1999) contends that the continued modernisation of football potentially undermines the centrality of the nation state. It is assumed that the global development of sport as it moves beyond the confines of national policy systems necessarily marginalizes the role of the state. In contrast, Houlihan (2000) argues that globalising pressures affecting sport are located within a pattern of international governance within which the state and international governmental organisations play a significant role. The extension of sport beyond national boundaries does not take place by bypassing the state but requires its active participation; sport businesses and international sports organisation operate within national systems of regulation. What is clear, is the process of globalisation has changed the context of governance beyond simply the level of the nation state. Rather, the rapidly changing landscape
involves increasing numbers of policy actors and has created less direct lines of accountability and regulation.

v. The political salience of football

It is only really in the latter part of the modern (post-1966) era of the history of professional English football that the visibility of government has increased. Developments in this area however, have been non-linear and fragmented. Generally, government intervention has predominantly been confined to responses to specific crises within the game. Most notably the crowd disasters at Ibrox in 1971, the Bradford City fire in May 1985, the Heysel Stadium tragedy three weeks later, and the Hillsborough Stadium disaster in April 1989 all evoked government initiated investigations and action.

Political discussion of football in England that evolved throughout the 1960s, 1970s and the 1980s articulated predominantly around a 'law and order' theme, identifying the game's problems as almost exclusively connected to the issue of hooliganism. This led to calls for, and subsequent regulation of, the game. As Houlihan (1991:18) contends:

> The issue of soccer hooliganism was defined as an issue of law and order rather than as one of crowd management, with the result that the policy responses selected included legislation to define new public order offences, to ban the sale of alcohol, and to increase the level of penalty for existing offences committed at soccer grounds. Part of the reason for the loss of control was the unwillingness of the sports organisations to seek a leadership role in its resolution.

Following this last observation, the government, the football clubs, the FA, the police and the courts all looked to one another to lead policy. Part of the reason for this was the general reticence about expanding their responsibilities outside their traditional boundaries. In addition, resources and interests within the policy arena were fragmented.

It is significant that during the Conservative era, football directors, clubs and fans were sceptical about 'meddling' government intervention; most notably the supporter-led campaigns against the ID card scheme, and resistance towards all-seater stadiums. In stark contrast, government is now perceived to have a vital role to play. This is illustrated by the government establishing a Football Task Force to
recommend solutions to a series of perceived problems in the game, and the concomitant debate surrounding the regulation of football. The implication is that there are failings in the way sport is being governed. Rogan Taylor (2000) argues there is a double vacuum at the heart of football's administration. First, Taylor cites the absence of supporter representation at the level of policy making in the game. Secondly, the FA's traditional role of regulating for the common good of the game has become skewed. In its place the Premier League has emerged, exercising considerable, and sometimes determining influence on a growing number of issues within the game. As Gerry Sutcliffe MP (2000:267) comments:

The FA, through FIFA, is responsible for the rules of the game, but it has failed miserably to protect and act in the interests of all who support the game.

Discussion

As these overlapping themes have illustrated, the governance of the football industry has changed fairly dramatically. In relatively recent times the growing significance of televised football in the expansion of non-terrestrial television channels, the flotation of clubs listed on the stock exchange, and the tensions between this new commercialism and football's social and cultural purpose has sparked enlivened debate over the governance of the game. The transformation that has taken place has created a highly fluid and confused situation, raising crucial questions about who governs and in whose interest? Significantly, the conventional and traditional hierarchy of power in football from FIFA, the world governing body, to UEFA, the European governing body, then proceeding to the FA and then to the individual clubs needs reassessing. The breakaway Premier League in 1992 and continuing threats of G14 for a European Super League suggest bigger clubs have a more influential say in how the game is run, its future direction and the distribution of the financial rewards. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the entrenched and established regulatory structures of the game in England and across Europe is under scrutiny. For example, Post-Bosman, European law has been used to undermine traditional sports rules and structures. In the event, the European Commission has found it difficult to come to terms with the specific structure of sport, and to accept that it has certain unique characteristics that set it apart from ordinary business.
Research Themes

1. The influence of government and government-related agencies on the sport policy and operation of the NGBs

Generally, professional football's authorities in England have remained largely unchanged since their conception. As Tom Cannon and Sean Hamil (2000:36-7) contend:

Football in the UK has a deeply rooted ‘amateur’ tradition in its governance and management. Even today, despite the fact that we now have an increasing number of specialists, experts and accountants involved in the game, it is important that the fundamentals of professional football in the United Kingdom are amateur. An examination of the boards of even Premiership clubs will show that they are peopled largely by non-executive, amateur directors.

This can in part be explained by the fact that football's governing bodies, the FA and the Football League, are self-regulating organisations, described by Julia Black as those ‘which have no formal legal or institutional links with government’ (cited in Gardiner et al. 1998:200). They derive their authority from consensual or contractual relationships with their stakeholders, not governmental decrees, while a primary objective of sports governing bodies has been to preserve their autonomy and self-interest. Moreover, English law recognises that sports governing bodies possess a fundamental right to freedom of association. This has enabled sports organisations to draw up the rules for the administration, management and organisation of their sport as they deem fit with minimal external regulation. In the case of football, historically, successive governments have adopted an arms length position, preferring a laissez-faire approach.

However, as elucidated above, recent domestic and international developments have highlighted a pattern towards increased governmental intervention and consequential legislation in sport. In particular, the government and/or individual Members of Parliament have increasingly become involved both on a local and national level, in football. This is illustrated by a number of MPs publicly expressing concern about the plight of relegation-bound Sheffield Wednesday from the Premier League. Such intervention drew widespread criticism, believing the politician's comments to be an unwarranted intrusion into sport. On the other hand, it could be argued that the incident merely reflects the growing significance of football on a social, political and
economic level. Indeed, one of the MPs justified his stance on the grounds that he would intervene in a similar way if a comparable situation arose in any local industry. Whatever the merits of the intervention, it is clear that opinions on the most effective way in which the national game should be governed, both within a particular football club and across the game as a whole, remain divided.

This is demonstrated in the internal workings of the Football Task Force, which contained a mixture of three groups: representatives of the football authorities, representatives of the supporters’ associations and a number of independents (Faulkner, 2001:36). The government appointed Task Force, established in 1997 to recommend measures on a broad range of issues, such as racism, disabled access, community relations and ticketing, was unable to reach consensus on the final report, and the general regulation of football. This was a pivotal moment, as Faulkner (2001:39) elaborates:

How it responded to these issues would determine how the whole Task Force process would be judged. If the Task Force had ducked its responsibilities and failed to meet the aspirations of both the government and the football supporters, it would have been derided and criticised and the Task Force process would have ended in dishonour. But equally there was no point in producing a report that was so radical but unrealistic that Kate Hoey, the Minister for Sport, would not take it seriously or have it approved by her colleagues.

In the end the differences between the supporters’ view and the perspectives of the game’s governing bodies (the Football Association, Premier League and Football League) were such that the Task Force produced separate reports. The majority report, backed by supporters groups, recommended the establishment of a Football Audit Commission (FAC) with power to sanction clubs and set targets for ticket pricing. In addition, it was suggested that an independent ‘ombudsfan’ should be appointed to adjudicate on the grievances of ordinary supporters, and refer cases to the FAC when necessary. It is clear that, in view of the financial interests of clubs and their shareholders, fan organisations remain sceptical that clubs and the game’s existing governing bodies are capable of self-regulation while providing appropriate mechanisms for protecting the interests of supporters. Furthermore, Andy Burnham (2001) believes there is a widespread feeling of ‘mutual distrust’ between football club boards and supporters across the country. As Sunder Katwala (2000:2) comments:
Just when governing sport has never been more complex or important, trust in how sport is governed has never been lower. Some sporting bodies – notably the IOC – have become synonymous with all that is worst about international bureaucracy, corruption and inertia.

Conversely, football's authorities proposed the formation of a part-time independent scrutiny panel with limited powers to monitor a code of best practice for clubs. Nevertheless, the football authorities' final paper according to Faulkner (2001:41) represented a 'step forward compared with their position three years previously'. While the two reports adopted a different approach they each acknowledge the need for greater independent scrutiny of the national game. The question now is whether the domestic governing bodies of football will act to meet the key recommendations arising from the Task Force report, or whether the government will intervene. Given the widespread interest generated by controversies in football, it must be questionable whether the government would wish to adopt a direct role in the running of the game. Certainly the perceived threat of a regulator being imposed on the football authorities appears to have awoken the FA from its slumber, announcing a range of initiatives to streamline its administrative and decision-making processes.

To conclude, since the early 1990s the way football in England is organised and managed has changed dramatically, with the formation of the FA Premier League, the advent of all-seater stadia, the transformation of clubs into limited companies, and the growing interpenetration of the media in the professional game. However, against this backdrop of change and the growing pressures of commercialisation and globalisation, the sport's traditional governing bodies have struggled to adapt. This has led to increasing pressure for what Cannon and Hamil (2000:46) describe as 'well-crafted state intervention' with the government imposing an efficient system of corporate governance and regulation.

13 The Government has agreed to establish the first ever independent external body to scrutinise the way the game is governed, in the shape of the Independent Football Commission (IFC). However, there have been problems over the identity and appointment of IFC members. In light of this, Chris Smith has proposed a Nolan procedure for the appointment of the IFC Chairman. The identity of the Chairman is yet to be announced, but as Sports Minister, Kate Hoey has commented, 'I think it is critical that, if the principle of self regulation is to be credible, then the appointment of a robust chairman to the IFC, who understands the issues, is very important (The Football Supporter, FSA magazine, April 2001:7).
2. The significance of the media and broadcasters in affecting NGB policy

In contrast to the vast amounts of money that have entered English professional football in the 1990s from the sale of television and other media rights, historically the marriage between football and television in Britain has not always been a happy one. Club directors had long been distrustful of televised live football, wary that it might adversely affect match attendance figures. Even as late as the mid-1980s the English FA routinely refused permission for terrestrial television stations in Britain to broadcast live coverage of major European matches fearing that televised football, domestically would reduce gates. Nevertheless, resistance by football's authorities and club owners gradually waned, reassured that regular, controlled transmissions of live matches could in fact widen the game's marketability and public appeal.

According to Szymanski and Smith (1997:150) the English FA traditionally has enjoyed a close relationship with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Independent Television (ITV) who shared football highlights. At this time television fees for matches were markedly low: in 1978 the BBC agreed a four-year deal with the Football League for £9.8 million (Cameron, 1997). Five years later, the first live football television deal was struck, covering five live matches each year for a period of two years at the cost of £5.2 million (Williams, 1994:386). The market for television rights was transformed in the 1980s by the emergence of satellite broadcasters that recognised the importance of offering premium sports channels as a 'battering ram' to develop successful pay-TV operations. In May 1992, BSkyB and the BBC jointly agreed a £304 million, five-year deal with the newly formed FA Premier League. This groundbreaking deal effectively excluded ITV from covering major domestic fixtures, with the exception of the UEFA European Champions League in which British clubs had tended to fair poorly. ITV responded by securing a £60 million deal in November 1995 to cover live FA Cup matches for four seasons from 1997. BSkyB were again a significant partner, paying £55 million for live matches except the final, with the BBC restricted to a £15 million highlights package. In 1997 BSkyB announced a £670 million deal with the FA Premier League for exclusive live match coverage over four seasons, and significantly including a provision for pay-per-view (PPV). The BBC remained a junior partner, paying £73 million for recorded highlights.

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14 BSkyB paid £191.5 million to screen 60 live matches per season, while the BBC paid £22.5 million for regular highlights, with the remaining £90 million derived from sponsorship and overseas television rights.

15 From 1954 top listed events, including the FA Cup Final, were deemed by government statute to be the property of the nation, something to be made available to all citizens. Their
while ITV were again excluded. This brief history of televised football, charting the size and terms of the agreements for exclusive broadcasting rights provides a ready indication of the key role of live televised football in the development of satellite television, and in particular BSkyB, whose profitability was transformed after it acquired the rights to Premiership football.

Clearly the stimulus to growth in British football has come from an injection of money from television (Williams, 1994). BSkyB’s acquisition of exclusive broadcasting rights to Premier League football for around £2 billion in total - £304 million 1992-7, £640 million 1997-2001 and the latest contract is worth £1.3 billion for three seasons - has effectively revolutionised the professional game that has a history of loss making and, even now, is largely populated by clubs that are characterised as small, or at best, medium sized enterprises. The contribution of television both directly and indirectly (through sponsorship and other commercial developments) has produced unprecedented income flows and has led to the development of strong international ‘brand’ identities for clubs such as Manchester United and Liverpool. As Spink and Morris (2000:168) observe ‘by increasing the public profile of football and the accessibility of matches, television coverage facilitates the maintenance of a widely dispersed fan-base and underpins other important revenue streams feeding the game, including commercial sponsorship, merchandising and ground advertising’. In short, broadcasters and BSkyB in particular, have repackaged the Premier League brand, while the exponential growth in the value of television rights has helped finance ground development and attract ‘star’ players from overseas.

The injection of capital from television has led to more commercially aware individuals and groups taking a closer interest in the sport (Symanski and Kuypers, 1999; Conn, 1999) so that ‘the commercial interests of the Premiership and its television paymasters are inextricably linked’ (Spink and Morris, 2000:168). Broadcasters have moved to forge strong links with key clubs (though restricted to less than 10 per cent stake) to try to guarantee themselves marginal influence over the distribution of television rights. This is evident in the spate of media companies, such as Granada, NTL and BSkyB acquiring shareholdings in a range of elite clubs. The definitive example of media groups buying significant share interests is BSkyB’s

universal availability, especially on BBC television, was regarded as part of the public service brief of the corporation (Williams, 1994:383-4).

16 In the UK Rugby union has also enjoyed a lucrative association with Rupert Murdoch’s BSkyB organisation, catapulted from amateur to fully professional status within the space of a few years on the basis an underpinning of media finance.
attempted takeover of Manchester United plc for £623 million in the autumn of 1998. The bid was referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, (MMC, now known as the Competitions Commission) which blocked the merger because it was against the public interest. The issue of ownership is acquiring growing importance as organisations like ENIC and BSkyB hold multiple stakes, and television contracts that had previously been organised centrally, are fragmenting as clubs across Europe ally themselves to media groups, which can help them breakaway from binding contractual relations with the game’s governing bodies. Indeed, Spink and Morris (2000) argue that one of the most contentious issues in recent years has been the mechanism governing the distribution of the broadcasting rights to televise matches. The arrangement for the FA Premier League to collectively sell their television rights was challenged as being anti-competitive in 1998. The subsequent Office of Fair Trading (OFT) investigation found that there was a cartel in operation, but concluded that it was not contrary to the public interest.

As suggested above, there have also been attempts in football to form rival leagues and challenge the traditional forms of governance (Caiger and Gardiner, 2000:3). The primary driver behind the formation of the FA Premier League was the leading clubs’ desire to secure a more lucrative exploitation of television rights. Similarly, the financial power of the broadcasters has affected the development of UEFA’s European Champions’ League and that the perceived threat of Europe’s elite clubs to abandon UEFA’s competition in favour of a media-funded European super league ultimately led to a restructuring of the Champions’ League in order to increase the number of fixtures and ensure that those clubs participating would be Europe’s largest (Boyes, 2000:72).

The interpenetration of professional football and the media however, has had a number of repercussions, including concerns about escalating player salaries, and a widening divide between rich and poor clubs. As Moss contends ‘the old four-division Football League has been split into the Premiership – filled with clubs that have become public companies and are packed with portfolios of expensive foreign players – and the rest (The Guardian ‘What a turn-off’, 22nd March 2002). The growing commercial significance of professional football has also ensured the increasing encroachment of legal intervention. The proximity of sport to broadcasting for example, has inevitably led to a closer relationship between sport and the EU. Parrish (2000:32-3) notes that the Competition Policy Directorate has examined four aspects of sports relationship with broadcasting. These are:
- The well-established practice of selling broadcasting rights to sports games on an exclusive basis, in particular with regard to the length of such contracts. In other words, the sale of exclusive rights, sold on long term contracts, may be viewed as a barrier to market entry.

- The joint sale of broadcasting rights on behalf of the participants.

- The manner in which broadcasting rights is acquired. The negotiating strength of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), a cartel of public service broadcasters who co-operate in order to enhance their collective bidding power, in particular have come under EU scrutiny.

- Finally, the Commission has investigated UEFA’s use of Article 14 to control cross-border transmission of football matches, and whether this constrains cross-border trade. Following negotiations between UEFA and the Commission, Article 14 was amended to become less restricted.

Furthermore, the growth of the pay-television market has led to concerns regarding restricted access to sporting events perceived to be of cultural or historical significance. In Britain this has prompted statutory protection of a range of listed sporting events, guaranteeing their availability on free-to-air broadcasts. The listing of specific sports events represents a significant effort to limit the threat of satellite and digital broadcasters to terrestrial television in Britain and to permit public accessibility to the key national and international sports events deemed to be of significance. The sale of the broadcasting rights to the 2002 FIFA World Cup Finals in South Korea and Japan to the German Kirch Group, which has attempted to auction the rights to the highest bidders, has challenged the ‘listed events’ framework. Kirch initially demanded €71 million for the UK rights for the 2002 World Cup. The BBC and ITV jointly offered only €55 million, sparking allegations from Kirch of unfair trading, who claimed the terrestrial broadcasters were acting together as a cartel and appealed to the EU, which refused to act. The final outcome was a joint bid of €160 million for the rights to both the 2002 and 2006 World Cup Finals, as well as BBC radio rights to cover both competitions.

In terms of regulatory action, issues of ownership and sale of television rights pose new challenges to football’s governing bodies. The expansion of international competitions and continued threats of a European ‘super league’ for example, have contributed to the elite clubs setting their sights beyond their national boundaries. According to Greenfield and Osborn (2001:188) ‘this may bring these clubs into
conflict with existing structures, national leagues and associations'. Meanwhile as a result of the close scrutiny that the sale of television rights by football's governing bodies is now under, broadcasters, NGBs and clubs alike must proceed with caution (Spink and Morris, 2000:195). This wariness is exacerbated by the growing recognition that the 'bubble has burst' following the announcement that ITV Digital cannot meet the costs of the £315 million deal agreed with the Football League for the rights to First, Second and Third Division games and the Worthington Cup. As a consequence, the clubs stand to lose more than £178 million, bringing into question the future of a number of League clubs that have become reliant on television money for their financing.

The impact of the media, in particular surrounding the purchase of broadcasting, raises important issues of governance. Financially, the injection of capital from satellite and terrestrial television and related revenue streams such as commercial sponsorship, merchandising and ground advertising, has transformed the game. However, the interpenetration of the media and professional football has come at a cost. According to Spink and Morris (2000:166) ‘the growing commercial significance of professional football has ensured the unwelcome attention and intervention of the law’. This is manifest in the mounting interest of the European Commission in the mechanisms governing the distribution of the rights to televise matches. Similarly, the emerging relationships between clubs and media companies manoeuvring for a foothold in the market, has come under legal scrutiny. As Greenfield and Osborn (2001:1) observe ‘as football has developed as an economic entity, we have begun to see the emergence of new threads and angles to regulation, moving away from public order and criminal issues and into the areas of civil law, and wider commercial issues such as broadcasting and merchandising’. At the same time, successive governments has generally been unwilling to take a lead role, deferential to the interests of media corporations, the biggest clubs that are starting to transcend national boundaries, and the bodies governing football. As a consequence, there remains a large degree of independence; however, ‘commercial pressures have increased and the sheer size of the finances involved means that there is a lot more at stake’ (Greenfield and Osborn, 2001:198). This is reflected in the collapse of ITV Digital, which has led to a number of football league clubs seeking the protection from the Court of administration whilst they restructure their finances. Despite pressure post-ITV Digital for the government to impose a system of regulation similar to that adopted in other industries, significantly New Labour has remained reluctant to intervene.
3. Issues of gender relating to how NGBs are structured and how they manage their sport

Football in England is irrevocably linked to notions of masculinity. It is widely regarded as a ‘man’s game’ in which women are seen as marginal, both as spectators and as players. In relatively recent times however, a number of key developments around the issue of gender in football – increasing numbers of females attending matches, and growth in the number of women players in the UK – suggest this situation is changing. Nevertheless, the perception that women cannot and should not be actively involved in football is still prevalent. Such gendered attitudes are reflected in Ron Atkinson’s now infamous assertion that, ‘women should be in the kitchen, the discotheque and the boutique, but not in football’ (quoted in Woodhouse and Williams, 1999).

According to Whannel (1992: 31) ‘the cultures of sport in Britain have been distinctively male, rooted in masculine values and patriarchal exclusiveness.’ These beliefs can be traced back to Victorian times that witnessed the emergence of dominant cultural assumptions, which equated manliness with sporting prowess. Where sport was concerned, women came to be viewed as weak and frail, passive and emotional, and seen more in terms of their reproductive capacity than in relation to their athletic potential. Rendered ill suited to vigorous exercise, women became the victims of an unfounded ‘scientific’ logic, which located them as ‘biologically’ inferior to their male counterparts. In this way, cultural values and attitudes came to shape the boundaries of female activity, and male superiority within sport became the ‘natural order of things’ (Parker, 1996). As Vamplew (1998:209) asserts, ‘considering Victorian and Edwardian social prejudices it was no surprise that women were virtually excluded from participation in professional sport.’ Vestiges of these beliefs are still evident within society today. Research has shown, for instance, that the practices of physical education in schools may well carry spurious gendered inferences towards ‘sex-appropriate’ sports participation (Scraton, 1993). There is also evidence of gender inequalities among managerial positions in sport. McKay (1999) has argued that female managers tend to be concentrated in so-called ‘soft’ areas (e.g. affirmative action, youth sport, human resources, women’s sport and public relations). Male managers on the other hand, are generally thought to dominate the ‘hard’ sectors: finance, marketing, policy development, men’s sport, elite sport and so on.
Historically, the development of women's football in England has encountered constant opposition (Hargreaves, 1994:251). At the time of the establishment of the Football League in 1888, organised sport in general was underdeveloped. However, in 1895, in the wake of the formation of the All England Women's Hockey Association, and exhibition cricket matches for women, a challenge match between women footballers was staged in London's Crouch End. Mirroring the geographical and social tensions already apparent in the men's game, the fixture was contested between the North and South of England. By 1902 the Council of the Football Association warned its member clubs not to play matches against 'lady teams'. Sue Lopez (1997:2) contends:

Football was considered to be an unsuitable game for women; it offended middle-class propriety and gave concern to some of the medical profession, who felt it would damage reproductive organs.

As Williams and Woodhouse (1991) point out, the FA Council's decision set a precedent for what became a long-standing policy of separateness in football, with men against men and women against women. Subsequently women's football floundered until the First World War, when a number of women's teams based around war factories were established to raise money for war charities. The most successful of these were Dick, Kerr's Ladies, a team formed in 1917 by a group of female munitions workers at an engineering works in Preston. By the end of the war, the numbers of teams had increased markedly (estimates suggest there were around 150 women's clubs in England in 1921, with the game particularly strong in the North and the Midlands) attracting sizeable crowds in some cases. For example, 53,000 spectators watched St. Helen's Ladies versus Dick Kerr's Ladies at Goodison Park. By this time the national interest in women's football was substantial if still relatively localised, a situation the FA found intolerable. Therefore, in December 1921 the FA instructed its member clubs to cease the staging of matches involving female players on the grounds of alleged maladministration of charity funds. However, the underlying sentiment of the ban was found in the FA's statement that it was of 'strong opinion that the game of football is quite unsuitable for females and should not be encouraged'. The loss of official sanction, and the use of grounds capable of holding the sorts of crowds which were frequently attracted to women's charity fixtures, secured men's future domination of commercial football and represents a blow from which the women's game in England has never truly recovered (Lopez, 1997:6-7).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Commentary</th>
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<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>March 23rd, the first recorded women's football match ends with a 7-1 victory for the North over the South.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>FA Council forbids its members from playing women's teams.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>During the First World War, women's factory teams began to spring up, raising money for charities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>April 30th, saw the first women's international fixture. Representing England, Dick Kerr Ladies beat a French team 2-0 in front of a crowd of 25,000. On Boxing Day, the largest attendance for a women's game in Britain, 53,000, witnessed a 4-0 victory for Dick Kerr Ladies against St Helen's ladies at Goodison Park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>December 5th, the FA bans women from playing on League grounds. The FA Council deem that the game of football is unsuitable for females and should not be encouraged. By the end of 1921 about 150 women's teams existed in England; representatives of 25 of them met in Blackburn to form the English Ladies Football Association (ELFA).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>The FA reaffirm its objections to the female game and continue to threaten its member clubs with dire consequences if women's games were played on their grounds.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>The World Cup success of hosts England acts as a catalyst for the women's game, with teams sprouting all of the country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>November, the Women's Football Association (WFA) is formed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>UEFA, the governing body of the European game, take action to sanction and control the burgeoning women's game. It requested that national FAs take charge of women's football, moving the English FA to rescind the 1921 ban on the use of league grounds by female teams and to set up a joint consultative committee with the WFA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>FIFA, the world governing body, instructs all the national governing bodies to take greater responsibility for developing the women's game. The WFA becomes affiliated to the FA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>The Women's FA Cup Final is screened live for the first time on terrestrial television by Channel Four, attracting an audience of 2.5 million.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>March, the FA rescinds Rule 37, which effectively banned mixed football in schools for the under-11s. September, the first Women's National League is formed, initially with 24 clubs divided into a Premier Division, Division One North and Division One South.</td>
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In response to the FA's attempt to stomp the growth of women's football, representatives of twenty-five women's clubs met in Blackburn in December, 1921 to form the English Ladies Football Association (ELFA). However, the ELFA lacked the necessary support and the organisational foundations, and the women's game lacked the venues and the strength in depth to manage successfully the transition.
from the staging of irregular charity fixtures to an autonomous regional league structure.

The staging of the World Cup Finals in England in 1966 represented a catalyst for the reconstruction of the game's image, and to substantially heighten the role and visibility of women within male professional football. Bale (1980) cites the influence of the rise of the women's movement in encouraging women in the 1960s to participate in 'masculine' sports, and he further notes the significance of proselytising individuals in establishing women's football in particular areas. As the number of women's clubs grew, the need for a national administrative body become more pressing. Accordingly, the Women's Football Association (WFA) was established in 1969, initially attracting forty-four member clubs. By the beginning of 1972 this figure had reached 182 and was continuing to grow. However, the WFA's reliance on a small band of volunteers, its crippling lack of finance, and the apparent opposition to the women's game from influential individuals within the FA, together constrained the effectiveness of the organisation. The FA's general attitude towards women playing during this period is reflected by the comments of Ted Crocker, the then FA chairman, on suggestions of mixed football at younger ages: 'We just don't like males and females playing together. I like feminine girls. Anyway, its not natural' (The Times, 26th August 1988). Significantly, the FA made no financial commitment towards the development of the women's football. Indeed it was not until 1984 that the WFA gained formal affiliation to the English FA under pressure by FIFA and UEFA for football national governing bodies to take greater responsibility for the development of the female game. As a result, the FA stated they would recognise the WFA 'as the sole governing body of women's football at the present time' – a statement that remained in place until 1993 (Lopez, 1997:60).

The integration of women's football under the management and control of the (male) Football Association triggered a number of significant developments in the women's game, in particular increased publicity and sponsorship. The international women's squad has a kit deal with Umbro, the domestic game has a four-year sponsorship agreement with AXA, while Sky Sports presently hold the media rights to broadcast England women's international matches, women's cup finals and high-profile women's Premier League games. This contrasts sharply with the acute lack of funding under the WFA that limited its attempts to administer and develop the game.
The women's game then, has undoubtedly benefited in some ways from its new links with existing structures and bodies of expertise within the Football Association. As Kelly Simmons, the FA's Women's Football Co-ordinator, explains:

The FA took over women's football in 1993 and what we've moved more and more towards is full integration across the departments and that's really the point where we are at now. So, marketing has somebody specifically looking at the marketing of women's football, and the internal and external affairs have an office designated to women's football, but the women's FA Cup, as it always has done, is run by the competitions department of the FA. But the bulk of it — the main development of women's football, the drive for the new professional league, the Women's Premier League — sits within this department which is the National Game department. This looks at everything to do with grassroots football: facility development, football development, women's football, disability football, county FA's etc all sit within that (interview, 7th March 2001).

It is important to understand how the FA structures the administration and management of women's football, which is not, as integrated with the men's game as in some countries abroad. Here, there is a Women's Committee which deals with (policy) matters relating to the female game. It is not autonomous, requiring the consent of the other FA committees and ultimately the FA Council before any significant decisions can be made. Below the Women's Committee, there is the Women's Football Conference, which is made of representatives from the former and the women's leagues in the pyramid. As Kelly Simmons explains:

We ask the leagues each year to nominate two representatives onto the Women's Football Conference from each league. It is an inclusive body and not just a talk shop (Interview, 7th March 2001).

Further down the FA hierarchy 'most counties have a county women's development group with key partners like sports development officers and sometimes you get club and league reps, and they develop a plan for women's football in their area' (Kelly Simmons, Interview, 7th March 2001). This rather complex organisational structure, coupled with fragmented policy development and implementation, means that there may be a relative lack of knowledge within the FA with regard to how the women's

17 UEFA had recommended in 1971 that national associations govern women's football, providing the impetus for countries such as Sweden, Norway and Germany to make
game is actually developing on the ground. In other words, the trend towards assimilation means that the women's game now relies on the expertise of the predominantly male FA staff that may or may not possess a good understanding of it. As Woodhouse and Williams (1999) contend, 'the women's game essentially lies with a small number of senior individuals within the FA, some of whom have little experience of the women's game'. Indeed, one of the recurring themes running through the development of women's football has been its relationship with the male football administration. The problem of uneven gender structures and practices however, are not unique to football, but enshrined in lasting structural forms in the key sporting institutions in England:

English sport is one of the most distinctly male of all social institutions. Sport has been played more by men, watched more by men, and crucially, controlled by men ... This is not a product of the nature of sport. It is part of a more general pattern in which social power is exercised by men over women. It is also a very specific product of the all-male upper and middle class world of the public schools and the universities. The key institutions of sport emerged from this all-male world. Just as their organisational rules and underlying assumptions enshrined class dominance, so they also enshrined gender dominance in a lasting structural form (Whannel, 1983:50).

This view supports research conducted by White and Brackenridge (1985) who stressed that women remain underrepresented at administrative, controlling and decision-making levels. Examining a range of governing bodies between 1960 and 1984, they argued:

It is clear that the proportion of women with power and influence in British sports organisations is very small, far smaller then the number of women participants would warrant on the basis of proportional representation (White and Brackenridge, 1985:104).

Explanations for the male dominance of British sports organisations range from general issues, such as the inappropriateness of the male model of sport for women and women's lack of access to political systems, to more specific issues such as the recruitment mechanisms that operate in sports organisations.
The position of women in football: from the terraces to the boardrooms

Evidence regarding female supporters in the formative years of professional football's history in England is sketchy. Rogan Taylor (1992) suggests the composition of early football crowds varied considerably, including female spectators, sometimes in their thousands. He goes on to cite the example of Preston North End, where they were forced to abandon the, often standard, 'ladies free' concessions in 1885 due to its popularity. There is also evidence of women supporters playing an important role organising a plethora of fundraising activities – from running tea bars and raffles to holding whist drives and jumble sales – to help sustain their football club. Between the wars – in contrast to the experiences of women players – the involvement of females as football spectators appeared to grow. Williams and Woodhouse (1991) suggest this can in part be understood by the improvement of facilities and spectator provision at grounds, as the game gradually became more respectable. This partial 'feminisation' of the football audience was not uncontested by some men who viewed the game as a welcome retreat from unnecessary female 'interference' and domestic responsibilities. The historian Nicholas Fishwick for example, provides an account of exchange in the Sheffield press in 1925, in which male fans accused affluent female supporters of 'butting into male affairs' by attending matches, and taking the space of the more knowledgeable, working-class male fan. To some extent, such attitudes persist today. This is reflected in Nick Hornby's distrust of the level of commitment of women football fans:

I have met women who have loved football and go to watch a number of games a season, but I have not yet met one who would make that Wednesday night trip to Plymouth (Hornby, 1992).

In 1990 the Sir Norman Chester Centre for Football Research (SNCCFR) conducted a survey of female football fans. The sample was based on replies from female FSA members. Respondents were asked for their observations and attitudes on major football issues, as well as their experiences as women at football matches. However, it is important to stress that the sample offers a somewhat narrow view, being made up of highly committed football fans and not representing those who stopped going to matches through intimidation or because of the standard of facilities available for women. 7 out of 10 female fans indicated that football authorities could do more to attract women spectators. The chief focus here was on an improvement in basic amenities such as toilet facilities (6 out of 10).

In addition, there was a strong feeling that respondents wanted to be viewed as 'football fans' rather than simply as women or female fans. This could be because of the stereotypes attached to women supporters such as the belief that they only attend to idolise male players or that they go because their partner goes. Furthermore, many wanted to see greater opportunities for women and that their role in the game needed to be taken more seriously. Female fans were also largely agreed in their desire to see more women in positions of authority in the game.

Today, according to most estimates in England on average women constitute between 10 and 15 per cent of football crowds at most clubs. It has widely thought that the number of female fans reflects the successful policy of the ‘feminisation’ of football that emerged as a response to the hooligan problem of the 1980s. The FA, in conjunction with private business sponsorship and senior police officers began a campaign to attract more women into football grounds. The government-commissioned Popplewell Report published in 1986 considered that women’s role in football crowds was ‘essential’ but failed to explain which women or why. Later, the Taylor Report following the 1989 Hillsborough disaster recommended that women be encouraged to football grounds as a means of altering the behaviour of some of the men therein. Thus, recent moves by politicians and those authorities concerned by the more traditional male practices such as chanting or swearing, have aimed at ‘civilising’ those aspects of male aggression through enhancing a ‘family atmosphere’ and encouraging women and children to matches.

The growth of family enclosures and the rise in marketing and commercial activities of clubs has increased the opportunities of work for women inside clubs. Today, many professional League clubs have women in senior management or administrative positions. Since 1990, the number of women working in senior positions inside FA Premier and Football League clubs has increased from 26 to 47 (Woodhouse and Williams, 1999) though often their role is subordinated to the whims of club chairmen and their boards.

On the playing side, since the late 1980s there have been gradual increases in the numbers of women in England who play football, particularly since 1993. There are now a number of FA-licensed Female Centres of Excellence, supplemented by a range of County FAs with approved plans for developing women’s football. These centres are predominantly based at professional male clubs, thereby benefiting from coaching and sports medicine expertise, as well as the kind of training facilities one would associate with a professional set-up. Together, they provide facilities for young girls to play football and develop skills. In essence, the playing structure for women’s football mirrors that of the men’s. Since 1993, under-16 and under-18 female squads have been established in England, while the league pyramid is designed to build a strong, broad base feeding up to an elite apex. In addition, there have been tentative moves towards including the professional women footballers into the Professional Footballers Association (PFA):
The professional players at Fulham are in the PFA. They are very keen. It's still early days really, but as I understand it the Fulham players have all the benefits that the male players would, and there are discussions about funding and scholarship payments, so they are well catered for (Kelly Simmons, Interview, 7th March 2001).

At a younger age, talented girls within a Centre of Excellence are also represented, with their interests protected in terms of restrictions of the numbers of matches they can play:

The Academy Director is responsible for making sure they are not pulled in every direction, and generally look after their development. So they are similar in that sense to the boy's academies. They all get an information pack detailing what to do if you have got a problem. But I have never had a complaint or a problem yet, it’s just sorted out locally. It is normally only when someone's daughter hasn't been selected. They stay in the Centre of Excellence until they are sixteen. Once they are out of that, they are into club football (Kelly Simmons, Interview, 7th March 2001).

**Affiliation or separatism: the governance of women's football**

The uneasy relationship between and within the women's game has made the debate concerning separatism highly topical. On the one hand, there is evidence that because women now have some share of the vast resources of the FA, there is greater potential for the future development of women's football. On the other hand, there are suggestions that the amalgamation of the two single-sex associations has in some instances meant that women have had to relinquish control of their own game. For example, Jennifer Hargreaves (1994:280) points out, the Women's Football Committee is dominated by male members, while 'in most contexts, male-defined practices and ideas dominate the women's game'. Hargreaves goes on to argue that women in women-only sports play important decision-making roles and are able to control funds and other resources that would otherwise have to be negotiated with men. Women's sports that remain separate in their administration and organisation may control the decision-making processes and resources but often do so from a position of difference that confirms their lower status. This has in part been the case in the development of women's football. As argued, the history of women's football has been characterised by numerous attempts of male sanction and control. It can therefore be suggested that separatism, to some extent, has
helped confirm ideas of difference and lower status. Pronger (1990: 18) for example, describes separatism as:

... a technique for maintaining a socially constructed difference between men and women, symbolically preserving through sports the power of men over women.

Thus, rather than strengthening women's position, it can be argued that separatism excludes women from power, status, money and interaction with others in the sports arena. The major alternative to inequalities between men and women has been to assimilate women into male-constructed sports organisations. This is clearly the route that the women's game is taking, with the woman's association affiliated into the men's association in 1993. Of course, the relative merits of this strategy are open to discussion:

Okay, the women's game may not have as much control as it would like but you weigh that bit of control against the investment and the staff, and the expertise and there is no comparison. I was out the other day with someone from the Women's Rugby Football Union, and they have been talking about merging for years. She was just blown away by the dramatic increase in investment in women's football since 1993. If you ever need an argument for integration, then this is it (Kelly Simmons, Interview, 7th March 2001).

### Significant developments in the history of club-player relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>First players' union formed only to be wound-up four years later.</td>
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<td>1909</td>
<td>Start of the season threatened by Players' Union affiliated to the National Federation of Trade Unions. The FA withdrew support for the Union fearing a strike and Manchester United players, led by Charlie Roberts, went on strike and were subsequently suspended by the club. The FA demanded all players resign from the Union and the first game of the season was called off. The FA later backed down and recognised the Union.</td>
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<td>1923</td>
<td>The Union challenged the Football League who wanted to force players that were already under contract, to take a wage cut.</td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>Maximum wage (then £20 per week) abolished following a campaign led by PFA Chairman Jimmy Hill.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>The George Eastham case. The English 'retain and transfer' system is ruled illegal in the High Court.</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>The Football League accepts freedom of contract for players. PFA lift ban on overseas players and the Football League introduce transfer tribunals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>A players standard contract and code of practice is introduced.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Jean Marc Bosman judgement. European nationals can move without a fee once out of contract, to another European Union country. No limits on EU players.</td>
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4. The ways in which athletes, coaches and managers are represented in the decision-making processes of NGBs

Given the widespread interest in footballers, it is strange that relatively little is understood about them and how they are represented both individually and collectively within the game. That said, there have been a number of worthy contributions chronicling the development of professional players from football's formative years (see Critcher, 1979; Fishwick, 1989). Less well articulated is the impact of significant changes within the game during the last decade or so on the complex power relations between club, player and governing body. How much is really known about the mechanisms in place to represent football players? What problems do players face in their relationship with their club? To what extent does the Professional Footballers Association (PFA) facilitate a voice for its members? In an attempt to shed light on these questions, a genealogical approach is useful to trace the economic and industrial emancipation of players, as well as highlighting changes in club-player relations. In particular, we will be examining the implications of (i) the abolition of the maximum wage and retain and transfer system, (ii) the Bosman judgement, and (iii) the European Commission's attempt to bring the contemporary transfer system into line with EU employment rights. Professional players have endured a long history of industrial weakness. As Greenfield and Osborn (1998: 19) contend: 'The struggle between professional footballers, their employers and the governing bodies to change basic terms and conditions has been a tortuous one'. The early history of English football, as argued, is understood as privileging amateurism. During its formative years, the Football Association believed the payment of players would corrupt the purity of the game. However, increasing competition between clubs, predominantly in the North, led to regular illicit paying of players by the mid 1880s. As a result, the FA grudgingly accepted working-class professionalism in order to isolate and control it. According to Giulianotti (1999:107) this transition reflects an obdurate social structure within football: the aristocracy and upper middle-class overseeing the rules, middle-class businessmen governing the clubs, and working-class professionals playing the game. Within this framework professional players had little control over their labour power. Introduced in England in 1890, the transfer system was primarily introduced to control the majority of players. Where they had been the free agents able to sell their labour to the highest bidder, footballers were now effectively the property of their employers. Players were tied to the club, worked within the confines of a maximum wage, and had few prospects upon retirement. Prior to the First World War, the 6,000 or so professionals
in the United Kingdom were in a ‘quasi-feudal market and work situation’ (Hargreaves, 986:69). The players’ union warned ‘the professional player is the slave of his club and they can do practically what they like with him’. Clubs as well as players were often critical of the system but preferred to curb its excesses rather than abolish it. In 1908 the FA imposed a maximum limit of £350 on fees, but this was difficult to police and lasted only three months. Between the wars, Arsenal and Everton led a series of unsuccessful campaigns by the richer clubs to cap transfers in an attempt to reduce costs. Furthermore, contractual restrictions and the uncertainties involved in playing professional football helped to minimise the assertion of rights. Therefore, while critics regarded the early transfer system as little more than a form of slavery, few were prepared to challenge it openly. Those that did were invariably forced to back down. In 1931 the Scottish international Alex James conducted a one-man strike by refusing to re-sign for Arsenal. Almost twenty years later, Middlesborough’s rejection of Wilf Mannion’s transfer request led to an eight-month stand-off between player and club. Mannion eventually returned but was never properly forgiven for standing up to the authorities. Indeed until recent times, the tightness of contracts, and the traditionally hierarchical nature of English football have not encouraged players to challenge authority. Moreover, individual players have rarely succeeded in defending their interests against their employers. Disputes within clubs are commonplace, but are usually resolved by simply dropping or disciplining the player, or transferring him to another club.

After the Second World War professional footballers were engaged in a collective struggle to enhance their economic situation. The details of that conflict have been comprehensively covered elsewhere: the annual bargaining over the maximum wage ceiling, the strike threats, the abolition of the maximum wage in 1960-1, while the ‘retain and transfer’ system was adjudged to be a restraint of trade for the 1963-4 season18. Above all, the retain and transfer system was about the power of a club to control its workforce. Players rarely had any say in whether they stayed or went, and that unlike other workers, they were not able to change employers at will. Here it may suffice to highlight two significant implications of these developments. The first of

18 The transfer and retain system was challenged by the footballer George Eastham as constituting an unlawful restraint of trade. Under the system on termination of a contract a club could decide to place a player on the retain list. As a consequence the player so retained was prohibited to play for any club in any country that was a member of FIFA. If the club refused to put him on the transfer list he had no choice but to accept the offer of a new contract from the club if he wished to work as a professional footballer. These regulations were declared in restraint of trade, although the rules enabling a club to require a transfer fee were upheld.
these, according to Critcher (1979) is the clear roots of the struggle in working-class activity outside the game. This is neatly summarised in a *Times* editorial at the moment of the abolition:

They ask for two freedoms: freedom for a player to negotiate his own contract of employment, and freedom to negotiate his own wages with his employer. These are freedoms which are basic, unarguable, and the right of every working man in Britain (cited in Critcher, 1979: 162).

Interestingly, there is evidence post-Bosman (see below) that the movement towards securing workers' rights has tilted the other way. In light of discussions on restructuring the transfer system the chief executive of the PFA, Gordon Taylor commented:

At first sight it may appear right and proper that footballers should have the same right as other workers. But it is not that simple. Business has copyright and patent laws to encourage and reward research and development. The transfer system is football's way of investing in development of talent. If football is to be compared to a business, it needs similar protection, and not de-regulation (*The Observer*, 3rd September 2000).

The second implication is the attitude adopted by the FA and the Football League, who in order to prevent the poaching of players and ensure a stable workforce, created a system which deprived footballers of the basic right to freedom of movement. The Eastham case signalled the beginning of a shift in the balance of power away from the governing bodies of English football, and has since accelerated with the implications of the Bosman ruling. Redhead (cited in Polley, 1998: 117) meanwhile has argued that the two victories must be seen as 'symbolic breakthroughs rather than fundamental changes in the legal and social status of professional footballers' as the employment structure that survived still relied upon stark inequalities in wage distribution, and restrictions on the employees' freedoms that would be unacceptable in other professions.

These two cases clearly helped to establish footballers on a more professional footing in the early 1960s, and helped to clarify to the most successful players that they were marketable careerists with greater opportunities for earning than the previous generation of footballers. More broadly, economic changes in football in the
post-war period helped to establish a climate in which the most organised professionals were gradually able to win concessions from clubs and football's governing bodies. Threatened strike action in 1977-8 led to a greater freedom of contract, with players able to move when their existing contracts expired in return for compensation from the new club. The domestic implications of the 1995 European ruling on Marc Bosman have extended these freedoms by allowing players at the end of their contract to move clubs without requiring transfer fees or negotiations.

In 1995 the European Court of Justice heard the protracted case of Belgian Footballer Jean Marc Bosman. In 1990 Bosman was registered with Belgian club RFC Liege who wanted to retain him on a quarter of his existing wages. Bosman refused and requested a transfer. He was placed on the transfer list by Liege at a relatively high price and was subsequently unable to find a club willing to take him. As a result, Bosman began litigation in the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg claiming damages of £300,000 from the Belgian Football Association, UEFA and RFC Liege for restraint of trade. In other words, they prevented his freedom of movement as a worker within the European Union contrary to EU law. In response, UEFA argued that football be deemed a special case, that it is a sport as well as a business, so that special arrangements to side-step normative EU laws are justified. In September 1995, the European Court of Justice ruled in favour of Bosman, though it quickly became clear that legal opinion viewed the decision as not applicable to transfers within European countries, only between them.

Bosman's case centred on the issue of players' rights to challenge restrictions placed on their freedom to choose where to sell their athletic labour. His victory represented a dramatic and ultimately far-reaching development for European players and clubs, and was welcomed by most professional footballers. According to Giulianotti (1999:122) the Bosman ruling had three essential impacts. Firstly, the mobility of players has increased dramatically, especially in Europe. In turn, new patterns of labour migration have emerged, for example Nordic/Scandinavian players attracted to English football (see Stead and Maguire, 1999). Secondly, the balance of power within European football has tilted increasingly towards the most affluent clubs who have greater access to the best professional labour. Thirdly, the income of the game's top players has increased greatly, as clubs signing players through Bosman (and therefore no transfer fee) are prepared to pay higher signing fees and salaries.

19 In a poll undertaken by the magazine Four Four Two, 93 per cent of all players in the Premier and Nationwide Leagues approved of the Bosman ruling.
However, this improved bargaining position for players does not necessarily extend to all. By definition, the improved ability to sell your labour applies most to those whose abilities are in the greatest demand. As a result, player power has increased disproportionately at the highest levels of English football. The contrast in the relative positions of professionals underlines the difficult balancing act that the PFA has to perform with regard to recent developments. On the one hand, the PFA could be seen to welcome the resultant increased employment freedoms for its members and supports the improvements in salaries and length of contracts secured by some. On the other hand, there is a cost to many of its other members employed at the lower echelons of the game who, in part as a consequence of Bosman, are in a more uncertain and stressful profession. Chief Executive of the PFA, Gordon Taylor however, has refuted any suggestions that the disparity in players’ economic position creates any problems:

It’s perceived to be (a problem) but we’ve always had a spread of earnings since the abolition of the maximum wage. Average earnings at the top level are £250-500,000 a year, in Division One its £50,000-150,000, Division Two £30-40,000 and Division Three about £25,000. So yes, you would wonder if players have common interests but in 1992 when we polled them about the Premier League breakaway, 92 per cent were in favour of supporting players in lower divisions to make sure that agreements on pensions and standard contracts held together. Obviously there’s much more worry about job security lower down, whereas at the top level players have never had more self-confidence in their ability to maximise their earnings (When Saturday Comes, 158, April 2000).

While Bosman had far reaching ramifications for football, there has since been a further attempt to restructure the game’s transfer system on the grounds that it contravenes EU laws on free movement of labour. The European Commission’s intervention has been widely interpreted as a reaction to the spiralling fees in European football which culminated in the multimillion pound transfers involving Hernan Crespo and Luis Figo. More specifically it was prompted by the action of Perugia in successfully objecting to the payment of a fee for the transfer of Massimo Lombardo from Grasshoppers Zürich. In truth however, the EC’s intervention is not about Crespo, Figo or Lombardo but the latest offensive in a long battle to force football to accept its status as an industry like any other. Specifically, the European Commission believes that all workers within Europe should have the same rights.
This includes the right to resign from your job and change employer, after a specified period of notice. Thus, the EC contends that footballers should be given the same rights as ordinary workers in the European Union and have the right to terminate their contracts, and move to another club.

Significantly, the international players' union, FIFPro was not represented in much of the negotiation process after walking out, unhappy with the lack of movement from FIFA and UEFA. The EC had long declared it necessary for the players to have a meaningful say in the discussions over the transfer system. An agreement however, was struck without the players' representatives present and against a backdrop of criticism from various people within the game. Jean-Jacques Amorfini, vice-president of the French Players' Union argued 'they (UEFA and FIFA) are treating the players like imbeciles. We have been taken for turkeys' (World Soccer, 2001, 41, 8, pp.12-13). Arsenal manager, Arsene Wenger has also been fiercely critical of FIFA's reaction to the EC which would abolish the transfer system and permit players over twenty four complete freedom of movement:

"We are all against that and I think there will be a huge strike if that goes through because nobody wants what FIFA is proposing ... It is disrespectful to the fans who love their players and their team. I feel really, really amazed that our football world would come up with that proposal" (The Guardian, September 3, 2000).

Gordon Taylor, representing FIFPro, is equally sceptical about the proposed new system:

"The principles are ambiguous and open to different interpretations. In claiming to allow players greater freedom it appears players can leave clubs, but all the 'exits' have been blocked up by various measures. As a result it is difficult to see any particular benefits for players compared to our present situation, and there are clear instances where it is worse turkeys' (World Soccer, 2001, 41, 8, p.12-13).

From the above legal milestones we can trace a movement from limitations on wages and the historical restriction on changing clubs to a position of free market negotiation of terms and freedom of movement without a transfer fee at the end of the contractual period. Furthermore, alongside this shift towards freedom of movement has been a growing debate about legal rights and duties. Legally, football
has found that an increasing number of violent incidents on the pitch are being dealt with by courts of law, rather than by the disciplinary procedures of the Football Association. For example, in November 1998 Bradford City forward Gordon Watson was awarded damages in the High Court as a result of a broken leg caused by a late tackle by Huddersfield Town's Kevin Gray. Underpinning this trend is the idea that athletes are members of the public and should experience the same level of protection available to all. Footballers participate in a relatively short career and if they are deprived of any significant part of their livelihood they should retain the right to redress the position. Moreover, professional football players are known to suffer higher rates of injury than many other occupations. For UK industry and commerce, the average rate for lost-time accidents over the period 1994 to 1997 was 0.004 injuries per 1,000 hours worked. Over the same period, the equivalent rate of injury in English professional football was 7 injuries per 1,000 hours of competition (Fuller, 2000:55). Player protection is therefore a crucial element, particularly in light of new accounting rules which require clubs to include players in the balance sheet. Players are now recognised not as slaves as previously, but assets and their success or failure can have a significant impact on share prices of football clubs. This transformation has happened against the rise of the Professional Footballers' Association (PFA) and subsequent collective action that has contributed towards the economic and industrial emancipation of footballers, and our attention will now turn to focus on the role of the players' union.

**Professional Footballers Association (PFA)**

An initial attempt to form a players' union was instigated by goalkeeper 'Billy' Rose of Wolverhampton Wanderers in 1893. He wrote to all league clubs suggesting a conference of leading players to discuss the issues that were pertinent to them, but only a few clubs responded. Following this unsuccessful attempt, the Association Footballers' Union (AFU) was established in 1898. The AFU were registered under the Trades Union Act, and was actively involved in the day-to-day administration of the game. However, the union suffered a series of damaging blows – in particular the FA refusing to sanction its rules – and ultimately the antagonism between the AFU and football's governing bodies meant that the union was later abandoned. It proved however to be the precursor of a stronger movement, and in December 1907 the Professional Footballers Association was formed. Shortly after its inception the organisation claimed to count the majority of players in league football as members. Its first objective was:
To promote and protect the interests of the members by endeavouring to 
come to amicable arrangements with the governing football authorities 
with a view to abolishing all restrictions which affect the social and 
financial position of players and to safeguard their rights at all times’ 
(Harding, 1991:46).

In addition, the PFA sought to provide members with legal advice, to help transfer-
listed or disengaged players to find employment, to provide temporary financial 
assistance for members when necessary, and to generally advance and promote its 
members’ interests. To a large degree, these initial aims remain the key objectives of 
the PFA today:

Firstly, representation. So any disciplinary matters – if a club say wants to 
discipline a player or if a player gets sent off and the club want to take 
an action against him. Or if a player is involved in something outside and the 
club wants to take action against him, which he doesn’t feel is justified, 
the club if they want to take action have to put it in writing and he can 
then appeal. If need be, we can then go along and represent him if it 
goes to an official appeal. Similarly, with the FA, when players are 
charged by the Football Association under the catchall 26a10 i.e. bringing 
the game into disrepute, players can have personal representation. Like 
this company here, Financial Management – this is our financial division. 
The seven consultants here, the financial advisors will be looking to 
advise players on issues relating to their financial wellbeing. A number of 
us have got licensed agents, so again we can represent players in 
contract negotiations and tying up transfers. Then there is our pensions 
scheme … In short, anything to do with protecting players’ interests, 
anything to do with his contract – he gets free legal advice. Anything that 
a player feels that he requires to do during his playing career he can 
come to us with a question, and if we can’t answer it we will know 
someone who can (Brendon Batson, Interview, 28th March, 2001).

Central to the PFA’s ability to provide a wide range of benefits to its members is the 
agreement the PFA struck with the Football League back in the mid-1950s which 
involved a percentage of television money being paid to the players’ union. The sums 
that were originally involved were quite small but, significantly laid the foundations for 
the variety of welfare schemes and advice that the PFA is able to offer its members. 
As Batson elaborates:
Historically, going back when highlights of the game were first televised in the mid-1950s, players secured the right that the money is paid to the Association for the benefit of all the players. Our television contract is up this year, so we are now negotiating our share with the Premier League and the FA. That money is then designated to a number of funds. We have an education fund, a benevolent fund, an accident fund, and those funds are recipients of the money from the television contract, and we then have to administer those funds to our members (Brendon Batson, Interview, 28th March, 2001).

While the influx of television money has therefore made it possible for the PFA to increase the range and quality of services available to its members it has also created a range of problems. Batson is concerned, in particular, about what he sees as a growing divide between the wealthy Premier League clubs and the poorer clubs in the lower divisions of the Football League. Here, clubs may experience financial difficulties which mean that, on occasions, they have problems paying their players' wages. In such situations the PFA may step in to loan money to clubs in order to secure the players' wages.

During its formative years the PFA struggled to make any significant inroads, often tilting at windmills with high aspirations but relatively little success. In short, the union possessed little influence and as Harding (1991) notes, was easily bullied or merely ignored by the game's authorities. Nevertheless, the PFA as a form of trade union has over time led a continuous struggle against wage and transfer controls. In 1907 it came into immediate conflict with the FA and Football League over the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 regarding the basic right for compensation for injury at work. Following a series of industrial disputes, a truce was agreed in which players would present any injury claims to the FA, and a small increase in the maximum wage and a bonus system was agreed. Looking to the future, Brendon Batson identifies a continuing power struggle between the PFA and the football clubs, in particular the elite Premier League clubs:

One of our biggest battles is the way the clubs, particularly the top clubs, view us as a power that needs to be curbed. They particularly don't like the way our members supported us in the ballot of 1992 when the League tried to reduce the amount of money going to the PFA from the deal with Sky television (cited in Waddington, 1998).
The task of the PFA is becoming increasingly complex. In particular, it is increasingly difficult to negotiate on behalf of all the players because the players' union now has to deal with the Premier League and the Football League. Consequently, players have differing interests and circumstances shaped by their relative position in the league structure. As Brendon Batson observes:

Our role hasn't changed dramatically in a sense since the formation of the Premier League. What is has done is put it on a tier for us to deal with. Before we just had to deal with the Football League, and the FA. Now we have got a third body with the Premier League, and they are competing leagues. Effectively we are still dealing with the players, but one of the things that we have seen increase over the years, is the number of clubs outside of the Premier League getting into trouble financially, and we think that is a clear indication of the clubs overstretching themselves. I think it was last season, we had for the first time, five clubs in administration. Thankfully we have always been able to resolve it, but I see only recently Swindon have got problems. Certainly it has increased, and made it more difficult to negotiate certain issues as a result of the Premier League being a separate entity. So when it comes to negotiating our television contract, previously it was just the FA and the Football League, now we have got to agree with the Premier League. And sometimes one becomes a stalking horse to see how they are going to get on when they come to negotiate with us (Interview, 28th March, 2001).

The increasingly intricate and sometimes antagonistic nature of the relationship between the players' union and football's governing bodies is illustrated in the rift between FIFPro on the one hand, and FIFA and UEFA on the other with regard to proposed changes to the transfer system. Nevertheless, Batson believes relations between the PFA and the game's other stakeholders is positive:

I think as a union, which is what we are, we have good relations with our employers, because the game is not like any other industry, they need those employees. It is not like they can just go and train them and get somebody else in. It doesn't work like that. I think on the whole, whilst we have issues that need to be resolved, we have got good relations with them. It is one of the successes within the game that we have been able to go along, have our disagreements, resolve them – even they we may
have to go to strike ballots – and still meet around a table and get on with things (Interview, 28th March, 2001).

To what extent then, does the PFA facilitate a voice for its members? In order to attempt to answer that question, one needs to understand the membership structure and composition of the players’ union. Firstly, the PFA represents around 4,000 professional and semi-professional footballers in England and Wales:

We have approximately four thousand members but that figure fluctuates. This is made up of about two and a half thousand professionals, anything between one thousand and twelve hundred youth trainees, and we have a certain amount of non-league members as well. And for the first time, we’ve got our first female members with Fulham Ladies (Brendon Batson, Interview, 28th March, 2001).

These players’ interests are represented on the PFA Negotiation and Consultative Committee, with regard matters of disciplinary guidelines, transfers and so on. The committee is made up of representatives from the Football Association, the Football League, and club chairmen. In the words of Batson, ‘nothing affecting players’ terms and conditions can be changed without our approval. That is the most important forum for us, to look after players’ interests’ (Interview, 28th March, 2001). In addition, the union have a range of democratic mechanisms in place that are provided by the electoral reform, in the cases when there are ‘major issues’ and voting takes place. On the issue of representation, Batson believes the PFA effectively facilitates a voice for its members, both as individuals and collectively:

We enjoy a very high profile now. Whilst we have collective bargaining and agreements, it is about individual rights as well. We feel that the strength of the collective bargaining protects the individual, so are very mindful that everything we do is to benefit the majority as opposed to the minority. We never lose sight of that (Interview, 28th March, 2001).

In terms of having a say in shaping club-player relationships, the PFA has been instrumental in devising a standard contract which outlines the rights and responsibilities of both parties:
The standard contract sets out dos and don'ts on both sides really. It is quite interesting in light of the current debate over the transfer systems, about unilateral breaks in contracts, but really the problems that can arise are: Firstly, discipline is always an issue. We, through the PFNCC forum have agreed guidelines for discipline. Within the contract, the maximum you can fine a player is two weeks, and in the past clubs have looked to fine players two weeks for even the most minor offences. Sometimes, and particularly in the lower divisions clubs have looked to take money off their players to help their cash flow. So we have agreed a schedule of fines for the different offences, and things like dissent as well. Second, we’re we have things like a player being victimised. It doesn’t happen very often, but we may have a situation where a manager doesn’t like a player for whatever reason and they have fallen out – there is a procedure within the contract. A lot of times we can go and resolve things within the club. Only recently, as a result of the debate over the transfer system, we have had instances of three players having their contracts terminated. It all comes down to settlements in the end, because they are now suddenly looking to use employment law and ignoring the rules and regulations that are set out. So in those cases, we can appeal and get those cases resolved, we just don’t like the way the clubs are doing it.

Another thing we’ve got, which is something we are very proud of in terms of how other sporting bodies deal with things, is the issue of drugs. We have an agreement that is a procedure within the FA that are in charge of the doping control – we have a procedure with them going back many years now – and we are heavily involved in that. Thankfully positive fines have been going down, but once there is a positive fine we are called in straight away, and we are part of the procedure. So anything really that a player feels is impacting on him, and he is not in agreement with, he can come to us and we can look to try and protect him or advise him.

If a player says 'I'm not going to do that' and the club say well, it is in your contract and we will discipline you, then the maximum fine is two weeks. If the player then comes to us, we say well, it is in your contract that you will co-operate for two to three hours per week for community service/public relations duties and that is spread around. We don't think it is a burden, it has never caused us any major problems. We have had
one or two flash points about it, but nothing considering the amount of years it has been in the contract. Really it is to talk about the players responsibilities in terms of keeping yourself fit, don't do this, don't do that. I mean they have freedom of speech, but it has to be used sensibly. What we don't want players to do is go into print slagging off the club, the manager and everybody involved because that then leaves it open to, not just being disciplined by the club but the FA for bringing the game into disrepute. So really it sets out grievance procedures, what the club can do, what the player can do if he feels the club are in breach of his contract (Brendon Batson, Interview, 28th March, 2001).

While the PFA has undoubtedly made great strides in protecting players' interests within the clubs, Batson suggests that some of the big football clubs, in particular, view the players' union as:

An influence they could well do without when it comes to their players. They would like to be able to say to their players that they want to whatever they wish, they want to do whatever they wish, they want to talk about disciplinary measures that would be far and away more stringent than any we have at the moment. They would have more control over their players without a union (cited in Waddington, 1998).

The function of the PFA is further problematised in light of the trend towards professional footballers seeking legal compensation for injuries sustained on the field of play. In such cases, the PFA has to adopt a neutral stance. As Batson elaborates:

We have to adopt a neutral position because otherwise we have a member against a member, and we couldn't be seen to be acting in favour of one against another. So we have a standard letter that goes out to both parties, effectively to let them know that they have to get their own legal representation because in those circumstances we can't get involved (Interview, March 28th, 2001).

In summary, the PFA has played an influential role in the economic and industrial emancipation of professional football players in England. This is reflected both in the recognition it receives in the media, and the finances accrued from the television deal. However, the changing landscape in English football has resulted in complicating the role of the players' union. As the boom in football's popularity
strengthens, there is little evidence of ‘player power’ relenting. The combination of freedom of contract for players established by the Bosman ruling and sizeable external investment in football has helped to create a new breed of elite player acutely aware of his pivotal role within the game. This has manifest itself in a number of high-profile transfer cases in England, involving the likes of Nicolas Anelka, Jimmy Hasselbaink and Pierre van Hooijdonk, as clubs attune to the full impact of the Bosman ruling. Clubs are culpable too, of paying inflated contracts, signing-on fees and wages. As incidents of players flexing their muscle in contractual negotiations increase in frequency, there is clearly a need for a more inventive, co-ordinated response from football clubs and the game’s authorities. Tony Higgins, secretary of the Scottish Professional Footballers’ Association suggests that clubs can no longer treat footballers as mere employees but must consult them as ‘partners’ or stakeholders in shaping the club’s future. There is a danger however, of overstating the supposed influence of even the top-flight professional footballers:

The majority of players are still paid slaves. There’s no freedom of movement until they’re 25, they can get fined two weeks’ wages for whatever misdemeanour the clubs decide. Clubs have always had it their way but there is an emerging sense now that clubs, players and agents have to work together (Rachel Anderson, FIFA registered agent, When Saturday Comes, November 1999:24).

Players cannot come and go as they please. Rather players sign contracts that legally bind them to a particular club and these contracts are legally enforceable by the club. Thus, players who have a contract cannot leave that club or play for anyone else without the permission of the club. This was illustrated when Pierre van Hooijdonk refused to play for Nottingham Forest at the beginning of the 1998-99 season, and was widely reported as criticising the club and his team-mates. A stalemate ensued with the player remaining on the sidelines but unable to play for any other club. This is in stark contrast to the position of employees in most areas of work where such strong legal contracts do not exist.

**League Managers Association (LMA)**

The League Managers’ Association is the official representative body for professional football managers and was inaugurated under its present title in 1992, the year the Premier League was formed. The Association was established off the back of the Football League Staff Executive Staff Association (FLESA). The latter included a
myriad of secretaries, commercial managers, coaches and football managers that met infrequently and had a largely peripheral role in the running of the game. From this, ‘a small minority group started to feel that the managers should have a stronger voice in the business that they are asked to manage’ (Interview, 29th November, 2000) which formed the basis of the LMA. Membership currently stands in the region of 120 members, comprising 92 practising league managers and associative members who have been out of management for a period of time. In short, ‘they have got to be in one of the four leagues or have managed in the four leagues’ (Interview, 29th November, 2000) while coaching staff, assistant managers, education and welfare officers etc. are included in the Technical and Development Staffs Association (TDSA).

Like the PFA, its members are required to pay a ‘nominal’ annual subscription, which brings in about £7,000 for the LMA. However, as John Barnwell observes, ‘we are not a money making organisation, not like the PFA who have got millions of pounds’ (Interview, 29th November). Rather, resources are tight with the LMA receiving a large proportion of its finances through a sponsorship deal with the FA Premier League sponsors, Carling:

Carling were flagged up as our main sponsors and they pass us some money. All the deals were done before I arrived, and let’s just say if we were starting now they would have to pay a lot more. When you get the PFA getting two and a half million pounds out of a deal, and we are getting £30,000 I think there is something not right because the managers – Sky, the media and so on – they need our co-operation. Managers are never off the television, it’s part of a managers job. You know there are so many channels asking the same questions but we’ve got to do it before the game and after the game … managers have to learn to handle that. But if we are going to co-operate with people and they are all making money out of it, then why shouldn’t the Association get some money out of it? (Interview, 29th November, 2000).

John Barnwell however, is cautious about some of the potential problems that commercial sponsorship brings:
Talks are ongoing, but we have to be careful that we don't create an animal which is a commercial animal which needs feeding because then you are just employing people and we won't do that (Interview, 29th November 2000).

As a result, the resources at the Association are stretched and they 'simply don't have a large enough staff to handle all the work that we have' (Interview, 29th November 2000). As Barnwell elaborates:

We want to employ managers in it but you can't employ managers who are working because they are too busy and to be consistent you employ those who are out of work, who are then in work and come away from it and that doesn't have any credibility. So we lean quite heavily on people like Frank Clark who have been out of work for a while, and people like John Duncan and Mike Walker (interview, 29th November 2000).

The LIVIA's role is manifold, encompassing a broad range of areas from providing legal advice on contracts to representing its members in helping them find employment, and in cases of unfair dismissal seeking compensation. Furthermore, the LMA is concerned with the welfare of its members. As a result, the Association has streamlined a pension package and provides health and accident insurance. As Barnwell highlights:

Like all football people and players, managers are vulnerable to the financial vultures outside and whether they are getting the best financial advice. Some were, and some weren't. So we have now got our own financial advisors who look after their pension funds and also any other financial advice they want at no cost (Interview, 29th November 2000).

One of the most significant breakthroughs of the LMA has been the introduction into Premier League regulations of a Code of Conduct governing the appointment of managers and the termination of their contracts. This is a nine-point document that sets out the duties and responsibilities of a manager, from complying with the 'Laws of the Game' and observing the terms of his contract, to ensuring a fair disciplinary policy and behaving in 'an ethical and professional manner'. Significantly, the emphasis upon the Premier League with different structures for the Football League leaves many loopholes for clubs to exploit. Further, when considered in relation to
player transfer transactions then a requirement to make full compensation for broken management contracts represents no significant financial penalty or deterrent.

John Barnwell believes relations between the League Managers' Association and the game's governing bodies are developing:

    In no disrespect to the past, things are in a totally different era with new chief executives in all three areas. They are fresh to the job with a new outlook. We have found that they have all been very responsive, and we have a good relationship with all of them. For example, every time the Premier League referees get together when they have a spare weekend, we are invited down. The communication is improving, and the same with the Football League referees (Interview, 29th November 2000).

Indeed, the philosophy of the LMA is 'to have a stronger voice in the game, a constructive voice and to have an input on legislation. In the past we never had a strong enough voice, so if legislation or a rule was put on top of you and you hadn't had any input, it might be a good rule but you'll be against it because nobody asked you' (Interview, 29th November 2000). Here, Barnwell cites the appointment of the England coach, where the Football Association ignored the LMA's recommendations:

    We went to them and said you should speak to these managers, the guys who have got all the experience. Not to tell the FA who should be the next England manager but to tell the FA the complexities of the job. But no, they think they know. You would think they would go and speak with the top guys and they said they did, but I don't know anybody that they spoke to … They should have been developing young managers under Bobby Robson for two years. We think there is a hidden agenda but it's done now. But then that's the way football is (Interview, 29th November 2000).

5. The ways in which supporters are represented in the decision-making processes of NGBs

In the United Kingdom, a number of developments have increasingly focused attention on the role of supporters in the governance of football. This is in part a result of the politicisation of football fandom in relatively recent times, which has seen an increase in the number and variety of fan organisations and publications. Underpinning this politicisation has been a concern with the democratisation of
football. The formation of the Labour government's Football Task Force to investigate ways in which supporters' concerns might be met by football clubs, for example, has fuelled the public debate about, and scrutiny of, both football's governing bodies and the governance of football clubs. At national and club level, a number of supporter groups have formed which have signified a qualitative and quantitative shift in the nature of the consumption of football (Brown, 1998:50). Our attention will turn to the two prominent national supporters' bodies: the Football Supporters' Association (FSA) and the National Federation of Football Supporters Clubs (NFFSC).

At a national level, historically, the FA and the Football League have seen no advantage in developing any real dialogue with the game's supporters. Even after the emergence of the NFFSC in 1927, the game's administrators 'did their best to ignore them ... fearful, suspicious and perhaps most of all, embarrassed by the passion that football fired in the hearts of its multitude of fans' (Taylor, 1992:181). Rogan Taylor illustrates this:

> In the first fifty years of its life the National Federation was never once formally consulted by the Football Association (Interview, 13th December 2000).

The NFFSC represented a somewhat 'official' aspect of football fandom: many of the supporters' clubs are tied to their clubs (often travel clubs rather than campaigning organisations) and involved in fund-raising and facilitating relations between supporters and clubs but rarely influencing the direction or decisions of the sport's governing bodies. In the words of Rex Nash:

> The NFFSC has only recently awoken from their thirty-year slumber, and their effect on the flow of events is minimal to say the least. At neither club nor national level have they ever helped empower supporters (Interview, 19th December 2000).

Taylor meanwhile, is equally scathing:

> The National Federation was absolutely hopeless. They didn't look like fans, they didn't talk like fans and the media never bothered to ask them anything because they didn't think they had any authority. They didn't

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20 Rogan Taylor's (1992) informative account of football supporters' relations with the game between 1885-1985 has dealt more thoroughly with the Federation's (and supporters' clubs') development than is possible here.
appear to have any legitimacy and 'terrace cred' about them (Interview, 13\textsuperscript{th} December 2000).

The NFFSC suffered greatly from its own image – that of an older organisation with a lack of individual membership, little visible internal democracy, little awareness of its existence amongst fans in general, and a lack of campaigning credentials (Brown, 1998:51). It also suffered in terms of profile since the formation of the FSA, which have achieved a much higher media profile.

The FSA is an individual membership-based organisation built around regional branches rather than individual clubs, with branches, affiliates and individual members attending an annual conference to establish policies. It was formed in the wake of the Heysel Stadium tragedy in 1985, with supporters increasingly frustrated at their lack of input into the game and concerned with the demise of football at that time. Its presence has been a relatively constant factor pulling the balance of power within the sport, however negligibly, toward the supporters. Jary \textit{et al} (1991:589) have argued that:

\begin{quote}
The organisation operates as a 'pressure group' seeking to represent the grass roots opinion of football supporters. It has established a regional structure, and it has opened up contacts with the police and especially with the media that have made it today a prominent participant in football politics. In brief the aims of the organisation are: 1) to improve the image of the game, 2) to improve the standard of the services provided for fans, and 3) to achieve representation for fans at every level of the game's hierarchies.
\end{quote}

In conjunction with the burgeoning fanzine movement (see Haynes, 1995) and the emergence of club-based independent supporters' associations, the FSA has built up a culture of opposition within the game. As Rex Nash contends:

\begin{quote}
At national level, the FSA has undoubtedly been able to generate access to important resources (political, economic etc.) through a combination of years of hard-work, and a pressing policy need on behalf of national government to be seen to be doing something about public order. These two pressures came together to create a situation in which at national level, supporters actually are able to influence policy to some extent. The fact that this agenda is driven by public order needs rather than
recognition of the position of the supporter is clear from the stance taken on stadium redesign (Interview, 19th December 2000).

The FSA however, is a relatively weak organisation in the hierarchy of power within football. Thus, the power and influence of commercial interests, of the sport's governing bodies and, even at club level, of the football clubs' boards of directors always outweighs the power of the FSA. Moreover, the organisation has a number of shortcomings. First, in general terms it is trying to represent a fairly disparate mass of people. For example, it has been estimated that aggregate attendance's at football matches in England topped fifteen million for the 1993-4 season\(^2\). Football supporters then, are not an easily identifiable or quantifiable group, and their sheer breadth and depth would make any notion of representation difficult. Secondly, the FSA is striving to gain representation where, as Taylor (1992) has illustrated, little has existed in the sport's history. In other words, the FSA is trying to have its opinions listened to when most clubs assume that they can rely on the brand loyalty of supporters to continue to provide the club revenue. Aside from these structural weaknesses, the membership strength of the FSA while hard to define due to dual membership categories of local and national status reflects 'no more than a vocal, articulate minority of football supporters' (Brown, 1997). Exacerbating these limitations has been the lack of a high profile, unifying campaign to capture supporters' imaginations in the years since the successful anti-ID card protests, and the likelihood of fans that are motivated to get involved in club-based protest groups and supporters' trusts. Nevertheless, the FSA has earned credibility amongst supporters, which the NFFSC lacks: notably, an independence from clubs and football authorities, a non-parochial perspective and perceived as an informed campaigning organisation.

Clearly the experiences of the NFFSC and the FSA illustrate that the relationship between supporters and the game is largely undiscovered territory. No significant attempt has been made on the part of the sport's governing bodies to enter in dialogue with football supporters. The formation of the Football Task Force in 1997 by the incoming Labour government signified a sea change in the relationship between football fans and those, who own the football clubs and administer the game at national level. The Task Force took as its starting point the assumption that there are problems with the game and its governance. It drew on a mixture of three groups
(representatives of the football authorities, representatives of the supporters’ associations, and a number of independents) to develop recommendations on how football might move forward. One of the Task Force’s key terms of reference was ‘to encourage greater supporter involvement in the running of clubs’. Implicit within this is the acknowledgement that the club-fan relationship is flawed. Traditionally the nature of the relationship between football clubs and their supporters has been characterised by a take-it-or-leave-it approach with the underlying assumption that fans can be expected to turn up on a Saturday afternoon regardless of how they are treated (Burnham, 2001). As Taylor elaborates:

I think that undoubtedly, traditionally, football fans were largely seen as a pain in the arse. A kind of unavoidable, odd necessity that they paid everybody’s wages and then they got in your way (Interview, 13th December 2000).

Furthermore, there was an entrenched view that supporters have neither the right to be involved, nor the ability to make any useful contribution to the running of their club. These views are increasingly dismissed as outmoded, outdated and overtaken by the emergence of numerous supporter associations, supporters’ trusts, and groups campaigning on single issues. Attention will now turn to the development of Independent Supporters’ Associations (ISAs) at club level in English football, which have informal, ad hoc links with each other, but no national structure. As Brown (1998) has argued, ISAs appeal to supporters of particular clubs in a way in which the NFFSC or the FSA have been unable to. A primary focus of fan campaigns has been the antagonisms caused by the actions of particular club chairmen. For example, demonstrations at Brighton and Hove Albion, Doncaster Rovers, Manchester City, Queens Park Rangers and Tottenham Hotspur against club owners and boards of directors are illustrative of the ways in which supporters have attempted to influence the running of their clubs. It is now necessary to briefly outline the motivations behind the formation of club-based supporter organisations, and it is with the particular mechanics of organisations at Manchester United and at the other end of the spectrum, Notts County on which I wish to dwell.

21 While this figure inevitably includes those who watch two or more football matches, it still indicates huge numbers of people. What is more, these are the attendees and do not include those who watch televised football, listen to radio commentaries, or read the press coverage.
The example of the Independent Manchester United Supporters Association (IMUSA) is instructive about the both the potential of and the limitations of fan democracy for influencing the activities of clubs, in particular those that are plcs and thereby subject to the whims of the Stock Exchange and its institutional investors. Supporters established IMUSA in April 1995, and with around 1,000 members, it has campaigned vigorously on a number of issues. For example, IMUSA has formed a share club to enable its members to purchase blocks of shares and thereby organise effectively at shareholders' meetings to articulate supporters' concerns (Lee, 1998). Adam Brown (1998:61) has illustrated:

IMUSA has developed an active, involved and committed membership, a democratic structure, and whilst the power of commercial interests in the club vastly out-gun the resources of IMUSA, the organisation remains a thorn in their side, as well as being one of the most successful ISAs in the country.

IMUSA's greatest triumph, together with its sister organisation, Shareholders United Against Murdoch (SUAM, now Shareholders United) has been the defeat of BskyB's proposed take-over of Manchester United. Significantly, in a field of protest more usually associated with pitch invasions and fans' demonstrations to 'sack the board', IMUSA and SUAM's campaign was two-pronged. On the one hand, IMUSA entered a public relations battle, generating widespread opposition to both Rupert Murdoch and support from fans of other clubs concerned at the further widening of the wealth gap in football. On the other hand, IMUSA and SUAM targeted the quasi-judicial competition process, mobilising the considerable resources and advice of key City law firms, financiers and political lobbyists22. What is clear from this process is that without ownership, supporter representation would inevitably be lip service and piecemeal, as has been the case at Notts County. The Supporters of Notts Action Group (SNAG) was formed by a group of committed supporters and e-mail list members, concerned about the possible take-over of the club to Reg Brealey23. The primary objectives of the supporters group are:

• To raise public awareness of all issues regarding the club.

22 For a detailed account of the supporter led campaign against the propose take-over of Manchester United, see Brown, A and Walsh, A (1999) Not For Sale! Manchester United, Murdoch and the Defeat of BskyB, Edinburgh: Mainstream.
23 In this I must declare an interest: I am a member of SNAG and also co-editor of The Pie, the 'original Notts County fanzine'.
• To ensure that all potential investors have the best interests of the club at heart.
• Provide an independent voice for all Notts supporters.
• Continue to give whole-hearted support to the team, players, management and backroom staff.

SNAG has pursued a strategy of holding regular open meetings, distributing leaflets before matches, and maintaining links with the local media and the club's long-running independent fanzine to disseminate information and garner support. Furthermore, fans effectively appropriated the media space of live televised football by unfurling banners against the take-over, at corners and goal kicks during a FA Cup tie with Bournemouth AFC. The relationship between the club and SNAG has oscillated between open hostility (the Chairman, Derek Pavis condemned the group as 'not real supporters') via ambivalence to engaging in dialogue over attracting potential investors and marketing the club. Following a series of meetings with club officials, Derek Pavis announced at the club's AGM that he would not be selling to any consortium involving Mr. Brealey.

Therefore at club level, there is some evidence to suggest that supporters have been able to use the plethora of fan organisations to articulate their concerns, although it is highly specific to local circumstances and changes to them, and more often than not, requires the co-operation of the clubs. As Rex Nash asserts:

> Crucially, the existence of such a role, and the agenda that frames the day-to-day involvement of supporters in these clubs remains very firmly controlled by the clubs themselves, and the extent to which fans are able to affect decisions in a meaningful and substantive way is open to considerable doubt. They have used PR, active campaigning, grassroots activism or whatever to create a sense of legitimacy, but they have virtually never been able to force their way in unless clubs are willing to let them in (Interview, 19th December 2000).

Furthermore, the passion and loyalty which club attachments generate make it difficult for fans to challenge how the game is governed. This echoes Rogan Taylor's recognition of the supporters' position as 'neither straight 'consumers' of a leisure product, nor ... legitimate participants in the game' (Taylor, 1992:179). Moreover, one of the key problems in confronting democracy in football is the justification of the issue itself. In other words, what 'rights' can supporters, as paying visitors to football
matches, expect from the game and what problems do they face? One of the responses to this, in which the role of supporters has been legitimised, is through the language of stakeholding. As Lee (1998:46) has argued:

The relevance of stakeholding for football supporters is immediate. In their hundreds and thousands, football supporters hold a stake in their clubs which is not normally based on any property or share ownership. Although their financial commitment to their club may be limited to the purchase of tickets and club merchandise (a percentage of their annual income often greater than that committed by major shareholders) supporters' stakeholding is based on something equally powerful and tangible, namely a long-term (possibly lifelong) allegiance to their club.

The language of stakeholding has been appropriated by the formation of Supporters Direct, a government funded initiative that provides legal and practical advice to supporters' groups in forming trusts which allow them a greater say in how their clubs are run. The 'philosophy and aims' of Supporters Direct are:

The aim of Supporters Direct is to offer support, advice and information to groups of supporters who wish to play a responsible part in the life of the clubs they support.

All models used and recommended will be based on democratic, mutual and 'not-for-profit' principles. Legitimate objectives will include:

Influence – the formation and running of representative bodies for supporters.

Ownership – the acquisition of shares in the football club to pool the voting power of individual supporters to further the aims and objectives of the Supporters' Trust.

Representation – securing the democratic election of supporters' representatives to the Boards of Directors of individual football clubs.

By these means we hope to improve the health of the whole football industry (Lomax, 2001:21).

The background to Supporters Direct and the emergence of supporters' trusts can be traced to developments at Northampton Town during the early nineties. As Brian Lomax recounts:
It arose out of a financial crisis at Northampton Town Football Club where consecutive chairmen who owned over seventy-five per cent of the club, and therefore had absolute power in the club had mismanaged the club for several years. It reached a point nine years ago when the club was 1.6 million pounds in debt, which represents two years annual turnover ... but this wasn't revealed until the supporters called a public meeting ... It was at that meeting in January 1992 that a resolution was passed to form a supporters' trust with two objectives. The first objective was to save the club but not to save the chairman, and to raise money to save the club from extinction. The second objective was to ensure that supporters had a realistic say in the running of the club so that the situation could never arise again (Interview, 28th November 2000).

The benefits of the Northampton Town supporters' trust have been not only financial (the Trust has paid over £105,000 into the football club over the last seven years) but also social – leading to closer links between the football club and the local authority, and fostering community development. The successes of the trust, in particular making great strides towards eliminating racism, improving disabled access and cultivating a three-way partnership between the football club, the supporters' trust and the local authority, were highlighted in the Task Force's report 'Investing in the Community' (1999:45) which noted that:

A club should not have to be on the brink of collapse before developments such as these can happen. There is a strong case for financial support being made available as a means of encouraging more supporters groups to establish trusts and become involved in the running of their clubs. We believe this represents a new model of ownership for all football clubs, but particularly small clubs, into the next Millennium.

In theory then, the stakeholder approach can allow for a positive recognition of the role of fans. As Rex Nash illustrates:

Any simple analysis of the sources of income for major clubs should reveal that active fans remain a key contributor, and therefore are key stakeholders. Logically this should therefore lead to a more proactive approach towards them by clubs (Interview, 19th December 2000).
Furthermore, Brian Lomax elaborates what supporters’ trusts mean in practical terms:

The proposal is that supporters should be partners with local businesses and the local authority in the running of their football club, instead of having no proper voice therefore being reduced to shouting ‘sack the board’ on match days when the team is beaten (Interview, 28th November 2000).

Rogan Taylor also recognises the potential of stakeholding as a mechanism for harnessing the positive role of supporters, but stresses its use is limited to small, community centred football clubs:

I think they (shareholder trusts) have a very valid, valuable role because they represent people that have put a financial contribution into the club. The problem is in most cases with regard the bigger clubs, its always going to be fairly small and insignificant contribution, whereas the Northampton Town example demonstrates, smaller clubs now have to find their raison detre in being orientated around their community, in being in good relations with their local authority and therefore their function is to act as a local emblem. Its simple, because they are not going to win the European Championship, they are not going to win the Premiership, they are probably not even going to get into the First Division, never mind the Premier League. Therefore the re-orientation at that level of the game gives for lots of opportunities for well organised fans or shareholder groups to find themselves quite deeply involved in the running of their club (Interview, 13th December 2000).

At the heart of the stakeholder approach is the argument that supporters have a ‘right’ to be meaningfully involved in the running of their club. This notion is grounded in the view that it is too simplistic to view fans in terms of merely being ‘customers’ but individuals, who’s emotional commitment normally extends to investing a degree of time, energy and loyalty, as well as money, into the club they support. It is this sometimes irrational and powerful bond, which Brian Lomax believes gives supporters the ‘right’ to be involved in their club:

Directors, managers and players come and go but supporters are there for life, and they have more of a ‘stake’ in the future of the club than
anybody else. Therefore, it is morally right and it is also practically right to be involved at a management level. They have the biggest incentive to ensure that the club is run properly and not for private profit (Interview, 28th November 2000).

On the reverse, this ‘special’ relationship means supporters are susceptible to being exploited, ignored and generally taken-for-granted by football clubs. Why should those in positions of influence concede ground to an already captive audience? Moreover, given the increased revenue from television monies, sponsorship, corporate packages, and merchandising are supporters (and the proportion of income they generate for clubs) legitimate stakeholders? Rogan Taylor (1992: 187) concurs with notion of supporters having ‘rights’ but with an air of caution:

Football’s fans have an historical and cultural right – and a right in common-sense justice – to take a real part in the running of the game. It is also in the game’s best interests. But it is unlikely to happen without the moral and financial support of football’s administrative bodies.

Taylor’s apprehension is significant: stakeholding is premised on the supposition, that not only are stakeholders (i.e. supporters) involved but their involvement is meaningful. Given the mutual distrust between boards and supporters that is repeated at clubs across England, with fans being seen as an ‘odd necessity’ while frustrated at the action or inaction of numerous club chairmen, the stakeholder model seems at best, fanciful. The problem with stakeholding is that while it offers an attractive political design, ‘it is indeterminate and ambiguous until it is articulated into detailed specific proposals’ (Nutti, 1997: 17). Rex Nash meanwhile, expounds two key limitations of the stakeholder approach:

Firstly, the emotional roots of fandom mean that these stakeholders are unique from others. The essential ‘irrationality’ of football support means that to some extent, they can be discounted, as they are unlikely to be going elsewhere. Other stakeholders (the shareholders, the corporate element, and dispersed fans who do not travel but consume) have not only the option of going elsewhere, but actively do. To this extent, there is a qualitative difference between these stakeholders and others, which I suspect generates a dismissive attitude within most clubs towards their role. Secondly, not all fan stakeholders are born equal. The season ticket holders arguably represent a different sort of stakeholder within the
economics and politics of the club from the more casual supporters, or those who regularly buy tickets on match-day. The category ‘fan stakeholder’ is therefore in itself differentiated, and constructing an adequate and equitable way of according each sub-category the level of input a ‘rational’ analysis of the situation would seem difficult and moreover divisive (Interview, 19th December 2000).

Taylor suggests the additional forces that have come into the game in the last ten years – in particular outright commercial forces – have had a noticeable impact on shaping relations between football clubs and supporters. For example, the sponsors of the Premier League, Carling, initiated the first ever surveys of football supporters, thereby profiling their customer base. Such an idea, even in the recent past has been completely alien to the football industry but is of course common practice within the business world. Drawing on his consultancy work at Newcastle United, Rogan Taylor argues:

I think that the media companies will probably be more sensitive to the fans than the clubs have traditionally … I’m certain that a considerable part of the pressure [to improve club-fan relations] that came upon the club was not from the fans who had pressed the club without result for years and years, but was from NTL. And that NTL were more or less whispering in the ears of the significant people within the club ‘listen, we want to sell these people things. They hate every man jack of you. Can’t you sort this thing out because if we can’t, we can’t reach the primary market that we’re after (Interview, 13th December 2000).

Discussion

In response to the growing influence of the elite Premier League clubs, there have been attempts to increase English supporters’ institutional access to power within football, such as the Task Force’s recommendations for an ‘Ombudsfan’ and an Independent Football Commission. These potential shifts in the power balance suggest that supporters increasingly be being recognised as having a constructive say in how the game is governed. At the heart of this debate is whether meaningful fan representation requires some form of government intervention. Rex Nash suggests that some kind of intervention, be it of the sort offered by Supporters Direct, or more direct intervention like the Task Force is necessary to get past the power imbalance between football supporters and clubs:
... embedding fans into the decision-making structure is more important than simply recognising their voice. Such a change would seem to require at the very least a push from government, to ensure that changes to fan group personnel do not lead to a collapse of the advantages gained. Of course, when all is said and done, the fan group have to be popular to some extent, and they must be capable of representing fan opinion and concern, but their ability to create an equal playing field in which to represent fan views seems minimal, and to that extent requires some external intervention. Northampton Town is maybe the best example of this, where the council have adopted the attitude that the systematic and embedded role of supporters at the club is not an add-on, but key to the whole strategy that led to the construction of the new ground in 1994. This represents a key stick with which the council can ensure certain minimum access for fans, and create a level playing field on which the competing agenda of fans and clubs can express themselves (Interview, 19th December 2000).

Hamil et al (2001:4-5) suggest a combination of top-down regulation by the competition authorities and the football authorities, and bottom-up regulation via greater supporter involvement in football clubs 'should do much to ensure the future health of the game and resolve inherent conflicts between the commercial and business interests of football clubs on the one hand, and the wider cultural and sporting interests of clubs, their supporters and local communities on the other'. At the club or local level of governance, it is probably fair to say that smaller clubs are often more interested in fans' opinions (as illustrated at Northampton Town, Bournemouth, Lincoln City and so on) while the largest clubs, according to Nash (2000) are noticeably less receptive to fans' concerns. Of course, until supporter groups penetrate club decision-making processes, their involvement will remain largely abstract. Historically, this has certainly been the case at the national level, with attempts by the National Federation and the FSA to enter into meaningful dialogue with the game's governing bodies being fairly futile.

The governance of football: some concluding remarks

Over time the 'map' of football governance has become increasingly complex and confused, with the relationships between policy 'actors' and the game's stakeholders becoming more and more blurred. Moreover, the globalisation of football has meant the number of actors and their frequency of interaction has multiplied (Giulianotti,
Old boundaries between the local, the national and the international are routinely penetrated or collapsed. As a result, pertinent questions in governing football can no longer be effectively solved at the domestic level, or simply by international governing bodies alone.

The organisation and administration of football used to be relatively straightforward. National and international bodies were responsible for establishing and enforcing the rules of sport, cultivating sport's development, organising tournaments, and to encourage and to facilitate international exchange (Houlihan, 1997:147). Thus the English FA traditionally was the arbiter of domestic football, exacting punishments and selecting the national team while the Football League structured the leading professional clubs into four divisions. However, the current role of the English FA and its influence within the policy process is less clear-cut. Below the FA is a myriad of football organisations that set rules for their constituent members, including competitions, clubs and individuals associated with them. It is therefore common for people in football to be operating under the jurisdiction of more than one body, for example the FA and the Premier League. This can cause confusion, inconsistency and complexity. The economic success of the Premier League since its conception in 1992 and the growing influence of its elite clubs raises questions about whether the Football Association has become irrelevant and suggestions that the organisation has outlived its usefulness. As Simon Freeman (2000:81) infers, 'the FA has no future and cannot continue in its current form'. Here, Freeman flags the FA's traditionally amateur, insular and parochial management as being ill equipped to deal with an increasingly complex football industry.

Clearly then it is necessary to recast football's governance 'map'. To an extent it seems convenient to retain football's governing bodies at the centre of this framework, playing a key role in framing and controlling the game. But it is also misleading to do so given the fundamental hypothesis that there has been a leakage of authority from these bodies, and subsequently a diminished capacity to 'steer' in an increasingly complex environment. As argued, enormous upheavals have occurred in the last decade or so. The advent of the Premier League, greater migration of foreign players and increasing revenues from television companies have meant that many aspects of the game have changed almost beyond recognition. As a result, clear threats to established structures are now emerging. Clubs are cultivating relationships with other clubs both within domestic and across international boundaries (Chadwick, 2000). In addition, media companies such as
BSkyB and ENIC are challenging the rules governing club ownership through strategically obtaining stakes in multiple numbers of clubs (Brown, 2000; Crowther, 2001). Moreover, broadcasting contracts that were previously organised centrally, are now fragmenting as clubs across Europe ally themselves to media groups which can help them break away from binding contractual relationships with the sport's governing bodies. There is subsequently a need to move away from a centralised, hierarchical map of power and control of football, to a more complex policy network in which the boundaries are becoming increasingly blurred. The role of BSkyB is a pertinent illustration of this fuzziness. The company currently holds the contract to broadcast live Premier League football, while being a minority shareholder in Leeds United, Manchester City and Manchester United, a key player in MUTV, and possessing links with other broadcasters and leagues across Europe and globally. This raises a whole series of issues about the integration of media companies into the ownership of football, and 'places a question mark over the future finance, organisation and governance of football' (Brown, 2000:92).

Moreover, the government has increasingly played a more active role in a game that has often been presented as 'above' politics yet has always been closely related to more fundamental relations of power and control. Traditionally, football has avoided government interference, with its governing bodies preferring to protect its autonomy and to regulate itself. An example of this arrangement breaking down is when the Conservative government proposed to introduce compulsory identity cards for supporters in light of crowd control difficulties, an object lesson of the dangers of attempting to regulate football from the outside without a real understanding of the game. In the last decade or so, the visibility of government has grown significantly. This is illustrated by the government commissioned Taylor Report in 1990 that signalled a restructuring and modernisation of football, backed by substantial public investment. More recently the Labour government have sought to address a range of problems in the game, by establishing a Football Task Force to make recommendations on racism and disability, community involvement by football clubs and commercial issues. The extent to which the government influences the way in which football is run however, has been undermined by the growing interest of non-domestic policy actors such as the European Union. European law has been identified as impacting on restrictions on players' freedoms to move, the legality of measures by regulatory bodies to prevent breakaway leagues and the right of clubs rather than leagues to own and exploit broadcasting rights, thereby creating a series of tensions with football's administrators (Foster, 2000).
The broadening range of policy actors and interests illustrate the difficulty of delineating the scope and boundaries of the football 'community' (Roche, 1993) and the complexities of understanding the process of sport policy-making. The fragmentation of the policy area has been accentuated by the changing dynamics of power. For example, the authority of the English FA has seeped out in a number of directions; upwards to FIFA and UEFA, the overarching bodies for the control of world and European football; outwards to sponsors and media corporations, and down to the leading professional clubs. As Gerry Boon of accountants Deloitte & Touche has argued, 'the clubs have the real power in football. They just have not yet learned to use it properly' (2000:33). This power has manifested in negotiating for more and more lucrative European competitions, with the elite clubs having a greater influence in how the game is run, and the distribution of financial rewards.

How can the different interests and stakeholders in football be reconciled, so that the rising influence of government, the media and commerce, and the leading professional clubs is dealt with fairly and the interests of players and supporters are taken into account? Here, the notion of 'good governance' is of particular relevance, highlighting the ways in which relationships between an organisation and its primary and secondary stakeholders are arranged. Significantly, in the case of football those groups that were peripheral during the seventies and eighties remain in relatively marginal positions today. As the paper has sought to demonstrate, historically, those in the positions of power within football have seen no advantage in developing any meaningful dialogue with the game's supporters. Despite the efforts of numerous fan organisations there is little evidence to suggest that supporters have a constructive say in shaping the way football is governed. As Katwala contends, 'in terms of loyalty, voice and exit, the fans' excessive loyalty and inability to exit means that their voice is too often simply ignored' (2000:33-4). Similarly despite a number of advancements, most notably the assimilation of the WFA within the English FA, the women's game remains peripheral.

In conclusion, if governance is in part a response to the erosion of traditional bases of power and control then the development of football in the twentieth century provides a particularly rich case study. It provides a theoretical language in which to identify key features of a complex reality and also to pose significant questions about that reality. What it does not do is offer all-encompassing explanations and answers to these issues.
Empirical material

Case study b: cricket

In recent years the ways in which cricket is governed - both at national and international level - has been brought under intense scrutiny, exacerbated by concerns of match fixing and suspicions of corrupt practices. This has prompted questions about how cricket's governing bodies, chiefly the International Cricket Council (ICC) and the national associations, organise and administer a sport that historically has been resistant to innovation and change. In order to gain an understanding of the interrelationships of the key stakeholders and decision making within English and Welsh cricket, it is necessary therefore to recognise the key historical developments that are salient to cricket's governance. Brookes (1978:7) charts the social history of cricket across five distinct phases, tracing its origins back to a cluster of sixteenth and seventeenth century bat and ball games through to the prominence of the professional XIs in the mid-nineteenth century, and the emergence of amateurism as the founding ideology for the game. He goes on to identify the phase up to the mid-seventies as being characterised by the growing commercialisation of cricket with the sport increasingly being recognised as having a number of business-like features. However, this is not the place for a complex chronology of the history of cricket in Britain but to demarcate developments, which carry the most apparent and significant implications for the governance of the game and to provide a context in which to situate the later discussion of the five research themes. The key developments are as follows:

i. The formation of and relationship between the governing bodies of cricket: from the Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC) to the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB).

ii. The evolution of the County framework.

iii. Gentlemen and Players: resistance to the professionalisation of cricket.

iv. The Packer revolution.

v. Cricket in the commercial age: broadcasting, sponsorship and corporate investment.

vi. It's just not cricket: allegations of match fixing and corruption.

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24 According to Hill (1987:68) 'cricket in general has, to a very large extent, been hidden from serious historical enquiry. For all the voluminous literature that has accumulated around the
The influence of each of these, in some cases overlapping themes, will be elaborated below with reference to the how the game is governed.

i. The formation of and relationship between the governing bodies of cricket: from the Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC) to the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB).

The structure and organisation of cricket in Britain is a complex and sometimes confusing jigsaw of governing bodies, associations, councils and unions. In contrast to the internal divisions and conflicts within associational football (case study a) with the formation of separate, to some degree rival, controlling bodies, cricket evolved as a largely unified game. The private Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC) founded in 1787 by a group of landed aristocrats to help usher the game into the emerging industrial society, was broadly accepted as its ruling organisation. The founding of the MCC – perceived to be the 'Parliament House of cricket' – and the establishment of Lord’s as the club’s home signalled an important landmark (Bradley, 1990: 3). The structure of the private club was hierarchical, with a restricted membership of socially and politically conservative members from the aristocratic upper-middle classes. These social elites regarded cricket as a national symbol and steered the game into what Hill (1987) describes as a 'semi-commercial' path of development. Here, Hill draws on their wage policies, the number of matches sanctioned, the failure to make first-class cricket more attractive to working class spectators, and the refusal to adopt company status, as providing rich evidence that profit maximisation was of little interest to clubs. Where profits were made, they were used to improve facilities and strengthen the playing staff rather than line members’ pockets (Sandiford and Vamplew, 1986:313-21).

It would be a mistake however, to conclude that the MCC during its formative years assumed the role of the governing authority. For much of cricket’s history, authority within cricket rested upon tradition and custom rather than formal written arrangements and sanctions. According to Williams (1999) the MCC has traditionally been paternal rather than punitive because of its aim to preserve cricket as a game: ‘for ages the MCC have put a code of honour before a set of rules, regulations and provisions. There has been honour on the field and in the committee chamber … whenever there have been incidents, which could not be approved of there has, by
common consent, been a policy of hush. Cricketers have never believed in washing dirty flannels in public places' (Athletic News, 1923; quoted in Williams, 1999:24). In other words the MCC, in the absence of any formal or coherent administrative structure, held influence over the game largely because they were part of the elite of society. Furthermore, one of the primary reasons for the acceptance of the MCC’s hegemony over first-class cricket was because those who ran the county clubs shared similar backgrounds to the private members of the MCC: the county clubs were restricted clubs whose members belonged to the wealthier sections of society and held similar ideas about how cricket should be governed.

By the turn of the century however, the MCC had cemented its position as the central administrative body for cricket in Britain. Two factors were important: the establishment of a coherent County Championship in 1894 (see ii for a fuller discussion) and the changing composition of the MCC. Here, the Board of Control to administer test matches in England, the Advisory County Cricket Committee and the Imperial Cricket Conference (later renamed the International Cricket Council in 1989) were established to cater for the growth in cricket at national and international level. These bodies existed up until 1968 when there was a significant reorganisation of how sport was governed in Britain with the creation of the Sports Council to oversee government assistance to sport (see section on government involvement for a fuller discussion). As a result of these changes, the MCC formed the Cricket Council in 1968 as the sport’s governing body. Its constituent bodies were the MCC, and two new organisations: the Test and County Cricket Board (TCCB) to administer the professional game, and the National Cricket Association (NCA) responsible for the recreational game. In the words of Marqusee (1994:101) the reorganisation signalled ‘at last, the rudiments of a democratic structure’. For example, the TCCB was more inclusive than the innately conservative and insular MCC, comprising representatives of the first-class and minor counties to whom they distributed Test match revenue. As a consequence, the first-class counties had greater security but it also tied them financially to the new governing body. As Wright (1993:201) has

25 For example, in 1788 the MCC established a code of laws for playing cricket, requiring the wickets to be pitched 22 yards apart and details how players would be given out.

26 The weak structure of the MCC is evident from its peripheral role in the major sporting controversies of the nineteenth century, failing to prevent professional player led initiatives of round arm and then over arm bowling.

27 The influence of the MCC at that time was evident in that the President of the ICC assumed the chair of the ICC.

28 According to the TCCB’s constitution, its principle function is ‘the promotion, financing and betterment of cricket generally with an essential object being the achievement of the highest possible standards at international level’.
argued 'the counties have lost their independence, in that they can no longer exist without the TCCB, whose business plan is the promotion of cricket through the England team'.

Amid this restructuring, the role of the MCC was significantly reduced, conceding authority to the TCCB, which became the 'leading executive arm in English cricket' (Sandiford, 1985:278). Moreover, the TCCB demonstrated far greater business acumen than cricket's administrators had displayed in the past, recognising the market value of the game and treating it primarily as an entertainment industry. According to Wright (1993:56) 'to all intents and purposes it [the TCCB] has become a corporation in miniature, with its executive and its various departments'. However, its committee-led organisational structure and the 'habit of the counties [who make up the TCCB] to set up working parties as a convenient device for delaying any sensitive decisions, and then to ignore their subsequent reports' (Lee, 1997:51) has in the words of Wright (1993:204) made the TCCB 'an easy target for those who find the modern game wanting'. Furthermore the divided responsibilities of the Cricket Council, the TCCB and the NCA yet with considerable overlap in terms of dialogue and representation hints at a complex and bureaucratic structure. As Hugh Morris, ECB Performance Director argues 'the problem was that under the National Cricket Association there was something like 23 different organisations delivering cricket – for example, the Association of Cricket Coaches and the National Association of Youth Cricket – so there were a whole plethora of organisations' (Interview, 28th September 2001).

The England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB) replaced the TCCB in 1997, which has taken control over not just Test and County cricket, but also the recreational game and women's cricket. 'The ECB was set up to make sure that everything came under one umbrella, and that is the structure we have been looking to develop for the last five years' (Hugh Morris, Interview with 28th September 2001). Part of the rationale for this re-organisation was to substitute the 'old, clogged, TCCB methods' with a new streamlined policy-making system overseen by Chairman, Lord Ian MacLaurin. As Wisden observed 'it [cricket] needs Tesco-isation. The game needs to become an attractive product sold in an imaginative manner at competitive prices'. Under the leadership of Lord MacLaurin the ECB has striven towards becoming 'a responsible and modern governing body' with an emphasis on 'integrity, professionalism and competence' (A Cricketing Future for All, 2001:3, 31). The increased revenues, principally from broadcasting and sponsorship – the ECB's annual turnover has risen
from £40 million in 1996 to £70 million – has been influential in the transformation of the governing body. In the words of Lord MacLaurin ‘we have got clear direction now. With a business, you need a vision, and the understanding that you can’t do anything unless the basics are right’ (The Independent, 30th May 2001:21).

One of the ECB’s first steps at reinventing English cricket was to launch a blueprint for the game’s future, entitled Raising the Standard (ECB, 1997). Its stated objectives was to enable cricketers from schoolchildren to Test players to perform to their maximum potential; a successful and vibrant England team; and that cricket in general should be more competitive, more appealing and more exciting. To paraphrase the report, the ECB proposed first, to rationalise the organisation of the game at school, junior and youth level. Second, the governing body acknowledged the divide between recreational and elite cricket, and subsequently aimed to improve the progression of players from club and non-first class representative cricket upwards. Thirdly, the blueprint stressed the importance of fewer first-class matches to allow a better balance between competition, rest and practice.

What then are some of the implications of these changes in the governance structures of cricket in Britain? From a deeply ingrained Victorian tradition and amateur ideology in its administration and management, cricket has gradually become more professional and increasingly complex, with a myriad of governing bodies, counties and other stakeholder groups. Consequently, the MCC’s traditional role as the ‘Parliament House of cricket’ has been steadily undermined, leaking authority to the TCCB and subsequently the ECB. The current role of the MCC as a result is unclear. According to Bradley (1990:3) ‘in the 1990s [the MCC] seems to be a semi-mythical body with its traditions and history concerning its power in the cricketing world shrouded in the mists of antiquity, having shed all its powers, save that of guardian of the laws, to the TCCB, the NCA, the Cricket Council, and the ICC’. The ECB has emerged as the central governing body, responsible for elite, recreational and women’s cricket. At the same time, the plethora of stakeholder groups involved in the development and delivery of cricket at various levels suggests that the sport remains inherently bureaucratic with confused lines of responsibility. As Wright argues ‘bureaucracy comes more naturally to governments than democracy, and the government of cricket has shown itself to be no exception to this’ (1993:34).
ii. The evolution of the County framework.

One of the primary stakeholders in cricket in England and Wales is the 18 professional First Class Counties, responsible for elite competition and preparing cricketers for international cricket. The origins of the county cricket structure can be traced back to 1875. Midwinter (1992) has classified these first cricket counties into three distinct categories. The first group that included Sussex, Nottinghamshire and Yorkshire, were supported by subscribers and had formally appointed Secretaries and Treasurers who helped to persuade their cricketing friends and wealthy benefactors to make a subscription to finance both home and away games. Over time, a committee was established from the subscribers, and it was these elected officers who selected the teams, fixed salaries and expenses, and oversaw the running of the county along similar lines to the modern club. An alternative route was taken by the second group, which included Surrey and Lancashire, where clubs were formed by groups of cricket enthusiasts. They acquired a ground, built up a fixture list against local clubs and employed professional bowlers for the county side. Their officials then raised representative county elevens, drawing on local talent as well as members of the club itself. The third category was a combination of the other two, with one set of individuals raising a county side via the subscription method, and a second group using an established club.

In addition to these ‘professional’ county clubs, the amateur sides were still in existence. Indeed, most counties in England and Wales had both a professional and an amateur side, but it was chiefly through the professional clubs that the County Championship developed during the second half of the twentieth century. The first County Championship involved nine counties in 1873. It remains the premier first-class cricket competition in England and Wales with eighteen counties now participating. In the competition’s formative years it had no administrative body and the scoring system was so complex that the press were normally left to decide the winner. One major stumbling block at that time was the issue of definition: which counties could be deemed ‘first-class’? The MCC finally ruled in 1894 introducing a classification procedure for counties. This, Malcolm (2000) notes, ‘marks the beginning of the MCC’s reign as the central administrative body for cricket in Britain’. The establishment of a coherent County Championship was closely followed by the formation of the Minor Counties Cricket Association (1895) and a Board of Control to administer test matches in England (1898).
The County structure has changed relatively little since its origins in the late 1800s. As Sclyd Berry has observed ‘the very fact that county cricket has changed so little in the course of the twentieth century means that it will have to change hugely to catch up with the twenty-first. The number of counties has grown in the last hundred years from 15 to 18, that is all’ (Wisden Cricket Monthly, January 2000, p.32).

iii. Gentlemen and Players: resistance to the professionalisation of cricket

By the end of the nineteenth century the distinction between the amateur and the professional was firmly embedded in English cricket. This was manifest in the amateurs and professionals travelling separately, having separate changing rooms, different entrances onto the field, and even a distinct method of recording their names on the scorecard. The relationship was essentially that of master-servant: the professional was a menial bowler, toiling in the field while the amateur was the gentleman with the bat. To preserve this distinction, cricket clubs (including the MCC) promoted a series of games between the Gentlemen and the Players. While the master-servant dichotomy served to sustain an obvious barrier, the relationship was inherently complex. As Sandiford (1994:107-8) has noted: ‘During the game itself, the professionals seemed more conscious of belonging to a particular club or county and promoting that groups’ interests, than of representing a particular class … If, in relation to other Victorian sports, the cricket professional was underpaid, this was certainly not due to greed on the part of the amateurs who ran the cricket clubs. It has much more to do with the faulty economic structure of the sport itself’.

Clearly the status of players has become a contentious issue, driven by the class stratification of the industrial economy. The distinction between professionals and amateurs was not resolved until 1963 when it was finally abolished. There is a danger in assuming that progress towards the abolition of the social divide separating gentlemen and players was either linear or inevitable. However, as cricket commentator Christopher Martin-Jenkins has pointed out, the abolition of the amateur status was ‘more a reflection of changing attitudes in society rather than a radical shift in the character of cricket’ (1984:11). The response to the decision is also instructive, illuminating the conservative nature of the majority of cricketers who wished to preserve as much of the old tradition even in the face of dramatic changes taking place in the socio-economic environment of English cricket. Indeed, the long history of snobbery over professionalism and paternalism in the management of cricket established traditions in the game’s governing bodies has made them generally unable to cope with the pace of change. As Sandiford (1985:273) argues
‘as late as the 1960s, cricket in England was still being run along Victorian lines as a sport dependent on its patrons and its fans’.

Even when the MCC was overseeing a fairly unified sport, they were still in a precarious position being frequently short of funds and open to challenge from a variety of sources. In particular, professional cricketers were involved in a series of disputes during the early 1900s over the organisation and financial rewards of overseas tours (Wynne-Thomas and Arnold, 1987). Off the pitch, county cricket finances were in a depressing state. County committees on the whole handled their clubs in haphazard fashion, regularly appealing for public support when deficits grew out of hand, and made no long-term plans for the future. In addition, attendances at county cricket grounds were in a similarly sorry state during the 1950s. By 1961 less then 4,000 spectators on average were paying to watch a county fixture. This situation led the MCC to initiate a series of commissions to investigate the state of county cricket. The Findlay Commission, set up in 1937, stated that county cricket was then being run at an annual loss of £27,000. Subsequent MCC enquiries in 1944, 1957 and 1960 concluded that the major problems facing cricket were the shortage of revenue, identifying dull cricket as the primary cause for the game’s malaise. The county committees however, were resistant to radical change and as a result relatively little could be done, bar cosmetic changes (bonus points, shortened boundaries and discussions regarding the lbw law) to attempt to address the perennial problems of county deficits.

Notwithstanding this resistance to change, the 1960s marked a significant watershed in the development of county cricket as professional business practices grew in importance. Numerous working parties looking at the future direction of English cricket were instigated, reviewing the finances and structure of the game. The subsequent reports recommended a number of radical developments. First, the widespread introduction of overseas players broadened the horizons of most counties in the hope that they would attract larger crowds and improve performances, thereby raising both public interest and income. This is a significant milestone, given that increasing emphasis was being placed on winning and success, rather than just playing the game. In other words, the influx of ‘star’ cricket imports was geared towards sporting success and concomitant financial rewards (Maguire and Stead, 1996). Secondly, there was the emergence of limited-overs county cricket in the 1960s, with the inauguration of the Gillette Cup in 1963, followed in 1969 by the John Player Sunday League. The relative success of one-day cricket also spawned a third
competition, the Benson and Hedges Cup in 1972, as county cricket embraced the commercial age, attracting sponsorship from cigarette companies and insurance-based multinationals. Thirdly, the gradual professionalisation of English cricket involved an overhaul of the game's traditional administrative structure. As noted, the governance structure of English cricket has become increasingly complex with a plethora of cricket clubs, leagues and players that meant it can no longer be 'steered' effectively. In its place the TCCB (and subsequently the ECB), the corporate voice of the counties, was established as the sport's governing body. In effect, it took control of the aspects of the game that had previously been the preserve of the Advisory County Cricket Committee and the Board of Control, both arms of the MCC. Moreover, this reorganisation was significant in that the counties were beginning to exercise their muscle, and looked to shape their own development.

iv. The Packer revolution

According to Gardiner (2001:334) the development of World Series Cricket sponsored by Kerry Packer as a challenge to established Test Cricket in Australia 'had major implications and consequences for world cricket'. During the mid-seventies, cricket in Australia was semi-professional, characterised by relatively low wages and inexpensive television rights compared to other similar sports. Packer believed the sport to be ideally placed for commercial exploitation, challenging the agreement that terrestrial channel Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) had with the Australian Cricket Board. Despite bidding six times more than ABC Packer failed in his bid. Effectively closed out of established cricket he decided to develop a rival international cricket competition and began to recruit established Australian test cricketers and signed up star players from England, the West Indies, Pakistan, India and South Africa. As Houlihan (1997:150) notes 'Packer demonstrated that the love of money linked players to promoters more tightly than the love of the sport linked players to administrators'. The proposed 'Packer circus' was strongly resisted by cricket's authorities. The ICC's initial response was to ignore the threat, but later imposed a ban on those dissenting players that had signed up to the World Series, challenging the proposals in the UK courts. The judge however ruled that neither the ICC nor the TCCB could force cricketers to violate binding contracts they had signed with Kerry Packer. The subsequent 'Supertests' and one-day internationals led to a variety of innovations such as improved televising and day-night contests, which have become a regular part of modern cricket.
The implications of Packer's World Series has been far-reaching, signalling a trend amongst cricket's governing bodies towards a more professional and business motivated approach. As Sandiford has argued 'Packer taught cricket administrators, in a word, how to bargain more assertively in the selling of exclusive rights and advertisements. Essential marketing lessons, which most cricketers had previously neglected, were now taken to heart' (1985:276). In other words, the intervention of Packer heralded a new phase. It brought into sharp focus that cricket's entrenched values of amateurism were ill equipped to resist a determined assault by an entrepreneur backed by commercial investment. In the wake of Packer's World Series, the amounts of money involved in cricket sponsorship increased significantly. According to Gardiner (2001:337) 'this period of history led to the financial contours of the game changing at the elite levels of cricket'. In 1978 sponsorship fees in English cricket surpassed £750,000 for the first time, and six years later a variety of sponsors led by Cornhill injected more than £2 million into the professional game.

v. Cricket in the commercial age: broadcasting, sponsorship and corporate investment

Since the radical overhaul of the game sparked by the intervention of Packer, there have been numerous changes to the format of county cricket, which have attempted to transform the image as much as the content of cricket. The introduction of four-day cricket and floodlit contests are two such changes, while the marketing of replica shirts and the renaming of teams have attempted to increase the games' appeal. According to Hignell (1999:59) 'every facet of the modern game now attracts corporate investment, with sponsors' logos on shirts, bats and other equipment, whilst the grounds are decorated with other advertising insignia and wooden boards with the corporate name'. Phil Carling (1983) similarly observes, 'the counties have been forced to use their facilities and their grounds to the full. Investment has been made in executive boxes, entertaining suites and, in some counties, the building of squash courts. Local firms have responded to this encouragement, and the partnerships at county level between business and cricket have increased the

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29 As in the 1960s, there have been numerous sub-committees and working parties formed during the 1990s to investigate the state of English cricket. The Murray Working Party was established by the TCCB in August 1991 to examine the state of the domestic first-class game in England. It made three recommendations. First, counties should play only four-day Championship matches. Secondly, it was suggested that the Benson and Hedges Cup should become a simple knockout competition and lastly, the Sunday League should be extended to fifty overs an innings. The latter two of the recommendations were abandoned after just one season.
game's income considerably'. Furthermore, the corporate support has made a
dramatic change to the finances of many county clubs, where in the words of Hignell
(1999:59) 'cash is clearly the king'. This is starkly illustrated by Lancashire, who in
1962 had an annual turnover of £67,000 with £39,000 from gate revenue and
subscriptions, plus £8,000 in Test and broadcasting receipts. By 1990, Lancashire's
income was in excess of £2 million with £500,000 from subscriptions and match
receipts, plus £1.5 million from Test matches, one-day internationals, broadcasting,
sponsorship, perimeter advertising, corporate hospitality and catering facilities which
function all year round (Hignell, 1999). In short 'sponsorship, not just of county
competitions but of Test matches, the sale of broadcasting rights and the intensive
marketing of the game put millions of pounds into English cricket' (Wright, 1983:15).

The increasing commercialisation and commodification of English cricket during the
last decade or so, has not been accepted uncritically, however. As Wisden's Warwick
Franks contends: 'part of the essence of cricket is its awareness of its history and the
ways in which its traditions link the past to the present. While cricket needs to be run
in a business-like manner, to turn it into just a business, where we know the price of
everything and the value of nothing, runs the risk of destroying those things that
make it a distinctive sporting experience' (Wisden Cricketers' Almanac, 2000-01).

vi. It's just not cricket: allegations of match fixing and corruption.

There have been increasing concerns in the last decade that match fixing is
prevalent in professional cricket, with sporadic rumours regarding irregularities in
Test matches, in particular one-day internationals, which provide a greater number of
opportunities for betting. Allegations have tended to centre round players receiving
financial rewards in return for information or to deliberately under-perform and
influence the outcome of the match. The ICC responded to the growing concerns of
illegal betting and match fixing by introducing a clause to its Code of Conduct in July
1995, which outlawed players and administrators from any involvement in betting,
gambling or unofficial speculation on the outcome of any cricket fixture. Five years
later, following the revelations of match fixing principally involving the South Africa
captain, Hansie Cronje, the ICC announced new regulations and possible bans for
players found guilty of being involved in match fixing. In addition to the new
guidelines the ICC formed a new independent Anti-Corruption Unit, headed by former

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30 Gardiner (2001:364) has charted a complex chronology of these allegations, highlighting a
number of investigations in the mid-1990s in Pakistan, India and Australia.
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Lord Condon, to investigate match-fixing allegations worldwide. The ACU published its report on *Corruption in International Cricket* in April 2001, highlighting the vulnerability of cricketers to corrupt practices due largely to their relatively poor wages, and short and uncertain playing careers, often without contracts. As Katwala (2000:74) has argued 'while the vast majority of cricketers are steeped in the values of their sport, the game is ripe for contamination when so many players take part in an endless series of insignificant and instantly-forgettable games, where the players are paid in hundreds while the interests of the gamblers, promoters and TV companies run into millions'. The ACU recommended the need for improved governance, and that the ICC should become more open, transparent and accountable. A panel of the ICC’s Code of Conduct Commission responded to Lord Condon’s criticisms, accepting that ‘the present structure of the ICC is inadequate to run international cricket, and to manage the vast sums of money it now receives from television rights and other sources’ (cited in Gardiner, 2001:375). According to ZH Syed ‘a major part of the blame for the latest crisis has to be shouldered by the game’s administrators … The ICC refused to pay heed to nearly two decades of finger-pointing and allegations of blatant corruption’ (*The Cricketer*, June 2000). The failure of the ICC to govern international cricket effectively is also highlighted by former Australian captain, Steve Waugh: ‘it’s absolutely ridiculous the number of people they’ve got working for them, trying to run a worldwide game. They need ten times that amount of people … the problem is that, with so many issues to cover, they can only scratch the surface of one before they have to move on to the next one’ (*Wisden Cricket Monthly*, January 2001, p.32). Waugh goes on to argue ‘a lot of the time, it seems the ICC’s hands are tied; they can’t enforce anything, not even penalties for match-fixing’.

**Discussion: cricket in crisis?**

As the key developments above have illustrated, the governance of English cricket has changed over time. As Wynne-Thomas and Arnold (1984) observe, the history of cricket has been beset by a series of conflicts. There remain a number of conflicting issues and relationships throughout the game, from the lower levels of recreational cricket through to the professional game and up to test cricket (Greenfield and Osborn, 1999:130). Furthermore, revelations about corruption, gambling and match fixing have sparked enlivened discussion about how national and international cricket is governed. Whatever the outcome of these various investigations, it is abundantly clear that professional cricket is part of the global economy and thus subject, as never before, to the enticing lure of money. Cricket is now awash – though
significantly still less so than some other sports — with money derived from corporate sponsorships, advertising and television contracts. At the same time, the structure of cricket is still sufficiently different to suggest the future direction of the game may differ from other highly commercialised sports. Most first-class counties are first and foremost clubs with members devoted to the game in their localities. During this time however, the failures of England’s national team has strengthened the argument that the interests of the county game should be subordinated to those of the national Test side. Indeed, it is widely assumed that club and county cricket only exists in order to provide recruits for the England team, and that the primacy of success on the international stage, to some degree, justifies undermining the game at the lower levels. As Dave Roberts, the then England physiotherapist, argues ‘to my mind, the success of the national side should override all other concerns. The county clubs obviously want their best players to give them their best. They do, after all, pay their wages. But what they have failed to grasp is that, through national sponsorship, Test match receipts and television revenue, the England team pays their bills’ (cited in Botham, 1997:231).

Historically then, there is a strong correlation between the success of the England Test team and the state of domestic county cricket. Financially, the revenue generated by the national side helps keep the county clubs afloat. However, since retaining the Ashes in 1986-7 and prior to the start of 1997, England had not won a full five or six Test series against any nation. Between 1987 and the 1996-97 home series, England played 98 Tests, of which they won only 20. That record put them bottom of the unofficial ratings of world cricket, an assessment underlined by Ian Botham who contended, ‘English cricket is in crisis, of that there is no doubt. Not only are England performances on the field in international Test cricket simply not good enough, but the county clubs are living in a fool’s paradise if they believe that they can exist through county cricket alone’ (1997:16). According to Matthew Engel, the editor of Wisden, ‘the consistent failure of the England team is the biggest single cause of the crisis’ but added ‘it is not the crisis itself. The blunt fact is that cricket in the UK has become unattractive to the overwhelming majority of the population’ (cited in Botham, 1997:16).

The catalogue of failures at international level, and shortcomings associated with the domestic set-up has proved a catalyst for a protracted period of reflection and analysis. In the preface to *Betrayal: the Struggle for Cricket’s Soul*, author Graeme Wright (1993:8) states ‘cricket in the United Kingdom faces some complex problems,
and there are pros and cons to most arguments. The game currently needs intelligent and considered debate about its future'. Significantly, nine years later these comments remain pertinent despite a series of reports, recommendations and strategies aimed at improving cricket's future. As Gardiner and Osborn (1999:130) observe 'English cricket has been searching for a formula to make the national side successful for over twenty years, and numerous reports have been commissioned in search of this Holy Grail'. As early as 1967 the Clark Committee attempted to gather a range of opinions from various groups involved in cricket, including ground staff, county members, players and spectators. They discovered the general consensus on county cricket was that the game was dull and unattractive, mainly because of the negative approach of the players. Nonetheless, the committee also found a strong interest in cricket, with high rates of participation. The considerations of the range of stakeholder groups were taken into account in the final recommendations in an attempt to meet three primary objectives. The first objective was to generate a more positive and enthusiastic approach by the players. The second was to produce a structure that would spark a revival of public interest, and thirdly to find ways and means of attracting more players into county cricket. In other words, the recommendations were designed to establish a pyramid by which the budding first-class player could graduate from club to county (Wisden Cricketers' Almanac, 1967). The Clark Report was described as a 'brave, intelligent attempt to come to terms with the problems confronting cricket at the time' (Wright, 1993:205-6). However, the first-class counties rejected its recommendations.

Subsequent reports have examined the state of cricket in England, forwarding a number of proposals for change. The Palmer Report in 1986 presented the findings of an enquiry into the standards of play in English Test and county cricket. They suggested the introduction of an organised structure for the development of excellence among young cricketers, and the full-time appointment of one of the England selectors to oversee the international team. Six years later, the TCCB published A Blueprint for the First-Class Game, a report by the working party headed by the chairman of Middlesex, Mike Murray. It took as its premise that the county game needed revitalising, proposing a reduction in the amount of cricket played and the restructuring of the Sunday League into two divisions with play-offs to determine the champions. Lord Griffiths' Working Party meanwhile, set-up by the MCC in 1993 stressed the need for a single administrative body for recreational and professional cricket in the United Kingdom. It had been intended that the Cricket Council, established in 1968, should reflect all levels of the game but as the Griffiths Report
argued, the Cricket Council 'is no longer the forum which holds the balance between the professional and the amateur game'. In 1997 Ian Botham published a report on 'what is wrong with English cricket and how I intend to put it right' (Botham, 1997). Having canvassed the opinions of county chairmen, chief executives, captains and coaches, the former England cricketer proposed a ten-point strategy for the future of English cricket:

- A two-division championship with promotion and relegation
- Contract an elite squad of international players to the central board
- Scrap one-day domestic competition, standardising one 50-over league and a cup contest
- Trim playing staff to a maximum of 20 full-time professionals, and reorganise 2nd XI cricket to be youth-oriented
- Replace the benefit system with pension funds; give the PCA funds to develop training programmes
- Introduce quality control in the hiring of overseas players
- Establish a national cricket academy, and appoint a national director of coaching
- Create a national development plan for schools cricket
- Revamp the marketing of the game
- Appoint a Chief Executive with full and unfettered power to coordinate the above recommendations (Botham, 1997:275-282).

Botham (1997:281) concluded by arguing that 'the stark and only choice facing English cricket' is to 'adapt or die.' He went on to contend 'for too long the county clubs have existed on a diet of complacency and romanticism. The complacency was founded on the mistaken belief that, in terms of its flagship, the England national team, fortunes in cricket were cyclical and that everything would turn out nice in the end'. In the same year, the ECB Chairman, Lord MacLaurin launched a blueprint for modernising English cricket and to create a 'virtuous circle of success'. Entitled *Raising the Standard* (ECB, 1997) the strategy document predicted that a streamlined first-class schedule and improved results for the England team would lead to 'maximum public interest, especially among the young' and a restructured programme of youth and regional cricket would then channel talented players into the professional game. Reaction to MacLaurin's proposals was mixed. The *Daily Telegraph*’s Martin-Jenkins argued 'there is every reason for their endorsement'
while the cover of Wisden Cricket Monthly (September 1997) dismissed the MacLaurin plan as ‘barmy’ claiming that ‘if it goes ahead, England will never beat Australia’. The Guardian columnist, Frank Keating is similarly critical of MacLaurin: ‘his opening blueprint … threw all his eggs into the questionably plausible theory that a powerful and all-conquering England team would hoist the rest of English cricket with it to the heady heights of all-round excellence. Some hopes. Precisely the other way round was the far better bet – that is, nurture the grassroots and you grow from the bottom up, not from the top down. Now the whole of the structure is in a terrible mess’ (The Guardian Sport, 8th April, 2002, p.19).

In May 2001, the ECB published A Cricketing Future for All, a national strategy for cricket, which in MacLaurin’s words ‘is an exciting document which has cemented the whole family of cricket together’ (International Cricketer, June 2001). The ECB’s vision for cricket is twofold: Firstly, ‘to ensure that England becomes and remains the most successful and respected cricket nation in the world’ and secondly, ‘to encourage the widest possible participation and interest in the game throughout England and Wales’. To underline its mission statement, the ECB sets out a number of broad guiding principles:

- The pursuit of excellence
- Coaching and training of World Class quality
- Social inclusiveness
- Equality of opportunity
- Contribution to communities
- Best business practice
- The best deal for supporters
- Good conduct on and off the field
- International cooperation

The backbone to the ECB’s National Strategy is the ‘seven steps’: primary schools, secondary schools, club cricket, district cricket, representative cricket, first-class county cricket and England teams. At grass roots level, the ECB in partnership with Channel Four have launched Howzat!, an initiative aimed at promoting cricket to children in schools, specifically tailored to National Curriculum requirements. However, pressures of the National Curriculum, a lack of training and unsuitable facilities means that opportunities to play cricket in primary schools are limited. Added to this, few primary school teachers are specialised in PE, and a 'children's
games’ approach to PE often suits them better. As a result a sport like cricket is often marginalised, as simpler games like rounders or softball can be used to satisfy national curriculum striking and fielding requirements. Nevertheless, more than one million children play cricket in primary schools and 800,000 in secondary schools (Sports Teacher, summer 2001, p.46) in part a result of a range of ECB initiatives including Kwik Cricket (cricket played with plastic bats and stumps and softer plastic balls) and Inter Cricket (designed to bridge the gap between the former and the traditional hardball game). In addition, the ECB’s Coaching in Schools Programme aims to introduce both pupils and teachers to the basics of cricket in their PE lessons.

Significantly, little consideration is given to the problems facing domestic cricket, in particular the imbalance between the strong public interest in the game and the parlous financial state of county cricket. As the chairman of the ECB argues ‘the financial situation in county cricket is that most counties are posting a loss, and I don’t think that any county is totally self-supporting. Local sponsorship is more difficult to attract because of the emphasis on the England side. We have to think about whether the game can sustain 400 or so first-class professional cricketers’ (International Cricketer, June 2001).

Research Themes

1. The influence of government and government-related agencies on the sport policy and operation of the sport’s governing bodies

Since being elected in 1997 the New Labour government have demonstrated little public interest in cricket. Indeed, Labour has historically had a double-edged approach to cricket. On the one hand, they have recognised the broad popularity of the game, including its following in the traditional working-class heartlands of Yorkshire and Lancashire, while on the other, the hierarchical structure of cricket, perceived by many to be an elitist sport, sits uneasily with the governments commitment to tackling social exclusion. The indifference of Tony Blair towards the sport stands in stark contrast to the interest shown by his predecessor John Major, who made no secret of his passion for the national summer game. Indeed, there has long been a close relationship between the Conservative party and the cricketing establishment. According to McKinstry (1988) this apparent closeness has cultivated an air of suspicion and distrust from Labour. He argues ‘for many socialists, the membership of MCC and the Tory party are interchangeable. Such ideologies would also argue that, in its structure, cricket reflects the worst of the British class system,
with a hierarchy dominated by wealth and privilege, and entry restricted to those who
have been to independent schools' (McKinstry, 1998:8).

Tony Blair's general indifference towards the national summer sport then, suggests
that New Labour has shown little public interest in developing a close association
with the governing bodies of cricket. ECB Performance Director, Hugh Morris, does
not reflect this in his comments, describing relations between New Labour and the
governing body as 'very good'. He goes on to state 'personally, I have worked closely
with government and the commercial department also works closely with them. The
previous sports minister, Kate Hoey was frequently at Lord's cricket ground and she
was enthusiastic about cricket' (Hugh Morris, Interview, 28th September 2001). It is
significant that as an under-commercialised sport, the ECB is heavily reliant on
external funding from government and government-related agencies, such as Sport
England and the distribution of National Lottery money. This point is spelt out in the
ECB's national strategy document, A Cricketing Future for All (ECB, 2001) which
concludes 'cricket is not a wealthy sport, and it does require financial assistance from
Government, Sport England and the Sports Council for Wales if it is to continue to
invest in today's youngsters – from Hackney to Harrogate – and to give them the
opportunities they unquestionably deserve'. As a consequence, the ECB's national
strategy shares a number of parallels with the Labour government's policy principles,
namely tackling social exclusion, equity and grassroots development – emphasising
that 'cricket is a socially-inclusive sport ... played by a wide cross-section of
communities in every part of the country (ECB, 2001). The governing body also
emphasises its commitment to investing 11 per cent of its broadcasting income on
grassroots development, a figure that exceeds the government's medium term
objective of between 5-10 per cent, arguing that there is 'a compelling case for
Government, Sport England the Sports Council for Wales to match this funding. (The
Football Foundation has, we understand, already benefited from such an
arrangement)' (ECB, 2001). This emphasis on meeting the government's
recommendations and embracing the 'sport for all' philosophy outlined in the policy
document, A Sporting Future for All (DCMS, 2000) demonstrates the pressures of
National Lottery and government guidelines on the governing bodies of sport to
conform to various aspects of good governance, and their dependency on external
investment.

2. The significance of the media and broadcasters in affecting NGB policy
Until relatively recently, the BBC dominated coverage of live cricket, in effect enjoying the benefits of a monopoly broadcaster. According to Greenfield and Osborn (1999:138) 'historically, cricket was the preserve of the BBC; indeed both quintessentially English institutions seemed inextricably linked, particularly with respect to the radio coverage delivered by Test Match Special, where the cricket often appeared peripheral to the drama created by the interrelationships of the commentary team'. However, this relationship has shifted markedly in recent years with the emergence of other broadcasters, in particular BSkyB and Channel Four, moving in on the traditional preserve. As a consequence, broadcasting rights to live cricket have attracted a more competitive price: revenues generated from television rose from a meagre £1.5 million a year to £60 million by 1998. Thus, cricket's relationship with the media during the nineties has radically transformed, in what Boyle and Haynes (2000:216) describe as 'an ideological struggle between tradition and modernity'. The sea-change was in part sparked by the ECB successfully lobbying to have Test cricket downgraded from government regulations, which restricted their sale of rights to free-to-air television broadcasters, in order to allow the governing body greater leverage in their negotiations with broadcasters and to raise the market value. At the time, Lord MacLaurin stated 'with the age of digital television fast approaching and the need for flexibility increasing, the case for de-listing Test cricket becomes ever more vital to the sport’s investment plans. Without it cricket will be unfairly hampered and our ability to develop a new generation of top class Test players placed in serious jeopardy' (Financial Times, 21st November 1997). The argument over de-listing was as much a political question – to balance the power of the rights owner to seek the highest bidder against the potentially conflicting public policy of preserving the broadcasting of sport on terrestrial television – as an economic decision. Writing in The Cricketer (August, 1998 p.3) Richard Hutton argued 'cricket’s problem is finding the right balance between getting the game to the widest possible audience and maximising its revenue generation'.

In general terms, the market for sports rights has become more complex, with new relationships being forged between satellite broadcasters. In the case of English cricket, Channel Four's deal – worth £103 million over four years – was underwritten by an agreement with BSkyB, which owns the rights to the Lord’s Test in any given series for the duration of the arrangement. According to the ECB's Hugh Morris the relationship between the governing body and Channel Four has been successful: 'I think Channel Four have been fantastic partners. They are keen on reaching new audiences, for example ethnic minority groups and appealing to young people. They
really have put their money where their mouth is, and not just the broadcasting. They have helped with things like setting up beach cricket in big city centres during the summer, where members of the public could come along and play cricket with Viv Richards. At Lords we had Jules Holland and a reggae band playing at the lunchtime interval. We at the ECB are very pleased with how the broadcasting has developed (Hugh Morris, Interview 28\textsuperscript{th} September 2001). Moreover, it is noteworthy that it is primarily broadcasting revenues that have driven the transformation of the traditional structure of professional cricket. An example of this is the pivotal role television played in the initiation and development of cricket's World Cup tournament, which attracts significant viewing figures in the participating nations. Similarly, the growth of televised cricket has seen a concomitant increase in one-day international matches – described by Vic Marks as 'the commercial backbone of the world game' (The Guardian, 14\textsuperscript{th} January 2001) - and the rise of triangular one-day tournaments involving the home nation and two visiting teams\textsuperscript{31}.

3. Issues of gender relating to how NGBs are structured and how they manage their sport

Cricket is widely regarded as a 'man's game' in which women are seen as peripheral, both as administrators, players and spectators. Between 1878 and 1998 the MCC preserved an exclusively male membership, while cricket discourses indicate that playing cricket was believed to promote distinctly masculine characteristics and subsequently help to emphasise the difference of women. As noted, the field of play has almost been exclusively a male cultural space. Women playing in men's teams are highly unusual, while women umpiring men's matches is equally rare. These deeply entrenched beliefs are reflected by research undertaken by Imray and Middleton on a village cricket club. They describe in detail the way in which the men of the village discriminate against women, marking the space around the clubhouse, the seating arrangements and the playing areas as exclusively male. At the same time, they contend 'in the private sphere, women are hard at work producing leisure for men … washing whites, providing teas, activities vital to the production of a cricket match' (Imray and Middleton, 1983:23). Indeed, chief columnist in The Cricketer, Christopher Martin-Jenkins has argued 'there is a limit to the ability of women cricketers. Most are relatively weak, physically' while suggesting that the current England women's team 'would be unlikely to win against any recent winner of the National Village Championship' (The Cricketer, November, 1998).

\textsuperscript{31} According to Katwala (2000:76) there were 159 one-day internationals in 1999.
Historically, records of women playing cricket date back to the eighteenth century, although the first club for women - the White Heather Club - was not formed until 1887. In parallel with the development of women’s football, the popularity of the women’s game was cultivated by a series of exhibition matches, which attracted comparatively large audiences, and in effect put women’s cricket on the national map. An important milestone in the organisation of women’s cricket was the formation of the Women’s Cricket Association (WCA) in 1926. The WCA was established and run by women. Its constitution stated that its primary aim was ‘to provide an organisation for the furtherance of women’s cricket’ (cited in Williams, 1999:99). The WCA can be seen as an illustration of what Hargreaves (1994) describes as ‘separatist sports feminism’ – in other words, the attempts by women not to seek inclusion in male sporting domains but forming alternative sports structures and opportunities exclusively for women. Hargreaves (1994:30-1) contends that such sports separatism ‘is not incompatible with the ideology of equal opportunity – it is seen as a way of balancing the advantages that men have had for so long. Separate organisations … provide women with opportunities to administer and control their own activities.’ Thus, the WCA stressed that it wished to organise and promote the playing of cricket by women and girls in their own style and for their own enjoyment (Williams, 1999:99). The WCA was crucial to the growth of women and girls playing cricket. By 1927 there were 10 clubs, and this figure had risen to 80 by 1934. At its peak, the WCA had 208 affiliated clubs and 94 school and junior teams. Until relatively recently the WCA was administered principally by volunteers, and had to raise funds for the England women’s team to tour Australia. For example, Gill McConway had to pay £67 for her England blazer. She notes ‘the whole team wore them as much as we possibly could to get value for money’ (Wisden Cricket Monthly, June 2001).

Women's cricket is now the responsibility of the ECB, which merged with the WCA in April 1998, thereby marking the end of a 70-year period in which the women's game had been administered by a separate association. According to Helen Pugh, Women’s Cricket Development Officer ‘the merger with the ECB wasn’t everybody’s idea of the best way forward, but I think it is the only way forward if we are going to get the resources and the level of support we need’ (Interview, 29th June 2001). The chief mechanism for representing women's cricket within the ECB is the Women’s Cricket Advisory Group (WCAG), which comprises of 9 elected members and meets three times a year to discuss recreational cricket, club/county relations and the
development of women’s cricket. This replaced the previous committee structure, which comprised representatives from every first-class county, often with little knowledge or interest in women’s cricket. While members of WCAG are also included on other ECB committees, the interests of women’s cricket are largely excluded and peripheral to the vision of first-class county cricket representatives and in the words of Helen Pugh ‘its going to take time for people to look beyond county cricket and try and think about women’s cricket as a whole’ (Interview, 29th June 2001).

The assimilation of the WCA within the ECB, in effect has shifted the women’s game from the margins to a more central and visible position, and as such benefits from the ECB’s National Plan for Cricket. This has strengthened the ECB’s ability to develop and promote the provision of more facilities and increase playing opportunities for women and girls. Part of this role has been undertaken by County Boards and County Development Officers, (CDOs) who have taken the lead in encouraging women’s and girl’s cricket. In addition, some counties have employed CDOs with the specific responsibility for promoting and developing the women’s game. To this end, four Women’s Club Cricket Development Officers have been appointed by the ECB, covering the South West, East Midlands, the North and the Home Counties. These appointments in part reflect the growing interest and participation in women’s cricket. There has for example, been a 19 per cent increase in the numbers of women playing cricket since 1998 (ECB figures) while there has been a comparable growth in the participation figures at primary and secondary school level. This surge of interest in women’s and girl’s cricket was confirmed in the ECB’s Annual Report published in May 2001, which reported that the numbers of women and girls playing cricket had doubled in the last two years.

Domestically, the majority of women’s teams are usually part of men’s cricket clubs. The league structure from county, through regional to the National Premier League with an annual system of promotion and relegation, is slowly evolving. The Premier League is divided into North and South divisions, both comprising six teams. In turn both North and South have two divisions, One and Two, of six teams each. In 2000, 5,000 women played at club level, but this increased to 7,611 women, with 36 new clubs formed and 56 new women’s sections formed at existing clubs. In addition, 4,339 girls play at club level, while at schools 640,824 girls have played cricket in 2000, an increase from 469,483 the previous year. The ECB and the first-class counties have linked these rises in participation of women’s cricket to the governing
bodies' investment in grassroots development. Key factors have been the introduction of CDOs and numerous initiatives to promote the game in schools – for example, Kwik Cricket, Inter-Cricket and Howzat! The ECB/Channel Four education resource packs. Furthermore, the new University Centres of Cricketing Excellence provide talented girls with the same opportunities as boys to advance their cricket while furthering their education. At the international level, England have three teams: England, England under-21, and England under-17. At junior level, there are under-19, under-17 and under-15 county leagues, mirroring the age structure of the men's game. In the words of Clare Connor, England Team Captain 'since the Women's Cricket Association was merged with the ECB in 1998, women's cricket has made great strides forward' (Wisden Cricket Monthly, June 2001). This is reflected in the ECB investing time, personnel and funds: in 2000 England's World Cup campaign received a grant from Sport England for £94,525. Vodafone sponsors the England women's team, like the men's, while CricInfo financed the women's two-Test Ashes series in 2001.

A significant landmark in the development of women's cricket and the acceptance of women within cricket was the MCC's decision to end its exclusively male membership. In September 1998, at a special general meeting, a majority of 66 per cent passed the amendment to rule 2.2(a) that 'men and women shall be eligible for membership'. The reasons for this are complex. The President and Chairman of the working party on women membership, Anthony Wexford claimed that they were inspired not by political correctness or a need for public money, but by 'what was right for cricket' (The Cricketer, November 1998). However, it is arguable that the all-male membership of the MCC had meant the organisation was unlikely to receive external investment, and remains unattractive to sponsors and that the inclusion of women members was important in improving the MCC's public image. Indeed, the introduction of National Lottery funding has acted as a catalyst for combating social exclusion, bringing pressures to be more accountable. As Helen Pugh, Women's Cricket Development Officer, notes 'lottery funding is a key issue because if a cricket club wants a new pavilion, they suddenly realise they are going to have to be more inclusive and promote women's and ethnic minority cricket. It is clearly not a pure motive to foster women's cricket, but if it gets women into clubs and is a way of developing women's cricket, then fair enough' (Interview, 29th June 2001).

In summary, the merger between the WCA with the ECB has provided women's cricket with greater resources to develop, particularly at grassroots level. However,
cricket remains a predominantly male, traditionalist and conservative sport, with deeply entrenched values and resistant to change. As Helen Pugh contends 'I know I am wasting my time with some of the clubs that I work with, and it is like banging your head against a brick wall trying to persuade them to have a women's team' (Interview, 29th June 2001). As a result, the women's game is largely peripheral to the interests of the governing bodies and the first-class counties.

4. The ways in which athletes, coaches and managers are represented in the decision-making processes of NGBs

While the PFA undoubtedly played a crucial role in shaping the economic position of professional players within football, the role and function of the players' union in professional cricket has proved far less influential. In contrast, the Professional Cricketers' Association (PCA) has a limited history both in terms of its formation and negotiation with the sport's governing bodies (Greenfield, 2000:130). At the first meeting of the PCA, in the words of Marqusee 'trade unionism made its belated entry into commercial cricket' (1994:102). At that time, county cricket had a predominantly feudal system with its employees denied freedom of movement, collective bargaining and grievance procedures. In an article in The Cricketer, the then president of the Cricketers' Association, John Arlott stated that during the 1960s 'cricketers were the only body of British wage-earners with no freedom of choice of employment, no representation, negotiation, arbitration, protection of independently-framed conditions of employment. Most administrators believed that state of affairs should continue; while many players were alarmed by the possible consequences of attempting to redress it' (The Cricketer, April 1974:21). Fred Rumsey, the former Worcestershire, Somerset and England bowler, did not accept the 'alarmist' argument and during the 1966-67 seasons lobbied for the formation of a players' union. During its formative years, the Cricketers' Association developed gradually: at the Association's first AGM in March 1968 at Edgbaston the membership had increased from 70 to 130, representing about one third of first-class players. According to Sissons (1988:286) many county captains and senior professionals were sceptical about the merits of such an organisation, believing that the Association would 'mirror the militancy of the Professional Footballers Association'. Nevertheless, by the early 1970s the PCA had achieved virtually 100 per cent membership, and according to Peter Walker of the PCA currently has around 400 members (Interview, 15th August 2001).

Significantly, when the Cricketers Association was established in 1967 both the MCC and the employers welcomed its formation. As Jack Bannister notes 'the initial
opposition barriers of union and brother images were to be expected. Perhaps less expectedly had been the ease with which those barriers had been removed. He goes on to stress that 'the MCC and the Counties have welcomed the formation of the Association, and already have shown full-cooperation in preliminary discussions on several important issues' (The Cricketer, September 1968, p.13). This according to Greenfield (2000) reflects the conservative nature of the players' union, which during its formative years received funds from its employers, the TCCB.

Since 1967 the Cricketers Association has introduced a number of services and initiatives for its members. One of the initial steps was to provide free accident cover of £10 per week while unable to play. The Association also played an influential role in the creation of a pension scheme in 1975, which replaced the old MCC-administered benevolent funds; the introduction of a minimum wage in 1978; and the standardisation of contracts in 1986. One of the most significant achievements of the Association was in 1975 when Tony Greig passed a resolution that unless the TCCB agreed to the PCA's demands for a percentage share of revenues accruing to the game, including the sale of television rights and Test match receipts then en bloc, first-class cricketers would strike. Despite threats from the game's authorities, the players' union stood firm, winning a landmark concession without having to take industrial action.

However, it has proved far more difficult to raise players' wage levels comparable with those generated by other professional sportsmen and women. As noted, the low payment of players has long been acknowledged in cricket, hence the established distinction between amateurs and professionals. However, the nature of first-class county cricket has meant that professional cricketers have been in relation to other sports people, relatively poorly paid. In 1995 the newly-appointed General Secretary of the PCA, David Graveney highlighted the relatively low wages paid to professional cricket players: 'an uncapped player earns between £5,500 and £8,500 depending on age; while for a capped player the minimum wage is £14,500. I am embarrassed saying that' (The Cricketer, January 1995). Ian Botham (1997:219) similarly is critical of the poor rewards offered in cricket, arguing that 'given the choice of sports to take up as a profession, or even as a hobby, the vast majority of eligible young talent will put cricket way down the list of preferred options'.

Contractually, players may be registered for only one county at a time and cannot move during the course of a season, thereby preventing transfers mid-season. On the one hand, cricketers have freedom of movement at the end of any contractual
period, but a player who is under contract has only a limited right to request any
move. Moreover, the cricketing authorities have historically sought to restrict the
development of a transfer market and to this end, have to some degree been
assisted by the lack of funds within the first-class county game. According to
Greenfield and Osborn (1999:134) 'at county level the administrators have always
sought to avoid a football-type transfer market amongst the clubs and players and
have maintained a very restrictive approach to player movement'. For example,
player registrations are strictly monitored by the ECB, with counties permitted to
register a maximum of 30 cricketers and only one non-EU national. The governing
body oversees the lists released by the counties of retained and non-contracted
players, regulating what they term as 'extraordinary registrations'. The latter allows
players to move, but only with the approval of the ECB, although no county is
permitted to effect more than two extraordinary registrations in 12 months or move
than three in a five-year period. According to Jim Cumbes, Chief Executive of
Lancashire CCC, 'the List One and List Two counties on the number of players they
can sign will have to become a thing of the past – not so much from the counties' point of view but from the players' – because my view is that it will inevitably be seen as a restraint of trade' (The Guardian Sport, April 15th 2002). In respect to younger players, a greater degree of flexibility has emerged, although the sanctity of contracts in cricket is still treated very differently in comparison with professional football. The re-structuring of the County Championship into two divisions and the possibility of cricketers moving from the second division to the top echelon of domestic cricket however has reinvigorated the issue of transfers within the game. This is exacerbated by the landmark move of former England batsman, John Crawley to Hampshire after being released by his county, Lancashire in March 2002. In the words of Paul Weaver 'county cricket now appears to be a short step away from a football transfer system' (The Guardian, March 23rd p.8) after the ECB's Contract Appeals Panel had previously ruled against Crawley who wished to leave, deciding that Lancashire 'were not in serious or persistent breach of their contract with Crawley'. In the end Lancashire saw little point in employing a player so anxious to leave, agreeing to release Crawley from his contract upon the payment to the club by him and Hampshire CCC of suitable compensation. In light of this landmark development, as well as Aftab Habib, who bought out his contract with Leicestershire to join Essex, the ECB is under pressure to introduce a system to deal with compensation payments. As Jim Cumbes, Lancashire's Chief Executive, contends 'while no-one really wants a football-style transfer system, it is inevitable that cricket's
contracts and registrations system ... will have to be reviewed' (The Guardian Sport, April 15th 2002).

The participation of overseas players has also been a controversial issue in modern cricket since the qualification rules were relaxed in 1968 (Greenfield and Osborn, 1999). The abolition of the qualification period previously required playing County cricket, signalled an influx of overseas players. Critics have argued that the use of foreign players decreases the opportunities for domestic players, and that this in turn weakens the base of the national side. As David Graveney, Chief Executive of the PCA, asserts 'it is an area for concern ... we have to keep in mind whether it is good for the future of English cricket. It will certainly be monitored closely' (The Times, October 3rd 2001). This argument has been repeated in relation to the FA Premier League, although crucially differs with regard legal status: the majority of players recruited to the Premiership by virtue of their country's membership of the European Union have a right to work in England, while regulations governing non-EU work permits and employment have also been relaxed. In contrast, the main source of overseas cricketers is from outside the EU because of the history of the development of the game.

In light of legal challenges to the transfer system within professional football – most notably Bosman – the ECB has re-examined its registration restrictions for overseas players with EU passports. As John Carr, the ECB's Director of Cricket Operations, explains 'we have had to reword our regulations, having been convinced that the existing ones were not legally defensible under EU employment laws' (The Cricketer, March 2002, p.6). Carr goes on to warn that 'professional sport is becoming increasingly litigious ... players have suggested that they might be prepared to take legal action in order to gain employment in county cricket'. The amendments mean that if a EU player has not played for any other full-member within the last 12 months, he can be registered as a non-overseas player, whereas previously he could not have played representative cricket for four years. The change in registration procedures comes at a time when the Counties are considering an allowance of two or three overseas players per club instead of one, in part a response to fewer England players appearing in county cricket because of international fixtures and resting centrally contracted players.

The above developments illustrate the importance of the role of the PCA, which has long campaigned to be included within the cricket community, and subsequently be a
recipient of ECB funding that is distributed among the 18 first-class counties. However, Richie Benaud argues ‘few administrators will go quietly at this suggestion because the fear factor always comes into it. The fear that the players are seeking to have a say in the running of the game, and to let them have money will only accelerate that effect’ (The Cricketer, July 1998). These concerns are reflected in the comments made by Chris Hassell, Chief Executive of Yorkshire, who argues that the sprinkling of current and former players in administrative positions ‘is the problem with cricket. Too many former players who couldn’t run a fish and chip shop’ (cited in Botham, 1997:267). However, in a survey conducted of Chairmen, Chief Executives, captains and coaches, Botham found that 73 per cent believed that players should have a greater influence in the running of English cricket. He argues ‘surely it can only be good for the game if players do become more involved’ (Botham, 1997:268). According to England fast-bowler Darren Gough, however the views of professional cricketers are often secondary to other concerns: ‘my opinions on cricket? Does it matter what a player has to say? Nobody takes any notice. They all only do what’s best financially for themselves’ (The Guardian Sport, April 15th 2002). Similarly, Hugh Morris, ECB Performance Director comments ‘I retired from the professional game about four years ago and then the players didn’t have much if any of a say in the organisation of cricket’. He goes on to argue that the PCA ‘are becoming increasingly important and players should have a voice’ (Interview, 28th September 2001). Lord Condon highlighted the lack of dialogue and consultation between cricket’s authorities and player representative bodies in his report into cricket corruption, which found that ‘the players are not sufficiently involved in the administration of the game and ownership of the problems, with limited recognition of players’ representative bodies nationally and internationally’. Lord Condon recommended that players should be drawn into ‘a more productive relationship with the ICC to give them ownership of the game’. In response, former England captain, Michael Atherton, stated: ‘there is no doubt that this is a good policy. For too long in the English game there has been a ‘them and us’ feeling between players and administrators. Players have felt short-changed financially and have invariably been excluded from the decision-making process that directly affects them. This extends to the realm of administration itself where so few recently retired Test players are encouraged to tread’ (Sunday Telegraph, June 24th 2001).

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32 Marqusee (1994:124) points to the close relationship between the players’ union and the TCCB (now ECB) which provides funds to the Association, and argues that it has subsequently been able to restrict the PCA’s influence, keeping it off all key decision-making committees.
In recognition of the global nature of Test cricket and the cross-nation migration of professional cricketers, the PCA was influential in the formation of a worldwide players' organisation to represent their interests at international level. The Federation of International Cricketers' Association (FICA) was established in 1999, and according to President, Barry Richards 'this is an exciting development within the professional game. At present, many decisions are being made without reference to the players, not always in their interests while at international level the cricketers' voices need to be heard and listened to by the International Cricket Council' (PCA, 2001). FICA comprises national players' associations from Australia, England, South Africa and West Indies, and has verbal and written arrangements with the Test nations that lack them. In the words of Tim May, Chief Executive of the Australian Cricketers Association (ACA), 'FICA has the absolute support of ACA because it is vital that professional players are represented by a unified voice. Matters of rules and playing conditions, safety, commercial considerations, racial and religious vilification codes, revenue streams and match scheduling need to be addressed on a global scale' (PCA, 2001). The primary objectives of FICA are as follows:

- To promote the establishment of professional cricketer associations in countries where non currently exist
- To develop communication between these associations across the world, encouraging contact between them so as they speak with one voice on matters affecting cricket
- To ensure that individual associations are recognised by their domestic governing bodies and the ICC
- Through their local governing bodies, cricketers should have an input to all decisions affecting the professional game
- To protect the commercial interests of members of FICA
- To assist individual associations to raise finance to ensure the development of projects which benefit their members, present and past

However, the attitude of the ICC towards FICA has been one of indifference, arguing that because FICA is not fully representative of all Test playing nations then it has no right to formally or informally attend ICC meetings. At the same time, David Graveney, Chief Executive of the PCA, contends that relationships post-Condon report should improve and 'force administrators worldwide to work closer together with their respective players' (PCA, 2001).
In summary, both the PCA and FICA have experienced problems in seeking to protect and advance the rights and interests of professional cricketers. This is in large part explained by the attitude of indifference by the governing bodies towards the players' associations, restricting and to some extent controlling their influence by providing funding and excluding them from policy and decision-making. Simon Ecclestone, PCA Commercial Director, reflects this in the comment that 'the attitude of landlord and serf seems to continue to exist' (PCA, 2001).

5. The ways in which supporters are represented in the decision-making processes of NGBs

It is first necessary to define 'supporters' in the context of professional cricket. It is widely recognised that cricket in England has a broad appeal. According to statistics published by the ECB, in 2000 there were 137,000 County and 19,000 MCC members, in excess of 500,000 spectators of international Test matches, while attendances of county cricket matches were approximately 1.1 million. The cricketing public therefore consists of a number of disparate groups. As Greenfield and Osborn (1999:135) contend: 'first are the County Club members who have paid for what is essentially a season ticket allowing them access to all of their county's home games throughout the season. Secondly, there is the group of people with less attachment that might turn up to the odd one day game, a day of a County Championship match or more likely a day at a Test Match at one of the six Test playing grounds'. In addition, the ECB points to a considerable television audience – 12 million viewers watch at least fifteen minutes of each England Test match – while the cumulative worldwide audience for the 1999 Cricket World Cup was 2.3 billion people. However, the relative lack (in terms of numbers) of a 'loyal' core audience, in comparison to professional League football in Britain, has been a perennial problem facing county cricket. As Katwala (2000:75-6) contends 'today the paying spectator at the average county cricket fixture is practically an extinct species, and the games go on, ignored and unwatched.' Indeed, the growing revenue streams for first-class counties and reliance on ECB funding, has meant that the importance of gate receipts has lessened. As Midwinter (1992) has argued 'spectators, and their income, are scarcely part of the formula anymore: in 1990 only 8 per cent of county income

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33 However, there is an undefined overlap between these three categories.
34 The numbers of people attending county cricket matches has decreased markedly since the post-war boom in 1950 with two million spectators paying to watch county cricket, beyond the county members.
was from gate-money and 17 per cent from subscriptions, with 70 per cent from commercial and TCCB sources.

According to Greenfield and Osborn (1999:139) however, 'with respect to spectators, the game needs to attract more to boost not only gate revenues but also the consequent increase in sales of teams' merchandise'. This is reflected in the ECB proposals for a short-form 20-over county league commencing in the 2002 season, which is hoped, will attract a new and younger audience to county cricket. This follows a six-month study commissioned by the ECB that classified 33 per cent of the public – around 20 million people – as potential cricket spectators. The study confirmed the widely held view that cricket's most passionate followers were predominantly white, middle- and upper-class males over 45. Nearly half of the potential fan base identified had never attended a game, and these non-attendees were largely in the 15-24 age group. However, in order to attract a new audience, the game must change some deep-seated perceptions flagged up by the research. County cricket was seen as taking up too much time (28 per cent) and boring (14 per cent). Younger respondents, as well as those from minority ethnic groups, also suspected that county clubs would be stuffy and unwelcoming (The Guardian Sport, April 13th 2002).

Historically, cricket supporters have been on the periphery of the governing bodies' vision. This is reflected in the TCCB's decision not to refund paying spectators when only two balls were bowled on the second day of the Edgbaston Test in 1992 between England and Pakistan. Meanwhile, despite fierce criticism from county cricket members for a proposed 20-over league, the ECB ruled in favour of the short-form game. Similarly, Brian Kemp, Chairman of the Essex Boundary Club, argues 'the ECB conclude that county members prefer the four-day game and that this has improved players at international level' despite there being 'no evidence' and that 'games rarely go into the fourth day and commercially they are a disaster' (Author's notes). Moreover, despite attempts to establish a national cricket supporters

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35 While the new 20-over league is aimed at attracting a new, younger audience, the research also found that as many as half of cricket followers are hostile to the 'slogathon', rising to 67 per cent among the ultra-conservative county membership (The Guardian Sport, April 13th 2002). There was also some resistance from the first-class counties, who voted 11-7 in favour of the short-form game.

36 The abandonment of the opening day's play due to bad weather had cost the governing body around £150,000 and it is thought the potential loss had there been no play on the second day would have added a further £250,000.
association\textsuperscript{37}, no such body is officially recognised by the ECB. At the same time, according to Richard Kaye, the ECB's Head of Commercial Affairs, the governing body are currently looking into forming an England members' club, which would provide ticket and travel arrangements for followers of the national Test team (Interview, 29\textsuperscript{th} September 2001).

At county level, most (but not all) first-class counties have a supporters' club, primarily with the function of raising-funds, arranging social events and organising transport to matches. These are largely voluntary run organisations, dependent on the hard work of a handful of individuals and the cooperation and goodwill of county staff. Indeed, 82 per cent of supporters clubs (n=11) surveyed described relations with the cricket club as either 'very good' or 'good'. Together, the supporters' clubs also provide a range of mechanisms for representing supporters' interests, through members' forums, meetings with club officials, and to a far less extent, undertaking club surveys. However, these mechanisms are confined to the local level, and the absence of a recognised national supporters' body highlights the lack of dialogue between the ECB and the first-class CCC supporters' clubs. As noted, no significant attempt has been made on the part of the ECB to enter in dialogue with cricket spectators, while on the flip-side there has not been the rise of fans' organisations, supporter trusts, fanzines and so on, that there has in football.

Conclusion

Reflecting on the three applications of governance identified in chapter two, the case study of cricket raises a number of interesting issues. As noted, the New Labour government – in contrast to the Major administration – has demonstrated little public interest in fostering a close relationship with the ECB, but works through the Sports Councils to direct funding to those governing bodies that exhibit a clear strategy to promote participation, excellence and tackling social exclusion. This is reflected in the ECB's national strategy document \textit{A Cricketing Future for All}, (ECB, 2001) which spells out a unambiguous commitment to the government's social policy objectives, including the introduction of child protection policies and initiatives aimed at attracting people with disabilities and people from ethnic minority communities to participate in cricket. In this way, cricket can be seen as vulnerable to the influence of external

\textsuperscript{37} Here, the details are cloudy with contradictory reports of whether a national association exists. Following a mailed questionnaire survey of first-class county supporters' clubs, responses were mixed regarding a national supporters' body. One respondent noted that 'an association (the County Cricket Supporters' Association) was formed in the early nineties, by about ten supporters clubs but was disbanded last year owing to a lack of recognition by the
funding agencies such as Sport England and the allocation of National Lottery money, upon which the ECB is heavily reliant. As the ECB’s strategy document claims: ‘cricket is not a wealthy sport, and it does require financial assistance from Government, Sport England and the Sports Council for Wales’ (ECB, 2001:33). The capacity of the ECB to steer is also weakened by its close interrelationship with the 18 First Class Counties, that with the MCC make up the First Class Forum, and the 38 County Boards (the Recreation Forum) so that ‘the ECB’s structure is such that the Counties are an integral part of the decision-making process’ (ECB, 2001:32). At the same time, however the commercial strength of the ECB and the high profile that Test and to a far lesser extent County cricket attracts, has enabled the governing body to diversify its revenue streams by forging new commercial partnerships. Here, the sale of the broadcasting rights to domestic Test matches to Channel Four for a total of £50 million over three years is a significant development in the ECB not only attempting to maximise revenue but protect its autonomy.

In terms of delineating a policy community or network for cricket, the case study material flagged up the difficulties of identifying the range of stakeholders involved in an increasingly pluralistic domain. Indeed, A Cricketing Future for All, (ECB, 2001) lists over twenty partners from DCMS and local authorities to the Youth Sports Trust and the British Indoor Cricket Association (BICA) with whom they are committed to collaborating with. Furthermore, the ECB is engaged in relationships with primary and secondary schools, club and district cricket, the 38 County Boards, the 20 Minor Counties and, most significantly, the 18 First Class Counties. Of this wide range of actors however, it is unclear how many directly or indirectly the development of sport policy. For example, the earlier investigation of the PCA revealed an uneasy relationship with the ECB, who see the players’ union as a potential threat and subsequently exclude from a range of key decision-making boards and committees. Similarly, women’s cricket has struggled to gain a role of any major significance within the ECB, despite its amalgamation in 1998.

The third and final concept of governance, namely good governance, helps flag up ways in which the ECB has been encouraged to modernise and introduce ‘best practice’. Here, the appointment of Lord MacLaurin as Chief Executive of the ECB is significant, illustrating the governing bodies’ commitment to inject modern business ideas to what is traditionally an amateur sport. The ECB’s strategy document, A Cricketing Future for All, (ECB, 2001) also provides a good indication of the growing importance given to improving corporate governance and financial management,
which sections given to financial and human resource management, accountability, monitoring and evaluation, and corporate governance. That said it is unclear how many of these principles would have been considered without pressure from the Sports Councils and National Lottery funding, whose funding is dependent on the adoption of a more professional approach to management.

In summary, the ECB currently finds itself in a difficult position amid allegations of match fixing and corruption, dwindling attendances, and the parlous financial state of First Class County Cricket. Its effectiveness is chiefly measured not in terms of widening participation and the development of the recreational game, but the success of the England team on the international stage, and to a lesser extent, its capacity to resolve the problems of first-class county cricket, over which it has only limited control. As noted, the catalogue of failures involving England between the late 1980s and mid-1990s reflects a period of neglect in the professional nurturing of Test cricket, and demonstrates a traditional ideology of conservatism and amateur values within cricket's governing bodies. As Lord MacLaurin, Chief Executive of the ECB has argued ... In response, the ECB's first strategy document, *Raising the Game* (ECB, 1997) gave greater emphasis to elite success, with the explicit aim of making England the number one ranked Test nation in the world by 2007. The growing importance of elite success, often to the detriment of county cricket, is reflected in the Central Contracts system, which in the words of Paul Allott 'gives the England set-up total responsibility for, and control over, its most valued players' (*The Cricketer*, August 2000). As a consequence, the centrally contracted players are largely unavailable to appear for their first-class counties – for example – at a time when general interest in county cricket is dwindling.

This 'balancing act' of attempting to reconcile the (sometimes conflicting) interests of amateur and professional cricket creates a number of problems, exacerbated by the traditional culture of amateurism and voluntarism embedded within the sport's governing bodies. The empirical material however, suggests that the ECB as a relatively young governing body is making strides towards incorporating the views of their stakeholders and partner organisations so that, in the words of the ECB's Performance Director, Hugh Morris 'they all have a voice at the table and a say in the running of the game' (Interview, 28th September 2001). Indeed, the formation of the ECB in 1997 represented at attempt at integrating the TCCB, which ran professional

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38 As Richards contends 'the constitution of English cricket is flawed as all the power rests with the county clubs, so how they use that power is crucial to the future of the game in this country' (*The Cricketer*, September 1998).
cricket and the NCA, which was responsible for grassroots development within one organisation. As Hugh Morris observes ‘the ECB was set up to make sure that everything came under one umbrella, and that is the structure we have been looking to develop for the last five years’ (Interview, 28th September 2001). However, while the organisational structure for English cricket has been unified, there is little evidence to suggest the ECB has successfully resolved the rifts within the recreational and professional game.

39 The Cricket Foundation was established at the same time as the ECB, as a Charitable Trust to distribute funds to develop the recreational game.
Empirical material

Case study c: swimming

This third and final case study examines issues of governance within the sport of swimming. In stark contrast to the previous case studies on association football and cricket, there is a paucity of literature on the development and organisational structure of swimming. As a consequence there are inevitably gaps in this synthesis, which nevertheless represents a scarce attempt to investigate a prominent sport that has previously been overlooked, and that in the words of sports historian Tony Mason 'awaits the scholar's scrutiny' (cited in Polley, 1998:10). The initial focus of the case study is to identify themes or developments that are salient to how swimming is governed, for example the formation of the sports' governing bodies and the targeting of elite performance swimming for National Lottery funding. These are not necessarily exhaustive of the range of such issues, but are selected as those, which carry the most significant implications for how swimming is organised, administered and managed in England. The second part of the case study will then concentrate on discussing contemporary issues of how swimming is governed, divided along the research themes identified in Chapter Four, namely the role of the Government; the influence of the media; gender issues; and athlete and supporter representation within the sport's governing bodies.

The key developments or themes in the organisational structure and development of swimming in England are identified below. The impact of each of these will be explored, in particular highlighting the changing nature of the sport's governance.

1. The formation of, and relationship between, the Amateur Swimming Association and the sport's other governing bodies

The Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) is the national governing body for swimming, diving, water polo, open water and synchronised swimming and supports national teams in each of the disciplines. The ASA employs 100 people throughout England, 40 of whom are directly involved in the development of sport and all provide support to the volunteers (Source: ASA report to the House of Commons Select Committee, 4th December 2001). It is responsible for organising competitions throughout England, and establishing the laws of the sport for each discipline. The
Association also has a strong educational focus and operates certification and education programmes for teachers, coaches and officials.

The formation of the ASA can be traced back to a cluster of London-based swimming organisations, principally the London and Metropolitan Swimming Associations. In 1873 they changed their name to the Swimming Association of Great Britain (SAGB) to reflect its desire to control amateur swimming competitions in Britain and to increase its authority. Once established the SAGB made great efforts to encourage clubs from all over the country to join but with only limited success beyond London. The major stumbling block appeared to be the vexed question about what constituted amateur status and the lack of clarity in the enforcement of competition rules. It is necessary to situate this debate within a broader discussion about the definition of amateur that was taking place in British society during the nineteenth century. Primarily these definitional issues revolved round the issue of financial rewards, but were also embedded in notions of sportsmanship, fair play and manliness. Such ideals helped shape the rules of the predecessors of the ASA who were influenced by those committee members that had either been to public school or shared the attitudes which had become current in them. Keil and Wix (1996:14-15) note that interpretations of the laws at that time were very strict, observing that teachers who accepted remuneration for instructing others how to swim were defined as professionals and subsequently could not become members of any amateur sports association.

It was the problems of clarity and interpretation of the term amateur, and disputes about the relative jurisdiction of the swimming bodies that led to the emergence of the ASA in 1886. According to Keil and Wix (1996:16) 'in defining its constitution the new association drew up 135 laws which covered its procedures for handling suspensions and appeals, the Conduct of Council meetings together with the organisation of championship competitions'. The ASA's objectives were revised to include the control of race meetings, the uniformity of rules, and to enforce the observance of the laws. The authority that the Association experienced as a result was a leading factor in attracting increasing numbers of clubs to join where the SAGB before it had previously failed. By 1894 over 300 clubs had affiliated to the ASA, prompting the need for the Association to be devolved into a District-based structure. Today approximately 1,600 clubs are affiliated to the ASA with a total registered membership in excess of 159,000 (Source: ASA report to the House of Commons Select Committee, 4th December 2001) and these are divided into five districts and
county groupings: Midland District, Northern Counties, North Eastern Counties, Southern Counties and Western Counties.

During its formative years, the Association and its immediate predecessors were concerned with promoting swimming in all its forms for recreation, health and for competition, as well as encouraging a greater provision of facilities. To a large extent these objectives remain today, although its focus has been refined to reflect the importance given to international success, education, equal opportunities, and more effective management. The mission statement of the Association (www.britishswimming.org/about/aims.asp, 28/11/01) can be summarised as follows:

- To ensure that everyone has an opportunity to learn to swim.
- To support the pursuit of excellence, in all its disciplines and at all levels of the sport.
- To provide the direction and effective management of the sport.
- To provide a proactive communication service to its customers supported by a measured, efficient service in response to its customer enquiries.
- To maximise the commercial opportunities available to the sport for the benefit of the sport.
- To provide an effective programme and the training of teachers, coaches and tutors.

During its early history the ASA developed in a number of ways that influenced its later structure and organisation. As argued, the internal organisation of the Association changed from a London to a national focus. There now exists a Scottish Swimming Association, a Welsh Swimming Association and the ASA, while the overarching body is the Amateur Swimming Federation of Great Britain (ASFGB) also known as British Swimming, of which the ASA is the largest of the constituent members. According to David Sparkes, the Chief Executive of the ASFGB, this 'overly complex' federal structure presents a number of difficulties, (Interview, 19th April 2001) which will be examined below.

The ASA played an influential role in the creation and success of international swimming. The growth of the Olympic movement signalled a need for universally accepted laws so that competition could be conducted on a consistent and equitable basis. In 1908 the then president of the ASA, George Hearn was asked to formulate an Olympic Swimming Code, but went one stage further drawing on representatives of ten nations attending the Games in London to set up an international body of
swimming with a set body of laws. Thus, on July 19 1908, the Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA) was formed, sharing close relations with the ASA. The purpose of FINA at that time was to draw up lists of official world records, organise Olympic swimming and to regulate competitive swimming on the world stage. The other significant governing body of swimming, LEN (League Europeene de Natation) was founded in 1927, primarily to organise swimming competitions across Europe. Today, LEN is responsible to over forty member countries for European swimming competitions. Relations between the ASA with these organisations is described by ASA's Chief Executive as 'excellent', with communications via annual meetings where there are opportunities to raise issues and suggest possible rule changes. Domestically, relations between the ASA and the Scottish and Welsh Associations as highlighted, occasionally create problems. David Sparks suggests this is the case because the 'English agenda is not always the same as the Scottish or the Welsh agenda' but notes 'broadly speaking there is a willingness to work together (Interview, 19th April 2001).

In its more recent history, the ASA has undergone a number of transformations. One of the key triggers for change was the Martin Report initiated in 1969 to scrutinise the internal organisation and administration of the Association. In recognition of the conclusions and recommendations identified by the Working Party, a further review was undertaken in 1987 and a report published later that year titled, Which Way Forward? The document highlighted a number of weaknesses within the ASA, stating that the organisation suffered from a lack of cohesion in speaking for sport to external bodies, a lack of financial independence giving external agencies potential for undue influence on policies, as well as the ASA demonstrating ineffective control over swimming and national water polo leagues. In response, the Working Party suggested that the Association should exert greater control by clearly identifying its major corporate activities, by making development plans, and by adopting an appropriate financial strategy. They also recommended that the ASA generate more of its income from its members, make more effective use of the enthusiasm of its dedicated band of volunteers and proposed a more efficient administrative framework.

The above findings reflect a more professional approach and management of the Amateur Swimming Association. As Inglis (1997) has argued, many amateur sport organisations are increasingly faced with numerous challenges associated with the management of financial resources, changing membership/customer needs, human
resource management and the need for new markets and partnerships. For most part of its history the capacity of the Association depended on the work of unpaid volunteers that participated at numerous levels: from clubs, county, District and the ASA Council. In 1970 the ASA appointed its first full-time salaried professional secretary with the task of heading the administration. This reflected the first step in what Inglis (1997:160) described as a shift from volunteer-run 'kitchen-table operations' to the introduction of professional managers operating in a highly rational, bureaucratic style. However, this trend toward a more effective and efficient management and administration of the ASA prompts questions about the future role of volunteers and the interdependencies and power relations between volunteers and paid members of staff. Indeed, more professional skills and training are now being expected of the voluntary clubs which form an important part of the ASA's Business Plan 2000-04 that states, 'the development programme will continue to be driven by our highly skilled team of development officers whose particular focus will be on the establishment of a sound development programme in all areas and the implementation of a club structure which provides pathways for athletes, coaches, officials, and administrators to reach the level to which they aspire' (ASA, 2000:3).

The committee structure of the ASA is important to the way that the organisation governs internally. The organisational structure of the ASA is summarised in figure 1. The ASA Committee according to Gordon (2001) is responsible for agreeing the policies and strategy of the Association, to ensure it is administered in the interests of the stakeholders, and that the Association complies with employment legislation. The ASA staff meanwhile are charged with managing and administering the Association, to implement the policy objectives or decisions made by the ASA Committee and 'foster good relations with other national and international organisations relevant to the long term strategy' (Gordon, 2001).

Embedded notions of amateurism have also been significant in the funding and treatment of elite athletes until the late seventies. While teams from leading competing nations in swimming received sizeable financial support from their respective governments and effectively worked as full-time athletes with access to excellent coaching and training facilities, the position of the ASA was in stark contrast. The Association, through its membership of ASFGB, with its continued commitment to amateurism, sat uneasily with what was happening overseas. The professionals made to swimming and accepted the situation finally changed in 1977 when the ASA acknowledged the contribution that changes in the definition of
amateur, which FINA had earlier adopted with the full support of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Today, the pursuit of elite international sporting

Figure 1: Organisational structure of the ASA
achievement represents one of the primary objectives of the Amateur Swimming Association and its umbrella body, British Swimming (ASFGB). The increased emphasis on fostering international success in many ways reflects the central thrust of successive governments on sporting excellence and seeking to address the issues associated with the elite end of the sports continuum. Thus swimming, most notably, is now included within UK Sport’s World Class Performance Programme. Between May 1997 and September 2001, world-class swimming received revenue and subsistence from the Sport England Lottery Fund totalling £2,874,608. This has helped fund elite athlete development, which is overseen by Performance Director, Bill Sweetenham. The World Class Performance Plan award is divided approximately into equal thirds of which one third goes directly to the top 80 swimmers and provides subsistence funding while training at elite level. A second third of the funding covers staffing costs of the National Performance Team and also finance for a network of National and Regional Centres. The final third of the award is directed towards developing a training and competitive programme for Britain’s elite swimmers. That the ASA has also been successful in its bid for lottery funding for the World Class Potential and Start programmes to aid the identification, selection, nurturing, and development of young swimmers who ‘have the potential to win medals or final at significant international events between 2004 and 2008’ (ASA Annual Report, 2000:6) re-emphasises the Labour Party’s emphasis on ‘talent development’ and ‘sporting excellence’ (A Sporting Future for All, DCMS 2000). The lack of success of the Great Britain swimmers at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, in particular has refocused the ASA’s attempts to seek improvements in elite swimming performances.

In summary, the ASA has developed from a cluster of London-based swimming clubs with a limited outlook to represent the national governing body for swimming, diving, water polo, open water and synchronised swimming. The ASA was also a key actor in the formation of FINA, the federation for world swimming, and the development of swimming across Europe. Nevertheless, for such a prominent governing body, the ASA remains heavily reliant on funding from Sport England and the dedication of hard-working volunteers, administrators and officials.

2. Local Authority provision for swimming: from Wolfenden to Best Value

An important development in the provision of swimming facilities can be linked to the findings of the Wolfenden Committee during the sixties. As discussed in Chapter Three, the Committee’s recommendations were influential in the formation of the
Sports Councils and redefining the role of local government in sport and leisure provision. This was in part a response to an acknowledged decline in the levels of sports participation among young people, and weak and often non-existent links between school sport and local sports clubs. Wolfenden played an important role in drawing attention to the part played by local authorities in providing sporting opportunities. According to Henry (1993) this reorganisation of local government and concomitant increase in leisure investment by the new authorities during the mid-seventies is illustrative of a broader shift towards welfare reform. The Labour government of that time identified recreation as 'one of the community's everyday needs' (cited in Henry, 1993:19) and consequently elevated leisure services to the status of a welfare right. Driven primarily by local authorities, there was a marked growth in facilities for sport and physical recreation during the seventies and the early eighties. Local authority provision of indoor swimming pools in England rose from 500 in 1972 to more than 850 by 1978 (Sports Council, 1983 cited in Henry, 1993:22). Furthermore, the number of sport and leisure centres increased dramatically from just four in 1970 to in excess of 1000 by the end of the decade. Underpinning this rapid and considerable public investment in specifically designed sport and leisure facilities was an emphasis on widening opportunities to sports participation, and an accent on sustaining the physical fitness of huge numbers of the population.

The election of the Conservative government in 1979 effectively ended the welfare agenda, viewing sport as largely peripheral to more pressing economic and macrostructural concerns. New Right ideologies emphasised that the 'nanny' public sector's provision of sports facilities was ineffective, inefficient and inappropriate (Jackson and Nesti, 2001:16). In its place it was argued that individuals should be free to meet their own sporting wants through the commercial or voluntary sectors. The resultant policies developed from these ideas were aimed at reducing the role of the state at both national and local level, by introducing market forces to the provision of public services. In the 1988 Local Government Act a range of services previously provided by local government were exposed to free competition in the marketplace under the banner of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT). According to Polley (1998:26) 'tendering ensured a continued local authority answerability on provision, and kept local facilities within the wider framework of local strategic framework'. Ravenscroft (1998) meanwhile has argued that while CCT was primarily concerned with commercialising the public sector, the underlying priority of government was geared more towards finding new and acceptable ways of reinforcing consumer-based
capitalism. The introduction of CCT was criticised by the Amateur Swimming Association who, while supporting the idea of value of money, felt that a number of the proposals conflicted with the interests of swimmers. These can be summarised as: charges for admission and group hire, opening hours and programming, and the use of facilities by marginalized sports and minority groups such as water polo, synchronised swimming, and disabled swimmers. The concerns were voiced in a policy document, *Local Authorities to Safeguard the Use of Facilities by Swimming Clubs*, which questioned how the needs of swimming clubs would be met in a commercial environment (Keil and Wix, 1996:180). In a survey carried out by Sport England in 1997 on local authority sports halls and swimming pools, of the ‘wet sites’ identified, casual/general use was the most likely type of use to be programmed in swimming pools, accounting for 59 per cent of the sporting use. This was followed by lessons (29 per cent) and club use (9 per cent), while coaching represented less than 1 per cent of the use programmed in pools.

By the end of 1996 local authorities had become frustrated with CCT both in terms of the continued intervention of central government and the failure to produce a significant improvement in service delivery. In light of these shortcomings, the Labour government in 1997 sought to redress the balance of prioritising financial returns at the expense of welfare or social services, by setting out the principles of Best Value. According to Jackson and Nesti (2001:29) ‘the duty of Best Value is an integral part of the New Labour’s government’s ambitious modernising agenda for local government which includes democratic renewal, community leadership, a new ethical framework, reformed local government finance and Best Value in service delivery’.

During the nineties a series of documents have examined the national provision for and participation in swimming. In 1992 Kit Campbell Associates undertook a study on behalf of the Sports Council, titled *Provision for Swimming: A National Strategy* that focused on the adequacy of the number of pools in England. It demonstrated that in 1991 the public had access to approximately 1,300 indoor pools of which over four fifths had been constructed between 1960 and 1990. A large percentage of this stock was local authority owned and required maintenance and refurbishment, representing a significant demand on local authority finance. Pools in private ownership but accessible to the public, catering largely for casual swimming, constituted about a tenth of the total provision. A national survey undertaken by Sport England in 1997 to examine the use made of local authority sports halls and swimming pools meanwhile found that of the 1,383 local authority-owned or
managed sports halls and swimming pools on Sport England's database, 552 are pool sites and 327 are mixed sites that have both a hall and a pool.

More recent figures released by Sport England suggest that swimming possesses a large stock of facilities, in excess of 3000 swimming pools in England alone, split between the public, private and education sectors.

The ASA and Sport England are due to publish a National Facility Plan for Swimming in the near future. Titled, 'From Arm Bands to Gold Medals' the overall aim of the national strategy document is to encourage the investment of a network of accessible, cost-efficient, well designed and managed pools to cater for demand across the development continuum of swimming's various disciplines (http://www.britishswimming.org/about/facilities.asp, 28/11/01). The plan highlights the pool requirements of the disciplines, which make up swimming, vary considerably from 8 lane 50 metre international and national competition standard pools to the shallow water required for teaching. In an interview with Swimming Times magazine, the Chief Executive of the ASA, David Sparkes highlighted the stark contrast between the investments that is made in association football to that directed to developing swimming facilities. He argued 'swimming is Britain's most popular participation sport. The lack of swimming facilities contrasts badly with the investment being made in football stadiums. The £120 million of lottery funds committed to Wembley Stadium would more than cover the cost of four 50 metre pools which could be used by everyone' (July 2001:4).

Participation in swimming meanwhile has remained relatively high in comparison to other sports for a number of years. The General Household Survey (GHS) of 1996 found that after walking, swimming was the most frequently mentioned activity with 15 per cent of adults stating they had been swimming in the four weeks before interview. According to Torkildsen (2000:154) a number of factors contribute to the attraction of swimming, including its mass participation appeal, individual or family orientation, it is inexpensive, and easily available to the majority of the population. A study undertaken in 1995 however suggests the growth in swimming participation (which had doubled in the period 1977 to 1990 according to the GHS) has at best halted and at worst may be showing signs of decline. Swimming in Decline? An Investigation of Changes in the Demand for Swimming in UK Local Authority Pools in the early 1990s, charts a fall in swimming participation. However, it is important to note that surveying local authorities represents only one part of the picture, with the emerging commercial provision of swimming not covered by the report. Moreover,
the accuracy of the findings is dependent on the accuracy with which local authorities record individual swimming attendances of different types. Nevertheless it is arguable that competition from commercial attractions may have contributed to a decline in attendances at local authority owned pools that are dated and ill equipped to respond to the changing needs of the swimming market.

One of the major issues facing local authorities is the age of the existing swimming pool stock, with more than 50 per cent of public pools being 20 or more years old, many of which will require considerable investment either in terms of refurbishment or, in the case of older pools, replacement. Thus, the leisure-building boom experienced in the 1970s and 1980s, partly as a result of positive local authority funding agreements, now means that there is a stock of facilities in need of modernisation. A recently undertaken study of Scottish pools by Sport Scotland (2001) revealed a need for an investment of some £554 million over the period 1998 to 2020 for 338 pools. The estimated costs in England for public sector pools alone (not accounting for educational sites) stands at approximately £2 billion. This represents a significant problem for pool owners, operators and external funding agencies at a time when budgets are under increasing pressure.

Additional pressure has come from the traditional swimming market segmenting into those that want to swim, dive, splash and have fun, and those who wish to improve health and fitness. Subsequently the design of a proportion of swimming pools has changed in recent years from the standard rectangular shape to the modern freeform with the addition of flumes, slides, tropical islands and spas, while existing pools have struggled to offer a wide-ranging programme in scarce water space.

Nevertheless, a national survey of local authority sports halls and swimming pools carried out by Sport England in 1997 found that ‘general swimming’ was the most popular pool activity, representing 84 per cent of the time available for hire. Lane swimming was provided for 4 per cent of the available time, while ‘fun sessions’ such as those involving flumes, wet ‘n’ wild, and wave machines, took place for 3 per cent of the available time. In terms of the percentage of pool visits, the majority of visits were table to take part in general swimming (95 per cent). The other notable activity was aquafit, which accounted for 3 per cent of visits, while diving, canoeing/kayaking, use of flumes and sub-aqua each represented less than 0.3 per cent of pool visits.

In terms of the contemporary provision of swimming facilities, it is necessary to recognise the emergence of new entrepreneurial developments in private health, fitness and leisure clubs. This trend signals not only a shift in large-scale business
away from public sports centres to increasingly well known brands such as David Lloyd and Virgin, but a more general growth in the lifestyle industry.

In summary, this section has sought to demonstrate the complex and fragmentary nature of the provision of swimming facilities. Swimming relies heavily on much public provision – in pools for hire in schools and community, in lessons in schools and public pools, and subsidised in clubs in some areas. This in itself creates problems as cuts in spending has forced the Sports Councils and local authorities to switch emphasis from the provision of new facilities to the more efficient use of existing ones. While there has been a growth in lifestyle fitness centres that accommodate new pools and swimming facilities, the presence of the ASA and swimming clubs within the private sector is minimal.

3. The introduction of National Lottery funding

The introduction in 1994 of the National Lottery during the last years of the Conservative government has had a dramatic impact on the funding of elite sport, and swimming in particular has benefited more than other sports. Up to September 2001, the Sport England Lottery Fund has invested £222 million in the development and refurbishment of capital swimming projects, with £161 million of partnership funding generating total project development costs of £383 million. This makes swimming the largest benefactor of Sport England Capital Lottery Funding to date. Swimming then has been assisted from the Lottery Capital Programme, with a number of new pools throughout England, and the development of 50 metre facilities in Aldershot, Norwich and Manchester. The Manchester Aquatics Centre – built to house the swimming and diving events in the 2002 Commonwealth Games – will form the second High Performance Swimming Centre as part of the Institute of Sport. Furthermore, work is underway on a 50 metre pool at Loughborough University which when completed, will form the third High Performance Centre for Swimming. As argued, this National Lottery funding has primarily been directed towards pursuing elite international sporting success. This close connection between the effective use of National Lottery money and the success of sports development at all levels was promoted in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport strategy A Sporting Future for All (DCMS, 2000). The government department were instrumental in reviewing how lottery funds are allocated, leading to Sport England producing a strategy document in May 1999 titled Investing in our Sporting Future. As a result, the estimated annual £200 million generated by the Lottery was divided into a Community Projects Fund, and a World Class Performance fund aimed at supporting
elite success on the national and international stage. The stamp of current national policies is clearly seen throughout this framework, with sporting aspirations that are deemed supportable by the Lottery Sports Fund wedded to wider issues of social inclusion, community development, health and other targets of Best Value services.

Narrowing the focus onto how the ASA is financed, David Sparkes suggests that the National Lottery 'is probably the biggest single source of income at the moment' (Interview, 19th April 2001). Funding from the National Lottery is not unproblematic, however. One of the difficulties facing the ASA is that these funds are increasing ring-fenced, such that 'big chunks of the money have some pretty big strings attached'. According to the Chief Executive of the ASA this contrasts sharply with the past when, generally speaking, funds did not have to be accounted for. Now the funds have 'clear objectives' with 'monitoring procedures' and wield more commercial, bureaucratic and legalistic strength (Interview, 19th April 2001). Some of the implications of these greater checks and balances imposed on recipients of National Lottery funding will be considered later, particularly in relation to issues of equity.

4. Swimming in Schools: the inclusion of swimming in the National Curriculum for Physical Education (NCPE)

Despite the difficulties associated with the provision of school swimming, it is nonetheless important to recognise that many children will be introduced to swimming at school. In other words, school is where the majority of children gain their first experiences of participating in a range of sporting activities. The background to the inclusion of swimming in the National Curriculum can be traced back to the 1980s when the ASA, the Royal Life Saving Society and the English Schools Swimming Association became alarmed that despite the obvious connection between swimming ability and safety, many schools and education authorities had no requirement for schools to provide swimming lessons. Together they formed the 'Swim for Life' campaign, with the goal of securing the teaching of swimming by all schools. In 1988, they surveyed local authorities and schools, and found that more than half of the schools had no clear policy on the teaching of swimming in schools, while 80 per cent of local authorities could not meet the three basic standards for the provision of swimming lessons: meeting the costs of swimming tuition, setting a

40 There remain concerns among organisations, which have an interest in water safety that there is a lack of a strategic approach. These concerns are heightened by an increase in the number of children under 14 who drowned in the UK, a rise from 36 in 1998 to 54 in 1999.
minimum swimming standard, and specifying the minimum number of lessons to be provided.

The ‘Swim for Life’ campaign lobbied for a swimming requirement to be included in the physical education section of the National Curriculum and in 1991 it was successful. The National Curriculum Working Group on Physical Education recommended that all 11 year olds should be able to swim 25 metres and have a sound knowledge of basic water safety skills. Their interim report concluded that ‘swimming was too important to leave to chance and should be an entitlement for all young people under the National Curriculum’. The physical education strand of the National Curriculum was designed as a foundation subject, of which swimming is a required element up to Key Stage 2. The National Curriculum in physical education was originally implemented in 1992 but the swimming element was delayed until August 1994. The original requirements for swimming are outlined in table 1. The development and implementation of the NCPE has been informed by a multiplicity of discourses both within and surrounding physical education. For example, Penney and Evans (1999) note there has been a rise in the interests of performance in sport, and remain dominant in many curricula in schools. This was most clearly articulated in the Conservative government’s policy statement Sport: Raising the Game (DNH, 1995). Significantly, the then-Prime minister John Major wrote the introduction, declaring ‘my ambition is simply stated. It is to put sport back at the heart of weekly life in every school’. He went on to add ‘I am determined to see that our great traditional sports – cricket, hockey, swimming, athletics, football, netball, rugby, tennis and the like – are put firmly at the centre of the stage’ (emphasis added). An underlying assumption was that teachers and their schools were prepared and capable of delivering national policy. However, the ASA have argued that ‘physical education and sport is just one area where large numbers of primary school teachers feel ill equipped to deliver an effective programme’ (ASA Annual Report, 2000:12). In addition, only 14 per cent of primary schools have a pool on site, thereby raising time and cost issues for transporting children, while the overall cost and time for swimming as a part of the national curriculum has led to a decline in teaching the vital, life-saving skills of basic swimming (Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy, 2001:1).

There is subsequent unease about the pressures to reduce swimming in schools and the ability of its status in the National Curriculum to protect it from these pressures. For example, there is increasing financial pressures on schools, causing them
increasingly to prioritise teaching on cost effectiveness grounds in addition to curriculum criteria. According to Lee (1994) increasing numbers of schools are finding government funding to be insufficient to meet the needs of their pupils and as

Table 1

National Curriculum Swimming Requirements, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key stage one</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If swimming is being taught, the key stage two criteria should be used.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key stage two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pupils should:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- be taught the codes of courtesy for using swimming pools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- be given the opportunity to develop confidence in water, be taught how to rest in water, how to float and adopt support positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- be taught the principles and skills of water safety and assess the nature, visibility and location of water hazards in a variety of conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- be taught survival skills appropriate to their competence in water skills efficiency against a range of criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- explore the elements of movement in the water through simple games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- be made aware of the role of swimming and water safety skills in supporting other water based activities, and activities near the water</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key stage three and four</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is no swimming programme at these levels. Pupils who wish to pursue swimming and other water based activities could, where schools have appropriate facilities, be able to do so in other contexts, for example, swimming as an athlete activity, water polo as a game and sailing as an outdoor and adventurous activity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a result, are asking parents to make voluntary contributions towards the cost of transport to the pool, and the cost of the instructor fee. In addition, pressures of time, access to pools and quality of swimming teaching have also been identified as negative effects on swimming in schools which counteract any positive effect of National Curriculum status.

According to King, Smithson and Taylor (1997) the National Curriculum has generally had little effect on the provision of school swimming. They suggest that it hasn't prevented the serious decline of school swimming, although it may have had a positive effect because if swimming wasn't included as compulsory in the National
Curriculum there may not have been local authority provision. Research by the Institute of Swimming Teachers and Coaches (Lee, 1994) meanwhile found that despite the inclusion of swimming in the National Curriculum, less than half the infant, junior, primary, first and middle schools that were surveyed provided swimming weekly throughout a year for any given age range.

In response to some of the problems associated with the provision of school swimming, the government has established a task force - to include OfSTED, the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority and representation from the swimming associations - to examine the state of school swimming. The investigation into school swimming follows a TES/Central Council for Physical Recreation (CCPR) survey in July 2000 which found that one in twenty primaries does not teach swimming. This report in turn followed an OfSTED report on Swimming at Key Stage 2, which highlighted a number of serious constraints to the effective delivery of swimming for 7-11 year olds. The report acknowledged that ‘greater time devoted to the National Literacy and Numeracy Strategies have brought with them pressures on time devoted to the remaining curriculum, and the preference by schools to use swimming pools only for afternoon sessions, reducing the length or number of sessions available to them’. Together, the OfSTED report and the CCPR/TES survey cast light on broader issues about the problems of teaching PE in primary schools, and the tendency for all but the core subjects to be downgraded. Nevertheless, the importance of the inclusion of swimming in the NCPE should not be understated, attracting far greater government funding and prestige to swimming than to many other sports. This is also reflected in the strong educational emphasis of the Amateur Swimming Association, which has its own Education Department and is assisted by the Institute of Swimming Teachers and Coaches (ISTC). The ASA supports a programme aimed at improving the nation’s swimming skills, training around 12,000 teachers and coaches each year and operating an award scheme which recognises achievement in swimming from the very young first learning to swim to senior citizens swimming for health.

The primary functions of the ASA Education Department (http://www.britishswimming.org/asaeducation/index.asp, 28/11/01) can be summarised as follows:

- An awarding body for the qualifications relating to teacher/coaches in all ASA disciplines and at all levels. The disciplines included are swimming, diving, water
polo, synchronised swimming, adult and child, swimming for people with
disabilities and aquafit.

- An accreditation body for those wishing to tutor courses leading to ASA
  Certification.

- The development of resources and training materials to support the above two
  points.

- The development of other resources, which promotes best practice and Award
  Scheme e.g. National Plan for Teaching Swimming; Awards scheme.41

- The delivery of training programmes aimed specifically at schoolteachers and
  swimming teachers working with schools.

- The lobbying of key decision matters to ensure that every child has the
  opportunity to learn to swim.

- To provide a kite marking scheme for Swimming Programmes.

The ASA has subsequently fostered important links to advance the position of
swimming. For example, the ASA has been involved at ministerial level in a schools
subject associations group and also with the Physical Education Association.

Discussion

In summary, the governance of swimming flags up a number of interesting issues.
The Amateur Swimming Association has a rich and diverse history. Having
established a network of administration within England, the sport has grown to
become one of the most popular, in terms of participation, in the country. However,
the ASA in contrast to the professionalism of the Football Association and the
England and Wales Cricket Board examined previously, functions with a strong
voluntary sector. As Theodoraki (1998:3) has argued 'without the commitment of a
huge army of volunteers, the great majority of whom are unpaid, organised
competitive sport as we know it would disappear'. In other words, the governance of
swimming is hugely reliant upon the involvement and commitment of volunteers. This
prompts the question whether volunteers have the capacity to successfully manage a
sports organisation which is striving to achieve strategically complex goals while
being increasingly scrutinised by their members, government funding agencies and
other stakeholders. In light of this, David Sparks has raised concerns about the
possible ramifications of the Labour Government's minimum wage legislation. For
example, establishing the nature of the working relationship between an individual
and a sporting organisation is in itself a grey area. One response from the ASA has been to gradually move towards the employment of paid staff to plan and manage their operations in a more professional manner. According to Kikulis et al. (1989) the structural designs of amateur sport organisations have become increasingly characterised by such attributes as more professional staff, more formalised operating procedures, and a hierarchical system of authority. Indeed, Cunningham, Slack and Hinings (1987) have noted a shift among amateur sport bodies from 'kitchen table' to corporate professional organisations. They argue that the latter are characterised by higher levels of specialisation and standardisation.

This is reflected in the ASA's 'Business Plan 2000-2004' that details a series of development plans covering each swimming discipline, as well as education and a corporate strategy. The document states, 'it is essential that the Association is led by a professional management team, one that works in close harmony with the voluntary sector and provides a clear leadership. Closely allied to this are well-equipped headquarters, providing an efficient, cost effective and accountable service' (ASA, 2000:2) It goes on to stress that 'constant monitoring of corporate governance will ensure transparency throughout the sport and key partners' (ASA, 2000:2).

With regard to identifying the 'stakeholders' in the governance of swimming, the sport is characterised by its close relations with local authorities and schools. In simple quantitative terms, major swimming clubs benefit greatly from local authority provision of pools (Taylor, 1993). Swimming pools are recognised as an important community resource from the points of view of safety, health, recreational activity and purposeful activity (Gheel, 2001) and provision of such facilities is largely dependent on local authority investment. This preponderance of pools in the public sector highlights the position of local authorities as a key stakeholder, and in turn raises questions about the nature of their relationship with the governing bodies of swimming and in particular the ASA. Similarly, swimming has a strong school focus. As argued, school is where the majority of children gain their first experience of swimming. Research by the Department for Education and Employment (1996) demonstrated that 85 per cent of primary schools and 60 per cent of secondary schools provide swimming, while six in ten primary school pupils aged 10-11 years swim frequently at school (Sports Council, 1995). As a consequence of this strong school focus, the ASA has developed important educational links and it is therefore

41 The ASA is the first national sports governing body to earn the government's official seal of approval for the teaching qualifications it offers swimming teachers and coaches.
necessary to examine the role of schools as stakeholders in the governance of swimming.

In short, the Amateur Swimming Association is distinctive as a governing body in that it does not own any of its facilities, which creates a series of dependency relationships with local authorities. The ASA is also characterised by having a strong voluntary structure, founded on a complex matrix of voluntary swimming clubs and groups. Thus, swimming is heavily reliant on the involvement and commitment of volunteers as coaches, helpers, officials, and administrators. Against this backdrop of voluntarism, the ASA has attempted to gradually introduce higher levels of both specialisation and standardisation. As David Sparkes contends 'we expect professional staff to have clear objectives, clear work programmes, job descriptions and all the rest of it. We are actually increasingly expecting volunteers to be the same' (Interview, 19th April 2001). Part of the reason for this change, has been the introduction of National Lottery funding and a concomitant rise in accountability and commercial pressures. As Geoff Parsons, Chief Executive of UK Competitors argues, 'I think governing bodies were in a difficult situation when lottery funding came along. They had run sport in a particular way for a very long time and found change difficult ... Governing bodies that had run traditionally as a small governing body with a band of volunteers, I think generally found life difficult ... they had done things in the same way for a very long time and lottery funding unhinged that and provided a fast track route for change and a lot couldn't live with it and still can't see why things are why they are and are fighting in different ways to qualify that' (Interview, 23rd October 2001). Here, Parsons highlights a key tension in the 'modernisation' of governing bodies of sport, between a strong voluntary ethos on the one hand and more professional, open and transparent goals on the other. In response to the increased investment of public money into elite swimming – between May 1997 and September 2001, world class swimming received revenue and subsistence from the Sport England lottery fund of approximately £2.9 million (source: Sport England report to the House of Commons Select Committee, 4th December 2001) – the ASA has formed a separate body to oversee the governing bodies' financial affairs.
Research themes

1. The influence of government and government agencies on sport policy of national governing bodies

As highlighted above, the government can be seen to have an influence on the organisation, administration and management of swimming at a number of levels. At local authority level, the public sector is a key provider of sports and leisure facilities. For example, Mills (1997) found that 55 per cent of swimming pools in the West Midlands region were under local education authority ownership, and a further 20 per cent owned by LA leisure and recreation departments. Taken together, this represents a sizeable proportion, highlighting the reliance on the public sector for swimming pool provision. However, as noted local government funding for sport has changed markedly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with local authority subsidies declining. Furthermore, Gratton and Taylor (2000) have argued that the cost recoveries of local authority sport facilities have also deteriorated in the first half of the 1990s. This decline in cost recovery was particularly apparent in built sports facilities subject to compulsory competitive tendering such as swimming pools, in part because estimates by local authorities of their direct income from fees and charges were declining. Local authorities net expenditure on sport and leisure is estimated at £1.5 billion a year, £300 million of which is spent on swimming pools and sports halls with swimming pools (Source: ISRM Report to the House of Commons Select Committee, 4th December 2001).

The interdependent relationship between the ASA and local authorities, which represent to a large extent the facility providers, is clearly an important one. The ASA has stressed the need for all local authorities to produce a written Swimming Strategy that addresses the swimming needs of the community, the facility requirements to meet these needs and links into cultural and education strategies. According to Ralph Riley, Chief Executive of the Institute of Sport and Recreation Management, there is little evidence of local authorities undertaking any kind of strategy, never mind having sufficient resources to implement it. Around 30 per cent of local authorities have a Sport and Recreation strategy, but the likelihood is that the figure would be much lower for those that have a Swimming strategy.

To assist local authorities and in an attempt to remove the fragmented and piecemeal approach to swimming that may be offered by clubs, the ASA has introduced ‘Swim 21’, a programme of assessment designed at providing a structured approach which
encourages clubs to work closely with local authorities and local education authorities. In addition, the ASA employs ten Regional Development Officers whose remit is to work closely with local authorities.

Government then, has considerable involvement in swimming in a variety of ways, through the national Sports Councils, through National Lottery funding, and through local authorities. Central government intervention not only takes the form of direct funding but also through its sports funding agencies it also imposes significant 'regulation' on the way that sports' governing bodies operate. One example of this is the 'focused' prioritisation of funding for selected sports that meet the targets and criterion proposed by Sport England. One such criterion is a commitment to equity that must be addressed by the NGBs in the form of an Equity Statement that forms part of a larger development strategy, which includes areas such as grassroots participation, work programmes for individuals within the organisation, and a commitment to monitoring and review by Sport England (Shaw, 2001).

Given the political importance of elite international sporting success and pressures over funding, the relationship with Sport England is a significant one for swimming's national governing bodies. This is in contrast with the relationships between Sport England and the other case study sports examined, as both association football and cricket are far more commercialised and therefore less reliant on Lottery funding.

According to David Sparkes, relations between the ASA and the ASFGB with the present Labour government have been 'very encouraging'. He cites a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the government have taken sport seriously, investing heavily in its development. Second, the Labour government has been prepared to 'listen' to sport and has ultimately 'got closer' to those involved in running sport. The Chief Executive of the ASA suggested this contrasted with the previous Conservative Government who 'didn’t want to talk to sport and tended to talk through the Sports Council and as such the message was blunted' (Interview, 19th April 2001).

Nevertheless these remarks appear to mask the introduction of greater checks and balances that have been imposed on recipients of National Lottery funding, such as the ASA. One consequence of this has been the gradual erosion of governing bodies' autonomy with sports organisations having to meet government aims and criteria in order to secure funding.

2. The significance of the media and broadcasters in affecting NGB policy
The relationship between swimming and the media has been a chequered one. In the words of David Sparkes, 'it's a hard slog and the bottom line is we could have done with a few gold medal winners, that would have helped' (Interview, 19th April 2001). This demonstrates the importance of elite success on the international stage in generating media interest. For example, swimming plays a significant part in the television and broadcasting of major sporting events such as the Commonwealth and Olympic games. Away from these high prestige events, coverage of swimming is poor in comparison to other sports although the Chief Executive of the ASA contends that 'as a sport we do better than most' (Interview, 19th April 2001).

Evidence of media coverage of swimming is scarce. Existing data of airtime of sports broadcasts used by the European Commission was for France in 1998. They found a 35 per cent increase in hours devoted to sport in relation to 1997, although the coverage concentrated on a limited range of sports. Of these, football (31.2 per cent) continued to be the most popular sport, while the second sport, basketball, accounted for only 7.96 per cent of the hours broadcast. In stark contrast, the three sports forming the bedrock of the Olympic movement – athletics, gymnastics and swimming – received only 95 hours airtime, with 76 hours for athletics. This illustrates the marginal position allocated by the sports media to swimming, despite the sport’s mass popularity in terms of participation.

The issue of broadcasting rights for swimming galas and competitions is complex. For British events, the rights of each competition belong to the Amateur Swimming Federation of Great Britain. However, broadcasting rights for international events are less clear-cut. As David Sparkes contends 'rights are an issue in their own right. If it's a FINA event, they own the rights. Now they may or may not pass on the rights to us (the ASFGB). Sometimes they do, sometimes they don't. It's a matter of negotiation at the time' (Interview, 19th April 2001).

3. Issues of gender within how NGBs are organised and govern sport

On cursory inspection, swimming may be perceived to be a ‘gender friendly’ sport that attracts male and female participants. This is supported by a survey conducted by Sport England in 1997, which found that women, in comparison to men, were well represented in swimming pool use (see table 2). Indeed, when asked about the issue of gender in sport, the Chief Executive of the ASA depicted a positive picture with increasing numbers of women involved, both as swimming teachers and coaches, and across different disciplines. According to David Sparkes 'if you took a snapshot
of it now, there would be shades of black and white, and shades of grey' (Interview, 19th April 2001). He went on to proclaim that '[swimming] is not a male dominated sport, there is a good gender balance'. These views were reflected by James Hickman, Great Britain swimmer and ASA athlete representative who believed that gender is not a significant issue within swimming: 'Men and women work side by side, it has the same funding criteria. There is no discrimination. I can see that people would see the governing body historically as having a problem but now there are more women than men at the administrative level'. He concluded by saying 'I don't think there is any gender discrimination whatsoever' (Interview, 1st August 2001). These perceptions by a prominent elite swimmer and the Chief Executive of the ASA however, mask underlying concerns of inequities between the genders within the organisation and management of swimming.

**Table 2** Swimming pool activity by gender (Sport England, 1997).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Male visits (%)</th>
<th>Female visits (%)</th>
<th>All swimming pool visits (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swimming</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquafit/aquababes/spinning</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canoeing/kayaking</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-aqua</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diving</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life saving</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water polo</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scuba diving</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of flumes/waves</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snorkelling</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synchronised swimming</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-pool kids' fun session</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other in pool</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted base (n)</td>
<td>535,261</td>
<td>667,083</td>
<td>1,210,715</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base: All swimming pool visits

*Less than 0.1 per cent

Looking back, the formative history of the ASA served to reinforce gender power relations in which men were dominant. The management of the early organisation was in keeping with the social climate of the time as it was predominantly organised by men. Some women's clubs emerged but were treated with a large degree of
disdain. As Keil and Wix (1996:22) note, apprehension about women took various forms, citing ASA records of the fears of one male athlete about using the same equipment as women as a reason for excluding them from participation. In addition, women only clubs were 'accepted, somewhat anxiously' by the Victorian establishment in the ASA, and that reviews of women's clubs were 'written by men who did not take them seriously. Their tone was jokey and patronising' (Keil and Wix, 1996:22). The issue of women's involvement in the ASA was crystallised when the Honorary Secretary sent a memo to the President. Two of the twenty issues he addressed referred to a desire to promote 'the application of the laws to both sexes and the inauguration of ladies' championships' (Keil and Wix, 1996:19). There was some bitter opposition to this, mirroring wider debates over women's involvement, which was beginning to emerge in sport organisations (Hargreaves, 1994). It was considered to be dangerous for some women to participate in sport given their status as the 'fairer' or 'weaker' sex, as well as concerns over 'decency' and whether women and men could compete at the same events. Despite these concerns and troubles, women were finally permitted to participate in national events from 1910 provided that both women and men followed strict 'decency guidelines' that were established in 1909 (Keil and Wix, 1996).

Historically, relationships between women and men in sports participation and its organisation have rarely been smooth and have frequently favoured men at the expense of women (Hargreaves, 1994). According to Shaw (2001) gender inequity is still evident within sport's governing bodies, which continue to be domains where men are well represented compared to women. Despite the creation of equity policies (see below) and increasing participation rates, in many areas of sport management attitudes towards gender relationships have changed relatively little and remain an area in which men dominate. According to Larissa Davies, a member of the Women's Water Polo squad, 'the [ASA's] workforce is gendered, probably towards women given the low pay associated with many positions in the organisation. Nevertheless I suspect that attitudes are predominantly male, as there is considerably more prestige associated with male swimming than women's swimming. There is definitely more prestige associated with men's water polo than women's water polo'. This is in spite of the women's water polo team being more successful and ranked higher in Europe than the men. Dr. Lisa Bartlett, a fellow elite swimmer, echoes this view stating that 'there are differences in the men's and women's disciplines in terms of water polo, both in terms of funding and prestige ... the women's team as a whole are more
successful on the international arena than the men, however, the women's game gets little recognition from the ASA’ (Interview, 22nd October 2001).

These comments serve to illustrate that at the very least there is a perception that gender inequalities are prevalent within the Amateur Swimming Association. However, the governing bodies' reliance on funding from Sport England whose recent conditions reflect a wider 'modernisation agenda' ensured that there would be negative repercussions for sports organisations which did not adhere to principles of equity (Sport England, 2000). Furthermore, governing bodies in receipt of National Lottery funding are encouraged to review their current governance structures and to become more open, transparent and accountable. It is important to recognise that the catalysts for change did not solely come from the governing bodies themselves, but were to some extent imposed and subsequently in some cases without internal motivation. Furthermore, little consideration was given to the governing bodies’ unique context, historical differences between groups, and organisational culture that will impact upon the implementation of equality initiatives. Nevertheless, the ASA responded by developing its own Equity Policy and Action Plan. The document states 'the ASA and ASFGB is totally committed to the principles of equal opportunities across all of its aquatic disciplines, both as an employer, provider and as a facilitator of such practices by all its members. In our work with key partners, such as swimmers, clubs, teachers, coaches, officials and administrators, we will advocate our policies to ensure that all participation has equity at its core'. In addressing issues of equity, the ASA and ASFGB are committed to taking 'positive action to increase the involvement from under represented groups in all aspects of our organisation'. In doing so, the national governing body for swimming supports four key principles as being fundamental to ensuring that everyone can participate in our sport and the achievement of equality of opportunity. These are as follows:

- **Entitlement**: people have a right to participate in and access quality and appropriate experiences within swimming
- **Accessibility**: it is the responsibility of the ASA – our teachers, coaches, officials and administrators – to adapt provision to fit the needs of the many
- **Inclusion**: wherever and whenever possible, all to access the same provision
- **Integrity**: whatever we do as an Association to change or adapt provision, it must be of equal worth, challenging, relevant and in no way patronising
The policy statement demonstrates a positive intention from the ASA. However, for an equity policy to be more than a gesture of intent and to become a concrete policy with action, the organisation must make purposeful steps in a direction which will allow it to best utilise its resources' (Hylton and Totten, 2000:60). Underlying the ASA's expressed commitment to pursuing equity (imposed externally by Sport England) is that the governing body is historically a male dominated sports organisation. Thus there exists a key tension between an embedded male culture in the management swimming on the one hand, and a commitment to promoting gender equality in order to continue to secure external funding on the other. Writing in the ASA Committee’s Report for 2000, for example, David Sparkes recognised that addressing issues of equity would ‘require a commitment and culture change throughout the sport’ (ASA, 2000:5). This clearly presents problems, in particular due to the complex club structure of the ASA and its reliance on unpaid volunteers, which makes it difficult to effectively implement ASA policy. The issue of equity is made more problematic by the differences that exist between swimming disciplines. According to Dr. Bartlett ‘in terms of our governing body, the major issue is not the gender one but the difference across disciplines where smaller disciplines who are often more successful internationally (but not publicised) struggle due to the lack of funding which is taken by the largest discipline which has yet to prove its success internationally’. This issue of representation will be examined in greater depth below.

In summary, while women and girls are well represented in some areas of swimming such as participation and teaching, this gives only one part of the picture. At elite level, male swimming is more prestigious and concomitantly receives more funding than other disciplines. Furthermore, despite calls for greater professionalism and equity (Sport England, 2000) women are still under-represented at the higher ‘management’ levels of the ASA. For example, women play only a marginal role in the ASA Committee where key decisions and policies are made and discussed.

4. The ways in which athletes, minors, coaches and swimming teachers are represented in the decision-making processes of NGBs

In the recent history of the ASA, the governing body has taken an active role in addressing some of the issues associated with the representation of athletes. Since the early 1990s there has been athlete representation on both the ASA and ASFGB Technical Swimming Committee. This was gradually expanded to include athlete representation on the ASA Committee and the GB Committee, latterly the GB Managing Board. In addition, athletes were also invited on other technical
committees. This fragmented, piecemeal inclusion of athletes was formalised in 1995 with the formation of the Athletes' Council. However, as James Hickman, GB swimmer and Chair of the Swimming Competitors' Association, explains 'the Athletes' Council was more a forum that was put together by athletes from teams and was not democratically elected. Athletes from all aquatic disciplines within the ASA – speed swimmers, disability swimmers, divers, synchronised swimmers, and male and female water polo – created it' (Interview, 1st August 2001). Ian Wilson, athlete representative from 1993 to 2000, also notes that until 2000 while athletes sat on a range of committees they had no right to vote. He contends however, 'this was not a huge issue, as rarely was there a contentious issue' (Interview, 9th October 2001).

From this first stage of formalising athlete representation, the Athletes' Council has subsequently been replaced by the Swimming Competitors' Association, (SCA) which has a more democratic foundation and attempted to counter the athletes' lack of influence at committee level. As Ian Wilson explains, 'when I finalised the SCA Constitution in 2000 this meant that the democratically elected members to sit on the GB Managing Board did so as a Director, with equal power as the Home Countries' representatives, which was a big step forward' (Interview, 9th October 2001). Chairman of the Competitors' Association, James Hickman supports this view: 'The SCA is a body, which the governing body has to listen to because they are representing the athletes. The SCA is now accountable to its members, the people that have elected us and because we are accountable, we have to be listened to' (Interview, 1st August 2001). According to Geoff Parsons, chief executive of athlete body UK Competitors, 'in something like swimming you have a classic example where three of the disciplines are not World Class Performance funded but the Council is strong. There is a representative from each of the disciplines even those that aren't funded they meet, they have negotiated resources with the governing body. We worked with James [Hickman] to formalise the organisation and then have voting rights on the board. That is really positive and beneficial to the sport' (Interview, 23rd October 2001). Nevertheless problems still exist within the new structure. According to Ian Wilson, 'in theory athletes sit on the respective ASA and ASFGB technical committees, and as such are privy to discussions on selection policies'. This in turn may cause problems 'if the athlete representative is a current athlete, there may be a perception of pushing a hidden agenda, or conversely, not speaking out for fear of recriminations by the Performance Director' (Interview, 9th October 2001). He went on to highlight the influence of the National Performance
Director, suggesting that 'whatever the NPD says goes ... sure, issues are debated and discussed, but the principle outlined by the NPD is endorsed' (Interview, 9th October 2001). James Hickman meanwhile, raises the problem of time-management: 'one of the difficulties we have is that we have a full-time job to do which is being an athlete, while at the same time trying to give up time for committees, which is difficult' (Interview, 1st August 2001). According to James Hickman this represents a barrier to encouraging other athletes to get involved in what is a voluntary role. Geoff Parsons of UK Competitors echoes this view, stipulating that athletes often lack the necessary skills and resources to contribute fully to meetings: 'One of the problems with athlete representation is, the classic scenario is the governing bodies will say to you, well we used to invite an athlete to the meeting every time and after two meetings they stopped coming. The response to that is, well they stopped coming because when you walked out of the meeting they had training the next day whereas you continued for the next three months to go to meetings, acquiring information. You had access to a computer and a database. You had someone to pay for your stamps, correspondence and letters to send out to people. You were lobbying opinion. The athlete comes back three months later and no one has taught them how to conduct themselves in a meeting. No one has taught them the rules of the meeting, how to conduct their business in that environment, how to lobby effectively, how to take notes, how to minute things, what to do. So they just sit there and after two meetings they don't come back because they don't know how to act and manage in that situation ... The athlete generally isn't equipped with those skills and ill-equipped to deliver their opinion. So for example, in gymnastics is it fair for us to stick a seventeen year old girl around a table in a business environment who is unskilled but may be the most popular person in her sport and asked to be the athlete representative' (Interview, 23rd October 2001). A further problem is that of the lack of communication, and how many elite swimmers are actually aware of the athletes' organisation. Larissa Davies, a member of the GB Women's Water Polo team, admitted that her knowledge of the role of athletes in decision-making is limited – a problem that was replicated in the interviews I conducted with other elite swimmers that are not directly involved in the SCA. On this point, James Hickman admits that there is much work to be done: '[communication] has improved. We are also finding that more athletes are now turning to us, and asking for our help with regard selection policy ... we are becoming far more integrated, we want to improve our relations with the governing body but the question is how much can we do? We are full-time athletes whereas people within the governing body are there full-time' (Interview, 1st August 2001).
Away from representation on technical committees, the involvement of athletes in shaping the content of sporting agreements, including areas such as marketing, code of conduct, discipline and selection procedures varies. According to James Hickman, one of the most contentious issues has been freedom of choice for technical equipment. As James explains, ‘the governing body were trying to find a new sponsor for the Great Britain team and in Sydney a great deal was made about giving the athletes the freedom to wear what they would like, so that the athletes were most comfortable and could wear what they train and compete in. We put it to the athletes what they wanted to do, and everyone was unanimous in that they wanted to have a choice in what swimwear they felt most comfortable with. We did try to put these views to the GB Managing Board and put these views to the governing body. They listened to them and I think they sympathised, but at the end of the day they had signed a kit deal and the athletes will be forced to wear whatever, which some athletes don’t feel is fair’ (interview, 1st August 2001). In terms of the code of conduct, the ASA provided financial backing for the Athletes’ Council to secure legal representation when the code was being deliberated in 1998. However, the issue of selection and appeal remains highly contentious, but there have been developments in that each technical committee now appoints a ‘selection committee’ to pick the team according to the criteria. The remaining members of the committee who do not have a vested interest in the issue then hear any ensuing appeals. This raises the issue of whether athlete representation in decision-making and selection procedures causes problems of self-interest and confidentiality. Geoff Parsons of UK Competitors argues that athlete representatives in particular, are in a difficult position when it comes to selection procedures. He argues ‘anyone that is an athlete representative is always hyper sensitive because as a representative they take a beating from their negotiations and dealings with the sport sometimes and therefore feel they are vulnerable to non-selection when they are on or about the line. Sport can often reap revenge by not selecting them – that is the most hurtful thing to an athlete’ (Interview, 23rd October 2001).

According to the Chief Executive of the ASA, David Sparkes, ‘athletes by their very nature are selfish beasts, they live for today and not for tomorrow’ (Interview, 19th April 2001). Ian Wilson accepts that to some extent, ‘swimmers are very selfish and will not do things they do not want to do ... we have had difficulties in getting representatives to make meetings and to try to explain to all athletes their ‘duty’ they have to give some time, or to contribute to decisions when asked’ (Interview, 9th October 2001). Indeed, from the interview material, the common issues that arose
were largely problems that concerned individual athletes, for example: a lack of funding, securing a place on the World Class Performance Plan, integrating sport with other personal commitments and discrepancies in selection policies. James Hickman does not agree, however: 'For elite swimmers, swimming is their career, its their life. The SCA is interested in the bigger issues, we would like to help further the development of athletes and we are concerned with ensuring that the best GB team is sent to a competition' (Interview, 1st August 2001).

Away from the ASA and ASFGB, the interests of elite athletes are also represented at international level. FINA has established an Athletes' Commission, which is appointed every four years, from all continents and across all disciplines. The Commission members are appointed by the FINA Bureau, and voice any athlete concerns at their respective technical committees. According to Melissa Cunningham, Open Water swimming and Oceania representative, the Athletes' Commission meets annually, usually at a major FINA competition (Interview, 29th October 2001). In terms of the Commission's influence, Melissa Cunningham states that 'the FINA Commission listens to the recommendations put forward' but accepts 'the final decision will be left with the FINA Commission. We can only let them know how the athletes feel' (Interview, 29th October 2001). Ian Wilson meanwhile contends that the Athletes' Commission 'are not a proactive group' and notes that Great Britain has never been represented on the Committee (Interview, 9th October 2001).

According to James Hickman, the Swimming Competitors' Association is committed to improving links with the FINA Athletes' Commission in the future, and believes 'they may be able to help us with lobbying the governing body and help with the freedom of choice of swimwear' (Interview, 1st August 2001).

The representation of minors and swimming club members

So far, the focus has been on examining athlete representation at the elite national and international level, but to what extent are the interests of swimmers at club, county and district level represented? Here the picture is confused and less clear-cut. According to Ian Wilson, the ASA Management and Technical Committees are made up of representatives from the five Districts, whose role is to highlight concerns and issues at district level. Feedback then trickles down via District and County Committees, and then through to the swimming clubs. In terms of representing club swimmers, James Hickman contends, 'I'm not sure that [the Swimming Competitors Association] extends that far down, so much as if I had a problem I wouldn't approach the SCA. I probably wouldn't know about it. I think if I asked the City of
Leeds Swimming Club about the SCA then only about fifteen of the three hundred or so members would know about the SCA’ (Interview, 1st August 2001). James went on to suggest that ‘there tend to be less problems at the lower level. The problems that are there are usually the types of thing the ASA would resolve. For example, if there was a clash between a swimmer and a coach for whatever reason, it wouldn’t be something for our Committee to be involved in, but the other members of the swimming club, the parents of the swimmer, the Head Coach and so on’ (Interview, 1st August 2001). This gives the impression that club swimming is self-regulating and is to some extent removed from the current debates at elite level. As Dr Lisa Bartlett argues, ‘in terms of water polo there isn’t a lot of representation at lower levels that I am aware of. I know we have a national water polo representative but to be honest I have never seen him at my club or know of any visits to any local swimming club. Overall, I would say the interests of club swimmers are not well represented’ (Interview, 22nd October 2001). The chief executive of the athlete organisation, UK Competitors Geoff Parsons, also suggests that the interests of club athletes are often overlooked in favour of elite level athletes. He argues, ‘the reality is, the sorts of issues that we deal with and the sorts of areas that we lobby are to do with World Class Performance elite level athletes. Club athletes do not tend to have the same problems or issues because it’s not their livelihood, it’s not funding dependent for them. So I might spend a fair amount of time with athletes that have been removed from lottery funding and we shall appeal the decision. That is not relevant to a club athlete. The club doesn’t remove £10,000 because generally they aren’t giving you £10,000 funding’ (Interview, 23rd October 2001).

Issues of representation of minors and swimming club members then, do not appear to be as advanced as that at elite level. The ASA has approximately 200,000 swimming club members, of which the overwhelming majority are under-16. This raises a key constraint to representation, in that it is felt that young swimmers do not have an understanding of the issues raised on committee agendas to enable them to contribute. Furthermore, swimming is a training intensive sport that presents time constraints on athletes to attend committee meetings. In addition, David Sparkes contends that the mechanisms in place are ‘not overly friendly because committees and meetings can be quite daunting for athletes’ (Interview, 19th April 2001).

The pattern of early and intensive involvement of swimming club member’s under-16 evident in the sport raises a number of health concerns, for children are particularly vulnerable to a variety of forms of exploitation or abuse (Waddington, 2000:49).
Research by the National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) has demonstrated that during 2000 and the early part of the following year eight sports received 179 complaints of often-criminal mistreatment by coaches. The ASA was the second highest sports' governing body with 65 cases. Indeed, in recent years there have been a number of high profile cases including top coaches. The notorious case of Paul Hickson, Britain's head swimming coach at the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, first drew national attention to the scale of the problem. Hickson was jailed for 17 years in 1995 for raping and abusing girls aged between 13 and 20 over a fifteen-year period. During that time many top swimmers had their suspicions but never said anything because they did not think officials would believe them.

In response, the ASA in June 1996 launched strict procedures to help identify and eliminate physical, sexual and emotional abuse of children in the sport. The Child Protection Procedures in Swimming guidelines were developed in conjunction with the NSPCC and with the support of the police, social services, the National Coaching Foundation and the Sports Council. The guidelines set out procedures for recognising and acting upon suspicions of abuse of children, and promoted 'good practice' to the staff, volunteers and organisations concerned. The ASA have also established a Child Protection Database that includes details of all individuals with access to young swimmers. Furthermore, every club is encouraged to have a welfare officer (usually a woman) who is the first point of call for any concerns. In launching the Child Protection Procedures in Swimming, it is noteworthy that the ASA became the first sports governing body to highlight potential problems and take positive steps to address the issue. However, the sport continues to be bedevilled by cases involving top coaches. In June 2001 Mike Drew, the former secretary of the British Swimming Coaches Association, was jailed for eight years after being found guilty of indecent assault on a 15-year old boy.

In reaction to a number of high profile court cases, in October 2001 Sport England in partnership with the NSPCC formed the UK Child Protection Unit (CPU) to advise sports federations on how to introduce child protection policies. As with the issue of equity considered previously, every governing body must sign up and implement the procedures of the CPU if it wants to continue to receive National Lottery funding.

Institute of Swimming Teachers and Coaches (ISTC)

Swimming teachers and coaches are represented by the Institute of Swimming Teachers and Coaches (ISTC), a body formed in 1975 by the ASA who were
pressured by a senior group of coaches to acknowledge that ‘there was a need for a teacher-coach voice’ (Interview, 14th May 2001). The original objective of the organisation was to provide ‘a comprehensive after sales service to ASA qualified teachers and coaches’ (Keil and Wix, 1996:134). In other words, in order to remain effective qualified swimming teachers and coaches needed to be informed of developments and changes within the industry. The aims of the ISTC (www.istc.co.uk/about.asp 29/11/01) can be summarised as follows:

- To unite all holders of various teaching and coaching certificates or awards
- To give members an opportunity to advise on future developments of the teaching and coaching of swimming or lifesaving. To provide a channel for the regular exchange of information ideas and suggestions for the benefit of swimming or lifesaving
- To bring to the notice of local authorities and other appropriate bodies the Register of Members Mission Statement: The Institute exists to serve its members with:
  - Information and communication about the industry
  - Support on member issues
  - Training and continuing professional development
  - Comprehensive insurance cover
  - The Institute upholds the principle that all swimming teachers and coaches should be qualified, embrace the concept of Continuing Professional Development and be fully insured

The ISTC is not the only organisation servicing the needs of swimming teachers and swimming coaches. An alternative body, the Swimming Teachers Association (STA) became a corporate association in 1976, offering qualifications to learners, teachers and coaches. Shortly before the formation of the ISTC the Amateur Swimming Association had abortive discussions with the STA with regard the fostering of a partnership to represent professionally all swimming teachers, and with the ASA overseeing the syllabuses and awards (Keil and Wix, 1996:135-6). The emergence of the ISTC was divisive, effectively signalling the separation of the ASA and the STA. In addition, the British Swimming Coaches Association (BSCA) aims to represent the interests of its members, ensuring that the needs of swimming coaches have a voice in discussions with the sports governing bodies. The distinction between swimming teachers and swimming coaches is examined in table 3.
As the key stakeholder organisation in representing the interests of swimming teachers and coaches, it is necessary to understand the structure and membership of the ISTC. The Institute is a limited company that according to Chief Executive Dennis Freeman-Wright, 'stands in its own right'. However, it is important to note that not only were the ASA instrumental in its formation, but also remain the majority shareholder. This close relationship between the sports governing body and the ISTC brings into question the autonomy of the Institute. Indeed, the relationship between the Association and the ISTC throws up a number of problems. Dennis Freeman-Wright notes that on the one hand, as every member of the ISTC is invariably an ASA qualified teacher or coach 'you could argue the major beneficiary of the Institute's existence is the ASA and its components'. On the other hand, because the ASA doesn't have individual members but affiliated swimming clubs, 'members of the ISTC stand in their own right and have nothing to do with the ASA' (Interview, 14th May 2001).

Table 3 Distinguishing between the 'roles' of the swimming teacher and swimming coach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The 'role' of the swimming teacher and swimming coach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASA Swimming Teacher</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once qualified a holder of the Teachers certificate is one who is able to teach groups, normally consisting of up to 12 participants of a range of ability from non-swimmer to those involved in early competition, and to organise and supervise assistant teachers and other helpers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASA Swimming Coach</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once qualified a holder of the Coach certificate is one who is able to coach swimming groups normally consisting of up to 30 participants aiming to achieve and maintain high levels of competitive ability; one who is able to work with a small number of swimmers in great depth; one who is able to organise and manage a club development programme at all levels; one who is able to organise and manage a number of assistants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: ISTC)

May 2001). Nevertheless, Dennis Freeman-Wright describes the relationship between the ISTC and the ASA as a 'partnership'. Quarterly meetings are held with the Amateur Swimming Association's Chief Executive, David Sparkes and in general terms 'everyone is working towards the same goal, so the room for conflict is limited' (Interview, 14th May 2001).
The organisational structure of the ISTC is as follows. Hierarchically, at the top sits the Institute's Board of Directors that comprises six directors and a chairperson. Until relatively recently, the Board of Directors as, in the words of the ISTC Chief Executive, 'appointed for life or until they fell off the chair dead at a board meeting' (Interview, 14th May 2001). This system was replaced in 1998 with the introduction of a more democratic structure that according to Dennis Freeman-Wright aims to 'reflect the views of the members'. Subsequently, the ASA appoints three directors, while Institute members elect the others annually. Below the Board of Directors, the ISTC has a voluntary regional set-up. The British Isles is divided into twelve regions, while the overseas members of the ISTC constitute a thirteenth 'international' region. In the words of the Institute's Chief Executive, Dennis Freeman-Wright 'this is one of the significant differences, how we differ from the Amateur Swimming Association, in that we cover a wider geographical sphere' (Interview, 14th May 2001). Each of the regions is represented by a committee that provides support, advice and organises full-day seminars, usually around three or four times a year.

The Institute of Swimming Teachers and Coaches, to some extent mirroring changes within the ASA, have made attempts at developing the organisation's corporate governance. In the words of the Chief Executive, the ISTC is 'self critical', annually reviewing the effectiveness of the Board of Directors and as stated have made a number of changes, introducing 'an element of democracy' to the appointment of directors (Interview, 14th May 2001). With regard the day-to-day administration and management of the ISTC, its staff are subject to a business plan that is continually assessed. The ISTC is reliant on member's subscriptions for it's funding, while money generated through training courses, seminars and conferences makes up the rest of the organisation's income. While the National Lottery is a major provider of funding to the ASA, the Institute benefits only indirectly when contracted by the Association to run training courses and workshops for swimming clubs. According to Dennis Freeman-Wright 'we (the ISTC) leave all the applications for National Lottery funding and grants to the ASA. I would love to get my hands on some money from the government but the fact of the matter is it is logical that the governing body should be the group to make the application' (Interview, 14th May 2001).

The ISTC has approximately 15,000 members, of which the criteria for joining have changed over time. At present, the Institute accepts any ASA qualified swimming teacher or coach, Royal Life Saving Society (RLSS) tutors and coaches, and is examining whether to accept STA members within the Institute. In short, 'anybody
that is qualified, that is working in the industry can apply to become a member’ (Interview, 14th May 2001). Around half of the members have no dealings with swimming clubs but are employees working within the swimming teaching industry. The other half is a ‘confusing mixture’ of swimming teachers working in swimming clubs as well as possibly the local authority. Each member pays an annual subscription, in return for which they receive a range of member services including insurance to cover public liability and personal accident, a copy of the monthly magazine Swimming Times, and access to legal, technical and medical advice.

According to Dennis Freeman-Wright ‘because we are a member-based organisation our principal objective is to serve the interests of our members, whatever they may be, and obviously that can change over time’ (Interview, 14th May 2001). The overwhelming majority of the Institute’s members are swimming teachers. This is largely because there are relatively few qualified coaches and as a result there is some conflict between the two groups. As Freeman-Wright observes ‘they (the swimming coaches) have always said that their interests are swallowed up by the voice of the swimming teachers’ (Interview, 14th May 2001). In simple quantitative terms women represent about 70 per cent of swimming teachers, but conversely are seriously underrepresented in swimming coaching. According to Staurowsky (1990) the under representation of women in coaching and leadership positions speaks to the strengths of the connection between sport and gender. She points to an underlying assumption that links sport expertise with masculinity and leadership with male superiority. This assumption has permitted the notion that coaching male athletes is the exclusive responsibility of male coaches. In this context, the role of coach is perceived as requiring manly characteristics, while effectively perpetuating the belief that females in sport are secondary and ‘devalued of experience, of achievements, and of self’ (Staurowsky, 1990:163). With regard teaching, Dennis Freeman-Wright explains ‘men feel inhibited about teaching children nowadays because as soon as there is a complaint about somebody they always scream child abuse, even if what they mean is bullying. And of course it is men that are ultra vulnerable’ (Interview, 14th May 2001). Thus, Dennis Freeman-Wright believes men feel disenfranchised from swimming teaching, and yet they dominate the coaching sphere. Minority ethnic groups meanwhile are seriously underrepresented in the ISTC, constituting only 6 per cent of its 15,000 membership. Dennis Freeman-Wright argues this to be the case because ‘swimming is one of the least penetrated sports by ethnicity. We have taken positive steps to penetrate the market. In other words, actively organising courses for ethnic groups but it is really hard’. He went on to suggest ‘you have got to accept the fact that the vast majority of ethnic groups in this
country have got a far greater interest in other sports than swimming. If you speak to Afro-Caribbean people it is basketball, athletics, cricket — all these sorts of sports. Swimming is a long way down their list of sports' (Interview, 14th May 2001).

The ISTC has a number of mechanisms in place to monitor the opinions and interests of its members. According to Dennis Freeman-Wright 'at every seminar or course we have throughout the year, people that attend them fill out an evaluation form that informs us how courses are run in the future' (Interview, 14th May 2001). The Institute also undertakes a number of surveys each year that are aimed at gathering information and canvassing the members' views on a range of issues. These include an elapsed members survey and every five or six years, a major survey of the ISTC members. In short 'we (the ISTC) are always doing surveys to get feedback' (Interview, 14th May 2001).

5. The way in which supporters are represented in the decision-making processes of NGBs

In stark contrast to the other two case study sports, swimming is not a particularly spectator friendly sport. In the words of Helen Gorman, ASA Senior Communications Assistant, 'to most people it is six or eight people bobbing up and down in a rubber hat'. There has however, been a number of initiatives aimed at increasing the numbers of people attending swimming competitions and events. For example, at Ponds Forge in Sheffield for the 2001 World Cup meet, local school children were invited to attend. As Helen Gorman explains, 'this was successful with screaming children showing up to cheer Britain's Mark Foster to a new world record in the 50 metre butterfly. After the first day of the two-day meet we worked with the Sheffield Events Unit to put on a gala for the school kids ... this meant the spectator area was completely packed for the final sessions on day one but it was all the kids and their parents rather than swimming supporters' (correspondence with author). Swimming does however attract an army of volunteers that help run and organise events. Subsequently, most attendees at swimming competitions are not there as spectators but volunteers involved with officiating and helping behind the scenes. So while there is no equivalent fan groups as there in association football, and to a lesser extent cricket, the army of volunteers, parents, friends who contribute significant amounts of time and money are a comparable group worthy of investigation. As Helen Gorman, writing in the Swimming Times, notes 'the time and financial demands on swimming parents are huge ... many parents are heavily involved themselves through their clubs. Thousands of parents drive their kids all over the country practically every
weekend to watch them compete and some even fly around the world to watch them swim internationally' (Swimming Times, September 2000).

Conclusion

Swimming is one of the major sports in the UK, which has been consistently shown in national surveys to be the countries' most popular active indoor sport. For example, it is estimated that 22 per cent of adults and 50 per cent of children take part, with around 12 million people swimming regularly. The ISRM meanwhile estimate that there are over 3 billion visits made to swimming pools in the UK every year. Significantly, swimming has been recognised as being able to deliver to a wider 'social' agenda and can have an influence in cross-cutting issues, such as health, community development, personal development, literacy and numeracy, equity and social inclusion. For example, swimming is most popular among women and girls, traditionally an under-represented group within sport and attracts a wide range of age and socio-economic groupings.

Despite the possible benefits outlined above, alongside the recognition that swimming is not simply a sport but an important life skill, the governance of swimming is disjointed and lacks coordination. For example, speaking at the House of Commons Select Committee examining the sport of swimming on 4th December 2001, former Olympic medallist Duncan Goodhew voiced his concern that the sport lacked leadership. In particular, he suggested that the ASA was 'not structured properly' and ill-suited to govern swimming, in particular lacking a public profile and failing to lobby successfully on behalf of the sport. Here, it is again worth noting that the Amateur Swimming Association has a long history of amateurism and voluntary involvement. The governing body employs 100 people throughout England, 40 of whom are directly involved in the development of the sport. This highlights the dependency on volunteers that help organise and run 1,554 ASA-affiliated clubs with a total registered membership of 159,000. The ASA is also heavily reliant on local authority provision of swimming pools, with which there is a need for improved relations and a coordinated Swimming Strategy, and education authorities to ensure that all children should be able to swim 25 metres by the end of Key Stage 2. However, the latter has also proved problematic, with the costs associated with hiring pools, lifeguards, safe transportation of children to and from the site, health and safety and insurance requirements leading to some schools opting out of providing swimming. This has resulted in a large number of young people leaving school that
have not been taught the recommended swimming activities and water safety.

According to the 1999 Young People Survey:

- Only 51 per cent of primary schools had at least one member of staff with a specialist PE qualification compared to 100 per cent of secondary schools surveyed
- 72 per cent of surveyed primary schools stated that they had access to an indoor pool, yet primary school children are swimming less (43 per cent in 1999 compared to 47 per cent in 1994)
- 30 per cent of surveyed school children had participated frequently in swimming within school lessons in 1999, a decline of 2 per cent since 1994

The OFSTED report into schools swimming, based upon an inspection carried out in November 1999, indicated that in inner city areas and those areas with a high level of deprivation, only two thirds of pupils could swim 25 metres at the end of Key Stage 2. In addition, half of the schools surveyed did not have a policy of provision for pupils who are non-swimmers or reluctant swimmers. In short, while the provision of school swimming is an entitlement for all children at Key Stages 1 and 2, existing evidence suggests there are gaps in the delivery of school swimming despite its inclusion in the National Curriculum.

One of the key themes to emerge from the Culture Media and Sport's public evidence session on swimming was the decline of public and education sector pools that have suffered from local authority spending cuts. As a consequence, a significant proportion of the existing stock of swimming pools are dilapidated, and in need of modernisation. In addition, local authorities have argued that ageing swimming pools no longer meet current public leisure needs. For example, it is not unusual for historic baths to contain a single rectangular swimming pool, causing inevitable conflict between lane swimmers, leisure swimmers and divers. They may also lack specific facilities such as Jacuzzis, gymnasia and or cafes. Again, the degree of influence that the ASA has at local authority level is slight. A minor number of local authorities have a Swimming Strategy, while the increasingly commercial nature of pool provision means that children and swimming clubs, who generate less income per square foot than 'general user' adult participants, are subsequently marginalised.

In conclusion, the sport of swimming is beset by a series of conflicts. There exists a tension between public/education sector provision of swimming facilities and an
ageing stock of pools exacerbated by cuts in local authority funding. There are also tensions between the widespread belief that swimming has a number of positive benefits – for example, health, safety, equity and social inclusion – and the lack of a coordinated Swimming Strategy at local and national level. The widespread popularity of swimming is well documented and yet the sport receives very little television and media coverage in comparison to sports such as football, rugby, golf and tennis. Swimming on the one hand, has benefited enormously from National Lottery Capital Funding (more than any other sport) but on the other, following the disappointing lack of Olympic success at Sydney 2000, Sport England has demoted swimming from a Level One to a Level Two sport and receives less investment as a result. Against the background of conflicts lies a governing body that according to Duncan Goodhew is ill equipped to organise and manage a major sport, and a sport that is divided into a range of disciplines with different issues and concerns. That said, the ASA has made significant inroads in facilitating an athlete and teacher/coach voice and are striving toward making the organisation more transparent, open and accountable. However, there remains a long history of voluntarism and under-representation of women from positions of authority.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

Using the evidence gathered in the empirical case studies, this chapter provides an evaluation of the utility of the various concepts of governance identified in the key questions that were outlined in chapter one. To recap, the principal questions we are concerned with answering are:

1. To what extent can we talk about sport policy as being steered?
2. Is it possible to identify a policy community or network for sport, and how does a governance network differ?
3. How useful are the interrelated terms of good governance and corporate governance in understanding meso-level governance, and relations between the governing bodies of sport and their primary and secondary stakeholders?
4. Can the three uses of the concept of governance be defined and operationalised as analytical tools?

1. To what extent can we talk about sport policy as being steered?

Here, we are interested in assessing the extent to which central government retains the capacity to 'steer' sport policy and act as a capable navigator of a policy arena, which is fragmented and incoherent. In chapter three, we presented a narrative of governance characterised by the general reluctance of successive governments to bring sport policy into the mainstream of parliamentary debate. As Hill (2002:149) contends 'the state, in the national sense of parliament, government, central administration and the law, has usually been hesitant of involving itself' with government for much of the century playing little or no part in sport. This indifference towards sport has changed, particularly during the last decade as the appointment of John Major as leader of the Conservative Party and the election of the Labour government in 1997 has heralded a higher profile for sport on the political agenda. This is reflected in what Allison and Monnington (2002:123) describe as a 'movement towards ever-greater government involvement and control of British sport' bringing about a 'significant, but not total metamorphosis'. However, Houlihan (1997:95) has argued that 'given the range and diversity of objectives that sport policy was seen as fulfilling over the past thirty years, it is no surprise that there has been considerable
uncertainty over the appropriate status and location of sport within the central administration’. Indeed, the position of New Labour towards sport is not entirely clear, caught between a desire for greater government influence and direction, and its commitment to maintain an ‘arm’s length’ relationship (Oakley and Green, 2001). As Houlihan (1991:200) has suggested, governments have sought to distance themselves from possible sporting conflict, preferring to establish quangos to administer policy solutions and deflect criticism of government when things go wrong. This is evident in New Labour’s reluctance to take a lead role in the development of a new national football stadium at Wembley, choosing to emphasise the Football Association and Sport England as the major players. This is nothing new. Historically the involvement of government in professional football has been reactive, fragmented and ad hoc, largely driven by a number of crowd/spectator disasters from 1923 to 1989. The failure of the football authorities to act on government recommendations on these events illustrates a general feeling of mistrust towards external regulation, the deference of successive governments towards NGBs, and a general reluctance to encroach on the game’s governing bodies and how they are managed. Against this backdrop, the formation of the Football Taskforce in 1997 under the New Labour administration represented, superficially at least, a marked shift in the attitude of government to professional football, introducing a range of new issues into the political and regulatory agenda (Brown, 2000a). According to Mortimer and Pearl (2000:218) ‘the Football Taskforce is searching for a ‘third way’ ... to redress the balance against wholesale commercialism currently dominating the corporate culture and also to re-inject a community spirit into the game’. The position of New Labour – committed to a review of the Hillsborough Enquiry and the possible reintroduction of terracing, as well as support for the FA’s bid to host the 2006 FIFA World Cup – contrasts sharply with the hostile attitude, and law and order agenda of the previous Thatcher administrations. However, the lack of statutory action to implement many of the Taskforce recommendations and the long-delayed formation of the Independent Football Commission (IFC) hinted at a government that is conciliatory and deferential to the powerful bodies that govern football, and that does not wish to offend the interests of big business. According to Brown (2000b:264) the government had little interest in imposing a regulator against the wishes of the football authorities: ‘what is crystal clear about the government’s role is that, quite differently from previous government attitudes towards law and order issues in football, they do not want to take firm legislative action.’ Thus, having established a body to investigate the governance of football, the Labour government is now keen to distance itself from suggestions of statutory action, preferring to encourage self-regulation and reform,
and foster a culture of dialogue and partnership in a sport that historically has been divisive and has failed to put its own house in order.

New Labour, like previous administrations, has been reluctant to lead, preferring to adopt a stance of weak regulator, tentatively supervising the actions of the game’s governing bodies. This form of weak regulation is evident in the formation of the IFC, dubbed as the ‘fans watchdog’ but with no statutory powers to act on behalf of supporters, the unenforceable recommendation that the FA direct between 5-10 per cent of its broadcasting income towards grassroots development, and the government’s unwillingness to take any responsibility (or blame) for the protracted redevelopment of the Wembley national stadium. The rhetoric on representing fans’ interests through the formation of the Football Taskforce and support for supporter trusts meanwhile hints at a populist stance, wishing to be closely associated with the ‘people’s game’. As Brown (1999:59) contends ‘for a new Labour government entering office, football became hard to ignore given both its own commitments and the increased profile of the game … it was easy for Labour to pick up the populist concerns about the development of football’. He adds ‘football was also an area in which the incoming government believed it could intervene in a meaningful way without significant cost’ (1999:60). Taken together the above examples of growing yet hesitant government intervention suggest a lack of policy direction or active steering, with New Labour tentatively supervising the FA on uncontroversial issues such as developing grassroots sport, or supporting a relatively limited role for supporter groups that depends on the cooperation of football clubs and the game’s authorities.

In contrast, since the 1997 election New Labour has shown relatively little public interest in cricket. Blair’s general indifference towards the national summer game differs from the passion of his predecessor John Major and the lack of systemic embeddedness of sports interests in the political/policy-making infrastructure. This illustrates the vulnerability of sport to the personal whims of politicians. According to McKinstry (1998) the close relationship between the Conservatives and cricket has cultivated an air of suspicion from Labour. In other words, the hierarchical structure of cricket dominated by wealth and privilege, sits uneasily with New Labour’s commitment to tackling social exclusion.

Drawing together the pattern of government involvement in British sport outlined in chapter three and the empirical material we argue that there has been a movement from the occasional, abrupt ‘top-down’ intervention of the Thatcher administration
(which for example attempted to impose a national membership scheme for all football supporters) to a more active era of 'governance' with an emphasis on developing partnerships and new forms of cooperation. According to Houlihan (1997:272) 'the administrative, financial and personnel infrastructure of sport has been colonised by government' which has been willing to exploit the pliability of sport as a policy instrument. Indeed, central government has emerged as a major provider of funding for sport, directing substantial public funds and National Lottery money to foster elite development and project a positive national image. It is noteworthy that this investment has not come without strings attached, with beneficiaries required to support specific government objectives. As we noted in the swimming case study, the Amateur Swimming Association's (ASA) reliance on government and National Lottery monies is bound up with Labour's wider social agenda of tackling social exclusion, promoting health and fitness, combating anti-social behaviour, and elite development. Similarly, the England and Wales Cricket Board's (ECB) strategy document A Cricketing Future for All (ECB, 2001) implicitly refers to embracing the government's A Sporting Future for All (DCMS, 2000) policy document, particularly with regard to broadening participation and developing sport at the grassroots level. Both these illustrations suggest the vulnerability of sports associations, which are dependent on financial assistance from government and government agencies, to external pressure and the subsequent erosion of their autonomy. Thus, through the use of National Lottery funding central government can be seen as retaining some capacity to steer sport policy, with even the relatively affluent and 'independent' governing bodies subjected to increased government authority and direction. This is particularly stark in the case of swimming, where the Amateur Swimming Association is heavily dependent on substantial funds from the National Lottery, the Sports Councils and local authority provision. The ASA is distinctive as a governing body in that it does not own any major facilities, which creates a series of dependency relationships – relying upon the upkeep and maintenance of local authority owned pools, the effective provision of school swimming that meets National Curriculum standards, and the investment through Sport England at the elite level for the development of the world-class performance plan.

As the empirical chapters have illustrated, the organisational framework for British sport is characterised by multiple lines of responsibility and numerous stakeholders. This highlights the absence and inadequacy of clear hierarchical lines of control; emphasising complex sports governance structures, which involves 'a differentiated polity ... characterised by functional and institutional specialisation and the
fragmentation of policies and politics' (Rhodes, 1997:7). Governments attempts to steer the crowded policy space of British sport - characterised by a range of, sometimes conflicting and diverse, interests, blurred lines of accountability and fragmentation – have consequently proved difficult. Labour’s announcement at the end of 2001 of a comprehensive review of the government’s existing sports policy and institutional and financial arrangements, aimed at developing a strategy for decision-making and bidding for major sporting events (http://www.piu.gov.uk/11/04/02) demonstrates the lack of clarity and coordination in this area. Put another way, the more determined intervention by successive governments to shape sport policy and harness the socio-cultural and integrationist qualities of sport for political purposes, has not been matched with a coherent, sustained and strategic framework for decision-making and directing investment.

The governance structures in the case study sports examined are similarly convoluted, comprising a multitude of organisations, including the public, private and voluntary sectors. For example, three separate national associations as well as the overarching body - the Amateur Swimming Federation of Great Britain – are responsible for swimming in the UK. This configuration is complicated by the existence of individual Sports Councils and UK Sport, an intricate map of facility providers (including local authorities, schools and the private sector) and a vast number of volunteer-led local swimming clubs at the grassroots level. The complicated arrangement of swimming in Britain is exacerbated by the lack of a coordinated strategy and the absence of a central core to direct and steer. Crucially, the recognised governing body for swimming, the ASA – historically, an amateur, male-dominated and insular organisation - lacks the capacity and the resources to lead sport policy. Moreover, due to the complex matrix of interdependencies the ASA is vulnerable to the action or inaction of central and local government, and the funding arrangements of Sport England and UK Sport.

The governing structures of professional football in Britain are similarly complex, with an increasing number of powerful policy actors. The case study highlighted that the responsibility for the organisation and management of football is no longer solely in the hands of one or two governing bodies but is spread across a range of organisations, leagues, and clubs. Consequently, the traditional hierarchical conceptualisation of the control of football from FIFA as the elite authority in world football, down to the national FAs at the lower levels is outmoded. As Gerry Boon, head of Deloitte and Touche's football industry team questions 'how entrenched and
established is this order?' (2000:33). He goes on to contend that it is the clubs that have the real influence, flagging up the importance of commercial properties in the game, concluding that 'power will certainly continue to move from football's current governing bodies, associations and leagues to the clubs' (2000:33-4). This power is manifest in the increased threats from the newly commercially empowered and internationally oriented leading Premier League clubs to breakaway from domestic competitions to form a European 'super league'. To date a collection of self-selected European clubs known as G14 has joined forces to pursue more rewarding, continental or global projects, such as the enlarged UEFA Champions League. The emergence of such a trans-national competition has implications for how football might be regulated internationally, and represents a potential threat to the standing and influence of existing national leagues and their associations.42

Moreover, the empirical material suggested that professional football in Britain is increasingly governed outside of the tripartite arrangement of the Football Association, the FA Premier League and the Football League. The increased integration of broadcasters and football clubs, with media companies owning stakes in nearly half of the Premier League clubs, poses a significant challenge to existing regulatory structures. As Hamil et al (2000:18) have argued 'increasingly the regulation of, and strategic planning for, the sector is being undertaken not in the headquarters of the traditional regulatory bodies of the FA and the Football League, but in the boardrooms of international media companies'. Similarly, repeated threats from the elite European clubs to breakaway from domestic competitions in order to secure a greater share of broadcasting and sponsorship revenues and greater autonomy, has consequences for how football might be governed internationally, and how international federations such as UEFA work with national governments (Walsh, 2000).

These developments demonstrate the difficulties that football's authorities face in their attempts to steer and direct, exacerbated by the pattern of interdependencies with broadcasters, sponsors, player unions, and the elite football clubs. Gardiner et al (2001:195) forward a counter-view, suggesting that 'sports governing bodies are clearly powerful organisations, they regulate particular niches of everyday life in much the same way as might be expected of the state'. In other words, governing bodies are responsible for a range of activities: they not only enforce rules that affect

42 Manchester United's decision not to enter the FA Cup in 1999-2000 in order to participate in FIFA's World Club Championship in Brazil is an pertinent illustration of the growing
the on-field (and sometimes off-field) activities of athletes, but engage in licensing, control safety standards, and have significant powers to exclude individuals from their sport. For example, the Football Association – now a considerable business in its own right, with a variety of independent revenue streams – has considerable discretion to shape its own objectives and set the rules of the game. Moreover, in the case of professional football in Britain, governments have adopted a reactive rather than proactive position, largely choosing to refrain from a regulatory role.

In examining the national governing bodies of association football, cricket and swimming, it is suggested that these sports organisations are vulnerable to commercial forces and government influence. While governments have invested heavily in sport, the greatest source of revenue for sport comes from broadcasting (Gardiner et al. 2001:415) accelerated by the spectacular rise in the value of sports sponsorship. In the summer of 2000, the television rights to the FA Premier League for three seasons were sold by auction for £1.3 billion, whilst new broadcasting opportunities have aided the staggering growth of Manchester United plc to reach a peak value in excess of £1.02 billion in March 2000. Such examples of the interpenetration of media and sports ownership are well documented (Barnett, 1990) but the impact of broadcasters and media corporations on the practice and policy of the governing bodies of sport is under-researched. This is in part explained by the difficulties of gaining research access to the commercial decision-making process.

We are therefore reliant on a limited body of knowledge, which is largely concentrated on the financial repercussions for NGBs through selling television rights.

The sale of broadcasting rights represents one way in which sports organisations have attempted to protect their autonomy and maximise revenue. Leagues or associations at both national and international level are increasingly assuming the control, marketing and sale of rights to individual events or matches by change to their constitution or rules. As we identified in the empirical chapters, the England and Wales Cricket Board sold the rights to cover domestic Test Matches for three years to Channel Four for £50 million, while competitions like the FA Cup and the Worthington Cup help raise important revenue for the FA and the Football League respectively. According to the English FA's Chief Executive, Adam Crozier 'with the new television deal, in a couple of years we'll be looking at £125 million a year, on influence of the elite international football clubs over national governing bodies of sport.
top of the Football Foundation’ (When Saturday Comes, October 2000:28). The influx of television money has also cultivated a change in the culture of managing professional football clubs across Europe, with a growing recognition that if clubs are to exploit the new television opportunities they need to forge partnerships with broadcasters44, sponsors and other clubs (Chadwick, 2000). The sale of broadcasting rights therefore, represents an important new flow of income injected into sport governing bodies and their clubs, but at a cost. One repercussion is the increasing role of television companies in influencing the fixture calendar and kick-off times, often with little consideration to supporters wishing to attend45. For example, Thursday, Friday and Sunday evening matches have become a common feature of ITV Sport’s broadcasting of live Nationwide League fixtures.

According to Allison (2001:47) the control of British sports over the last decade has ebbed away in the direction of global sports associations and global media corporations, which determine the rules of sport and the timing of events and competitions. He also notes the steady erosion of autonomy of sports clubs, ‘swallowed up’ by larger organisations, leagues and pyramids within sport, and the increasing influence of the state that regarded sport as a political resource. ‘The effect at the grassroots of sport was a loss of autonomy from the club to the national association and a parallel loss of autonomy from the sport to the state’ (Allison, 2001:55). This is more pronounced in the less commercial or minor sports, such as swimming that receive relatively little media coverage46 and rely heavily on central and local government investment and National Lottery funding47. At the same time, the relatively affluent and seemingly independent governing bodies of the FA and the ECB have also been subjected to increased government influence and direction,

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43 The Worthington Cup for the season 2000-01 raised £80 million for the Football League and its members.
44 One example of this is the rise of media companies buying shares in football clubs to secure a stake in the lucrative football market, with BSkyB, NTL and Granada having ownership stakes in nearly half the clubs in the FA Premier League (Crowther, 2001).
45 A recent illustration of this is the influence the BBC had in the FA’s decision that the FA Cup quarter final between Newcastle United and Arsenal should kick-off at 5.30 for live terrestrial television coverage, despite poor rail links for travelling supporters and the concerns of Arsenal manager, Arsène Wenger.
46 As noted in the case study chapter, away from the prestige events of the Olympic Games and the World Championships, swimming occupies a marginal position, in part suffering from its image as an unfriendly spectator sport. This has led to the ASA investigating new initiatives aimed at attracting larger audiences to swimming competitions, although it is arguable that greater success on the international stage may be a more important driver in generating media interest.
47 From 1997 National Lottery funding for sport has also required development plans oriented to producing ‘world class performance’
conforming to items on the government agenda including tackling social exclusion, promoting elite development and allocating 5 per cent of broadcasting revenue for re-investment in grassroots development. Moreover, New Labour's *A Sporting Future for All* (DCMS, 2000) strategy for sport emphasised a more direct relationship with the NGBs by allowing the delegation of operational power to qualifying governing bodies that can demonstrate 'good governance' practices. This is an example of what Stoker (2000) describes as 'light-touch' government, by building on its capacity to create the conditions for positive-sum partnerships and changing the rules of the game to encourage 'desirable' goals. In contrast, the Labour government's most recent *A Sporting Future for All* action plan is more directive in tone, stressing a greater role for government.

In summary, the conceptualisation of governance as steering emphasises that government are merely one policy actor within an increasingly 'differentiated polity' (Rhodes, 1997). As argued, the organisational framework for British sport is characterised by multiple lines of responsibility and numerous stakeholders with sectoral interests. Moreover, the role of different levels of government is unclear. This is reflected by the views of Brian Alexander, who suggests 'the number of politically motivated sports organisations in Britain is weighing our sporting nation down with an unacceptable burden of bureaucracy' (*The Guardian*, 21st January 2000). This implies there is no unambiguous chain of command, or clear strategic direction driving policy. Indeed, what evidence is there of government wishing to take a lead role in sport policy? As we have noted, many of the developments and changes to British sport have been government-led and it is therefore undeniable that sport has become firmly established as an area of policy activity for parliament. The government's strategy documents *Sport: Raising the Game* (DNH, 1995) and to a greater degree, *A Sporting Future for All* (DCMS, 2000) illustrate a growing interest and desire of government to influence the sports policy community. This confirms the empirical material, which highlights a significant degree of government control by managing the resources available to the governing bodies of sport. However, this desire to steer is to some degree tempered by the increasing complexity and the changing configurations of governance structures. At the same time, the three case studies illustrate a general reluctance of government to lead sport policy and consequently there is no clear direction driving policy. This prompts the question whether government has clear aims and objectives for sport in Britain? Here, it is possible to delineate two key features of sports policy in the last decade or so. First, there is a growing emphasis placed on performance sport and elite achievement.
Indeed, there has been considerable continuity between New Labour and Conservatives in their commitment and increasing intervention in elite sport (Oakley and Green, 2001) with an emphasis on NGBs becoming more professional and accountable. Second, is the government’s commitment to developing youth sport and sport in education, and a prominence given to harnessing sport for the purposes of urban and regional regeneration and combating social exclusion. Both these policy aims are reflected in the strategies of the three key governing bodies examined in the case study material, which suggests a high degree of government control over its policy network.

The above illustrates the growing interest and influence of government in directing sport policy in Britain. However, to what extent does government have the capacity and the necessary tools to steer? With regard resources, the government and related agencies (Sport England/UK Sport) have considerable influence in how funds, such as the National Lottery, are distributed and utilised. As well as direct funding, the government is also able to regulate, although this is in many cases is patchy, weak and/or deferential to commercial interests and the governing bodies of sport. For example, New Labour has distanced itself from calls from supporter groups and the ‘majority report’ recommendations of the Football Taskforce to impose a regulatory body, preferring to encourage a culture of self-regulation and reform. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that while the government is able to steer effectively in some areas of sport policy (particularly the less commercial sports, such as swimming), it is weaker in others, such as at professional club level. It could also be argued that while government has the necessary resources and tools to steer policy, the absence of a sustained consistent and coherent government policy toward sport makes steering difficult. This supports Leach and Percy-Smith’s (2001:4) contention that steering denotes a different and more difficult role for government, highlighting the compatible notion of ‘enabling’, flagging up the need for collaboration or in their words ‘getting someone else to do the work’. This implies a greater complexity and fragmentation of ‘government’, rolling out to incorporate an increasing range of stakeholders to achieve its objectives. This leads us to the second concept of governance, that of governance as networks and the range of interests, actors and stakeholders involved in sport policy.

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48 Oakley and Green (2001) use the term ‘selective re-investment’ to describe subtle changes in governmental influence over the sports policy community, and the increasingly targeted funding of Olympic sports.
2. Is it possible to identify a policy community or network for sport, and how does a governance network differ?

As we noted in chapter two, a key proposition of much of the governance literature is a shift from traditional forms of hierarchical, top-down government towards networks and partnership as new modes of governance. This implies a change in the role of government to influence and steer a wide range of policy actors. As John and Cole (2000:82) argue 'political systems must adapt to form more horizontal, cooperative and trusting relationships with the many actors who need to be involved in the policy process. Command and control does not work; networking, bargaining and cooperation are part of the answer.' Clearly this approach shares a number of similarities with the concept of governance as steering that emphasises government developing new strategies to influence and shape the actions of others.

To briefly recap the terms introduced in chapter three, a policy community assumes that it is possible to identify actors with a general concern for sport policy, while a policy network refers to those actors involved in developing policy responses to a particular issue or problem. Both terms, by attempting to delineate the scope and boundaries of the sport policy domain are inherently problematic due to the breadth of institutional actors either directly or indirectly involved in sport. One of the principal characteristics of the sport policy area is its administrative dispersion: the scattering of policy actors, including both central and local government. Added to this is the emergence of the European Union, which is increasingly involved in various aspects of sport. This suggests that decision-making is becoming increasingly pluralistic as the policy process fragments, and an increasing number of stakeholders are admitted into the policy domain. For example, the dramatic economic expansion of professional football over the last decade has resulted in a far greater range of institutional actors within the game, including media corporations, sponsors, G14 group of European clubs, FIFPro, and player's agents. Furthermore, the ECB in its strategy document A Cricketing Future for All (ECB, 2001) detail an exhaustive list of over twenty stakeholders, which the governing body will need to work with in order to achieve its objectives. The list includes: 'Government (especially DCMS), local authorities, Sport England, the Sports Council for Wales, broadcasters, sponsors, the Cricket Foundation, the Professional Cricketers Association, the Lord’s Taverners, the MCC, the Youth Sports Trust, the Minor Counties Cricket Association, the English
Schools Cricket Association, the Welsh Schools Cricket Association, Headmasters Conference Schools'.

Clearly however, the evidence presented in the empirical section suggests that of this wide range of actors, relatively few directly or indirectly influence the development of sport policy. This prompts the question whether this organisational pluralism and fragmentation has led to policy being developed within increasingly specialised and restricted areas with a limited cluster of participants. Moreover, this highlights that not all stakeholders are equal in the policy process: there are hierarchies of influence and authority, and as a consequence some organisations and individuals occupy a more influential position than others in terms of their ability to shape developments relating to sport policy. This is particularly pertinent in the marginalised role of women's sport that is often viewed as a poor relation to the male equivalent, with women seldom holding key positions, confined to support roles within governing bodies of sport and sports clubs (White and Brackenridge, 1985). Progress made by women in the administration of men's professional sport has been relatively slight, with few women occupying senior or influential positions with Premier League and Football League clubs, and first-class cricket counties. In swimming, there are few female coaches, while the proportion of women with power and influence within the ASA is slim. According to Crolley and Long (2001) 'it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this is a product of institutionalised exclusion, rather than accident or coincidence'. However, Jennifer Hargreaves (1994) retains the view that there has been a gradual shift in recent years to a position that is less oppositional to women's sports and less resistant to women in sport. The English FA, which in the past has been chauvinist and opposed to women's involvement, can be seen to have been supportive of the expansion of women's football. Similarly, in 1998 the MCC ended its 120-year history of exclusively male membership. A significant landmark in this development was the assimilation of the Women's Football Association within the FA in 1993, and the ECB taking responsibility for women's cricket from the Women's Cricket Association in 1998. Previously, both women's football and cricket had been represented by separate organisations and were therefore easily defined as outsiders, thus confirming ideas of difference and lower status. In the case of women's football the change has had a number of positive repercussions, including access to greater resources, a more professional approach to management, and new links with existing structures and bodies of expertise within FA departments that deal with public affairs and commercial issues. As noted in the case study chapter, the ECB meanwhile is now responsible for supporting the women's game in the form of
facility provision, coaching, financial support, and employing a network of Women's Club Cricket Development Officers to widen opportunities for women and girls to participate.

Despite these advances, there is little evidence to suggest any real modification of the power structures within the respective sport's governing bodies. The interests of women's sport are largely excluded and where they are included, are often vulnerable and pushed to the margins. Representatives of women's football have only minor influence, with policy changes and decision-making requiring the consent of numerous FA committees and the FA Council which are predominantly made up by men, many of which have little knowledge of women's football. In comparison, by decreasing its membership, which in turn means there are fewer opportunities to consult club and county representatives, has undermined the influence of the Women's Cricket Advisory Group (WCAG) that represents the interests of women's cricket within the ECB.

Membership of a policy community therefore does not imply equal involvement, similar resources or common goals (Rhodes, 1986). Weed's (2001) work on the British sport policy community is instructive here. He suggests that the secondary policy community for sport is fragmented, characterised by unstable membership with groups joining and leaving according to the issue under discussion, and little insulation from other policy areas. In contrast, Weed contends that membership of the primary community is relatively stable and restricted, which includes the Department of Culture, Media and Sport, Sport England, and UK Sport. As argued above, the government is able to exert influence through the possession of economic resources, for example Sports Council grant aid and National Lottery money, upon which other members of the community are reliant. As a result, Weed (2001:137) argues that many of the actors in the secondary community 'have to accept the general policy directions and terms and conditions under which they are offered.' Roche (1993:78) similarly notes that 'while sport authorities have some power, most financial power lies outside their hands in the control of various other agencies and sectors'. One consequence of this is the distinction between the policy goals of the governing bodies of sport, and the power to act, regulate and meet these objectives. For example, the influence of the ASA is essentially that of a lobby group, which is dependent upon and in turn vulnerable to intervention by central government, local authorities, and Sport England.
It is argued therefore, that examples of collaboration and partnership between stakeholders may not necessarily be self-generated, but driven by external requirements or obligations. Put another way, the enlargement of networks, drawing upon a greater range of actors involved in shaping and delivering policy, does not indicate empowerment but to some extent signifies an extension of the range and penetration of government influence. This contrasts with Rhodes (1997) definition of networks as 'self-organising' and relatively autonomous from government or state involvement. It appears then, that while there has been a shift towards networks as a new form of governance, this must be tempered by the suggestion that hierarchy is still important. As noted previously, the government is able to exert a high degree of control over its policy network, in particular the NGBs, by managing key resources available to them. Moreover, a range of the stakeholders identified in the empirical material – in particular, athlete organisations and supporter groups – are either excluded or restricted to the margins of the policy community and subsequently have little input into the development of sport policy. As Roche (1993:73-4) argues 'notwithstanding rhetoric about consultation and representation, in reality the sports polity in general (and sport administration in particular) has been largely unresponsive to and untouched by democratic ideals and practices'.

The relationship between athletes and their governing body across the three sports investigated is not clear-cut and suggests that any gains made by athletes have been modest and painstakingly achieved. Furthermore, the empirical data highlights the lack of an active voice on the part of athletes in the decision-making process. Indeed, organisations representing athletes have experienced a number of problems in seeking to protect and advance the rights and interests of members. The athlete bodies in football, cricket and swimming have all experienced problems in obtaining recognition as well as cultivating a bargaining relationship with the governing bodies of their respective sports.

The Professional Footballers Associations' (PFA) relationship with football's governing bodies and employers has been at the heart of most disputes since the formation of the old Players Union in 1909. The PFA has played an important role in changing basic terms and conditions for its members through legal interventions (most notably Eastham), collective solidarity and threatened legal action. This has shaped the relationship with the game's governing bodies, which originally viewed the PFA as a fairly innocuous organisation because of its parlous financial state (Greenfield and Osborn, 1998) but nevertheless treated the union with suspicion.
Bringing the discussion up to date the recent dispute over the distribution of television monies illustrates the sometimes, conflictual relationship between the players' union and football's governing bodies, and in some ways encapsulates a number of key issues regarding the role and position of the Footballers' Association. In one sense the conflicts had primarily been to secure the PFA a stake in current debates on the governance of football against repeated attempts by the FA and the Premier League to curb the union's influence. According to John Harding 'the PFA is not a client of the Premier League nor of the Football Association. It is a freestanding organisation that owes its existence and its status to its members alone' (When Saturday Comes, December 2001). While the PFA is undoubtedly an effective union, Harding is guilty of overstating its autonomy by failing to recognise that the organisation is dependent on football's governing bodies through an agreement dating back to the 1950s for a share of revenue accruing from the sale of broadcasting rights. Nevertheless, this money – which currently stands at £17.5 million a year (representing a 2.5 per cent share of broadcasting revenue) – has enabled the PFA to transform itself from a union in the traditional sense, to a predominantly 'commercial' organisation. For example, while the Professional Footballers Association is still responsible for the welfare of its members and offers financial and legal assistance on contractual issues, the Association has also developed the education and training of all young professionals entering the game, has implemented coaching schemes and programmes, and promoting Football in the Community and anti-racism initiatives.

The Professional Cricketers' Association, like the PFA, is closely intertwined with the sport's governing body, upon which it is dependent on funding. In 2000 the PCA received a 1 per cent share of the ECB's total expenditure, a figure thought to be around £400,000. According to Peter Walker of the PCA, relations with the ECB are described as 'cordial' (Interview, 16th August 2001) although Marqusee (1994) has argued that the interdependent relationship has meant the governing body has been able to restrict the Association's influence, preventing its representatives from attending all key decision and policy-making committees.

49 In 1975, eight years after the PCA was formed, the then-Test and County Cricket Board, in light of threats of industrial action agreed to the Association's demands for a percentage share of revenues accruing to the game including television fees and Test Match receipts.
While the governing bodies of football and cricket are to some extent wary of the influence of player organisations, in swimming the ASA has taken an active role in addressing some of the issues associated with athlete representation. During the early 1990s however, involvement was fragmented and piecemeal with swimmers included only on the ASA and ASFGB Technical Swimming Committee. In 1995, with the assistance of UK Competitors, athlete representation was formalised with the introduction of the Athletes' Council, which represented elite athletes from all five aquatic disciplines but with no right to vote. The Council has since been succeeded by the Swimming Competitors' Association that has a more democratic foundation and has countered the athletes’ lack of influence at committee level by securing voting rights and enabling elite swimmers to voice their concerns on issues such as lottery funding, selection procedures and freedom of choice for technical equipment.

In contrast to the funding relationship of the PCA and the PFA, sponsors Speedo provide the venue for meetings, travel expenses and administrative support to the SCA. While this means that the Association is not dependent on the ASA for running costs, it raises a new problem with the Swimming Competitors Association lacking the necessary resources to operate effectively. As James Hickman contends, ‘we want to improve our relations with the governing body but the question is how much can we do? We are full-time athletes whereas people within the governing body are there full-time (Interview, 1st August 2001).

While experiencing some success, the athlete bodies examined have not assumed a role of any major significance in the running or governance of their respective sports. Through representing the collective interests of their members and in particular through the threat of industrial action, both the PFA and the PCA have made important advances, but crucially still only have limited influence at governing body level. In particular, the attempts of the athlete organisations have been primarily concerned with elite sport and have overlooked athlete-centred issues at the grassroots and amateur club/county level.

In parallel, despite the important role of supporters and volunteers - whether through paying ticket prices, television subscriptions and buying merchandise, fund-raising or ferrying offspring to swimming galas – historically the sport's governing bodies have seen no advantage in developing any meaningful dialogue with them. In cricket there is little evidence to suggest that supporters are recognised by the governing body as one of the sport's stakeholders, although there are future plans to set up an official
‘England Barmy Army’ that will coordinate ticket and travel arrangements to England Test fixtures (Interview … ). At County level there are a range of affiliated supporters clubs whose purpose, in general terms, is a mixture of fund-raising and organising social events. Attempts at forming a national cricket supporters’ organisation have largely been unsuccessful. Research on the network of volunteers and helpers in swimming meanwhile, suggests that while they undoubtedly play an important role in running swimming clubs, administrating, and officiating at competitions, there are no formal mechanisms for representation at governing body level.

Drawing together the experiences of supporters and volunteers across the three sports identified, it could be argued that they occupy a relatively peripheral position, kept at the margins and excluded from policy and decision-making. While football in the 1990s has been characterised by a growth in ‘fan democracy’ with the advent of supporter trusts and an increase in the number and variety of independent fan groups and fanzines in the last fifteen years, there is little evidence to suggest that supporters have a constructive say in shaping the way football is governed. The case study evidence adds weight to Katwala’s conclusion that ‘in terms of loyalty, voice and exit, the fans’ excessive loyalty and inability to exit means that their voice is too often simply ignored’ (2000:33-4). One of the possible reasons for this is that supporters are difficult to organise in any formal democratic structure. Indeed the greatest degree of influence has centred on particular clubs involving coalitions of disparate fan groups existing only for limited periods. This new ‘fan power’ although by no means influential at all clubs, and limited at national level due to the relative ineffectiveness of bodies such as the FSA, nevertheless demonstrates a new, proactive role for supporters within the game.

In conclusion, the evidence presented suggests that governance conceptualised as a form of network adds relatively little that is new to our understanding of the strategic management and policy process of sport in Britain. In some ways, networks as a new form of governance involves little more than identifying the range of actors involved in policy. While this illustrates the complexity of governance structures in British sport, in the words of Leach and Percy-Smith (2000:37) ‘it does not tell us who calls the shots, who wields the power and influence’. John (1998:85-6) is also critical of the policy network approach: ‘the concept is hard to use as the foundation for an explanation unless the investigator incorporates other factors, such as the interests, ideas and institutions, which determine how networks function. The result is an endless circle of argument whereby the network idea is extended to breaking point to
try and explain something it really only describes.’ The language of policy networks implies a segmented system of policy making, conveying the impression of order and identifiable exchange relationships. However, as Roche (1993) contends the development of British sport policy is characterised by a ‘remarkable degree of disorganisation’ (original emphasis) with no clear direction driving policy. Moreover, while the policy networks approach reinforces a pluralist image of policy making – even the Rhodes model implies that policy evolves consensually because the participants share conceptions of their interests - the empirical research highlights a lack of adequate consultation, which fails to involve all stakeholders, a lack of consensus between departments, agencies and interests and consequently no clear direction driving policy. Thus, John (1998: 91) concludes that the network approach ‘offers an incomplete and partial explanation of policy change and variation’. While the network approach is arguably fairly crude by merely attempting to identify who is included and excluded from policy-making, the notion of governance as networks and the overlapping concept of stakeholding are useful in differentiating between different levels of influence, and nature of involvement of interest groups in the policy process. Here, the concept of primary and secondary stakeholding is particularly useful in highlighting the subtleties and the different layers in the policy network. The recognition that the governance structures of sport are characterised by a high degree of fragmentation between stakeholder groups and interests, prompts the question of how these relationships are arranged, which brings us to examining the concept of good governance.

3. How useful are the interrelated terms of good governance and corporate governance in understanding meso-level governance, and relations between the governing bodies of sport and their primary and secondary stakeholders?

The third concept of governance, namely governance as good governance, is largely prescriptive, identifying a broadly agreed checklist of values and goals for how relationships between stakeholders should be arranged. The qualities of effective sports governance negotiated at ‘The Rules of the Game’ – Europe’s first conference on the governance of sport (see www.governance-in-sport.com 11/04/02)- was guided by corporate governance and developments in the business world. They highlighted the principles of openness, integrity, accountability, transparency and greater democracy, but crucially little consideration was given to how the ‘rules of the game’ would be policed and how compliance is to be guaranteed.
The relatively recent rise in interest in good governance is in part a consequence of what Gardiner et al. (2001:165) suggest as ‘an increasing belief that the standards of sports governance in the UK have been sub-standard.’ As we noted in chapter four, the traditional ethos of sports administrators in Britain has been built on a base of amateurism and voluntary contributions, which has struggled to adapt to increasing commercial and government forces within sport. According to Katwala (2000:21) ‘sporting governance often lacks the capacity and culture to cope with the new complexities of global sport.’ Each of the governing bodies explored in the empirical chapters, have struggled to modernise and develop more effective mechanisms of governance. As argued, the English FA has traditionally been seen as out of touch with the realities of modern sport, caught between the affluent Premier League clubs and the amateur game at grassroots level. Moreover, concerns have been raised about the unwieldy nature of the FA’s general committee made up of ‘103 largely elderly and exclusively white men, drawn from the professional and amateur games as well as the armed forces and the old universities’ (Back et al. 2001:167) that continues to provide overall leadership and guardianship. Similarly, the examination of the governing bodies of cricket revealed largely amateur, male-centred and conservative organisations that have been slow to respond to commercial forces, and allegations of corruption and match fixing. The governance structures of swimming in Britain are also rooted in amateurism, with the ASA characterised by ‘kitchen table operations’ with a heavy reliance on volunteers at different levels of the organisation.

The empirical work then, identified a strong culture and ideology of amateurism, cumbersome organisational structures and voluntarism within the governing bodies of sport. According to Gardiner et al. (2001:166) there is subsequently ‘a need to improve the standards of organisational governance and also a need for the operation of NGBs to comply with the external norms dictated by the law.’ With this in mind, the evidence also suggested there has been some degree of modernisation, albeit slow and piecemeal. The appointment of Lord MacLaurin, ex-chairperson of the Tesco supermarket chain, was designed to inject fresh ideas and a more rational ‘businesslike’ plan for the future of cricket. The ECB has subsequently reviewed its traditional committee structure, introducing new corporate governance practices to ‘manage its affairs to the highest possible standards of integrity, professionalism and competence’ (A Cricketing Future for All ECB, 2001). The decision-making process within the governing body was simplified, with an executive management team to oversee issues of policy, planning and strategy, while the ECB’s strategy document spells out the importance of its relationship with the stakeholders to whom they are
accountable. However, the constraints experienced by the PCA, with limited consultation and restricted access to decision-making processes suggest that the governing bodies' rhetoric about stakeholding and representation is exaggerated. Indeed, development of internal organisational effectiveness within the PCA has been marginal, reflected by the poor economic position of first-class cricketers and the Association being excluded from or underrepresented in a number of ECB committees. Part of the reason for this according to Marqusee (1994:102) is that 'trade unionism made a belated entry into commercial cricket' and the PCA has not developed a strong bargaining position. Greenfield (2000) suggests this reflects the conservative nature of the players' union and the highly dependent relationship on the ECB for funding. Nevertheless, the PCA has achieved a virtually 100 per cent membership (approximately 400 members) and every first-class county has an elected PCA representative who has access to a laptop computer. At governing body level however, the PCA has experienced only limited success and has subsequently developed along non-traditional union lines. They have become commercially astute, developing their own brand, a successful website, fostering business partnerships, and manage the commercial affairs of Team England.

The English FA, like the ECB, brought in an individual from outside of the sport to review current organisational practices. Adam Crozier, the Chief Executive of the FA since 1999, whose background was in advertising, has overseen a period of modernisation within the governing body. He is reported to have been instrumental in introducing 'a very clear and simple structure, so everyone knows what they're doing. We're investigating more and getting more consistency into governing the game' (The Observer, 13th January 2002). The players' union, the PFA has also contributed to developing internal or good governance, through providing a range of welfare and support services as well as running schemes that promote good practice. One such initiative is the Kick Racism Out of Football campaign instigated at the start of the 1993/94 season by, among others, the Commission for Racial Equality. Here, the PFA was a key organisation in persuading clubs of the existence of the problem of racism, developing models of good practice and providing a framework for clubs and other agencies to develop their own schemes and agendas (Garland and Rowe, 2001). Players' interests meanwhile are represented on the PFA Negotiation and Consultative Committee, while the union also has a range of democratic mechanisms in place that are provided by electoral reform. However, voting has only taken place...
in a handful of cases where a major issue arises, such as the threat of industrial action in 1991 and 2001 when the distribution of broadcasting money was under discussion. At Premier and Football League club level, the PFA has an elected representative, although it is unclear how effective this is due to the uneasy relationship between the union and the clubs, who would like to see the influence of the PFA curbed on contractual and disciplinary issues (Waddington, 1998).

In parallel, the ASA has gradually introduced more professional values and transparent goals. The ASA’s Business Plan for 2000-2004 emphasises the importance of clear procedures and policy advice for clubs and members on core issues such as child protection, ethics, equity and integration. As noted in the case study, the governing body has also made attempts to ‘ensure that the voice of swimming is projected to all levels of swimming and sport in general, and influences key agencies’ (reference). This is evident in the formation of the SCA, a formal democratic body with full voting rights representative of each aquatic discipline, sitting on a range of ASA and ASFGB committees. However, this is not without its shortcomings. First, the swimming case study found the scarce resources of the athlete body mean that it is dependent on individual athletes to attend meetings and canvass the opinion of other swimmers. This raises a second limitation, that in most cases the athlete representatives are ill-equipped to manage themselves in meetings and do not possess the necessary skills and resources to lobby effectively. Third, according to Geoff Parsons of UKC athletes are vulnerable and ‘hyper sensitive’ to sport seeking personal retribution through non-selection (Interview, 23rd October 2001).

More generally, the ongoing concern by governments to increase the effectiveness of sports governance is reflected by New Labour’s commitment to devolve greater power to deploy public funds to NGBs that demonstrate high standards in corporate governance and management. In parallel, UK Sport has embarked on a three-year modernisation project directed towards governing bodies of sport. Indeed, one of the main drivers for greater professionalism within the governing bodies of sport is the introduction of National Lottery funding, which has brought pressures to meet particular aspects of good governance. In other words, if sports organisations wish to attract public money then they are required to modernise and be more accountable. As noted in the empirical chapter, the Labour government was also a major player in both appointing a Football Taskforce in 1997 to broadly consider issues of governance and regulation, and more recently establishing Supporters Direct, an
initiative backed by the Football Foundation and the Cooperative Bank (see http://www.supporters-direct.org/ 11/04/02) to assist fan groups in setting up trusts to have a 'stake' in their football club (Hamil et al. 2001a; Michie, 1999). The Taskforce was also instrumental in the introduction of 'Customer Charters' at FA Premier League clubs, which set out club policy with regard ticketing, merchandise, and club-supporter relations. These initiatives in essence represent a form of 'supervised autonomy' (Foster, 2000) where government can promote good governance without imposing a strict form of external regulation.

In spite of these government-backed initiatives and pressure to modernise, there is little evidence in empirical material to suggest any significant changes in how the three case study sports are governed internally, that is the relationship between the NGBs and their stakeholders, whether they are clubs, athletes or supporters. According to Hamil et al. (2001b) many professional football clubs communicate ineffectively, noting a lack of cooperation between clubs, their supporters and the local community. They argue 'the football industry at present lacks a code of best practice and one of the effects of this is that clubs do not always know what good practice is, or in some cases, what is required of them by law'. This highlights the failure of the football authorities to govern in the interests of the game and its supporters.

In summary, the concept of good governance as a language for reform has gained credence among a range of sports associations that traditionally have been managed along amateur and voluntary lines. However, it is necessary here to distinguish between professionalising sports management and administration on the one hand, and adopting aspects of good governance on the other. It is also significant that the pressure to modernise has largely been external, from various funding agencies on the basis of continuing to receive investment. An example of this is the much-lauded Child Protection in Sport Unit (CPSU) launched by the NSPCC in partnership with Sport England in October 2001 to advise organisations on how to introduce child protection measures, undertake research into abuse within sport, and raise the profile of child protection among sports governing bodies (www.sportengland.org/press_releases/child_protect.htm 10/01). However, in order for the issue of child abuse within sport to be taken seriously, all bodies funded by Sport England must have child protection policies in place to receive funding. This reflects in part recognition of the culture embedded within the policy area that stresses the autonomy of the governing bodies of sport. It is therefore easy to
appreciate the problems that government and government-related agencies face in attempting to foster a culture of cooperation, negotiation and for sports bodies to accept what Foster (2000) terms 'supervised autonomy'.

To what extent then, have the standards of good governance increased in the three case study sports examined? While we have identified a number of examples of 'good practice' – for example, the introduction of child protection and equity policies, and attempts to broaden consultation to include athletes' and supporters' interests – it is important to distinguish between official rhetoric and 'idealised' NGB principles, and the practical reality. This is exacerbated by a general lack of awareness and understanding within the sport's governing bodies of what constitutes good governance and how its principles may be implemented. Moreover, the empirical evidence demonstrates a culture of fierce policy autonomy within the NGBs, which are resistant to change. Indeed, where there have been changes in governance, or moves towards good governance, these have largely been fostered by external funding agencies, such as Sport England, and through UK Sport's modernisation programme. In particular, the introduction of National Lottery funding has allowed for pressure to be exerted on governing bodies of sport to conform to certain aspects of good governance, such as accountability. This is manifest in A Sporting Future for All Action Plan, (DCMS, 2000) which recommended greater devolved power to selected NGBs to deploy funds, and control over plans and resources. In return, UK Sport would work alongside the NGBs to modernise their structures and systems, and to achieve high standards of governance.

Additional pressure has come from stakeholder groups (for example, player/representative bodies) lobbying for closer cooperation, and the threat of legal challenges and scrutiny of the rules and procedures of NGBs. This confirms McCutcheon's (2000:116) contention that 'athletes and others who are dissatisfied with the resolution of disputes by the internal decision-making machinery are more likely now than in the past to litigate. One result of the increasing willingness of the law to intercede in sport is the recognition by NGBs that their laws will need to become more formalised. This is illustrated by the work of UK Competitors (UKC) that has surveyed athletes and governing bodies involved in the World Class Performance Plan, with regard to Codes of Conduct and Competitor Contracts. They concluded: 'given the current sporting environment, serious consideration may well be necessary in order to ensure a fair and equitable, generic style competitor contract ... further consideration needs to be given to those contracts and codes of
conduct which currently exist, which bundle up competitor commercial rights along with behaviour and discipline matters' (UKC, 2001). This provides a further example of the challenges facing NGBs, whose internal rules are increasingly subject to external judicial and arbitral examination, as well as the growing scrutiny and awareness of athlete/representative bodies. The concept of governance as good governance then, directs our attention to the intricate relationships between stakeholders, in particular the ambiguous position of athletes as both employees and club members, and external influences on the internal machinery of sporting bodies.

4. Can the three uses of the concept of governance be defined and operationalised as analytical tools?

To conclude, we will return to the overarching issue of evaluating the utility of the governance concepts in understanding the management and policy process of sport. Broken down, the above question raises two important issues. Firstly, is governance as a set of concepts useful in their own right or simply as concepts, which make us use existing and more revealing concepts, such as policy networks, more sensitively? Second, as an analytical perspective, governance remains under-researched and as Pierre and Peters (2000) note 'ends up raising more questions that it answers'. Part of the reason for this is the elasticity of the governance concept, which can cause confusion and make it difficult to delineate the most rewarding approach. In other words, there remain clear problems in establishing agreed definitions of governance.

Reflecting on the three uses of the governance concept examined, we can conclude:

1. The notion of governance is valuable in directing our attention to how governments cope with increasing complexity in the policy process. Moreover, governance introduces greater subtlety to the related concepts of steering and networks, highlighting problems of coordination both in government and across a range of agencies, organisations and policy actors. Subsequently, governance recognises that no single actor has the capacity to control a diverse field of actions and interactions, flagging up 'new' forms of governing i.e. cooperation, and partnerships.

2. Secondly, the interrelated concept of stakeholding is also useful in differentiating between levels, and the nature of involvement of interest
groups and organisations in the policy process. Here, the distinction between primary and secondary stakeholders is constructive in exploring the complex and intricate relationships between policy actors and interest groups.

3. Thirdly, the concept of governance as good governance raises a number of interesting questions regarding the distinctiveness of voluntary sports organisations; the role and position of fans; and the ambiguous position of athletes as both employees and club members. In short, governance broadens our conceptual repertoire and introduces greater sensitivity and subtlety into policy analysis.
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List of interviewees

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Job title/description of position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Barnwell</td>
<td>Chief Executive, League Managers Association (LMA).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Lisa Bartlett</td>
<td>Elite-level swimmer.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brendon Batson</td>
<td>Deputy Chief Executive of the Professional Footballers' Association (PFA).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Melissa Cunningham</td>
<td>Elite-level swimmer and Open Water Swimming and Oceania Representative on FINA's Athletes' Commission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Larissa Davies</td>
<td>Elite-level swimmer.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dennis Freeman-Wright</td>
<td>Chief Executive, Institute of Swimming Teachers and Coaches (ISTC).</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Hickman</td>
<td>Elite-level swimmer and Chair of the Swimming Competitors' Association (SCA).</td>
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<td>Richard Kaye</td>
<td>ECB Head of Commercial Affairs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brian Lomax</td>
<td>Chair of Supporters Direct. Former Chairman of Northampton Town FC Supporters’ Trust, elected Director of Northampton Town FC 1992-99, and is an Associate Research Fellow, Birkbeck College.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gill McConway</td>
<td>Member of WCAG, the Women’s Cricket Advisory Group, which advises the ECB on the desired structure of the women’s game.</td>
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<td>Hugh Morris</td>
<td>ECB Performance Director.</td>
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<td>Rex Nash</td>
<td>Lecturer, Football Research Unit, University of Liverpool.</td>
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<td>Geoff Parsons</td>
<td>Chief Executive, UK Competitors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helen Pugh</td>
<td>ECB Women’s Club Cricket Development Officer responsible for the East Midlands.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kelly Simmons</td>
<td>Head of Development of Women’s Football at the Football Association.</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Sparkes</td>
<td>Chief Executive of the Amateur Swimming Association (ASA).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Rogan Taylor</td>
<td>Director, Football Research Unit, University of Liverpool.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter Walker</td>
<td>PCA Representative.</td>
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